The Influence of Multipartyism on Perceptions of Transparency and Accountability in the Planning and Budgeting Process in Bushenyi District –Uganda

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Disclaimer:

This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

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Dedication

I dedicate this research paper in honour of my dear mother Mrs.Katemba Grace who did her best to make me who I am today.

To my little nieces and nephews Denise, Bridget, Dionne, Anthia, Glen, Dinton, Rodney, Devin and Howard who always asked what I was doing away from home. Let this serve as an inspiration to them for the long journey they still have ahead of them in academics.

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List of Acronyms

APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
CAOs	Central Administrative Officers
CBO	Community Based Organization
DP	Democratic Party
DSC	District Service Commission
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
GoU	Government of Uganda
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
KAS	Konrad Adenaur Stiftung
LC	Local Council
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
NIMES	National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy
NDP	National Development Plan
NEC	National Executive Committee
NPA	National Planning Authority
NRM	National Resistance Movement
OBT	Output Budgeting Tool
OSIEA	Open Society Initiative for East Africa
OSMP	Open Society Media Program
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
PWDs	People With Disabilities
RDC	Resident District Commissioners
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Scientists
UPC	Uganda Peoples' Congress

Abstract

This study examines the influence of the Multiparty System of governance on the perceptions of transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District- Uganda. The introduction of multiparty politics in 2005 heralded a period of varied political parties that were formerly barred from organising, participating in the political process and had varied ideologies and policies. This has had a profound effect on the perceptions of transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process under the Multiparty System of governance which gives room for representation of various voices.

In practice, this paper finds that the principles of participatory planning and budgeting have been violated, due to the manipulations, political corruption and patronage-clientelistic networks at both personal, party, national and local levels. This has had adverse effects on the transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process since *a priori* the process should involve participation of all relevant stakeholders such as technical officers, CBOs, opinion leaders and political arms of local governments. This has led to an outcry for more transparency and accountability in government processes.

Relevance to Development Studies

This study is relevant to development studies in a sense that; it establishes the influence of multiparty system of governance on the perceptions on transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District Uganda as the local government tries to fulfil its mandate under the Local Government Act. In doing this, the Local Government pursues and contributes to the fulfilment of the national vision objectives, the goal and objectives of the National Development Plan (NDP), and the ultimate result of improved service delivery.

It is important to note that development requires all stakeholders' participation in the entire process and since communities are expected or required to be playing a vital role in planning and budgeting process, this study is important for gauging such practice.

Furthermore, the findings from this research will contribute to the knowledge base which could be used to inform other future similar studies and may inspire informed and evidence based policy debate on contemporary democratic practices, governance and development issues in Uganda.

Keywords

Multiparty System, Political Accountability, Transparency, Corruption, Patronage and Clientelism, Planning and Budget Process and Uganda

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

The nature of democracy prevailing in a country is an important factor which contributes to the level and form of citizens' participation in a country's governance processes. Proponents of democracy such as Devas and Grant (2003) and Blair (2000) argue that the more people are involved in decision making process, the more transparent the processes become – hence, the more accountable political stewards are to their subjects. In many ways, increased citizens' participation has been touted as one of the key democratic principles. One area of participation and influence largely emphasized by proponents of democratic governance is citizens' participation in planning and budgeting processes.

In many countries, the classical tradition of making national budget processes secret seems to be quickly changing with the dispensation of democratisation, globalisation and free market economics. These have ushered in a spirit of participation in governance activities both at the national and local/regional government levels. It has been especially agitated for by the voices of the governed who increasingly demand for increased participation, more transparency and accountability by and from their governments. Such has been widely attributed to Multiparty System of governance.

Uganda, like many other countries, embraced political party pluralism as one way of improving transparency and accountability which hitherto was considered as the missing link. This followed on from a decentralisation policy, which is a system aimed at transferring responsibilities (political, administrative and financial, among others), to lower tiers of government so as to improve the effectiveness of decision making.

Much as the Multiparty System of governance has evolved over the years, there is still the question on whether this has improved transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting processes. Hence, this paper explores how the Multiparty System of governance has influenced the perception of transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process in a local government in Uganda (Bushenyi District).

1.2 Background

Multipartyism is not a new phenomenon in Uganda. It dates as far back as the early 1960s following independence from Great Britain. However, the practice was short-lived following intense power struggle between the then President (Kabaka) and Prime Minister (Obote). It was at this time the country's constitution, which provided for multi-party system, was abolished. (Mutabazi n.d: 96). Henceforth, between 1970 and 1978, the country experienced dictatorship and economic privation therefore prompting a coup d'état which ushered in a military dictator, Idi Amin, to power.

The first multi-party elections after the Amin regime were widely believed to have been rigged by the military government. Discontentment over the results resulted into civil war which lasted 5 years. The new military government, following the civil war, imposed a moratorium on political parties and exer-

cised one party rule for nine years. Under this system, ascension to elective political office was based on individual strives and not on party affiliation. (OSIEA 2010:1and FHRI 2007:14). During this period, planning was centrally based with limited stakeholder consultations.

Notwithstanding, the 2005 referendum overwhelmingly marked the reintroduction of Multiparty System in Uganda. Makara (2010), Makara et al (2009), OSIEA (2010) and Katono and Manyak (no date) assert that the reintroduction of multi-party politics is largely attributed to internal and external pressures in demand for free political space. They allude internal pressure to struggles within the ruling party. Although the authors do not specify the source of the external pressure, it is probable that it came from civil society organizations and external donors as conditionality for aid. It is believed that Uganda currently has about 34 registered political parties[1], and all are urban-based with limited community outreach (Makara, n.d:3).

As part of the governance reforms instituted in the early 1990's, Uganda adopted a Decentralization Policy with the objective of devolving power to local communities. Constituting the decentralization package was the devolution of political, planning, financial and personnel oversight to locally elected representatives and administrators of respective districts (Nsubuga and Olum 2009: 29). A district is the primary government administrative unit under which are lower level local governments (sub-county, municipality, division and town councils). Local Government planning and budgeting takes the form of participatory bottom-up approach (Asiimwe and Musisi 2007:76).

While improved service delivery was a driver for decentralisation in Uganda, many doubted it. For example, Okidi and Guloba (2006) opine that decentralisation in Uganda neither improved service delivery nor generated the feel of local ownership as it intended. They argue that it was more a client-patron relationship other than citizens' empowerment (Okidi and Guloba 2006:13). This counter-productive relationship influences transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process.

So with the adoption of multi-party system, how has this new political arrangement influenced transparency and accountability in the Planning and Budgeting Process? Is resource allocation and service delivery done alongside party lines? Are there patron-client tendencies in public goods and service delivery? To answer these questions, the research investigates the influence of Multiparty System of governance on transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District.

[1] Some of the registered political parties include; the National Resistance Movement, Forum for Democratic Change, Democratic Party, Peoples' Progressive Party, Uganda Peoples' Congress, Uganda Federal Alliance, Justice Forum and Conservative Party among others. There are predominantly two political parties namely NRM and FDC which since the political arena was opened in 2001 have taken over 90% of the votes cast (African Elections database, n.d.).The rest of the parties including DP and UPC which were the key players in 1960 an 1980's have always collected less than 5% of the votes.

1.3 Problem statement and Justification

The type of political system of governance determines the level and limits of citizens' participation in decision-making processes which affect their very wellbeing. It also determines the level of openness and accountability of political officials to their subjects.

Devas and Grant (2003:309), in their article on literature review on local decision making, citizen participation and accountability in Kenya and Uganda, they asserted that; "Accountability can be strengthened through enhanced citizen participation." Mushemeza (2008:31)[2] observed that; "In Uganda the transition to Multiparty System represents an important step towards strengthening democracy and accountability".

Much as several studies have been undertaken on the functionality of the Multiparty System in Uganda such as by Juma (2010), Mushemeza (2007) and Manyak and Katono (2010), no research has been undertaken on its influence on transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process in the local governance in Uganda.

The gap in the knowledge on participation of citizens in the contexts of Multiparty and One Party Systems was revealed by Babcock et al. (Babcock et al. 2008: 16).However, their emphasis was on the right to participate in budgeting and revenue generation but not the effect of Multiparty System of governance on the planning and budgeting process in the districts of Uganda. This research is an attempt to address this knowledge gap.

Given Uganda's past reforms described above, different districts can now be expected to have leaders with diverging views and perceptions in accordance with the position of the political parties they are affiliated to. It is therefore interesting to find out how these differences are playing out in the planning and budgeting processes. The assumption is that under the Multi-party System, political parties assist in creating space for involvement of all stakeholders in the governance process. It is believed that political pluralism is core to augmentation of democratic governance across the world through provision of checks and balances of the incumbent party (Juma 2010:111). However, according to (Juma 2010: 114), in Uganda the reverse has been confirmed true with the Multiparty System of governance leading to splitting up people into separate political groups with diverging ideas. There is a high probability that these divisions have undermined transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process where people in the ruling party are likely to leave out those in other parties when it comes to participation in the planning and budgeting process. With such seclusions among people with different political ideologies, there is likelihood of having a planning and budgeting process which is short of transparency and accountability principles.

[2] This is not included in the references as it is unpublished research paper.

Hypothesis

The Multiparty System of governance influences transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting if a country has a dominant party system like Uganda due to its attendant vestiges of patronage-clientelist and power relations whereby patron-clientelistic networks exist at all levels of government including districts.

1.4 Research Objectives

The main objective of this study was to establish how the Multiparty System of governance has influenced transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi district**.**

1.4.1 Specific objectives

1. To investigate the influence of the Multiparty System of governance on the level of transparency in the preparation phase of planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District.
2. To investigate transparency levels in the approval phase of the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District.
3. To investigate the level of accountability and transparency in the implementation/execution and monitoring and evaluation phases on the planning and budgeting process.

1.4.2 Research questions

Main Question

How has Multiparty System of governance influenced accountability and transparency in the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District?

Sub-questions

1. How has the Multiparty System of governance influenced transparency in the preparation phase of the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District?
2. How transparent is the approval of budgetary allocations and projects under the Multiparty System of governance in Bushenyi District?
3. How has transparency and accountability been exercised in the implementation phase of the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District?
4. How does the monitoring and evaluation phase of the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District ensure accountability and transparency?

1.5 Methodology

The study aims at establishing how the Multiparty System of governance influences the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi district. To achieve the study objectives, both quantitative and qualitative study designs were used, in which both primary and secondary data were collected. This section spells out the scope and limitations of the study, various research methods and techniques of data collection and analysis that were used to undertake this research.

1.5.1 .Scope and area of the study

The study focus was to examine the influence of Multiparty System of governance on transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District.

Bushenyi District was purposively chosen due to its historic influence on Multipartyism in Uganda and also as a result of personal factors. From personal point of view, I felt it would be easy for me to access valuable documents and information since I am a born of that area and was once in charge of monitoring work done in Local Governments.

Bushenyi District was also chosen because of its location and historical experience of Multipartyism in Uganda. In 1980s, it was known as a UPC District. However, when NRM came to power, the District (population) embraced the NRM as a party and has continued to support it. Lambright (2011: 12) put it that; …"Bushenyi District has a history of political alignment with whatever government happens to be in power." This view is supported by Katureebe (the Independent February 3, 2009:1-2) in his article on Why Museveni freed Rwakasisi asserts that; ...*"Bushenyi district is considered to be a power-house of Uganda's politics. During Obote II's regime, the district used to host Heroes day (Annual UPC pilgrimage) every 27 May. The district has been looked at as a model in the Western Region of the Country...Under all Multi-party politics; the district has always had prominent politicians in all regimes".*

The district is one of the oldest districts in Uganda that pioneered the implementation of the Decentralization Policy, and has over the past decade been ranked among the best performing district by the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) which oversees the Local Government performance through annual national assessment. The National Annual Assessment is an alternative monitoring and evaluation aggregating intermediate performance of local government service delivery systems in the country. Bushenyi District compared to other districts in the same region such as Kabarole, Mbarara, and Kabale districts, has been meeting the minimum conditions and Performance Measures upon which Local Governments are assessed as a basis for resource allocation in the following year and qualification for local development grants. For instance in 2008, Bushenyi district was rewarded with a 20% increase in local development grant while its neighbouring districts such as Mbarara, Kyenjojo, Ntungamo, Kabale and Kabarole were penalized (MOLG 2008:57-58).

1.6 Bushenyi District Profile

Bushenyi District is administratively divided into, two (2) parliamentary constituencies, seven (7) sub-counties and three (3) town councils, 64 parishes and 565 villages. It has a population of about 300,000 persons, 50 percent of whom are females according to population projections based on 2002 population and housing census. The District area covers 841 sq.km and 910-2500 metres above sea level (Bushenyi District information portal 2011). The main economic activity in the district is Agriculture.

In Bushenyi District, the key actors in the planning and budgeting process at the district include technical officers, elected representatives and other stakeholders such as the Civil Society Organizations and opinion leaders among others.

The District is headed by the Local Council V- Chairperson elected by all voters assisted by councillors who are also elected by their voters in the areas they represent. The District Council is the planning authority of the District and in executing its duties; the Council is assisted by the District Executive Committee, the Sectoral Committee, District Technical Planning Committee and the District Local Government Tender Board. On the other hand, the technical administration wing is headed by the CAO who is the Accounting Officer appointed by the President. In executing his duties, the CAO is assisted by other technical officers below him. For administrative purposes the district is divided into sections of; administration, finance, planning, internal audit, community based services, production and marketing, health, education, works and environment. Okidi and Guloba (2006:2) for example explain that "all plans, budgets and action programs are approved by the council to which immediate accountability is also submitted".

Worth noting here is that the study was conducted mainly at the district level, taking into consideration of time and resource constraints, locus of party politics and the role of the district in the planning and budgeting process. Thus information from sub-counties and other smaller Local Government units were not gathered.

The map on the next page shows the location and composition of Bushenyi District which is the area of study in this research.

Map 1: Map of Bushenyi District

Source: http://www.bushenyi.go.ug/ Accessed 3 July 2011.

1.5.2 Sample Selection

Sample selection was done using random sampling which drew respondents from the representatives of political leaders, technical officers, community based and opinion leaders that composed the study sample. The district council has 25 councillors from 7 sub-counties / town councils and other special interest groups such as woman representative for every two sub-counties/town councils, representatives for People With Disabilities (P W Ds) for every sex and the youth and technical Members of staff who are 88 in number and are prohibited from being members of the council. The rationale behind selected sample was that these selected respondents are involved in the planning and budgeting process at the districts. The distribution of the sample was 15, 12, 11 and 7 for political leaders, technical officers, community based and opinion

leaders respectively in view of the weight attached to representativeness and importance in the planning and budgeting process. The interview guide was administered to the above sample with the intention of getting responses to enable the study meet its objectives.

1.5.3 Data collection

Data was collected using semi-structured interviews that provided the researcher with flexibility to employ both qualitative and quantitative methods to collect enough data. An interview guide was administered by the researcher with the view of gathering as much response as possible to provide answers to the research question. The researcher opted to use this method due to the sensitivity of the topic, rapport needed to be created with the respondents to enable them provide appropriate answers to the research questions.

1.5.3.1 Semi- Structured interviews

Semi- Structured interviews were conducted using an interview guide by the researcher to collect primary data from the sampled respondents. The interview guide was structured into key budget phases to allow better interrogation on what happens under each phase of the Planning and Budgeting Process. This gave an opportunity of probing respondents that later gave the in depth understanding of the study. Respondents were required to state the most appropriate answer to the questions in the interview guide and not a list of answers therefore the frequencies of responses in all questions totalled to 100 percent. A number of responses were generated. The researcher later coded the replies according to the main answers and dominant points. These coded replies formed the major position for analysis and conclusions herein made. Of note here is that all informants interviewed were promised that their responses would be kept confidential.

1.5.3.2 Secondary sources of data

Data collection involved review of secondary documents which included; the Local Government Act, the Public Finance and Accountability Act, the Harmonized Participatory Planning Guide for Lower Local Governments, Annual Local Government Performance Assessment reports, Budget Call Circular, District Development Plan and the National Development Plan. Academic Journals and internet sites were also consulted and such information was used to corroborate and triangulate findings from the interviews, hence strengthening evidence of the researcher on the information on perception of making the research richer about the influence of the Multiparty System of governance on perceptions of transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District.

The use of triangulated methods and techniques of data collection led to the reliable data set which guided this study in drawing the conclusions reached

by its (study) findings. The data collected was edited, summarised, and coded and a dataset created for analysis

1.5.4 Data Analysis

Data analysis was done using MS-Excel and SPSS from which tabular presentations were drawn from the data gathered from the field interviews and documentation analysis. Analysis was done according to objectives, and conclusions and recommendations were drawn from the amalgamated qualitative and quantitative data generated from the interviews conducted and literature reviewed. Analysis also followed the theories such as the patron-client and elite theories that have direct relationship with the concepts used in the study. The relationships derived at from the analysis are presented in chapter three in form of tables and supporting explanation.

Summary of data collection

1. Semi-structured Interview
2. Review of documents/document analysis
3. Interviewed -**45** Respondents
   - **-**Political leaders-**15**
   - **-**Technical officers-**12**
   - **-**Community based-**11** and
   - **-**Opinion leaders-**7**

1.7 Limitation of the study

The limitations that constrained this research include the following:-

Wrong assumptions at the proposal design stage due to limited data and information on the topic of study. While designing the interview guide for this research, the assumption was that that the politicians, civil society and opinion leaders work in a mutually exclusive environment or cocoon and yet the planning and budgeting process is a vertical and mutually inclusive approach. Initially I had disaggregated the questionnaire into three groups of; Technical officers, Politicians and Civil society organisations & opinion leaders. I found this not applicable to the local reality. This was because the questions that I set were not cognisant of the targeted population for instance the questions I had in the section of technical officers were instead meant for the politicians. After interviewing the first three respondents and going through some of the planning documents such as the District Development Plan and Performance Reports, I was able to identify the weaknesses in my initial interview guide. This forced me to change my interview guide to have one harmonized guide that could apply to all the key informants.

More so, some key informants kept on cancelling the already scheduled interview appointments. This prolonged the whole field exercise since I had to keep on rescheduling the meetings. It was also difficult to access all useful documents since the district had just been divided into five more districts and the council had just been elected to power.

Being a sensitive topic, I could not use other means of data collection such as Focus Group Discussions, basing on the key respondents' political ideologies, they were not willing to express their views publically and this was going to make the moderation difficult. For instance one respondent revealed that he belongs to another political party, but could not mention it in public meaning he assumed political office using the umbrella of the incumbent dominant ruling party. Sensitivity of the topic also affected the study in that the data provided seemed inadequate due to fear to discuss political issues freely.

These coupled with continuous network breakdown caused by heavy down falls in the area of study made it had for the researcher to access and have continuous communication with the supervisor on the progress so far made in the field.

1.8 Paper Structure

After the preceding chapter, three more chapters follow. Chapter two looks at the background to the Planning and Budgeting process in Uganda, Chapter three concentrates on definition and description of theories and topic related to the study and conclude with an analytical framework reflecting the relationships between the study concepts and their influence on transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process. Chapter four discusses analysis of field findings in an attempt to answer the research questions and Chapter five gives conclusions and policy implications of the study.

Chapter 2 BACKGROUND TO THE PLANNING AND BUDGETING PROCESS IN UGANDA

2.1 Introduction

This chapter gives an overview of the planning and budgeting process in Uganda, and scales down to talk about planning at the district level of which Bushenyi District is not an exception. It talks about the Institutional arrangements and Policy backdrops for the entire planning and budgeting process.

2.2 The Planning and Budgeting Process

As mentioned by Ehrhart et al. (2000), a budget process is conceptualised to mean; " a system of rules governing the decision making that leads to a budget, form its formulation, through its legislative approval, to its execution". Of note here is that Planning and Budgeting usually go hand in hand in with each other.

While looking at planning, Davidoff and Reiner (1983) cited by Kartasasmita and Bratakusuma (n.d: slide 14) defined Planning as; "a process for determining future action through a sequence of choices". Kartasasmita and Bratakusuma went ahead to say that Planning refers to; "deliberate attempt to formulate decisions from some alternatives to achieve the goals. It has elements of goals, priority and targets, time frame, constraints, capital and resources and its allocations, implementation policies and strategies, implementing agencies and human resources, monitoring, evaluation and control mechanisms".

Accordingly, (MoFPED 2003: 2) looks at the budget of a government to as "a statement of the revenues the government expects to collect over the next 12 months, and it plans to spend those revenues". In Uganda, the core rationale of a budget is for; economic growth, macroeconomic management and service delivery (Ibid).

For the purpose of this research, the researcher looked at the Budget process to mean preparation, approval, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of both physical and financial performance of the budget since they are the key phases of the planning and budgeting process in Uganda.

2.3 Overview of the Planning and Budgeting Process at the National Level

In Uganda, Planning and Budgeting process follows the five year National development Plan (NDP) which embraces strategic deliberations of all sectors within the entire economy. The current NDP covers period between fiscal years 2010/11 and 2014/14.The sectors are categorised into various clusters of; primary growth, complementary, social, and enabling sectors. All these four sector clusters focus on the major theme of; "Growth, Employment and

Socio-Economic Transformation for Prosperity" (GoU 2010:39). The Planning and budgeting process is assumed to be participatory, open and transparent in nature at all levels. This transparent planning and budgeting process enhances accountability through making it possible for the citizens to get involved in the entire budget process with the aim of empowering them to easily identify budget leakages and overruns in case of any. This means the process uses bottom up system of approach[3] and that every qualified citizen, has a role to play. Budget transparency work can play a significant role in improving accountability by facilitating public engagement in the budget process and oversight. The participatory kind of arrangement has both legal and policy back up.

According to (MOFPED 2009:4), the budget process is taken care of under several legislations such as the 1995 constitution of the Republic of Uganda, the Local Government Act 1995 (amended), the Budget Act 2001 and the Public Finance and Accountability Act 2003 which have a link to the Planning and Budgeting process. Besides those legislations, there are other policy reforms such as the Decentralization Policy which guides the planning and budgeting process in the Districts. This chapter discusses the planning and budgeting process at national level in Uganda and scales down to elaborate on how the planning and budgeting process is undertaken at the district level.

With the introduction of human rights basic principles such as democracy, freedom of media and expression in Uganda, this has broken the old tradition chain of transacting planning and budgeting process in a concealed manner which was partially attributed to lack of policies advocating for doing such work in open and dominancy of government bodies (Kuteesa et al. 2006:22).

Currently, the budget preparation is done at least on paper using bottom – up approach through a transparent consultative participatory process. This is to ensure that the views, aspirations and priorities of all stakeholders are taken into account throughout the entire planning and budgeting process.

From a macro perspective, the planning and budgeting process is embarked on at four major entry points of ; Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development MoFPED), Sector Working Groups, Line Ministries and Local Governments, Cabinet and Parliament (ibid :5). This paper focuses on the local government level and in particular Bushenyi District.

2.4 Planning and Budgeting Process in Practice

Much as there are so many activities involved in the planning and Budgeting Process, there are four key phases/stages of planning and budgeting. These phases include; a)Preparation phase, b) Approval phase, c) Implementation phase, and d) Monitoring and Evaluation Phase. Of note here, it is worth discussing the phases of the planning and budgeting since they work at all levels of government of which the Local Governments and Bushenyi in particular are not an exception.

[3]In practice Bottom-Up approach refers to participative planning where the communities are allowed to initiate their own program and project priorities.

2.3.1 Preparation Phase

Both preparation and approval phases are provided for under Articles 155-158, Chapter 9 of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (MoFPED 2009:4 and GoU 1995:81-82).The activities involved in the preparation phase include; deciding the fiscal envelope, agreeing on the national priority areas, holding stakeholders' budget consultative meetings at different levels including Local Governments and preparing of budget estimates (MoFPED 2009:7-13).

2.3.2 Budget Approval Phase

Subsequent to the completion of preparation of the budget estimates, there follows approvals and submissions of various budget documents such as:- the National Budget Framework Paper by the Cabinet and this is usually concluded by 30 March; approval of the National Budget Framework Paper by Parliament which has to be concluded by 15 May; submission of the budget estimates by the budget statutory bodies to the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development-MoFPED by 30 April; approval of the Budget by the Cabinet which is done by early June; presentation of the budget speech by 15 June the same date for all East African Countries; reporting on state indebtedness (i.e. loans and grants) which is usually concluded by 15 June, preparation and submission of the Ministerial Policy Statement which spells out the link between the strategic priorities and the proposed allocation by 30 June; preparation of vote on account by MoFPED for parliamentary approval to allow public spending up to a third of the budget as they await budget approval by Parliament by 31 August and approval of budget estimates through Appropriation Bill by 30 September (MoFPED 2009:15-18). At Local Government level, Budget approval by the council is done before 31 August (ibid: 18).

2.3.3 Budget Implementation Phase

Asiimwe and Musisi (2007:86) while citing MoFPED(2003), put it that budget implementation phase is a key phase in the budget and plan cycle since it is at this level that actual funds are released for use. Budget implementation aims at poverty reduction through delivery of public services which include; health, education, good roads, security and pensions among others (MoFPED 2009:19). Activities in this phase in their sequence of occurrence include; disbursing of funds to the spending entities, granting of credit on consolidated fund by the Auditor General to the Finance Minister who later issues the warrant to the former permitting him to draw money from the consolidated fund. Other activities entailed under this phase include; releasing of the quarterly cash limits to the spending agencies which guide the recipient ministries in coming up with projected expenditures for subsequent submission to the Director Budget. This activity is followed by issuing of accounting warrants by the Auditor General to Accounting Officers of spending agencies (including

Local Governments) an assurance for availability of funds who then make quarterly cash requisitions in line with the approved work plans and pass them on to the Director Budget for thorough checks. Subsequent to checks, the Director Budget disburses funds using Electronic Funds Transfer Payments with the assistance of Uganda Computer Services (ibid: 20-22).

2.3.4 Budget Monitoring and Evaluation Phase

Monitoring and Evaluation is very important aspect of the planning and budgeting process which aims at assessing value for money. The monitoring and evaluation activity takes place at various levels of operation and this helps in avoiding budget leakages and overruns. The activity of monitoring budget performance at national level is undertaken by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic development which is also responsible for compiling semi-annual budget performance reports with a reflection on the budget out-turns. While at agency spending level, the Accounting Officer does the monitoring of the budget performance and compiles budget performance information for integration into the annual budget performance report for subsequent submission to the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development which later form a basis for the comprehensive financial year report compiled by MoFPED for submission to Parliament MoFPED 2009:24).

At the end of every quarter, every accounting unit, including the Local Governments submits a budget performance report to the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development through a management information system called the Output Budgeting Tool (OBT) and a performance report to the Office of the Prime Minister for the preparation of Government Performance Reports under the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NIMES). In addition, there is a Budget Monitoring and Accountability Unit that samples the investments on which budgetary resources are spent on at the District level for physical verification of projects and value for money assessments. The Office of the Prime Minister conducts Sub-county Information Sharing Meetings called Barazas that provide the citizens of every sub county an opportunity to debate the receipt and use of budgetary resources in their respective sub counties and a form of accountability and citizens' participation. Worth noting here is that above arrangement involves Local Governments (including Bushenyi District) which is the focus for this paper.

2.4 Planning and Budgeting at the District Local Governments' level

Section 36 (1) of the Local Governments Act 1995 (amended), states that the District council is the Planning Authority of the District, and thus section 36(3) empowers it to come up with a holistic development plan reflecting views of the lower local governments within their area of control for submission to the National Planning Authority (Asiimwe and Musisi 2007:75). The Act also provides for political and technical organs to ensure participatory and bottom up

planning and budgeting at all tiers of Local Governments which has to be done in accordance with the National Development Plan.

The roles of the council and its committees in the planning and budgeting process include but not limited to: approval of annual development plans, monitoring and implementation of the development plans, Periodic review and evaluation of development plans, Identification of council priorities, approval of annual budgets and work plans.

Therefore the role of technical and development partners are to support the planning and budgetary process. The technical organs are established under section 36-37of the Local Government Act of the 1995 as amended of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda which defines the role of the Technical Planning Committees at all Local Government Levels. Equally the participation of various stakeholders including CBOs and citizens is specified under the guiding principles of Harmonized Participatory Planning Guide for Lower Local Governments (MoLG 2003:3).

At the beginning of the planning and budgeting process, a budget conference drawing members from all stakeholders is held to review the previous financial year budget and physical performance and agree on the proposed priorities. This conference is chaired by the council.

Figure 1 on the next page summarises the bottom up planning and budgeting process at the district and lower local government. The process begins at village level through parish planning committees, sub county council to district council as shown from the inner, middle to outer circles respectively. Note that the circles show different activities undertaken by different responsible stakeholders. The detailed intermediate processes at each level of planning are as described in Appendix I.

Figure 1: The District Local Government's Level Planning and Budgeting Cycle



Source: *Harmonized Participatory Planning Guide for Lower Local Governments 2003:4*

The above planning cycle is divided into three concentric circles which represent three levels of the Planning and Budgeting Process in the District. These concentric circles are; a) Parish/Ward; b) Sub county/Division and c) District/ Municipal.

The above description applies depending on either Urban or Rural set up. That is to say, Wards, Divisions and Municipals refer to Urban District set up while Parishes, Sub-counties and Counties apply in the case of Rural District set up. The Parish/Ward is composed of villages and households and this is what forms Local Councils 1 and 2 and Sub County/ Division is made up of Parishes and this is referred to as Local Council 3 while the District/Municipal is composed of counties (i.e. Local Council 4) and any municipalities in the area. These form Local Council 5 which is the District.

From the figure, we can see that Planning and Budgeting process commences in July with the review of the technical functionality and ends in June

with giving of the feedback to the lower local governments. This process involves all stakeholders.

2.5 Is Participatory Planning and Budgeting Process in Uganda Real?

In my view, much as the planning and budgeting process is documented and meant to be participatory in nature involving all stakeholders as provided for in Section 36 of the Local Governments (amended) Act of 1997 of the Republic of Uganda Constitution and other supporting documents such as the Harmonised Participatory Planning Guide, one wonders how participatory that process is in real practice. There are loopholes in the system that may hinder full participation and therefore may not grant transparency and accountability. For instance although local governments are mandated to initiate and come up with their district plans, they don't control most of the resources that central government sends to them as conditional grants hence rendering the district priorities useless.

Much as the planning and budgeting process is supposed to follow bottom-up participatory approach and be transparent; the activities to be implemented are centrally decided and the responsibility of shaping the budget policy remains at the centre. So, what level of participation is taken into account when it comes to decision making at the centre? How transparent and accountable is such a process? More so, bottom-up participatory planning and budgeting involves communities initiating, identifying and proposing projects suit for their localities and subsequently their proposed ideas are supposed to be integrated into the final development plans, however, little or at times none at all of their ideas is taken into consideration at the central government level where 70% of the national revenue is controlled and managed.

This challenges the purpose of bottom-up participatory planning and budgeting approach and leaves the communities disappointed by the whole arrangement. The question that leaves a lot to be answered here is how plans that do not embrace the ideas initiated by the all stakeholders the communities inclusive respond to the needs of the communities? The above critiquing ideas are also supported by Nsubuga and Olum (2009) who pointed out that "[...] not all ideas get included in development plans during bottom-up participatory planning, leading to unfulfilled expectations" Nsubuga and Olum (2009:31).

However Nsubuga and Olum are not the only voices questioning the so called 'participatory planning system' in Uganda. Although the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Report for Uganda (2009), appreciated the existing framework for budget consultations as one of the remarkable best practices in the planning and budgeting formulation process; the report questioned the effectiveness and how encompassing the budget consultations are at the grass root levels (APRM Country Review Report 2009:141).

The African Peer Review Mechanism report too mentions that bottom-up planning processes are faced with several challenges some of which include; lack of flexibility in implementation of programs and projects since funding are disbursed from the centre tied to specific activities; there is too much depend-

ency of local government on transfers from the centre which compromises the autonomy of local governments and their capacity to attend to their own issues. Such arrangements leave behind the question of how local concerns and priorities are taken care of (APRM Country Review Report 2009: 277).

