



STATE, RELIGION & FAMILY:
the Turkish case from a feminist perspective

A Research Paper presented by

Ans Zwerver
(The Netherlands)

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for Obtaining the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Members of the Examining Committee

Ms. A. Chhachhi
Prof. Dr. M.R. Doornbos

The Hague, October 1990

STATE, RELIGION & FAMILY :
the Turkish case from a feminist perspective

by

ANS ZWERVER

(The Netherlands)

A research paper submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the Degree of Master of Arts in Development Studies of the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague

October 1990

This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies; the views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

Research papers and theses are not made available for outside circulation by the Institute.

Chapter 1	Introduction	1
	the case	1
	concepts	3
	hypothesis	5
	method of approach	5
	research methodology	6
	outline of the paper	8
Chapter 2	Conceptual Framework	9
	introduction	9
	the family	9
	religious fundamentalism	11
	feminism	12
	patriarchy	15
	the state	17
	liberal-pluralist approach to the state	18
	classical marxist approach to the state	18
	feminist critique on the two approaches	19
	post-colonial state	23
	summarizing	25
Chapter 3	Reforms in Atatürk's time	27
	introduction	27
	a historical overview - factors leading to the reforms	27
	reforms during Atatürk's time	29
	discussion	33
Chapter 4	Developments since Atatürk	37
	introduction	37
	economic developments	37
	political pluralism (1950-1980)	41
	political restrictions (1980 -)	44
	the emergence of women's groups	45

Chapter 5 Synthesis	48
introduction	48
state/civil society	48
women's movement	51
women's movement as a changing agent	55
conflict, compromise and cooperation	57
conclusion	59
bibliography	61

Chapter 1 Introduction

This research paper intends to explore the dynamics of interaction between the state, religion and family law and how it affects as well as reinforces the subordination of women. This exploration takes the case of Turkey and will concentrate on the period of initial modernization of Turkey (1923-1934) and the contemporary situation (1980-1985).

Since the "Decade of Women" it is widely recognized that women play an important role in the development process. Improvement in the lives of women did, however, not automatically follow with this recognition.

There is a complicated relationship between women, state and religion. Customs, norms and legislation will construct women in a particular way. The symbolic functions women perform have their origin in the way women are constructed in state policies, as well as religious policies. Women's place is in the family and legislation concerning the family is directed at controlling women and supporting their subordination. This means that policies which may be viewed as positive and liberating to women do not have any effect as long as the patriarchal character of the state, and of civil society, is unquestioned.

This paper focuses on three areas:

1. The state and its relation to the family, through examination of family law.
2. The Islamization process.
3. The women's movement vis à vis religion and the state.

the case

The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, marking the final breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and

it's leadership, the Caliphate.

The state was secularized with the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, the adoption of a secular Civil Code and the unification of education. At the same time the state took control of Islamic institutions and decreed the restriction of their scope as a matter of national policy. This meant that it eliminated almost all institutions which defined Islamic law, education, theology and social ethics. These had been state institutions in the Ottoman Empire.

"Secularism became to signify political control over religious life by bureaucrats, rather than, as the term usually implies, separation of church and state" (C. Keyder, 1988:210).

However, the state did not diminish popular belief or practice, nor effectively suppress religious protest and social protest (Binder, 1988:348).

The introduction of the Turkish Civil Code, in 1926, and in line with this, the secular family law in lieu of the Islamic family law in Turkey, laid the foundation for the establishment of more egalitarian relationships within the family.

The good intentions of this essentially top-down remedy notwithstanding, it would become apparent that the replacement of the role of the customary law requires far more than a government decree. A section of believers within Turkey's 98% Muslim population rose in dissent. Religion and law, they said, should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. The state did not pay much attention to this view.

Of late, a new radical transformation in official policy seems apparent. Presently, for example, the state actually encourages the expansion of religious educational facilities; an 180 degrees transform from Atatürk's time. There is no longer an official ideology that denies the legitimacy of religious thought. The state makes use of Islam as and when needed. Even though Turkey has not converted back to an Islamic state, it is using Islam in an instrumental way.

"Kemalism" was the ideology of the state in Ataturk's time.

Even though women were entitled to almost the same rights as men the structures of patriarchy were not touched upon. The state actively constructed and propagated an identity for women. Women were to be seen as being educated, obedient wives and good mothers. Women got several rights and some used them to enhance their position. Feminists at that time identified themselves with "Kemalism", this meant that for the "prominent women of this generation 'feminism' and 'Kemalism' became synonyms" (Tekeli, 1986:193). This led to the phenomenon of "State-feminism". However, the conditions on the ground did not change much contrary to the beliefs of the feminist. Tekeli calls this effect a "Schizophrenic illusion" (Ibid, 1986:185).

Class differences, discrepancies in education as well as the urban-rural divide, inevitably contributed to this schism. In analyzing the oppression mechanisms of the state and religious fundamentalism, these differences play an important role.

This paper will look at these differences and the way the state and its ideology, in addition to other ideologies, construct women. The family, as an institution, is focus of this paper. Changes in its structure, or its resistance to change, will be examined in relation to changing forms of the economy and of male dominance.

Apart from the above mentioned differences, there are also ethnic differences. The Kurdish question, for example, is a result of these differences. The most important limitation of this paper, is that it does not take these differences into account.

concepts

- The concepts used in this paper can roughly be classified in three categories.

First the "actors", which are the state and civil society.

Secondly, the ideologies: religious fundamentalism, patriarchalism and feminism.

Thirdly, the regulations. Here the focus is on secular family law as opposed to religious family law.

Schematic overview:

ideologies -> religious - patriarchalism - feminism
fundamentalism

actors -> state - political forces - civil society
family

regulations -> secular family law - religious family law

A distinction should be made between religion and institutionalized religion. Islam, as a religion involve communities of believers. The way these communities organize themselves tend to be along a formal, bureaucratic structure with a hierarchy of religious officials. Mostly they represent "the conservative face of religion, since they are integrated within the existing institutional order" (Giddens, 1989:463). As most institutionalized religions, Islam is constructed on a patriarchal ideology.

Islam, as a religion, is not always considered like that. Some feminist theologians have argued that to change or improve women's position through Islamic discourses is very well possible. Others are disputing this feasibility because there are limits to what can be achieved to further women's emancipation using this strategy. They point out that the Qur'an specifies a subordinate position for women. (A.M. Imam, 1990, in a public lecture at ISS on "Female Seclusion and Islam in Northern Nigeria").

This paper takes the stand that all monotheistic religions are constructed on a patriarchal ideology "The rule of the father". "Father" can be God, Allah, but can also be the senior man in the family. Religion basically constructs men superior to women.

Further elaboration of this conceptual framework follows in chapter two.

hypothesis:

The Turkish state in promoting the nuclear family prototype, does not intend to change its patriarchal character.

Since feminists question patriarchy, they can be looked upon as a threat because the state and Islamic fundamentalism seek to reinforce a traditional patriarchal family structure. This means that women cannot be seen as having "an identity independent from that of the family, and yet the family is a most conservative institution, in which role definitions change very slowly" (Tekeli, 1986:191).

This implies that feminism, insofar as it attacks women's subordination in the family, is a threat to the traditional patriarchal family.

method of approach

This research paper is describing an activity. What is happening? What has happened? Describing an activity is attributing actions to agents. The agents, moreover, only come into "existence" as a product of their actions or non-actions. Any agent is, in his/her actions constructing him/herself, creating him/herself as an agent. In describing activity, in naming agents, to what extent am I constructing these agents?

For this paper I am using secondary resources, mostly books and published articles. This means that this research is based on - opinions and assumptions presented in these books and articles. If one places on top of this my own subjectivity, my own biases, assumptions and opinions, the limitations of this paper are there. Furthermore, this paper is limited to one case.

research methodology

If anything, my methodology is a feminist one.

According to Sandra Harding:

"Knowledge is supposed to be based on experience, and the reason the feminist claims can turn out to be scientifically preferable is that they originate in, and are tested against, a more complete and less distorting kind of social experience" (Harding, 1987:184).

Thus, in this view, women's experience provides a more complete and less distorting knowledge claims than do men's. If one accepts this stand, there still are questions to ask. Women's experience is not universal, solely because women are women. There will be many stories that women tell about the different knowledge they have. Generally, one can say that "feminist epistemology resembles the efforts of many oppressed groups to reclaim for themselves the value of their own experience" (Narayan, 1984:257). By legitimizing the "subjugated knowledges" of women through science one can command political changes. This means that there is a shift from the objective, distant scientist in favor of taking a political stand, which has subjective elements in itself (Harding, 1986:1-14).

I will use my perspective as a "western" feminist to examine critically the interaction between state, religion and family, in order to try to understand the complexities of the oppression involved in different historical and cultural settings.

This means placing the researched matter in a logical conceptual framework in order to reach a coherent picture in which strategies for change may be anchored.

My interest in taking up an issue that concerns a group I am not part of (I am neither a Turkish woman, nor a Muslim woman) lies not in the fact that I want to give judgments of any kind, but in my wish to achieve a genuine understanding. Awareness of the

possibility of failing to fully understand the subject is there, also the danger of oversimplification, but still I want to make the attempt.

In my work with Turkish women in the Netherlands and my visits to Turkey one of the striking impressions on my mind was the impact religion has on the position of women. My understanding of Turkish history at that time, was limited and therefore I did not fully understand women's position towards religion and the impact Atatürk's reforms, have had on this. That Atatürk had a reverential status was clear from the way the Turkish women I know were talking about him. Tensions always prevailed when religion was discussed. Wearing or not wearing a headscarf, to be a religious woman, were prominent issues. That something very fundamental happened in Atatürk's time, which still had an important impact on Turkish women nowadays was obvious, but not what it was. This is the most important reasons why I took up this research issue.

outline of the paper

Chapter 2 Conceptual framework

In this chapter the conceptual framework will be described. I will review some literature in order to provide a framework that links the concepts of religious fundamentalism, feminism, patriarchy and the capitalist/patriarchal state.

Chapter 3 Reforms in Atatürk's time

Together with chapter 4 this chapter puts down the description of the case. The relation between the state, religion and family will run through them like a continuous thread.

The founding of the Republic of Turkey by Atatürk was accompanied by reforms that led to a secular state.

The aim of this chapter is to describe the impact this secularization of the state has had on women's role in Turkey.

Chapter 4 Developments since Atatürk

This chapter describes relevant developments since Atatürk, relevant insofar as they have had an impact on women's position. The aim of this chapter is to provide the necessary understanding of the reasons why and how women became politically active.

The emergence of different women's groups will be elaborated upon. Special attention is given to the emergence of fundamentalist women groups.

