

Delegation of authority

An empirical study in supermarkets

Eelco Tammens (283310)

ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM

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Supervisor: prof. dr. B. Visser

Co-reader: dr. N.V. Zubanov

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1. Introduction

In recent years, more and more economic research has been done in the field of organizational economics. Where micro economists usually treated firms and institutions as a *black box*, organizational economists look at the way value is created *inside* organizations. An important part of this research is to understand the decision-making process in an organization. In organizational economics, delegation is seen as an important tool for organizations to improve decision-making.

The theoretical economic literature on delegation gives several reasons for the use of delegation to make more efficient decisions. With delegation, decisions may be based on better information. Delegation of responsibilities may also provide incentives to employees to more effort into their job. Besides information and incentive effects, several other factors may influence the delegation decision.

The vast majority of literature on delegation consists of theoretical papers. To further improve economic research on delegation, it is important to do empirical research to test the outcomes of theoretical models. Empirical research may confirm the results of theory, or provide new directions for theoretical models. Few empirical research on the theory of delegation has been done. Bloom et al. (2010b) have presented a survey of the recent empirical studies in the field of organizational economics, including works on delegation. The most significant empirical study on the determinants of delegation is that of Colombo and Delmastro (2004). They investigated the delegation of authority to plant managers in Italian manufacturing plants.

The purpose of this thesis is to empirically test the theory of delegation. The economic theory on delegation will be reviewed briefly along the lines of three main questions:

- *When is delegation an optimal choice?*
- *If delegation is optimal, how much should optimally be delegated?*
- *In case the principal can choose between agents, to which agent should a task be delegated?*

The empirical research is conducted along the lines of those same questions. In the analysis, the outcomes of empirical research are compared to the expectations based on theoretical models.

This research studies the delegation of authority by store managers in a supermarket to their team leaders. The research is conducted in seven supermarket stores using a self-administered questionnaire for team leaders and managers. The collected data on the discretion of each team leader and some background variables is used in a quantitative analysis. Using an ordered logit model, the effect of the team leaders' information position on his discretion is tested. The research shows that private information on the side of the team leaders may be a relevant factor in the delegation decision. However, the team leader needs to have sufficient knowledge to interpret and use his information. The nature of the learning process to obtain this knowledge depends on the delegated task.

The results of this research can be relevant in a number of ways. First, it may provide theoretical researchers with new insights on the delegation of authority in organisations. Those insights might be useful in the development of better models to analyse decision-making processes. Second, this thesis tries to "translate" theoretical models into practical situations. Therefore it may help managers to understand the relation between abstract theoretical models and their daily work.

The remaining part of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the economic literature on delegation. Chapter 3 describes the delegation decisions under study in the supermarket organisation. Chapter 4 discusses the research methods and the research process. Chapter 5 analyzes the results of the research. Finally, Chapter 6 formulates the conclusions and provides suggestions for further research.

2. Literature

This chapter will give an overview of the economic literature concerning delegation. It looks at three main questions in the delegation decision:

- *When is delegation an optimal choice?*
- *If delegation is optimal, how much should optimally be delegated?*
- *In case the principal can choose between agents, to which agent should a task be delegated?*

The articles discussed in this chapter typically use a Principal-Agent model, where the principal has to decide on a project in an uncertain environment. The principal can decide to take this decision by himself or to delegate decision-making to an agent. Within this framework, articles differ in the way they model the preferences of principal and agent, the distribution of private information, the timing of decisions and the possibility of monetary transfers. Different assumptions may lead to different outcomes, which can provide lessons to understand the process of delegation.

2.1 When is delegation an optimal choice?

There are two main factors that can make delegation an optimal choice. The first is asymmetric information (the agent has an informational advantage), the second is the provision of incentives to the agent.

Dessein (2002) has developed a model where the agent has private information on a project. The principal can choose to delegate the decision to the agent or make the decision by himself after receiving a recommendation from the agent. Communication may provide some information, but the agent's signal will always be noisy. Therefore, even when the agent makes a recommendation, the principal does not have complete information. The principal can choose to take a (partly) uninformed decision, or let the agent decide. In the case of delegation, the principal incurs a cost because the agent is biased: the preferences of the agent are different from the principal's preferences. Delegation is preferred if the bias of the agent is sufficiently small (i.e. the preferences of the principal and agent are closely aligned) compared to his informational advantage. However, when uncertainty is small, communication may be preferred.

Gautier and Paolini (2007) use a two-period model, with one decision on a project in each period. The agent has information that is valuable for decisions in both periods. When the principal delegates the decision in period 1 to the agent, the agent reveals his private

information by taking his decision. The principal can use this information to take a decision in period 2. The alternative for the principal is to take decisions by himself after receiving a signal from the agent. In case of delegation, the difference in preferences will lead to a suboptimal decision for the principal in period 1. In the case of centralization, the principal has to take a decision without the information of the agent in both periods. Delegation will be optimal if the informational advantage of the agent is large compared to the bias in his preferences.

In Aghion and Tirole (A&T--1997) the principal decides on authority first. When authority is assigned, both the principal and the agent choose how much information they gather. The principal and agent have different preferences, but a negative (positive) outcome for one means always a negative (positive) outcome for the other. Both principal and agent prefer not implementing a project over taking an uninformed decision. Because the principal will never take an uninformed decision, he will always rubberstamp the proposal of the agent, when the agent has information and the principal has no information¹. Even if the principal takes the eventual decision, the agent has *de facto* decision-making power because the uninformed principal will always copy the agent's proposal. Therefore A&T make a distinction between **formal** and **real** authority. In the case of P-formal authority, the chance that the agent has real authority grows when the principal puts less effort into finding valuable information. Since the agent will only make a decision if he has information on a project, the prospect of being able to make the decision will provide an incentive to put more effort into gathering information. Thus, A&T conclude that less supervision will lead to more initiative from the Agent. A&T call this the *Incentive effect*.

Bester and Krähmer (B&K, 2008) assume there is no private information, instead they just look at delegation as a way to provide incentives. The principal designs a contract in which authority is assigned and a wage schedule is described². When authority and wage are contracted, the project is chosen. Then the agent chooses the (unobservable) effort he exerts to work on the project. The effort level affects the probability that the project will be a success. B&K consider three cases in this model. The first is an unrestricted wage schedule. In this case delegation is optimal when the costs of effort are high or when the agent cares much more about the project than the principal. This seems logical: if a high wage is needed to compensate for the agent's effort, it might be more profitable to compensate him for his effort

¹ This is a result of the assumption that a positive outcome for one always means positive outcome for both. Therefore the Principal knows that the Agent will never propose a project that yields a negative outcome to the Principal.

² Wage schedule consists of a wage in case project is a success and a wage in case project fails

through delegation. The second case B&K consider is with limited liability (i.e. wages cannot be negative). B&K find that in case of limited liability delegation is never optimal. Intuition behind this result is that a positive wage already provides a compensation for the agent's effort, therefore delegation will not provide an incentive for higher effort. This remarkable difference with the outcome of A&T can be explained by two differences in the models: first, A&T do not consider monetary transfers, so there is no `competition` between wage and delegation as providers of incentives. Second, in A&T the agent chooses his effort level before the project is chosen, whereas in B&K the effort level is chosen after the choice of project. B&K also consider a third case, where effort levels are contractible. In this case it is optimal to delegate when the agent cares more about the project than the principal³.

Prendergast (2002) investigates the relation between uncertainty, incentive pay and delegation. He finds that delegation is more likely in an uncertain environment, because assigning the right tasks to an agent is more difficult when there is more uncertainty. This comes with output-based payment, since it is hard for the principal to assess the efficiency of inputs. Key assumption here is that the agent has more information about the payoff of actions. Prendergast concludes that asymmetric information in an uncertain environment makes delegation more likely.

2.2 Optimal delegation

The articles discussed above mostly looked at the choice between no delegation (principal takes decision) and full delegation (agent can take every possible decision). However, it is also possible, maybe even optimal, to limit the choices of the agent. This leads to the *delegation problem*. The principal should choose a set of feasible decisions. The agent is allowed to choose any decision from this *delegation set*. The problem for the principal is to choose a decision set that maximizes his expected pay-off (Holmström, 1984).

The delegation problem was further analysed by Alonso and Matouschek (A&M--2008). They find that the bias in the agent's preferences is most important to determine the agent's discretion. The optimal control set may often take the form of an interval, a range in which the agent can freely make a decision. This can be optimal if the agent's preferences are sufficiently aligned. Instead of an interval in which the agent has discretion, a delegation set can also consist of two (or more) possible decisions the agents is allowed to take. A&M show

³ Aghion and Tirole also discuss the willingness to pay for authority as a reason for delegation. They call this the *Participation Effect*: when a decision matters much to the agent, he may refrain from participating when he has no authority on the subject. Therefore, decisions that matter much to the Agent and (relatively) less to the Principal are likely to be delegated.

that it might be optimal to rule out intermediate decisions, when the agent is locally very unresponsive to the state of the world. In that case, allowing only extreme decisions induce the agent to let his private information play a larger role in his decision-making.

Szalay (2005) discusses a set-up similar to that of Aghion and Tirole, where the agent has to exert effort to acquire information about a project. He shows that excluding intermediate options may provide an incentive to exert more effort on information-gathering: one wants to think twice before taking an extreme option

Veto-based delegation is another option to put constraints on the agents' discretion. It gives the agent authority on the decision, but the principal always has the right to overrule. In that case a default decision will be taken. Dessein (2002) concludes that veto-based delegation only is an optimal choice when the agent's bias is sufficiently large. He states that when the default decision set is equal to the optimal decision of the uninformed principal, veto-based delegation can never lead to a worse outcome than the outcome under P-authority with an uninformed principal. Mylovanov (2008) concludes that optimal outcomes can be implanted through veto-based delegation, but stresses that the right choice of the default decision is crucial for implementing optimal decisions through veto-based delegation.

2.3 Differentiating between agents

In the theories discussed above, there has been no possibility for the principal to choose the agent he wishes to delegate to. In practice, it may often be the case that there are multiple agents the principal can delegate to. He may choose to delegate to all of them, only to one of them, or differentiate in the amount of discretion he gives to each individual agent.

Alonso and Matouschek (2008) discuss which agent is likely to have more discretion and come to the rather counter-intuitive conclusion that the agent with more aligned preferences may not always have more discretion. The slope of the bias also matters. If the agent is on some interval very unresponsive to his information about the state of the world, it may be optimal to rule out decisions in that interval to force the agent to be more responsive to the state (i.e. closer to decision the principal would like to take in a specific state). In this way an agent that is more biased for all possible states may get more discretion, because there is no reason to rule out decisions on a specific interval.

Delegation could also be used by the principal to signal some private information to the agent. Bénabou & Tirole (2003) analyze a situation where the principal is better informed about the abilities of the agent than the agent himself. They assume ability and effort to be complements. In this situation, the principal can increase the motivation of the agent by

signaling that the agent is of high ability. A possible way of signaling is to delegate an important task to the agent, as it shows confidence in the agent's ability. Thus, by delegating the task, the principal increases the self-esteem and motivation of the agent⁴. Crutzen, Swank and Visser (CSV, forthcoming) start with similar assumptions, but study a case where the principal has two agents, and can choose to differentiate between the two agents (i.e. to signal that one agent is more able than the other) or to refrain from differentiation. The relative signal might lead to a more motivated agent with the highest ability, but may also demotivate the less able agent. CSV argue that no differentiation is chosen when the difference in abilities is small, and especially when absolute levels are high.

2.4 Empirical literature

Although the theoretical literature on delegation has become expansive over the last years, the amount of empirical papers is limited. However, in recent years more and more empirical research on delegation is done. This section briefly discusses some of the most notable contributions.

Colombo and Delmastro (2004) have investigated the effects of a wide range of possible determinants of delegation. The study uses information for 438 Italian manufacturing plants on the delegation to the plant manager of the responsibility for a number of strategic decisions. They find a positive effect of the complexity and size of the plants' organisation on delegation. This result confirms that the information advantage of the agent (i.e. the plant manager) is a key determinant of delegation. However, this effect disappears for plants that have adopted advanced intra-firm communication technologies. Second, they find that delegation is less likely in plants that are part of multi-unit firms. Again, the adoption of advanced communication technologies influences the result: when communication technologies make monitoring easier, the negative relation disappears. Third, in general, the use of advanced communication technologies tends to favour decentralization. Final result is that different types of decisions lead to different levels of authority. According to the study, the assignment of authority depends on the relative importance of the decision, the extent of intra-firm externalities and the desire to the advantage of local knowledge and specific capabilities of the plant manager.

⁴ Note that in this case, the agent is motivated in a different way than before. In the first case, the agent was motivated to exert more effort because he would be able to choose his preferred project, which is more valuable to him than the principal's preferred project. In the second case, delegation provides the signal that the agent is of high ability, therefore his effort will be more productive. This induces the agent to exert more effort.

In contrast to Colombo and Delmastro, most empirical papers focus on a specific determinant of delegation. Foss and Laursen (2005) and DeVaro and Kurtulus (2010) investigate the relationship between uncertainty and delegation. Both find evidence that supports the theory of Prendergast (2002), who proposed a positive link between uncertainty and delegation. Acemoglu et al. (2007) investigate the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and decentralization. Key assumption is that the agent is better informed about the correct way to implement new technologies. The need for delegation decreases when information about technologies becomes more publicly available. Main results are that firms closer to the technological frontier, firms in more heterogeneous environments and younger firms are more likely to delegate decision-making. Bloom et al. (2009) investigate the effects of improved information technology and communication technology separately. They find that improvements in information technology lead to more decentralization. In contrast, improved communication technologies lead to more centralized decision-making. Bloom et al. (2010a) test the relationship between product market competition and decentralization. They find that an increase in competition leads to more delegation.

3. Practice

This chapter will describe the delegation decisions at hand in stores of a supermarket company. First the organisation of the supermarkets will be described, followed by a description of four cases in which there is a possible delegation decision. Also, the factors that may influence the delegations decision will be analysed for each case.

3.1 The organisation

A supermarket is led by the management team, which consists of a store manager and one or more assistant store managers⁵. The organization is divided in three teams: one team is directly led by the management; the other two teams are led by team leaders⁶. The main task of team leaders is to organize and control shifts, which take about four hours. In those shifts the primary process of their team takes place. Other tasks include: making the week schedule for the team, developing and implementing more efficient work methods, annual report of employee's performance, replacing the management in their absence. Also, team leaders may hire new employees.

The division of tasks and responsibilities between management and team leaders is described in job descriptions and organization manuals. However, in some cases, the description can be interpreted in several ways. This gives the management a choice to decide on the authority on certain issues. The job description of the assistant store manager even states: "*the manager delegates tasks and responsibilities*"⁷. Clearly, the management has to make delegation decisions.

For each team, there is more than a fulltime job to do, so it is natural that there is more than one team leader per team. The number of team leaders depends on the size of the store: the smallest stores have only three team leaders per team; the larger stores may have up to ten team leaders per team. These team leaders differ in several characteristics including age, education, job experience and work hours per week. Although formally all team leaders share responsibility for the entire team, it seems natural that the management assigns different responsibility to team leaders in some cases.

⁵ The tasks of the store manager and his assistant(s) are roughly the same; main difference is that the store manager has final responsibility for the store and its results. Although a special focus area may be assigned to each individual manager, the entire management team is responsible for the entire store. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, the management team is considered to be one. For the remainder of this thesis, I will refer to the management team simply as "the manager" or "the management".

⁶ The two teams, *Verkoopklaar* and *Verkoopafhandeling*, deal with logistic processes (all actions to make sure all goods are available) and money transactions (check-out and all subsequent actions) respectively.

⁷ Functieprofiel ASM 2 (2010)

3.2 Delegation decisions and factors that influence them

This thesis will look at four cases where the manager can make a decision to delegate authority to the team leaders. This paragraph will describe those four cases. The role of management and team leaders will be described according to their job descriptions and organisation manuals. This will be used to make an assessment of the actual freedom of the manager to assign authority in each case.

The previous chapter has described some factors that are important in the delegation decision. These theoretical factors will be “translated” to the four supermarket cases: an assessment will be made of the distribution of information, the alignment of preferences, relative importance of the decision and possible incentive effects of delegation.

3.2.1 Recruitment of new employees

Most employees of supermarkets are students that work part-time. Many of them only have a short-term contract and do not stay around very long. As a result, the supermarket is in search of new employees almost permanently. The role of team leaders in the recruitment of new employees is stated as follows: “*the team leader contributes to recruitment and selection of new employees (provide input, reflect)*”⁸. Whether this means that the team leader can also hire new employees all by himself stays ambiguous. The management has to decide what the exact role of team leaders in this decision making process should be.

The team leader has an information advantage, because he knows exactly what kind of employees the team needs. The manager may be less aware of this. However, this information can be communicated to a large extent. It is likely that the manager has more experience with job interviews and therefore he will be more able to assess the quality of the applicant. This would give an informational advantage to the manager.

There are several ways that may lead to a biased team leader. For instance, he may be inclined to hire persons he gets along with well, rather than the best employees for the firm. Note that this may even happen unintentionally: without being aware of it, the team leader may just hire people that are much like him (which might not be optimal for the firm). Of course, the manager may face the same problem, but as he has more distance to the team, he should be less likely to act this way.

⁸ Original Dutch text states: “*bijdragen aan de werving en selectie van (...) medewerkers (input geven, overleggen)*” (Functieprofiel Teamleider Verkoopklaar, 2010; Functieprofiel Teamleider Verkoopafhandeling, 2010)

Delegating recruitment to the team leaders can provide a strong incentive. When he has hired his own workers, it may be more important to the team leader to make them perform well. Also, when he has decision rights, the team leader might be more willing to gather information (think about) what the team really needs. Therefore the incentive effect is supposed to be quite strong in this case.

Decision rights concerning the recruitment of employees may be relative important to the team leader, because he is the one who has to work directly with the new employees. The manager is only involved indirectly, so he probably cares less about which employee is hired.

3.2.2 Schedule work hours

Every week, the work hours for the team have to be scheduled. As the results of the store depend largely on labour costs and productivity, the team schedule is of major importance. Formally, it is the responsibility of the team leaders to make a schedule that is both feasible and effective. However, the job description also states that the team leader has to harmonise this schedule with the management⁹. This implies that the management has the possibility to put restrictions on the freedom of the team leader to make the schedule. When the management limits the choices of the team leader to an extreme extent, the team leader effectively is only implementing the manager's decision. Therefore the real authority in that case would be with the manager¹⁰.

The relative information position of manager and team leader is rather ambiguous in this case. The manager may be better informed about productivity targets and wage budgets, and about ways to achieve those goals; but the team leader may be better informed about the actual workload during the week, and the capacities of each employee. Therefore it is hard to say whether asymmetric information will have an influence on delegation here. However, it is expected that a team leader with more experience or more work hours per week will generally have a better information position.

Differences in preferences between agent and principal can appear because the manager will look at the store's total results, where the team leader may have more individual goals. For example, the team leader may schedule extra employees on his own shifts. This may result in a biased team leader. It is hard to make any prediction about which team leader will be more biased.

⁹ Functieprofiel Teamleider Verkoopklaar (2010), Functieprofiel Teamleider Verkoopafhandeling (2010)

¹⁰ Some managers have stated that it is also possible that the manager makes the schedule by himself, even though job descriptions may say otherwise.

Delegating this task to a team leader might provide him with an incentive to gather more relevant information to perform this task. When he is responsible, the team leader might care more about the results of the team in terms of productivity and wages. However, it is less likely that delegation will have a strong influence on his daily efforts to achieve productivity and labour cost goals, since supervising a 4-hour shift only has a small effect on total wage costs of the team.

The team leader might care about authority in this task because it gives him the freedom to decide which employees will work on his shifts. However, it is likely that the manager cares relatively more about this task, because the work schedule is of major importance for the goals of the manager, i.e. the store's results.

Making week schedules for an entire team is a difficult job. That makes it likely that the agent to whom this task is delegated sees it as a signal that he has the ability to perform a more difficult task.

3.2.3 Disciplinary actions

When employees misbehave, disciplinary actions can be taken against them. There are several possible sanctions, varying from a warning to termination of the employment contract. Job descriptions do not mention authority in these cases, probably because there are legal restrictions to what a team leader can decide independently. However, both managers and team leaders have stated that the full range of decision is in fact taken by (some of the) team leaders¹¹. To which extent team leaders have authority may differ between team leaders and between stores.

The team leader has a clear information advantage in this subject: he works directly with the employee, so he will be much better informed about the general behaviour of the employee. This may provide a strong argument to delegate these decisions to the team leader. In a larger store, with more employees, the informational advantage of the team leaders might be larger. Differences in preferences may occur when the team leader lets personal sympathy or antipathy towards an employee play a role in his decision-making. However, taking disciplinary actions without sufficient justification can have strong negative consequences for the team leader (think about his reputation among his colleagues), so it seems unlikely that there will be large differences in preferred actions.

¹¹ Note that even though the manager may have legal obligation to take the eventual decision, team leaders may still have *real* authority if the manager rubberstamps their decision.

Leaving the decision to the team leader may induce higher effort in the sense that he feels there is more at stake for him when he is responsible for the decision. When the final decision would be with the manager, the team leader might care less about the quality of the decision.

Team leaders may care a lot about their discretion on this issue, because they might feel that being able to take disciplinary actions is an important part of their job to lead the team. However, when it comes to more radical decisions, like termination of the contract, the manager might care more because the potential repercussions of a bad decision are larger (e.g. an employee who gets fired can start legal proceedings against the firm). Who cares relatively more about discretion might therefore depend on the nature of the decision.

As said before, taking disciplinary seems a natural part of leading a team. Therefore, authority on this subject is not likely to provide a signal of high ability. However, when a team leader does not get any discretion, that may signal to him that he lacks the ability for those decisions.

3.2.4 Make adjustments in the work process

The work process of each team is shaped by the guidelines of the company. However, the management and team leaders of each store should take into account store-specific conditions when they implement these general guidelines. Therefore it is possible, to some extent, to shape the work process according to one's ideas. The management is responsible for implementing processes according to the company's organisational structure. The role of the team leaders is to notice bottlenecks in the work process, translate that into actions and take care of its implementation. Also, team leaders are supposed to make proposals to the management to achieve a high quality of the process. If the management is involved in decision making concerning the work process may differ depending on situation, specific characteristics of the stores and characteristics of managers and team leaders.

The team leader has a clear information advantage in this subject: he is in charge of the work process every day¹². This may provide a strong argument to delegate decision right to the team leader. In a larger store processes might be more complex, which might affect the informational position of the team leaders.

Team leaders may be biased in the way that they might seek for ways to make their own work most comfortable, instead of designing a work process that is most efficient to the firm. Also, when team leaders are used to work methods that are no longer part of general policy of the firm, they might stick to their own methods when they have full discretion.

¹² Manuals also state that the team leader should have specific knowledge about processes, whereas the manager only has general knowledge about them (Verkoopklaar Handleiding voor het management, 2007; Verkoopafhandeling Handleiding voor het management, 2007).

Leaving decisions to the team leader may signal confidence in his ability to shape the work process. When he feels he is able to give direction to the processes on his own, this may increase the self-confidence of the team leader. That might provoke him to put more effort into fine-tuning the process.

Small changes in the work process may be of importance to the daily work of the team leader, but may not bother the manager quite as much. However, when radical changes are proposed, the stake for the manager grows. Again, who cares relatively more about discretion might depend on the nature of the decision.

4. Methodology and research process

This chapter first describes the choice of research methods, and then it describes the research process. Finally, the measures taken to ensure a high response rate will be explained.

4.1 Choice of methods

There are several ways to perform an empirical study to the delegation behaviour of managers. For example, one could observe the behaviour and decisions of a manager for a certain period of time. This would be a time consuming method relative to the information that is gathered on the subject. Another possibility would be to perform a qualitative research through interviewing managers and team leaders. In this option there is still trouble with the representativeness of the research, as it is hard to interview a large number of managers and team leaders. To get a representative view on the effects of delegation and to be able to compare between different situations (i.e. stores with different characteristics, different team leaders), a quantitative research approach seems more appropriate. The most practical way to design this research is using a questionnaire. To perform quantitative analysis, it has to be possible to standardize the answers. Therefore the questionnaire uses closed-ended questions. This approach may have several disadvantages. Closed-ended questions limit the respondents in their choice of answers. This may imply that the answer one wants to give is not available, and the respondent is forced to choose an answer that not entirely reflects his position. Using a questionnaire is useful to reach many respondents, but self-reports may not always accurately reflect the actual situation. Finally, the data has to be suitable for quantitative analysis. Variables need to be operationalized, which may affect the validity of the analysis. For some variables it may be very hard to operationalize them in a valid way.

4.1.1 Formulating the questions

The aim of the research is to empirically test the economic literature on delegation. It is important that the research should provide data on the same topics as discussed in the literature. Therefore, the research should provide data on the following questions:

- *Is the task delegated to a team leader?*
- *In case of delegation, how much discretion does a team leader have?*
- *In case of delegation and the possibility to differentiate between team leaders, which team leader has more discretion?*

To standardize answers, possible delegation choices are limited to: full delegation, no delegation and one or more ways of partial delegation. Those options are formulated such that every option reflects a different delegation decision.

4.1.2 Operationalization of variables

In the analysis, the relation between the information position of the team leader and delegation is tested. Those variables needed to be operationalized, to be able to make comparisons between different stores and different team leaders. These operationalizations are as follows:

Delegation: in the questionnaire, all possible answers clearly represented different levels of delegation, so an ordinal variable ranking from 0 (no delegation) to 3 or 4 (full delegation, number depends on number of intermediate options) could be constructed.

Information position of the team leader: a team leader who works more **hours per week** is believed to have a stronger information position. Also a team leader with more years of experience as a team leader could be better informed. It is the relative information position of the team leader compared to the managers that matters according to theory, so in the analysis the **relative tenure** (the team leaders' tenure divided by the managers' tenure) will be used. One might argue that those two measures reflect different kinds of information. A team leader who works much will be well informed about information that is important on short notice and can be assessed quickly. A more tenured team leader will be better informed about matters that require long, extensive studying and that is valid for a longer period.

4.1.3 Selection of target group and distribution method

The collaboration of the supermarket company is essential to reach a large group of respondents. The company has its own communication network. If it would be possible to use this system, it might be possible to reach a large population without significant troubles. First, a regional human resource manager was contacted. However, the regional manager did not want to cooperate. Second, the head office of the company was contacted for their support of the research. It became clear that the company's policy was to limit companywide research to researchers who are working internally for the company. All external proposals were simply rejected. The only option left was to contact individual store managers and to ask them for their cooperation. Unfortunately, this posed some new problems. Individual stores do not have the administration rights to their computer network. Therefore, digital technologies could not

be used to distribute and fill in the questionnaire. Furthermore, because each store had to be contacted individually, the amount of stores involved in the research was limited. In the end the survey was operated in seven stores. All participants answered the questionnaire on paper.

4.1.4 Questionnaires for team leaders *and* managers

Two questionnaires were used for this research: one was distributed to team leaders, the other was distributed to managers (one per store).

The team leaders had to answer questions about their own discretion in the four delegation situations, and about the discretion of other team leaders of their team. They also had to report some general characteristics that could be used as explanatory variables. The individual reports of team leaders are used for the quantitative analysis in this thesis.

In addition to information about their discretion, team leaders were also asked to score their attitudes in some statements about the effects of delegation. The repeated statements were intended to compare team leaders' attitude towards delegation in several delegation situations. Unfortunately, it was not clear to most respondents that the statements (repeated after each delegation situation) were aimed specifically at the delegation situation at hand. Therefore a comparison between the attitudes towards delegation in different situations was not possible. The scores on these statements are not used in any analysis.

The questions asked to the managers were similar to those asked to the team leaders. For each delegation situation, they had to report if there was delegation to team leaders. In case of delegation, follow-up questions were asked about the level of delegation and about differentiation between team leaders. Additionally, for each delegation situation, managers were asked to score the importance of a number of reasons to delegate. In case of differentiation between team leaders, the manager was also asked to score the importance of a number of reasons to differentiate. In addition to the questionnaire, the managers were asked to comment on their choices in a one-on-one interview. Purpose of the interview was to gain more insight in the exact way tasks were delegated, and to give managers the chance to explain the motives behind their delegation choices. As there are just seven observations, the results from the managers' questionnaire are not useful for quantitative analysis. However, these results and the managers' statements in the interviews are useful in several other ways. First, they can be used to check the reliability of team leaders' reports. Second, the answers can provide useful insights to interpret the results of the quantitative analysis of the data provided by team leaders.

4.2 Research process

The research process can be divided into two stages: the first includes the actions to compose and test the questionnaires, the second is the actual distribution and return of the questionnaires. Both stages will be described briefly here.

4.2.1 Testing the questionnaires

In the testing phase the following aspects of the questionnaires were tested to guarantee the reliability and validity of the results:

- *Content*: regarding this aspect, it was tested if the questionnaires provided useful information to perform an analysis. Also it was tested if the answers to closed-ended questions were a truthful representation of the actual possibilities.
- *Phrasing*: regarding this aspect, it was tested if the phrasing of the questionnaires met the requirements stated in literature. Main concern is that the items in the questionnaires should be clear and unambiguous and questions should be formulated with the perspective of the respondent in mind (Babbie, 2004).

The questionnaires were not only tested to meet requirements as stated in the literature, but it was also field tested. Ten persons, either team leaders or managers, were willing to give their opinion on the content of the survey and the phrasing of the questions. Every new version of the questionnaires was tested in practice. The comments of team leaders and managers are used to compose the final questionnaires.

4.2.2 Distribution and return of the questionnaires

At first, only the team leaders of team *Verkoopklaar* were asked to fill in the questionnaire. The first questionnaires were distributed on July 4th, 2011. The printed questionnaires were delivered to the stores personally. At that moment, also the questionnaire for the manager was delivered and an appointment for an interview was made. Team leaders present at the moment of delivery were asked to fill in the questionnaire immediately. The other team leaders received the questionnaire in their mailbox at the store, together with a request from their manager to participate in the survey. The research period ended 5 weeks later, on August 7th, 2011. Twice, after two weeks and after five weeks, a reminder was send to the managers to ask the team leaders to fill in and return the questionnaire. At the end of this period, 31 team leaders (on a total of 41) had returned the questionnaire.

Because this sample was too small to perform analysis, the questionnaire was distributed to team leaders from the other team as well. Distribution started on January 30, 2012 and returns

ended on February 29, 2012. The distribution and return of the questionnaire followed the same procedure as in the first period.

4.3 Measures to achieve maximum response

The research is designed in a way that should make the response rate as high as possible. The following measures are taken to ensure a high response rate:

- Although the thesis is written in English, the questionnaires were written in Dutch. Using an English questionnaire would probably have caused a dramatically lower response rate, as English is the second language for almost all respondents and their command of the language might not be such that they are able to complete an English-written questionnaire easily.
- The formulation of the questions is as easy and clear as possible. Use of difficult words and terminology is avoided as much as possible to keep the questionnaire understandable for all respondents. The phrasing of the questions is tested in every version of the questionnaires and comments of the test panel are implemented to make sure the language would be clear to all respondents.
- Respondents can choose to stay anonymous. They do not have to provide personal information, therefore they do not have to be concerned that their answers will be published mentioning their name.
- Respondents received the questionnaire accompanied by a letter from their manager. It is expected that team leaders are more likely to respond positively to a request from their manager than to a request of someone they have no connection with. Furthermore, managers are used to work on response rates for questionnaires, as it is one of their tasks to achieve high response rates on periodical employees' satisfaction surveys.
- After distribution of the questionnaire, a reminder was send twice (after two weeks and after four weeks) to ensure that team leaders would not forget to respond.

4.4 Response rate

The response rates for each store are shown in Table 1. In total, 58 team leaders returned the questionnaire, which equals a response rate of 78 percent.

Table 1 Response rates per store

store	respondents	total team leaders	response rate
1	15	18	83%
2	6	10	60%
3	7	9	78%
4	11	12	92%
5	6	7	86%
6	6	9	67%
7	7	9	78%
<i>all</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>74</i>	<i>78%</i>

Although the response rate of 78 percent is quite high, some of the non-response might be caused by factors that are related to the outcome of the research. There are several possible explanations for the non-response (22 percent of the target group):

- The questionnaire was first distributed in August. At that time a lot of team leaders were on vacation. The team leaders had four weeks to return the questionnaire, which is longer than the average summer break. However, the moment of distribution might have affected the response rate negatively.
- Some of the managers simply forgot to distribute the questionnaire, until they were reminded to do so after two weeks. This reduced the time team leaders had to complete the questionnaire, which may have caused some of the non-response.
- There were also team leaders who just forgot about the questionnaire after it was handed to them.
- Although the length of the questionnaire was kept as short as possible, some team leaders may have failed to return the questionnaire because they did not have time to complete it.

Of the possible reasons for non-response, there is one reason that might influence the results of the research. Team leaders that did not have time to complete the questionnaire appear to be busier than those who did find the time. The lack of time of the non-respondents might occur because they have a lot of tasks delegated to them. However, it could also mean that they did not get a lot of extra responsibilities, because they are already busy. The exact effect of this non-response on the questionnaires' outcomes is therefore uncertain.

5. Analysis of results

This chapter gives an overview of the results of the research. First, it gives an overview of some general characteristics of the respondents. Then, the results for each of the delegation situations are discussed and compared to the expectations that were formed based on the theoretical models.

5.1 General characteristics of the respondents

This section looks at some general characteristics of the respondents that are important in the analysis later on. First, it gives an overview of the hours worked per week by the team leader. Then it looks at the tenure of the team leaders.

Table 2 Average team leaders' hours worked per week

store	average hours	standard deviation	min.	max.
1	23,7	9,7	12	40
2	22,8	12,9	9	40
3	21,0	13,1	10	40
4	21,1	10,4	12	40
5	17,8	7,5	12	32
6	20,0	6,7	12	28
7	16,1	11,4	5	40
<i>all</i>	<i>20,9</i>	<i>10,2</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>40</i>

Table 2 displays the average hours worked per week by team leaders for each store. There is clearly a large variation in work hours, as in most stores the maximum hours per week is 40, whereas the minimum hours per week is 12 for most stores and even less for other stores. Store 5 and 6 are the smallest stores in the sample, which might explain why there is no full-time team leader in those stores.

Table 3 Average tenure of team leaders

store	average tenure (years)	standard deviation	min.	max.
1	8,0	4,8	2,4	19,9
2	9,7	7,2	3,8	23,3
3	8,8	10,9	2,2	33,3
4	4,4	2,7	2,0	11,0
5	10,3	14,6	3,0	39,9
6	8,1	4,2	2,4	12,9
7	10,0	10,7	3,0	34,0
<i>all</i>	<i>8,1</i>	<i>7,8</i>	<i>2,0</i>	<i>39,9</i>

Table 3 shows the average tenure of team leaders per store. From this table it seems clear that one has to work at least two years for the company before having a chance of being promoted to team leader. It also is clear that there are enormous differences, as the most tenured team leaders are working at the company for over thirty years.

5.2 The estimated model

This section first describes the model that is used to determine the effects of the explanatory variables on delegation. Second, it explains which variables are included in the model and the reasons to add those variables.

5.2.1 The Ordered Logit Model

The dependent variable in the model is delegation, denoted by D_i . For each delegation situation i there were k ($0, \dots, j$) possible delegation choices, where D_{0i} denotes no delegation, and D_{ji} denotes full delegation. As these choices are ranked according to the level of delegation, the dependent variable D is an ordinal variable.

The explanatory variables are denoted by the vector x_i . To analyse the effect of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable D_i an Ordered Logit model is developed. This model estimates the equation

$$D_i^* = x_i' \beta + \varepsilon_i$$

where D_i^* is an unobserved index variable. The error term ε_i in a logit model follows a logistic distribution. Thus, the value of D_i^* has a logistic distribution with mean $x_i \beta$. The model also estimates threshold values of D_i^* , for each possible outcome D_i . Using these threshold values and the logistic distribution of D_i^* , the probability of any level of D_i can be determined.

The purpose of this thesis is not to compute the probability of each delegation option, but rather to determine the effect of the set of explanatory variables on the delegation choice. Therefore, the estimated models will be interpreted only in terms of the signs and significance of the estimated coefficients β , where positive (negative) signs obviously mean that an increase (decrease) in the explanatory variable will have a positive (negative) effect on the level of delegation.

5.2.2 Included explanatory variables

In the research process, two measures of the team leaders' information position were formulated: relative tenure and the hours worked per week. These two measures will serve as explanatory variables in the ordered logit model. Because the relation between information

position and hours worked is supposed to be non-linear, the logarithm of the hours worked will be used as explanatory variable.

First in the analysis, ordered logit models were estimated with only one of the explanatory variables. Then, both relative tenure and the hours worked were included in the model. Comparison of the results showed that addition of another explanatory variable affected the coefficient of the already included variable. This means that the effects of those variables on the dependent variable are somehow related. This is not surprising, as both variables aim to measure the same concept: the information position of the team leader. However, relative tenure and worked hours measure somewhat different aspects of information: long-term relevant information and short-term, current information respectively. It is plausible to think that a combination of both might be the best measure of information, as one needs both current and long-term information. Therefore, a third explanatory variable was added to the model: the product of relative tenure and worked hours. A positive coefficient for this variable would mean that one who is well informed, both on the long term and on the short term, gets delegated more tasks.

When estimating a model, one always has to make choices to include or omit explanatory variables. In general, irrelevant variables that don't have a clear effect on the dependent variable should not be in the model, as they have a negative effect on the reliability of the model. The inclusion of variables that are relevant may help to get a more unbiased estimate of the direct effect of all variables. However, it also leads to less efficient estimators (i.e. larger variance in estimated coefficients). The analysis in this thesis will use the model that includes the three explanatory variables mentioned above, because all three are deemed to be relevant. Furthermore, the effect of all three variables is important for the analysis in this thesis.

Table 4 Variables included in the model

Variable	Description
<i>Relative tenure</i>	Tenure of team leader / Tenure of manager
<i>Log hours</i>	logarithm of the hours worked by the team leader
<i>Relative tenure × log hours</i>	combined measure of relative tenure and log hours
<i>Store dummies (1-6)</i>	dummy variables to account for store specific effects

Dummy variables, that take value 1 for one store and value 0 for all other, are included in the model to control for store-specific effects. This way all effects that are caused by store characteristics are filtered from the coefficients of the explanatory variables and the direct effect of those explanatory variables remains.

5.3 Analysis of delegation choices

This section discusses the delegation choices made by managers in the supermarkets where the research was conducted. For each delegation situation, a separate ordered logit model was developed to estimate the effect of the explanatory variables on the level of delegation to team leaders.

5.3.1 Recruitment of new employees

The task of recruiting new employees is delegated to 61 percent of the team leaders. As 39 percent of the team leaders does not perform this task, it is clear that it is not by definition part of their job. Most of the team leaders who are performing this task are limited in the choices they can make without consulting the manager. Only 2 team leaders reported that they have full freedom to hire the employees of their choice.

Table 5 Discretion of team leaders in the recruitment of new employees

Choice	Description	Count	Percentage
0	No delegation	22	39%
1	Always managers' approval needed	2	4%
2	Manager limits choices, other choices not possible	5	9%
3	Manager limits free choices, other choices require approval	26	46%
4	Full delegation	2	4%

Table 6 shows the results for the estimated ordered logit models in this situation. Clearly, none of the three variables that reflect the team leaders' information position has a significant effect on delegation. Therefore, the conclusion from this research should be that there is no relation between the information position of the team leader and the discretion he has to recruit new employees.

Table 6 Results of Ordered Logit model for recruitment

Explanatory variable	Coeff.	Prob
Relative tenure	-2,5513901	0,514
Log hours	-0,0225902	0,984
Relative Tenure × log hours	0,5661764	0,629
Store1 dummy	-0,5867138	0,602
Store2 dummy	3,329735	0,018
Store3 dummy	1,97468	0,103
Store4 dummy	2,866434	0,028
Store5 dummy	3,571041	0,013
Store6 dummy	-0,0455015	0,972
<i>Log likelihood</i>	<i>-51,812478</i>	
<i>LR χ^2</i>	<i>30,22</i>	<i>0,0004</i>
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	<i>0,2258</i>	

The team leader may have an information advantage that is relevant for this task, because he knows exactly what kind of employees the team needs. The manager may be less aware of this. However, this information can be communicated to a large extent. Also, the private information of the team leader is not the most essential part in the recruitment of new employees. There are other factors that may be far more important for the execution of this task.

First, the team leaders’ ability to interview applicants and to assess their qualities as an employee is likely to play a major role in the decision whether this task should be delegated to him. When the team leader is not able to assess the qualities of the applicants, his private information on the needs of the team becomes useless.

Second, the incentive effect can be a major factor in this decision. It will reflect badly on a team leader if the employees he has hired perform poorly. Therefore, the team leader will have an incentive to put more effort into the coaching of these employees than he would do when the workers were hired by the manager.

5.3.2 Schedule work hours

The teams’ schedule has to be made once a week. It is unlikely that there is more than one team leader working on it. Thus, one would expect that if this task is delegated, it would be delegated to only one team leader per team. Indeed, there are only 13 team leaders who are performing this task. There is one store where this task is performed by a manager for one of the two teams.

In case of delegation, managers have to choose how much discretion the team leader has, and to which team leader they delegate this task. As Table 7 shows, the majority of the managers gives a team leader full responsibility for the teams’ schedule.

Table 7 Discretion of team leaders in scheduling work hours

Choice	Description	Count	Percentage
0	No delegation	44	77%
1	Manager checks and (may) make final changes	1	2%
2	Manager has to approve before schedule is published	4	7%
3	Full delegation	8	14%

Table 8 shows the results the ordered logit model. There is a strong positive relation between the team leaders’ hours worked per week and delegation. There is no significant relation between team leaders’ relative tenure and delegation or between delegation and the combined measure of relative tenure and hours worked.

