Exiled Memories:
The Collective memory of Indonesian 1965 exiles
A Research Paper presented by:

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ampera</td>
<td>Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat (The Mandate of Suffering People)</td>
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<td>Baperki</td>
<td>Badan Perkumpulan Keturunan Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Descent)</td>
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<td>ET</td>
<td>Ex-Tahanan Politik (Ex-Political Prisoner)</td>
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<td>IISG</td>
<td>International Institute of Social History</td>
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<td>LPK 65</td>
<td>Lembaga Pembela Korban 1965 (Institution of Victims of 1965 Defender)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahid</td>
<td>Mahasiswa Ikatan Dinas (Students bond)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDI P</td>
<td>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesia Democratic Party in Struggle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pepicek</td>
<td>Paguyuban Eks-Pelajar Indonesia di Ceko (Community of Indonesian Ex-Students in Czech)</td>
</tr>
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<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Perhimpunan Persaudaraan (Association of Brotherhood and Sisterhood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>Perhimpunan Pelajar Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRRI</td>
<td>Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of Republic of Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTIP</td>
<td>Pendidikan Tinggi Ilmu Pengetahuan (Higher Education and Science)</td>
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Abstract

This study is about the memory of people in transition after the experience of statelessness. The stateless people discussed in this study are Indonesians who were prevented from returning home because the state considered them part of a group inspired by leftist ideologies. This was a story of stigmatisation that took place against the left in Indonesia in 1965. Since the state revoked and refused to renew their passport, and because of the fear to return, they became stateless people in mainly socialist countries. Many of those who are the subject of this study went through some transit countries before finally gained a Dutch or Czech citizenship. As part of the study, interviews guided by the focus on oral history and memoir research were conducted with 1965 Indonesian exiles living in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic.

The focus of the research is to explore the interplay between collective and individual memories. In particular, the study tries to analyse how individuals’ exilic trajectories have shaped their memories of homeland and of the 1965 event itself. To do so, I borrow the notion of “collective memory” from Halbwach and “site of memory” from Pierre Nora to understand how they adjust the meaning of home in relation to their different exilic trajectories and their being away from the actual violence of 1965. Among the key findings are how the meaning of home is not static in relation to one geographical area but is identified through two or more countries according to their different exilic trajectories. Taking into account the fact of different exilic trajectories, it is of course interesting to understand that they demonstrate a variant of the 1965 discourse of state’s violence and at the same time reveal different sub-group and individual memories in which their exilic trajectories are remembered.

Relevance to Development Studies

The year 1965 in Indonesia is historically known as a change of government from the Old Order to the New Order which implemented development programmes in the country. While the development improved the economic condition and seemed to give prosperity, its exercise involved violence with mass killings, stigmatisation of socialism and communism and created exiles whose life trajectories are little understood in a post-communist world. Their exilic trajectories challenge the notion of identity as citizen, problematise state’s official history, and demonstrate the existing violence that accompanied the development programmes.

Keywords

Exilic trajectories, 1965 exiles, 1965 event, memory, collective memory, site of memory, statelessness, home, diaspora, socialist, communist and history.
Chapter 1
Introduction

“Ho Chi Min had several papers. In China, he became Chinese. In Russia, he became Russian. In France, he became French. So it is with you. You will never be a Dutch because you are Indonesian. Your heart remains Indonesian.” (an interview in July 28, 2011)

The above words came from Fahmawati’s husband, a respondent living in Amsterdam, as they discussed her difficulty to go to a conference in France. He suggested that she takes Dutch citizenship as her legal identity which is convenient to travel and to pursue her career as a lecturer on the Vietnamese language. After she lost her citizenship following the regime change in Indonesia in 1965, she had stayed in Vietnam and moved to the Netherlands in 1981 as a stateless person.

There are about 150 Indonesians who went through the same situation as a result of internal struggle in Indonesia in 1965. What happened in 1965 was really a complicated matter which becomes a subject of several studies (Anderson and McVey 2009, Baskara 2007, Crouch 2007, Farid 2005, Pilger 2002, Roosa 2008, Schreiner 2005, Shiraishi 1997, Wieringa June 2009, Wieringa 2002). The simplified version of the event is often pictured as an ideological contest between the socialist – communist and the West – capitalist in a Cold War context (NN 1958). In this simplified representation, Sukarno was considered an ally of the socialist – communist ideology bloc, while Suharto was an ally of the western bloc.

As Suharto and his New Order Regime rose to power, there was a witch-hunt against the proponents of socialist – communist and Marhaenist1 ideologies in Indonesia. To date the death toll continues to be disputed. The estimation though ranges from 250,000 to 500,000 (Crouch 2007). The New Order regime strengthened its grip by applying a screening process on individuals which is known as bersih diri (clean in self) and on his/her familial ideological orientation or bersih lingkungan (clean by association)(Heryanto 2006: 36) as a condition for entering the ranks of civil servants and armed forces. It repeated the message of bahaya laten komunis (latent danger of communism) as a common threat to the nation, and put an ET sign – Ex-Tahanan Politik (Ex-Political Prisoner) on the identity card of former political prisoners of the 1965 event. The objective was to crush its opponents, to legitimise its rule, to stigmatise leftist groups and to create a collective memory of communist threats.

Indonesian embassies, under the control of the military attaché, conducted screening processes abroad and asked every Indonesian to sign the loyalty statement to the New Order. Fahmawati with other students who studied in socialist countries like the Soviet Union, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, China and

1 Marhaenism is a socialism à la Indonesia developed by Sukarno based on the Javanese ideal of harmony with norm of gotong royong (cooperation) and masyawarah – mufakat (deliberation to reach consensus) (Wieringa 2002: 165).
Vietnam refused to do so. They considered that New Order was and is a coup d’etat against the legal government. The New Order regime revoked their passport and advised other Indonesians not “to give any financial and social support” for them. (Letter of Indonesian Embassy in Moscow, dated August 1, 1966). Including in this group were a sizeable number of diplomats, journalists and cultural workers participating in the celebration of the anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing (Hill 2009: 5).

Their statelessness on the one hand suggests their loss of rights and formal identity as an Indonesian citizen. On the other hand it consists of exilic trajectories which emotionally tie them to different states. They remember their exilic trajectories very well from their memory of being involved with the Vietnamese Revolution, the Cultural Revolution in China, the Sino – Soviet split, the Perestroika of the Soviet Union and the democratisation of Eastern European countries. The exilic trajectories then suggest a social space and process in which they try to negotiate their emotional ties with the meaning of home related to their country of origin. As they resettled in the Netherlands or in the Czech Republic, they actually came with a baggage of exilic trajectories containing the memory of different socialist – communist histories and experiences.

Considering their various exilic trajectories and their reunification in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, this study wants to address how 1965 exiles understood the meaning of home and their identity as they went through exilic trajectories. It was a period where they became stateless people, or in-between citizens. This statelessness relates to what is known as de facto statelessness where somebody may have lawful a claim as a citizen but is prevented from asserting such a claim because of fear of persecution or discrimination. In the climate of the Cold War and what happened in Indonesia, the 1965 exiles were given protection under the Red Cross of respective countries. Formally, in terms of citizenship, there were periods of being in-between. This period contains exilic trajectories where they felt engagement with and belonging to a community where they contributed to its revolutions. The exilic trajectories resemble other studies of bond and memories with the motherland, the negotiated meaning of home (Uusihakala 2008, D’Alisera 2002, Jacobsen 2009) and identity (Orjuela 2008, Wayland 2004, Steijlen 2010).

1.1 Research question

A preliminary observation suggests that statelessness is a common experience remembered by the 1965 exiles. It is their collective memory of the 1965 event rather than the actual violence itself. This collective memory has become problematic because it contains exilic trajectories which are remembered differently. In other words, unpacking the content of such exilic trajectories can reveal the problematic relationship between collective, individual and subgroup memories. It would also touch on the questions around identity such as the issue of citizenship and a sense of belonging.

The main research question is how statelessness has become a negotiated social process of collective memory and identity.

More specific research questions are as follows:
1. How do we link individual experiences of loss of citizenship with their social positioning (based on gender, age, family circumstances etc.)?

2. How do these individual memories interact with the collective memories and with the politics of belonging?

1.2 Justification and relevance

For the New Order, 1965 has become the *raison d’etre* of its rule. It gained further legitimacy by implementing development programmes along the neoliberal orientation as indicated by the involvement of Berkeley University graduates as economic advisors (Klein 2007: 68 - 69). The impressive economic growth and development produced the success story of Indonesia as a model pupil of development (Pilger 2002: 17 - 47). This success story required stability and order where the communist threat became a ‘master narrative’ to deliver terror. The New Order’s anti communist attitude reproduced monuments, icons, trials and simulacra to continue the threat of communism and to immortalise itself (Heryanto 1999: 153 - 154). The New Order used history as its political tool (McGregor 2005: 228), and the memorialisation of *Hari Kesaktian Pancasila* (The Day of Sacred Pancasila Remembrance) to reinforce its authorship of the communist threat (Schreiner 2005: 273).

What is often missing in the analysis of the 1965 event is the creation of stateless people as a result of state’s violence. Some publications in recent issues of RIMA (*Review of Indonesia Malaya Affair*) and others brought up the issue of Indonesian 1965 exiles. Among the concerns raised are a lack of academic interest (Hill 2009), the 1965 exiles’ formation and its relation to host countries (Hill 2010), exiles as a ground for topics like trans-nationalism and diaspora discussion, (Hill and Dragojlovic 2010), the changing meaning of home and identity (Hearman 2009), the collective mourning among the 1965 exiles (Setiawan 2010), the active agency of 1965 exiles in the national project (Dragojlovic 2010), an analysis of two memoirs of a brother (Asahan Aidit) and a daughter (Ibarruri Alam Perkasa) of the PKI leader DN Aidit (Hill 2009, Hill in press 2011). These studies enrich the existing literature of Indonesian exile around independence (Lingard 2008, Bennett 2003), specific ethnic identities like the Acehnese (Missbach 2010) and the Mollucans (Steijlen 2010). What is interesting with the 1965 exiles is that they emerged as a result of the 1965 event without the actual violence.