Chapter 5 Synthesis

This chapter will synthesize the foregoing chapters into a descriptive analysis of the interactions between state and civil society in contemporary Turkey.

The emphasis lies on women's role in Turkey and the nature of the women's movement.

Chapter 2 Conceptual Framework

introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the issues raised. I will review some literature in order to provide a framework for discussing religious fundamentalism, feminism, patriarchy and the capitalist/patriarchal state and their influences on the family.

the family

The family, as an institution, is an ideological construction that varies from one region to another. This can be due to class differences and/or differences in location i.e., urban or rural. The changing forms of patriarchalism towards the family can best be identified by looking at two different types of the family, i.e. the extended family and the nuclear family. Both construct women in certain ways. The emphasis on women as wives, as mothers, as workers can be shifting in time along changes in social-economic setting or in ideology.

The extended family can be characterized by unequal relations between its members. The senior man has great power over every member of the family, the mother-in-law controls her daughters-in-law, and the husband controls his spouse.

Marriage is determined by the parents and is regarded as an union between two families. Thus it is not an agreement of two individuals. This has, according to Serim Timur two consequences:
- "economic transaction accompany marriage, and marriage between relatives is encouraged" (Timur, 1981:69).

Another feature of the extended family is that it is not solely an important social unit, but it is also the unit of economic production in rural areas (Timur, 1981:59-73).

This family type is common in classic patriarchy. Classic patriarchy is based on a particular notion of political rights and political obedience. Sons have a subordinate position towards their fathers, implying an inferior rank in the public spheres of political power. Political right was natural and political power was paternal and had its origins in the procreative power of the father (Pateman, 1988:19-38). The boundaries between public and private, between the state and the family, are clearly defined in the extended family. Obedience to the patriarchal head is what holds these families together.

The nuclear family refers, in its simplest form, to the married heterosexual couple with children.

"This unit is referred to as conjugal family, when the accent is on the husband-wife relationship, and the nuclear family, when it is viewed as the basic unit of all more complex forms. The head of a nuclear family is independent, neither subject to the authority of any of his relatives nor economically dependent upon them." (Timur, 1981:60).

In this family form sons emancipated themselves from their fathers. This can be described as modern patriarchy. It is fraternal and contractual and it structures capitalist society (Pateman, 1988:25).

In general, each family goes through a life-cycle. People are born in their family of origin, get married, start their own family, become grand-parents when their children start a family. Family roles transform as the individual family member moves through the life-cycle.

- This paper will use the word family in a very broad sense because it is mainly interested in the process of transformation from the extended family into a nuclear family and especially in the changing relations for women within the family, their relations towards the state and the way they are constructed by different

ideologies. It is therefore a prerequisite to have a closer look at ideologies, which construct women in certain ways.

religious fundamentalism

This paper has as a case study Turkey and for that reason will deal with Islamic fundamentalism. It goes without saying that Islam is not the only religion which has experienced the phenomenon of fundamentalism. One only has to look at the emergence of Christian fundamentalist groups in the USA, Jewish fundamentalist groups in Israel, Hindu fundamentalist groups in India etc., to realize that almost every religion has its fundamentalist groups.

It is necessary to conceptualize religious fundamentalism because historically the term underwent changes. Religious fundamentalism literally means a strict maintenance of the fundament, the roots, the principles of religion, but are contemporary fundamentalist groups really going back to the roots of religion?

This paper takes the stand that religious fundamentalism is always contextual. Fundamentalist groups invent and/or select events in order to construct an Islam suitable for achieving certain goals. Adherents of fundamentalist groups themselves, however, are convinced that they possess the truth. Their representation of Islam is presented by them as the only valid one.

According to Amrita Chhachhi,

"Fundamentalism then, can only be understood in relation to a specific historical context. It is crucial to identify when it emerges, which are the social groups initiating as well as constituting the support base of this phenomenon and what exactly is being protected as the basic principles of adherence" (Chhachhi, 1988:14).

This means that the way in which items, like representation of gender are taken up by fundamentalist groups, will depend on actual political and social contexts.

Studies done on Islamic fundamentalism have shown that fundamentalist ideology has a basic contradiction in itself towards women. On the one hand it sees women as the source of all evil and at the other hand as the most vulnerable members of the household and the ones in need of constant protection and guidance by men in their lives (Afshar, 1987:70). This contradiction has its impact on women and will come into light if one has a closer look at the activities undertaken by women in order to "maximize security and optimize life options" (Kandiyoti, 1988:274).

feminism

There are different types of feminism, meaning different theories which deal with the oppression of women. It goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them all, but in general one can say that feminism is an ideology whose aim is to end women's subordination. The different views and emphasis on the structures of patriarchy and on the manifestations of capitalism (class relations) are reflected in the different types of feminism. This paper will use the definition of feminism given by Kumari Jayawardena:

"an awareness of women's oppression and exploitation within the family, at work and in society, and conscious action by women (and men) to change this situation" (Jayawardena, 1986:2).

In this definition strategies for change are incorporated.

In the beginning of the 19th and early 20th century feminism signified agitation on issues concerning equality and emancipation of women. This erupted in its demands for equal rights and legal reforms, in order to redress the prevailing discrimination of women (Jayawardena, 1986:2). The meaning of feminism widened in the second wave and it is in this period that

one can identify the different perspectives of feminism.

The liberal/reformist perspective stayed in line with former demands. It was concerned with uncovering the immediate forms of discrimination against women and the fight for legal and other reforms to overcome them. Others went beyond this concept of emancipation.

Emancipation is a legal issue, it is striving for equal rights and legal reforms which are essential for the liberation of women. But liberation of women being "the process of eliminating forms of oppression as long as these continue to arise" (Jaggar, 1983:6), necessitates that it not be a static process. Oppression, the concept of the imposition of constraints, suggests that one group is actively exploiting another group to its own interest. This includes "two groups with conflicting interests: the oppressor and the oppressed. It is a world view, moreover, that strongly suggests that liberation is unlikely to be achieved by rational debate but instead must be the result of struggle" (Ibid, 1983:6).

Feminism then means dismantling structures of oppression and exploitation. Domination of gender and domination of class, that is, patriarchy and capitalism, are the focus of the struggle from a socialist feminist perspective.

Two other feminist perspectives can be identified, the Marxist feminist perspective and the radical feminist one. Marxist feminists see women's struggle as an essentially part of the fight to overthrow capitalism. Women's oppression is integrally tied up with the capitalist mode of production. Radical feminists see male control over women as the main problem and argue that women must free themselves from patriarchy. The family is seen as a key instrument of the oppression of women.

- This paper will use the word subordination to indicate the general character of inequality and exploitation, oppression or inequality in a specific way, because these are "historically specific forms which have to be empirically established. The universal fact of social relations of gender being hierarchical

is better conveyed by the general term subordination" (Chhachhi, 1986:16).

A women's movement can be a feminist movement, in the sense that it takes up a feminist ideology, but that is not necessary. The definition used here will be a broad one, focussing on activities, as opposed to ideology:

"... the women's movement includes feminist activities by women in, say, women's committees in the political parties, trade unions, public institutions or other social movements" (Dahlerup, 1986:6).

This definition does not deal with the vision of the women's movement or the goals it is working upon for change. The definition also implies that a women's movement does not have to be autonomous.

Using this definition, one could argue that religious fundamentalist women's groups are part of the women's movement. If their struggle is concerned with changing structures of oppression and exploitation by eliminating or fighting against extreme manifestations of patriarchy, they should be considered as part of the women's movement. On the other hand, religious fundamentalist women's groups advocate the preservation of patriarchal structures. The man, as head of the family, should fulfil his duty as protector. This is certainly not feminist, in the sense of fighting women's subordination and it is precisely what makes it so difficult to see these groups as part of the women's movement. However, with some restriction, this paper will regard these groups as part of the women's movement, on the grounds of some of their activities.

patriarchy

The concept of patriarchy was first used by radical feminists to specify women's oppression as a sex. It "expressed the systemic character of the oppressive and exploitative relations which affect women" (Chhachhi, 1986:7, original emphasis).

The validity of the use of the concept of patriarchy was criticized by a number of feminists. They regarded it as a timeless concept, meaning it was a-historical and implicitly based on biological differences. Since one cannot change one's biological sex, it was argued, the concept implied that total domination of men over women could not be changed or did not undergo a transformation over time. Michèle Barrett (1980) and Sheila Rowbotham (1981) shared this stand.

"It is not sexual difference which is the problem, but the social inequality of gender - the different kinds of power societies have given to sexual differences, and the hierarchical forms these have imposed on human relationships" (Rowbotham, 1981:366).

This in itself is a valid statement, but one should not focus solely on sexual differences in discussing the validity of the concept of patriarchy.

Other feminists have felt that the concept can very well be used if one takes the word patriarchy beyond its original meaning.

"The concept of patriarchy is important even where it has been rejected (!) because the issue that it raises for analysis, i.e. the origin and linkages of patriarchy / or the sex-gender system / or women's subordination, with other social institutions, whatever terminology, is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of women's subordination" (Chhachhi, 1986:8).

- The focus is on women's subordination and its relation with other structures in society. This means looking for the way in which women's oppression works, how patriarchal structures are maintained as well as reinforced and if they are overthrown, how new forms emerge.

There is a gender hierarchy with male dominance, which at the same time corresponds with authority structures. Thus patriarchy is not solely to be seen, in this paper, as male control over women's biological reproduction or as control over women's labour, but can extend beyond its original meaning if one takes the authority structures into account. Forms of patriarchy are then to be found all over society, but also within the state. It reflects the relations women have inside and outside the family. Thus the relation with other structures in society. In other words: "Patriarchy denotes a structural system of male dominance" (Chhachhi, 1986:8).

In "Bargaining with Patriarchy" Deniz Kandiyoti deals with the transformation of patriarchy, and how women perceive these changing forms of oppression and what strategies are taken up to "maximize security and optimize life options" (Kandiyoti, 1988:274).

She identifies a "classic patriarchal belt". Turkey is situated in this belt. Classic patriarchy is a powerful cultural ideal expressed in the extended family, where the senior man has authority over all the members of the household. Kandiyoti argues that the extended family is "bound up in the incorporation and control of the family by the state" (Ibid, 1988:278) when societies become capitalist.

The authority men have over women is grounded on a material base, while responsibility is controlled by norms. Changes in material conditions implicitly undermine the normative order.

Women do not necessarily gain by the transformation from classic patriarchy towards modern patriarchy. Modern patriarchy will give younger men an earlier chance to emancipate themselves from their fathers and to take over power in all spheres of a society which is becoming capitalist.

