Multistakeholder Processes in Sustainable Development

The Limitations of Agenda 21 in Costa Rica

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOSA</td>
<td>Area de Conservación de Osa (Conservation Area of Osa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda21</td>
<td>Agenda 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECROPIA</td>
<td>Local NGO of Environmental Issues of OSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covirena</td>
<td>Comités de Vigilancia de Recursos Naturales (Committees for the Surveillance of Natural Resources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWD</td>
<td>Fallen Wood Decree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMP</td>
<td>Forestry Management Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environmental Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPB</td>
<td>Hydroelectric Project of Boruca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>Institute of Costarrican Electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>Institute of Agrarian Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINAE</td>
<td>Ministry of the Environment and Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multi National Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>Multistakeholder Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Government Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>Natural Resources Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCSUB</td>
<td>National Strategy for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>Office of Civil Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>Payment of Environmental Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROFOR</td>
<td>Programa Forestal de Bosques, UNDP (Global Forest Program, UNDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNDF</td>
<td>Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Forestal (National Forestry Development Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINAC</td>
<td>Sistema Nacional de Parques (National Parks System)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCED</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Environment and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCED</td>
<td>World Commission on Environment and Development</td>
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Chapter 1 Introduction

The development discourse in the 1990s was stretched until it included sustainability, the new strategy of development (Sachs, 1993:9). A generalized concern for the global environment elevated sustainable development (SD) to a position where it is a leading focal point of both political action and development studies (Grubb et al., 1993). But, it was the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, "Our Common Future" in 1987, which ensured its prominence within the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, governments, NGOs and multinational corporations who have internalised, supported and endorsed this discourse (Kolk, 1996; World Bank, 2002).

The Sustainable Development discourse has effectively infiltrated major policy documents, scholarly and government recommendations regarding environment and development issues. Despite a diversity of interests on these matters, and, points of view of: environmentalists, policy makers, community based organizations, international banks and corporations all these seem to converge in Sustainable Development. But as Mowforth and Munt argue the popularity of the discourse is due to its ambiguity (1998). In a more poignant manner Sachs notes how sustainable development has inherited the fragility and 'monumental emptiness' of development (1993:9). This paper intends to shed light on how this has affected the contest over resource use at a regional level in Costa Rica.

Costa Rica has gained the reputation of being a democratic and environmentally-aware country at a global level (Silva, 2001; Campbell, 2002). The conservation area of OSA (ACOSA) has contributed to this image as it is the richest area in biodiversity of the country and has also been a significant contributor of foreign exchange (with monoculture and extractive industries) (MINAE, 2001). However, ACOSA is also known for the deplorable socio-economic conditions in which its population lives in and for the marginalisation of the area to the relative overall development which has characterised the rest of the country that has strongly endorsed the Sustainable Development discourse, and that specifically has implemented a 'plan of action for sustainable development', Agenda 21, in ACOSA.
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Agenda21 was drawn up in the United Nation’s Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. By this time, the discourse of Sustainable Development had encompassed the contested concept of participation (Barkin, 2003). The participation of civil society in policymaking and planning processes, is seen as indispensable to achieve Sustainable Development (Barkin, 1998, Dodds, 2000, Mowforth and Munt, 1998). Participation was crucial for Agenda21, which was ultimately implemented in various regions of 178 governments that took part in the UNCED (UN, 2003). In this way, previous top-down policymaking was to be challenged by coordinating local-level actions, plans and interests of various stakeholders in order to achieve a development which could be sustainable (Hemmati, 2002). The main objective of this paper is to study whether Agenda21 actually has provided an opportunity for a rural poor stakeholder of ACOSA, to exercise influence on policymaking that affects their livelihood.

The product of top-down development approaches, a long history of monoculture and extractive industries in ACOSA has depleted its natural resources (i.e. banana and timber plantations) (Vandermeer, 1995). Agenda21 was implemented in the region as a governmental reaction to a social uprising in 1998 due to poor access to forest resources (MINAE, 2001) and structures of power determined historically (i.e. marginalisation of indigenous populations). Scoones and Keeley (2001) have pointed out that multistakeholder processes which aim to achieve Sustainable Development (such as Agenda21) can have different outcomes in terms of the participation of the rural poor in forest policy-development, considering how the demands and interests of these stakeholders are taken into consideration). At the same time, an attempt is made to examine what does this specific example of civil society interaction with government entities and other stakeholders tell us about the model of sustainable development that emerged since the Rio Conference.
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Organization of the paper

The second chapter is the presentation of methodology used to carry out the research. The remaining six chapters are the 'body' of the research and are divided in two parts. The first are chapters three and four which introduce the macro-dimensions and micro-realities the research interacts with. The second part of the paper examines the implementation of macro-dimension in the regional context of Costa Rica. Each of the first three chapters of this second part, explore a different forestry policy. The last chapter of the paper presents specific and macro conclusions of the implementation of Agenda21 and Sustainable Development discourse.

1 concepts debates, and, the theoretical framework used throughout the paper
2 regional aspects of ACOSA and description of the local stakeholder used to illustrate the participation of rural poor in Agenda21, Covirenas
Chapter 2: Research Methodology

This chapter presents the methods employed to gather the necessary information to tackle the concerns raised in the analytical framework. The orientation has been chiefly qualitative, as the objective is to discover and describe the interaction of interests and outcomes within the concrete process of participation in the plan of action for Sustainable Development provided by Agenda21.

Sources of Information and Levels of Analysis

Using political ecology as the theoretical framework required using complementary sources of data. As Stott & Sullivann argue, they are necessary to,

build relatively full pictures of dynamic local narratives... (and in response to) growing focus on the significance of history and contingency in guiding both the construction of particular narratives, and ways in which people use or manage environments (2000:56).

Field work carried out in Costa Rica during the period 21 July to 3 October, 2003, analysing specific aspects of the role of Covirenas and other stakeholders in the planning, implementation, feedback and evolution (through various phases) of forestry policy within this conservation area.

It was necessary to explore the process of policy development, to assess not only the role but the actual leverage of civil society within the MSP.

Data derived from four main sources:

A background review of the literature on the relevant themes

Official government documentation

Participant observation of Agenda21 meetings

In-depth interviews with representatives of three main stakeholders

In-depth Interviews

Interviews were held with 22 different actors from three main domains: the State, NGOs and Civil Society. The choice of this method was due to the limited amount of

---

3 The primary data were issued by the Office of Civil Society (OCS) of the Ministry of Environment and consisted mainly of the minutes of each Agenda21 monthly meeting in Acosa, as well as the records of the implementation of Agenda21 in the period, 1999-2002.

4 There is a distinction made between NGO and civil society although NGOs do belong to civil society, the latter many times represent interests of the government, international actors and the private sector (ref.).
secondary information on voluntary work by civil society groups (such as Covirenas) concerned to preserve natural resources or on the implementation of Agenda21 in Costa Rica a itself. Secondary sources of information could not suffice to yield enough information to account for the participation of the rural poor in Agenda21.

The technique used in the interviews was mainly open-ended questions, in order to obtain descriptive and fuller responses, what Lofland (1971) would call a “guided conversation” (in Gilbert 1993:28). An original list of ‘obvious’ interviewees was drawn up before fieldwork began --obvious because, from past field-experience, there was knowledge of certain actors who were indispensable sources of information for the research. This list (see annex 1) was expected to expand through the snowball technique, as members of the original list were asked to recommend other relevant persons who could also contribute to the research (Reason, 1994).

Interviewer Effects:

. Regarding human inquiry, Reason (1994), notes:

While holding on to the scientific ideals of critical self-reflective inquiry and openness to public scrutiny, the practices of human inquiry engage deeply and sensitively with experience, are participative and aim to integrate action with reflection (1994:10).

Throughout the research (before, during and after field work), a diary was kept of personal reflections, in order to understand the evolution of our own ideas throughout the process. At the beginning of the research-process, some scepticism reigned regarding Agenda21 as a participatory process toward a plan of action for sustainable development. This initial position influenced the design of our working-plan, as interviews were scheduled to begin with Covirenas and other rural population stakeholders. The design of our concluding interviews with government organizations was subsequently enriched by our appreciation of the grass-roots perspective of the official point of view. This is an illustration of critical theory applied when conducting qualitative research. By avoiding attempts at a “neutral” approximation throughout the research, Fals-Borda (1991) and other scholars argue, researchers must place attention, not on creating a false impression of objectivity, but instead on accepting the subjective nature of all social research. Equally, it is creditable to maintain a critical-stand throughout the research process, so that this subjectivity does not bias the investigative outcomes.
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Participant Observation:

This last method evokes ‘research with people,’ rather than ‘research on people’ (Reason, 1994). Participant observation allowed further gathering of information that was not “planned” (Goffman in Gilbert 1993:156). The limits of interviews, especially in terms of validity of data, were in some cases overcome with ‘empirical social research’ as it enabled ‘analysis of different procedures such as actual behaviour patterns’ (Friedrich and Ludtke, 1975:19) thus, complementing informants’ views and recollections (see Box 2.1).

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Box 2.1 Key Elements Recorded during Participatory Events</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Basic recording:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Place, location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Date, time, duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Participants (number, gender, ethnicity, generation, names, specific key individuals present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Language issues (i.e. translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recording of the processes:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Who participates? How does the quality of participation change during the exercise?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relevant aspects of the context (previous information gained on the subject)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How was the exercise initiated and by whom?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Full reporting on the content of the discussion generated while the exercise is being carried out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Decisions taken during the event by the facilitators (i.e. not to follow a planned agenda for a specific reason)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

As a member of a San José based Costa Rican NGO and an intermittent participant in Agenda21 since 2000 (Arruko) the author was able to participate as an observant in the process of Agenda 21. Nevertheless, the research was never a participatory process in itself and never intended to be.

Fieldwork in San José was mainly in the Office of Civil Society (OCS) of the MINAE. Fieldwork in ACOSA was conducted during four visits, specifically in the localities of Golfito, La Gamba, Palmar Sur and the indigenous reserve, Piedras Blancas. The two ‘natural settings’ where participant-observation and mere observation took place were:

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5 This office serves as headquarters of A21 in ACOSA, although situated in San Jose (almost 7 hours drive from ACOSA). These are not only the main offices of Jorge Polimeni (OCS Director) and Marvin Fonseca (A21 Coordinator), it is also the national government-base of Covirenas coordination, where most
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- **Agenda21 Meetings**: The monthly meetings held on August 12th (in Golfito) and the September 11th (in Piedras Blancas) were both attended as a member of the Arruko Foundation.

- **Regional Covirenas Committee for ACOSA**: There was open access for observation to the bi-monthly meeting of this regional organisation of Covirenas which took place in the locality of La Gamba. This was especially valuable as it provided an opportunity to observe the Covirenas free from the influence of or interventions by other Agenda21 stakeholders.

  This proved was a useful method to explore the relevant variables underlying the behaviour of different actors (Friedrichs and Ludtke, 1975:85) and their relation to each other (and to the process itself, in the case of Agenda21 meetings).

**Analysis**

The analysis of the collected information was done by triangulating the information contained in more than 300 pages of interview transcripts, an archive of official documentation from the Office of Civil Society and field-notes resulting from participant observation. This served the theoretical approach of the research paper, as it shed light on the political understandings and interests of the different stakeholders.

The interviews, in their ‘developed’ form represent a “conversation” between two persons; while participant observation registered perceptible actions in ‘natural’ situations (Friedrich & Ludtke, 1975:3), complimenting the previous two methods of investigation.

The main sources of information that we have referred to also reflect different levels of analysis. Political ecology requires an historical, socio-economic and political understanding of contexts. These are both what I have called macro-dimensions and micro-realities. In chapter 3, a macro-dimension has already shed light on the origins of Agenda21 and sustainable development discourse. Analysis of local reality is necessary to appreciate the historical process of Agenda21 and the three forest policies within the structural context of Costa Rica. Individual interpretations of interests depicted during fieldwork of the research were collected through in-depth interviews and participant-observation methods and are set within in a larger notion of structure for analysis in part two.
Limitations of the Research

Although the method of in-depth interviewing allowed for substantial insights from specific stakeholders quite closely involved with the implementation of Agenda21, it limited the scope of analysis to other areas of policy development besides that of forestry policy. The research design also prevented the inclusion of other insights of many other stakeholders of the Agenda21 process apart from Covirenas. NGOs, small local development associations, indigenous peoples networks and the influential cooperative movements of ACOSA are many of the absent voices in this research.

