The Politics of Conditional Cash Transfers of the Philippines

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Emma Lynn L. Dadap
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Members of the examining committee:
Dr. Andrew M. Fischer [Supervisor]
Dr. Saturnino M. Borras, Jr. [Reader]

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Inquiries:
Postal address: Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands
Location: Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands
Telephone: +31 70 426 0460
Fax: +31 70 426 0799
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>CARP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program</td>
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<td>CCT/CCTs</td>
<td>Conditional Cash Transfers</td>
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<tr>
<td>DepEd</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
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<td>DILG</td>
<td>Department of Interior and Local Government</td>
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<td>DOH</td>
<td>Department of Health</td>
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<td>DSWD</td>
<td>Department of Social Welfare and Development</td>
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<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<td>E-VAT</td>
<td>Expanded Value Added Tax</td>
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<td>FDC</td>
<td>Freedom from Debt Coalition</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>FIES</td>
<td>Family Income and Expenditures Survey</td>
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<td>GRS</td>
<td>Grievance Redress System</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>KALAHI</td>
<td>Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan Program</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MST</td>
<td>Landless Workers’ Movement</td>
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<td>NAPC</td>
<td>National Anti-Poverty Commission</td>
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<td>NHTS-PR</td>
<td>National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction</td>
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<td>NSCB</td>
<td>National Statistical Coordination Board</td>
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<td>NSO</td>
<td>National Statistics Office</td>
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<td>PCIJ</td>
<td>Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism</td>
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<td>PCUP</td>
<td>Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor</td>
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<td>PIDS</td>
<td>Philippine Institute for Development Studies</td>
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<td>PMT</td>
<td>Proxy Means Test</td>
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<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnership</td>
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<td>SAE</td>
<td>Small Area Estimates</td>
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<td>SAPs</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programs</td>
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<td>SOBUSTEHA</td>
<td>South Bus Terminal Homeowners’ Association</td>
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<td>SWP</td>
<td>Social Watch Philippines</td>
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<td>TULHOA</td>
<td>Tarkum Upper Laguerta Homeowners’ Association</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>4Ps</td>
<td>Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (old nickname)</td>
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Abstract

This research examined the conditional cash transfer program of the Philippines, dubbed Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (Pantawid Pamilya), through a historical institutional approach. It sought to answer the questions, “Why did the Philippine government decide to embark on a CCT program? How has this decision been influenced by the historical and institutional contexts of social policy of the country, as well as the various forces in the state and in society, and with what implications?”

The results show that on the surface, the government’s decision to adopt, continue, and subsequently expand CCTs has been triggered by the urgent need to address poverty in the country, as well as the intent to meet the MDG targets, especially as regards reduction of poverty and hunger, and improvement in education and health indicators. But digging deeper, this decision only reflects the country’s unchanged social policy trajectory epitomized by the bias for targeted, palliative, and purportedly apolitical social provision measures, not to mention externally-influenced, drawing “encouragement” and financial support from multilateral institutions, all at the expense of structural reform and redistribution. The results further show that the very nature of the scheme which is loath to confront structural issues, paints a bleak picture for the long-term solution of the problems of poverty and inequality, and the necessary shift towards a more redistributive and/or universal social provision.

If anything, the Philippine case (re)emphasizes the fact that social policymaking is never a straightforward process, and that there is no hard and fast rule to explain the policy positions of forces in the state and in society at certain junctures.

Key Words

conditional cash transfers, CCTs, social policy
Chapter 1
Introduction

Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are among the most popular social protection schemes today. Promoted by multilateral institutions, notably the World Bank, CCTs have been adopted in at least 30 countries as of 2008, with further ones expected to follow suit in the coming years (WB’s CCT Webpage). The map below shows these country-adopters.

CCTs are grounded on the principle that human capital accumulation is a development vehicle which can be achieved by providing money to poor households, often to women, on conditions that they ensure children’s regular attendance in school, accompany them to health clinics, and participate in classes and workshops on topics related to health, nutrition, and sanitation (St. Claire 2009: 177; Bradshaw 2008: 188; Hall 2006: 691). Citing the experiences of Latin American countries, particularly Mexico and Brazil, advocates have repeatedly claimed that CCTs are an effective and efficient means of reducing poverty and hunger, keeping children in school, enhancing the use of preventive healthcare, empowering women, and increasing the freedom of poor households to invest in their varied needs (WB’s CCT Webpage; ECLAC 2004). No wonder, with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) deadline getting near, CCTs have been in vogue in a number of countries, including that archipelagic country in the east—the Philippines.

Map 1.1. Conditional Cash Transfers in the World as of 2008

Source: WB’s CCT Webpage
In view of the worsening poverty situation and the MDG targets, the Philippine government ran a pilot CCT project in 2007, targeting 6,000 poor households in two provinces and two cities. It proceeded to implementing a full-scale program in 2008, calling it Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) and targeting 320,000 additional households.

When Benigno Aquino III was elected president in 2010, he decided to sustain his predecessor’s 4Ps, and further expand its coverage so that when he bows out of the presidency in 2016, it will have reached a total of 4.3 million households (PCIJ 2011). Quoting the Philippine Development Plan 2011–2016, CCTs are the “cornerstone” upon which the government “has anchored [the] epic battle against poverty in the land” (ibid.).

This research has avoided the usual route of scrutinizing the implementation and (non)impact of CCTs in particular, and of development programs in general. It has taken one step back, and examined the factors that influenced or helped shape the government’s decision to adopt CCTs in a country marked by a long history of poverty and inequality, and was once described as the Latin America in Asia1. The interest on this topic grew out of the observation of the government’s continued adherence to the so-called residual type of social policy and social provision despite the lessons learned from and the criticisms hurled at past and on-going initiatives. It is in fact worth noting that the 4Ps which of late is called Pantawid Pamilya, is just one of the targeted and palliative poverty reduction measures pursued in the country. An earlier one, and internationally acclaimed at that, is the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (Linking Arms Against Poverty) or KALAHI which has been the flagship poverty reduction program since 2003.

A critical review of the KALAHI program reveals that its overall intervention does not offer a more permanent and effective way out of poverty because it lacks coherent plans and mutually supporting projects; and that its social protection component is neither broadly implemented nor viewed to provide permanent economic opportunities for the poor to accumulate assets and to engage in permanent income generating activities (Lim 2009: 29). An assessment of the Philippines’ performance vis-à-vis the MDGs supports this analysis. It stresses that...

Social protection in the Philippines is not universal; it is simply a bundle of safety net measures targeted at the poorest of the poor. It is [neither] a rights-based entitlement for all citizens…[nor a determined effort to] address the structural causes of poverty…Since it only targets the “poorest of the poor”, many poor remained excluded from the government’s anti-poverty programs. (Serrano in Social Watch Philippines 2010: 23)

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1Please see Nelson 2007 for an interesting discussion on the similarities between the Philippines and some Latin American countries, leading to a conclusion that the Philippines is just Asian in location, but Latin American in everything else.
The analytical position adopted here is that “policy choices are very political” no matter how they are couched in technocratic jargon and touted as neutral (Fischer 2010: 40). As further explained, “social policies are the outcomes of political bargains and conflicts since they touch upon power in society—its distribution and accessibility to different political actors” (Mkandawire 2004: 11 and 12). It is therefore imperative to unravel the interplay of different political processes, institutions, and actors, along with their diverse agenda and ideological persuasions in order to gain a better understanding of social policy choices.

This research posits that the Philippine government’s decision to adopt CCTs reflects the unchanged social policy trajectory marked by the tendency towards targeted, palliative, and supposedly apolitical social provision, not to mention externally-influenced, drawing “encouragement” and support from multilateral institutions, all at the expense of structural reform and redistribution (i.e., asset reform, employment creation, recall of unfair international trade rules and agreements). This trajectory has been defined by the interaction of various political institutions, also called “the rules of the game”, as well as actors, notably the elites whose longstanding dominance in the political and economic arenas has compelled and enabled them to suppress or overturn reform efforts that threaten their position and hold of power.

That being said, CCTs paint a bleak picture for the long-term solution to poverty and inequality in the country mainly because like many other World Bank/multilateral donor-backed initiatives, they preclude rationalizing and confronting the structural roots of these problems. Framed in a way that appeals to the elites, middle class, masses, policymakers, bureaucrats, academics, and even a number of progressives—a program that addresses the laziness of the poor by requiring them to do something in exchange for some amount; a program that invests in the well-being of children; a program that efficiently uses the limited resources of government; a program that is supposedly “apolitical”, “neutral”, or “non-partisan” and thus effectively reduces the likelihood of manipulation by politicos—a broad agreement of outright support for Pantawid Pamilya has been created despite warnings that it may only serve the Washington Consensus agenda of limiting the state, leaving the market to take care of income and welfare distribution, and granting mere safety nets to people who lose out in the process.

Pantawid Pamilya is nothing but a continuation of the purportedly apolitical social policy of the country, and as such, runs the risk of obstructing government and society from going beyond palliatives and undertaking the untidy process of structural reform and distribution. With a situation like this, it is not to be expected that the program will catalyze the shift towards a redistributive and/or universal social provision.
1.1. Brief Background on Poverty in the Philippines

The Philippines is a country in the Southeast Asia in the western part of the Pacific Ocean. Its population based on the 2007 census is 88.5 million, of which 44.8 are males and 43.8 are females. Its average population growth rate as of that same year is 2.04 which registers a .32 decrease from 2000's 2.36. (NSO Website)

Based on World Bank records, the growth in the country has been averaging around five percent over the last 10 years, except in 2010, where it has reached 7.6 percent, the highest in 30 years. Despite this positive picture, however, poverty continues to plague the country, while inequality remains a huge obstacle in achieving major strides in poverty reduction.

The 2009 Official Poverty Statistics, the latest poverty report of the National Statistical Coordination Board, reveals that poverty incidence among the population has declined from 33.1 percent in 1991 to 24.9 percent in 2003, 26.4 in 2006, and 26.5 in 2009. Nevertheless, there still remains more than a quarter of the population, or roughly 23.14 million Filipinos living in poverty. As for subsistence incidence among the population, the figures have decreased from 16.5 percent in 1991 to 11.1 in 2003, 11.7 in 2006, and 10.8 in 2006.

As often the case, the official report differs from the unofficial report, especially if the bases are the perceptions of the poor themselves. Based on the survey conducted by the Social Weather Stations, self-rated poverty has ranged from 46 to 72 percent between 1991 and 2009. These numbers are obviously way about the official estimates. Within that period, overall self-rated hunger has averaged at 13.3 percent, of which moderate hunger has roughly been 9.8 percent, and severe hunger, 3.4 percent. Moderate hunger is when a family went hungry at least once in the last three months, while severe hunger is when a family often went hungry in the last three months. (SWS' Social Weather Indicators Webpage)

Inequality has shown a downward trend, but despite this decreasing gini ratio—from 0.4605 in 2003 to 0.4580 in 2006 to 0.4484 in 2009—it is still highest among the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (UNDP as cited in NSCB 2011: 8). For instance, for the year 2009, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam recorded a gini ratio of 0.394, 0.425, and 0.378, respectively (ibid.).

In terms of the Human Development Indicators, on one hand, the country’s performance has been promising. Its score has consistently increased from 0.550 in 1980 to 0.571 in 1990, 0.602 in 2000, 0.641 in 2010, and 0.644 in 2011, although these are still below the global and the East Asia and the Pacific averages (UNDP's Human Development Reports Webpage).
It is also important to take into account the spatial dimension of poverty. The regions with highest poverty incidence by families are the Caraga Region (39.8%) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (38.1%), while those with highest number of poor families are Central Visayas (415,303) and Bicol (385,338). The regions with highest subsistence incidence are the Zamboanga Peninsula (18.6%) and Northern Mindanao (15.6%), while those with the highest number of subsistence poor families are Central Visayas (181,649) and Bicol (137,527). Almost 40% of the income poor families are in Luzon, and 40% of the subsistence poor families are in Mindanao. (NSCB’s 2009 Poverty Statistics Webpage) Moreover, majority of the poor are still located in the rural area with figures that have remained in the 70-percent-mark since 1985 based on the estimates of Balisacan (2006).

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<tr>
<th>Table 1.1. Ratio of Urban and Rural Poverty from 1985 to 2006</th>
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<td>Urban</td>
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<td>Rural</td>
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An important point to be made about the poor in the Philippines is that they are “neither jobless nor lazy…many of them are employed simultaneously in different occupations…they cannot afford to be unemployed…” (Collas-Monsod and Monsod in Balisacan and Fujisaki 1999: 58).

1.2. Research Methodology

Inspired by historical institutional approaches in political sociology and social policy, the author started this research by understanding what CCTs were all about, thus helping her map-out the literature into a three-way debate and giving her a good grasp of the whole gamut of the CCT discourse. She likewise located CCTs within the Philippines’ social policy context, recognizing the fact that the program did not just come out of nowhere. Its genesis in the country has been influenced by the historical and institutional milieus, and its major elements have shared some semblance of past and on-going World Bank/multilateral donor-backed poverty measures. She then reviewed background papers, evaluation documents, and journal and newspaper articles to understand how such influences have led the government to embark on Pantawid Pamilya.

Finally, in an attempt to answer her research questions, she conducted key informant interviews which included, among others, Corazon “Dinky” Soliman, Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD); another personnel of the DSWD who asked not to named, but is knowledgeable on Pantawid Pamilya because he has been with the program since its inception;

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2 DSWD is the lead implementing agency of the Pantawid Pamilya.
Dr. Joel Rocamora, Secretary of the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC); Naty Bernardino, Director of the Basic Sectors of NAPC; Rep. Walden Bello of Akbayan Partylist; Nazmul Chawdhury, Human Development Country Sector Coordinator of the World Bank Philippine Office; Chris Spohr, Senior Education Economist of the Asian Development Bank; Milo Tanchuling, Secretary-General of Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC).

The most challenging part of the fieldwork was requesting from the DSWD some CCT-related documents and names of beneficiaries who would form part of the prospective respondents. The author was told of the agency’s standing policy wherein researchers could only be furnished with documents and allowed to do interviews with employees and beneficiaries after they have secured a written permission signed by the Secretary herself which, in turn, could only come after they have submitted copies of their research proposals, questionnaires, and interview schedules. She emailed a toned-down version of her research proposal—as per her supervisor’s advice—if only to appease and pass through the gatekeepers. She got a reply two days after instructing her to print the document and visit the DSWD Central Office to fill-out some forms. She realized that it would take some more days to get that permission. Meanwhile, time was running out since she only had four weeks of fieldwork. She decided to proceed even without the official documents, and do the interviews with beneficiaries via unofficial channels.

Interestingly, the World Bank and the ADB officers proved to be accessible. They accommodated the author for an interview a day after she emailed them. They also gave links to CCT-related documents.

Through the help of her former office colleagues, the author was able to conduct focus group discussions (FGDs) in two Cebu City-based urban poor associations, namely, South Bus Terminal Homeowners’ Association (SOBUSTEHA) and Tarkum Upper Laguerta Homeowners’ Association (TULHOA). Interviewing beneficiaries was not part of the original plan, but as suggested by her second reader, it was important to get a sense of the program implementation that has been going on for four years or so. SOBUSTEHA and TULHOA are both relocatees. The former used to occupy a space within the Cebu South Bus Terminal and was relocated in the late 1990s, while the latter used to occupy a privately-owned lot in Pier 4 and was relocated in 2004. Of SOBUSTEHA’s 120 member-households, 20 are CCT beneficiaries, while of TULHOA’s 118, 36 are CCT beneficiaries.

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3NAPC is tasked, among others, “to act as coordinating and advisory body that exercises oversight functions in implementing the government’s Social Reform Agenda (SRA)...institutionalize basic sector and NGO participation in managing the SRA cycle” (NAPC’s website <http://www.napc.gov.ph/index.asp>, accessed on 12 September 2011).

4Rep. Bello is among those who supported CCTs.

5FDC is among those organizations that are critical of CCTs.
1.3. Structure of the Paper

The paper is divided into five chapters. This introductory chapter is followed by the literature review, “Understanding Social Policy and the Conditional Cash Transfers”, where the author discusses social policy and the way by which it has been reduced to mere safety net schemes such as the CCTs. She then presents the three-way debate around CCTs and some frameworks in policymaking that have informed her inquiry.

In chapter three, “An Overview of the Social Policy Context of the Philippines”, the author analyzes social policy and social provision through an historical-institutional lens. In a succinct account, she describes how the country ensures (or not) the welfare of its people from the colonial period up to the present, establishing trends and giving a hint as to CCTs’ potential of providing a long-term solution to poverty and inequality. In chapter four, “Of tide-over and bridges: the Conditional Cash Transfers of the Philippines”, she examines the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program based on the data obtained from the field and the insights culled from different documents. She puts considerable attention to the debate which illustrates the observations that social policymaking is a complex process, and that there is no single explanation for the policy positions adopted by different political forces at certain junctures. In chapter five, she gives a summary of findings and concludes the paper.
Chapter 2
Understanding Social Policy and the Conditional Cash Transfers

This chapter explores more thoroughly what has been discussed in the introduction about CCTs, that they preclude rationalizing and confronting the structural roots of poverty and inequality. It begins by locating CCTs within the discourse on social policy and social protection, essentially asserting that the scheme is but another contracted and compromised version of social policy which, aside from poverty reduction, is supposed to perform other important tasks like equity and national unity (Adesina 2011: 1 and 2; Mkandawire 2005: 7). The chapter proceeds with a brief account of the origin of CCTs and the context that paved the way for their conception and initial implementation, followed by the debate around the subject, particularly the ideational and ideological persuasions that underpin the positions herein categorized as outright support, nuanced support, and radical opposition. The chapter closes with a presentation of some frameworks in policymaking upon which the author has drawn some insights to explain social policy and social provision of the Philippines.

2.1. Social Protection and the CCTs

The late 1980s saw the escalating levels of poverty and inequality in many developing countries as a consequence of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) promoted and “encouraged” by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Bradshaw 2008: 188–189). Social policy then was focused on social protection instruments aimed at mitigating the social of SAPs, or the so-called “social dimensions of adjustment” (Adesina 2011:1).

What does social protection really mean? The term has been defined in slightly different ways, and donors, governments, and other institutions have adopted different social protection approaches. For instance, the United Nations Children’s Fund pursues a child-responsive approach that includes access to services and the provision of unconditional transfers; the International Labor Organization focuses on setting up minimum labor standards; the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development focuses on chronic poverty; while the German Agency for Technical Cooperation on social health insurance. (See de Haan 2011: 2 and 3; Gentilini and Omamo 2009: 3)

What stand out as a commonality are three components, namely, social insurance, social assistance, and standards or regulations (see Barrientos 2011: 240; Hujo and Gaia 2011: 231; Slater 2011: 251). Social insurance involves people contributing a portion of their income to the state or a private provider in order to have a fallback in the event of shock or permanent change in their circumstances. Examples include contributory pension schemes, health insurance, and
unemployment guarantees. Social assistance involves non-contributory transfers to people deemed eligible by society on the basis of income, vulnerability, work, or rights as citizens. Examples include state-financed old-age pensions, child grants, food vouchers, and fee waivers for education and health services. Lastly, standards or regulations involve putting in place minimum standards to protect citizens. These should ideally extend to the entire economy, but in practice, these are limited to the workplaces, thereby excluding the informal economy. Examples include minimum wage policy, anti-discrimination law, trainings, and social dialogs. (Ibid.)

Sadly, social protection in many developing countries has been reduced to social assistance aimed at reducing poverty and providing support for the poorest (Barrientos 2011: 241). Social assistance, in turn, has been reduced even further to cash transfers, both conditional and unconditional (Adesina 2011: 1). This disturbing trend has been eloquently described as “a retreat to a narrow vision of social policy”, when apart from poverty reduction, social policy should be fulfilling equally important tasks such as “production, protection, re-distribution, reproduction, and social cohesion” (ibid: 1 and 2; Mkandawire 2005: 7).

Of the cash transfers being implemented, CCTs are perhaps gaining the highest momentum and much of the popularity. In fact, the World Bank is happy to report of the scheme’s presence in every continent since 2009 (WB’s CCT Webpage). But how and where did it all begin? What is its underlying logic? What reactions does it instigate?

CCTs originated in Mexico in the mid-1990s as a response to the country’s mounting poverty and inequality problems brought about by the economic crisis (Bradshaw 2008: 191). They were meant to replace both the universal and targeted food subsidies (i.e., tortillas, beans, bread, maize flour, and milk) that were allegedly besieged by leakage and undercoverage problems, wasting huge government resources (ibid; Levy 2006: 4–8).

In his book, Progress Against Poverty: Sustaining Mexico’s Progres–Oportunidades Program, Santiago Levy (2006: 14–15), CCTs’ chief architect, explains that the economic crisis that crippled the country sparked a motivation to change its poverty reduction strategy to that which fosters a sustained improvement in the living standard of the poor, and ultimately, an accumulation of human capital. Levy reveals that building a consensus within the Cabinet was gradual and never complete, but that the government managed to initiate Progresa in 1997 which, by 2005, became Mexico’s largest single poverty reduction program covering 24.06 million people in 31 states, 2,435 municipalities, and 86,000 localities.