The relation patriarchy - state will also undergo changes. The relationship of the citizen towards the state derives its status from the relationship the father had towards his son. It is a

relationship of protection. The state protects its citizens through legal paternalism. It is also a relationship of obedience. In order to get the protection, one has to obey regulations. However, an important question remains: Is the state directly patriarchal in its legislation towards women, or indirectly, by using the father-son relationship and therefore implying patriarchal relations between men and women? I will deal with this question in my discussion of the concept of the patriarchal state.

the state

The state is a concept most people use in everyday life without their being able to give an all-embracing explanation of how the state is to be viewed. The state has been approached in many ways in the history of social science.

This paper will briefly look at the liberal-pluralist approach and the classical-marxist approach which have had an important impact in further research about the state. They, however, look mainly at the capitalist state and have their limitations in the case of Turkey. Therefore this paper will look briefly at the debates on the post-colonial state.

Another limitation of the two above mentioned approaches, is the absence of a feminist perspective as there is no attention to gender. This is the reason why this paper will move on towards a feminist approach of the state. Since feminism does not have a unifying theory of the state, a closer look at the feminist debate on the state would be helpful. The focus will be on the characterization of the state, its relation to the family and how the law reflects state intervention in the family.

liberal-pluralist approach to the state

The liberal-pluralist approach sees the state as neutral negotiator of competing forces in society. Individuals are allowed to pursue freely their economic and political interests. Each person has a right to life, to be free and a right to own property. The authority of the state and also the state's duty is to protect these rights. Individual freedom and equality are key words.

Liberalism was built on a strong belief in separation of the political from the economic sphere, and on the separation of the public sphere from the private sphere of the family (Siim, 1988:162). State interference in private matters (within the family) was out of question.

A liberal-pluralist approach to the state recognizes conflicts between different groups, but there will be conflict regulation based on interaction between the different groups. In effect, this means that strong groups make up state policies at the cost of weaker groups. Oppression of one group of the other is then a fact. Capitalist interests will predominate all other interests and the group who owns the capital will predominate other groups and thus make up the state.

Essential in this approach is the split of the economic from the political sphere and the split of the public from the private sphere.

classical marxist approach to the state

This approach sees the state and society as two concepts which cannot be analyzed separately from each other. The state is a dependent variable of the economic system, which is therefore an independent variable.

"The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (passage Communist Manifesto, quoted by Stepan, 1978:20).

In this view the state's function is to maintain and defend class domination and exploitation, in other words, to be an instrument of the ruling class.

Engels states in "Origin of the Family" (chapter 9) that the state is

"as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class" (quoted by Bottomore, 1988:465).

This accentuates the coercive role of the state whereby a dominant class imposes and defends its rights at the cost of the classes which it dominates.

Interpretations of Marx' and Engels' analysis of the state have led to an instrumentalist approach to the state and a structuralist one. The instrumentalist interpretation of Marx sees the state as an instrument of the dominant classes, the structuralist one is concerned with analyzing the underlying structures of the state (Bottomore, 1988: 464-469).

feminist critique on the two approaches

The feminist critique on the liberal-pluralist approach of the state is that the state is primarily concerned with the economy and that the state directs its policies towards the public sphere. Often in that case religion fills up the gap and interferes in regulation of the private sphere.

"... the so-called 'universal' categories of liberalism, like the individual and the citizen, are not universal but are sex/gender specific, or masculine. On this basis it becomes both a theoretical and a practical problem to determine how both sexes can become integrated into the category of the individual, and to understand what is the political relevance of sexual and gender differences" (Siim, 1988;162).

The classical-marxist approach for its part, is taken to task for the lack of attention given to the relationship the state has towards the family. Questions about the relationship between the production of goods and the reproduction of human beings led to a greater understanding of the relation between the state and the family. What both approaches have in common is the absence of gender-based analysis.

Feminist studies have looked at the state in different ways. Initially they were mostly concerned with the relationship between women and the state, i.e. state policies and their effect on women. Later studies focused more on the ties women have with state institutions and on the characterization of the state, e.g. patriarchal, capitalist, capitalist/patriarchal. This means that there was a shift from an instrumentalist interpretation of the state towards a structuralist one.

Mary McIntosh argues that oppression of women is not the specific characteristic of the state. State actions oppress women not directly but indirectly. The state does this by sustaining and supporting a specific form of household, for the advanced capitalist state this is the nuclear family.

"The relation of women to the state agents is much more often indirect than that of men. The state frequently defines space, the family, in which its agents will not interfere but in which control is left to the man" (McIntosh, 1978:256).

Since women are in legal respect full citizens, which might go to show that there are different aspects of the state which treat women in contradictory ways. The discrepancies are to be found between women's position in the private sphere, the family, and in the public sphere. This comes down to two distinct ways in which women are oppressed by the state.

(1) "... for the reproduction of labour power the state sustains a family household system in which a number of people are dependent for financial support of a male breadwinner"

(2) "the state has played an important part in establishing married women as a latent reserve army of labour" (Ibid, 1978:264).

Unemployed married women are thus financially dependent on their husbands and not fully integrated in the labour process.

The capitalist state is not likely to change this situation, in view of its duty to capital. That there is an emphasis in society on women's morality to uphold the family system is therefore only convenient. Women are supposed to get married, single motherhood is not propagated by the state.

McIntosh' analysis is interesting, but only valid for certain groups of women in certain situations, namely the housewives and women wage laborers. For these groups, the state's intervention in their lives is indirect. The one-parent family deals already with a different state interference but she does not call this a direct interference.

McIntosh does not discuss race and class differences between women, this could conjure up a totally different picture, with more direct interference, on the state's part, into the lives of women.

Her approach is materialist in the sense that she takes as a starting point the production and reproduction of daily life.

Zillah Eisenstein's approach to the state is a structuralist one. She focuses on the state as a mediator of different conflicts and contradictions in society. This makes the state an active

participant in political processes, instead of a "merely determined instrument of the economic class interests or patriarchal needs" (Eisenstein, 1984:95). This comes to the fore in her view of the law:

"An instrumentalist view of the law as merely mirroring the patriarchal needs of the state is insufficient. The law articulates as well as reflects patriarchy; it is both real and ideal; it both constructs reality and mirrors it; it is both determined and determining" (Ibid, 1984:97).

Patriarchy is thus reflected and constructed through laws defining the contours of public and private life, and the various interactions.

Eisenstein conceptualizes the state as a capitalist-patriarchal one. She distinguishes two systems of power, capitalism and patriarchy. These two systems of power become one system of oppression.

The notion of the capitalist-patriarchal state implies on an ideological level a mixture of the ideologies of liberalism and patriarchalism.

Between the ideology of patriarchalism and the ideology of liberalism there is an inherent tension resulting from the conflict between structural inequality and individual freedom for women. The state's ideology is an outcome of an ideological confrontation and is as such a compromise. The degree of state regulation and legislation and the sanctions created to enforce them are the instrumental outcome of the compromise.

The concept of a capitalist-patriarchal state is a very useful one, but has its limitations. The state is portrayed in this view as either being the instrument of capitalism or patriarchy or both. It does not take into account policies of the state which have served as instruments of liberation for women from their dependence in the family. Women are not solely victims of patriarchy. Activities undertaken by women in undermining and/or

bargaining over patriarchal structures are not taken fully into account, meaning the structuralist approach to power should be completed with the instrumentalist outcome of the policies. This is what Anthias and Yuval-Davis are pointing out by saying that the state is neither unitary in its intentions, nor in its practices and effects (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989:5).

Feminist debate on the state revolves primarily around the advanced capitalist state and does not deal specifically with the post-colonial state as a special entity. This does not mean that their critique cannot be applied to the post-colonial state but there are important differences to be considered. The relationship between state, capital and patriarchy is very complex in post-colonial societies. It is important to have a closer look at this type of a state because Turkey, in many ways, can be characterized as a post-colonial state.

post-colonial state

In transition from a colonial to a post-colonial state a characteristic pattern seems to be "a series of alliances between the bourgeoisie and other dominant classes, along with mass support from subordinate classes" (Chhachhi, forthcoming:10).

Alavi identifies two of these characteristics:

First, the inheritance of a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and mechanisms of government. This meant that the new state did not dismantle the bureaucratic structures, nor did it undermine the power of pre-capitalist dominant classes.

Secondly, the state created conditions for the development and expansion of capital. This meant heavy bureaucratic activity in the name of promoting economic development.

On an ideological level, the state had to create its own hegemony (E. Tsikata, 1989:31-36). In other words, the state strove to create a new national identity. The role of the state towards civil society was state-centered and showed strong paternalistic

tendencies.

The post-colonial state, sculpting a national identity, had also to construct women in particular ways. Here attention was given to gender in order to serve state interests. This implies a denial of acknowledged differences between women, like class and race. The post-colonial state assumed that the dominant class controls the state, without going into the discussion of the character of the relationship. Gender was regarded as a constituting feature of the state and women were incorporated into state and national processes.

Anthias and Yuval-Davis provide a useful viewpoint on this type of a state. They discuss how women were incorporated by the state and how state actions effect them. They look at the state both in terms of its intentions and its effects. Their definition of the state will be used in this paper as a working definition.

"a body of institutions which are centrally organized around the intentionality of control with a given apparatus of enforcement at its command and basis. Coercion and oppression are then to be seen as forms of control and back-up" (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989:5).

They argue that institutions, whether they are situated in the state or in civil society, produce their own ideological content and are mutually influenced by each other.

Family, as an institution, is situated within civil society and is then to be seen as an institutional form for ideological production.

On the basis of examining these theories, it becomes evident that a patriarchal state makes use of ideological institutions, i.e. the family, in order to control women's labour, fertility and sexuality for the benefit of men. Women's labour through unpaid domestic labour in the 'private' sphere. Control over women's fertility comes to the fore in population control, through a

system of giving incentives or disincentives to control the number of children women have.

Last but not least, women are seen as "participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture." (Ibid, 1989:7) Here family law is used as a controlling device.

"Customary and religious norms and legislation, which usually construct women as primary biological reproducers, will often be incorporated and reinforced by state legislation, although contradictions can exist also between state and religious legislation" (Ibid, 1989:10).

This can mean that the family form promoted by the state is built on heterosexual monogamy and nuclear families. Since marriage as an institution mediates women's subordination and given the official sanction for the propagation of nuclear families, the ideological basis on which subordination of women is built, namely patriarchy, remains untouched. Strongly put, it is constantly perpetuated and sanctioned. This leads me to classify such a state a patriarchal state.

summarizing

For describing the interaction between civil society and the state definitions of these concepts are needed, that will allow a clear distinction between two kinds of processes:

- a. influences of the state on civil society, to be described, in some way, as the intentions and effects of state practices;
- b. influences of civil society on the state, to be described as political processes of conflict, compromise and co-operation of political forces.

The dynamics that will be explored will be described along the following lines of influence:

- ideology in relation to the state and civil society,
- civil society towards state, through political forces, here the focus is on the women's movement,
- state towards civil society through regulations, here family law is taken as an issue.

However limited, this suffices in the scope of this paper.

The state and civil society influence each other strongly. State processes are subjected to, and at the same time figure within the dynamics of political power in society. This can be seen as an integrated process. Since the state has the monopoly of legitimate coercion and oppression, in the sense that the effects of state practices is to sanction social relations, in the widest sense of the term, within civil society, it has a privileged position towards civil society.

Rule-making covers every aspect of civil society. Political processes include legislation, which define the scope and reach of state institutions. The latter participates in these processes themselves, together with other political forces. The converse also holds as the influences of civil society on the state are also wide ranging.

Inevitably there is conflict between the state and civil society. Tensions between certain groups within civil society with opposing interests, e.g. feminists and religious fundamentalists, are not difficult to imagine. Both these groups will have their own dynamics towards the state. The state has a choice to cooperate in some areas with certain groups of civil society and can be in conflict in other areas. It can also take up the role of mediator of conflicting interests in civil society.

That the state has a dynamic of it's own implies that it need not solely be an instrument of the ruling class. This, however, also depends on the ideology of the state.

Chapter 3 Reforms in Atatürk's time

introduction

The aim of this chapter is to look at the impact the reforms of Atatürk's time had on women's role in Turkey. To look at these reforms it is necessary to have a better understanding of the factors leading to it.

This will be done via a short historical overview in the following two sections, dealing respectively with pre-Atatürk times and Atatürk's reign. The relation between the state, religion and family will be woven through them.

The third section composes of a discussion on the impact of the reforms on women's role.

a historical overview - factors leading to the reforms

Before the declaration of the republic, in 1923, Turkey was part of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was a feudal, powerful, centralized state with its economic basis being the mode of self-sufficient family production in agriculture. The patriarchal extended family was predominant. Political power was in the hands of a bureaucratic elite in the cities.

In the Ottoman Empire the state's ideology was Islam, which meant active support by the state of Islamic institutions. Naturally this meant that women's legal and social status was defined by Islamic law, the Sharia. Her life was centered around the family. In the patriarchal extended family her status would show a promotion along the line: girl, just married, mother of sons, grandmother.

Women in rural areas, however, were less confined to their houses than women in urban areas. The necessity of their labour to sustain the self-sufficiency of the farms brought them out. This meant that life for them was not as restricted and isolated when

compared to their counterparts in urban areas, simply because they were needed in the production process.

In the urban areas, especially in the middle class and bourgeoisie, there was no place and no economic need for women in the production process. Women's tasks lay within the family. "Public" life was a taboo. Not only were women economically and socially dependent on their fathers and husbands, the state also regulated their lives outside their homes, by enacting dress codes and regulations specifying days of the week in which they could step out of their houses.

Differences apart, both rural and urban areas women's lives were regulated by men "through the mediation of institutions of state, religion and family" (Tekeli, 1986:181-183).

The country, meanwhile, was going bankrupt at the end of the nineteenth century. The emerging bourgeoisie saw integration into European capitalism as a means to cope with the economic crisis, this asked for restructuring the Ottoman feudal system. A process of modernization and westernization was set into motion. After the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 this process gained more substance.

Modernizing the society brought up a struggle between two opposing forces on the ideological level. The progressives argued that the emancipation of women was a prerequisite for democratization, while on the other side, the conservatives, the so-called Islamists, argued "that the Koran provided a readily available blue-print according to which social life was to be organized and that any deviation from these regulations would lead to corruption and moral deprivation" (Sirman, 1988:5).

The economic crisis coupled with a state crisis following the first world war, when the empire lost all its European and some Balkan territories, reduced this enormous mass to Turkey as we know it today. In 1922 the sultanate was abolished and with it the feudal state.

These crises tipped the power-balance in favor of the

progressives. Changes this brought about were basically an imitation of the European life-style. Educational institutions were made accessible to the women because it was seen as essential to progress which was part of modernization.

This did not mean that there was a shift in emphasis of the kind of roles women performed. Mothers and wives remained their most important roles, which were not challenged, neither by the women themselves, nor by the state. They were superficially "modernized".

To be educated meant going out of the house and further to occupy a place in "public" life through employment. This "unintended effect" brought great changes, especially for women in the urban areas who saw their confinement dissolving. However small, this was a first step in changing relationships within the patriarchal extended family, as women's roles were transformed.

On the other hand, these reforms did not lead to women's economic independence, hence did not free them from dependence on their families. "Giving women the chance of developing their own independent identity and freeing them from men's control was never dreamed of" (Tekeli, 1986:183). However, despite these limitations and its limited reach, they still provided a break from traditional society and for that reason laid a basis for the changes to come.

The issue of women's emancipation in the Ottoman Empire was taken up by the process of republican reforms, i.e., at the time Turkey became a secular state. In the construction of the new state, the Republic of Turkey, the ideological roles given to women were crucial in the creation of a national identity.

- reforms during Atatürk's time

The republic was founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and his followers, who came to be known as Kemalists.

"The proclamation of the republic, abolition of the sultanate and caliphate, introduction of secularization, adoption of Western law, liberal capitalism, and industrialization became signposts on the road the Turks were told they would travel henceforth" (Çosar, 1978:124).

The Kemalists were exponents of the progressive forces that prevailed just before Atatürk came to power.

Kemalism became the ideology of the state in this period with its ultimate goal the development of a capitalist state through economic modernization. This state was to be achieved by "etatism".

"Etatism" must be seen as giving the state, rather than the private sector, a mandate to be the vehicle for capital accumulation and hence industrialization (A. Pollis, 1989:240), in other words the creation of state capitalism. This led to the conviction that the state was the vehicle for change. Popular participation and mobilization were concepts unknown in Turkey until recently.

A resulting characteristic of Turkey was a heavy and costly bureaucratic-military state apparatus. The one-party system combined a great number of different dominant groups.

To achieve economic growth 5-year plans were made.

"The state's role in the economy began to expand as it entered various branches of local industry to develop the infrastructure, establish banks, and regulate commerce -all coordinated within the broader framework of the national economy" (Berberoglu, 1982:24-25).

Two goals were important in this process. First, the creation of possibilities for the development of a national industrial infrastructure and second, the restriction of the import of consumption articles. Protection and import substitution became the dominant strategy which stayed until the 1980s (Ibid, 1982; Sunier, 1989).

"Etatism" was closely linked with the creation of a new national identity. The new leaders needed a Turkish identity, distinctive from the Ottoman identity or Islamic identity. In the "West" modernization meant secularization, this is probably one of the reasons why Atatürk was adopting the particular "Western" model of modernization as opposed to an "Islamic" model. By doing so, the Islamic way of life was undermined.

To replace the existing identities more powerful identities were needed. These new identities were suggested to have their origin in pre-Islamic times. A "New Turkish Woman" was to be constructed.

Ziya Gokalp, an historian who played an important role in the creation of a new national identity, highlighted women's high status and great equality in pre-Islamic times. Gokalp writes:

"Under the influence of Greek and Persian civilization women have been enslaved and lost their legal status. When the ideal of Turkish culture was born was it not essential to remember and revitalize the beautiful rules of old Turkish lore? Hence it is for this reason that as soon as the current of Turkism was born in our country the ideal feminism was born with it. The reason why Turkists are both populist and feminist is not simply because these ideals are valued in this century; the fact that democracy and feminism were the two main principles of ancient Turkish life is a major factor in this respect" (Gokalp, quoted by Kandiyoti 1988(a):237).

Here an attempt was made to distinguish current Turkism from Western modernization to make modernization more acceptable and present it as true Turkish heritage. Decline of the status of women was said to have its origin in recent past and was caused by the acceptance of Islamic law. The "New Turkish Woman", however, was supposed to be equal to men.

The Turkish civil code, adopted in 1926, was the most important piece of legislation in implementing the secular nature of the new state. This law replaced the Islamic law and gave women "almost" equal legal status to men.

The moment Turkey became a secular state Islamic institutions

were restricted. Almost all institutions that defined Islamic law, Islamic education, theology and social ethics were eliminated.

However, the state did not intervene to try to diminish popular belief or practice. This meant that Islam continued to predominate, as it had done, in the life-styles of the people. The state was taking over, through its legislation, certain tasks which were formerly the responsibility of the male heads of the families. Secular education became a requirement until the age of 16, for both boys and girls. Marriage, which was decided between families was also brought under the legal preview. These were areas in which the head (patriarch) of the family used to have absolute power.

"The new secular family law code was meant to change the very structure of Turkish domestic life to bring it closer to models of nuclear family known in Western Europe" (Starr, 1989:498). Under the new law polygamy was abolished and women were regarded as equal partners in the marriage contract. The marriage was required to be registered, women obtained the right to divorce, and the minimum age for marriage was set at 17 for women and 18 for men. Exceptions could be made to get it down to 15 years. Women got various rights to property and a Muslim woman could marry a non-Muslim man (Ibid, 1989:498). However, the man continued to be the head of the family.

Despite Atatürk's advanced attitude towards women's emancipation, he continued to stress the importance of motherhood and the role mothers played in educating their children. For him this was the most important task for a woman, basic to civilization, because the foundation of progress and power is to be found in family life (Jayawardena, 1989:37).

In 1934 women were given equal political rights, which brought them into the political terrain. Kandiyoti (1987) and Tekeli (1981) have pointed out that this was probably due to Turkey's attempt to distinguish itself from the rise of dictatorship

elsewhere in Europe. The goal was to show Europe that a one-party state could be truly democratic, and the women's right to vote was to be seen as a symbolic gesture. But that was not the only purpose, the linking of women and democracy has also to be seen as being part of the struggle against Islamic forces. A struggle, "in which images of an essentially democratic and feminist Turkish past were frequently made use of" (Sirman, 1988:11).

Despite the undoubted innovations in Turkey in this period, the reforms stayed class bound and did not affect the majority of the women. The opposition between modernization on one side and Islam on the other remained. One could almost say that modernization/westernization was to be found in the cities while customary and religious norms and legislation prevailed in the rural areas.

discussion

Since Atatürk's ultimate goal was the establishment of a capitalist state Turkey went through changing economic realities. Industrialization came about. The family was to be regarded as a kind of labour reservoir controlled by the state.