Conducting the study of 1965 exiles is relevant to understand the nature of statelessness as a result of state’s violence. Subsequently, their exilic trajectories and negotiated meaning of identity are further implications of such violence. The existence of 1965 exiles challenges the idea of Indonesia or identity of Indonesia as being formally, locally and emotionally attached to a particular state. This reflects Benedict Anderson’s notion of long distance nationalism (1992: 4 - 11) like the Sri Lankan case (Orjuela 2008) or the Kurdish diaspora (Curtis 2005). In this notion of nationalism, the diaspora co-determines the direction of state’s policy and supports the ‘liberation’ cause of the ethno-religious identity. The concern of this study is to understand the 1965 exiles’ collective memory, its interplay with individual and sub-group memories as they relate to Indonesia. This interplay is in fact useful to critically examine the past as a “contested terrain” (Triulzi 2006: 122) and to problematise identity.
1.3 Organisation of this study

This study is arranged in a logical order as an attempt to answer the research question and objectives. This chapter aims to introduce the problem and the research question and to describe the development of this study. Chapter Two develops a suitable theoretical foundation and an appropriate methodology. There are three sets of literature used to develop the theoretical foundation. The first is the analysis of the 1965 event to give a specific location of 1965 exile in a broader picture of 1965 studies. The second is the concept of collective memory and site of memory. The third is the concept of liminal community (Turner 1969: 95) as a frame of their statelessness, the exilic trajectories and their identity as a diaspora community. Chapter Three is a contextual background of the creation of statelessness and their exilic trajectories. Chapter Four and Five become the main bulk of this study which is composed out of a total of forty hours of interviews and observations. These chapters will demonstrate the statelessness as a collective memory of the 1965 exiles with its interplay with individual or sub-group memories of exilic trajectories. Chapter Six is the conclusion as an effort to tie up the whole study.
Chapter 2
Theoretical foundation and methodology

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a consideration on how the research question will be addressed and answered. Two matters are discussed in this chapter namely the theoretical foundation and the methodology. The theoretical foundation serves as a framework to analyse the issue, and the research methodology provides an explanation and the approach to organise the empirical data and to analyse it.

2.2 Theoretical foundation

2.2.1 Situating the studies of the 1965 exile

What happened on September 30, 1965 and the following days remains a big question to many researchers as well as Indonesians. The official version of the history always calls it a betrayal by Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI here after (Indonesian Communist Party) against the legitimate government of Sukarno. What happened next was that Sukarno gave his legal mandate to rule Indonesia to Suharto. Therefore, at least in this official version, Suharto and New Order regime were justified legally.

The 1965 exiles were abroad when 1965 happened. Their geographical distance suggests a different experience of the 1965 violence as compared to that of the victims in Indonesia. For them, the state’s violence was manifested in the deprivation of their Indonesian citizenship. They became stateless and began to experience movements from one socialist country to another before they finally settled. Locating this specific experience of 1965 exiles might illumine another impact of state’s violence on citizens.

A lot of research of the 1965 event focuses on Indonesia. Among them is a study by Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey (2009). Other than this, there are different perspectives for the studies such as a familial tradition of Indonesia in the politics (Shiraishi 1997), the involvement and role of the military in the event and its continuing grip on the government (Crouch 2007), the feminist approach on the event (Wieringa June 2009, Wieringa 2002), the event as a pretext to incite mass killings against those considered communist (Roosa 2008), the approach on the state’s effort to immortalise itself by rejuvenating the communist threat as a master narrative (Heryanto 2006) and the Cold War as an international context for the 1965 event (Baskara 2007).

Hill (2009: 158) first raised these issues among Australian scholars as a long forgotten subject of studies. He and his colleagues then developed the subject further through publication of four articles (Hill 2009, Hill 2010, Hill and Dragojlovic 2010, Setiawan 2010, Dragojlovic 2010, Hearman 2010) in the Review of Indonesia Malaya Affairs. This research paper follows the direction of studying Indonesia exile of 1965 by taking the case of those living in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic.
2.2.2. Liminality of 1965 exiles

Statelessness refers to a person or a group of persons with no nationality at birth, lost it and unable to acquire another (Linde 2006: 345). Among the reasons for being stateless is a situation following the dissolution or independence of a state when long-term residents failed to obtain citizenship in the new state. Discriminatory act on the basis of gender, religion, political opinion or ethnicity often become the reason to grant citizenship. This happened for instance in the case of long residents of Arab, Afghani and Pakistani origins in the Hyderabad state of India following partition of India in 1948. Their Moslem religion became the reason for the Indian government to deport and to refuse them access to the Indian citizenship. (Sherman 2011: 87 - 97). If religious identity became the basis of statelessness of the Arab, Pakistani and Afghan residents, political opinion and ideology became the basis for the statelessness of the 1965 exiles.

Politically, stateless people lose their rights and privileges which are normally enjoyed by citizens. They belong to a situation of being ‘in-between’. The anthropologist Victor Turner coins the term liminality to describe this ‘in-between’ situation as “a state or process which is betwixt-and-between the normal, day-to-day cultural and social states and process of getting and spending, preserving law and order and registering structural status.” (Turner 1979:465). In addition, Turner (1969: 93) said that the liminal entities accept the power and punishment imposed on them without complaint.

Turner develops liminality based on van Ganep’s notion of rites de passage which accompanies every ‘change of place, state, social position and age’ (Turner 1969: 94 - 95). There are three stages of this rite namely “1) separation (from social life) ; 2) margin or limen (meaning a threshold when the subjects of ritual fall into a limbo between their past and present modes of daily existence; and 3) re-aggregation, when they are ritually returned to a secular or mundane life –either at a higher status level or in an altered state of consciousness or social being”(Turner 1979: 466 - 467). The liminality of the 1965 exiles shows their “limbo between their past and present modes of daily existence” in terms of legal – political identity as citizens. Liminality relates to a transition period where the individual goes through a ‘cultural realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state’ (Turner 1969: 94). However for the 1965 exiles this transition happens permanently rather than temporary as suggested by Turner. The regaining of citizenship does not necessarily re-aggregate or to reintegrate the exiles into society because it takes place in a very different social and cultural setting from their origins.

Their statelessness contains historical journeys of migrating to one or several several socialist – communist countries with their social and political dynamics before they finally decided to reside and to become citizens of the Netherlands or the Czech Republíc. I prefer to call these migration paths exilic trajectories because they better reflect their status as exile rather than just migrants. However these exilic trajectories resemble the phenomenon of transitivities found in human trafficking. Transitivities refer to the situation where “migrants can enter a recipient country legally, but may consider it an in-between station on the way to somewhere else, rather than a final destination”(Truong and Gasper 2011: 8). Although the term transitivities share the
in-between situation of the exiles in geographical terms, it fails to capture the political dimension which created the 1965 exiles. Their exilic trajectories took place within socialist countries because of the existing communist – socialist alliance.

These exilic trajectories, for instance, are shown in the collection of books of Ahmadi and Fahmawati, two respondents from the Netherlands. Fahmawati collects books on political – social issues of Indonesia especially about 1965 together with Vietnamese language, social sciences and history. Ahmadi collects the same issues on Indonesia and social, legal and political issues on the Soviet Union. In their nice small living room, these collections, which are visible to guests, show the representation of memory of their exilic trajectories. This representation reveals the idealised and frozen past as they live their present retired lives in the Netherlands. As retirees, they have less interest in Dutch socio – political situations, which again reflect their liminality as an individual and perhaps as a group. This study is interested in understanding the liminality of the 1965 exiles in terms of transnationalism and a diaspora perspective. This consists of the dynamics of social and cultural bond with their country of origin and their transit countries.

For the host countries, the incoming migrants who gradually created their own cultural enclaves have generated a discussion of multiculturalism in Europe. At the same time, the same phenomenon develops further the idea of citizenship in the United States which is normally based on the bipolar of idea of black and white colours (Ong 2004: 62). For the diaspora communities themselves, living in the new countries do not necessarily mean losing their bond with their homeland. Studies of Sierra Leonian diaspora in the US show how they arrange their community around the symbol of a cotton tree which has become a symbol of home and community identity. In this symbol, “the romantic idealized past is articulated through which community is imagined and constructed” (D’Alisera 2002: 80). To find a home in the community, there is a need to bring some aspects of the past home into the current context. This underpins what Mary Douglas writes that “home starts by bringing some spaces under control”(Douglas 1991: 289). Sumarni, a respondent in the Netherlands, shows how home can also mean Indonesia and Soviet Union. She converses with her three sons in Indonesian and Russian, paid special television channels in Russian and prepared Russian dishes in their house.

The bond with home country is often manifested in the political influence toward home country. It is clear in the case of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora (Orjuela 2008) in their contribution to the war or to the peace process in the country. The same story can be found in the case of Hindu nationalism among the Gujaratis in the US. Biswas (2010: 702 - 704) illustrates the case of the Hindu nationalist leader Narendra Modi who was the chief of Gujarat state. He was notorious for inciting the Hindu – Moslem violence in 2002. His invitation to the US in 2005 by the Asian American Hotel Owners’ Association prompted anti-Modi protests from other Indian diaspora groups in the US and Canada. The pro and anti-Modi groups used their influence on the US department of immigration, the host state, either to smoothen or to cancel the visit of Modi.
While the 1965 exiles have tried to get involved in the political situation in Indonesia especially after Suharto, it is hard to trace where their influence really is. It is of course worthwhile to notice the creation of LPK 1965 – Lembaga Pembela Korban 1965 (Institution of the 1965 Victims’ Defenders). It claims to represent the 1965 exiles and other victims of the New Order regime. Some members of this institution are also involved in one of Indonesian nationalist political parties PDIP – Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle). However, Mahardi and Karsiman reject this institution on the basis that they are rather a lost group than the victims. Both suggest a more intellectual involvement in the writing of Indonesian history rather than in NGOs or parties. Their political roles seem to be more diverse than united in one action.

2.2.3. Collective memory and site of memory

One of the analytical frameworks to understand the relationships between the 1965 exiles’ bond with motherland, their exilic trajectories and the current country of residence is by looking at their collective memory and site of memory as individuals and as a group. As the 1965 exiles remember their motherland and their exilic trajectories, they remember actual places and time in a nostalgic way. This is because the places have meanings for them and they have adapted their habits and thoughts to the circumstances of the new place (Halbwachs 1950: 2-3). As they moved from one country to another, there was a change and an adjustment to the new place, and this journey left traces of memory. This memory supports the group in their unique existence and identity as a group. The existence of Fahmawati’s and Ahmadi’s libraries underlines the need to maintain this memory in the way that remains of a building could persist in the name of a local street or as a signboard (ibid: 4).

In his notion of memory, Halbwach argues for collective memory rather than individual memory. According to Halbwach, if we isolate the individual from society, we would find only material things of the body which do not generate memory. What explains the recurrence of the memories if not a material thing? Halbwach argues for something not material within the individual which he called collective memory (Halbwachs and Coser 1992: 170) as a framework for individuals to recollect, to recall and to remember something of the past. This collective memory is just like the order of physical things, time and space as social establishment is imposed on individuals. It makes individuals sense the reality as opposed to dream (ibid: 171). Collective memory becomes a constraint for individuals and a source of identity (Nora 1996: 11).

In line with collective memory, Pierre Nora develops the concept of site of memory or lieu de memoire. This concept consists of three material, symbolic and functional aspects that always co-exist (Nora 1996: 14, Nora 1989: 19). Nora takes an example of a calendar adopted in the French Revolution as a site of memory. It provides a framework for the memory of the French people and to cease history at the moment of the Revolution. But as it becomes an instrument to set dates and years, it ceases to be a site of memory but instead functions as a history (Nora 1996: 15). Nora wants to point out two things by this example. The first is the interaction of history and memory, which creates a site of memory. And the second is the capability of a site of memory to change, to resurrect old meanings and to generate new meanings. While the site
of memory functions as a framework to recall the past (Schreiner 2005: 269), it is tied up to the present situation (Nora 1989: 8) in which some aspects of the forgotten past are found and given new meanings.

In the case studied here, statelessness seems to be a collective memory of the exiles. It marks their status as a liminal community created violently by the power of the state. Representing the state is the Indonesian embassy which actually was the direct actor who deprived their citizenship. The Indonesian embassy became a site of memory on how the past of 1965 is recalled and remembered. It is a symbol of state power in which they share the same feeling of being victimised by the state and the New Order regime. This symbol extends to other Indonesian embassies including the Indonesian embassy in the Netherlands which was not the actual actor who revoked their passport. It is functional in triggering their memory of being stateless.

There are several issues with the notions of collective memory and site of memory. The first is the issue of power relations in deciding what to remember and to forget and the other option to remember (Schreiner 2005: 270, Legg 2005: 495). The creation of the French Revolution calendar demonstrates how the dominant narrative and power insist on its creation as a site of memory and collective memory of France. Second, it is the issues of the individual and the collective in the act of remembering. Both Halbwach and Nora opt for collective memory as a social reality that shapes individuals. Historians distance themselves from Halbwach because he is considered to write off individuals and to see individuals merely as socially determined (Kansteiner 2002: 181). Uusihakala (2008: 8) criticises the notion of collective memory as something static and emphasises the significant distinctiveness of remembering for the individual while she acknowledges the social dimension of remembering. The third is related to the effective ability of social resources and practices of collective memory like monuments or archives to change people memory (Hirst and Manier 2008: 187). This is critical to Nora’s notion of the capability of the site of memory to resurrect and to give meanings to individuals. The question here is why some sites of memory have more influence than others.

Pierre Bourdieu with the concepts of habitus and field and Anthony Giddens with the concept of structuration are contemporary scholars who deal with the issue of objectivism and subjectivism, or between structure and individual agency. Their ideas might illumine and give some sociological understanding of the problematic and interplay between collective and individual memories in the case of 1965 exilic trajectories.

Habitus is seen by Bourdieu as a system of dispositions in which the past is present in the form of schemes, perceptions, thoughts and actions (Bourdieu 1990: 54). The presence of the past for Bourdieu gives continuity and shows the weight of earlier experiences. At the same time, habitus is also modified by the new experiences within the limit of the past. Habitus ensures continuity by the power of selection and causes unique integration within the domination of the earlier experiences. (Ibid: 60). Misztal (2003: 138) says that the concept resembles Durkheim’s idea of the continuity of the past. In the same way, memory organises the way individuals understand the world and act in it. In this light, Bourdieu discusses about the individual and class habitus in which he says “Each individual system of dispositions is a structural variant of the others,
expressing the singularity of its position within the class and its trajectory” (Bourdieu 1990: 60). The individual habitus is then considered as a variant within the class as a result of “unique integration” of the new within the limit of the past. This notion could be related to Giddens’ discussion on structuration in which he elaborates the duality of structure where the “structural properties of social system are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organizes” (Giddens 1984: 25). Giddens understands structures not only as constraints and determining social forces, as understood by functionalists, but at the same time they are also enabling. While individuals define and transform the social system, they do so within the system itself which is shared socially and collectively.

The past Indonesia surely continues to be present within the memory of the 1965 exiles, but how about the past of their exile countries like Vietnam, the Czech republic, the Soviet Union and China? Looking at the 1965 exilic trajectories, their process of adjustment and their construction of the past, the 1965 exiles demonstrate the constraining and enabling aspect of each society where they lived. As Indonesians, they adjusted to social – cultural situation of the new situation which is significant for them. This study wants to argue that although there is a shared collective memory of being stateless, the individual and the sub-group have modes of remembering events which are significant and important for them.

2.3 Methodology

Epistemologically, this study understands the subject matter from a post-positivist perspective and takes a qualitative approach to deal with the subject. The aim is to unpack the memory within a discussion of individual and society rather than searching for a general trait as shown by psychological studies of memory (Hirst and Manier 2008: 197). A specific qualitative interview, oral history and ethnographic methods are employed in this research. The ethnographic methods are conducted within the 1965 exiles’ meetings, and in looking at places where they used to study and to hang around in the case of Czech exiles.

The presentation of the data follows a panel data developed by Malkki and Eltringham. The panel data refers to “a set of composite interviews containing ‘chapters’ of an artificial, standardised narrative whose parameters are determined thematically or by periodisation/turning points as employed by the actors” (Eltringham 2004: 162). The idea is to triangulate the data based on a certain known point of past and how it is interpreted by individual or group involved in the event. It is also known as a chronicle event or a ‘point of zero’ to which history must be true. Browning (quoted in Eltringham 2004: 153), for instance, mentions this as the existence or the nature of the event interpreted by various survivors or witnesses to the event. This study takes statelessness as the point of zero pointing to a history of state violence and to diverse exilic trajectories. The parameter to present the empirical data is composed of the the exilic trajectories based on countries as a way to locate their sub-group or individual memories.
2.3.1. Data gathering

The data was obtained mainly through fieldworks that took place from mid-June to mid-August 2011 mainly in Amsterdam, Utrecht, Leiden, Den Haag and Prague. In addition, I use one document of oral history at the International Institute Social Geschidenis – IISG (International Institute of Social History) and one written memoir. Contact with the respondents began sometime in November 2010 through a colleague living in Amsterdam. The snowballing effect and technique are then followed to find respective respondents who mostly are men within their social networks. The Czech diaspora was arranged through another contact. Both diaspora groups knew each other through the internet and mailing list. The interviews were conducted in Indonesian with an average of 40 hours interviews in total.

In addition, I also conducted observations on the respondents’ house, and in Czech I managed to visit some of their memorable places like their universities, their places to hang out and their places of work. These observations help me to have a sense of the place that triggers their memories and the memorialisation of the places and times where they used to live. However, because most of the respondents are male, it is possible that female perspectives are not adequately represented in this study.

2.3.2. Reflexivity

I and they share the same Indonesian identity but in different ways. In terms of a formal identity, I have an Indonesian passport and citizenship which they owned until 1966. Fahmawati and I even share the same geographical origin. Most of them had lived in cities and towns in Indonesia where I also lived. I communicate in the Indonesian language which they fluently speak, and some speak Javanese which I also master. They once studied abroad just as I do now. These languages, student’s lives and geographical locations help me to identify with their sense of being Indonesian although most of it comes from the past that they can remember. Somehow the past that they recall, cannot be present, since it is never present, in my own memory. Here I deal with an Indonesian identity which is not monolithic but multiple and creates a different level of belonging shaped by the present and the past of the geography and historical events.

The shared sense of being Indonesian and being a student helped me to gain their trust to conduct interviews. This was preceded by the initial contact in November 2010 with one of the 1965 exiles and through several dinners and discussions that I attended. Attending their discussions and talking to them served as entry points which then shaped the direction of this research. Initially this research was provoked by the lack of studies on Indonesian exiles. The first encounter with one the 1965 exiles introduced me to the existence of such exiles. And it became even more interesting when I learned that they were related to the 1965 event which is a more established field of study.

During interviews, I clearly stated my intention and reason to conduct this research as another means to sustain the mutual trust and to keep their names anonymous. Appendix 1 shows their pseudo-names except for Sarmadji who is already known publicly through the newspaper publication (Mariani 2006). Self-introduction helped to create a friendly and confidential atmosphere. In fact, it
became generational exchanges of view about the 1965 event since they assumed that I was part of a generation with twisted understanding of Indonesian history through the New Order stigmatisation of the left and Sukarno’s loyalists. This atmosphere somehow created a standard explanation of the 1965 event as a coup d’etat against Sukarno, marked by the repression of leftist ideas and oppositions. I used a collection of oral history at the IISG and had a discussion with another Indonesian student, Agnes Gurning of Utrecht University who was conducting the same research topic, to get deeper understanding as well as to interrogate critically the interview results.
Chapter 3
The Making of Indonesian 1965 exiles

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the making of the 1965 Indonesian exiles in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. The objective is to get a comprehensive understanding of who the 1965 exiles are, the context of their making, their social position among other migrants and other Indonesian migrants in particular and their entrance to the Netherlands by taking into account the Dutch immigration system and the social networks.

3.2 Migration and statelessness

Migration as a social phenomenon in the contemporary world attracts much attention. Anthropologists, for instance, have become increasingly engaged in this phenomenon of either a forced or voluntary migration (Colson 2003: 2). The uprooting, the creation of diaspora, the sense of belonging, home, transition and social networks are topics developed within the field of migrations. As immigration policies, especially in Europe and North America, become increasingly stricter, refugees have to go through tighter screening processes of refugee status. This then creates fragmented journeys for migrants and refugees where they stop in several transit places before their final destination as indicated by Collyer’s study (2007).

Another concern of forced migration is statelessness. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Person article 1 defines a stateless person as one “who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law” (quoted in Linde 2006: 345). Statelessness implies the loss of rights and privileges enjoyed by a person as citizen because citizenship preconditions a person to enjoy rights provided by the state (Goldston 2006: 321). Among other factors of statelessness is the exclusion of long-term residents due to the transfer of authority following the dissolution, independence or succession of a state and the state’s refusal and revoking of one’s citizenship on the basis of gender, ethnic, religious or political ideology.

The 1965 exiles were a phenomenon of forced migration because they were prevented from returning on the basis of their political aspirations. In fact they could be considered refugees as described in the UN Convention 1951 relating to the refugee status. Since they remained or moved around socialist countries, this case was less publicised. Besides, the socialist countries where the 1965 exiles had lived only ratified the UN Convention 1951 in 1990 onwards.

The other issue I would like to pay attention to is the transitivities of these exiles. Collyer’s study explicates the fragmented journey of migrants in Morocco, which relates to the increasing cost of their journey to Europe. On the one hand, the stricter border control prolongs their migration. On the other hand, the social network provides them with means of migration and prevented them to return (Collyer 2007: 686). This study resembles the transitivi-
ties of the 1965 exiles in several countries as a direct result of their prevention to return, but in addition, there was a factor of socialist solidarity for revolution and socialist network in their transit and resettlement stage.

3.3 The international and national context

The socialist solidarity illustrates the international context of the Cold War. There were two superpowers namely the Western – Capitalist Bloc and the Eastern Socialist Bloc which dominated international politics. The Western capitalist bloc presented themselves as a force of free market economy and democracy with the US as its assumed leader. The Eastern socialist bloc embraced a socialist – communist ideology centred on the state. The Soviet Union emerged as the representation of this bloc. However this bipolar picture was more complicated in reality with national interests and differing interpretations of the ideology itself. The socialist bloc for instance in 1960 went through a worsening political and ideological situation as reflected by a conflict between the Soviet Union and China, which was later known as the Sino – Soviet split. National interests and different interpretations of Marxism – Leninism led China to formally denounce the Soviet variety of communism in 1961. China saw Soviet communism as a “Revisionist Traitor” because it contained the idea of peaceful coexistence with the Western capitalist. One of the examples of the Sino – Soviet split was the situation in Indochina where the communist Vietnam looked toward Soviet Union, while in 1973 Cambodia aligned itself with China.

Standing in between the two poles were newly independent countries like Indonesia, India, Myanmar and a number of predominantly Asian and African countries. These countries had come out of colonisation and had a strong position of anti-colonialism and imperialism. They developed an international network among themselves which was often called the NEFO (New Emerging Forces). Later some leaders like Nehru from India, Sukarno from Indonesia, U Than from Birma, Gamel Abdul Nasser from Egypt and Tito from Yugoslavia formed a new bloc which was known as the Afro – Asian Movement or later the Non Aligned Movement. Economically speaking they were considered as less developed and poor countries. Politically, they represented the “third component of in the operation and dynamics of a bipolar global balance” (Smit 2010: 4) or the third world.

In the national context, Sukarno was the president of Indonesia with some internal difficulties following the independence. Among them were slow development of the country, poverty issues, separatist movement like in the Molucas, Sumatera, Sulawesi, and West Java, the instability of the parliamentary system and the dissatisfaction of the army against his civilian rule. During this time, PKI was successful to establish itself as the fourth largest political power in the country which created tension with the religious based parties.

Sukarno also rose up as a popular international figure for the third world countries and developed a co-operation with the Western and Socialist blocs based on the Indonesian foreign policy of bebas dan aktif (being independent and active). Hatta pictured it as “mendayang diantara dua karang (steering between two reefs)” (Hill 2010: 23). Western media like Times (NN 1958) portrayed Soekarno’s policy as skewed towards the socialist – communist. But Muraviev
and Brown observed that this socialist cooperation was pragmatic rather than political or ideological in nature (quoted in Hill 2010: 26).

One of Sukarno’s initiatives for development was a five-year plan called Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat – Ampera (The Mandate of People’s Suffering) in which he sent students abroad to upgrade expertises and skills. Along with that, Sukarno also upgraded the military with much help from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union granted six hundred million American dollars for military developments by providing naval cruiser, destroyer, submarines, fighting planes, amphibical tanks and training for military personnel (Lebang and Susanto 2010: 15).

3.4 Indonesian migrants and exiles

Historical records of the Netherlands show that the first person who came from what is now called Indonesia to the Netherlands was a delegate of the Sultanate of Aceh in 1602. The Sultan of Aceh was invited by Prins Maurits to discuss a possibility of help to fight against the Portuguese in Aceh (Irma Piatopang 2009: 8). Since then, there was a migration of Indonesians as maids for their Dutch masters, students for running the Dutch administration, and political exiles from the Mollucas (Steijlen 2010: 146 - 148), Papua, and the 1965 event. Currently Indonesian migrants come for reunification of family, as nurses (Irma Piatopang 2009: 20 - 29) and as undocumented domestic worker. The history of colonialism seems to suggest a pattern of migration of people from former colonies to their colonisers. In the Indonesian – Dutch context at least until 1985, it was related to the immigration policy which gave privileges to Indonesians as opposed to other nationalities. Meanwhile in the Czech Republic, there are fewer Indonesian migrants because of the language barrier, and politically and historically speaking it does not have the same weight of importance as the Netherlands.

I remain to use the term 1965 exile because it links their existence or perhaps their creation with the 1965 event. Another term is orang kelayaban coined by the late Indonesian president Abdulrahman Wahid in his attempt to resolve the issue of the 1965 exiles abroad. He called them “anak bangsa – korban rezim Orba Jenderal Suharto yang terpaksa kelayaban di manca negara”. In one of e-mail exchanges in 2006, the 1965 exiles refused strongly the term because they saw themselves being prevented from returning home by the New Order regime rather than wandering around. Another possible term is leftist exile. But this term reflects the New Order’s narrative to generalise their opponents as leftist or communist. In reality, there is a range of diversity in terms of ideological perception, their social and class background.

In comparison to other Indonesian migrants and political exiles, the 1965 exiles have a specific place. First, their nature of migration is political rather than just common migration for economic and social reasons. Second, as po-

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2 The literal translation of the sentence would be ‘children of the nation – victims of the New Order regime of General Suharto, who were forced to wander abroad’. The term kelayaban oftens connotes an undecisive and unclear direction and destination just as somebody who walks around without a purpose.
political exiles in comparison to the Mollucans, Papuans or Acehnese in Sweden, the 1965 exiles actually stand for an integrated vision of Indonesia rather than the segregation of Indonesia. In other words, they have a strong nationalist identity with some socialist and communist ideological content.

Who are the 1965 exiles? Many of them were students who were part of international exchanges with socialist – communist countries either through the government or the PKI. The students under the government’s development programme were often called Duta Ampera or Ampera Ambassadors. Some were also called Mahid - Mahasiswa Ikatan Dinas (students of government service). They were supposed to fill governmental positions and became civil servants upon their return to Indonesia. Therefore, they were strictly instructed to study seriously, to return as soon as they finished studying and not to marry local people. The students of the PKI exchange programme were more to do with some friendly cooperation between communist parties and were not included among the Mahid students. However, a national department in charge of sending students abroad called PTIP - Pendidikan Tinggi Ilmu Penguatan (Higher Education and Science) arranged all students’ departure, their welfare abroad and their documents.

These students organised themselves in an association called Perbimpuan Pelajar Indonesia or PPI (Indonesian Students Association) in their respective countries. It was a political and intellectual space for these students, as well as a space for state’s indoctrination. PPI also became a political tool for the students to channel their demands to the Indonesian government as well as to represent these students within the universities. For instance, in 1958 they demanded an increase in their allowance through PPI. And in 1961, they organised a PPI conference and development seminar in Prague.

1965 brought about a sudden change for them. The friendly embassies started to become hostile where military attaché played an influential role to screen every Indonesian for their individual and familial ideological background. The screening process started in 1966, and every Indonesian was asked to sign a loyalty statement to the New Order regime. Those who refused to do so had their passports revoked and finally lost their citizenship. Among the students, the 1965 event divided them into the pro-New Order and the pro-Sukarno groups. In the Soviet Union, the respondents confirmed that it also culminated in physical fights between the two groups of students. The revoking of passports and disruption of their relationship with Indonesian embassies became a moment where they lost their influence, power and privileges with the state as represented by the embassies. They were pushed to the margin of social structure (Glasser and Strauss as quoted in Berger 1995) in terms of their formal identity.

The loss of citizenship could be seen as the second liminality of the 1965 exiles. Their first liminality took place as they moved out of the countries for studies because they were physically segregated from Indonesian society. As they went for studies, it was expected that their return would contribute to the Indonesian development programme with their skills and knowledge. This contribution would help the country to move further in its development programme. In social structures, they were expected to contribute to the process of social change with their expertise. Turner understands this process as re-
aggregation where liminality contributes to revitalise social structures (ibid: 105). The 1965 event did not only prevent their return but created liminality for the second time. In fact this liminality has become their continuous situation ever since.

Being stateless did not prevent the host countries to accept and to provide them with occupations and opportunities for further studies. Most of the Czech exiles for instance worked as civil servants, like those in the Soviet Union. They were actively involved in the political and social situation of the country. Their liminality as stateless persons brought them to integrate with the countries where they lived. They worked as government officials and even as soldiers who went to war like those in Vietnam. They interacted with the society of the host country and some even married local people. They slowly identified themselves with the countries to which they could contribute their expertise. These examples, I would argue, shows that re-aggregation can take place outside the original society of the liminal group and not limited to the same society as written by Turner.

For the communist cadres, the Sino – Soviet split and the re-establishment of the bilateral relationship of Indonesia and Tiongkok became a factor that pushed them further to liminality. Responding to the PKI leader Jusuf Adjitorop in Tiongkok to regroup, Ibarruri in her memoir writes how Soviet teachers increasingly disliked her and her sister. The Sino – Soviet split created PKI split between the Jusuf Adjitorop faction which was pro Tiongkok, and the Thomas Sinuraya faction which was associated with the Soviet Union. This split complicated the existing division among Sukarno loyalists and PKI cadres regarding the involvement of PKI in the 1965 event.³ The Soviet faction moved from Tiongkok to Moscow and the Tiongkok faction regrouped in Tiongkok where they were located to a remote area of the Jianxi provincial capital of Nanchang (Hill 2010: 35). Srikandi portrayed this time as an unhealthy period because they did not work, lost contact with local people and were more engaged in endless ideological and political disputes about revisionist and Maoist standpoints.

3.5 Immigration and social networks in the Netherlands

The move to Western countries apparently took place first among the exiles living in Tiongkok. Sarmadji and Srikandi were among the first to move to the Netherlands. Those in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc moved to the West only after the perestroika and democratisation process in the early 1990s. The preferred western countries were Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, France and Germany especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Suratman mentioned that the Scandinavian countries were considered to be the proponents of human rights and a heaven for exiles. The Netherlands was seen as to offer a possible reunification with relatives in Indonesia and as a place to get

³ Sukarno loyalist referred to Sukarno’s statement before the People Assembly in 1967 called Pelengkap Nawaksara (Supplement to Nawaksara) where he indicated three actors namely the outrage of PKI leader, the neo-colonialism’ subversive shrewdness and the existence of incorrect actors (NN 1997)
more of the Indonesian atmosphere. And from my respondents, I have not found the preference to live in Germany and France.4

For most of the 1965 exiles in Czechoslovakia, moving to Western countries was considered equivalent to being a foreigner. Their marriage to Czech women implies their adjustment to see the Czech as part of their home. Mahardi and Sumarni also indicated the same feelings when they reluctantly moved to the Netherlands following the Rumanian revolution and perestroika in Russia. The worst case happened to Sarman who, apart from being stateless and married to a Russian, experienced family separation. He moved to the Netherlands to escape the harsh cold climate of Russia while his wife returned to Russia with their son remained in the Czech Republic.

There are two considerations to understand how they moved to Western countries, in this case the Netherlands, and how they finally resettled either as citizens or permanent residents. The first is the available social network in the Netherlands that provided them with an invitation to visit, to help them with lawyers, shelter, financial issues and jobs. This social network ranged from relatives, fellow exiles who had already stayed in the Netherlands, Church organisations, journalists, human rights organisation and the Communist Partij Nederland – CPN (Netherlands Communist Party).

The second is the structural factor of immigration policy and its changes that had different consequences for the exiles depending on their year of entrance. For the Netherlands case, all respondents mentioned that they had to go through several legal procedures before they finally received residence permits. When they first arrived they applied as political exiles from what happened in socialist countries and in one case from the violence of 1965. On this basis, they were treated as political exiles just as refugees are treated. The immigration policy was much more relaxed for those arriving before 1985 when the Netherlands renewed its immigration policy. The previous law of 1848 stated that population in the colonies were recognised as citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands with limited social and political rights. This applied to Indonesians who had been born before 1949, the year that the Dutch government officially recognised Indonesian independence. The exiles arriving before 1985 mentioned that they used this law to get a residence permit and to get citizenship without applying as a political asylum. And those arriving after 1985 with a stricter immigration law in place mentioned that they applied as political asylum seekers before they were finally given a residence permit.

However, they all mentioned that they had a special status compared to other migrants from Marroco, Turkey or Suriname. This special status perhaps reflected the immigration policy of the Dutch government which considered them as more Dutch compared to other migrants. This basically is the racism

4 Sobron Aidit, another brother of the PKI chairman D.N. Aidit, moved to France and opened an Indonesian restaurant which attracted the sympathy of the late French President Francois Mitterand. He passed away on February 12, 2007 because of heart attack.
discourse which underlines the Dutch immigration policy (Yanow and van der Haar 2009: 24 - 27).

Despite this special status, those who moved in the late 1980s and the early 1990s basically had a difficult time to get a job they wanted because of their age. Fahmawati, Srikandi and Sarmadji got relatively decent jobs as a lecturer, an acupuncturist and a worker. Those who came later technically entered a pension age and did voluntary works and had limited social interactions with the local situation. Some are actively involved in their local neighbourhood, while some relatively are less involved with their localities. There are some factors like interest in certain issues and length of stay in the Netherlands that might explain their preference of involvement and interaction with the localities.

The exiles in the Czech Republic continued to have the hospitality of Czechoslovakia during their stateless period. Most of them were married to Czech women, lived a decent life and had good jobs mostly in governmental institutions. In other words, their stateless situation did not prevent them from having good jobs and lives just like other Czech citizens. The situation changed with the democratisation of Czechoslovakia in 1991 and its bifurcation into Czech and Slovakia. In 1993, the Czech republic introduced a new citizenship law No 40/1993. The law provides opportunity for stateless persons like the Indonesian exiles to become citizens by taking into consideration their long residence in the Czech Republic and possibly their marriage to Czech. The 1965 exiles took this chance to become citizens except for Sarman.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter shows the international historical context and background of the formation of the Indonesian 1965 exiles as part of the state violence against the leftist and loyalists of Sukarno. As part of the narrative of the 1965 event, the 1965 exiles went through a situation where some of them moved from one socialist country to another, and some remained in the same socialist country. Their movement were sometimes related to the international political context like the Sino – Soviet split, bilateral context of Indonesia – Tiongkok relationship and the network of socialist students. For those in the Czech Republic, the situation is relatively simpler because they remain in the same country, have decent jobs and most of them are married to local people. For those who entered the Netherlands the situation is more complex in relation to the immigration policy and the image of the Netherlands as former coloniser. However the same colonial history, social networks of 1965 exiles, CPN, human rights and Church organisations provided them with access to enter the Netherlands and gave them privileges in terms of immigration policy especially before 1985. With the change of immigration law in 1985, some needed to go through a complex process of immigration.
Chapter 4
Trajectories of liminality

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the collective memory and its sites of memory, and the personal or sub-group memory and its sites of memories. The collective memory is focused more on the statelessness with Indonesian embassy as the site of memory for them. In this collective memory, they could associate themselves with the victims of 1965 in Indonesia, and therefore constitutes their identity as a group. And as reflection goes further, this collective memory in fact varies to several sub-group and personal memories with its respective site of memory. The observation and interviews with Ahmadi for instance demonstrates the existence of library with collected books of Indonesian and Russian issues as his personal site of memory. It triggers his remembrance of what happened following the statelessness. And over time, the site of memory of Indonesian embassy could have new meanings as shown by the Czech sub-group. As the ambassador used more friendly approach toward them, he triggers pre-1965 memory of friendly Indonsian embassy.

The cases of sub-group and personal memories are critical to understand Halbwach’s notion on the construction of the past on the basis of the present situation and its function for social cohesion. Although statelessness is present as a collective memory, every individual and sub-group constructed the past according to their own significance. They give different meanings to the collective memory by constructing their own site of memory like library of Ahmadi and Fahmawati, Czech sub-group of relation with embassies, and Karsiman effort to translate Chinese poems. I would distribute the section of collective memory and individual or sub-group memories with reference to the country in order to demonstrate the interplay between collective, sub-group and individual memories.

4.2 The collective memory of being citizens and stateless

The 1965 repeatedly mentioned 1965 event as a sudden disruption to their lives and their future possibility to live, to contribute and to give meanings to Indonesia’s independence. As they departed for studies, they understand themselves as being segregated for the rest of Indonesians, perhaps as a chosen one, and they expected to return and to revitalize the country with their expertises. Their segregation was a liminality stage of Indonesian citizens under Sukarno’s ideals of self-reliance from the new imperialism and colonialism. As Sukarno was brought down by the New Order regime, they felt victimized like the rest of 1965 victims, with their inability to return and their stateless status. They were pushed to the permanent liminality as Indonesian citizen with the instrumental role of Indonesian embassies and military attaché.

They built their memory either as victims or the lost party relate to what happened in 1965. They associated and identified themselves with the collective memory of 1965 victims in Indonesia. This association somehow gave
them a legitimised sense of identity as 1965 victims. They reflected their experience of state’s violence in term of state revoking their passport. They extended the violation of human rights from conducting actual violence into something subtler like creating statelessness. This reflection shows the shared collective memory of 1965 event with a different degree of identification or victimhood of the event. In the context of collective memory of 1965 event, the 1965 exiles remember it as the loss of citizenship.

The physical site of the state was represented by the Indonesian embassies. This representation reveals the violent power of the state that made them a liminality of stateless. It triggered their collective memory of stateless period or their permanent liminality. This collective memory of liminality is created by the state as part of stigmatisation toward the leftist and Sukarno’s loyalist. The 1965 exiles shape their identity on the structure of state’s narrative either as a lost party or victims. Although there is a dispute as to call themselves victims or a lost party among the exiles, it only has a meaning within the narrative of state’s violence.

Bearing in mind their better future social status and to some was their privileged class status like PKI top cadres, the stateless might imply the loss of desirable social status. Their title of Ampera Ambassador no doubt suggests that they were selected people. Setiarti mentioned that being selected as Ampera Ambassador would give her a chance to become a doctor, to buy a car and to help her parents. It indicates the future social status of somebody with a degree and education that would ensure their social class and their social obligation toward the parents. Being prevented to return to Indonesia and their statelessness disrupted this desirable better social class and familial duty.

Indonesia then collectively remembered in two eras. First is the era of Sukarno that made them citizens, selecting, sending, financing their study abroad and ensuring their future social class in the country’s or party bureaucratic structure. This era of Indonesia created liminality for them as a temporary process with a possible re-aggregation in a more influencing role. The second is the era of Suharto and New Order that revoked their passport, prevented their return to Indonesia and made them stateless. This era of the state created them a permanent liminality of stateless and disrupted their future social class and familial duty. Both collective memory, however, indicate the role of state as an actor to shape their collective memory which they maintained as a source of identity and group cohesion (Halbwachs and Coser 1992: 142).

However the 1965 exiles collective memory is problematic within the framework of 1965 collective memory as far as the actual violence is concerned. Their associated identity with the rest of 1965 victims is a distant and indirect experience of actual violence. They understood state’s violence more on the basis of the deprivation of citizenship. I will develop this problematic of collective memory by reflecting more on the individual and sub-group memory of exilic trajectories in the transit countries.

### 4.3 The trajectories of exiles’ memories

By exilic trajectories, I refer to the transit countries where 1965 exiles lived for some years before they final resettlement in the current country of residence. Most of them considered the exilic trajectories as a temporary status because
they hoped the change of Indonesian politics. As the New Order really took the whole control of Indonesia in 1971, they realized the end of such hope. Somehow it pushed them to adjust further with the country of residence and to consider moving to the Western countries. There is a degree of adjustment and integration with the transit countries that are memorialised in the form of libraries, language to communicate and even some habits from the past. The memorialisation manifests their sense of being home, and their effort to create personal site of memory.

4.3.1. The memory of Vietnam

There are three respondents and one source of oral history for the Vietnamese experiences in 1960 – 1980 namely Fahmawati, Suratman, Setiarti and Budiarto Djayadi. All three participated in the Vietnam War and knew each other. Only Fatmawati who lived there since the beginning, the other came in 1967 from Soviet Union. As the war was intensified, Suratman, Setiarti and Fatmawati moved to Tiongkok, as they called China, to save their lives, while Budiarto Djayadi moved back to Soviet Union.

Memory of Vietnam left more impact for Fahmawati who arrived there in 1967 and was able to speak even the vernacular language. Her objective within the students’ exchanges programme of PKI and Vietnam Communist Party was to study the scientific basis of the origin of Vietnamese and Indonesian ancestors. On the one hand, there was a theory mentioning that Indonesian ancestors came from Vietnam, and on the other hand there was another theory saying the contrary. In her search for historical proof, she found herself absorbed into the Vietnamese culture which finally gave her an opportunity to become a lecturer at Leiden University. This engagement still continues where she managed to collect books on Vietnamese issues along with the Indonesian issues. The library implies the representation of her negotiated process to consider Vietnam as home along with Indonesia (Douglas 1991: 289).

Setiarti and Suratman are couples who married in Vietnam. Their arrival in Vietnam was part of their effort to find a place to contribute their expertise for the fellow socialist revolution. Both shared the memory of Vietnamese revolution and raising their first son in the trench. Being part of the revolution, they felt instrumental to help as an engineer for repairing weapons and to help the victims as a doctor. Vietnamese revolution has become a social setting of personal contribution and to start a family life.

Budiarto Djayadi remembered more within the perspective of PKI failure to have back up plan after what happened in 1965. He understood his being in Vietnam as a failure of PKI’s plan toward their cadres. He understood this as a lack of leadership because the internal conflict of PKI leadership of Tiongkok and Soviet Union. Although he enjoyed his stay in Vietnam, he expressed it in terms of bitter memory of PKI dissolution. He reflected more the failure of PKI to recruit qualified members and to organize itself after 1965 event.

4.3.2. The memory of Soviet Union

There were six respondents with Soviet Union trajectories namely Setiarti, Suratman, Budiarto Djayadi, Ahmadi, Sumarni, Sarman, Karsiman and the biography of Ibarruri Putri Alam. Ibarruri and Budiarto were part of student exchanges between PKI and Soviet Communist Party. All respondents but
Karsiman, who moved to Soviet Union from China, were sent to study in Soviet Union and became stateless in this country.

One common memory among those who ever lived in Soviet Union was the impact of Sino – Soviet split in PKI leadership after their statelessness. PKI splitted into two groups namely the pro Tiongkok Jusuf Adjitoropo faction and Thomas Sinuraya faction associated with Soviet Union. This division added the Marhaenist faction like Ahmadi who did not belong to PKI. Karsiman mentioned that each faction tried to get sympathy for the exiles in Soviet Union, and Ibarruri (2006: 123 - 128) considered Thomas Sinuraya faction as a puppet of Soviet Union. Sumarni, Sinuraya’s wife was silent about this.

There is a different degree of belonging to Soviet Union within the exiles which related to the length of stay and their active participation in the country. I would take the case of Ahmadi and Sumarni in order to illustrate their personal site of memory and memorialisation of Soviet trajectories. Ahmadi’s reason to stay was his further continuous study for PhD in International Law. As he graduated from Lomonosov University, Ahmadi worked as a researcher in one of the government research institute until 1990. He married a Russian woman and had a daughter. As he moved to the Netherlands, he left both of them in Moscow. He moved to the Netherlands because of perestroika. He found the rising anti-foreigner climate in which he did not felt secured. He keeps his ties with Soviet Union through marriage and a library with collection of books in Russian language. He said that he followed the latest situation in Soviet Union and also critically compared the old days of communism with the new democratic capitalism situation of Rusia.

Sumarni’s reason for staying in Soviet Union is because her marriage with Thomas Sinuraya, the students leader of PKI who became a rival of PKI in exile orienting itself to Tiongkok. Sumarni still remembers her lives in Soviet Union as a doctor in the hospital and how she could raise her three sons. There is sense of social negotiation with how to live in Soviet Union and to feel belong to it including a social class she enjoyed in Soviet Union. This might explain her reluctance to move to the Netherlands. She only mentioned it as her husband’s decision and was not at home to stay in the Netherlands. In addition, she felt her husband instrumental role to maintain the friendly bilateral relationship of Indonesia – Russia after 1965. She is very critical to the publication of a book called Sahabat Lama Era Baru (Old Friend in a New Era) that does not mention her husband role. For her it is a real sign of the persisting Indonesian government discourse on anti-communist.

4.3.3. The memory of Tiongkok

There are six respondents mentioning their memories of Tiongkok in the interviews namely Srikandi, Karsiman, Sarmadji, Suratman, Susilowaty and Setiarti. In addition, Ibarruri biography mentioned her stay in Tiongkok as well after Soviet Union. The first three initially went to Tiongkok, while the other two moved to Tiongkok from Vietnam. They used the word Tiongkok instead of China since it was used Indonesia until 1972 rather than China. The term was abandoned in the period of hostile in 1960s and was replaced with Cina. In this section, the word is used following the respondent frequent use of it rather than Cina. This also reflects how they remember the country’s name in their past rather than following the word Cina promoted by Suharto’s regime.
The 1965 exiles in Tiongkok recalled their statelessness as an expiration of passport rather than a state’s active action of revoking the passport. The embassy did not actually exist anymore since Indonesian government terminated the diplomatic relationship with Tiongkok under the accusation of involvement in PKI failed coup. The Tiongkok ambassador refused to return to Indonesia and finally became exile himself. In this way, I would argue that sub-group memory demonstrate a different meaning of passport revocation and being stateless.

Except Sulistiawaty, the rest remembered the Cultural Revolution in 1968. Considering the time, I do think only three Srikandi, Sarmadji and Karsim went through it directly. The rest experienced the effect of it where many of the 1965 exiles were sent to a remote area. Interestingly, Suratman whom I do not think experienced the Cultural Revolution in 1968, mentioned that their movement to remote area was an effort to keep the exiles safe from the Cultural Revolution. Whatever it was, Srikandi did remember it as unhealthy situation since the exiles did not work, did not have much contact with local and were isolated. She also remembered the arrival of some other Indonesian which perhaps indicated the arrival of those who listened to Jusuf Adiutorop to regroup in Tiongkok.

Srikandi remembered her journey to Tiongkok as her effort to prove her argument her father. She argued against his father Siaw Giok Tjian who became the chairman of Baperki – Badan Permussyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia. She suggested for Chinese people to return to Tiongkok instead of fighting Tiongkok people’s right in Indonesia as her father preferred to. On her way to Tiongkok, Srikandi saw the Chinese Indonesian who were forced to return because the discriminatory law of No 10/1959 that prohibited Chinese people to trade from regency to village level. The 1965 event although opened her chance to adjust more with Tiongkok, in fact changed her perspective toward Indonesia thanks to her romantic relationship with a young nationalist student from West Sumatera.

The memory of her father and his dedication for egalitarianism for the Chinese minority, his imprisonment by New Order regime and her long separation with the husband became crucial factor for Srikandi to concentrate on her work and her decision to move to the West and left Tiongkok in 1978. She remembered well the students’ lives in Tiongkok with dirty toilets and bathrooms, their bigger pocket money compared to the local Tiongkok students, the portion for ethnic students in Tiongkok to study, Indonesian students politics in PPI and her romance with her husband during their study.

Setiarti and Suratman might be the persons with another forced displacement in Tiongkok when Tiongkok government decided to re-establish bilateral relationship with Indonesia in 1980s. The consequence of Indonesian demand

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5 The Cultural Revolution in 1968 caused Li Shaoqi, the president of Tiongkok, to fall of favour because he was considered as revisionism toward orthodoxy of Marxism and Maosim, and considered ‘capitalist-roader’.

6 Baperki was an institution for the Chinese Indonesian to fight for their equal rights as Indonesian citizens and against discrimination toward minorities.
to clear up the issue of exiles brought both of them with the choice to remain in Tiongkok as citizens or to move to other country. Though they found dilemmatic situation of their children education, they finally sent them to Soviet Union using their social network in Moscow. They themselves moved to the Netherlands where other social network facilitated their visit before asking for asylum. Both of them repeatedly said their exilic trajectories as their effort to develop social network in the respective countries.

4.3.4. The memory of Czechoslovakia

There are seven respondents involved in the interviews namely Sarman, Arman, Sanusi, Herman, Himawan, Atmojo dan Hasan. Czechoslovakia has a specific place in the leftist diaspora under this research. Except Sarman who came from Soviet and married a Russian, the rest studied, stayed and worked in Czechoslovakia since 1964. They married local women and speak fluent Czech. Among the seven, six experienced their passport revoked by the Indonesian embassy because they did not want to sign the loyalty statement. Only Hasan survived the passport revoking because he signed the loyalty statement. He remained in Czech after learning that his place of origin in West Sumatera was known as the basis of PRRI – Permesta. He anticipated a possible problem with this background, and decided to remain in Czechoslovakia. He then worked in the Indonesian embassy which considered him as a local Czech staff. He did not receive a pension either from Indonesian or from Czech government upon his retirement.

This group shared the memory of how Indonesian embassy changing environment in 1995 from site of memory of state’s violence into a friendly place again. It was possible due to the role of the ambassador who happened to be their fellow students in Czech. Interestingly, the memory of division among pro Sukarno and pro Suharto did not have any lasting impact. It seems so easy for the state to erase its violence by just returning them within the state’s framework to develop bilateral relationship with Czech. In other words, the state somehow manipulated their social position within Czech society and their sense of belonging to Indonesia to reach state’s objective. This sub-group memory suggested what Halbwach wrote about the construction of the past based on the present situation with a critical eye to see the role of power relation that he did not mention explicitly.

Besides Hasan, the rest shared the memory of democratisation process as a social process that ousted them from governmental position and received a decent pension. The collective memory of Czech old regime somehow becomes part of their sub-group memory as 1965 Indonesian exile. This collective memory then shows the adjusted process of their identification with Czech. Their marriage and history of living in Czech somehow sustain this negotiated process. It also change the feeling of 1965 exile as a group of people being prevented to return into a group of people preferring not to return.

4.3.5. The memory of Rumania

I only found one respondent who ever lived as an exile in Rumania namely Mahardi. He went to Rumania initially as a participant of Youth Conference in Helsinki, Finland in 1962 and attended the celebration of Rumanian liberation. It was not clear how the arrangement for him to study in Rumania. He only
mentioned that the ambassador told him to stay for studying following the message from a party member. At that time he was already 28 years old and relatively older compared to other Mahid students.

After the embassy revoked his passport, he took a leave from his study to help his fellow students. He mentioned his role as an elder brother in assisting the other students. He remained in Rumania while the other student tried to find another country to work and to live. Many worked for Algerian oil companies thanks to the social network they had with Algerian students. He explicitly mentioned his role as somebody who looked after the house while others moving out, and prepared to receive them when something bad happened.

This description shows the domestic role he played with Rumania as home. He described the other as doing public role and bread winner while he took a domestic role. It shows clearly a division of labour centered around the idea of home as suggested by Douglas. The political event of 1965 created a domestic space for him and demonstrated that Rumania was really a home rather than just a temporary place to stay.

He married Rumanian woman, and got a job in the ministry of tourism. The political upheaval in Rumania with the overthrow Nicolae Ceaucescu regime became the turning point of his live. His friend in the Netherlands arranged for his entire family to move to the Netherlands. He reluctantly followed the advice as he perceived that the situation in Rumania during the democratisation process was not as dangerous as outsiders thought of. He was convinced because the Netherlands offered a more quality in education for his children than the Rumanian system.

In his house in Leiden, one could trace the memory of domestic role from Rumania. He provides her house a home for Indonesian visitors especially visiting scholars in Leiden, Indonesian student to discuss Indonesian issues. Through the group’s discussion he seems to create a space between some of 1965 exiles and the Indonesian students in Leiden. This might reveals the memory of domestic role to create home for his Indonesian with a shift of home from Rumania to the Netherlands.

4.4 Memorialisation of the liminality

4.4.1. The exiles in the Netherlands

Given its history of colonial ties with Indonesia, living and becoming citizens of the Netherlands were problematic for the 1965 exiles. On the one hand, the colonialism created a sizeable community of Indonesian and atmosphere where they felt belonging to. The good political relationship also provided them with a protection as Dutch citizens to visit Indonesia in the case of a possible threat against them. On the other hand, colonialism left the memory of repression of Dutch which was very much opposed by Sukarno and the atmosphere of third world movement.

Some justified their living in the Netherlands and being Dutch by referring to the Indonesian founding fathers strategy of cooperation with the colonizer for independence of Indonesia. Some justified this by unpacking the monolithic concept of Dutch as colonial. Karsiman for instance mentioned the involvement of some Dutch to support Indonesian independence. The justifica-
tion seems to involve a historical aspect of Indonesia around independence. This strategy may imply the distance they want to make with the colonial aspect of the Netherlands while benefiting by becoming its citizens. The benefit is quite clear with the protection and social security as citizens in the Netherlands especially in their old age. The protection also guarantees them to visit Indonesia and to criticize Indonesian government under Suharto especially in 1980 and 1990s.

As Suharto stepped down from the power, they were enthusiastic with the investigation and justice for 1965 victims including themselves. Their interest as expressed by some was to get formal recognition of what happened to them as part of state’s violence. It is not only about returning their passport and formal identity. For some others, it is about righting the history of 1965 event rather than just victims’ discourse. These two discourses of righting history and victims aim to insert their version of 1965 history and to give external aspect of 1965. The victim discourse set up Lembaga Pembela Korban 1965 – LPK 65 (Institution of Victims of 1965 Defender) focusing in the human rights issues. The righting history discourse created a space for intellectual discussions with Indonesian scholars in order to bring the issues of writing history.

However, as argued by Farid (February, 2002) methodologically righting history is problematic because it started with a priori that the 1965 exiles version of history is right and they were victims. In fact, history has interpretive aspect from the side of the narrator. And in terms of victim’s narrative, there is a critical question of what is the “added degree” of 1965 victims in comparison to other victims of state’s violence like Papuan, Acehnese, or the Chinese minority.

Despite this division on discourse, they exiles organized their presence in the Netherlands by forming the organization called Perkumpulan Persaudaraan – PP hereafter (Association of Sisterhood – Brotherhood). Four male 1965 exiles started PP namely Wiyanto, Suhaimi, Sutarto, Suryosubroto, Suhartono and Sungkono. As Setiarti mentioned that every Indonesian could be the member of this group. And yet she added that it seems easier to make sense for those Papuan or RMS exile considering their political nature of exile rather than with fellow Indonesian with a different nature of migration. What she did not mention was that neither Papuan nor RMS joined PP because they contest the nature of Indonesia.

PP also holds some national ceremonies especially Hari Kemerdekaan (Independence Day), Hari Kebangkitan Nasional (National Awakening Day) and Hari Sumpah Pemuda (Oath Youth Day). Sarman said that PP normally invited them to celebrate the event which is celebrated separately from the Indonesian embassies and other Indonesian communities. They tended to celebrate a ‘more traditional Indonesia national days’. What he actually meant is Indonesia as they remembered under Sukarno. They also celebrated a new year, birthdays and Idul Fitri or Eid Mubarak where almost every member and their children would normally gather.

The other common gathering is Forum Diskusi (Discussion Forum) focused more on holding thematic discussions. Forum Diskusi conducted three to four times in a year for thematic discussion. Normally there are about 30 – 40 participants present. The core committee selects the theme and speaker ac-
cording to the available speaker and interest of the participants. As part of the
discussion, there is also sharing session for the members who just returned
from Indonesia either for their vacation or for special purposes. The sharing
session is left to the speaker to say whatever he or she wants. In two of their
discussions, I found that the content could be everything ranging from per-
sonal issues, health issues, political issues or just a description of their journey
to Indonesia. The thematic discussion consists of more serious analysis based
on the current event in Indonesia.

There is a more limited memorialisation like Sarmadji library with a collec-
tion of PKI document, books on 1965 event, New Order and Indonesian mil-
tary. The unique collection of the library is the obituaries of exiles nicely com-
piled in a folder. His intention was to set up a monument for the 1965 exiles
as a duty of Javanese Islam of *aman ma’ruf naimungkar*, to fight the evil through
goodness. This religious motive somehow demonstrates also the memorialisa-
tion of collective memory of 1965 exiles and the site of memory of their state-
lessness created by an individual person.

### 4.5 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates the interplay between collective memory and indi-
vidual memory. As part of collective memory of 1965, the exiles remember
collectively the event as the state’s violence by pushing them to liminality of
being stateless. In this line, the narrative of 1965 about state’s violence need to
be extended in the creation of stateless and exiles. In other word, memory of
1965 event besides the actual violence in Indonesia also has a variance of creat-
ing exiles.

In the context of 1965 exiles, their collective memory of statelessness is
complicated further by their exilic trajectories in some countries. Indonesia, as
the country of origin is not the only country they felt belonging to or emotion-
ally involved with. There are complicated processes to adapt, to negotiate the
meaning of home, and to contribute that created sub-group and personal
memories of their exilic trajectories. Some even memorialised this in their per-
sonal interest and activities in the current country of residence.
Chapter 5
History and memory of liminality

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is going to explore three notions related to the interplay of collective memory and sub-group or individual memories. Taking into account their exilic trajectories in which they adjusted and negotiated their relation to the country of origin, countries of exilic trajectories, and current country of residence, there are issue of home, sense of nationalism and how they look at history of 1965. By raising these issues, I hope to further problematise the interaction of collective – sub-group/individual memories.

5.2 Home and belonging

The 1965 exiles is a permanent liminality because they were not integrated into the community they firstly belonged to. In fact, they were integrated to different community which kept them in the edge because they were not considered as original. The permanent liminality somehow becomes a distinctive identity of 1965 exiles. Their distinctiveness is the experience of exilic trajectories where they gradually adjusted to belong to and to develop a new meaning of home with transit countries. There is a development of emotional ties with the transit countries and the current country of residence although they were never considered as original.

What do actually they refer to as home? To answer this question let us look at Mary Douglas argument of creating solidarity from home. Mary Douglas (1991: 289) argues that home is located in space, has some structure in time and for “the people living in that time and space, it has asthetic and moral dimensions”. By moral dimension, Douglas wants to show the possibility of solidarity through the idea of home as not for profit institution. It tends to develop a simple division of labour on the basis that everybody keeps the common good. It is a common good because every member needs to understand how to behave in the presence of other members. A punishment and a criticism are always in the name of collective good rather than individual benefit. Solidarit is realised “through the actions of inhabitants, through the routine ways of spacing provisions, dividing labour, synchronizing timings and placings” (Douglas as quoted in Uusihakala 2008: 101) happened at home.

Taking Douglas notion of solidarity and home, it is clear that their exilic trajectories showed how they sympatized with the people they lived with in transit countries. In other words, they were integrated to the social structure of their new community and created a sense of home for them. This sense of home has been added to the previous sense of home with Indonesia. This shows a process of negotiating the meaning of home (Hearman 2010: 104 - 105) where they they belong to. The exilic trajectories suggest multiple sense of home which geographically might attached to two or more countries.

In post-Suharto era with the possible return to Indonesia, there seems a concern of their current social situation if they need to return. The 1965 exiles
In Czech expressed the concern of social and health security that would be lost as they move to Indonesia just like the exiles living in Moscow (Lebang and Susanto 2010). Although the 1965 exiles in the Netherlands raised the same concern, they expressed that the policy to ban all leftist is still implemented in Indonesia. Taking the case of Acehnese diaspora in Europe might indicates a possible advantage of continuing to live abroad while still could play the role of political advocate (Missbach 2010: 132 - 134) rather than returning home to a new situation that might challenge their current social status and habits. Returning home can bring them to the new situation or unwelcoming atmosphere where they might considered absent from the actual event. In other words, the country of origin has become something foreign to them rather than something familiar.

In their relation to second generation, they also found the different sense of what home means. The second generation develop more sense of belonging to the Netherlands or Czech. As Sumarni said, the children belong to Europe rather than to Indonesia. The tone of her expressions suggests a sense of failure to educate their children to love Indonesia. However it indicates different perceptions of new generation of what home means. The second generation and third generation of exiles slowly becomes migrant (Steijlen 2010, Hearman 2010, Cornejo 2008) where their parent’s country of origin seems to be something foreign for them while their first and perhaps their current country of residence seems to be ‘original’.

5.3 Long distance nationalism

In his classic book on nationalism, Benedict Anderson argues that the foundation of imagined communities were the spread of printing technologies enabling unified exchanges and communication (Anderson 1991). Building on the idea of pilgrimage, a journey to the a sacred place as developed by Turner, Anderson (ibid : 56), wrote the double aspect of this religious pilgrimages: that resonates the role of bilingual literate to create a sense of collectivity:

“... a vast horde of illiterate vernacular speakers provided the dense physical reality of the ceremonial passage; while small segment of literate bilingual adepts drawn from each vernacular community performed the unifying rites, interpreting to their respective following the meanings of their collective motion.”

The empirical data of 1965 exiles shows that they identify themselves with Indonesia rather than with Dutch or other countries. Their sub-group and personal memories added the strong sense of nationalism with Indonesia. But their present situation of age and living outside Indonesia create an atmosphere where they prefer not to return. They maintain a sense of nationalism, with Indonesia as a nation accompanied with an effort to influence its policy while belonging to a citizen of other state. This resembles the phenomena with other diaspora communities which may demonstrate the phenomenon of long distance nationalism (Anderson 1992). The emotional ties with the motherland as a country of origin are strongly present in many of the interviews even though they already spent more their lives outside Indonesia. The sense of Indonesia as an identity where they belong to as a place of born resembles the diaspora
identity like East Timorese in Australia (Wise 2011) or Kurdish diaspora (Curtis 2005).

In the case of Indonesian exiles and its sense of nationalism with Indonesia, Dragojlovic (2010) argues that the exilic long distance nationalism manifested in their participation of non-violent activism during Suharto’s New Order regime like lobbying, contributing money, sheltering Indonesian activists persecuted by New Order and holding a political discussions. In the post-New Order, the nationalism is manifested in the leftist documentation and library like Sarmaji’s library, actively writing critical articles toward Indonesian government in the internet, making statement on 1965 issues and some event involved in the political party.

Taking into account their exilic trajectories and their collective memory, sub-group and personal memories one would wonder about the sense of nationalism they might develop with their transit countries or their current country of residence. I would argue, from their negotiated process of home, their sub-group and personal memories, that they develop a sense of belonging with transit countries. The vivid memory of being part the Vietnamese revolution, Russian social upheaval or Czech political process creates a sense of identification. This memory, I would argue shows the possible extension of nationalism toward the countries where they involved in its process of state building or a common project of that nation (Benedict 1999). They have a relation to the motherland and multiple or single country of residence where they lived and are living (Uusihakala 2008) where they felt belonging to. In this perspective, they do not belong to the diaspora community that develop a sense of nationalism on the basis of ethnic or religious statement as Kurdish or Sri Lankan diaspora or even Papuan and Acehnese. They developed more a nationalistic sentiment understood in terms of the nationalistic project of Sukarno and its sense of international ties with other socialist countries or third world countries.

### 5.4 Righting history

One of the concerns of the 1965 exiles is about meluruskansjarah (righting the history). In his speech, to commemorate 45 year of G 30 S, in Diemen, the Netherlands, MD Kartaprawira mentioned that the violation of human rights should be material basis for any effort to right the history which for 32 years manipulated by the Suharto’s New Order regime (Wirantaprawira 2010). Several interview explicitly mentioned the history post New Order is a diverted history for the sake of political power. Within this debate, the exiles critically examined the role of historian like Nugroho Notosutanto as an ideological historian.

This concern has become increasingly discussed following the fall of Suharto. The memoirs and oral history project have become a trend to propose a contesting view or a repressed narrative and to make history right. Besides its importance as sources for Indonesian post-independence and 1965 event (Hearman 2009, Van Klinken 2001), there is a serious question toward the righting history. Parid (February, 2002) mentioned three problematic concerns regarding righting history. First, the assumption that history is diverted or manipulated. Second, is the assumption that history can be rightened. Historians themselves disputed these issues since the completeness of historical material
would often produce strength and weakness of analysis. History is opened to the interpretation. Third, is the assumption that there is an authority who determined that the written history is rightened. In the case of New Order history on 1965, Farid argued that methodologically, it starts with a conclusion before conducting research. Historical facts are collected selectively to confirm the apriori. He then continues by saying that the history of anti New Order regime often follows the same methodological error.

In the rise of oral history in Indonesia, Roosa and Ratih (2008) warned the difficulty of composing oral history. Oral historians stand between the empathy and objectivication. They suggests to adapt selectively and critically ‘Freud’s concepts for social analysis like “working through”, “acting out”, “transference”, to enable oral historians to keep a distance from empirical methodology and to start a difficult self-reflection about interaction with the interviewee, with the past events and with the targetted readers.’ The unique position of oral historian lies between empathy and objectivity understood as non-positivistic term.

I would like to see the dispute about righting history in in discussion of Nora and Halbwach on history and memory. As Nora (1989: 8) mentioned that history is about representation of the past, or the construction of the past (Halbwachs and Coser 1992: 47). In history they both see the frozen of memory rather than living experience. History therefore by constructing or representing the past involves a process of forgetting or annihilating the reality that takes place (Nora 1989: 9). The debate about righting history might suggest the dispute about memory and history of 1965 event. This rising of memoir writing and historiography claims themselves to provide a lack of informations, the forgetting and annihilating reality that takes place and historical facts constructed by official history.

Memory might add to history what it can preserve and save from the live experience of individual, while history preserves collective representation of memory (Crane 1997: 1383). For Crane, history provides a central remembering organ in which individual can ‘produce histories in which they claim their historical subjects as part of their memories’. Putting Crane’s analysis on the history and memory, the memoir or memory of 1965 exiles could be seen as individual claiming his/her historical knowledge to produce histories. At the same time, New Order version of history, or even trained historian like Nugroho Notozutanto produced its and his history on the basis of its and his memory. Within this analysis, writing history is not about righting history its but perhaps about historical consciousness in which individual memories could contribute to.

The discourse of 1965 exiles is their statelessness as a result of New Order violence. In this discourse, they intend to put themselves in the bigger discourse of 1965 event either as victims or the lost party. In that discourse, the 1965 exiles mobilised themselves to the problem of righting the history with their historiography. Although I could sympathize with this, I would argue that it is problematic because their statelessness is only one side of the coin. The other side is their exilic trajectories which actually problematic to establish within a single collective memory. Maintaining collective memory as stateless would politically reproduce the history of victim – perpetrator or bad – good.
Taking the discourse of exilic trajectories may produce a fruitful understanding of historical interpretation surrounding 1965 event.

One element of writing history within the 1965 exiles might relate to the ideas of ‘whenever’ or ‘we centered talk’ that try to ‘uphold the past’ like the case of ex-Rhodesian community (Uusihakala 2008). In this memory, the past is actually remembered in a nostalgic way and yet gives them a sense of belonging to certain part of history and a certain place. Indonesia as a nation-state might be nostalgic or idealized and historically discontinued. This nostalgia ‘imagines the originary homeland born of the negative of the present and displaces it in time and space’ (Legg 2005). The exile diaspora freezes the past according to their selective foils of pleasant memories or/and their sufferings (Missbach 2010). Within nostalgia, homeland or a selective period of history in the homeland tends to be idealised and frozen that became an aspect of diaspora community (Carruthers 2008).

This nostalgic Indonesian past underlines critics toward Nora’s site of memory as argued by Bell (quoted in Legg 2005). The selective frozen past or site of memory shows the degree of memorability of site of memory. But if we return to Halbwach notion on collective memory, this selective process is understandable on the ground that the past is always shaped within the present interest for social coherence (Halbwachs and Coser 1992). Within diaspora setting, their displacement seems to suggest also the displacement of time and space of the homeland in order to return to the familiarity and meaning of home. Nostalgia might suggest the reinforcement of agency within the selective process of site of memory as well as the presentism aspect of constructed history.

In this study I demonstrate that the collective memory of stateless needs to be understood in the sub-group and personal memories that show more diversities and a long complex process of negotiating the meaning of home. Statelessness as a formal identity discourse might be problematic with the affective – emotional sense of belonging or even sense of nationalism. If righting history is meant to be a positivistic effort and truth of what happened on 1965 event, it might be too early to say that 1965 exiles would have profound legitimacy because they were actually absent in the 1965 event. Despite the truth they claim to be found in this righting history, the problem is not only methodological but also the fact that they shared different memories of 1965 event with those in Indonesia. They need to maintain this 1965 righting history because one of their associated identities as exiles related to the event itself. Dismantling 1965 from their memory and context would associate them with the other migrant.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter explores further three aspect commonly found among diaspora namely the sense of home and belonging, long distance nationalism and the specific concern of righting history among the 1965 exiles. I argued that exilic trajectories of 1965 exiles are something typical to their memory and narrative which is different with the narrative of 1965. Their discourse of righting history while reflecting the New Order methodological error, is also functional to give them identity as part of Indonesian history of 1965. At the same time, this
identity is complicated to their adjusted process of relating to home and sense of belonging. They identified themselves as being part of countries where they experience their exilic trajectories. This adjustment or social negotiation process might reshape the meaning of home and belonging as something not limited to a single geographical area and state formal identity but extend to multiple geographical state through emotional bond shaped in the course of time. In fact, the meaning of home and the sense of belonging are a selective frozen of the past which looked through their present situation of an old age and retirement. This sense of belonging, while maintaining the sense of nationalism with country of origin, may be related to something in the past and is complicated with their memory of exilic trajectories. The collective memory of being stateless suggests a more complicated picture of nationalism, sense of belonging and identity as the analysis goes to their exilic trajectories.
Chapter 6
Conclusion

This study is an effort to look into the problem of 1965 exiles using the analysis of collective memory and site of memory. In such effort, I took a position of post-positive epistemology using extensive qualitative approach for my methodology. This stand reflects the issue of collective memory as socially constructed rather than something fixed and static. Methodologically, I understand my research as a journey’s process and discussions with authoritative and legitimate of sources through interviews, observations and literature reviews. As a result of this journey and discussions, this study does not intend to provide exhaustive analysis of collective memory, diaspora community or 1965 exiles. Returning back to Fahmawati’s words, I want to understand how she adjusted and negotiated her emotional ties with Indonesia and with her exilic trajectories as she was pushed to the permanent liminality of being stateless.

Chapter 3 provides a social, political and historical background of the creation of 1965 exiles. In this chapter, I demonstrate how they became stateless people by exploring the international context of Cold War, the national political situation and how they finally resettled as citizens in the Netherland and Czech. This chapter provides the idea of who are the 1965 exiles and how they arrived in their current country of residence.

Chapter 4 explores what happened to the 1965 exiles in their in-between citizens or what was the negotiation process that took places taking into account their situation including gender, social-political situation and their age. I apply the notion of collective memory and site of memory to develop this chapter and the subsequent chapter. I shared the perspective of Halbwach and Pierre Nora of the importance of the present to construct the past. Halbwach argues for a collective memory as something that frames and put society’s pressure within individual mind to remember (Halbwachs and Coser 1992: 51). This study shows that albeit the existence of society, the exilic trajectories evidenced the agency of exiles to negotiate their meaning of identity and home. They remembered their statelessness collectively but at the same time writing their own memories of exilic trajectories. I would agree with Ushihakala (2008: 8) that uses the word remembering together. In other word, it suggests the social action of remembering while it also allows the individual or sub-group mode of remembering on the basis of their significance. The significance may be related to the negotiated social process of how they see their relation to the country of origin, the transit countries and their current country of residence as they lost their citizenship. The significance may also be related to their social class, or lost social status and gender perspective as raising family or being a house keeper for other exiles.

Chapter 5 explores how the social negotiation creates multiple meaning of home and belonging. Rather than fixed identity of country of origin, they could identify with their exilic trajectories. One of their identification with Indonesia as the country of origin is the discourse of righting history around 1965. The 1965 exiles contend the idea of righting history which started with an apriori
that New Order twisted Indonesian history (Hilmar Farid. February, 2002). This might indicated the underlying assumption for the 1965 exiles to associate themselves with the narrative of the victim in Indonesia. This association creates a sense of identity and gives meaning to their exiles status. The issue here is the absence from actual violence that makes a significant difference and perhaps a sense of guilt like the American Jews toward the European Jews (Novick 20001). But I would argue that the fact of history of 1965 exiles as part of the state’s violence need to be considered in their unique situation of exilic trajectories. This reflects the diversities of history around 1965 event where individual memories, frames and interpretations could contribute. This study wants to contribute to existing literatures of diaspora community and 1965 event by suggesting a variance to the discourse of 1965 event about actual violence and its consequence in Indonesia.

However, this study is limited to the 1965 exiles in two countries and who were abroad for a long time. There is more people impacted directly by the 1965 who experienced the actual violence and fled abroad. These people with other 1965 exiles in France, Germany and Sweden are not included here due to the limited space and time. The existing oral history documents at IISG for instance are not extensively used. The other interesting thing which is not included here is the transfer of memory to second generation. Taking the limitation into account, it is quite clear that there is a need for further study of the 1965 exiles. This may have a contribution not only for the study of 1965 event, but also for the diaspora and migration study.
Appendix 1: Table of respondents’ description

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Appendix 2: Map of the exilic trajectories


- Soviet Union trajectories
- Rumanian trajectories
- Vietnam trajectories
- Czechoslovakia trajectories
- China/Tiongkok trajectories
References


NN, 1958. Indonesia: Djago, the Rooster. *Time Magazine*, Mar 10, 1958,