CCTs entail giving cash directly to poor households, often to women, on conditions that they ensure children’s regular attendance in school, accompany them to health clinics, and participate in classes and workshops on topics related to education, health, and hygiene (St. Claire 2009: 177; Bradshaw 2008: 188). The
Conditionalities are attractive to donors and governments alike. *Euphemistically* termed as “co-responsibilities”, they are aimed at creating behavioral changes among beneficiaries, as well as cost-sharing where on the side of the implementers includes money, skills, and time; and that of the beneficiaries mainly includes compliance of program requirements (Molyneux 2008: 176; author’s emphasis added).

### 2.1. The CCT Debate

Just as CCTs gather epic support, so do they attract grand objection. The vast literature on the subject points to a three-way debate that includes positions categorized by the author as outright support, nuanced support, and radical opposition. The **outright support** position is upheld by the World Bank and its regional cousins like the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, as well as multilateral institutions like the International Food Policy Research Institute, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, and the Australian Government’s Overseas Program. These advocates have maintained a solid optimism that CCTs will not only help poor households meet their needs, but also break the intergenerational transmission of poverty by investing on poor children’s education and health.

In this perspective, poverty is seen as a result from being excluded from the market and failing to maximize the opportunities it offers. The cash transfers are supposed to integrate the poor into the market, enabling them to choose from a variety of options and to invest in the ones that best satisfy their needs. In addition, poverty is located within individuals, especially in their alleged negative attitudes and behaviors, i.e., they are lazy; they do not try hard enough; they prefer to gamble rather than buy nutritious food for their families; they encourage their children to work rather than attend school; and so on. The set of conditionalities are supposed to “discipline” the poor to be more responsible and to better manage their lives.

The **nuanced support** is exemplified by the works of Bradshaw, Molyneux, Barrientos, Handa and Davis, Schuber and Slater, and St. Clair. These scholars have seen in CCTs a potential to help the poor improve their situation except for a number of concerns and weaknesses. Bradshaw (2008) and Molyneux (2007), for example, caution that channeling the cash transfers through women and putting on their shoulders the responsibility to comply the conditionalities may only perpetuate their traditional roles as wives and mothers, so that their “empowerment” is confined within the very structures that produce gender inequality, thus undermining their development. Barrientos (2009), on one hand, maintains that the supposed benefits from CCTs are matched by the non-trivial costs the conditionalities impose on beneficiaries. He also states that while these conditionalities are believed to strengthen the link between cash transfers and basic services utilization, they only do so at a marginal level. In a 2011 article, he casts doubts on the developing countries’ capacity to finance the expansion and
sustainability of social protection, of which CCTs are a major part, owing to their weak tax bases. He adds that while the recent global financial crisis reinforces the need for social protection, it also contracts the resources for such undertaking through negative impact in aid and fiscal revenue.

Handa and Davis (2006), for their part, warn that CCTs may just create false hopes among people beleaguered not only by supply-side constraints, but also access differentials, i.e., between the rich and the poor, urban and rural citizens, men and women. They explain that this inequality yields poor outcomes, and hinders governments and societies from achieving major strides in poverty reduction and development. Schuber and Slater (2006: 572) express concern on the replicability of CCTs due to the differences in the social, political, historical, and economic contexts of countries which means that what works in Latin America may not work in other parts of the globe. Along the same vein, St. Clair (2009: 179) highlights that “CCTs can be appropriate policy suggestions within a particular context, and it is in the investigation of the context that I suggest is needed now rather than more isolated analyses whether or not these policies are efficient per se”.

There are at least three ideas that underpin this position. First, given the supposed constraints of developing countries, especially the alleged lack of financial resources, weak governance, and difficulty in obtaining political consensus, programs like CCTs are the more pragmatic option. This is because they hit two birds with one stone, that is, they help the poor by giving them money, and at the same time preserve the status quo given their evasion of the challenging route of redistributing assets and income. Second, CCTs can kick-start the process towards a redistributive and/or universal social provision. For how long do societies have to bear with such schemes? To what extent do they allow shifts in social policy? These are the big questions that are left unanswered. Third, CCTs are a good complement to structural reform efforts. They contain poverty while the struggle for structural reform is being carried out, or while its fruits are yet to sink in. This idea seems popular among progressives, and may help explain why, despite its opposition to Bolsa Familia in public, Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement (MST) maintains a tacit approval of its members’ participation in the program.

The radical opposition is embodied in the works of Adesina, Correll, Fischer, and Mkandawire. These scholars are opposed not to CCTs per se, but to the diminution of the concept and practice of social policy which, as earlier discussed, has been focused on combating poverty largely by providing safety nets or some forms of relief to the poor. Adesina (2011: 3–5) elaborates this by noting that the various strands of social protection—from the Highly Indebted Poor Country Program to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, the Social Risk Management Framework, and the transformative social protection—follow the same logic, i.e., a focus on the chronically poor, also called critically poor or ultra-poor; use of “highly ponderous and restrictive targeting mechanism”; and refusal to engage the neoliberal framework. Tendler (2004: 119–142 in Mkandawire 2004) for her part,
emphasizes the tendency of the international donor community to “project-ize” and “micro-ize” social policy so that a stream of bite-sized projects are produced which clearly increases the role of private players while decreasing that of the government. Correll (2008: 453) adds a valuable insight through his scrutiny of the MDGs. He posits that these goals “are a sad and minimalist collection of random targets, disconnected...from [their] origin which was the Copenhagen World Summit for Development which was primarily about development”. If anything, these goals have fostered a limited view of development which has been about poverty reduction via safety nets or temporary assistance for the poor.

The bottom line of this radical opposition is that targeted, palliative, and supposedly apolitical (which largely means technocratic) fixes like CCTs are just a part of the Washington Consensus project of rolling back the state and leaving the market to function freely. They only “depoliticize” the issues of poverty and inequality so that governments and societies are dissuaded from structural rationalization, thereby relegating asset reform, employment creation, moratorium on debt servicing, and recall of neoliberal policies to the sidelines. As Adesina (2011: 10) puts it, “[failure to] confront the...logic of neoliberalism reflects the ideational concession, not its negation”.

2.3. The (Un)Making of Social Policy

There exists a vast literature on the different approaches by which to understand how policies have been created, and how they have shifted at certain junctures in a specific context. Grindle and Thomas (1991), for instance, propose a framework which emphasizes that a systematic handle of the experiences, expertise, proclivities, and values of policy elites, and the historical, institutional, and political contexts within which they operate is critical to understanding policies and instances of reforms. It also makes a distinction between “crisis-ridden” and “politics-as-usual” reforms, asserting that this allows a deeper appreciation of the stakes involved, the actors in and the timing of the decision making, as well as the extent of change introduced. It likewise suggests that policy elites use four criteria in the decision making, namely, technical advice, bureaucratic implications, political stability and support, and international pressures.

This piece of work is of course beyond critique. Moore (1993: 269–271), for example, observes that while it attempts to highlight the autonomy of the state, it fails to give a satisfactory answer to the question, “to what extent do governments and policy elites perform their policymaking function independent of the pressures coming from bureaucratic and societal interests?” Nonetheless, it proves useful, as it draws attention to the consequential role of policy elites and the different influences they bring to bear in policies and reforms.

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6The term is borrowed from Fischer’s 2010 article, ‘Towards Genuine Universalism within Contemporary Development Policy’ published in IDS Bulletin.
While the above framework has a state-centered leaning, Fox (1992), in his study of the food programs of Mexico, offers an interactive approach that attempts to explain how changes in the balance of power within the state repeatedly interacts with the changes in the relationship of forces within society. It suggests that whether or not redistributive policies could be enacted or successfully implemented depends on the nature of coalition and complementation between pro-reform forces in the state and those in society, strongly recognizing that division could exist within the latter. It further suggests that if the actions of both sides are mutually reinforcing, their efforts could instigate conflict within the state which, in turn, could lead unexpected political outcomes.

Meanwhile, Skocpol (1992), in her study on the political origins of social policy in the United States, puts forth another framework that veers away from explanations such as the welfare state is a necessary consequence of industrialization and modernization, the fruit of the labor movements’ relentless struggles, or the function of the bourgeois elites’ double-edged interests. Rather, it brings to the fore how specific governmental and political institutions influence different political actors and groups as they decide over certain social policy options.

Dewitt (2003) summarizes Skocpol’s massive and complex work into the following points: 1) the narrative of modern social provision in the U.S. did not commence with the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935; 2) between the 1870s and the 1920s, the country already has a well-developed and generous social provision, albeit it was focused on soldiers and mothers; 3) the program for soldiers was a paternalist social provision meant for a “worthy” group of people, but could not be translated into a full-scale welfare state given the country’s weak central government, feeble bureaucracy, competitive political parties surviving on patronage, and a strong court system capable of crushing universal welfare proposals; 4) the programs for women and children were maternalist social provisions brought about by women’s organizing of clubs and voluntary associations outside, yet parallel to the formal political institutions, and around the cause related to the “worthiness” of their roles as mothers of the nation; 5) both approaches, however, were not sustained and were superseded by the contributory social insurance model of the Social Security Act of 1935; and 6) despite their replacement, they should be viewed as positive contributions to the development of the uniquely American version of the welfare state.

From this, it can be said that Skocpol’s work also demonstrates the value of historiography which accounts the compelling melodramas that took place within a particular political landscape. This insight finds resonance in the work of Esping-Andersen (1990) which involves 18 case-countries in the North grouped into three types of welfare regimes, namely, liberal, residualist as in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada; corporatist-statist as in Germany and Austria; and social-democratic as in Sweden and Norway. In his rather crisp introduction of his book, he accentuates that …
“...we must conclude that politics not only matters, but is decisive...For some regimes, [the] role [of the working classes’ political mobilizations] has been marginal and we must instead understand the evolution of welfare states here as the result of the state’s history of nation-building and/or the influence of conservatism and/or Catholicism. We have tried to embed our explanations in the political histories of nations.” (Ibid: 4)

He further stresses that the historical forces driving the regime differences are dynamic and interactive. These include the pattern of working class formation; the political coalition-building within that pivotal transition from rural economy to working class society; and the past reforms which helped institutionalize class preferences and political behaviors. He expounds the last point by illustrating that in liberal regimes, the middle classes became integrated into the market; in corporatist-statist regimes, they got accustomed to hierarchical, status-specific social insurance; while in social-democratic regimes, they were able to meet their preferences owing to the state’s intervention of establishing universally inclusive, earnings-related insurance on top of a flat-rate egalitarian one. (Ibid: 32)

The frameworks presented here are not necessarily opposed to each other. They may differ on the vantage point through which they study policy and policymaking, but they illustrate that in this endeavor, there is no escaping from historical and political developments, as well as state-society interaction which clearly involves various political institutions, actors, and groups. Using these insights as guides, the author analyzes social policy and social provision of the Philippines through an historical-institutional lens. The results of this endeavor are encapsulated in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
An Overview of the Social Policy Context of the Philippines

The chapter hopes to bring out an understanding of the country’s social policy and social provision by examining the historical and institutional landscapes through which they have been shaped. The chapter takes readers to the colonial period where the country’s organized welfare took its roots; the postwar and martial law period where economic growth was largely believed to take care of poverty and inequality; and then the post-martial law period where the Comprehensive Land Reform Program has been undertaken, along with various poverty reductions initiatives, many of which have been influenced, if not imposed as loan conditionalities, by the World Bank and other multilateral institutions. Inevitably, the chapter also discusses the political climate surrounding social policy and social welfare. It provides a brief description of the administrations or regimes, their ascension to power (and the downfall of some), as well as the pressures they confronted.