Table 8 Results of Ordered Logit model for schedule work hours

Explanatory variable	Coeff.	Prob
Relative tenure	0,520833	0,915
Log hours	3,729719	0,021
Relative Tenure × log hours	-0,1429719	0,921
Store1 dummy	-1,325938	0,392
Store2 dummy	0,4236857	0,805
Store3 dummy	1,691517	0,314
Store4 dummy	-1,291143	0,453
Store5 dummy	-0,2210226	0,907
Store6 dummy	-0,7654786	0,671
<i>Log likelihood</i>	<i>-30,516115</i>	
<i>LR χ^2</i>	<i>23,02</i>	<i>0,0062</i>
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	<i>0,2739</i>	

These results suggest that, if there is a link between the information position of the team leader and delegation, it is the position of the team leader on the kind of information that is current and quick to process which is most important in the delegation decision. That seems to be a logical conclusion, as the task of making a week schedule mostly requires information on the current situation. Although the link between information and delegation of the scheduling task seems logical, there might be another explanation for the significant relation between hours worked and delegation. It could also be the case that this task is delegated to a team leader who works more hours, simply because he has the time to perform this task. For team leaders who work less it could be less convenient to have responsibility on this subject, because it would leave them with insufficient time for their other tasks. Managers have stated that time is indeed one of the factors that influences this delegation decision. The positive relation between hours worked and delegation is therefore equivocal: both the (current) information position of the team leader and the time he has to perform the task are feasible interpretations of this result. From this data, it is not possible to draw a conclusion to which factor is more relevant.

Although there is a clear relation between team leaders' hours worked and delegation, it is possible that there are more factors that influence the delegation decision. Incentive effects and the bias in team leader preferences could also be important.

It is unlikely that the provision of incentives plays a large role in this delegation decision. The team leader who performs this task may become more concerned with the stores' productivity and wage goals, but his effort during his work time only has a marginal effect on the stores' total results. Therefore, an incentive effect is not expected.

The team leaders' preferences could be considered as a factor in this delegation decision. Team leaders may be inclined to schedule more workers during their own shifts. However, it would be hard for the manager to tell which team leader is most biased. Moreover, this type of biased behaviour would be quite obvious, as it influences either the total productivity or the number of workers in other team leaders' shifts. The former will be observed by the manager when he observes the results of the schedule; the latter will be signalled by other team leaders. Therefore, biased team leader preferences are not likely to play a role in this delegation decision.

5.3.3 Disciplinary actions

In the questionnaire, the team leaders were asked about their discretion to take several disciplinary actions. Four possible sanctions were formulated, the team leaders reported their discretion for each sanction separately. As taking disciplinary actions is an essential part of leading a team, it seems logical that team leaders have some discretion.

Most team leaders report that they have full freedom to decide not take register all overtime work when an employee does not commit to the company's rules. Just three team leaders report they have no authority at all in this situation.

Table 9 Discretion of team leaders to choose not to register (overtime) work hours

Choice	Description	Count	Percentage
0	No delegation	3	5%
1	Manager always takes final decision	5	9%
2	Manager only takes final decision in some cases	12	21%
3	Full delegation	36	64%

The case of giving official warnings is even stronger: not one team leader reports that he has no authority in this situation. Again, 36 team leaders report that they have full freedom to make decisions in this situation.

Table 10 Discretion of team leaders to give official warning

Choice	Description	Count	Percentage
0	No delegation	0	0%
1	Manager always takes final decision	5	9%
2	Manager only takes final decision in some cases	14	25%
3	Full delegation	36	63%

Results in the case of temporary dismissal look a bit different: 15 team leaders report that they have no authority to take this decision. The reason for this difference may be that this is a

more severe sanction, which also has financial and (possibly) legal consequences for the company. Still, 19 team leaders report they have full discretion to take this disciplinary action.

Table 11 Discretion of team leaders to temporary dismiss employees

Choice	Description	Count	Percentage
0	No delegation	15	26%
1	Manager always takes final decision	0	0%
2	Manager only takes final decision in some cases	20	35%
3	Full delegation	19	33%

In case of the most severe sanction, termination of the contract, only 2 team leaders report they have no discretion at all. This may seem a surprising result, but it can be explained by the fact that this sanction can be interpreted in several ways. Many team leaders will feel that they have the authority to decide that an expiring contract is not renewed, and thus that the employment contract is terminated. It is likely that many team leaders have interpreted the question that way. When they would have looked at immediate dismissal as a disciplinary action, results might have been somewhat different.

Table 12 Discretion of team leaders to terminate contracts

Choice	Description	Count	Percentage
0	No delegation	2	4%
1	Manager always takes final decision	5	9%
2	Manager only takes final decision in some cases	24	42%
3	Full delegation	24	42%

As there were observations on four different actions, there were four measures of team leaders’ discretion in the domain of disciplinary actions. Using factor analysis, one factor was constructed that captures the discretion of the team leader in this domain. This constructed factor was used as dependent variable in the analysis¹³.

Table 13 shows the results of the ordered logit analysis in the case of disciplinary actions. There is a positive relation between the combined measure *relative tenure × hours worked* and delegation. Furthermore, there is a negative significant relation between team leaders’ relative tenure and delegation, and between delegation and the team leaders’ hours worked per week. This suggests that a team leader who is more tenured *and* works many hours will have more discretion, where team leaders who have less tenure or work few hours have less discretion.

¹³ An explanation of the construction of this variable using factor analysis can be found in Appendix A.

Table 13 Results of Ordered Logit model for disciplinary actions

Explanatory variable	Coeff.	Prob
Relative tenure	-10,11655	0,020
Log hours	-1,907735	0,064
Relative Tenure × log hours	3,109938	0,019
Store1 dummy	3,66462	0,000
Store2 dummy	0,6407046	0,521
Store3 dummy	1,532763	0,113
Store4 dummy	6,111334	0,000
Store5 dummy	3,329673	0,005
Store6 dummy	2,754679	0,034
<i>Log likelihood</i>	-141,764	
<i>LR χ^2</i>	34,00	0,0001
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	0,1071	

In general, a possible explanation for this result could be that when a team leader does not meet a minimum level of commitment (i.e. he is not working a lot of hours per week), his discretion will decline over time. When a team leader is sufficiently committed to the organisation, his discretion will grow as he gets more tenured. This explanation suggests that there is a *critical level of involvement*. If a team leader is sufficiently involved, discretion will increase with tenure. If not, the team leader will gradually have less discretion.

This general explanation for this result does not focus on the main aspect of this research, the relation between information and delegation. There is also a possible explanation for this result that focuses more specifically on the role of information. First, it should be clear that the information advantage of the team leader in this situation exists within the intensive, short-term type of information. Therefore, one would expect that hours worked is the most important measure of information here. However, when a team leader is less tenured, he might not have the knowledge (information) to properly process this information. Therefore, a learning process has to take place before the team leader really can use his informational advantage. When a team leader has not enough tenure, the team leader who works more might have less discretion, since he will be more often in place to take decisions and therefore could do more damage to the company taking the wrong decisions.

Although this might be a reasonable explanation for this result, it might be the case that it has no practical importance. Managers in six out of seven stores stated that they do not differentiate between team leaders. As team leaders report different levels of discretion, there clearly is a difference between the reports of team leaders and managers.

In one store, the manager did report that he differentiated between team leaders. He stated that the team leaders who were more likely to take decisions close to the decision he would take himself were the team leaders that had more discretion¹⁴. It seems clear that the manager would not prefer to delegate discretion over disciplinary actions to a much biased team leader. However, even a biased team leader should be reluctant to take extreme decisions, as wrong decisions may reflect very badly on himself.

It seems unlikely that delegation is used here to provide incentives. All managers have argued that it would be strange to expect more motivated team leaders when they have the power to take more disciplinary actions. However, it could be demotivating when the team leader does not have any discretion, as the ability to enforce rules is an essential part of leading a team.

5.3.4 Make adjustments in the work process

As team leaders are dealing with the work process every day, it seems logical that they have some discretion in the design of the work process. Indeed, only 7 team leaders reported that they do not take any decisions concerning the design of the work process. In most other cases, the manager is only involved in the decision when significant changes are made.

Table 14 Discretion of team leaders to design the work process

Choice	Description	Count	Perc.
0	No delegation	7	12%
1	Manager always takes final decision	0	0%
2	Manager takes final decision in case of highly significant changes	41	71%
3	Full delegation	10	17%

The results of the ordered logit analysis in the case of the work process are similar to the results in the case of disciplinary actions: there is a positive relation between the combined measure *relative tenure* × *hours worked* and delegation, and there is a negative significant relation between team leaders’ relative tenure and delegation. The results of the ordered logit model in this situation are shown in Table 15.

The possible explanations for this result are similar to those in the case of taking disciplinary actions. It might be that there has to be a critical level of involvement, but it is more likely that there has to be some long-term, extensive knowledge before a team leader is able to assess the information on the current situation properly. It seems clear that one has to know how the organisation and its processes work before one can analyse how the current situation

¹⁴ Aghion and Tirole (1997) have named this the level of *congruence*, which seems very appropriate in this context. Most other articles talk about agents with (more or less) biased preferences.

can be improved. However, also in this case, managers in six out of seven stores stated that they do not differentiate between team leaders.

Table 15 Results of Ordered Logit model for work process

Explanatory variable	Coeff.	Prob
Relative tenure	-7,360783	0,127
Log hours	0,0715638	0,956
Relative Tenure × log hours	2,357986	0,109
Store1 dummy	-0,7211321	0,545
Store2 dummy	-2,583469	0,056
Store3 dummy	-0,4495825	0,731
Store4 dummy	0,3374015	0,817
Store5 dummy	-0,1895513	0,886
Store6 dummy	-0,8468681	0,572
<i>Log likelihood</i>	-36,00676	
<i>LR χ^2</i>	16,83	0,0515
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	0,1894	

The bias in team leaders' preferences is not likely to play a major role in this delegation decision, because both managers and team leaders are constrained by the company's general guidelines. Within those constraints, the manager might not care as much about the actual work situation as the team leader does. Potential differences in preferences will form no real concern to the manager.

As the team leader deals with the work process every day, he is most concerned about the way it is shaped. It seems a natural part of his job to have some discretion on this issue. Therefore, the team leader would not get more motivated as he gets more discretion, but rather be less motivated when he has no discretion at all.