Moreover, the same APRM report observes that much as the planning and budgeting process is supposed to be consultative in nature encompassing participation of all stakeholders as specified in the laws such as the Budget Act and the Local Government Act; there are some impediments that make community participation to be assumed unreal and these include; lack of proper ways of involving communities, limited budget set aside for participatory planning at the grass root levels, no planners at the sub-county level, lack of capacity to analyse budget allocations and monitor budget utilisation and no feedback from the District on which projects have been decided upon for implementation. This leads to communities losing interest in taking part in making future deliberations in the planning and budgeting process (APRM Country Review Report 2009: 157).

Similarly, patron-clientelism practices remain a prevalent challenge to participatory planning which tend to affect transparency and accountability in the budget process in Uganda. Francis and James (2003) and Okidi and Guloba (2006) for example, observe that decentralization, which guides planning, propagated patron-clientelistic relations instead of empowering citizens in Uganda. Francis and James (ibid) specifically point to the limited financial autonomy, resource inadequacy and limited disclosure as a manifestation of the effects of patronage in the decentralization program. This situation is sustained by the fear factor which characterizes the patron-client relations. Local leaders tend to be afraid of criticising central government's policies for fear losing central government's fiscal benevolence and subsequent imposition of stricter accountability measures in local governance. The case of Jinja Mayor's alleged abuse of public office, which was believed to be influenced by his lack of support for the sitting government as reported by Mufumba (2009) in the Observer and Anyoli (2009) in the New Vision, is a classic example. Francis and James (2003) in this regard makes reference to the "technocratic" mode of decentralisation where grants intended to address poverty reduction in local communities are in a way conditioned on fostering patron-client relations. Hence, decentralized planning comes into question when local priorities are overridden by central government's implicit demands or conditions.

Thus in all, the planning and budgeting process is not all that rosy as the framework shows, it is riddled with challenges and complicated by political parties which affect the districts and hence affecting the budget process and limiting transparency and accountability. This study is trying to find out if Multiparty System of governance is addressing the aforementioned issue which is the focus for this research paper.

2.6 Chapter summary

The planning and budget process described above gives a real picture of what happens at different levels of government planning and budgeting backed up by both institutional arrangements legal and policy frameworks that define and guide the budget process. The chapter explains the planning and budget decision making process which encompasses preparation, approval, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the budget performance. The chapter however, spells out some scholarly contradictions to the entire ideal transparent bottom-up approach of planning and budgeting process that leave a lot to be questioned. It gives an overview of the ideal planning and budgeting process and creates a link to the next chapter which discusses the conceptual and analytical framework of the study variables.

Chapter 3 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents definitions and discussions on the concepts and theory used in the study and the analytical framework. The analytical framework illustrates the relationship between the study variables. In analysing the influence of Multiparty System on perceptions of transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process, the researcher chose using Patron-Client theory and some of its related concepts because the planning and budgeting process entails distribution of resources that covers access to and control over by the citizens, technocrats and the politicians respectively. The planning and budgeting process is exemplified by several issues such as corruption and political patronage tendencies.

3.2.1 Definition of key Concepts and Theories

3.2.1 Multi-party System

Defining Multiparty System of governance in concise manner is quite challenging. This is due to apparent differences in the influence of the grass-root party activists on ideology, the class of their supporters to explain the number of parties. Due to this, one falls back on the tenets of what constitutes a Multiparty System and the normal practice so as to identify whether a system is a Multiparty System or not (IDEA 2007:51).

A Multiparty System of government has three tenets:-the legal existence of three or more political parties; a high degree of fragmentation of the electoral base of each of these parties; and the inability of any single one of these parties to form a government on its own thus rise to the emergence of coalitions of several parties to form government (KAS 2009:26)

Ideally political parties are supposed to play a cardinal role in entrenching democracy in any multiparty arrangement. More so, Political parties generally attempt to take action about the needs and aspirations of the people by addressing them in their election manifestoes that are supported by the citizens (Juma 2010:109). They act as a link between government and citizens. This is through direct democracy, representative democracy, democratic participation, and pluralism. Manning (2005:717) while quoting Huntington (1968) aptly put it; "Parties [...] perform essential functions in terms of ordering the political system. Political parties provide order and stability in society, and they serve to structure the political process and ensure that citizen participation in that process is orderly. They create new bases for solidarity and identity within society, cross cutting and alleviating pre-existing cleavage lines such as clan, ethnicity or religion. They seek to provide a distinctive collective identity for their followers, one that is premised upon acceptance of the basic rules of the national po-

litical arena. Parties also provide order to the political process. This western context of what a party is-is very different in the African context".

There are two main forms of democracy and these include; direct and representative democracy.

Direct democracy, is whereby all qualified persons have a right to participate in decision making on matters affecting them through debating the issues put on the agenda. These persons are required by law, norms, cultures and any other criterion set by that particular society from which they hail. In Uganda this is practiced at the village level/Local Council 1 and the same system was used in 2005 during the referendum when the government was changing from a one party system to a multiparty system (KAS 2009:12)

Representative democracy according to Friedrich (1968:278) is a

> "process by which political power and influence which the entire citizenry or a part of it might have upon governmental action, with their express or implied approval, is exercised on its behalf by a small number among them, with a binding effect upon the whole community thus represented."

This is mostly used at higher local government level especially at the national and district levels. In Uganda, both direct and representative democracy is used under a presumed Multiparty System of government. So, what could be the relationship between the multiparty democracy and the planning and budgeting process? Does the Multiparty System of governance promote the aspect of transparency?

3.2.2 Political Accountability, Transparency and Corruption

3.2.2.1 Political Accountability

The concept of political accountability denotes 'the constraints placed on the behaviour of public officials by organizations and constituencies with the power to apply sanctions on them' (The World Bank Group 2011:1). According to Newell and Wheeler (2006), accountability concept is made up of; answerability and enforcement which form a basis for the interactions between citizens and the state agencies that handle issues that impact on their lives. Whilst answerability revolves around the responsibility to give information and entitlement to demand the same on decisions taken, enforcement on the other hand involves the ability to sanction the aberrant party where the former defaults in its duties.

Newell and Wheeler (2006) consider Political accountability as a concept that involves multiple actors who provide checks and balances to ensure that the state and all the people working in different institutions explain or provide an explanations and justification for certain actions. Whereas the state provides accountability of its actions through its organs and institutions like Parliamentary committees, the citizens and civil society use more vertical means such as voting and court cases to compel the state to account for their actions.

Then how is accountability exercised in the planning and budgeting process under the Multiparty System of governance in the districts like Bushenyi?

3.2.2.2 Transparency

According to TI plain language guide 2009, the concept transparency refers to; "characteristic of governments, companies, organisations and individuals of being open in the clear disclosure of information, rules, plans, processes and action".

In theory, public and private sector officials owe a duty to their subjects to be opened in the execution of their responsibilities in a way that they are predictable and accessible to scrutiny and to also ensure that subjects share ownership of decisions (TI plain language guide 2009:44).
Worth noting is that accountability usually moves hand in glove with transparency.

In this research, transparency concept will be used to measure how Multiparty System of governance has influenced perceptions of transparency in the planning and budgeting process as far as putting that process in the public gaze is concerned.

Under the same note on accountability and transparency, the concept of corruption arises since the two are not mutually exclusive but share inherent traits such as abuse of government office. Political accountability and transparency check for the existence of and act as guard to forestall or root out corruption.

3.2.2.3 Corruption

There are various definitions of corruption.

Khan (1996) cited in (Webster n.d: 1-2) define corruption as "behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives such as wealth, power, or status".

Political corruption is "when laws and regulations are more or less systematically abused by rulers, side-stepped, ignored, or even tailored to fit their interests" (Amundsen, 1999:3). To Amundsen (1999) and Nsubuga and Olum (2009), political corruption entails taking away the little public resources available by the elite groups who not only use their positions, but also use their status to obtain such resources for their masters.

Furthermore, Local elites are well placed when it comes to policy and decision making processes. This puts them an advantage over the poor citizens who are not given clout to contribute towards deliberations on issues concerning their localities. The local elites hijack the whole decision making process since their positioning gives them social, economic or political powers to do so (Steiner, 2008:38-39; Nsubuga and Olum, 2009:31).

This form of corruption is rampant in the third world whereby due to the neo-patrimonial relations, there isn't a clear distinction between the public and the private domain. For instance, in Sub-Saharan African countries (Uganda inclusive) this has over time resulted into what Amundsen (1999:9) calls 'hegemonic elites, or state-classes' that control the political and economic spheres of the country. Corruption can make it had for the council to monitor how funds are utilized. Therefore this study will seek to find out if there are budget leakages or any other vices which create an opportunity for corruption in the budget execution and evaluation.

Political corruption has various forms in which it is practiced such as bribery.

3.2.2.3.1 Bribery

As mentioned by Amundsen (1999:11) it is when a state official responsible for awarding contracts is given a certain percentage of the contract. This payment is given in order for expeditious or favourably awarding of the contract to avoid certain obstacles in the process.

3.2.4 Patronage Theory

According to Stein (1984:30), patronage is '[a] mediating system... seen as an adaptive response to hostility and inequality'. The patron becomes the aviator of the client's social universe by offering to protect the client in an unreliable world. He or she offers a semblance of stability to clients, awards resources to those who don't have and always finds ways to outwit the formal bureaucratic structure by creating parallel structures to gain supremacy over the system.

In party politics, patronage entails a dyadic relationship between party leaders and their allies. At a more profound level, the relationship is one of reciprocal dependence which inhibits development in general, since individuals involved are not able to devise other means of survival on their own. This makes it impossible for them to end the dependency relationship. In this case the party uses patronage to entrench political support within the whole community. It uses party or state resources to reward pro partisans who play key roles in party activities at the expense of the common good of the larger society (Kopecký and Mair 2006:3 and Stein 1984:34). Roniger (2004) also point out this reciprocal relationship between patrons, sub patrons, brokers and their clients. He claims the former use their political positions and social influence to position themselves or even their clients where they can avert resources meant for the common good, avail material benefits and protection to their clients in return for clients' vote, political support and praise-singing.

At the institutional level, both Frye (1997) and Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) discuss the main goal of patrons in the political environment. They point out that patrons seek to establish their power base through self-style institutional arrangement as a clever means of perpetuating their influence in public office and over their subjects.

Interestingly, patrons do their best to avoid their clients' mistrust of the world around them. They make every effort to preserve the relationship by keeping their clients dependent on them. Client dependency helps sustain the relationship by making the patron indispensable (Stein, 1984:33). This kind of socio-political symbiotic relationship conceals the real effects of patron-clientelism relations on society such as dominance, dependency and underdevelopment. This is clearly shown by the patron's maxim of 'you need me to protect you...I need you to protect you' (ibid).

Patronage has concepts such as clientelism that emanate from it so as to clearly be able to trace its vestiges.

3.2.4 Clientelism

Clientelism is defined as 'dispensing of public resources (or the promise to do so) by political power holders/seekers and their respective parties, in exchange for votes and other forms of popular political support, being a strategy of elite controlled political participation fostering status the quo' (Banck cited in de Wit, 1996:50).

Furthermore, Roniger (2004) observes that broadly, clientelism can be looked at using lenses of partnership approaches, relations between the centre and the local governments and its various exchanges. As mentioned by Roniger (2004:356);

> "[...] Clientelism involves complex (often pyramidal) networks of patron-brokerage selectively reaching different strata, sectors and groups, and selectively pervading political parties, factions and administrations; that, in many cases, clientelism assumes an addendum-like character, ancillary to democratic institutions, and only seldom does it become a major organisational mechanism,[…]. Also clientelist strategies are affected not only by immediate considerations of power and instrumentality, but often encompass longer evaluations of reciprocal benefits and commitment as prerequisite for the maintenance of ongoing relationships."

Clientelism is usually a 'particularised and reciprocal relationship between two actors controlling unequal resources' (Carney 1989:44). The bigger the difference in status will lead to a high level of affectivity in the relationship. The dealings between the client and the patron are characterised by a give-and-take relationship of resources most of which are economic as well as political such as support, votes, protection and loyalty. This exchange is in most cases dual and simultaneous by both parties and both feel obligated to fulfil their end of the bargain. Solidarity is couched in the relationship and attaches both the patron and the client to each other although this may be ambiguous. The attachment may be strong like in the classical type of patronage or it may be weak (Roniger, 2004:354)

Despite the degree of affectation, loyalty; paradoxically the relationship is premised on the inequality of the patron and the client. Therefore, the patron continually tries or even succeeds in a monopolisation of the resources that are essential to the client. This is done by limiting the free access of the masses to these resources, access to the means of production, major markets and centres of society and then converting these resources into political capital (Roniger 2004: 359). This is to manipulatively control and increase the leverage the patron has over the client since the attainment of parity in the relationship would automatically dissolve the relationship while a widening of the gulf between the two would enhance the relationship and the client's need of the former. This inter alia is driven by the client's desire to advance one's 'economic and social status.' but also for one's survival in the current environment of scarce resources, psychic and material insecurities perpetuated by the patron (Mair, 1961:325)

The patron-client relationship is voluntary and either party can withdraw from the arrangement. The reasons of the existence of the relationship may

become obsolete, dissatisfaction of one party with the arrangement, or else 'may simply die a natural death or may end amidst conflict and dashed expectations' (Carney, 1989:45) or as earlier mentioned the attainment of parity. However of note in most instances, the patron in most instances typically ends the relationship and not the client.

The relationship is not legal and is actually castigated by the official laws of the land but is rather an informal relationship based on social arrangements which are perceived by Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980) and Roniger (2004) as a way of institutionalizing resource and power exchange in society by de-facto. These arrangements are done in a way that clients at the receiving end of the line see them as a legitimate and the only chance for them to be able to access these resources.

Clientless is both particularistic and universalistic. It is particularistic in the use of public resources such as jobs and in exchange for votes. Under such arrangement, clientelism acts as best alternative to provision of social rights through selective distribution of state resources which the citizens are not able to attain through political participation. As a result, there is no observance of supremacy of laws and citizen's political rights are violated (Foweraker and Landman 1997 cited in Escobar 2002:23).

Patronage-Clientelism theory will be used to analyse the field findings in an attempt to answer the research question of the influence of Multiparty System of governance on perception of transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District. This will be done by looking at how patron-client networks play out in the planning and budgeting process under the multiparty system.

2.7 Conceptual and theoretical linkages

Having conceptualized the above concepts and theories, it is crucial to demonstrate the links and synergies between them. One must first all of understand the distinct nature of both particularistic and universalistic theories;

Universalism as mentioned by Mungi-Pippidi (2006:88) refers to a situation where 'individuals expect equal treatment from the state' while for particularism- treatment is based on their status in the given society and surprisingly, people don't expect equal treatment and fairness from the government, though they expect the same treatment to be accorded to everyone in that particular position or to people with that status (ibid). These two will either foster or negate the main elements of patron-clientelism, democracy, corruption and transparency. The following is a discussion on the links and synergies between them.

Democracy entails the ability of group of people to access and hold political power with the major objective of availing all citizens with public and collective goods in a transparent manner (KAS 2009:11 and Oarhe, 2010:46). Clientelism involves an asymmetrical relationship of power and exchange that is beneficial to both the patron and client. It is particularistic in nature that is; it consists of a mediated and selective access to resources and markets from which others are normally excluded in a process highly governed/premised on

the subordination, compliance/submission and ultimately dependence on the good will of others.

Both representative democracy and patronage-clientelist relationships strive to deliver public goods but the two diverge on the means employed by both. Piattoni (2001:3 and 199) claims that "politics is inherently particularistic and that what makes the difference is how particular interests are presented, promoted and aggregated". Thus pluralism in democratic representation theoretically ensures the acceptance of divergent political views but the normative and pragmatic level are diametrically opposed especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and Uganda in particular a heterogeneous nation with the various tribes each having a distinct socio-cultural fabric.

Clientelism fills the void left by representative democracy in the provision of public goods especially due to the resultant effects of administrative ineffectiveness. Clientelism then becomes a fora 'in which interests are represented and promoted, a practical (although in many ways undesirable) solution to the problem of democratic representation' a 'dialectical relationship between what is theoretically desirable and what is practically possible' Piattoni (2001: 18).

The prevalent view that clientelism is particularistic is being challenged by the mutation of clientelism into a collective conscious in its particularistic enclaves. As observed by Gay (1998) on his studies on Politics of Brazil, this shift results into what he referred to as;

> "a means to pursue the delivery of collective as opposed to individual goods. This means the political clienteles are less likely to assume the form of loose clusters of independently negotiated dyads than organisations, communities or even whole regions that fashion relationships or reach understandings with politicians, public officials and administration. In other words contemporary clientelism exhibits both hierarchical and relational elements and elements of collective organisation and identity." (Gay 1998:14) as quoted in Roniger, 2004:358)

The same goes for Uganda as the political sociology of Uganda has changed with various groups most especially ethnic demanding for collective goods as a district local government.

The above concepts and theories are used to analyse the field findings using the analytical framework.

2.8 The Analytical Framework

The study examines the influence of Multiparty System of governance on the perception of transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process in the districts of Uganda. It analyses the role played by political parties at different phases of the planning and budgeting cycle with the aim of having improved service delivery in the district. The figure above is a diagrammatic presentation of the relationships and linkages between study variables that determine the influence of Multiparty System of governance on planning and budgeting process at district level.

To explain the link between the study variables in this research, Multiparty System of governance is assumed to be an independent variable, while the

budgeting and planning process (preparation, execution, monitoring & Evaluation and reporting phases and their related activities) are assumed to be dependant variables. This dependant variable is affected by Patronage, clientelism, corruption, accountability and transparency factors. The way Multiparty System of governance influences the perceptions of transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting considering other factors that may contribute to the way Multi-party influences direct the planning and budgeting process. The diagrammatic representation of this whole framework is in figure 2 on the next page.

Figure 2: Analytical Frame Work: An illustration of the Relationship between the Study Variables



Source: Researcher's Own Construction

Chapter 4 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FIELD FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the findings of the study. It tries to answer the main research question which is; on the influence of the Multiparty System of governance on perceptions of accountability and transparency in the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District. In trying to answer the research question, the study looks at how the multiparty system of governance has influenced transparency in the preparatory phase of the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District. This chapter also describes transparency in the approval stage of the planning and budgetary process under the Multiparty System of governance, talks about the ways through which transparency and accountability are exercised in the implementation phase of the planning and budgeting process and ends with the means of ensuring accountability and transparency in the monitoring and evaluation phase of the planning and budgeting processes.

4.2 How the Multiparty System of Governance has Influenced Transparency in the Preparation Phase of the Planning and Budgeting Process (sub-question 1)

With regard to the influence of Multiparty System on perception on transparency in the budget preparatory phase, parameters such as project selection, areas where the opposition participates in the planning and budgeting process, and influence of opposition parties in the planning and budgeting process were looked at to capture the perception of respondents.

Project Selection

Transparency in project selection is important and it has overflow effects in that it increases accountability. As Chene (2011:4) states 'transparency work can play a significant role in improving accountability by facilitating public engagement in the budget process and oversight'. For transparency cannot exist if the beneficiaries are not empowered to participate in all processes and this dismally affects accountability and the ability for them to respond to the policies that are implemented. Therefore, when the public or communities participate, it enhances accountability by providing the affected communities with the option of giving them the means to influence the kind of projects that should be adopted in a more accountable manner (Chene 2011:2).

Brunetti and Weder(1998 as quoted by Lambsdorff,1999) are of the view that the ability to combat corruption by control and participation or what they call the "Voice" is highly determined by the degree of political rights, democracy and the other means of control over politics and bureaucracy. These can have a significant effect on the degree of corruption. Thus the more citizens participate, have more rights and have the ability to influence the politicians

and the technocrats, the more likely projects that are relevant to the local context will be chosen. Subsequently, there will be a low level of corruption in project selection since the people themselves are the determinants and no one has to be bribed to pass or select a particular project.

However, patron-clientelist networks can be able to manipulate the project selection process through implicit or covert means. Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980:49) mention the ability of patron-clientelistic relations ability to determine the regulation of cardinal facets of institutional order, its organization of how resources are distributed and the power relations among various local, social groupings and their ability to be perceived as legitimate.

Besides, in Uganda the question of the people's power to choose the manner in which local resources are to be used as not having been realised under decentralisation as had been presumed. Instead, cliques of Local Leaders have hijacked the process with the attendant resources for personal aggrandisement and this has left the ordinary people powerless and unable to bring them to account thus exacerbating corruption in district local governments. Secondly, a new strain or class of local leadership has emerged that is predatory in nature by embezzling chunks of revenues that have been assigned to their care so as to deliver services to the citizens (Jim: n.d)

Furthermore, budgets are just fancy lists that are mixed up whereby one has development budgets particulars mixed up with the recurrent budget items. The quarterly reports explaining the current revenue and expenditure are none existent and the various accounts are not made in time and the accounts are not well written (ibid).

The study considered who in the area of study selects the projects to be included in the budgets. The findings established that 42 percent of the respondents perceived the communities to constitute the single largest voice in project identification, which was followed by 29 percent of the respondents perceiving the politicians to be having a lead role in selecting. On the other hand, 18 percent of the respondents believed that the technical members take lead in project selection while 11 percent of the respondents mentioned that Social and opinion leaders had the least say when it comes to project selection and inclusion in the budget. This situation arises from the nature of planning which is bottom-up as emphasized in figure 1. Uganda uses bottom-up planning and budgeting where 65 percent of the budget allocation goes to the community level which is headed by the sub-county. Budget execution is meant to be done at community level and budget and project planning and budgeting should be done at same level to allow communities select the project suit for their areas.

The Community being pointed out as taking lead in project selection, one of the respondents had this to say;*"...Construction of Health Centre IIs*[4] *ideas originate from the communities which they know the focal point where the health services can be easily accessed rather than walking long distances and queuing in the main hospitals where one may have to wait for so long to be attended to and also when it comes to construction of village water points, a village can work on a protected spring within its locality and by the time government comes in to support, the communities have already done the selection themselves and the water springs are functional and serving the communities around"(Interview with a CBO Respondent 12 August 2011).*

Table 1: Project Selection

Project selection	Frequency	Percent
The community	19	42
Political leaders	13	29
Technical members	8	18
Social and opinion leaders	5	11
Total	**45**	**100**

Source: Field Data August 2011[5].

Opposition Participation in the preparation phase of the Planning and Budgeting Process: Key Areas according to Respondents

As shown in bar chart 1, opposition parties were perceived to be effective in lobbying and advocacy aimed at influencing the decision making process. The majority of respondents who gave this response cited cases in education and health sectors.

On the other hand, the study found that opposition parties are effective in resource mobilization and project identification/selection. Opposition parties contributed towards Monitoring of projects. By virtue of their smaller number in different levels of political decision making they accounted for meagre contributions in the budget and work plan preparation respectively. Other critical voices such as the Civil Society Organisations respondents complained that the planning and budgeting process is not smooth as presented in theory on paper. For instance majority of the civil society respondents complained that; *"...the budget process is given little time and in most cases the so called budget conferences which are held at the commencement of every planning cycle are always hijacked by technocrats and the*

[4] According to the Government of Uganda, Health Sector Strategic Plan III, 2010/11-2014/15, Health Centre IIs are health facilities within the parish that provide outpatients Primary Health Care and community Ooutreach services.

[5] Respondents were required to state the most appropriate answer to the questions in the interview guide and not a list of answers therefore the frequencies of responses in all questions totalled to 100 percent. Note: This applies to all tables and charts.

Council Executives who don't give them enough time ask questions since they come when they have already agreed on most important issues and that this habit is in built right from the national level" (Interviews with CSO representatives held on the 3rd,4th,5th,11th and 12th August 2011 respectively) .

However, the fact that multiparty exists and different parties participate at preparation phase of the planning and budgeting process enhances transparency and accountability which raises a difference from the one party system.

Figure 3: Opposition Participation in the Preparatory Phase of the Planning and Budgeting Process: Key Areas according to Respondents



Source: Field Data August 2011

Influence on Resource Allocation

Political parties play a major role in the integration of a nation by being representatives of divergent groups at both the national and local level. Parties therefore help in the articulation of interests as well as the aggregation of these interests thereby being able to some extent to determine government policies Makara (n.d: 50).

However, decentralisation can also be used as a local tool in which technocrats and the local elites build power bases so as 'to create and sustain power bases in the country side' (Crook, 2003:86). There are instances of 'local elite capture' whereby the local elites take over the decentralised public services (Prinsen and Titeca, 2008:151).

Both forms of elite capture can occur spurred on by clientelistic imperatives whereby decentralisation or modernisation of institutional arrangements only allows the elite to use them in power struggles (Roniger, 2004:20).

The study also considered whether party pluralism had influence on resource allocation in Bushenyi. In the view of the respondents Advocacy/lobbying helps in resource allocation aimed at shaping service delivery. Findings in Table 2 showed that, 27 percent of the respondents perceived party ideology to have brought about balanced resource allocation. While 22 percent of the respondents indicated that opposition served as 'Watchdogs' for budget implementation. Watchdogs are an all time observers ready to question implementer's mistake. Furthermore, the study established that 18 percent of the respondents indicated that the opposition members acted as a control in planning and budgeting process. Control amounts to checks for what would have been excess variations from what is planned. The other 17 percent of the respondents acknowledged opposition as a source of new ideas. In practice the study found that members of the opposition are often allocated the overseer functions in committee such as; chairing public accounts scrutiny committees and procurement committees.

In addition to the above, one respondent said that; "... *In our District, our party was behind the idea of having urban markets by the road side to enhance the household revenue base and fight poverty and this has already yielded good results in some households and everyone knows and appreciates our party contribution (Interview with a Politician, 11 August 2011).* This mix of ideas, ideologies, and doctrines is crucial especially during implementation stage of plans and budgets. This fosters transparency to the benefit of the people thus a depiction of positive influence of Multiparty under this phase.

Table 2: Party ideology influence in the Planning and Budgeting Processes

Opposition influence on planning and budgeting processes	Frequency	Percent
Balanced resource allocation	12	27
Served as 'Watchdogs' for budget implementation	10	22
Acted as a control in planning and budgeting process	8	18
Has been a Source of new ideas	8	17
Strengthened Advocacy and lobbying	7	16
Total	**45**	**100**

Source: Field Data August 2011

4.3 Transparency in the Approval Stage of Planning and Budgetary Process under the Multiparty System of Governance (sub-question 2)

Regarding the respondents' perception on transparency in the approval stage, the study looked at the common methods used in resolving disagreements

since decision making under multiparty system involves actors of different party ideologies.

Methods used in Cases of Disagreements over Approval of Budget Priorities for service provision between Different Parties

Clientelism involves positioning cronies and friends in profitable areas where they can have authority and power over public resources. This has a negative impact on the already established management structures in place where clientelism damages the management mechanisms and more importantly transparency and accountability (Roniger 2004:354). He goes on to say that clientelism leads to '[...] biased bidding for public works and over-pricing, secluded negotiations and private deals involving public resources' (ibid).

For patron-client relations in their main essence mean a unique form of moderating the cardinal facets of institutional order that is 'the structuring of the flow of resources, exchange and power relations and their legitimation in society' (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980:49). Subsequently, at the end of the day negotiations in public actions and debates are left in the hands of those with political and financial powers and influence at the expense of the voiceless. (Osmani 2002:235).

The study was keen to find out the methods used in cases of disagreements in approval of budget priorities for service provision. As shown in Table 3, twenty-four (24) percent of the respondents mentioned that bribery and patronage constitute the greatest tool of settling differences in approval of priorities in service provision in Bushenyi. In addition, 18percent of the respondents perceived coercion and blackmail as the forms of settling disagreements in approval of priorities in service provision while 18 percent of the respondent believed that settling of differences in approval of priorities in service provision is done through appeals to religious, tribal and gender sentiments. The study further found out that 16 percent of the respondents perceived consensus as form of solving disagreements in budget approvals, while 13 percent of the respondents recognized Intrigue as an alternative approach in case of any dead-end street in the budget approval phase. The other 11 percent of the respondents revealed that they perceive negotiation as method of solving budget approval impasses. One of the respondents mentioned that; *"... a person close to the ruling party was given a contract of Ugandan Shillings worth 1.2 Billion to construct the District, had not made a bid and did not go through the contracts committee and worst of it all, the District went ahead and paid for nonexistent stadium and there was no value for money. There are also several cases of bribery for instance in our District, the District farm institute was given to a private company to develop Banana research where members of the District council were bribed with Ugandan Shillings 100,000/= to allow that private company take over the farm Institute(Interview with a Community Based Representative, 11th August 2011).* This twisting of contract procedures in favour of the incumbent party followers, supported by the District councillors when it comes to awarding of valuable government contracts at the expense of other service providers and more over at a disservice of the citizens (clients) carries manifestations of patron-clientelism theory.

Another Respondent echoed that; *"... the Vice Chairperson who was in favour of splitting the District into five counties to form the districts of Sheema, Rubirizi, Mitooma, Buhweju and Bushenyi itself, after gathering enough support, District Councillors were bribed to pass a vote of no confidence in him and the council voted him out as a result of Bribery yet for him i.e. the Vice Chairperson was mindful of shortages in operational costs for the new districts (Interview with a CBO Representative,19th August 2011).*

The means of settling disputes when it comes to approval of budget priorities for service provision as pointed out by the respondents in Bushenyi District are likened to corruption tendencies and patronage networks which dent transparency. For instance the council members rewarding their political supporter with the tender to construct the district stadium was looked at as a form of political inspired corruption.

Table 3: Common Means of Settling Differences in Approval of Budget Priorities for service provision between Different Parties

Methods	Frequency	Percent
Bribery and Patronage	11	24
Coercion and Blackmail	8	18
Religious, tribal and gender appeals	8	18
Consensus	7	16
Intrigue and deceit	6	13
Negotiation	5	11
Total	**45**	**100**

Source: Field Data August 2011

4.4 Exercising transparency and accountability in the Implementation Phase of the Planning and Budgeting Process (sub-question 3)

While looking at the ways of exercising transparency and accountability in the implementation phase which mainly focuses on undertaking activities aimed at on spending the funds allocated to them, the study considered the respondents' role in the planning and budgeting process, how respondents ensure that their party programs priorities benefit constituents and criterion for resource allocation in the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District.

Respondents' Role in the Planning and Budgeting Process

Accountability and transparency are key elements in the implementation phase in the planning and budgeting process. As mentioned by Osmani (2002:238), this process can be improved and given more gravitas by moderating suitable social action. Osmani attaches importance in empowering the masses in determining responsibilities. Overriding all this is the element of participation that allows them to be able to use their right to hold those responsible to account.

It is also supported by some evidence that a country with democratic decentralisation and its promotion of transparency exposes corruption especially if the country has political accountability, a free press and political party competition (Crook n.d:416).Elections are the most common form of political accountability at the local level because they initiate 'a demand for internal political accountability' (Crook n.d:414). This continues even in the post-election period as the elected officials or representatives and constituencies during the participation process (ibid).

MoFPED (2009: 29) also states that citizens have role to play in the budget process since they contribute a big percentage of the country revenue (i.e. domestic revenue which is more than 70 percent) through payment of taxes such as the Value Added Tax, Income Tax and Pay As You Earn and also through fees for travel documents and therefore should take part in monitoring the implementation of government program and projects

Respondents were asked about their individual roles in the planning and budgetary process. Findings in table 4 reveal that 29 percent of the respondents were involved in Resource mobilization and Monitoring service delivery and their own project respectively while 27 percent of the respondents were involved in Project identification and selection. On the other hand, nine percent of the respondents were involved in supervision and seven percent of the respondents were involved in technical support (specialised activity area requiring specialised skills) and co-funding respectively. The roles pointed out by the respondents all contribute a lot towards implementation phase of the planning and budgeting process.

A respondent stated that; *"...I always make sure I get involved in choosing programs and projects that are beneficial to our communities for instance as a community, we chose raring hi-breed goats under NAADS program. ...Every member has at least got a he-goat. This has helped us reduce poverty in our community"(Interview with an Opinion Leader, 2 August 2011).*

Another respondent mentioned; *"...as community members, we get involved in monitoring both government and community initiated programs. Non Government Organisations such as Uganda Debt Network have helped us in the district to train and get involved in monitoring activities so that we make a follow up on implementation of the projects we identified. This has improved service delivery in our district (Interview with a CBO Representative, 4 August 2011).*

Table 4: Respondents' Role in the Planning and Budgeting Process

Roles of Respondents	Frequency	Percent
Advocacy and Resource mobilization	13	29
Monitoring	13	29
Project identification and selection	12	27
Supervision and technical support	4	9
Co funding and ownership	3	7
Total	**45**	**100**

Source: Field Data August 2011

Ensuring Party Programs Priorities Benefit Constituents

One of the core strategies for building trust and support among people within a community is through addressing the community needs either directly or indirectly with the aim of benefiting all and the ultimate goal of contributing towards their entire community development. This can be done by either stakeholder depending on where and how they are positioned with their communities. As Titeca (2005:52) put it "[...] bringing development to their own regions (but not to other regions), are not intrinsically bad practices. On centrally, they may bring more development to previously marginalized areas." However, this makes local people to believe that whatever services are delivered in their communities even if they are NGO, independent agency and or central government led, they have to be through political patrons (Steiner 2006:19). "Both Parliamentarians and Local Councillors create exactly this perception: Without their support and lobbying, services would not have been delivered". This consolidates the leaders' power and influence over and among their clients (ibid).

This study took interest in finding out how party priorities were incorporated in planning and budgeting processes for the benefit of the constituents. Results Table 5 indicate that 27percent percent of the respondents attained it through lobbying and advocacy, 24 percent through representation on committees responsible for planning, while 20 percent of the respondents ensure that their party programs benefit their constituents by having party priorities incorporated in the planning process through negotiations. The field findings also revealed that 16percent of the respondents guarantee that their party priorities benefit their constituents by participating in the planning and budgeting processes and 13 percent of the respondents ascertain that their party programs benefit their constituents by building interest blocks with their party and other parties' members with the ultimate goal of having improved service delivery.

On lobbying some councillor had this to say; *"I had to lobby the council for construction of a secondary school in one of the parishes in my sub-county to help the school children who used to travel long distances to other sub-counties for education and the proposal was seconded. My electorates appreciate the idea and are aware that it is my -brain child" (An interview with a politician on 10 August 2011).*

Table 5: Ensuring Party Programs Priorities Benefit Constituents

Strategy	Frequency	Percent
Lobbying and advocacy	12	27
Representation on planning and budgeting organs	11	24
Negotiation	9	20
Participation in planning and budgeting processes	7	16
Building interest blocks	6	13
Total	**45**	**100**

Source: Field Data August 2011

Resource Allocation during the Planning and Budgeting Process

As mentioned by Khan et al (2011:79) "The degree of equality in popular participation can have important equity and efficiency effects. If one demographic group, for example, is more politically active than another, parties and politicians are likely to cater to this group's interests more, and policies will deliver more benefits to it than to other groups." However, this can be detrimental for it will lead to 'economic distortions if politicians divert resources to specific groups of more active citizens' (Benabou, 2000; Rodriguez, 1998 as quoted in Khan et al. 2011:79).

This study examined the criteria for resource allocation during planning and budgeting process. According to the study findings, 24 percent of the respondents stated that allocation is based on priority areas, 22 percent of the respondents mentioned that they follow efficiency, economy and effectiveness of a project. Another 22 percent of the respondents declared that they are guided by the expected revenue while 20 percent of the respondents use demographic factors as a criterion for resource allocation. The remaining 11 percent of the respondents cited affirmative action as the criterion followed during resource allocation.

In an interview with the Deputy District Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), he elaborated that allocation of resources during the planning and budgeting process, considers most the priority areas which are the 'engines' of growth and development. In Bushenyi District, the four priority areas include Health, Education and Road Construction among others.

He commented that; *"...Case of Roads is paramount in the district. Resource allocation usually tends to favour Roads section because with the breakdown of feeder roads in the district can put every business at stand still and of course the blame is put on the district officials" (Interview with the Deputy CAO 2 August 2011).*

As for expected revenue, respondents mentioned that they plan according to the expected revenue which is either internally or externally generated and or from the central government. For this aspect a respondent revealed that; *"...when it comes to allocation, we have to consider the availability of funds and what we expect to be released from the Ministry of Finance, the resource we generate locally within our*

district such as revenue collected from markets and other sources which usually come while tagged to certain activities for instance the conditional grants we receive through Ministry of Local Governments come already earmarked for certain program activities" (Interview with the District Statistician, 29 July 2011).

For Demographic and Geographical set up, when it comes to planning and budgeting, the area with more persons is allocated more funds to be able to handle physical development and sanitation.

On consideration of demographic and Geographical set-up, a respondent had this to say; *"Construction of health centres most especially location of Health Centre IIs is usually done by taking into consideration the accessibility and the number of people in the location of interest" (Interview with a Community Based Representative 5 August 2011).*

The Respondents too pointed out that Efficiency, Economy and Effectiveness area among the criterion for resource allocation where for economy the proposed project for implementation should have a saving, for efficiency, the project, the project should have at least cheap means of achieving project goals not only dealing with money bit also other resources to minimise costs (that is to say using whatever amount of available resources effectively to meet the priority needs of the communities in terms of outputs and outcomes) and for effectiveness, usually allocation considers if the proposed project is likely to achieve the targeted goal. The implemented project should benefit the population and the population should maximise utility from such projects. However, important to note here, is that respondents who pointed out Efficiency, Economy and effectiveness as a basis for resource allocation were technical officers who are not inclined to any political party according to the Ugandan Civil Service code of conduct and the Ugandan constitution.

Table 6: Resource Allocation in the Planning and Budgeting Process

Resource allocation criterion	Frequency	Percent
Priority areas	11	24
Efficiency, Economy and effectiveness	10	22
Expected revenue	10	22
Demographic and Geographical set up	9	20
Affirmative action	5	11
Total	**45**	**100**

Source: Field Data August 2011.

4.5 Means of Ensuring Accountability and Transparency in the Monitoring and Evaluation Processes (sub-question 4)

In trying to answer the research question on ways of ensuring accountability and transparency in the monitoring and evaluation phase of the planning and budgeting process which gives citizens an opportunity of following up what was decided at preparatory stage and how it is being implemented, the study analysed the awareness of key respondents on their rights and roles in the in

the planning and budgeting process under Multiparty System of governance and ways on how planning and budgetary process accounted to the stakeholders. Worth noting is that before getting involved in the monitoring and evaluation of the budget performance, it is important to know and appreciate the rights, roles and entitlements. The study looked into the respondents' awareness of their rights and roles in the planning and budgeting process in trying to answer sub-question 4 of the main research question.

Multi-Party Democracy and Respondents' Awareness of their Rights and Roles in the Planning and Budgeting Process

Evidence shows that decentralisation fosters participation leading to enhanced security and accountability of the responsible public officials and transparency when making decisions (Herridge, 2002 as quoted in Khan et al. 2011:79). Consequently, Khan et al. (2011:80) observed that 'Access to information on the action and performance of government is critical for the promotion of government accountability. Unless the public knows what goods and services have been provided by the government, how well they are provided, who the beneficiaries are, and how much they cost, they cannot demand effective government'. This then demands for transparency in the process whose pre-requisite is that information must be availed to those who are going to be affected by this. This information must be easy to understand and easily be accessible by the public (Khan et al. 2011:79). However, low levels of participation can be explained by the mistrust of the public of political parties. van Biezen and Seward (2008:21) explain this mistrust as general trend worldwide that has seen the 'pervasive erosion of popular support for representative democratic institutions. Increasing discontent with politicians and political parties' this is due to the fact that 'with parties today often being seen as both the institutions most susceptible to corruption and one of the least trusted public institutions'.

The study investigated the degree of awareness of respondents' rights and roles in the planning and budgeting process. Findings as shown in Table 7 indicated that a good number of citizens had awareness of their rights and roles in the planning and budgeting process. They expressed this perception as follows; 24 percent of the respondents claimed that they have a role to play in operation and maintenance for sustainability purposes, 20 percent of the respondents mentioned they are involved in mobilization and sensitization activities, another 20 percent of the respondents revealed that they are aware of their rights and roles and they thus participate directly in the planning and budgeting process while 18 percent of the respondents said they are aware of their rights and role in the planning and budgeting process and they co-fund and have ownership in most of the community projects. The remaining 18 percent too expressed their awareness of their rights and roles in the planning and budgeting process and stated that they participate in monitoring and evaluation of the both physical and financial performance of projects implemented within the planning and budgeting cycle. This exhibits existence of transparency in the implementation phase of the planning and budgeting process. In an interview with a CBO representative, a respondent highlighted that; *"...in community projects such as Water Projects, by virtue of bottom –up planning, all projects from government*

are owned by communities which continue running and caring for them after government has handed them over to us. We take care of our water points" (An interview with a CBO Respondent 3 August 2011).

Another respondent reported that; *"...We participate in monitoring and evaluation of projects within and outside our communities. And we have the skills to monitor since we were trained by Uganda Debt Network on our obligations and entitlements as community members and this has helped to build our capacity to demand for accountability from our local leaders and the civil servants responsible on how the resources committed to service delivery in our communities are utilised" (An interview with an opinion leader on the 12 August 2011).*

When asked whether this was attributed to multiparty democracy, one councillor is quoted to have said as follows; "*Multiparty democracy gives every person the right to know what is taking place in government and to participate or not to participate" (Interview with a Politician on 10 August 2011).* Awareness of the rights and roles of respondents strengthens preparation for the next electoral process and also empowers the respondents to vigorously participate in the monitoring and evaluation of the budget performance and hence ensure transparency and accountability in the budget process. In it there is desire to be looked at as an advocate of the people. The opposing voices strengthen monitoring and evaluation of projects which translates into transparency and accountability of those in control of implementing projects hence multiparty influence on transparency and accountability in the implementation phase of the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District.

Table 7: Respondents' Awareness of their Rights and Roles in the Planning and Budgeting process

Citizens Understanding of Roles	Frequency	Percent
operation and maintenance for sustainability	11	24
Mobilization and Sensitization	9	20
Direct participation in the process	9	20
Co-funding and ownership of projects	8	18
Participatory monitoring and evaluation	8	18
Total	**45**	**100**

Source: Field Data August 2011

Accountability to the Beneficiaries

Chene in her work on good practices in strengthening transparency, participation, accountability and integrity, observes that access to public information contributes a lot towards averting corruption. However, she goes on to say that this needs to be supported by empowerment of citizens to be able to hold their local leaders accountable; and that this can done by involved them (citizens) in deliberations on issues affecting their communities and monitoring

development projects, programs and policies being implemented in their areas. She emphasises that this kind of information sharing, involvement and participation of citizens in decision-making fosters accountability and responsiveness of public policies (Chene 2011:5). Such arrangement where citizen directly get involved and participate in discussions on matters affecting them instils a spirit of ownership and responsibility among them hence transparency and accountability.