Mkandawire (2004: 3–4) writes that “social policy should be conceived as involving overall and prior concerns with social development, and as a key instrument that works in tandem with economic policy to ensure equitable and socially sustainable development”. Learning from this, a meaningful study of social policy then entails a parallel study of economic policy. This explains why the economic policy or bias of every administration also becomes a constant feature in this chapter. Other elements that repeatedly come out are the interests and preoccupations of the elites, pressures coming from multilateral institutions, and actions of the other social forces (i.e. non-state actors like political blocs, nongovernment organizations, and people's organizations) which are a struggle to bring out, as they hardly feature in the scholarly works perused.

There is a dearth of literature on the country’s social policy and social welfare, thus, the author had to make do with and make sense of the development plans and poverty reduction programs crafted and implemented over the years. Obviously, this gap comes with a price, that is, only crude snapshots on the subject could be obtained. Nonetheless, the resulting account could be a modest contribution to the task of understanding the ways by which the Philippines takes care of its people, especially the poor, and its performance in this area.

3.1. Colonial Period
The Spanish conquest which lasted for more than 300 years (from 1521 to 1898) caused massive poverty in the archipelago, as natives were dispossessed of their lands and forced to abide by unjust rules such as the payment of tribute or service, and the cultivation of a single crop (e.g. the tobacco monopoly) that rendered
The conquest is seen by many historians as being carried out both by the sword and the cross as evident in the number of religious orders founding thousands of towns and their governance, and initiating social welfare efforts.

The Spaniards sowed the seeds of the country’s organized welfare which, back then, grossly lacked the Spanish government’s support, and was primarily pursued by religious orders and pious individuals who wished to be saved from eternal damnation (ibid: 562). Social welfare in this period was residualist and individualist. Residualist because it only provided temporary assistance to a certain group of people considered “the deserving poor”; and individualist because it located social problems within individuals as matters of moral and spiritual frailties, and was motivated by the charity and personal salvation of the givers rather than the rights and needs of the receivers (ibid.). It is interesting to note that structural rationalization was prohibited at that time, and as Yu reveals, “to suggest that colonial subjugation was the cause of social problems would have been treasonable” (ibid.).

The Filipinos rejoiced when they were finally freed from Spanish rule, but before long, the Americans took over. They occupied the country for 48 years (from 1898 to 1946) through the Krag and the school, meaning, through sheer brute force and through education intended to pacify the natives and develop in them an affinity with the colonial government to reduce the likelihood of rebellious attempts (ibid: 562 and 564; see also Karnow 1989; Constantino 1982).

The Americans have undoubtedly revolutionized the country’s social welfare through public-funded education and health programs, but these advances were nothing compared to the enormous damage they have caused, including the deaths and massacre of thousands of Filipinos (ibid: 564). Social welfare in this period was functionalist and individualist. Functionalist because it only served the colonial agenda of assimilation and subjugation; and individualist because it still located social problems within individuals (i.e., “the unschooled savage”), considering them as consequences of the backward education and value systems, coupled with the lack of exposure to modern thinking and practices (ibid: 565). Yu likewise indicates that “the restrictive colonial environment...would also have provided penalties for anyone who suggested structural attributions to social problems” (ibid.).

The emergence of a distinct class during the colonial period also begets attention. As discussed by De Dios and Hutchcroft (in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 46 and 47), the commercialization of agriculture, especially towards the end of the Spanish conquest, paved the way for the formation of a new class of landowners who were quite autonomous from the state, and who composed the primary social base of the first Republic of the Philippines established in 1899. They were the same people whom the Americans co-opted through a “policy of attraction” (i.e.,
spoilimg them with favors like control of the state apparatus and access to the American market) in the intent of undermining widespread support for the struggle of independence. It is important to highlight the formation of this class and its earlier role in Philippine society because, as both authors move on to argue, these people embarked on quite a number of “oligarchic plunder” of the country’s political and economic resources which has done a huge disservice to the majority. Their dominance in the political and economic spheres affords them the privilege and role of shaping and reshaping the country’s social policy and social welfare.

3.2. Postwar and the Martial Law Period

Balisacan (in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 312) cites that the focus of development planning after the Second World War was economic reconstruction, and that a series of development plans from 1947 to 1962 (i.e., seven five-year plans, a three-year plan, five-year fiscal plans that were annually reviewed, and specialized development plan for agriculture and electric power) was focused on industrial development mainly through import substitution, and social investment in power and transportation facilities. All these, he adds, were geared towards accelerating economic growth then thought to be the sure way of reducing unemployment, underemployment, and ultimately, poverty.

Within this period, the emerging elites did not fail to assert their presence and rather distressing role in politics and the economy. De Dios and Hutchcroft (in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 47 and 48) point out that only three years after independence, the elites almost brought to collapse the Philippine state when they unabashedly plundered the rehabilitation assistance from the U.S. to pay for imports, thereby causing a balance-of-payment crisis. The scholars add that in the mid-1950s, these elites found themselves in situations of diversification and homogenization. Diversification because they tremendously expanded their interests for wealth accumulation which, aside from agriculture, also included commerce, finance, industry, and real estate; and then homogenization because they were one in major issues of economic policy—including, of course, the solid stance against land reform—beyond which they saw it more advantageous to just maximize their influence to exact particularistic favors rather than seek policy change benefiting any sector.

In 1962, Diosdado Macapagal rose to power. As noted by Lim and Montes (2001: 11), his party won the election under a free trade banner, and his administration moved on to instituting limited trade liberalization and devaluing the Philippine peso by 100%, from two pesos to four pesos per dollar. It was during this time, they add, that the country obtained a standby credit from the IMF, a tutelage that has been sustained to this day.

On the basis of these historical accounts, one is led to believe that social policy took a backseat after the war and before martial law, especially in the light of the dominant view at that time which considered economic growth to be the vehicle
for social welfare and poverty reduction. The literature perused so far has made little mention of explicit and direct interventions to address poverty and inequality. It appears that the poor were pushed to one end, waiting for the benefits of economic growth to trickle down.

In 1965, Ferdinand Marcos was elected president. Determined to stay in power, he sought reelection in 1969, but as noted by Lim and Montes (2001: 12 and 13), his victory was greeted by student protests fuelled by allegations of electoral fraud. He proceeded to declaring martial law in 1972, against a backdrop of continuing protests, a Maoist rebellion, and a mounting disorder caused by the bombing of an apposition party rally the year before.

His administration’s overall development policy combined import substitution and export-oriented industrialization which, De Dios and Hutchcroft (in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 49) describe as “incoherent from an economic point of view”. Development planning, however, seemed to have improved. As Balisacan (in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 313) explains…

Beginning with the Philippine Economic Program of 1967…the policy measures were aimed at dealing with the basic problems [of] chronic unemployment and underemployment, high population growth, inadequate infrastructure, and a tight balance of payments situation. In addition, income inequality, a low standard of living, and—partly in the wake of the oil shock in the early 1970s—rising prices became major policy concerns.

He adds that the development plans, especially in the 1970s moved beyond the paradigm of poverty reduction through economic growth through industrial development, to include “direct policy measures aimed at sharing the fruits of development with a broad section of the populace” (ibid; emphasis by Balisacan himself).

Among these “direct policy measures” was what this author called a Marcos-brand agrarian reform. Mandated by Presidential Decree No. 27, the program was the “first major attempt at land reform”, but it registered major gaps herein summarized as follows: 1) it only covered rice and corn lands; 2) it only covered lands used for rice production by 1972, but excluded those that were cultivated from 1973 onwards; 3) it allowed landlords to retain seven hectares which was relatively high compared to what was allowed in other East Asian countries that proved successful in their agrarian reform efforts; 4) it allowed absentee landlords to retain seven hectares, a provision that never materialized in neighboring countries; and 5) it involved a process of land acquisition that was tedious for beneficiaries (Adriano 1991: 9). Noble (1978: 356) observes that the program suffered from a narrow scope, as it excluded agricultural laborers, tenants on lands
below seven hectares, and both laborers and tenants on lands that produced anything but rice and corn. Reyes (2002: 9) adds that the program was hindered by problems in land valuation, surveys, and landowners’ resistance.

In the Capital, the construction sector was bolstered to provide jobs to the rapidly growing urban population. The focus of this strategy was the construction of hotels that did provide jobs, but ended as losing investments due to the buildings’ low occupancy rate, averaging only at 40%. It is sad to note that while the government spent 350 to 500 million US dollars for these “projects”, it only allocated 13 million US dollars for public housing. (Fox 1977 as cited in Noble 1978: 358; see also Lim and Montes 2001: 12)

Where were the elites within this period? De Dios and Hutchcroft (in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 49) recall that among the promises of Marcos in declaring martial law was to save the country from an oligarchy that enjoyed so much power and wealth. Both scholars opine, however, that the strongman only tamed the oligarchs that were most threatening to his regime, and that a “new oligarchy” of his relatives and cronies gained dominance throughout the martial law period.

Meanwhile, for most of the 1970s, the country was able to achieve economic growth at an average annual rate of 5.9%. According to Lim and Montes (2001: 14), this was explained by the heavy borrowings from multilateral institutions, and the confidence bestowed upon the martial law government by the business sector. Balisacan (in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 313 and 314) recounts that a downturn was felt in the early 1980s with the severe recession in the world economy, sharp falls in the world prices of the country’s traditional exports, and the worsening internal political crisis that followed the assassination of Benigno Aquino, Jr., a known Marcos critique and opposition. Interestingly, the IMF took a decisive shift in its position towards the government. In the words of Montes (as cited in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 50), it transformed itself from being a “doting parent” to a “vengeful god”, imposing economic stabilization that triggered deep recession in the country. This immensely hurt the regime’s popularity, and strengthened both the leftist and moderate resistance that eventually led to the regime’s downfall through a “people power” in 1986 (De Dios and Hutchcroft in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 50).