The only manager who reported that he does differentiate between team leaders, stated that differences in the information position of team leaders were the main reason to do so. The team leaders that had the best knowledge about all the processes that take place during the week would have more discretion in shaping those processes than team leaders with less knowledge. The team leaders who worked most and those with the highest tenure were the ones who were supposed to have more knowledge. If there is differentiation, it seems likely to be because of differences in information.

5.4 Discrepancy between managers' and team leaders' reports

The outcomes of the questionnaires showed that there were discrepancies between the reports of managers and team leaders in the delegation situations disciplinary actions and work process. Most managers reported that they did not differentiate between team leaders, however, team leaders reported different levels of discretion. This section aims to provide explanations for the discrepancy between managers' and team leaders' reports.

There are several possible explanations for this discrepancy. First, the research design may have affected the outcomes. Second, the division of responsibilities may not always be completely clear.

5.4.1 Research design

Using a self-administered questionnaire with closed-ended questions has several weaknesses. Self-reports may lead to biased response, closed-ended questions may lead to different interpretations of the presented possible answers.

It is possible that managers are differentiating between team leaders, but are reluctant to report it. Some managers hold the view that, since each team leader has the same job description, all team leaders should have the same discretion. Therefore, it can be seen as incorrect to say that there is differentiation between team leaders.

It could also be that team leaders reported different levels of discretion, although their actual discretion is equal. Team leaders could be overstating their discretion on purpose, for instance because they like to present themselves as more influential than they really are.

Differences in team leaders' reports may also occur because of the use of closed-ended questions. Respondents have to choose the answer that is most appropriate, which can be hard especially when the actual situation is not exactly reflected in one of the answers. There may be differences of interpretation to which answer is most appropriate, which would lead to different answers from team leaders who hold equal discretion.

5.4.2 Ambiguity about discretion

Another explanation for the discrepancy is that the actual discretion that is given to the team leader might not be completely clear to either manager or team leader.

It is possible that managers do differentiate between team leaders without the intention to do so. Instructions and feedback on issues of disciplinary actions are likely to be given in individual conversations with each team leader. Therefore, the discretion could differ among team leaders, or at least the perception of team leaders can be different.

Team leaders could also report different levels of discretion because they are not completely sure about the amount of discretion they have. Team leaders who are relatively new to the organisation or who are working few hours have less experience with situations where they have to impose sanctions. Therefore they might be more insecure of their position in these situations, and therefore more likely to seek approval from the manager. This could explain why those team leaders' reported levels of discretion are lower than those of team leaders who work more and are more tenured.

Also in the situation of shaping the work process, differences in the reports of team leaders may occur because team leaders are uncertain about their discretion and therefore are less likely to take action without consulting the manager. Another important issue here is that decisions about the work process are usually taken in meetings of team leaders. In those meetings, it is not always clear-cut who has the right to decide. Team leaders with more experience and more information on the current situation may feel more confident to influence the final decision.

6. Conclusion

This chapter forms the conclusion of this thesis. The first section discusses the results in the four delegation situations. Based on those results and the differences between situations, a conclusion for the research is formulated. Although the analysis showed that interpretation of the results was somewhat ambiguous, the conclusion focuses on the possible relation between information and delegation, as this was the purpose of the research. More research is necessary to further clarify the nature of the results. Suggestions for such research and other directions for further research are discussed in the second section.

6.1 Discussion of results

There is one delegation situation where information does not have any significant effect. In the case of recruitment, other factors are deemed to be more important. The reason for this result lies in the fact that the private information of the team leader is not the information that is most important for this decision. Furthermore, this private information can be communicated easily.

In the other three situations, there may be a significant relation between information and delegation. However, the nature of this relation differs between situations. In the case of making the week schedule, it is clear that current (short-term) information is most relevant. This is also the kind of information that is better available to team leaders than to managers. In the cases of disciplinary actions and the work process, the team leaders' informational advantage is also supposed to lie in the information about the current situation. That the relation between information and delegation is not as clear-cut as in the situation of scheduling, might be due to the knowledge that is necessary to interpret and use this short-term information. This knowledge can only be obtained by extensive learning, thus by being in the organisation for a long time.

This poses the question why there is not such a result in the situation of making the week schedule. One might expect that in that situation there is also some knowledge required to take benefits from private short-term information. A possible explanation for the different results is that making the week schedule is a highly specific task. The knowledge that is necessary to assess the relevant information is also much more specific and can be obtained by specific training. In contrast, taking disciplinary actions and shaping the work process are more general tasks, which can involve many different aspects of the job and the organisation.

Therefore, the knowledge that is necessary to benefit from private information in those situations can only be obtained through extensive learning.

In general, the research of this thesis shows that private information on the side of the agents can be a relevant factor in the delegation decision. However some requirements have to be met before information becomes relevant. First, the agents' private information has to be of sufficient relevance to the task that might be delegated. Also, this information should not be easily communicated. Most important result of this research is that the agent should have the ability to interpret and use his private information when a task is delegated to him. The agent has to develop this ability through learning. The nature of the learning process may differ per situation. If specific knowledge is required, the learning process may be short and intensive. However, for more general tasks, experience will be an important factor and the learning process is likely to take longer and be of a more extensive nature.

6.2 Suggestions for further research

The most prominent conclusion from the research is that, to make the informational advantage relevant in the delegation choice, an agent needs to have the ability to interpret the private information he holds. In many theoretical models, it is the principal who has insufficient knowledge to either gather or process information. In those cases, the agent is usually seen as an expert advisor. In general, theoretical articles on delegation do not consider a situation where the agent does not have enough knowledge to use his private information. However, there are articles that consider agents with differences in ability. Recall for instance Bénabou and Tirole (2003) and Crutzen, Swank and Visser (forthcoming), who consider delegation as a tool to signal ability to an agent.

A possible way to extend theoretical literature is to incorporate the learning process in the delegation decision. For tasks that require more general knowledge, experience is likely to be an important factor in this learning process. One could argue that this learning process can be accelerated by performing related tasks ("learning by doing"). In this line of reasoning, delegation of tasks could be a tool to develop valuable capacities of an agent. The principal would incur a cost for delegating to an agent with low ability in the first period, but may profit there from in later periods because of a learning effect.

The information perspective is just one of the possible interpretations of the results. Instead of a necessary learning process to be able to interpret private information, the results could also mean that an agent needs to be sufficiently committed to the organisation to get more

discretion over time. Another possibility is that there are no real differences in discretion between team leaders, and these outcomes are merely a result of biased reports. Further research is necessary to gain better insights in the exact nature of the results.

The present research could be extended in several ways. Obviously, a larger sample could lead to more significant results. Larger samples are also necessary to make an increase of the number of explanatory variables possible. Using different operationalizations of the information position of the team leader may help to get a less equivocal result. Finally, one could consider qualitative research to get more insight in the determinants of delegation.

Theoretical models on delegation name several factors that influence delegation decision. This research has just looked at one aspect, asymmetric information. More empirical research on this and other determinants of delegation should be done. Some empirical research has been done recently, but there still remains a lot to explore. As the theoretical literature expands, the need for empirical testing remains even more present.

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Appendix A. Construction of the disciplinary actions factor

In a set of correlated variables, there may be one or more underlying factors that can explain the correlation between these variables. The idea is that the common variance of these variables can be explained by their dependence on one or more unobserved factors. Factor Analysis is a technique to determine these factors.

In this thesis, the variables that might depend on an underlying factor are the observations on team leaders' authority in taking four different disciplinary actions. As these variables all measure a different dimension of the same concept, i.e. the authority to take disciplinary actions, one would expect that there is a factor that can explain the common variance between those variables.

Using factor analysis, one of the main decisions is the choice of the number of factors to be retained. A much-used rule is that the factors to be retained should be those with an eigenvalue greater than one. This rule is known as the Guttman-Kaiser criterion. The simplest intuition behind this rule is that factors with an eigenvalue greater than one explain more of the total variance than one of the original variables does.

Table 16 Factors and eigenvalues

Factor	Eigenvalue
Factor 1	1,12802
Factor 2	0,26834
Factor 3	-0,17489
Factor 4	-0,026700

There is one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one. This factor is used as measure for authority on disciplinary actions in the analysis in this thesis. The factor score on each observation is calculated using the factor loading for each variable. The factor loading is a measure of the correlation between a variable and a factor; the squared factor loading equals the percentage of variance in a variable that is explained by the factor.

Table 17 Factor loadings for Factor 1

Variable	Factor Loading
Not register (overtime) work	0,4883
Give official warning	0,6611
Temporary dismissal	0,4695
Termination of contract	0,4818

Appendix B. Questionnaire for team leaders

Filiaalnummer:

[][][][][]

A. De volgende vragen gaan over situaties in het werk waarin een beslissing moet worden genomen. Er wordt gevraagd naar de afspraak die je met je (A)SM gemaakt hebt over wie de beslissing mag nemen. Je kan steeds maximaal één antwoord aankruisen.

I. Elke week moet de weekplanning voor jouw team gemaakt worden. Hierover gaan de volgende vragen.

a) de weekplanning van mijn team:

- wordt gemaakt door mijn (A)SM → *ga verder op pagina 2*
- wordt gemaakt door een andere Teamleider → *ga verder op pagina 2*
- wordt door mij gemaakt

b) als ik de weekplanning gemaakt heb:

- hoef ik die niet aan mijn (A)SM te laten zien, die ziet achteraf wel of het goed was
- moet ik altijd aan mijn (A)SM goedkeuring vragen voor de planning definitief is
- moet ik die altijd aan mijn (A)SM laten zien, die controleert en past als het nodig is de planning aan

c) De volgende stellingen gaan over jouw beleving bij de verantwoordelijkheid die je op dit punt krijgt van je (A)SM.

1= heel erg mee oneens

10= heel erg mee eens

1. Ik ben meer gemotiveerd als ik zelf de verantwoordelijkheid heb om beslissingen te nemen
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2. Als ik van mijn (A)SM de verantwoordelijkheid voor de planning krijg, zie ik dat als een teken dat hij vertrouwen heeft in mijn kwaliteiten als TL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

3. Ik ben meer gemotiveerd als ik het gevoel krijg dat ik goed ben in mijn werk
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

4. Als ik meer verantwoordelijkheden krijg dan andere TLs zie ik dat als een signaal dat ik een betere teamleider ben dan zij
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

5. Als ik minder verantwoordelijkheden krijg dan andere TLs zie ik dat als een signaal dat ik een minder goede teamleider ben dan zij
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

II. Het team heeft regelmatig nieuwe medewerkers nodig. Het voeren van sollicitatiegesprekken en het aannemen van nieuwe medewerkers kan een taak zijn van de (A)SM, maar kan ook door Teamleiders gedaan worden. Hierover gaan de volgende vragen.