The study covered ways of how planning and budgetary process accounted to the stakeholders. Findings as in Table 8 are the underlying principles of planning which elaborate ways through which planning and budgeting process accounts to stakeholders. Findings showed that 22 percent of the respondents perceived accountability to the beneficiaries being done through information sharing. Twenty (20) percent of the respondents observed that the other vital aspect through which the planning and budgetary process accounted to the beneficiaries was cooperating amongst stakeholders. Further, 18 percent of the respondents too noticed that accountability to the beneficiaries is done through inclusiveness and participation of the beneficiaries. As part of accountability, 16 percent of the informants believed to achieve it through capacity building and empowerment, while 13 percent and 11 percent of the respondents held it that accountability to the beneficiaries is attained by having clear roles and responsibilities and Resource sharing respectively.

For information sharing, every project that is implemented is given enough publicity at all levels of execution and more so, all quarterly and annual Indicative Planning Figures and final and audited accounts and reports are posted on notice boards. Information is pinned on the notice boards and published in the local news papers and that shows transparency and openness. More so, this disclosure of public information is one way of empowering citizens to be able to hold their local leaders accountable for their actions and decisions hence fostering transparency and accountability.

A respondent said; "... there is an arrangement under the Baraza Program[6] which aims at promoting public information sharing on government development programs and how they are being implemented and this provides a forum for public criticism so that the community can be able to know how much funds have been disbursed from the centre to the district and then sub-county for easy trucking of success or failure" (Interview with the Deputy CAO on 2 August 2011).

Still on information sharing another respondent revealed that; *"... Availability of budget information and engagement of communities in the budget process is paramount since it empowers communities to hold its local leaders accountable for the utilisation of resources disbursed from the centre. This helps in minimising the chances of misuse and embezzlement of funds and also helps in exposing cases of corruption" (Interview with a Civil Society Respondent on 12 August 2011*).

[6] Baraza Program refers to initiatives where public fora is set up at sub-county level for the local leaders to explain to the public how public funds are being utilized when it comes to implementation of government development programs within their localities.

The examples cited by the respondent depict that under the Multiparty System of governance, Monitoring and Evaluation processes in Bushenyi District ensure accountability and transparency.

When it comes to collaboration and cooperation, these forge ways of working together. People participate in community projects and provide resources such as manpower. With this arrangement, there is increased level of understanding and cooperation amongst stakeholders when it comes to planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting. The stakeholders complement each with the aim of achieving community outcomes.

On Capacity building and empowerment, building community capacity and engagement help in imparting and enhancing skills and instilling the spirit of ownership among members. On Capacity building and empowerment, one respondent echoed that *"...when projects are being implemented, for example in construction of Community Based Orphan Child Protection and Empowerment (COPE) schools, some jobs were offered to the local people who had some skills in construction, this enhanced their skills and empowered them through giving them means of earning a living" (interview with CBO Respondent 5 August 2011).*

Resource sharing involves placing resources where they can benefit all communities maximally. Explaining this form of accounting to the beneficiaries, some respondent mentioned that; *"...In our District, usually construction of schools is done at a confluence of two villages to ensure optimal utilization of resources and make it easy for school children in the areas where those schools are located to access the schools with ease instead of moving long distances to attend schools in distant locations" (Interview with Deputy CAO 2 August 2011).*

Table 8: Accountability to Beneficiaries

Principles	Frequency	Percent
Information sharing	10	22
Collaboration and cooperation	9	20
Clear roles and responsibilities	6	13
Capacity building and empowerment	7	16
Inclusiveness and participation	8	18
Resource sharing	5	11
Total	**45**	**100**

Source: Field Data August 2011.

4.6 Chapter Summary

With the adoption of the Multiparty System of governance, one expects the country to have a deepened democracy with its principles such as; good governance, citizen participation, transparency and accountability among others. This chapter answers the main research question on the perceptions of respondents on the influence of Multiparty System of governance on transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process which covers

the key stages of preparation, approval, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the budget performance. In general, the study established that Multiparty System of governance positively influences transparency and accountability in the preparatory, execution and monitoring and evaluation phases of the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District, except for the approval phase which remains a suspect as a result of patronage networks that undercut democracy principles of transparency and accountability therein.

Chapter 5 CONCLUSION AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter gives the conclusions from the study findings summarised under each research question and highlights probable policy implications for the smooth operation of the Multiparty System of governance in Uganda.

5.2 Conclusion

This research paper investigates the influence of the Multiparty System of governance on perceptions of transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District. The study used patron-client theory and its related concepts such as corruption and bribery among others to analyse the field findings which helped in coming to conclusions of this study. On preparation phase, the research found out that the Multiparty System of governance has influenced the spirit of transparency in the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District. This is demonstrated by the way it has created room for a number of people in different positions to participate in the planning and budgeting process which is viewed as representative of the composition of the district. Participation by members of political parties in the planning and budgeting preparatory process has an increasing influence on resource allocation for improved and balanced service delivery and development. Participation of citizens in project selection builds their spirit of ownership and transparency in the activities that are undertaken within the communities. Hence the study results indicate that respondents acknowledge that Multiparty System of governance has had promising results on transparency in the preparation phase of the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District.

Considering the approval phase, in previous times, under the 'no party or movement system', there were no opposing voices in the council. This meant that bargaining was, at most, on individual basis. But with the Multiparty System of governance, elected councillors have to represent their party ideologies wherein there is a lot of collective bargaining for a common goal. This seems to have influenced the way discussions and decisions have been made to arrive at consensus. Oftentimes, discussions are marred by disagreements when it comes to approval and awarding of contracts. The council favours members of their respective parties in the awarding of tenders and contracts, while services are delivered at the expense of the poor clients who have no connections to the power that be. The outcome is high risks of patronage, clientelistic, corruption and bribery tendencies and consequently little value for money to the poor in the delivery of public goods and services. This is a clear manifestation that respondents perceive the approval stage of the planning and budgeting process under the Multiparty System of governance not to be transparent due to the existence of patron-client relations involved in there that undermine transparency and accountability.

Regarding the implementation phase, the paper also establishes that projects tend to fail if transparency and accountability elements are lacking in the implementation of planned activities. The way this has been curtailed is through the establishment of clear roles and responsibilities for stakeholders with the prime objective of attaining the desired community goals. This is one of the core ways through which accountability and transparency has been exercised during the implementation phase of the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District. Thus the study found out that implementation phase is transparent due to community involvement and participation with clear roles and duties without any patrons in between.

Finally, looking at the monitoring and evaluation phase of the planning and budgeting process, the study found out that Multiparty System of governance enhances monitoring and evaluation processes. This in turn guarantees accountability and transparency by creating citizen awareness of the rights and entitlements in terms of public goods and services. In Bushenyi, monitoring and evaluation has assured information sharing through which citizens are aware of budgetary appropriations and progress in project implementation. The practice of information sharing in monitoring and evaluation activities has served to assure local citizens of project ownership which influences their curiosity to cross-check project progress. The feel of ownership encourages locals to contribute their own labour at lower than market price. This, in practice, helps in minimising chances of corruption and enhances accountability and transparency as locals themselves are part of the implementation of most projects.

From the field findings one can come to a conclusion that Multiparty System of governance positively influences perceptions of transparency and accountability in the formulation, implementation and monitoring & evaluation stages of the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District. However, with regard to the approval phase, the perceptions of the respondents on transparency and accountability in the planning and budgeting process are mostly negative.

On the topic of this research paper, future research needs to take a big sample and probably all planning levels to look at the dynamics of participation at such levels so as to contribute towards knowledge and inform policy decision making process.

5.3 Policy Considerations and Implications

Having examined the study findings, I consider the issue of coming up with a mechanism that can help build consensus and absorb the minority(opposition) views when it comes to council meetings and other planning and budgeting related meetings. The minority opposition ought to be given more clout since they may also have relevant contributions to make towards the subject of debate.

Measures ought to be taken to ensure that the approval phase of the planning and budgeting builds on the transparency demonstrated in the preparation phase since all these phases feed into the other for a better planning and budgeting process. Finally, giving more clout to the opposition members, emphasising transparency and accountability in all phases of the planning and budgeting

is very important. This will contribute to better local democracy, local governance and improved service delivery at the grass root levels.

Appendices

Appendix I: Table 9: Summary 0f Planning Steps at the District Level

July Review	Technical Planning Committee (TPC) Functionality
August	Dissemination of Planning Information for Parishes/Wards
September	Support to Village/Parish Level Planning
October	Situation Analysis at LLG level
October	Discussion and Prioritization of LLG Challenges/Obstacles and Opportunities (LLG SWOT analysis)
October	LLG Visioning and Goal Setting
November	Identification of LLG investment priorities
November	Budget Conference
December	Forwarding projects for district/municipal consideration
January	Development of the project profiles
January/February	Review of project profiles by Standing Committees
February	Compilation of the draft Comprehensive Development Plan
March	Review of the Draft Comprehensive Plan by the Executive
March	Refinement of the Draft Comprehensive Plan by the TPC
April	Discussion and approval of the Comprehensive Plan by the Council
April	Finalization of the Comprehensive Development Plan
April	Submit the Approved Comprehensive Development Plan to the HLG
May/June	Final feedback to the LLCs (parish/wards and villages/cells).

Source: *Harmonized Participatory Planning Guide for Lower Local Governments 2003:3*

Appendix II: Interview Guide

Interview Guide on: The Influence of Multipartyism on Perceptions of Transparency and Accountability in the Planning and Budgeting Process in Bushenyi District –Uganda

Socio-Economic and Demographic Background

Sex	**Age**
1. Male **2.** Female	1. 18-30 2. 31-40 **3.** 41-50 **4.** Over 50
Education background	**Occupation**
1. Primary 2. Lower secondary 3. Higher secondary **4.** Tertiary	1. Politician. 2. Civil servant 3. CBO worker **4.** Community, religious or opinion leader
Which party do you belong to?	

Other Questions

Sub-question 1. How the Multiparty System of Governance has Influenced Transparency in the Preparation Phase of the Planning and Budgeting Process in Bushenyi District?

a) Who determines project selection for inclusion in the budget?

b) What are the key areas of opposition participation in the preparation phase of the planning and budgeting process?

c) What influence has the opposition members had on the resource allocation in the planning and budgeting processes?

Sub-question 2. How transparent is the approval of the budgetary allocations and projects under the multiparty system of governance in Bushenyi District?

a) What methods have been used in cases of disagreements over approval of priorities between different parties?

Sub-question 3. How has transparency and accountability been exercised in the implementation phase of the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District?

a) What is your role in the planning and budgeting process?

b) How do you ensure that your party programs priorities benefit your constituents?

c) How is resource allocation done during the budgeting process?

Sub-question 4. How does the Monitoring and Evaluation phase of the planning and budgeting process in Bushenyi District ensure accountability and transparency?

a) Are you aware of your rights and roles in the planning and budgeting process?

b) How does the planning and budgeting process account to the beneficiaries?

c) Is there any other thing you would like to comment about that we may not have discussed?

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