3.3. Post- Martial Law Period

Corazon Aquino was installed to the presidency through the said people power revolution. Unsurprisingly, her administration was confronted by pressures from different angles. Foremost, there was the battered economy which was in the midst of the deepest recession within the postwar period; the broad coalition which included the politicized and putsch-oriented factions in the military, the elites who were against Marcos, the politicians who were disenfranchised in the previous regime, the middle class, the Church, and the various nongovernment
organizations and people’s organizations whose leanings ranged from the extreme to the moderate left, all of which wanted to advance their agenda in the renewed democratic space; and then there was the collapse in investor confidence, several coup attempts, and the continuing rebellion especially in the countryside (ibid.).

According to Lim and Montes (2001: 15), the Aquino administration addressed the economic crisis by implementing trade and financial liberalization via the lifting of import restrictions and the completion of tax reforms and privatization of government-owned and/or controlled enterprises. De Dios and Hutchcroft (in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 53) expound that…

the administration proceeded to dismantle…monopolies in agriculture, eschewed favoritism to further large industrial projects, and committed itself to a unilateral, programmed reduction of tariffs, as well as the process of forming the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. External support for these measures came, of course, from both the World Bank and the IMF.

Both scholars add that the administration subjected itself to controversy, and certainly criticisms, when it decided to honor Marcos’ debts fully and unconditionally by upholding the Automatic Appropriation Law on Debt Servicing (ibid; author’s emphasis added).

Social policy, on the other hand, found a glimmer of hope when the administration placed the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) at the center of its economic and social development agenda (Balisacan in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 314). CARP was a welcome departure from previous land reform programs because it covers all farmlands, both private and public, and irrespective of productivity and tenurial status, except those with a slope of more than 18%; those used for national defense, education, and experiment; ancestral lands; and reserved lands such as forests, watersheds, national parks, churches and mosques (Boras 2007: 107; Reyes 2002: 12). Earlier assessments of CARP cite a number of gaps, among them are the lack of funds to pay the landowners, slow litigation of cases, and some inherent weaknesses of the law where, for instance, the long list of exempted lands allowed landlords to devise evasionary schemes to exclude their property from coverage (see Putzel 1992; Adriano 1991). De Dios and Hutchcroft (in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 52), for their part, emphasize that the newly convened congress “provided the venue for landlord interests, especially sugar bloc interests [and even] members of the Aquino family, to undermine the enacted law by allowing various loopholes in implementation”. They move on to conclude that with the scores of pressures that battered the Aquino administration, it ended up “preclud[ing] the undertaking of more ambitious social projects…[and] ultimately…was nudged towards an agenda that was decidedly modest, if not downright conservative” (ibid: 53).
In 1992, Fidel Ramos won the presidency. Under the banner “Philippines 2000”, a rallying cry that captures the aim to join the league of the newly industrializing countries by the turn of the century, his administration intensified the liberalization and privatization processes, and embarked on an infrastructure development program and a purposive attack against cartels and monopolies (ibid: 55). The liberalization aspect, Lim and Montes (2001: 16) stress, is in accordance with the country’s commitments to the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In no time, however, the cost of liberalization would take its toll on the country with the onset of the Asian financial crisis where investments flew out as fast as (or even faster than) they came in.

Land reform and rural development did not make it to the priority list of the Ramos administration. What was pursued instead was the Social Reform Agenda (SRA) that Collas-Monsod and Monsod (in Balisacan and Fujisaki 1999: 59–60) describe as “a package of government interventions organized around nine flagship programs, each under a lead government agency designated as a flagship champion, and each intended to focus on the critical needs of a specific basic sector—farmers, fisherfolk, indigenous people, urban poor, and others”.

The SRA targeted the 20 poorest provinces, also known as the Club 20, reportedly handpicked by the president himself, contrary to official claims that they were selected based on poverty incidence, contribution to total poverty, shortfalls in minimum basic needs or in human development (ibid.). As the two scholars reveal, “the list includes only nine out of the 20 provinces with the highest poverty incidence, only one out of the 20 provinces with the largest number of poor, and only nine out of the 20 provinces with the lowest human development index”. They also point out that the SRA suffered from a “deadly combination of not enough focus and insufficient funds” which undermined its potential towards achieving human development (ibid.).

As for the elites, De Dios and Hutchcroft (in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 57) indicate that a number of them were opposed to the liberalization thrust of the Ramos administration, and that apparently, the attack against cartels and monopolies was aimed at creating a climate of competition, an assumption held by free-market paradigm. Whether or not the elites’ action at that time is judged as good, largely depends on one’s ideology, but the point here is that they were (and still are) a force to reckon with in politics and the economy. Citing Jose Almonte, Ramos’ presidential security adviser, “the rich and powerful families could still prove stronger than the forces of reform” (ibid.).

7 The author italicized the term “reform”, as it could mean differently to different people, for instance, pro-market changes are considered reform by some, so does land redistribution.
In 1998, the former action star Joseph Ejercito Estrada came to power. If anything, his victory reflects the politics of personality which, of late, has heavily relied on the mass media for image-building and name recall (ibid: 59). Not much has been written about the economic policy of the Estrada administration, but what is certain is that the latter launched an ambitious pro-poor development agenda which, as Balisacan (in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 315) notes, recognized the need for a broad-based rural development to combat poverty. The development plan crafted for 1999 to 2004 included, among others, an aggressive delivery of basic social services, improvement in governance, removal of policy and regulatory barriers towards an efficient resource allocation and equitable outcomes, as well as sustained development of rural infrastructure (ibid.). Meanwhile, the flagship poverty reduction program was Lingap Para sa Mabirap (Looking after the Poor) wherein 100 poorest families in each province and city were identified and provided with a package of assistance, particularly livelihood assistance, medical assistance, price subsidy for staple food, socialized housing, and if applicable, rural waterworks system (ibid.).

A pro-poor campaign helped Estrada win the presidency, but sadly, it would only remain a propaganda because, as De Dios and Hutchcroft (in Balisacan and Hill 2003: 60) observe, those who benefited were the members of his “midnight cabinet” (i.e., drinking buddies), and his cronies, some of whom are resurrected Marcos associates. Personalities like Eduardo Cojuangco and Lucio Tan made a comeback. Cojuangco regained ownership of San Miguel Corporation, the country’s largest conglomerate, while Lucio Tan who owns the Philippine Airlines raked in huge profits with the reversal of the country’s liberal airline policy. All these abuses, however, fuelled another people power revolution in 2001 that removed Estrada from power.

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who was then vice-president, assumed the presidency. Her administration was expected to usher in a new brand of governance grounded in accountability, transparency, and participation, as well as reforms that remained wanting for many years.

Looking at her economic policies, they proved to be a continuation of the World Bank- and IMF-influenced policies of the past presidents. While the extension of CARP was achieved within her term, it was nonetheless matched by the adoption of more neoliberal measures such as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) which privatizes the country’s power sector, and the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) which, among other things, removes tariffs on key Japanese products without imposing the same for key Philippine exports. Meanwhile, her flagship poverty reduction program—which has been sustained up to this day—is World Bank-influenced and financed. Dubbed Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kabirahan (KALAH, Joining Hands Against Poverty), it involves five core strategies, namely, accelerated asset reform, improved access to human development services, provision of employment and livelihood opportunities, security from violence and social protection, and institutionalized and
strengthened participation in governance by the so-called basic sectors (Lim 2009: 26). It is targeted to the poorest provinces and municipalities, and its projects are based on the needs of the community that the members themselves identified and prioritized (ibid: 27).

Assessing the KALAHI program, Raquiza (2010: 16) states that even with its generally positive results in terms of increased incomes for barangay (village) residents, improved access to social infrastructure, and enhanced local empowerment and collective action, the myopic—in Tendler’s terms “micro-ized” and “project-ized”—nature of its various interventions have generated some impact which, at best, is localized and seems to do little in addressing poverty and unemployment.

It was in the latter part of the Arroyo administration that CCTs/4Ps was implemented. The program, now nicknamed Pantawid Pamilya, is discussed at length in the next chapter. It is important to highlight at this point that the nine-year Arroyo regime only disillusioned the majority of Filipinos, as amid the massive poverty and inequality, most that they heard and saw in media were allegations of—with evidences and witnesses to boot—electoral fraud, rigging government contracts and reaping huge sums in the process, misuse of public funds, protection of illegal gambling operations, and of course, the dispensation of favors to family, friends, and supporters.

In 2010, Benigno Aquino III, son of the late President Corazon Aquino, won the presidential election. As early as his first year in office, he already bared his bias for public-private partnership (PPP), an innovation promoted by the World Bank and the many other multilateral institutions, which eventually became the centerpiece of the economic policy of his administration.

Aquino has vowed to remain true to his campaign slogan “kung walang korap, walang mahirap” (if there is no corruption, there will be less deprivation), thus, his administration is focused on fighting corruption and poverty. Interestingly, the war against poverty has been waged using a number of pantawid (tide-over) as bullets. There is the Pantawid Pamilya which includes three subsidy schemes, i.e., Supplemental Feeding Program, Food for Work for Internally Displaced Persons, and Rice Subsidy Program, and then the Pantawid Pasada (Public Transport Assistance Program).

Sec. Joel Rocamora and Dir. Naty Bernardino of the NAPC revealed that their agency has drafted a Poverty Strategy Paper which is a first in the country, and quite comprehensive in that it does not only include pantawid schemes, but also agricultural growth, asset reform, and employment generation, among others. The paper has only been recently approved by the President, and is yet to be made public.
3.4. Synthesis

Based on the foregoing accounts, at least four points have come out. Foremost, structural reform and redistributive programs are rather scant. CARP, of course, is a major progress, but some scholars think that it is not purely redistributive. What abounds are a range of safety nets that are often targeted, benefiting only certain segments of society deemed as deserving based on some criteria; palliative, fulfilling only the short-term needs of the poor; and purportedly apolitical, precluding efforts that could potentially challenge the very structures that breed poverty and inequality. Second, these interventions lack consistency, as a number of them, along with the coordinating or implementing agencies, are coterminous with the administration. The same is true with the bureaucracy in which a change in administration means a turnover at the top level, i.e., from the secretary (or minister), to the undersecretary, the assistant secretary, and even the directors. Third, the elites have proven that they are a strong force capable of suppressing or overturning reform efforts that threaten their position and hold of power. Their resources and connections have undoubtedly enabled them to lobby or make concessions within the bureaucracy, the legislature, the judiciary, and even the palace. The entry of progressive and leftist personalities in government has made some advances in the struggle for structural reform and redistribution, but much has yet to be done inside and outside government. Fourth, the influence of multilateral institutions is irrefutable. One needs only to look at the policies and programs implemented since the end of the Second World War to realize the not-so-invisible hand of the World Bank, the IMF, and the ADB, among others, on the state of affairs of this country.