- a) Het aannemen van nieuwe medewerkers voor Team Verkoopklaar
- wordt alleen gedaan door het MT → *ga verder op pagina 4*
 - wordt (ook) gedaan door teamleiders
- b) Welke teamleiders zijn verantwoordelijk voor het aannemen van nieuwe medewerkers?
- Alleen ikzelf
 - (sommige) andere teamleiders en ikzelf
 - Alle teamleiders
 - Alleen (sommige) andere teamleiders → *ga verder op pagina 4*
- c) Als ik nieuwe medewerkers aanneem:
- moet ik rekening houden met voorwaarden die mijn (A)SM gesteld heeft (bv. leeftijd, contractduur, aantal contracturen)
 - stelt de (A)SM geen voorwaarden waaraan nieuwe medewerkers moeten voldoen, dat mag ik helemaal zelf weten → *ga verder naar pagina 4*
- d) Deze afspraak heb ik met mijn (A)SM heb over het aannemen van nieuwe medewerkers:
- Ik mag aannemen wie ik wil binnen de voorwaarden van de (A)SM, anders moet ik toestemming vragen
 - Ik mag binnen de voorwaarden van de (A)SM iedereen aannemen, daarbuiten niemand
 - Ik moet altijd goedkeuring vragen aan de (A)SM voor ik iemand aanneem

e) De volgende stellingen gaan over jouw beleving bij de verantwoordelijkheid die je op dit punt krijgt van je (A)SM.

1= heel erg mee oneens

10= heel erg mee eens

1. Ik ben meer gemotiveerd als ik zelf de verantwoordelijkheid heb om beslissingen te nemen
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2. Als ik van mijn (A)SM de verantwoordelijkheid voor de sollicitaties krijg, zie ik dat als een teken dat hij vertrouwen heeft in mijn kwaliteiten als TL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

3. Ik ben meer gemotiveerd als ik het gevoel krijg dat ik goed ben in mijn werk
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

4. Als ik meer verantwoordelijkheden krijg dan andere TLs zie ik dat als een signaal dat ik een betere teamleider ben dan zij
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

5. Als ik minder verantwoordelijkheden krijg dan andere TLs zie ik dat als een signaal dat ik een minder goede teamleider ben dan zij
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

III. Als een medewerker de regels overtreedt (bijvoorbeeld niet op komt dagen, zich ten onrechte ziek meldt, diefstal pleegt of zijn werk niet afmaakt) kan er de beslissing genomen worden om een sanctie op te leggen. In deze vraag noemen we een aantal mogelijke sancties. Per sanctie vragen we door wie die sanctie mag worden opgelegd.

a) Beslissen om (een deel van) de uren van een medewerker niet uit te betalen (bijv. als hij moet overwerken omdat zijn werk niet op tijd af is of omdat een ziekmelding niet volgens de regels gebeurt)

- Mag ik als TL zelf beslissen **zonder overleg met de (A)SM**
- Mag ik als TL alleen beslissen **na overleg met de (A)SM**
- Mag alleen de (A)SM beslissen
- Mag ik **soms zelf** beslissen, maar **in sommige gevallen** heb ik **toestemming van mijn ASM** nodig. Geef aan wanneer toestemming nodig is: _____

b) Het geven van een officiële waarschuwing:

- Mag ik als TL zelf doen **zonder overleg met de (A)SM**
- Mag ik als TL alleen doen **na overleg met de (A)SM**
- Mag alleen de (A)SM doen
- Mag ik **soms zelf** doen, maar **in sommige gevallen** heb ik **toestemming van mijn (A)SM** nodig. Geef aan wanneer toestemming nodig is: _____

c) Het schorsen van een medewerker:

- Mag ik als TL zelf doen **zonder overleg met de (A)SM**
- Mag ik als TL alleen doen **na overleg met de (A)SM**
- Mag alleen de (A)SM doen
- Mag ik **soms zelf** doen, maar **in sommige gevallen** heb ik **toestemming van mijn (A)SM** nodig. Geef aan wanneer toestemming nodig is: _____

d) Het ontslaan van een medewerker:

- Mag ik als TL zelf doen **zonder overleg met de (A)SM**
- Mag ik als TL alleen doen **na overleg met de (A)SM**
- Mag alleen de (A)SM doen
- Mag ik **soms zelf** doen, maar **in sommige gevallen** heb ik **toestemming van mijn (A)SM** nodig. Geef aan wanneer toestemming nodig is: _____

e) Andere teamleiders:

- Mogen evenveel zelf beslissen als ik
- Mogen meer zelf beslissen dan ik
- Mogen minder zelf beslissen dan ik
- Sommige teamleiders mogen meer beslissen, andere minder

f) De volgende stellingen gaan over jouw beleving bij de verantwoordelijkheid die je op dit punt krijgt van je (A)SM.

1= heel erg mee oneens

10= heel erg mee eens

1. Ik ben meer gemotiveerd als ik zelf de verantwoordelijkheid heb om beslissingen te nemen
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2. Als ik van mijn (A)SM de verantwoordelijkheid krijg om zelf sancties op te leggen, zie ik dat als een teken dat hij vertrouwen heeft in mijn kwaliteiten als TL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3. Ik ben meer gemotiveerd als ik het gevoel krijg dat ik goed ben in mijn werk
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4. Als ik meer verantwoordelijkheden krijg dan andere TLs zie ik dat als een signaal dat ik een betere teamleider ben dan zij
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5. Als ik minder verantwoordelijkheden krijg dan andere TLs zie ik dat als een signaal dat ik een minder goede teamleider ben dan zij
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

IV. In de handboeken en opleidingen heeft Albert Heijn beschreven hoe de werkprocessen ingericht moeten zijn. Elke winkel moet hier echter zijn eigen invulling aan geven, denk bijvoorbeeld aan het dagritme (“de klok”) waarin staat op welk moment je welke activiteit doet. De volgende vraag gaat over wie bepaalt hoe het werkproces is ingericht.

a) Beslissingen over de inrichting van het werkproces:

- Worden genomen door teamleiders, waaronder ikzelf
- Worden door andere teamleiders genomen, maar niet door mij
- Worden door mij genomen, maar niet door andere teamleiders
- Worden alleen door de (A)SM genomen

b) Wat is de rol van de van de (A)SM bij de inrichting van het werkproces?

- De (A)SM bemoeit zich niet met veranderingen in het werkproces
- De (A)SM neemt de definitieve beslissing als teamleiders voorstellen doen voor grote veranderingen, over kleine veranderingen beslissen de Teamleiders zelfstandig
- De (A)SM neemt altijd de definitieve beslissing als teamleiders voorstellen doen voor veranderingen in het werkproces
- De (A)SM bepaalt alles wat er verandert in het werkproces

c) De volgende stellingen gaan over jouw beleving bij de verantwoordelijkheid die je op dit punt krijgt van je (A)SM.

1= heel erg mee oneens

10= heel erg mee eens

1. Ik ben meer gemotiveerd als ik zelf de verantwoordelijkheid heb om beslissingen te nemen

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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2. Als ik van mijn (A)SM de verantwoordelijkheid krijg om zelf beslissingen te nemen, zie ik dat als een teken dat hij vertrouwen heeft in mijn kwaliteiten als TL

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

3. Ik ben meer gemotiveerd als ik het gevoel krijg dat ik goed ben in mijn werk

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

4. Als ik meer verantwoordelijkheden krijg dan andere TLs zie ik dat als een signaal dat ik een betere teamleider ben dan zij

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

5. Als ik minder verantwoordelijkheden krijg dan andere TLs zie ik dat als een signaal dat ik een minder goede teamleider ben dan zij

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

B. De vragen in dit deel gaan over overige gegevens die van belang kunnen zijn voor het onderzoek.

Leeftijd: _____ jaar

Wat is het niveau van de hoogste opleiding die je hebt afgerond?

- Basisschool
- VMBO
- HAVO
- VWO
- MBO
- HBO
- Universitair

Wat is het niveau van je huidige opleiding (die je dus nog niet afgerond hebt)?

- Ik volg momenteel geen opleiding
- VMBO
- HAVO
- VWO
- MBO
- HBO
- Universitair

Hoeveel uur werk je per week (contracturen)? _____ uur

Hoe lang werk je al bij Albert Heijn? _____ jaar en _____ maanden

Hoe lang ben je al Teamleider? _____ jaar en _____ maanden

Dit was de laatste vraag.

Controleer nog een keer of je alle vragen beantwoord hebt.

Bedankt voor je medewerking aan het onderzoek!

Appendix C. Questionnaire for managers

Filiaalnummer:

[][][][][]

- A. De volgende vragen gaan over situaties in het werk waarin een beslissing moet worden genomen. Er wordt gevraagd naar de afspraak die met de Teamleiders gemaakt is over wie de beslissing mag nemen. Je kan steeds maximaal 1 antwoord aankruisen, tenzij er anders staat aangegeven.**

I. Elke week moet de weekplanning voor elk team gemaakt worden. Hierover gaan de volgende vragen.

a) de weekplanning van team VK:

- worden gemaakt door de (A)SM → *ga verder op pagina 3*
- wordt gemaakt door een Teamleider

b) als de TL de weekplanning gemaakt heeft:

- hoeft de TL die niet aan een (A)SM te laten zien, die ziet achteraf wel of het goed was
- moet de TL die altijd aan een (A)SM goedkeuring vragen voor de planning definitief is
- moet de TL die altijd aan een (A)SM laten zien, die controleert en past (als het nodig is) de planning aan

c) Hieronder staan een aantal mogelijke redenen om de Teamleider de verantwoordelijkheid voor de weekplanning te geven. Geef op een schaal van 1 tot 10 aan in welke mate deze redenen van toepassing zijn bij jouw beslissing om deze taak wel of niet aan een Teamleider te delegeren.

1 = geheel niet van toepassing

10 = heel erg van toepassing

1. Ik delegeer deze taak aan mijn TL omdat ik verwacht dat hij meer gemotiveerd is als hij zelf beslissingen mag nemen

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2. Door te delegeren wil ik mijn TL het signaal geven dat ik vertrouwen heb in zijn capaciteiten

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

3. Ik verwacht dat TLs meer gemotiveerd raken als ze meer vertrouwen hebben in hun eigen capaciteiten

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

4. Ik laat de Teamleider besluiten omdat die beter op de hoogte is van zaken die voor het maken van de weekplanning van belang zijn

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

d) Hieronder staan een aantal mogelijke redenen om de ene Teamleider meer verantwoordelijkheid te geven dan de andere. Geef op een schaal van 1 tot 10 aan in welke mate deze redenen een van toepassing zijn bij jouw beslissing om de verantwoordelijkheid juist aan deze Teamleider te delegeren.