The state provided it with an ideology aimed at constructing the "New Turkish Woman", decreasing the magnitude of family structures and giving women access to public spheres.

The "New Turkish Woman" had a task to fulfill in "public" life. She was a well-educated, employable woman, not too over-westernized but still associated with capitalist development and liberal ideology. At the same time women's subordinate position in the family was not challenged. The old family structures, however, were on the verge of collapse.

Through state legislation a new familial ideology was enforced. This ideology represented the patriarchal nuclear family as the natural and "modern" way of live. This meant that new forms of patriarchal structures within the family emerged. Having

employment did not bring about a different division of labour, women's primary identity was still a mother and a wife, and it was seen as a vocation that enabled women to fulfil their emotional needs.

The state, in essence, remained patriarchal. It acted as a surrogate for the family. Earlier, women found protection in family life and in return were obedient wives and mothers and now the state provided certain women with an emancipated image, through its secular legislation and ideology and in turn asked them to perform symbolic roles. This performance was desperately needed in Atatürk's time in order to inculcate a new national identity and modernize Turkish society along the western model.

Without a doubt the reforms had an impact on civil society. Considering the facts that civil society was far from secular and that the reforms were imposed from above, it remained to be seen if the reforms managed to reach the roots of civil society.

The symbolic values of changing the Islamic family law into a secular one were great and could be seen as a victory over the Islamic clergy. They lost a great deal of power.

The process of secularizing Turkish society was not unproblematic and has had probably a positive impact on women's position in general. It was, nevertheless, class-biased, but can one change society overnight anyway? The state was the main instigator of change. Formal emancipation was obtained by legal reforms. The official state ideology regarded men and women as equals. This equality comes to the fore in the "public" sphere of civil society, where well educated women occupied high posts. The gender equality proclaimed by the state, led, according to Tekeli, to "state-feminism". The state actively propagated women's identity: educated, obedient wives and good mothers.

The most distinguishing factor about state-feminism is that women got rights without asking for it. Normally changes come about on recommendation of social movements within civil society. The state dictated these changes on women because of its own interests and aspirations.

Women representatives did not represent the real conditions of the majority of Turkish women. "And so they were led into a tragic 'schizophrenic illusion': the new identity of these women was not one they had selected themselves, but an ascribed one. And the ascriber was the state" (Tekeli, 1986:185).

Secularism and the secular state provided these women protection from Islam and tradition who were trying to undermine the rights women had been granted.

The secularized family law was aimed at reforming the classical family structure but its effects were mostly to be found in urban areas. It was, rooted in the assumptions based on nuclear family units. The man stayed the head of the family.

Ideas about modernizing Turkey were to be found in the bourgeoisie and the middle class. In these classes western life-style was something to be proud of and therefore it is not amazing that one can find there the prime advocates of this new way of life.

The reforms stayed for a long time a dead issue in rural areas. Kandiyoti describes it as follows:

"The avoidance of civil marriage in favor of religious ceremony, with the related possibility of polygamy, repudiation, and illegitimacy; the marriage of underaged girls; the demand for 'baslik' (brideprice) in the marriage contract; the denial of girls right to education; and the emphasis on women's fertility were continuing signs of the uneven socioeconomic developments of the country. There is no doubt, however, that the Kemalist reforms have directly benefitted women of the urban bourgeoisie" (Kandiyoti, 1987:322).

There were also accessibility problems, as many people were oblivious of the new structures and norms. The implementation of the family law was found lacking as most women did not know about it. Not only were the agents of the state neglectful of there task in raising consciousness they also did not effectively sanctioned the secular family law.

One could question if the state's intention to emancipate women were sincere. Alliances had to be built, also with the landowners in the rural areas. Industrialization was to be found in the cities, this made the need for educated women more important than in rural areas. There agricultural production was still based on small family units, and therefore there did not seem to be any material basis to transform women's roles.

The goal, emancipating women, was thus partially achieved.

The dominant ideology of the state concerning women did not contradict the self image of middle class women, but was an enigma for the rural women.

Women's potential for organizing themselves in autonomous movements was not great. In Atatürk's time the movement was initiated and controlled by the state. A women's movement in that time was the Turkish Women's Federation. Between 1926 and 1934 it fought to obtain a right to vote. It is important to note that it was a very small group of women. The existence of this movement shows that there was some resistance in civil society towards the state. It is, however, highly questionable if this women's movement was behind the sanctioning of the right to vote. The political reasons to grant women this right seem more convincing. Kandiyoti remarks that the state abolished independent women's organizations and implemented state-sponsored ones, which have to be seen as "docile auxiliaries of the ruling state-party" (Kandiyoti, forthcoming:22).

Chapter 4 Developments since Atatürk

introduction

In the first two sections of this chapter a brief overview on the economic and political background in the period 1950-1980 will be given, in order to provide the necessary understanding of factors leading to the military coup in 1980.

This period is characterized economically by the development of a national market economy combined with industrial modernization. The effects this had on labour relations in the agricultural sector will be highlighted, especially the migration caused the old structures fall apart.

Political pluralism is another characteristic of this period: The emergence of political groups ranging from extreme left to extreme right, and the re-entry of an Islamic party.

Towards 1980 the political scene was chaotic and dominated by acts of violence between the different parties. In 1980 political activities were put under severe restrictions by the military. The third section of this chapter describes this development.

These changes have had an impact on women's position and will provide the necessary understanding to locate the reasons why and how women became politically active.

The fourth section of this chapter will elaborate this further.

economic developments

During the second world war the landowners, and in their wake, the trading bourgeoisie, had made huge profits by supplying the warring parties in Europe. Their need to invest the accumulated capital boosted national economy.

In the 1950s Turkey went through a rapid economic development, which brought about many changes in Turkish society. Economic state-policy shifted towards less dirigism and the state

companies stepped back in favor of private enterprise. Especially the rural areas were afflicted. The modernization of agricultural production became state-policy under pressure of the rich farmers. The needed capital investments were done by the rich farmers (landowners), who could get the credit facilities. Poor farmers, who were not able to invest, were priced out of the market. This resulted in a stronger concentration of land in the hands of few, who changed to modern, capital-intensive production (Sunier, 1989).

Small family enterprises were gradually breaking up and more and more people became unemployed. The rural areas were impoverishing and in search for jobs many men left the rural areas and went to the cities or even abroad.

"The absorption of villages into the national market economy, along with the high exodus of excess labour to foreign industrial centers, has turned some members of peasant families, at the beginning solely males and later predominantly females, into wage earners" (Abadan-Unat, 1981:22).

Initially women stayed in the villages and took over certain tasks which were formerly performed by men. Men's status as head of the family was doubly tested: first the transition from (more or less independent) farmer to wage earner and then the physical separation from the family.

Family life was not solely a social unit but also an economic unit. The man as the head of the family, was responsible for his wife and children, and it is through this that he draws his authority. He is the wage-earner and the members of the family are economically dependent on him.

The fact that rural women became responsible for the well-being of their families, while their husbands were working in the urban areas led to a transformation of the women's position in these societies. Women became responsible for their own actions, that is, acquired authority.

Authority is based on, and results in, an extension of responsibility into the sphere of other person's actions. Getting more responsibility means increasing one's own authority. Increasing one's own authority can only be achieved at the cost of a decrease of somebody else's authority, in this case, the authority of the head of the family, who is absent.

The rural women thus gained more autonomy over their lives. Starr (1989, 497:523), in her research on changing lives of rural women, noted that in this period (1950-1970) women started initiating divorce which was not permitted according to Islamic law. It illustrated a tendency of leaving Islamic law as a practical guideline in favor of the formal Civil Code. She also noticed that by the mid-1960s women brought other conflicts to court, e.g. wife-battering cases. The patriarchal extended household was breaking down and women "were interested both in setting up their own nuclear households and in limiting numbers of children" (Starr, 1989:499).

When the migrated men succeeded in finding a steady job they would arrange for their wives to join them. Between 1965 and 1970 these women migrated in great numbers. By doing so, they not only lost their secured place within the family's "life-cycle" but they also experienced a loss of "authority", which had given them some independence. Çosar describes their position as follows:

"These women, who had a certain amount of social and familial authority in the village because of the part they played in the economic life, find themselves deprived of it while still remaining under the social pressure of their male relatives" (Çosar, 1978:125).

Becoming totally dependent on their husbands, who in turn faced mass-unemployment¹, these women were confined to their houses and - faced a very uncertain future.

¹ Unemployment reached disastrous levels by the end of the 1970s. According to the OECD 20% of the labour force was unemployed by the end of 1978 (Berberoglu, 1982:117).

Men being unemployed "means a decline in men's purchasing power and patriarchal authority, and thus brings about the collapse of the family as an institution that provides for the needs of women and children" (Sabbah, 1988:16). Turkey went through such a process.

The growing urbanization, as a result of this migration, was not matched by an adequate housing program. This led to the "birth" of the "gecekondu"² women. They were working-class women from the rural areas who followed their husbands into the cities (Tekeli, 1986:187).

"The transition from traditional agriculture and household industry to modern organized industry and services demand new skills, these women, handicapped by the lack of opportunities to acquire these skills find themselves unwanted by the economy" (Abadan-Unat, 1981:23).

The only jobs they could find were low paid household jobs. These jobs brought them into the houses of the middle class and bourgeoisie women, which in turn made it possible for the latter to practice their occupations.

The growing urbanization, according to Timur, did not automatically lead to the adoption of the nuclear family. The nuclear family was adopted by high income professionals but poor people continued to live in extended families for economic reasons.

The economic development, initiated by national capital, became, during the 1960s, more and more dependant on foreign capital. Throughout the 1970s Turkey had a balance of payment deficit. This deficit was worsened by the fact that the influx of foreign exchange through deposits of workers abroad came to a stop due

² Gecekondu means 'made overnight'. If people managed to build their house overnight then they could stay there and the police would leave them at peace. Afterwards they could always improve their houses.

to family-reunion. The oil-crisis dealt the final blow. The economy was in a steep crisis. Structural adjustment programs of the IMF did not have the intended effect. This was partly due to the fact that state-policy tried to combine the development of import substitution and export-led industry. The growing liberalization of the economy and the high level of wages, due to a strong labour-movement, conflicted with this. (Sunier, 1989, Özbudun, 1989).

The coup of 1980 created a political environment that favored export-led industry.

"Greater reliance on market mechanisms, greater emphasis on expanding export instead of an inward-turned, import substitution economic strategy, realistic exchange rates, and a sharp reduction in bureaucratic controls over private economic activities are the main ingredients of the new economic policy" (Özbudun, 1989:223).