Needless to say, this is the context through which CCTs have been brought in to the Philippines.

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8The palace refers to Malacañang Palace where the President resides and holds office.
Chapter 4
Of tide-over and bridges: the Conditional Cash Transfers of the Philippines

This chapter examines the Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino Program (Pantawid Pamilya). It begins with a brief discussion of the program’s inception in the country, and then its key features, bringing in the experiences of some beneficiaries in order to give a sense of the implementation that has been going on for four years or so.

This chapter also looks at the political dynamics surrounding the pilot test and the subsequent expansions, and ends by mapping out the major positions on the program, digging deeper into the possible reasons and influences that underpin each position.

4.1. Genesis
CCT program in the country is dubbed Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program. The term “pantawid” rightly describes the initiative, that of being a “tide-over”, or more figuratively, a “bridge” through which poor Filipino families could cross over some trying economic times.

There are at least two versions to the story of how CCTs came about in the Philippines. Secretary Corazon “Dinky” Soliman of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the lead implementing agency of Pantawid Pamilya, explained that the government’s desire to meet the MDGs triggered the discussions which started as early as 2005 during Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s administration. She said that video conferences with some government officials of Mexico and Brazil were even done in order to learn as much about the scheme which, needless to say, has been forwarded by the World Bank. It is important to note that Soliman was in the same cabinet position during Arroyo’s term until she bolted out from government along with nine other cabinet members in the middle of 2005, at the height of allegations of electoral fraud and protection of jueteng (an illegal numbers game) which crippled the president’s credibility and popularity.

Nazmul Chawdhury, the Human Development Country Sector Coordinator of the World Bank Philippine Office, offered a slightly different version. He said that the series of shocks experienced by the country, and the high level of vulnerability among the majority of the population led the government to engage in a policy dialog with the World Bank. He added that in 2007, the Bank invited some government officials to a conference in Istanbul, Turkey where they learned about CCTs and heard the successful experiences of other countries.
Judging from the two accounts, it is apparent that the World Bank has been a major actor in the adoption of CCTs in the country. This is affirmed by two of the key informants who requested to remain anonymous as regards this matter. Key informant A opined that the adoption was “World Bank-driven”, after all, the institution was (and still is) bent on popularizing the scheme. Key informant B remarked that Pantawid Pamilya was initiated in discussions with the Bank, and so, it is impossible to believe that the latter could not have influenced the government’s decision to implement the program. What’s more, he said, the World Bank loan was a major factor in starting the initiative.

The World Bank and the ADB narrative has always been that Pantawid Pamilya is government-owned as explained by the fact that both institutions’ participation in the program is limited to providing partial financing (i.e. through loans) and technical assistance. The term “government-owned”, however, is a tricky one. It is possible that the government assumes overall control of design and implementation, but was led by some external pressures to decide for the adoption of the program.

Two explanations for the genesis of CCTs in the country have emerged so far: 1) the government’s desire to meet the MDGs, and 2) the majority’s high level of vulnerability to shocks and hazards. The data seem to suggest that these situations provided the World Bank the opportunity to advance its social protection paradigm, particularly the conditional cash transfers. The Bank’s influence is not to be taken lightly in view of its adherence to the Washington Consensus agenda veiled by its seemingly apolitical programs and projects for human development, social protection, and social safeguards—a point which has been discussed time and again throughout this paper.

4.2. Program Features

As mentioned earlier, the implementation of Pantawid Pamilya is led by the DSWD which, in turn, is supported by key agencies, particularly the Department of Education (DepEd), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), and the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank). While the DepEd, DOH, and DILG help ensure the availability of education and health services in the target areas, the Land Bank serves as the main channel through which beneficiaries, using their cash cards, may withdraw the grants/stipends.

One important feature of the program is the targeting of beneficiaries which, as advocates have repeatedly declared, is “objective, transparent, and uniform (Valerde and Fernandez 2011: 2), thereby minimizing, if not totally avoiding, leakage and undercoverage problems, as well as abuse by politicos and local bosses.
Fernandez and Olfindo (2011: 2 and 3) describe the targeting system to be following a “multi-step process” wherein the poorest provinces are selected based on the poverty data generated by the Family Income and Expenditures Survey (FIES) of the National Statistics Office (NSO). Within the selected provinces, the poorest municipalities/towns are selected based on the poverty data produced by the Small Area Estimates (SAE) of the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), while the cities are selected based on the pockets of poverty data of the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP). Within the selected barangays, poor households are identified through a household targeting system that primarily employs proxy means test (PMT). Finally, potential beneficiary households are identified based on the eligibility criteria (please see Box 1); and the list of these households is published at the barangay hall for community validation before any of the names are enrolled as program beneficiaries.

Following a relatively successful implementation of Pantawid Pamilya, the DSWD started implementing the National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR) in 2009 (ibid: 3). Still with the use of geographical targeting and the PMT, the NHTS-PR is supposed to “guarantee the generation and establishment of socio-economic database of poor households which will be used as reference in identifying beneficiaries of the various social protection

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8The local government units in the Philippines are grouped into three levels (in hierarchical order): provinces, municipalities and cities, and barangays. The municipalities and cities are clustered into districts from where congress representatives are elected. There are two autonomous regions, namely, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera Autonomous Region which prove to be an exemption in that they are also considered as local government units, but with more power given the scope of their jurisdiction, extending to all of the said regions’ provinces, municipalities and cities, and barangays.

10For the first two phases (i.e. sets 1 and 2) of Pantawid Pamilya expansion, all barangays within the selected municipalities/towns were covered by the program, while the number of barangays in selected cities depended on the quota set by DSWD (Fernandez and Olfindo 2011: 3).

11This test determines the socio-economic category of households based on such proxy indicators as access to water and sanitation facilities, education of household head, livelihood, ownership of assets, and type of housing (Pantawid Pamilya Website <http://pantawid.dswd.gov.ph/index.php/home>, accessed 12 September 2011).
programs of the government” (Alipio 2009: 7; NHTS-PR Website). The new targeting system is not at all cheap. It requires a total of 1.7 billion pesos (around 28.5 million Euros) to be fully functional (NHTS-PR Website). Add to that amount the pay of some 21,900 workers and enumerators hired to conduct the house-to-house interviews across the country (PCIJ 2011), one will get a hefty figure that could go a long way in terms of procuring additional books for primary and secondary public schools, or additional medicines for barangay health centers.

Indeed, targeting looks objective and non-partisan one paper, but the key informant from the DSWD revealed that for the third expansion (i.e. set 3 beneficiaries), districts had to be included as target areas because some congress representatives complained about the exclusion of their constituents who, they said, were very poor and deserving of the assistance. On the other hand, some of the FGD participants were wondering why a number of their neighbors who are equally poor, if not poorer than their families, have not been included in the program. As one participant stressed...

Nakapangutana gyud ko nganong wa naapil tong usa namo ka silingan ay nga pito kaluuk anak, nya perte man jung probreha, mas pobre pa gani namo. (I couldn’t help but ask why a neighbor who has seven children and is very poor, even poorer than our family, has not been included in the program.)

They added that at times they feel guilty to be receiving cash from government every two or three months, while the others who are also in need are not getting any, but that this is one grasya (blessing) they could not forego, and there is nothing they could do about it “kay ang computer man ang mipili sa among ngalan” (because it was the computer that picked our names). Sec. Soliman admitted about such errors, explaining that human frailty is inevitable especially in the conduct of the house-to-house interviews, but that the DSWD has been validating the list of beneficiaries and has removed roughly 155,000 names as of July this year. She added that a Grievance Redress System (GRS) has been set up wherein complaints of targeting errors, payment irregularities, corruption, or abuse by Pantawid Pamilya personnel and beneficiaries may be reported through text, email, and various social networking sites.

The possibility of social stratification resulting from the targeting component has not been thoroughly explored by this research, but if the FGD participants’ testimony (i.e. feeling guilty) were any indication, it would appear that Pantawid Pamilya has created within its target areas a distinct subgroup of people who are lucky enough to be “chosen by the computer” to receive grants/stipend from the government.

Another important feature of Pantawid Pamilya is the set of conditionalities, also termed “co-responsibilities”, laid down in the so-called panumpa (oath of commitment) that is read and signed by beneficiaries in an assembly held to commence their participation in the program. It must be recalled that there are
two sets of conditionalities involved in the program, i.e., the *ex ante* and the *ex post*. The former includes, quite obviously, the household’s poverty and vulnerability status, as well as documentary requirements such as birth certificate, ID picture, proof of child’s enrolment signed by the school principal, and immunization record of kids from zero to five years old. These proved to be difficult to comply, however, for some beneficiaries. The FGD participants from TULHOA revealed that they were only given a week to come up with the documents, and since two or three could not afford to secure them, the others contributed money to make sure that they could all make it to the final list of program beneficiaries. One of the three said…

_Sus, nangolekta jud ko’g lata, akong gipisa, ug gibaligya sa junk shop aron makakwarta ko kay wa man jud kay madaginot adtong panahona…wa gani ko’y para ipa-ID. Nya labi pa nang pamilita kay layo man ning among relocation, 48 pesos pod baya ang minimum. Maayo gani kay gitabangan ko sa akong mga silingan. (I had to collect tin cans, press them, and sell them to the junk shop just so I could raise some amount, as I had none at that time. I could not even afford to have an ID picture. Transportation cost is another thing. Since our relocation site is quite far, going to and from the city costs us 48 pesos (around 80 euro cents) at a minimum. Good thing my neighbors helped me.)_

One parent leader admitted to have approached and sought financial assistance from some city councilors in her intent to have everyone in her group submit all the documents and be enrolled in the program. This anecdote highlights the fact that while CCTs have reduced the interference of politicos or local bosses in the selection of beneficiaries, the scheme could also open new doors for patronage, if not expand the existing ones.

As for the *ex post* conditionalities, the FGD participants from SOBUSTEHA are confident that they could comply with the education and health aspects simply because they have no supply-side constraints, and their relocation site is close to the public elementary and secondary schools, as well as the barangay health center. On the contrary, those from TULHOA are a bit concerned because they are far from the public schools and the barangay health center which means that they could and would incur high transportation cost. As a way of coping with this situation, they encourage their kids to just walk to and from school in order to save on the budget.