1 = geheel niet van toepassing

10 = heel erg van toepassing

1. Ik geef meer verantwoordelijkheid aan de Teamleider waarvan ik denk dat hij ongeveer dezelfde beslissingen neemt als ik zelf zou doen

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2. Ik kies ervoor om het maken van de planning te delegeren aan een TL waarvan ik denk dat hij de capaciteiten heeft om ingewikkelder beslissingen te nemen

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

3. Ik kies ervoor om het maken van de planning te laten doen door een TL die zijn "normale" werk erg goed uitvoert

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

II. Het team heeft regelmatig nieuwe medewerkers nodig. Het voeren van sollicitatiegesprekken en het aannemen van nieuwe medewerkers kan een taak zijn van de (A)SM, maar kan ook door Teamleiders gedaan worden. Hierover gaan de volgende vragen.

a) Het aannemen van nieuwe medewerkers voor Verkoopklaar

- wordt alleen gedaan door het MT → *ga verder op pagina 5*
- wordt gedaan door sommige teamleiders, maar niet door alle
- wordt gedaan door alle teamleiders

b) Als een TL nieuwe medewerkers aanneemt:

- moet hij rekening houden met voorwaarden die de (A)SM gesteld heeft (bijv. leeftijd, contractduur, aantal contracturen)
- mag hij helemaal zelf bepalen wie hij wel een niet aanneemt → *ga verder met vraag (d)*

c) als de TL nieuwe medewerkers aanneemt:

- mag hij aannemen wie hij wil binnen de voorwaarden van de (A)SM, anders moet hij toestemming vragen
- mag hij binnen de voorwaarden van de (A)SM iedereen aannemen, daarbuiten niemand
- moet hij altijd toestemming vragen voor hij iemand aanneemt

d) Hieronder staan een aantal mogelijke redenen om de Teamleider de verantwoordelijkheid voor sollicitaties te geven. Geef op een schaal van 1 tot 10 aan in welke mate deze redenen een van toepassing zijn bij jouw beslissing om de verantwoordelijkheid wel of niet aan een Teamleider te delegeren.

1 = geheel niet van toepassing

10 = heel erg van toepassing

1. Ik delegeer deze taak aan mijn TL omdat ik verwacht dat hij meer gemotiveerd is als hij zelf beslissingen mag nemen

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2. Door te delegeren wil ik mijn TL het signaal geven dat ik vertrouwen heb in zijn capaciteiten

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

3. Ik verwacht dat TLs meer gemotiveerd raken als ze meer vertrouwen hebben in hun eigen capaciteiten

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

4. Ik laat een Teamleider besluiten omdat die beter op de hoogte is van zaken die voor deze beslissing van belang zijn

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

e) *Deze vraag hoef je alleen te beantwoorden als sommige Teamleiders wel sollicitaties doen en andere niet*

Hieronder staan een aantal mogelijke redenen om de ene Teamleider meer verantwoordelijkheid te geven dan de andere. Geef op een schaal van 1 tot 10 aan in welke mate deze redenen een van toepassing zijn bij jouw beslissing om de verantwoordelijkheid juist aan deze Teamleider te delegeren.

1 = geheel niet van toepassing

10 = heel erg van toepassing

1. Ik geef meer verantwoordelijkheid aan de Teamleider waarvan ik denk dat hij ongeveer dezelfde beslissingen neemt als ik zelf zou doen

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2. Ik kies ervoor om de sollicitaties te laten doen door TLs waarvan ik denk dat ze de capaciteiten hebben om ingewikkelder beslissingen te nemen

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

3. Ik kies ervoor om de sollicitaties te laten doen te laten doen door TLs die hun "normale" werk erg goed uitvoeren

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

III. Als een medewerker de regels overtreedt (bijvoorbeeld niet op komt dagen, zich ten onrechte ziek meldt, diefstal pleegt of zijn werk niet afmaakt) kan er de beslissing genomen worden om een sanctie op te leggen. In deze vraag gaat het erom welke bevoegdheden teamleiders hebben om sancties op te leggen. Bij elke deelvraag kunnen meerdere antwoorden worden aangekruist.

- a) Als een medewerker de regels overtreedt mag de TL **zonder toestemming van de (A)SM:**
- (een deel van) Zijn uren niet uitbetalen (bv. bij ongeldige ziekmelding of overwerk omdat zijn werk niet op tijd af is)
 - Hem een officiële waarschuwing geven
 - Hem schorsen
 - Hem ontslaan
- b) Als een medewerker de regels overtreedt mag de TL de volgende sancties opleggen **na overleg met de (A)SM:**
- Zijn uren niet uitbetalen
 - Hem een officiële waarschuwing geven
 - Hem schorsen
 - Hem ontslaan
- c) Als een medewerker de regels overtreedt kan de TL zijn (A)SM **advies geven** de volgende sanctie te nemen, **waarna de (A)SM altijd beslist:**
- Zijn uren niet uitbetalen
 - Hem een officiële waarschuwing geven
 - Hem schorsen
 - Hem ontslaan

d) Hieronder staan een aantal mogelijke redenen om de Teamleider de beslissingsverantwoordelijkheid te geven. Geef op een schaal van 1 tot 10 aan in welke mate deze redenen een van toepassing zijn bij jouw beslissing om de verantwoordelijkheid wel of niet aan een Teamleider te delegeren.

1 = geheel niet van toepassing

10 = heel erg van toepassing

1. Ik geef verantwoordelijkheid aan mijn TL omdat ik verwacht dat hij meer gemotiveerd is als hij zelf beslissingen mag nemen
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2. Door verantwoordelijkheid te delegeren wil ik mijn TL het signaal geven dat ik vertrouwen heb in zijn capaciteiten
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3. Ik verwacht dat TLs meer gemotiveerd raken als ze meer vertrouwen hebben in hun eigen capaciteiten
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4. Ik laat de Teamleider besluiten omdat die beter op de hoogte is van zaken die voor deze beslissing van belang zijn
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

e) Laat je elke Teamleider evenveel zelf beslissen?

Ja → *ga verder naar pagina 7*

Nee

f) Hieronder staan een aantal mogelijke redenen om de ene Teamleider meer verantwoordelijkheid te geven dan de andere. Geef op een schaal van 1 tot 10 aan in welke mate deze redenen een van toepassing zijn bij jouw beslissing om de verantwoordelijkheid juist aan deze Teamleider te delegeren.

1 = geheel niet van toepassing

10 = heel erg van toepassing

1. Ik geef meer verantwoordelijkheid aan de Teamleider waarvan ik denk dat hij ongeveer dezelfde beslissingen neemt als ik zelf zou doen
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2. Ik kies ervoor om belangrijke beslissingen te delegeren aan TLs waarvan ik denk dat ze de capaciteiten hebben om ingewikkelder beslissingen te nemen
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3. Ik kies ervoor om belangrijke beslissingen te delegeren aan TLs die hun "normale" werk erg goed uitvoeren
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

IV. In de handboeken en opleidingen heeft Albert Heijn beschreven hoe de werkprocessen ingericht moeten zijn. Elke winkel moet hier echter zijn eigen invulling aan geven, denk bijvoorbeeld aan het dagritme (“de klok”) waarin staat op welk moment je welke activiteit doet. De volgende vraag gaat over wie bepaalt hoe het werkproces is ingericht.

a) Beslissingen over de inrichting van het werkproces:

- Nemen de teamleiders in overleg met elkaar, zonder dat de ASM zich daarmee bemoeit → *ga verder met vraag (c)*
- Worden niet genomen zonder dat de ASM er mee te maken heeft gehad → *beantwoord ook (b)*

b) de rol van de van de ASM bij de inrichting van het werkproces is:

- Voorstellen van teamleiders bekijken, sturing geven en opvolgen
- Voorstellen van teamleiders bekijken, geeft geen sturing maar stelt een deadline voor een nieuw voorstel
- De ASM bepaalt alles wat er verandert in het werkproces

c) Hieronder staan een aantal mogelijke redenen om de Teamleider beslissingsverantwoordelijkheid te geven. Geef op een schaal van 1 tot 10 aan in welke mate deze redenen een van toepassing zijn bij jouw beslissing om de verantwoordelijkheid wel of niet aan een Teamleider te delegeren.

1 = geheel niet van toepassing

10 = heel erg van toepassing

1. Ik delegeer deze taak aan mijn TL omdat ik verwacht dat hij meer gemotiveerd is als hij zelf beslissingen mag nemen

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4. Ik laat de Teamleiders besluiten omdat die beter op de hoogte zijn van zaken die voor deze beslissing van belang zijn

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

d) Laat je elke Teamleider evenveel beslissen?

- Ja → *ga verder op pagina 9*
- Nee

e) Hieronder staan een aantal mogelijke redenen om de ene Teamleider meer verantwoordelijkheid te geven dan de andere. Geef op een schaal van 1 tot 10 aan in welke mate deze redenen een van toepassing zijn bij jouw beslissing om de verantwoordelijkheid juist aan deze Teamleider te delegeren.

1 = geheel niet van toepassing

10 = heel erg van toepassing

1. Ik geef meer verantwoordelijkheid aan de Teamleider waarvan ik denk dat hij ongeveer dezelfde beslissingen neemt als ik zelf zou doen

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

3. Ik kies ervoor om belangrijke beslissingen te delegeren aan TLs die hun "normale" werk erg goed uitvoeren

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

B. De vragen in dit deel gaan over overige gegevens die van belang kunnen zijn voor het onderzoek.

Functie:

- ASM
- SM

Hoeveel uur werk je per week? _____ uur

Leeftijd: _____ jaar

Wat is het niveau van de hoogste opleiding die je hebt afgerond?

- Basisschool
- VMBO
- HAVO
- VWO
- MBO
- HBO
- Universitair

Hoe lang werk je al bij Albert Heijn? _____ jaar en _____ maanden

Hoe lang ben je al werkzaam in deze functie? _____ jaar en _____ maanden

De omzet van de winkel per week is:

- Minder dan 100.000 euro
- 100.000-200.000 euro
- 200.000-300.000 euro
- 300.000-400.000 euro
- 400.000-500.000 euro
- Meer dan 500.000 euro

Het winkeloppervlak is ongeveer: _____ m²

Het aantal medewerkers in de winkel is _____

Aantal Teamleiders VK: _____

Het management team heeft een formatie van _____ uur per week

Dit was de laatste vraag. Controleer nog een keer of je alle vragen beantwoord hebt. Bedankt voor je medewerking aan het onderzoek!