

Identity and the Scottish National Party

A study into the use of national and state identity in modern Scottish
political nationalism



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1. Introduction

Scotland, the country of the misty Highlands accompanied with the echoing sound of the lonely but proud piper dressed in a kilt standing on the top of a hill. It is a country of merchants and of preachers, of football and of rugby, of vast grasslands and deep lochs. It is a place that draws to the mind many distinct images, images that have been created, recreated and re-recreated for hundreds of years, and in many ways it is as real a place as Germany, Italy or Ireland. An important difference is, however, that Scotland is not a state. Not since the Act of Union in 1707 has it been an independent country. Since that union it has formed a state together with England and Wales: the United Kingdom of Britain and as such it was a part of an empire that at its height stretched the full length and breadth of the earth.

Within this union Scotland was changed from a country on the fringes of the European continent, mainly reliant on its agriculture and the trading of raw materials, to a major trading hub and the second most industrialized area in the world. It also changed in a cultural sense, creating a national culture that for the first time spanned the cultural divide between the Highlands and the Lowlands. During these economic and cultural changes the country was part of, what Linda Colley has called, the ‘forging’ of the British nation.¹

The nature of these changes and the place of Scotland within the British Union have both been much debated. ‘Development by invitation’ by Wallerstein² and ‘Internal Colonization’ by Hechter³ have both been thought provoking theories to explain Scotland’s development. Both argue in some way that England condoned Scottish capitalism as long as it was agreed with English objectives or it did not at least hinder these objectives while implanting in some way English culture into Scotland. Other such as Devine, McCrone and Harvie have rather argued Scotland’s uniqueness.⁴ Devine’s research indicates that the union with England allowed Scotland’s to use its inherent economic strengths rather than that it was developed by England. Together with Harvie and McCrone he has pointed to the resilience of a unique Scottish culture.

¹ Linda Colley, *Britons Forging the Nation 1707-1837 revised edition*, (New Haven and London, 2009).

² Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World*, (Cambridge, 1979), 52-54.

³ Michael Hechter, *Internal colonialism the Celtic fringe in British national development*, (New Brunswick and London, 1999), 15-46.

⁴ T.M Devine, *The Scottish nation 1700-2007*, (London, 2006), 574-617; David McCrone, *Understand Scotland the sociology of a nation*, (1992, London and New York), 149-174; Christopher Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism Scottish society and politics 1707 to the present fourth edition*, (Oxfordshire, 2004), 11-35; 162-189; 219-239.

1.1 Identity and nationalism

Whatever the true explanation of the historic relationship between Scotland and the British Union may be, during the last quarter of the twentieth century this relationship has changed. Where until then the place of Scotland within the union had never been under discussion within the wider public this was now changing. The defining change in this context has been nationalism. During the 1970's the Scottish National Party (SNP), for first time since the Act of Union, popularized the issue of 'home-rule' (Scottish independence). As a political force the SNP was able to gather 22 percent and 30 percent of the vote during the two general elections of 1974. From that point onward nationalism has been a dominant political force in Scotland; this was not only proven by the SNP, but also by the Scottish Labour Party that since the 1970's has taken over important parts of the nationalist agenda. This led to changing political views towards devolution within Britain's major political parties and created the atmosphere in which in 1997 the Scottish Parliament could be reinstated for the first time since 290 years. That nationalism has remained a relevant political issue ever since is best indicated by the fact that on 5 May 2011 the SNP for the first time in its existence won an overall majority during the Scottish election, clearing the way for a vote on independence.

The importance of nationalism has, however, not only been contained to the political spectrum, since the 1970s marked changes can be seen in national identification within the Scottish public. Since 1979 surveys into national identity have shown that the numbers of inhabitants of Scotland describing themselves as British have been going down in favour of those describing themselves as Scottish. In 1999, only 17 percent of those asked indicated that they saw themselves as British, 21 percent points down from 1979. More specified research in 1997 showed that 61 percent of those surveyed indicated that they described themselves as solely Scottish or more Scottish than British. 27 percent indicated that they saw themselves as equally British and Scottish. Only 8 percent described themselves as British or more British than Scottish. Though not all quantitative research into national identification is completely comparable it would be fair to conclude that Scots have been increasingly identifying themselves as Scottish.⁵

As these two movements, the rise of political nationalism and changing national identification, have taken place within the same timeframe, logic would seem to suggest that that they are interconnected. This would be in line with traditional theories on nationalism. Gellner poses in his *Nations and Nationalism* that the definition of a nation is based on

⁵ David McCrone, *Understanding Scotland the sociology of a nation – second edition (New York, 2001), 31-53.*

commonality between people. ‘Two man belong to the same nation if and only if they share the same culture...’⁶ and ‘Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation’⁷. In other words, nation is built on a common identity. Hobsbawm agrees and builds on this concept by saying specifically that the nation is build on ‘national identification’. The importance of Hobsbawm’s definition lies also in the fact that national identification is not fixed but can change and shift over time. A changing and shifting national identification is also something that returns in the theory of Anderson when he describes the nations as an imagined community.⁸ The basis of Anderson’s theory is the premise that nations are such large communities that it is no longer possible for an individual to know all other individuals within a community. Their bond is thus based on an imagined principal of commonality rather than a real one. Hence Anderson poses that a nation is an imagined community, what is imagined is a common bond, a common identity. The relevance of this national identification within a Scottish context was proved by Rossie & Bond in their 2002 article on the effect of national identities on post-devolution Scotland.⁹ They found that those who identified totally or mostly with the Scottish national identity where more likely to vote SNP, where in favour of more powers for the devolved parliament and were more supportive of independence. It can thus be concluded that within Scotland nation, political nationalism and national identity are strongly interrelated.¹⁰

Despite the clear importance of national identification to voting patterns in general, and to political nationalism and the SNP in particular, there has been done little research that explicitly looks at the interrelation between to the two. Research done by Lieth is an exception and looks into how the SNP represented Scotland and Scottishness.¹¹ He concludes that the SNP has moved from (partially) representing Scottishness as ethnically with clear boundaries to inclusive and civic. However, the majority of studies in these subjects are interested in either nationalism or identity in Scotland as separate issues. Authors as Finlay, Lynch, Hasan and Kernohan for instance have looked extensively at the nationalist movement

⁶ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism – second edition*, (Malden, Oxford & Carlton, 2006), 6.

⁷ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 7.

⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities – revised edition*, (London and New York, 2006), 4-13;

⁹ Ross Bond and Michael Rossie, National-Identity is Post-Devolution Scotland’, *Scottish Affairs*, (40, 2002,) 34-53.

¹⁰ E.J. Hobsbawm, ‘Nation and nationalism since 1780 program, myth, reality second edition’, (Cambirdge, 1994), 1-13; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1-7;

¹¹ Murray Stewert Lieth, ‘Scottish National Party Representations of Scottishness and Scotland’, *Politics*, (28, 2008), 83-92.

in Scotland and specifically the SNP.¹² These researchers have looked at the creation, the organisation, the message, the image and the people who have been part of the nationalist movement in Scotland. They have focussed on describing and partly explaining the SNP and have done so mainly from a contemporary perspective. That is to say that their explanations of the changes that the nationalist movement went through are found within the timeframe in which they were actually taking place. They also focus quite narrowly on the political spectrum and on telling the story of the party without focussing on a wider historical framework. What is an interesting aspect of these books is that they hardly deal with the question: what makes the SNP nationalist. A central tenant of these books is that the SNP calls itself nationalist and it strives for Scottish independence and thus is nationalist. From this omission follows their lack of interest in identity. Both an explicit or an implicit study of identity, by going into a larger (historical) process that shaped the “Scottish Nation”, is lacking.¹³

With respect to identity, in previously mentioned surveys there was both an adherence to the British and to the Scottish identity in Scotland. Both of these identities are historical constructions in so far as they are build over time and on the basis of (a common) history. While authors such as Trevor-Roper and Hechter have argued against the validity of the Scottish identity or its relevance, the vested knowledge has become that both this identity and the British identity are real but not mutually exclusive.¹⁴ Authors focussing on these identities or the history of Scotland have found that they have been based on different parts of history and different institutions. Authors as Devine and Harvie have often associated Scottish identity with the creation of a national culture inspired by Tartanism during the eighteenth century, Kailyard in the nineteenth century and Red Clydeside in the twentieth century.¹⁵ They have recognised specific Scottish institution such as law, education and the Church of Scotland that have created a frame which was recognisably Scottish. On the British side of the equation it was Nairn who in 1977 identified the importance of empire as the central binding force within the Union during the eighteenth, nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth

¹² Richard Finlay, *Independent and Free: Scottish Politics and the Origins of the Scottish National Party*, (Edinburgh, 1994); Ed. Gerry Hassan, *The modern SNP from protest to power*, (Edinburgh, 2009); Peter Lynch, *SNP the history of the Scottish National Party*, (Cardiff, 2002); R. D. Kernohan, ‘The political scene in Scotland’, *Contemporary Review*, (1536, 1994), 33-38.

¹³ T.C. Smout, ‘Perspectives on the Scottish identity’, *Scottish Affairs* (1994), 101-113.

¹⁴ Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The invention of Scotland myth and history*, (2009, New haven and London); Linda Colley, *Britons Forging the Nation 1707-1837 revised edition*, (New Haven and London, 2009) 118-133; 372-393.

¹⁵ Devine, *The Scottish nation*, 363-388, Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism*, 162-189.

century.¹⁶ A vision that was partly shared by Colley who's widely cited 1991 *Britons: forging the nation* looked at the origins of the British identity. She, however, recognised two other factors as more detrimental to its creation in the period 1707-1837, namely: a shared Protestantism across the British isle combined with the wars against France.¹⁷ More specifically on the Scottish basis of British identity Colley agreed with Nairn that it was empire and to some extent industry that were important factors. The historical importance of the British Empire to Scotland and Scotland's place in the union is also the basis of Devine's book *The Scottish Empire* and a similar influence of industry was found by Whatley in *The Industrial Revolution in Scotland*.¹⁸ But not only by looking back into history is it possible to see that these items were important for affirming the Union in Scotland, Pittock describes in his *Scottish Nationality* how economic issues such as industry and especially trade, and hence empire, were already important issues for those Scots writing favourably about the Union.¹⁹ Furthermore Devine, McCrone and Begg & Stewart also identify the British state administration as of important influence on the relation between Scotland and the rest of the Union.²⁰ They differ, however, on the role of that the state's administrations played. Some stress its role, after the 1850s, in taking over those tasks that had traditionally been part of the Scottish estates and so further integrating Scotland in the Union. Others on the other hand stress the point that the creation of the Scottish office started the devolvement of power from Westminster to Scotland itself. So opinions differ on what the role of the state's administration with regard to the relationship between the British and Scottish identity is.

For later periods both the growth of the state apparatus during the nineteenth century and the creation of the welfare state during the second half of the twentieth century, are indicated by Smout as important parts for confirming what it meant to be British in Scotland. However, the general image that comes across from all authors is that Scotland saw two movements that were neither exclusive nor did they weaken each other. Hence within the same timeframe one can find the creation of a modern Scottish national identity while at the same time a British state and Empire was formed which also created its own identity.²¹

¹⁶ Tom Nairn, *The break-up of Britain - second edition*, (Wiltshire, 1981), 11-92.

¹⁷ Colley, *Britons*, 118-133; 372-393.

¹⁸ Christopher A. Whatley, *The Industrial Revolution in Scotland*, (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne, 1997), 38-63; Devine, *The Scottish nation*, 363-388.

¹⁹ Murray G.H. Pittock, *Scottish Nationality*, (New York, 2001), 1-13; 81-102.

²⁰ H. M. Begg and J. A. Stewart, 'The Nationalist Movement in Scotland', *Journal of Contemporary History*, (1, 1971), 135-143. Christopher Harvie, *Scotland and nationalism Scottish society and politics 1707 to the present*, (London and New York, 2004), 80-110.

²¹ Smout, 'Perspectives on the Scottish identity', 101-113

What can thus be seen is that many authors have either directly or indirectly focused on identity in Scotland or on political nationalism. What has been lacking is research that connects on the one hand this process that formed and shaped identity in Scotland and on the other hand that of contemporary political nationalism in Scotland. So looking at the influence that national identification had on voting patterns as Bond and Rossie have done becomes much more significant if it is coupled to research looking into what that Scottish identity actually entails. Finding the basis of identity, how it has changed over time and more importantly if it has influenced the political alignment in Scotland will become much more relevant with the finding of Bond and Rossie that national identities have been of significant influence in Scottish politics since devolution. Hence this thesis will look specifically at the interrelation between the historical factors of identity and political nationalism in Scotland.²²

1.2 Theoretical Framework

There are off course those like Baumann within the identity debate that would pose that identity, even a national identity, is an inherent personal choice which is not or only partially affected by larger systems.²³ This thesis rather follows the principles of identity set-out by authors such as Hall: 'Though they seem to invoke an origin in a historical past with which they continue to correspond, actually identities are about using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being.'²⁴ Hall thus sees a national identity as an identity that is formed through a process and as something that is ingrained into a society rather than something that an individual is free to choose at his or her own accord. What complicates this principal when applied to Scotland is that both the British identity and the Scottish identity would fit this description. Therefore for any definition or model to be useful within a Scottish context it has to carry within it the possibility to make a clear distinction between the Scottish and the British identity.

The definition of identity hence used in this thesis is build on the concentric rings of identity model of Smith and applied by Smout, and the national and state identity model of McCrone.²⁵ This model, which will be further explained in chapter 2, poses that there is a difference between an identity based on the state and an identity that is based on the nation.

²² Bond and Rossie, 'National-Identity in Post-Devolution Scotland', 34-53.

²³ Z. Bauman, 'Soil, blood and identity', *Sociological Review*, (40, 1992), 675-701.

²⁴ S. Hall, 'Introduction: who needs identity', in S. Hall and P. DuPage (ed.) *Questions of Cultural Identity*, (London, 1996), 4.

²⁵ A. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, (London, 1981); T.C. Smout, 'Perspectives on the Scottish identity', *Scottish Affairs* (1994), 101-113; McCrone, *Understanding Scotland*, 127-174.

Implemented on Scotland this means that we have a British state identity and a Scottish national identity and that these two are markedly different and separately identifiable. This model of national and state identity thus provides us with the ability to separately analyse both the British and the Scottish identity. Hence it provides for a framework in which to analyse the complicated reality of identity in Scotland and the influence that identity has upon modern Scottish political nationalism.

1.3 Research question and outline

Previous research has shown that the creation of identity, be it state or nation, has been a historical process in which historical events, cultural movements and influential persons have all had their impact. The basic premise of this thesis will thus be to connect the historical construction of national and state identity to Scottish Nationalism. There are those such as Trevor-Roper that would place the start of the construction of the modern Scottish identity at the start of the second century AD. This Thesis will however limit its scope to the past 300 years using 1707 as the ultimate start, but will mainly focus on the period from the last part of the eighteenth century onwards. This choice is based on the fact that firstly Devine, Harvie, Cohen and others indicate that this is the period in which the modern Scottish identity was formed, and secondly the relevance of identity for this study is based on the fact that it is set inside the British Union.²⁶

This study will also limit itself by only focussing on the SNP while looking at nationalism in Scotland. Other parties and interest groups have also adopted some parts of the nationalist agenda, primarily the pre-1997 call for devolution. These policy changes have, however, usually come in response to the success of the SNP; they are thus rather reactions than actions. Adding to that the SNP was and is the only political party in Scotland to solely run on a nationalist ideology, the fact that other parties have changed their stances in response to this only affirms the belief that the SNP is the primary representative of the nationalist movement in Scotland. The last point in which the scope of the research is limited is the timeframe in which this thesis looks at the SNP. This will be from the General Election of 1970 onward. This timeframe has been chosen because it has only been from this point onwards that the SNP has made any significant electoral impact.

²⁶ T.M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation 1700-2007*, (London, 2006), 273-798; 574-590; Christopher Harvie, *Scotland and nationalism Scottish society and politics 1707 to the present*, (London and New York, 2004), 11-35; Anthony P. Cohen, 'Nationalism and Social identity: who owns the interest of Scotland' *Scottish Affairs*, (18 1997), 95-107.

On the basis of previous research of Rossie & Bond combined with electoral results it can be predicted that identity was and is an important tool for the SNP. Within the previous sketched confines this thesis will look into the use of identity by the SNP and thus poses the following research question:

Why has identity been a successful tool for the SNP since 1970?

To be able to answer this question it is important to have a clear image of what both national identity and state identity mean in a Scottish context, what are their main focus points and how do they differ from each other? Also to better appreciate the significance of the SNP it is important to look more closely at its rise to popularity. Hence this will lead us to two sets of sub-questions, those based on identity and those based on the SNP.

Identity questions:

1. What are the main elements of the national identity in Scotland?
2. What are the main elements of the state identity in Scotland?
3. What are the main differences between state and national identity in Scotland?

SNP questions:

4. How has the SNP political message of the SNP changed over the period 1970-2011?
5. How has the SNP electoral strategy changed over the period 1970-2011?

These questions will be answered on the basis of a qualitative analyses of secondary literature and will make use of the research in the fields of history, sociology and political science. These analyses will result in a list of attributes that can be assigned to either state or national identities and give us a clear overview of history and the success of the SNP.

Hence they will provide the tools and set-out the boundaries of the following analysis which will be based on primary sources, i.e. the General Elections manifesto of the SNP for the 1970-2010 period and the Scottish Assembly Election manifestos of the SNP for the 1997-2011 period. Party manifestos are the embodiment of the political will and the social outlook of a party on a specific point in time or in the words of Lieth: 'SNP manifestos serve as a record of the changing nature of the party and specifically the changing conceptualizations of

Scottishness and Scotland.’²⁷ They thus provide the clearest statement of political will and are continuingly available for the described period. The choice for manifestos of the General and the Scottish Assembly, and not for manifestos of Local and European Elections, has been based on the fact that the focus of this study lies on the whole of Scotland and not on particular localities or on Scotland’s position within the European Union. These manifestos will be analysed on the basis of the list of attributes of national and state identity. Both state and national identity will be used as it stands to reason that within the British framework both are detrimental to the nationalist argument. If indeed identity is a successful tool for the SNP both identities thus need to be taken into account.

In general this thesis will follow the structure as set out by the sub-questions. It will start by further exploring the models of national and state identity in order to formulate two workable definitions of these two forms of identity. The implementation of these definitions on the Scottish case will be the next step on the basis of which sub-questions 1, 2 and 3 will be answered. These should result in a list of attributes that can be assigned to either the national or the state identity. Then it will give an overview of the SNP’s general history and an analysis of its electoral gains and losses answering sub-question 4 and 5. These two parts will provide the theoretical basis for this thesis as well as its historical outline: the groundwork upon which the analysis of the primary sources can take place.

²⁷ Lieth, ‘*Scottish National Party representation of Scottishness and Scotland*’, 85.

2. National and State identity

As discussed in the introduction this thesis uses the respective models of Smith and McCrone to describe the relationship between the British and the Scottish identity. The basic premise on which these models are built is that a person's identity is assembled out of different layers. Rather than identity thus being a monolithic construction within this model, it is seen as a diverse and changeable whole. Smith's model of concentric rings of identity recognises seven rings of identity: 1. home and family 2. kin, clan and surname 3. locality 4. nationality 5. state 6. empire and 7. supranational. In a more visual perception one can imagine this model in an onion like fashion in which the concentric rings form the rings of the onion. In such an image one would find home and family identity at the heart and supranational identity as the outer most layer. All these different sub-identities are recognisable as separate rings, but such a ring must always be seen within the context of a system of identity, as such they are part of a whole.²⁸

This model means in practise that at each of these rings a person has something which to identify with. At the first ring it is family, your children, your parents, your grandparents, your spouse, your brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts. Together they all form a group that a person relates to in a certain fashion, although not always in a benign way. As with the sixth layer, Smith's second ring of kin, clan and surname has lost importance in a contemporary western perspective. In other parts of the globe (parts of Sub-Sahara Africa and the Arabic world) it does, however, play an important role and there is an argument to be made that hooliganism is the modern variant of this type of identity. What is less controversial however is the third ring of locality, an identity that is based on a certain area or city. At this point this thesis enters the domain of Anderson's imagined communities. Although his theory is based on nationality it is also applicable to the ring of locality. Here we imagine a community on the basis of the city, village or area we live in, for instance a Parisian, Amsterdammer or New Yorker. It is imagined because we only know but a small percentage of that particular community, that is to say we imagine this community. We imagine a connection to all the members of this community because it is too large to actually have a real connection to each and every individual. At the same time it is limited because we can separate those individuals that belong to it from those who do not. It is a community because we imagine each member to be an equal part of it regardless of social status, gender etc.²⁹

²⁸ Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, 91-107; McCrone, *Understanding Scotland the sociology of a nation*, 149-174.

²⁹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities – revised edition*, (London and New York, 2006), 1-8; Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, 91-107.

Within the fourth ring of nationality the same principal is found: an imagined community, only at a higher level of abstraction. In practical sense it is most probably the highest form of an imagined community that the most people perceive. It is the idea that an individual is Czech, Italian, Japanese, etc. According to Anderson the nation is not only imagined to be a community but also imagined to be sovereign. That is to say Anderson sees the nation as the community with the power to rule over itself without having to secede power to a higher authority. This is where Smith and Anderson diverge, because within the concentric identities model sovereignty lies in ring five: state identity. The basis of this difference lies in the fact that Anderson describes the nation as being equal to the state. Or more specific Anderson thinks of the nation-state when referring to the nation. This implies that nation and state span the same community. Smith, however, makes a clear difference between state identity and national identity. 'The latter [the state] refers exclusively to public institutions, differentiated from, and autonomous of, other social institutions and exercising a monopoly of coercion and extraction within a given territory. The nation, on the other hand, signifies a cultural and political bond, uniting in a single political community all who share an historic culture and homeland'.³⁰ Both state and nation are thus clearly different principals and identities based upon them do thus not always overlap. Though of course there are enough examples to be thought of where national and state identity overlap. The Danish nation is more or less equal to the Danish state and the American nation also equal to the American state. In these examples both state and nation define more or less the same community. However, there are more than a few examples to be named in which this is not true. For instance the Kurds, the Basques, and the Quebeckers can all be defined in some sense as nations while they are without a state. They are societies with their own culture, language and history and more importantly they identify themselves as a nation. Kurds, Basques and Quebeckers all have some connection to state identity though it may not be strong, they have passports, their rights are administered along a state line and their sports players will perform under the state colours. The concentric rings of state identity thus describes the identification of an individual with the legal construct of the state vis-à-vis the fourth ring of nationality that describes the identification with a community namely the nation.³¹

State and national identity are separate entities even though they in some cases coincide. Though clear and definable differences between state and national identity may lead to conflict, as is the case for instance in the difference between the Spanish state identity and

³⁰ Anthony Smith, *National identity*, (London & New York, 1991), 24-25.

³¹ *Idem.*

the Basque national identity, this is by no mean a given. In practise this is not only pointed out by the British example but also for instance by the Frisians in the Netherlands. Here national and state identity coexists, though there are clear differences between them in culture and dialect/language.

Differences between identity rings are thus based on different aspects. For instance the home and family identity is based on who you are married to and who your parents are, while locality is based on place of residence, place of birth, local dialect etc. The earlier mentioned quote by Smith described the basic difference between attributes of the state identity and attributes of the national identity. Where (historic) culture, community and homeland can be generally attributed to nation and national identity, state refers to public institutions and authority. However it is important to realise in this context that certain attributes can play to multiple identities for instance a sports club can call on the local identity in the national league but the national identity during an international event.

With regard to national and state identity it is important to realise that history plays such a role. Certain events and processes from history may be attributes to either the nation or the state identity, for instance remembrance of the defeat of the French army during the siege on Groningen in 1692 may be attributed to Frisian identity in the context of that single battle, while the complete victory in the overall war might play to the Dutch identity. Furthermore identities should not be perceived to be solid entities, they change over time. Where the state identity might once have been associated with strong military prowess it may now represent a strong social welfare system. As representation of historical events change, so may the identities that that historical event is linked to. The value of slave trade may in the nineteenth century have been a supportive attribute to the state identity while a hundred year later it may be a strong argument against that same state identity. Furthermore state and national identity can also replace each other; the creation of a new state may lead to a reformulation of a national identity, while a successful nationalist movement may reformulate the state identities along the lines of the national identity. The differences and boundaries between nation and state identity are thus as real as they are fluid.

The essential idea of a national identity and a state identity is successfully applied to Scotland by McCrone is his *Understanding Scotland*. McCrone's describes Britain as a nationless-state.³² That is to say, Britain is a state which contains four separate nations: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. According to McCrone the British nation

³² McCrone, *Understanding Scotland the sociology of a nation*, 149-174.

does not exist there is only a British state. With respect to identity he proves, based on forty years of survey data, that Scots make a clear distinction between the British identity and the Scottish identity and he argues that, based on historical data that Scots have always been able to distinguish between the two identities. To explain this difference McCrone concludes that the British identity is a state identity and that the Scottish identity is a national identity. Though McCrone does not refer explicitly to the concentric rings model his distinction between state and national identity are essentially the same thing. McCrone backs up his assessment with data from British Elections Surveys and is also supported by the findings of Rossie and Bond that were discussed in the introduction. McCrone argues that both state and national identity have been build on different attributes therefore they are not oppositional and hence make it possible to feel both British and Scottish.³³

In his *perspective on the Scottish identity* Smout has nevertheless made a valid point about the difficulty to distinguish between being English and being British: 'It would be impossible to imagine a Margaret Thatcher, a Winston Churchill or any modern British prime minister to whom a loyalty to a smaller England was distinguishable from that to a larger Britain, or an English population that did not take the Union Jack to be the national flag...'³⁴ With this quote Smout points out that in reality, even in Britain with its clear division across the land, it is not always as easy to make clear distinction between national and state identity. However with regard to Scotland Smout concedes that Scots almost universally acknowledge that there is a clear distinction between Britain and Scotland.

Distinguishing between a national Scottish identity and a British state identity provides us thus with a workable and academically acceptable model. In the following chapters this thesis will delve further into the two different identities and will try to give substance to the distinction between state and national identity within a Scottish context.

³³ Bond and Rossie, 'National-Identity in Post-Devolution Scotland', 34-53.

³⁴ Smout, 'Perspectives on the Scottish identity', 104.

3. The British State Identity

This chapter will take a closer look at the British state identity in order to answer the question: *What are the main elements of the state identity in Scotland?* This thesis will do so based on secondary literature, in particular publications in the fields of history and sociology. Based on this secondary literature the aim of this chapter is to provide both an overview of the theories on the British identity and their applicability to Scotland while placing them within a historical framework.

3.1 Periodization

As explained in the introduction the choice of periodization with respect to both the Scottish and the British identity is a debatable subject. This thesis has chosen 1707 as starting point because this is the year in which, through the Act of Union, England and Scotland stopped to exist as independent states and the state of Great Britain was created. This however needs some further explanation. One could for instance argue that 1603 with the Joining of the Crowns, when James VI (1566-1625) of Scotland also became James I of England, is an apt starting point. The Joining of the Crowns gave both countries the same head of state and brought both countries closer in some respects. The most dramatic example of this is Scotland's involvement in the English Civil War (1642-1651) and the following Jacobite Risings. However, although the Joining of the Crowns led to increased (political) interaction it did not create a common state or a shared community between England and Scotland. Hence 1603 is more relevant as starting date when interested in the creation of the British state; however, the period 1603-1707 is much less relevant with respect to a British identity.

Choosing a starting point later than 1707 is also feasible, for instance the 1843 schism within the Church of Scotland that dramatically changed its function within British and Scottish society. Or 1918 as in the wake of World War I (1914-1918) Ireland became independent and both in Wales as in Scotland new nationalist groups were formed or 1945 as afterwards the nature of the British state changed quite dramatically. However, all these dates have in common that they take out of account certain formative periods within Scottish society and the British state. This thesis is interested in identity as an historical construction, hence these formative periods are of great interest to it. Also these other periodization would in themselves be much more subjective as they are based on the interpretation of events. The choice for 1707 is based on an objective fact, namely the creation of the British state. It is because of the creation of this state that there is a difference between state and national

identity in Scotland. Furthermore it is the same starting date chosen by Colley for her analysis into the origins of the British identity and it is the same periodization that is used by authors such as Devine and Harvie when describing (elements of) the creation of modern Scottish society.³⁵ With all this taken into account 1707-2011 seems to be the correct period in which to analyse the creation of state and national identity in Scotland.

3.2 The Act of Union

Although a complete historical account is neither the object of this thesis nor should it be, some insight into the creation of the Union is useful for future reference. On the first of May 1707 the Scottish Parliament voted the Kingdom of Scotland out of, and the United Kingdom of England, Wales and Scotland into, existence by accepting the Act of Union. In the period leading up to this act the northern nation had virtually gone broke. The reason of this distress can be found in failed colonisation attempts, most prominently the Darien scheme which was to create a Scottish colony in current Panama. Recent historical research has shown that possibly up to a quarter of all capital in Scotland was invested in Darien and its subsequent failure thus led to great financial problems in the country.³⁶ Though the reasons for failure of several colonisation attempts are diverse it has become conventional wisdom that the inability of the Scots to protect both the colonies and their supply lines with any significant sea-power played a major role. Furthermore, the country's trade revenues were falling, caused by rising mercantilist policies in its major trading partners England, the Netherlands and France. While at the same time agricultural revenues were also lagging behind when compared to her southern neighbour. These circumstances are the reason why authors such as Wallerstein and Hechter have argued that Scotland on its own could not develop.³⁷ In their perspectives it was only through English controlled and incentivised development that eventually the country started to grow. Devine, however, makes in his 2007 book *The Scottish nation* a compelling argument when he writes that Darien proved Scotland's innate ability to organise capital and resources.³⁸ Following that line of argument Devine says it was not English interventions that made Scotland into an industrial heartland and a trading hub for the world, but rather it was the Scottish organisational ability that made the country flourish. Regardless of the

³⁵ Colley, *Britons*, 1-8; Devine, *The Scottish Nation, I-XXII*; Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism*, 4-13.

³⁶ Richard Cavendish, 'Founding the Darien colony', *History Today*, (48, 1998) 48-50; George Ellis, 'Disaster in Darien', *Americas* (46, 1994), 36-40; Douglas A. Watt, *The Price of Scotland: Darien, Union and the wealth of nations*, (Edinburgh, 2007); Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 3-30.

³⁷ Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World*, 52-54; Hechter, *Internal colonialism*, 15-46.

³⁸ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 3-30.

interpretation of Scotland's position prior to the Union it is quite clear that the country had much to gain by it in both the short and the long term. It would relieve the state of its financial worries and it would grant Scots free trade access to England and her colonies. Although recent research has shown that bribery played a significant role in the final vote on the Act of Union in the Scottish Parliament the benefits to the Scots were quite clear.³⁹

The Union had also clear benefits from an English perspective. Since the Glorious Revolution (1688) both England and Scotland had replaced the Catholic Stuart line (Scottish in origin) for a protestant monarch (first William of Orange, followed by the house of Hannover). However, this led from 1689 onwards to continuing Jacobite risings. The aim of these risings was to reinstate the Stuart line as the rightful kings of both Scotland and England. These revolts were thus a direct threat to the Kingship of William of Orange and the later line of Hannover as well as to the protestant nature of the two countries. Further complicating the case was the fact that the Stuarts were heavily backed by France. What England feared most was a Jacobite revolt in Scotland which would make it into the ideal landing zone for a France invasion into England itself. The Union was for the English an attempt to secure Scotland and in doing so defend Protestantism in the country.⁴⁰

Although the Act of Union in effect ended Scotland's existence as an independent country it did not mean that Scotland lost all of its sovereignty. Scotland kept many of its distinct institutions most prominently the Three Estates of law, education and religion. Hence Scotland kept its own distinct law, courts and judges to which all in Scotland had to answer and who were not under the control of Westminster. The country also kept its own distinct educational system, a system that had given Scots the reputation of great scholars and that would be the basis under the eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment. Finally, Scotland had its own religious institution: the Church of Scotland, which was Presbyterian instead of Episcopalian or Anglican in nature. Hence Scotland did not only have its own Church but that Church followed a completely different interpretation of the protestant faith than the Anglican Church did in England.

Although the Act of Union thus formally created a new state the power of this state in Scotland was limited. Even though through the centuries this relation of course changed the fundamental principal of a British state that partial autonomy for Scotland (and for Wales and

³⁹ Christopher A. Whatley, *Bought and sold for English Gold? Explaining the Union of 1707*, (East-Linton, 2001), 21-48; 101-127; T.C. Smout, 'The Anglo Scottish Union of 1707: the economic background', *The Economic History Review*, (16, 1964), 462-463.

⁴⁰ T.M. Devine, *The Scottish Nation 1700-2007 reissued edition*, (London and New York, 2006), 3-30; R.H. Campbell, 'The Anglo Scottish Union of 1707 II: the economic consequences', (16, 1964), 468-477.

to some extent Ireland) remained in place. It can thus be said that the shape that the Union took at its creation has been quite influential with respect to its future development.

3.3 The umbrella identity: The general nature of the British identity

The effect of the limited state authority, as described in the previous part, had on the general nature of British identity has been described by Tom Nairn in his 1977 *The Break-Up of Britain*. His main analysis of the British state was that it is an archaic principle. He bases this conclusion on his thesis that Britain was a state that was put on-top of the historic nations of England, Scotland, Wales and later Ireland instead of replacing these nations. It did not build a nation through nation-building and centralisation in the way Germany was created; it rather draped a state over societies that already were nations themselves. The reason why such an institution was capable of surviving in a changing world lies, according to Nairn, in the fact that it possessed first the British Empire and when this was slowly crumbling during the twentieth century it replaced it with the financial power of the City of London. These two institutions made sure that there was a constant influx of capital from overseas that made sure that the British state could constantly invest in itself and could “buy-off” disenfranchised groups within its society. Nairn’s thesis for why Britain since the 1970’s was increasingly in state of break-up lies in the fact that as it lost its ability to attract such overseas capital, it lost its main purpose of being. The new nationalist movements both in the Celtic fringe (Scotland, Wales and Northern-Ireland) and in England itself were, according to Nairn, thus a reaction to changing socio-economic realities. Since the British state is no longer providing its traditional benefits the old nations are rediscovering their ancient independence.

Nairn’s thesis is of particular importance as he describes the British identity as an imperial identity. In that sense Nairn followed an idea of the New-Zealand historian Pocock who argued that the British identity was a shared identity across the British Empire rather than something specific to the United Kingdom, *Civis Britannicus Sum*. The British identity in this case becomes interwoven with the existence of the British Empire.⁴¹

The British Empire as the basis of the British identity is also a prominent part of Marquand’s analysis of the British identity. He poses that the British Empire was the basis under the classic (Whig) interpretation of what Britain is. ‘... the British nation is a uniquely imperial nation: constituted as a nation by its decision to seek an oceanic and imperial destiny

⁴¹ Tom Nairn, *The break-up of Britain*, (London, 1977), 11-92; P.G.A. Pocock, ‘British History: a plea for a new subject’, *Journal of Modern History*, (4, 1975), 601-621.

rather than a merely continental, European one.⁴² He also poses that under this interpretation Britain consisted of multiple Kingdoms, united under one crown. Similar thus to Nairn, Marquand recognizes under this interpretation that the British identity thus is two-fold, firstly it is based on the British Empire and secondly it envisions it as a state over a greater multitude instead of a single nation. However, Marquand also accepts that there are two more recent interpretations of the British identity. One is attached to the Labour movements that rose to prominence during the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. He classifies this as collectivist-democracy and is associated with the struggle for workers and women rights. It sees Britain as a multi-national, multi-ethnic state, but stops clear of having a vision on what British identity should be, save from a state in which all its citizens share equality through democratic rights. The most recent interpretation of the British identity that Marquand distinguishes is linked primarily to former Prime-Minister Margaret Thatcher (1925-1990); this interpretation (authoritarian individualist) sees Britain as being equal to England. It sees the British state in the post-imperial times as an English state. It also sees the state as ideally being only limited in scope.⁴³

Robin Cohen also speaks to the difficulty of distinguishing between Englishness and Britishness and what he describes as the fuzzy boundaries of these concepts.⁴⁴ Cohen describes a process in which Britishness has become to include an increasing amount of people, from the Celtic Protestants to the Irish Catholics, from the white settlers of the colonies to the Brits from Asian and African descent. Cohen paints a broad picture of all different kinds of people and communities claiming some part of the British identity while at the same time it is that same identity that sets them apart from the alien Frenchmen, Germans or Russians. Cohen accepts that during the later part of the twentieth century British has become on the one hand more synonymous with England while on the other hand it is supposed to be open to more people than ever before. Another point that can be found within Cohen argument is that the British identity is an umbrella identity that is draped over other national identities instead of replacing it. Within this concept the principal of the British identity as a state identity can thus perfectly be fitted.⁴⁵

⁴² David Marquand, 'The twilight of the British State: Henry Dubb versus Sceptred Awe', *The Political Quarterly* (2, 1993), 219.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 210-222.

⁴⁴ Robin Cohen, 'Fuzzy frontiers of identity: The British case', *Social identities* (1, 1995), 35-64.

⁴⁵ David McCrone, 'Unmasking Britannia: the rise and fall of British national identity', *Nations and Nationalism* (3, 1997), 579-596; Robin Cohen, 'The incredible vagueness of being British', *International Affairs* (76, 2000) 575-582.

The analysis that Britain was a state that was draped over already existing nations rather than replacing nations is also a part of *Britons: forging the nation* by Colley. In this book she describes the process which brought the different nations together under the same banner. Equal to Nairn, Colley accepts that particularly for Scots, Empire was an important binding force within the Union. However, Colley's main thesis is in line with Hobsbawm's quote: 'There is no more effective way of bonding together the disparate sections of restless people than to unite them against outsiders'.⁴⁶ Colley argues that in the case of Britain the disparate sections of restless people (the different nations of the British Isle) were brought together against the outsider (Catholic France). Even though Colley accepts that there are market differences between the Protestant faiths across the British isle (most prominently the difference between the Presbyterian Church in Scotland and the Anglican Church in England) their shared Protestantism was enough to bring them together against the Catholic threat posed by France. The constant warfare and fear that followed the almost constant state of war between the countries in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, is for Colley the most prominent reason for the creation of a common British identity. Marquand calls this principal: the negative construction of identity. Although Colley thus may recognise different grounds upon which the British identity was built, Colley also describes it as an identity that was put on top of the national identities. The British identity was built on a commonality within the different national identities: Protestantism. This was used to create a common identity, a higher identity, rather than creating a new national identity in which all members of the community were Protestant. Hence you are a Scot, Welshman or Englishman and our common Protestantism makes us British rather than, we are British and hence Protestant.⁴⁷

Previous arguments by Marquand and Colley were used and further expanded on by McCrone in his 1997 article *Unmasking Britannia: The rise and fall of British national identity*. He reiterated the fact that England and Britain are becoming increasingly synonymous. He agrees with Marquand's assertion that under Thatcher the boundaries between civil society and state have been changing, equating the English civil society with the British state. However, this is a more recent development, the origin of the British identity is for McCrone one that is only loosely superimposed over civil society. McCrone explicitly calls the British State a night-watchman state, arguing that it created state institutions while at the same time the different nations kept a certain amount of autonomy. McCrone agrees with Marquand that it was the British Empire that was paramount to the British identity while also

⁴⁶ E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, (Cambridge, 1990), 91.

⁴⁷ Colley, *Britons*, 372-385; Marquand, 'The twilight of the British State', 215.

acknowledging Colley's thesis that it were the wars against France that inspired loyalty towards that identity. He extends this analysis from just the wars with France to the long range of conflicts that the British state was part of during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. Loyalty to such an umbrella identity as the British, instilled through fear of the other instead of a sense of community, cannot be qualified as nationalism but rather as patriotism. For McCrone the British identity is best expressed in the expression 'for King and Country', it emphasizes loyalty to the crown and to the state, instead of to the community. The 'unmasking' of that British state took place in the period after the 1945, first when it was extended much beyond the parameters of the night-watchman state under the influence of the democratic collectivist interpretation without reformulating what it meant to be British. While secondly in later stages that identity was being equated to the English identity under the autocratic individualist influence. Here McCrone readily uses Marquand's qualifications to make the case that drastic reinterpretation of the British state has led the British identity to wither, especially in those areas that have access to the English identity.

All these authors thus generally agree on the basic premise that the British identity is an umbrella identity under which it was possible to keep another national identity. This assessment is in line with the interpretation of the British identity as a state identity versus the Scottish identity as the national identity. What is more, there are two assumptions of the British identity that can be found within the writings of several of these authors: Firstly that the British Empire is one of the, if not the most important historical component of the British identity. Secondly, that increasingly the British identity is being equated with the English identity.

3.4 The British identity in Scotland

While knowledge of the general nature of the British identity is of course useful for our later analysis, this thesis is more interested in the nature of the British identity in Scotland. Precisely because the general nature of the identity was an umbrella identity its interpretation could vary from nation to nation. This chapter will look into what the British Union meant specifically for Scotland and how this (reasonably) would have affected the perception of the British identity in Scotland.

3.4.1 Empire

As shown, several authors have underlined the importance of the British Empire with respect to the British identity. As important as the Empire was for the creation of such an identity in

general it was probably even more important for Scots. The great importance of the Empire on Scotland is most comprehensively described by Devine in his *Scotland's Empire*. With respect to identity the book has attention for a wide range of social, economic and cultural aspects of that link Scotland and the British Empire. Devine recognises two forms of success that Scots had in the Empire, the first was success through trade and the spin off this generated and the second form of success were the achievements that Scots had in service of the Empire.

The impact that imperial trade had on Scotland is best exemplified through Devine's description of the tobacco trade. Where in pre-Union times the tobacco and other forms of trade with the colonies in America would have been exclusively for English traders within the Union, Scottish traders had been awarded equal trading rights. He shows that in 1710, only 10 percent of UK's tobacco came in through Scotland. In 1765 this had quadrupled with over 40 percent of all tobacco imported to the UK coming through the harbour of Glasgow.⁴⁸ Although less spectacular, sugar trade followed roughly the same route. He explains how this led to an enormous influx of wealth into Scotland in general and the Glasgow area specifically. It was this wealth that, going forward, directly financed spin-off industries such as banking, but more importantly it also directly financed Scotland industrialisation. The picture thus painted by Devine is that free excess to the Empire's markets fuelled Scotland's economy and was the basis for Scotland enormous industrialisation and urbanisation.

In his book Devine comes up with a large amount of achievements of Scots in the Empire. However, these achievements can be divided into two sub-categories: military service and civil service. On the point of military service Devine is quite clear; the fact that Britain became a colonial power also made it a militarized power. Devine hence draws a direct line between the Empire and the growth of the army. He shows that Scots especially during the eighteenth and nineteenth century were grossly overrepresented both in the lower ranks as well as in the officer corps. Devine finds the causes for this overrepresentation in Scottish experience and acceptance of mercenary military service in armies all across Europe, the striking poverty especially in the Scottish Highlands and the habit of the elite in especially the Highlands to view themselves as a warrior caste. Combined this created a system in which military service was a respected and sought after way to both earn a living and honour. The British army thus provided for those from the lowest to the highest echelons of society with a career previously not open to them. More interesting, however, is that Devine has also found

⁴⁸ Devine, *Scotland's Empire*, 69-93.

that the numbers of those who were volunteers in the British Army were also much higher in Scotland which seems to indicate that allegiance to the institute was based on more than just career possibilities and way earn a living.⁴⁹

But Scots were not only overrepresented in the military, they also delivered a higher percentage of colonial governors, administrators etc. Devine describes how in the different colonial areas of the Empire: America, Canada, the Caribbean world, India and Australia Scots rose to prominent position and even kept office as governor. Scots proved to be highly successful in gaining positions of prominence, setting up communities and spreading the gospel. Devine paints a picture of Scots as willing and successful Empire builders.⁵⁰ This analysis is in line with that of many other authors, in Colley's *Briton* the success of the Scots in the Empire is seen a major contribution in their acceptance of Union and the creation of a common identity.⁵¹ Colley stresses this Scottish success in administration even further than Devine showing that Scots were even very successful gaining high position in England itself. However, the Scottish success is best exemplified in her description of the reactions to this success as articulated by the English Member of Parliament John Wilkes (1725-1797). Though he represented only a small minority in England his vehemently anti-Scottish rhetoric is telling about the position that Scots were taking up in English society and across the Empire. His basic complain was that Scots were taking all the good positions that should be filled by Englishmen. The fact that as an MP he got the podium to vent such opinions and the fact that he was re-elected on an anti-Scottish platform shows indirectly the impact of the Scottish success. The fact that Wilkes was already doing so in the 1760's also shows the pace of the success of Scots. Already some fifty years after the Union Scots were already so successful that it produced a counter movement.

Returning to Devine, his conclusion is that Empire had a profound effect on identity in Scotland in the respect that it made Scots increasingly British. He firmly bases this on the fact that the Empire could provide in career opportunities and allowed for an influx of wealth into the country. His analysis is that this created strong loyalty towards the institution that provided these opportunities. Devine also shows that he is not the only one to draw this conclusion, already in the around 1800 it was Sir John Sinclair editor of *The Statistical Account of Scotland* who warned that Scottish success within Britain would make Scotland into "North-Britain". Equally Sir Walter Scott, a fervent supporter of the Union, was afraid

⁴⁹ Devine, *Scotland's Empire*, 290-319.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Colley, *Britons*, 118-133.

that the close cooperation in the Union would eventually anglicise Scotland and take away all that was particularly Scottish. In the end, however, Devine comments that although it is true that Scottish success in the Empire created and reinforced a British identity within the Scottish people, this was also the same period in which Scots through Tartanism completely reinvented and reinforced the Scottish identity.⁵²

Devine is by no means the only modern scholar to indicate the importance between identity and the Empire. As mentioned, Colley also accepts the importance of the institution for the acceptance of the British identity in Scotland. But in the 1998 essay *Empire and National Identity the case of Scotland* by Mackenzie a similar point is made.⁵³ Mackenzie shows that the connection between Scotland and the Empire was strong. Not only was Scottish participation in the Empire important, Scottish public institutions, business and artisans went through great lengths to emphasise their connection to the Empire. His analysis is that Scots experienced 'pride in the imperial achievement, coupled with a sense of duty towards the colonial enterprise.'⁵⁴ According to Mackenzie this was not just demonstrated by industry and administration but also by religious institutions as Scots were strongly investing in missionary expeditions. Mackenzie's main point is, however, that loyalty and pride towards the British Empire did not mean that Scottish identity was suppressed by the Empire. On the contrary he shows that during the nineteenth century, Scots working within the Empire and showing great loyalty towards it were also strongly participating in the recreation and the revival of the Scottish identity. Mackenzie hence underlines the principal of our model that state and national identity even within the Empire were not mutually exclusive.

Harvie makes a similar point in his *Scotland and Nationalism*, pointing out that Scots, especially in the nineteenth century, were heavily investing in the Empire and the army while at the same time they still kept a strong cultural bond with Scotland. Harvie shows the interconnectedness between the two identities when he explains that Scottish participation within the British Empire was generally seen, through their bravery, to compensate for English cowardice.⁵⁵ Although it is of course hard to say how far spread this idea was, it does show that the differences between the peoples of Britain were used in an imperial context as a strengthening instead of weakening aspect of the Union. A same principal is at play in

⁵² Devine, *Scotland's Empire*, 346-360.

⁵³ John M. Mackenzie, 'Empire and National Identity the case of Scotland', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, (8, 1998), 215-231.

⁵⁴ John M. Mackenzie, 'Empire and National Identity the case of Scotland', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, (8, 1998), 224.

⁵⁵ Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism*, 63-64.

Devine's description of the Royal Highland Brigade. This Brigade was a clearly distinguishable as Scottish as their uniforms were based on Highland regalia.⁵⁶ However, during the wars with France they became a symbol of British patriotism as they performed several heroic feats on the battle field. The fact that clearly identifiable Scottish soldiers became a symbol of British patriotism once again shows the interconnectedness of the two identities, British and Scottish. The Union provided mutual gain for both nations, England gained fierce warriors, while Scotland gained wealth and other opportunities this created commonality within the British identity while at the same time they also kept the separate national identities. Empire thus contributed to the British state identity in Scotland in such away as it provided for Scots an opportunity to prosper. Scots could feel loyalty towards the Empire because of the career possibilities and the wealth that it created, at the same time being distinctly Scottish within the empire was also possible, think of the Highland regiment. As with the general British identity the Empire was thus an overarching principal providing opportunities for Scots while not being in direct interference with a national identity, even in some cases strengthening the national identity because of the pride that Scots could feel about Scottish exploits in the Empire. Hence the Empire can be seen to reinforce the principal of an overarching identity and therefore fits perfectly into and reaffirms the place of the British identity in the model of state and national identity.

3.4.2. Industry

The importance for Union in Scotland lay not only in the Empire. Another source of influx of wealth into Scotland was based on industry. In *The Industrial Revolution in Scotland* Whatley searches for the causes that helped nineteenth century Scotland to become one of the most industrialised zones in the world.⁵⁷ However, Whatley spends quite a lot of time explaining that pre-Union Scotland was not as backwards a country as some have suggested, and that there were strong internal dynamics that created a climate in which investment and discovery spurred economic growth. Nevertheless, Whatley also recognises that the Union was detrimental in Scotland's industrial success. He recognises two areas in which the Union has been of great importance. Firstly, the creation of a common market. According to Whatley Scots did not only gain trade opportunities through the Union in a sense that they could buy and sell import products from the colonies, it also provided them with a huge market for their own produce. At the beginning of the eighteenth century this was generally based on primary

⁵⁶ Devine, *Scotland's Empire*, 49-68; Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 238-244.

⁵⁷ Christopher A. Whatley, 'The Industrial Revolution in Scotland', (Cambridge, 1997), 38-63.

resources, such as wool, meat, timber and coal. However, capital gained through these exports was invested in industrialisation and the industrial produces also found a ready market in England, Ireland and the rest of the British Empire. Also the usefulness of the common British market was made even greater for the Scots by the imposition of trade tariffs by the British state. The net positive effect of these tariffs is clearly shown by Durie with reference to linen industry.⁵⁸ He shows that imperfect as trade tariffs might be they protected the upstarting Scottish linen manufacturers from advanced competition on the British market coming from the Low Countries and the German speaking world. Whatley thus argues that the combination of a large internal market and protectionist policy created ideal nurturing grounds for the Scottish industry. Secondly Scots profited from English know-how and investment. Although as said at the time of the Union Scotland was not a complete economic backwater, England was much further developed. After the Union Scotland's vast natural resources attracted much investment from English entrepreneurs. This led to the introduction of English mining techniques, industrial know-how such as the Spinning Jenny, and agricultural reforms which all helped Scottish output rise quite sharply. 'At operative level, there is hardly an industry of any importance which did not owe something to the skills of workers who were imported from England...'⁵⁹

Devine in *The Scottish Nation* largely agrees with Whatley on the effects that the Union had on Scottish industry. Especially, the point of know-how is reiterated by Devine.⁶⁰ More in general, Devine concludes that Union created the economic context in which Scots could flourish. In his description of Victorian industrialization of Scotland this is an important paradigm. Scotland's economic growth and its industrialization took place within the contours of the Union. It made use of its structure, its rule and regulations, English technical know-how, expertise and capital; together these things made it possible for Scottish Industry to flourish. But Devine adds that these things made industrialization possible but by no means guaranteed it. Scots own ingenuity and willingness to invest in their own country were just as detrimental to the process. In the end industrialization in Scotland was a complex process with many different causes which are difficult to differentiate from each other. What is, however, clear that during the nineteenth century Scotland became one of the most industrialized and the most urbanized areas in the world. Furthermore industrialization, just as was the case with the British Empire, created a constant flow of wealth streaming into Scotland.

⁵⁸ A.J. Durie, 'Market Forces of government intervention the spectacular growth of the Linen industry in Eighteenth century Scotland', *Scotia*, (1991), 15.

⁵⁹ Whatley, 'The Industrial Revolution in Scotland', 48.

⁶⁰ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 61-63.

It is this wealth that Nairn identifies as the most important reason why Scotland did not have a nationalist movement during the nineteenth century similar to those in other European nations that were part of larger Empires such as the Austria-Hungarian, Russian or Ottoman empires. Nairn argues that ultimately the basis of such nationalism was the equal spread of wealth over the different nations within the Empire. As Scotland, through Empire and in the nineteenth century more importantly through industry, had a constant inflow of wealth similar to that of England it did not experience such inequality. According to Nairn, Scots and especially the Scottish intelligentsia did not develop nationalist ideologies but rather were content in the status quo. Though Nairn does not explicitly mention identity this analysis is quite similar with Devine's point on identity in reference to Empire. The fact that Scots accepted and felt loyalty towards the British identity or, in Nairn's thesis, did not rebel against it, was based on the fact that there was a constant flow of wealth into Scotland.

3.4.3. Governing Institutions: Church and state

As mentioned, Colley explained the importance of religion for the formation of the British identity. This link between Britain and religion in Scotland was based in principal upon the Act of Union itself. Where Scotland pre-1707 had been divided roughly 30-70 between Episcopalian and Presbyterian interpretation of the protestant religion, the Act of Union made the Presbyterian the only officially allowed religion in land. This made the Presbyterian Church, which ministered to the vast majority of Scots, the official Church of Scotland. The creation of the British state was thus at the same time the basis for the Church's status in Scotland and as such ensured the loyalty of the church towards the state. This was a major victory for Unionist (those in favour of the Union) as the Church had before 1707 rejected the Union. However, with its new rewarded status as the national church it became a staunch supporter of the Union and is held responsible in a large part for the acceptance of the new state by the Scottish public.⁶¹

What is more because of its representative nature, the Church became the unofficial state organ of Scotland taking over many of the duties that had previously fallen to the Scottish parliament. In other words, the Scottish church functioned in many ways as the unofficial government of Scotland. Westminster was thus content to rule at a distance while the Church took care of matters at the home front. McCrone points out that this institutional distribution of authority was extremely important. As explained earlier according to McCrone

⁶¹ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 363-388.

the British state was set-up as a night-watchmen and multi-national state.⁶² During the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth century this meant that the British government reigned from a distance while letting local issues be decided by local institutions. In this distribution of authority one recognises the same principals as those seen when discussing the general nature of the British state, an overarching state identity that left room for national identities. The Church of Scotland in this sense was thus a good representation of how the Scottish and British identity functioned in tandem with each other. In many ways the Scottish church was through its authority a representative of the British state and affirming the British identity on the other hand it was a distinctly Scottish institution based on a distinctly Scottish interpretation of the Protestant religion and in this sense a representation of the Scottish identity. Smout references to this position of the Church when he notes that Scotland's religion within a British context is both a 'powerful uniter' and a 'powerful divider'⁶³. Smout thus concurs with Colley that a united Protestantism was a large part of the British identity. Furthermore, he states that the Church of Scotland was a Unionist institution, it owed its existence to the Union, its holy texts were in English (as opposed to Scots or Gaelic) and it relied on the British state to defend it from a Catholic/Episcopalian challenge by the Jacobites. However, at the same time being a Presbyterian instead of Anglican or Catholic was a large part of the Scottish identity. The Church both emphasised the commonality and the good of the Union in a general and overarching sense while at the same time it was a powerful symbol of what made Scots different. Here one can observe how, in a practical way, the interrelation between the British State identity and the Scottish National identity worked and how the two were not mutually exclusive.

Hence until the second half of the nineteenth century, the Church functioned in many respects as the government of Scotland. The main reason for this loss was the Disruption of 1843 in which a large part of the Church broke away over church doctrine to form the Free Church of Scotland. As the religious control over poor relief, care of the sick, the mentally ill and the dying, and most importantly education became fragmented, the state took over. From 1845 onwards bit by bit these tasks were taken away from the Church and put under the supervision of separate boards over which in 1869 a Scottish Secretary was appointed. Finally, in 1885 this led to the creation of the Scottish Office which was a ministry part of the British government. However, the fact that there was a separate Scottish Office that was filled

⁶² McCrone, *The Unmasking of the Britannia*, 579-596.

⁶³ Smout, *Perspective on the Scottish identity*, 4.

primarily with Scots meant that Scotland still kept its institutional separateness. In this office one can find a symbol that is both British and Scottish at the same time.⁶⁴

During the first half of the twentieth century in Scotland, as in many other countries across Europe, the state was rapidly expanding. Interestingly enough, however, in Scotland this expansion by the British state was put under the prerogative of the Scottish Office. In line with McCrone one could argue that this was the way in which the British government kept in place its status as a night-watchmen state. Though the Scottish office was part of the British government and its minister was appointed by the British Prime Minister, its separateness within that British Government and its clear recognisability as a Scottish institute could be argued to still hold in place the divide of authority. McCrone argues that it was only after the fall of the British Empire and in response to that fact the integration by the British government of all state tasks under a common British banner, that the balance between nation and state in Scotland was disrupted.⁶⁵

Generally it can thus be said that at least until the second half of the twentieth century there was a certain equilibrium in which they remained a fair amount of authority and power in institutions that were distinctly Scottish. Not only was this a direct continuation of the agreement reached within the Act of Union it also seems to be a blueprint for how the British and the Scottish identity came to relate to each other.

3.5 Conclusion

Hence it can be concluded that the British state identity is an identity that has been constructed as an overarching identity “draped” over the national identities present in the United Kingdom. Loyalty towards that British identity was in general sense created by commonality. Commonality that was created by a shared Protestantism and commonality created by warfare and a common enemy. In Scotland loyalty towards the Union, in other words the British identity, was built also on the fact that it provided both Scotland as a whole, as well as some individual Scots with a constant influx of wealth and it gave Scots a vast array of career possibilities that would previously not have been open to Scotland. Also the effect of the overarching principle in Scotland can be seen in the institutional distribution of Authority. While the British state ruled for the most part from afar the Scottish Church and later the Scottish office were distinctly Scottish institutions that handled much of the affairs of Scotland.

⁶⁴ Jonathan Hearn, *Claiming Scotland: national identity and liberal culture*, (Edinburgh, 2000), 108-119.

⁶⁵ McCrone, ‘Unmasking Britannia’, 579-596.

4. Scottish National Identity

The previous chapter described in general terms the basis for the British identity and how this affected Scotland. It showed that through influx of capital, the growth in possibilities, and the creation of large overarching institutions such as the British Empire, the British Army and the British State, Scots came to accept the British identity. Also there were those that at the start of the nineteenth century warned that this system would eventually be the kiss of death for the Scottish identity. Curiously enough the opposite has happened, it was during this nineteenth century that the Scottish identity was almost completely reinvented and that it became a true national identity. This chapter will look at the creation and the implementation of that identity and analyze how it stands in relation with the British identity.

4.1 The great divide: Highland culture versus Lowland Culture

Currently, at least from a distance, most of us would envision Scottish identity to be nearly synonymous with Highland identity. The tartan, the kilt, the clan system and the Highland games are all cultural traits that could generally both be ascribed to Scottish and to Highland culture. However, the fact that Highland cultural expressions could also be seen as generally Scottish is a relatively new phenomenon. Until the end of the eighteenth century Scotland was a heavily divided nation. It was a divide that ran more or less along the geographical line separating the Lowlands from the Highlands. The Lowlands was the area where the bulk of the Scottish population lived, a culturally and economically developed area with some urbanization, a fairly high-educated artisan workforce, a literate and aristocratic elite and a



Traditional Highland dress engraving by Van der Gucht of the Black Watch in 1743.

group of fairly successful traders; an area governed over by the Scottish parliament and the Scottish crown. An area that can, very generally, be described as prospering, certainly if compared with the Highlands. Those Highlands on the other hand were an area that was, at the beginning of the 18th century, still being organized through clan connections; with the clan leader as supreme lord residing over the rest of the clan. Clans that were constantly feuding against each other and eyeing to expand their land and influence. Land that was sustained by small, poorly developed farms depended on oats and later potato crops with some additional goat and sheep farming. Highlanders were generally very poor and by many,

if not all, Lowlanders seen as backwards barbarians. The land that they lived on was seen as a barbaric wilderness. This image was intensified by the fact that both areas supported a widely different culture. The Lowlands had a European culture mainly formed under a combination of Irish-Celtic, Norwegian and Anglo-Saxon influences, a legal system based on Roman law and most important they spoke a form of English called Scottish. This was opposed to the Highlanders who clung to their Celtic identity based on Pictish and Irish-Celtic hereditary. An identity enforced by organization of the society, the Celtic Highland dress and use of Gaelic as the main language. There also was a difference in religion between the Lowlands and the Highlands. In the Lowlands the majority of the people and the elite had come to follow the Presbyterian version of the Protestant faith. However, in the Highlands, the Episcopalian church had found footing on the fundamentals of the old Roman Catholic traditions and increasing amount of Highland clans had during the seventeenth become Episcopalian adding yet another cultural barrier between the Lowlands and what was called its Celtic Fringe.⁶⁶

Something that affected this divide even more was the Union itself. In 1745 the last Jacobite rebellion had been started from the Highlands and was quite successful until it was finally defeated by the British army at the battle of Culloden in 1746. Not only did the revolution, like past Jacobite Risings before it, start in the Highlands, the Jacobite army also largely consisted of Highlanders. The relevance of these facts lie primarily in the reaction this provoked from the British government. In direct reaction to the Jacobite revolution of 1745 the Westminster parliament passed the Heritable Jurisdiction Act of 1746, ending the clan system and the Act of Proscription of 1746 which forbade the wearing of the Highland dress. The government sent troops into the Highlands to enforce these laws as well as the Disarmament Act of 1715 that had proved ineffectual until then. The period following 1746 until well into the 1860s has been called the Highland Clearances. Such authors as Devine and Womack concur that during this period the old Highland culture was virtually destroyed.⁶⁷

Looking at this divide it can safely be said that at the start of the eighteenth century there was no uniform Scottish identity. What is more, if one looks at the strong position, numerically, economically and culturally, of the Lowlands coupled to the complete destruction of the Highland culture, one would expect that Lowland culture would be the basis of a truly national culture if and when such a culture came into existence. However, in reality

⁶⁶ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 124-169; Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Invention of Scotland, Myth and History*, (New haven & London 2008), 3-32.

⁶⁷ Tom Devine, 'The Highland Clearances', *Refresh* 4 (spring, 1987) 1-8; Peter Womack, *Improvement and Romance construction the Myth of the Highlands*, (London, 1989) 4-26.

the exact opposite happened. From the late eighteenth century onwards there was a rapidly growing movement that accepted a representation of the Highland culture as the national culture and that placed Scottish history within a Highland context. Hence at the moment that the destruction of the Highland culture seemed to be complete, it came to represent the national culture. This movement, called either tartanism or Highlandism, and the effects it had on the Scottish identity will be further discussed in the next part.

4.2 Tartanism

The end of the eighteenth and the nineteenth century were the period of nationalism. All over Europe nationalist movements sprang up proclaiming national culture and coming to arms against multi-national empires such as the Russian, the Habsburg and the Ottoman. As shown in Chapter 3 Scotland did not go through such a nationalist movement. Contrary to the state identities of those other multi-national empires the British identity was an overarching identity. It was open to Scots and proved to be highly advantageous. Scotland, however, did not completely Anglify or Brittify. Tartanism or Highlandism can be seen as Scotland's version of nineteenth century Romantic nationalism.

The origins to Tartanism can be found in the *Historia Gentis Scotorum* by Hector Boece (1456-1536) and in the *Rerum Scoticarum Historia* George Buchanan (1502-1582). In his *The Invention of Scotland* Trevor-Roper has done a comprehensive analysis of these two writers and shows that together they weaved a false narrative in which the Scots were seen as an old *Kulturvolk* that could be traced back to ancient Greece. Trevor-Roper subsequently shows how these ideas led to James Macpherson's (1736-1796) *Ossian* or the *Ossianic poems* published between 1760 and 1765.⁶⁸ It was this best selling and widely read work that is seen by many authors such as Devine, Whithers and Porter as the first true expression of Tartanism.⁶⁹ James Macpherson's book was an epic tale that was supposed to be told by a blind old harper and Highlander called Ossian and was about a heroic figure Fin from the third century. Macpherson sold his book as the Scottish Homer implying, based on the ideas of Boece and Buchanan, that the Scots had a direct connection with the ancient Greeks and that the traditions of those ancient Greeks still lived on within the Gaelic population of the Highlands. The effect of the *Ossian* was twofold. Firstly, the story itself placed the landscape

⁶⁸ Trevor-Roper, *The Invention of Scotland*, 33-54; 55-74.

⁶⁹ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 242-243; Charles Whithers, 'The historical creation of the Highlands', in *The Manufacture of Scottish History*, ed. Ian Donnachie and Christopher Whatley, (Edinburgh, 1992), 150-152; James Porter, "'Bring me the head of James Macpherson'" *The execution of Ossian and the wellspring of folkloristic discourse*, *The Journal of American Folklore*, (454, 2001), 396-435.

of the Highlands squarely in the spotlights and secondly the false story about its origin made the Highlanders out to be reminiscence of an ancient and revered culture. According to Whiten and Devine the effect of the *Ossian* was significant in that it changed the general attitude towards the Highlands. It changed the perception of the landscape of the Highlands from a 'barren wilderness to a place of compelling natural beauty'.⁷⁰ It did so not only in the eyes of Scots but also in the eyes of other Brits. In the period after the publication of the *Ossian* the Highlands became a tourist attraction for the elite and the well-to-do, all over the nation. The book can also be seen as the start of changing opinion about the Highlanders themselves; they were no longer seen just as barbaric people but as custodians of long lost Scottish heritage.⁷¹

One person that was certainly effected by the *Ossian* was Sir Walter Scott (1771- 1832). Known to be a fan of the *Ossian*, he has become known to the world as the personification of Tartanism. It are his novels, his recreation of Highland regalia and his invented tradition that can to this present day be found in Scotland. The main achievement of this Edinburghian son of a solicitor is his literary work. Books such as *Ivanhoe*, *Rob Roy*, *The Lady in the Lake*, *Waverly*, *The Heart of Midlothian* and *the Bridge of Lammermoor*, are to this day considered to be literary classics of the English language and Sir Scott is seen by many as the creator of the historical-romance genre. What is important in regard to Scottish nationalism is that almost all his books are centred around Scottish or Highland themes and often



Edward Waverley the main character from the *Waverley* stories by Sir Walter Scott

take places in the Highlands during important historical events. It was Scott, who with his *Waverly* recreated the image of the Jacobite revolution. The book, first published in 1814, tells the story of Edward Waverly and how he meets Highland rebels for the Jacobite cause and how he eventually joins them. The story describes the beauty of the Highlands and the fervour, pride and bravery of its inhabitants and their culture. It was an instant hit, selling-out the first print within two days and by November 1814 it was already in print for the fourth

⁷⁰ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 243.

⁷¹ L. Leneman, 'The effect of *Ossian* in Lowland Scotland' In *Aberdeen and the Enlightenment*, J.J. Carter and J.H. Pittock eds., (Edinburgh, 1987).

time. The book and its successors, which would become known as the Waverly novels, had significant impact on the perception of the Jacobite Revolution and the Highlanders outside as much as within Scotland. What Sir Scott did in *Waverly* and in his other novels was to create a melting pot in which Scottish history and the Highland identity are fused together. According to Trumpener Scott's use of history, in the time of the enlightenment and its scientific ideals, gives it the power of factuality while essentially conveying a sentimental message.⁷² It proved a powerful combination as success of the novel stretched across the whole of Europe and English speaking people of North America. In later novels Scott harnessed this vision of the Highlands and the popularity it had so obviously inspired with its public. The effect that Sir Scott novels had are hard to understate his representation of the Highlander as a noble warrior fighting for a noble cause, men in close relationship with nature fitted strait into the Enlightenment's ideal of the noble savage. It permanently changed the perception of the Highlander.

Sir Scott's greatest achievement, however, can arguably be said to be King George IV visit to Edinburgh in 1822. This visit was from the start to the end thought up and directed by Sir Scott. His vision of the Scottish identity was, as he had previously envisioned in his novels, that of the Highlander. It was thus his aim to show this version of Scotland on the visit of his monarch. The reality was, however, as has been shown above that this identity was completely absent from the Lowlands. To mask this Sir Scott had an assembly of the clans, inviting the clan chiefs to come down together with their complete following. Of course they had all to be dressed up in complete Highland regalia but this was not enough to confer the Highland image on the entire Scottish population. So Sir Walter Scott had Highland regalia designed for all the Scottish noble families. At enormous financial costs he had the city cleaned and outfitted with all sorts of



An oil reproduction based on David Wilkie's painting shown below of George IV in Highland Dress at the Palace of Holyrood, 1822, a painting by Sir David Wilkie.

⁷² Katie Trumpener, 'National Character, Nationalist Plots: National Tale and Historical Novel in the Age of Waverly, 1806-1830', *EHL*, (60, 1993), 685-731.

Highland flags, signs and drapes, and also convinced the nobles and the chiefs to hold a giant parade. As the cherry on the cake he even had Highland regalia designed for the King and had him wear it from the moment he got off his royal train until the moment he boarded again. If there was ever a specific moment on which the Highland dress was engrained upon the Scottish psyche it was this event. From this visit onwards most Scottish noble families had a tartan and became proud to wear it.⁷³



The 42nd (Royal Highland) Regiment of Foot in 1748

But it was not only Sir Scott that helped imprint the image of the Highlander onto the Scots. In Chapter 3 the Royal Highland Regiment was already mentioned, in that context it was stressed that the interesting point of the Regiment was that it was clearly distinguishable as Scottish but also became a strong symbol of British patriotism. However, the Regiment was also important because it was distinguishable as Scottish while of course it originated from the Highlands and its official uniforms were based on Highland regalia. In a time when the wearing of the Highland regalia was officially banned, the Highland regiment came to represent Scottish battle prowess. Womack and Devine both conclude that the Regiment impressed upon Scots the notion of the warrior people and glorified the Highlander.⁷⁴ Specifically interesting in this instance is, once again, the fact that this symbol that helped impress the idea of tartanism or Highlandism into the Scottish identity was also a symbol of British patriotism. This would seem to imply that Highlandism and Britishness were not oppositional.

⁷³ John Prebble, *The King's Jaunt: George IV in Scotland, August 1822*, (London 1988), 3-31.

⁷⁴ Peter Womack, 'Constructing the Myth of the Highlands', (London, 1989), 145.

A similar point can be made when examining Sir Scott as it is important to understand that he was by no means a political nationalist. Rather Sir Scott was a strong proponent of the Union and a true Royalist. As his biographer Lockhart put it:

He delighted in letting his fancy run wild about ghost and witches and horoscopes ... (but) ... no man would have been more certain to give sound direction in estimating the pretended evidence of supernatural occurrence of any sort; and I believe, in like manner, that had any anti-English faction, civil or religious, sprung up in his own time in Scotland, he would have done more than other living man could have hoped to do, for putting it down⁷⁵.

Scott however thought that the Union was stronger through diversity and feared that the Scottish people would lose their distinctiveness as a people as they would, under the influence of the Union, become more and more Anglicised. In Scott's view, this was thus not only bad for Scotland but also for the Union.

Sir Scott's fear was not baseless. Nairn, Fry and others have shown that at the end of the eighteenth century and the nineteenth century the Scottish Elite had increasing interactions with England and had in a number of cases anglicised various forms of Scottish society.⁷⁶ One such influence can be felt in the attitude towards Scottish history. Smout and Fry have shown that during the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century Scottish history was perceived to be outdated and no longer relevant for society. Under Whig and Enlightenment influence academic teaching of history was anglicised. Hence Smout concludes in his article *Perspectives of the Scottish Identity* that Sir Scott through his work saved the Scottish people from a history-less existence.⁷⁷ But Smout also concludes that Sir Scott created a history that was secondary to English history. According to Smout what Sir Scott created was a romantic view of the Highlands and the Scottish past that in all its romanticism created separateness from the English but at the same time was not serious enough to challenge the British identity. A same type of analysis can be found in Womack's work when he concludes that: 'as Lowland Scotland becomes more and more like England, it turns to the Highlands for symbols and beliefs to maximise the difference'⁷⁸. As mentioned

⁷⁵ J.G. Lockhart, *The Life of Sir Walter Scott*, (Edinburgh, 1906) 653.

⁷⁶ Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*; Michael Fry, 'The Whig interpretation of Scottish History', in *The Manufacture of Scottish History*, Ian Donnachie and Christopher Whatley (eds.), (Edinburgh, 1992), 72-89.

⁷⁷ T.C. Smout, *Perspective on the Scottish Identity*, *Scottish Affairs*, (6, 1994), 8.

⁷⁸ Peter Womack, 'Constructing the Myth of the Highlands', (London, 1989), 145.

before, this difference was constructed so that it was harmless vis-à-vis the British identity. Devine concludes: ‘... Highlandism answered the emotional need for the maintenance of a distinctive Scottish identity without in any way compromising the Union’⁷⁹.

4.3 The Kailyard

Though Sir Scott’s influence on the recreation of the Scottish identity was enormous during the first decades of the nineteenth century, he is by no means the only literary force that influenced identity in Scotland and that used a Highland setting. During the end of the nineteenth century, the Kailyard literary stream used a romantic view of Highland country life. Kailyard was a literary school of novels, short stories and poems that be placed in the period 1880-1914. Though often criticised for its intellectual hollowness and conservative values by such people as the Scottish poet Hugh MacDiarmid (1892-1978), the Kailyard books proved to be highly successful and influential, especially among the burgeoning middle class. In his analysis of these books Cook found that they great similarity to Scott’s work.⁸⁰ Harvie has even noted that ‘tartanry attained its fullest extent in the shrewd marketing of the Kailyard authors in the 1890s.’⁸¹ As the earlier discussed Waverly novels, the Kailyard also called upon the sentiment of the Highlands, however, instead of placing it in historic events the Kailyard writers used the sentiment to represent the true Scottish life, as being rural, rustic and small scale and taking place in the Highlands. ‘Kailyard prose was indeed popular, but it also gained the reputation of representing the real Scotland, authentic literature peering into the heart of Scottish nation, culture and life.’⁸² As the new middle classes in urbanised an industrialised Lowland Scotland sought new reference points, Kailyard provided a sentiment of community that was both morally and socially familiar. ‘The construction of the Kailyard nation erases the violent history of Scotland in reconstructing an affective economy that is simultaneously pre-modern and backwards while being civilized enough to support contemporary middle-class attitudes.’⁸³ The significance of the Kailyard does, however, not only lie in its local appeal, as with the books of Sir Scott Kailyard was widely read outside of Scotland, especially in England and the United States. The image of Kailyard and its

⁷⁹ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 244.

⁸⁰ Richard Cook, ‘The Home-Ly Kailyard Nation: Nineteenth-Century Narratives of the Highland and the Myth of Merrie Auld Scotland’, *ELH*, (66, 1999) 1053-1073.

⁸¹ Christopher Harvie, ‘Industry, religion and the state of Scotland’, in D. Giffords (ed.), *The History of Scottish Literature, Volume 3, the Nineteenth Century*, (Aberdeen, 1988), 27.

⁸² Cook, ‘The Home-Ly Kailyard Nation’, 1054.

⁸³ *Ibid*, 1067.

representation of the Scottish identity came thus not only from Scotland itself but was also reinforced from outside.

How much Kailyard has influenced the Scottish identity is hard to gage in the end. Nairn in his own style has often lamented Kailyard for representing and imprinting parochialism on the Scottish society.⁸⁴ However, Devine states that the impact that the Kailyard had should not be overemphasized.⁸⁵ He, however, does acknowledge that Kailyard was influential among the (higher) middle class of Scotland. Though it is not debatable that much more was published at the time, and much was also written for the lower classes that was less conservative or even downright militant. However, the fact that a class that was rapidly gaining political and economic power, as the middle class was doing in Victorian Scotland, was heavily influenced by the Kailyard is significant. As was the case with tartansim, Kailyard created and reinforced a view of the Scottish identity that was both separating it from England while at the same time it posed no threat to the overarching British identity. With its emphasis on non-violence and its culturally conservative values Kailyard shows us how popular culture in Scotland could play to the Scottish identity or even reinforce that identity while still functioning within the framework of Britain. Nairn explains the Kailyardism as a form of cultural sub-nationalism that was fostered because of the fact that the major national culture was produced in England.⁸⁶ Though Nairn's pessimism of a country that was dominated by a culture from England can be questioned, his analysis that Kailyard was a way of fitting a Scottish national culture or a national identity into a larger whole seems to be correct.

4.4 Equality, Red Clydeside and Scotland's move to the left

Another aspect that is of importance in evaluating the Scottish National Identity is the egalitarianism in Scotland, also known as the Scottish myth. The myth is extensively investigated in both McCrone's *Understanding Scotland* and Hearn's *Claiming Scotland*.⁸⁷ To McCrone the Scottish myth is to Scots what the American dream is to Americans. 'It is a story, a narrative of considerable power' and it is this narrative that helps Scots define who they are, in other words it is an important aspect of their national identity. The principal of the Scottish myth is that Scottish society is inherently egalitarian. That is to say in Scotland every man is equally judged only based on its abilities and not on his lineage. Central to this idea is

⁸⁴ Tom Nairn, *After Britain*, (London, 2000), 240; Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, 160-162.

⁸⁵ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 296-298.

⁸⁶ Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain*, 160.


⁸⁷ McCrone, *Understand Scotland*, 90-103; Jonathan Hearn, *Claiming Scotland*, (Edinburgh, 2000), 139-154.

that equality is the natural state of man and the inequality was created by man. The origin of this myth is difficult to trace back though Linklater and Dennison in their introduction to *the anatomy of Scotland* see strong overlaps with Presbyterian interpretations and argue that it was the Church both with its particular interpretation of the protestant faith as with its horizontal organizational structure that enshrined equality into the Scottish psyche.⁸⁸ McCrone largely agrees with this thesis finding that the Presbyterian principals stood both at the cradle of the Scottish myth and reaffirmed it.

McCrone, however, also argues that from the nineteenth century onwards the myth finds much of its affirmation in Scotland's educational system. Here the idea was that in Scotland everyone could have a good education as long as she had the intellectual abilities to do so. Research by McPherson and by Anderson has shown that there actually is some truth in this assertion. From the nineteenth century onwards Scottish university had relatively high numbers of students from lower social backgrounds in comparison to English or continental universities.⁸⁹ McCrone supports these findings, his analysis is that the myth and institution enforced each other. Not only did they do so in the nineteenth century but he argues that enlargement of the educational system in the twentieth century kept it alive. Furthermore, McCrone shows that equality was also an important *leitmotif* within the Kailyard stories. McCrone assesses that although Scottish society was essentially not an egalitarian society. Within Scottish history one can find enough instances in which society was basically split and opportunities were for the best part only open for those from privileged backgrounds. However, there were enough examples, literary (through Kailyard) and institutional (in the educational system) to keep reinforcing the idea of Scottish equality. McCrone argues that a myth does not need concrete proof to be kept alive it merely needs belief in it to remain strong. McCrone is thus very specific on this point he refers to egalitarianism as a myth as it is not important whether it is true or not, it is important whether it is generally accepted as true.

⁸⁸ Magnus Linklater and Robin Denniston, *Anatomy of Scotland: How Scotland Works*, (Edinburgh, 1992), 2-5.

⁸⁹ A. McPherson, 'An angle on the geis: persistence and change in Scottish educational tradition', in W.M. Humes, and H.M. Paterson (eds.), *Scottish culture and Scottish education*, (Edinburgh, 1992), 216-243; R.D. Anderson, 'In search for the "lad of parts": the mythical history of Scottish education', *The History Workshop Journal*, (19, 1985), 82-104.



A poster used during the Red Clydeside period

Scottish egalitarianism is of specific interest for this thesis as both McCrone and Hearn conclude that it has had a particularly strong influence on Scotland's current political direction.⁹⁰ McCrone argues that the egalitarianism is open to a radical interpretation that says that not only is everyone equal in Scotland but that society should make sure that everyone has equal opportunities. Hearn argues along the same line by arguing that the egalitarian principal was during the beginning of the twentieth century culturally fused with 'Red Clydisism'. This is the socialist movement and the social unrest that sprung up in Glasgow's industrial heartland and especially in

the shipbuilding industry along the Clyde during the period 1914-1919. Authors such as John Foster had, previous to Hearn, already claimed that this movement, as well as its heavy repression by the British state, had had market effect on Scottish society giving socialism a specifically Scottish aspect. Hearn's thesis is that Red Clyde socialism and the principal of Egalitarianism came together led to McCrone's radical interpretation and made that interpretation into a part of the Scottish identity. On the basis of this thesis Hearn explains that Scotland during the second half of the twentieth century became a nation that has a strong preference for the left of the political spectrum.

Though Hearn's thesis is interesting and has a high form of plausibility it must also acknowledged that it has some flaws. The mayor problem lies with the direct coupling of the equality myth and socialist or leftwing politics. Although within McCrone's analysis one can find that the Scottish egalitarianism is open to an interpretation that can be seen as to the left side of the political spectrum, he also makes the point that it is also open for a conservative interpretation. 'If man is primordially equal, social structural inequalities do not matter, so nothing needs to be done.'⁹¹ According to McCrone it is this interpretation that was during the 1960s used in defense of conservative ideas. However, in the end McCrone concludes that, although Scottish egalitarianism is open to different interpretations, it did help to 'underpin a social and cultural order which placed a premium on collective, cooperative and egalitarian

⁹⁰ McCrone, *Understand Scotland*, 90-103; Hearn, *Claiming Scotland*, 139-154;

⁹¹ McCrone, *Understanding Scotland*, 91.

commitments.⁹² McCrone's conclusion is thus somewhat more nuanced than Hearn's as McCrone doesn't make a direct link to political affiliation nor does he link Red Clyde traditions to the myth. However, it is also clear that McCrone sees in the egalitarianism myth an explanation for Scotland's hang towards a society build on cooperative and collective policies. In conclusion, it can be said that the principal and myth of equality is a strong part of the Scottish identity

4.5 Conclusion

Though this chapter has shown forms and expressions in that can and should be linked to Scottish National Identity it must also be accepted that a clear definition of what it is, in the end, impossible. As Beveridge and Turnbull have shown tartanary and Kailyard are not hegemonic, they do not represent all that is Scottish culture nor do they represent all that is Scottish identity.⁹³ Nor can one extrapolate the equality myth in such a way that is explanatory for all that is Scottish. What is, however, telling is that these large movements in some shape or form had major impact on the Scottish identity and are all cultural expressions. They are expressions that set Scotland apart but they are not expressions that are in any way in direct conflict with the British state identity. These three movements, tartanism, Kailyard and the equality myth all have their roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and they thus stem from a period in which Scotland was a strong partner in the British Union. As the British identity grew into an overarching identity, as shown in the previous chapter, the Scottish identity became a specific cultural identity. It set apart Scots from Englishmen, Welsh and Irish, but in such a way that it was complementary to, or at least not in conflict with, the British identity.

⁹² Ibid, 102.

⁹³ C. Beveridge and R. Turnbull, *The Eclipse of Scottish Culture: inferiorism and the intellectuals*, (Edinburgh, 1989), 14-16.

5. Analysis

The previous chapters on identity have indicated that the British identity has developed into an overarching identity. It based its acceptance in Scotland on the fact that from the start it was open to Scots, that the creation of the Union provided an influx of wealth into the country, that it gave Scots career possibilities not previously attainable and that it provided Scots with institutions that physically, financially and socially protected them. The Scottish identity is built mainly on cultural concepts, the principal of a historical nation and local institutions. These two identities are, however, not at odds with each other per se, rather they developed simultaneously and history shows that they could be simultaneously relevant.

On the basis of this principal, identity does not seem to be a logical political tool for a political party which strives for independence. However, identity was a tool that was directly or indirectly used by the SNP. This chapter bases itself on SNP party manifestos that have come out since 1970. It will be a topical analysis in which not each and every manifesto will be completely reviewed; rather it will focus on large recurring topics. Such topics lend themselves best to show either consistency or change in the argumentation and the use of identity by the SNP.

5.1 The Scottish National Party

Before the actual analysis, this chapter will give an outline of the history of the SNP and its standing within Scottish politics. This will be relevant as it creates a reference within which analyse of the party can be made. The SNP was founded in 1934 but its true roots lie in the period shortly following the end of the Great War or the First World War. In this period a mirage of organisations sprung up all proclaiming that Scotland should become independent. The source of this movement lies in according to Pittock four separate issues.⁹⁴ The first is the disparate amount of Scots who died during the war as roughly twenty percent of war victim was Scottish. The second reason was the strong over-reaction to Scottish labour protest that led to 1919 to troops and tanks being deployed in the centre of Glasgow. The third reason was Sin Fein's political success in Ireland and the subsequent 1919 Irish declaration of independence and 1922 creation of the Irish Free State. The fourth and final reason recognised by Pittock was Scotland's gradual economic downturn that saw Scotland glide from industrial powerhouse to a local economy. Together these events both inspired to, and helped, a group of Scottish intellectuals to conclude that Scotland should no longer remain within the Union.

⁹⁴ Pittock, *Scottish Nationality*, 103-130.

This general movement for independence consisted both of political parties, but also other forms of organisation, of which the most important was the Home Rule Association (HRA). This association consisted of people from all walks of life but also combined people from different political parties (mainly labour and liberal) who came together with the aim of making Scotland independent based on non-partisan politics. The effect of the smaller organisation on Scottish Society was negligent as they often were one-man shows helped on by a handful of devotees. The effect of HRA was also very limited because it found the trade unions, which had significant political power in Scotland, were opposed to independence and hence blocked any form of political leverage that it could possibly have had. Disillusioned with this non-partisan approach the HRA leadership started their own political party in 1928, i.e. the National Party of Scotland. However, the party soon caved on the pressure of radical nationalist and the party's public perception was heavily damaged by a group of members in flamboyant tartanary and with militant tendencies. The belief that independence could only be won through presenting oneself as moderate led to the creation of the centre-right Scottish party in 1932. In 1934 these two parties merged into the Scottish National Party to create a united front for an independent Scotland. The outset and the political right of existence for the SNP was thus the creation of an independent Scotland. However, the merging of the two parties had little electoral effect for the party throughout the thirties and the war years. Independence always failed to become an electoral issue of any significance. The other organisations that had rallied to this point also withered in this period leaving the SNP as the sole representative of the independence movement within Scotland. Though after the war the National Convention for a while seemed to blow back a little life back into the debate about independence this also failed. Electorally the SNP fared no better after the war than before it, unable to win any seats in the Westminster parliament and only able to win one or two seats in local elections. However, during the 1950s and the 1960s the party did gain increasing numbers of grassroots support and it was able to build a party machine and build a national image. It presented itself in the moderate fashion once originated from the Scottish Party but it had traded its centre right ideology for a centre left one.⁹⁵

The party's major breakthrough came in the 1967 Hamilton by-election when it won its first seat in the Westminster parliament. Since then the party has held a constant presence in Westminster and has worked on a steady increase of its vote. Over a time span of thirty

⁹⁵ Richard Finlay, 'The Early Years: From the interwar-period to mid-1960s', in Gerry Hasan (ed.) *The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power*, (Edinburgh, 2009), 19-31; Peter Lynch, *The History of the Scottish National Party*, (Cardiff, 2002), 25-43.

years the SNP saw its share of the vote consistently go up from 11 percent in 1970 General Election (GE) to 17 percent in the 1979 GE to 22 percent in the 1997 GE. In this time period the SNP became Labour's greatest rival in Scotland. What, however, tempered the SNP success was that its vote was spread over the entirety of Scotland. In a first-past-the-post system this meant that although its relative share of the vote was quite large the amounts of seats that the Party won hovered around 5 or 6 of the 73 possible seats. This all changed in 1997 when Scottish devolution was approved in a referendum and Scotland regained its own parliament. Though the SNP had been opposed to it, seeing it as a lukewarm compromise for true independence it was to profit from it majorly. As the Scottish Parliament was chosen based on a proportional voting system the SNP now suddenly was fighting to become the biggest party in Scotland. In 2007 this was realised, under the banner of party leader Alex Salmond the party got 32% of the vote and in the subsequent parliament formed a minority government. For the first time in the party's history the SNP was able to govern. In 2011 the SNP campaigned on a message of good governance and won an absolute majority in the Scottish parliament. From the 1970's onwards the SNP has grown into one of the major electoral powers in Scotland, its policy point is and has always been Scottish independence.⁹⁶

5.2 Oil and Natural resources

During the 1970s Britain was experiencing an economic downturn, a combination of a worldwide economic recession and bloated government spending led the UK government in 1976 to become the first developed country in the world to ask for assistance by the International Monetary Fund. These economic woes hit Scotland especially hard; rising unemployment, stagnating wages and rising prices were having severe effects. Some research shows that during this decennium a third of all Scots were living on or below the poverty line.⁹⁷ In October 1970, however, offshore oil was found in Scottish territorial waters. This oil and its revenues were seen as the solution for the financial woes of the United Kingdom. The combination of these two facts led to a situation in which it was easy to make a nationalist argument and the SNP certainly did not let it slip. The clearest examples of the use of oil argumentation can be found in the party manifesto of 1974. The first political statement made by the SNP in this manifesto reads:

⁹⁶ James Mitchell, 'From breakthrough to Mainstream: The Politics of Potential and Blackmail', in Gerry Hasan (ed.) *The Modern SNP: From Protest to Power*, (Edinburgh, 2009), 31-41; Peter Lynch, *The History of the Scottish National Party*, (Cardiff, 2002), 93-220.

⁹⁷ Devine, *The Scottish Nation*, 626-630.

The SNP views the present industrial unrest in the United Kingdom as inevitable corollary of economic decline. As the economic “cake” becomes smaller squabbles over relative shares will become increasingly bitter and intractable. Scotland, by way of contrast, is a rich country. The vastly increased prosperity guaranteed by oil will mean that everybody can be better off – in contrast to the U.K. situation where gains for one group can be only at the expense of the other.⁹⁸

The message of this statement is clear, though Britain as a whole may be on a downturn, Scotland should not be because of this new oil wealth. Because of this oil money, which is Scottish, Scotland should be able to look out for its own people in a way that is impossible within the Union. This is an argument that can also be found in the specific policy points of the party. When the manifesto speaks about higher state pensions the first sentence is: ‘An oil-rich Scotland can afford to after its old folks.’⁹⁹ The importance that this oil wealth has had for the argument of the SNP can also be seen in one of the first tenants formulated by the SNP on Scottish independence: ‘The land and all natural resources in Scotland ultimately belong to the people...’¹⁰⁰ This is made even more concrete in the chapter on natural resources itself: ‘It is generally accepted that every country has the right to be the main beneficiary of its own natural resources and it is the task of government so to exercise the control over the way in which a natural resource such as oil is exploited in such a way as to ensure that maximum benefits are gained for its own people in both the short and long terms.’¹⁰¹ All in all there are nearly three whole pages of a twenty page document devoted to oil. The point that the SNP is thus making is twofold, one explicit point: this oil belongs to Scotland and should be used to Scottish benefit. The second one is more implicit: the British government is not using this money for Scotland’s benefit and only as an independent country can we make sure that this wealth is kept in Scotland and used for the benefit of its inhabitants. If it is accepted that the British identity has in Scotland historically been built on the fact that it provided for an influx of wealth; it can thus be deduced that such oil argumentation is a quite direct attack on such an identity.

In subsequent manifestos oil remains an important topic but no longer the main topic. The attacks on British failure to provide for wealth in Scotland through oil were, however,

⁹⁸ Scottish Nation Party, *General Election Manifesto*, (1974) 1.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, 2.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 6.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 8.

becoming sharper. From 1978 the oil revenue point is combined with the massive unemployment in Scotland.

The UK government will have received at least £5000 million in Oil and Gas Revenues by 1980. The annual revenues will be at least £3000 million a year in the period 1980/83. At least £1000 million a year of Revenues from the Scottish sector of the North Sea should be invested in Scotland. [...] That share [...] would extend Scotland's horizon in job-opportunity and security and the back-log of vital investment in schools, hospitals, housing and welfare could be systematically overtaken without further delays.¹⁰²

The message was clear; the British government is taking the money from Scottish oil but is not using it for Scotland's benefit. This link between oil revenues and public expenditure is made even clearer in the 1983 manifesto: 'Despite the high levels of unemployment and poverty under London rule, Scotland is potentially a wealthy nation in terms of resources and raw materials.'¹⁰³ The manifesto continues by making a direct link between cuts in public spending in Scotland and the oil revenues. 'Whilst revenues this year will be worth £1 million every hour, public spending in Scotland continues to be cut. No Scottish government would allow this rip-off to continue.'¹⁰⁴ The attack here is quite clear, through the unionist system Scotland's wealth is siphoned off while its people are being "ripped-off". Again in the context of a British identity based on the creation of wealth and possibility, this is a potent attack. However, the amount of words spent on oil is already considerably less than the 1974 manifesto. This trend continues in the following manifesto in which oil revenues are only named in reference to paying for jobs programs. A good example is 1992 manifesto which claimed: 'Since 1979, £100 billion of our North Sea oil and gas revenues have been wasted by Westminster, with £40-50 billion forecast for the 1990s. An SNP government will use some of the vast resources which remain to help fund employment.'¹⁰⁵ In 1997 the attention for North Sea oil is also relatively limited with only a couple of sentences directly aimed at the subject. These sentences, however, do take a new perspective to an old tune. The manifesto argues that: 'When our share of North Sea output is taken into account, an

¹⁰² Scottish National Party, *Return to Nationhood*, (1978), 7.

¹⁰³ Scottish National Party, *SNP Manifesto 1983: Choose Scotland – the challenge of independence*, (1983) 5.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ Scottish National Party, *Independence in Europe make it happen now! The 1992 manifesto of the Scottish National Party*, (1992), 5.

independent Scotland would become the eighth richest nation in the developed world.’¹⁰⁶ This statement is placed next to a quote by a spokes person of the British Ministry of Finance: ‘Scotland is a rich country, with a wealth of natural resources. Since 1979, Scotland has sent £27 billion more to the London Treasury than we have received in return.’¹⁰⁷ The message from these two statements combined is simple: Scotland is being held back by Britain.

Although all manifestos up to 1997 still reference to Scotland’s oil wealth, the drop in revenues from North-Sea oil during the 1990s meant that the SNP’s interest in the issue was waning. The 2001 manifesto was the last manifesto to employ this type of argumentation and even here Oil is no longer directly named, instead the manifesto refers to Scotland’s natural resources in general. ‘Scotland is a wealthy country and can afford to invest more in public services. However, we need to ensure we can invest in the long term by using the benefits of Scotland’s wealth of resources. Scotland will send £7.7 billion to Westminster more than we receive back...’¹⁰⁸ From this point onward the manifestos no longer mention Scottish revenues that are sent to the British government rather than to Scotland nor do they mention a financial imbalance between Scotland and Westminster. Hence it can be concluded that arguments based on oil revenues were most important to the SNP in the decade following its discovery and the first exploitation. The fact that revenues of oil make up a large part of British state income is consistently framed within opposition to the British state. The SNP is thus pointing out that instead of wealth flowing into Scotland because of the Union it is flowing out of it. In later manifestos this is made more personal by linking this outflow of wealth to the low state of personal wealth of the Scottish population, in practise by connecting Oil Revenues to unemployment policy. It is also placed into the context of the wealth of the entire nation as the party claimed that, referencing to oil revenues, an independent Scotland would be the eight richest country in the world. The SNP message is thus quite clear the British Union is no longer providing for wealth rather it is taking it away, it is hindering Scotland in its growth.

As shown the SNP attacks on the distribution of the oil revenue can be placed in the context of an attack on the British state identity in Scotland. First of all this is done by showing that the redistribution of oil revenues is not fair and is juxtaposed to Scottish needs. Hence, as has been argued already above, the SNP argues that the British state is no longer performing its historical right of existence in Scotland: providing for the influx of wealth into

¹⁰⁶ Scottish National Party, *Yes we can, win the best for Scotland: the general election manifesto of the Scottish National Party 1997*, (1997) 7.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Scottish National Party, *Heart of the Manifesto 2001*, (2001), 4.

the country. The SNP couples this fact to the fact that a supposed independent Scottish government could, and would, take better care of these funds. With this argumentation the SNP drastically changed the balance between state and national identity in Scotland. It took a founding aspect of the British state identity and placed it in the column of the Scottish national identity. By doing so the SNP not only made a rational argument for independence but it also made an emotional argument trying to change the context of identity in Scotland.

5.3 Economic growth and unemployment

In the previous part Scottish unemployment was used in reference to the inflow of the oil revenues, but unemployment was an important SNP subject on many other levels as well. Together with economic growth in general, unemployment became one of the central themes of the SNP for much of the last quarter of the twentieth century. The basis of the argument used about unemployment is a constant factor throughout the SNP manifestos of this period, however, the style and the attention to the subject changed. The 1970 manifesto laid, in reference to unemployment, the foundation for later arguments: ‘Scotland as a province or a region of the United Kingdom has been kept back.’¹⁰⁹ This statement is backed up by the claim that over the previous decade: ‘Every other country comparable to Scotland in size and resources has expanded.’¹¹⁰ This argument itself is, however, not much further expanded upon. In 1974 the argument returns when, under UK economics, the country had an economic growth rate that was ‘virtually stagnant’¹¹¹ and the SNP claimed that ‘... under London rule Scotland has fallen so far behind other European states that a “short-term” growth spurt is necessary to tackle most of the key problems of the Scottish Economy.’¹¹² And a few pages later: ‘In Britain’s relatively prosperous days success Tory and Labour governments completely failed to create living condition in Scotland comparable to those existing in South-East England or in Neighbouring European countries.’¹¹³ As with oil the more general economic message is thus clear: Scotland can no longer prosper within the Union and therefore it must be independent. The UK government is represented as an institution that is not interested in the well being of Scots. The most potent statement on this subject is found within the same manifesto when the rhetorical question is asked: ‘Do you wish to be “Rich

¹⁰⁹ The Scottish National Party, *The New Scotland*, (1970), 7.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ Scottish Nation Party, *General Election Manifesto*, (1974), 2.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 4.

Scots” or “Poor British”?’¹¹⁴ This message and sharp tone continued in the manifesto of 1978 and 1983 which stated that ‘Britain isn’t working’¹¹⁵ and that the Scottish economy was being ‘taken over and run-down’¹¹⁶ by the Westminster establishment.¹¹⁷ The 1983 Manifesto backed up its claim that the Union is not good for Scotland through a comparison with Norway and Austria. Both relatively small countries and in that sense equal to Scotland. However, unemployment was much lower at the time (4,0 percent and 5,4 percent against Scotland’s 16,2 percent) while growth rate was much higher (4,0 percent and 3,9 percent against Scotland’s 1,3 percent). These figures were used as proof for the SNP that despite its size Scotland could independently take care of its citizens in a way that the UK government was not doing.¹¹⁸

In its 1987 manifesto the SNP clearly changed its tone. It went from claiming that the union as a system was to blame for Scotland’s economic problems to blaming the Tory party and the Thatcher government for its misery. ‘Scotland has suffered a heavy economic and industrial price during the years of Thatcher government. The dramatic rise in unemployment and industrial base had a devastating effect on the ability of the country to compete in an international context’. What is also interesting is that there is less emphasis on the entire aspect of placing blame. Rather the SNP argument proves that Scotland economic position would be better if it had an own government by presenting a wish list of Scotland centred economic policy proposals. For instance, the manifesto asked for ‘the establishment of a Scottish centre for industrial innovations’¹¹⁹ and ‘a Scottish Export unit’¹²⁰ to strengthen Scotland’s international position, the creation of a Scottish Merger Board to protect Scottish manufacturing and the creation of a Scottish ministry of industry and development to spearhead all these initiatives and create general economic growth. The subtext for all these proposals is that Scotland should do this on her own. This trend of arguing that Scotland is economically better off alone through policy proposals continued throughout the years leading up to devolution. In the 1992, manifesto SNP proposed: ‘Creating a Scottish Steel Corporation to undertake a substantial programme of competitive investment in steel’¹²¹ and the 1997 manifesto asked for a new business tax policy specifically for Scotland to attract

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Scottish National Party, *SNP Manifesto 1983: Choose Scotland – the challenge of independence*, (1983), 4-9.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Scottish National Party, *Return to Nationhood*, (1978), 11-12.

¹¹⁸ Scottish National Party, *SNP Manifesto 1983: Choose Scotland – the challenge of independence*, (1983), 5.

¹¹⁹ Scottish National Party, *Return to Nationhood*, (1987), 8.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Scottish National Party, *Independence in Europe make it happen now! The 1992 manifesto of the Scottish National Party*, (1992), 7.

investment and encourage entrepreneurship.¹²² The sublime message within all these proposals remains we, the Scottish people, should manage the Scottish economy in Scotland. It is this style and tone of argumentation that remains emblematic of the economic chapters of the SNP manifesto until the 2003 manifesto.

In this manifesto there is a return to the more combative style on the economy and employment and a return to the argumentation seen in earlier manifestos.

Other small European countries have the power to compete on their own terms. They are led by politicians whose utmost priority is creating a better future for their people and their country. They have the advantage of sitting at Europe's top table and of arguing for their own interests and industries. Small European countries are 35 per cent richer per person than large ones like the UK; they grow 64 percent faster; they have 40 per cent lower unemployment; have deficits around a quarter of large countries like the UK; they have a balance of trade seven times more favourable; and they spend 36 per cent more on research and development. We could do the same and more. Scotland has potential in abundance. We just have to release it. The fact is we would be the eighth richest country in the world if Scotland were an independent state. But as part of the UK, we are nineteenth and falling.¹²³

Basically this is of course the same argument as with the comparison to Austria and to Norway seen in the 1983 manifesto. The argumentation is thus twofold, firstly, based on the fact that other small European countries which are not part of a larger union are doing much better the reader should conclude that Scotland is being kept back economically because it is part of the union. Secondly, an economic independent Scotland is economically viable. Though more subtle the same argument returned in 2007: 'Scotland is surrounded by an Arc of Prosperity. In Norway, Iceland and Ireland we have three of the six wealthiest nations in the world. There is no doubt Scotland has the people, talent and resources to match their success.'¹²⁴ Although independence here is not named in this quote nor is there an explicit reference to the Union the message of the quote is clear nonetheless. These independent countries are very wealthy and Scotland could be as well if only it would not be part of the United Kingdom.

¹²² Scottish National Party, *Yes we can, win the best for Scotland: the general election manifesto of the Scottish National Party 1997*, (1997), 12.

¹²³ Scottish National Party, *Release our potential*, (2003), 5.

¹²⁴ Scottish National Party, *SNP: It's time*, (2007), 18.

The final two manifestos returned to the more nuanced argumentation of the beginning of the first decade of the twenty-first century. The 2010 manifesto read on the addition of more economic powers to the Scottish parliament: ‘This would enable Scotland to respond more effectively to economic pressures, and speed our nation’s recovery and, of course, with independence, Scotland would be able to achieve even more.’¹²⁵ And ‘With independence we will be able to deliver a more successful Scotland, with greater prosperity for the people of our nation.’¹²⁶ In the 2011 Scottish election manifesto an addition of a new element of argumentation can be found. Namely from 2007 onwards the SNP had ruled Scotland as a minority government and now the party argued that they did a better job than the UK government. However, on economic policy these arguments are limited to a few occasions such as: ‘Unlike the UK we have taken a risk-based approach to regulation and have focused on collaboration with business and other partners supported through the Regulatory Review Group to address specific issues.’¹²⁷ However, throughout the whole manifesto there was no strong condemnation of UK policy. A plausible reason for this is off course that Scotland was, just as the rest of Britain, hit hard by the consequences of the financial crisis and since the SNP was in government itself this was not such an attractive political argument to make.

Overall it can be said that the argument of the SNP has consistently been that Scotland as an independent state will be in better economic shape and will have lower unemployment figures and higher wages. Throughout the years it has changed the intensity of the argument and how explicitly it has been used in reference to the union. However, with respect to identity the basic effect is the same. Scotland entered the Union and gained economic strength through the Empire, a common market, industry, know-how etc. An important pillar of the British identity in Scotland has been built on the fact that the Union has provided Scotland with economic growth that would have been unattainable on its own. Argumentations that the membership of such a Union is holding the country back is thus, just as was case with the argumentation based on North-Sea oil revenues, a direct attack on the pillar of British identity in Scotland. Furthermore, by emphasizing Scottish policy alternatives, and for the last election making a good governance argument the SNP not only attacked the economic pillar under the British state identity but also tried to shift it to an aspect of the Scottish identity.

¹²⁵ The Scottish National Party, *Elect a local champion*, (2010), 17.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 17-18.

¹²⁷ The Scottish National Party, *Re-elect a Scottish government working for Scotland*, (2011), 11.

5.4 Britain is England.

In the argumentation about oil and wealth, and the argumentation around economic growth and unemployment the SNP made the argument that the Union was not a profitable arrangement for the Scots. However, in the 1974 manifesto another sort of remark can also be found: ‘Scotland in the past 100 and more has always been a wealthy country but it has sacrificed in successive waves of demand for commitment to somebody else’s interests...’¹²⁸ Not only does the quote say that the union is not working for present day Scotland but it has been bad for Scotland for a long time. The most interesting part of it are the words ‘somebody else’s interests’. This implies that the Union has only been beneficiary to another nation, and it can safely be presumed that the composers meant England in this instance. This is the first quote within our sample to say or imply that the Union is a specifically an English project or that it at least is profitable for England only. Of course one might have read such a thing in the topics on oil and economic growth, but in these topics such a statement is not made explicitly. The 1983 manifesto made a similar point when in its introduction it is remarked: ‘Scotland’s MPs [ministers of parliament], in a tiny minority in Westminster, will be continuously outvoted by English MPs. Whichever English party wins the election, regional aid will be redirected to the Midlands of England, to Scotland’s disadvantage.’¹²⁹ The argumentation here was thus that the Union is set-up in such a way that it is only advantageous to England and not to Scotland because Scotland has no electoral power of its own.

The electoral argument that there is a skewed relationship between England and Scotland can also be found in the constant reference to ‘the English Tory Government’¹³⁰ in the 1987 manifesto. The use of this term emphasized the fact the Tory government of Margaret Thatcher had had no significant electoral support in Scotland and thus based its majority in Westminster thus almost exclusively on English seats. This finding also seems to affirm Marquand thesis that under Margaret Thatcher a conservative definition of the British identity was created that interpreted that identity to be equal to the English identity; at least the SNP saw the Tory government in such a light. Further in the 1987 manifesto an even more explicit reference to the Union as being solely for the good of England can be found.

¹²⁸ Scottish National Party, *General Election Manifesto*, (1974), 5.

¹²⁹ Scottish National Party, *SNP Manifesto 1983: Choose Scotland – the challenge of independence*, (1983), 1.

¹³⁰ Scottish National Party, *Play the Scotland Card*, (1987), 3; 6; 11.

The North/South divide is really a Scotland/ England divide. Never before have our two countries moved so far and decisively apart. As England's unemployment falls by leaps and bounds, the Scottish totals hardly budge. As poverty is reduced in England, the crisis in Scotland becomes graver. As the English economy booms, Scotland stagnates.¹³¹

Though this was a constant theme in the economic arguments seen in the previous parts of this chapter what is different here is that these arguments are framed within a strong divide between England and Scotland. It once more makes the argument that the Union was essentially unfair but also that it had an English bias. In the 1992 and the 1997 General Election manifestos as well as the 1999 Scottish election manifesto no more direct reference to England centeredness can be found. However, the argument returns in the 2003 manifesto

London government regards the south-east of England as the only powerhouse in the UK economy, with successive Chancellors regarding it as their only economic priority. The south-east of England acts as a magnet for people, businesses, investment, and growth within the UK. The area is attracting more and more people and businesses from Scotland and it's getting worse. We need to make sure we are more competitive than the south-east of England, not less, so that we can overcome its gravitational pull and start winning success for Scotland.¹³²

Once again the UK government is represented as having an English bias. In the 2007 Scottish election manifesto the divide between England and Scotland within the Union was mentioned less confrontational claiming that: 'The SNP believes Scotland and England should be equal nations – friends and partners – both free to make our own choices.'¹³³ Though the tone is conciliatory the message is clear, Scotland and England should be equal nations, but at the moment they are not. The exact same point was made in the 2010 and 2011 manifestos. Though the UK government is no longer described as actively biased towards England, the Union between the two countries is described as unequal.

With respect to identity this line of attack by SNP goes into the question of whether the British identity was still open to Scots. If the British state and therefore the British state identity has a bias towards the English than it is no longer an identity that is equally open to Scots. Where both the oil argument and the economic argument attack the pillar of wealth on

¹³¹ Ibid, 5.

¹³² Scottish National Party, *Release our potential*, (2003), 3.

¹³³ Scottish National Party, *SNP: It's time*, (2007), 18.

which the British identity was built, this argument attacked the very foundation of the identity namely the fact that Scots were equals in the Union, could participate equally in it and could gain equally from it. The SNP basically argued that within the Union Scotland was and would always remain a second tier region.

There is also another way in which the SNP between 1987 and 1991 tried to convince its readers of an English bias within the UK government. In the 1987 manifesto a first version of this interesting argument can be found: ‘Scotland is covered with nuclear bases and military installation, making us a number one target in the event of nuclear war. Nuclear weapons have been placed on our soil by both Labour and Conservative Governments without the consent of the Scottish people.’¹³⁴ The argument here in play is thus that the UK government is placed the Scottish people directly in harm’s way. In 1987 the SNP argued that the UK government will make Scotland ‘a key target’ through the placement of Trident nuclear submarines in Scottish harbours.¹³⁵ How this arguments affected the relation between England and Scotland is further explained in the 1991 manifesto which remarked: ‘both UK parties want to base Trident Submarines on the Clyde, far away from London.’¹³⁶ The argument thus was that the UK government wanted to have nuclear weapons but also wanted the Scots to take the risk. The fact that London is so explicitly named by the SNP the remark seems to imply that the UK government had an England centred bias. In relation to identity one could argue that this would attack the basis of commonality and equality. A common defence and a common patriotism come under pressure when the SNP argues that Scots are facing the risk for something that at best should serve the defence of all Brits. It must be said that after the 1991 manifesto the SNP dropped this argument and in later manifesto one can no longer find this direct link between the UK government being in London while placing missiles in Scotland.

5.5 Independence in Europe

If there is one issue on which the SNP has had a significant change of heart it is Europe. In the manifestos from the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s strong opposition towards the European project can be found. The 1974 manifesto reads on the subject of the European Common Market:

¹³⁴ Scottish National Party, *SNP Manifesto 1983: Choose Scotland – the challenge of independence*, (1983), 10.

¹³⁵ Scottish National Party, *Play the Scotland Card*, (1987), 10.

¹³⁶ Scottish National Party, *Independence in Europe make it happen now! The 1992 manifesto of the Scottish National Party*, (1992), 2-4; 9.

A vast majority of Scots were opposed to British entry. A majority of Scotland's MPs were opposed to British entry. The SNP opposed British entry, basically on political grounds of opposition to the centralist thinking inherent in the Treaty of Rome, and the belief that within the Common Market, not only Scotland, but the United Kingdom, would find its quality and standards of life deteriorating.¹³⁷

To SNP the European project thus presented a danger for Scotland (and for the rest of the UK). This line continued in the 1978 and the 1983 manifestos in which the European Economic Community (EEC) was even called: 'Extremely damaging to Scotland.'¹³⁸ All these manifestos call for a referendum on membership of the EEC at independence and include the statement that the SNP would campaign against it. This standpoint was reversed in the 1987 manifesto. In a list of statements on what they would do regarding Europe the SNP claimed: 'Recommend membership of the European Economic Community in a Referendum of the Scottish electorate, providing guarantees of protection for vital Scottish interests, particularly in relation to agriculture, industry, fishing, oil and steel can be obtained.'

But the most radical change came in 1991 when the actual title of the manifesto is *Independence in Europe, make it happen now!* In this manifesto membership of the European Community (EC) is used to make independence credible. 'As a successor state to the United Kingdom, Scotland continues to be part of the European Community'. Here membership of the EC is thus not only something that is good and should be approved through referendum, it is important to stress that membership should not be in danger when independence is declared. Throughout the whole manifesto the SNP stressed that Scotland would be a wealthy nation within Europe, it would be a powerful voice within Europe, Scotland will contribute to European security and possible peacekeeping, it will use the EC to strengthen the rural economy, etc. The subliminal message is although as an independent country Scotland would not be part of the larger whole of the United Kingdom, it would still be in Europe. 'All those benefits that we have from being part of the UK remain protected in Europe.'¹³⁹ From 1992 onwards this is the line that the SNP followed using the EC and later the European Union (EU) as an argument for the viability of an independent Scotland. In 1999 the first few sentences of the chapter on independence are devoted to the SNP wanting an independent Scotland to become member of the European Single Currency (Euro) and European Monetary

¹³⁷ Scottish Nation Party, *General Election Manifesto*, (1974), 10.

¹³⁸ Scottish National Party, *SNP Manifesto 1983: Choose Scotland – the challenge of independence*, (1983), 11.

¹³⁹ Scottish National Party, *Independence in Europe make it happen now! The 1992 manifesto of the Scottish National Party*, (1992), 2-4; 9-12.

Union (EMU).¹⁴⁰ During the first decade of the twentieth century one can find this as a constant in all SNP manifestos as they reference to EU economic policy, EU guidelines, net positive gains that Scotland could get out of EU assistance, green energy that could be sold to the EU market, etc. The 2007 manifesto even had a separate sub-chapter devoted to the Scotland's relations with Europe.¹⁴¹ Only when in 2010 and 2011 the financial woes of the EU became visible can a significant drop in references to the EU be found and membership of the Euro-zone and the is membership of the EMU dropped as issues altogether. The EU was now framed as an institution that will make sure that an independent Scotland will lose nothing rather than gain something. For instance: 'Scotland and England' [...] 'as members of the EU there will be open borders, shared rights, free trade and extensive co-operation.'¹⁴² However, as with the manifestos of the previous years the EU and Scottish membership of the Union remained important points in the manifestos.

The EU thus is another weapon that can be placed within the SNP attack on the British identity. The SNP argued from 1987 onwards that Scotland can be independent from the United Kingdom without suffering severe consequences because of its membership of the European Community or European EU. This thus attacks the British identity on its overarching principal. The notion that the Scots profited from being part of a larger whole, a concept that for 300 years made up a strong part of the British state identity in Scotland is being reframed by the SNP. Such a Scotland can be independent and still have the benefits of an overarching whole through membership of the EU. It would not lose any of its current benefits while gaining new ones. As was found in previous parts of this chapter SNP rhetoric both attacked and reframed the relation between state and national identity in Scotland. Once again the European issue attacks a fundamental principal of the British state identity while trying to claim it for the Scottish national identity reframing that identity to a state identity.

5.6 Scottishness and the Scottish institutions

Until now this thesis has only gone into points from SNP manifestos that can be associated with opposition to the British state identity. However, there are also parts of several manifestos that can clearly be associated with the Scottish national identity. There is, however, only one manifesto that specifically speaks of identity which was the 1983

¹⁴⁰ Scottish National Party, *Scotland's Party manifesto for Scotland's Parliament*, (1999), 3-4.

¹⁴¹ Scottish National Party, *SNP: It's time*, (2007), 16.

¹⁴² The Scottish National Party, *Elect a local champion*, (2010), 22.

manifesto. Under the header “Safeguarding Scotland’s identity” the SNP, in this manifesto, created a framework which would allow the Scottish culture to flourish.¹⁴³ The party proposed focussing on three areas: education, Gaelic and arts and media. Under the arts and media section the party proposed such things as better funding for the arts, more arts and music education, encouraging independent Scottish press etc. Nothing of much interest to this thesis. However, on the point in the case of Gaelic the manifesto claims: ‘Although the Gaelic-speaking areas are now concentrated in the Hebrides and North-West, Gaelic was once the language of the greater part in Scotland and forms a living part of our national heritage.’¹⁴⁴ In order to promote the use of Gaelic the party proposed bilingual road and street signs, encouraging Gaelic-medium education, a Gaelic national library, a Gaelic university and increasing broadcasting time of Gaelic programs. Hence within this manifesto the SNP made a strong connection between the Scottish identity and the ability to speak Gaelic and thus promoting Gaelic is promoting and strengthening the Scottish identity. This point underlines the power of Tartanry in Scottish society. The SNP claimed that most of these policies were only specifically aimed at the Highland area where Gaelic was traditionally spoken. The fact that it is one of the three items discussed in the context of “safeguarding Scotland’s identity” does, however, indicate that the SNP judged it to be more than just Highland culture but rather Scottish culture. On the point of education the effect that the traditional separateness of the three estates (education, law and religion) had in respect to identity can be found. The SNP started the sub-chapter on education by saying: ‘In the past, Scotland’s education system was the envy of Europe. This is no longer the case.’¹⁴⁵ Here the SNP invokes the separateness and the success of the old Scottish education system as it functioned for much of the period that Scotland was part of Union as well as the period before the Union. Next the party invokes history itself: ‘Scottish education also suffers from a failure to teach our children about their country’s past. Much of it is not relevant to Scottish history or to Scottish life because English history and culture are allowed to overshadow our own. This neglect of our own culture and tradition must be ended.’¹⁴⁶ Here a very traditionally nationalist argument claiming that through teaching history, particularly national history, the national identity can be instilled upon the next generations can be identified. All in all with its specific interest in vernacular

¹⁴³ Scottish National Party, *SNP Manifesto 1983: Choose Scotland – the challenge of independence*, (1983), 12-13.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 13.

¹⁴⁵ Scottish National Party, *SNP Manifesto 1983: Choose Scotland – the challenge of independence*, (1983), 12.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*

issues, history and tradition this chapter of the SNP manifesto of 1983 has a very conventional nationalistic sound.

In the 1987 manifesto a chapter that handled the same topics as under ‘safeguarding Scotland’s identity’ in the 1983 manifesto can be found. However the chapter no longer refers to Scottish identity, rather it is called: *The creative and inventive society*. Though it still handled the issues, education and arts and media and had an extra sub-chapter on sport and leisure the tone is different. With a changing header there is also a change in tone in the introduction it called rather for the opportunities to develop and express the Scottish character rather than safeguarding Scottish identity. The part on education no longer referred to an education tradition in Scotland nor does it promote the teaching of Scottish history. Rather it is focused on strengthening the schools and universities of the land. The only exemption is the part on Gaelic, this is still almost the same, and it referred to Gaelic as ‘a living part of Scotland’s identity and heritage’ and promotes the expansion of the language. However, different from the 1983 manifesto the chapter called Gaelic one of the three languages of Scotland (the others being Scots and English). Here one finds a more nuanced approach to the direct coupling of speaking Gaelic and being Scottish. Overall the chapter is less conventionally nationalistic than the 1983 version.

The peculiarity of the 1983 manifesto, and to some regard the 1987 manifesto, is that they are a general break with both previous and later manifestos. These manifestos had no chapter devoted to identity specifically and only occasionally stroll upon the subject, for instance the 1978 (the manifesto that preceded the 1983 one) does mention that Scottish civilization has its roots in Celtic traditions but never expanded on this subject nor did it have any reference to Gaelic Scottish history or the education tradition of Scotland.¹⁴⁷ Neither can any of these topics be found in the 1991 manifesto (the manifesto following the 1987 one). Gaelic as a topic did return from the 1997 manifesto onwards but always in the sense of protecting its status as one of the languages of Scotland and in protecting the rights of Gaelic speakers instead of proposing to expand Gaelic speaking in Scotland. In general the claim that the SNP is not interested in the promotion of, and campaigning on, the Scottish identity holds true. Even the 1983 manifesto only dealt with a narrow list of issues that touched upon identity and did so only at the end of the document after the chapters devoted to social and economic items. In the end it can be concluded that the SNP is interested in the subject of Scottish identity in a very limited way, if interested at all.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Scottish National Party, *Return to Nationhood*, (1978), 13; 17.

¹⁴⁸ Scottish National Party, *SNP Manifesto 1983: Choose Scotland – the challenge of independence*, (1983), 12.

5.7 Social Democracy in the SNP

If one looks at the politics of the SNP it can be concluded that at least one part of Scottish identity can clearly be found within the party: equality. Throughout all manifestos in our research period one finds that there is a strong emphasis on social fairness and social equality that should be safeguarded by the state. The 1970 manifesto, for example, remarks on the topic of welfare:

The Scottish National Party recognises that an adequate system of welfare benefits, which can provide security for everyone in the community, is an essential provision in any civilised country. The present British system neglects the special needs of those dependent on the state support for long period, e.g. elderly, the disabled, the chronic sick...¹⁴⁹

This argument can, once again, be classified as an argument against Britain and the British identity in ways similar to the argumentation that was discussed in previous parts of this chapter, an uncaring state, a state that does not take care of Scots. However, the emphasis on welfare and taking care of all in Scotland also fits into the equality myth that is part of the Scottish identity. From that perspective the SNP makes an argument against the Union by making use of principals enshrined in the Scottish identity. The same type of argumentation can be found in the 1974 and 1978 manifestos. The 1983 manifesto made this point more specifically:

The 1971 census showed the most deprived areas of the UK were in Scotland. In 1973, the “Born to fail” study showed that 1 in 10 Scottish children were seriously disadvantaged through adverse social and economic circumstances, a figure now believed to be 1 in 5. It has been estimated that 50% of Scots now live below or barely above the poverty line’ [...] ‘The failure of Westminster Government is plain to see. But the elderly, the unemployed, the low paid and those “born to fail” can take hope from the alternative of independence.’¹⁵⁰

The SNP then continued to say that an independent Scotland would respond to these social problems by reinforcing the social welfare such as unemployment benefits, child benefits,

¹⁴⁹ The Scottish National Party, *The New Scotland*, (1970), 7.

¹⁵⁰ Scottish National Party, *SNP Manifesto 1983: Choose Scotland – the challenge of independence*, (1983), 14.

pensions and allowances for disabled people. Here, as with the 1970 manifesto, a strong emphasis was laid on equality and fairness, and the fact that the Union is not providing such values. In other manifestos this emphasis on economic equality can also be found. The 1991 manifesto for instance called for fairer welfare: ‘An SNP government will undertake a Comprehensive review of social security system. Benefits will be raised in real terms by 10 percent over four years, with child benefit increased to £10 a week for every child’¹⁵¹ and equality in career perspective for instance for the disabled saying that employees should be forced to hire at least ‘3 percent of the workforce from the disabled population.’¹⁵² In the 1997 manifesto the SNP wanted: ‘A Scotland in which poverty is eradicated and those in need are assisted to the maximum degree possible; the Scotland that all Scots want.’¹⁵³ Ten years later this commitment still stands, as is shown by the statement:

Scotland has one of the highest levels of income inequality in Western Europe. Too many deprived areas suffer from persistent inter-generational poverty and dependency, damaging the health and limiting the life chances of the individuals who live there. Inequality on this scale is a sign of serious political and economic failure. Reducing poverty and dependency will be an SNP priority.¹⁵⁴

It can thus be stated that equality in at least economic sense was an important part of the platform. But from the 1991 manifesto onwards equality became a wider issue for the SNP. This manifesto now also mentioned providing equal rights to all Scotland’s inhabitants. Within the perspective of a new independent Scottish state the SNP writes: ‘An SNP government is committed to a Parliament that has a fairer balance of the sexes and will ensure that the working practices of that parliament do not – as Westminster – discriminate against women.’¹⁵⁵ It continued proposing legislation for equal pay for men and women, better housing policies for women and stronger protection against abuse. The party also commented: ‘As far as racism is concerned, the SNP utterly rejects any discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds. The Bill of Rights will outlaw such discrimination. The presence in Scotland of people from diverse origins is a source of enrichment for Scottish society’ and ‘Citizenship of

¹⁵¹ Scottish National Party, *Independence in Europe make it happen now! The 1992 manifesto of the Scottish National Party*, (1992), 14.

¹⁵² *Ibid*, 15.

¹⁵³ Scottish National Party, *Yes we can, win the best for Scotland: the general election manifesto of the Scottish National Party 1997*, (1997), 14.

¹⁵⁴ Scottish National Party, *SNP: It’s time*, (2007), 44.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 14.

Scotland will be granted to anyone living in Scotland or born in Scotland, regardless of race or colour. An SNP Government will ensure that education reflects the multi cultural and multi racial aspects of Scottish life.’¹⁵⁶ The conclusion that can be drawn from this and other quotes is that the SNP fully and unquestionably embraced the principal of equality and equal opportunities. This principal of the creation of a new state that was based on equality remains an important point for the SNP from 1992 onwards, for instance the 1999 manifesto claimed: ‘The SNP will put equality at the heart of government. There will be a Parliamentary Committee on equality, empowered to address existing inequality in society and promote equality in all the Parliament’s activities.’¹⁵⁷ The 2003 manifesto had a whole chapter devoted to equality which speaks on equal opportunities: ‘All of our people have a right to share in our nation’s opportunity and potential, and we want to guarantee that equality’¹⁵⁸ ; on equality in a diverse society ‘The SNP welcomes the contribution of Scotland’s ethnic minorities to our national life. Scotland has a long tradition of welcoming those who choose to live here.’ [...] ‘But words are not enough. The efforts of the Labour-LibDem [Liberal-Democrats] coalition to tackle racism have been hampered by the fact that control over key policy levers such as immigration, asylum, and equal opportunities are reserved to Westminster. With Independence, however, the SNP will deliver a fair immigration policy without racial bias.’¹⁵⁹ On equality for the disabled: ‘The SNP is committed to tackling discrimination and eradicating the barriers faced by disabled people in Scotland. We will ensure that every area of legislation promotes equality of opportunity...’¹⁶⁰

It can thus be concluded that equality was important for the SNP and has become even more so throughout our entire research period. As explained in the chapter on the Scottish national identity, equality is an important part of the Scottish identity and hence an important part of the Scottish perception of society. The SNP’s emphasis on equality can thus be seen as, actively or passively, connecting and being in line with Scottish identity. Unfortunately it is, just on the basis of manifestos, impossible to prove whether this has been an active strategy by the SNP or that accepting equality as an ideological basis is the result of the Scottish identity influencing the party. Because of this fact it is impossible to say whether the party’s emphasis on equality has only been an electoral strategy or whether it is a heartfelt commitment. What is, however, clear is that this is by far the most important reference to the

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Scottish National Party, *Scotland’s Party manifesto for Scotland’s Parliament*, (1999), 31.

¹⁵⁸ Scottish National Party, *Release our potential*, (2003), 27.

¹⁵⁹ Scottish National Party, *Release our potential*, (2003), 27.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

Scottish identity that can be found within the manifestos. As discussed in chapter 4, according at least to McCrone, this principal of equality was open to both a conservative rightwing interpretation and a social leftwing interpretation. In that same chapter it was discussed that Hearn, and to some degree McCrone, posed that the leftwing interpretation has become prevalent in Scotland, whether that is through a merger of Red Clydeside mentality with the equality myth or not. Providing that Hearn and McCrone are correct in their analysis, this is another way in which the SNP has connected to the Scottish identity. Whether it is through direct references to equality or through its social-economic policies the SNP had constant left of center positions. In a nation in which a left of center interpretation of one of its core values (equality) is prevalent, campaigning on issues related to that interpretation both reinforces that interpretation upon the nation and at the same time shows that the party is in line with the nation on the issues. Hence whether by active or passive choice the SNP used the Scottish identity to gain traction. Furthermore by emphasizing that Scottish values should be applied onto social economic policy the SNP is scottifying those areas of policy that have traditionally belonged to the British state. By successfully doing so the party reinforces the Scottish national identity in such a way that it is more and more becoming a state identity as well.

6. Conclusion

Throughout the past chapters this thesis has shown how both the Scottish and the British identity have evolved throughout the past 300 years. If the two identities are placed in the model of state and national identities it shows that both have had their own function within the Scottish and wider UK society. In general sense it can be concluded that the British identity as a state identity has evolved to be an overarching identity. It has not been an identity complete with a cultural framework that has been forced upon its subjects by the state such a way as the German identity was through the *Kulturkampf*. Rather it was an identity that was based on some overarching principals such as the Crown, Protestantism and Empire but that left room for national cultures and identities to develop (further). For Scots it has been an identity that in large parts has been built on the fact that being part of the Union provided them with significant advantages that they could not have gotten without it, primarily these advantages can be found in the field of economics. Through Empire, trade and industrialisation and through military and administrative service Scots gained wealth and opportunities that would not have been open to them without the protective umbrella of the British state.

The Scottish identity had in this same period developed around cultural items. Through the literature and invented traditions of tartanry and Kailyard the perception of a truly national culture was composed and impressed upon Scots. This perception was enhanced by the fact that the images provoked by tartanry and Kailyard did not only come from within Scotland but were also reinforced by perceptions they created of Scotland in the rest of the world. Scottish identity was also influenced by the myth of equality which became enshrined onto the national identity through Church doctrine, the institution of education and the socialist movements. It meant that Scots came to see the Scottish identity as an egalitarian identity with social emphasis on cooperation and equality.

Hence differences between the Scottish identity and the British identity are vast. Where the Scottish identity is primarily based on cultural aspects; the British identity finds its basis in social-economic aspects and state functions. More fundamentally the Scottish identity became an identity that was strongly national but not in conflict with the British identity. The two identities were shaped within the same timeframe and became essentially complementary. In this sense the Scottish identity became much like one of its major influencers Sir Walter Scott. Scott was both a Scottish cultural nationalist and a Unionist. Scott thus combined a strong devotion to the Crown and the British Union to a belief that it was important to protect

that what made Scotland different. He devoted much of his life to strengthening and instilling that what he perceived as truly Scottish into Scottish society. For Scott this project was not at odds with his Britishness as he believed that Britain was strong in its diversity and hence he believed that strengthening Scottishness also strengthened Britishness. It can be said that Scott's vision gave the modern Scottish identity its form and its function within the British Union. Hence the model of state and national identity is indeed the model which best describes the place of identity within Scotland.

In the introduction it was already shown that recent research has indicated that only a small minority of Scots still feel equally British as Scottish or more British than Scottish. The role of identity in Scotland is thus most probably changing. As the British identity is accepted less its role as an overarching identity would seem to be in danger. At the same time we see that the Scottish National Party has grown from a small opposition party into the governing party in Scotland. Over this period of time we the party has come to combine social-democratic values with the call for an independent Scotland. It has consistently called for stronger welfare state, better poor relief, more and better social housing etc. It also consistently argued that an independent Scotland would take better care of its citizens than the UK government did. The SNP did have a major change of heart on the issue of European integration. During the 1970s and the 1980s the party was primarily opposed to Scottish or British membership of the EEC and the EC. However since the 1990s the party has been a staunch supporter of European project, opting for independent Scottish membership of the EC and later the EU as well as the EMU. Hence in the context of changing aspects of identity in Scotland and the rapid rise combined with the ascension to power by the Scottish National Party this thesis has asked the question how identity has been used as a tool by that party.

Based on the analysis of the manifestos from the period 1970-2011 the conclusion can be drawn that identity has been used by the SNP in two separate ways. Firstly to attack the basis on which the British identity was constructed, and secondly by placing the SNP in the middle Scottish public opinion and in connection to the nation. The attacks on the British identity can be generally found in the economic argumentation of the SNP. This thesis has found that on the social-economic issues the SNP has constantly made the point that the policies of British Government have been bad for Scotland. The SNP manifestos are full of arguments of British mismanagement, of an uncaring attitude by the state towards slow economic growth and unemployment and of holding the Scotland back. North Sea Oil has, for a period of time, also been a big electoral topic the SNP, arguing that since this oil was found

and drilled up in Scottish waters that Scotland should also be the recipient of the revenues. Based on this principal the SNP has for a long time argued that Scotland has been a net payer to the Union while not receiving any benefit from it. Coupled with the argumentation on unemployment and economic growth the SNP has spun an image of the Union holding back Scotland. This can be interpreted as an attack on the core of the British identity in Scotland. For centuries this identity had been build on the fact that Scots received significant benefits in favor for reduced sovereignty within their own country. The fact that through the Union Scots had gained wealth and career opportunities can be seen as one of the defining reasons for support for the Union. Hence the attack that the Union is no longer providing for additional wealth, that it is holding back Scotland instead of helping in its progress, must certainly be seen in the context of identity.

But not only through economic argumentation is the British identity attacked. The principal of the overarching state that is open to all inhabitants of the United Kingdom is also attacked by emphasizing the English nature of the Union. Though this is a strategy that the SNP followed only for a short period it is none the less interesting. If the Union is essentially a vessel for English needs than by default it must not be in the best interest of Scots to be part of it. The overarching nature of the British identity is also attacked through the emphasis that the SNP lays on the role the Europe can play within Scotland. Here the SNP is placing some of the parts that had traditionally been part of the British state identity in the hands of a European institution. All in all it can be concluded that primary use of identity by the SNP is to attack the roots of the British identity in Scotland.

Looking at the Scottish national identity it can be said that, with exception of the 1983 manifesto, the SNP is not overly interested in promoting the Scottish identity or making its case, or the case for Scottish independence, based on this identity. However, the SNP manifestos do put strong emphasis on equality. They promote this principal both from a social-economic perspective and from a social-rights perspective emphasizing that in Scotland all should have the ability to live their lives with equal opportunity. Emphasis on welfare, anti-discrimination, multi-culturalism and feminism, and more often than not equality is a specifically named in reference to these points. With this emphasis on equality the SNP is actively placed within the Scottish identity and indicates that its political values are in line with this identity. With the emphasis on social-economic equality the SNP places these items also within the framework of the Scottish identity while traditionally they have been part of the British state identity. Hence the SNP is strengthening and to some degree redefining the Scottish identity to better fit the political purpose of independence.

Generally speaking with regard to identity the SNP's argumentation is thus not built on the traditional nationalist argumentation which lays much emphasis on the specifics of the nation and its cultural icons to claim the right for independence. A logical explanation for this fact could be that the identity, on which such claims would be based, was created synchronic to the British identity. Because these two identities are by their very nature part of a model in which state and national identity coexist or are even complementary. Emphasizing this identity is not a very powerful political argument for independence. The fact that Scots are a nation and that they are fundamentally different from Englishmen and Welsh is a given fact to most if not all Scots, however, this is not at odds with Scotland being part of the Union. Within this logic it would seem thus far more useful for a party that strives for independence to debase the British identity than to emphasize the Scottish identity if independence is the target. Namely, if the British state identity is discredited enough that Scots feel no longer any form of allegiance to it than the Scottish national identity would probably by default fill that gap. Within this logic arguing against the British state identity is thus equally arguing for a Scottish state identity. This is the context in which the SNP attacks on the British state and the UK government must be placed when judging their use of identity. It can also be concluded that the SNP is firmly in line with the Scottish identity on the issue of equality. What is off course impossible to make-out on the basis of manifestos is whether this is active strategy of the SNP to better connect to Scottish mainstream or whether its political course comes from the fact that it is an essentially Scottish movement and thus "automatically" places emphasis on equality because of the Scottish identity.

What this thesis thus has shown is that identity certainly is a tool for the SNP. What still remains is the question what the motivation behind the use of these strategies was and what their influence on Scottish society are. Interesting issues for new research would thus be to find what came first, the SNP attacks on the British identity or the waning importance of the British identity in Scotland. In other words, did the SNP tap into a movement already present (waning loyalty towards the British state identity) in Scottish society or are they the partial cause of it? Also the questions whether it was an active strategy of the SNP to attack the British state on social-economic issues and to use equality to appeal to the Scottish electorate or that these were merely effects of a party devoted to independence being rooted in Scottish society? The answer to these questions would give us a greater insight both in the use of identity in Scottish politics as well as insight in the effects that identity can have on the political landscape more in general.

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