When asked about the possibility of a number of beneficiaries getting disqualified because of supply-side problems, the key informant from the DSWD said that it was unavoidable. He added that some 20 to 30 percent may not be able to comply

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12The amount seems little, but in the Philippines, 48 pesos could already buy a kilo of premium quality rice. If the government-subsidized variety is preferred, the amount could buy at least 1.5 kilos.

13A parent leader is a point-person between the Pantawid Pamilya, local government unit/municipal link, and the beneficiaries at the barangay level.
with the conditionalities because of such problems, but that the good thing is, they could start pressuring their respective local government units to provide the necessary basic social services. It is sad to note that while in Mexico, the government first ensures the availability of basic social services before enlisting an area to Progresa-Oportunidades; in the Philippines, the opposite is happening. Here, Pantawid Pamilya is expected to (help) catalyze the fulfillment of the supply-side, thus imposing additional burden on beneficiaries who are already saddled by the program’s conditionalities.

Also, the FGD participants from both organizations shared that the activities related to the program could be demanding at times. They revealed that aside from attending parent development sessions and meetings, they were also asked to render community service like garbage segregation, street cleaning, and tree planting. Specifically for the latter, they had to contribute some amount for the bus driver’s food and honorarium\(^\text{14}\), as well as bring their own food. Some tagged along their kids since no one could take care of them at home.

The more outspoken FGD participants said that if their panumpa were to be strictly observed, they did not have to participate in the aforementioned activities, but that they could not dare bring this up to any of the Pantawid Pamilya personnel, let alone complain, for fear of getting disqualified from the program. They proceeded to saying that there were times when they had to drop their plans or their chores to give way to the program activities, somehow constraining them from pursuing other endeavors.

Again, these field data support earlier criticisms that the conditionalities are an additional load on the beneficiaries, especially the women who, as grant recipients, are mainly responsible in complying the program requirements. In addition, the empowerment often proclaimed by advocates seems to be invisible. Beneficiaries’ silence of their concerns vis-à-vis Pantawid Pamilya for fear of disqualification does not indicate empowerment, but helplessness. Going further, it signals how the program could fall into the trap of treating and making beneficiaries feel as helpless recipients.

On a more positive note, the grants/stipends have made a difference in the beneficiaries’ lives. The FGD participants said that the money has increased their incomes, and has helped them buy the school needs of their children and more food for the family. They confirmed delays in the release of transfers, but said that it is better than not having anything to expect. When asked about reports of some beneficiaries “pawning” their cash cards to money lenders, they denied having such cases in their areas, but admitted to have used the coming transfers as guarantee when making small credits—usually on rice and canned goods—in the neighborhood sari-sari (variety) store.

\(^{14}\)The practice is that they can use the barangay’s bus for free, but they have to take care of the driver’s food and honorarium because Pantawid Pamilya activities usually happen on weekends.
4.3. Pilot, Continuity, and Expansion

Reports on Pantawid Pamilya often talk about a pilot project from which government supposedly gathered some insights on the program’s feasibility in terms of finances, institutional arrangements, political support, and social impact, not to mention its potential in helping the poor. The key informant from the DSWD, however, disclosed that the original plan was to run the initiative for a year (from September 2007 to September 2008), but that barely three months into the implementation, then President Arroyo decided to go full scale the next year, allocating five billion pesos from the windfall of the expanded value-added tax (E-VAT) and increasing the target by 320,000 households. Subsequent expansions were undertaken in 2009 and 2010. He said that people in the DSWD were particularly surprised when the former president announced a total target of one million households by the end of 2009. (Please see Table 1 for the actual number of program beneficiaries.)

Table 4.1. Pantawid Pamilya Beneficiary Households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set</th>
<th>Actual Number of Beneficiary Households</th>
<th>Period of Expansion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>4,459</td>
<td>September to December 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>333,281</td>
<td>March to December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>288,192</td>
<td>March to July 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>412,901</td>
<td>October to December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,038,833</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Fernandez and Olfindo 2011: 3, based on DSWD data

But why did Arroyo decide to proceed with the expansion? The official narrative is that the key elements were already intact, i.e., the money, supplemented by loans from the World Bank and the ADB; the expertise, offered by technocrats from both institutions; and the good experiences with the pilot project. But the key informant suspects that the reason was very political.

It is worth noting that 2010 was an election year, and though the president is prohibited from seeking reelection, it was important for Arroyo to have allies elected in key government positions due to the various accusations (e.g., electoral fraud, protection of jueteng operators, rigging government contracts, among others) hurled against her and her family. She must have thought of Pantawid Pamilya as a tool that could help attract votes to her favored candidates, or at least help improve her troubled net satisfaction rating—the difference between those satisfied and dissatisfied—which lingered in the negative zone from October 2004 until she bowed out of the presidency in June 2010, plunging as far as −50 at some point within that period. Whether or not the key informant is right, what is certain is that the program, still in its infancy at that time, did not make any difference in the former president’s reputation among many Filipinos.
As earlier discussed, President Benigno Aquino III decided to sustain his predecessor’s CCT program, and even expanded its scale and coverage. For this year alone, Pantawid Pamilya has a budget of 21 billion pesos\(^{15}\), more than a hundred percent increase from last year’s budget of 10 billion, and is expected to reach 2.3 million beneficiary households. For next year, the program will have an even bigger budget of 39 billion, and is expected to reach three million beneficiary households.

Asked why Aquino decided to sustain and expand the program, Sec. Soliman of the DSWD gave two reasons. First, the number of those in need remains high. She said that “the more people who will benefit from the program, the sooner we can get families out of vulnerability”. Second, the government is determined to meet the MDGs, specifically those that are related to poverty reduction, and improvement in education and health indicators. Sec. Joel Rocamora of the NAPC echoed that based on data, poverty worsened during Arroyo’s administration, and the government needs a tool to prevent it from spreading further. In trying to explain the role and value of CCTs, he remarked that “if somebody is drowning, you don’t tell him I’ll teach you how to swim”, thus referring to the scheme as a lifesaver. He also implied that the government drew inspiration from the vast literature showing “CCTs as a useful and relatively efficient tool” in addressing poverty.

However, the key informant believes that the World Bank and the ADB had a hand on the President’s decision vis-à-vis Pantawid Pamilya. Theory has is that the World Bank loan was ready for release in the last days of the previous administration (i.e., months before the May 2010 national election), but that the Bank bought some time for apprehension that the money may be used, in one way or the other, to advance the campaign of the Arroyo-supported candidates. Moreover, he suspects that delaying the release was the Bank’s strategy of ensuring program continuity across administrations. The loan, he said, could have been used as leverage so that the government would yield into the World Bank and the ADB agenda of program continuity. He recalled that in July 2010, the President met with representatives of the two financial institutions to discuss about the latter’s plan for the country, including CCTs. That meeting, he said, must have helped the executive to decide in sustaining Pantawid Pamilya, and subsequently, expanding it.

In a PCIJ (2011) report, Dr. Gilberto Llanto, senior research fellow of the Philippine Institute of Development Studies (PIDS), offered a slightly different angle. He conceded that through Pantawid Pamilya, Aquino is able to “respond effectively to the political challenge of addressing the immediate needs of those who have put him in power”.

\(^{15}\)With the average conversion of 59.5 pesos to a euro, 21 billion pesos is around 352.8 million euros; 10 billion pesos is around 168 million euros; while 39 billion pesos is around 655 million euros.
The field data surrounding the continuity and the expansion of Pantawid Pamilya point to a couple of things. One, the program serves the political interest of both administrations, whether in trying to gain the support and confidence of constituents, or in addressing their needs. Two, the World Bank and the ADB again used their fairly not-so-invisible hand in the decision making process.

4.4. Debate

The current CCT debate in the country resonates that in the literature. It also branches out into the outright support, nuanced support, and radical opposition, plus an add-on, the nuisance opposition (the reason for a fourth position will be discussed later in the section).

The **outright support** position is held by the advocates who are convinced that CCTs are an effective and efficient tool to improve the lives of the poor. Aside from the World Bank and the ADB which both run offices in the country, this position is represented by a number of the so-called policy elites, including the President, Sec. Soliman of DSWD and other cabinet members, and bureaucrats, especially those who authored the Philippine Development Plan 2011–2016, who go as far as declaring that Pantawid Pamilya “shall be the cornerstone of the government’s strategy to fight poverty and attain the MDGs”. These personalities do admit that CCTs are not enough, and that the scheme should be complemented with other programs. Sec. Soliman, for instance, clarified that it is wrong to consider Pantawid Pamilya as a cornerstone strategy, nonetheless, it is an important direct assistance program that helps ensure that “no one gets left behind” as the country aims and achieves economic growth. She said that it must be paralleled with initiatives such as employment and livelihood creation, asset reform, and agriculture growth.

What is noticeably absent from this position is the structural rationalization of and approach to the problems of poverty and inequality. One has yet to hear any of the advocates who opine that the unequal free trade agreements (e.g. unilateral tariff reduction) the Philippines has forged with powerful blocs and countries have compromised the local producers and the local products; that export-driven growth and heavy reliance on foreign investments and remittances from abroad have rendered the country vulnerable to shocks in the global economy; that privatizing education and health has resulted in stratified services between those who can afford and those who cannot; or that promoting long-term lease agreements with multinationals over huge tracts of agricultural land has displaced peasants, if not starved them. This absence of structural reasoning, indicating either an adherence to the neoliberal paradigm or simple naiveté, helps explain why CCT advocates in the country are partial to the scheme.
It is also important to highlight the influence of multilateral institutions in the decision to adopt and continue implementing CCTs. As shown in the preceding sections, the World Bank and the ADB facilitated policy dialogs and conferences where some government officials learned about CCTs; their representatives met with President Aquino at the start of his term; and most all, they helped finance the program. This implies that the country’s policy elites are never completely autonomous in their policy decisions, and that international pressures are a strong determinant in their policy and program choices. It is interesting how, in the interviews, the World Bank’s Chawdhury and the ADB’s Spohr reiterated that it was all the Aquino government’s decision to sustain Pantawid Pamilya. But with a multimillion-dollar loan ready for release during the President’s first year in office, one could not help but be skeptical.

In addition, it is necessary to point out that domestic social pressures also form part of the influences of policy elites. When Aquino was starting his term, some 600,000 households had been registered as Pantawid Pamilya beneficiaries who were expecting to receive continually the cash transfers in the next three to four years. The President and his advisers must have thought that terminating the program would be politically damaging for the administration which was then enjoying high popularity and credibility ratings. The President could, of course, have other reasons ranging from the need to reward immediately those who supported him; or use the program to leave a legacy ala-Zedillo of Mexico or Lula of Brazil; or gain the confidence of the World Bank and the ADB; or gain prestige in the international community. The bottom line is that policy elites could not decide in isolation from the pressures and forces in society.

Moving on, the nuanced support position acknowledges the merits of CCTs and at the same time recognizes that the scheme is insufficient and must be complemented with structural reform programs if governments and societies were to make a dent on poverty. This position is represented by Walden Bello of Akbayan Partylist and Sec. Rocamora of NAPC, as well as organizations like Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and Social Watch Philippines (SWP). Bello and Rocamora are known progressives who are now in government, in the legislature and the executive, respectively.

In an interview with Rep. Bello in July, he said that Akbayan has always believed that there is no substitute for structural reform, unlike some people in the administration who think of CCTs as the cornerstone strategy for poverty reduction. He clarified that the Party maintains a critical alliance with the President, meaning, it does not agree with all of his positions and policy choices. He then explained that Pantawid Pamilya could be a useful tool to contain poverty, while the long-term solution (e.g. land reform, strengthening the local market) for the problem is still being fought for. He expounds this position in an article where he writes that…
I agree with the comment of the MST leader on the Bolsa Familia: given the large and increasing numbers of people going hungry, CCTs have a critical role to play, though I would not go as far as saying they are “necessary” ... The key measures to reduce poverty are reversing trade liberalization, a moratorium on foreign debt payments, and effective agrarian reform. Progressives need some time to win approval for these policies in the administration coalition, and after that, we need more time before the poverty-reduction impacts of these far-reaching reforms kick in. Thus I would see CCTs as a stopgap measure, to keep millions above the water line until reforms show results. (Bello 2011: 136 and 137)

On the other hand, Milo Tanchuling, the Secretary General of FDC, raised concern on the loans saying that the minimal interests do not change the fact that they are debts which would be paid by the next generation of poor Filipinos. This is further explained in the position paper of FDC (2011: 1) which states that...

[Pantawid Pamilya] is not redistributive: it is not linked to any asset reform program because it is not financed through progressive taxation. There is no net transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor. In fact, being debt-financed, it merely transfers wealth from the future poor—if regressive taxation policies are not removed—to the poor now.

Meanwhile, SWP, through its recently conducted self-perception survey on the effects of Pantawid Pamilya, forwarded several recommendations to government, including the need to address the supply-side gaps, explicitly integrate a women’s rights and gender equality dimension in the program, provide sustainable livelihood and decent work which are a function of macro-economic and social policy, and address problems of inequalities in assets, incomes, and outcomes through redistributive measures like asset reform (SWP’s News Webpage).

An interesting question to ask is “why do progressive individuals and groups in the country support, albeit nuanced, Pantawid Pamilya?” There is no easy answer to this, but the author views them as being realists or pragmatists. Having worked towards structural reforms—some of them within and outside government—for quite some time, they understand that the institutional arrangements so entrenched within the state do not allow them to effect dramatic change instantaneously. They could only do so much within the system. They recognize that CCTs are but an ad hoc response; nonetheless, they see the scheme as a useful tool that prevents the poor from sinking further down the poverty hole. Their nuanced support for CCTs does not imply a negation of their ideologies and vision of society, but rather a practical response, a compromise maybe, given the limitations they are confronted with.

The third position is of radical opposition to CCTs. It maintains that the scheme only serves the neoliberal agenda, deviates government’s attention from the roots of poverty and inequality, and further delays the struggle for structural
reform. It is represented by left-wing partylists Bayan Muna, Kabataan, Gabriela, Anakpawis, and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT Teachers). On behalf of these partylists, Rep. Teddy Casiño (2010: 3 and 4) of Bayan Muna writes…

We express our strong objection to the Aquino government’s adoption and expansion of Arroyo’s CCT program as its main strategy for poverty alleviation, demanding in the short term a re-channeling of funds direct to schools, health centers and hospitals, farm subsidies, irrigation, livelihood and housing services and in the long term the replacement of neoliberal macroeconomic policies towards a more progressive, sustainable and equitable development framework…A progressive party’s role is to serve as a critic of neoliberalism, expose and oppose projects and programs that sugar coat its destructive effects, and work with the oppressed in changing the system…Even without us (i.e., progressive parties), the WB, ADB and local ruling elites will push through with the CCTs because it is a solution that glosses over the root causes of poverty and makes the system appear pro-poor.

Undoubtedly, these concerns are valid. In fact, they are the same concerns discussed in the literature. But there could be another explanation for them, that which reflects real-world, country-specific politics. It should be noted that Bayan Muna and its sibling-partylists were an opposition to the President in the last election in that they allied with his closest rival. It may well be that their objection against Pantawid Pamilya is prompted by the fact that they are an opposition now, and as such, are the least, if not excluded from, the administration’s priorities (translate, no pork barrel(?), less programs and projects, and zero prospect of having allies or party members appointed in key government positions). This view may not be totally unfounded because when Pantawid Pamilya was first implemented during the term of Arroyo, there was hardly any objection heard in the media.

Before asking the bigger questions, a discussion of the fourth position should first be done. Labeled as nuisance opposition, it also reflects a politics specific to the Philippines which explains why it does not feature in the literature. It is represented by no less than the former president–now congress representative Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her allies whose objection against Pantawid Pamilya clearly stems from fact that they are an opposition to the President. Nevertheless, they could not be ignored since there are a number of them in Congress, and thus, could still influence decisions, especially as regards program budget.

Would the different camps view CCTs differently if they were in a different circumstance? Would Rep. Bello and Sec. Rocamora still be supporting Pantawid Pamilya if they were an opposition to the present administration? This is a relevant question to ask, especially because Rep. Bello was initially opposed to the scheme only to change his position later for the reason that he understood better its potentials after studying the experiences of countries like Mexico and Brazil. Would Bayan Muna and its sibling-parties still be objecting Pantawid Pamilya if
they were an ally to the present administration? No one really knows. As for Arroyo and her supporters, there is no need to ask the same question. Theirs is a glaring case of “where you stand depends on where you sit” (Miles 1978: 399–403). If anything, these things once again highlight the fact that social policymaking is never a straightforward process, and that there is no hard and fast rule to explain the policy positions of forces in the state and in society at certain junctures.

Meanwhile, it must be emphasized that of the four positions in the debate, the outright support position prevailed. Apart from the influences and possible reasons discussed earlier, this may also be explained by how CCTs are framed—a program that disciplines the poor from being lazy and from staying most days gambling, drinking, and making babies; invests in the education and health of children to help them secure a better future; efficiently uses the limited resources of government by ensuring that only the poor would benefit; is supposedly “apolitical”, “neutral”, or “non-partisan”, thus reducing the likelihood of being used by local bosses to award supporters and punish non-supporters. Who doesn’t want a program like that? No wonder, a broad agreement of outright support for Pantawid Pamilya has been created among different sections in Philippine society.
Chapter 5
Conclusion

This research began by asking the questions, “Why did the Philippine government decide to embark on a CCT program? How has this decision been influenced by the historical and institutional contexts of social policy of the country, as well as the various forces in the state and in society, and with what implications?

On the surface, the decision to adopt, continue, and subsequently expand CCTs has been triggered by the urgent need to address poverty that has plagued millions of Filipinos, as well as the ardent desire to meet the MDG targets, especially as regards reduction of poverty and hunger, and improvement in education and health indicators. But digging deeper, this decision only reflects the country’s unchanged social policy trajectory epitomized by the bias for targeted, palliative, and purportedly apolitical social provision measures, not to mention externally-influenced, drawing “encouragement” and financial support from multilateral institutions, all at the expense of structural reform and redistribution. This trajectory is, in turn, shaped by the historical and institutional contexts, of which the elites and the multilateral institutions have been a constant feature. Dominating the economic and political arenas, the elites have not only helped mold and remold policies, but have also proven to be a strong block, thwarting reform efforts that threaten their position and hold of power. On one hand, maximizing the country’s seemingly insatiable need for financial assistance, multilateral institutions, notably the World Bank and the ADB, have been able to push a number of policies and programs including, of course, the conditional cash transfers whose very nature is loath to confront structural issues. Given this, it is neither to be expected that Pantawid Pamilya would provide a long-term solution to the Philippines’ poverty and inequality problems, nor catalyze the necessary shift towards a more redistributive and/or universal social provision.

The untidy process of social policymaking must also be (re)emphasized. As illustrated by the CCT debate in the country, policy elites or policymakers are never really autonomous in their policy and program choices. Apart from their own interests, proclivities, and values, they also have to deal with and “listen” to the pressures coming from the different forces in society which, in this case, include, among others, the clamor and need of the poor to survive, contending views of progressives vis-à-vis CCTs, as well as the advice and preferences of multilateral institutions. Likewise, progressives, especially those who are now in government, have to make a difficult decision that involves, on the one hand, making a compromise of their ideologies to address an urgent need (i.e., poverty and hunger), and in view of the institutional limitations that do not allow for dramatic reforms instantaneously; and on the other, going for structural reform and redistribution without delay or distraction. The decisions made and positions taken by the different progressive groups must be understood in the light of the
political alliances they have forged with. Thus, these important questions are asked: Would the different camps view CCTs differently if they were in a different circumstance? Would Rep. Bello and Sec. Rocamora still be supporting Pantawid Pamilya if they were an opposition to the present administration? Would Bayan Muna and its sibling-parties still be objecting Pantawid Pamilya if they were an ally to the present administration? No one knows the answer at this point in time. But what lingers is the possibility that they (progressives), too, could not escape from the age-old adage, “where you stand depends on where you sit” (Miles 1978: 399–403).

Another point that must be made is that of the positions that have surfaced in the CCT debate in the country, the outright support position prevailed; and apart from the possible influences and reasons discussed earlier, it may also be explained by how the scheme is framed. Peppered with such ideas as disciplining the poor, investing in children’s well-being, saving on government’s tight budget, and less susceptibility to politicking, it has elicited a strong appeal to many, thus creating a broad agreement of outright support among different sections in the Philippine society.

Lastly, it must be brought out that in the midst of the aforementioned debate, one voice remains a whisper, that of the poor whom CCTs are supposed to be helping. The positions that have emerged must be assuming that they represent the voice of the poor. But do they really? Many of them are wary of the assumptions behind the scheme and its implications on poverty reduction, but isn’t excluding—intentionally or unintentionally—the voice of the poor in the discourses a sign of an equally worrying assumption that they do not know enough, or that others know better? This, for sure, is something to reflect on.
References


