RURAL STRUCTURES AND MIGRATION TO URBAN AREAS:
THE ETHIOPIAN CASE

a Thesis presented by

Mrs. Atnaf Alem Yemane
(Ethiopia)

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining
the Degree of

MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Members of the Thesis Committee:

Professor K.W.J. Post
Drs. S.M. de Boer
Ir. H.Ph. Huffnagel

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A Thesis
submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the Degree of
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DEDICATED

TO

My beloved son, Cashaw Terrefe who has been getting less motherly attention while I was writing this thesis.
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Institute of Social Studies

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CHAPTER I

PART I - INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia, like most of the so-called "developing" countries is experiencing a high rate of rural-urban migration. The country is faced with low and declining production in the agricultural sector and a mounting rate of unemployment and underemployment in the urban areas. To reverse this trend it is necessary, among other things, to contain the flow of the rural labour force to the towns. On the other hand, the contrary is what is actually taking place. Rather than being abated, the process of urban-ward migration is in fact accelerating.

The fact that urbanization is growing at a high rate without a parallel economic growth even in the narrow sense of industrial expansion suggests that appropriate measures should be taken to control the rural exodus. This in turn necessitates a careful study of the basic causes and contributory factors, the pattern and the effects of migration; for it is only after these are fully grasped that effective policies and plans can be formulated and a serious attack mounted both on its root causes and the problems emanating from it.

Rural-urban migration is a complex process involving the movement of people from an area or sector considered rural by a particular society to an area considered urban. Various economic, social and political factors lead to it. A number of economic, social and political consequences flow from it. Moreover, both its causes and effects vary from country to country and from one period to another (we will see the complexity of the situation in Part II of this chapter). Nevertheless, this does not mean that major and minor, basic and contributory causes cannot be distinguished. Indeed, we submit (and we will show this in Chapter II) that although there certainly are secondary factors the root causes of the exodus in Ethiopia lie in the objective conditions of the rural sector, i.e. the agrarian structures. By this, however, we do not mean that the present paper will be limited to the analysis of those structures alone. The attempt
is to focus attention on the dominant factors that lead to the swelling stream of migration to towns and cities and, to offer suggestion which might serve as a basis for the formulation of rural development policies. Our basic assumption is that the problem of rural-urban migration can only be effectively attacked within the framework of a balanced overall national development. Just as the trend of migration cannot be seen in isolation from the present state of the country's underdevelopment, effective solution to the problem cannot be obtained unless a structural transformation is effected.

Before we turn to the case of Ethiopia, we will discuss certain theories advanced by some writers in the field to explain the causes of rural-urban migration in most developing countries. The attempt here is not purely to give a brief exposé of the current approaches but also, and more important, to establish a possible theoretical framework which may assist us in analysing the phenomenon of rural-urban migration in Ethiopia. We should note, however, that our aim is not to impose any a priori conceived schema on the Ethiopian reality but to analyse that reality and bring out prominent features that relate to the core of this study, i.e. rural-urban migration in Ethiopia. To this end, the structure of rural Ethiopia, the specific pattern of landownership, land tenure systems and the relations of production will be analysed and related to urban-ward migration in Chapter II.

Chapter III will deal with the historical growth of cities, how they became dominant in relation to the rural areas and the impact of their apparent features on the process of migration. This will be followed by an analysis of certain rural development policies (mainly those of the 3rd year Development Plan) with a view to indicate their effects on the rural exodus. While we do recognize the significance of urban/industrial development policies in accelerating migration, neither time nor space permits us to discuss these in any meaningful way. After a discussion of the impact of rural development policies, therefore, we will turn, in Chapter V, to a consideration of the pattern of migration and its impact on the rural and urban sectors as well
as on the national economy generally. In Ethiopia where the vast majority of the people work and live in the rural areas (90% of them) arresting the present trend of migration necessitates basic structural alteration in the agrarian sector. Lastly, therefore, by way of suggesting measures both for controlling the present trend of migration and enhancing development, changes that should be effected in the rural sector will be identified and linked to requirements for a balanced national development.

Before discussing any aspect of the migration process, however, we wish to clarify some concepts that will be used in our discussions concerning Ethiopia in the following.

Urbanization as a process has been defined by many social scientists in the field in different ways suitable to the country of study. While doing so many of them include such common criteria as population size and density, more work and diversity of work, mobility and other factors. For the sake of understanding the term used in this paper, however, urbanization defined as "... the physical and economic process involved in the relative growth of urban population as a result of migration from rural areas to urban places and from land based occupation to industrial types of work, and secondary and tertiary services"¹ is acceptable.

Rural-urban migration refers to the mobility of people from an area which is considered rural where the majority of people are engaged in farming to an area considered urban where the majority are engaged in non-agricultural pursuits.

Rural area refers to relatively small and relatively sparsely settled area where the majority of people are engaged in agriculture.

Urban centre refers to an agglomeration where there are at least 2000 inhabitants and where the dominant economic activities are non-agricultural i.e. when the inhabitants are engaged in industry, commerce and other related pursuits. Similarly, a town refers, officially

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In Ethiopia, to a locality with 2,000 and more inhabitants plus the above mentioned criteria.\(^1\)

**PART II - CAUSES OF RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION**

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

In general, it can be said that one of the most significant and common features of the developing countries is the extensive migration of labour from the rural to the urban sector. This phenomenon continues to prevail and accelerates despite the prevailing existence of low level of economic and technological development and high level of urban unemployment in most of these countries.

Indeed the rate of migration of the young and able-bodied forces of the rural sector to the urban areas is so intensive that today most of the urban centres of the developing countries grow at a very high rate - most of them by 5-8%\(^2\) or more annually. In the case of Ethiopia for instance, the average rate of urban growth is found to be 6.6% while Addis Ababa, the capital grew by 7% annually during the second half of the 1960's, as reported by the two national sample surveys of 1961 and 1967. The yearly rate of natural increase for both rural and urban areas is estimated to be 2.5% while the yearly net in-migration to towns with and over 2,000 inhabitants, referred to as urban centres officially, is estimated to be 4.1% - 4.5% by the same surveys.\(^3\) A similar situation is discernible in most developing countries. The

\(^1\) Central Statistical Office (INO), *Urbanization in Ethiopia*, Statistical Bulletin 9, A-A, August, 1972, p.4

\(^2\) Joan Nelson, "The Urban Poor, Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities", *World Politics*, Vol. XXII, No.3, April 1970, p.l

\(^3\) C.S.O., *Urbanization in Ethiopia*, op.cit. p.10
strongest increase of population in urban areas of these countries is caused not by natural increase but rather by migration from the rural areas.\textsuperscript{1)} As regards the situation in Asia, McGee states: "While there is no doubt that natural increase and urban extension have contributed to some of this increase, it is impossible to disagree with U.N.E.S.C.O. when it comments that rural-urban migration has undoubtedly accounted for the overwhelming share of urban growth in the region." He continues to state, "Historically of course, rural-urban migration has always contributed the major part of the urban growth of Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{2)}" The same situation is observed in many Latin American countries where "their populations increase at a rate of 2.5 to 3\% and their urban areas 5 to 6 \% per year. In some instances, the population in slums and shanty towns aggregates at the staggering rate of 12 to 15\% a year."\textsuperscript{3)} The intensive migration in most developing countries, may, as some writers observe, prove uncontrollable in future and lead to serious economic and social problems at both local and national levels if proper measures are not taken to attack its basic causes. The negative impact of such a process on the rural and urban sectors and on the national economy of most of these countries is even more pronounced when we consider that "... the great migration into the capitals and metropolises of Africa, Asia and Latin America is most intensive and rapid in areas where natural resources are underdeveloped and where the economic and technological resources and human skills are inadequate."\textsuperscript{4)} The high rate of migration and the consequent problems emanating therefrom seem to have been recognized by most governments most of whom have launched policy measures to deal with the alarming situation. However, most of these measures and efforts seem to increase the migration trend and therefore its consequent problems instead of abating it thus defeating their own aims. The failures could be due to lack of detailed

\textsuperscript{3)} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{4)} I.U.L.A., \textit{Urbanization in Developing Countries}, op.cit. p.14
studies of causes and effects prior to the formulation of policies and attempts at implementing them as well as the inappropriateness of the objectives which these governments try to realize. By inappropriate objectives we mean, for instance, government attempts to solve the problem through increased agricultural output without tackling the basic question of structural transformation.

The high rate of migration in developing countries has attracted the attention of various social scientists\(^1\) most of whom have recently tried to explain the various causes of migration and have formulated behavioral models that, in their opinion, may help policy makers when they plan to take measures in this respect. However, it must be mentioned that most of these writers have concentrated on the economic factor thus introducing mainly economic behavioral/motivational models which are more or less of the same nature. On the other hand, some other writers have also tried to explain the process of the rural exodus by giving structural factors responsible for it. Such structural factors, among others, could imply agrarian structure, involving mainly landownership and tenure systems and the relations of production therefrom, that tend to lead to low productivity and rural poverty. This structural situation could thus lead to increased urbanward migration of the rural masses - mainly the poor and impoverished peasants and tenants. Indeed, while both factors could be said to have led to the present migration trend observed in these countries, some of them could play a dominant role in causing the trend depending on the particular conditions of the country concerned. Thus in the following pages an attempt will be made to identify theoretically some of the major factors - both structural and behavioral - which could lead to rural-urban migration in most of the developing countries.

i) The Impact of Structural Factors on Migration

A discussion on the structural factors should, we submit, concentrate on the analysis of the objective conditions of the rural sectors that force many of the rural masses in the developing countries to migrate to the urban centres. Indeed, available evidences show that the agrarian structure poses as the dominant cause behind the swelling stream of urban-ward migration observed in most of them.

In many Latin American and Asian countries as well as in Ethiopia the prevailing agrarian structure in general and the land-ownership and tenure systems and the relations of production in particular lead to low productivity, low production and rural poverty. This situation of poverty and unrewarding drudgery forces a considerable number of the rural masses, mostly the poor peasants, tenants or sharecroppers, to react to the objective conditions in the villages through migration to urban areas. Intensified migration involving a loss of young and ablebodied forces in the rural sector leads to still lower production which in turn becomes an obstacle to the general development possibilities of these countries. This is so because most of them are agricultural countries where 80 - 90% of their population depend on agriculture for their livelihood while agriculture contributes the major part of their GNP as well as their exports. Furthermore, in countries like Ethiopia where a large portion of the land is owned by a very small segment of the society consisting of big landowners (or landlords in case of Ethiopia where they own 90% of the land being only 5% of the population) and the local gentry the majority of the rural population become landless or poor peasants working as sharecroppers, tenants, wage labourers (though limited in number since the capitalist sector is mostly small), or unemployed. Given the exploitative relations of production between the owners and the tillers of land the latter (depending on their condition as sharecroppers, tenants or part-time tenants with small plots of land) submit the largest portion of their produce

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* We are aware that to a situation of poverty and degradation people react in various ways ranging from millenarian movements to rebellion and revolution. In this paper, however, our concern is with one particular mode of reaction, i.e. migration.
to the landowners thus remaining with hardly enough to cover their
basic needs and that of their family members. In addition to such
obligation to their landlords the poor peasants and tenants are
also legally required to pay various taxes to the state which makes
their situation even worse. The poor peasants owning uneconomic
units of land are also faced with the same situation of poverty and
the necessity to supplement their low income by renting additional
lands from the big landowners. By doing so they simultaneously en-
ter the exploitative landowner-tenant relations. It must be noted,
also that both cultivators of this land have no security of tenure
or legal rights which in effect leads to arbitrary eviction at the
will of the owners. Thus, on the one hand, obligations to landlords
and lack of security create low incentive to invest in and improve
the land. On the other hand, even if there is the will to improve
the productivity of the soil the poverty and the resultant finan-
cial incapacity of the cultivators makes this virtually impossible.
All these, combined with the use of primitive forces of production
(farming tools and implements) leads to low productivity and produc-
tion and hence rural stagnation. Moreover, the non-existence of
credit and other development facilities for these groups in most of
the rural areas of the developing countries force the poor peasants
to borrow money (either for consumption or for buying seeds etc.)
from money lenders who are usually the big landowners themselves.
This causes chronic indebtedness and not unusually results in the
poor peasants giving up their land to the money lenders and thereby
joining the ranks of landless tenants or migrants, while the indebted
tenants become life time tenants to pay their debts or run away to
the urban centres to look for alternative means of livelihood.

Furthermore, the introduction of money economy under such cir-
cumstances in the traditional sector aggravates the living condition
of the cultivators since they need cash to be paid against rent, tax,
manufactured goods and other necessities which are not usually avail-
able in the rural sector. In relation to this situation in most
developing countries since recent years De Gaay Fortman states,
"Taxation, the introduction of industrial goods and the provision
of services such as education against money created a great demand for cash among the indigenous populations which could be satisfied only by selling labour in towns or on agricultural estates.\textsuperscript{1)}

Given that the landlord-dominated-commercialized sector and the agricultural estates are limited in most but in few Latin American countries, the above mentioned factors have indeed contributed to the present intensive urbanward migration in most of those countries which have either been directly colonized or been under the indirect influence of the western developed countries.

The accelerating impact of the prevailing agrarian structure and its production relations on the rural exodus is discussed by De Gaay Fortman who quotes Furtado as declaring "... the problem is not in the behaviour of the agents who make decisions in the economic field that may be guided by strict criteria of rationality. Rather, the core of the problem resides in the structural relations that determine the field in which the relevant decisions are made."\textsuperscript{2)}

Lastly he comments, "If the structural relations that result in the rural exodus are to be broken, then the prime need is for a deliberate strategy for rural development."\textsuperscript{3)} As we have also pointed out earlier, it is true that the structural relations, especially the dominant production relations in most of these countries are known to contribute to the present migration trend. However, as to whether the present governments or policymakers dominated by the landowning classes, are able or willing to introduce rural development strategies that will change the prevailing landownership systems and the structural relations that result in rural exodus is to be judged according to the particular conditions of the countries concerned. Experiences from rural development policies implemented in most of these countries show that their effects had already led and are leading to increased rural inequality of income and wealth as well as

\textsuperscript{1)} Bastiaan de Gaay Fortman, "Rural Development in an Age of Survival", I.S.S. Occasional Papers, The Hague, p.?\textsuperscript{7}
\textsuperscript{2)} \textit{Ibid.} p.9
\textsuperscript{3)} \textit{Ibid.}
intensified migration of the rural masses instead of abating the process. It is important to note also that the main objectives of most of such policies being increase of production and agricultural output for export purposes, they are known to ignore their side effects on the masses of cultivators. Thus when these policies are implemented within the existing agrarian structure where the majority of the cultivators are poor peasants, tenants and sharecroppers, they tend to lead to loss of employment, and hence loss of income which forces a considerable number of the rural poor to migrate to cities to look for jobs and other sources of income.

Such a situation is created mainly by the fact that the big landowners and absentee holders are the ones who can adopt the new techniques of farming and modern implements like tractors to increase their income, thereby evicting their tenants, sharecroppers or labourers and replacing them with labour saving technology. It is also useful to mention that since most of the extensive landowners are absentee lords residing mainly in the capital cities (holding high government offices or engaged in business) and since they enjoy increased and modernized consumption patterns that necessitate more hard cash, they are inclined to pay less attention to social obligations and paternal relations towards the cultivators. Thus the demand on the rural masses to fulfil obligations to the landowners and the government in form of increasing rent, as well as land, education, health, income and other taxes, tend to be more than they (the poor peasants and tenants) can manage with the result that many of them are forced to migrate to the urban centres. To the new tendency of the big landowners to mechanize their farms and therefore evict many of the sharecroppers, tenants or part time tenants and labourers in order to increase their income should be added the impact of the rural development policies of the respective governments as they strengthen the causes and accelerate the present migration trend as will be shown below.

As mentioned already one of the development strategies advocated and presently implemented in most of the developing countries is the mechanization and modernization of agriculture. Some also introduce the process as the "Green Revolution" advocated by F.A.O. and adopted
by most of these countries which recognize the prevailing low productivity and stagnation of the rural sectors. However, since the main objective of these policies have become the increase of production and output, their side effects have been mostly Thus the result of most of them is shown to be increased inequality between the rich and the poor, increased eviction and displacement of tenants, share-croppers or labourers and intensified urbanward migration.

The impact of mechanization and modernization policies on the peasant farmers and on the rate of unemployment in both the rural and urban sectors of the developing countries has been dealt with extensively by various writers in the field among whom are Professors Feder and de Gaay Fortman. In discussing the impact of such policies on the poor peasants Professor Feder states: "... many more people were thrown out of their job during the past five years than (say) in an equivalent period of some 20 years ago."1)

Furthermore, referring to the effects and side effects of these policies in countries where unequal distribution of land exists and where few people own the major part of the land Fortman states: "... the M.I.T. team has concluded that where an unequal system of land distribution exists, the Green Revolution tends to cause widening inequality. The social effects can then be extremely harmful. Agricultural unemployment increased migration to the city, and perhaps even increased malnutrition since the poor and unemployed do not have the means to buy the newly produced food."2)

Indeed, the experiences derived from both large scale commercial agriculture and the "package programmes" of the peasant sector in Ethiopia points in the same direction since more and more peasant farmers are being evicted and replaced by tractors and other farm

2) Bastiaan de Gaay Fortman, op.cit., p.3
machinery and thereby forced to move to urban centres, as will be discussed in Chapter IV.

The same pattern of increased eviction and therefore rural exodus is experienced in some other developing countries like India and Pakistan where such development policies are implemented within the prevailing agrarian structure which is dominated by unequal distribution of land. In relation to the same situation in Latin America, de Gaay Fortman quotes Flores' warning against the latifundia system as follows:

"Here, policy boils down to a simple equation: extensive cultivation and mechanization = rural exodus".  

The same remark can be made about the situations in most countries of Asia, and those like Ethiopia where the systems of land tenure seem to be similar in some respects. In general it can be said that rural development policies such as those analysed above tend to have an accelerating effect on the trend of migration.

ii) One of the main factors to which the intensive migration to urban centres can be attributed is the expected differential between the rural and urban sectors in terms of income, employment opportunities and other economic and social activities. Available evidences indicate that the urban centres especially a few major cities grow and develop at the expense of the rural areas which are used to provide both labour and material resources to develop the cities. Consequently, most of the bigger cities and urban centres in general become concentrations of various development activities that are potentials for employment and income creation. This process of concentration increases expectation and therefore stimulates the rural population, who live in a sector relatively deprived of such opportunities to migrate. As a result of such exploitative relations between the two sectors, which are enhanced by the measures of the so-called "development agents" who are themselves largely urban

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1) Ibid. p.11
based and urban biased, the rural sector tends to be deprived of much of its resources that are mainly exported to the towns or to foreign markets. The surplus generated in the rural areas is therefore used for the development of the urban centres without being re-invested in the former. This trend is discernible in the "development plans" of most developing countries where the urban and the industrial sector absorbs the major portion of the investment and capital expenditure. This is of course, despite the fact that most of these countries are agricultural and therefore exporters of raw materials that contribute most to their G.N.P. All these result in more imbalance between the two sectors which in turn stimulate many of the rural people who live in a stagnating and deprived sector to migrate to the urban centres by creating high expectations.

When we consider the cash income of the wage earners or industrial workers in the modern sector most evidences show that those working in the urban sector get annually an average income higher than that of those working in the rural areas. Based on this, some writers tend to refer to income differentials as one of the causes of migration. To this effect Singer, among others states that:

"... Since wage levels in the modern sector may be perhaps two or three times the level of average income on the family farm - and many of the younger people might not even have the chance of sharing this average income it becomes rational to emigrate even on a 50% or 33% chance of a job in the town."1)

In relation to the situation in Ethiopia Mesfin argues that unskilled labourers in towns may get, if they are lucky, between 15 and 30 Ethiopian dollars. While a hard working agricultural labourer in rural areas may earn Eth. $ 15 - 20, plus some sort of food per year.2) Indeed, as the above source shows there is a cash income differential between those employed in the modern sector of the two

areas. However, it may be difficult to see the real income differential between them since the cost of living in the two sectors usually varies with that of the rural sector being mostly lower.

Moreover, such differentials as mentioned above should be seen in relation to those few employed in the modern sector thus excluding the majority of the masses who are found unemployed and under-employed even after migrating to the urban areas. And indeed, it is these masses who live under very severe conditions (similar to those of the rural sector) in most of the cities whose employment and other opportunities are inadequate and therefore fail to absorb the exodus. "Rarely does the newcomer find sufficient employment in the city to improve his conditions. In fact, he often exchanges a miserable rural subsistence for urban living at an even lower level."  

Thus in such situations the "real" income differential hypothesis forwarded by some writers to explain the general causes of migration in the developing countries seems to be exaggerated and therefore questionable. The absence of any detailed study on the expenditures of urban and rural households makes it difficult to make a definitive statement. Nevertheless, it appears incontrovertible that the fortunate few who obtain wage employment in the urban centres pose as social elements of emulation. In other words, what seems to be important is the fact that the rural masses living under depressed conditions migrate to towns hoping that they would secure employment even when such a possibility may be non-existent.

In relation to the inefficiency of the income differential to explain the causes of rural-urban migration Ch. Allen states: "Without extensive surveys, and some means of assigning a monetary value to rural leisure and urban opportunities a direct comparison cannot be made, instead one must contrast incomes, making allowance for different responsibilities and costs. It is here that exaggeration

1) I.J.L.A., Urbanization in Developing Countries, op.cit. p.15
of the differential can arise, by neglecting or under-estimating costs and liabilities. \(^1\)  

Indeed, such urban costs as food, fuel, transport, clothing and others are mainly found to absorb the major portion of the incomes of the urban wage earners while these necessities are mostly home produced or organized by the rural people thus consuming much of their own labour and less of their cash incomes.

In addition to such expenses in cash from their income the urban wage earners or the casually employed have also to incur extra costs necessitated by visits of relatives and new migrants whom they have to house and feed. Allen rightly explains the situation in the following terms: "Wage earners maintain families and often provide hospitality for relations or friends seeking wage employment and who cannot make a significant contribution to household income." \(^2\)  

Similar occurrences are common in most of the developing countries where the relations of the extended family and therefore one's obligation to family members especially young siblings and close relatives still prevail. Therefore, such additional costs and different responsibilities in the two sectors should be taken into account when one tries to give the income differential as a factor causing migration. Moreover, such conditions occurring in most of the developing countries where, by and large, wages are low and stagnant and the wage earner's condition is not very different from that of the rural areas, indicate that the "real income differential" hypothesis cannot be easily accepted as a valid and adequate explanation of all the migration processes. Rather, it shows that it is the "expected" income differential in addition to the prospects of urban employment and other opportunities that stimulate the rural peasants (especially the young, poor peasants and tenants) to migrate to cities while the adverse conditions created by the agrarian structure and the production relations thereof, make them footloose, and sensitive to respond

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2) Ibid.
to such situations in various forms beside migration. It should also be added that by contrast to the grim and rather inert rural atmosphere where the earning opportunities other than farming are limited, beside being unequal and inadequate for subsistence, many of these rural peasants migrate to the urban sector with the hope of finding a job and other means of income for their livelihood either in the formal or informal sector. The expectation is, of course, that income and level of living will rise in the urban areas, while they remain stagnant or declining in the rural areas. This is, however, despite the limited probability of getting jobs of any kind or pay comparable to their rural earnings. Indeed, most evidences show that the failure to achieve their expectation results in increasing rate of unemployment, underemployment, destitution, urban congestion, housing shortages and other problems which have become the characteristic features of most towns in developing countries. This view is also shared by Todaro who states, "... while analysing the determinants of urban labour supplies, one must look not at prevailing real-income differentials as such, but rather at the rural-urban "expected" income differential."¹)

As already mentioned above, inspite of the lower probability of successfully finding a permanent job the "expected" income differential may still continue to stimulate more migrants to go to the already congested towns thereby increasing the unemployment and underemployment rate and the misery of the urban poor who are found in such situations. Moreover, the problem gets intensified by such movement despite increased but concentrated employment and other opportunities in the urban centres especially in the few bigger cities of most of these countries. For instance, if we take the situation in Ethiopia, the rate of unemployment in most of the towns was found to be more than 50% of their labour force in 1966.²) The efforts of the

local and national governments to increase and expand employment opportunities especially in the few big cities have resulted in more unemployment as a consequence of more migrants attracted to these areas than can be absorbed. Moreover, as discussed above, where large scale farming and mechanization of agriculture is encouraged by development policies in a situation where most peasants are poor share-croppers or tenants the exodus of those evicted or displaced cannot be explained by the availability of employment in the urban areas but rather by the lack of it in the rural areas, and the hope of obtaining some source of income in the former.

Having studied the experiences of some cities like Calcutta and Naples, Warriner came to the following conclusion:

"As to the conditions in which this type of movement is likely to occur, the assumption that the general cause of rural-urban migration is disparity in earnings between urban occupations and agriculture is obviously not a sufficient explanation, since in the more advanced countries labour leaves agriculture for urban employment at standard wages, without causing an increase in urban unemployment or underemployment. In economic terms, urban drift must be interpreted as the result of agricultural unemployment, which induces rural workers to move, in the hope of finding employment at any level of earnings, since the chances of finding employment in large towns are higher than in the land."¹

Furthermore, the existing concentration of employment and other economic and social activities in the urban areas especially in a few major cities - stimulates more migrants to move away from the villages where these opportunities are lacking or extremely limited. Such a trend of concentration seems to be a common feature of most of the developing countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa. Various reports and statistics show that industries and such other economic activities as commerce and marketing, construction and social services are largely located in the towns. Referring to such situations in developing countries one source states: "It is observable .... that

most industrial enterprises are located in or near large urban centres. And certainly the resulting marketing, financing, and commercial (internal and export) activities are likely to take place in large cities.¹)

Such a situation induces urban-ward migration by heightening expectations of the rural masses, particularly the young, able-bodied and therefore potentially the most productive segments of the agrarian sector. However, due to the inadequacy of these services to cover the exodus and the expanding urban population most of the migrants who are also in the majority of cases unskilled or semi-skilled, remain unemployed or casually employed with low wages that are not enough to cover their basic necessities and that of their family. This situation forces many of them into destitution, and many get engaged in other part time but unfavourable activities to earn a living or to supplement whatever low income they earn through their formal jobs. Such exodus of the manpower away from the land also adversely affects the already declining productivity of the rural areas. The expensive measures taken by the respective governments, both local and national, to alleviate the economic and social problems observed in most of the cities by creating more jobs, schools, hospitals and the like tend to defeat their own aims by increasing their attraction which leads to increased and excessive migration to them. As De Gaay Fortman put it succinctly: "... slum areas in developing countries are growing day by day. Further industrialization is unlikely to stop this trend. It has even been found that the more employment opportunities that are created in towns the larger will be the amount of unemployment there, because even more people are then attracted to the cities."²)

Another point that should be noted is that as a result of excessive migration, the bigger cities grow much faster than the middle sized or smaller towns. In relation to this pattern in South East

²) Bastiaan de Gaay Fortman, op.cit., p.3
Asia one source observes:

"Most evidence suggests that the largest cities of South East Asia today are attracting a greater proportion of the rural migrants than the smaller cities...... For instance, while the population of Manila City grew by only 166,000 between 1948 and 1960, the population of Metropolitan Manila increased by almost 1 million people.1) Laguian tells us that the same city "is nine times larger than the next largest city, Cebu".2) When we consider the Ethiopian case (which will be discussed in detail in Chapter III), we note that Addis Ababa has grown by about 710,000 during 1938 - 1970, while Asmara, the second largest city has grown by only 121,000 during the same period. Thus by 1970 Addis Ababa was four times larger than Asmara which was bigger than the former in 1938,3) because of the increasing concentration of economic and social activities which attracted more and more migration though it is unable to absorb it.

In relation to the same pattern in Latin America, Laguian states: "The population growth of metropolitan Lima has been extremely rapid. During the period 1940-1961 the yearly rate of population increase in Lima was 5.2% as against 2.2% for the whole country and 4.5% for all other urban areas."4) He continues, "..... most of the rapid growth of Lima metropolis has been due to internal migration.... About 45% of the residents of Lima are migrants, according to the 1961 census."5) Similarly, the proportion of the migrant population of Addis Ababa in Ethiopia was found to be 53.7% while only 44.3% were born in the city itself with 2% as international migrants, according to the two national surveys of 1961 and 1967.6)

Closely related to the above discussion is the disparity between regions in terms of economic growth, which could possibly contribute to the process of urban-ward migration. Regional imbalances in this

2) A. Laguian, Rural-Urban Migrants and Metropolitan Development, Metropolitan Studies Services, Canada, 1971, p.137
3) In 1939 Asmara had a population of 98,000 while Addis Ababa had 90,000. For comparison refer Table V in the Annex.
4) A. Laguian, Ibid., p.112
5) Ibid.
in this sense may result from various factors: historical, political, geographical etc. depending on the particular pattern of development of a given country. Although, as we have implicitly indicated in the above statement, many imbalances result from the interplay of several factors, it may be safe to assume that the policies and practices of the ruling classes play a dominant role either in creating or in accentuating these imbalances. Those who are in the decision making process therefore may favour some regions because they reside in them, or they originate from them. Whatever the case, once imbalances emerge and gather momentum, they tend to influence the pattern of investment and the allocation of the national resources in such a way that the relatively advanced regions benefit at the expense of the others.

Consequently, the favoured and relatively developed regions become the centre of excessive migration and their cities grow at a higher rate while the neglected regions become repulsive to their population and therefore lose their productive forces to the other regional cities.

In relation to this situation in developing countries Myrdal remarks:

"The localities and regions where economic activity is expanding will attract net immigration from other parts of the country. As migration is always selective, at least with respect to the migrant's age, this movement by itself tends to favour the rapidly growing communities and disfavour the others."¹)

A similar trend is said to have occurred in countries like Thailand in Asia, Sudan in Africa and others where regional imbalances in development exist and contribute to the excessive rural-urban migration observed in them. Generally it can be said that where regional imbalance exists it can have a considerable impact on the migration trend, though of course, it is related to the above discussed "expected" differentials between the urban and the rural sectors.

While discussing the present excessive rural-urban migration in the developing countries one needs to show the processes that help in increasing the expectations of the rural masses. In this respect, one may presume that expanding networks of communication and information flows between the rural and urban sectors contribute to the migration trend depending on the level of technological and economic development of the countries concerned. However, since most of the developing countries are at a lower level of development (with some differences) some common features could be identified and mentioned in a generalized form. Among these factors one could mention contacts which migrants maintain with friends, relatives, village members etc. who have remained behind. Such contacts provide information about city life, its glamours and its differing aspects from the rural areas in terms of development opportunities.

Although the majority of the migrants do not secure jobs, the few who succeed try to bring their wives, children or other family members under their responsibility thus involving more migrants. Others try to save from whatever small income they may get in order to pay visits to their family members in the villages where their outward appearances give the impression that towns offer a higher standard and better style of life. Some others continue to send some financial and material assistance to their relatives back in the village, while others bring with them some cheap but attractive gifts for their relatives in the extended family as well as for their friends. Such demonstration effects and contacts raise the expectations of the relatively deprived potential migrants who flock to the cities to look for employment and other sources of income. Moreover, certain development programmes in the rural areas like Community Development further create new values and attitudes, new demands and needs that cannot be satisfied within the socio-economic reality of the villages. The failure to satisfy their newly acquired values and needs induce them to migrate to cities in the belief that the latter would offer better opportunities.

In some countries the relatively safe and secure journey today
either on foot or by other means like trucks, lorries etc., facilitates the process of migration. In short, contacts between migrants—particularly the successful ones—and the villagers, the relative expansion of communication facilities as well as rural community development programmes seem to intensify the process of migration despite the inadequacy of the urban centres to absorb the exodus.
CHAPTER II

BASIC CAUSES OF RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION IN ETHIOPIA

In the above discussion an attempt has been made to indicate the complex nature of the migration process. We have also tried to show that the urban-ward migration is caused and accentuated by the interplay of various factors. Nevertheless, although the factors contributing to the present rural-urban exodus are many and interrelated, we submit that in the case of Ethiopia the prevailing agrarian structure plays the most dominant role in forcing part of the rural labour force to move to urban centres. The purpose of this Chapter, therefore, is to analyse the objective conditions of the rural areas and to show, so far as possible, their impact on the process of migration.

The Impact of Agrarian Structure on Rural-Urban Migration

Considering the objective conditions of the rural areas from where the exodus flows we note that certain factors lead to this situation. Among those factors the most significant is the prevailing agrarian structure. By agrarian structure we understand the prevalent landownership and tenure systems and the relations of production emanating therefrom. These lead to low productivity and production and rural poverty which in effect forces the rural masses to migrate to the urban areas. Indeed, this effect of the agrarian structure has been recognized by the 3rd Year Development planners themselves who declare: "Out of 4 million peasant holdings 90% cultivate less than five hectares each, two thirds of them less than 1½ hectares. The existing systems of land tenure further reduce the number of economically viable farms and the combination of these results in the low productivity, the low savings capacity, and the low standard of living of the mass of the people."1) They continue to state: "These factors in turn

reinforce the low productivity because neither the means nor the motives exist for increasing output.\(^1\)) The actual situation of the rural sector which is the major sector of the economy has been analysed in a paper presented during the seminar on "Agrarian Reform" held in 1970. This study states: "... the subsistence sector of the economy, important as it is, is barely keeping up with population growth in this country. In fact during the Third Five Year Plan the envisaged growth rate of the subsistence sector is 1.8% per annum, while during the same period population is expected to increase annually at a rate of 2.2%.\(^2\)"

This shows the incompatibility of the two growth rates. In relation to the precarious result of such a trend for overall development the same source continues, "Evidently, the situation is in need for some positive action that can improve this dismal state of affairs.\(^3\)"

Recent statistics unmistakeably show that agricultural production is not keeping pace with population growth. In fact one notes a not insignificant decline in the output of the agricultural sector. For instance, during the 1962-1967 period production in this sector grew by 2.2% per annum.\(^4\)"

On the other hand, between 1968 and 1972 agricultural growth averaged 2.1% per year, a figure which is not only much below the 3.1% target of the Third Five Year Plan but also lower than the rate of growth during the Second Five Year Plan. It is also significant to note that output growth rate has fallen below the 2.5% population growth per annum in the same period. The decline in agricultural output combined with increasing rate of population growth has resulted, in most parts of the country, in serious food shortages and mass famine. The famine which started back in 1972 has, in recent months, been intensified so much so that between February and April 1974 it claimed the lives of over 100,000

\(^1\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Ibid., p.135
people while affecting about 5,000,000 more.\textsuperscript{1} Although the immediate cause of the famine has been reported by government sources to be "drought", various foreign observers have rightly shown that the root of the problem was not simply the failure of the rains. Rather, they state that the real cause was the prevailing land-ownership and tenure systems in the country. In fact, having analysed the declining agricultural output in the country no less an authority than the U.S. AID had warned as far back as 1966 that "the food supply in Ethiopia may hit crisis locus by 1970-72."\textsuperscript{2} It is necessary to note for our present purpose, that beside the death of thousands of peasants both in the northern and southern provinces it has also been reported that a considerable number of the affected rural masses continue to migrate to the relief centers in the urban areas.\textsuperscript{3}

To return to the major issue we should note that the objective reality of the agrarian sector stands out as the dominant cause of the poverty, the resultant ills and the migratory tendencies of the rural masses. Addressing himself to this BAZAY observes rightly, "Among other reasons, the presence of large idle lands reinforced by high rate of absentee ownership, high rate of tenancy, insecurity of tenure, operation of sub-economic sizes of farms and lack of relevant supporting institutions constitute principal bottlenecks that keep agriculture in a subsistence and generally retarded state."\textsuperscript{4} This factor has also a negative effect on the overall development of the country since agriculture is the main backbone of the Ethiopian economy and therefore whatever happens in the sector affects the national economy. One can safely say that the monopolistic pattern of ownership of land and the technologically backward and economically inefficient use of the available land are the major factors hindering development.

\textsuperscript{1} Lionel Cliffe, \textit{A Note on the Famine in Ethiopia}, unpublished manuscript, February 1974, pp.1-4
\textsuperscript{2} SIDA, \textit{Regional Development Projects in Ethiopia}, Part III, Appendices, Report No.1, October 1966, p.1
\textsuperscript{3} L. Cliffe, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{4} F. BAZAY, \textit{op.cit.}
Besides migration, the reaction to such adverse conditions is also manifested by increasing number of peasant revolts and resistance movements that have become common in some provinces ever since 1960.\(^1\) Reactions such as the latter, though interesting in themselves, could not be discussed here since they are outside the scope of this paper.

In recognition of the fact that stagnant or declining peasant agriculture leads to attempts to escape poverty through migration to urban centres, the planners declare: "... in the long run, the fundamental forces, which will propel the subsistence farmer, away from his traditional way of life, will have to come from the fact that while the other sectors provide him with attractive possible alternatives at the same time the development within the agricultural sector should assure that this does not lead to an uncontrollable exodus."\(^2\)

To this effect the planners identify certain objectives of agricultural development policy among which the main ones are increased agricultural output and the transformation of peasant economy to market economy. Thus, the introduction of money economy and the commercialization into the traditional sector which is aimed at involving the peasant cultivators in the market economy has been planned and implemented in order to increase output and the GNP. However, the result of such measures without fundamental alteration of the agrarian structure has led to increased inequality and rural poverty (of the rural masses), which has forced a considerable number of the rural population to migrate to the urban areas to look for alternative employment opportunities. This is attested to by the recent experiences of the regional development projects of both commercial and peasant sectors which have led to increased eviction and displacement of


\(^2\) Third Five Year Plan, op.cit., p.182
the peasant cultivators and the consequent migration of many of them to urban areas. The impact of such rural development policies on the process of migration will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV. We should note at this juncture, however, that as long as the present agrarian structure continues to prevail the impact of such measures as the above, aimed at increasing agricultural production, will be increased and accelerated rural-urban migration of the impoverished masses.

The following pages will be devoted to a discussion of the historical evolution of landownership and tenure systems, the prevailing production relations and their combined effect on rural productivity as well as on the process of migration.

Landownership and Tenure Systems in Ethiopia

A. Historical Background

Traditionally, land had been the most important basis for Ethiopia's economy as well as for its social and political life. Its importance in determining the social, political and economic power of the different classes in the society has been recognized by many writers. For instance, Richard Pankhurst claims that "Ethiopia's traditional system of landownership was of crucial importance to the country's economic and social life, for besides determining questions of tenure and social class it was the basis of administration, taxation and military service."¹)

Regarding the significance attached to land traditionally another writer states, "...the very humanity of the person and

¹) Richard Pankhurst, State and Land in Ethiopian History, Monographs in Ethiopian Land Tenure, no.3, A.A. 1966, p.29
his status in society is defined mainly by his ownership of land, or more correctly by his membership of a landowning kinship group. Possession of land is therefore sought not only for economic benefits..... It is sought for the status, respectability, dignity and pride that go with ownership of land.¹)

Thus the landownership system in the country has been the determining factor in all aspects of life. Its role in the country today can be asserted since Ethiopia is basically an agricultural country whose economy is determined primarily by agriculture and therefore by the extent of ownership of land as the major means of production. Thus the more the land is concentrated in the hands of certain groups in society, the more the economic, social and political power these groups have and could exercise over those who own less land or no land at all, in order to maintain their dominance. Hence the ownership and distribution of land and the relations of production between those who own and control the major part of the land and those who own little or no land but cultivate somebody's land play an important role in creating the objective situation which puts the latter group in a migratory state.

The land tenure systems in the different regions of the country show various details in which ownership, inheritance, disposal and land tax vary according to local customs, types of agriculture and the total socio-economic structure of the community. "Great variety also resulted from the fact that each province was autonomous and the local government itself imposed such taxation as it thought fit."²) The land tenure system was further complicated by imperial grants to members of the nobility, the high clergy, the bureaucracy and also to a limited extent the peasantry. The variety of feudal and military services with which

¹) Mesfin W. Mariam, An Introductory Geography of Ethiopia, A.A. 1972, p.82. These remarks refer to Abyssinia which, before the mid 19th century, included only the northern provinces of what is today called Ethiopia. Little is known about the pattern of landownership in the southern provinces prior to their conquest between 1880 and 1900 though available evidences indicate that communal ownership was dominant in most of them.
²) R. Pankhurst, State and Land in Ethiopia, op.cit., p.29
land holdings was invariably linked further increased the variety of tenure systems not only between provinces but also within each province. In general the complication arises from the multiplicity of tenure systems that exist in the country and the fact that land taxation and peasant services to the government and the landowning classes were and in most parts still are directly related to the system of land tenure.

It should be noted, at this point, that according to the legal tradition of ancient Ethiopia, all land in the country was the property of the state. Only the state had the absolute right of ownership, that is the right to dispose of and revoke land on temporary or permanent basis. Originally the major part of the land was held by the church, the nobility, the kinship groups and the communities at the will of the state. In other words, they were all tenants of the state removable at the will of the Emperor as the head of the state. Thus, such allocations of land were for the most part temporary. Since they were granted, in effect, as a substitute for salary, they could be held only as long as the grantees occupied the position or performed the function which entitled them to the land. The Emperors fully controlled administration at all levels with the monopoly of landownership and tenure as well as office from the late 13th century up to the middle of the 18th century. During that period land was held by the hierarchy of vassals in lieu of services rendered to the lords.

In due course and particularly from the late 18th century up to the middle of the 19th century the Emperor's right to grant and withdraw, at will, both office and land faced direct and concentrated challenge from the regional lords. This led to various wars after which some regional lords (rulers) who were required to pay tributes and services to the Emperor became stronger and

1) Ibid., p. 31
claimed for themselves the Emperor's prerogatives and right to land tax and land allocation.

Imperial control of land and the right to dispose of it at will was recovered during the last quarter of the 19th century when Emperor Menilik II (1880-1903) conquered the southern provinces and incorporated them into his Empire. The Emperor is reported to have confiscated three-quarters of the conquered land from the autonomous regional kingdoms and distributed it among his noble followers, favoured gentry and the military and civil officials under different tenure called "maderia", "gult" or "riste-gult", "gebbar" systems in order to encourage colonial occupation of the newly acquired territory. The church hierarchy also received what is termed "semon" land according to rank while some of the land was reserved for future grants and as state or crown domain. ¹) The peasant owners who were cultivating the conquered lands were also given along with the land to the grantees according to the latter's rank and were therefore made virtual serfs producing for their landlords as well as providing the latter with various services. Thus, in this way, was feudal ownership introduced in these provinces and tenancy started to prevail. The remaining 1/3 of the land was left to the local chiefs later known as "balabats" in form of "sico" tenure and these groups were incorporated into the local levels of the imperial government. ²)

Over time in Northern Ethiopia the royal family, the higher clergy and the nobility became the practical owners of their holdings. Parallel to this there were also kinship groups who owned land communally with inalienable right to use, divide among themselves and their children, as well as the right to lease their holdings. Individual members of these groups could neither sell

²) John M. Cohen, Ibid.
nor give away their plots of land to outsiders. In case of the conquered lands in the southern provinces the high civil and military officials, members of the royal family and regional nobility, the local nobility known as "balabats" and the higher clergy became the owners of the major part of the land expropriated from the peasants.

B. The Present Systems of Landownership and Tenure

The present patterns of landownership and tenure are hardly different from the historical patterns discussed above except that some of the traditional forms of tenure are translated into full ownership, comprising the right to sell or transfer. For instance, since 1955 the "maderia" land which used to be given to administrative officials in lieu of salary, as discussed above, is legally recognized as "rist"—permanent inheritable land, thus entitling the holder to absolute rights of ownership. Similarly by the 1966 legislation the "riste-gult" and "siso-gult" granted to the nobility and the royal family with land taxes due to them instead of to the state, are changed into full ownership whereby the holders are expected to pay taxes directly to the state.1) However, as with all legislation in Ethiopia which attempts or is reported to attempt to change traditional aspects of land tenure and taxation, the actual implementation of this proclamation is incomplete and subject to corruption.

Moreover, as it used to be in the past, most of the arable land is today in the hands of the state, the royal family, the church and its high clergy and the nobility as well as the civilian and military officials. Hence the landowning classes remain more or less the same as before, consisting of the above mentioned groups who are largely absentee as will be shown later. Moreover, while such type of feudal ownership exists both in the northern and southern provinces it is also known that communal ownership of land exists in the northern provinces side by side with

1) Ibid.
the feudal type. The distribution of land in the Empire between the two ownership systems or among the different groups of the landowners is not exactly known since no figures are available. The type of ownership differs from region to region and estimates vary. Nevertheless, it is generally recognized that the major part of the land and the revenues accruing therefrom are in the hands of the traditional aristocracy and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Some sources estimate that 90% of the cultivable land is owned by the imperial family, members of the nobility, the church hierarchy, the local gentry and the state (in effect meaning the Emperor). The remaining 10% is said to be owned by the rest of the population, mainly the peasantry estimated at 90% of the population of which 80% are tenants. 1) One source declares that "three-quarters of the arable land in the country is subject to a feudal type of ownership." 2) Recent studies by the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration (MLRA) show that "in the Empire 69% of the measured lands are now under Gebbar - private (feudal) ownership 3) and mention that most of the unmeasured lands are under the same system of feudal ownership.

The government is known to be one of the largest landowning institutions in the whole country. This was asserted by various sources like Cohen and the MLRA based on data collected over a number of years until 1972. Their estimate was that it owns approximately 11.8% of the arable land and 46.6% of all the land in the country. 4) Most of these lands remain idle, reserved for

patronage grants (like before) to private individuals, mainly the high military and civilian officials, patriots and others for political reasons in order to attract supporters for the present regime and the feudal system. Some are rented to foreign enterprises for large scale farming and plantations like those of the Dutch sugar plantations, U.K. cotton plantations and others with long term leases on concession basis while some are leased out to tenants in small holdings, with lease arrangements similar to those of lands owned by the landlords under private ownership.

The extent of ownership by the church which is also one of the two biggest landowning institutions is not known though some estimates made by some researchers based on oral and scattered written information do exist. For instance, Lipsky's estimates show that "between 25% and 40% of all the land is in the hands of the church," (1) held under different tenures subject to feudal type of ownership both in the northern and southern provinces. Cohen's estimate, on the other hand, indicates that "the church holds about 5 per cent of the total land and 20% of the arable land of Ethiopia." He adds, however, that "possibly the only time the church owned one-third of the land was prior to the reign of Menelik II, when the Empire consisted of the northern provinces of Tigre, Begendir-Semien, Gojjam and parts of Shoa and Wellas." (2) As with all types of land tenure in the country the nature of church holdings and its extent vary from north to south and from province to province. However, most lands under the direct or indirect control of the church are rented out to tenants or granted to church officials who utilize them through tenancy arrangements.

Similarly the exact holdings of the nobility are not known since neither land measurement nor register of land taxes are

1) Lipsky, op.cit.
2) Cohen, op.cit., p.369
available for their ownership alone. Even if limited measurement of some lands are done by the Ministry the powerful landlords are known to avoid such measures as well as taxation. Despite such factors, however, the nobility is estimated to own about the same amount of land as that of the church - i.e. 20-30% of all the land in the country according to various estimates. The above quoted source by G. Nicolas in UPAHAMU shows that 62% of the arable land is owned by the nobility with the lion share going to the imperial family. Moreover, their holdings continue to grow through royal grants, illegal purchases, fraud and expropriation of the small peasant owners. Indeed, out of the total amount granted to private citizens under the state's grant policy between 1942 and 1969 95% of the registered grants was granted to such land-owners while only 5% was granted to the landless tenants as will be discussed later in detail in the following Chapter IV. Such privately owned lands are mainly concentrated in the southern provinces where extensive lands are found to be owned by few landlords largely northerners and absentee residing in the capital and other urban centres holding high positions in the bureaucracy. Such ownerships are also existing in the northern provinces on church and government owned lands which are under the feudal ownership as well as in the communal areas where lease arrangements could exist as discussed in the preceding section.

Although various kinds of land tenure systems exist in the country and are among the most complicated in the world even today, it is possible to identify the most basic ones existing in the northern and southern provinces for our purpose. Thus the purpose of the following section will be to discuss the two regions along with their impact on the agricultural productivity and on the condition of the peasantry who are found to be the most migratory groups of the rural population.

1) G. Nicolas, op.cit. p.49
3) J. Cohen, Ibid. p.366
1) Communal Ownership and Tenure Systems and Its Impact on the Condition of the Peasantry and hence Rural-Urban Migration

This type of tenure is found in the four northern provinces of Eritrea, Tigre, Gojjam, Begemdir and the two sub-provinces of Wello namely Lasta and Wag and part of Northern Shoa. The history of this tenure system is mostly legendary - a biproduct of triple division of land into equal proportions between the different groups of the society as discussed in the historical analysis of this chapter. The ownership right in these communal areas is vested in the community referring to a family or village. 1)

The communal tenures can be classified into two basic categories as follows:

(1) The extended family system (rist)
(2) The village system (giraf-gettit)

The extended family tenure system entitles an individual member of the family up to four to seven generations, to cultivate a plot of family land by virtue of his being a descendent of the original head of the family who is supposed to have been the first settler or founder of the land area occupied by the family. However, a member of this extended family is forbidden to sell, bequeath, dispose of or mortgage the piece of land by customary rules. 2) When a member dies his land is divided among his children equally, although in some areas females are not eligible to inherit unless a will is left by the deceased father. 3)

The village tenure system is actually limited to the highland sub-province of Eritrea. 4) Under this system all land within the territory of a village is considered to be the common property of the village community. Thus every married member of the village who has a home and is a permanent resident of the village has a

1) T. Kebede, op.cit. p.31.
2) Ibid.
4) Ibid. p.8
right to an equal share of land, based on periodic redistribution every four to eight years. The holder is allowed to use it but not to dispose of it through sale, gift, will or mortgage. Moreover, he is not allowed to get compensation for any improvement of the land when it is redistributed. 1) Among similarly situated claimants, no one is entitled to a better share than another since the share of village land is of equal size and fertility. Every person receives as much of the fertile as of the poor land. 2) This system does not allow a member to belong to more than one village unit or exercise right to more than one piece of land within the village's domain. This is believed to avoid unequal ownership of land between members of the same village or extended family unlike the extended family system which allows much inequality between family members. In relation to eligibility for the use of land some communities accord rights only to those residents who can trace their descent to the founding fathers while in other villages permanent residence and payment of land tax is a sufficient condition. 3) New families and former residents returning from other villages or urban centres have to wait for periodic redistribution to receive a share of village land. Furthermore, when an individual member leaves the village his plot is reverted to the community and is later distributed among the villagers. 4) This fact can partly explain the non-existence of reverse migration to the rural areas which is experienced in the country, as will be discussed in Chapters III and IV. There is reported to be 0.4% yearly out-migration from rural areas of all provinces while there is nil in-migration to them. 5) Such situation in the southern provinces can be explained by the lack of one's own land or property to which the poor migrant peasants could return. (This will be discussed later.)

1) T. Kebede, op. cit., p.32
4) Ibid.
5) C.S.O., Urbanization in Ethiopia, op. cit., p.14. See also Table III in the Annex.
Unlike the village system of tenure as discussed above the extended family system allows every member to claim rights to more than one piece of land within a village community or in a number of villages by establishing his claims. Moreover, rights in land are inherited both on the male and female sides and any individual belongs to several extended families whose founding fathers settled in different areas.¹) Though this is true in theory, however, "those in a position to make good their claims to plots within the domains of different families tend to be persons of relatively high social status."²) This factor allows unequal distribution and ownership of land even among the same family members thereby forcing the poorest among them to migrate to cities to look for supplemental jobs and income.

The resulting effects of both communal tenure systems discussed above, have been fragmentation and parceling of land, scattered holdings with uneconomic size and hence low productivity. The division and redivision of such lands under the extended family system, along with the population increase, is believed to have led to the present parcelation of land in the areas so much so that today most holdings are not more than one hectare. For instance, data collected by the MLRA show that 45% of the operated holdings in Tigre are below half a hectare or 69% below one hectare, and 89% below two hectares.³) Details of farm size is shown in table I in the Annex. What should be noted at this juncture is that while the average size of holdings is 1.24 that of holdings operated by tenants is 0.95 in all the northern provinces. The current policy of the communal ownership system allowing any individual to claim land through lineage tracing up to any generation both on the paternal and maternal sides has resulted in various problems that have led to the existing low productivity of the rural sector.⁴)

Expectedly the policy has led to progressive fragmentation of land and division of holdings into units of uneconomic size - a size in which marginal productivity of labour is declining and on which the

¹) H. Menkerios, op.cit. p.6
²) MLRA, Draft Policy on Agricultural Land Tenure, op.cit. p.4
⁴) T. Kebede, op.cit. p.32
The endemic economic problems of the communal tenure are fragmentation, insecurity of tenure and lack of incentive to make any permanent improvement on the land. Combined with restricted access to credit facilities on the part of small holders, these expectedly lead to low productivity, low production and mass poverty. For instance, the regular distribution of land every four to eight years makes it difficult for the occupants to cultivate certain crops (like fruit trees etc.) that may occupy the land for a longer period but are good sources of income for the cultivators. Temporary absence from the land can also lead to other people claiming the land and the crops on it. It should also be noted that since a person has no individual title to his holding and therefore is not allowed to alienate his land through sale, gift, mortgage, most of the farmers have virtually nothing to offer by way of security demanded by the national credit institutions. They are thus forced to depend on the local money lenders who are usually large landowners, traders etc. who made profit by lending at usurious "interest rates of up to 100 to 300% annually." As a result of such adverse conditions some of the poorer peasants are forced to be either tenants, or part-time tenants to supplement their income. The relatively high rate of tenant cultivators in these regions where the landownership system is supposed to be communal and where everybody is supposed to own a plot of land can be seen from Table II. Besides being tenants or landless labourers in the agricultural sector during harvest times in their own provinces many of them are also known to migrate seasonally to other rural areas mostly in the southern provinces where plantations and the new regional development projects such as those of the Setit Humera plantations, Lower Awash Valley cotton plantation etc. which pose as poles of attraction. A study by Lars Bondestam shows

1) Ibid.
that more than 30,000 labourers from Eritrea, Tigre and Wello high-
lands go yearly to the lower Awash Valley to pick cotton on sea-
sonal basis while 50,000 go to Keffa for the purpose of picking
coffee.\textsuperscript{1)} A considerable number of the peasants are also known to
have migrated to the urban areas expecting to get employment oppor-
tunities. This is discussed by many writers in the field includ-
ing Mesfin W. Mariam, S.G. Selassie and many others who recognize
that the increasing low productivity of agriculture affects the
poorer section of the rural population in these areas thus forcing
them to look for alternatives in the urban centres.\textsuperscript{2)} For instance,
H. Merkerious notes that "in some villages individual holdings are
so small" that the poor peasants are forced either to be tenants
or to resort to urban-ward migration.\textsuperscript{3)} However, many of these
migrants are found to be engaged in begging, prostitution and ca-
sual labour since the economic base of the urban sector itself is
too narrow to absorb the exodus. Thus the migrants, in effect, ex-
change rural poverty with urban unemployment and misery. In re-
lation to the extent of rural-urban migration in the whole country
we will see in Chapter III that over 100,000 people migrate to the
urban areas every year. Furthermore, from the population in Addis
Ababa, though we do not have data for other towns, we note that a
considerable number of the in-migrants (21.9\%) are from the north-
ern provinces.

The system of inheritance in communal tenure where females
are not allowed to inherit land unless the deceased father leaves
a will to this effect make the condition of female members of socie-
ty considerably worse than that of the males. This is enforced by
the fact that once they are married women are considered to belong
to their husbands' families and therefore not allowed to inherit
land within their own communities. This explains, at least in part

\textsuperscript{1)} L. Bondestam, "The Population Situation in Ethiopia," ENI, On Family
Planning in Ethiopia, No.1, 1972, A.A. p.9
\textsuperscript{2)} See S.G. Selassie, Some Aspects of Social Problems and Services in
\textsuperscript{3)} H. Merkerious, "The Present System of Land Tenure in Ethiopia",
Challenge, op.cit., p.5
the preponderance of women among migrants to urban towns in these provinces. The urban survey by the Statistical Office shows that female migrants outnumber the male by 6%.\textsuperscript{1) This will be discussed in detail in Chapter V. In case of divorce, since they have no security or claim of ownership in their original villages women are again forced to migrate to the urban areas and look for means of livelihood. As a result a large number of migrants are found to be young female divorcees. For instance, the above mentioned survey shows that 59% of all female in-migrants to towns in Begemdir, 53% in Tigre, 45% in Gojjam and Wello and 32% in Eritrea are divorced.\textsuperscript{2) In addition to the above factors mention must also be made of the oppression which peasant women suffer in the society which factor also propels them to escape to the urban areas.

Although it is commonly held that the northern provinces are characterized by communal ownership, tenancy and lease holdings also exist side by side with this system. Under both tenure systems persons are allowed to lease to others land over which they have rights but cannot cultivate efficiently due to lack of farming tools, in case of peasants or due to extensive lands inherited from both parents in different places in case of big landowners with high social status; or those who live in towns with high government posts as members of Parliament. The extent of such tenancy is reported by the first C.S.O. National Sample Survey to be 25% in Tigre, 15% in Begemdir, 20% in Gojjam, 37% in Wag and Laata. The details can be seen from Table II in the Annex. It was found out by the same survey that "the proportions of landless inhabitants - persons with neither effective rights over land nor any type of tenancy arrangements, who are either unemployed or work as agricultural labourers - is higher in the communal areas."\textsuperscript{3) In terms of cropped area of land out of total holdings in these provinces 25% in Tigre, 15% in Begemdir, 20% in Gojjam, 37% in

\textsuperscript{1) Central Statistical Office, \textit{Urbanization in Ethiopia}, \textit{op.cit.} p.22
\textsuperscript{2) Ibid. p.26
\textsuperscript{3) Draft Policy on Land Tenure in Ethiopia, \textit{op.cit.} p.5
Wag and Lasta (Wello) are rented to full-time and part-time tenants with similar form of production and production relations as that existing in the southern provinces. The impact of this tenure on the condition of the cultivators will be discussed together with the feudal type of landownership existing in the southern provinces, since similar lease arrangements and production processes exist in both areas.

In short, the effects of the communal ownership systems in the northern provinces have been low agricultural productivity, rural poverty and the consequent exodus to urban areas.

II Private Ownership and Tenure System and Its Impact on the Condition of the Peasantry, and hence Rural-Urban Migration

Southern Ethiopia consisting of the provinces of Shoa, Arussi, Sidamo, Kefa, Wollega, Illubabor, Bale, Harrar and Gomu Goffa and all sub-provinces of Wello except the two sub-provinces of Wag and Lasta, is characterized by private ownership of land called "Gebbar" system. This type of tenure was introduced by the conquest of these territories during Menelik's time (1889-1913). Following the conquest "ample land" was made available for grants to government civil and military officials of the imperial government, who were from the northern provinces. Thus, private or individual ownership was introduced in the sense of inalienable heritable rights to land known as "rist". A part of the conquered land was distributed among the Emperor's soldiers according to their ranks, and the peasant owners were also given along with land to new landlords as tenants. The native rulers called "ballabata" (local nobility) were allowed to retain 1/3 of the land in their locality as free hold known as "siso" (literally meaning one-third). Both to strengthen his position by winning supporters and to weaken the position of some of the feudal lords in the north who were contenders to the crown, the emperor made generous grants of land in the
newly acquired areas to the northern feudal lords as well as to his Shona supporters. The church officials, namely the clergy also received land in the form of "semon" land which became inalienable heritable land (rist) as long as the owners continued their services to the church, or hire substitutes in their absence. 1)

Part of the conquered land was also held by the royal family under various names as royal land, crown land, government land etc. Of such lands, the government allocated a part under "maderia" tenure to be distributed to administrative and military officials in return for their services to the state. The holders of such lands can bequeath it to their descendants as long as they continued rendering services to the state but they cannot sell or mortgage the land. 2)

In this way "Gebber" or fee-simple became the dominant form of tenure in the above-mentioned 10 provinces. After the introduction of salary in cash to military and civil servants especially after the restoration in 1942, some of the "maderia" holders were converted to "rist" (free-hold) which enabled the owners to sell, mortgage or transfer it at will. The government also allowed "maderia" holders to convert a portion of their holdings into "rist" in lieu of pension by order of proclamation No.22, of 1956. 3)

It also enacted a system of granting one gasha (35 and 80 hectares of land in fertile and poor areas respectively) of government land as "rist" to patriots and exiles, and to all civil servants, army personnel and police. However, the success of getting the said land depends on one's social and political position. The powerful and influential members of society can get the law implemented in their favour, while the weak and the poor can hardly hope to do so. Regarding this Cohen states:

1) Ibid, pp.5-6
2) Draft Policy on Agricultural Land Tenure, Ibid. p.6
3) Ibid.
"... the land grant policy is based on political rather than developmental considerations. Those who receive land are in most cases gentry, civil servants and military or police officers, rather than landless peasants. These recipients usually obtain their land as a reward for service and loyalty without any developmental conditions being placed on its use."

As a result of such grants however, the proportion of land under individual ownership over the years has increased substantially in these provinces. On the other hand, because of the introduction of various taxes in cash and the pressure of big owners and money lenders, peasants owning small plots of land have been increasingly forced to sell their plots and migrate to cities to look for employment opportunities.

During recent years, the feudal lords, the new and old bureaucrats, the military officials and private domestic and foreign enterprises continued to acquire land either through royal grants, contracts, purchases or various forms of expropriation of the peasant owners. Most of these extensive landowners reside outside the provinces, in cities, mostly in Addis Ababa, and are by and large high government officials, members of parliament or to a lesser extent people engaged in private enterprises. Thus, in the southern provinces besides the concentration of land in few hands, one finds a large number of absentee landowners, while there are also small local lords (balabats) who may or may not reside in the same provinces. The prevalence of absentee ownership in these provinces and the area owned by them can be seen from Table III in the Annex, which covers the result of the survey done by the Ministry in each province.

The existence of such high rate of absenteeism is shown to have contributed to the present low productivity of the rural sector by many land tenure surveys conducted by the Ministry of Land Reform. As regards absentee ownership in the country one

study comes to the conclusion that "a major problem that keeps total production at a low level is the presence of a high rate of absentee ownership that prevails in the country."¹ Such landowners are known to be less interested in investing in their extensive lands for various reasons. One of these is that they get regular rent and tax revenues which are quite high from their tenants. Moreover, since this income is only supplemental to their high salaries in high government posts or private business in urban areas, they spend no funds or time to improve productivity. This tendency and less interest in encouraging their tenants in the new agricultural development techniques has been experienced by "CADU" package programmes in Arusa where the main programme targets - poor peasants and tenants are not participating in the use of its benefits. Most of the land-lords still consider land as a source of social prestige and keep it idle while land hungry peasants suffer from starvation and lack means of livelihood - thus running from rural to rural and from rural to urban areas in great numbers.

F. Ezaz makes the matter clear when he states: "... in the areas held by absentee landlords, production in most instances, is nil or at best, less than optimum. Moreover, absentee landlords are reluctant to undertake capital investment on the lands, their major objective being onesided, mainly the acquisition of land ... they may not depend for their living on the income derived from this source, in which case, it is likely that they neglect the use of their land from pure disinterest." Whatever the reason, he continues, "the end result is the same, the unproductiveness of land and therefore, lower total production of agricultural commodities."² This past trend, though, seems to have changed in the past few years. Some of the extensive land holders appear to have realized the advantage of increasing output and are presently engaged in large scale mechanization either on their own

¹) F. Ezaz, op. cit., p.139
²) Ezaz, op. cit., p.137-139
or through contractors. Such a situation has led to the eviction of the part-time or full-time tenants in Chilalo and Ada. The impact of such regional development policies on the tenant farmers will be discussed in Chapter IV, so no detailed exposition will be made in this section. What should be emphasized at this point is the fact that this process of mechanization has resulted in the eviction of numerous tenants, in the loss of employment and income as well as in the acceleration of the trend of migration to urban centres.

So far, attempts have been made to discuss the origin of the different ownership and tenure systems, and the present form of land ownership and tenure systems in the two regions of the country. Moreover, the impact of both sets of systems on rural productivity, and on the condition of the peasantry have been discussed. The following analysis will be devoted to the dominant form of production and production relations (in terms of areas of land covered and number of cultivators affected). The impact of the prevalent landownership system and the production relations thereof on rural productivity and the condition of the cultivators will be analyzed in order to show the objective situation under which the majority of the rural masses live and which impels many of them to migrate to the urban areas.

Before we turn to consider the dominant production relations and the pattern of surplus appropriation, it is important to bear in mind that tenancy is the dominant form of occupation in the country. While about 90% of the population depend on agriculture, 80% of these are widely believed to be tenants. Although the greatest number of tenants are concentrated in the southern provinces, quite a considerable number of full and part-time tenants are also found in the northern provinces under church and government tenure and within the communal areas themselves since lease arrangement is allowed everywhere, as discussed earlier. The findings of the sample surveys by MLRA can be seen from Table II. While 53% of the rural population covered by the surveys in the southern provinces are found to be tenants cultivating somebody's land, 22% in the
communal areas are also found to be tenants despite the usual
generalization made about these provinces being totally communally
owned where everybody is owner and owner-cultivator. The full-time
tenants referred to in the table for the northern provinces are
those made landless either by the process of inheritance or by the
transfer of land to creditors, while those in the southern provin-
ces are largely those whose land was expropriated by the northern
conquerors. The part-time tenants consist of those poor peasants
with small un-economic holdings enforced by the system of produc-
tion arrangements and inheritance which tend to increase fragmen-
tation of parcellation as discussed earlier. Those found in the
southern provinces are those with small holdings who are not able
to earn a minimum living by cultivating their plots and are thus
forced to rent land from the extensive landowners. Due to such
processes the poor peasants are forced to rent lands from big land-
lords thus entering the feudal mode of production.

The above mentioned sample surveys also showed that the major-
ity of the tenants in the whole country are share-croppers. For
instance 80% of those in Arussi, 90% in Shoa and 40% in Wollega
are share-croppers. 1)

In addition to payment of land rent in kind it is also known
that cash tenancy exists to a limited extent in a number of regions.
The prevalence of share-cropping can be seen from Table III which
covers both southern and northern provinces. Since the majority
of the rural population i.e. peasants either own no land at all,
or do not have sufficient land of their own, they are obliged to
be tenants and earn a living mainly by share-cropping under a feudal
mode of production. The dominant relation of production i.e. the
relation between the owners and the producers and its impact on the
productivity of agriculture, the condition of the rural masses and
hence on the migration trend will be discussed below.

1) K. Koomsa, "Problems of Agricultural Tenancy in Ethiopia", in
Seminar Proceedings on Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia, op.cit., p.53
The Main Form of Production Relations and Surplus Appropriation and its Impact on the Condition of the Peasantry

As discussed above, the majority of the cultivators in Ethiopia are tenants tilling small plots of land (1 - 1½ hectares or less) owned by big landowners who are mostly absentee owners residing in the urban areas. Such big landowners have neither legal nor social obligations to the tenant farmers, while the latter's obligations to the former are defined both by law and by custom.

Information collected by the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration (MLRA) revealed that 2/3 of the tenant population is concentrated in 1/8 of the land surface of the country, and that the average cultivated or cropped holding of tenants is only one hectare.¹ Similarly we have seen that the majority of the cultivators are sharecroppers, although limited cash tenancy also exists. The tenant surrenders a large portion of his produce to the landlord. It is clearly stipulated in the Civil Code of 1960,² that the tenant can be required to pay the landlord up to 75% of his produce, though in practice most of them pay 50% of their produce.

The prevalence of share tenancy and the extent of payments in different provinces is shown in Table IV. Prior to leasing the land, the tenant has to pay an initial fee to the owner of the land. Consequently some landowners are believed to evict their tenants in order to get such fees from the new ones. In relation to actual payment of land rent one source indicates that "in provinces of Shoa and Arussi more than 50% of the tenants pay 1/4 to 1/3 of the crop yield; and in Wollega 80% surrender 50% to 75% of their crop yields as rent to the landlords."³

In addition tenants are found to pay tithe (asrat), one tenth of the total produce before dividing among themselves and the landlord, although this payment has been abolished by the tax proclamation law of 1967 which replaced it by income tax to be paid directly

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¹ T. Kebede, "Will Family Planning ever eliminate the Need for Land Reform", ENI, op.cit., p.34
² Imperial Ethiopian Government, Civil Code of 1960, Article 2986-91 Addis Ababa
³ T.Kebede, op.cit., p.34
to the state. Despite this law the customary payment of tithe is still in operation in many areas. The sample surveys of the MLRA revealed, for instance, that in 25% of the areas surveyed landlords still appropriate tenants' produce under the name of Asrat. 1) The same sample surveys show that in all ten provinces covered there are some sub-provinces where landlords require tenants to pay tithe or land tax on top of the standard rental. In addition to all these obligations tenants are also obliged in many areas to render personal services to their landlords. These services consist of free labour on the landlord's land, transporting the landlord's share of the produce to his granary and/or his residence building work and fencing. 2) Such services reduce the tenant's efficiency by taking away much of his labour input from his farm which otherwise could help in increasing production. Besides such free services he is customarily required to bring gifts to his landlord during festive occasions such as Christmas, Easter, New Year, Wedding Ceremonies etc. Failure to fulfil all these duties could lead to eviction which forces many of the tenants to migrate to other villages or to the urban centers to look for employment and earning opportunities. This is strengthened by the fact that there is no legal guarantee to protect tenants from eviction as well as from other mistreatments by their landlords or their agents. In most cases lease agreements are verbal and are negotiated by the two parties who are evidently unequal. The landlord or his agent thus has a good bargaining position since he is able to use his economic and not unusually his political power to his advantage. "In nine provinces surveyed by the L.S.O. and MLRA 90% of all lease agreements were verbal, leaving it up to the courts to choose between landlords and tenants' versions of the agreements in case of dispute." 3) Written agreements are virtually unknown in the peasant

1) Ibid.
3) Draft Policy, MLRA, op.cit., p.8
sector although in areas where commercial agriculture is introduced agreements are more and more taking a written form. Even in the case of the later, however, formal written contracts are the exception rather than the rule. For instance, out of seven provinces in the south where commercial agriculture is introduced 94% of the contracts were found to be verbal agreements between landlords and tenants. 1) Such absence of written contracts for the majority of the tenants benefits the landowners while the tillers live in a state of insecurity in relation to tenure or the rate of rent to be paid from year to year. Moreover, irrespective of the form and content of prior verbal agreements available evidence shows that it is up to the landlord primarily to decide when and how to terminate tenancy, without prior notification. 2) In case of government lands failure to pay tax for three consecutive years leads to confiscation of land that applies to both part-time tenants and tenants who get economic incapacity to fulfil such obligations. 3)

While the tenants invest not only their labour power but also seeds, oxen-power, farming tools and in some cases fertilizers - the landlords' contribution to the production processes is only land as a factor of production. For instance in 91% of the surveyed tenancies, the landlord did not provide the services of bullocks and other inputs. In case of eviction, moreover, no compensation is paid to tenants for permanent improvements. 4) Not unusual as we have seen, the poor peasants and tenants have to borrow money at usurious rates of interest ranging from 100-300%. In addition many also borrow grains and rent oxen from the rich who are mostly big landlords, their agents or the local gentry. 5) The resulting indebtedness leads to loss of holdings which in turn forces many to migrate to urban areas to look for alternatives to rural poverty.

1) K. Koomsa, Seminar Proceedings, MLRA, op.cit., p.53
2) D. Rahmeto, "Conditions of the Ethiopian Peasantry", Challenge, op.cit., p.35
3) H. Menkerios, Challenge, op.cit., p.20
4) Draft Policy, MLRA, Loc.cit.
5) H. Menkerios, Challenge, op.cit., p.12
In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to show the exploitative nature of the prevalent production relations between the landowners and the tenant cultivators in the dominant sector of the country's economy. From the above discussion it is easy to see the negative impact of these relations on the productivity and the living condition of the cultivators. The major drawback of crop sharing whereby the tiller has to submit more than half of his produce to his landlord is obvious even for casual observers. In such a situation it is not natural to expect the tenant to be capable to invest cash or other inputs since he is even unable to retain enough for decent living as most of his product is squandered by his landlord. Furthermore, the existing insecurity, the threat of eviction and the uncontrolled changes in terms and conditions of leasehold by the landlords plus the lack of compensation for any permanent improvements reduces the incentive and effort of the farmers to improve the land and thereby increase production. All this, not unexpectedly leads to rural stagnation and poverty of the rural masses.

Because of the exorbitant rent, the nature of insecure verbal lease arrangements, extra free labour, unconditional eviction without compensation for incurred costs of improvements, the tenant has neither the financial capacity nor the necessary incentive to increase productivity. Moreover, utilization of modern inputs, even if provided to the tenants, is discouraged under such conditions. The disincentive of the majority of the cultivators and their poor participation in development projects have been experienced in the regional development projects introduced in the southern provinces of Arusai and a few others such as "CADEL". As will be shown later in Chapter IV such experiences have occurred despite the fact that these projects were established with the declared objective of involving the cultivators in the peasant sector where production is recognized to be low. Instead, these package programmes have stimulated the big landlords to adopt the new technology which in effect has led to increased eviction of tenants and therefore loss of employment and income. This has led a considerable number of the poorer cultivators to migrate to the urban areas.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Although it has not been possible to cover all types of landownership and tenure systems and their impact on the condition of the rural masses, the dominant ones have been selected and discussed above. Moreover an attempt has been made to show their negative impact on agricultural productivity and on the rural exodus observed in the country. The agrarian social structure that leads to increased migration both in the communal and private/feudal ownership and tenure systems can be summarized as follows.

In Northern Ethiopia where communal ownership prevails (though mediated, as we have seen, by the feudal mode of production) holdings are fragmented and parcelled. The periodic division and re-division of land discourages investment in land and permanent improvement as well as long term planning. Where combined with the lack of credit institutions lead to low production and poverty. Furthermore, extensive lands owned by the government, the church and the few landlords remain idle and under-utilized while the majority of the peasants cultivate less than one hectare of land which is very uneconomical and unrewarding even for subsistence production. All these conditions lead to the present low productivity and rural poverty which in turn forces many of the poorer peasants and landless labourers to migrate to the urban areas, to look for alternative means of livelihood.

In the northern provinces and some of the northern sub-provinces where private feudal ownership prevails a large proportion of the cultivators remain landless tenants and agricultural labourers, who work and live insecurely on somebody else's land achieving low yields, paying high rents and rendering free services. Besides, from what remains to them after paying the landlords (not to mention the money lenders) they are required to pay income tax, education tax, health tax etc. to the feudal state, although education, health and other services are rarely encountered in the rural areas. Insecurity of tenure and therefore lack of
incentive to improve holdings together with financial incapacity to invest keeps productivity very low. Moreover, given the exploitative relations of production between the landowners and the tenants which impoverish the tillers, the incentive to work hard or otherwise to improve the productivity of the land expectedly becomes low since this would mean either paying more to the landlord or even inviting eviction. When one adds to this adverse situation the lack of interest of the feudal lords to invest on the lands cultivated by their tenants for reasons discussed above and the absence of compensation for improvements made on the land during eviction, the stagnating state of agriculture becomes clear and understandable. To this state of affairs should be added the obsolete tools and mode of production, usury and indebtedness. What emerges from such system is the immiseration of the rural masses. Unlike previous years when their mass movement was unknown due to limited or non-existent information and communication with outside areas as will be discussed in the first part of Chapter III, today they are found to escape from such adverse conditions by various manifestations. In relation to the same response to external factors by such rural masses, K. Koomsa notes, "The bonds that have kept the peasants down are loosening due to popular enlightenment created in the twentieth century atmosphere. Tenants are informed of events taking place domestically and around the globe."¹ Such information about outside conditions reach the peasants through contacts with migrant relatives, friends etc., discussions during market days, especially visits to markets which are invariably located in towns near by their villages. This process has resulted in peasant revolts (in Bale, Gojjam, Wello, Eritrea, etc.) as well as in increased migration particularly of the young and ablebodied peasants who are made footloose by such agrarian structures as discussed above and are stimulated by the expectation of an employment and other means of income in the urban areas.

1) K. Koomsa, op.cit., p.3
In addition to the conditions created by the prevalent agrarian structure measures undertaken by the feudal state and the landlords encouraged by certain rural development policies to increase rural production have led to increased inequality, poverty and eviction of those whose labour is no more needed in the mechanized land. This will be discussed in Chapter IV. Suffice it to say at this juncture that these new measures, instead of abating it, are actually accelerating the rural exodus since they benefit only a few while adversely affecting the many.

So far we have discussed the dominant causes of rural-urban migration observed in the country. However, as we will show in the following chapter, the urban centres have also played a not insignificant role in accentuating the exodus of the rural masses by creating high expectation. In order to show their role therefore, we will first discuss their historical growth after which we try to look for certain factors that contribute to the apparent features of these cities which increase the migration trend.
CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL GROWTH OF URBAN CENTRES IN ETHIOPIA

AND THEIR IMPACT ON MIGRATION

I. Historical Growth of Cities

The process of urbanization as is understood today, started late in the 19th century. However, this does not mean to say that Ethiopia experienced urbanization only during this period as an entirely new phenomenon. Indeed, a number of experts in Ethiopian history show that a number of towns and ports flourished during the early Christian era, the middle ages and the last century. Richard Pankhurst, for instance, states that "though the country was traditionally one of small villages and isolated homesteads, there were several important cities or towns, as well as numerous villages large and small."1) Although the type and characteristics of these cities during these times did not correspond to those of today's, a few, mainly administrative and religious centres, are said to have existed with some urban characteristics. Some of these cities were Axum, Lalibella and Gondar which were mainly administrative and military centres where the Emperors and their feudal lords lived for short periods of time until change of palace residence.2)

Although such pre-industrial cities existed some centuries ago, various factors led to their decline and late occurrence of urbanization in the country. Among the reasons some of the main ones were the social and political conditions of the country manifested in various and frequent regional rivalries/wars between the feudal nobility as well as religious wars; the physical configuration of the country discouraging free and secure movement of people

1) R. Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, op.cit., p.689
and goods while it promoted regional isolations; the socio-cultural attitudes towards work and workers other than farming which was negative and effectively prevented the emergence of non-agricultural but productive forces in the country. As a result, the Ethiopian society was almost throughout its history fundamentally rural. The peasants were the only productive force mercilessly exploited by the non-farming population. Under conditions of insecurity, absence of economic diversification and difficulties of transport and communication within and outside the country, urban centres could not develop and hence migration was kept minimal between regions even if existent between neighbouring villages. This is especially evident when we consider that the principal residents of early Ethiopian cities including Gondar were military people of various ranks and their dependents and household staff. As a result the urban land of even later cities was given to Chiefs and military commanders for royal services and this group in turn divided part of their portions among their faithful servants who were allowed to reside around their masters in the same area.\(^1\)

On the other hand, the peasants remained in their home villages providing the regional nobilities, the roving Emperors and their followers with their necessities. Thus during these early days movement of these groups was restricted or even non-existent.

**Recent Growth of Urban Centres**

The present process of urbanization can be said to have started during the reign of Menilik II (1889-1913). During this period the Emperor and his wife Empress Tayitu, established Addis Ababa as the capital city of Ethiopia, during his expansion southwards, as discussed in Chapter II. Other administrative centres such as provincial capitals and towns were also established. The

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1) Seyoum G. Selassie, *op.cit.*, p.9
frontiers of Ethiopia were properly defined and effective penetration by Europeans and European ideas was realized. The construction of the Franco-Ethiopian railway linking Addis Ababa and Djibouti (which passed through and made some towns like Dire Dawa important commercial centres) made easy contacts and trade with the outside world. It was also during his reign that the rudiments of modern and centralized administration with the introduction of money economy were introduced. A modern school and a hospital were built, radio and telephone communications were introduced, and a modern newspaper ushered in a new era—all concentrated in the capital which made Addis Ababa a central pivot. The increasing impact of such concentration of development in the capital (from such an early stage up to now) on the rural exodus will be discussed in the second part of this chapter.

Although the reign of Menelik laid the ground work for urbanization, the process was accelerated during the Italian occupation (1936-1941), which reduced the physical obstacles and regional isolation by building a network of good roads connecting the important administrative centres and the military garrisons.\(^1\) This relative development of infrastructure accompanied by the construction of buildings and some factories in the bigger towns thus created by them, together with the insecurity of property and life in the rural areas due to the condition of war, induced large number of the rural masses who are already made footloose by the rural structures discussed in the preceding chapter. This led to creation of workers who lived in urban centres and a new economic class who started to live by catering to the needs of the wage earners. Furthermore, the large number of soldiers in the towns created a new demand for hotels, restaurants, "local bars", shops and other activities giving a new character to the urban complex. The concentration of these activities in the urban centres together with the lack of them and the insecure and adverse life in the rural areas led to exodus of migrants. As a result some urban centres

\(^{1}\) Mesfine W. Mariam, Problems of Urbanization in Ethiopia, op.cit., p.1
grew at a very high rate during the occupation. For instance, between 1935 and 1938 the population of Asmara increased by 512.5% and the population of Gonder, Jimma and Addis Ababa in just one year, 1938 to 1939, increased by 15%, 73.3% and 76.7% respectively.\(^1\) Besides such explosive growth of these towns it is believed that imbalance between the sexes was created largely by large numbers of Italian and native soldiers with the male dominating the females in number. For instance, Mesfine gives the male-female ratio among the Italians in 1939 100:16.7 and 100:6.7 in Addis Ababa and Jimma respectively.\(^2\) The same imbalance is believed to have existed among the native populations, although we lack population data to show the extent. The same writer declares that it was during this period of insatiable demand for young women that exodus of young women started to prevail in order to work in the established local bars and restaurants where they started to practice part-time prostitution in order to earn a living. This trend of larger female migration than male continued to prevail in almost all towns today as will be shown later.

The last three decades after liberation have been relatively peaceful and stable as a result of the development of transport and communication systems as well as the centralization of the administration and the armed forces. This made it easier and safe to travel from one part of the country to the other as well as from the rural areas to the urban centres. The administrative and tax reforms with the introduction of money economy into the country around 1942 accelerated the migration of the rural masses who fail to pay taxes in cash and expect to secure jobs in the urban areas. Consequently trade, both internal and external developed considerably which led to increased import of goods which exceeded exports between 1945 and 1963.\(^3\) Private commercial and industrial concerns (with the latter extremely limited in number till today) started to employ more and more labour thus competing

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1) Ibid., p.2
2) Ibid., p.3
3) Mesfine W. Mariam, Problems of Urbanization, op.cit., p.3
with the government which had been the only employment agent. All these activities, though inadequate, created in the urban centres stimulated large numbers of the peasants from the neglected but heavily taxed and exploited rural areas, where they lived in adverse conditions, (discussed in Chapter II) to migrate and try their luck.

The rural exodus in recent years has resulted not only in the increase of urban population but also in the number of towns. For instance, Ethiopian government sources indicate that while there were about 35 towns (for which there is statistics of population) in 1938 this figure increased to 1300 in 1966.\(^1\) Although we do not have estimates of the total inhabitants in urban centres prior to 1967 we do have evidence showing that the urban population increased from 8.1% to 9.6% of the total population in 1967 and 1971 respectively.\(^2\) For the number of towns during recent years the official characteristics is that it should be an agglomeration of 2,000 inhabitants and above. This fact implies that a large number of towns considered urban earlier are left out since the official Statistical Abstracts after 1967 have included in their reports the urban centres with the latest characteristics. As to the formation of urban centres however, a wide variety of factors seem to cause their growth at any place in the country. These factors range, as Mesfine observes, "from a restaurant or a modest water-mill or a highway workers' camp to dams and industrial establishments,"\(^3\) with the latter two factors being minimal at the present stage of the country's development. Furthermore, the traditional market places which used to be uninhabited in previous years are being converted into urban centres. The establishment of administrative centres, police stations, army headquarters, schools, hospitals and large scale commercial farms is providing the nuclei of urban growth in the recent years. Moreover, the construction

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3) Mesfine W. Mariam, An Introductory Geography of Ethiopia, op.cit., p.190
of roads and communication facilities which is relatively greater than before induces more population movement, which in turn leads to growth of towns at a rapid pace while the existing ones are also expanding.

The present high rate of urban growth can be clearly seen from Table V in the Annex, which indicates population growth in towns between 1938 and 1970. This table shows that big cities like Addis Ababa and Asmara grew by about 800% and 123% respectively while small towns like Assela, Nazareth, Bahr Dar and Shashemene, which became industrial and business centres since recent years, grew by 2000% to 4000% during the same period. Similarly towns like Dilla, Ambo and Askaki located near and around Addis (as well as having the biggest textile industry in case of Askaki) have grown by a considerably high rate. On the other hand, a few of them have shown relative decline or a low rate of growth because, as we will see later, of the uneven development policy being pursued.

When we consider the existing towns, however, we note that there is an uneven growth between them leading to uneven distribution of the urban population. This can be seen from Table VI. This table makes it clear that very few towns cover the major part of the urban population. In 1971 only 7 towns (4% of the total) consisted of 53.2% of the total urban population in the country while the remaining 175 towns (i.e. 96% of the total) had only 46.8% of the total urban population. The main causes for such concentration of urban population in few big cities will be explained in the following section of this chapter. The main points that should be noted here are the rapid growth of the existing towns and the evident imbalance between them.

As indicated already in Chapter I Part II, the yearly growth rate of all urban centres is estimated to be 6.6% while Addis Ababa grows by 7% during the same period. Out of this yearly increase the rate of migration to and from the towns can be seen from Table VII. From this table it is clear that the major part of the urban
growth rate is caused by rural-urban migration. The 4.1% annual net-in-migration corresponds to about 100,000 migrants every year. Such a high rate of migration represents a significant loss of manpower in the rural areas while it contributes to the increasing rate of unemployment in urban areas. (This effect will be discussed in detail in Chapter V). We should also note here, that Addis Ababa, the capital, has a high rate of in-migration and a low rate of out-migration as can be seen from the same table. As we will show in more detail later Addis Ababa's virtual monopoly of modern economic enterprises goes to explain this situation.

Furthermore, the two sample surveys of 1961 and 1967 showed that the majority of the urban population are migrants (50.1%), and that the majority of the migrants are young (aged 15-49).\(^1\) (This will be discussed in Chapter V). Among the towns however, the bigger ones are found to have more in-migrants to them than the general trend. For instance, the towns with more than 20,000 inhabitants are reported to have 53.2% of their population as in-migrants.\(^2\) This evidence corresponds to our discussions in Chapter I Part II where we suggested that the bigger cities attract more migrants and therefore grow at a faster rate every years. The reasons for such situation will be discussed later in the following section.

In a country like Ethiopia where there is a very low rate of economic and industrial development the existence of such a high rate of urban growth could have serious negative effect on the country's development. Although the per capita GNP growth does not show us the real situation it is reported to have grown by 2.1% annually between 1968 and 1973\(^3\) and is expected to persist with the same rate. Such discrepancy between the rate of urban growth (6-7%), and that of the per capita GNP has indeed resulted

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2) C.S.O., Urbanization in Ethiopia, Statistical Bulletin, Ibid.
in the present high rate of urban unemployment,\(^1\) and the consequent urban problems that will be discussed in Chapter V. The high migration rate is also believed to have contributed to the existing low agricultural production so much so that today the Government has started to plan and implement certain rural and urban development policies to control the trend. However, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV and is already pointed out in the preceding chapters the effects of the rural development policies implemented under the present agrarian structure have been accelerated urban-ward migration and other unexpected results. Although the urbanization policies like those of creation of "urban growth centres" planned in the 3rd Five Year Development Plan are not yet implemented, their effects should be expected to be similar with those of the rural development policies since they could serve as stepping stones to further migration to the bigger cities where more employment opportunities are perceived to exist. This is even more so for the present pattern of migration is mainly step migration from small towns to bigger ones as will be shown in Chapter V. The increasing incapacity of the urban centres to employ the exodus and their expanding population gainfully is manifested by the present high rate of urban unemployment and underemployment despite the concentrated efforts of local and national governments to create and increase new and more services in them thus attracting more migrants to them. This will be discussed in detail in the following section since the present urban-biased policies and the emphasis on urbanization rather than on industrialization by the ruling classes had created some apparent features of the urban centres that are known to induce many of the footloose rural masses whose objective situation is discussed in the preceding chapter.

\(^1\) The unemployment rate for the whole country between 1970-90 is estimated to be 15%. See Employment Problems in Ethiopia, Planning Commission, A.A., May 1972, p.24
Part II - The Impact of the Apparent Features of the Urban Centres on Migration

In the above discussion we have shown that the urban centres especially the few bigger cities grow at a very high rate (6-7% annually) due to the rural exodus created by various factors. While the dominant cause for such trend as discussed in Chapter II remains to be the agrarian structure, it is also shown in the first part of this chapter that the cities have played a role in the process. The main concern of this section will then be to identify the factors in these areas that stimulate migrants to come to them.

Among these factors the basic ones are the differentials between the rural and the urban sectors in terms of expected income, employment opportunities and other economic and social activities. While the adverse conditions of the rural areas discussed in Chapter II force the rural masses to move away from them the relative lack of such employment opportunities in the rural areas and the hope and prospects to get jobs in the urban sector induce them to migrate and try their luck. This is, of course, despite the fact that there is a low probability to get urban employment as manifested by the high rate of unemployment and underemployment in most of the urban centres. The case of over 50% unemployment rate of the labour force in most of the towns is already pointed out in Chapter I Part II (ii), despite the increased efforts of the local and national governments to increase and expand industries and other employment opportunities especially in the few cities of Addis Ababa, Asmara and Dire Dawa to a lesser extent.

Such expected differentials between the two sectors as above have resulted from the combination of various factors. Among these the basic ones are the historical pattern of development the country followed as well as certain development policies and measures that the ruling classes maintain as priority in achieving certain objectives.
During our discussion of the historical growth of cities we have shown that, as a result of Western influence particularly late in the 19th century, the national government dominated by the big landlords mostly absenteees, has given priority to modernization and urbanization processes. As a result various urban centres, mostly administrative and commercial ones, emerged and grew at the expense of the rural areas. Hence, the surplus of the rural areas started to be drained away to satisfy the discretionary consumption of the ruling classes, namely the largely absentee landlords and the government officials, as well as to develop the urban centres especially the capital and a few others where these classes reside. Such exploitative relations between the urban and the rural areas started at the initial stage of her economic development since the establishment of Addis Ababa as the capital and seat of the Central Government. In relation to such situation where Addis Ababa and other cities grew and expanded at the expense of the countryside which was heavily taxed and deprived of its material resources, Pankhurst gives a detailed exposition in his book Economic History of Ethiopia. 1) The same pattern continues to exist in present Ethiopia where the towns and particularly the few bigger ones grow and expand both in population and in relative economic activities as sources of employment which create high expectation among the rural masses and thus lead to the exodus observed today. The resulting growth of cities at the expense of the rural areas is rightly discussed by Mesfine: "The growth of towns is simply a malady, like elephantiasis. Elephantiasis makes the leg grow too big at the expense of the other parts of the body and also makes movement slow and hard." 2) Apart from such emphasis on the urban sector which can have a stagnating and deprivation effect on the rural areas as above, it has also been shown by various studies that the rural areas remain stagnant. This is reported by the same person who studied the rural situations and came to

2) Mesfine W. Mariam, An Introductory Geography of Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 195
the following conclusion contrasting the rural areas with the urban ones. "...the rural areas form a great silent shade, remote and inaccessible, timid and voiceless, dazzled and almost literally standing outside the stream of development."1) As a result of such imbalanced development of the two sectors where by the urban centres become the focus of development measures a number of the rural masses who live in the relatively deprived and stagnating sector continues to flock to cities with high expectation of employment and earning opportunities.

The imbalance between the two sectors is maintained and encouraged by urban-biased development plans and policies which are largely in the interest of the ruling classes and are also largely the responsibility of those who are in decision-making positions. Indeed, while the main backbone of the country's economy still remains agriculture which supports 86-90% of the total population as well as contributing about 60% of the GNP in 1968, it is evident from the development patterns followed during the past years that urbanization and hence urban development is given priority. In recent years however, the planners seem to realize the importance of agriculture for the country's economy when they state explicitly, "The foundation for the Ethiopian economy is and must long remain agriculture. But the development of agriculture and, especially of agricultural society in the proper broad context of this plan, requires emphasis also on a concurrent development of industrialization."2) Despite such recognition by the formulatores of the plan however, the plan's pattern of investment and allocation of capital expenditure proves the contrary since it is heavily biased for the urban/industrial sector. The result of such emphasis is shown to be unequal expenditure of the national resources the major part of which comes from the agricultural sector, and hence imbalance between the two sectors. When we consider the

1) Mesfin W. Mariam, "The rural-urban Split in Ethiopia", op.cit. p.10
2) I.E.C., 3rd Five Year Development Plan, op.cit., p.37
expenditure pattern within the industrial sector however, we note that the major portion goes to tertiary sector mainly to transport and communications which has an increasing impact on rural-exodus but low impact in improving the income of the migrants who get marginal wages not enough to cover their basic needs. The secondary sector, beside having the lowest share of the investment allocated for the industrial sector, is left to the initiative of private enterprises or investors especially foreign who are known to export the surplus to their own countries. Moreover, they are mainly capital intensive industries employing an insignificant number of the labour force as will be shown in the following discussions. Both foreign and private domination of the productive sector is encouraged by the government through various fiscal policies as will be discussed in Chapter IV in case of incentives for commercial agriculture. While such urban-biased policies without necessarily giving emphasis to the secondary sector but tertiary serves the conspicuous consumption pattern of the ruling classes, their impact on the masses have been increased attraction and urban unemployment.

Considering the three sectors of the economy however, it is clear from all the past national development plans that higher investment was allocated to the urban sector where industries and social and economic activities are concentrated, inadequate as they are. For instance, the distribution of monetary investment between the different sectors of the economy for the 3rd Five Year Plan as can be seen from Table VIII in the Annex, makes the general trend clear. It shows that agriculture was planned to absorb only 10.9% while industries and social services, largely located in the few big cities were to absorb 76.3%. Out of the amount allocated for the urban/industrial sector however, it should be noted that the largest portion (40.1%) was planned to be spent on such tertiary services as transport, communication and housing which are not directly and immediately productive but serve the interests of the ruling classes and the higher echelons of the bureaucracy who are known to spend much of their wealth on discretionary consumption.
Moreover, although they are insufficient to absorb the rural exodus they continue to attract migrants and facilitate movement relatively as well as providing few jobs whose income is not enough for survival of the masses.

Further consideration of the government's budget allocation and expenditure for the year 1969/70 shows the same pattern of urban-biased development plans which have led to increased imbalance between the rural and urban sectors and hence increased migration and urban unemployment. This can be seen from Table IX which indicates that "general services" accounted for more than twice the amount allocated for both economic and social services. Moreover, within the general services the largest amount was spent on "national defence and security" which is not directed to the interest of the masses but the ruling classes. In terms of employment opportunities as well as development of the economy one should note that a good amount of its budget was spent on importing weapons and machinery thus allowing the surplus, created largely from the agricultural sector to leave the country for different purposes as well as being absorbed by the higher military officials in form of salary. Similarly out of the amount allocated for economic services the highest share was spent again on the tertiary sector consisting of public works and communication. While one cannot deny its indirect contribution to the development of the productive sectors one wonders if such heavy expenditure can be justified by the present low rate of the country's economic development. Moreover, its increasing impact on the attracting features of the urban centres and consequent contribution to the exodus cannot be undermined.

As a result of such imbalance created in these ways it is known that the urban centres attract more labour force as well as more activities potential of employment opportunities. For those wage earners employed in the modern sectors of the two areas, however insignificant they are in number, some reports show that those working in the urban sector get higher wage than those of the other sector, but urban areas have also higher cost of living. In addition to the wage rate differentials for these groups indicated in
Chapter I (ii) from the estimate by Mesfin, Ginzberg reports similar rates. He indicates that the monthly wage rate for agricultural labourers is Eth. $10.- while custodial and production workers in the urban areas get Eth. $30 and Eth. $40 monthly. He adds that most of the working population in the country falls within these income groups. 1) Despite such differentials however, it should be noted that these groups represent a minute fraction of the labour force in Ethiopia. For instance, out of the total labour force estimate of 7,362,600 in 1967, 86.1% were engaged in agriculture while 7.7% and 6.6% were employed in industries and services respectively. 2) Out of this amount however, only 500,000 were employed in the modern/commercial sector while the remaining 5,691,700 were still engaged in the subsistence sector. On the other hand the growth rate for agriculture, industry and services' employment is shown to be 0.20; 0.88 and 0.69 respectively. What one should note from such factors is that the modern sector of both areas employ an insignificant number of the country's labour force and its employment growth rate is very minor especially in relation to the number of migrants that it attracts. Earlier in this chapter we have shown that about 100,000 people are migrating to the urban centres every year and about 50% of the labour force in most towns remains unemployed, as will be discussed in Chapter V in detail and mentioned earlier in Chapter II.

Despite the expected employment opportunities in the urban centres that stimulate some migrants the rate of such unemployment as mentioned above is known to prevail in the centres. The situation for 10 big towns where various development measures are concentrated but also with high rate of unemployment the same was as the other urban centres can be seen from Table X. Although this estimate shows the condition in 1966 recent estimates by Government planners also show an increasing rate of unemployment in the

urban sector. The projection for 1970-1990 shows that there is an overt (effective) unemployment rate of 15-20% which is expected to rise to about 25% by 1990 along with a worsening distribution of income if the present pattern continues to prevail without change in and development of the agricultural sector. During the same period the labour force is estimated to grow by 8.5% annually, the same rate as the urban population (6.6 + 2.5).

Leaving the biggest number that remain unemployed aside, if we consider the situation of those migrants and urban labourers who succeed to secure jobs in the modern sector we note that most of them live in misery and low standard of living since they receive low and stagnant wages that cannot cope with the high and increasing prices of food, shelter and other basic necessities of the urban poor. For instance, out of 200 industries employing 25,606 people the majority of the employees (80%) were at the wage level of E $ 30 - 100 per month while 12% were getting E $ 100 - 200 per year. This low rate of cash income, despite the fact that it exists and does not cover the employed labour forces’ basic needs continues to create high expectation among the footloose rural masses who flock to cities and become a burden not only to the urban centres but also to their relatives. To these urban low and stagnating wages should also be added the fact that the migrant labourer is expected to receive and support regular rural visitors and members of the extended family who come to look for expected employment opportunities. As we have discussed already in Chapter I Part II the communication processes between the migrants and their relatives and village members have played a role in increasing high expectation of the rural poor about the urban centres.

Besides being expected to look for and get him (the new migrant-relative) an employment or other source of livelihood, the urbanised relative is also expected to feed, shelter and protect the migrant until he gets a job and becomes independent. However, with

1) I.E.G., The Problems of Employment in Ethiopia, op.cit., pp. 24-25
the inability to get urban employment where these opportunities are increasingly becoming inadequate the migrants' dependency on his host worsens his living conditions and that of his family. Moreover, we must recognize the relatively higher cost of living in the urban areas manifested by high expenditure for housing, food and other basic necessities as opposed to that in the rural areas where such requirements are largely met by home production. Such disparity between income level and expenditure in the urban sector puts the living condition of the urban wage earners in the same adverse condition as the rural masses. In such situation where the rural migrants remain unemployed and where inadequate and insufficient employment opportunities, though concentrated in the urban areas exist, the real difference in income or wage level could not account for such rural exodus existing in the country. However, the development differentials between the two sectors create high expectation of the prospects to get employment opportunities in the urban areas which induce more people to migrate.

The rural-urban differentials in terms of expected employment opportunities can be explained by the present distribution pattern in the country. In this respect various documents show that almost all such opportunities are located in the urban sector and particularly in a few bigger cities like Addis Ababa, Asmara and to a lesser extent Dire Dawa. As a result many studies in the field of urbanization, migration and other related subjects have tried to show the impact of such pattern on the rural exodus. For instance, a survey of Addis Ababa's population in 1967 showed that most migrants came to Addis to look for employment being attracted by its apparent features. Failing to get it most of them remained unemployed and underemployed, engaged in casual labour with low wages and other unfavourable activities such as begging, theft, crime etc. while still searching for regular jobs. Due to the inadequacy of the urban centres to absorb the exodus they attract however, "urban unemployment is increasing, not only in absolute figures, but in relation to the total urban population as
well"¹) as rightly reported by Lars Bondestam, and with it the consequent urban problems of congestion, housing shortages, slums, destitution and many others.

The impact of the apparent features of the urban centres especially the bigger ones which have become the focus of development measures on the rural exodus seems to be recognized by the government planners themselves who state, "... In the course of the Third Year subsequent five year plans, the establishment of the secondary and tertiary activities will naturally tend by itself to concentrate in too few urban centres. At present whatever has been achieved in economic and social development and particularly in industry is mostly concentrated around Addis Ababa, Asmara and very few other cities. This has led too many able-bodied men to leave the countryside to seek for employment in these cities."²) Accepting further, the negative impact of such lopsided development pattern on the rural exodus and hence on both the rural and urban economy they declare, "If not checked this tendency will have grave economic and social consequences for both the cities and the countryside."³)

Within the urban centres themselves it should be noted again that there is imbalance in development measures, expenditure of national resources and hence imbalance in migration and urban population. For instance, some big cities like Addis, Asmara and Dire Dawa have been and continue to be the focus of relative employment opportunities and other development activities due mainly to their historical importance at the local, regional or national levels and due to political reasons. Consequently their provinces are also marked by most of the activities and thus the greater number of urban centres and urban population are found in them. Of

¹) Lars Bondestam, op.cit., p.12
²) 3rd Year Development Plan, op.cit., p.383
³) Ibid.
these cities Addis Ababa was established as the capital of the Empire, as discussed in the first part of this chapter, by Menelik II during his attempt to expand his Northern Empire southwards between 1889-1900. Starting from this period this city continued to absorb the major portion of the national resources exploited from the countryside and the southern conquered provinces. Moreover, the ruling classes being from the Shoa dynasty continued to increase and expand several activities which attracted the footloose peasants. When we consider the attracting features of the second largest city, Asmara, we note that it has more political and administrative reasons for its relative growth. This city and Eritrea located at the northernmost end of the country had been conquered by the Italians since 1896 and later continued to be under the occupation of the British since the Italians withdrew from the area. As a result of such historical factors that the province and its cities experienced under external rulers for about 60 years it had gone through a different and relatively higher pattern of economic development than the rest of the provinces and their capitals. Starting from such time on the city maintains its dominant position as the second largest city in the country. Furthermore the city and its province being in the North from where the present rulers originated it continues to absorb the biggest investment second to the capital. Moreover, Dire Dawa, being the centre of commerce and trade due to its geographical position, where the Franco-Ethiopian railway linking Addis Ababa and Djibouti and the outside world was constructed, as discussed earlier, continued to absorb a considerable number of development opportunities. In general as a result of such historical factors the above mentioned big cities and their provinces have continued to be the nuclei of economic and social activities. Such activities are also known to be improved and expanded by the local governments despite the fact that such measures in the cities alone increase their attraction and thereby more unemployment and consequent urban problems. Indeed, such activities as civil engineering works, building programmes and road construction, commerce and industrial establishments and others stimulate migrants by creating high expectation. Further-
more Addis Ababa being the seat of the ruling classes, the bureaucracy, the High Court and the Parliament as well as the international agencies such as O.A.U., E.C.A. etc., a considerable number of the rural population flock to the cities which attract not only the rural masses but also the nobility who are found to live in the capital and other big cities with government offices.

The invariable location of employment opportunities inadequate as they are, in the urban sector attracts and stimulates a number of the footloose young and ablebodied rural masses who are in regular contact with previous migrants or visit the town during market days as pointed out in Part II of the theoretical framework.

The consequent concentration of expenditure of national resources manifested by concentration of manufacturing industries in the bigger cities as well as urban centres can be seen from Table XI for 1966/67. Out of the total 395 industries located in 30 towns of the country surveyed by the C.S.O. about 80% were located only in the above discussed three cities. The same concentration of employment is seen in the same areas although it is not indicated on the table. Out of the available industries, the consumption goods industries like food, beverage and textiles are known to dominate the others with most of them being foreign dominated. Out of the total employees in these establishments 62.9% were employed in food and textile industries that are largely located in Addis and such surrounding areas as Akahl, Wonji and Nazareth. The same pattern was reported in 1965/66 by a survey conducted by two government offices. The relatively more attracting features of the bigger cities and hence excessive migration to them is noted by the government planners who state, "In the recent years, migration to the larger cities and towns has increased and will continue to increase... the population of Addis Ababa itself

1) The emphasis given to such consumer goods and light industries can be seen from the large investment they absorb every year. For instance from the budget for the industrial sector in 1965 these industries absorbed 56% and 73.5% respectively. For detailed study see: Inter Economics, Monthly Review of International Trades and Development, No.1, 1968, pp.22-25
2) C.S.O., Statistical Abstract, 1970, op.cit., p.54
3) S.G. Selassie, Some Aspects of Social Problems and Services, op.cit., p.339
has increased by more than 40% during the period of 1953-59 (E.O.) Other major and middlesized cities have also grown rapidly.1) Despite such recognition however, these big cities still continue to absorb much of the investment and capital expenditure for the economy and hence most employment opportunities are created in them increasing their attractive power to the rural masses but also increasing their employment problems.

Apart from manufacturing industries the consequent tertiary and service industries are also largely located in the same areas. Since most migrants are unskilled or semi-skilled, illiterate and therefore not fit for the existing clerical jobs in the public or private sector, they mostly remain as labourers with low wages in construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels, restaurants, "local" bars, domestic service and the like. It is important to note here that even in such big cities as Addis most migrants are not employed gainfully in the productive sector. Moreover those few industries which employ relatively high numbers like those of textiles, beverages and food, are known to employ less and less workers and employ more capital intensive methods. This is easy of course, in a situation like Ethiopia where foreign investors are encouraged to operate independent of state interference except being given the necessary incentives through state fiscal laws discussed in Chapter II. To come back to our main point, they cooperate and satisfy the consumption needs of the ruling classes as long as the low absorption of labourers by the productive sector can be seen from employment structure of migrants in Addis Ababa where they are concentrated. Out of 264,941 employees in industrial establishments by 1972, 85.1% were reported to have been employed in the tertiary sector with the majority (43.8%) in wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants.2) (For detailed discussion of employment structure in the same city refer to Chapter V, II).

1) 3rd Year Development Plan, op.cit., p.339
Besides, regular decrease in amount of available employment is experienced from year to year in both secondary and tertiary sectors, due to increased use of mechanization which displaces labour as well as reduces newly employable labour. During six months i.e. between March and September 1972, the employment survey reported a fall in employment for almost all sectors of the industrial establishments. However, the biggest fall was in those areas which are frequented by migrants and the urban poor who are unskilled, illiterate etc. and lack employment opportunities in the other sectors. Thus the biggest fall (29.1%) was in construction followed by transport, storage and communications (15.2%).

This fall was indeed reported to be due to increased capital intensive methods used by these privately initiated and operated sectors.

When considering the situation in the industrial sector in the whole country we also note the same experience of decreased employment despite increased number of industrial establishments. For instance, between 1965/66 and 1968/69 the number of industries increased from 273 to 442. On the other hand, employed labour in this sector decreased from 9790 to 8583 during the same period. Despite such experiences of fall in employment in the urban areas however, their unequal distribution between the big and small towns and their lack in the rural areas continue to create high expectation among the rural masses (who live in a deprived area and adverse conditions discussed earlier) and thus stimulate more migration to these areas which fail to absorb the exodus. In relation to this situation Mesfmine, after making a detailed research on the motivational factors that lead to increased migration to the cities, reports, "All of these opportunities have created job opportunities which in turn stimulated large numbers of people to move from the rural to urban areas. For instance, in Addis Ababa

1) I.E.G., MNLDA, Addis Ababa Employment Survey, Ibid., p.23
2) C.S.O., Statistical Abstract 1970, op.cit., p.54
it was found out that 57.5% of the interviewed population gave employment opportunities as reason for migration.¹ This happens to persist despite the fact that the cities cannot absorb them any more. Another writer in the field also observes, "Young women from villages come in the hope of getting jobs and when they cannot find jobs they take to the profession that does not require much skill - prostitution."² The discrepancy between such created expectations and the achievement after migration has indeed led to various consequent urban problems observed in most cities varying from prostitution, begging, crime and delinquency to congestion, housing shortage, slums and the like. This is intensified by the same pattern of concentration of the social services like schools and medical facilities in the urban centres especially the bigger ones which monopolize the most.

The present unequal distribution of the social services can be seen from Tables XII and XIII. As pointed out earlier such services are located largely in the big cities with the capitals of each province absorbing the major portion. More than this factor these services together with the earlier discussed industries are distributed unequally between provinces too. Thus the capitals and the bigger cities of some few provinces absorb the major portion of such activities which lead to their attraction of more migrants than others. For instance, Table XII indicates that the largest concentration of the medical services in 1970 was only in three provinces namely Shoa, with Addis Ababa as its capital, Eritrea with Asmara, and Hararge with Dire Dawa absorbing the greatest number. (The historical and political reasons for such provinces to be the focus of all development activities have been discussed already in Part I and the beginning of this section.) Accordingly, about 62% of all hospitals, 74% of the beds, 53% of the clinics, 74% of the doctors, 73% of the nurses and 93% of the

¹) Mesfin W. Mariam, Problems of Urbanization in Ethiopia, op.cit., p.3
²) S.G. Selassie, Some Aspects of Social Problems, op.cit., p.30
pharmacists were located in the towns of these provinces with their capitals dominating the other towns. If we take the case of Addis Ababa alone, being the capital of the Empire as well, it absorbed 16% of all hospitals, 50% of the doctors, 45% of the nurses and 66% of the pharmacists. A similar pattern of concentration in the urban sector during 1971 is noted by the assessment of the 3rd Year Plan which states, "... the Ethiopian health service continues to be characterized by an inequitable distribution of spending between urban and rural areas and between provinces. Addis Ababa and Asmara with only 5% of the urban population continue to absorb over 40% of total expenditure, while the rural health service suffers from shortage of funds, equipment and supplies. Lack of roads, and communication, also limit the area which the Basic Health Services cover."¹ Such basic health services referred to above are expected to cater for the needs of the rest of the population (90% in the rural areas). However, besides being extremely inadequate and limited in number they are mainly concentrated in the rural areas of the above mentioned 3 provinces where urban facilities are also concentrated as can be seen from the table. Consequently the mentioned assessment of the 3rd Year Plan in 1973 reports that only 20% of the rural population were expected to be reached by such services directed mainly to eradication of malaria to which 12-13 million are expected to be exposed, as well as control of such communicable diseases (as T.B., Small Pox, and Leprosy) by the end of the 3rd Year Plan, while 80% will continue to depend almost totally on traditional medical practices.²

The same trend of location of educational facilities in the towns as well as the provinces can be seen from Table XII covering the period of 1963/64, the only period for which such information could be found. However, since the present trend follows similar

¹) I.E.C., Draft, 3rd Year Plan: Assessment and Implementation Report, op.cit., p.5
²) Ibid.
pattern consideration of the period could give us some insight into the actual situation. The table shows that about 20% of all schools and 50% of all government schools were located in Addis Ababa, Shoa, Eritrea and Hararge to a lesser extent, with their capitals absorbing the major portion. On the other hand, some provinces mainly in Southern Ethiopia such as Bale, Gemu Gofa and Keffa are the least covered with such urban facilities. Hence, they have few urban centres as well as a small urban population as can be noted from Table XIV in the Annex. This fact corresponds with our discussion in Chapter I Part II of the possible fact that those areas absorbing the major expenditure and urban activities attract more migrants thus growing faster than the other urban centres or regions in most developing countries.

According to a recent statistical Abstract of 1970 which shows the students enrolled in primary and secondary schools by provinces in 1968/69, about 50% of the total students were found in the same three provinces with Addis absorbing about 33% of the areas' students and 17% of those in the whole country.¹ On the other hand, some southern provinces like Bale and Gemu-Goffa and their respective towns had the least number of students with 1.5% and 2% respectively.² What one should note here is that although such urban facilities as above are inadequate and therefore the largest number of school age children remain outside school even in big cities where they are concentrated, their locational pattern influences migration with those of more activities attracting more migrants. By attracting more migrants they also attract more urban problems manifested in most of them due to their inability to absorb the exodus they stimulate. Such problem is also observed by Seyoum who states: "As schools are mostly found in either provincial capitals or district towns children are obliged to stay away from home and since most parents cannot afford to pay for the subsistence of their children especially when away from home they are

²) Ibid.
obliged to discontinue their help thus forcing children to leave school."\textsuperscript{1)} As a result by 1966/67 only 10.5%\textsuperscript{2)} of primary school age children could go to schools following the programme of the Ministry of Education despite increase in number of schools during the same period. Indeed the increase in rate of primary school age enrolment was experienced by the Third Year Plan over the previous years. However, this increase was restricted to the two provinces of Shoa and Eritrea with Addis and Asmara absorbing the major increase. For instance, the mentioned assessment report indicated that by 1972 about 17% of school age children were already enrolled in schools while the estimate would reach 18% in (1965 E.C.) 1973 and more than 20% by 1974. The target for the plan period was to reach 18% by 1974 thus indicating that a relatively higher rate was achieved already before the period. However, it should be noted that "most of the increase occurred in Addis Ababa, and in Shoa and Eritrea provinces,"\textsuperscript{3)} and other bigger cities following the second rate. The same pattern of increased concentration in the urban sector and in the bigger cities within the urban sector as well as in some provinces is expected to have continued in recent years as asserted rightly by the Assessment report as follows: "Despite the plan's intention to obtain a better geographical distribution of primary school facilities, with special attention paid to rural areas, the participation rates in the big cities and some provinces in 1964 (E.C.) were far above the national average - 17.4%: Addis Ababa 75%, Gondar 42% and the province of Eritrea (52%)....\textsuperscript{4)} Despite such increase in primary school enrolment it is known that there is a high rate of dropouts and discontinued education for various reasons. Among these factors the basic one is the low economic conditions of the parents who fail to support and allow their children

\textsuperscript{1)} S.C. Selassie, \textit{op.cit.}, p.20
\textsuperscript{2)} 3rd Year Development Plan, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.290-291
\textsuperscript{3)} An Assessment and Implementation Report, \textit{op.cit.}, p.52
\textsuperscript{4)} \textit{Ibid.}
to continue the long period of education as well as their inability to fulfil the expensive requirements and obligations of schools. In addition shortage of schools, overcrowding, shortage of teachers and above all these the type and content of education itself accelerate the trend of dropouts and discontinued education by many of the few urban poor who succeeded to join these schools by attaching themselves to relatives living in the cities. Such dropouts in the small towns along with those few who succeed in their entrance examinations for secondary education are known to migrate to the bigger cities where such better employment opportunities as clerical jobs and others are expected to exist. Here mention should be made of the fact that the type of the education system being western, elitist and unrelated to either the needs or the particular environment of the country, prepares those few who join schools for white collar jobs that can be found only in the urban areas, mostly the bigger ones, further creating negation of rural living and the peasantry. They are then motivated to migrate to the cities in search of such clerical jobs for which they feel better fitted rather than staying in the villages which are experiencing low productivity and poverty and adverse conditions as discussed earlier.

Despite the low rate of educational facilities existing in the whole country in relation to the school age children (which is reported to be almost half of the total population) the unequal distribution of the few existing ones has led to unequal rate of literacy between the rural and urban sectors with the urban centres having the highest rate. For instance, the two national urban surveys of 1961 and 1967 reported that the literacy rate in the urban sector was 34% while it was only 4% in the rural areas. Furthermore, among the towns themselves the biggest towns and the smaller ones had 44% and 22% respectively\(^1\) during the mid-1960's. The rate for the biggest city, Addis, was 54.2% in 1967.\(^2\) This fact

1) C.S.C., Urbanisation in Ethiopia, op.cit., p.4
may explain partly the low rate of out-migration from and high rate of in-migration to Addis (discussed in Part I of this chapter) since its monopoly of most development activities attracts more migrants than it can absorb. Moreover, the form of migration observed in the country today being largely step-migration, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter V, most of the migrants who fail to get employment or other sources of income in the smaller towns flock to this city expecting to secure more opportunities. Due to such discrepancy between their expectations and achievement in most big cities various problems such as prostitution, "street" boys involved in delinquent activities, housing shortages, congestions and the like are reported to exist.

In relation to such problems in the areas that have become attractions to many of the footloose rural masses a recent survey conducted by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Affairs indicates that the majority of the "street boys" in Addis, Asmara and Dire Dawa came to the respective cities to look for "employment opportunities" followed by "search for educational opportunities". ¹) Failing in achieving their expectations however, they were forced to undertake any street activities to earn a living for themselves involving shoe-shining, begging, stealing and several delinquent activities. The result of this survey, although it does not cover all street boys in the whole country, can be a reasonable indicator of the general situation of young migrants since most of them are found in the areas covered by the survey.

The impact of the apparent features of the cities on the exodus can be seen more clearly from a recent survey conducted by Addis Ababa's municipality in the capital. This survey covered 1940 vagrants (who migrated to the city for various reasons) in order to find out why they came from their villages. As can be seen from Table XV in the Annex, the majority indicated that they came to the city expecting to get employment, medical services and education. This together accounted for about 63%, showing that they become vagrants due to failure in achieving what they expected

¹) For detailed results of the survey see: S.G. Selassie, op.cit., p.41
to secure. From the reasons given by the respondents it can be said that the concentration of such activities in the urban areas has also an impact in stimulating those who live in deprived and exploited conditions both by the feudal order discussed in Chapter II and the resultant deprivation, by the urban sector, of their resources which leads to increased poverty. Beside vagrancy the failure has also led to increased prostitution involving the majority of the female migrants whose position is intensively exploited and oppressed both in the household and the rural feudal society. While many are known to join such profession those who succeed to get jobs are engaged mostly in domestic services to the largely absentee landlords and high officials thereby entering the common exploitative relations of master and servant which they left in their villages. Those who join part-time or full-time prostitution are forced to do so to earn a living which they could not otherwise since there is less alternative for a woman particularly when she is illiterate and unskilled. It is also important to note that their economic necessity forces them to join such profession although it is socially despised and degraded in the society. Despite such discouraging facts in the society, prostitution is known to increase in extent in almost all urban centres with the bigger ones having the largest number. For instance, Addis Ababa alone is reported, by various sources, to contain "about 70,000 prostitutes," and that "93% of the 300 prostitutes interviewed in the city gave economic reasons for joining the profession, mainly to support themselves and their families."

In order to understand the apparent features of cities that are able to attract such female migrants who are the majority among rural migrants as shown above, it is important to show the position of women in the rural society as well as their roles and obligation in the family. In this respect Rosita Forbes after making an extensive study of women's position in the Ethiopian society in gene-

ral, observes the following: "Throughout the changing fortunes of the past, the peasant woman remained in the anomalous position of a beast of burden with a complete system of civic and material rights to. Abyssinian woman falls the hardest of the communal tasks throughout a life which prematurely ages and destroys her. She is the hewer of wood and drawer of water and as the villages are always distant from either she toils for miles with incredibly heavy weights on her back."¹ This is of course, in addition to her backbreaking work in the household where she serves as manager, organizer and producer as well as her division of labour in the field during weeding, harvesting and all seasons of farming. (This part will be discussed in Chapter V under the impact of migration on the rural sector). For such migrants who live in such adverse conditions in the rural areas it is of course understandable and to be expected that a slight possibility and hope to secure an alternative way of living in the urban areas could induce many of them to migrate and escape their oppressed condition. To this should be added the high expectation raised through information and contacts with previous migrants - relatives, friends, village members and through visits to urban centres. Indeed, while such adverse conditions in the villages play a dominant role in forcing many of the rural masses to migrate, as discussed in Chapter II, the hope and expectation to get a source of livelihood in the urban areas where such opportunities are relatively concentrated increases the exodus. As a consequence most urban centres are being filled with various problems, among which some are discussed above. It was also discussed earlier briefly how the exodus of the young and ablebodied forces of the rural sector can have an adverse effect on the agricultural production which is already low and is declining. Moreover it can also have a negative effect on the national economy if it continues to prevail under present circumstances.

¹ Rosita Forbes, From Red Sea to the Blue Nile, Abyssinian Adventures, U.K., 1925, p.77, quoted by BENELUX Study Group, the Condition of Ethiopian Women, op.cit., p.12
Although the present exodus is recognized, by the development planners, to affect both sectors negatively as well as the national economy it should be noted from the following discussion that the measures planned to counteract the trend will in fact accelerate it further. After recognition of the need for counteracting the exodus before it becomes uncontrollable the planners give the planned solutions by stating: "It is the government's policy to counteract the tendency by promotion of urban growth centres other than Addis Ababa and Asmara." \(^1\) Such urban growth centres, although their number and location was not specified for the plan period, were expected to provide "new job opportunities and cultural attractions" that are hoped to retain migrants who would otherwise move to the bigger cities and intensify the urban problems in them. Such centres planned to be given in "packages" in a limited number of pilot localities with concentrated government investments seem to be similar to the "package projects" for modernization of the peasant sector mentioned in the preceding chapters. While one cannot deny the excessive migration attracted by the bigger cities like Addis Ababa and Asmara it is also important to note that the pattern of the present migration in the country is step migration usually, from villages through smaller to bigger towns. Thus, it can be argued that these planned urban growth centres expected to concentrate in potential pilot localities could facilitate the migration trend by serving as temporary stops for those who could not go directly to the bigger and usually distant ones from their villages. Moreover, even if we assume that they could serve the purpose of reducing exodus to the bigger cities, it will be difficult to expect the continuity of their creation to absorb or retain the exodus especially given the low rate of financial and technical resources of the country. In fact given the present migration trend whose major cause is the objective conditions in the rural areas they should be expected to be exceeded by migration flow to them thus experiencing similar shortage and overcrowding, unemployment and the consequent problems observed

\(^1\) 3rd Five Year Development Plan, op.cit., p.383
in the existing towns. While their creation, if effected, will accelerate the exodus to them and the bigger cities they should also be expected to accelerate the low rate of production of the rural areas by stimulating their manpower to migrate away from them.

The imbalance between the rural and urban areas and between the provinces discussed above should be seen as related factors to the agrarian structure discussed in Chapter II - since the latter factor remains the most dominant in accentuating the migration process to the urban areas in Ethiopia today. Added to this factor certain rural development policies which are known to accelerate the process when implemented under the existing rural structure should be examined. Thus the purpose of the following Chapter will be to analyze the planned and existing rural development policies which have direct relation with the basic causes of rural-urban migration identified in Chapter II.
CHAPTER IV

THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT POLICIES ON RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION

The main causes of rural-urban migration in the country as a whole have been discussed in the preceding chapters. From these discussions we have seen that one of the most significant causes of urban-ward migration is the prevailing agrarian structure involving the landownership and tenure systems, complemented by the apparent features of the urban areas which create high expectation among the foot-loose rural masses. As shown earlier, the government itself recognizes in its 3rd Five Year Plan that the low agricultural production resulting from the landownership and tenure systems, and the consequent rural poverty lead to the present exodus.

The urban/industrial biased development trend that the country followed throughout its recent history and its resulting impact on the migration trend has been discussed in Chapter III which also dealt with the apparent features of the urban areas in detail. While both rural and urban/industrial development policies are known to accelerate the trend by strengthening the main causes mentioned above, lack of time and space makes the present paper unable to deal with both policies extensively in this section. Moreover, since the apparent features of the urban areas causing the migration trend are partly the result of the urban-biased policies, their impact on the exodus as well as the would-be effects of the planned "urban growth" centres which are not yet implemented at the national level are discussed extensively in Chapter III. Mention should also be made of the fact that certain planned and implemented rural development policies seem to play a more dominant and direct role in accelerating the present exodus of the rural masses. Thus, the following discussion will focus on the impact of these rural development policies.
Before we deal with the rural development policies in the country it is important to re-iterate a basic fact about the country's rural economy.

Rural Ethiopian society is characterized by two modes of production, co-existing side by side, as already discussed in the preceding chapters. By far the more dominant one of these is the feudal mode of production existing in the major part of the peasant subsistence sector. (Refer to discussions under Chapter II.)

The second, the capitalist mode of production found in the commercial sector is very recent and limited both in extent (area covered) and in terms of its contribution to the national economy. However, it is obvious from the pattern of investment and expenditure of the 3rd Five Year Plan, that the second form of production is expected to replace the first in the long run. Indeed, the basic objective of the national agricultural development policy is the commercialization of agriculture and the "fastest" growth of output for internal and external markets. In order to achieve these objectives, main emphasis was given to involving the peasants in the subsistence sector, in the market economy, thus transforming the sector into a modernized commercial sector. During the 1968-1973 plan period, agriculture as a whole was expected to grow by 3.1% annually. This target was not achieved by the end of the plan period. In fact, the rate of growth of agricultural production declined compared to that of the second Five Year Plan period.

The peasant sector was expected to grow by 1.8% while a growth rate of 12.6% was anticipated in the commercial sector involving big mechanized farms.

According to the 3rd Five Year Development Plan, two development problems in the agricultural sector were identified and these were planned to be tackled by certain development policies that will

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1) While in 1970 agriculture on the whole contributed 70% of the GNP, only about 15% of this came from commercial agriculture. G. Nicolas, op.cit., p.48
2) see Chapter II of this paper.
be discussed in the following section. The problems are stated by the plan thus, "Agricultural policy is designed primarily to deal with the two great problems which beset Ethiopia - the problem of production - and the problem of the peasantry."¹) The dominant objective for this sectoral policy was "rapid growth of output for internal and external markets", while the second objective dealing with the problems of the peasantry was given a lower priority. The assessment of the same plan reported: "The principal strategy to obtain the growth objective was to encourage rapid development of the commercial sector."²)

This tendency of laying emphasis on the commercial sector is also manifested by the projected growth rate of some agricultural products during the plan period. The largest annual increase was expected in those products grown in the commercial sector largely owned and controlled by foreign enterprises. For instance, the production of cotton was expected to grow by 20% and that of sugar cane by 10%. On the other hand, the least growth rate, 2.3% per year was projected in the production of such staple food stuffs as "teff", wheat, maize etc. These products are grown largely in the peasant sector and are the ones that could be consumed by the masses of the population.³)

In order to deal with the two problems identified above, two rural development strategies were adopted and are being implemented in the rural sector. They are policies for "commercial agriculture", and for "peasant subsistence agriculture".⁴)

¹) Third Five Year Plan, op.cit., pp.189-190
²) An Assessment and Implementation Report of the 3rd Year Plan, op.cit., p.14
³) Ibid., pp.202-203
⁴) Ibid., p.191
I Description of Rural Development Policies

1. The Policy for Commercial Agriculture

This was planned to bring about a rapid development of large scale commercial agriculture which is considered to be "the only way to get the relatively quick increase needed in agricultural exports and supply of food stuffs for the rapidly expanding urban population."

By this policy the government intends to induce more foreign private investment and to import the needed managerial and technical skills, and thereby to help develop large scale agriculture as fast as possible. Priority and encouragement is given to mechanization and commercialization of large scale farms and ranches owned and operated predominantly by private enterprises, both foreign and domestic. Various incentives are given to private investors through the fiscal policies involving investment laws, income tax laws, customs and tariffs. Presently, income tax relief of 5-4 years, import duty relief for agricultural machines, export duty relief, remittance of foreign exchange through the National Development Bank, acquisition of immovables like land, concession of government land in the case of foreign investors, untaxable dividends besides various financial and technical services are provided to such private investors with large capital to mechanize large scale farms.

The domestic agricultural enterprises are dominated by members of the big land-owning classes consisting of the royal family, the regional nobility, the high military and civilian officials and the higher clergy, whose large properties in land are found mainly in the southern provinces where cash crops like coffee, cotton etc. are being cultivated on a large scale. These enterprises are either

1) Ibid., p.191
operated by landlords themselves or by large scale contractors who have the necessary capital and skill to mechanize extensive tracts of land. The hold of foreign capitalists on the commercialized extensive agricultural sector is increasingly becoming important because of the contracts with individual landlords and concessions given to them by the state. The state also owns some large scale farms like those in Arba Minch, Awassa and Majete operated by the Ministry of Community Development as well as by the Ministry of Agriculture. Most of the mechanized farms and ranches are found in the southern provinces where, as shown in Chapter II, the dominant form of landownership is feudal. For quick realization of such projects and plans in the commercial sector, reliance is placed on private initiative and enterprise, and particularly on private foreign investment which is encouraged and assisted by the above mentioned fiscal policies.

2. **Policy for Peasant Subsistence Sector**

This is aimed at transforming the subsistence sector into a market economy as well as to increase the productivity of small farms. "The problem of the peasantry was to be ameliorated slowly... through credit, extension and marketing services provided through package programmes which focus on areas of potentially high response."¹)

Identification and preparation of promising areas for concentrated development in different parts of the country was expected to be done while immediate policy for the plan period was to concentrate on three regional projects where identification and further study was already done. These were the comprehensive package programmes known as CADU, WADU and the Southern Range-land Livestock Project. The first two package projects started in 1968 and

¹) *Assessment and Implementation Report, op.cit.*, p.14

* Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit
* Wolamo Agricultural Development Unit
1970 respectively and are limited to their respective districts. According to the plan of spreading activities of these projects to other parts of the country certain "minimum package projects" were already launched in 1971 which were designed to provide fertilizers, improved seeds, credit and marketing services to the farmers in selected areas in 10 of the 14 provinces in Ethiopia.

The concept of "package programmes" implies the policy of concentrating development efforts in given areas utilizing all the material and human resources required to change the traditional and inefficient methods.\(^1\)

"Part of the objective of this policy", as stated by the planners, "is to increase output so much that significant surplus become available for marketing outside the area, as a result the peasants will be introduced to the commercial market system."\(^2\)

As far as the problem of the peasant sector goes, the government gives priority to such package projects as they are believed to be the most effective way of developing the sector to increase output. The plan states, "the government is convinced that such an approach is appropriate to Ethiopia, and the Ministries of Planning and Development and of Agriculture are now identifying and preparing more schemes to augment those already began in Chilalo and Wolamo."\(^3\)

Indeed, the "minimum package projects" launched in different parts of the country are inspired by the experiences attained in CADU.

So far it has been attempted to describe the existing and planned rural development policies which are meant to ameliorate the "problem of production and that of the peasantry". Before we deal with their impact on the exodus of the rural masses, it is essential to show the distribution of government capital invest-

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1) 3rd Year Plan. op.cit., pp.193-194
2) Ibid.
3) Ibid., pp.194-195
ment between the two policies during the plan period of 1968-73. As can be seen from Table XVI about 60% of the total development expenditure was planned to be spent on the productive activities consisting of commercial and peasant agriculture. When we consider this amount for the two sectors, however, we note that 75% was projected to be spent on the mechanized and commercial sector. On the other hand, the peasant sector was expected to absorb only 25% of the planned expenditure in agriculture together with the multi-purpose cooperatives, which are known to benefit the well-to-do farmers within the sector. This means that only 1/3 of the amount planned to be spent on commercial agriculture was allocated for the implementation of the policy regarding the peasant sector.

II Impact of Rural Development Policies on Migration

As we have seen above, the existing low productivity is rightly recognized as a development problem by the government planners. This recognition has initiated the above discussed development policies which are expected to tackle the problem. However, since the problem of production is given priority as manifested by the pattern of investment and capital expenditure, these policies have increased and will continue to increase the income of the large landowning classes and the private foreign enterprises who are able to participate in the mechanization process. Given the present agrarian structure where 5% of the population owns and controls 90% of the land (refer to Chapter II for distribution of land between the different groups in the society) and where 90% of the rural population are peasant cultivators with 2/3 of them cultivating less than 1½ hectares, and where 80% of them are estimated to be landless tenants cultivating small plots of land belonging to the big landowners, the negative effect of such policy encouraging mechanization of large scale farms on the peasant cultivators cannot be expected to be positive. In addition, the location of these projects being mainly in the southern provinces where the private/feudal ownership of land and tenure prevail, the resulting impact on the rural exodus of the poor peasants and tenants who get evicted cannot be underestimated.
Available evidence clearly shows that both the process of mechanization and the introduction of the comprehensive minimum package programmes do not have an ameliorating effect on the condition of the peasantry. Rather, they change the situation from bad to worse.

Regarding the effects of mechanization as well as of the package projects, Michael Stahl, an SIDA expert states: "Since the mid-1960’s, a growing number of big landowners have, as a consequence of the World Bank and F.A.O. inspired official agricultural policies, turned to commercial mechanized farming. Using tractors, fertilizers and improved seeds, they have started to produce wheat on their holdings for the growing urban markets. Tenant farmers, who previously operated these holdings (in small holdings of 1 - 2 hectares) have, in the process become economically superfluous." Addressing himself to the problem of insecurity of tenure which strengthens the position of the landowners he notes that: "Since lease agreements as a rule are verbal and can be terminated by the landlord without the agreement of the tenants (and with no compensation for previous improvements) a growing number of them (tenants) have been evicted since mechanization started around 1966-67."¹

Such a mechanization/eviction process is presently restricted mainly to the southern provinces where private/feudal ownership of land prevails and where landless tenants and large holdings with absentee ownership are numerous. "Because of the communal form of land tenure, in the northern provinces where land is owned by the village community and the extended family group little mechanization has taken place in the highland agricultural regions there."²

The big landowners presently involved in the mechanization process include largely members of the traditional landed aristocracy including the imperial family (which is the biggest landowning

²) Ibid.
family in the country) and members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who either through purchase or grants from the emperor have been able to acquire large tracts of land particularly after the 1942 land grant proclamation (discussed under government landownership in Chapter II). It is important to note that all these are members of the privileged classes most of whom either hold high posts in the bureaucracy or have seats in the parliament, both houses of which are composed of members of the nobility and the local gentry.

While some of the big landowners in recent years have come to appreciate the value of commercial agriculture, and are engaged in the operation of large scale mechanized farms, most prefer to lease their holdings to large scale contractors. Such big landowners and contractors are encouraged and assisted by various state measures such as the provision of credit duty free importation of farm machinery and other privileges mentioned above. In this respect the stimulants are the activities and demonstration effects of the package projects which were meant to assist poor farmers to increase their productivity and thereby generate surplus and improve their living conditions. Indeed, experiences from the CADU project area and other "minimum package" projects show that the increased output in the extension and model farms stimulated big landowners to evict the peasants and consolidate their mechanized holdings, when they realized that "big money is hidden in the Green Revolution for those who are able to utilize the technological innovations." ¹)

It is significant to note that the policy of mechanization and that of helping the peasantry are contradictory, since given the reality of rural Ethiopia the former has in fact resulted in increased eviction which has in turn radically worsened the condition of peasant cultivators. This is evidenced in Northern Chilalo Project Area as well as the other "minimum package" project areas where eviction is increasing every year since their inception.

¹) Ibid., p.6
Having studied the impact of both policies Stahl came to the conclusion that "when the two strategies have been tried at the same time in the same area, the small farmers' interests have had to yield to the interests of the big landowners and contractors."  

An investigation of the effects of mechanized farming on peasant agriculture in Northern Chilalo Project area showed increased eviction and displacement of tenants and small peasants which in effect led to out-migration of these people to other villages in search of land for rent or to urban areas. The study showed that mechanized cultivation was negligible prior to 1968 and that by 1970 25% of the tractor-cultivable land was already under tractor cultivation. Holdings of extensive landlords were the most mechanized in the area. Out of the total number of 3,420 tenants in the surveyed area in 1968/69 450 and 500 tenants were estimated to have been evicted in 1969 and 1970 respectively due to mechanization. This rate was 13.2% and 14.6% in 1969 and 1970 respectively. During the same period 538 tenants moved out of the area studied, of which 392 tenants were evicted as a direct result of mechanization, according to the interviews of officials keeping records of movements from the area. While some of the evicted tenants were reported to have left Arussi for other provinces mostly Shoa, Bale, Harar to look for land to be rented in areas where mechanization has not started yet, others are said to have migrated to urban areas in search of employment.

A government source reports that the process of eviction is accelerating in Chilalo area in general with an average rate of peasant displacement of 7% yearly or 67 to 75% over ten years. It declares "if displacement of tenants in other development areas proceeds at only half the rate observed in Chilalo, where conditions for mechanized farming are especially favourable, i.e. at

1) Ibid., p.10
2) Ibid., p.7
3) Draft Policy on Agricultural Land Tenure, MLRA, op.cit., p.19
4) Ibid.
per cent per year, then by 1980 roughly five per cent of the present tenant population of Ethiopia will have been evicted.\(^1\)

The result of such a process is of course, to the present experiences from the project areas, increased rural unemployment and poverty of the poor peasants and tenants and therefore accelerated migration to the urban centre where employment is expected to exist. In Chilalo project area as a whole about 6,000 tenants and small peasants are known to have been evicted by 1971 by the mechanization and tractorization process encouraged by the government.

Due to the present policy of commercialization and mechanization of large scale agriculture through the various incentives given to private enterprises mechanized farming is expanding at the expense of peasant agriculture. One estimate based on recent surveys shows that 30-40% of the 2,500 tractors available in the country were found to be in areas that were traditionally farmed by tenants in small holdings by 1970. The average use of tractors in these areas is estimated to be 1 per 80 hectares while there used to be one peasant per 1.5 hectares prior to mechanized farming. The same source indicates that 60,000 hectares of the traditionally cultivated land under peasant small holdings were under mechanized farming by 1970 and that this corresponded to 40,000 peasants. Out of these peasants only 5,000 could be re-employed in the big farms while 35,000 got evicted and lost their means of livelihood. Since eviction affects not only the tenants themselves but also their family members, this figure corresponds to 170,000 people by conservative estimate.\(^2\)

"If the mechanization process continues at almost the same rate," the source concludes, "an additional 180,000 peasants will be replaced during this decade corresponding to almost 0.9 million people. With the peasant subsidies

\(^1\) op.cit., p.20

on mechanized farming, however, mechanization is likely to grow at an increasing rate, thus displacing well over 1 million people in the current decade.\textsuperscript{1)} In such circumstances and where mechanization of large scale farms and ranches owned and controlled by the few big landowning classes and large scale private enterprises is given priority at the policy level increased eviction and poverty of the rural masses should be expected to accelerate the rural-urban exodus.

Besides eviction and increased unemployment, the process has also adversely affected the small owner-cultivators and those tenants who are not evicted from the land. Available evidence shows that in areas where government projects of agricultural modernization have been launched as well as in other areas where mechanization has been introduced both the rent and the price of land have significantly increased. The increasing price of land stimulates small holders to sell their plots of land to large scale owners or contractors who offer relatively attractive prices. On the other hand, a part of what peasants receive is nullified by the fact that they have to pay previous debts. In this way they are forced to become tenants, wage labourers or to migrate to the urban areas. What we are faced with is the progressive deterioration of the condition of the poor peasants. While many are ejected from the land those who remain as tenants are required to pay more and more by way of rent. After studying such experiences in different areas where the policies of "increasing output" are implemented, Johna Holmberg declares, "As a consequence of rural development and increasing crop yields rents often rise, as they have in CADU's project area, from one third of the annual crop to half."\textsuperscript{2)}

In the above analysis it has been shown that the existing rural development policy for commercial agriculture, with the main emphasis on the mechanization of large scale farms, has led to evictions, mounting unemployment and increased poverty on the part of poor peasants.

\textsuperscript{1)} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{2)} Holmberg, J., \textit{Ibid.}, p.8
peasants. Given the prevalent agrarian structure where 90% of the land is owned by 5% of the population mainly composed of members of the landed aristocracy and members of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (refer to Chapter II), where 90% of the rural population are poor peasants with $2/3$ of them cultivating less than $1\frac{1}{2}$ hectares, where tenancy is the dominant form of land tenure and the status of 80% of the peasantry it is by no means surprising that the policy of increasing agricultural output has led to the deterioration of the peasants' condition. The measures have expectedly helped in increasing the income of the big landowning classes and that of the large scale contractors. But this had not resulted in the acceleration of the economic development of the country, for the landowning classes are more interested in satisfying their requirements for discretionary consumption than in investing in the productive sector of the economy. On the other hand, as far as the vast majority of the rural population are concerned, their condition has only been exacerbated by the process of rural "modernization".

Thus the impact of this policy has already been and will continue to be increased rural inequality and increased poverty of the rural masses which will accelerate the migration trend to the urban sector. Regarding the effect of the "modernization" drive on the poor peasants the policy makers themselves state: "On the absence of finance to participate in the technological revolution ...... the small landowner (the poor peasant) must sit by and watch his large neighbours achieve gains in productivity. Eventually these neighbours or other well-financed entrepreneurs offer him a handsome price for his land, and the farmer succumbs to the attraction of a capital sum, which, however, may be soon exhausted, leaving the man landless and forced to earn his living as a hired labourer, or sending him off to a city in search of urban employment." ¹ In the same draft policy they mention the fact that the reorganization of this negative impact has led the government to undertake the "comprehensive" and "minimum package" projects to

¹ Draft Policy on Agricultural Land Tenure, op.cit., p.17
counteract the process by providing modern inputs and credits to the small farmers consisting of the poor owner-cultivators and tenants. However, as will be shown in the following analysis, the application of these projects in the selected potential areas, mainly in the southern provinces has shown unexpected results which are not in the interest of the target groups.

We have shown already that the major objective of the policy for the peasant sector is the same as that of the commercial sector, viz, "the increase of production and output for internal and external markets" by involving the peasants in the money economy. The strategies selected for achieving this objective are such projects as "CADU", "WADU", "ADA" and the "minimum package" projects with the latter to be established at the rate of 10 "packages" every year. The activities of these projects are mainly the provision of credits, modern inputs (such as fertilizers, seeds and farming implements) as well as the demonstration of the effects of the modern techniques (new technology) through their demonstration fields (extension areas) and model farmers' fields.

Experiences from such projects have, however, shown unintended results (at least according to the expressed planned objectives). While the declared aim of the government is to improve the condition of the peasants, the implementation of the projects has, as we saw above, resulted in: (a) strengthening and improving the position of the big landowning classes and the rich farmers and (b) in the further impoverishment of the poor peasants, mounting unemployment in the project areas as well as in those parts of the country where mechanization has been introduced. One result of increased impoverishment and the loss of sources of livelihood on the part of the rural masses has not unexpectedly been increased migration to urban areas which are also faced with a mounting rate of unemployment. In this respect, the effect of these projects have been similar to those experienced in other developing countries like South and South-East Asia where the "Green Revolution" has been launched with the declared purpose of assisting small
farmers to increase production and productivity. For instance, Professor Jacoby, a known expert in this field, having done an extensive research into these measures in various developing countries, declares that, "contrary to all expectations, ... the application of these technological innovations, commonly known today as the "Green Revolution" has not resulted in similarly favourable developments (as that of the developed countries ...) but rather seems to have taken the economic foundation of their agricultural population and given rise to unexpected developments."¹) Indeed in countries like Ethiopia, where land is concentrated in few hands and where the landowning classes enjoy not only economic but also political power the assumption that a transformation of agriculture in the interest of small farmers can be achieved through such measure is highly questionable. In fact experience proves the contrary. "Considering the structure of the prevailing agrarian systems," however, Professor Jacoby notes, "it seems more likely that rather than improving rural conditions such a transformation will primarily benefit the already privileged farmers while bypassing the bulk of the rural people and even reducing their chances of gaining a livelihood in agriculture."²)

In relation to the effect of such policies in Ethiopia various investigations to date show that the existing package projects in the southern provinces where feudal landownership prevails, have in fact led to increased rural inequality and the deterioration of the condition of the rural masses whom they were intended to serve.³) Contrary to official expectations, those who have been able to effectively participate in and benefit from the projects are the already privileged classes - the big landowners and the local gentry. Experiences from CADU's project areas show that the new technology

1) Jacoby, E., "Effects of 'Green Revolution' in South and South-East Asia", Modern Asian Studies, Vol.6, 1, 1972, p.63
2) Ibid.
has led to increased productivity in terms of yield per hectare which has resulted in substantial increase of income on the part of the above classes who, because of their advantaged position have been able to utilize and benefit from the services offered by the project. 1) On the other hand, given the agrarian structure of the project areas when the majority of the cultivators are either poor peasants or tenants (40%) and where 47% of the holdings are under cultivation 2) the success of the project to involve its targets — "the lower income-bracket farmers" has been blocked precisely by these structural factors. 3) Even the distribution of increased income among the owner-cultivators who are able to participate in the programmes shows that the large owners benefit for more than the relatively smaller holders. Experiences show that the increase in income depends on the size of land owned and on the distribution pattern of land in the area. It was reported in 1972 that in the district of Chilalo (where CADU has been in operation since 1968) 36% of all the farmers accounted for only 14.5% of the total annual income while the richest 5% of farmers account for 18% of the total income. 4) From this example it is clear that distribution of land size limits the income increase of the poor farmers. In relation to this failure of provision of modern technology to benefit the main cultivators under the existing agrarian structure in the country the "SIDA" evaluation report states: "The uneven distribution of land will eventually become a real constraint for the goal of a more even distribution of the income generated by CADU's credit programme. When the proportion of CADU's inputs per cultivated area approaches the optimum level, area owned per farmer becomes the limiting factor for further income increases, and the proportion of income increases will reflect

1) For details see J. Holmberg, Small Farmer Credit in Ethiopia, op. cit., p. 54
2) Ibid., p. 7
3) Ibid., p. 56
4)
the distribution of land.\footnote{Ibid.} The same source indicates another structural factor that limits the success of such projects in the country — namely the inefficiency of the taxation system. This unfair and corrupt system of taxation allows big landowners to evade paying taxes or to pay less while the poor peasants, with no political or economic power either to bribe or to apply pressure on collectors, cannot escape paying. Such system in addition to the existing uneven distribution of land and wealth as well as the share cropping system leads to an increased gap between the income of the rich and poor farmers. Experience also indicates that the government policy can worsen the already uneven distribution of rural income, thus needing other measures to further such projects of technical services, if the mass of farmers are to be involved in the programme and if reasonable increased rural productivity is to be achieved only after which can the exodus of the rural masses be counteracted.

Apart from such rural inequality and worsening living conditions of the poor peasants engendered by policies of "modernizing" agriculture, many of the target groups are known to be barred from the programmes due to the prevalent agrarian structure as well as by the nature of the projects themselves. The small peasants cultivating mainly less than 1-5 hectares have not been able to participate in the credit programmes offered by the "comprehensive" and "minimum package" projects established so far. The majority of them being tenants are either not allowed by their landlords to participate in the schemes or are not motivated to increase their yields since it would mean either paying more rent or inviting eviction. Addressing himself to this problem Stahl states, "Tenant must be able to show up a written lease agreement on his holdings, signed by the landlord or his local representative, who also must be one of the guarantors of the farmer ... the big landlords especially are reluctant in giving their tenants written lease agree-
ments (which would increase the security of the tenants). Our conclusion then is that a majority of the projects' target group is at present excluded from the project activities.\textsuperscript{1)} Basically the big landowning classes and their members who also hold top offices at the local, regional and national levels are known to block the bulk of the tenants from participating in the projects' activities and benefit therefrom. "As long as the present power structure exists in the rural Ethiopian societies, the landowners' attitudes are of decisive importance for the possibilities of the tenants to participate in the minimum packet projects" as well as in the comprehensive ones.\textsuperscript{2)}

If not in intent and design at least in effect the projects themselves have tended to work against the interests of the rural masses. Their credit regulation as well as their insistence on down payments have in fact worked in such a way as to exclude the poor peasants and tenants. The repayment rate for credits taken in kind is 12% annually while the down payment rate is 25% of the value of the inputs, mainly fertilizers of one quintal costing $40,- - $50,-.\textsuperscript{3)} The poor farmers who are not even able to feed themselves and their families cannot be expected to pay these rates out of their meagre incomes.\textsuperscript{*} Thus, the majority of the peasants are excluded from participating in the projects not only by their structural position vis-a-vis the landlords but also by the mode of operation of the projects themselves. On the other hand the rich farmers operating up to 20 hectares or more enjoy most of the benefits that were, at the level of declarations, supposed to accrue to the poor peasants.

As we have seen the activities of the package projects have stimulated the big landowners to take up farming by themselves or

\textsuperscript{1)} Stahl, M., \textit{op.cit.}, pp.28-29
\textsuperscript{2)} \textit{Ibid.}, p.29
\textsuperscript{3)} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.14-15
\textsuperscript{*} The per capita income is estimated to be Eth.\$ 150. The actual cash income of the peasants, however, must be much less than this figure. (Eth.\$ 1,- = U.S.\$ 0.40)
through contractors and this has led to an increasing eviction of tenants and labourers. Experiences from CADU and the minimum packages have shown that the big landowners are changing their attitude towards land use and social prestige. They are increasingly realizing that if and when modern techniques are applied land can become not only a source of prestige but also of greater wealth and economic power. This can be seen from the fact that labour saving machines are being increasingly introduced in the project areas as well as in those where mechanization has been introduced.

From the above discussion it should be clear that the "problems of production"and that of the peasantry as identified by the 3rd Five Year Development planners in rural Ethiopia cannot be solved by the existing policies. In fact, when implemented within the existing structural framework, they lead, as we have seen, to the deterioration of the conditions of the masses of the rural people. The major problems of the rural masses are so fundamental that the provision of credit per se even if properly administered cannot contribute to their development. As Holmberg notes, "Many if not most of the major problems lay outside the province of credit. In the absence of a land reform, without rural roads and a strengthened government supported marketing system, there are definite constraints to the inputs that may be given to development of the ... peasant society."1) The provision of modern inputs and credit, as we have discussed above, may help a limited number of the rich farmers and the local gentry with social, economic and political power to use these services to their own advantage and thereby increase their income. However, for a majority of the Ethiopian peasants under the present agrarian structure such an income will not reach them and if it does it will not provide them with what they most need and aspire to namely title to the land they cultivate. Quite to the contrary their increased yields have

1) Holmberg, J., Small Farmer Credit in Ethiopia, op.cit., p.77

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3) For instance, in one project area (Negele) the number of tractors and harvesters increased from 3 and 1 in 1968 to 37 and 12 respectively in 1971. See M. Stahl, Ibid., p.35
provided many landlords with the incentive to evict them from the land." For a great many Ethiopian farmers", as Holmberg rightly observes, "this vicious circle will remain a reality in the absence of land reform."¹ Moreover, we have also seen that small owner cultivators are being forced to sell or give up their land and look for employment elsewhere. Thus as long as the present agrarian structure prevails the rural masses - both poor peasants and tenants - will continue to lose their employment and source of income by the effects of such rural development policies. For the purpose of this paper, we have identified two major results following from rural development policies, i.e. eviction and increasing landlessness on the part of the poor owner cultivators. The combination of these two effects will continue to accelerate the rural exodus since a considerable number of those evicted and made landless will expectedly migrate to urban areas in anticipation of employment opportunities.

¹) Ibid.
CHAPTER V

PATTERNS AND IMPACT OF RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION

I Patterns of Rural-Urban Migration

Rural-urban migration as it is observed in Ethiopia today can be said to be highly selective of persons with particular characteristics. When we consider the different socio-economic groups of the rural population that mostly move to the urban areas, we have seen that most of the migrants are the rural masses, i.e. poor peasants and tenants. This has been asserted by various surveys and studies conducted by the Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Community Development and Social Affairs, the Addis Ababa Municipality and individuals interested in the field of migration and related subjects. As we have shown in the preceding chapters and will show in the present one which are based on most of these studies, most of the migrants who flock to the cities are mainly unskilled, illiterate and poor who are forced to leave their villages for lack of minimum living and employment. After migrating to the urban centres, moreover, most are found unemployed or underemployed looking for low paid jobs mainly in daily labour as carrying goods, building roads and construction, domestic service to the absentee landlords and the urban elites and other low paying jobs which the higher income groups do not aspire to look for. The prevalence of these labouring masses among migrants can also be seen from the fact that most towns which are subject to excessive migration like Addis Ababa, Asmara and Dire Dawa are characterized by various economic problems manifested in unemployment, underemployment and the consequent urban problems of begging, destitution, street activities by those street boys discussed in Chapter III, child neglect, crime and delinquency, prostitution, housing shortages and slums etc. whose roots/causes are mainly economic. The increasing incidence of destitution, child neglect and delinquency
in the two bigger cities of Addis Ababa and Asmara, which are known to attract more migrants than other towns, can be seen from a survey done by the Ministry of Community Development and Social Affairs in 1964 which revealed that there were about 3,000 and 425 street boys in Addis Ababa and Asmara respectively. The number has definitely increased to a great extent although recent data to show the trend is not available. However, such migrants, after coming to the cities expecting to get employment and education, were not able to secure either thus were found engaging themselves in various street activities and petty crime in order to earn a living. The case of interviewed "street boys" in Addis Ababa, Asmara and Dire Dawa as has been discussed in the preceding chapter, has shown that they joined these activities after failing to get employment for which they came from their villages. The same holds true for female migrants who became mainly domestic servants with very low wages and exploitative relation of servants and masters or failing in getting any kind of job remain as waitresses in the "local bars" thus practicing part-time or full-time prostitution in order to survive in the cities. This is also shown partly from the prevalence of prostitution in Addis Ababa and other cities mainly for economic reasons as discussed in Chapter III.

In addition to such urban problems which are mainly the result of the adverse economic conditions of the migrants who are unable to earn a living in the countryside as well as in the urban centres, the prevalence of unemployment in the towns also shows that the migrants are mostly the ones who remain unemployed and underemployed. For instance, by 1966, it has been shown in the preceding chapter that more than 50% of the labour force in most of the towns covered by the estimate were unemployed. The extent of such economic problems in the urban areas especially among the migrants who are the largest group in almost all towns as shown in Chapter III and will be shown hereafter, makes it clear that the poor

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peasants and tenants are the most migratory groups. The basic cause for the exodus being the low productivity of agriculture created by the agrarian structure which forces the poor rural population to leave their villages in search of employment and other sources of income perceived to exist in the urban areas it is evident that those who are victimized by such reality of the rural society are the rural masses. Indeed our discussion in Chapter II shows clearly that the rural masses who are being impoverished by the agrarian structure are the ones who migrate most to the urban sector. Among migrants found looking for jobs in Addis most of them were reported to be semi-skilled, unskilled and illiterate looking for manual work through the employment office of the Ministry of Community Development and Social Affairs. 1)

As we have shown in the preceding chapters it is also true that the landowning classes including the royal family, the regional nobility and some of the local gentry live in the urban areas especially the capital and the provincial capitals but for different reasons. While the rural masses are mostly forced to move away from the rural sector which is experiencing low productivity and production and hence poverty due mainly to the agrarian social structure prevailing in the society with the hope of getting a source of income in the expanding cities, the movement of the other classes is of a different nature. The big landowning classes move to live in the cities as already discussed in Chapters II and IV, in order to man the high government positions in the bureaucracy as well as to join houses of the parliament which are concentrated in Addis Ababa. Many of them are also living in the provincial capitals where they serve as governors and other officials in the administration of which they form the majority. Moreover, they move to the urban centres because it is only there that various social services such as education, health, housing and others are

concentrated. However, given the traditional and conservative outlook of the local gentry and some of the regional nobilities living in the remote villages the number of those moving to cities for such reasons is limited when compared with those remaining behind in order to enjoy their social prestige and economic privileges derived from the labouring tenants who are intensively exploited. (Their position in the rural areas has been discussed in Chapter II). Moreover, their presence in the cities is not noticeable due partly to lack of research done and due to lack of observable problems facing them as can be observed openly from those facing the labouring masses.

Apart from the present prevalence of rural-urban migration among the lower socio-economic groups of the rural population, it is also evident from its pattern that migration is highly selective of particular age groups in the country. Among the different age groups it is mainly the young and the ablebodied forces of the rural sector that are found migrating in exodus to the urban areas. This can be clearly seen from the fact that the majority of the residents in towns with more than 2,000 inhabitants are of young working age. The result of the national sample surveys of 1961 and 1967 showed that out of the total urban population in the country 57% were between 15-59 years of age, considered to be the economically active population in the country. On the other hand, only 4% of the total urban population were 60 years and above while the rest (39%) were below 15 years.\(^1\) The same source indicated that this last category constituted 40% of the total population in the country by 1970.\(^2\) Given the fact that the contribution of migration to town growth is much higher than the natural increase, as discussed in Chapter III - 4.1% to 2.5% respectively - it is clear from above rates that the majority of migrants are relatively young. Indeed the findings of the two surveys showed that in general in-migrants are, on average, younger than both rural and urban

\[^1\] C.S.O., Urbanization in Ethiopia, op.cit., p.17
\[^2\] Ibid.
residents and that the age group of 15–29 years, both males and females, constitutes the bulk of the mobile population.

Although we do not have data showing the age distribution of actual migrants to all urban areas or towns at the time of migration, due to non-existence of centres to register new migrants, the present pattern of selective migration of young and able-bodied manpower of the rural sector can be seen from Table XVIII involving age distribution of those who ever in-migrated to the respective towns in 1970. From the table it is clear that the majority of those migrants to the respective towns i.e. 71.1% were young and economically active within the category 15–59 years of age. When we consider the total urban population, on the other hand, we note that only 57% were in the same age group. This clearly shows the prevalence of young working age group in the present rural-urban migration process in the country. The same difference is also noticed among the age group 15–24 between the total town population and those who migrated to the respective towns, with the latter being the majority in this age group. The situation in Addis Ababa, for which we have data on age distribution at the time of migration, shows that the average age of migration for all sexes was estimated to be 22.2 years while that of male and female was 23.3 and 21.1 years respectively by 1967.\(^1\)

As a result, by the end of 1967 40% of the city's population were under 15 years of age, 2% above 65 years while the majority (58%) were 15–64 years of age.\(^2\) From the above data we should note that the migration process involves mostly the young and active labour force and that female migrants are relatively younger than males. The same pattern is believed to exist among migrants to the rest of the urban areas. As we will see later in this chapter such pattern of migration involving the young and the active population should have a negative effect not only on the rural areas from where they move out in exodus but also on the receiver sector i.e. the urban areas, where employment opportunities are extremely

\(^1\) C.S.O., Population of Addis Ababa, op.cit., p.39
\(^2\) Ibid., p.35
inadequate, as well as on the national economy.

Beside the prevalence of migration among the young and active age groups various findings also show that it is highly selective of young females in terms of the different sexes. This is, of course, contrary to the general pattern observed in most developing countries discussed in Chapter I Part II. This is especially contrary to most areas in Africa where male migrants seem to be the most dominant ones. In relation to the influx of more women than men to towns in the country Mesfine reports, "In very many of the Ethiopian towns females constitute between 50% and 60% of the total population."1) Similar pattern is also reported by the above mentioned urban surveys covering 50 towns in the country. According to these results the Central Statistical Office reports that "... the female population of the 50 towns surveyed at both rounds ... outnumbered the male one by almost 6% at the time of the second round."2) In relation to the situation in all towns in the country the same surveys showed that the ratio of females to males was 100 to 86.4 in 1967 while it was 100 to 97.4 in Addis Ababa. It is interesting to note here that the ratio for Addis Ababa during the first urban survey in 1961 was 100 females to 103.5 males, suggesting that there were more male migrants than women to the capital. However, by 1967 there were found to be 2.6% more females than males in the capital at the end of the second survey.3) From all these realities we should note that the major migrants to the towns are female while the male migrants are also increasing at the same time. Furthermore if we take the 4.6% annual net-in-migration to the capital, Addis Ababa, as mentioned earlier, we find out that it consisted of 5.3% female migrants and only 3.9% male migrants every year as reported by the two surveys. Furthermore, the yearly average growth rate for each was 7.7% and 6.3% respectively4) while more

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1) C.S.O., Urbanization in Ethiopia, op.cit., p.16
2) Ibid., p.22
4) Ibid., p.26
than three-fourths of the women above 15 years of age were found to be migrants. ¹)

The prevalence of female over male migration to the urban areas in the country can be seen from the distribution of all urban population by sexes in all the urban centres or towns with more than 2,000 inhabitants considered officially as urban centres. This can be seen from Table XIV which indicates that the female population was larger than the male population in almost all towns by 1970. Note should be made here of the fact that the urban centres with more male population indicated in the table are those in provinces where cash crops and plantations are encouraged and are found since recent years especially under the policy for commercial agriculture discussed in Chapter IV. Hence, due to seasonal migration largely but also to male migrants who expect to get employment in the commercial farms, the towns of the southern provinces like Gore, Jimma and a few others are known to attract more male migrants. Except for few cases like these in the southern provinces, most urban centres are found to have more female migrants to them that contribute to their population growth. During the same period of 1970 the second urban survey found out that there were 11% more women than men living in the towns with more than 5,000 inhabitants. ²) The excess of females in the above cases can be explained of course, by larger numbers of female migrants than males to the urban centres in the country.

A survey conducted by the Central Statistical Office in 1970 covering 12 urban areas with more than 20,000 inhabitants revealed that "almost 50% more females than males had resided for less than one year in 10 of these at the first round survey ... and (that) there were 48% more females than males who had resided 1-5 years in these 10 urban areas." ³) The findings of the survey are shown in Table XVIII in the Annex. From this table it is clearly seen

¹) Ibid., p. 27  
²) Ibid., pp. 23-24  
³) Ibid., p. 25
that the female migrants outnumber the males among both those who resided in the respective towns for less than one year as well as for one to five years. As we have mentioned also in Chapter II (i) the excess of female over male migrants was larger in the northern provincial capitals like Asmara, Bersie, Mehale and Debre Markos where they accounted for 40-60% more females than males. While the female rural-urban migration has so far been larger than the male one the difference in their mobility is reported to be mainly due to more males than females moving between towns.\(^1\)

Among the female migrants who are found dominant in rural-urban migration it is also important to note that the great majority of them are young and single or divorced. It is shown earlier in the preceding discussions that all migrants are largely younger than male migrants. For migrants to Addis Ababa they were found to have an average age of 21.1 years by 1967 and this trend seems to be unchanged at present. In addition, the young age of female migrants can be discerned from Table XIX which covers the result of a survey involving 8 urban areas which attract more migrants to them due to concentrated employment opportunities which create high expectation among the rural female and male migrants who live in adverse conditions. (For reasons of migration refer to Chapter II and Chapter III). The above mentioned table shows that the largest number of female migrants (31.3%) is in the age group 15-29 years. Moreover, women of reproductive age constituted a big portion of the urban population, a recorded 27.6% compared to only 23.6% in rural areas. What is important to note here is the imbalance that could be created in terms of population in the urban areas, pointed out in Part I of Chapter III. Moreover, the implication of such high rate of young female migration away from the rural areas where they are involved both in household and field production should be carefully considered for it has a definite negative effect both on the rural and urban areas as will be shown

\(^1\) Ibid.
in this chapter later on. In most of the towns covered by the above mentioned urban surveys it was found out that the largest number of the females is in the age group of 15-29 years and this is believed to result in the imbalance of sexes in the urban centres. Furthermore, the survey showed that the male migrants, excluding Addis Ababa, were only about two-thirds of the females in the above age group of 15-29 years, with the difference increasing in the bigger towns. Some towns in Begemdir, Gojjam and Wollo had more than twice as many females as males recorded in age group 15-29 years. 1)

The prevalence of single and divorced women among female migrants to towns can be discerned from Table XX. As can be seen from the table, when compared with the rural areas, a relatively small population of the women in towns (67.6% to 43.5%) were married. On the other hand, the number of those single and divorced is bigger among the urban population as opposed to the rural areas. The low rate of married women and high rate of divorcees in the urban areas could be explained by a high rate of divorced migrants whom drudgery and oppressed position in the rural areas, as discussed in Chapter II and Chapter III, along with the attracting features of the urban centres creating high expectation of employment opportunities have made footloose. Added to this situation should be mentioned the early stage of marriage to which the peasant woman is exposed which is known today to lead to increased divorce rate in the towns. Such migrants after divorcing their husbands are known to flock to the cities thereby increasing the number of single, young and divorced females in the reproductive age of 15-29. The small rate of married women among the urban population, and therefore during the migrants, can also be to a limited extent attributed to the relatively higher rate of school enrolment among the urban population especially when they are living in the bigger towns, (as discussed in Chapter III, Part II) which could lead to postponement of marriage by young girls. For instance, the rate of literacy among women inhabitants above 10 years of age in the rural areas was almost zero (0.4%) while it
was 23% and 9% in the bigger and smaller towns respectively with Addis Ababa having 26% by 1965/66.\textsuperscript{1}) Although such is the situation however, the insignificant rate of literacy among the female urban population even when they reside in the big cities like Addis has less impact on keeping the urban masses single. Whatever causes led to their divorce or single position in marital status, it is obvious that their movement in large numbers can have a considerable negative impact both on the rural and urban areas as will be shown later.

The present exodus of such young and ablebodied, single and divorced (in case of female migrants) people of the rural areas to the urban centres show the tendency to be permanent and indefinite rather than temporary. This can be asserted from the preceding discussions where it was pointed out that the rate of out-migration from the towns has been very minimal both for the bigger and smaller towns. The tendency of permanent form of migration can also be seen from the fact that the rural areas showed loss of population of 0.4% every year as shown by the two sample surveys discussed earlier in this chapter as well as Chapter III. Due to non-backward migration to the rural areas therefore, they are reported to grow by 2.1% (2.5 - 0.4) annually. Such permanent form of rural-urban migration can be explained by the fact that the poor peasants and tenants who are the major migrants do not return to their villages mainly due to insecurity of tenure discussed in Chapter II where the major land belongs to the big landlords who mechanize it or rent it to other tenants. In case of the rural masses in the communal areas most of them are displaced from their small plot of land by the tenure and inheritance laws and therefore have no direct security of tenure before redistribution periods, (For details refer to Chapter II B). For those migrants whose small plot is already pledged to the money lenders and their creditors at the time of migration, the alternative for many of them is to stay in the towns and look for employment and other sources of income for

\textsuperscript{1)C.S.O., Urbanization in Ethiopia, op.cit., p.9}
livelihood either in the formal or informal sector. Failing to
get what they expected to secure in the smaller towns to which
they usually move at the first stage, most continue to migrate to
the bigger towns and remain there while looking for employment op-
portunities. In the meantime they get involved in casual labour
with low marginal wages thus joining their relatives, friends or
village members who are expected to assist them until they get
employment in which they succeed very rarely. The rate of unem-
ployment in the towns had been mentioned to be 50% for most towns,
estimated by Mesfine, while government sources estimate overt un-
employment of 15-19% annually, as shown in the preceding chapters.
In brief, the adverse conditions together with the lack of land and
employment in the rural areas for the majority of the migrants tend
to give the migration process in Ethiopia a more permanent charac-
ter.

Although the major part of the exodus is permanent in the
country in general it is also known that there is a limited extent
of seasonal migration especially since recent years. However, this
pattern involves a few segments of the rural society mainly the
"Gurages" whose number may not exceed 300,000 - 500,000. Such
seasonal or periodic migration is known to exist mainly in Addis
Ababa where the migrants engage themselves in retail trade, shop
keeping, portering, shoe shining, domestic service and all kinds
of "money-making" manual work which seem to be discriminated against
by the other migrants coming from other provinces especially the
northerners for traditional and cultural biases against manual work
still persisting. Talking about this situation starting from early
days of the establishment of Addis Ababa as the capital Richard
Pankhurst states: "Construction of various kinds, such as build-
ing of houses and palisades and the clearing of roads, created a
considerable demand for manual labour and led to a further influx
of population, particularly from the southern provinces where the
traditional distaste for manual work was less operative. Gurages
living over a hundred kilometres from the capital arrived for this
work from the very beginning of the city.\(^1\) Furthermore, their staple food called "insete" which needs longer period of time before harvest forces them to migrate to the urban areas to look for source of livelihood without which they could not survive. After being involved in such manual work and small businesses most of them are known to return to their villages for harvest until the next season during which they have to migrate again to the cities. On the other hand, a considerable number of them are also staying behind looking for permanent employment either in the secondary or tertiary sector while they are involved in casual labour with low wages or remain unemployed depending on their relatives who migrated prior to them. Apart from such groups not significant in number especially in other towns except Addis Ababa, seasonal or periodic rural-urban migration is less known among others both from the Northern or Southern provinces. Thus one can say that the overall trend of migration to the urban areas in Ethiopia today tends to be permanent and long term rather than seasonal or temporary for various reasons among which some are mentioned above.

In conclusion it should be stated that the present intensive rural-urban migration rate being mainly permanent involves, as we have discussed above and shown throughout the preceding chapters in detail, the rural masses namely the poor peasants and tenants who are the most productive sector of the society in the rural sector. Furthermore, it involves the young and ablebodied forces of the sector with the young females dominating the male migrants. Thus given that the trend involves the most productive manpower of the rural sector which is at present in a stagnating and declining state, and that it contributes much to the explosive growth of the urban centres, it becomes evident that there is an urgent need for an effective development strategy to counteract the massive trend before it becomes uncontrollable. This is found to be essential especially considering the fact that the process can have a great

\(^1\) R. Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, op.cit., p.709
negative impact not only on the rural or urban sector but also on the national economy as well as on the national development of the country. We will, therefore, turn to a discussion of the impact of the process and pattern of migration on the national economy as well as on the rural and urban sectors.

II. The Impact of Rural-Urban Migration

The present migration trend involving the above discussed pattern has not only demographic but also socio-economic implications for the rural and urban sectors as well as for the national economy. In Ethiopia as in most of the developing countries, discussed in Chapter I under the theoretical framework for causes of migration, urbanization is taking place at a very rapid pace unaccompanied by a similar degree of industrial and economic development. In connection with the existing unequal pattern of urbanization and industrial development in Africa it is interesting to note the following remark since it explains the situation in Ethiopia more clearly and accurately.

"Urbanization is a feature of our industrial age, an age unequalled in technological achievement and unequalled in dynamic economic and social changes. Over the past decade in continent after continent man has failed to adjust himself to his new environment as is all too clearly and permanently portrayed in the character and inefficiency of the urban and rural areas in which are manifested our social and economic problems."\(^1\)

The exodus of the young productive forces from the rural to the urban centres with lower level of industrial development that fails to absorb them productively has indeed led to a negative effect on both the rural and urban areas. This is discussed earlier in Chapter II where the recognition of the situation by the government planners is started. Such exodus becomes even worse when we consider that most of the trend is permanent, involving long period of absence from the farm which is the basic means of livelihood for

90% of the population and contributes 70% of the GNP as discussed earlier in Chapters II and IV. The following discussion will then attempt to show the impact of such migration process on both sectors and the national economy separately for purpose of analysis although some of the discussions will have to overlap.

a) Impact of Migration on the Rural Sector

As mentioned earlier the movement of the young and able-bodied people away from the rural areas for a longer period of time or on permanent basis has a definite negative impact on the economy of the agricultural sector which is considered by the 3rd Year Development planners and the previous ones, as the "mainstay of the national economy and of livelihood of the majority of the Ethiopian people."¹ Presently the mentioned sector is suffering from increasingly low productivity and therefore low output which has led to the present economic crisis and irregular mass famine which the country is experiencing today. This state of affairs in the Ethiopian rural sector today has been shown extensively in Chapter II where we have discussed the prevalent agrarian structure. As we have noted already, such a situation of food shortage and economic crisis has been predicted by various agencies like the U.S.A.I.D. and F.A.O. some years ago but the result has been increased famine which caused the death of many peasants as well as urbanward migration of a considerable number of those affected by the disaster. As we have shown in Chapter II, the major cause for such low production and poverty of the rural masses is the prevailing agrarian structure. On the other hand, the rural exodus which, as we have seen above, involves largely the young and productive forces of the sector can have a further decline in production if it is allowed to continue the same way.

As a result of the existing low productivity in agricultural sector there has been a regular experience of increased import and decline in export of agricultural commodities in the country since

¹) 3rd Five Year Development Plan, op.cit., p.37
recent years. For instance, in 1966 the U.S.A.I.D. Mission to the country came to the following conclusion: "Productivity is so low that almost everything produced must be consumed at home for survival. Only about 15% of the agricultural products produced is marketed. Life is very near the bare survival margin for millions of Ethiopian people."1) As a result of such low productivity, the same source reports, "For example in 1952 Ethiopia exported more than 50,000 MT cereals, grains and flour. Exports have declined steadily since that date. Practically, no grain has been exported in recent years, and imports have exceeded 50,000 tons in two recent years."2) Despite the fact that such critical situation was reported years ago the result has been more deterioration and it is manifested by the present famine experienced in the country, as discussed in Chapter II.

After an overview of the general condition of the agricultural sector in Ethiopia and the economic crisis she is experiencing presently in the preceding discussion it is now possible to show the negative effect of the rural exodus on the rural and the national economy.

In order to show its impact on the productivity of the agricultural sector from where the exodus moves it is important to consider the production process of the economy and the division of labour involved. In the preceding discussions it has been shown that the peasant subsistence sector is dominant in today's Ethiopian economy. In this sector we should note that not only adults but also young boys after 8-9 years of age as well as young females share in the production processes of farming, weeding, gathering,

1) SIDA, Regional Development Projects in Ethiopia, op. cit., p.2
2) SIDA, Ibid. The main export commodities include agricultural products like coffee (64% of exports in 1967), oil seeds, pulses and cereals, hides and skins, with most of them produced in the peasant subsistence sector. On the other hand, import commodities include mainly manufactured goods mostly consumption items like automobiles, radios, T.V.sets, modern furniture, etc, mainly consumed by absentee landlords and the urban elites.
clearing, harvesting and other field work as well as household activities in case of the latter group. Under such realities therefore, the absence of large numbers of not only young males but also young females should be expected to adversely affect the rural productivity and hence the sector's output since their labour input will be reduced by their movement either on permanent or temporary basis. Indeed, other studies of causes and effects of rural-urban migration in developing countries as a whole come to similar conclusion when they state, "... the effects of migrants' absence on output and productivity depends in part on the division of labour among various groups in the economy." 1) Thus in an agricultural country like Ethiopia, where the main productive forces are the poor peasants accounting for 90% of the rural population and on whose labour power the feudal and the landowning classes depend for their existence with luxurious living either in the rural but most often in the urban centres, the movement of such labouring masses in exodus to the other sector affects the rural economy more significantly. In effect the resulting low production leads to serious negative implications for the national economy for it is this sector which contributes the major part of the GNP.

Furthermore, the pattern of migration observed in the country being highly selective of young females in their reproductive age, as discussed in Part I of this chapter, could have a definite impact on the social development of the sector as well as on the demographic situation of both the rural and urban areas. Such movement, has led already and can continue to lead to further imbalance in age and sex ratio of the two sectors. We have already seen in Chapter III and Chapter IV that males outnumber females among the rural population, especially in lower age groups with 48.7% females, while they outnumber males in most of the towns with

50-60% females. Furthermore, recent studies as well as that of U.S.A.I.D. revealed that "about ½ of the current population is 14 years of age or less."¹ The prevalence of female migrants and the consequent imbalance in sex among the urban population as well as the imbalance in age for both sectors have been discussed in the above mentioned chapters. The situation for both sectors can be seen clearly from Table XXI in the Annex. This table makes it clear that there is a larger number of children below 15 years in the rural areas (44%) than in the urban areas (36.1%). Moreover, the female population below 15 years of age is larger in the rural than in the urban areas while those in their reproductive age - 20-44 - are smaller in this sector than the urban one since most of them migrate during this period as seen earlier in Chapter III and the first part of this chapter. The same is true with the male population between 25-49 which is less in rural areas than in the urban ones. Such increasing imbalance between the rural and urban sectors in terms of age and sex could have a negative effect not only on the demographic aspect but also on the social institutions such as the family as will be shown as follows.

The exodus of young male and female population away from the rural areas has also a negative effect as the traditional family which is largely an extended family. The family, being the main basic social, economic and cultural unit of society in Ethiopia, has established its own societal mechanisms in order to deal with certain social and economic problems such as destitution, disease, poverty, old age, handicap, child neglect, orphan and other outrageous fortunes affecting the extended family members. ² However, in present Ethiopia where urbanization is taking place at a rapid rate and where rural-urban migration of the young and ablebodied

¹) SIDA, Regional Projects, op. cit., p.1
members of this extended family occur extensively the societal mechanisms mentioned above tend to be inadequate and even disappearing. Once such family members migrate to cities mostly as single persons the family as a unit ceases to perform its role in the rural areas while the conditions both social and economic in the urban sector do not allow it to discharge such functions as above. Among the basic obstacles to functioning the same way as above in the urban areas one is the dispersal of family members to look for employment opportunities or working in different parts of the city or different cities or towns. Another handicap is the frequent failure of most migrants to get jobs that enable them to help another member of the family in a substantial way so as to save him from severe social and economic problems in which they are themselves involved living in slums and shanty towns in urban misery. The disappearance of such societal mechanisms in effect makes the rural poverty more evident since protection is no more possible with reduced productive members thus accelerating the plight of these young impoverished peasants to the urban centres to follow and depend on their migrant relatives who are expected to assist them in finding jobs or other sources of income for livelihood. The basic cause for their poverty is discussed in detail in Chapter II. The note we should make here is that the exodus of such young and ablebodied members of the rural family which used to be the basic unit of the Ethiopian society. In effect the disappearance of the mechanisms when accompanied by inadequate and even lack of institutions to replace it effectively deteriorates the conditions of the rural masses who are faced with deteriorating positions both in the rural and urban sectors.

In the case of personal or periodic migration discussed above, though limited in extent, the most significant consequence it has on the rural sector and the remaining society is change in consumption patterns and way of life which acts as a demonstration effect stimulating more migrants to cities. This process accelerates the migration trend when those migrants who move to Addis Ababa as they usually do, during lean seasons or other periods mentioned earlier,
return home and invest whatever small income they get from their earnings in the city in their small plot of land. Apart from such demonstration effect by the small number of the migrants, the transfer of new techniques or capital for use to increase output is very limited and almost non-existent since most migrants remain unemployed and largely underemployed with marginal casual jobs which could earn them only enough for subsistence until they return to their village. Rather the resulting high consumptive pattern of clothing, cheap shining ornaments and other things brought with them during return or visits create high expectation and stimulates more younger relatives and friends to move to the cities and try their luck.

The selective migration of young people and females in particular may also lead to reduction in the rural population growth in the long run. At the same time the presence of the very young and the old in large numbers could lead to serious economic and social problems for the individual family in particular and the society at large. The reduction in birth rate and the movement of the younger people from the rural sector could certainly have grave economic and social implications not only on the sector itself but also on the national development of the country. Though not manifested by their planned policies and solutions in the 3rd Year Plan the planners seem to recognize this fact, as already indicated earlier, by stating, "If not checked, this tendency will have grave economic and social consequences for both the cities and the countryside."¹ In fact, we have shown in the preceding chapter that their planned policies have contributed to and will continue to accelerate the exodus of the rural masses by strengthening the main root of the migration process in the country.

b) The Impact of Migration on the Urban Sector

Presently various social scientists such as those mentioned in Chapter I section II, have recognized the general negative effect of migration on the urban areas especially on the capital

¹) 3rd Five Year Development Plan, op.cit., p.383
cities of most developing countries. This recognition has indeed led many of them to make research into its causes and implications. Similarly most of the respective governments have recognized the fact and have shown their concern with the situation arising through their delegates in international organization seminars such as those of U.N., E.C.A., U.N.E.S.C.O. and others. Indeed, Ethiopia seems to be one of such countries concerned with the present high migration rate and its negative impact especially on the bigger cities like Addis Ababa, Asmara and a few others. Despite various attempts, however, it is evident that none of them have come to a definite and clear policy or strategy to eradicate the basic roots of the problems related to migration. This suggests not only a need for more research and analysis of the particular situation in each country but also a change of approach to development problems.

Generally from the pattern of migration observed in developing countries as well as Ethiopia as one of them, as we have seen in Chapter II, the principal effect on the urban areas is the increasing inadequacy of the cities to absorb the exodus and their expanding population. This has led to an increase in the supply of unskilled labour or "reserve army" (as it is referred to by some writers) and therefore increased unemployment and underemployment in the urban sector. Such a situation surely helps the owners of the means of production (such as industrial establishments highly dominated by foreign capital) to keep down wages of the labouring masses, both urban residents and the migrants, and facilitates increased output and surplus. However, it is also true that the effect of migration on output of such a large supply of unskilled labour can be positive only when the total supply of labour can be fully absorbed by the urban economy. The excess of labour migration has indeed partly led to the present high rate of urban unemployment experienced in the country, as pointed out earlier in the preceding chapters. Thus most of the urban economy is being absorbed by the controllers and owners of the industries both secondary and tertiary who are a small segment of the society.
and foreign investors while it is flooded with a large pull of unproductive workers mainly in the service and tertiary sectors which cater for the interests of the ruling classes and the higher strata of the bureaucracy whose basic origin is discussed in chapter II. The consequent high rate of unemployment and underemployment observed in most of the towns has led to increased mass poverty and marginality of their position in sharing the benefit (surplus) that is the result of their labour power.

Furthermore, the increasing population of the towns especially big cities like Addis has led to and will continue to lead to more demand for public and private services mainly consumer goods such as food, clothing, shelter, for more electricity, water, police protection, and more important for economic and social activities like employment, health, education, housing etc. The discrepancy between the supply of such essential services and the demand for them has indeed led to the present high rate of unemployment, congestion, housing shortage, slums, vagrancy, begging, street activities as mentioned earlier in this chapter, prostitution, crime and delinquency and many others whose main causes are the lack of employment and source of income for the majority of the masses. Some of the above mentioned problems have been discussed especially in relation to their causes in Chapter III and the first part of this chapter. In relation to those few migrants and the urban poor who are involved in the industrial sector with very low wages, we have shown in Chapter III that the majority (85.1%) employed in Addis Ababa by 1972 were engaged in tertiary sector and services. Among all employed labour, on the other hand, only 20.7% were engaged in manufacturing industries. 1) Out of the 85.1% of those employed in the tertiary sector the majority - 43.6% - were employed in whole sale and retail trade followed by community, social and personal services (21.1%) and transport, storage, communication and construction (10.5%). Such employment structure is in fact existing

in a city like Addis where almost all industries including manufacturing are concentrated and attract more migrants who are living in adverse conditions in the rural areas by creating higher expectations than it can provide for them. The pattern is more severe in other towns where the tertiary and service sector is much more dominant than the productive sector of the economy. The situation is thus a marginal position of most migrants who are usually involved in such unproductive sectors whose pay does not benefit them but the higher echelons of the urban society. However the expectation to get jobs increases more migration which in effect intensifies the burden of the urban sector.

The consequent inadequacy of the urban economic activities to absorb the exodus has indeed led to the inability of the urban masses to cover their basic needs and that of their family. This is manifested by increasing rate of the urban problems observed in most urban centres and discussed earlier. The problem of housing shortages is further accelerated by the existing monopolistic landownership systems both in the rural and urban areas. Mesfine referring to the capital, the biggest city in the country states, "5% of the population own 95% of the privately owned land."1) Beside the increasing high rent charged by the landlords with no control over the rents they charge, the condition of the existing limited houses deteriorates lacking rudimentary sanitation and basic facilities needed for healthy environment. Such shortages of housing for the majority of the urban masses become more accelerated by increasing migration to them which makes most towns full of slums and other related problems. Such occurrence in extent can lead to unfavourable effects on economic development not only directly by inflation or fast deterioration of the level of living but also indirectly through heightened social and political tensions detrimental to the healthy growth of the economy as a whole. Such indications are already shown in Ethiopia today, where social

1) Mesfine W. Mariam, Urbanization in Ethiopia, op. cit., p.9
and political tensions are increasing and are becoming the order of the day, thereby threatening the existing feudal order which is gradually giving way to evident changes but which are not in the interest of the masses. Given the present exodus of the young and ablebodied rural masses to the urban areas and the unproductive utilization of resources both by the public and private sectors not only the rural masses but also the urban masses will be severely affected by the rising costs of living and the unfavourable social and political effects will continue to persist.

The process of rural exodus to the urban centres has also a far-reaching negative effect on the stabilized labour force both in the industrial and tertiary sectors. The presence of unemployed labour or reserve army in the cities has led to low wages and stagnant level while it increases the profit of the foreign capitalists and the emerging national bourgeoisie. The present low level and stagnant wages of the few labourers who could get employment in these urban areas has not been able to cope with the increasing cost of living, thus leading to their impoverished position which does not make them much different from their poor relatives in the rural areas who continue to flock to them to seek for employment opportunities. Such exploited position of the workers by both the foreign capitalists, who dominate the industrial sector both in the rural and urban sector, and by the few national bourgeoisie of which the major part is also the absentee landlords and the high civilian and military officials, can be seen from the following pattern which is even worse since recent years. For instance, between 1955 and 1966 wages in thirteen provinces of Ethiopia increased only by 5% while that of Eritrea actually declined by 12% during the same period. 1) On the other hand, goods needed by the masses witnessed a fantastic increase. For instance, teff, the staple food, increased by 61%, wheat by 215%, maize by 30%, beef by 50% during 1953-1962. Cotton wool which is used by the poor masses

1) Amban Ayele, op.cit., p.39
increased from 16% - 25% in 1961-1964. Housing shortages due to the exodus and increased slum clearance programmes of the state especially in the big cities increased while the rate of rents charged by the landlords increased by 200% during the last years.\footnote{Ibid.} An urban situation such as this where its major productive population suffers from shortage of food and other basic necessities while those few employed labourers eke a living from their low wages with an increasing cost of living cannot be expected to have any but a grave consequence for both employed and unemployed labour forces which in effect affects the national economy.

Thus, as has been shown above, the intensive rate of rural-urban migration and its pattern as observed in Ethiopia has and will continue to have a grave result and negative effect not only on the rural and urban areas but also on the national economy and development of the country if it is not minimized before it becomes uncontrollable. This asks for a serious consideration of the basic causes of the migration process identified to be the agrarian structure discussed in Chapter II and strengthened by the existing rural development policies discussed in Chapter IV. Thus, the following section will attempt to offer some suggestions to policy makers when they try to deal with migration problems occurring in Ethiopia by attaching its roots rather than its symptoms or manifestations.
CHAPTER VI

SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding chapters an attempt has been made to indicate the main causes of rural-urban migration in Ethiopia. While these causes emanate from the country’s system of social organization they are also being strengthened by certain development policies whose effects are in contradiction with the interest of the rural masses. It has been shown that the existing low productivity of agriculture is the basic cause for the present rural exodus and that it is also the fundamental problem of Ethiopia today. This has also been recognized by the development planners as we have seen in Chapters II and IV. On the other hand, the low productivity is in turn caused, as the planners themselves logically concede, by the agrarian structure referring to mainly the prevailing landownership and tenure systems as shown by quotation from the 3rd Year Development Planners’ statements. Despite such recognition by the planners, however, we have seen in Chapter IV that the "problem of production" and the increase in agricultural output has been the principal objective and therefore given priority over the "problem of the peasantry", which had led to the planned and implemented policies discussed above.

In the 3rd Year Development Plan, however, one sees clearly the recognition, by the same planners, of the incapacity of such policies to achieve their objectives. In fact the plan makes it clear that these policies, if applied within the present agrarian structure, could deteriorate the living conditions of the peasant cultivators and accelerate the present intensive urbanward migration (for the rate of migration refer to Chapter III). To this effect they state: "The need for vigorous land reform is evident. Very little progress in agrarian reconstruction and development, particularly in peasant agriculture, can be made under the existing tenure and farm size." 1) They add that the transformation of

1) 3rd Five Year Development Plan, op.cit., p.195
the peasant economy into the market economy and the commercialization of agriculture within the present agrarian structure could lead to uncontrollable exodus if not accompanied by land reform measures. When we consider these statements and the planned and executed rural development policies we see clearly the contradiction between the formulation of plans and policies and their implementation; for it is exactly the measures considered inadequate by the planners that are being applied in the agricultural sector today and are accelerating the migration trend. On the other hand, the low priority given to the agricultural sector as opposed to the urban/industrial sector of the economy is manifested by the planned pattern of investment and expenditure of the 3rd Year Plan period discussed in Chapter IV, and suggests the accelerating impact of the industrial policy on the rural exodus.

Given the existing socio-economic structure of the Ethiopian society where the few landowning classes, mostly absentee, are dominant in both policy-making and the bureaucracy, one should recognize the fact that any land reform that will be in the interest of the rural masses cannot be effected. This is especially so when we realize that effective land reform would involve the share and transfer of not only the economic (control of land) but also the social and political power which this class enjoys. In this respect Professor E. Jacoby, rightly, reminds us of the following, "A development policy directed towards the redistribution of income and opportunities and a more favourable social stratification is not only unpopular, but it is unacceptable to those who, through control of land and labour, wield the economic and political power which they fear to lose if institutional reforms were to be introduced."¹ Indeed, experience shows that the present regime in Ethiopia cannot introduce even mild land reform measures in the interest of the masses let alone an effective land reform since this would involve "devices for producing fundamental alter-

ations in property rights and economic obligations." For instance, in 1966 a bill regulating landlord-tenant relationships and introducing a uniform rental system was submitted only to be successfully rejected by the landlord-dominated parliament. Addressing himself to this problem, Holmberg in the SIDA evaluation report of the "package" projects declares: "It is unrealistic to expect rapid progress in either the income of production sides in agriculture, or in the development of a domestic market in which industrial expansion can be based, until bold measures in land reform are taken. The IEG (Imperial Ethiopian Government) seems unable to mobilize support for the necessary adjustments, even though the national development plans and other policy statements loudly proclaim the need." Despite the fact that it has created an institution of Land Reform in 1966 it has failed to take measures to solve the problems identified as fundamental by the planners themselves. This can be seen from the fact that, as Holmberg clearly explains the situation, "A ministry of Land Reform was set up in 1966. In 1966 the Parliament rejected mild tenancy legislation; a re-submission in weakened form in 1970 was less than favourably received; a further version is still before parliament." He concludes, "in no other area is the gap between public declaration and performance so large." It is important to note here that the above mentioned version pending in the parliament since 1972 is "a draft tenancy relationship proclamation" which does not touch or alter the fundamental issue of land reform involving ownership of land, but specifies the form of landlord-tenant relationships thus cleaving the rural power structure in tact. Even if carried through and successfully implemented, therefore, this policy cannot be expected to change the condition of poor peasants and tenants fundamentally.

2) J. Holmberg, op. cit., p.116
3) Ibid.
4) Ibid.
5) M. Stahl, op. cit., pp.49-50
Despite sweet declarations contained in the 3rd Year development plan, moreover, various writers based on a range of evidence indicate the present low commitment of the state either to national development or to the interests of the masses. In this connection Holmberg states, "Resistance to land reform comes in large measure from within the government itself. Civil servants, soldiers and police are frequently granted government land, usually 40 hectares a piece for "patriotic services". In the last two years 104,000 hectares were granted, while pending applications covered a further 428,000 hectares. Only about 5% of the grants were to landless persons who generally experience difficulties in obtaining land in this manner owing to the cumbersome and slow procedures involved. "Most land granted in this manner is taken up merely for speculative purposes and at best leased to tenants."\textsuperscript{1}

Such land grant policies implemented this way are in fact contrary to the Third Year Development Plan which declares that government lands will be given to private citizens including landless peasants "on condition of full and proper exploitation of the land within a reasonable time."\textsuperscript{2} Because of the lack of financial and technical capacity, according to Cohen, many of the landless peasants who received 5% of the land grants are known to have sold the land and migrated in the hope of securing urban employment.

Beside such observers and researchers, the development planners themselves justify the need for land reform by stating the existing problem as follows: "The immediate concern of land reform is to overcome the apathy of the agricultural population caused by traditional inequitable land tenure pattern, concentration of landownership in a small group, insecurity of tenure and exorbitant rent or share cropping arrangements."\textsuperscript{3}

However, the measures advocated by the planners for both "economic and social reasons" do

\textsuperscript{1} J. Holmberg, \textit{op.cit.}, p.76. For similar accounts of land granted since 1942 see J. Cohen, \textit{Ethiopia after Haile Selassie}, \textit{op.cit.} pp.377-379

\textsuperscript{2} 3rd Five Year Development Plan, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.196-197

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid.}, p.195
not transcend "legislation for cadastral survey, title registration and adjudication procedures" as well as "legislation concerning landlord-tenant relationships, tax on unutilized land" and enactment of "the already approved programmes of distribution of government lands to private citizens" including landless tenants.¹)

As can be seen from the above sets of policy measures it is clear that none of them touch the major issue of landownership despite the fact that they recognize it as the major cause of low productivity in the agricultural sector. Moreover, it should be mentioned that the enabling law for the measures proposed in the third development plan has not yet been promulgated since both the lawmakers and implementors, as mentioned earlier, have vested interest in the existing system. The only conclusion that can be drawn from all this is that as long as the existing power structure prevails no effective agrarian reform or land reform and therefore no significant change in the rural or the national economy can be expected. M. Stahl seems to recognize the significance of this when he states: "In such a confrontation between different agricultural development strategies the outcome is to a great extent dependent on which party the government sides with. If the government in the execution of agricultural policies, identifies with and supports the large scale commercial farms (the analysis in Chapter IV has shown that this is the case in Ethiopia today) then it is unrealistic to think that efforts to promote the interests of the subsistence farmers can be successful as long as their interests are in conflict with those of the commercial farmers."²)

For such measures to be effective and in the interests of the masses therefore, it seems that there is a need for agrarian reform that should precede such policies, which otherwise will continue to reinforce the low productivity and rural poverty and the consequent rural exodus.

¹) Ibid., pp.196-197
²) J. Stahl, op.cit., p.56
From the above arguments therefore, we should conclude that the change in the agrarian structure should involve effective agrarian reform or land reform. By agrarian or land reform it is not meant to refer to land redistribution or land tenancy reform alone, since neither of them can produce lasting effects without control of the forces which dominate land, credit and local markets. The establishment of a new system of landownership is evidently an integral part of a social and economic reconstruction. However, even land redistribution schemes launched with the best of intentions cannot succeed unless the peasant obtains complementary support, such as the provision of credit, fertilizers, seeds and farm implements as well as education, and marketing facilities and more, since long term development requires the formation and social reproduction of cooperative societies. On the other hand, these in turn must be coordinated with industrialization and general resource development. "Only such an approach", as Professor Jacoby rightly observes, "can protect the peasant against the impact of superior market forces and establish new patterns of land and income distribution of social values, of rural-urban relations which will make possible the transition from subsistence to market economy and from servitude to a meaningful life."¹ The present paper shows clearly that it is only when measures of this kind are taken that the rural low productivity and hence the rural poverty can be eradicated and therefore the rural exodus could be minimized to a considerable degree.

While the above mentioned land reform measure and other reforms complementary to it are found to be an essential precondition for any development strategy in the rural sector, it should also be noted that there is a need for simultaneous development of the urban sector as complementary to the suggested rural development measures. In this respect integrated urban and rural development planning and policy at the national level is an essential measure. This will help in bridging the existing imbalances between the two

¹ E. Jacoby, Man and Land, op.cit., p.26
sectors, discussed in Chapter III, in terms of economic and social
development, which can in turn ameliorate most of the urban pro-
blems caused by accelerated exodus. However, time and space for-
bid going into detail regarding possible urban-centred policies.
It is hoped that enough has been said concerning the rural areas
alone to show the seriousness of Ethiopia's current migration
problems.
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<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Owns-operated Household</th>
<th>Tenant-operated Household</th>
<th>Partly owned</th>
<th>All Households</th>
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<td>0.78</td>
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<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.82</td>
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### Table II

Percentage distribution of Tenants by provinces

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<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Rural Pop.</th>
<th>Tenants No.</th>
<th>Tenants %</th>
<th>Partly Tenants No.</th>
<th>Partly Tenants %</th>
<th>Total Tenants No.</th>
<th>Total Tenants %</th>
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<td>Sheoa</td>
<td>3,585,000</td>
<td>1,826,350</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>573,600</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,401,950</td>
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<td>Arussel</td>
<td>690,000</td>
<td>307,764</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50,724</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>358,488</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wollega</td>
<td>1,664,100</td>
<td>574,738</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49,715</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>624,453</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td>Geamu Goffa</td>
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<td>21,633</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1,987,590</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>39,751</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>775,159</td>
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<td>571,769</td>
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<td>29,073</td>
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<td>600,842</td>
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<td>515,375</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>71,778</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>775,207</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wello</td>
<td>2,061,800</td>
<td>341,586</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>330,366</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>671,982</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>12,457,835</td>
<td>5,488,620</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,176,977</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6,665,597</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Province         |                |             |           |                    |                  |                   |                 |
| Begemdir         | 1,087,200      | 97,848      | 10        | 65,232             | 4                | 163,080           | 15              |
| Gojjam           | 1,344,500      | 172,785     | 13        | 95,024             | 7                | 267,809           | 20              |
| Tigre            | 1,410,800      | 98,756      | 7         | 257,218            | 18               | 355,974           | 25              |
| Bag & Lasta      | 474,600        | 18,968      | 4         | 143,828            | 33               | 162,784           | 37              |
| **Total**        | 4,277,100      | 388,355     | 9         | 561,292            | 13               | 949,647           | 22              |
| **Grand Total**  | 16,734,935     | 5,876,975   | 35        | 1,738,269          | 10               | 7,615,244         | 45              |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Absentee owners %</th>
<th>Land owned by absentees</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arussi</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bale</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemu-Wafa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harerge</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allubabor</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
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<td>Keffa</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>Shoa</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>Sidamo</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>Wellega</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>Welo</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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### Table IV

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<th>Crop and Cash</th>
<th>Services</th>
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<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Harrarge</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illubabor</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shewa</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Wollega</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>Sidamo</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>Wag &amp; Lasta</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Total(Grand)</strong></td>
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Source: Seminar Proceedings on Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia, MLRA, August, 1970, pp.53 and 74
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<td></td>
<td>1938&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1967&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1970&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Growth rate</td>
<td>1938-70: &lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;%</td>
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3 - Statistical Abstract 1970, " " Gobenment, A.A.
## Table VI

### Density of population of towns with 40–800,000 inks in 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Towns</th>
<th>Pop. Density 1971</th>
<th>Pop. as % of total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Addis Ababa</td>
<td>851,610</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Asmara</td>
<td>232,550</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dire Dawa</td>
<td>63,570</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dessie</td>
<td>47,150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Harer</td>
<td>45,840</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Jimma</td>
<td>44,780</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Nazareth</td>
<td>42,860</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 towns</td>
<td>1,328,460</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175 &quot;</td>
<td>1,160,980</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Total 182 towns</td>
<td>2,489,440</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table VII

Migration to and from towns in 1970, by size of towns  
(Number in 1,000)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>N° 53</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 5,8</td>
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<td>1,4</td>
<td>4,4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Towns with</td>
<td>N° 44</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.000 - 20.000</td>
<td>% 7,0</td>
<td>3,5</td>
<td>3,5</td>
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<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>N° 45</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>20.000 +</td>
<td>% 5,6</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>4,6</td>
</tr>
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<td>(excl.Addis Ababa)</td>
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<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>N° 142</td>
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<td>99</td>
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<td>% 6,0</td>
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<td>4,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All towns</td>
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</table>

Source: Urbanization in Ethiopia, Statistical Bulletin 9,  
C.S.O. p.14
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industries</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Manufacturing and Handicrafts (x)</td>
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<td>248.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Mining</td>
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<td>175.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<td>- Transport and Communications</td>
<td>499.1</td>
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<td>624.0</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>- Electric Power</td>
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<td>120.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Social Services</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>11.0</td>
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<td>41.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>- Housing</td>
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<td>- Social Welfare and Rural Water Development</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Others &amp; Unallocated</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Urban infrastructure</td>
<td>223.2</td>
<td>143.6</td>
<td>366.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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(x) Handicrafts was planned to absorb $50 million of the total amount.

Source: Third Five Year Development Plan, I.E.G., 1968-73, A.A.
### Table IX

**Distribution of current Government expenditure 1969/70--- (Eth. million).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Machinery &amp; Equipment</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>General Services</td>
<td>159,653</td>
<td>37,102</td>
<td>15,058</td>
<td>213,829</td>
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<td>- National Defence</td>
<td>66,039</td>
<td>16,682</td>
<td>2,621</td>
<td>85,342</td>
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<td>- Internal order</td>
<td>65,222</td>
<td>13,028</td>
<td>2,770</td>
<td>81,851</td>
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<tr>
<td>&amp; justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Services</td>
<td>29,265</td>
<td>7,320</td>
<td>6,306</td>
<td>44,103</td>
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<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>7,287</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>10,457</td>
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<td>Industry &amp; Commerce</td>
<td>3,218</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>4,684</td>
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<td>Public Works &amp; Communications</td>
<td>18,760</td>
<td>5,094</td>
<td>5,052</td>
<td>28,962</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>73,213</td>
<td>9,275</td>
<td>4,131</td>
<td>94,211</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education &amp; Culture</td>
<td>59,686</td>
<td>3,656</td>
<td>2,768</td>
<td>66,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>11,099</td>
<td>5,186</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>20,564</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social affairs(housing)</td>
<td>2,428</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>4,656</td>
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Table X

Population working and not working on % of total working force (10+ years) (in 1966).

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<th>Towns</th>
<th>Working</th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Not Working</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>Age group</td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10-44</td>
<td>45+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 - 44</td>
<td>45+</td>
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<td>35.8</td>
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<td>10.6</td>
<td>64.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harer</td>
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<td>8.8</td>
<td>57.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10.7</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>58.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11.3</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assela</td>
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<td>8.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>68.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Axum</td>
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<td>16.9</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dilla</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leqemt</td>
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<td>54.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dessie</td>
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<td>9.4</td>
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### Table XI
Distribution of Industries by towns (1966/67)

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<tr>
<th>Towns</th>
<th>No. of industries</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Addis Ababa</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Asmara</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dire Dawa</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Nazareth/Wonji Area</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Harar</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Akaki</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Gondar</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Dessie</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Massawa</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Awassa</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Assab</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Khaliti</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Agere Hiwot</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Jimma</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Adola</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Derar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Din Din</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Neghelle</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Bahr Dar</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. 10 towns (1 each)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total: 30 towns**  
395

**Total: no. of employees**  
46,372$^x$)

Source: Survey of Manufacturing and Electricity, 1966/67, C.S.O., A.A. p. 27 – 50 (Compiled)

$x)$ = Statistical Abstract 1970, S.O., p. 54
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<th>86</th>
<th>823</th>
<th>936</th>
<th>536</th>
<th>8'254</th>
<th>8'4</th>
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<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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<td>324</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>360</td>
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<td>24</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>25</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>275</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>211</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Provinces: Pharmacist, Nurses, Physicians, Doctors, Citizens, Hospitals, Beds

Source: Statistics Afghanistan 1979, Imperial British Indian Government.

Distribution of Medical Services by Province (1979)
Table XIII
Distribution of Schools by Provinces - 1962/63

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Government Schools</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>183</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wollega</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>20</td>
</tr>
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<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dire Dawa)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>83</td>
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<td>69</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-5</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>323</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ogaden</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>199</strong></td>
<td><strong>193</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,362</strong></td>
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</table>

### Distribution of urban population by sex and by towns (in 1970)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Towns by Provinces</th>
<th>No. of towns</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total population (Urban)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>24,720</td>
<td>24,950</td>
<td>46,670</td>
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<td>8,660</td>
<td>8,446</td>
<td>17,106</td>
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<td>2,700</td>
<td>6,000</td>
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<td>12,040</td>
<td>12,430</td>
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<td>- Goba</td>
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<td>6,008</td>
<td>5,769</td>
<td>11,777</td>
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<td>- Ginir</td>
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<td>2,036</td>
<td>2,263</td>
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<td>Gemu Gofa</td>
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<td>15,920</td>
<td>10,550</td>
<td>32,470</td>
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<td>4,500</td>
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<td>2,050</td>
<td>3,690</td>
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<td>12,300</td>
<td>11,650</td>
<td>23,950</td>
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<td>4,399</td>
<td>3,982</td>
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<td>3,072</td>
<td>2,832</td>
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<td>33,060</td>
<td>69,360</td>
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<td>- Jimma</td>
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<td>- Agaro</td>
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<td>55,200</td>
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<td>- Yirga Alem</td>
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<td>5,881</td>
<td>13,715</td>
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<td>6,211</td>
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<td>49,610</td>
</tr>
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<td>- Lehemte</td>
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<td>8,151</td>
<td>7,954</td>
<td>16,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ghimbi</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,104</td>
<td>3,626</td>
<td>7,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Begemder</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37,890</td>
<td>47,270</td>
<td>85,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Gonder</td>
<td></td>
<td>16,370</td>
<td>18,955</td>
<td>35,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Azezo</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,038</td>
<td>5,168</td>
<td>9,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>153,870</td>
<td>167,610</td>
<td>321,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Asmara</td>
<td></td>
<td>100,980</td>
<td>117,380</td>
<td>218,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Massawa</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,790</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>18,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Adi Ugri</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>6,220</td>
<td>11,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gojam</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>35,990</td>
<td>43,680</td>
<td>79,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Debre Markos</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,726</td>
<td>14,444</td>
<td>27,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Bahr Dar</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,861</td>
<td>12,331</td>
<td>22,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dangla</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>2,660</td>
<td>4,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hararge</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>81,890</td>
<td>84,290</td>
<td>166,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Harar</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,487</td>
<td>22,546</td>
<td>45,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dire Dawa</td>
<td></td>
<td>29,901</td>
<td>31,024</td>
<td>60,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Asbe Teferi</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,618</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>9,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>No. of towns</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total population (urban)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Shoa</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>520,120</td>
<td>524,940</td>
<td>1,045,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Addis Ababa</td>
<td></td>
<td>400,380</td>
<td>395,520</td>
<td>795,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hazret</td>
<td></td>
<td>19,340</td>
<td>20,019</td>
<td>39,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Debre Zeit</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,221</td>
<td>14,406</td>
<td>27,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tigre</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>54,970</td>
<td>68,710</td>
<td>123,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mekele</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,522</td>
<td>15,373</td>
<td>27,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Adwa</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,225</td>
<td>8,487</td>
<td>15,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Wollo</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>45,990</td>
<td>58,900</td>
<td>104,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dessie</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,839</td>
<td>24,892</td>
<td>45,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sekota</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>10,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>179 towns</td>
<td>1,117,700</td>
<td>1,174,370</td>
<td>2,292,070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table XV

Causes for migration to Addis Ababa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>No. of Cases interviewed</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To beg</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek employment</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visit relative</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Court cases</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Seminar Proceedings on Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia, MLRA, A.A, 1970, p. 413
Table XVI

Capital Expenditure Projections - 1968-73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital Expenditure</th>
<th>Eth. million</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Productive activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Commercial farms</td>
<td>209.</td>
<td>(75.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Awash Valley Authority alone)</td>
<td>(60.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Multi purpose cooperatives</td>
<td>30.</td>
<td>(12.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Peasant farms</td>
<td>35.</td>
<td>(13.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Marketing Organizations</td>
<td>11.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Service &amp; Research</td>
<td>30.</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Water resources Surveys and Studies</td>
<td>28.</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Forestry &amp; Fishing</td>
<td>18.</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Capital Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>361.</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recurrent development expenditure</strong></td>
<td>102.</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Develp. Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>463.</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Land Reform(Cadastral Survey)‡</td>
<td>12.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‡ Additional allocation to the Ministry of Land Reform and Administration for cadastral surveys in Arussi and Shoa.

Source: Third Five Year Development Plan, Imperial Ethiopian Government, Addis Ababa, p. 204.
### Table XVII

Age distribution of total town population and in-migrants to the respective town.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Town pop.</th>
<th>Born in same town</th>
<th>in-migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 14</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 14</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 24</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 59</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table XVIII
Urban population by length of residence and sex
(Towns with more than 20,000 inhabitants)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Towns</th>
<th>Born in Town</th>
<th>Resident less than one year</th>
<th>Resident 1 - 5 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>144,400</td>
<td>158,540</td>
<td>19,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asmara</td>
<td>49,200</td>
<td>49,780</td>
<td>2,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ufre Dawa</td>
<td>11,250</td>
<td>12,700</td>
<td>1,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dessie</td>
<td>9,340</td>
<td>10,740</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harar</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>13,290</td>
<td>1,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jimma</td>
<td>6,810</td>
<td>7,870</td>
<td>1,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazreth</td>
<td>4,510</td>
<td>5,290</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonder</td>
<td>7,410</td>
<td>9,230</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekele</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debre Zeit</td>
<td>3,530</td>
<td>4,350</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debre Markos</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>5,790</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahr Dar</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>1,870</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 towns</td>
<td>280,040</td>
<td>286,650</td>
<td>32,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 towns (excl. A.A)</td>
<td>15,640</td>
<td>128,110</td>
<td>12,630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table XIX

Age distribution by sex in 8 urban areas. 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Both sexes</th>
<th>Rural areas covered both sexes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 14</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 29</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 59</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Addis Ababa, Asmara, Dessie, Harar, Timma, Gondar, Debre Zeit and Bahr Dar.

Table XX

Marital Status of women (10 yrs +) by size of towns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of towns</th>
<th>single</th>
<th>married</th>
<th>widowed</th>
<th>divorced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 - 20,000</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 +</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 +</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Urbanization in Ethiopia, Statistical Bulletin 9, G.S.O., A.A., p. 16
Table XXI
Age and sex composition of rural and urban population.
(in percent) by 1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age-group</th>
<th>Male Rural</th>
<th>Male Urban</th>
<th>Female Rural</th>
<th>Female Urban</th>
<th>Total % Rural</th>
<th>Total % Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 14</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 19</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 24</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 29</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 34</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 39</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 44</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 49</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 54</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 - 59</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