This prevention avoided for close examination of other areas of policy development, such as coastal management, which have seen co-management experiences that emerged partly due to Agenda21. Nevertheless the method was flexible to record, at least through participant observation and informal conversations during fieldwork, the lack of legitimacy Agenda21 has for many skeptic stakeholders in ACOSA, even many of those who regularly attend the monthly meetings.
Part One: Macro Dimensions and Micro-Realities of the Research

Chapter three explores the theoretical framework and main concepts used to carry out this study. Some recent approaches to environmental issues and specifically with regard to the concept of sustainable development are presented through the theoretical prism of political ecology. The fourth chapter introduces the micro-realities or the field of analysis with both the scene—ACOSA—and the actor—Covirenas—with which the exploration for the research will be carried out.

Chapter 3: The Analytical Framework

Following a brief exploration of political ecology as the theoretical orientation of the research, the chapter uses a number of concepts to examine the plan of action for sustainable development known as Agenda21. Beginning with the concept of sustainability, it explores the multiple dimensions of the contested concept of sustainable development and briefly considers the salience of multi-stakeholder processes, participation and power.

3.1 Political Ecology

Political ecology is an analytical approach that integrates environmental and political understanding of resource problems, identifying multiple power relations in a given societal formation (Bryant & Bailey, 1997; Peet & Watts, 1996). More pointedly, it focuses on the claims by different stakeholders on natural resources, and how the patterns of use and management of these resources depend upon the socio-economic structures and distribution of power (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Peet, 1990; Rocheleau et al., 1996). Thus, Moore writes that

Political ecology searches for causal explanations for ecological transformations not simply in nature, but tries to grapple with the social, historical and political factors in the contexts of local production relations and wider economic systems (Moore, 1993:381).

This emphasis on the political and economic dimension of environmental management arose out of the increasing understanding by researchers during the 1970s and later in the 1990s of how the problems of natural resource degradation were not only the result of market failures but a manifestation of broader political and economic forces (Bryant & Bailey, 1997:3; Blaikie, 1997). Early studies borrowed theory from Marxist and Neo-Marxist thinking to explain the environmental impact of capitalist expansion (Watts
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1983; Blaikie 1985). But, political ecology goes a step further than the neo-Marxist tradition by showing how negative impact on the environment was not only the result of the structural system of world capitalism, but the result of the self-driven interests of powerful local actors in specific communities (i.e. the state) (Bryant & Bailey, 1997:48).

Inherent in the emergent political ecology view is a radical position favouring change. Stott and Sullivan (1997) state how only far-reaching changes in local and regional political-economic processes will resolve environmental problems. This makes politics a central component of political ecology if the status quo (referring to unsustainable natural resource use and management) is regarded as the outcome of the conflicting political interests of different stakeholders. It also means, in turn, that the understanding of the politicised nature of natural resource management requires taking a closer look at specific stakeholders and the variety of interactions they have with others in order to advance their interests.

By tracing the “genealogy of narratives” concerning the environment, Stott & Sullivan (2000) identify how power relationships are supported by such narratives. They therefore conclude that it is fundamental to the theoretical approach of political ecology to question for example, who decides the “truth” about environmental problems, who defines priorities for policy action and what implications environmental problems, so conceived, have— and for whom? In this way, the active interplay of economic and political forces in the use of natural resources comes concretely to fore within this theoretical framework.

This paper therefore uses a political ecology approach to portray how certain interests have emerged and are reflected in environmental policy and practice. The central question of the research, on which this perspective is brought to bear, is two-fold. First, Agenda21 serves as a field in which to understand the different interests of various stakeholders (i.e. local population, corporate and government organizations, etc) and to explore their different strategies, In this sense, in this paper, Agenda21 is regarded as more than a framework; it is a field of contestation, where we can explore the richly textured politics through which Agenda21 is being implemented.
Secondly, at the same time, the research seeks to understand Agenda 21 in its own right, as the recommended MSP policy developed in Rio, as a putative means to achieve sustainable development, but to understand it in terms of the contradictions of the model and discourse itself. By tracing the genealogy of sustainable development, we can locate the origins of Agenda21 in relation to the discourse on which it appears to be based. By clarifying some of the elements that lie beneath the surface, we can see evidence that Agenda21 is not just a benevolent framework created by benevolent actors in 1992. The Earth Summit in Rio itself —chaired by the wealthy Canadian businessman Maurice Strong (who also presides the BCSD) who was a close associate of Brundtland—went far beyond the genuine concerns for the environment and development that once seemed to be its essential impulse. From Rio, a global sustainable development discourse —and Agenda21—were exported globally (Sachs 1993). To see what the results were of the internalization of this discourse in a country such as Costa Rica is a major part of this study.

3.2 Sustainability

In his book on multi-stakeholder process for sustainability, Hemmati states how Agenda21 was portrayed during the Earth Summit as an “effective method for addressing the urgent sustainability issues of our time” (Hemmati, 2002: p.3). So what is sustainability and how is it interpreted in definitions of sustainable development?

Shiva defines sustainability as being

“when human societies’ material basis of survival over centuries is given by deriving livelihoods directly from nature through self-provisioning mechanisms. Meanwhile limits in nature have been respected, and have guided the limits of human consumption” (Shiva, 1993:188).

Sustainability confronts certain fundamental dilemmas inherent in the conventional view of development, which has not resolved the needs of the vast majority of the world population’s which live in poorer conditions today than in recent human history (Barkin, 2003:1). As Barkin points out, poverty is inherently linked to sustainability to the degree that this discourse “raises the spectre of the unravelling of present systems, social, political, productive and even those of personal wealth” (Barkin, 2003:1). Traditional approaches to development are typically guided by ‘market signals’ which tend to push governments far from sustainability into programs whose emphasis is on the exploitation of particular
commodities, without regard for the social, economic and environmental consequences which tend disproportionately to benefit the rich and endanger the poor.

Nevertheless, the state can be an instrument for building sustainability-led programs, if it "may be forced to play a creative role in encouraging or "liberating" creative participatory energies to promote programs of local development and social justice which also contribute moving the society in the direction of sustainability" (Barkin, 2003:3). Thus, while Barkin’s pro-poor slant on sustainable development specifically refers to the concept of sustainability, he pushes it beyond the environment alone, when he asserts that economic and social justice in development is also a factor in the maintenance of biodiversity. Sustainability in this view is also about the active participation of people in the operation of natural systems (Cleaver, 2002) and therefore depends upon the redesign of productive systems (Mosse, 2002) to allow them live fruitful lives today, while conserving the planet’s ability to host future generations. In other words, sustainability becomes inextricably bound up with the problem of ‘empowerment’ (Barkin, 2003:2).

Put very simply, then, sustainability refers to deriving livelihoods from natural environments through ecologically respectful self-provisioning mechanisms in a way that ensures the survival of future generations. This necessarily means that the issue of poverty must be addressed as a crucial part of the process for achieving sustainability. While this also implies that both the state and civil society are both central stakeholders in this process, it is important to note that state’s interpretation and implementation of policies about sustainability have not necessarily incorporated a pro-poor approach. More often, it has reflected the international official consensus about sustainable development:

3.3 Genealogy of Sustainable Development Discourse

In the global context, countries in the South have been at the receiving end of the history of development discourse created by different stakeholders in the North⁶ (Salih, 2000, Sachs, 1993). Development experts whose authority was based on ‘scientific’ knowledge and Western regimes of truth have believed that their object of study — underdeveloped countries—could, in time, move along the path of progress toward some
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future state of development (Escobar 1995, Sachs, 1993). Much the same has been the case in regard to sustainable development (Sachs, 1995; Salih, 2000).

In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, presented its report, 'Our Common Future'. The report began with certain acknowledged 'facts':

In the middle of the 20th century, we saw our planet from space for the first time. ...From space, we saw a small and fragile ball dominated not by human activity and edifice, but by a pattern of clouds, oceans, greenery, and soils. Humanity's inability to fit its doings into that pattern is changing planetary systems, fundamentally. Many such changes are accompanied by life-threatening hazards. This new reality, from which there is no escape, must be recognized and managed. (World Commission 1987:1)

The term, 'common futures,' has, ever since, become a fixture of conventional development discourse, championed in the main by northern stakeholders. 'Common futures', in practice, however, only translates into the intensive privatisation of resources and the dismantling of regulatory constraints (Ross, 1996:4). Thus, put very simply, mainstream development discourse is based on the assumption that economic growth is the means to overall 'progress' and development (Mowforth and Munt, 1998:25). The expansion of capitalism—with its new opportunities and new markets, its imperative for sustained growth and profitability—is seen as the motor behind this (Foster, 1998). Based on neo-liberal assumptions, the expansion of economic activities is confidently expected to cause a 'trickle down' effect that somehow distributes economic benefits, and reduces poverty. But, as Tandon (1995) observes, “the benefits of the (capitalist) system have definitely not 'trickled down' to two-thirds of humanity. Indeed their fate is worse than ever before...as humanity seems to move inexorably towards its own demise through ecocide” (p.44). Ross points out how it is not surprising that neo-liberals argue that only the market and privatisation of the environment can ensure the survival of natural resources; and this is one of the “most important reasons why the (discourse) of sustainable development conforms so well to the perspective of those who favour free-trade”(Ross, 1996:4), and the maintenance of the status-quo. In the following sub-section, this discourse is examined in a way that will clarify some of these points.
3.4 A Sustainable Development Debate

The definition of sustainable development proposed at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, which drew up Agenda 21, will serve as a starting point. It declared that

'...the right to development must be fulfilled so as to meet equitably developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations' (United Nations, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992)

In 1987, Brundtland, had affirmed that a "new reality" required an overdue global recognition of the degradation of the Earth. The need to manage this launched what came to be regarded as the only proper strategy: the pursuit of "sustainable development." One result, as Kolk (1996) notes, has been the exponential increase of "information on environmental 'risks of irreversible damage', which focused on three main themes: the depletion of the ozone layer, global warming and deforestation"(p.21). International stakeholders and governments internalised the sustainable development discourse in their own manner as they reacted to such information in the light of this the new world-wide 'strategy'.

Like many others, the Costa Rican government absorbed this discourse by modifying existing policies and 'spreading the word' to all sectors of the country. In a creative, simplified manner, the minister of environment, René Castro, (a former consultant for the Inter-American Development Bank, IDB), wrote up the official definition of sustainable development for students within the country (Programa de Extension a Colegios MINAE). Using images of a huge spacecraft, he portrayed its crew, humans, as not using the technical devices given to them adequately and wasting all of the provisions (referring to natural resources) they had in the first days of their long journey. Perceiving the earth in this way as an object of global-environmental management --echoing the perspective of Brundtland in 1987-- is an outcome of space travel and satellite pictures (Sachs,1995). But, as these images have been constructed out of mountains of scientific data, but no people, Sachs argues they reflect a gap between the 'observers' and the 'observed' in which "the claims of global management are in conflict with the aspirations for cultural rights, democracy and self-determination". Such aspirations, as we have already seen, are crucial
elements in David Barkin’s definition of sustainable development that attempts to address the relationship between systems of resource use and the condition of the poor.

But, in the more conventional view, the state of the environment simply became a new field in which the pursuit of specific interests could be rephrased (Kolk, 1996). In this way, The Business Council on Sustainable Development (BCSD) –with which Maurice Strong is associated— represents prevailing global corporate interests through its assertion of environmental concerns. The BCSD reflects the mounting interest of international business organizations for this discourse. Together with the International Chamber of Commerce and development banks, these global-reaching actors are powerful stakeholders in the sustainable development discourse which they help to shape within the neo-liberal framework.

In the same way, since the 1970’s –that is, even before Brundland– limits to growth have been acknowledged by governments and corporations, which nevertheless continued with the same economic policies and activities (Sakar, 2001). Today, sustainable development is marketed as an alternative, when it really is a makeover of capitalist system (Sakar, 2001; ref.). This new discourse, does not attack the roots of global environmental or social problems (Sakar, 2001), such as unequitable access to resources, the contraction of economies and the enduring absence of land reform.

Critics of this discourse therefore point out, how in the 1980’s, global management meant that “...the objectifying gaze [of the North] was turned not only to people, but to nature” (Escobar 1995:155). Nature itself seems to have become a resource, one more factor of production, which, as such, could more readily be managed (Shiva, 2000). The market, as noted earlier, came to be viewed as the optimum means of distributing resources; in the new terms of reference, if only the market could price them, natural resources could be used and managed more rationally (Baden, 1996).

The main enunciators of this perspective are a series of actors in the global political environment. The United Nations is one. Amongst the others are the World Bank’s, Global Environment Fund (GEF), the development banks such as the IDB, the International Monetary Fund, and international non-governmental organizations. These are organizations that are chiefly influenced by countries of the North and whose political and economic relationships stretch beyond the boundaries of nation-states. A measure of their power is
that the decisions of these organizations are felt thousands of miles from where they are taken. (Mowforth and Munt, 1998: p.34). The following parts of this paper will give evidence of the influence of some of these decisions and how they have framed the national sustainable development discourse in Costa Rica, with particular regard to the principles of forest management (see Silva, 2001; Campbell, 2001; Figuerola, 2002; 2003).

3.5 Some Main Concepts

In 1989, the U.N. expressed deep concern about the 'serious degradation of the global life-support systems' (U.N. resolution 44/228, 1989) and convened the Earth Summit. The purpose and content of the conference were to

"elaborate strategies and measures to halt and reverse the effects of environmental degradation in the context of strengthened national and international efforts to promote sustainable and environmentally sound development in all countries" (Mowforth and Munt, 1998: p.23).

Agenda21, embodied in a 40 chapter document which outlined a 'plan of action' for sustainable development, was the main product of this conference (Hemitt, 2001). As one writer notes:

The plan of action for sustainable development, A21, effectively integrates environment and development concerns; it is strongly oriented towards 'bottom up', participatory and community-based approaches in many areas, including population policy. (Grubb et al., 1993: xv)

This initiative was ostensibly devised as a means to challenge inter-related environmental and social aspects of top-down development, and 'lead' the way into the 21st century. As a plan of action, it took the form of a multi-stakeholder process (MSP) to be implemented globally, nationally and locally by organizations within the U.N. system and by "governments, and major groups in every area in which human impacts on the environment [occur]" (www.un.org, 2003).

"In each of its chapters, A21 refers to the roles that stakeholder groups have to take in order to put the blueprint into practice. Stakeholder involvement is being described as absolutely crucial for sustainable development" (Hemmati, 2002:3). Understandings of environment and the values placed on different types of 'nature' are socially constructed, in different ways by different actors and therefore subject to contestation (Keeley & Scoones, 1999). The goal of MSP is that, through the participation of all stakeholders, a consensus of understandings --and interests-- may be reached and conflict overcome (Dodds, 1996). In Agenda21, in particular, stakeholders participate on
what seem to be equal terms, to reach consensus-building decisions regarding natural resource conservation, use and management. In this way, MSP\(^7\) challenges preconceptions, moving policy-makers away from dominant, normative, sterile ways of thinking (Holland 1998), as other stakeholders’ views and demands are considered.

**Stakeholders** are defined as “those who have an interest in a particular decision, either as individuals or representatives of a group” and they include “people who influence the decision, as well as those affected by it” (Hemmati, 2002:2). From this point of view, MSP must consider not only power structures, but the relations amongst different stakeholders, whether the powerful or the powerless.

In the case of Costa Rica, one can begin to do this and to explore the role of different actors in the process of implementing Agenda21, by grouping the main stakeholders in four domains: international organizations, government organizations, the business sector and civil society.

The first domain has been discussed in section 1.3. As Keeley and Scoones (1999) point out, it is relevant because

The reliance of government agencies and civil society organizations in the south on external funding for their activities makes the role of the multilateral, bilateral agencies, international NGOs and corporations particularly influential (Keeley and Scoones 1999:15).

Government organisations include not only all the agencies that express the interests defined by the central government (ministries and presidential representatives) but that reflect the interests of local governments, which may or may not coincide with the interests of the central government, as well as the interests of governmental organizations operating in the specific region of ACOSA (e.g., the Electricity Institute, or ICE, which leads plans for the construction of the largest hydroelectric dam in the southern region of Costa Rica. This will be discussed further in following part).

The business domain refers to international corporations, the national and regional private sector, and profit-making cooperatives. In Costa Rica, the influence of this third group of stakeholders in policy-development is considerable. Specifically, in the southern region, there are clear examples of international corporations which have shaped policy and development matters, of which will mention three. In the 1960s, the U.S. corporation,

\(^7\) Holland refers specifically to Deliberative Inclusionary Processes, of which MSP form part of (see, Keeley
Multistakeholder Processes in Sustainable Development: The Limitations of Agenda 21 in Costa Rica

United Fruit Company (UFCO), withdrew from the Caribbean coast of the country due to labour protests and, with incentives offered by the Costa Rican government, established a plantation of more than 150,000 hectares in ACOSA. This provided job opportunities (but under exploitative socio-economic conditions), which caused immigration from other regions of the country (Hombergh, 1999).

The second example is Alcoa, a leader in the global mining sector which extracted bauxite in ACOSA (ref.). This required a cheap supply of energy, which led to plans for the construction of the Boruca Hydroelectric Project, a 1500-megawatt dam which would not only have been the largest such project in Central America, but also would have flooded 25,000 hectares of largely indigenous lands (World Rainforest Movement 2001). Originally abandoned, plans for this dam recently have been revived.

Finally, there is the Stone Container company of the United States, one of the largest packaging and paper companies in the world, which has 24,000 ha. of gmelina plantations in the region. The implementation of its project, Ston Forestal in Costa Rica has influenced the new forestry law (No. 7575), making it more amenable to private initiatives (Hombergh, 1999).

These examples briefly serve as to illustrate the broad range of stakeholders who have interests in ACOSA, which, as we will see below, bear on issues which have been brought up in regional discussions within Agenda21 (monthly minutes MINAE, 1999-2003).

The last domain is the opposite of the previous one. As mentioned earlier, civil society is meant to be a crucial stakeholder for sustainable development.

Relevant and sustainable policy-making also requires the voices of the affected population to be heard because the priorities and understandings of policy-makers may bear little resemblance to those of the 'beneficiaries'. (Keeley and Scoones 1999)

By involving civil society, especially in the form of marginal populations, in policy-making, it is argued that projects and programs will better respond to their specific needs (Zazueta 1995). It is precisely because of this assumption that this paper concentrates on the participation of civil society, to test the claim made in sustainable development discourse that the Agenda21 model not only allows for, but facilitates, the emergence of a consensus between society at large and traditionally powerful stakeholders such as the state and multinational corporations.

and Scoones, 1999).
With regard to civil society, the research paper will make a broad distinction that seem relevant for our analysis of Agenda 21 in Costa Rica, between community-based organizations (CBOs) and non-government organizations (NGOs). The former refer to organizations set up with the aim of advancing the interests of its community members - e.g., women’s support groups, youth associations, Natural Resource Monitoring Committees (Covirenas), the last of which will be discussed at some length in chapter 4).

As stated, the Agenda 21 model is regarded as a consensus-building process. Such a process is one in which:

all those who have a stake in the outcome aim to reach agreements on actions and outcomes that resolve or advance issues related to environment and economic sustainability. In a consensus process, participants work together to design a process that maximizes their ability to resolve their differences (Canadian Round Tables, 1993:p.6).

Nevertheless, as we have argued, decision-making processes (in this case, regarding the use and management of natural resources) are charged with power and politics (Luke, 1974). That being the case, to what extent are some stakeholders’ interests actually likely to be satisfied --and differences between different groups likely to be resolved-- in participatory development processes through consensus-formation, in order to achieve sustainable development? Possible answers will be considered in parts three and four, in an effort to shed light on sustainable and participatory development practice in Costa Rica. Toward this end, the concept of participation, or, more specifically, participatory development, as a crucial component of Agenda 21, will be examined more closely in the following chapter.

As an alternative to top-down approaches, participation has promised to empower people, build competence and (local) knowledge, recognize and be responsive to people’s (differentiated) needs and interests (Mohiddin, 1998; Chambers, 1997; Cooke & Kothari, 2002). As Cooke and Kothan observe:

The ineffectiveness of externally imposed and expert-oriented forms of research and planning became increasingly evident in the 1980s, when major donors and development organizations began to adopt participatory research and planning methods (Cooke and Kothari, 2002:5).

But, one must consider: who precisely is participating, in what way and under what conditions? Who is allowed to participate in an informed way must be taken into account. As can be appreciated, then, participation is yet another contested concept. Thus, Chambers (1997) and Hildyard (2002) both highlight the differences between participating in
processes in which there is consultation (regardless if it affects decision-making); and participating in processes in which participants’ opinions define the orientation of the process itself. Power differentials inevitably affect the nature and outcome of the participatory process (Luke, 1974; Stiefel & Wolfe, 1994) and hence determine the answer to the questions we have posed. Power then is the final concept to be examined.

The primary rationale for the exercise of participatory policy-development is to make policy more responsive to the reality of affected people and therefore, as Hemmatti (1998) has stated, to achieve sustainable development. A participatory approach to sustainable development should aim to

- make ‘people’ central to development by encouraging beneficiary involvement in interventions that affect them and over which they previously had limited control or influence (Cooke and Kothari, 2002:5).

Participation, in this paper, then, refers to the influence of civil society in policy-development, reflecting how their interests, demands, points of view and reality are being considered (or not) by policy-makers, in regard to processes of sustainability, specifically within the ideal plan of action represented by Agenda A21. But, as Giddens has observed, it is ultimately the capacity to shape results that matters.

Power is the capacity to achieve outcomes. Power is not, as such, an obstacle to freedom or emancipation but its very medium... The existence of power presupposes structures of domination whereby power operates (Giddens, 1984:p.257).

This requires us to explore certain issues of power to understand the potentially deceptive quality of participation. Popular participation often has been viewed by governments as a set of techniques to legitimize their rule and to allow for the controlled expression of popular sentiments (Stiefel & Wolfe, 1994). More specifically, “the rhetoric of participation... is thus used to promote manipulated ‘alternatives’ to ‘divisive’ pluralist democracy” (idem, 1994: 28; Luke, 1974)

Power is ever present within MSP and undoubtedly affects results. In cases of disagreement, let alone disputes, power not only can impede a valid agreement, but make any consensus little more than rhetorical, as Dryzek points out:

Ideal deliberative procedures involve ‘free debate and dispute in which the only legitimate force is a good argument’. Communicative rationality is achieved to the extent that interactions are egalitarian, uncoerced, competent and free from delusion, power and strategy (1993:229)

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8 As pointed out, sustainable development is ‘socially constructed’ as reflects many interests and charged with power. Political ecology puts forth questions such as whose power and interests are reflected and in this way who does it benefit?
Multistakeholder Processes in Sustainable Development: The Limitations of Agenda 21 in Costa Rica

The concepts reviewed so far in this analytical framework set the framework for an inquiry into whether the discourse of sustainable development really offers an opportunity to challenge previous top-down development approaches, by enhancing consensus-building as opposed to the imposition of the will of powerful stakeholders (i.e. the state) regarding development aims and outcomes. This paper explores the policy development of forestry policies in Costa Rica in order to determine to what degree the participation of marginalized civil society stakeholders really appears to influence the process of sustainable development through Agenda21, asking whether the latter allows sufficient effective participation by the traditionally powerless stakeholders in forestry policy development? In part one of the paper we will examine this question more fully by exploring the role of the poor local stakeholders, the committees for the surveillance of natural resources (Covirenas).

The participation of the Covirenas in policy development is relevant because the livelihoods of poor people in ACOSA crucially depend on the design of self-provision mechanisms that do little damage to the natural resources they rely on (interview with Castro, regional representative of Covirenas). As Barkin points out when referring to sustainable development, “people with knowledge of their natural surroundings should be the key informants and facilitators of these processes” (Barkin 2003:3). Such rural populations should be in a central position for the advancement of sustainability (Cooke and Kothari, 2002; Barkin, 2003). But, in most contexts (and Costa Rica seems to be no exception), they face issues of accessibility, powerlessness and exclusion from the processes that determine the development of their own region. Whether Agenda21 has changed this in any significant way is the fundamental question in this paper.
Chapter 4 ACOSA and the Covirenas

The central concern of this paper is how well suited the model of Agenda21 for ensuring sustainable natural resource management. Our goal is to examine the political factors which condition ecological degradation, therefore the area of study is presented detailing the political factors which have made ACOSA a suitable place for implementing Agenda21. The case of the Covirenas is brought forward as a local actor with a direct role within ecological politics in ACOSA and therefore become the main source to understand the mechanics of Agenda21.

Through a brief overview of the Conservation Area of Osa (ACOSA) incorporating historic and socio-economic elements, this chapter explores the political reasoning in the implementation of Agenda21. As part of the origins of this political ecology exploration Narayanan notes,

As the natural world could not be separated conceptually or ontologically from the social world, the political question of how does society want to produce nature and make decisions was raised (Johnston et al., 1994 in Narayanan, 2003:39).

The minister of environment for the 1990-1994 presidential period, noted how, “it was originally intended to put Agenda21 into action at a national level” (interview, Bravo-MINAE). However, the plan of action for Sustainable Development and participatory decisionmaking mechanism (Agenda21) was not implemented at a national level but only in this single conservation area. Thus, a conceptual understanding of why the Costa Rican government has only implemented Agenda21 in ACOSA and seven years later than the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, will serve as guiding questions for this chapter.

ACOSA contains the highest density of biodiversity (culturally and biologically speaking) with forests whose complexity and richness in biodiversity resembles that of the Amazon forests or tropical forests of Africa and Asia (World Rainforest Movement, 2003).
As seen in **Map 4.1**, nearly half of the lands (42%) are in some category of protection. The richness of natural resources in ACOSA encloses a Pandora box of possibilities and realities and contrasts with the extreme poverty that reigns amongst the population which form part of the highest indices of poverty in the country (MINAE, 2001:43).

**Table 4.1** Percentage of population living unable to satisfy basic needs and in extreme poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Unable to Satisfy Basic Needs</th>
<th>Extreme Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total at National Level</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Pacific</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huétar Atlantic</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunca (including ACOSA)</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: ILO 2001)

Since the 1980s, the social and economic crisis has served as a catalyst for civil society to organize itself in numerous CBO as a means to access more power (interview, Polimeni-OCS). Amongst these groups are indigenous groups as ACOSAs' biodiversity also stands out because of its multi-ethnicity (see table 3.2). As part of this dialectic (richness and poverty), the Guaymies, Cabecares, Bruncas and recent rural immigrant populations of ACOSA have been marginalized from mainstream development of the country. In an interview the director of the Office of Civil Society Polimeni remembered how in the first
Agenda21 meeting carried out in an indigenous reserve government representatives took pictures of the indigenous population. “This is how forgotten this region is to the central and local governments!” (interview-director OCS). Nevertheless, the historic marginalisation of the indigenous population faces dramatic change. The resources their lands contain are currently of global and national relevance. Plans of the construction of the Central America’s largest hydroelectric dam is to be carried out in the indigenous lands of the southern region of Costa Rica. This dam not only encompasses new export service for markets afar (such as Mexico and the United States) (World Rainforest Movement, 1999) but is also part of the integration initiative of Plan Puebla Panama which the WB funds (see chapter 6).

Table 4.2 Indigenous population of the Southern Pacific Region of Costa Rica

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Total Population estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boruca</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teribe</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabecar</td>
<td>2400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bribri</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngobe (Guaymi)</td>
<td>4150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15300</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: OIT 2001)

As appreciated, the resources enclosed in ACOSA have historically been subject of socio-economic and political interests. These interests of international and national scales, have been serviced since the 1970s, through top-down policymaking, planning unilaterally the destiny of ACOSA. As an example, development strategies product of SAPs substituted the region’s traditional agriculture (mainly basic grains) for monocultures of banana, palm oil and pineapple (Reuben, 1989). Likewise, extractive industries such as gold, bauxite and predominantly timber, have counted with policymakers influence.

Since the middle of the 20th century banana became the main produce of the region, and thus the source of income for thousands of employees which mainly immigrated from other regions (Reuben, 1989). Due to the fall of international prices in the late 1980s, MNC banana enclaves left ACOSA, and by the 1990s stopped purchasing the produce from cooperatives (ref.). Discontent due to health and environmental consequences of the agrochemicals used, (still is the main polluter of the gulf (Foro Ambiental, 2003) and the significant increase of poverty indices, demanded politicians attention.
By the late 1990s the forest crisis was the major cause of discontent of rural populations in ACOSA. As the main extractive activity of the region, timber has been a highly contested matter (Hombergh, 1999). The historical high-rates of deforestation⁹ in Costa Rica have consequently brought the forests of ACOSA to policymakers’ attention as they are the remaining forests of the Pacific-coast (idem). Both drastic conservation measures (see chapter 7) and the 1996 forestry law (see chapter 5), which promotes the timber industry (Silva 1999; MINAE, 2002) have been motives of discomfort amongst rural population. The discontent rose to a climax with the implementation of the Ston Forestal project in ACOSA. Despite local protests this US timber industry came to ACOSA because it favoured political and economic interests (Hombergh, 1999; World Rainforest Movement 2003).

Gold mining is another example of an extractive activity of the region but as this was carried out by the rural poor, once the areas were declared part of protected the protected regime, this activity was easily banned. This rural population (oreros in Spanish) affected by environmental policy were also part of the social movements in ACOSA.

For many, the environmental degradation of ACOSA is due to the socio-economic reality the rural populations of the region face. However, political-ecologists propose that these extractive economies (exporting primary products) are the ones responsible for the poverty (Guha and Alier, 1997 in Narananyan, 2003:44). In this manner political-ecology introduces the concept of ecologically unequal exchange, whereby extractive economies and the absence of political power, face the inability of slowing down the process of extraction or raise prices, which leads to a vicious cycle of poverty and environmental degradation (idem).

Poverty and environmental degradation of ACOSA built up to a major social protest carried out the 19th of February, 1999 (La Nacion, 20/02/1999:16A). Students, peasants, numerous CBOs, and environmental NGOs protested about the deforestation crisis of the region (MINAE, 2001). Local authorities were informed of the social movement and threats of blocking the Inter-American road turned a peaceful manifestation to a violent one (La Extra, 20/02/1999: 10).

⁹ Since the mid 1950s 50% of the land which had previously covered the lands of Costa Rica by the 1980s fell to 35% (Castro, 1995:18).
The social movements drew the attention of the government, the media and civil society in general to this forgotten region by the country. The following weeks, different articles in national newspapers published the demands of local leaders and organizations, these are summed up in **Box 4.1**.

**Box 4.1 Demands of ACOSA social protest**

- The National Forests Front had denounced illegal Forestry Management Permits, approved by MINAE officials, authorized 10 thousand trees be cut down in primary forest areas and no corrective action was taken (La Nacion, 22/01/1999).

- Environmental degradation within the Peninsula of Osa is due to illegal timber activities due to the lack of control. This has meant the loss of 8,956 has. of primary forest and the overuse of 27.5% of the 57,333 has destined for forestry activities (Al Dia, 23/02/1999:4).

- Local community leaders denounced the abandonment the region has suffered from the last governments (idem). They pointed out that in 1995, in the diagnosis the Junta Peninsular del Sur of the government made they had already denounced the increase in deforestation, the abnormal approval of FMPs and the growing rates of poverty and unemployment and yet no attention had been paid by the government (Al Dia, 23/02/1999:4).

As it may be appreciated in the articles published in the following weeks of the social disrupt in ACOSA, the rural poor see no response from the central or local government to their demands and socio-economic needs. At this point the government reacted promptly and is clearly stated by the MINAE itself:

> The social crisis originated by the unsustainable use of forest resources of the region imposed the need to find a special response. With the Presidential Decree No. 16 the president created the Inter-institutional Commission of Osa... to create an Integral Plan of Development for Osa which should deal with the unemployment, poverty and deforestation situations (MINAE, 2001:2).

As an executor of agreements made in the Inter-institutional Commission of Osa the Office of Civil Society (OCS) of the MINAE developed the Agenda21-ACOSA program (idem). When asked why Agenda21 was implemented in ACOSA, the director of OCS responded, “a crisis situation -in this case catalyzed by the deforestation- mobilizes affected population which unite in groups, this social organization is almost a requirement to implement Agenda21 in any region of Costa Rica” (interview, Polimeni-OCS). Thus, past policies which promoted extractive activities and their consequent negative outcomes for the environment and increase in poverty, were responsible for the social crisis which led to organization of local population. This new scenario with effective organization in ACOSA,
served as a platform where the government has implemented a MSP for participatory planning.

Since the constitution of the SINAC this was the first initiative created to develop local efforts for participatory planning of development based on the human and sustainable development model (MINAE, 2001:3).

The participation of rural populations in regional planning brings their view into the perspective of institutions and policymakers (Zazueta, 1995; Keeley and Scoones, 1999; Cooke and Kothari, 2002; Hemmati, 2002) which otherwise, in the case of ACOSA had not occurred before. As a MSP Agenda21 would serve as an arena where stakeholders would meet monthly in different locations of ACOSA. This way, accountability could systematically be dealt with and a more transparent with timely flow of information. For the OCS, through Agenda21 mechanisms of participatory democracy are strengthened, in which each citizen can be an active actor in decisionmaking (MINAE, 2001). This paper will focus on how the rural population of ACOSA takes part in decisionmaking of forest policy. Forest policy was chosen because of its relevance in the social movements of 1999 (see part two for further reasons). Although many crucial issues are dealt with in Agenda21, in order to make the study possible this sector serves the papers’ purpose. Likewise, due to limitations of this paper, the CBO of Covirenas, will serve as a sample to illustrate the rural poor influence on forest policy development.

The relationship Covirenas have with the OCS and consequently the MINAE, will serve as a starting point to understand this stakeholder’s relevance for the research. In MINAE’s auto-evaluation (1999) the ministry recognizes the unsustainability of its ‘in-situ conservation’ initiatives,

There is insufficient institutional capacity of the Conservation Areas for the...application of existing regulations and guidelines. The development of national capacity, especially within MINAE the management and monitoring of species and ecosystems is incipient. Operational and financial capacity of the protected wildlife areas is not sufficient to guarantee an effective operation that can be sustained over time. (MINAE, 1999:15)

Social conflict in ACOSA was mainly triggered by inequitable access to resources and environmental degradation leading to a mobilization based on the same premises. Groups of environmentally aware and politically active people began to emerge, some of which later became Covirenas. This stakeholder is thus relevant reference to understand the wider dynamics of rural populations interaction in MSP processes such as Agenda21.
Nevertheless, civil society is not a homogenous realm of interests, by focusing in Covirenas interactions with government organizations will allow us to understand the specificity of interests and mobilization of local stakeholders in a given context.

A nation-wide network of grouped volunteers was already organized in 1992 by the MINAE in order to compliment its efforts of the protection of natural resources (Figuerola, 2002). By April 2002, there were 2700 volunteers grouped in 180 committees nationwide. The network was created because of the serious shortfalls within the complex system of protected areas (see Boza, 1993; Evans, 1999; Campbell, 2002). The Covirenas initiative is re-structuring of the national parks system of which devolution of control from a central agency (the MINAE) to local populations is seen as critical to long term success (Bruggemann, 1997 in Campbell, 2002:39).

The official recognition of Covirenas meant a recognition by the state of the proactive role civil society has in natural resource management. In the ‘National Strategy for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity’ referring to efforts of sectoral and cross-sectoral coordination the government states:

The different sectors of society have not been effectively involved in the sustainable management of biodiversity...yet there has been a greater appropriation of this issue on the part of civil society, which is not directly responsible for the management of biodiversity, than on the part of the relevant State institutions (MINAE, 2000:13).

Although officially Covirenas are portrayed to collaborate with the state, in ACOSA the case is not quite as straight forward. Despite economic limitations and institutional opposition, Covirenas of ACOSA have challenged these elements making a positive and widely acknowledged intervention, due to their persistence (Castro, Nat.Dir.Covirenas). Working on a voluntary basis they have improved control of illegal logging, wildlife trade in the buffer zones of protected areas of ACOSA. Nevertheless they complain of the lack of institutional support and even obstruction from the MINAE for some cases of natural resource management. Furthermore, MINAE officials disregard Covirenas as non-scientific, ignorant and simply community members who lack a wider view of environmental matters.

State support to Covirenas is channeled through the OSC, however it is limited only to a compulsory course of environmental education, the issuing certificates documents and – for the first time since 1992- allocate a small budget that barely covers the cost of raincoats and torches for local surveillance groups.
In his article “Wealth, Poverty and Sustainable Development” Barkin highlights that sustainability depends on the success in “forcing the government to incorporate grassroots groups to oblige the affluent to limit their pillage and control their consumption, and in the emplacement of development programs which offer material progress for the poor and better stewardship of the planet’s resources” (2003:3). However, the scarce support received by Covirenas in ACOSA does not seem to follow Barkin’s criteria of state “incorporation of grassroots groups” in Natural Resource Management.

This chapter has illustrated how the social and political scenario in ACOSA presents interesting contradictions for natural resource management. The history of the region has been one of continuous resource extraction to supply the international markets of bananas, paper, electricity and environmental services. This has not come without social convulsion, the 1998 protests were a wake up call for the government which reacted by implementing a dormant model of MSP. This model follows a Sustainable Development premise of civil society working together with the government. Yet even if the mere existence of Agenda21 in ACOSA is a move forward in this direction by the state, the skeptical position of the Covirenas seems contradictory. Covirenas have hands on natural resource management and have a clear interest for policy intervention. Yet the fact that Covirenas are still mostly small tenant or landless farmers, some of whom are illiterate and certainly part of the world population that lives with less than US$2 a day. This stakeholder is the necessary voice of the powerless that allow us to test the Agenda21 model in a specific scenario. Our guiding question for this research paper is therefore,

Guiding Question for Research:

Are ACOSA’s local poor - such as the covirenas - able to access policy-making arenas of natural resource management and shape policy, or have institutions and other powerful entities made local people and CBOs a vehicle for their own interests?
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Part Two: Macro Dimensions Implemented in Micro-Realities

As a participant of Agenda 21, Covirénas have put their views forth in this MSP. By analysing the nature of their participation, with particular attention to three different forest policies, this part of the research paper considers whether these local actors exercise any effective influence on the current status and further development of those policies. This will shed light on whether Agenda 21 has conferred upon the poor new opportunities for a greater role in the decision-making processes that affect their access to the resources upon which they depend.

It is important, first, to highlight some general aspects of the national forestry sector. Costa Rica's forests have succumbed to many pressures, including agriculture, ranching by large-scale commercial farmers, mining and even tourism (Carriere 1991; Hopkins 1995). Legal and illegal logging also have been a perennial source of deforestation, especially through the practice of high-grading for both the domestic and foreign markets. As a result, studies have demonstrated that, at the current rates of deforestation, all of Costa Rica's remaining natural forest will be gone in a couple of decades, except for what currently lies within protected areas (see Carias, 2001). Unfortunately for some, even forests in such areas will be harvested too if and when economic pressures increase (Bulte et al. 2000 in Carias, 2001:24). Paradoxically, many of the causes of environmental degradation are or have been supported by government initiatives through subsidies, which have been regarded as a means to stimulate economic growth (MINAE et al, 2002).

As mentioned previously, Costa Rica follows international policy guidelines regarding natural resource management. But, more to the point, international factors, such as GEF, international environmental agreements and foreign environmental policies (as part of the "ecological footprints" of developed countries), all have had an effect on the nature of local participation in national forest policy-development.

Thus, Bryant (1992) sees the environment as a politicised condition, where the distribution and use of resources are regarded as the outcome of political policy decisions. Through an analysis of forestry-policy development, this part of the paper will shed light on
the interplay of some of the political and economic forces that shape the allocation and utilisation of forest resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box II Reasons why forestry policy was chosen as the scene of analysis</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worldwide concern of the forest due to its relevance for sustainability of the planet i.e. CO2 emissions (Kolk, 1996; WB, 2001)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amongst the government priority issues to deal within ACOSA are: poverty, scarcity of employment and deforestation (Directriz Presidencial No.16, 1999).</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The richness of biodiversity (and the main resource) in the region of ACOSA is provided by the large amount of forests within.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deforestation served as a catalyst of social movements, which called for an institutional response, and for which AGENDA21 was implemented in the region.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Covirenas were institutionalised by the MINAE because of the acceptance the ministry needed civil society participation in natural resource management, specifically in the supervision the protected areas demand (protecting from illicit felling carried out in these areas).</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Both nationally as in ACOSA, a motive for unity for Covirenas is the deforestation crisis the country faces (felt most strongly by stakeholders with strong economic and livelihood dependence on forests (Buss, 2002:99)) which is one of the largest of the world (Humbergh, 2000).</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis will be carried out by focusing only on three forest policy areas as these were dealt with in depth in Agenda21. The first two chapters present policy instruments: Forestry Management Plans and Payment of Environmental Services. The last addresses a broader conservation policy discourse its relation to the Fallen Wood decree (drawn up in Agenda21).

Each of the three chapters in this second part is divided into four sections. The first presents an overview of global and national official stakeholder views on the policy area. The next offers a local view—that of the Covirenas-CBO stakeholder in the forestry policy under discussion—with their stand-point, interests, actions and possible proposals. The third part studies the Covirenas’ participation in AgendaA21 and how they put forth their position (studying agreements, reactions and so on) regarding the respective policy area. The final part of each chapter are concluding remarks and serve as an analysis of the outcomes (relating to the issues brought up in the analytical framework of the paper).
Chapter 5. Forestry Management Plans

5.1 Official National and International Positions

With the rise of global concern about the decrease of tropical forests during the nineteen-seventies, the Costa Rican government --under international pressures-- began to implement the prevailing conservation discourse (see ch.7). As a part of this, its forestry management plan (FMP), originally devised as a government mechanism to allow use of forest-products in both private and state owned lands (MINAE et. al, 2002:16), was created in parallel to the creation of protected areas. In 1986, when the forestry sector was declared in a 'state of national emergency,' the FMP was institutionalised and defined in the 7132 law as a:

Set of technical norms to regulate actions within forest...these could be conservation, development or improvement of the vegetation, under a principle of rational use of renewable natural resources. (Gaceta 2003b)

In the 1990s, there was a further promotion of the 'forestry-production culture' for those interested in 'managing' forests, by increasing the flexibility of access to natural resources (ibid, 2002), despite the fact that, in order to obtain an FMP, a forestry expert now had to create a guiding-plan which ensured the 'rational use' of forest. This took place alongside the increasingly exclusive conservation discourse which grew in size and strength.

That these apparently opposite government efforts were centralised in the National System of Conservation (SINAC) is evidence that they were less inconsistent than they first seemed. Both were also the product of international pressures (ibid, 2002) which reveal interesting contradictions. On the one hand, in response to environmental concerns, the idea of 'our common future' had made tropical forests of the South into 'our forests'. These global concerns, however, were expressed within the existing global-economic order. The result was that the sustainable development discourse coexisted both with sustained economic growth (with its detrimental impact, in this case, on forests resources) and with efforts to curb environmental degradation through the strict conservation of natural resources (Kolk, 1996:43).
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As in other parts of Costa Rica, the delicate balance of the rich ecosystems of ACOSA, is sustained by primary forest in "protected" areas under a management regime which the government regarded as ensuring their preservation. Thus, according to audits made by MINAE and FONAFIFO, the forests which are submitted to management systems are under strict control of forestry-experts, the landholders themselves and public servants. In this way guaranteeing the permanence of forests in conditions that will not put the services forests provide society, in danger (MINAE et. al, 2002:20).

Within ACOSA, both in Corcovado, and Piedras Blancas national parks, logging was supposedly banned. But, logging was and still is permitted at Golfo Dulce and in the wet-lands (or mangroves) of Sierpe-Terraba forest reserves, by means of special concessions (FMP) issued by the government in the light of the valuable natural resources in these zones. Meanwhile, it has seemed almost inevitable that, with the rise in the value of timber,

...state officials themselves actively undermine the institutions that had been effectively regulating the industry. By undermining the institutions they were able to create opportunities for corruption or rent-seeking (Ross 2001).

In the process, local institutions have been undermined and environmental organisations --among them, the Covirenas-- have denounced the abuses committed in these areas (World Rainforest Movement 1999)

Nevertheless, the World Bank notes that “the effect is not inevitable...local actors also have an incentive to build institutions to regulate valuable resources, and the effect of international trade itself may be quite modest” (World Bank, 2002:133). This possibility will be studied briefly with particular regard to FMP.
5.2 Covirena’s Stand Point

Even before the implementation of Agenda 21, the Covirenas were constantly denouncing illicit-logging (i.e. felling within strictly prohibited areas), in many cases with FMP approval. The results of their local efforts, however, remained at the local level as there was—and remains—a lack of capacity to trace illicit extraction to its roots, to catch the bigger fish, i.e. companies, public servants, etc., due to the limited power of groups such as the Covirenas.

As a result there is a sense of powerlessness felt by many by Covirenas:

No one can justify unto the Costa Ricans why illegal logging occurs in the Peninsula. There is only one road by one can come in and out, how can the MINAE say they don’t know how deforestation occurs in the area? How can loggers take the trees without being seen, and who gave the permit in the first place? Why do we have the MINAE post, when the loggers pass right in front of it at the entrance of the park and further down in the post of Chacarita? We denounce this, but for what, if nothing is done about this? (interview with E. Beita, Covirena)

The effectiveness of the Covirenas is limited. When the extraction of wood is carried out without permits (or with illicit ones), Covirenas need to be accompanied by a formal authority (i.e. park-rangers, local government officials) in order to confiscate equipment or the timber. When Covirenas gather information, such as: permit numbers or evidence of illicit permits, quantity of authorised and felled trees, and guides of transportation, during their field-work, and when they present their findings to local authorities, the files pile up on these authorities’ desks, waiting for action to legally prove the acts wrong.

It is particularly important to highlight the tension which surfaces in the MINAE-Covirenas relationship. As one Covirena member observed, “if the MINAE is indiscriminately giving out licenses to kill forests, it is not fulfilling its obligations... then Covirenas who were created to accompany and collaborate with the ministries’ conservation, education and surveillance functions; end up being enemies” (interview with Polimeni, director OCS). In some cases, despite the Covirenas’ reports, after a short period of time there was further felling in the same areas (interview O. Henriquez, Covirena).

Structurally, not much has been done to prevent such outcomes.
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5.3 Covirenas' interaction in Agenda 21 Regarding FMP

This situation was addressed in an early phase of Agenda 21, when "it was agreed the Covirenas' role should not stop at a local authority level. Denouncing should go even further and structural-corrective measures should be taken within other spheres of the ministry" (interview Polimeni, director-OCS).

Once this decision was taken early in 1999, further precise information was compiled in a database by Covirenas. A commission was created within the MINAE to cross-check this information with official documentation, and put it in the hands of members of parliament, regional or local authorities and officials of the MINAE. This simple, yet time-consuming procedure provided evidence not only that permits were being given to log in areas in which such activity was unconstitutional (river basins or/and within protected areas), but that the very same permit was being used in many different areas, reflecting the chaotic reality of the forests. Once the procedure was completed, it was found that more than 18,700 trees actually had been cut down, when the number officially allowed with FMP was only 2100 (interview with Polimeni, director-OCS).

Things began to change when the OCS (and MINAE) followed-up and respected the decision-making process of AGENDA21. As a result of their co-ordinated effort, 95% of all the approved FMP were abolished as having been illicit or irregular. Along with this astonishing development, numerous MINAE officials were dismissed. "This specific, corrective measure, would not have been possible without the proactive participation of the Covirenas of ACOSA" (idem); what had previously been just rumours of corruption within governmental organizations and specifically within the MINAE, had finally been proved as a result of the initiative of CBOs. Today, FMP are rarely issued.

Covirenas' participation in and influence on FMP policy had other consequences. With the implementation of Agenda 21, the MINAE had helped the Covirenas of ACOSA participate in the latter by providing basic transportation for them to attend AGENDA21

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11 In 1998 and 1999, this field-work was, on many occasions, made possible with resources and support of the environmentalist NGO Cecropia.
12 Much of the information the Covirenas compiled did exist in the past but this was conveniently lost or misplaced.
13 The commission was made up by the minister of environment, the directors of: National Parks, OCS and the SINAC.
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But, since the Covirenas' denunciations regarding FMP, this support has changed dramatically; as one Covirenas participant has said, "...they believe we are their enemies and now refuse to pick us up." (interview with E. Beita, Covirena). Furthermore, the MINAE ('mother' institution of the Covirenas) has at times dismissed, disregarded and, in some cases, opposed the evolution of the Covirenas action (interviews with D. Vartanian and anonymous former MINAE employee). “The denouncing of illicit forest permits has not been institutionalised because it does not serve economic interests of the remaining corrupt public servants, the participation of Covirenas has proven effective and this intimidates the power of money (interview with anonymous former MINAE employee).

5.4 Concluding Remarks

Although the participation of CBOs played an essential role in the structural (corrective) measures of FMP, their participation was otherwise limited during this rather static policy-evaluation period. Before Agenda21, Covirenas lacked the power and access to information required to influence this policy. While some things have changed, denunciations of illicit timber extraction are still frustrated by the will of powerful stakeholders (interview with G. Villachica, Mayor of Osa):

Although we may have made it at the beginning [of AGENDA21]... truck loads of wood leave the peninsula and we're there denouncing... the people get bored when there is nothing effective done about it, still today, we place complaints unto the local authorities. But when not heard, this does not work, people are demotivated (interview E. Beita, Covirena).

Why did an effective evaluation of FMP policy in 1999 not have permanent influence? As mentioned earlier, participation in decision-making is not neutral or free of power interests (Weber, 1923; Chambers, 1997; Scoones, 2002). The participation of the Covirenas in FMP seems to have served mainly two interests: those of the process of Agenda21 itself and those of the Covirenas. In the case of the former, Agenda21 proved to be an effective MSP in articulating a stakeholder consensus for state actors (see Hemmati, 2000). This had widespread and concrete results, which contributed to the legitimisation of the process of Agenda21 as an effective institution in this region.

14 Transportation of MINAE for Covirenas is facilitated for meetings amongst themselves in the Regional...
It is important to consider that Agenda21 was implemented during a specific period of crisis in ACOSA, due to local demands regarding the forestry sector. This makes the success of FMP incidence more relevant. Agenda21 was the arena which harnessed corrective outcomes and, as such, was proven an effective process for CBOs, civil society at large and other institutional actors.

As stated, this also served the interest of Covirenas as stewards of nature. They had experienced a long history of failed denunciations and, in this case, their impact transcended the local level. Accountability was enforced with consequent dismissals of public servants—an event which was covered by the national media.

However, prompt top-down reaction from government organisations are not entirely a novelty to the region. As seen in chapter 3, after the social-forestry crisis of the late 1990s, the government created the High Level Regional Direction and added a park-ranger post in the Peninsula. As seen in the FMP case, the linkage of the efforts of the powerless Covirena with the process of Agenda21, made structural changes possible. But, the structures of power were not challenged. Thus, from the viewpoint of Covirenas,

One still needs courage to denounce, institutions continue to see one as a small peasant, not an engineer or of the sort, they think you are not capable of speaking up. The institutions should respect the language of the peasants, of the small landholders, of rural citizens and respect what we feel. (Beita, Covirena)

Despite the initiatives of local actors, if there is no political will on the part of powerful stakeholders to allow the building of effective institutions to regulate resources, the impacts of local actors’ interventions are wasted, is commercial interests in the forests use FMP to neutralise their efforts.

No institution was created to further promote the role of the Covirenas. While their participation in policy development produced some notable results which discomfited local authorities and the current power structure, the lack of real empowerment is evident in the fact that they continue to face same treatment as before. No more than in 1998 has Agenda21 really challenged existing power structures, so that the question must inevitably arise of whether there is any interest in really empowering the rural poor.
Chapter 6 Payment for Environmental Services

‘For millions of years flowers have been growing thorns. And for millions of years sheep have been eating flowers. And is it not worth to understand why they go to such lengths to grow thorns...? Is the war between sheep and flowers not important? Not more serious and important than the sums of the red-faced gentleman?’ (Extract of ‘The Little Prince’, Saint-Exupéry, 1995:33)

This chapter addresses the Payment for Environmental Services (PES), a policy-instrument –defined as “a mechanism that assigns resources to the conservation and recuperation of forest lands” (MINAE et al, 2002:21). What is innovative in PES is that it links not just forest products but services as well to the market. As such, it reflects a new element of sustainable development discourse which even more than previously embodies the prevailing market ideology.

PES reflects the general influence on national forestry-policy of international institutions such as the World Bank and the Global Environmental Fund (GEF) which, in 1995, pointed out that Costa Rica ignored the value of its forest’s environmental services and non-timber products (Carias, 2001; Calvo, 1996) A few years earlier, the National Financial Fund for Forests (FONAFIFO) was created with funding from the GEF and World Bank in 1990 (interview Cubero, FONAFIFO), while the PES itself, which was established in 1996 in the new forestry law No. 7575, has also been promoted by the Bank (WB, 2002).

The PES will be used in this chapter especially to examine how the participation of Covirenas has influenced forest policy through the Agenda21 process. The participation of Covirenas in the new market for forest services and the effects these have on their livelihoods will also be explored.

\[GEF\text{ is a crucial international stakeholder was designated in the Agenda21 document as a \textit{major funding body... which should cover the agreed incremental costs of relevant activities under A21}}\text{'} \quad \text{(Grubb et al, 1995:143)}\]
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6.1 Overview and Official Views

The chapter on “Integration of Environment and Development in Decision Making” of the Agenda21 document, which is the basis of PES, strongly promotes market-oriented approaches and incentives for natural resource management (Grubb et al., 1993), such as compensating landholders who submit their forests to reforestation or preservation schemes. As a means of incorporating a variety of forest services (see Table 6.1), it “reflects a strong move towards consideration of economic instruments for environmental policy [and] a global endorsement of a ‘polluters pay principle’.” (idem:113). As an economic instrument, the PES is regarded as a successful environmental policy and thus an example of why Costa Rica is widely regarded as a ‘trailblazer’ in environmental policymaking (Silva, 2001).

Table 6.1 The Services Forests Provide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN environmentalist classification of services</th>
<th>Costa Rican government classification of services</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Mitigation of gases causing greenhouse effect</td>
<td>- Mitigation of gas emissions responsible for greenhouse effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Prevention and control of soil erosion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Protection of biodiversity, as habitats of flora and fauna</td>
<td>- Protection of biodiversity for sustainable use and conservation - Protection of ecosystems and forms of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Watershed stability</td>
<td>-Protection of water for urban, rural or hydroelectric usage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Supply of genetic material</td>
<td>- Scientific, pharmaceutical, and genetic research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Eco-tourism</td>
<td>- Natural scenic beauty for tourism and science</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the period when they receive PES incentives, beneficiaries grant their forest rights to FONAFIFO (La Gaceta, 2003:29) which operationalises the PES in conjunction with SINAC. SINAC determines the priority areas to benefit from PES incentives, deals with some of the application procedures and controls and manages the contracts between the landholders and the FONAFIFO (La Gaceta, 2002:13). The financial resources received by the government to fund the PES (see Box 6.1) are paid to beneficiaries through FONAFIFO.

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16 ‘Integration of Environment and Development in Decisionmaking’ is the name of Agenda21 Chapter 8.
Multistakeholder Processes in Sustainable Development: The Limitations of Agenda 21 in Costa Rica

Box 6.1 Some Financial Sources of the PES

- 5% of the national income product of fuel tax
- 40% of the national income product of forest tax
- Resources FONAFIFO receives through the emission of forest bonds
- International or national donations or loans:
- MINAE negotiated national and international cooperation for the PES program, for which a new World Bank loan was signed in 2003, accompanied by a GEF donation. Along with a national counterpart, this pact was baptized the ECOMERCADOS project (eco-markets project). Its objective is to ‘promote both the development of markets, and provision of environmental services within private properties’. These services are: mitigation of gases causing greenhouse effect and the conservation of water for hydroelectric projects in Costa Rica. Due to the limited resources of the PES, the ECOMERCADOS project prioritises the areas in which the policy instrument will be applied, in accord with the plan of the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor.

Sources: Law No. 7575 articles 43 and 47 (1996); MINAE et al. 2002; Lo Castro (2003a)

The PES assigns resources to landholders under two land management options (see Box 6.2).

Box 6.2 Description of PES modalities, which landholders can abide by:

1. **Preservation:** forests are subject to strict conservation, yet forest landowners receive incomes for not depleting or for under-utilising the resources that forest provide.

2. **Reforestation:** land is reforested and timber can be extracted according to the guidelines of a forestry-plan. Owners are encouraged to plant high-value trees as a long-term investment.

Sources: MINAE et al. 2002; Figueres 2003

In order to benefit from the PES incentives, applicants must fulfil a series of requirements including: proof of landownership and a management-plan created by a forestry expert and presented to FONAFIFO. The amount paid per hectare to the landowner varies with the extension and type of forest specified in the management-plan. The fees of the forest expert are a fixed percentage of a landholder’s PES earnings; thus, such experts tend to favour the larger landowners, which normally are industrial enterprises (interview Montero, JUDESUR).

Thus, the U.S.-owned timber company, Ston Forestal, is an example of a multinational corporation which not only benefits from the reforestation option of the PES,
but also from such financial incentives which are being used to promote foreign direct investment in the forestry sector. In 1999, in a self-evaluation report, the MINAE recognised that this was likely to occur, noting that the legal processes aimed at obtaining compensation for environmental damage continue to be lengthy and the established sanctions do not compensate for social damage. The absence or non-application of regional planning instruments (land-use, regulatory plans) is one of the elements that allows the development of production activities that exceed the carrying capacity of ecosystems. (MINAE, 1999: 15)

As Bass notes, companies such as Ston Forestal “want access to cheap forest assets, and therefore prefer [countries with] weak or chaotic policies” (Bass, 2002:100). Since Stone Forestal is the largest forest industry in ACOSA, it remains to be seen to what extent the PES also distributes resources to the rural poor in the name of the ‘conservation and recovery of forest lands’. The following section will explore the Covirenas’ views and demands regarding this particular policy instrument.

6.2 Covirenas Stand Point

The PES objective of compensating landholders who decide to preserve forest and/or reforest has significant local support, despite the shortfalls of the policy in achieving this objective in an equitable manner. Local support (including Covirenas) for the policy is mainly due to its potential to help alleviate poverty within the region.

However, few Covirenas benefit from the PES; many more have unsuccessfully applied to this incentive as they practice preservation and/or reforestation within their lands (interviews Castro, Benavides-Covirenas). Indeed, poor small-landholders generally are not benefiting from this the policy instrument as they do not have access to it (or fail when attempt).

...no one has helped or paid me anything. I’d like some of the PES resources to help my plans of for eco-tourism. The PES has been given to people with much more than 50 has and can pay, but those of us with small plots of land, who made a genuine effort and planted native trees are disregarded. (interview Beita-Covirenas)

Covirenas dispute the PES because of the lack of accessibility to the policy itself. Usually only large-landowners, more specifically those with resources, and the forest industry benefit from the PES.

Around 1997, we heard about the PES, funds the government had to give for our forests...There were great expectations...But nothing, they are inaccessible to us small
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applicants. You see, Acosa is rich, rich in biodiversity and that’s why the timber industry comes and makes so much money here, and many get incentives for buying land and get the wood as well. But on the other hand Enrique Beita does not get paid a penny for more than 1500 trees he has and decided to preserve. (interview Beita-Covirena)

Although the MINAE states that “Criteria such as ‘social equity, environmental sustainability and economic efficiency’ established in the National Plan of Development should be central elements to fix rates and prices and applicable to the environmental services” (2002:42), social equity is left behind. This inaccessibility issue is due to the requirements needed to apply (Box 6.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 6.3 Requirements for Applying for the PES Program and Inaccessibility Issues:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High costs of forestry expert fees</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Landownership is an issue for many peasants in ACOSA</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Bureaucracy: many small landholders cannot afford to comply with the time-consuming bureaucratic procedures, and facing paperwork may be a further filter because of literacy issues (interviews with Castro, Benavides-Covirenas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. High degree of centralization of offices required to visit (i.e. FONAFIFO, Public Registry amongst others) and lack of mobility of small landholders and peasants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Corruption within institutions (MINAE, local government, and FONAFIFO) giving approvals (personal communication of Fallas, Castro, Montero and Barrantes) where these give preference to the application which involve larger amounts of money.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on (Ghimire, 1993)

The difficulty of PES, is that there are not enough resources (D Vartanian) to neither pay a more decent amount per hectare of forest or to cover all the demands of applicants. The filtering process, of who gets through to benefit of the PES occurs with criteria not documented.
6.3 Interaction in Agenda21

The Covirenas brought the issue of the inaccessibility of poor small-landholders to the PES policy-instrument to Agenda21 in June, 2001. After debates about how this could be overcome, a proposal with four main points (Box 6.4) was drawn up.

**Box 6.4 Proposal to Increase the Accessibility of PES:**

- Fees of the forest-engineer were negotiated to be paid in smaller periodical amounts and only after the economic benefits were received.
- The MINAE agreed to raise procedural issues with FONAFIFO, in order to ease these and workshops were to be arranged socializing information.
- Legal procedures regarding registration of land-ownership it was proposed a group of lawyers could be brought together and offer subsidized services.
- A series of workshops were also arranged within AGENDA21 on how to benefit of the PES program.

Through both inter-institutional coordination and inter-sectoral support this proposal has moved into its phase of implementation. In late 2002, a decree was passed, acknowledging that the land-titling requirement was an obstacle for potential beneficiaries. “In order to comply with national conservation policies it is necessary to establish conditions so non-registered lands have access to the PES program”.

Regarding other points of the proposal drawn up in Agenda21, a local office has recently been established in the heart of the Osa Peninsula, with the goal of democratising information and access. It is too soon to know for certain if this has made a significant difference, though generalized complaints about the PES inaccessibility continues to predominates in the marginal rural areas where poor landholders still have little if any information whatsoever about the PES program, while other stakeholders (e.g., the World Bank, the GEF and central government) are very well informed about how they have decided to implement this policy.
6.3 Participation in Agenda 21: PES and the Lands Destined for the Boruca Dam (HPB)

Another aspect of accessibility debated in Agenda 21 is of a territorial character and concerns the Boruca indigenous lands. The government’s 2001 classification of the services that forests provide (see table 6.1) was dramatically narrowed down by the terms of the ECOMERCADOS project from a broad range (see table 3.4) to only two: how “forests mitigate greenhouse effect and protect hydrological resources for human consumption and hydroelectric generation” (Decree No. 30090-MINAE in La Gaceta, 2002a:2). The reduction of the services forests provide, sheds light on the interests being served in the development of this policy instrument. As one of the services, biodiversity was part of the broader range of forest services and of up most importance for the livelihoods of the rural poor, this has been left behind whilst the hydrological resource for hydroelectric generation was clearly brought forth.

Paradoxically in February 2002 a decree had passed stating, “the areas which would be covered by the possible hydroelectric-project of Boruca (HPB) should be excluded from the PES policy. Although the hydroelectric plant is officially not yet approved this exclusion was justified by government organizations:

- If the dam were to be built, these populations would be extradited from their lands, and the compensation the government would have to pay them would be higher if they were benefitting of the PES program...they (policy-makers) probably thought there was no point of allowing these to benefit, if a damn was to be built over these lands (Polimeni, Director of OCS).

Once the ECOMERCADOS is signed in 2003 these excluded lands are now a priority area for the PES policy. However the indigenous population that live in these areas, form part of the extreme-poverty indices of the country. Thus the same accessibility issues Covirenas and other poor landholders face in taking part of the PES program would be experienced in Boruca. So despite titling of lands have been waved off and their lands enclose exuberant richness of forests they would still face other obstacles (see Box 6.3).

During the exclusion period, the Covirenas supported and represented indigenous organizations’ interests as they are also committed to the preservation of natural resources. Together, these local organisations brought this issue to AGENDA 21 in August, 2002.

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17 A World Bank-MINAE project that aims for a (Mesoamerican) biological corridors, created through market led incentives.
18 With its market-orientation the government have focused on broad consumer demands of these hydrological sources and include hydroelectric demands (MINAE et al, 2002: 47).
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There was consensus on elaborating a proposal of decree to be sent to the MINAE. This proposal made a case for the potential beneficiaries of the PES incentive who could not be benefited because they remained within the site of the Boruca Hydroelectric Dam project, even if it had not even passed the pre-elementary phases of environmental or social impact assessments. The proposal was submitted to policymakers and other stakeholders, and in a matter of months, it was approved by the MINAE. As mentioned, the lands within the Boruca Dam area, were not only allowed to benefit from PES but as these lands (and the dam is crucial for these plans) are a crucial area for the Mesoamerican plans, these were now part of a priority area for the PES. In 1998 only 40 PES projects had been approved by 2002 this amount had doubled (Polimeni, Director of OCS) since Agenda21 intervention. But who’s interest are being served is still to be seen, will the indigenous population benefit of the PES? and if so what would happen if the hydroelectric project is implemented?

6.4 Concluding Remarks

In the development of the PES, as international stakeholders took further presence in actually guiding the policy to their interests (i.e. determining areas which will benefit of the policy), local stakeholders needs and interests were opaque.

The inequalities of access to the incentive reflect power structures and the promotion of tree plantations benefiting industries such as Stone Forestal and how this power favor profit-making and not egalitarian distribution. Despite local efforts in increasing equity and social justice, the benefits are still awaited by many of the most in need.

One concrete result of the PES policy development is the inclusion of indigenous lands ‘destined’ for the construction of PHB. Whether this was product of international or local stakeholders (local demands canalized through Agenda21 to policy-makers) is very difficult to tell. Overall however, local populations have little incidence in the decision-making of policy-development.

Whether the lands within the Mesoamerican biological corridor will benefit poor landholders still remains to be seen. What is evident is that they had not much to say in any of the planning and much less if their right to benefit from a PES will be taken away from them once other forest services become of relevance if the BHP comes forth. The BHP
construction is are already within the hands of international and bureaucrats' hands as they begin to clear the policy road (i.e. emphasizing the benefits forests provide for the generation of hydroelectricity, giving priority to the lands within the Mesoamerican biological corridor to this profit-making and detrimental goal.

There may have been some incidence of local actor’s participation regarding the inclusion of Boruca lands for the PES. Considering the stakeholder power differentials involved in the hydroelectric project, the doubt regarding local participation in decision-making would be clarified if despite opposition, the construction is enforced.

At both global and national levels the rhetoric in PES policy-paradigm speaks of benefiting local and global populations, economically and environmentally, respectively. As studied, this is not achieved at the local level and seems not the genesis or motor behind political and economical interests of policymakers. The Mesoamerican plan is the current engine powering further PES implementation with the economic and political interests it may serve (i.e. construction of BHP). Poor landholders have been and could continue to be marginalized from what seems an initial phase of a future and broader (Mesoamerican) development of the region. It seems this is considered to be a cost required but policymakers rest with the assumption this will be paid off once, the ‘benefits’ of global plans (for the region) begin to reap and trickle down to those previously marginalized.
Chapter 7: Conservation Discourse in Costa Rica

7.1 Official National and Global Views

The Costa Rican conservation discourse is based on the establishment of 'protected areas' (Campbell, 2002), which the Rio Convention on Biological Diversity defines as "areas where special measures are needed to regulate or manage biological resources important for the conservation of biodiversity" (Grubb et al, 1993:78). This discourse had a predominant role in national policymaking during the period from 1950 to 1980, and was consolidated in 1996 with the creation of the national park system (SINAC), placing Costa Rica in an outstanding position regarding international environmental matters (further influencing current policy-making). The creation of protected areas, where wildlife is not subject to human exploitation or competition, is based on the assumption that local population practices are a major cause of deforestation (Fairhead and Leach, 1995; Campbell, 2002:30), disregarding the fact that, until the advent of the world market, rainforests generally had been used sustainably by local people for generations (Ross, 1978; Vandermeer, 1995).

Moreover, government efforts to create protected areas have not always been effective in protecting biodiversity from external threats. Rapid urbanization (with booming consumption and production patterns) which lacks planning has affected these artificially limited areas, where nature processes are confined to fragmented areas, endangering species (Vandermeer, 1995; Calvo, 1996). Protected areas have also been ineffective in halting deforestation, the main threat to biodiversity.

Furthermore, as top-down policy normally does, the implementation of the conservation discourse lacked local participation in decision making for the implementation of 'protected' areas by rural population whose livelihood depended on forests. (Hombergh, 1999; Edelman, 1999; Campbell, 2001). As Ghimire points out,

"Timber extraction has in fact increased in recent years because peasants fear that more forest areas will be incorporated into conservation criteria, and that they will be prohibited from using the remaining forest resources" (1993:62).

This is because invisible costs are not considered and meant "the destruction of other economies, nature's processes and people's survival" (Shiva, 1992:187).
Disregarding shortfalls of the CD, the government argues that national wildlife parks provide socio-economic benefits (i.e. ecotourism and environmental service payments) which will gradually trickle-down to rural populations. These possible economic-returns for communities, however, benefit only a few and in any event, require investment at a regional level. The prohibition (a procedure of exclusion) which national parks entail operate in a complex, ever-changing manner which raises questions such as: prohibition for whom and, protected from whom?. Campbell (1998) illustrates this reference to the privileged access to non-extractive activities within these areas noting for a Coastal National Parks that, "...one of the prime objectives of establishing protected areas, was to limit and sometimes eliminate use of marine turtles by local people, (yet) simultaneously promotes their ‘use’, by tourists" (in Campbell, 2002:38).

Despite debates about the benefits of protected areas, rapid growth in the 1980s and 1990s of the tourism sector (the largest source of foreign exchange by 1993) (MINAE,2000) sustained both the emergence and continuation of this discourse. In the same sense, the global view of environmental services from forests for preserving biodiversity and carbon sequestration has maintained the CD at the national level. This international 'cooperative' action can be appreciated through agreement with mechanisms whose objective is the internalization of positive externalities by paying global forest services (WB, 2002).

"This could be done either by relying on new markets for environmental services such as joint implementation, bioprospecting deals, debt-for-nature swaps or ensure that host countries receive international compensation for additional conservation efforts that protect or provide global environmental benefits." (Barbier, 2000 in WB, 2002).

The CD is still ever present in the Costa Rican national policy areas.

7.2 Covirenas Stand Point

These government-imposed initiatives have affected local social realities by marginalizing rural populations from the lands of biological interest. In ACOSA, 24% of its area is protected, which implies the isolation of many rural communities from the environment resources required for subsistence. The government promised economic compensation for the displaced populations who were moved to marginal lands. But in most cases there has been no compensation, only a promise of a World Bank led ECOMERCADOS project.
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As an attractive destination for scientific research and ecotourism, ACOSA has served the 'green image' of Costa Rica yet with high social costs. Opposition to the CD and the lack of government payments for the lands involved were among the elements which catalysed the social protest in 1998.

With the further creation of protected areas, the Ministry found itself in an increasingly unmanageable situation. This not only involved the high costs of purchasing lands but, under these circumstances (distancing resources from local reality) required a natural resource management which involved a sophisticated system of surveillance which the government could not afford (interview with Vartanian, CONADES). In this manner, protected areas have not been an effective measure to deal with deforestation, which is the main threat to biodiversity. Artificial boundaries surrounding the protected areas in ACOSA do not protect forests from corruption.

Covirenas are also protecting the forests from corruption of the local governments and MINAE. They blame their lack of resources to pay more park rangers, but even if they triple their employees, deforestation would not stop because of their interest is in money not the forests. (Interview, Belta-Covirena).

There is a consensus amongst Covirenas regarding conservation discourse by arguing that not only it is inefficient for natural resource management, but it also "does more harm than good for communities as...it doesn't consider needs of the population" (interview with Castro-Covirenas). This standpoint complements an ongoing national debate on natural resource management by both the state and civil society about whether the current conservation discourse can lead to sustainable development. Many believe that the main limitation of current policy-development is that it hasn't evolved according to the needs or reality of communities (interview Vartanian-CONADES). The official position is not, however, to change the actual regime and solely ensure the preservation of biodiversity by excluding its human 'threats' (Interview ugalde-MINAE).

In Agenda21, Covirenas have highlighted the need for further consideration of the economic needs of rural populations whilst improving coordination of natural resource management at the local level, emphasizing the need for a pro-poor focus in Sustainable Development (interview Castro-OCS). Their proposal for this, is co-management of natural resources (see Borrás, 1999) where communities lead natural resource management processes, complemented (not dominated) by the efforts of the state. The co-management option for national parks has support within the Ministry of Environment (beyond the
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debate of natural resource management) and is seen as a “viable sustainable solution because livelihoods within these communities, require a true conviction to the protection of biodiversity” (interview, Polimeni-OCS).

7.3 Participation in Agenda 21: Fallen Wood Decree

In August 2001, Covirenas raised the inappropriateness of the CD in Agenda21. They demanded former land-holders and the population which lived in buffer-zones of protected areas be allowed to make use of fallen wood within these areas (as the land was once their own). Once a consensus was achieved, stakeholders of Agenda21 elaborated a proposal for what was known as the Fallen Wood Decree (FWD).

Covirenas’ participation was predominant during the elaboration of the proposed decree. They had once elaborated a project with an English NGO, proposing an alternative natural resource management which allowed the sustainable-use of resources within protected areas. In a similar way the Fallen Wood Decree reflect Covirenas’ view of a pro-poor Sustainable Development which priorises the economic needs of present generations, and is summed up in this paradox of “watching a whole tree rot on their land, while this could provide an income for a family that …” (interview Benavides-Covirena).

In Agenda21 the proposal requested specific permission to make use of this wood on a case by case basis, meaning that the interested beneficiaries would have a forestry-expert elaborate an impact assessment and, if the extraction of the fallen tree would not cause environmental harm, would be granted to the applicants who would be escorted by a park-ranger to withdraw the fallen tree. An initial condition put forth by the MINAE is that there would be no change of land use, though the sustainable-use of certain natural resources within the protected areas would be allowed.

Allowing populations to extract fallen wood from protected areas is a delicate matter for both the MINAE and Covirenas as this could open the possibility of illicit timber extraction (interview Castro-Covirena). Anticipating this risk, the proposal elaborated in Agenda21 specified that parkrangers were to be accompanied by a Covirena during the extraction process. As a solution not well taken by the regional office in ACOSA.

The MINAE, as the government organisation involved, has the power of approval of the decree. After local debates, MINAE officials finally had a modified version of the proposal drawn up by a lawyer which disregarded the disputed clause. The latest draft of
the proposal, which is still pending of the minister's signature, reads "MINAE officials may be accompanied by a COVIRENA whilst making the inspections."

By not enforcing through legislation the inspection of sites of fallen wood collection under a co-management framework, MINAE was allowed to choose at its own discretion when or whether to carry out these inspections with local witnesses. Thus, an important point for local stakeholders was disregarded and the government view was imposed. It is important to note that this has fed local scepticism about MINAE's transparency as an institution. For Covirenas, it affirms that MINAE officials have much to hide from civil society and that their accountability is non-existent. It does little, moreover, to alter the general belief that state institutions discredit the work of the Covirenas (interview Castro-Covirena).

7.4 Concluding Remarks

The conservation discourse is far from leading to Sustainable Development and local stakeholders are rejected as stewards of natural resources. The CD itself, as embodied in policy has not been particularly influenced by the participation of Covirenas. So, it is especially ironic that, in its assessment of the in-situ conservation of protected areas the MINAE notes that,

mechanisms to promote individual and community initiatives are still inadequate, particularly in the management of biological corridors and in the conservation of species (p.15).

As seen in the case of ACOSA, Agenda21 has served as an arena to bring forth strong community-conservation initiatives, which the MINAE itself has tended to ignore. CD disregards community needs in policy-development while, in contrast, as we have seen in previous chapters, World Bank influence on policy is considerable.

With the FWD there was space for local stakeholders to voice proposals, and an apparent disposition to hear local requests, but these were modified so as not to inconvenience the status quo. The MINAE, which originally institutionalised the Covirenas, now seems to oppose their actions by disregarding a well argued local demand for co-management. Is there, in such circumstances, a possibility of structurally empowering the Covirenas? Is there a truly institutional intention to empower any local stakeholder? Traditional forms of policymaking remain intact as the power-holders are still the top-
bureaucrats (and the political and economic forces behind them) who create the policies that are imposed on the bottom.
Chapter 8: Conclusions

The second part of this research paper (chapters 5-7) has explored the effectiveness of the ‘plan of action for sustainable development’ - Agenda 21 - in representing the interests of the rural poor of ACOSA through the development of forestry policies. This chapter concludes the main arguments brought forward in two sections, the first of which examine the access of the rural poor both to forest resources, and, decision-making processes in ACOSA and the second of which explained the contradictions and limitations of sustainable development, through the experience of Agenda 21 in the same region.

The last section of each of the three chapters (5.4, 6.4 and 7.4) of the second part of this research paper synthesize the findings of the interplay of interests and the influence that Covirenas have had on each of the forestry policies we have studied. This sheds light on the access the rural poor have to forests resources, a function of policy frameworks.

8.1.a Access of the Rural Poor to Forest Resources

In the FMP policy case, the rural poor have influenced forest policy, yet their access to resources succumbed to the interests expressed by the bureaucratic structures. Corruption not only subordinated the livelihoods of the rural poor to private gain by giving illicit access to environmental resources through the allocation of forest permits, but it also led inevitably to resource degradation.

Although social justice and equity are basic elements of the SD discourse (MINAE, 1999; Barkin, 2003), the rural poor in fact do not enjoy either, as we have seen in the cases of PES policy and the Conservation Discourse. Covirenas have attempted to incorporate both equity and social justice unto the process of resource management by participating in Agenda 21, yet did not succeed. In the Conservation Discourse case for example, the Covirenas’ co-management option was not ratified and the Fallen Wood Decree was left to the Ministry’s discretion.

In the PES case, equity has been ignored, since its creation in 1996, the access of the rural poor to the forest resources originally contemplated in this policy instrument has been insignificant. Currently the policy is at the discretion of the ECOMERCADOS project and its prioritisation of possible beneficiaries. The possibility of Covirenas influencing this policy under the new framework of World Bank influence seems grim. Even if they did
succeed in incorporating the Boruca lands, it is not clear if this outcome was the product of Covirenas’ concern to allow indigenous populations to benefit from the PES policy or of the relevance these lands’ forest services to hydroelectric dam construction plans.

Bass has characterized other Agenda21 experiences as being ‘well-meaning’, but essentially ‘top-down technocratic’ processes of expert-development plans which rarely match with local needs, resources or capacities (Bass in Dodds, 2001:46). In the three policy cases that we have revised, it is clear that Agenda21 presents a series of possibilities for policy-development and, thus, for access to resources for poor, yet there are structural limitations in challenging top-down technocratic policy making that prevent this from happening.

8.1.b Access of the Rural Poor to Decision Making in Agenda21

Agenda21 does offer a set of possibilities for the marginal region of ACOSA. There has been an increase in the accountability of public servants and government organizations to the region’s population. There are numerous multi-sectoral efforts carried out by the government and rural people of ACOSA, creating some new linkages among these actors. The inter-institutional coordination produced through the creation of the Inter-institutional Commission of Osa and Agenda21 is appreciated by many, as one important outcome. It also signifies a linkage of governmental development efforts with the private sector, who in only exceptional cases have been part of Agenda21, which may be more problematical trend.

According to state officials, the main success of Agenda21 is that “the levels of social disruption in the region have diminished” (MINAE, 2001:13; interviews with Polimeni-OSC and Vartanian-CONADES). In Rio, when Agenda21 was envisaged, its aim was that all stakeholders would have equitable means to resources and decisionmaking, according to the discourse of Sustainable Development. In fact, powerful stakeholders such as government organizations of the Inter-institutional Commission of Osa, multinational corporations and other international stakeholders, set the pace for policy development. This contrasts with the limited influence the Covirenas. Despite strong local opposition, the possible construction of both the Boruca Dam and the pulp mill for the timber company - Stone Forestal- in ACOSA (Rockymountains, 2003) illustrate the magnitude of power
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differences which influences development plans. This reality is far from the innovative participatory planning for sustainable development that the MINAE describes Agenda 21 as being. Such reality more closely resembles the historical experiences of ruling groups devising new strategies to legitimate their power and convert it into what Weber termed domination (Weber, 1922).

8.2 Limitations of the Model of Agenda21 and Contradictions of Sustainable Development Discourse

The implementation of Agenda21 in Costa Rica demonstrates how sustainable development is failing to achieve its objectives for equitable access to natural resources of present generations and ensuring these do not compromise the security and welfare of future generations. Revising and contesting structural power differentials can constrain environmental degradation (Narayanan, 2003), but it depends upon wider participation. The model of Agenda21 is an interesting attempt in this direction and the premise of multistakeholder process for policy-development is an improvement from previous top-down development models that exclude the poor from the political arena.

Nevertheless, this paper has shown that participation requires more than filling rooms with people to discuss (policy) issues, although this would fit the government’s definition of participation (see MINAE, 2000) and would probably be agreeable to most international stakeholders.

The limitations of the Agenda21 model is not due to its premise of wider involvement of stakeholders (i.e. civil society) in participatory decision-making. This model is flawed rather because it assumes that other institutional and economic spheres behave within and respect the logic of a multistakeholder process. The hidden and not-so-hidden agendas of powerful stakeholders within Agenda21, as well as of those external to the process, shape the environmental policies of Costa Rica. Governments are sensitive to -and many times impotent to resist- international policy "recommendations" which have economic growth as their principal aim, while objectives such as equity, participation and poverty alleviation, are merely window-dressing. Agenda21 has not proven to be able to prioritise the fact that forest resources are fundamental to livelihoods of the rural poor of ACOSA.
As Gro Harlem Brundtland, one of the architects of sustainable development discourse admits in "Our Common Future and Ten Years After Rio":

...the number of people living in absolute poverty has increased. They number today some 1,300 million people who live on less than US$1 per day. If we go up to US$2 the number rises to half the world's population. (Brundtland, 2000:257)

Yet, Brundtland's solution is the promotion of corporate initiatives, making specific reference to the way the profitable mining sector can engage in cooperative voluntary schemes with powerless local stakeholders. Its relevance for ACOSA is that, within its rich biodiversity it holds bauxite reserves, which the US multinational ALCOA once exploited and the current exploitation of which is promoted by international banks. If the Boruca Hydroelectric project can ensure a supply of cheap energy for bauxite extraction this could make ACOSA an attractive prospect for international investors.

If this scenario unfolds, it will repeat the stories of the forestry industry, large multinational corporations being promoted by the government and international institutions simply because of their apparent affinity for growth oriented development. Such an orientation, however, would allow any industry, regardless of how damaging it might be for biodiversity, to maintain its extractive practices at the expense of local stakeholders who were never allowed to hold much of a stake in the first place.

As long as all stakeholders are previously convinced of the need for equitable access to resources by all -including the poor- sustainability can be aimed for. So long as government policies and international "recommendations" place poverty alleviation and sustainability as the starting point of development; instead of perpetuating development based on economic growth and unequal systems of resource allocation, the people of regions such as ACOSA, can have some hope of a secure and productive future. The present study suggests that such a prospect is by no means certain.
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Annex 1 Inter-Institutional Commission of Osa

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<td>2. Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVIU)</td>
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<td>3. Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social (IMAS)</td>
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<td>4. Municipalidad de Osa</td>
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<td>5. Municipalidad de Cartago</td>
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<td>6. Ministerio de Seguridad Pública, Gobernación y Policía</td>
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<td>8. Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS)</td>
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<td>9. Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería (MAG)</td>
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<td>10. Ministerio de Vivienda y Asentamientos Humanos (MIVIHA)</td>
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<td>11. Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA)</td>
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<td>13. Patronato Nacional de la Infancia (PANI)</td>
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<td>14. Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuacultura (INCOPESCA)</td>
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<td>15. Instituto Costarricense de Puertos del Pacífico (INCOP)</td>
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Annex 2 List of Interviewees

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<th>Lives in</th>
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<tr>
<td>Marcos Castro</td>
<td>Representative of Regional Committee of Covirenas ACOSA</td>
<td>La Gamba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eduardo Benavides</td>
<td>Covirenas</td>
<td>La Gamba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respondent A</td>
<td>Local Government of Golfito/ Secretary of Regional Committee of Covirenas ACOSA</td>
<td>Golfito</td>
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<tr>
<td>Olman Castro</td>
<td>Covirenas</td>
<td>La Gamba</td>
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<td>Claudio Barrantes</td>
<td>Ex director of CLACOSA</td>
<td>Golfito</td>
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<td>Mabis</td>
<td>AMUGO</td>
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<td>Business owner</td>
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<td>Rolando</td>
<td>Hotel owner</td>
<td>Palmar Norte</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabriel Villachica</td>
<td>Mayor Local Government of Osa</td>
<td>Ciudad Cortes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carlos Montero</td>
<td>JUDESUR</td>
<td>Ciudad Cortes</td>
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<td>Rafael Hernandez</td>
<td>ZMT Local Government of Osa</td>
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<td>Omar Henriquez</td>
<td>Covirenas</td>
<td>Rancho Quemado</td>
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<td>Enrique Beita</td>
<td>Covirenas and leader of Junta Reforestradora del Sur</td>
<td>Golfito</td>
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<td>Alvaro Ugalde</td>
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<td>Jorge Polimeni</td>
<td>Director of Civil Society Office, MINAE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marvin Fonseca</td>
<td>Coordinator of AGENDA21, MINAE</td>
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<td>Olman Castro</td>
<td>National Coordinator of Covirenas, MINAE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Herman Bravo</td>
<td>Former Environment and Energy Minister</td>
<td>Coronado</td>
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<td>Daniel Vartanian</td>
<td>Coordinator of Environmental Forum of CENAT</td>
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<td>Dagoberto Rodriguez</td>
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<tr>
<td>Juan Figuerola</td>
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<td>La Palma</td>
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Annex 2 Map of Peninsula de Osa (Hombergh, 1999) (with details on National Parks, Concentration of Gmelina Plantations)
Multistakeholder Processes in Sustainable Development: The Limitations of Agenda 21 in Costa Rica

Annex 3 Photographs of ACOSA
Annex 4 Photographs of Agenda 21 monthly meeting in ACOSA