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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO TANZANIA

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The Colonial Heritage

Generally speaking leaders of African states who replaced colonial powers as well as those who supplanted the former, whether military or civilian, have continued to look to the metropolitans not only as elements for emulation but also for guidance and direction, in a word for leadership. However, historically explicit leadership roles by former colonial powers has become somewhat untenable. Not only because of the surfacing of conflicts of interests between the metropolitans and their former colonies but also, and probably more important, because of a psychological climate that militates against any overt "interference in the internal affairs of states." Determining causes and effects of any social phenomena is here regarded as an onerous task, particularly in international politics where much of the drama is played behind the scenes or underground shrouded in secrecy. 1) Once attempted, cause-effect analysis bears the responsibility of defining the distant and immediate causes, the necessary conditions and occasions pushing phenomena to the realm of the observable. Apart from the danger that one or more of the links in these processual connections may be disregarded, the very ramification of the effects produced may simply defy categorization, of cause with varying limits imposed by our own state of knowledge in different fields. Having stated this limitation, one may say that the ethic of non-interference though intimately partaking in the nature of jealousy guarding any and all power positions, occurs in its modern manifestation in the concepts of self-determination and sovereignty of political systems. Furthermore, freedom as an imperative

1) Writing on communication, secrecy and social policy, Norbert Wiener, "The founder of the science of cybernetics," wrote: "In the World of Affairs, the last few years have been characterised by two opposite, even contradictory, trends. On the one hand, we have a network of communications, intranational and international, more complete than history has ever before seen. On the other hand ... we are approaching a secretive frame of mind paralleled in history in the Venice of the Renaissance," The Human Use of Human Beings, Cybernetics and Society: Sphere Books Ltd., London, 1968, p. 99.
poses interference and all other elements that go with it as factors to be eliminated if development is to occur. The assumption underlying this needs to be specified: development is concomitant on freedom, that condition of existence in which knowing, learning, willing and acting human beings can realize themselves both individually and as groups. This bears particular relevance to former dependent peoples who only recently emerged from colonial status.

Colonialism is a complex process of human existence, dramatic, vivid and yet largely elusive. Perhaps Lucian W. Pye is quite right to note that it "cannot possibly be described or fully comprehended by the limited language of politics." 1) Though having recognized its immense complexity he reverts to a position of simplicity by viewing the phenomenon merely as "the diffusion of the world culture: a culture which represents the essence of much of the culture of the West, its place of origin ...." 2) Certainly, involved in that complex process was acculturation to Western civilization. But there was also, as he concedes, foreign domination and the search for independence; and all these factors had diverse and far-reaching implications. Acculturation did not take place in a free flow of different cultural traits and between independent peoples making free choices; one culture was imposed on another just as one people was subjected to another's rule. Europe's civilizing mission or "the white man's burden" was expressed in "dominer pour servir." In the case of Africa Ruth Slade puts the matter thus:

"The Africans had not been asked to express their opinions on the subject of introduction of Western civilization; it was assumed that they would be glad enough of the change once they discovered that they were to be compensated for the inconveniences — such as forced labour — by an improvement in their material conditions of life. There was no idea during these years, of equality between black and white; it seemed abundantly evident that the relationship between European and African could only be that of benefactor and recipient." 3)


The risk involved was treating the "natives" as "something less than men." 1) "See how well we look after our cattle," remarked a Belgian colonialisr proudl) pointing to the sports ground, the hospital and the school in his camp in Katanga. However, happiness and content cannot be measured by material conditions of life alone and as Slade observes, "at all times, men have found freedom in misery preferable to a comfortable slavery." 2) Thus the independence movement, when it finally came, predictably assumed the form of the reassertion of the natural equality of the Africans and their colonial masters.

The claim to equality by the colonial peoples, once consciously posed, proved to be the rock against which classical colonialism was to be crushed, though particularly at the initial stages "powerless conscience" had to face "conscienceless power". Independence in this sense meant one thing: the rejection of an enforced humility and the claim to a lost dignity - in a word rehumanization. Here, however, one thing needs to be grasped: leadership undefined is not the absence of leadership. Particularly in the case of the point at issue, it is leadership unspecified, subtle, indirect, not easily cognizable and consequently difficult to control.

At any rate what is being stressed here is the fact that the question of political development in Africa cannot possibly be seen apart and separate from the trends in recent history, a history dominated by slave raiding, slave trading, slave owning and the consequent devaluation of the human person to the level of mere commodity. We need to bear in mind, however, that though the mass involvement in the business of slave trade dramatizes Europe's role in it, neither was slavery in general terms unique to Africa or to recent centuries, nor were Europeans its initiators in what was then referred to as "the Dark Continent". When the European arrived on

1) A. Macdonald depicts the early colonial period in Tanganyika in the following terms, "... almost anyone could order him (the African) flogged without trial ... African work gangs could be recruited at any time, not only for public works but for private labour." See Macdonald, Tanzania: Young Nation in a Hurry, Hawthorn Books Inc., New York, 1966, p. 32.

2) Slade, op.cit., p. 5.
the scene the Arab was already an old hand at the trade, and opposition was not lacking from that quarter when Europeans finally recognised that by denying humanity to the African, in fact, in quite a direct way they were calling into question their own humanness. However, this realization and the consequent attack on the slave trade came at a time when colonialism was already becoming a force on a worldwide scale and, therefore, the basic ethic of superiority—inferiority could not be seriously and fundamentally questioned. This is to say that when the metropolitans' attention shifted from slavery to "civilizing" the right of the "native" culture for self-sustained development could not be granted recognition. In other words, paternalism, missionary, official or private, however well meaning failed in one thing: it did not meet the need for self-respect, pride in one's own past and confidence in one's future.

This should not mean that colonialism was totally negative. Indeed my position is that probably nothing in history can be found negative in that absolute sense. I am treating colonialism, albeit rather sketchily, only from the vantage point of its influence upon and consequences for political development to be defined in human terms—in terms which give centrality to meaningful participation by people in the processes of deciding upon matters affecting themselves or their relationships with others. Once this position is assumed the conclusion becomes inescapable that development occurs in a situation where people pose as subjects and not as objects of civic actions, wherein "things are not done for them, because of them or about them but by them themselves."

At this juncture, the question needs to be asked: what does political development mean in relation to former colonial peoples whose social and psychological environment still remains largely colonially determined? The technological advance which made European domination physically possible also went a long way towards causing the "native" to doubt the viability of the self—its creative vigour. As interpreted by the colonial scholar his own historical past could only fit a world picture in which he was represented as a retarded member of the human family, to be salvaged only by the missionary zeal of the European—the latter himself on a higher stage of evolution.
As we have already noted, the rejection of this world picture constituted the major aim of the liberation movement. This was a positive objective, though in the fume of demagogy that preceded and followed independence it was sometimes pushed to a point where colonial racism instead of being rejected was actually emulated. Though this may be understandable, and indeed predictable in terms of psychological reactions to an imposed position of inferiority, it seems logically untenable to fight for and win liberation on the basis of the equality of all men and revert to racism. However, it is only in a few countries like Tanzania, where the nationalist leadership appear to have grasped the essence of this and adamantly and consistently rejected any tendencies towards "racism in reverse". That whatever stand is adopted on this issue will have significant consequences is too clear to need extended illucidation. Suffice it to say, therefore, that not only do concepts of race and ethnicity not easily lend themselves to clear and easy delimiting lines between them, but also that if it is to be mutually satisfying for those involved, international intercourse on this growingly shrinking planet of ours can only be based on human relations firmly grounded on equality.
Chapter I

COMMENTS ON INCREMENTAL THEORIES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Now, coming to the sphere of theories of political development one needs to note from the outset that political science, though it has made important advances in recent decades, has thus far not been able to get to the core of the problem of political underdevelopment. Many reasons suggest themselves. Prominent among these seem to be the underdeveloped state of politics as a field of research and analysis, and probably consequent on this the use of conceptual tools which having been evolved and elaborated in the industrial West largely fail in their explanatory efficacy in terms of political processes in non-Western communities. It is tempting to agree with Manfred Halpern's thesis that

"... problems are in some important ways actually easier to perceive and analyze in new nations than in the old. The prerequisites and requisites of development ... and the transformations are dramatized with greater clarity than in the seemingly established societies."

And yet there may be a subtle dimension. The very dramatic nature, the very fluidity and dynamism of political processes simply by virtue of their being such, as Halpern seems to recognize, appear to defy analytic categories presently in use. And it is not simple to start afresh or introduce a thoroughgoing revision; since as Ann Ruth Willner argues once they gain intellectual currency concepts tend to be set.

1) This underdeveloped state is marked by the lack of agreement among theorists on such fundamental questions as the nature and field of politics itself. Harry Eckstein's argument that despite its ancient and respectable pedigree, "Comparative politics seems today to be preoccupied, almost paradoxically, with questions we associate not with the maturity but with the infancy of a field of inquiry - questions about the fundamentals, the 'first things', that govern the processes and ends of analysis," can well apply to the entire discipline of politics. See Harry Eckstein, "A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present", in: Comparative Politics, Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (eds.), New York, 1963, p. 3.
institutionalized and attain a degree of respectability which makes deviation difficult. 1) Somehow, therefore, we are forced to make do with tools which do not measure up to the task. Consider, for example, input-output analysis. This may be quite fitting in situations where structures such as legally organized interest and pressure groups, parties, more or less vital parliaments are available, and in cases where the concern is with the formal functions of these structures, but falls far short of demands placed upon political analysis by informal and, therefore, subtler interactions. And it is difficult to accept categorization of systems as "traditional", "transitional" etc. by virtue of the fact that such political forms do not exist; for the substance of politics can and indeed does take various forms in different environmental situations.

However, another dimension, one of which some scholars are growingly being conscious, remains to be mentioned. This relates to the theoretical parochialism and the ethnocentric bias which account to some important degree, particularly in the case of Anglo-Saxon writers, for the failure of theory to evolve new perspectives for capturing the dynamic complexities of the politics of the third world. The literature in the field still remains to emerge, as Paul Streeten observes, "from the optimistic and pessimistic bias, from the transfer of mental habits appropriate to different circumstances, from the language of diplomacy which conceals arrogance." 2)

The position taken by C.E. Ayers in 1957, "that the values of modern Western culture are superior to those of other peoples, and hence they should and will prevail", 3) seems to be the current wisdom among scholars interested in political development. Although only a few like Almond, Verba and Pye have been able to equal Ayers, most of the writers with whose works I am acquainted have harped

2) Paul Streeten, Introduction to Development Studies, a select reading list, Massachusetts, 1968.
on more or less the same theme. 1) Some pose the matter in terms of a "World Culture", which originated, grew and developed in the West and which the Third World should internalize if it is to develop.

This prescriptive and strongly deterministic approach fixes the Western model as the end towards which non-Western societies should evolve. Lucian Pye makes his own point as much as his colleagues' when he notes:

"... there is an embarrassingly artificial quality in all the Western protests that the underdeveloped areas have much to offer ... any sense of mutual interest seems to be increasingly limited to an effort to make the latter more like the former." 2)

Thus any processes and directions which divert from this model are either precluded or condemned. The tendency naturally, therefore, has been to read into the volatile situation of the Third World experiences in recent Western history, and not to analyse this situation in the light of available data whatever the conclusions such analysis may lead to.

Curious as it may appear, the model offered excludes much of the process going on in the Western societies today. The tense race-relations in the United States and the violence it has given rise to, the language problems in Belgium and Canada, the question of religious bigotry in Northern Ireland, the "student revolt" throughout Europe and America, among many others, thus become things which the West has conveniently left behind. Our concern here is with theory. It does by no means mean that political actors remain equally oblivious of political reality. In fact the report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, appointed by former President Johnson,

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2) Pye, op. cit., p. XIV.
makes this point quite clear. Although, according to Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the report was the work of a commission composed of members of the establishment, it spelt out the situation in these terms:

"Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white, - separate and unequal. Reaction to last summer’s disorders has quickened the movement and deepened the division. Discrimination and segregation has long permeated much of American life; they now threaten the future of every American ...

"What white Americans have never fully understood - but what the Negro can never forget - is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.

"It is time now to turn with all the purpose at our command to the major unfinished business of this nation. It is time to adopt strategies for action that will produce quick progress. It is time to make good the promises of American democracy to all citizens - urban and rural, white and black, Spanish surname, American Indian, and every minority group." 1)

This extended quotation shows, unambiguously the range of the problems facing the student of political development. The paradigm he is offered does not correspond even to the Western reality as he knows it. The problem facing leaders in the Third World seems even more perplexing. The theorists generally counsel an incremental approach to development; because according to their interpretation, this is the lesson to be drawn from the history of Western Europe and America. Whatever the validity of this interpretation, the advice appears precisely what developing countries cannot afford to accept. If not any other logic, the fact of an immense technological gap between the industrially advanced and industrially underdeveloped countries and the realization that this gap, instead of closing, is in fact widening at an alarming rate forces these leaders to ask some fundamental questions. Among these for example: is free and self-respecting existence possible for any people in the Third World in a situation of immense imbalances in technological power? But there

is also another factor of no inconsiderable importance. If there is anything universally true today, it is that man has come to recognize that he has the capacity to change his environment, physical and social, in a conscious and deliberate way.

Indeed, this seems to be at the heart of the present worldwide concern with the concept of planning. True, theoretically both progress and regression can be planned. But the fact that today in the Third World reality has been found unsatisfactory and development strongly desired makes the latter alternative practically impossible. This is what calls all incremental models of political development into question. These models are almost literally innumerable, and this makes it impossible for me to deal with them all in any meaningful way. I have, therefore, chosen to examine briefly what has now come to be called "the new political science", the system-function (I coined this to mean the combination of systems theory and structural functional analysis) approach and then, as an illuminating case to treat Samuel Huntington's model. One thing must be said at this point, viz. that contemporary political theorists who have adopted the system-function approach do differ on a number of issues, and sometimes quite substantially. However, my concern here is with what underpins all their analyses - incrementalism.

Modern structural-functionalism derives from anthropological and sociological theories advanced by such scholars as Bronislaw Malinowski, A.R. Radcliffe Brown, Talcott Parsons, Robert K. Merton and Marion Levy. Though these theorists may differ both on the nature and functions of a system, they are united on the assumption that "the ability to explain and predict in social sciences is enhanced when we think of social structures and institutions as performing in systems." 1) In politics their influence was to shape the school of structural-functional analysis of political systems, a school which came to dominate the whole discipline almost completely following the publication of "The Political System" by David Easton, a paper on "Comparative Political Systems" by Gabriel A. Almond, "The

1) Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 27.
Gold Coast in "Transition" by David Apter and particularly "The Politics of the Developing Areas" by Almond and Coleman (eds.).

As it has been developed up-to-date, the system-function approach manifests a number of traits. The first of these is the emphasis on cultures in contradistinction to constitutions, power and countries. The concept of culture includes in just one reference frame the economic, the social, the governmental, the linguistic, the religious and other structures. Cultures are regarded as systems. A system is a whole which consists of a set of interacting parts that are distinguishable from other systems on the same plane by a threshold or boundary and such that a change in anyone part (or sub-system) can be expected to effect changes in other parts so that the system's equilibrium is maintained. The polity is a sub-system of a particular kind, what distinguishes it from such other sub-systems as the economic and the social being the mechanism of "legitimate physical compulsion," for the control of violence in the whole culture. Each system or sub-system has a structure and a function or a set of functions. Therefore, what is studied is structures functioning so that the function of the system may be inferred from what it is observed to be doing.

A system is seen as functioning at different levels.

"One level of functioning is the system's capabilities, that is, the way it performs as a unit in its environment .... At this level we are focusing on the behaviour of the system as a unit in its relations to other social systems and to the environment .... The categories of capability which we use grow directly out of our analysis of types of inputs and outputs". 2)


2) Almond and Powell, op. cit., p. 28.
To designate "the flow of activity into and out of the political system" the concepts of regulative, extractive, distributive, responsive and symbolic capabilities are used. Another level relates to the system maintenance and adaptation function while the third refers to the input output conversion process. The political system absorbs supports, processes (or discourages as the case may be) demands and releases outputs - decisions and policies and executes them authoritatively. In a macro sense, however, the system-function approach does not seem to cover, describe or analyse the whole network of political interactions and processes in a society; for not only the sources of political power but also the subtle and informal socio-economic relationships influencing what is called input output conversion function are almost completely neglected. However, since my intention is not to offer a general critique of "the new political science" I will limit myself to those points which pertain to its incrementalist strain.

As already indicated, equilibrium underlies system-function analysis. 1) Inputs and outputs have to be balanced in the sense that inputs particularly demands, either flowing from the environment or emanating from within the system itself need to be within the limits imposed by the system's capability to satisfy them. When the demands placed upon the system are too great for its capacity, in terms of its strength to regulate behaviour within the larger society, extract resources, distribute them etc., the system tends towards disequilibrium. If they are to lead not to the weakening or disruption of the system but to its persistence and strengthening then flows must be made to conform to certain standards according to which systems' strength can be judged. That system which so regulates and limits

1) Almond defines this equilibrium in the following terms: "When all these flows (inputs and outputs) have a particular range of content and level of magnitude, such that the structures and cultures of the political system can cope "with them, we may speak of the political system as being in equilibrium". Almond, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems", World Politics, No. 2, January 1965, p. 207."
demand - inputs to a level where the resultant outputs can cope with them is supposedly more mature than another in which the input flow is not so regulated and as a consequence the output functions may fall short of satisfaction. As Easton puts it

"... if there were no way of limiting volume and regulating content (of demands) ... large numbers of demands might go unsatisfied. If these were from politically significant members, the consequences for a system would without doubt be stressful." 1)

Almond approaches the matter in terms of the responsive capacity of the political system. If this capacity is limited again several demands would have to go unsatisfied and consequently support may be withdrawn or active opposition instituted - here again discussion being only in terms of those who are thought to be "politically relevant". Clearly, however, responsive capability is closely related to the nature of the demand as well as the regulation, extraction, distribution by and the ceremonial behaviour of the polity.

Inasmuch as it is able to penetrate its intra-national environment the polity enjoys a degree of regulation over demand flows. On the other hand, as we have seen, in the system-function approach, change in one sub-system affects the total system. Hence, for instance the degree to which government allows the spread of education will inevitably influence both social relationships and political processes. Education affects individuals' and groups' level of political consciousness and, therefore, its spread necessarily increases the "politically relevant" section of the population, with probable stressful results. Moreover, education also leads to demands for positions of status and influence. When such demands fail to be met, either because the economic base is too narrow or recruitment to elite positions is limited for whatever reason, demands tend to be cumulative.


Professor H. Victor Wieseman sees the matter from a slightly different angle when he writes, "opposition to the regime is less important if there are accepted ways of changing the values, e.g. by constitutional amendment through a process which is neither too rigid nor too flexible," Wieseman, Political Systems, Some Sociological Approaches, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967, p. 123.
Over time, this leads away from equilibrium and thereby threatens the stability and persistence of the regime. Hence distributive demands must be made to match with the system's extractive capacity or the polity needs to employ its regulative potential which in this case means increasingly drawing upon its coercive mechanisms. Nevertheless, even this latter, would in some sense require that extraction be of such a degree as to support the coercive machinery, particularly when its intensive employment is required over an extended length of time.

Thus the question boils down to the level of confrontation between the distributive capacity and the regulative power of the polity. It must be recognized, here though, that increased extraction may eventually give rise to either the acceleration of demands or the withdrawal of support. In terms of systems maintenance and perpetuation neither of these is desirable. Easton makes this clear:

"Even if members have put in no specific demands about a matter, output failure may still occur. This is the case when the authorities fail to take action that anticipates conditions which may later arise and to which relevant members of the system might then object." 1)

It, therefore, behoves the authorities to restrict the spread of education (in our example) to a degree which is commensurate with the absorptive capacity of the economy and the bureaucracy.

In actual political practice, manpower planning seems to be the method for implementing this incremental approach to development. The attempt is to determine the number of graduates from primary, secondary and vocational schools and from institutions of higher learning according to projections of demands in different sectors of the economy and the polity. Particularly in developing countries, much intuition, much guess work, and improvisation go into the preparation of the plans, with the result that their accuracy

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becomes dubious at best. Nevertheless, even more important for my purpose is the fact that the dynamic nature of education is largely overlooked. The person who has learnt how to think and work himself must surely be seen as a great asset in terms of innovation. That is to say that he can create not only demands but also ways of satisfying them. I must concede, at this juncture, that what I am saying amounts to a fundamental deviation from the system-function approach. In other words, the raison d'être of any system is not here accepted as being its own goals defined in terms of its needs for self-perpetuation. The alternative assumption advanced in this study is that justification for the existence of any political system emanates from the volume and content of its services to the society.

I do recognize, furthermore, that conceptually however we are resolved on this matter depends, among other things, on our general views of politics. In very broad terms these views can be either restrictive or inclusive. In the case of the first political involvement is conceptually narrowed down to a relatively small group of so-called "politically relevant" people, either because the mass of the population are perceived as apathetic and inarticulate or their being so is presumed desirable. 1) Easton provides us with a forceful illustration of this. He writes:

"... under certain circumstances very few members need to support a system at any level. The members might be dull and apathetic, indifferent to the general operations of the system, its progress or decisions. In a loosely connected system such as India ... the system may be able to act on the basis of support offered by the known three percent of the Western-oriented politicians and intellectuals who are politically active." 2)

1) Making this presumption explicit Huntington maintains that "rapid or substantial expansions in the membership of an organization or in the participants in a system tend to weaken coherence". Once this position is assumed the need to limit such expansion becomes evident. See Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay, World Politics, XVII, 3 (April 1965), p. 403.

Arguing on the same line Huntington also asserts that political
"consensus must extend to those active in the system. Non-participants
or those only sporadically and marginally participant in the system
do not have to share the consensus ... ." 1)

The restrictive approach to political life inevitably faces
a number of fundamental questions which it has not seemed capable of
answering. Supposing, for example, the existence of the system
depicted by Easten can be empirically demonstrated one would like to
ask such questions as: What is the moral basis of such a system?
What are the economic and social bases of the political power rela-
tions in it? What defines its very raison d'être - is it the apathy
of the great majority of its members? And if so, in terms of polit-
cal development where do we place such a polity or any other established
on inferior-superior, or if you like herder-herd relationship? My own
answers will manifest themselves when I discuss my concept of polit-
cal development. Suffice it to say, at this juncture, that such
statements as Easten's, in my opinion, seem to be more of assumptions
carrying the burden of proof than descriptions of empirical situations.
At any rate once, such assumptions are accepted along with those regarding
the desirability of systems' persistence it may be safely argued
in favour of limiting benefits such as social services largely to
those "politically relevant" sections of the population dominating
or entirely controlling the governing institutions.

On the other hand our conception of politics can, and indeed
in my opinion, ought to be inclusive. According to this view, no
section of the membership can be regarded as politically irrelevant
in general terms. Political action and/or reaction may be sporadic
or intermittent. A section of the population may not be actively in-
volved in some political issues or controversies at one moment while
at another point in time the same group may be heatedly drawn in through
whatever channels open to it. What psychologists have called the
submission-aggression syndrome seems to be quite relevant here. A
group may be apathetic simply because existing structures are perceived
as dysfunctional for its goals and interests. It may be submissive,

1) Huntington, loc.cit.
willing to accept policies, strategies and regulation by the authorities not as a result of conviction but because a different mode of behaviour is seen to have severe consequences for itself. In other words in the short run power may have a self-legitimating side to it. However, submissive dispositions may, on the other hand, suddenly change to aggressive outbursts. A situation of submission and apathy if and where it exists, therefore, can in some sense, be seen as being pathological and hence calling for serious correction.

In essence this discussion brings us face to face with the lack of transcendence of the system-function analysis. Justification for structures emanates from their functionality in terms of interests and goals of the structures themselves, and that for functions from their contribution towards the persistence of the structures in their prominent characteristics. This has several important implications. One is that the political system becomes an end in itself with the result that societal needs do not define its goals. This does not mean that political structures (or governing organizations) do not meet extra-system wants. It only means that this is not necessary, according to the system-function approach, to justify the continued existence of these structures if and insofar as their performance is such as to make their maintenance possible or still better possible with the minimum stress. Thus attention need be paid to extra-system (societal) needs only inasmuch as they have an impact, (negative or positive) on the political system. That all this means: the system exists because it functions and its functions are justified only because they lead to its continued existence. And this does by no means lack rationality. Indeed, probably every institution may be said to be rational if its performance leads towards the attainment of its goals. In this sense one can speak of the old Indian practice of burning wives following the demise of their husbands as being instrumentally rational supposing that there were objectives satisfied thereby. Be that as it may to us, today, the practice becomes immensely detestable. Why? Because we are in possession of certain a priori standards of valuation (such as justice and the imperative of equality) which makes impossible the acceptance of system-goals leading to the burning of human beings. In other words, at least some of our goals,
whatever the clarity with which they are defined, transcend systems
and their functions. Thus transcendence precludes the possibility
of us agreeing to the proposition, supposing it were made today,
that wives should continue being burnt after their husbands' deaths.
And by disapproving we are in fact calling the whole institution into
question, and on grounds other than its goals or functions. In sum,
this short reminder may suffice to show that we can neither shy away,
as adherents to functionalism tend to do, from basic criticisms
of existing systems, nor overlook the implications of political actions
in terms of the life and happiness of the immense majority of a popula-
tion, whatever the functionality of these actions as regards the
maintenance of the political system in operation.

Some of the implications of the system-function approach have
been brought out in their most prominent features by Samuel Huntington
in his article on "Political Development and Political Decay". Pol-
itical development is defined by Huntington as "the institutionaliza-
tion of political organizations and procedures". 1) These organiza-
tions have to be exclusive, since "political organizations and pro-
cedures which are vulnerable to non-political influences from within
the society are also usually vulnerable to influences from outside
the society." 2) The arguments flowing from this are predictable.
Social mobilization in the sense of a rapid spread of education, of
modern media of public communication as well as participation in
political processes lead not to political development but to political
decay.

"Rapid economic growth breeds political instability

... Increases in literacy and education may bring
more political instability ... Sharp increases in
voting and other forms of political participation can
also have deleterious effects on political
institutions (i.e. on political development)." 3)

1) Huntington, op. cit., p. 393.
2) Ibid., p. 402.
3) Ibid., p. 406. On the assumption that "anything which slows social
mobilization presumably creates conditions more favorable to the
preservation and strengthening of institutions" (that is, to poli-
tical development), Huntington has devised a method of slowing down
mobilization. "The means he employs are: "to increase the complex-
ity of social structure; to limit or reduce communications in
society; and to minimize competition within the political elite." (Ibid., pp. 416."

Therefore, developing countries ought to discourage all these phenomena or face, inevitably it seems, political instability.

The most important question which Huntington should face, it seems to me, is: "Organizations for what?" In their functions he regards political institutions not as representative of interests of social forces outside themselves but as having their own "reasonably concrete" interests. These interests make up the "public interest" defined as "whatever strengthens governmental institutions." 1) It is not difficult to see that this view disregards two important factors: first that there can be a conflict of interest among different political organisations, and second, and probably more important, that the interests of governing institutions and those of the mass of the population are not necessarily positively correlated. Let us take up the second. Organisations are created, manned and controlled by people. These have interests, and their interests have goals, which may be positive or negative (from the point of view of society), unificationary or divisive as the case may be. It appears reasonable, for example, to assume that in societies where the visible differences in the ways of life are great, and where interests of one group consequently centre around the alleviation of shortages and the removal of excesses the goals of those committed to change on the one hand and of those opposing it on the other are negatively correlated. This means that the maximisation of the interests of one group (those controlling governing institutions for instance) may lead to the minimisation of those of others (say, those calling for change). Then, how can we define public interests in terms of the interests of governmental institutions? To disregard such phenomena and concentrate on institutions which themselves may very well be a party to the conflict amounts to a misplaced trust.

Coming back to the first factor, the question must be raised as to whether the interests of public institutions do not collide at least at some critical moments. To make this question clear let us take an illustration from Huntington's own article. Following Stalin's death a struggle ensued between the Communist Party led by Khruschev .

1) Ibid., p. 412.
and the public bureaucracy headed by Malenkov. The victory eventually won by the Party strengthened it at the expense of the bureaucracy. If we accept this, it follows that at least at that point in the history of the Soviet Union the interests of the major governing institutions did not make any coherent whole in terms of which the interests of the society may be defined.

Organisations are instrumentalities created and developed largely consciously for the attainment of a purpose or a set of purposes — certainly modified over time. When, therefore, they outlive their purposes, or become ineffective, whatever the cause, one sees no reason why they should not be reformed or dissolved. Indeed, in many countries some of the major bottlenecks to overall national development happen to be obsolete institutions.

Huntington's objection to a concentrated attack on ignorance and attempts at general social and political mobilisation is understandable in terms of what is supposed to be the experience of the West. But there is more to it. He fears that mobilisation would lead to political unrest. The validity of stability theories aside, one feels that while his fear may be a justifiable one, his prescription is decidedly negative. It is true, for example, that in many developing countries a growing number of educated and semi-educated persons have not been able to find jobs. Nevertheless, this does not mean that these countries have over-educated their peoples. The reason must be sought in the social and economic structures and in the prevalent system of education, a system which, as we will see later, in almost all developing countries has, as yet, not been socially relevant. White-collar office work which young people are taught to respect and look forward to cannot be available to all. But the answer is certainly not to contain education but to change it both content and form wise in such a way as to make it socially more meaningful.

Knowledge is power. It defines a people's capacity for accelerated development. Therefore, arguing, among other things, in favour of containing education or against a rapid spread of knowledge amounts to advocating the continuation of underdevelopment — that situation which militates against a fuller and more satisfying life for those in it. Seen in the light of this instead of curing the malady incrementalism actually hides away the medicine.
Political Development as Citizenship Development

As I have tried to indicate above, political theorists have thus far tended, explicitly or implicitly, to blame the anomie situation in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World on "rapid development" and the politicisation of the masses. 1) This aversion to development rests on the assumption that when people become knowledgeable they place more demands than the polity can satisfy. Thus it is argued, as we have seen, that education, modern means of information, social mobility and the like must be minimised, or in other words, people must be consciously kept in ignorance, in seclusion, insulated as far as possible from the political processes where their destinies are decided. All this because the polity may be unable to meet the demands of a conscious, alert public. The very ineffectiveness of the political system has thus been worked into the basis of its legitimacy.

The position adopted in this study is the opposite of this. It seems clear to me that essentially political development means the development of the human components of society. This is not a new discovery. In fact, its origin may be traced back to the "ancients," particularly Aristotle who in the third book of The Politics made the politeis (citizen) central to the discussion of political life. 2) Today, democracy appears to be the one single word which has received the most extensive treatment in political writings. In the field of practical politics, one hears it ringing from all corners of the world as each government claims bound by its principles. But these principles are not clear and easily discernible — with the consequence that no government can be proven undemocratic. I do not pretend to solve this problem. I want only to suggest that any genuine concern with democracy must also be a concern with the free and effective participation of the common man in matters of communal and national


interest.

Viewed from this vantage point, political development would mean the development of a politically conscious, self-respecting, self-reliant and freely participatory citizenry. Thus, a system of masters and slaves, whatever its institutional strength, whatever its legitimacy, whatever its capabilities and penetrative power cannot be called a developed political system. For "the truth is that development is the development of people." 1) It must be stated here that what is being said amounts to sanctioning values conducive to equality not only among different human collectivities but also and equally important among members of the same collectivity. Participation as an operative ideal may be derived from this ethical imperative. This is not to imply that these values can be separated from science. I submit that science can only be meaningfully defined in terms of activities and the search directed toward uplifting the unknown to the realm of the known; in other words, toward making the hidden potential in nature "susceptible to discovery". On this ground I agree with J. Bronowski that the ethical neutrality of science cannot be sustained; for as Bronowski notes "science is not a mechanism but a human progress, and not a set of findings but the search for them." 2) It is impossible, therefore, to introduce clear delimitations between science and standards of valuation, i.e. values, or as Professor Louis Junker puts it "criteria of judgement." 3)

The question may be raised as to what the need for participation is. To such a question there can be a twofold answer. First, participation is a value in itself. In this sense inability to participate represents a serious deprivation. But it is also defensible on utilitarian grounds, since it liberates the potential energies

naturally resident in man, through various ways - among them the discovery of these same potentialities. But it also enhances, increases and enlarges energies existing in potency through the cumulative effect of experience and the ever expanding new vistas of knowledge it opens up. Norbert Wiener seems to express this when he writes:

"I repeat, to be alive is to participate in a continuous stream of influences from the outer world and act upon the outer-world, in which we are merely the transitional stage. In the figurative sense, to be alive to what is happening in the world, means to participate in the continual development of knowledge and its unhindered exchange." 1)

The same author has presented cogent arguments to the effect that man's very physiology is unsuited for an "orderly state of permanently allotted functions." 2) Compared to other animals man may be regarded as the most mature at any point of time in his life span. At the same time he enjoys tremendous advantages over all other living things. He is a learning being, flexible, adaptable, capable of accumulating and co-ordinating experience and acting upon it as well as of using the feedback for further action with high logical performance.

It remains to be stated, on the other hand, that a system which restricts participation by the majority of its members in the process of decision-making throws away most of these enormous advantages we have overall sub-human forms of nature. Whatever the degree of its commitment to any meaningfully fast rate of progress, therefore, its very nature cannot but frustrate its efforts. Development requires that energy be captured, a phenomenon which such a system can attempt only with very limited success. This is because it is intrinsically wasteful of both social and economic values, in the sense that it leaves largely unliberated unmobilized and, therefore, unused the potentially available immense human energy - the ingenuity,

2) Ibid., p. 47.
the creativity and initiative of its members. On another plane it may be viewed as a relatively closed system of short circuit information and feedback flows partaking in the nature of limited, and therefore, for our purpose inefficient communication. Short circuit because information flows relevant to national development and most of the significant discussions and processes of deciding and implementing are limited to a small group. On the other hand that an expansive system of communication is central to development is almost self-evident. Indeed as Wilbur Schramm observes, "an efficient national effort is impossible without it." 1)

Development as a national concern is co-extensive with the nation. Initiatives, decisions and the freedom of choice that these presuppose must be widely diffused. The significance of this has been pointed out by Knud Erik Svedsen: "development on a broad scale will never take place if all lower levels (regional, local etc.) expect to get financial support from the central government. Neither will an attitude of waiting upon someone to take initiative lead anywhere." 2) Erich Fromm puts the matter in a different manner:

"... a significant condition for the development of biophilia is freedom. But 'freedom from' political shackles is not a sufficient condition. If love for life is to develop there must be freedom 'to', freedom to create and construct ..." 3)

The foregoing discussion, I think, is enough to show that neither casting votes in ceremonial elections nor supporting politicians can be called effective participation. 4) Neither indeed are


4) That elections do not necessarily mean freedom or free choice is spelt out in a dramatic way by Professor Marcuse. Although what he writes, in this case, is self-evident it usually tends to be overlooked; that is why we need to quote him. He states: "Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves," Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, Sphere Books, London, 1968, p. 23.
they a sufficient condition for the emergence of a participatory citizenship. It is said that political leaders are "under heavy pressure" almost everywhere "to derive their theoretical right to govern from the support that they (or the movements they lead) allegedly enjoy from those who are bound by their decisions". However, political support seems to be only indirectly related to political participation in the sense discussed above. Supporting leaders and meeting their demands is certainly not participating in leadership. There is need, therefore, to incorporate in our conception of participation the factor of distribution of effective power and the sources from which it emanates. The superficial political scene in Africa can be quite deceptive. Government officials deliver impassioned, moving speeches; party leaders communicate their goals to members through the media of huge rallies; bodies affiliated to the political parties are sometimes used to get the "masses" accept and endorse decisions. And these activities may be mistaken for full citizen participation if sufficient recognition is not granted to the fact that effective participation calls for "equality of access to the means of influence." 


2) Within the framework of functionalism Sidney Verba speaks of "Democratic" political participation as referring to acts by those not formally empowered to make decisions - the acts being intended to influence the behaviour of those who have such decisional power." Sidney Verba, "Democratic Participation," The Annals, 2 (1967), p. 55. It is clear that Verba's thinking runs along party lines - those who make decisions and those who seek to influence them. The target thus becomes "the President, Congressmen, party leaders or bureaucrats" and not the processes through which national or local matters are discussed, decided upon and these decisions are carried out. Moreover the author neither raises nor, therefore, answers questions pertaining to the basis of power and the distribution of means of influence. Even accepting the dichotomous presentation of decision-makers and the rest, the relation between, on the one hand, the "deciders" and, on the other, those who influence them, those who follow them, and those who having no effective means to influence decisions either remain apathetic or seek a transformation of the whole relationship still remains to be considered. The degree to which individuals and groups enjoy manipulable economic and social levels
Elections, as they are practised in Africa, may be one aspect of political action. Nevertheless, in themselves they mean very little in terms of citizenship development. The one party system generally prevalent makes election results predetermined. On the other hand, in the few cases where there have been parties of competitive electoral strength elections are rigged and ethno-linguistic and religious susceptibilities are exploited. About the Nigerian case, for example, an acute observer had this to write:

"... each party secured its power in a region of the country by appealing to ethnic sensibilities...
Time and again, they have been willing to perpetrate electoral fraud at the risk of violence and secession in order to prevent radical political changes." 1)

The case of Sierra Leone is even more revealing. Leaders of the ruling party, the S.L.P.P., failed to carry through Albert Margai's suggestion to make the country a one-party state, because of the existence of a strong opposition. In 1967, a general election was held in which as Professor Ken Post notes,

"... enough voters changed their allegiance to make it seem that the opposition party had won. At this point the army intervened, at first to prevent (Siaka) Stevens (opposition leader) being Prime Minister, then to supercede civilian government altogether." 2)

should not, in my opinion, be overlooked in any discussion of political participation. In this sense the very nature of the framework functionalists use poses as an inhibition. That may be why Verba regards "sit-ins and demonstrations" simply as new modes of participation. While these political acts may be aspects of extra legal attempts to influence decisions they can and indeed must be viewed, on the other hand, as protests against a position of deprivation - a position of non-participation. In this sense they represent struggles over means of influence and power positions. They emerge because the political system does not allow a portion of the population sufficient access to available means of influence and sufficient opportunity to partake in the process of defining their future.


Such political practices lead to two conclusions. The first and more evident: that effective political participation does not occur. The second and more important: that the political drama being played does not and cannot lead to the emergence of a self-respecting, consciously participating citizenry - i.e. to political development. 1) On the contrary instead of mounting an attack on a sense of impotence, the heritage of colonialism, it actually perpetuates it. A man with little or no self-confidence is an apathetic man at best. We may view development as arising from the sum total of the productive energies emanating from a people. Techniques need to be devised to channel these energies in the direction of optimum societal advantage. But really, what techniques can work on a people without self-respect? And so the argument that the peasants, the overwhelming majority of Africans, are apathetic becomes justifiable.

It must be noted, however, that the suggestion implicit in this, i.e. that they are necessarily so ought to be taken for what it is: a self-fulfilling prophecy. Given that apathy is motivated its basis may be fear, powerlessness and hopelessness, and for these in turn, there may be other foundations; among them, for instance, the system of allocation of economic and social values. To put it in a slightly different manner, if we assume that the raison d'être of a political system is the development and well-being of its members the question of motivation of this type must carry us into a basic consideration of the system in operation. Motivation can and indeed must be altered; but nor can its foundation stay intact. Once the moral imperative of equality is accepted as a basis of social existence, for instance, this moral aim can then be translated into disciplined work, in both economic and political terms, and into effectiveness through the alteration of the existing patterns of allocation and motivational structure. Thus, the moral aim of creating a conscious and alert man - the political man - somehow coincides with a given technological aim-efficiency.

1) Summing up the whole political situation in Sierra Leone between 1951-68 Christopher Allen writes: "Social change in Sierra Leone since 1961 has not been markedly more rapid than or different in type from that in pre-independence decade. The primary factors in the political system and political dynamics of the country remain, therefore, much as they have been since 1951 ...", Allen, op.cit., p. 305.
Political development as I have tried to sketch it assumes an ideal image, not in terms of unattainability but in the sense that it has hardly been attained in any society. Treatment of development as a state of things, a stage in the evolution of societies where some have reached and others have failed to approximate seems to lack justification. The position taken here is that development is an on-going process; on-going but not "by itself". The phrase by itself is not by itself. It has a whole world picture behind it, being one manifestation of a generalized view according to which man himself being part of his physical environment can hardly work deliberately on it. Those who are persuaded that such is the case, see in efforts at consciously planning development as scarcely any more than a show of man's ignorance of the laws inherent in the physical world around him. For mastery of these laws should make it clear that the planner is in fact a prisoner of the reality he sets out rather pretentiously to plan. My own assumption is that man is not helpless. He can exert sufficient influence on the course of events that the final result is perhaps as much attributable to the actor's conscious effort as to the process. This view rejects the denial of opportunities implied by an uncertain future. Man is a learning being and not the amphibiaene: "with a head at both ends and no concern where it is going." He moves forward (not to imply a straight line) from a past which is known to a future which leaves much room for prediction. However, one thing must be clear, viz., that neither man nor society is a piece of mud that one can take into one's hands and shape into a piece of artistry. But the more man becomes conscious of change, the more he desires to influence it and the more this desire is substantiated both at the level of thought and action the more change bears a human stamp.

Prerequisites to Political Development

Defining political development in terms of the development of a participatory citizenry makes it in the African context a function of political socialization. There are, however, factors which must be present if political education is to produce the desired effect. Those are: a theory of social organization, decolonization and urban-rural integration.
CHAPTER II

THE NEED FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The working out of a coherent theory of social organization, in the sense of a consistently logical body of ideas defining societal goals and the major instruments used to realize them seems to be one of the primary vanguard activities an African leadership ought to perform. This is because Africa is today faced with a number of basic questions which need answering. What sort of society do we desire to build? What will our economic base be? What type of political relationships will be needed? What should our core ethos and ethical imperatives be? The answering of these and other such questions cannot be done in a philosophical vacuum nor in a theoretical chaos.

In other words, the search for new and just political forms can only be meaningfully conducted within the framework of a new rational-scientific world picture. What we are faced with are critical questions which fundamentally relate to man's capacity to define as well as realize the ends of his own actions. A vehicle must be discovered to generalize and express ideas and more — to determine the very basis of society and the social, economic and political forms which relationships within it should assume. Both as a logical necessity of its basic position and through its own scientific vigour and logical coherence, this vehicle — our theory of social organization makes manifest "the supremacy of reason and the virtues of science". Put another way this means that we are referring to a system of secular, rational-scientific objectives and instrumental means. Apart from the empirical test — in terms of its capacity to lead to and sustain self-generating development to which it will have to be submitted, this will be its internal measure. But to the extent it enjoys general explanatory efficacy as regards historical phenomena both itself and its test transcend this. Hence the criterion of generality. However, at this point one thing needs to be grasped: generality need not, and should not, be equated to rigidity. Particular situational environments need to be accounted for and explained. On the other hand, strategies cannot fruitfully overlook the existence of situational differences. Therefore, in the same way as no self-respecting military
strategist can pretend to prescribe tactical moves for all circumstances, so also no serious theory of social organization can afford to hold out solutions for all particular problems. Flexibility thus seems to recommend itself as a necessary ingredient.

What makes such a theory necessary? The answer is both theoretical and empirical. Here, I will attempt to tackle the more theoretical aspect, and in the next section the empirical ground in the case of Africa. To start with, in the absence of a coherent theoretical framework action becomes problem-oriented, while solutions of day-to-day problems may be unrelated or even mutually contradictory. Policies (as well as actions designed to further them) that viewed separately appear logical and consistent may produce only an incoherent picture as a whole. On the other hand, concepts which in themselves seem to be critically important may be only secondary or even irrelevant when ranged along with others. Thus, not only can unnecessary mistakes be committed but also economic and political paths which make the situation even more lop-sided may be pursued as correct lines of development. Moreover, the absence of a manifestly coherent theory of social organization signifies also the absence of agreement on such major questions as the nature of the state and general social relationships within it. In such a situation political socialization so central, as we will see later, to political development becomes difficult. In this respect Lucian W. Pye's finding in South East Asia seems to be quite pertinent to Africa. To quote him:

"Since independence none of the countries in the region (South East Asia) has successfully developed a means of giving its population a shared view of its national political life. This lack of continuity and common direction in the socialization process stems mainly from the absence of agreement on the fundamental ideals and goals of the state. When the people of a nation do not have a common sense of identity and a shared self-image they cannot be expected to have a common pattern of political socialization. On the other hand until a common pattern of socialization is created that will provide the necessary minimum agreement on the role of the citizen, there can be little hope for a coherent and integrating political system." 1)

The problems of political identity and solidarity in the developing countries, insofar as they do exist, may be traceable to the absence of coherence in the patterns of socialization, and this in turn to that of a theory in the sense discussed above. This is particularly so in countries with significant cultural discontinuities. These traits themselves as well as their consequences do not seem incapable of being eliminated or minimized by the conscious manipulation of a theory of social organization. But the difficulty should not be minimized. The existence of competing socializing processes—national and parochial complicates the issue of identity. To appreciate this just consider the primacy of the family in many of the developing countries, and the existence of nationals of several countries in the modern school systems—with their different historical and ideological backgrounds, different religions—and different degrees of understanding of the country they are in. This notwithstanding, identity may be expressed in terms of political consensus attainable through political education. Thus consensus seems to underlie identity and solidarity. 1) This relationship must be extended a little further; for consensus is not by itself. It is dependent, it seems to me, upon the existence of agreement on the pattern of allocation of wealth as well as other socially useful resources over which conflict may arise. It may be said that this agreement more than anything else lies at the heart of consent and dissent in politics.

The critical importance of this must be recognized; for in political processes nothing can effectively replace agreement on fundamentals, both within the ruling stratum and at the level of the mass of the population. 2) Given agreement on fundamentals political democracy may prevail, because then the terms of participation can safely be liberalized. Some people have argued that what really matters is the establishment of legal procedures for the solution of political problems. But one wonders how this can stand since in the absence of

1) Solidarity may be regarded as a function of identity in the sense that often if not always people appear to feel and express solidarity with those to whom they identify.

2) Kemal H. Karpat has clearly argued that even at the height of religiosity in the theocratic state of the Islamic caliphate lack of consensus on mundane political questions had an undoing effect on the political system. Kemal H. Karpat, "Ideology in the New States, End or Beginning?" International Political Science Association, Brussels, September, 1967, pp. 4-5.
consensus on the moral basis of these procedures both their challenge and their defence become equally moral. Another argument usually advanced is that in a discussion of questions pertaining to consent and dissent in politics, greater weight needs to be attached to the consideration of the presence or absence of consensus within the elite group than within the general population. This may be acceptable with one modification, viz., that the philosophy of the leaders should be such as to integrate them with the mass of the people. Once this is so the formal and informal educational mechanisms, the available media of public communication etc. can be meaningfully geared toward political socialization and resocialization. This means, in other words, that overtime the philosophy of social organization itself can spread along with new economic and political skills thereby bringing consensus and new political capabilities to the grass root level.

What we have said thus far is sufficient, I hope, to indicate that what is here termed a theory of social organization is not a set of beliefs based on ignorance, fear and hope, nor on pure speculation. As we have already suggested, it is an action oriented system of ideas grounded on science, explaining historical phenomena, justifying or limiting policy choices and linking particular actions to a wider set of meanings. However, it may still be necessary to articulate what has been implicitly set out — that is the recognition of the equality of all men not simply as a respectable slogan to be aired but as a living ideal operationalized through distributive justice and effective participation. With this firmly established as its basis the theory we are concerned with thus becomes one geared to the full release of the productive potentials of society for economic growth and political development, and to the emergence of self-respecting, responsible and dynamic members of society. Hence its function as a necessary ingredient of progress,
The Post-Independence Theoretical State of Africa

In the foregoing discussion an attempt has been made to suggest that the requirements for a comprehensive, elaborate and consistent theory of social organization cannot be forgone, without heavy losses in terms of development, in favour of pragmatism and that a pragmatic, problem solving approach may result in the maintenance, or still worse the strengthening of a lop-sided situation. However, one should hasten to add, at this point, that in fact this seems to be the line followed by most political elites of Africa whatever their protestations to the contrary. 1) Charles F. Andrain sums up the findings of many observers when he writes:

"In general, African political leaders have not formulated a clearly defined ideology, in the sense of a comprehensive, consistent and carefully elaborated system of beliefs. Especially in English speaking Africa the pragmatic empiricism of British thought has influenced nationalist ideas." 2)

A number of factors combine to make this situation possible. These factors are both internal and external. Among the first could be mentioned the pattern of education to which African political leaders were exposed both at home and in the metropolitan centres, their felt advantage and objective structure of opportunity which accrue to them by virtue of positions of power and prestige inherited from the colonial administrations, the existence of colonially oriented, hardly reformed bureaucratic and military paraphernalia as well as the existence of a colonially determined system of education. These will be treated in the parts of this study dealing with decolonization, urban-rural integration and political education.


2) Andrian, ibid., p. 156.
External political influences, being usually behind the scenes, or hidden away in official files and coming to public notice mainly at the discretion of politicians may be more difficult to grasp, but no less real. These influences assume various forms—cultural, economic, military etc. — with differing degrees of subtlety or perceptibility. Given the scope of this study, however, it is neither necessary, nor possible to analyse them all. We might, therefore, briefly touch upon the academic and the political spheres. In the case of the former I am particularly thinking of scholars like Karl Mannheim and adherents of the end of ideology school. In so negative a light do these see ideology that they virtually excommunicate it from the realm of scientific endeavour. Mannheim treats it, for instance, as a function of a patrified psychology, of an "unorganized insecurity". 1) His thoughts developed in a situation of crisis, of disillusionment, of at least partial desperation, as a consequence of the great depression of the late twenties and early thirties and the rise of fascism in Europe. Whatever the explanation, this approach minimizes, if it recognizes at all, the role of the objective structure of social opportunities and the capacity of ideology to transcend the present (which neither in the forties nor in the sixties has been altogether satisfying) through rational calculations pointing the way to a new and better social existence. In similar vein scholars of the end of ideology school regard pragmatism "as having cured the ills of the West", and prefer to look upon theories directing towards the attainment of new social formations as "impediment to rational social science and even economic development". 2) This is strongly contrasted by my own position stated in the last section and, as Karpat notes by the "enthusiasm and predilection for ideology among intellectuals and leaders in new states." 3) Nevertheless, the influence of the end of ideology school has proved quite farreaching. Even a

2) Karpat, op. cit., p. 2.
3) Ibid.
political theorist like Apter, who does not profess adherence to this orientation does in fact fall back on its basic assumptions when he identifies the ideology in the developed countries of the West with "social science" and that prevalent in the Third World with "the cultural hunger of a world in extreme transition", with beliefs and "values" (implying that these are subjective and unscientific), of the consummatory type. 1)

Karpat appears to have placed his finger on the right spot when he observed that studies on the subject of ideology seem often to succumb to the author's views on foreign policy or his total commitment to uphold the virtues of liberal democracy and economy ... these prior commitments whatever their motives often prevent the student of new nations from seeing the ideology in the Third World within its own functional context." 2)

The academic, the communication media and the political spheres enjoy a good deal of interpenetrating influences which, one is led to believe, often sum up, among other things, in encouraging a pragmatic approach to development. At stake here, in practical terms, are the numerous forms of financial and technical assistance obtainable from the industrialized countries of the West under conditions of friendship defining the interests of the donors and diversion from which may and usually does necessitate withdrawal of aid. Whether it is the actual or presumed benefits which this friendship holds out or the real or imagined danger which withdrawal of support may entail that binds African governments to the relationship cannot be clearly demonstrated. Particularly so since governments which have maintained close ties with Western powers have been heard to complain that the latter, supposedly because of these same ties have treated them "in a step-motherly fashion": The Tafawa Balewa government of Nigeria, for instance, used to lament that it was "being penalized for being reasonable and not flirting with communism". 3)

1) See Apter, op. cit., pp. 24-32.
In the same vein, Julius Nyerere who until recently was regarded in London as "our man in Dar-Es-Salaam" (1) complained that "Tanganyika's stability was used (by the British) as an argument why we should not get financial help." (2)

Be that as it may, with rare exceptions African political leaders appear never to have had the will and the capability to define the conditions for these relationships on their own terms; nor to work out a theory of social organization either within the framework of the Western model or breaking away from it and thereby possibly risking their sources of aid. Neither, indeed, did the politics of liberation assume a form that might evidence the need for and facilitate the process of theorizing. With the exception of Guinea and Algeria the transition from colonial status to independence took place largely within the bounds of colonial constitutions. Moreover, at points where the possibility for independence loomed so large as to make its continued denial economically and politically untenable, the colonial powers intelligently hastened to give it away. Hence the struggle for liberation was neither hard nor prolonged enough to necessitate and facilitate the formulation of a theoretical picture of "the new society". The approach of the nationalist leaders, thus constrained, became in the words of Ken Post an "empirical one, devoted to the winning of power in whatever context it could be gained rather than to theorizing about the nature of the nation and the state." (3)

Assessing the African theoretical scene, Andrain notes: "most leaders point out that the economic system must be adapted to the African realities and not to an imported theory like bourgeois capitalism or Marxism-Leninism". (4) But what, one may ask, is the economic system? Is it a model to be adapted or something out there operating in reality - hence to be modified or transformed? If the latter, does it mean that African economic systems are not adapted to the


4) Andrain, op. cit., p. 155.
African reality? If so is it a foreign importation? In case the answer to this should be in the affirmative what is the basis for rejecting so-called "imported theories"? However, one must hasten to add that this apparent confusion is not Adrain's making, though to the extent he fails to recognize it he may be said to have his share in it. As we have already indicated the reasons for the rejection of these theories lie deeper than this confusion. Arguments in support of it have usually been based on the assertion that the physical and socio-psychological environment in which these theories evolved were radically different from that prevailing in Africa. On the other hand, leaders in most African countries have also laid claim to the need to retain their own independence of mind, though in actual fact this independence does not seem to transcend the colonial heritage. What usually does not come out in these arguments, it appears to me, is what in fact is the most significant, viz. the inherited structural and psychological rigidities and the foreign influences which militate against their transformation.

Opposition to the "importation" of theories of social organization has usually been offered with a tone strongly suggesting that African leaders have the will and the freedom to evolve a theory reflecting the special circumstances of Africa and that because of this such a theory would be a useful guide to successful action. However, one needs say that the assertion of freedom underlying this suggestion may be more pretended than real. The process of "nation-building" in Africa, as perhaps elsewhere in the Third World, be it in terms of theorizing or acting does not appear to have enjoyed, thus far autonomous internal dynamics. Nor have leaders been able to define and realize their goals. Lucian W. Pye puts this in a nutshell (though unfortunately in a dichotomous form) when he submits that "the impact of the modern world (largely Western in the case of Africa) on traditional societies has been a pressure in set directions." 1) William Attwood, former U.S. Ambassador to Guinea, in his revealing book: "The Reds and the Blacks," affords us several concrete evidences which support this line of argument. When the Guinean delegation to

1) Pye, op. cit., p. 11
the Afro-Asian Jurists Conference in Conakry voted for a resolution which Washington did not like; the U.S. Ambassador had only to express disapproval and displeasure to receive the reply: "It was all a terrible mistake ... It won't happen again." 1) Moreover, Attwood reports that Guinean Cabinet Ministers were ill at ease when he entered their offices, adding:

"It was understandable. Being black, poor and insecure in their jobs ... they could hardly be expected to greet the representative (may be a racist - his own words) of the most powerful nation in the world with the assurance and equanimity of a Dean Rusk or Robert McNamara." 2)

But then the question remains: can such leaders who can neither vote without fear nor meet an Ambassador with self-assurance be expected to have the freedom and originality so indispensable for successful theorizing? Attwood's statement about the ministers may be an expose of his own opinion of them as much as or even more than their own self-picture. However, the Ambassador's sweeping successes in Guinea suggest that perhaps, they were both at work.

In any case where efforts have been made on the basis of the above assumption the result has, all too often, been a mixture of elements borrowed from pre-colonial African, communocratic humanism, 3) from Marxism, from Western liberalism and different religious sources. What does not appear to have been sufficiently grasped, however, is that all these idea-systems have their internal difficulties and that attempts at blending concepts borrowed from two or more of them might increase these difficulties proportionately. Moreover, the problem of context has to be faced, since all these systems of ideas whatever their degree of elaborateness represent different world pictures.

2) Ibid., pp. 35-6.
This means that using concepts which occur in anyone of them would have to be done with careful regard for, and thorough understanding of their general frameworks — another requirement which does not seem to have been satisfied thus far.

At any rate, leaders who have attempted such a blend, in one combination or another, with the exception of the Tanzanian leadership in recent years, appear to have lacked the determination and the perseverance necessary for the task. On the other hand, despite the volume of literature produced — and this is less than considerable — a successful synthesis is certainly far from achieved. In other words the eclectic approach so far tried has, alas, too often, shown little fruition. Indeed it is not uncommon for the student of African political thought (who is prepared to do the necessary cuttings and plasterings) to be confronted with voluntarism and determinism, egalitarianism and claims for competitive self-assertion in the scattered writings and speeches of a top party leadership or indeed of a single politician. A priori rejection of theories developed outside may offer the possibility for free search and unhampered thought. However, one is forced to wonder whether the responsibility commensurate with this — of assuming a sense of urgency — has been recognized, and indeed whether given the present power base of African governments this is at all possible. Furthermore, free lancing in thought as well as in action may be regarded as a game which Africa — with its immense problems can hardly afford. A position is often stated with apparent militancy; justification for its antithesis is also put as militantly and any reader or listener is left free to choose what pleases him. And more so since the two do rarely, if at all, attain projection on the same theoretical screen. Nkrumah, for instance, writes and speaks of capitalism with immense vociferous antagonism — so much so, indeed, that he asserts that "capitalism at home is domestic colonialism" 1) and, hence deserves to be rejected. "If therefore, we are to fulfill our pledge to the people," he tells us,

"socialism is our only alternative. For socialism assumes the public ownership of the means of production, the land and its resources, and the use of those means in fulfilling of the people's needs." 2)

1) Nkrumah, Condemn Colonialism, op. cit., p. 74.
2) Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, op. cit., p. 119.
On the other hand, in his attempt at theoretically devising the future economic pattern of Ghana he introduces five sectors in three of which domestic and foreign private capital is allocated either exclusive or substantial roles. Thus despite Nkrumah's claim: "we aim at creating in Ghana a socialist society in which each will give according to his ability and receive according to his needs," one expresses little surprise when his close associate, the ardent Nkrumahist, Kofi Baako states:

"... in a Nkrumahist-socialist state, the farmer will not lose his farm; the landlord will not lose his house but will not be allowed to exploit his tenant, the employer will not be allowed to exploit the worker; nor will the worker be allowed to cheat the employer by idling about; the car owner will still have his car ..." 1)

though as Ficht and Oppenheimer note this, in effect, amounts to saying "neither landlords nor capitalists will be abolished - they will simply be regulated." 2)

The situation being such it becomes difficult to attach any concrete meaning to the written or the spoken word. Not only can thought be divorced from action but also any statements carry no conviction or commitment. Indeed sometimes, as President Nyerere of Tanzania, with his usual frankness and by way of self-criticism, wrote in the Arusha Declaration what matters most seems to be the audience addressed. To appreciate the full significance of this, I believe it is necessary to quote Nyerere. He states:

"... in the past Tanzania has said it is committed to building socialism, but we have not made clear what we mean by this. We have called for private investment in industrial and agricultural activities but at the same time we have spoken frequently of our determination to control our economy. ... But we never laid down our criteria for the division between public and private enterprise. Instead we talked in general terms about the advantages of each - often according to whether the factory we were opening was public of private." 3)

Sekou Touré put the matter in an equally revealing way when he told American journalists in the United States: "Don't judge us by what others say, or even by what we say, but only by what we do." 1) The importance of this statement, again, cannot be overestimated, for its author is the same Touré who along with Nkrumah, Modibo Keita and recently also Nyerere has often been willing to argue that thought and action are mutually reinforcing — thought leading to action and action feeding back thought.

Numerous examples could be cited to illustrate that neither the "radicals" — Touré, Nkrumah and Keita nor the "reconciliationists" of the Senghor type have articulated a comprehensive body of coherent ideas that signifies a theory of social organization. On the other hand, most African governments have declared themselves socialist. Socialism, perhaps, is the most widely used and the most ill defined term current in the continent. The colloquium on Policies of Development and African Approaches to Socialism held in Dakar in 1962 and attended by political leaders and intellectuals from a variety of African countries failed to come up with any concise or clear definitions of African socialism. Nevertheless, socialism is usually regarded as being something "vaguely beneficial" and only in a few states like Liberia and Ivory Coast is it necessarily regarded as "a threat to the status-quo". Claims of affinity with socialism are popular inasmuch as they imply a scientific approach to development and serve to identify governments with rapid consciously directed change. 2) But in many cases the term implies "little more than a general desire to raise the standard of living." Thus the "pragmatic socialism" of the NCNC in Nigeria disclaimed any design of nationalizing foreign owned businesses while Chief Awolowo's "democratic socialism" of the immediate post-independence period partly meant in the words of Ken Post, "the simultaneous expropriation of foreigners and the encouragement of Nigerian private enterprise". 3) As noted earlier though under Nkrumah's "socialist" leadership the state was allowed a more pronounced place in the Ghanaian economy; the dominant role was securely reserved for foreign and domestic private capital. Indeed that situation seems to have been fairly represented by Krobo Edusei when he defined socialism as a system wherein "if you have a lot of money you can still keep it." 4)

3) Post, op.cit., p. 126.
4) Ficht and Oppenholmer, loc.cit.
At the extreme, of course, one finds the example of Kenya where African socialism is being utilized "unscrupulously to rationalize the march of the new African elite into all sectors of the economy - public and private." 1) The programme of land consolidation encouraged and supported by the British and the World Bank met outright opposition at least among the Luos. But once the politico-administrative elite led the way in consolidating land and buying off the rich white farms after independence popular aspiration to individual land ownership could not but be aroused. In Kenya today, one witnesses an expanding frontier of new landlordism (often absentee) spear-headed by President Kenyatta and his close lieutenants. Aaron Segal describes the situation in the following terms:

"President Jomo Kenyatta himself symbolizes the country's new landowning squirarchy by residing on his prosperous coffee farm near Nairobi - an example thousands hope to emulate." 2) Such examples furnish the empirical foundations for Professor René Dumont's conclusion that African socialism is "too often just a cover for neocolonialism, or else a not always honest attempt to reconcile the communal ideal with African tradition". 3) And evidences are abundant to prove that such conclusions are not necessarily limited to the "socialists". Houphouet-Boigny, for instance, promised his countrymen that his government would eliminate "the last hovel" from Ivory Coast in ten years, and that "without being socialist" he intended to make the country "better than the socialist states". 4) In proof of this, he built himself a beautiful modern palace (at the cost of four billion francs) with malachite imported from Russia by air. 5)

However, quite bewildering can all these be if the nature of African socialism is not fully grasped, or if it is glibly identified with Marxism-Leninism. Though often African "socialists" have expressed concern with distributive justice this has almost never been a necessarily logical derivation from a general theory. Justification for it is uneasily obtained by reference

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1) Arrighi and Saul, op.cit., p. 160.
3) Dumont, op.cit., p. 203. Ken Post notes that the various shades of African Socialism - "scientific", "Nkrumahist", Humanist", "Pragmatic" etc. mask inventions ranging between a genuine desire to raise the living standards of the masses and a genuine concern with individual enrichment at the expense of the many." See Post, op.cit., p. 66.
4) Ibid.
to pre-colonial African communalism and to a co-operative, non-possive "attitude of mind" which with surprising feats of patriotism is allowed to outlive the onslaught of competitive individualism wrought in the wake of colonialism. On the other hand, most African "socialists" are either silent or evasive on the question of Marx's class antagonism or reject its relevance to the African situation. 1) At their hands "classlessness" all too often becomes not the ultimate objective of development policy but the immediate reality of contemporary African societies. While colonialism is interpreted in terms of exploitation of one people by another, the existence of exploitation within African communities is usually denied. Equally rejected are historical materialism and its corollary atheism. Modibo Keita sums up the stand of the "radicals" and the "reconciliationists" alike in the following manner:

"Mali and her leaders draw their inspiration for socialist construction from the theory of Marxism-Leninism. But we do not adopt its materialist philosophy, and we do not adopt its atheism, because we are believers." 2)

The "socialists" concept of democracy draws heavily upon Rousseau's Volonté-general. The fact that Africa has "no antagonistic classes" makes it happily possible to construct a democracy based on the unanimous will of the whole people. This, Touré, for example, calls a "popular dictatorship." The inappropriateness of the term "dictatorship" is, of course, immediately apparent. If the political system is founded and led by the unanimous will and interest of the entire population the question of dictatorship cannot possibly arise. Perhaps those thinking on this line are extending the will and the interests of the elite - at any rate even her unanimity is seldom found - to cover the mass of the people. And at the same time they may be thinking of the coercion which the elite finds it necessary to employ with increasing intensity perhaps as a result of the masses' failure to trace the identity of interest underpinning the populist strain of African socialist thought.


The theme has been presented in summary by Worsley: "Africa is its peasantry, subsistence producers, cash crop producers, but independent peasants. This is the basic fact about the social structure of the New African States." Given the urban-rural split in Africa (to be dealt with later) and the often immense income differentials between the elite and the masses and the impact of this on political power relations this becomes quite a suspect. Besides, in the words of Garry Thomas: "relatively great extremes in rural incomes do exist", 1) even in such relatively undifferentiated economies like that of Tanzania, while as observed earlier, in countries such as Kenya an emergent pattern of landlordism is assuming features not too difficult to discern. What is clear, however, is that the issues of structural transformation and of effective decolonization as well as the implications of these for long-term strategies of economic and political development cannot be squarely faced within the prevalent framework of populism which obscures the process of social change and inhibits understanding thereof. Little wonder, then, that pre-colonial egalitarian and participatory features are still insisted upon, despite the condemnation of colonialism for having distorted the normal course of African history. To the extent that the result of this distortion in terms of new social formations has not been spelt out and analysed this condemnation does not only lack intellectual vigour. Even more important economic, social and political inequalities resulting either from the pre-colonial or the colonial experience are allowed to persist and get more and more entrenched with the laps of time.

The Tanzanian Case

Before the Arusha Declaration on Socialism and Self-reliance was promulgated in 1967, fundamentally there was very little to distinguish Tanzania from the rest of the continent. The country was declared socialist immediately after independence; and in 1961, as one of the major policy moves a law was enacted replacing colonial free hold land tenure with lease-hold tenure. 1) In principle land became public property, held in trust for posterity. Though the actual acreage thus affected was small the move went a great length towards discouraging the growth of landlordism, particularly absentee landlordism of the civil servants and urban businessmen, a phenomenon which has become part of the social landscape in countries like Kenya and the Ivory Coast.

However, as some scholars have discovered, and as President Nyerere has come to recognize, neither the law nor its relatively strict application could prevent an increasing degree of rural social stratification. 2) Nor could Nyerere's "attitude of mind" type of populist socialism provide adequate conceptual tools for capturing the process of rural and urban change for the purpose of analysis. 3) Moreover, the Tanzanian socialism as all other shades of African socialism, happened to be so loosely defined that as John Lonsdale puts it, "few shades of belief could not be subsumed within it." 4) But a further distinction may be mentioned: What has now come to be termed as the Tanzanian political style - a style marked by simplicity, frank discussions of issues, successes and failures of policies, and a readiness to discover mistakes and draw conclusions therefrom.


The Arusha Declaration, with its supplementary formulations, interpretations and elucidations has come to represent, in the words of Henry Bienen "something of a milestone". It spelt out logically linked principles, enunciated long-term policies and their implications in social, economic and political terms. According to the Declaration Tanzania stands committed to "a more rigorously defined socialism" and to self-reliance—two inter-related concepts which furnish the basis of the future society. Socialism is understood as a social situation marked by equality, cooperation and participatory democracy—a situation which excludes the possibility of one class or person having control over the means of livelihood of another. In other words what is aimed at is an egalitarian society in which "neither capitalism nor feudalism exists," and in which neither class nor personal exploitation is permissible. 1) The major means of production are to be collectively owned and controlled by workers and peasants either through the instrumentality of the government or through co-operatives. 2)

Perhaps it needs pointing out here, that theoretically rejection of private ownership does not seem to arise from the fact of ownership per se. Rather it emanates from the recognition that it can hardly satisfy two requirements: one—a corollary of equality, —that any mode of ownership should not lead to the employment and exploitation and the loss of dignity and selfrespect of others; and the second that it must enhance accelerated development. On the other hand, such a development is held to be dependent upon the progressive utilization of modern techniques of production. To the extent, therefore, that individual capacities are limited, insofar as, for example, an individual unaided by the labour of others cannot satisfy the requirements of scale, justification is found for collective ownership as well as co-operation. But the moral meaningfulness of this is also buttressed by drawing upon pre-colonial history. What is attempted here is the re-envigoration of Ujamaa (communal-cooperative village) principles whose defences have been weakened by


competitive individualism brought in the wake of colonialism. There is a noticeable departure from the simplistic African socialism which assumed an automatic socialist "attitude of mind" as found in Nyerere's 1962 paper on Ujamaa, in favour of a more sophisticated assessment of Tanzanian realities. Thus "Tanzania is a state of peasants and workers," the Declaration reads:

"but it is not yet a socialist state. It still has elements of capitalism and feudalism and their temptations. These elements could expand and entrench themselves." 1)

In further elucidating this point, Nyerere notes:

"there has been a general acceptance of the social attitudes and ideas of our colonial masters. We have got rid of the foreign government, but we have not yet rid ourselves of the individualistic social attitudes which they represented and taught." 2)

Whatever insistence that one finds in recent formulations do not seem to pertain so much to the continuity of pre-colonial egalitarian and co-operative Ujamaa values. Rather is it a call for not only introducing changes in property-relations but also, and equally important, for that type of political education which enhances equality while successfully mounting an attack on egoism, acquisitiveness and competition. 3) In other words, public ownership of the means of production - in whole or in part - is held to be not a sufficient condition for the existence of socialism. At the focal point is man; and the basic assumption: the equality of all men, not only before God but also before man here on earth. 4)

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4) In a discussion with a group of Dar-es-Salaam University College students, President Nyerere called the Arusha Declaration a "man-centred" document based on "human equality", further noting that, "in Tanzania which is implementing the Arusha Declaration, the purpose of all social, economic and political activity is Man." Nyerere, "The Arusha Declaration, Teach-in", National Printing Co.Ltd., Dar-es-Salaam, 1967, p. 2.
In the absence of equality public ownership of the means of production and/or distribution cannot guarantee even against fascism. "If the racist governments of Rhodesia and South Africa were to bring the major means of production in these countries under their control and direction," the Declaration explains: "this would entrench exploitation. It would not bring about socialism." 1) From this emerges the recognition of the need for operationalizing equality through participation. Given this socialism makes the right combination of political and economic contents possible. Though it is also economic in as far as it is concerned with development the new doctrine is held to be primarily political. In this sense it refers to development strategy based on the broad and active involvement of the common people - "the peasants and the workers" - in the formulation and implementation of policies. The recognition that the economic and the political in this combination are inseparable, that development cannot be defined nor construed in narrow economic terms is one of the factors which make present day Tanzania atypical in Africa.

Another factor is the significant role assigned to self-reliance. Before we discuss this, however, it is necessary to show briefly how, in concrete terms, the people's involvement is envisaged. To begin with, participation at the local level is closely tied to the concept of Ujamaa - an economic and social community "where people live together and work together for the good of all." The basis of Tanzanian life, it is stated, should consist of such communities which are not isolated but "inter-looked so that all of the different communities also work together in co-operation for the common good of the nation as a whole." 2) Within the Ujamaa village all socio-economic and political decisions are to be made by a general meeting of all its members. This same body would also elect its own executive officials who "remain equal members with the others, subject always to the wishes of the people. Only in relation to work discipline would there be any hierarchy, and then such officials would be merely acting for the village as a whole." 3) A number of such villages could also come together and organise for economic, social

1) The Arusha Declaration, loc. cit.
3) Ibid., pp. 13-20.
and political purposes on the same participatory principles. Thus as Henry Bienen notes, "a democratic system of local government is to grow out of these living and working communities". 1)

The position at the national level is not as clear. It is stated that the Tanzanian National Union is "a party of peasants and workers" and the National government should be "elected and led by peasants and workers." 2) However, these terms have not yet been sharply defined. Besides, both before and after Arusha, much of the top party and government leadership has been composed of people who could be termed workers or peasants only by some stretch of imagination. Despite these, however, it remains to be noted that today Tanzania has been the country in Africa where determined efforts have been made, both at the levels of theory and practice, to minimize seriously the differences in income and lifestyle between the elite and the masses. Probably the clearest and most detailed part of the Arusha Declaration is its leadership code - designed to eliminate opportunism, acquisitiveness and any desire on the part of persons in the higher and middle echelons of the party, the government and the para-statal institutions to use political power for private economic ends. This will be dealt with in more detail later. Suffice it to say here that the strict application of the code which was effected (a phenomenon which again distinguishes Tanzania from almost all other African states) within a year of its promulgation expelled those who were not willing to give up their business interests (and these were very few) and forced others to forgo these same interests. This was strictly in line with the Arusha creed which recognized the equality of all men and consequently disavowed all forms of exploitation. The political significance of this seems to lie more in the sphere of elite - mass reintegration than in anything else. In this sense, the attempt has been at the equalization of the economic sources of influence - so essential, as we have argued earlier, for a viable political democracy.

2) The Arusha Declaration, op.cit., p. 4.
It has been repeatedly made clear that at the core of Tanzanian development strategy are people, not things. From this, then, follows the indispensability of "democracy in decision-making." This has an educative aspect to it, since it is believed that by participating in the process of decision-making marked by frank, honest and uninhibited discussion people learn to evaluate policies and the consequences thereof. But there is another aspect too; for such a process makes decisions "ours" as opposed to "theirs." This means that the chances are high for the participants to identify with these decisions and commit themselves to their successful implementation. Hence President Nyerere's recognition that leadership cannot replace democracy; that a leader should regard himself and be regarded by others as an equal among equals. A leadership role thus becomes one of teaching and learning from others - of discussing, persuading, taking cognizance of others' knowledge and experience, "and working with the people to show what it is you are urging them to do. It means being one of the people and recognizing your equality with them." Arguments in the Arusha Declaration and in the President's subsequent statements, in this respect, amount to a call for what may be termed as an integrative-liberating type of political leadership as opposed to the alienated type. Such a leadership starts from the basic recognition of the dignity and capacity of the people which it confirms through participation. It seeks to liberate human energies for common ends. It rejects pompocity, consumptionism, coercion and alienation - as explicit or implicit symbols of authority. As suggested earlier, however, how this is to be realized, particularly at higher levels of decision-making, still largely remains to be worked out.

It needs to be pointed out that the Arusha leadership code was not a sudden stroke. It has a history behind it - which may be traced at least to 1965. During the general elections of that year, the electorate demonstrated that those of their representatives who having been elected found too much comfort in the luxuries of town life to pay sufficient attention to their constituencies could be penalized. Many M.P.'s including two ministers and six junior ministers were rejected by the voters, while farmers, teachers, co-operative or trade union workers fared
well. 1) And that was a lesson the Nyerere leadership took good note of: Addressing the new Assembly the President said that one of the conclusions drawn from the elections was that "there had not been sufficient practical recognition of the need to keep in constant touch with the people." 2) Göran Hyden was referring to this as much as to the more general concepts of socialism and self-reliance when he concluded in his study on Political Development in Rural Tanzania that

"... the prescriptions for improvement that are presented there (in Arusha) do point at exactly those weaknesses in the system capabilities that are recorded in our survey. It emphasises that the rural inhabitants in the first years of independence have suffered from a relative economic stagnation. It records the unfavourable implications of a growing difference between the richer and the poorer sectors of the population. It was on these points that the village expressed particular concern and discontent. This study, therefore, confirms the relevance of the recommendations offered in the Arusha Declaration." 3)

Apart from the Nationalization Act, the one aspect of Arusha and subsequent formulations which has evoked the most debate and the bitterest criticism abroad is the concept of self-reliance. Despite the controversy that has come to envelope it, however, this concept is neither entirely new either to Africa or to Tanzania nor anything


3) Göran Hyden, TANU Yajenga NCHI, Political Development in Rural Tanzania, Scandinavian University Books, Lund, 1968, p. 244.
so shakingly dramatic. Several African governments have professed commitment to the mobilization of their populations, and have purportedly sought to use the enthusiasm generated by political independence for development, or as Ken Post puts it to develop the "sense of urgency further and direct the general desire for change into some sort of productive effort." Self-help has been encouraged, at least in words—so much so indeed that in French speaking West Africa "investissement humain" has become part of the political language code, though admittedly it has never received a sharp definition or been presented as part of a general development strategy.

In Tanzania the significance of the spirit of community self-help was recognized even before independence. Community schools were built, classes were organized to counteract the meagre treatment of the colonial educational system; leaders of the liberation movement campaigned for hard work, better educational, health and housing facilities on a do-it-yourself basis. Numerous marketing co-operatives and unions had emerged, sometimes against the strong objection of the colonial administration, from the farmers' recognition that if they were to hold their own economically they had to avoid the low prices and weighted balances of the middlemen. 1) At independence "self-help and voluntary labour schemes" received further emphasis and encouragement while a year after independence an attempt was made to co-ordinate these schemes into nation-building projects. 2) An estimation by the Commission of Community Development shows that "in the first five years of independence the whole value of work done through projects in which the people voluntarily participated without any financial rewards amounted to 77 million Shs. 3) In fact when the first five year plan foundered almost completely as a result of the economic pressures applied by West Germany, Britain

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1) Ibid., pp. 107-114. Cf. George Bennett, An Outline History of Tanu, Makerere Journal, No. 7, 1963, pp. 23 and 27. One of the major aims of the Kianja Labour Association—an organization which sprung spontaneously in Kianja following World War II—was "to persuade people to work for their advancement". This as Hyden notes, "was an exhortation, in some way, for self-reliance". Hyden, op.cit., p.113.


3) Hyden, op.cit., p. 50.
and other Western powers on Tanzania because of its independent foreign policy, "the most dramatic successes" were scored in

"... the co-operative settlements which had developed outside the government framework. Particularly outstanding was the work of the Rovuma Development Association ... In such schemes the capital costs were minimal and real leaders had emerged from among the people" 1)

Thus as John Lonsdale observes "the lesson was plain": such things as foreign aid and money were not "the only nor the most important spur to development"; 2) there is a "more precious commodity" — self-reliance. But still one does find something of a novelty in Arusha's self-reliance, and that is, in my opinion, the sharper definition it has received, the fact that it is now presented as part of a wider development policy plus the expression of determination to implement it.

The basis of Tanzanian self-reliance is the recognition that development is the development of people not of things, that such a development cannot be imposed, or, in other words, that "the development of the people can only be effected by the people." From here the rest follows: freedom and development are seen as inseparable parts of the same phenomenon. To develop Tanzania according to the needs and interests of Tanzanians national independence, both political and economic, must be guaranteed. Unless the nation is free in these two senses, groups or individuals within it cannot enjoy the right to live in dignity and equality with others and to participate in decisions affecting the nation as a whole or parts thereof. And to the extent that this is not possible, the people cannot develop themselves. On the other hand the enjoyment of freedom is held as being dependent in no insignificant measure on economic and political development. So long as people are poor, diseased and illiterate, so long as their political understanding is low their independence can be endangered by others who are better equipped, whether the attack and the defence take military or other subtler forms not withstanding. Thus self-reliance is logically and inextricably linked with both independence and development.

2) Ibid.
Its meaning is, then, that for their development Tanzanians have to depend upon themselves and their resources which are chiefly agricultural, rather than upon foreign aid in financial or technical assistance. The application of this doctrine of self-reliance is seen as capable of enhancing the country's ability to define and carry out an independent domestic and foreign policy. This ability is sought because as President Nyerere explained: "only Tanzanians are sufficiently interested to develop Tanzania in the interest of Tanzanians and only Tanzanians can say what those interests are." Underlying this, of course, the conviction that, reliance on foreign aid does constrain political independence and, on the other hand, that given the opportunity the people can, through "intelligent hard work", realize the economic development of the country.

Are there any empirical grounds for this conviction? At independence the Tanzanian government fell in line with other independent African states. Nyerere sped to London to ask for financial assistance - an experience which as we have seen was quite disappointing - and went on to Washington for the same purpose. His ministers followed suit and rambled several capitals in search of financial and technical assistance. Though never great, "untied" aid also kept coming from different sources in the form of gifts and loans. Why then self-reliance?

During the first Five Year Plan foreign sources were expected to finance 70 per cent of the total expenditure in the public sector. However, their contribution during the first three plan years in fact amounted only to less than 40 per cent. Moreover, it was soon learnt that donor states with whom Tanzania had foreign policy disagreements could withdraw their assistance any time. Henry Bienen

1) Ibid., pp. 4-10; cf. The Purpose is Man, in Ujamaa, Essays on Socialism, op.cit., p. 95-6. In 1966, "all the mining and manufacturing of Tanzania produced ... less than 7 % of the gross domestic product?; The Arusha Declaration Teach-in, op.cit., p. 4; cf. Bienen, "An Ideology for Africa," op.cit., p. 545.


3) Peter Meyns, Some Aspects of Planning and Socialism in Tanzania", Mvion, 4, 9 and 10 (March and April, 1968), p. 5.
illustrates this, in the case of West German and British aid as follows:

"After the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the new state run into difficulties with the Federal Republic of Germany since Zanzibar had previously recognized East Germany. When East Germany was permitted a consulate in Dar-es-Salaam, the West Germans broke an agreement to aid the Tanzanian airforce ... Even more costly for development efforts in the short run was Tanzania's break with Britain in accordance with an Organization for African Unity (OAU) resolution on Rhodesia. In the name of anti-colonialism, African Unity, African honour and freedom of action, Tanzania lost British assistance at a crucial time in the first Five Year Plan. Thus it seemed to Tanu's government that Tanzania's foreign policy decisions would have immediate consequences for its economic prospects as long as it continued to rely on foreign capital for development." 1)

The obvious choice was thus between maintaining independence of policy and action and accepting a curtailment of this in favour of foreign capital, technical or personnel assistance.

At this point it needs also to be stated that although efforts were expended to attract foreign private investment, although for instance, several pieces of legislation guaranteed the security of such investment and offered inducements by way of profit repatriation "net overseas private investment had been negative since independence." 2) On the other hand, while the Five Year Plan estimated that only 22 per cent of the development expenditure would come from local resources, the people actually "managed to contribute 61 per cent of the development finance. 3) As stated earlier voluntary self-help schemes were making headway. All this experience suggested emphasis on internal self-reliance. Moreover, the pattern of successes and failures in the agricultural sector also confirmed the lesson, since as we have seen self-


2) Lonsdale, ibid.

reliant village settlements scored conspicuous successes while others sponsored, controlled and directed by the government bureaucracy provoked dramatic failures. Thus, as Hyden argues, if all these could be done while the level of involvement of the mass of the population was not very high "much more could be achieved" by rightly mobilizing the available human energies.

Whether one agrees with Hyden's conclusion that "the new Tanzanian policy of socialism and self-reliance is to a large extent the answer to the numerous humiliations by outside powers that Tanzania and Africa as a whole have had to stand in the last two years," 1) will depend on how one interprets the phrase "to a large extent". At any rate it is by no means a policy which had its origin in frustration and desperation. Insofar as it was influenced by practical experiences there certainly is another equally or probably even more important aspect to it - viz. the demonstrated capacity of the people for self-help and the realization that given the right policies this capacity could be remarkably increased through the release of the people's greater potentialities. 2) Indeed it is in this sense that Arusha regards not only land and good leadership but also the policy of self-reliance as an exploitable resource. 3)

The picture will not be complete, however, unless and until it is stated that self-reliance does not mean self-sufficiency. For even the rejection of all types of external assistance. According to Arusha the Tanzanian leadership is committed to the diversification of the internal economy and the external market; the people are called upon to be self-reliant, particularly in food, clothing and housing and to increase their productivity through greater co-operation. Arusha also strikes at urban and particularly elite consumptionism and seeks to discourage the import of discretionary consumables which in the past represented a significant drain on the "resources" of the country. On the other hand it is fully recognized that the Tanzanian economy is tied to the international market despite the fact that the progressively

2) See the Arusha Declaration, op.cit., p. 15.
3) Ibid., pp. 17-8.
lower prices of its exports - as those of other Third World countries - are only matched by the increasingly higher prices of its imports of manufactured goods. Nor is a drastic change in this pattern envisaged in the very near future. To the extent that emphasis is shifted from cash crops to self-reliance in food, clothing etc., dependence on the international market may be reduced. But it has been repeatedly made clear that though its customers may change, though the proportion of goods and services exported to and/or imported from a specific country may change, Tanzania will maintain trade relations both with its East African neighbours and other nations. 

With regard to foreign assistance, it must be pointed out that what Arusha and its subsequent elaborations reject is not external aid per se, but dependence on it. This certainly does not mean as often suggested in the foreign press that all aid will be refused; nor even that it will not be elicited. It only means that aid proposals will be scrutinized to determine what effects they may have on the country's independence and development efforts, and will be accepted or declined depending on whether these effects are found to be positive or negative.

In concluding this section, one may observe that the theoretical picture in Tanzania is not yet quite complete and that, indeed there are some obvious gaps. For instance, although a comprehensive and fairly elaborate agricultural policy has been formulated no corresponding strategy has been laid down for the modern industrial sector. In fact it is fair to say as Arrighi and Saul note, that

"... industrial growth is still a missing link in the chain of socialist strategy in Tanzania. There is a relative silence on the priority to be given to industrialization, on how capital formation should be divided between the capital goods sector and the consumer goods sector or again between the sectors serving the rural areas and those serving the urban areas ..." 2

Moreover, both the Arusha Declaration and subsequent formulations are equally silent on the question of participation in the decision-making processes within the nationalized industrial sector, while as we have already indicated statements pertaining to the more general issues

1) The Arusha Declaration, op.cit., pp. 7-9; cf. After The Arusha Declaration, op.cit., p. 3.
2) Arrighi and Saul, op.cit., p. 167.
of political participation beyond the local level fall short of clarity. Despite this it still remains true to say that Arusha represents "something of a milestone" in Africa. Tanzania today has a comprehensive and fairly elaborate theory of social organization — a fact which has moved the country away from the typical African pattern. But this movement becomes even more pronounced when note is taken of the determined efforts on the part of the leadership to live the principles declared.
CHAPTER III

DECOLONIZATION

As I have argued in the first part of this study, decolonization means, more than anything else the rejection of a colonial philosophical and material framework. Brian Weinstei1 right13T characterizes it as the substitution of "a sense of human autonomy for a sense of being an object ... a sign of independence and social change, a key to nation-building." 1) The substantiation of this rejection, the effectuation of this change of status itself calls for a new coherent and comprehensive theoretical framework within which both thought and action can be explained. Insofar as this is lacking, therefore, colonialism, in one form or another still lingers on with all its debilitating effects.

Colonialism has been variously interpreted by its academic and press torch-bearers, its apologists, its critics, by the colonizers and the colonized. It may be that the critics have overplayed its strident excesses and supporters and apologists its benevolent beneficence. However, without entering the controversy one may start, as we have done, from the position that colonialism involves the subjugation of one people by another - for whatever purpose - and that from this ensues a spiral definable by a superior-inferior relationship. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights declared in 1952 that "slavery exists where an alien people hold power over the destiny of a people." 2) The nature of this power is not only political and economic. It is important that the seemingly abstract psychological considerations not be dropped (as sometimes happens) out of the equation. With India as his immediate concern, but in a way that typifies all colonial situations, Nehru put this mental variable in its right perspective when he commented:

1) Brian Weinstei1, "Africanization in French West Africa," Transition, 6, 3 (June/July 1967), p. 32.

2) Quoted in Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1962, p. 302.
"He developed the mentality of a good house-servant. Sometimes we were treated to a rare honour - we were given a cup of tea in the drawing room. The height of our ambition was to become respectable and to be promoted individually to the upper regions. Greater than any victory of arms or diplomacy was this psychological triumph of the British in India." 1) 

Crossing the social barrier to gain admission to the drawing room was of course the privilege enjoyed by a select few and the whole process did not find consummation in the drinking of the tea - but rather in the mental bent of the parties involved. And the tea party, not always accepted nor often shunned seems to have been symbolic of a slight economic uplift or some "unstrategic" administrative post confirmed. This whole phenomenon found its parallel in the French, Belgian and Portuguese policy of assimilation. As examples of the African evolué, Blaise Diagne and Felix Houphouet Boigny come readily to mind. Diagne, a Senegalese deputy in the French Assembly lent support to Nehru's observation already in 1922 by gratefully declaring:

"We French Blacks want to remain French; France having given us every liberty and mingling us without reservation with her own European children," 2) 

while Boigny echoed the same theme in 1957, when in the words of Rupert Emerson; "this strand of thought had largely lost its appeal." 3) Such were the extravagant responses to the lead offered by the metropolitan dignitaries and needed no strenuous reflection. Premier Guy Mollet chose New York as a platform from which to declare:

"... in Algeria, as in Black Africa, France intends to insure the complete liberation of the peoples for whom she is responsible, in other words, the individual liberation of each man and each woman ... ."

In similar vein, the Belgian colonial Minister, Buisseret also characterized his country's colonial aim as being "to humanize, to develop, to associate,

1) Ibid., p. 208.
2) However, only 27 years earlier, Jules Ferry had declared "without a twinge of conscience that 'the Declaration of the Rights of Man was not written for the Blacks of Tropical Africa,'" see Dumont, op.cit., p. 34.
3) Emerson, loc. cit.
and finally to emancipate in the framework of that association."

However, admirably attractive this doctrine might have been, it suffered from two fatal flaws. Individual liberation did not mean national liberation nor did the acceptance "without reservation" of the individual evolved mean the acceptance of his culture and his past. It is clear that recognition in fact went to the superiority of the metropolitan culture absorption by which gave the "evolved" African a new status.

Moreover, assimilation had to proceed along slow, rigidly selective lines, which meant that its capacity to penetrate the mass of the people was mightily curtailed—so much so indeed that the length of time its completion might have required defies any attempt to determine it finitely. Referring to this phenomenon, Emerson has commented:

"The African need perform no great feat of memory to establish that until the end of World War II forced labour and indigent (a special and prejudicial penal system for Africans) were in force, that French citizenship was limited to a handful, that there was virtually no representation either in Paris or locally, and that, in brief the ordinary African was a 'native', very largely at the disposal of the French administrator and employer. Cultural and social assimilation was for practical purposes restricted to a small elite ... Even when the post-war reforms were introduced, there remained the racial discrimination of the petit blanc in the colony, the continued harassment, by the old-style employer or official, and the manipulation of supposedly democratic political processes to produce results called for from above."

One of course cannot take the Portuguese "assimilado" even as seriously. It may be remarked, nevertheless, that although Portuguese association with its dependencies goes back to about half a millennium, out of a total population of 5,700,000 only 4,353 Africans had been "civilized" in Mozambique by 1950, while the illiteracy rate stood at 99 per cent. In 1958 there was "exactly one African with a University degree." Certainly not much more can be expected from a state like Portugal which has not been able to rid itself of internal fascism.

1) Ruth Slade, op. cit., p. 20.
3) Ibid., p. 63.
But Ruth Slade affords us' evidences which confirm that the Congolese under Belgium found themselves in a sufficiently strident situation. The status of the Congolese évolué remained largely legal and even then too often circumstantial and too rarely enforceable. Moreover, despite the policy of assimilation and the reforms introduced after 1945, "there was a very real racial discrimination ..." Whatever legal postulates were in the air, Slade observes:

"When it came to inviting Africans to a meal, to buying meat at the same butcher's shop, to travelling next to an African in the train, to letting their children sit in the same school benches as young Africans, to the great bitterness of the évolués the Europeans objected." 1)

It is in the light of such evidences that we have earlier referred to independence as the claim to a lost dignity and the rejection of an enforced humility. Has political independence guaranteed this? Have the colonially created or induced structural and psychological rigidities been successfully overcome? The available evidences far from proving that decolonisation has actually occurred only help to indicate the apparent indefeasibility of colonial determinism. Writing of Africa's colonial legacies, Andrew M. Kamarck, for instance, has commented:

"The existing economic structures of African states were influenced, shaped, and sometimes created by colonial regimes and their relationships to the metropolitan powers. The export trade and production, the system of transport, the commercial, financial, monetary, tax, fiscal and administrative structures - all were created during Africa's colonial period and have not been greatly modified since." 2)

Several studies have confirmed Kamarck's position and identified a good many elements of colonial determinism which have manifested a vigorous capacity for persistence. Major among these:

(a) economic structures including patterns of foreign trade and the close dependence of African economies on former colonial powers;

(b) artificial national boundaries;

(c) inappropriate administrative structures;

(d) the urban-rural split; and

1) Slade, op. cit., pp. 16-29.
(e) socially irrelevant systems of education. 1)

The existence of these rigidities years after political independence leads to another question. Did in fact the lowering of the metropolitan flags and the hoisting of the various standards of African states represent actual transfers of power?

In all former colonies, with the exception of Algeria, Guinea, and possibly Ghana and Mali, "the colonial power", to use Ken Post's words "not only set a ceiling upon the economic potentialities of Africans but also largely determined who would be given access to political power." 2) The attempt was to ascertain, through a process of selection, that the formal political replacement of the colonial administration would be of such a power base and orientation as to militate against socio-psychological transformation. Cogent and factual arguments have been advanced by an increasing number of writers to the effect that the intention of the colonial powers was to hand over some degree of political control to a new group, but that "they had no desire to do anything which would substantially affect their economic stakes" in their dependencies. 3) As a result and also because anti-colonial struggle in Africa was of a limited extent and intensity, economic power remained where it used to be – in the hands of expatriates. That economic power and political control can be separated and allowed to enjoy separate and independent existence is an academic subtlety of bygone days – which at any rate does not appear to have enjoyed a high degree of profundity. Today the recognition that economic and political power go hand in hand has obtained its sustenance not only from logic but also from an immense and growing amount of historical data. Whatever theoretical position is taken on this issue, by and large, political independence in Africa has not proven much more than a change in formal status. As Catherine Hoskyns put it the former colonial states of Africa:

1) The last two factors will be discussed in chapters three and four respectively.
"... inherited their basic position within the international community direct from the colonial relations. In strategic terms this meant that they remained within the sphere of influence of Western Europe; in economic terms it meant that the majority remained virtually client states on the periphery of Western European economic systems." 1)

Dependence on Export Earnings

Lest the implications of such statements be considered solely in functional terms it would seem necessary to shift the emphasis to the realities of trade patterns, capital flows, dependence on foreign personnel, transport networks, and productive areas, "if only because, as J.A. Hellen notes, "these manifestations constitute something of an evolutionary record which reflects the forces which have shaped them or to which they have adapted." Unfortunately, however, neither space nor time would allow a meaningful treatment of all these factors here. I will, therefore, restrict myself largely to the first three.

Africa's trade relations as well as its visible landscape display the heavy imprint left by its almost complete dependence, in colonial days, on earnings from the export of primary commodities. Since independence adverse terms of trade coupled with the failure of African governments to modify effectively let alone eliminate completely what Hellen calls "the crude dependencies on the pacte coloniales" has frustrated development thereby exacerbating an inherited vicious circle.

It is common knowledge that economic dependence on the export of few raw materials typifies the underdeveloped parts of the world. But this is more true of Africa than either Asia or Latin America. The 1963 UNO report shows that African exports constitute "about one fourth and imports one third of its output ... since nearly one third of the continent's output originates in subsistence agriculture, its relative dependence on foreign trade is even greater than indicated

1) Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 446.
by these shares.\(^1\) Relying on UN sources, Pierre Jalle~statistically
demonstrated that in 1964, 83 per cent of Africa's total exports went to
"advanced capitalist countries," 5 per cent to socialist countries
and 12 per cent to the Third World.\(^2\)

It is both interesting and significant to note that by far
the largest bulk of Africa's trade is still with Western Europe—Particularly
the sterling and the Franc zones—while inter-Africa trade has remained
as marginal as it had been in colonial days. This is attested to by
the overall statistical situation. For our purpose, however, Kamarok's
report that:

"of Sub-Saharan Africa's total trade ... two thirds is
with Western Europe, 12 per cent with the U.S., 5 per
cent with other African countries and 5 per cent with
Eastern Europe. No other primary producing area in
the world is so heavily dependent on trade with Western
Europe," \(^3\)
is opposite. While these facts furnish at least partial justification
for characterizing African countries as "a series of islands lying off
the coast of Western Europe," it still needs to be added that internally
also their economies are characterized by "islands of development," in
which economic activity is concentrated to the great disadvantage of
the wider hinterland. Though it is generally true to say that relatively
the fastest growth rate has occurred in the minute industrial sector,
this growth is "concentrated on existing urban centres and does not
negate the unfortunate disposition of export oriented production areas." \(^4\)
Thus it is not only the continuation of dependence of former colonial
powers that is signified. Particularly in those countries where attempts
have been made to escape what G. Hunter calls "the exploitation of Africa
to provide cheap food and raw materials for industrializing Europe"
by opting for rapid industrialization" in its most modern and striking

\(^2\) Pierre Jalle, \textit{The Pillage of the Third World, An Economic Study,}
\(^3\) Kamarok, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 73.
\(^4\) Hellen, \textit{loc. cit.}
form, the results have been both to further exaggerate reliance upon foreign capital and to exasperate the pre-independence urban-rural dichotomy.

What makes this anomalous situation all the more vulnerable is that though fluctuating within a narrow range, generally, the prices primary commodities fetch on the international market are marked by a progressive decline. This means that greater exports in terms of volume do not lead to a corresponding rise in national income. Particularly true is this of cash crops. That is why Professor René Dumont has warned:

"Agricultural development must go beyond its colonial framework. Until now the main emphasis, sometimes the exclusive one, has been on export crops ... But if all tropical countries produced only cash crops, the total of this 'produce of the colonies', as the Germans still call them would overtake demand in many instances." The terms of trade have already fallen; from 1955 to 1959 export prices went down 15 per cent, entailing a loss to Tropical Africa of 600 million dollars, twice the annual amount of foreign aid."

The danger against which Professor Dumont cautioned Africa has already made itself manifest in many countries. Ghana tasted its full scale bitterness in the early part of this decade when the price of cocoa whose share of Ghana's total export value was between 56 per cent and 75 per cent (1950 to 1962) came tumbling down from £467 in 1954 to £170 in 1962 and a mere £86.10 shs. a ton in 1965. As the study by Ficht and Oppenheimer clearly shows, parallel to this drastic fall in the price of cocoa were the steadily rising prices of imported industrial commodities. On the other hand, typical of Africa, inability to de-emphasise cash crops and diversify agriculture meant that a large portion of the sales had to be nullified by "greatly increased expend-
tures for non-durable consumer goods (chiefly food and clothing)." 1) Given Nkrumahism the Ghanaian government's search for foreign capital could not prove a rewarding enterprise. In fact two of the factors Ficht and Oppenheimer introduce to explain Ghana's economic crisis are: "disinvestment by private capital" and the continual reduction by foreign banks of their assets in the country. 2) The development plan which was drawn on the assumption that the price of cocoa would not fall below $200 proved a dismal failure. The Ghanaian economy has been one characterized by dependence on a single cash crop. But how many are other African countries of which this cannot be said? In fact rather than make Ghana atypical this throws it right into the general picture. Almost everywhere export outlets reflect persistent links with ex-colonial powers - despite a small but increasing share of socialist countries - while exports continue to depend on a few "vulnerable products." In many countries "conditions still approximate to mono-economic dependence." 3) Thus the African dilemma is an acute one, since for Ghana as for the rest of independent Africa it remains true, as G. Obayade notes, that

"... the productive capacity that is objectively relevant for structural transformation may be rendered even more lop-sided by expanding production along traditional lines." 4)

Dependence on Foreign Capital

The break through, however, waits upon a thorough decolonization, presently made difficult by the features discussed above as well as, among numerous other things, by currency arrangements and reliance on foreign capital, and the siting of towns built under the aegis of colonial rule. The issues which all these raise are almost literally innumerable and only very few of them can be briefly discussed here.

2) Ibid., p. 92.
3) Hellen, op.cit., p. 706.
Most African governments have elected to preserve their membership in the two large monetary zones—the sterling and the franc. To the question why? J.A. Hellen answers:

"...habit, facility of well established financial and trade links, and the influence of expatriates have all played a part in this continuance of membership", adding that more potent motives are not lacking,

"since membership in an area is only part of a more comprehensive relationship including tangible advantages, such as outlets for exports, sources of capital and inter-governmental aid." 1

In other words, rethinking of general financial arrangements and a thorough going revision of monetary policy may risk foregoing these advantages. What makes the risk even more pronounced is, however, the "heavy dependence" of African economies both on foreign capital and expertise. 2 Countries relying for 70 per cent or more of their public investment on foreign sources are by no means a rarity. On the other hand, the more the old and colonially determined patterns and international relationships persist the more is dependence etched into the economic and political systems.

**Bilateral Public Aid**

Much of the material on capital movements while revealing the influx of foreign capital neglect retransfers from countries receiving loans or investments. However, that aside from outright gifts which, at any rate, are fast dwindling, both private and public capital movements are induced not only politically but also by prospects of economic gain is not too difficult to demonstrate. Let us consider the return to foreign public loans. In this case the gains are obtainable in terms of interests, "administrative costs" to the lending party and actual or presumed risks involved in foreign lending. An orthodox economic

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1) Ibid.
rationale for this has recently been presented by no less a personage than Andrew Kamarok, Director of the Economics Department of the World Bank, who writing on the return to lenders underscored:

"In foreign lending, though, risk is always involved, and the return to the lender must include not only a return on the capital but a differential payment for the particular risk taken. In addition the lender will usually have administrative costs that have to be covered." 1)

Allowances need be made for political considerations such as the strategic significance of the recipient to the donor or as Ambassador Attwood shows in the case of West German involvement in Guinea for the desire to establish good will among potential customers with the ultimate objective of maintaining viable markets for industrial products. On the whole, however, loans from Western sources have carried high interest rates - not too rarely as high as 6 per cent or more. The heavy burden on the weak African economies which this represents has been ably demonstrated by Professor Dumont and particularly by Pierre Jalée. In his thorough and detailed study of international capital movements the latter author has shown that, for instance, while in 1959 and 1960 net income from foreign public gifts and loans amounted to 9.6 per cent and 4 per cent outpayments of interests and dividends equalled 9.5 per cent and 11 per cent respectively of the total African currency resources. 2)

The burden becomes all the more heavier since, as Professor Dumont and Pierre Jalée clearly show the capital obtained is all too often expended for other than development purposes. In the case of North Africa for example Jalée writes:

"It is also known that much of French aid to North African countries is to be used for compensation of French nationals, whose property has been nationalized or taken over. These few examples serve to show that French bilateral aid is, above all, a matter of self interest; it helps to cover luxury or prestige spending of the ruling groups of newly independent countries, keeping them respectable and attached to France;

1) Kamarok, op.cit., p. 186.
2) Jalée, op.cit., p. 74.
the part that does go to real investment is unplanned and mainly designed to strengthen the position of business interests in the country giving aid, increase sales to the recipient ... " 1)

And René Dumont corroborates this by drawing attention to the fact that donors are interested in sectors which largely happen not to be those directly generative of development. Having asked the directors of the Fond d'Aide et de Cooperation to consider revising the principles by which they granted credits, he reported:

"Their attitude reminded me of Jules Mélina, who spoke before the annual meeting of the association of Industry and Agriculture on March 6th, 1899. He wanted 'to discourage in advance any signs of industrial development in our colonies, to oblige our overseas possessions to look exclusively to the mother country for manufactured products, and to fulfill by force if necessary, their natural function, that of a market reserved by right to the mother country's industry'. " 2)

As we have already indicated, the political implications of international aid, particularly the bilateral type can be farreaching. No serious academic today denies that bilateral assistance, in whatever form it is offered, "has political conditions attached to it." The United Nations World Economic Survey of 1962 recognizes this in its statement that "the allocation of public money for aid is determined by political factors," while a conservative French periodical noted in an article:

"This aid to the Third World is not gratuitous generosity, and it would be childish to deny the political, or commercial, motivations of what is variously called aid, technical assistance, or cooperation. It even happens that potential donors enter into secret competition to be the first to show their generosity to those newly admitted to national sovereignty. A glance at the map will show that nations without strategic importance get less than others." 3)

1) Ibid., p. 54.
2) Dumont, op.cit., p. 44.
3) Documents de la Revue des Deux Mondes, November 1962, quoted in Jalse, op.cit., p. 64.
Although it has been widely recognized now that bilateral aid is far from disinterested, its political and economic aspects are closely intertwined that it is often difficult to disentangle them. This may explain why the consequences of dependence on foreign aid on national independence has not been so widely appreciated. At this juncture what needs be pointed out is that generally donors make capital available to those whose policies they approve of and/or who are prepared to manifest friendly gestures. What this means in concrete terms is that political decisions in the receiving country cannot safely disregard the reactions of the parliament and the government of the donor state; or, in other words, that policies and actions of the former must involve considerations other than the interests of the people even as perceived by the rulers. While as Professor Dumont states, "a lender can impose political conditions" 1) not always clearly discernible there is no necessary congruence between his ulterior motives and "the development needs of the recipient."

However, once reliance on foreign assistance is accepted, it becomes necessary, if the sources of aid are not to be lost, for independence in the formulation and application of both internal and external policies to be seriously compromised. The more so since donor states usually call for not neutrality but active support in international power politics. In his "Principles and Development", President Nyerere affords us illuminating statements. Writing about aid giving states, he notes:

"But the difficulty is that such countries often demand support — not just neutrality, and if we believe them wrong we can surely not give support. Vietnam is an example of this ... We were called upon to endorse various aspects of American policy, it was our refusal to do that which caused us to quarrel with the British Government when they proposed that a particular kind of Vietnam Peace Mission should be sent from the Commonwealth Conference in June, 1965. Our refusal to endorse this move also attracted U.S. criticism on us." 2)

1) Dumont, op.cit., p. 34.
2) Nyerere, Principles and Development, op.cit., p. 3.
Reference has already been made to the fact that Tanzania's stand on the Rhodesian U.D.I. and the East German question cost it British and West German assistance. And although the Vietnam issue did not affect any existing agreement with the U.S., as Nyerere points out, "disagreements certainly induced an un-cooperative coldness" between the two states; "thus suspending and then greatly slowing down further aid discussion". 1) Under the circumstances the Tanzanian development plan, drawn on the assumption that generous assistance would be forthcoming particularly from Britain, West Germany and the U.S. could only prove a failure, though the long-term effect of this would seem to have been more than countered by the formulation of a policy of self-reliance which made development dependent on the enthusiasm and intelligent hard work of the people.

From West Africa we obtain another equally interesting and illuminating example. And this time our source is no less an authority than William Attwood, former U.S. Ambassador to Guinea. In the early part of this decade President Touré's government felt the need for assistance from Western sources and naturally the United States was the most important area it turned to. Attwood shows that aid flowed into Guinea in various forms, and that in 1962 the government also "promulgated a new investment law that explicitly encouraged private capital, declared its intention of joining the International Monetary Fund and signed an Investment Guarantee Agreement with the United States." 2) But the Ambassador also tells us that before all this could be done the content of the information made available to Guineans over the country's media of public communication had to be changed as per his expressed desire. 3) What is more the continuation of American assistance further necessitated, as we have seen in the last chapter, a reconsideration of the voting pattern of Guinean delegations to international conferences. 4)

1) Ibid., p. 11.
2) Attwood, op.cit., p. 75.
3) Ibid., p. 38.
4) Ibid., p. 111.
Such examples seem to underpin the voices that are today raised everywhere to demand that bilateral public aid should be replaced by the multilateral form. While it may be true that, as Jalée contends, some in the West push along this front in the hope that "national contributions will, somewhat, be lightened if they go through international agencies instead of directly from donor or lender to recipient," 1) the theme is generally taken up in the Third World on the ground that international aid "would not impinge upon their freedom" at least to the same degree as national aid. This proposition, however, ought to be examined. Let us start, with the economic considerations.

Multilateral Aid

Although it seems to be on the increase multilateral public aid dispensed through international agencies was, in 1967, only less than a tenth of bilateral public aid. 2) In percentage terms, Jalée puts the contribution of such agencies as amounting to 1 per cent of gifts and 20 per cent of loans emanating from Western countries as a whole. 3) Almost all of this is dispensed from three sources: The World Bank (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and its affiliates, The International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Although there are such other institutions as the Inter-American Development Bank and the African Development Bank, making marginal contributions, our brief analysis will be limited to the World Bank, and to a lesser extent its subsidiaries - the IDA and the IFC.

Established in 1960 the IDA offers long-term credits (over a 50 year period) free from interest and with amortization beginning after the first ten years. It demands only a yearly commission of 0.75 per cent "on the accumulated total of amounts lent and not repaid." The consequence was that for a total of $993 million advanced on subscription, its net accumulated income as at June 30, 1966 amounted to only $9.81 million. 4)

1) Jalée, op. cit., p. 65.
2) Ibid., p. 61.
3) Ibid., p. 65.
4) Ibid., p. 66.
The IFC was set up in 1965 under the sponsorship of the World Bank with the expressed purpose of encouraging private enterprise in the underdeveloped world. However, the capital available to it has been very limited and this in turn has been reflected in its meagre operations. Most multilateral credit transactions have thus been through the agency of the World Bank. On June 30, 1966, the cumulative commitments of the IFC stood at $84 million, of the IDA at $1,247 million and of the World Bank at $6,299 million. These figures clearly indicate the relative scope of operations of these three institutions.

World Bank and IDA credits to Africa upto June 30, 1966 amounted to 1,390 million dollars, significantly less than amounts received separately by Asia, Latin America and Europe. While this may reflect proportionately greater contribution to Africa from foreign national sources, the question we wish to ask at this point is whether in general terms multi-lateral aid represents the absence or a significant reduction of economic burdens on the recipients. Regarding the interest rate of the World Bank Andrew Kamarok, a person who should know, has this to say:

"Until quite recently, the make up of the World Bank's interest rate, for example, was explicit on this point (the risk premium); it was made up, grosso modo, of the cost of money to the Bank - the rate the Bank was paying on money it borrowed at a given time - plus ½ of 1 per cent for administrative expenses and 1 per cent for a special reserve against losses; that is, it explicitly combined the return on capital, administrative costs, and the risk premium."

The Bank has now given up the practice of mechanically breaking up the return on capital lent in these separate categories; but neither has it given up calculating its interests on presumed risks it has never incurred nor, perhaps as a consequence, has its rate been radically changed. During the five years ending in 1966, the long-term interest rate it charged varied between 5 per cent and 6.25 per cent depending on the rates it paid to the original lenders. Thus the Bank has come to be a "healthy and prosperous business undertaking." Its profits for the financial year ending on June, 1966, totalled to 143 million dollars, on a capital of only 2,243 million dollars - reflecting a

1) Ibid., p. 65.
2) Kamarok, op.cit., p. 186.
rate of return of 6.4 per cent. 1) At the same time its reserves had increased by 42 per cent of the original capital. 2) I think it is fair to say that generally the prosperity of the Bank mirrors a proportionate burden on the economies of Africa and other Third World areas. Particularly so since, as Jalée clearly demonstrates, the purposes of the World Bank and the IDA credits have emphasized general physical infrastructure to the disadvantage of agriculture, industry and to an even more pronounced degree of education. 3) Nevertheless, although both the sectoral distribution of credits and the high rate of returns (in the case of the World Bank) can certainly be criticized it is also necessary to recognize that to the extent that no loans or subsidies are made to balance what Professor Dumont calls "tottering budgets" the contributions of the World Bank and its subsidiary IDA have more to show, in terms of the development of the borrowing countries, than the bilateral form of aid. The "amounts that could be diverted to meet wasteful luxury spending" are small and fall only under a few headings, while there appears "no visible sign of strings attached to aid". This means that on the whole multilateral loans and credits of the kind discussed above are generally more disinterested than the bilateral form. This much can be said, though one may certainly add from one's own experience as much as from the literature available that experts working on the planning and execution of projects usually direct required purchases to those countries they favour.

Turning now to the political aspect, we must ask: which are the states that control the World Bank and its subsidiaries and what are the motivating forces? As regards the Bank Pierre Jalée answers the first part of this question as follows:

"There is nothing 'world-wide' about the Bank but the name. Although it sprang from the loins of the United Nations and is associated with it as a special agency, the socialist countries, with the exception of Yugoslavia, do not belong to it, nor do its operations extend to any socialist country but Yugoslavia, which might be considered a border-line case. So the World Bank is

1) Jalée, op.cit., p. 66.
2) Ibid.
3) Ibid., p 66. As at June 30, 1966, the World Bank and IDA granted credits in the following manner: power, transport and communications $7,313
really the Bank of that part of the world which

calls itself free." 1)

The issue which this raises for African countries relying even
on such types of multilateral aid may be seen in relation to the concept
of neutrality in bloc politics. Neutrality if accepted and seriously
pursued may mean, in an international environment dominated by cold
war politics, the capacity to maintain independent domestic and foreign
policies. In terms of this, then, one should ask whether it would be
politically safe to depend on say credits from the World Bank. This
question, of course, displays some superficiality; for often Third World
countries obtain capital simultaneously from national and international
sources. Even at this superficial level, however, we may still need
to clarify our point by more factual presentation.

Let us turn once more to the World Bank and the IFC for an
example. All matters handled by the Bank call for majority decisions
- and so far it is quite democratic. But, six countries; the U.S.,
Britain, France, West Germany, Japan and Formosa control more than
50 per cent of all the votes. The position in the IFC is even worse,
since only four countries, the U.S., Britain, France and West Germany
together constitute a majority. The preferences that influence the
allocation of loans and investment funds are not difficult to imagine.
And so long as they are desirous to obtain the capital these institutions
make available, African and other Third World countries will, of course,
be forced to accept the authority of these preferences. Thus seen,
multilateral aid is no less political than the bilateral form - it only
happens to be at a different level. Separately given by Britain,
France, West Germany or the U.S. aid is meant to secure maximum support
for the national policies and interests of these states as seen and
interpreted by their different governments. International aid, on the

1) Ibid., pp. 65-6.
other hand, seems to have been designed to further broad common policies and bloc interests at any given time and place. Proofs of this are not difficult to obtain; perhaps the best, though, is a statement attributed to the late President Kennedy which defined the purpose of international aid as being:

"To help the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to modernize themselves and to safeguard their liberty and freedom of choice, at least for the future, to make possible the creation of new links between the Atlantic community and the Third World and to defend the frontiers of the free world everywhere." 1)

Thus to the extent that foreign public aid, in whatever form it is given is incapable of being isolated from the political motivation of the donor states, to the extent it cannot be separated from cold war politics the dilemma of independent African countries becomes manifest. The more reliant on aid the more are they dependent on former colonial powers and the more this is so the less possible it becomes to sustain the imperative of national self-determination. The result: moving within a colonially determined vicious circle. This vicious circle is both economic and political-economic inasmuch as it helps, in the words of Professor Dumont, to "prolong the 'raw material' economy of Africa," 2) and politically in as far as it hampers the formulation and application of independent policies. But the two are closely intertwined; for as Ken Post notes in the case of West Africa, primary goods producing states are "in fact, fundamentally dependent upon the good will of developed countries. Increasing their resources by producing more raw materials for export is dependent on the willingness and ability of the manufacturers to buy them." 3)

1) Ibid., p. 69.
2) Dumont, op.cit., p. 44.
3) Ken Post, op.cit., p. 137.
Private Investment

Turning now to foreign private financial and technical capital flow into Africa and its economic and political implications we must note at the outset that much of the information in this field, particularly as regards profits and capital retransfers are inaccessible. Returns to investment as well as data on trade and production can be regarded as the investor's property—usually carefully guarded against competitors and possible tax demands. Public service records and official statistics though possibly technically correct can only show what is officially acknowledged as profit and this often bears "only a distant relation to the whole." Nevertheless, a picture, however hazy and incomplete, can be constructed to indicate the benefits that accrue to the host countries from foreign private undertakings.

What sectors of underdeveloped economies attract direct foreign investment? This question can also be asked in a different form, i.e. what are the motives behind such investment? The 1963 Report of the International Monetary Fund states that in the Third World much of foreign private capital assumes "the form of direct investment in primary production for export, especially in the oil industry." Analysing the structure of capital America exported between 1958 and 1961, The International Flow of Long-term Capital and Official Donations (1959-61) affirms this by pointing out that "the oil industry absorbed two thirds, and the extractive industries almost one sixth of all capital exported by the United States for direct investment in the underdeveloped countries outside the Western hemisphere." Generally a defender of foreign capital flow into underdeveloped economies, Kamarck admits that "one important reason for investing in the development of iron-ore and bauxite resources in Africa has been the desire to have a sure source of raw materials." ¹ His colleague Pierre Mousa, while conceding that "the Prime motive" behind direct foreign investment is "the search for raw materials" adds, rather defensively, that "the exploitation of the raw materials of underdeveloped countries by the industrialized countries should not be regarded as a priori crime."

1) Kamarck, op.cit., p. 188.
What these evidences show clearly is that foreign investment in Africa as elsewhere in the Third World occur largely in mines, oil wells and the extractive industry generally; in other words, in sectors "which contribute least to a balanced development of the economy."

This can hardly be surprising; for what foreign investment there is is almost invariably determined by the interests of the firms and giant corporations making the investment and not by the development needs of the country hosting them. However, the picture drawn thus far is quite simplistic and needs to be further complicated by the introduction of other variables such as the search for markets and profits.

The desire to sell what is produced at home and the need to circumvent regulations for the control of imports in African and other Third World countries has necessitated, particularly in recent years, an increase in foreign private investment in manufacturing industries. Kamarck for example points out that:

"A good part of the foreign investment in manufacturing plants in South Africa, Rhodesia, East Africa and Nigeria was made in the hope of gaining a foothold in a market that was likely to be (or was being) otherwise cut off by tariff barriers. Some machinery manufacturers make direct investments as a result of their sales of machinery ... There are other motives too; for example the Empire-building instinct in corporate managers ..." 1)

Here a clarification is in order if the true character of foreign capital is to be firmly grasped. The stature of manufacturing industry in African countries is really "minuscule." 2) In the Ghana of 1958, for instance it accounted only for 1.8 per cent of the gross domestic product, and that including the contribution of all independent artisans 92 per cent of whom employed no wage labour. 3) What is important and interesting about foreign capital in Ghana as in the rest of Africa generally, is not that it controls the manufacturing sector, but that it makes negligible attempt to exploit possibilities of the domestic consumer market, let alone provide money and expertise for the capital-goods industries. The manufacturing "activities of

1) Kamarck, op.cit., p. 188.
3) Ficht and Oppenheimer, loc.cit.
foreign firms are often confined to assembling, packaging or processing of imported commodities usually designed for urban and particularly elite discretionary consumption. This affords the overseas companies sales outlets but "does not start the process of developing an integrated manufacturing sector in Africa." In cases where an attempt is made to establish industries making use of domestically available resources, "security" of capital seems to demand, as Professor Dumont shows, that complementary factories be established in different countries. On one of such cases, Professor Dumont comments thus:

"Alucam, the Compagnie Camerounaise d'Aluminium of Edéa, forms a kind of a foreign body in the Cameroon economy, as it contributes very little to development. It pays rents and salaries, which provide some outlets for local agriculture, but no aluminium industry derives from it. To avoid being nationalized the capitalists deliberately chose to manufacture alumina in Guinea and aluminium in the Cameroons." 1)

That such phenomena militate against the emergence of integrative economic processes is not too difficult to understand. Equally obvious is that this pattern cannot be comprehended in isolation from the fact of colonial determinism. The dominant features of the classical colonial economy, its primary goods export orientation, its subservience to metropolitan interests - its being geared to furnish raw materials for metropolitan industries and markets for their manufactured commodities - still characterize almost all African economic systems. What is more, a very significant portion of the income generated in Africa, as already noted, is expatriated in the form of interests on money borrowed from foreign public sources, not to mention amounts drained through the payment of salaries of experts, advisors, consultants etc. The transfer of profits, fees and interests and the like to industrially advanced countries by private firms and international corporations constitutes another very important form of surplus absorption.

It is a "well-established fact," as Arrighi and Saul, Pierre Jalle, A. Baran and M. Sweezy clearly demonstrate, that foreign private investment in less developed economies, "far from being an outlet for a domestically generated surplus, is a most efficient device for trans-

1) Dumont, op.cit., p. 89.
ferring surplus generated abroad to the investing country." 1) Between 1950 and 1963, the United States received an inflow of investment income totalling to $29,416 million from direct investments abroad amounting only to $17,382 million. 2) In the case of Africa the total of America's direct investment in the period 1959-1964. amounted to $386 million as against an investment income of $610 million. 3)

Figures for the years 1959-1963 show, in fact, that most types of American direct investment in Africa tended to have higher returns than in other parts of the world. 4) Investments in mining and smelting brought profits ranging from 8.8 per cent to as high as 24.7 per cent and those in manufacturing (mostly in South Africa which this study does not include) usually stood around 16 per cent though at times going as high as 24 per cent. 5) Despite the fact that returns on direct investment by the U.S. in Africa appears to be higher even than those secured by other investors, this pattern is by no means atypical. The Government of the Ivory Coast, found out that in 1961, 10,000,000,000 LFA francos moved into the country and 19,000,000,000 out of it, mostly to France.

If a further illustration is needed we may draw attention to the giant British firm, the UAC, which controls the channels of exchange in many countries both in East and West Africa and which in the words of Ficht and Oppenheimer "accumulates yearly net profits higher than the revenues of most African nations." 6)

The question forced upon us then becomes: Can this pattern have the potential to give stimulus to exploit the existing surplus

2) Arrighi and Saul, loc.cit.
3) Ibid.
4) Kamarck, op.cit., p. 195.
5) Ibid.
6) Ficht and Oppenheimer, op.cit., p. 89.
productive capacity in the agricultural sector? I agree with Arrighi and Saul when they maintain that "the development potential of a given pattern of surplus absorption in the modern economy is determined by its impact on the demand for peasant labour and produce." 1) The production technique foreign investors employ is almost invariably capital intensive. This is because the choice between labour and capital intensive methods is determined not by the employment needs of the host country, not by the availability of labour, however cheap, but by the techno-managerial capacity of the investor - a capacity that Europe and America enjoy to a pronounced degree. The current high rate of mechanization, and the slow growth of the money economy discourage the growth of wage-employment opportunities for the peasants. Perhaps even more important, urban discretionary consumption - mostly nurtured by imports from industrialized countries - and the transfer of investment income together absorb a significant share of the surplus thereby restraining the expansion of internal demand for peasant produce. Thus foreign demand for African products, "sluggish" as it is, is largely left to determine the increase in rural productivity. On the other hand, the slow growth of peasant income and productivity impedes the expansion of the internal market thereby exercising a negative influence on the growth potential of the modern sector itself. It is in the light of these considerations that Arrighi and Saul have properly characterized the current economic growth of tropical Africa as "perverse growth, that is growth which undermines rather than enhances the potentialities of the economy for long-term growth."

Policies of decolonization and self-reliance are defensible on these economic bases alone. Their defences can be buttressed further, however, by the introduction of the political dimension as well. That reliance on foreign public capital cannot be detached from political dependence has already been noted. Is private capital any different? The answer need not be long. What motivates foreign private investors is the search for raw materials, markets and profits. If not anything else these interests would dictate that whatever policy or move of a host country happens to threaten them must overtly or covertly be contained. It matters very little whether such policies and moves

1) Arrighi and Saul, op.cit., p. 150.
are in the best interest of the masses of the people of that country. If one combines with this the influence which giant corporations enjoy within their own countries of origin, and the interests governments of these countries have in the growth and prosperity of their business concerns abroad, and adds the fact that for most of Africa the fact of economic dependence is not limited either to public or to private foreign capital but is discernible in both simultaneously, one would see that Africa is confronted with the Thermidorian syndrome – the a posteriori existence of the order of things which the liberation movement at first proposed to destroy.

What lies at the core of this is not only that in a situation of economic dependence political independence can hardly become meaningful. Its psychological impact is equally important. Colonial determinism makes for the persistence of a sense of dependence, a sense of impotence, a "sense of being an object." In other words, it stunts the potentiality for the emergence of a self-respecting and self-reliant citizenry.

**Africanization**

Closely bound up with the above considerations is the concept of Africanization. The transfer of political power to nationalist leaders have proved much more difficult than was thought during the pre-independence period. The "pro-consuls" were dethroned; but the basic colonial structures remained accepted while greater opportunities were sought within their limits. To the extent it has occurred, Africanization, by and large, assumed the form of replacing Europeans by Africans, whites by blacks or Arabs within the colonially determined administrative, economic and educational systems. The almost unquestioning acceptance of these systems necessitates that such personnel replacements be gradual and long-term. This is because the functions existing structures perform and the basic assumptions underlying them call for a particular standard of education in terms of degrees, diplomas and certificates. Inasmuch as Africans qualified enough on these grounds are not available to discharge functions attached to certain posts it becomes necessary to retain former colonialists through a variety of inducements and/or obtain the services of other expatriates. On the other hand, this
phenomenon lends support in quite a significant way to the maintenance of colonially created or induced structures. Most Westerners, particularly veterans of the colonial administrations, perhaps naturally, tend to believe that the structures they have created and maintained represent or at least approximate to the best that can be devised. It was, after all, their genius that gave birth to these structures and meaning to their functions. Fundamentally altering or completely abolishing them, may be interpreted as a rejection not only of what they have accomplished in Africa but also of the models on which these accomplishments were based. Besides, both their education and their experience, either in the colonies or in the metropolitan centres do influence their professional-behavioural dispositions. This does not deny the existence of a small number of innovative and flexible foreigners with the capacity and the will to offer service to Africa. Even here, however, the persistent dominance of social statics in the form of structural rigidities together with the general lack (except in Tanzania) of a clear strategy of development seem to have neutralized their influence. In any case, to propel social dynamics in the direction of accelerated development more is needed than a few individuals whether foreigners or nationals. And whatever help is obtained from abroad can only play a marginal role in the development equation. At the risk of repetition, it must be reiterated that the responsibility for development can only be born by the people themselves. For rapid progress to be attained, for acceleration to be accelerated, the people must come to their own. In other words, they must be free—economically, politically and psychologically. This is why decolonization has been regarded as "a sign of independence and social change, a key to nation-building". This is also what lends significance to Africanization.

Most leaders of Africa have persevered in rejecting what they call "Africanization on the cheap" or a "cut rate Africanization". Independence inevitably Africanized the highest posts in politics and general administration. The externally imposed colonial administration concerned itself primarily with the maintenance of law and order and the promotion of interests of European powers. The building of transport networks, the education system and the provision of services generally depended on the needs of the administration and foreign business concerns. After independence most of the Africanization that has occurred is in
positions which for the most part existed prior to independence. By and large, the functions remain the same with the maintenance of order as the most prominent one. Neither has the total number of civil servants from the former colonial countries varied greatly. This is particularly true of the former French territories — with the exception of Guinea and Algeria — where Frenchmen have remained prominent as administrators, councillors, and instructors. Between 1960 and 1966, the number of French civil servants in fourteen of the fifteen former West African colonies of France, for example, decreased by 18 per cent. 1) This figure does not include 1,500 military men doing part of their services as teachers, technicians and administrators, nor 3,800 men sent by the Bureau pour le developpement de la production agricole and other French public agencies. 2) Indeed the number of French citizens in the Ivory Coast has increased from 12,000 at independence to 30,000 in 1967. 3)

French general administrators who have remained in West Africa are "in the highest ranks of the French civil service, ... they act as advisors to cabinet ministers and presidents and are the highest ranking judges." Others work as "super-prefects coordinating the work of African prefects," 4) The French government pays these people. Thus "they are even more closely associated with the former colonial power than they otherwise might be." On the other hand, these French officials "have formal and informal contacts with the French aid missions and large businesses which several large foreign companies might own but which Frenchmen usually run." 5) At the same time French teachers and technicians fill most important posts associated with economic expansion and development, which were the promises of independence. 6)

There is a cultural aspect to this snowball phenomenon of dependence. As at March 1, 1965, of the 5,041 French technical assistance personnel 2/5 or 55 per cent were teachers. These are to be found almost

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1) Brian Weinstein, op.cit., p. 33.
2) Ibid.
4) Weinstein, loc.cit.
5) Ibid., p. 34.
entirely in the post-primary schools, and so, "represent a powerful cultural influence upon the future high- and middle-grade manpower of the French-speaking states." 1) But this influence is not limited to the realm of personnel. The content and form of education as well as the systems of examination "are still very closely linked to those of France."

The ground on which a fast rate of Africanization has been rejected is that such a move could result in a temporary decrease of efficiency. Such efficiency is, of course, defined within the structural and psychological rigidities imposed by the colonial framework. Now given the rapid technological advance in Europe and the largely socially irrelevant systems of education in most African countries, one can predict that Europeans will be technically more efficient than most Africans at any moment in the near future. And the short run can be quite long, particularly if independent Africa continues revolving within the circumference of a predetermined and debilitating vicious circle of the type discussed above. In 1968, the Hudson Institute rank-ordered nations in the year 2,000 based on current projections. The result is interesting: thirty years from now Africa shall still be "pre-industrial" with per capita incomes of $50 to $200. The position of Western Europe will be that of "mass consumption" societies, with highly advanced industries and per capita incomes somewhere below $4,000. 2)

Thus, in the foreseeable future insistence...a technical efficiency will inevitably preclude the African from coming to his own. What this means, in very simple terms, is that in the meantime he will not be allowed to come to grips with his own problems, to make mistakes and draw conclusions from them, to direct his own affairs and thereby develop new economic and political capabilities. Under these circumstances Weinstein's question: "How can the African masses have a sense of independence or even individual autonomy?" becomes extremely pertinent. Until such time as

1) Post, op.cit., p. 147.
African countries are thoroughly decolonized, however, the answer will remain, "they cannot". And insofar as they cannot, political development also cannot be expected to occur.

Decolonization in Tanzania

We have already seen in the last chapter how Tanzania has attempted to opt out of colonial determinism through self-reliance, and why it has rejected dependence on foreign financial and technical aid. Nevertheless, a few observations seem to be in order at this juncture.

That every people has the right to self-determination has, for quite sometime now, been part of the semantic vogue of international diplomacy. As we have seen in the case of Africa, however, it has largely stagnated at this vocal and formal level. And this by and large, seems perfectly acceptable both to the dominant powers and the "client" states, declarations to the contrary notwithstanding. But if we start, as the Tanzanian leadership does, from the basis that development is a function of the people progress, however defined, becomes concomitant on their efforts and capabilities. The intensification of these efforts as well as the self-regenerating development of these capabilities require overcoming the dependence ethic operating in present day Africa. The sense of dependence the Arusha Declaration and its supplements are concerned with is a manifestation of the reality of dependence - economic political etc. Individual or group behaviour is, I suggest, fashioned by the way the individual or superordinately the collectivity perceives a given environment - physical or social. On the other hand, the environment as an objective reality does have an influence on the process of perceiving, what is called for, therefore, is more than a psychological break through. It is also overcoming structural rigidities and relegating all forms of foreign aid at least to a position of marginality.

It has already been noted that even in narrow economic terms dependence on foreign assistance is incapable of leading to a self-sustaining growth. Thus Arusha's policy of self-reliance is defensible even on that ground alone. There are two other counts, though, on which this policy has been sustained. Firstly, it is argued that even disregarding such questions as the transfer of domestically generated
surplus in the form of interests, profits, patents and the like, and the encouragement of raw material export orientation which reliance on foreign sources of capital entails, Tanzania cannot obtain enough foreign capital for its development. Secondly, "even if we could get it such complete dependence on outside help would have endangered our independence and the other policies of our country." 1)

But both the declaration and its subsequent elaborations recognize the importance of the psychological impact of dependence. If it is a self-reliant people who can be responsible for their own development it is a confident and self-respecting people who can be self-reliant. This whole network of relationships is achievement oriented. What people accomplish through their enthusiasm, physical and mental exertion represents a collective achievement - a basis of group-self evaluation. Discussion, objective criticism and self-criticism within the framework of a participatory democracy is seen as an essential part of this relationship; for it enables the people to constantly assess their contributions to as well as the pace and direction of development. The positive pride and the self-confidence emanating from achievement reinforce self-reliance and are, therefore, a necessary ingredient of development. Hence the positive correlation and the mutual reinforcement between national freedom and development; 2) and hence Arush's recognition as a self-evident truth that "independence means self-reliance". 3) This conclusion is drawn from Tanzania's brief historical experience. Coming to independence Tanganyika found itself heavily dependent upon the former colonial power and upon the West generally. In 1961 roughly 80 per cent of her total trade was with the sterling area, the European Economic Community and America; "85 per cent of her development revenue came from British loans." 4) Her economy was dependent on the sale of raw materials the prices of which were subject to great fluctuations with a strong tendency toward negative terms of trade, and the import of Western manufactured goods "the prices of which were steadily rising."

1) The Arusha Declaration, op.cit., p. 11.
These factors led the Tanganyikan government to adopt a conformist foreign policy. Economically most emphasis was placed "on the search of foreign aid" and politically on the strategy of the new states in the common wealth and the United Nations. 1)

Thus although as Catherine Hoskyns notes, "when a situation of injustice and irrationality came clearly into view the Tanganyikan government did feel sufficiently confident to innovate rather than to follow," it was following the mood and the policy the majority of the elder new states had set. But changes were to come in 1964 when Tanganyika became "the centre of the cold war storm". The revolution in Zanzibar and the support the Tanganyikan government secured for it, the mutinies in the three East African countries, the Union of Zanzibar with Tanganyika, the acceptance of Chinese military advice and loans, Tanzania's stand on the Congo crisis and the fact that Mozambique freedom fighters based on Tanzania were allowed to declare war on Portugal were not the only causes. The bitter reaction of the West to all these also had an important impact.

Such actions as "

"... support for the New Zanzibar Government, the rebels in the Congo and the Mozambique freedom fighters as representative movements replacing or opposing tyrannical regimes, which to Tanganyikan leaders were logical and principled ... were not only not shared by Western powers, but also Tanganyika's own stance was bitterly denounced in the overseas press, and diplomatic pressure applied to change it." 2)

In November, the whole situation culminated "in the publication by the Tanzanian Government of letters which suggested that under cover action was being taken by the United States to overthrow the regime." 3)

The effect of all these proved to be some policy revisions by the Tanzanian leadership. While the Union with Zanzibar might have

1) Ibid.
2) Ibid., p. 453.
3) Ibid.
influenced both the tempo and direction of change, developments in the mainland seem, in my opinion, to have been mainly responsible for the relative radicalization that followed. Important among these was the fact that the cautious policy of the immediate post-independence years did not produce the amount and kind of foreign aid required. This and the external pressures applied on the country was producing "a sharp realization" of the relation between "internal development and foreign policy."

Within a space of eighteen months Tanzania rejected West German aid when this was tied to its policy toward East Germany, virtually broke with the British Commonwealth over Vietnam and Rhodesia and finally severed diplomatic relations with Britain following the Rhodesian U.D.I. and the failure of the British Government to take a clear stand on that issue. As noted earlier this cost Tanzania at least two of its important sources of aid.

In 1966 a presidential memorandum, "Principles and Development" systematised the experience obtained from these events. According to it, the country's "prime aim" now became "a position of greater independence". Foreign aid would be closely and carefully examined to determine its contribution to the kind of socialist society Tanzania was attempting to build. However, although in themselves these principles did not lack reasoned arguments to back them up they appeared isolated and somewhat haphazard. In the absence of a comprehensive theory of social organization they failed to establish linkages with requirements for overall development. Moreover, by 1966 approximately 60 per cent of the country's trade was still with the West from where also the bulk of its aid came. It was on this situation and on a general awareness among the labour unions, government and party leaders that Tanzania's economic and political vulnerability could be abated and finally eliminated only within the framework of a comprehensive development theory that 1967 dawned. The Arusha Declaration came both as an ideological and a pragmatic answer to this.

Most of the dominant themes of that Declaration have already been dealt with. It may still be necessary, however, to recapitulate those which, in my opinion, have a direct bearing on decolonization. Arusha and subsequent formulations offered fairly elaborate and coherently
linked principles clearly maintaining the primacy of participatory political processes and cooperative enterprises in the economic sphere. A system of education relevant to an egalitarian, self-reliant society was enunciated and the existing urban-rural dichotomy was theoretically challenged with specific policies laid down to correct it.

The Tanzanian economy, as those of almost all African countries, had been characterized by its raw material export orientation. This colonial heritage meant that in many of the most fertile areas cash crops became the primary, or sometimes even the exclusive aim of farmers' productive agricultural endeavour. This had two dangers - political and economic. The political vulnerability of a country dependent on other nations for its food is too clear to need any elucidation. The second danger involved the sale of cash crops on the international market at uncertain and declining prices and importing food thereby nullifying a large part of the returns from the export of the former.

It is to arrest these tendencies and their effects that the Tanzanian people are now called upon to be self-sufficient in food as well as in clothing and housing. In the rural areas this requires rectifying a mistaken emphasis on cash crops, establishing industries, especially the cottage type and encouraging some degree of specialization and division of labour (carpentry, building, nursery etc.) within the framework of the Ujamaa community. 1) The urban centres would produce goods and services for the domestic market, particularly the rural areas where the overwhelming majority of the population live, at the same time providing a local market for agricultural products.

All these issues are bound up with a pattern of surplus absorption Tanzania is trying to develop. As already noted, everywhere in Africa elite consumptionism and income repatriation in the form of profits and interests on foreign capital represent drains on the small locally produced surplus. These phenomena, in turn, help perpetuate a state of underdevelopment and dependence. In these spheres Tanzania has found it relatively easy to bring its short term intentions to fruition. This is the case with the leadership code and policies in the industrial sector. Thus the salary cuts effected already in the pre-Arusha period in the

higher and middle echelons of the government and party bureaucracy as well as of para-statal agencies was followed up by more rigorous measures designed to reduce the level of income differentiation which had allowed for expenditure on imported luxuries. With very few exceptions involving people who have resigned from positions of leadership in preference to their economic interests, those who belong to the above categories have already withdrawn from landlordism and from owning, controlling or holding shares in any business enterprises. Of course this is not the most important aspect of the leadership code. As already noted its main aim is to reintegrate the leadership with the masses, to discourage political positions being used for private economic ends and to prevent politicians and civil servants from linking up with foreign capital through honorary directorships, board memberships etc. of foreign owned or controlled economic concerns.

In accordance with Arusha the nation could also take over the ownership, and the control of the banks, the targeted key industries and commercial enterprises and the "National Development Corporation could negotiate for a 60 per cent interest in other selected industries (e.g. breweries, tobacco, without too much difficulty). The Tanzanian leadership maintains that the nationalization or majority ownership of these business concerns, almost all of which were formerly foreign owned and/or dominated, would help the country to be economically as independent as is consistent with its political sovereignty and to have effective control over all major decisions being taken within it. The same argument applies to the position of marginality assigned to all kinds of foreign aid; for here again the attempt has been, in the words of Henry Bienen, to ensure "that an independent foreign policy would not lead to disruption of economic plans."

It is too early to assess the effects of Arusha and to determine the gaps between policies and their implementation. Nevertheless, it still appears possible to point out two relatively evident problems. The speed of Africanization has not been very slow compared to that of many other African countries. Tanzania's dependence on foreign personnel, however, is quite appreciable; and given the disparity between the new system of education and the bureaucracy's pattern of recruitment which remains largely unformed, there seems to be little possibility of breaking the iceberg in the

1) Bienen, op. cit., p. 547.
short run. The second problem is that while the primary concern of the civil service has changed from law and order to development, one notices that not sufficient efforts have been expended, even at the theoretical level, to shake the bureaucratic and military apparatuses out of their colonial structural past. It is true that the political leadership has attempted to reorient civil servants and soldiers through a method of "shock and example" and that the search for more effective means of attitudinal change has grown in the recent past. But it is equally true that many of the posts and the functions attached to them remain unchanged and that unless specific corrective and preventive measures are adopted bureaucratization may itself end up in posing as one of the bottlenecks to development.
Colonial determinism is nowhere more evident than in the position and continued dominance, or over-dominance of the African cities, particularly the capitals. The rural areas may be characterised as "a great silent shade, remote and inaccessible, timid and voiceless, dazzled and almost literally standing outside the stream of development."

Parallel to this are the preponderant, over bearing cities which having been shaped under the aegis of colonial rule, developed as "outposts of imperial civilisations" naturally looking outwards to the metropolitan countries and away from their own hinterland. The relation between the colonies and the "mother countries" stressed the significance of coastal as opposed to interior cities. Thus of Africa's 32 coastal states 22 have their capitals on or close to the littoral.

The criteria used in the siting of towns and the development of infrastructure in colonial Africa were defined in terms of strategic and economic needs of the European powers. The force behind the creation and growth of towns and cities was not an internally generated movement of people from the rural areas, but rather such determinants as pacification, the extension of effective administration and European health problems. Once established such urban centres also become points through which resources extracted from the colony could be forwarded to the metropolitan centres.

It was natural for people who suffered alienation towards the occupants to hold colonial towns as being especially symbolic of the reasons for their alienation. Following independence, the new rulers set themselves up in these same towns, "occupied the same buildings where the colonial administration kept its officers" - usually forgetful of the people concentrated in the rural areas. Neither the colonial social structure nor the purpose and mode of production nor again the defective communication and transportation systems having undergone fundamental alteration the basic relationship between town and countryside could not but continue as inherited. Often, indeed, the wide gap that separated the urban and the rural areas in Africa has, as of independence, been seriously aggravated by the extension of "development efforts" along
lop-sided lines. What Edward Shils says of the Third World in general is highly observable in today's Africa: "modernization is concentrated in the population of a few large urban centres and within those centres to a small proportion of the whole. The rest of the society remains bound within the traditional form of life." 1) This is clearly shown by the undoubted concentration of modern economic activities and educational, health, electric, water and recreational services in urban areas, particularly the capitals and a few other cities.

The large income differentials between the peasants on the one hand and the townsfolk, especially the "elite-groups" on the other also work to the same effect. The salary structures of independent African states remain an outstanding evidence of the persistence of a colonial legacy. During the last phase of colonialism, the European powers had to adopt a policy equalizing the salaries of Africans and Europeans in similar jobs as an expression of their preparedness to place an effective curb on discrimination in public positions. As Africans gradually moved into the senior civil service, replacing the expatriates, they assumed not only the basic salaries but also colonial supplements – formerly intended to make service within the tropics attractive to Europeans. 2) At independence, "this pseudo-equality has led," in the words of Professor Dumont, to flagrant disparity with the rest of the population, "whose standard of living is often a fifteenth of the French." 3)

Although the supplements have, in some cases, been reduced they have still not be abolished. As for the rest, no African country, except Tanzania, has effected serious salary cuts to make elite remuneration more attuned to the general level of income.

Recent reforms have tended to reduce the difference between junior and senior salary scales within the political-administrative apparatuses but have done nothing about the immense gap that divides the politicians and the civil servants from the poor farmers or the

1) Edward Shils, op.cit., p. 25.
3) Dumont, ibid.,
unskilled labourers. 1) Thus, P.C. Lloyd demonstrated that in Western Nigeria, where the per capita income is £30, "the farmer usually pays tax on an assessed income of £50; the unskilled labourer earns £75 a year and the most skilled artisan nearly £300. The University graduate, however, commences at £750, with a ceiling at £3000." But this is not all; for the higher the income and the position held the more the privileges and amenities enjoyed. This is the logic that sustains the practice whereby the graduate, in addition to his absurdly high salary, obtains: "a loan to buy a car and a monthly allowance to run it" plus a partially furnished government house, at almost a token rent, if he happens to be in the higher ranks. 2)

Equally high is the remuneration of politicians. Often a member of parliament in former English territories receives £1000 per year - an income which professionals may get substantially increased by pursuing their careers. For those occupying ministerial positions salaries of £3000 per annum, with allowances and expensive chauffeured cars are not uncommon.

In the former French territories one finds the situation even more exasperating. A lengthy quotation from Professor Dumont may be necessary to show the magnitude of the problem:

"The elements of the civil service, deputies and ministers constitute a highly privileged group whose members support each other. In England, a member of Parliament draws the pay of a middle rank civil servant. In France he draws the salary of a top level civil servant. Because of the "assimilation" policy, whereby the colonies were to be put on the same footing as France, a Gabonese deputy earns more than the British M.P: £165,000 CFA francs compared to about 100,000 CFA francs a month in England (f.1000 in salary and f.750 for expenses per year). As for the cost of the Gabonese Presidency, Parliament and Ministers, with all their supposedly useful trips, it probably represents, in relation to the national income of the country, more than the cost of the Court of Louis XVI, in 1788 relative to the French national

1) Lloyd, op.cit., p.11.
2) Ibid. Similar salary scales are operative in other African countries (except Tanzania) with some of the former French territories actually showing more glaring inequalities.
income in that period."  1)

All this sounds preposterous enough. Yet it cannot but become even more so when we range it along with the wretchedness of the peasantry. Professor Dumont calculated that in one and a half months of work a deputy in former French Africa earns an amount equal to what a peasant obtains during his entire productive life.

"A deputy works(?) three months out of a year and receives 120,000 to 165,000 francs a month all the year round. On six months of salary, or 1½ months of work he earns as much as the average peasant in thirty six years, a whole lifetime of hard labour."  2)

With such incomes, which they rarely hesitate to increase through corruption and embezzlements, 3) members of the elite are assured a life of real ostentation — with such status symbols as palaces, villas, cars not too rarely complete with radio and air-conditioning, TV sets, refrigerators (and in the case of Tom Mboya more than 360 woollen suits to wear). All this gives them a standard and pattern of life comparable with that of men of similar affluence in Western Europe. At the same time the standard and, therefore, style of life they enjoy, "their scale of values"as well as their very cast of mind"set them distinctly separate from the masses they purport to lead.

The unquestioning acceptance of the colonial salary structure has had farreaching consequences. It created a "huge gap between the incomes of the elite and sub-elite in bureaucratic employment and the mass of the wage workers."  4) This brought the whole range of labour

1) Dumont, loc.cit. Public administration is the grandest and most expensive enterprise in Africa. Since independence both the size and the income absorptive capacity of the bureaucracy, have in most cases, been greatly expanded. Put differently, this means that the general costs which administration as a non-productive "industry" simply adds to are, instead of being reduced, actually increased. Thus in Dahomey, for instance, personnel expenses alone account for 60% of the country's internal income. