NGOs influence in International Environmental Treaty Formation:
Indigenous Peoples (IPs) and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+):
A case study

A Research Paper presented by:

**Vineet Kumar**
(India)

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Members of the examining committee:

Dr Murat Arsel [Supervisor]
Drs Rosalba Icaza [Reader]

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Dedication:

The paper is dedicated, first and foremost to my dear mother, sister, and father who have always believed in my dreams and have supported me in my exploratory journey in the world. Also, to my friends in India and abroad who have always been there at the times of joy and sorrow.

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Inquiries:

Postal address: Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands

Location: Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands

Telephone: +31 70 426 0460

Fax: +31 70 426 0799
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<tr>
<td>AWG-LCA</td>
<td>The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action</td>
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<td>BAP</td>
<td>Bali Action Plan</td>
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<td>CBD</td>
<td>Convention on Biological Diversity</td>
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<td>CBOs</td>
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<td>CDM</td>
<td>Clean Development Mechanism</td>
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<td>CI</td>
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<td>CO2</td>
<td>Carbon Dioxide</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Conference of Parties</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<td>CTW</td>
<td>Carbon Trade Watch</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>Environmental Defense Fund</td>
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<td>(E)NGO</td>
<td>Environmental Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>EU Group</td>
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<td>FCCC</td>
<td>Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<td>FCPF</td>
<td>Forest Carbon Partnership Facility</td>
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<td>FPIC</td>
<td>Free, Prior, and Informed Consent</td>
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<td>GCS</td>
<td>Global Civil Society</td>
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<td>Global Forest Coalition</td>
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<td>IEN</td>
<td>Indigenous Environmental Network</td>
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<td>IFIPCC</td>
<td>International Forum of Indigenous People on Climate Change</td>
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<td>IIIPFCC</td>
<td>International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change</td>
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<td>IGOs</td>
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<td>INCI</td>
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<td>(I)NGOs</td>
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<td>IPE</td>
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<td>IPED</td>
<td>International Political Economy and Development</td>
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<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
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<td>KI</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interview</td>
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<td>MNCs</td>
<td>Multi-National Corporations</td>
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<td>TNCs</td>
<td>Trans-National Corporations</td>
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<td>NAPM</td>
<td>National Alliance for People’s Movements</td>
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<td>NBA</td>
<td>Narmada Bachao Andolan</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>POS</td>
<td>Political Opportunity Structures</td>
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<td>RED</td>
<td>Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries and approaches to stimulate action</td>
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<td>REDD</td>
<td>Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation</td>
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<td>REDD+</td>
<td>Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries’</td>
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<td>SBSTA</td>
<td>Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice</td>
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<td>SNV</td>
<td>Netherlands Development Organization</td>
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<td>TNC</td>
<td>The Nature Conservancy</td>
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<td>TNCs</td>
<td>Trans-National Corporations</td>
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<td>UNDRIP</td>
<td>United Nations Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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Abstract

This thesis investigates whether NGOs have exerted any influence in championing the demands of Indigenous Peoples into climate-change negotiations, and of REDD+ in particular. It finds that NGOs have achieved bounded success in raising awareness of issues related to Indigenous People and have obtained moderate discourse change in the official documents deriving from negotiations. The thesis acknowledges, however, that REDD+ negotiations do not happen in a socio-political and economic vacuum and that a number of factors may be at play in shaping the outcomes of negotiations, either independently from or in interaction with, NGO strategies.

The research sets out to understand the increasing relevance of NGOs as political actors in the international arena as a result of the opportunities created by pressures towards global governance. At the same time, it contends that NGO emergence and proactiveness cannot be fully understood within that framework, as civil society movements mobilizing to expand the scope of social rights grew long before globalization. As a result, the thesis adopts Political Process theory as a theoretical tool to account for changes in NGO actions and strategies as a result of the political and institutional context in which they find themselves. Political Process also offers the conceptual benefit of highlighting the strategic nature of NGOs behaviour, regardless of the veracity of their commitment to the cause of Indigenous Peoples.

In the research, analysis of the texts of REDD negotiations is complemented with interviews to key informants to assess the impact and the characteristics of NGOs tactics. Findings are reported against the backdrop of a series of potential other political and economic factors that largely impact on the outcomes of the REDD+ negotiation and may help comprehending why, NGO action in REDD+, despite moderate openings in political opportunity structures, has been only partially effective.
Relevance to Development Studies

This thesis contributes to a relatively underdeveloped, though growing, debate on the conceptualization and measurement of the influence of civil society actors in international fora. The thesis exposes all the ambiguities of such debate: the difficulty of identifying both behavioural and discursive indicators to measure influence in a field where a number of structural factors may influence the outcomes of negotiations in a plurality of ways. The thesis adopts both behavioural and discursive approaches to study influence and it also assess the circularity of Political Opportunity Structures and social mobilization, which in turn works to change the Political Opportunity Structures in its favour.

Given the non conclusive nature of the conclusions that can be derived from such analysis at the current stage, the current research also relies on key informants reviews to grasp the most commonly adopted tactics adopted by NGOs to impact negotiation processes. The findings, although not automatically generalizable, seem to be in line with the predictions of Political Process theory, in that they highlight that tactics that are most compatible with the framework of opportunities provided by the institutional context appear to be relatively the most successful.

Keywords

[Indigenous Peoples, REDD, REDD+ Negotiations, Global Governance, Strategies, UNFCCC]
Chapter 1
Introduction

Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is only thing that ever has.

Margaret Mead, US anthropologist (1901-78)

The sentiment embedded in this famous quote has inspired generations of Non-Governmental Organizations (hereinafter, NGOs) to champion civil society concerns in the changing global dynamics and new players on the horizon who often received scant consideration from the governments. In light of these, this thesis analyses the influence of International Non-Governmental Organizations [hereafter, (l)NGOs] on the International Environmental Agreements which historically have been relegated to the margins of policy making. With the dramatic rise in numbers and reach, NGOs have become influential actors within the domestic and international political arenas and increasingly become important participants in the international environmental institutions (Raustiala 1997). The paper analyzes how influential NGOs have been and whether they have influenced the ongoing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter, UNFCCC) Climate talks. The focus of the paper is on REDD and its + part (REDD+) that has emerged as the front runner on which any future agreement will take place or will be a major part of any agreement which arises in post 2012 scenario.

REDD is based on the concept that finance is provided to developing countries for reducing emissions from deforestation or forest degradation through the implementation of various policies and measures. Developing countries will be rewarded for keeping their forests standing rather than cutting them down. REDD+\(^1\) means reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The Indigenous Peoples (hereafter, IPs) demands are one of the main contentious issue around which different actors are debating in the UNFCCC talks. These will be the main indicators through which analysis of NGOs influence in REDD+ has been done in this paper.

The paper exclusively deals with the concepts of NGOs, IPs and representations, mushrooming of (l)NGOs as prominent non-state actors through globalization and social movement theory. The development of REDD to REDD+ and specific issues of IPs have also been examined. The paper then analyzes the influence of NGOs in pushing forward the demands of (l)NGOs from year 2005 to year 2010. Thereafter according to the findings, the paper spells out the possible reasons behind the unevenness in influence of
(I)NGOs. The paper ends with an overview of the challenges faced followed by conclusion of the paper.

1.1 Background

The alarming negative impacts of climate change have generated widespread interest in development of mechanisms that can slow down deforestation and degradation. Forests are central functionaries in maintaining atmospheric balances. The importance of avoiding deforestation has been advocated by the environmental group’s long time ago, although the main focus at that time was preservation of forest resources for forest dependents, IPs and maintenance and safeguarding of bio-diversity. With the increasing findings highlighting its importance to mitigate the emission of CO2, its strategic importance in the last decade has multiplied. Stern Review (2007) recommended that curbing deforestation is a highly cost-effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and is the “single largest opportunity for cost-effective and immediate reductions of carbon emissions”. The main idea behind this push is that the market will save the day (Corbella 2011, personal interview).

However, addressing the issue of mitigation of greenhouse gases at the international level is not an easy task; policy formulation, coordinating international agreements, designing monitoring policies, law enforcement mechanisms, fair distribution of benefits are some of the concerns (Vatn et al. 2009). An issue of climate justice and power disparities between actors and stakeholders at the international level, unequal social and economic power relations are some of the other dimensions which need to be addressed.

It is being said that reduction in CO2 emissions from deforestation could also have a significant impact on the livelihoods of indigenous and forest dependent people. However, in the proposed REDD+ mechanism, there is huge potential that IPs face unique challenges in preservation of their culture, livelihood practices and their life styles. Any new mechanism focussed on forests will be presenting an insurmountable challenge as it has been evident from their past experiences of the creation of national parks and other similar conservation practices.

Throughout history, IPs has been marginalized in terms of language, culture, politic, and economic opportunities. There is apprehension that REDD would be least concerned with the rights of the IPs and forest-dependent peoples who live in and rely on the forests (Sherpa 2009, IEN 2009, GFC 2008a). There is a serious attempt by IPs groups and INGOs to disengage with the process. Keeping these in the hindsight, it is important to study whether IPs demands have been accommodated in the REDD negotiations and how influential they are. Consequently, what has been the role of INGOs in pushing for IPs rights?
Having said so, different state and non-state actors are involved in the negotiation process. States negotiate the international legal instruments creating global environmental regimes but non-state actors like Industrial-corporate lobbies, mining companies, NGOs, think tanks, research institutions also exert major and increasing influence on regime creation. Evidences have indicated that INGOs have assisted in setting up the global environmental agenda, initiate, and mediate the process of regime formation and cooperate with developing countries on projects and programs directly affecting the environment (Newell 2000, William and Ford 1999, Ringius 1997, Lindborg 1992). A huge window of opportunities to analyze the role of NGOs especially in the REDD negotiations and analyzing their impacts in the development of international environmental policy exists here.

The landscape of INGO activity in global environmental politics and future changes needs to be continually studied. This paper is also associated with personal motivation. Drawing on my own experiences in international development, I observed that a significant number of INGOs function to change the situation demanding reforms and changes in policies, framing of new laws, crusading against human rights violations and environmental destructions. On one hand, it is argued that they have been a successful force but on the other hand argument exists that they have not been hugely influential at the international platform. Therefore, it is essential to look at the influence of NGOs in order to understand their real significance. In addition, my association with IPs movement in Narmada valley in Madhya Pradesh, India and as member of NBA Support Group in University of Delhi, New Delhi, I am further motivated to research on this subject.

1.2 Research Objective and Questions

To find out whether INGOs have influenced the REDD negotiations is the objective of this thesis. If yes, then how; if not then why? To achieve this objective, the main research question and sub-questions are:-

Main Research Questions

1. Whether NGOs have influenced the REDD+ negotiations?
2. How influential have INGOs been in pushing for IPs issues in REDD+?

Sub-questions

i. The main demands in REDD+ negotiations in relation to the IPs?
ii. What strategic tools have been used to push for the demands of IPs?
iii. Key challenges that contracted the ability of NGO’s to influence the talks
1.3 Methodology

Qualitative approach has been chosen to address research questions. Under qualitative approach, I used secondary data and applied a qualitative interviewing technique, Key Informant Interview (KII). The purpose of the KII is to collect information from a broad range of people – including professionals and community leaders. These people generally have first-hand knowledge. With their special knowledge and understanding, they provide unique insight on the nature of problems and give useful responses. Two common techniques for KII are:-
- Telephone/Skype interviews
- Face to face interviews

I mostly relied on Skype interviews and conducted some face-to-face interviews too. My Key Informants represent a diverse set of people and are active and operational in different parts of the world, having diverse set of opinions. This brings varied perspectives to the research.

Key informants from two different set of organizations have been interviewed who have major policy differences in terms of REDD+. A challenge remains that I may end up with results that are biased or one-sided as mainly key informants belong to Global Forest Coalition (hereinafter GFC) and The Nature Conservancy (hereinafter TNC). So, these interviews may end up being the challenge for the research. However, some informants themselves represent different background from local to regional and international so their affiliations will not constrain the research to reaching out to new findings.

Apart from that, Indigenous Environmental Network (hereinafter IEN), Carbon Trade Watch (hereinafter CTW), Friends of Earth International and others have been used for the purpose of this research. For the interviews, I prepared an interview tool to guide the necessary discussions though outlining a script and with an open-ended question relevant to the topic. A set of five questions with additional time for closing questions was drafted. During the interview, I took notes to document the key informant’s views.

**Organizations and Key Informants (KI):** I selected three Environmental NGOs for my case study. I mainly drew upon their resources and informants to carry forward the research. According to Bas Arts (as cited in Jamil and Maeztri, 2011), an (E)NGO is a non-profit, non violent, non-state group of people, which pursues certain public aims and directly or indirectly, seek to influence political outcomes and decisions. Gough and Shackley (2001:332) has outlined three main groups of (E)NGOs:-

i. Business Alliances
ii. Research-based organizations or think tanks
iii. Advocacy/Campaign groups
Selected organizations fall into one of these categories or are overlapping as they also have strong emphasis within. The three (I)NGOs are GFC, TNC, and Indigenous Environmental Network (hereinafter, IEN). These (I)NGOs also fulfill these following criteria created by me:-

- International presence
- World-wide coalition
- Pro-activeness on REDD+ issue
- Strong IP component in their work portfolio

Being accredited organizations within the UNFCCC, they submit information and position papers when submissions are requested from Parties \(^8\) (UNFCCC 2011).

A noteworthy challenge which I faced was of reaching out to a wider set of (I)NGOs. I also did not have the opportunity to be part of the UNFCCC negotiations. These two have constrained the research work but in-spite of this limitation, a good mix of secondary data analysis has been done with interviews.

I had a total of nine key informants. Seven of the key informants were from (I)NGOs; one is the lead negotiator from EU Group for UNFCCC and the National Organizer of National Alliance for People’s Movement \(^9\) (NAPM) from India respectively [Profiles attached as Annex I]. These informants represent different continents and countries with a diversity of opinion in relation to their understanding and dealing with the climate talks. The informants interviewed are based in South America (Brazil), North America (USA), Europe (Germany and Netherlands), Asia (India and Indonesia), and Africa (South Africa). These interviews have revealed particular insights into the different informants’ experiences, ideas, and thoughts about the influence of organizations in UNFCCC and their own impact assessment and effectiveness.

**Secondary data** include literature on the influence of NGOs in global environmental politics, non-state actors in IPE, NGOs position papers, publications, annual reports, articles, speeches, and relevant literature from their websites and academic journals. UNFCCC official website has been a repository of official texts. In analysis, the official positions of the organizations and final official (draft) texts of the UNFCCC represented by SBSTA \(^10\) and AWG-LCA \(^11\) documents have been used.

**Time Span:** The paper evaluates the climate talks from year 2005 Montreal COP to year 2010 Cancun Agreements.
Challenges faced: Reaching out to key informants was a challenge. First, finding ‘leads’ to key informants was a substantial challenge. After communicating with email, the process of reaching out to the possible KIs started via email, phone and Skype. Email communication took considerable amount of time to receive a reply and in some cases, negative response came as either the informants were occupied with preparation for the meetings, conferences, important round of climate talks or simply did not want to discuss the topic of influence. No success was achieved in reaching out to the IEN key informant.

A cursory presentation of the general difficulties faced during the interviews is in order here. First, in response to the questions on the influence of (I)NGOs and possible changes made in the text, my interviewees were very cautious to provide a clear answer. When directly asked, they hesitate to provide a definite opinion. Two interpretations can be derived from this. First, it may be possible that (I)NGOs are more active in championing their strategies than in thinking retrospectively about their outcomes.

Secondly, since the negotiations are still in the process, organizations are unsure about the ultimate outcomes of their strategies and therefore refrain from making any claim. Both these mechanisms are likely to affect my analysis.

1.4 Organization of the paper

The paper is organized into six chapters:

With this first chapter serving as an overview of the research paper, chapter two explains the mushrooming of (I)NGOs using the theoretical framework from global civil society and governance. It also critically engages with the concepts of NGOs and IPs.

Chapter three chronicles the evolution of REDD+ and lays down the core demands/contentious issues of IPs.

Chapter four shows how in last five years, the issues of IPs have or have not been incorporated and what has been the role of (I)NGOs in it. This will be done through analysis of various stages of the negotiations.

Chapter five discusses (I)NGOs influence as testified by previous analysis and analyses the specific strategies (I)NGOs use to influence the negotiations.

The concluding chapter six provides an overview of the challenges faced by the (I)NGOs and the final remarks of the paper.
Chapter 2
Conceptual Framework

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework and concepts used in the analysis. It also defines the actors pressing specific demands in the process. Then global governance and deterritorialization as well as Social Movement Theory will be referred to in order to account for the recent mushrooming of (I)NGOs. The final section gives an overview of the issue of (I)NGOs effectiveness/influence.

2.1 An introduction to NGOs: diversity, interests and strategies.

Defining and accounting for NGOs emergence requires first of all a definition of the social arena in which NGOs reside, that is to say, civil society. Democratic theory has singled out civil society as the cushion of organizational life that divides the state on one hand from individuals on the other. Some scholars have also posited that civil society plays a crucial role in maintaining democracy, as it enhances social trust and positively affects institutional quality (Putnam 1993). The role recently played by CSOs in precipitating political change, often towards democratization (for instance, in the former Soviet area), has opened opportunities for the emergence of scholarly approaches understanding civil society as a contentious arena for the advancement of new political goals, in other words as “political space where voluntary associations seek deliberately to shape policies, norms, and deeper social structures” (Scholte and Schinabel 2002).

Civil society is comprised of a number of different actors, ranging from professional groups, to ethnic-based circles, religious organizations, unions, think tanks and philanthropic foundations (Wilkinson 2005, Scholte and Schinabel 2002). NGOs represent one, though crucial, element of that arena. What NGOs share with all other civil society actors is the fact that they all derive from organized collective action, geared at influencing particular agendas.

The growth of (I)NGO action in the past decades is hard to overstate. Their increasing numerosity as well as their broadened capacity to advance goals in the public sphere has turned them into an important, potentially powerful, source of policy ideas. The legitimacy usually granted to organizations independently created for the pursuit of some social good has pushed political institutions to deal with (I)NGOs in the process of devising their policies.

However, (I)NGOs form a rather heterogeneous crowd; the positive connotation generally applied to them begs at least some qualification. In
particular, relevant questions to be answered are: who constitutes (I)NGOs, where did they originate, and most importantly, are they just self-appointed advocates of the will of people or do they actually give voice to the demands of otherwise politically under-represented peoples? Furthermore, what decision-making processes do NGOs adopt? Does their participation in civil society make them automatically democratic?

Providing an answer to these questions requires identifying all possible dimensions across which (I)NGOs differ across one another.

Firstly, (I)NGOs differ in terms of their organizational structure: they may go from very limited to extended membership; they may survive on a variety of sources of funding or solely depend on members’ contributions; they may well-established or recent; they may be more or less hierarchal, and they may be part of different coalitions. Furthermore, (I)NGOs differ in the patterns of cooperation or competition that they entertain with other social movements, for instance, with environmental movements or anti-discrimination and anti-oppression groups.

(I)NGOs also differ in terms of their class composition; the fact that they may be purporting objectives of equality or justice does not imply that their membership is not skewed towards the wealthier, more educated and urbanized social sectors, while providing limited space (if any) to other marginalized social strata, including IPs.

Also, NGOs entertain different forms of collaboration and accommodation in their relations with national governments. In some countries, they face political repression; in others, they are susceptible to co-option, particularly when market forces provide opportunities for these trajectories to take place. In recent times, we have seen that more and more industry sponsored/supported NGOs/forums have emerged. The Amazon Sustainable Forum (Forum da Amazônia Sustentável) is one such example which includes mining companies like Vale or the Aluminum Company Alcoa and civil society organizations (Fatheuer 2010). In other cases, they have expanded the funding base with issuing certain guidelines for NGOs creating a certain kind of discourse around the issues and peoples.

The dimensions of heterogeneity that we have highlighted so far are not significant per se, yet they make evident the variety of interests and strategies that (I)NGOs pursue in their double effort to both preserve themselves as institutionalized organizations and players in the field of social justice.

Interests and strategies are undoubtedly, at least partially, informed by the different ideologies that (I)NGOs uphold. (I)NGOs with more radical objectives may for instance, when establishing alliances, prioritize results-oriented activism over financial security; others may prefer collaborating with
market forces with the aim of bringing their target constituents from exclusion closer to the area of inclusion or to enhance their own possibility of survival.

Different funding strategies may also determine and constrain the goals purported by different (I)NGOs. While (I)NGOs based in the advanced capitalist democracies have managed to benefit from large individual membership and state support, those of the global south depend on support from their national state, or most importantly, from governments in the North, from (I)NGOs, foundations and funding agencies that have their own specific goals to pursue, which inevitably constrain the scope of actions of south-based NGOs. States have actively sought to support (I)NGOs for different purposes: “to mobilize political constituencies, to confer legitimacy to policy-processes, to implement policies, and to monitor and evaluate them” (Woods 2002, Risse 2002).

The acknowledgement that (I)NGOs have specific objectives to pursue, which may relatively differ from those of the peoples to which they are meant to give voice, is particularly relevant when addressing the role played by (I)NGOs in the REDD negotiations. I have highlighted above that (I)NGOs are primarily comprised of the better-off social strata, while they tend to provide limited space to those sectors that are most likely to be directly impacted by the negotiations. This precipitates at least two questions. Firstly, whose interest are NGOs going to uphold during the negotiation process? Are they going to privilege those of their members over those of their constituents? Furthermore, will the urbanized world view of (I)NGOs members predominate in the conduct of negotiations?

2.2. Indigenous Peoples and Representativeness

Ferreira and Filho (2011:20) describe IPs as ‘native’ and ‘original’ communities who inhabited lands across the earth prior to their absorption into modern states centric system. Having being the losers in the processes of modern state formation, they are relatively remote from mainstream society. Their absence in decision-making fora makes them susceptible to substantial human rights violations, economic marginalization, cultural repression, ecological displacement and political subordination. The same condition of marginality characterizes to a large extent, I argue, also informal workers, rural and slum dwellers and sexual minorities.

In my treatment of the issue of (I)NGOs influence in REDD negotiations, what is particularly crucial to understand is the way in which the interests of IPs have become incorporated in the strategies of collective actors, such as (I)NGOs, that unlike them, benefit from greater representation in decision-making fora.
Historically, North dominated (I)NGOs have taken the lead in giving voice to IP’s specific demands. They were, however, met with resistance, as a result of widespread fear of their vested interests, and their exclusively North dominated membership, which severely jeopardized the legitimacy attributed to their action. The later rise of South-based NGOs did not provide a solution to the problem either, as a result of their typical over-representation of urban middle class, bourgeois members, largely identified (and rightly so) as having a stake in the current system and therefore, regardless of their good intentions, as not the “true” representatives of IPs. Recently, in a workshop organized by Building Global Democracy (2011), it was again reiterated that a history of NGOs ‘acting upon’ and ‘speaking for’ marginalized people without having a proper mandate to represent them exists (Kumar 2011, personal interview).

Marginality of IPs has a triple nature: Collective, Structural, and Cumulative. It is collective in the sense that, regardless of some differences within IPs, they as a whole are systematically worse-off than mainstream society and also their position is socially stigmatized. It is structural in the sense that it depends on institutional and historical factors that are hard to reverse. Also, it is reproduced by a variety of old and new actors, from states to multinational corporations, to global governance institutions, to global information technology industries. Finally, it is cumulative because the forces of globalization have increased their vulnerability directly and indirectly, with multinational corporations forging alliances with national states to the detriment of IPs.

Furthermore, marginality is increased by political agency that disregards the interests of IPs. Political agency depends on the visions of the future that politicians uphold but is also restrained in scope by the frames of “minority relations” adopted by predecessors. In the African continent, for instance, countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Tanzania systematically differ, in terms of the views of minority relations they entertain, and they do so largely as a result of their different trajectories to independence and of the actors that won the independence struggle, more to the point, of the particular visions of social relations they adopted. The prospects for the success of IPs demands, as well as of (I)NGO action in these countries, are also likely to be different. ‘Different people because of different level of education are differently-abled and this reflects into the political, social, economic, and industrial sphere (Karumbidza 2011, personal interview).”

It must be noted, however, that despite shared marginality, IPs are worse off in the South than in the North in absolute terms. Higher literacy rates, urbanization and higher mobility place the First Nations of Canada and the US in a more advantageous position than their counterparts in the South. Resort to their diasporas in the developed world may even produce unintended, negative consequences for them, as the concentration of resources
among those abroad may lead to favouring their interests over those that directly suffer the consequences of marginalization. This gap of representation is often filled by intermediary organizations like TNCs, GFC, which, however, bring into the picture further diversification of interests in international environmental negotiations.

Arguably, IPs faces major challenge in global political economy. Diversification of actors and interests might have produced an over-representation of IPs that, while not redressing their lack of representation, has created opportunities for the furtherance others than those of IPs. At the same time, however, it is possible that such over-representation has precipitated some progress ‘to forge a unified political mobilization around the general category of indigenous’. It can be a possibility that (I)NGOs and other big international associations themselves acting as the opportunity structures where IPs are using them to advance their claims and enlarge their stake at the international platform.

Though anecdotal, the evidence from Brazil, where IPs struggles have escalated directly from regional to global fora, seems to point in this direction (Ferreira and Filho 2011:21). Though at the moment, it is impossible to predict the direction that such process will take, there is some moderate hope that it may offer new opportunities for IPs demands and intermediary kind of organizations [NGOs] playing an important role for creating the opportunity structures for the IPs.

From a normative perspective, it seems plausible to suggest that building empowerment of IPs, from the local to the global level, may be useful. Secondly, the possibility of divergence between IPs actual interests and those filtered in (I)NGOs strategies should be taken into account, and should inform more direct participation of IPs in setting the agendas of negotiations. Thirdly, limitations in funding and access should not limit IPs mobilization; regardless of its degree of organization, presence of IPs in public realm may help in advancing a new discourse of environmental protection that includes views of IPs themselves. Fourthly, development of a sense of cosmopolitan identity is a common good that should become dominant objective of actors in the public arena. The IPs here, have a specific role to play:

“As Indigenous Peoples move across local, national and global arenas, they draw on traditional principles and practices of relationality and reciprocity in order to avoid the exclusionary practices by which modern states have disempowered them. In the process, Indigenous Peoples are carving out “new transversal spaces, expanding the reach of their diplomacies and creating new discourses of representation which reposition them as autonomous global actors” (Stewart-Harawira 2011)."
Now in the next section, I will deal with the globalization and governance and mushrooming of (I)NGOs.

2.3 Globalization and Governance

I have argued earlier on that the rise of (I)NGOs and the increased importance of the role they play in political decision making are hard to overstate. What is, however, necessary to highlight for my discussion of influence in international negotiations, is that such rise has not only taken place at the national level; rather, it has been particularly strong in the emerging geopolitical order. This process has been recognized by several scholars: Keohane (2009), Kingsbury and Krisch (eds) (2006), Bandy and Smith (2005), Ruggie (2004), Slaughter (2004), and Scholte (2001) have especially focused at the rise of Global Civil Society and the mushrooming of (I)NGO’s influence in Global Governance.

While traditional realist literature has acknowledged that the nation states can no longer be regarded as the only locus of political authority, given the move “in the direction of transnational policy-networks and functionally specific “sphere of authorities” (Rosenau 1999, 2003), it has however not foreseen any specific role for (I)NGOs, which can at best represent supporting players (Vogler and Imber 1996:44).

The new liberal institutionalism of Keohane, Held and McGrew, and Scholte has taken the issue with such position, contested the state-centric approach of the realist school and underlined the importance of international institutions, international organizations, and (I)NGOs when accounting for changes in global governance. Scholte (2001) has singled out in globalization the driving force that is eroding the authority of sovereign states and, as a result, it is transferring unprecedented powers to different transnational actors. This shift happens according to a variety of mechanisms: the transformation of global economic activity has altered prevalent notions of territoriality, of democratic decision-making, as well as people’s self-understanding of their shared destiny. In turn, these changes challenge the underpinnings of the legitimacy of the national state. The rise of global media, international communication as well as the opportunities for the development of supraterritorial networks has increased the salience of transnational issues, ecological problems being a case in point.

Some scholars have even ventured to argue that, in the current era, sovereign states are less important political actors than international state and non-state organizations (Held and McGrew 2002). While such claim is controversial, the operational and discursive opportunities opened up by the rise of a trans-national level of governances are impossible to deny. These opportunities have benefitted in particular – what interests us for the purpose of this paper- (I)NGOs.
Though apparently contradictory, globalization and the rise of transnational governance have precipitated a tendency towards decentralization of policy-making, which has in turn contributed to the multiplication of layers of governance, where different actors increasingly compete to create their own niche of potential influence. For example, economic decentralization through privatization and market liberalization quickly created the demand for greater political participation, a consequence that was not fully anticipated either by the state or by the corporation’s (Rondonelli 1990).

Scholars have argued that the roll back of the national state has allowed for what has been defined the “Privatization of governance”, that is to say a handover of governance from the public sector to non-official quarters, which provided strength to non-state actors (Scholte and Schinabel 2002). Again, (I)NGOs have benefitted along with other actors that are rather different in nature and purpose, such as transnational corporations.

Particularly (I)NGOs, such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, as well as transnational women’s and environmental movements illustrate the increasing importance of transnational political solidarities and mobilization of democratic forces (McGrew 1997). Furthermore, (I)NGOs have increasingly found themselves in the paradoxical position of redressing the social wrongs brought about by the processes of globalization and roll back of the public sector that has also allowed them to grow. The implementation of development cooperation as well as the furtherance of multilateral environmental agreements has also fallen on the shoulders of NGOs, whose current role in the “formulation and implementation of global public policy” is hard to overstate (Held and McGrew 2002).

To sum up, (I)NGOs have thrived on the one hand, the augmenting inadequacy of national state to provide adequate policy responses to the structural changes brought about by globalization and the ensuing tendency towards global governance, and on other, on the emerging needs of representation generated by the strains put on the legitimacy of the national democratic state. NGOs significant growth and strength has also been enhanced by the subjective role which has been played out by governments. Awareness about their limited capabilities further precipitated by a growing disenchantment with their performances has fed in need of popular participation in the governance (Wilkinson 2005). However, the question hovers whether the growth of (I)NGOs is paralleled by an equal growth in the attention put on the needs and demands of the people that of those NGOs represent the very constituency. So far, this question has generated no consensual answer, and this thesis represents an attempt to contribute and advance such debate.
2.4 The growth of NGOs: a result of globalization or an instance of social movement emergence?

In the previous section, I highlighted that the need for democratic participation has been one of the factors that increased the legitimacy of (I)NGOs. However, and rather ironically, it has been observed that the privatization of governance allowing (I)NGOs to thrive is hardly democratic in nature. Not only does (I)NGO influence on policy-making lack democratic legitimacy, for it does not provide for popular participation, transparency and accountability. Also, its capacity to master social change is hindered by what some have referred to as its ultimate class-based nature: in other words, the new world of global governance and private actors is not so different from the old world of the struggle between labour and capital (Vogler and Imber 1996).

Can the debate on the effects of global governance on the growth of the (I)NGOs and the divisive nature of the issue whether such growth is “good” or “bad” for people? In the remainder of the chapter, I will suggest that the growth of (I)NGOs need not be explained as a result of the forces unleashed by globalization: it can also be accounted for through reference to Social Movement theory.

Social Movement theory can be defined as an inter-disciplinary approach in social sciences that aims to account for collective mobilization in organized groups. In this paper, in particular, we focus on the branch of social movement theory that is defined as “political process”: epitomized by MacAdam’s seminal work Black insurgency in the US, political process interprets collective action as a result of opening Political Opportunity Structures, that is to say, of possibilities of access to leverage collective demands. For instance, decreasing state repression, and/or access to elite allies all create opportunities for contentious collective action to emerge. Social Movement theory provides an additional benefit: it acknowledges the strategic nature of collective actors without resorting to evaluations of their actions and allows predicting how such strategy may vary as a result of changing political context.

Social Movement theory appears the most appropriate to the current analysis of (I)NGOs influence on international negotiations as well as of the incorporation of IPs demands into (I)NGOs strategies: it allows to predict not only that the strategy of (I)NGOs will vary according to what avenues of influence certain political opportunity structures will make more likely to success, but also that the incorporation of IPs demands is likely to happen to the extent in which it allows (I)NGOs strategies to succeed, for success means for them not only advancing social goals but also, inevitably, surviving.
2.5 Using Social Movement Theory to explain (I)NGOs growth

(I)NGOs action in the field of advancing IPs demands and other marginalized issues dates back to an era when the forces of globalization were not as preponderant as they appear to be now. In the 1960’s and 1970’s, both local and North-based (I)NGOs became engaged in expanding and protecting the sphere of social rights. Advocating social rights, at the outset of (I)NGO expansion, can hardly be explained as a strategy for the maximization of influence, and rather appears to be closer to a genuine attempt to give voice to the voiceless.

At an early stage of their development, arguably (I)NGOs did not need to actively seek to maximize their influence, for their capacity to articulate needs that national states did not envisage, let alone provide for, made their objectives directly realizable through their own actions. That is to say, at their emergence, (I)NGOs both gave voice to needs that had not been envisaged as such before and presented themselves as the legitimate actors fulfilling those needs.

Currently, however, the discourse of social rights has become largely accepted and the field of (I)NGO action has become saturated by a variety of different and differently motivated actors. It is, thus, rather dubious that the goals (I)NGOs seek to achieve today are still the same. This statement becomes clearer if one considers that the increased popularity of (I)NGOs have created incentives for state-actors to allow them concessions in international negotiations. This is susceptible to happen, however, as an a priori, and regardless of the advocacy group actually conducted by (I)NGOs. Two questions then arise: first, whether one can talk of influence of (I)NGOs at all, and secondly, whether influence can actually be envisaged as the objective they set for themselves.

In the present political economy, (I)NGOs have transformed from being independent to dependent on external sources of funding and thus susceptible to endorsing objectives that are not those of the people. They have gone from engaging in one major struggle to conducting “thousands of tiny struggles”: We are seeing an increase in what can be termed as ‘multiple mutinies’ across the world. However, such multiplicity of struggles need not be interpreted as the result of a flat playing field, where a plurality of players seek their own niche of influence, but can also be accounted for as the result of a change of the social movement institutions that they belong to, where multiplication is the most adequate strategy to advance interests against the backdrop of changed institutional circumstances. Before moving to an analysis of (I)NGOs attempts to influence REDD+ negotiations, I will provide a focussed review of the concept and measurement of influence.
2.6 Measuring (I)NGOs Influence:

Recently, the previously limited body of literature dealing with a conceptual definition of (I)NGOs effectiveness and influence has started to grow and exposed all the ambiguities of this endeavour. Michael Zurn’s contribution is a case in point (as cited in Betsill and Cornell 2001). While noting a scholarly consensus on the possibility for knowledge producing communities and (I)NGOs to shape agendas and play a role in the negotiation processes, he also concedes that their influence may ultimately be limited. The question at stake is: how to define influence in ways that are not technical and ad-hoc, as it has been predominant in the literature so far? Without such a definition, it is impossible both to affirm any definitive conclusion and to compare the degree of influence of different NGOs (Betsill and Corell 2001).

The contribution by Bjorkbom (1999) seems to provide a way forward. In a special issue of International Negotiation that focused on the role of NGOs, he focussed on Negotiations over Trans-boundary Air Pollution and proxied NGOs influence in these negotiations by measuring their ‘access to negotiations’. Furthermore, in his research on trans-boundary movement of hazardous wastes, Kempel (1999) identified another indication of influence, that is to say whether NGOs representatives ‘enabled state negotiators’ on policy matters by providing them with relevant information and policy advice. Short (1999), in his research on the Ottawa process to ban landmines, moved from behavioural to discursive indicators, and looked at the inclusion of NGO text in the convention to ban the use of land mines as an evidence of influence. The suggestion that looking at the inclusion of specific text in the agreement propounded by Betsil and Corell (2001) may yield an effective measure of influence resonates with the former. Along these lines are the contributions of Princen (1994:41-42) and Pollard and Court (2005), who identify NGOs influence in the ability to play a role that no other actors in the international arena wills to take up, that is to say the one of speaking for those who are not represented and introducing new ideas and concepts.

Ideally, the most definitive way to assess (I)NGO influence would be to determine its necessity and sufficiency in the outcomes one observes at the level of negotiations. Considering the constraints the subject matter social sciences provide, Weberian counterfactual reasoning represents the only way to address the problem of causal inference. Both Betsil and Corell (2001) and Zurn (1998:640) endorse this position and suggest that the “logical chain of evidence linking NGO participation in international environmental negotiations with the effects of that participation” be reconstructed (Betsil and Corell 2001:77). This is, however, very difficult to do. At the current stage of scientific knowledge in the field, it is difficult to produce counterfactual analysis that takes into account all possible factors that may mediate the
relationship between (I)NGO influence and outcomes. The causal effects of influence are, therefore, practically difficult to ascertain.

In sum, the merits of these attempts notwithstanding, it is impossible to ascertain if the influence that the authors identify in their pieces is the actual outcome of (I)NGOs action or if it is also due to other, uncontrolled factors, which may have played in favour of the objectives of these organizations. The debate, in other words, is not solved.

The personal interviews conducted within this research appear to contribute to the discussion. Speaking about his experience of TNC, Jorge for instance (2011, personal interview)\textsuperscript{14} highlighted that, even for well-stock organizations with relatively easy access to negotiations, actual influence is difficult to pin down and measure. Even if we accept the above mentioned ways of looking at effectiveness, it remain debatable as these scholars may have looked for signs that (I)NGOs have made the difference but in the process those evidences may have been ignored where (I)NGOs had not had effect.

The analysis in the following chapters exposes all the difficulties we have highlighted so far. While we identify a relation between (I)NGO action and discursive changes in the negotiation texts, and we acknowledge that recognition of IPs demands in the official documents follows (I)NGO mobilization, we also recognize that negotiations do not happen in a vacuum. The relationship we encounter may, therefore, be subject to the influence of other factors, some of which we venture to suggest in Chapter 5. At this stage, it is likely that only qualitative assessments of (I)NGO influence are possible. Betsil and Corel (2008:32) go in this direction when suggesting that “high, moderate or low levels of influence can be assessed by combining different types of evidence of influence.”

I have practically attempted to measure effectiveness by focussing on the duration of the negotiations and trying to identify signs of a transformation of discourse. Political Opportunity Structure theory has helped me focus on the relations between changes in institutional contexts and changes in strategy and the reverse (see chapter 4). In Chapter 5, I have specifically dealt with tactics of (I)NGO influence and provided some examples based on interviews with key informants. While I acknowledge that my results are not conclusive, the analysis provides an attempt to conjure up the methodological tools to measuring influence with the theoretical statements provided by social movement theory, which ultimately suggests what we define (I)NGO’s bounded success.

In the following chapters, I will attempt to:

1) establish the strategies entertained by (I)NGOs as a result of changing political context, and identify critical points in which (I)NGOs themselves have contributed to facilitate such change and
2) What strategies (I)NGOs specifically have adopted in the process of negotiating for REDD.
Chapter 3
REDD+ and IPs

The aim of this chapter is to map-out the historical development of REDD+. This is followed by a section on problematizing REDD+, where the conflicting interests/demands of IPs have been discussed. These demands are the indicators for assessment of (I)NGOs influence in the negotiations.

3.1 Background on REDD+

Forest destruction and degradation is estimated to add approx 17% of global CO2 emissions into the atmosphere, resulting in an accelerated global warming (Vatn et al., 2009; IPCC, 2007; Gullison et al., 2007; Achard et al., 2004). The mechanism proposed to mitigate these emissions is REDD+. The recently agreed REDD+ in Copenhagen is now part of a considerable international move to ‘include emissions from habitat change in a more comprehensive agreement under the UNFCCC’, which hopefully will become operational in 2012 (Burgess et al. 2010).

The idea of REDD was formalized at the UNFCCC COP13 in 2007 (UNFCCC 2007), its seeds were sown in Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1997:2). After being added and removed from the agenda of negotiations in further rounds, the it was introduced in Montreal COP11, when Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica with Coalition of Rainforest Nations submitted the agenda item: ‘Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries and approaches to stimulate action’ (RED) (Parker and Mitchell 2009:12). After a two year exploration and submission of proposals and recommendation to SBSTA, it took serious shape by 24th SBSTA session at Bonn (UNFCCC 2006:11).

At UNFCCC COP13 in Bali Action Plan, parties adopted REDD as part of national/international action on mitigation of climate change (UNFCCC 2008a). At the same time, the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries was recognized (ibid. 2008a). This was embraced in SBSTA 29th session at Poznan where its report referred to ‘reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries’ later referred to as REDD+ in the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009). This finally became part of the Cancun Agreements at COP16.

The important landmarks in this journey have been highlighted through the following Timeline:
3.2. Problematizing REDD+

REDD+ requires land and forests for the purposes of reducing emissions which are home to 60 million IPs and 1.6 billion forest dependent peoples for their livelihoods (FAO 2011). The lands and forests are the basis on which the IPs and rural communities function without being wholly market dependent. REDD+ has implications on rights, livelihoods and biodiversity of nearly all forest dependent communities including IPs. The REDD+ negotiations focus at the forestry and mentioned IPs and forest dependent peoples as one of the contributors to the GHGs emissions (IEN 2008). IPs considers themselves to be the guarantor of the nature and a custodian of the Mother Earth. A report by GFC (2010:19) stated, “Forests are not considered in a reductive, mechanical way by Indigenous Peoples. Rather they are an integral part of peoples’ and communities’ existence and identity, intrinsic to life itself, both spiritually and practically: the forests are central to many Indigenous Peoples’ traditions and culture, and the source of food, medicines and building materials [...] home to their gods, and of great spiritual importance.”

Their contribution to global warming is by no means same as in comparison to the Annex-I countries and the major energy and industrial corporations. These issues along with past experiences of CDM and creation
of national parks which excluded them from their lands had a strong effect on their mobilization strategies to oppose REDD+.

Another key problem for IPs with REDD+ is its inclination towards market orientation and further marginalization and their rights not being respected in the process. Any agreement without the full informed consent of IPs will provide opportunities for corporations and governments to take strong control of the forests creating further marginalization for the IPs. REDD will allow the companies to buy carbon credits so as to be allowed to keep on releasing emissions in the atmosphere and carbon credits generated will provide them with those incentives (IEN 2009). But ultimately not much reduction of the pollution will happen and the companies that are polluting in Annexure-I countries and emerging market economies will get the benefits. On the other hand, the people in rural and forested communities who face poverty and marginalized situations but have access to land; these companies will come and ask to use the land in return of money and jobs (Karumbidza 2011, personal interview).

At the end, REDD+ will create winners and losers; the former being the companies and governments and the latter being the IPs and forest dependent peoples.

Inherent in these discussions are divide among the IPs and NGOs. Huge expectations have been triggered with the possibility of billions of dollars moving into forest preservation. NGOs like Organizations of the Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon River Basin (COIAB), the rubber tappers (CNS) the Amazon Working Group (GTA) have mobilized in support of REDD [+] (Fatheuer 2010). At the same time, the objections to it have built up. For example NGOs (FASE, Amigos da Terra Brazil), East Amazon Forum (FOAR) and farmer organizations (Via Campesina) with other NGOs in 2009 issued letter known as Carta de Belem rejecting the notion of turning forests into a commercial good and commodity (ibid. 2010). Therefore we see that different players are indulged with separate ideology and representing different interests and issues.

3.3 IPs demands (the contentious issues):

Acknowledging the fact that no common position exits among IPs in relation to their engagement with or not with REDD+, most NGOs and IPs organizations are ‘united in their stand that their rights as contained in UNDRIP should be respected and protected in all activities related to forests and climate change, including REDD+’ (Tabtebba Foundation 2009:56, Hiraldo and Tanner 2011). A review of majority of NGOs and INGOs, IPOs has brought forward the following demands that can also be identified with the UNDRIP articles 18, 19, 28, 29, 30, and 32 as particularly relevant to IPs:-

a. Respect for the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) of IPs and local

b. ‘Respect and inclusion of explicit recognition and commitments on the rights of Indigenous Peoples and the implementation of UNDRIP in all intergovernmental REDD+ agreements’ and ‘full coherence between different international agreements including the CBD’ (GFC 2009, Accra Caucus 2008)

c. All initiatives on REDD [+] must guarantee the acknowledgement and protection of IPs’ rights, including protecting their rights to land, customary domains, ecosystems and providing maximum opportunities for indigenous communities (GFC 2009, Accra Caucus 2008)

d. Recognition and protection of IPs traditional knowledge in all mitigation and adaptation measures

e. Exclusion or inclusion of market based mechanism: Major differences exist among NGOs on this point. Networks like Accra Caucus, IEN, and GFC do not support the market based financing system (Accra Caucus 2008). But other TNC and CI are in for a pro-market approach with recognition of rights of IPs associated into the agreement.
Chapter 4: Analysis (Stages of Negotiations & NGOs actions)

This chapter traces down the different stages of negotiations and analyzes the changes that have happened or have not happened in the REDD+ negotiations. By doing this it will show that whether in a gradual progression IPs demands have made an advancement into the official texts or not. Also to find out whether there is any change in discourse and prioritization of IPs issues at the negotiations. This will be done in two separate sections. The first one will take the reader through important stages of the climate change negotiations from 2005 till 2010 Cancun Agreements (List of COP from 2005 to 2010 attached as Annex II). In the analysis, I have primarily focussed upon the 'absence/presence of IPs demands in the official documents’, proxied by (l)NGOs positions. This analysis will help the reader to understand whether from being underrepresented in the negotiations, their positions have gained representation in REDD+ or not. If the increasing strength and presence is identified at different stages, then this can be interpreted as a possible indication of (l)NGO action on the REDD negotiations.

In addition, the findings will show that how over a period of time, a change in discourse has happened and I have tried to show that, as social movement theory suggests, the mobilization of resources, lobbying and advocacy that have helped (l)NGOs. In line with political process theory, (l)NGOs have benefitted from openings during the negotiation process to push for the IPs demands. While my conclusions are not definite, my overall attempt is to establish if REDD+ has become more responsive and sympathetic to IPs demands or not and if so, how.

4.1 Bali Action Plan

REDD negotiations saw in year 2007 a critical juncture. In that year, the Bali Action Plan was launched, providing the legal mandate for United Nations negotiations and establishing the scope and agenda of discussions. It also marked a success for IPs representation in UN-led negotiations, with the adoption of UNDRIP by General Assembly in United Nations, which made explicit guidelines to finally signalling the arrival of decades of struggles at a global stage. The year 2007 also was historic as it saw unprecedented number of high-level diplomatic meetings dealing with climate change issues, as exemplified by the G8 Summit or the special sessions of UNSC and UNGA (Santarius et al. 2009). In the following section, I will show how the paramount moves of year 2007 were preceded by intensive action of (l)NGOs, which arguably played an agenda-setting role.
From 2005 to 2007, (I)NGOs were active in the background analysis and creation of their position in relation to REDD. The lead was taken up by organizations active in the field of International Forestry Policy like Third World Network, Friends of Earth International, and GFC. The GFC Annual report of 2007 shows how in the previous years, the organization was active in the publication of reports and analysis of IPs situation: the historic marginalization of IPs and other social groups in the market economy was raised and strong emphasis was put on ‘recognizing and safeguarding Indigenous Peoples territorial rights’ and inclusion into the texts and agreement from the nation states (GFC 2007b). Friends of Earth International (2006) also raised the critical land issues – displacement of IPs, protection of homes and livelihoods, traditional knowledge.

Later, during the Bali negotiation itself, (I)NGOs championed the cause of REDD, which was the subject of ‘at least a third of the side events over the two weeks’ period (SNV 2007). The idea that marginalization of IPs and the carbon trade being detrimental to them ‘as it tends to negatively impact land reform and processes to recognize IPs land rights’ gained, arguably as a result, more attention (GFC 2007b). GFC’s (2007a:4) ground research was instrumental to achieving such purpose, particularly through the evidence gained on the fact that recognizing and safeguarding IPs territorial rights over their own forest areas had proven to be a highly effective policy for reducing deforestation in countries like Colombia and Panama.

Increased attention to IPs demands in 2007 is also illustrated by the presence of IEN, an Indigenous Peoples Organizations with good resource base, in the climate change negotiations. IEN itself had been involved into lobbying for the full participation of IPs and implementation of UNDRIP.

While the increasing importance of IPs issues at Bali can hardly be overstated, it must also be noted that direct participation of IPs was not permitted. SBSTA, for instance, invited the IPs groups to present their views, which however they were not allowed to present in the plenary session. Members of IIPFCC were barred from opening of the UNFCCC COP13 (Natari 2007). Here it is important to notice that a pattern emerged in which their social exclusion became evident at the international stage. Against this backdrop, only two strategies could be deployed: discourse change and production of new knowledge, which we also see in the empirical world after the launch of the action plan.

The first clause referring to the indigenous communities was incorporated into the Bali Action Plan, Decision 2/CP.13:
Recognizing also that the needs of local and indigenous communities should be addressed when action is taken to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. 

Although finally IPs was recognized, the ambiguity of the text received severe criticism from different quarters of civil society. The BAP incorporated words like ‘recognition’ and phrases such as ‘needs should be addressed’ of ‘indigenous communities’; however, the paragraph deliberately referred to the ‘needs’ of local communities, not their ‘rights’. This was indicative of the fact that the IPs was not being considered an equal stakeholder into the process and decisions were to be made without their being consulted or informed.

Moreover negotiations discussed about the inclusion of indigenous and local communities as stakeholders but the extent of their rights in terms of participation, land tenure, distribution of funds etc. remained unresolved in the BAP (Holloway and Giandomenico 2009). Two years after the introduction of REDD, an absence of IPs issues shows that (I)NGOs and IPs groups had a tough fight ahead for the incorporation of their demands. At this stage NGOs among themselves were also developing their skills and gathering information to counter and set up the debate. However, efforts of coalitions like GFC managed to positively frame the agenda towards their inclusion into the debate paving the way for further inclusion. Important points on ‘national or regional pilot activities’ and measurable, monitored, and verified emissions reductions from avoided deforestation were introduced by TNC in their submission to SBSTA strengthen the ability of state negotiators and UNFCCC (2006).

It can be argued that Bali Action Plan represents per se an opening of opportunities for (I)NGOs to step into the arena of environmental protection. It is also interesting to see that the (I)NGOs that took the lead were the bigger ones, which probably counted both on more resources as well as networks and experience and were therefore better placed than others to take advantage of the opportunities opened by the Bali Process. According to Political Opportunity Structure theory, I expect it to precipitate mobilization of NGOs in that arena. What we see, in terms of (I)NGO activation, is compatible with this theoretical prediction.

4.2 Poznan

At the half way mark of between Bali and Copenhagen, Poznan represented a pit stop, but still an important step in championing the agenda of climate change policies against the odds of the incumbent financial crisis.

GFC produced three papers on the impact of market-based and non-market based approaches to REDD and published a briefing paper on Rights, Equity, Development and Deforestation and the Governance of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities together with IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy (GFC 2008b). This was presented
and widely disseminated at the 14th COP. Simultaneously; GFC also targeted genetically engineered trees and agrofuels in which their impacts on forests and well as on IPs and forest dependent peoples were highlighted (GFC 2008b).

GFC also remained active in Side Events, in cooperation with IFIFCC. Press releases such as: “UN Poznan Fortune Telling,” “Plantations are Not Forests,” “Agrofuels threaten Indigenous Peoples in Paraguay,” and “Forest Groups Caution Poznan Outcomes will Cause Havoc to Forests and Indigenous Peoples” gave voice to IPs concerns during the negotiations.

The integration of language on the need to respect and protect indigenous peoples’ rights in REDD+ was further pushed forward by NGOs, IPs groups, and friendly states’ (Tebebaa Foundation 2009). TNC (2008), a pro market NGO also proposed that “REDD mechanism should apply effective safeguards to protect the rights of IPs and local communities including the relevant provisions of the UNDRIP”. These efforts further strengthened the claims of IPs issues and opened the door for wider avenues. However, IPs rights continued not to be integrated in the texts at this stage.

It needs to be noted that those countries that at Poznan discussed the participation of IPs at length, i.e. Bolivia, Denmark, the EU, Norway, Mexico, Switzerland, were countries where domestic NGOs and allies had strongly pushed for attention to be devoted to the UNDRIP.

Conversely, Annex-I countries, the USA, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia still blocked the inclusion of reference to “IPs” and explicit mention of rights in SBSTA. These same states used the phrase “indigenous people” instead of “indigenous peoples” with an “s” which is the internationally accepted language. The “s” in ‘peoples’ mean that IPs has collective rights and has the right to self-determination (UNDRIP 2007, Tauli-Corpuz 2008).

In the draft conclusions of Agenda Item 5\textsuperscript{16} of the 29\textsuperscript{th} Session of SBSTA, in Para 45, any reference to UNDRIP and the rights of IPs were removed and only referred to Indigenous People without the 's'. This provoked harsh protests (Goldtooth 2008). It was contrary to the international human rights instrument on IPs rights, the UNDRIP adopted by 144-UN member states, which uses 'Indigenous Peoples'. (f)NGOs received support from UN permanent forum for Indigenous peoples which stressed upon several points which in the next stage started to emerge into the texts in a concise manner though remained under debate.

The role of UNFCCC at this stage appears ambiguous: on the one hand, it had manifested an opening towards IPs groups by investing them to the negotiations but on the other, had not provided them with any opportunity to speak up. This pattern is best illustrated by Blessings Karumbidza (2011 personal interview) who said, “Every effort has been made to undermine the rights of the IPs and acceptance of their role as the traditional inheritors of knowledge and preservation of forests.”
To sum up, “Poznan witnessed a significant backlash since the final language excludes important references to indigenous peoples’ rights and to biodiversity” (Santarius et al. 2009:21) but at the same time it also saw a growing number of countries rejecting the ‘sub-national market based approaches to REDD financing’ (GFC 2008b:19).

What needs to be noted is that IPs presence was not envisaged in the BAP and was later added into the text document. Although a causal relation is impossible to establish, it is plausible to hypothesize that, since INGOs were the main actors championing that cause of IPs representation, the final inclusion of IPs in the document might be attributed to their actions. This need not, however, represent a success, for the ambiguous language adopted does not guarantee actual IP representation and rights based approach. At last, Poznan represents a moderate step forward, when compared to Bali, for at least the need to protect the rights of IPs is mentioned. It can be argued that this in an instance in which the double role of (I)NGOs can be seen: on one hand, like social movement predicts, NGOs can further new frames. At the same time, however, their success is constrained by political and institutional structures (in this case, the negative stance taken by countries such as New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and USA).

4.3 Copenhagen Accord

Copenhagen marked the much hyped culmination of two years of continuous negotiations. Nine rounds of global negotiations took place from December 2007 to December 2009 though little progress in key policy debates happened (Dimitrov 2010). Countries wrangled on procedural issues and continue to reiterate their previous positions. Atmosphere was filled with high expectation as 115 heads of states arrived. It was an important political opportunity for everyone involved. Surprisingly, access for NGO delegates in the last critical days of conference was restricted. NGO representatives argued that their exclusion from negotiations as such a crucial juncture was not good, as possibilities for influence were severely hindered by their ignorance of ‘what was going on and [were] not allowed near the building where these crucial negotiations were taking place’ (IISD 2009).

However, continued lobbying and advocacy had led to a wider acceptance of IPs issues resembling itself into June 2009 AWG-LCA negotiating text in Bonn. In Bonn, the wider debate focused at the inclusion of issues and interests but no consensus was reached as such as the states were not strongly willing to include them. In the end, discussions regarding IPs, their engagement and to what extent they would be involved followed and it shaped up as follows (please note that elements in brackets mean that this text doesn’t have consensus).
The above mentioned text shows an important change emerging and a shift in the debate and recognition of the IPs in climate talks. For the first time explicit mention of full and effective engagement, FPIC, UNDRIP, ‘transparent’, and ‘efficient’ made its way into the agenda even though it was in brackets. Still, this was a positive step towards engagement with IPs.

Later on, AWG-LCA presented a non-paper No. 39 in Barcelona Meet. Disappointing for the IPs activists, this talked about weak provisions for IPs rights as no special adjustment were made to the wording around IPs participation. This one also showed that the state parties have not come to a consensus (wordings in the text were in brackets that were discussed but were not part of the agreement).

Here, we see that the inclusion of land tenure, and forest governance, into the agenda again happened (GFC 2008a, TNC 2008). Pressure at this time was also being built by the No-REDD (I)NGO groups (IEN 2008, GFC 2008b). These acted as a pressure on the state negotiators to see the issue in a
different light and possibly bring land tenure and governance issues into the negotiating table and the inclusion of IPs in monitoring and reporting also. The draft text also included many references to other issues GFC had been advocating for over many years, as the need to address gender considerations, land tenure issues and other drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (GFC 2009a:14).

However, these were prone to changes as per countries and conditional to country’s recognition of IPs. These attempts in the end at COP15 in Copenhagen, Decision 4/CP. 15 ended up in this form:-

Recognizing the need for full and effective engagement of indigenous peoples and local communities in, and the potential contribution of their knowledge to, monitoring and reporting of activities relating to decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 1 (b) (iii)

3 Encourages, as appropriate, the development of guidance for effective engagement of indigenous peoples and local communities in monitoring and reporting

Copenhagen also included plus parts of REDD+. This was a setback for the (I)NGOs and IPs. In the past, history of national parks establishment had caused frequent evictions, loss of lands and violations of rights of IPs. Because of history of exclusion of IPs in the sustainable management of forests, + part had been opposed by the GFC, CTW, IEN, and many coalitions and networks. But the efforts of (I)NGOs did not manage to create an influence in comparison the push which came from countries like India which had a major stake in the process. Henceforth, when it comes to an important push, state wields enormous power to get their agenda enlisted and accommodated in the negotiations. When it comes to the rights and demands of IPs, it has continued to refuse integration at a concrete level and has continued to push it for the future round of negotiations.

Consequently, the high profile Copenhagen Meet did not result into any consensus as either the interests of the parties did not cumulate together as it only remained noted in the COP decisions. Counter-intuitively, however, it can be argued that lack of consensus may be an expression of (I)NGO action. As years passed, (I)NGOs may in fact, have contributed to make the arena of REDD+ a contestable one, and managed to gather interest in the cause, if not approval, by certain states (even if not by others). Although lack of consensus may ultimately be bad for IPs interest, as it creates a stall in the negotiations, at the same time, it may also be understood to testify to the fact that, at least, some debate exists on the need to uphold IPs rights.
4.4 Cancun Agreements

Cancun was preceded with the increased focus on incentives and policies to “reduce deforestation and forest degradation and enhance forest carbon stocks”. GFC and IEN (2010) with Timberwatch\textsuperscript{\textregistered}, Biofuel Watch\textsuperscript{\textregistered} called on “negotiators to remove subsidies for fossil fuels, industrial bio-energy and agrofuels, and to fully recognize the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and other international norms, standards and agreements that protect land-based peoples and human rights.” The anti-REDD lobby continued to press for no-REDD stance. This opened up the door for flexibility from other corners in which the parties and other actors have to take stock of their situations and finally agree to bring some pertinent issues on board.

GFC and IEN through the series of seminars and training workshops for and by IPs representatives were able to subsequently influence many IPOs and through them, reach out to the key policy makers (GFC 2009a). Similar initiatives were carried out by many other (I)NGOs and networks. TNC also had adopted the policy of engagement with IPs at the ground level and empowering them to speak for their issues at national and global stage (Rane Cortez 2011, personal interview)\textsuperscript{\textregistered}.

Finally Cancun saw adoption of number of safeguards intended to avoid some of the negative consequences. We see a more concrete introduction of a safeguard provision in Cancun Agreements Appendix I paragraph 2 [Attached as Annex III].

But the text [Appendix1 para 2 (c)] again only has note that the UN “has adopted” the UNDRIP. This text does refer to the IPs rights, their full and effective participation but is silent on the protection part. These safeguards remain weak as Cancun Agreements Appendix 1 paragraph 2 only talks about to be “promoted and supported”. Though it can be seen that the full and effective participation making finally into the texts but the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent principle is still not included in the Cancun texts.

In the main Cancun Agreements text\textsuperscript{\textregistered}, the para 69 refer to safeguards but then only talked about “promoted and supported” which are ambiguous terms and not sufficient to promote IPs rights. More so, the AWG-LCA puts the onus on the developing countries by ‘requesting’ to ensure the ‘full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, inter alia IPs and local communities in Paragraph 72 of the Cancun Agreements:-

\begin{quote}
72. Also requests developing country Parties, when developing and implementing their national strategies or action plans, to address, inter alia, the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, land tenure issues, forest governance issues, gender considerations and the safeguards identified in
\end{quote}
Appendix 1 shows some positive movement towards acceptance of IPs demands into the official documents happened though much improvement is still needed. The UNDRIP has finally received a mentioned in the annex. But it is still included as a “safeguard” that should be “supported and promoted” rather than being obligatory for governments to comply with UNDRIPs. As Carbon Trade Watch (2011b) stated, “these sneaky words are absolutely inadequate to protect indigenous and forest-dependent peoples’ rights.”

Also, it is necessary to take into account that FPIC and UNDRIP should not be taken as a recipe which will address all the issues. The problem of recognising of IPs into many countries, legislation and implementation of UNDRIP at national level may take decades or may never happen (IEN 2009, GFC 2010). The Executive Secretary of UNFCCC also noted that neither UNDRIP or FPIC was legally binding (IEN 2009:17). So, there is a further layer of complexity and to quantify how we can measure an advancement to be an influence is again a difficult proposition.

The most controversial part of REDD+ ‘how REDD + is to be funded’ has not even received mention in the agreed part of the REDD+ text in Cancun. But this exclusion does not mean that anti-market REDD NGOs demands have prevailed. REDD+ market mechanism is already under process through many governments, World Bank, FCPF, and other international agencies that have invested money and setting up the carbon trading mechanisms. According to IEN (2008), “the political and economic actors in favour of market based architecture have tremendous power which allows them to call the shots and influence the decision making in the UN. [...] The small countries [in alliance of anti-market REDD] that proposing non-market REDD don’t have enough clout or even the support of their regions to get their proposals accepted.”

All in all, the journey from 2005 to 2010 has been of considerable developments, the credit for which goes to (l)NGOs and civil society actors. To summarize the outcomes of the COP16 with respect to REDD+ and IPs, one should note that a number of important safeguards that focus on protecting IPs rights and biodiversity has been incorporated (GFC 2010b).

Also, NGOs action at the domestic level has impacted the positions of certain countries at the international level. Bolivia is a case in point: the presence of IPs in the government and active NGOs action has provided for the country to bring the issue of Mother Earth in the talks. This can be seen as one type of influence in which the NGOs won some leverage and managed to stall otherwise unanimous Cancun Agreements.
However, we should keep in mind that it is actually very difficult to say whether any particular decision or policy was made because of the pressure from (I)NGOs. And the work of GFC, IEN, and TNC to influence the negotiations cannot be attributed to them alone. I would conclude that as far as influence of (I)NGOs is concerned at the REDD+ Negotiations, the above analysis shows that (I)NGOs have a mixed set of results and since the talks are still on-going it is really difficult to predict about an influence. However, the whole process can be defined as one of “bounded success”; that developments in the future may help to better understand if the actions of (I)NGO produces actual results. Some elements, however, exist that allow us to consider a plausible understanding of NGO action in terms of social movement strategy (both influencing and influenced by institutions).

4.5 Changes in Discourse:

When looking back into the past five years of REDD+ negotiations, important advancements can be identified, ranging from informal one-day seminars for government representatives in May 2005 to the long term discussions in 2010. Now discussions cover wide range of formerly “unmentionable” issues, such as adaptation and mitigation by developing countries to the Indigenous Peoples issues like UNDRIP and FPIC on the agendas (IISD 2009).

IEN and GFC in cooperation with like-minded groups, fora, networks and caucuses strongly advocated for the rights of indigenous Peoples and women. The adoption of UNDRIP in 2007 was a significant milestone and became an important tool used by Indigenous and non-Indigenous members to advocate strongly for the integration of its principles in forest policies (Samangun 2011, personal interview)24. In an interview with Clabbers25 (2011, personal interview), he pointed out that the fact that IPs issues managed to make it into the agenda of the negotiations as one of the main contentious issues is the result of the continued advocacy and pressure from (I)NGOs and civil society groups.” If today FPIC – a previously taboo topic- is discussed, it is largely the result of the contribution of INGOs into the negotiations.

Also, according to GFC (2010b), “Representatives of research institutions (e.g. CIFOR) and UN institutions (e.g. the UN Forum on Forests) have started to express concerns about the potential impacts of REDD+ that are very much in line with the concerns voiced by GFC and its allies since 2005.”

Following Sassen (1999:3), these changes can also be viewed from the perspective of ‘relocation of authority’ and the ‘conceptual and operational openings for other actors’ that have provided space to ‘those collectivities whose experience of membership has not been subsumed fully under nationhood in its modern conception, e.g. minorities, immigrants, and first
nation people and many feminists. These openings were being utilized by the IPs groups and (I)NGOs who have pushed using different strategies for the inclusion of IPs issues into the official agreements.

Also, considering the role played by globalization in re-shaping the institution of the national state, and based on our analysis of INGO influence on REDD+ negotiations, I venture to suggest that the theory of political opportunity structure may be improved by acknowledging that opportunities for collective action are now shaped not only by state structure, but also by the increasingly important transnational actors facilitated by globalization.

REDD+, in other words, is not happening in a vacuum; socio-economic and political changes at the global level are likely to influence, enhance or hinder, NGO action to the benefit of IPs.
Chapter 5

5.1 Why NGOs have limited level of influence on the ongoing climate change talks?

In the previous chapter, I have defined the performance of NGOs in REDD+ negotiations as one of “bounded success”, at least up to now. On the basis of such analysis, now the question arises why has been so the case and why NGOs effectiveness have been limited. Andersen and Skodvin (2008), Betsill and Cornell (2008), Burgeil (2008), Corell (2008), Pollard and Court (2005), Albin (1999), Bjorkbom (1999), Short (1999), Kempel (1999), Hagerhall (1993) have shown that NGOs have had some influence in affecting the Kyoto Protocol, Desertification Convention, Whaling Commission and other environmental regimes. Why is the outcome that we testify different from the case made in the UNFCCC climate change talks?

To answer this question, it is pertinent to look beyond what is happening at the Copenhagen, Cancun or what is going to happen in Durban. REDD+ negotiations are connected with the wider climate change talks and not being negotiated as an isolated international issue. Climate change talks are integral to growth strategies, interests of elites, life style and mass consumption. In this context, NGOs face structural limitations, both when dealing with states at the national level and when trying to influence international negotiations directly. Moreover, the changing geo-politics has opened up new challenges. I want to build my argument on the premise that negotiations can be categorized in two different frames: i) Socio-Political and ii) Economic.

**Socio-Political:** There appears to be a consensus in relevant literature according to which (I)NGOs tend to have more influence in socio-political issues than in impacting economic agendas. Some of the good examples are strong mobilization of NGOs and other civil society actors in lieu to the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and related Intolerance, World Conference on Women, Right to Water, and International Criminal Court. In these negotiations, (I)NGOs have a major say in setting the agendas and influencing the negotiations, and their insights gain easier acceptance.

However, REDD+ directly relates with national and international economic agendas, where (I)NGOs tend to lose, unless they are provided with massive elite support or large scale public opposition. REDD+ has never attracted the large scale mobilization, at times violent, that characterized for instance international negotiations at Seattle, Genoa, and others. These were very hardcore physical attack and have had a very different impact. In contrast to this, REDD+ and IPs issues seems to present itself as a soft peddling of
issues and neither attracted large scale mobilization nor very violent opposition.

**The marginality of IPs and the salience of related issues**

In the previous chapters, I have highlighted IPs remoteness from mainstream. This tends to decrease the salience of issues that relate to them, and as a result, makes public mobilization in their favour more difficult. The fact that IPs is underrepresented in government structures in their countries also contributes to explain limited NGO influence in this realm.

**Who sets the agenda?**

Lukes (2005) has famously argued that agenda-setting is one of the three faces of power: who sets the agenda gets to advance his/her interest by positive action. In the case of REDD, the agenda is not set by (I)NGOs but by Voluntary carbon Markets, Agribusiness and logging sectors, fossil fuel industry, multilateral organizations, and International financial institutions (CTW 2011a). As a result, the influence NGOs can realistically wield is constrained.

**WTO and Climate Change talks**

To complicate things further, Climate change *per se* is an issue where the leverage of (I)NGOs is severely limited by its implications on economic development. As Dimitrov (2010:795) argued, “governments are negotiating a fundamental transformation of the global economy toward low-carbon development based on new energy and production and consumption.”

To delay the process of consensus-building on REDD+, other factors have intervened, such as food scarcity and agricultural issues. These are *per se* a result of climate change. What they, however, precipitate is a need for technological innovation, which is environmentally beneficial. As witnessed in the Doha round of talks, developing countries face a serious challenge in committing to environmental agreements based on the promise that they will receive technology transfers from developed nations. Their flipside is, in fact, vulnerability to TRIPS, DSM in case of violations the IPR regime and issues like access to information, and historical background of developed countries for greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere (Littleton 2009).

Moreover, as argued by Littleton (2009:233), “such transfers are not occurring at a rate fast enough to aid these nations in mitigating and adapting to the EFFECTS of climate change.” This is directly connected with the global intellectual property regime. The TRIPS regime is highly contestable and the fear among the developing countries is that it will limit their capacity to grow.
In addition, binding commitment to finance mitigation and adaptation from developed countries, competitiveness fears, technology innovation and transfers are other issues that divided developed and developing nations' thereby affecting the negotiations (Hufbauer and Kim 2010).

**The Controversy on Growth and Emissions:**

The current talks on climate change are also marred by widespread controversy between developed economies and developing ones. The former face economic crises and demand that rising economies take more responsibility for increasing GHG emissions, despite having historically contributed to their accumulation. The latter, on the other hand, tend to prioritize economic growth. More specifically, the Annex-I countries desire binding commitments from all major GHGs emitters including Brazil, China, India and others in the rank of developing countries whereas these emerging nations ask for lead in reductions to be taken up by developed countries (Hufbauer and Kim 2010).

Solana and Carranza (2011) have noted that non-Western countries - which include big consumers such as China and India, and the largest producers (the Gulf states and Russia) - don't trust the institutional system created mainly by the West. The emerging countries [...] argue that the West is responsible for today's climate-change problem. From the Industrial Revolution until very recently, the West's development was free of any environmental restrictions, and the emerging countries believe that they should not have to bear the adjustment cost. Likewise, producing countries oppose giving up one of the few bases of power they have.”

As a result of this “cold conflict”, no country is willing to make a first move, which in turn makes conflict more severe and does not lead to any final agreement in the REDD negotiations. No state party is ready to commit the potential political suicide of binding itself to any agreement. In this situation, the strategies entertained by NGOs both at the national and international level are severely constrained.

**Fossil Fuel based industries:**

To increase the likelihood of stalemate in REDD+ negotiations; other players have their own interests at stake. Any strong low-carbon development approach and a move from fossil fuel based economy to green economy can severely affect the energy and industrial lobby.

It is a well-known fact that the most of the global commercial energy is currently produced by the combustion of fossil fuels. A deal where any action taken to mitigate involve rapid reduction on the production and consumption of fossil fuels will not at all serve the interests of the fossil-fuel related oil
companies. These companies are among the largest economic entities in the world and potentially powerful subset of global capital making them significant global players to influence any decisions made in any negotiation. The industrial and energy lobby that is Transnational Corporations in this case would expect ‘to advance an international agreement that most protects and/or advance its interests’ (Rowlands 2001).

In its annual report, GFC (2008b) highlighted that “NGOs face stiff opposition from powerful actors with economic interests in relation to forests and plantations” and from agro-industrial and car industry lobbies.

**Geo-Political Changes:**

In the last decade, the world has witnessed a shift at the global stage. The emergence of powerful economies in Global South as trade powerhouses has a direct bearing on the creation the post-2012 climate regime. The need of economic growth, the conflictual relations among developing economies and between them and developed nations has made any deal logistically difficult. As more players get on the stage of the negotiations, multiplication of interests and the lack of real interests of politicians in striking any environmental deal to the detriment of economic growth concur to diminish the likelihood that REDD+ will make any strides in the near future.

All these constraints notwithstanding, (I)NGOs have managed to include issues on the agenda and more effects may still be identified, as no consensus has yet been reached in climate talks. In the next section, the strategies (I)NGOs used to achieve these goals will be discussed.

### 5.2 Strategic Tools Used by NGOs

The question for this section is that whether the practice of NGOs, which are the focus on this research, reflect different strategic tools which assisted (I)NGOs during the course of negotiations or not. With regards to the REDD+ process, do (I)NGOs actively engage in an attempt to change mainstream discourse? Do they actively look to redress prevalent power relations to the benefit of the IPs?

In this chapter, I will try to provide an answer to these questions, based on the results of interviews I have conducted with key informants. I will try to analyse the self-reported strategies of (I)NGOs here.

#### 5.2.1 Insider, Outsider, and Dual Strategy

Whenever seeking to exert influence, NGOs may decide to either adopt an insider or outsider strategy to action. When working closely with state negotiators and government officials by lobbying, seeking accreditation at
multilateral institutions, providing expert advice and policy solutions, NGOs pursue insider strategies (Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004). They may also engage in knowledge construction, production of research reports, publications, and papers, field activity reports on particular topics to provide important insight which at times are used by the negotiators (Gough and Shackley 2001).

Conversely, pursue outsider strategies, when engaging in outward contention, for instance through demonstrations, campaigning, protests, petitions, disturbances, threats and boycotts, as well as shaming strategy and direct actions (ibid. 2001).

In reality, these two strategies are not mutually incompatible, and some organizations resort to both. In the following section, I address different tools and attempt to establish to what extent they have been applied in the REDD+ process.

5.2.2 Advocacy and Lobbying

The success of the strategies of advocacy and lobbying rests on them being implemented in the context of insider strategies. Advocacy and lobbying rely on one hand on the production of public awareness materials, discussions, and on the other, on meetings with policy makers at different levels of governance (Fogarty 2011, Jordan and Maloney 1997, McCarthy and Zald 1987, Jenkins 1983)

The success of advocacy and lobbying also depends on maintaining continuous year round processes to create a significant influence at the international forum (Gastelumendi 2011, personal interview)26. This process needs to be carried out at different levels; national, sub-national, and local level.

In the case of REDD+, GFC, IEN, and TNC actively used advocacy and lobbying strategy to influence the state negotiators. Key informant Jorge has underlined the importance of continuity: “If advocacy and lobbying is done at the national level where the important political decisions are made, then by keeping the ministries and policy makers in loop, it helps to get things done during the final days.” It must be noted, however, that the possibility for (I)NGOs to entertain advocacy and lobbying strategies largely depends on their resources. Budget size is positively related to their capacity to actively pursuing insider strategies. This bears particular importance in our analysis, as insider strategies are widely held to be the most successful by our key informants.

It is likely that bigger organizations will be in a better position to influence negotiations; however, these may be the most remote from IPs demands. Furthermore, their necessity to “win” negotiations in order to maintain their institutionalized structures may create incentives for them to disregard IPs de-
mands or to select them strategically in order to maximize their chances of success.

5.2.3 Access into negotiations

It is plausible to hypothesize that (I)NGOs access into negotiation is the most powerful opportunity to exert influence. It opens up doors for variety of other strategies. In the case of REDD, NGOs entry into the UNFCCC has provided the opportunity to be at the centre-stage. The scope for (I)NGO access in climate talks has significantly expanded over time. (I)NGOs are accredited as observers to the climate talks since 1991. In the beginning, their participation has been restricted to access to the conference venue, presence during meetings, interventions during debate, face-to-face lobbying of delegations, and distribution of documents as explained by Gulbrandsen and Andresen (2004:59). Later, representatives of NGOs have been given the opportunity to speak in the plenary sessions and sometimes attend the important meetings (Rane Cortez). This is likely to provide increased chances of access, as a result of formal and informal communications with delegates.

Interviews with key informants have also highlighted that access to negotiations has provided indirect opportunities through the possibility for ‘Side events’. These have emerged as an important arena organized along with every COP where (I)NGOs and others come together organizing seminars and workshops. This is an important form of access that has been discussed in detail by Oberthür et al. (2002). GFC, IEN and TNC hosted and participated in many side events.

According to Swati Shrestha, ‘If facilities are given for side-events, NGOs usually organize talks and workshops on REDD for government delegates, media and members of civil society. No-one strategy can be said to be effective. Usually these methods sometimes manage to get attention of the UN and other government delegates.” With a similar approach, some protest groups/(I)NGOs also organized activities outside the formal political space using the side events as the stage through their outsider strategy to indirectly influence the negotiations.

Side events help in seeking international media attention and press coverage and is broadcasted all over the electronic world. The workshops and seminars organized are crucial as they try to bring in the state negotiators to attend and pass on their demands to them (Hjerpe et al. 2008). Key Informant Yabanex (2011, personal interview)27 mentioned that a strategy is to invite negotiators for lunch and share with them ‘a one-pager to the point’ policy recommendation along with a brief presentation given at them.

Another Key Informant Hubertus Hugeman (2011, personal interview) said that side events are really a good place but as we can see now with the increasing fear of (I)NGOs intervention, the UNFCCC is organized in places
around where it is difficult to carry out the side events. This distance is leading to problems as bringing/arriving of negotiators to the side events has been restricting the quick fluid movements with a strong bearing on the influence of the (I)NGOs.

5.2.4 Knowledge and Information

(I)NGOs have also tried to influence the process by providing policymakers with new sources of information and dissemination of knowledge (Keck and Sikkink 1998:19, Arts 1998:270). Now, whether that is an effective mechanism of influence is highly debatable.

Key Informant Rane Cortez stated that NGOs have ‘some’ role to play in the negotiations by providing enriched information to the negotiators. It is likely that their usefulness relates more to their capacity to increase the salience of certain issues, rather than to “enlighten” policy-makers. Also, by reaching out to the media, knowledge-producing NGOs manage to mobilize public opinion in order to exert pressures on the negotiators.

TNC has also widely used the systematic implementation of REDD projects with their partner organizations to provide and come up with the knowledge to present a certain viewpoint and policy support to negotiators. The Noel Kempff projects and others being implemented by TNC in Indonesia, DRC, Bolivia and Brazil are used as a ground experiences. The experiences derived through these projects are directly relevant to topics under discussions in REDD (TNC 2006). GFC and many other (I)NGOs are working with the same strategy but the efforts vary according to the resources available and their funding bases.

5.2.5 Other findings

The interviews with key informants have also brought other elements to the fore that, while not necessarily connected to the strategies of influence of our interest, do provide some clues to understanding both whether NGOs actually manage to exert influence and how they choose their tactics strategically, as a response to institutional changes, in order to maximize their chances of success.

Firstly, there seems to be some agreement on the fact that NGOs opposing REDD are unlikely to make any strides. Furthermore, state parties have actively sought to engage with NGOs that provide suggestions on how to make the mechanisms work rather than with those who oppose it.

Secondly, NGOs lobbying and advocacy work is the most associated with influence at the national level, and reasonably so, because state negotiations are assigned specific mandates from their national governments
that they are unwilling to renege upon (Mr. Cladders).

Thirdly, influence on negotiation has mostly come in the form of “small changes in the text”. In other words, NGOs demands have been most likely to enter documents when reasonably in line with state actors’ priorities.

Fourthly, people to people connection and individual interaction have provided opportunities for direct influence.

Finally, openings to discussion with non-state actors have been dependent on the specific politics of each meeting.

It is important to note that the results of interviews convey perceptions rather than facts; making any general statement from them would probably be inappropriate. However, it is useful to note that all the observations listed above are compatible with my predictions based on Political Process theory: the most influential NGOs have been those who have been able to make their demands compatible with mainstream discourse, their capacity to influence negotiations has depended on the degree of political openness of each meeting, and influence has been primarily exerted through (moderate, and thus acceptable) discourse change. As highlighted in the previous chapter, the phrase “bounded success” appears appropriate to define the result of (I)NGOs action in the REDD+ process so far.

Some points need to be emphasized. Firstly, the resort to different tactics appears to be linked with the different degree of openness of the political structure in which negotiations take place. For instance, access to negotiations occurs when institutional opportunities for it obtain. Conversely, knowledge production and sharing, as well as enhancement of issue visibility, occur at relatively early stages of a negotiation, where no other opportunity for influence exists.

Such observation appears to be in line with the predictions of Political Opportunity Structure theory. More research will be necessary to understand to what extent those structures also affect the possibility of success of the tactics implemented by organizations.

In the following chapter, I will discuss the challenges faced by NGOs by way of conclusion.
Chapter 6

6.1 Challenges faced

(I)NGOs had to face different challenges that constrained their ability to influence the negotiations. The factors that constrained their ability to influence the negotiations vary. They do not sit at the ‘High Table’ of the official negotiations and access to the ‘Green Rooms’ is limited (Cortez, Samangun 2011, personal interview). Approximately 200 state parties alone along with other IGOs, UN agencies, and multilateral agencies participate along with accredited NGOs. This number makes it difficult for (I)NGOs to have good time allotted to speak at the plenary or any crucial sessions.

(I)NGOs which stand in opposition to major policies supported by the states face funding cuts or reduction greatly impacting their ability to remain a strong player in international forest policy (S. Shresth, personal communication, 27 October 2011). In case of REDD+, a strong anti-REDD stance often resulted in funding being cut or reduced greatly impacting an organization (GFC 2008b). NGOs participations are still counted as ‘Also’. This shows that other parties have more acceptance and NGOs still are looked differently.

The challenge thrown by the current power relations and hegemonic market-based ideology puts IPs critical views at the margins as it clashes with the ideology. So, (I)NGOs advocating their stand face determined challenges. Another key challenge has been the eruption of economic crisis in 2008 which led to decreased financial flows to (I)NGOs and IPOs. The limited funding that remains are highly conditional and making it very difficult to act as independent watch dogs.

6.2 Conclusion

The increasing challenges to the nation-state notwithstanding, the current power of balance in an increasingly globalized arena, is still tilted towards state actors. However, the impact of non-state actors on international environmental agreements cannot easily be ruled out. It is important to understand that the climate change negotiations are different than many other environmental agreements of the past. Some of the past negotiations were based on one-off environmental issues like ozone layer, whaling, biological diversity, forest conservation, trade in forest products, ban on land mines and others. In contrast, there is much more at stake in current negotiations: as Dimitrov (2010:795) argues, ‘UN climate change negotiations are not “environmental”: they are about the economic future of nations’.

Against this backdrop, we have identified a degree of “bounded success” in the influencing strategies implemented by (I)NGOs in the REDD+ negotiations. Although (I)NGO positions on IPs issues are not reflected the
way these organizations have been demanding, NGOs have worked behind the scenes to press for the incorporation of IPs issues into the agenda and to influence the positions and atmosphere within the whole UNFCCC process.

Chapter four has shown that efforts of (I)NGOs have at least partially paid off and IPs is now on the agenda. IPs issues are now on every COP meeting agenda. This would not have been possible just few years ago when despite all efforts; IPs did not have a right to speak in the talks. It was confirmed in an interview with Swati Shresth (personal communication, 27 October 2011) that the, “IPs [also] has realized the importance of putting across the issues of rights, sovereignty and livelihoods more strongly. Earlier, there was too little information or experience on REDD+. Now as adverse impacts of REDD+ become more obvious, IPs realize that they need to be stronger than before.”

It can concluded that (I)NGOs most visible contribution has occurred over time in this case rather than in any specific stage of negotiation during the entire period taken into account for this paper. They have succeeded in

i. Pushing the issue at the frontline of the discussions which cannot be avoided anymore or relegated to a secondary position.

ii. Reframing the issue in negotiations from purely economic towards a rights based approach

Finally, activities of (I)NGOs have been important in highlighting issues of IPs. They have managed to create significant pressure during COP conferences and prior using different strategies as have been discussed in Chapter five. They used a variety of conventional and unconventional strategies to reach out to their audience, acquire resources, allies, and influence the political process. Usage of side events, access to negotiators, good relationship building with the state negotiators, sharing of information and knowledge, use of media to put pressure on the conference of parties have been some of the widely use tools assisting in creating an environment of pressure which then translates into influence.

Meanwhile, it was also found that (I)NGOs that advocate policies and support the neo-liberal market driven model find it easier to get financial support and also impact domestic and international policy (Karumbidza 2011, personal interview).

Marc Williams (1996:44) said that in international relations NGO influence is noted merely as an additional factor which has to be taken into account, and in the end, analysts tend to the conclude that nation-states are ‘still primary determinants of issue outcomes in global environmental politics’ (Porter and Brown 1991:68). This is to say, international environmental negotiations is an arena where states have the formal decision making power and influence as they generally establish rules and nature of participation and are the final authority to vote on adoption of a particular text (Betsill and
NGOs still participate only as observers and have no formal authority to vote; furthermore, they are completely dependent on the whims of the state negotiators, who are in turn dependent on the popular mood in the country and the priority of economic growth.

Any conclusion on the REDD negotiations is currently impossible to draw, as they are still ongoing and part of the wider climate change negotiations. However, NGOs have been so far influential in pushing for issues that are on the sidelines or relegated to the borders. Although national states still predominate power structures, the present trend towards global governance is creating a contested global arena in which opportunities for civil society movements slowly but steadily increases. From Tunisia to Egypt, to Occupy Wall Street, emerging collective contention provides a case in point.
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<http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php>

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2>


<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/cop14/eng/03.pdf>


<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2006/sbsta/eng/05.pdf>

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf>


## Appendices

### Annex I: Profile of the Key Informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S. No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Clabbers, ir. B.J.L. (Bas)</td>
<td>Ministry of Nature and Food Quality, Government of Netherlands</td>
<td>Head of the Dutch Delegation and EU Group Lead Negotiator for UNFCCC Climate Change Talks</td>
<td>September 22, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Karumbidza, Dr. Blessings</td>
<td>GFC/TimberWatch, South Africa</td>
<td>GFC’s African NGO Focal Point</td>
<td>September 15, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Samangun, Hubertus</td>
<td>GFC/ICTI Tanimbar, Indonesia, Coordinator Nusanfara Region International Alliance of Tribal and Indigenous Peoples of the Tropical Forests</td>
<td>GFC’s Asian Indigenous Focal Point</td>
<td>September 9, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Corbella, Joanna</td>
<td>Carbon Trade Watch</td>
<td>Netherlands Focal Point</td>
<td>June 16, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Gastelumendi, Jorge</td>
<td>The Nature Conservancy, USA</td>
<td>Senior Policy Advisor - International Climate Policy</td>
<td>August 22, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kumar, Madhuresh</td>
<td>National Alliance for People’s Movement, India</td>
<td>National Organizer</td>
<td>October 22, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cortez, Rane</td>
<td>The Nature Conservancy, USA</td>
<td>Forest Carbon Policy Advisor</td>
<td>August 30, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Shresth, Swati</td>
<td>GFC/Atree, India</td>
<td>GFC’s South and East Asian Focal Point</td>
<td>October 27, 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex II: List of COP from 2005 to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COP</th>
<th>Place, Country</th>
<th>Month and Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COP 11</td>
<td>Montreal, Canada</td>
<td>December 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP 12</td>
<td>Nairobi, Kenya</td>
<td>November 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP 13</td>
<td>Bali, Indonesia</td>
<td>December 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP 14</td>
<td>Poznan, Poland</td>
<td>December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP 15</td>
<td>Copenhagen, Denmark</td>
<td>December 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP 16</td>
<td>Cancun, Mexico</td>
<td>November 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP 17</td>
<td>Durban, South Africa</td>
<td>November 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex III: Appendix I of the Cancun Agreements: FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add 1

Guidance and safeguards for policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries

1. The activities referred to in paragraph 70 of this decision should:
   (a) Contribute to the achievement of the objective set out in Article 2 of the Convention;
   (b) Contribute to the fulfilment of the commitments set out in Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Convention;
   (c) Be country-driven and be considered options available to Parties;
   (d) Be consistent with the objective of environmental integrity and take into account the multiple functions of forests and other ecosystems;
   (e) Be undertaken in accordance with national development priorities, objectives and circumstances and capabilities and should respect sovereignty;
   (f) Be consistent with Parties’ national sustainable development needs and goals;
   (g) Be implemented in the context of sustainable development and reducing poverty, while responding to climate change;
   (h) Be consistent with the adaptation needs of the country;
   (i) Be supported by adequate and predictable financial and technology support, including support for capacity-building;
   (j) Be results-based;
   (k) Promote sustainable management of forests;
2. When undertaking the activities referred to in paragraph 70 of this decision, the following safeguards should be promoted and supported:

   (a) That actions complement or are consistent with the objectives of national forest programmes and relevant international conventions and agreements;

   (b) Transparent and effective national forest governance structures, taking into account national legislation and sovereignty;

   (c) Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, national circumstances and laws, and noting that the United Nations General Assembly has adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

   (d) The full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular indigenous peoples and local communities, in the actions referred to in paragraphs 70 and 72 of this decision;

   (e) That actions are consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biological diversity, ensuring that the actions referred to in paragraph 70 of this decision are not used for the conversion of natural forests, but are instead used to incentivize the FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 protection and conservation of natural forests and their ecosystem services, and to enhance other social and environmental benefits1;

   (f) Actions to address the risks of reversals;

   (g) Actions to reduce displacement of emissions.

1 Taking into account the need for sustainable livelihoods of indigenous peoples and local communities and their interdependence on forests in most countries, reflected in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as the International Mother Earth Day.
NOTES

1 ‘REDD+’ is used as a generic term for a range of options and financing mechanisms that can be used to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, including provisions discussed in the REDD unless specified otherwise.
2 Personal interview with Joanna Corbella on REDD+ in Amsterdam, 15 June 2011
3 Non-state actors (NSAs) are all those actors that are not (representatives of) states, yet that operate at the international level and that are potentially relevant to international relations (based on: Arts et al., 2001; Furtak, 1997; Higgot et al., 2000)
4 Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) started around 1985 in protest against the construction of Sardar Sarovar Dam on River Narmada in India. It took shape of a NGO that brought together the Indigenous Peoples, the farmers, the environmental activists, and the human rights activists against the Sardar Sarovar Dam.
5 GFC is a worldwide coalition of NGOs and IPOs promoting rights-based, socially just and effective forest policies at international and national level, including through building the capacity of NGOs and IPOs in all regions to influence global forest policy. http://globalforestcoalition.org/
6 TNC is among the largest conservation organization of the world headquartered in USA with operation in more than 30 countries and all 50 USA states. http://www.nature.org/
7 IEN is an alliance of grassroots Indigenous Peoples whose mission is to protect the sacredness of Mother Earth from contamination and exploitation by strengthening, maintaining and respecting traditional teachings and natural laws. http://www.ienearth.org/
8 Over 1,409 NGOs and 86 IGOs are admitted as observers in the UNFCC (http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php) Accessed 20 September 2011.
9 NAPM is an alliance of progressive people’s organisations and movements working together to bring the struggle for primacy of rights of communities over natural resources, conservation and governance, decentralised democratic development and towards a just, sustainable and egalitarian society in the true spirit of globalism. http://napm-india.org/aboutus
10 SBSTA counsels the Conference of the Parties on matters of climate, the environment, technology, and method and is also the empowered committee to discuss on REDD related activities.
11 AWG-LCA is a subsidiary body under the Convention, constituted in agreement with the COP, to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, in order to reach an agreed outcome and adopt a [final] decision.
12 Personal interview with Madhuresh Kumar on NGOs and IPs marginalization through Skype, 22 October 2011
13 Personal interview with Dr. Blessings Karumbidza on climate change negotiations and IP through Skype, 15 September 2011
14 Personal interview with Jorge Gastelumendi on climate change negotiations through Skype, 22 August 2011
15 UNFCCC/CP/2007/6/Add. 1, 14 March 2008
16 FCCC/SBSTA/2008/L.23
17 Not a ‘agreed text’
18 November 2009
19 UNFCCC, AWG-LCA “Non Paper 39” Barcelona, November 2009
20 Timberwatch is a voluntary alliance of South African non-governmental organisations and individuals that are concerned about the negative impacts of industrial tree plantations on people and the environment. Timberwatch co-operates with international organisations like the World Rainforest Movement (WRM), Friends of the Earth international (FOEI), and is GFC's focal point in Africa.
21 BioFuel Watch based in UK and US, works to raise awareness of the negative impacts of industrial biofuels and bioenergy on biodiversity, human rights, food sovereignty and climate change.
22 Personal interview with Rane Cortez on the REDD negotiations and influence of NGOs, 30 August 2011
UNFCCC Decision 1/CP/16 2010

Personal interview with H. Samangun on REDD+, 9 September 2011

Personal Interview with B.J.L. Clabbers on the climate change negotiations and role of NGOs in The Hague, 22 October 2011

Personal interview with J. Gastelamendi on REDD Negotiations on Skype, 22 August 2011

Personal interview with Yabanex Batista on REDD in The Hague, 5 September 2011.