This policy implied a greater dependence on the international market. The IMF was asked again for support and a vast adjustment-program was adopted. The resulting boom in the economy ebbed off towards the end of the 1980s and left Turkey with high inflation and in the hands of the international economic cycle.

political pluralism (1950-1980)

After the second world war the wish, instigated by private capital, to be freed from the dirigist (kemalist) approach of the state took hold. The hegemony of the one-party-state collapsed which led to the formation of all kinds of political parties. Between 1973 and 1979 Turkey had different unstable coalition - governments which fell one after the other. None of them were able to determine the economic crisis.

"These continued crises in the economy dragged the country from one ruling-class government coalition to another, and led to increased unrest and militancy

among the masses, which, as on two previous occasions, reached explosive proportions by the end of the 1970s" (Berberoğlu, 1982:109).

It was in this climate that the military took over on the 12th of September 1980 .

The decline of Kemalism, with its emphasis on "The New Turkish Woman", resulted also in a decline of the number of women participating in the political process despite women's right to vote. The pulling-force of Kemalism, in this matter, was not replaced. It was not until after the 1980 coup that women started to organize themselves in autonomous groups, the next section of this chapter will elaborate on that.

Within the various left-wing groups emerging in Turkish society, feminism played no part. Feminism was viewed as being something bourgeoisie-like and therefore a potential danger to "class solidarity" and to their respective political forces (Tekeli, 1986:195).

It was not only the leftists who were organizing themselves, the extreme right and religious groups were also closing ranks. More attention will be given to the last category, because they played an important role in the several coalition governments in this period.

Illustrative of the religious groups was the National Salvation Party (NSP) which was founded in 1972. One of its main aims was the re-introduction of the Sharia. According to the NSP the economic crisis was due to the fact that Turkey had alienated itself from its own true heritage by westernization and simultaneously failed to industrialize the country. This was the fault of the Turkish elite with their western orientation. With the influence of western culture, it was believed, came the influx of moral laxity and social corruption. These criticisms towards the Turkish elite were especially sharp with respect to

family life and social customs. Secular law, it was said, was not derived from traditional values and moral heritage and therefore was inadequate. They stressed that the Sharia was capable of ordering human lives better than any other code (Zakaria, 1988:28).

"Historically, Islam was both a system of religious belief and practice and a system of state, society, law, thought, and art - a civilization with religion as its unifying, and eventually dominating factor" (Lewis, 1960:133, quoted by Starr, 1989:497). Religion and law are seen as integrated entities. This holistic view was essential to Islamic fundamentalism. "Marriage, divorce and family relationships have always been, to the Muslim mind, even more closely associated with religion than other legal matters and therefore controlled by Islamic law" (Schacht, 1964:76, quoted by Starr, 1989:498).

NSP gave political expression to the persistent "Islamic" view that women should be under the authority of fathers, brothers or husbands. Issues this party raises mostly came down to the question of women's role in Turkish society. Dress regulations and a re-introduction of the Sharia occupied a central place in their debates. From the point of view of women, the NSP attempted to legitimize traditional sex roles. Toprak calls this the rise of a counter-elite.

"It is no longer the women of the periphery who dress according to Islamic traditions. The women of the center, e.g., the wives of politicians and professional people within the NSP ranks, are also abiding them and are radically competing with Western fashions in women's clothing through creating indigenous styles for Muslim women" (Toprak, 1981:292).

The NSP became very popular in the cities. For the people who migrated to the cities it serves as a means of protest against the new way of life (Toprak, 1981: 281-292).

In an economic crisis as well as in a cultural-identity crisis

people looked for certainties of life. Religious fundamentalist groups present themselves as providing emotional security. Through the use of and attention to symbols (like dress and headgear) they made their stance known. The way a woman dresses "explains" her attitude towards religion. This meant that "a woman in public has a choice between being secular, modern feminine and frustratingly passive (hence very vulnerable) or becoming a mutadayyina (religious), hence formidable, untouchable, and silently threatening" (D. Kandiyoti, forthcoming:31).

This probably is one of the reasons that women living in insecure circumstances, economically as well as socially, felt attracted to religious fundamentalism.

The attraction was translated into passive support, that is through votes. Active participation anyway was not in line with the image of women as constructed by the religious fundamentalists.

The democratization of the state led to the emergence of different political forces, which had different "policies" and attitudes towards women. What unified these forces was the consensus about the place of women within the family and about control over women's labour, sexuality and fertility by men. The patriarchal character of civil society and the state remained untouched.

political restrictions (1980 -)

The military coup in 1980 was a reaction to the economic crisis and the political chaos in which debates were settled at gun-point. The military put a ban on all political parties. Right from the beginning they ascribed to their intervention a temporary character, in due time power would be restored to democratically elected civil authorities. "Due" meant that guaranties against renewed political disorder must be evident.

The 1982 constitution went as far as to put restrictions against former political leaders becoming active, it introduced " highly restrictive provisions on political activities of trade unions, associations and cooperatives" (Özbudun, 1989:208). This meant that these organizations were not allowed to have political links with political parties.

The presidential veto right on parliamentary decisions was adopted along with other presidential powers. Through the presidential council the military kept a control over things. Under this umbrella of power elections were held in 1983. Through manipulation a majority of the parties (11 out of 14) was excluded from the elections. The exclusion of parties from the political scene could however, not prevent the existence of a wide range of movements, often directly related to the excluded parties.

It is in this political climate that the emergence of autonomous women's movements takes place.

the emergence of women's groups

In the 1960s and 1970s groups of women participated in political parties and in the unions. In these left-oriented parties there was a thinking that it was not necessary to organize in autonomous women's groups. Emancipation of women would automatically come about with the elimination of bourgeois structures and feudal structures.

The fact that political parties were banned from the political scene after the military coup might have provided major boost for the feminist groups. "It has been linked to the domination of left-wing ideology in anti-state circles" (Sirman, 1988:13).

- Tekeli puts it as follows:

"..., in a number of both leftist and rightist circles whose political rights had been restricted, 'democracy' as such, which before the 1980 coup was not considered as seriously as it might have been, was taken up as a central issue. The demands of women for

'equality, freedom, solidarity' brought the feminist point of view naturally to the forefront of the fight for democracy" (Tekeli, 1986:195).

The penetration of the bureaucracy by Islamic and neo-fascist ideologies during the 1970s was, according to Pollis, destroying the last remains of the ideological parameters of the bureaucracy and hence "the pillars of the Kemalist Turkish state are threatened with collapse to the extent that secularism is challenged and modernization fails" (Pollis, 1989:248-258). This threat to secularism provided a major stimulant for a group of women to look for means of counteraction. On the other hand a great number of women tended to go in a reverse direction. Tekeli describes it as follows:

"Afraid of losing their traditional identity, and as a reaction to the imposed modernization and secularism, women, especially those living in small towns and the gecekondus, showed a tendency to cover themselves up. The covering-up symbolized a demand to return to Islamic values and to the style of life prescribed by Islam for women. These women that Islam 'mobilized', therefore, not only did not demand an extension of their rights, but on the contrary were hostile to the message of the feminist ideology." (Tekeli, 1986:194)

Shortly after the 1980 coup feminist groups were emerging, women were organizing themselves around demands for "equality", freedom and solidarity. This resulted in movements that were politically autonomous, and independent from the state ideology: a radical change from the way women's movement was organized before.

One can broadly distinguish three women's groups, coming from three different ideological forces within civil society.

- The first autonomous feminist groups that came about which were, in effect, small consciousness raising groups. These groups wanted to remain autonomous, not only from the state but also from other political associations.
- The bourgeois/middle class women, the ones who had benefitted most from the Kemalist reforms, stayed within the existing

women's associations, in other words, in line with Kemalist Republicanism hence in line with the ideology of the state.
- Islamic fundamentalist groups emerged as a reaction to the secular character of the state.

In the next chapter I shall examine these groups more closely.

Chapter 5 Synthesis

introduction

The interactions between the state and civil society have seen considerable changes from the period of initial modernization of Turkey, Atatürk's time, to the period following the military coup of 1980. These changes will be dealt with in this chapter.

Firstly, the influences of the state on civil society will be described with reference to the intentions and effects of state practices in the periods.

Secondly, a closer look is given to the nature of the women's movement today. This political force with its processes of conflict, compromise and internal cooperation as also with relation to other political forces will be described.

A short overview of the three identified women's groups will be undertaken to illustrate that women in contemporary Turkey have become initiators in the struggle for their emancipation.

state/civil society

Where women's role is concerned it is the family-structure that defines the boundaries and interactions between the private and public. The state propagates and reflects this structure. Secularizing family law changed the formal family structure considerably. The assumptions about the family in the secular family law were based on the nuclear family model.

Initially, in Atatürk's time, the nuclear family model was part of the creation of a new national identity. The "New Turkish Woman" was constructed not only as a mother and a wife but also had a task to fulfill in "public" life. For the woman this meant a double working day, since the sexual division of labour in the family was not overtly challenged. These working women had,

however, a possibility to hire working-class women to take over some household jobs.

Implementation and accessibility problems made the secular family law a dead issue for most people. Its symbolic meaning however, was tremendous. The symbolic values of changing the Islamic family law into a secular one, which gave the state more tools in controlling the family, were great and could be seen as a victory over the Islamic clergy.

The patriarchal character of the family was not totally at stake. Women still had to ask permission to go out to work, to school etc. according to the new law. Islam as a constructing force molding women's role in civil society was confined to the private sphere.

According to Sirman: "Nationalist and Islamic discourses concur in establishing a definition of woman congruent with the true identity of the collectivity, one in which the sexuality of women is kept under strict control" (N. Sirman, 1988:10).

The secular Civil Code meant a decline of power for the traditionally powerful family head. The state, by taking over the traditional functions of the male head of the family (such as education and the provision of economic security for members of the family, i.e. an individual salary for working wives, daughters, and sons) undermined his authority and "placed him in a subordinate position with respect to the state not very different from the position of women in the traditional family" (Mernissi, 1985:173).

In the second phase the nuclear family model was further re-enforced by the capitalist reality of Turkish society.

- Turkey, on the road to capitalism required cheap labour in creating its industrial sector. Since capitalism needs education to instill habits and values, schooling was imperative. There one learned "punctuality, the ability to stay in one place for hours doing dull tasks according to a strict schedule, willingness to

take orders from a stranger" (Keddie and Beck, 1978:12). Women were also required to join the ranks of the labour force in specific professions, like teachers, nurses, and also as low-paid factory workers.

In all these cases women's role was still defined within the family, even when they had paid jobs. Having a job did not automatically mean independence. "In general, the money that working women earn goes directly into the family budget as 'additional income', and even pocket money cannot be spared" (Çitçi, 1982, quoted by Tekeli, 1986:189).

Many working class women lost, in this process, their secured place within the extended family and were more exposed to exploitative relations in and outside the family. Being part of an extended family, with its hierarchical character of social relations, meant that the protection given to women was organized along this line. If her husband did not provide the necessary protection, there was still the mother-in-law or as a last option the senior man of the family. All were responsible for the honor of the woman in the family.

Living in a nuclear family, which most people do nowadays, means for a woman that she is solely dependent on her husband. If he does not give her protection, for whatever reason, she has to look for it elsewhere. Women's position in the nuclear family is in a sense comparable with the sons position in the extended family.

Her husband, as the head of the family, became economically more dependent on the state, the main employer. This puts him in a dependent position on the state, this is comparable with the dependent position women have on their husbands. Economic support is given in exchange for obedience. This situation is a direct result from the transition of classic patriarchy into modern patriarchy.

The nuclear family model combined two advantages for the state: in the private sphere, it maintained a certain level of male-control over women, as wife and mother, and at the same time, in the public sphere, it enabled women to participate, with a minimum of restriction, in the labour process.

Patriarchalism as a basic ideology was thus reflected in the public spheres because women are subordinated into a latent reserve army of labour. In the private spheres also the subordination evolved with male control over women's labour, fertility and sexuality.

Women's subordinated role in civil society is taken up as an issue by the women's movement. Women have begun "to define an ideology which has as its objective a society where women can decide their own fate according to their own analyses and desires" (Tekeli, 1990:284). Women are mobilizing themselves, which contrasts with Atatürk's time, when women were looking and expecting state-initiated changes in their position.

women's movement

In the beginning of the century women started organizing themselves and founded feminist associations. They demanded equal rights which would come about through legal reforms. The Women's Union was one such group.

Atatürk's time brought the legal reforms and women's position changed considerably even beyond their demands. This had as effect that most feminists at that time became Kemalists. However, in the one party state mass-participation was discouraged. An example of this is that the modest campaign by the Women's union to obtain a right to vote was hindered by the authorities of the single party.

Women got their rights to vote finally in 1934, mainly because Turkey wanted to be recognized (internationally) as a full-grown democracy.

Among women an attitude of complacency evolved. They expected the state to safeguard their rights without taking part in any social activity. No attempts were made to organize themselves in autonomous movements (Tekeli, 1986; Kandiyoti, 1987; Sirman, 1988).

Essentially different than the earlier trends the contemporary women's movement is in confrontation with the state and wants to be an autonomous movement. This attitude is not only directed against the state but also towards legal political associations. Sirman (1988) remarks that the refusal of many women to become part of such an organization was not only a way of distancing themselves from the state but also from "state-feminism".

The term "state-feminism" makes the state the actor of feminism. The actors of the women's movement nowadays are the women themselves.

Contemporary women's movements can roughly be grouped into three categories:

1. Feminist groups

The women that call themselves feminists are organized in various small groups. They "believe in the liberation of women through the liberation of the sex as a whole, not through their own individual emancipation" (Tekeli, 1986). The issue of the oppression of women is raised by them as a major area of struggle in contemporary Turkish society (Sirman, 1988:14).

The family is seen as the focus of feminist activity. This means undermining the structures of patriarchy within the family.

Women, who became active in these groups, had mostly participated in the left movement. Some students and teachers also joined in. Tekeli distinguishes two opposing objectives within the feminist groups: "the purely feminist one of forming consciousness-raising groups and that of 'carrying on the ideological struggle' by means of publications" (Tekeli, 1986:196).

All these women were influenced by the Western feminist movement. Sirman remarks that Turkish feminists themselves seem to take over concepts of the Western feminist movement without exposing it to serious questioning. The feminist groups did not want to be identified as either Marxist, radical or socialist feminists, although they have many features of these feminist perspectives. Still, it is difficult to say what specific Turkish feminism consists of, however, the fact remains that in the short time of its existence, the women's question was taken up, as an issue, by other groups in civil society.

Their activities consisted of translating books written by western feminist and in 1983 a feminist publishing-firm was set up in Istanbul, Kadin Çevresi (=women's circle). Their "brief was to evaluate the work of women, paid or unpaid, outside or within the home" (Sirman, 1988:1).

In Ankara a coffee-house for women was established, which brimmed with different activities (Lutz, 1989:167-168).

In march 1986 a petition was organized which called for the prevention of discrimination against women and in 1987 Kadin Çevresi started a campaign against physical abuse of women.

In 1987 the first feminist journal appeared, called "Feminist". The policy of the editorial board was that women's subordination was a part of patriarchal ideology and social organization; the family produces and reproduces subordination of women. "Feminist" strived to be a forum for the organization of actions.

Another feminist journal, "Kaktüs", came into being. This journal proclaimed itself to be a forum for discussion between different currents in the women's movement.

- 2. Kemalist women's group

This group is organized along state-sponsored organizations. The Foundation for the Elevation of the Turkish Woman headed by the Prime minister's wife, is an example of such an organization. The

membership consists mostly of wives of rich and influential men from the Turkish industry and state bureaucracy. According to this group, the position of the Turkish woman should be improved through legal reforms and equal rights and not by undermining patriarchal structures within the family. This distinguishes them from the above identified feminist groups.

This is clearly evident in the activities they undertook. They were mainly directed at the protection of the family, rather than women per sé. Thus, it can be inferred, that they attacking patriarchal structures in the public sphere of civil society and leave the patriarchal structures of the family unquestioned. Their activities were projected by the party in power as its contribution to the emancipation of women (Sirman, 1988, Tekeli, 1990). The Kemalist group's ideology can be said to have many characteristics of a liberal/reformist feminist perspective.

Their main activities concentrate around marry women legally who were married by unofficial religious ceremony and the campaign to bring health visitors and means of birth control to rural women (Sirman, 1988).

3. Islamic fundamentalist women's groups

The main aim of these groups is to oppose secularism and modernism. Secular law is claimed to be alien to traditional values and moral heritage and therefore inadequate. They have a benevolent attitude towards the structures of patriarchy. They believe that men exist as the head of the family and should fulfil their duty as protector of the family, however, extreme manifestations of violence by men within the family are to be countered.

These groups concentrated mostly on women in rural areas and "gecekondü" women.

It is remarkable of these groups that they also use protest marches and petition campaigns to express their political beliefs as the endeavor of the fundamentalist Muslims has been, "to keep women out of active social and political life, have been influenced by the ubiquity of women giving voice to their complaints" (Tekeli, 1990:284).

Tekeli points out that these women groups refuse to cooperate with feminist groups. In their view feminist groups are westernized and materialistic. Individually some contact exists and sometimes their analysis are similar too (Lutz, 1989:169). Like the other groups they use magazines as a voice-tube. "Woman and family" is such a magazine. Their brief is "selling" a 'life-style' for the conscious Islamic woman and mother. One central issue was the question of "veiling". Covering one's head is emphasized as being different and at the same time resisting the loss of collective Islamic values, like communal sense, hospitably in a modern, egoistic society.

Another magazine is "Our Family". This magazine targets young women and propagates that believing in Allah does not make one a backward person and can be integrated in modern life (Lutz, 1989:169).

women's movement as a changing agent

The contemporary women's movement is situated within civil society and the protests voiced are not solely directed at the state but also against civil society. The campaign against wife-battering is an example of this. It did not ask the state to interfere but was directed at society, more specific, at the family, where assumptions about women, like the saying "men - should never leave a woman's womb empty of child, nor her back without a stick" (Tekeli, 1990:285) were taken under attack. Campaigns directed at the state do not seek its intervention but call for the state to lift constraints e.g., the campaign of the

religious fundamentalist group demanding the right to wear headscarves. Interestingly, when this demand was voiced, the Kemalist women's group organized a symbolic march to Atatürk's Mausoleum, because the demand was perceived as a retreat to Islam, "a retreat that would primarily affect women's position in society" (Abadan-Unat 1987, quoted by N. Sirman 1988:12). According to Tekeli (1990) the feminist view was that the state, by forbidding the wearing of headscarves in certain circumstances, was coercing women.

Another example is the campaign for segregating public transport. Sirman(1988) remarks that it generated a great deal of debate between feminists as to whether they should join with the religious fundamentalist women in their demand, because it was in the name of democracy and was directed against male society as well as its state apparatus. Other feminists argued that this was "carrying anti-statism too far and that feminism and Islam could never be compatible" (Sirman, 1988:17).

It can be deduced, therefore that feminism seems to be trapped between modernism and non-modernism. Uma Narayan identified these problems as feminist groups try to extend the scope of feminist concerns to other groups. According to her critique of marriage and the family is a concern of small groups of middle-class feminists. These feminists live in a society with a powerful tradition and although it oppresses women, it also puts high value on women's place in the family.

"Not only are the roles of wife and mother highly praised but women also are seen as the cornerstones of the spiritual well-being of their husbands and children, admired for their supposedly higher moral, religious, and spiritual qualities, and so on" (Narayan, 1984:259).

This puts feminists in an ambivalent position towards their society. The fact that being critical of how culture and tradition oppress women is in conflict with the desire, as members of this culture, to affirm its value.

conflict, compromise and cooperation

Feminist groups are in a way a threat to civil society and the state. Within civil society, there remains the reaction of fundamentalist groups, the Kemalist women's groups and the left.

The fundamentalist groups wish to see women kept between the four walls of their houses. That this is a wish and no longer a fact is illustrated by the activities undertaken by the islamic fundamentalist women themselves.

The role of religion nowadays can be seen as restricting women's space. Restriction, in the sense that women's place remains in the family, but for economic as well as political reasons, some space is created for them to go out for work, for actions, but only as pious women. Instead of being totally dependent on their husbands, these women seek protection through religion and religious fundamentalism legitimizes this space.

Feminism of the radical variety is perceived as a danger as it questions family structures. Feminism, meaning "an awareness of women's oppression and exploitation" in the "public" and "private" sphere and taken up as a strategy for change is exercised by these groups.

The Kemalist women have an ambiguous attitude towards the feminists. They claim that women in Turkey have already obtained their rights and that they can enter in professions, without having to neglect their domestic responsibilities. On the other hand there is an awareness that legal reforms do not change women's subordinate position within the family.

- The left groups in Turkey perceive feminism as a threat to class solidarity. This is regrettable, because if one looks at left ideology, which favors equality, freedom, solidarity and change, these groups should be at the forefront in supporting the demands of feminism.

So, generally it can be said that feminist groups find themselves alone in the political arena. This antagonistic attitude can strengthen the resolve of feminists of staying an autonomous group and might lead to developments towards the emergence of Turkish feminism. However, the disparate trends prevent the movement from becoming a major political force at this moment.

Tekeli (1990) remarks that the women's movement is seeking unity instead of differences. The main initiators for this stand are the feminist groups. According to them, there are enough themes around which women can organize collective campaigns. Tekeli identifies these subjects as militarism, democracy, peace, education, child care and environmental awareness. This not because the three trends identified are all opposing the patriarchal character of the family in a general way, or of society or of the state. Their strength could be, meting around specific issues concerning some aspects of the subordinate position of women in society.

This is not easy; obstacles such as tensions with the Islamic movement and dealing with a state which is becoming more and more conservative remain.

These three groups, with their respective ideologies and strategies, face problems with the state, within civil society and with other political forces and have, in that respect, their own dynamics towards these actors. The Kemalist women are looking for protection from the secular character of the state, while the feminists want to get rid of the patriarchal-capitalist character of the state and the Islamic women are opposing the secular character of the same state.

conclusion

The hypothesis in chapter 1 was generated with the assumption that the state and Islamic fundamentalism seek to reinforce a traditional patriarchal family structure and that feminism was perceived by them as a threat. Feminism and women's movement were portrayed as being largely synonymous. In the course of this research the differences in ideology and strategy within the women's movement became evident. The identified differences resulted in a general classification of three categories within the women's movement: feminist, Kemalist and Islamic fundamentalist.

When I focus on the feminist groups in Turkey I see the hypothesis confirmed. Still this is not satisfactory. Feminist activity by the feminist groups is described as: "undermining the structures of patriarchy within the family", the affirmation of the hypothesis could not miss.

On the other hand, when I focus on the ideology of the other two women's groups, especially their attitudes towards the family, the hypothesis cannot be said to be wholly sustained. Nonetheless, I definitely perceive a feminist perspective and a feminist consciousness that seems to be affirmed on examining their strategies and activities. This paper touched upon them, but a lot more analysis is needed. What was shown is that the different baselines from which women negotiate and strategize affect the forms and potentials of their resistance and struggle. The nature of the patriarchal system in its cultural, class-specific, and temporal concreteness can be captured with the help of systematic analysis of women's strategies and coping mechanisms. It helps "to reveal how men and women resist, accommodate, adapt and - conflict with each other over resources, rights, and responsibilities" (Kandiyoti, 1988:285).

Kandiyoti points out that her analysis of female conservatism as a reaction to the breakdown of classic patriarchy merely

demonstrates the place of a particular strategy within the internal logic of a given system. It is paralleled by analyses which may be found in very different contexts, such as the industrialized societies of Western Europe and the United States.

This research paper provides some insight but leaves a lot to analyze. For future research in the nature of patriarchal systems a particular useful term was put down by Kandiyoti, "the patriarchal bargain":

"It is intended to indicate the resistance of set of rules and scripts regulating gender relations, to which both genders accommodate and acquiesce, yet which may nonetheless be contested, redefined, and renegotiated.

..(It) .. commonly denotes a deal between more or less equal participants. .. my usage, clearly indicates an asymmetrical exchange. Women as a rule bargain from a weaker position" (Kandiyoti, 1988:286).

I find this particularly inspiring for further work.

bibliography

Abadan-Unat, N.

"Social Change and Turkish Women", Women in Turkish Society (ed) Abadan-Unat, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1981.

Afshar, H.

- "Introduction" and "Women, Marriage and the State in Iran", Women, State & Ideology: Studies from Africa and Asia, (ed) Afshar, MacMillan, 1987.

- "Behind the Veil: The Public and Private Faces of Khomeini's Policies on Iranian Women", Structures of Patriarchy: The State, the Community and the Household, (ed) Agarwal, Zed Books Ltd., London, 1988.

Anthias, F. and N. Yuval Davis.

"Introduction", Women - Nation - State, MacMillan, 1989.

Barrett, M.

"Some Conceptual Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis", Women's Oppression Today, Verso, London, 1980.

Berberoglu, B.

Turkey in Crises: From State Capitalism to Neo-Colonialism, Zed Press, 1982.

Binder, L.

Islamic Liberalism, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, pp 346-350.

Bottomore, T. (ed)

A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1988, pp 464-469.

Binder, L.

Islamic Liberalism, University of Chicago Press, pp.346-350, 1988.

Chhachhi, A.

- - "Concepts in Feminist Theory - Consensus and Controversy", Paper presented at the seminar: Gender in Caribbean Development, University of West Indies, 1986.

- "The State, Religious Fundamentalism and Women: Trends in South Asia", Working Paper - Sub-series on Women, History

and Development: Themes and Issue - No. 8., 1988.

- "Forced Identities: The State, Communalism, Fundamentalism and Women in India", Women, Islam and the State, (ed) Kandiyoti, MacMillan, forthcoming 1990.

Çosar, F.M.

"Women in Turkish Society", Women in the Muslim World, (eds) Keddie and Beck, Harvard University Press, 1978.

Dahlerup, D.

- "Introduction", The New Women's Movement: Feminism and Political Power in Europe and the USA, (ed.) Dahlerup, Sage Publications London, 1986.
- "Confusing Concepts - Confusing Reality: A Theoretical Discussion of the Patriarchal State", Women and the State: The Shifting Boundaries of Public And Private, (ed.) Sassoon, Hutchinson, 1987.

Eisenstein, Z. R.

"The Relative Autonomy of the Capitalist Patriarchal State", Feminism and Sexual Equality, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1984.

Galjart, B.

"Withdrawal and Expansion of the Developmental State: A proposal for an international Comparative Research Project", unpublished paper, April 1989.

Giddens, A.

Sociology: The Textbook of the Nineties, Polity Press, 1987
(op cit.)

Harding, S.

"Introduction: Is there a Feminist Method?", "Conclusion: Epistemological Questions", Feminism and Methodology, (ed) Harding, Indiana University Press, 1987.

Heller, A.

- "On Formal Democracy", Civil Society and the State, (ed) Keane, Verso, 1988.

Jaggar, A.M.

Feminist Politics and Human Nature, The Harvester Press, 1983, pp 1-25.

Jayawardena, K.

Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World, Zed Books Ltd., 1986.

Kandiyoti, D.

- "Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case", Feminist Studies 13, No. 2, 1987.
- "From Empire to Nation State: Transformation of the Woman's Question in Turkey", Retrieving Women's history: Changing Perceptions of the Role of Women in Politics and Society, (ed) Jay Kleinberg, Unesco, 1988. (a)
- "Bargaining with Patriarchy", Gender & Society, Vol. 2, No.3, September 1988. (b)
- "Women and the Turkish State: Political Actors or Symbolic Pawns?", Woman - Nation - State, (eds) Yuval-Davis and Anthias, MacMillan, 1989.
- "Introduction", Women, Islam and the State, (ed) Kandiyoti, MacMillan, forthcoming 1990.

Keddie, N. and L. Beck.

"Introduction", Women in the Muslim World, (eds) Keddie and Beck, Harvard University Press, 1978.

Lerner, G.

The Creation of Patriarchy, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 212-243.

Lutz, H.

"Feministische Tijdschriften Internationaal: Türkiye", Lover, nr. 3, 1989.

MacKinnon, C.A.

Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, Harvard University Press, 1989, pp. 157-170.

McIntosh, M.

"The State and the Oppression of Women", Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production, (eds) Kuhn and Wolpe, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978.

Mernissi, F.

Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Muslim Society, Al Saqi Books, 1985.

Narayan, U.

- "The Project of Feminist Epistemology: Perspectives from a Non-Western Feminist", Gender, Body and Knowledge, (eds) Jaggar and Bordo, 1984.

Özbudun, E.

- "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations", Volume 3: Asia: Democracy in Developing countries, (eds) Diamond, Linz and Lipset, Boulder, London, 1989.

Pateman, C.

- "Patriarchal Confusions", "Feminism and the Marriage Contract", The Sexual Contract, Polity Press, 1988.

Petek-Salom, G. and P. Hukum.

- "Women's Emancipation after the Atatürk Period", Women of the Mediterranean, (ed) Gadant, Zed Books Ltd., 1986.

Pollis, A.

- "Development, Growth and Human Rights: The Case of Turkey", Human Rights and Development: International Views, (ed) Forsythe, MacMillan Press Ltd., 1989.

Rowbotham, S.

- "The Trouble with Patriarchy", People's History and Socialist Theory, (ed) Samuel, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981.
- "In and Against the State", The Past is Before Us: Feminist Action since the 1960s, Penguin Books, London, 1989.

Sabbah, F.

- Woman in the Muslim Unconscious, Pergamon Press, 1988.

Sen, G. and C. Grown.

- Development, Crises and Alternative Visions: Third World Women's Perspectives, Earthscan Publications Ltd., London, 1987.

Scott, J. W.

- Gender and the Politics of History, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988.

Siim, B.

- "Towards a Feminist Rethinking of the Welfare State", The Political Interests of Gender, (eds) Jones and Jónasdóttir,

Sage Publications Ltd., 1988.

Sirman, N.

"Turkish Feminism: A Short History?", unpublished paper presented at the XII IUAES Congress, Zagreb, July 1988.

Starr, J.

"The role of Turkish Secular Law in Changing the Lives of Rural Muslim Women, 1950-1970", Law & Society Review, Volume 23, No. 3 1989.

Stepan, A.

"Liberal Pluralist Classic Marxist, and 'Organic-Statist' Approaches to the State", The State and Society, Princeton U.P., Princeton NJ, 1978.

Sunier, J.T.

Turkije, landen documentatie map, Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, Novib, SDU uitgeverij, 1989.

Tekeli, S.

- "Women in Turkish Politics", Women in Turkish Society, (ed) Abadan-Unat, E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1981.
- "The Rise and Change of the New Women's Movement: Emergence of the Feminist Movement in Turkey", The New Women's Movement: Feminism and Political Power in Europe and the USA, (ed) Dahlerup, Sage Publications, London, 1986.
- "Women in the Changing Political Associations of the 1980s", Turkish State, Turkish Society, (eds) Finkel and Sirman, Routledge, London, 1990.

Timur, S.

"Determinants of Family Structure in Turkey", Women in Turkish Society, (ed) Abadan-Unat, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1981.

Toprak, B.

"Religion and Turkish Women", Women in Turkish Society, (ed) Abadan-Unat, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1981.

- Tsikata, E.

"Women's Organizations and the State in Ghana", unpublished paper for obtaining the degree of Master of Arts in Development Studies, ISS, The Hague, 1989.

Zakaria, F.

"The Standpoint of Contemporary Muslim Fundamentalists",
Women of the Arab World: The Coming Challenge, (ed) Toubia,
Zed Books Ltd, London, 1988.



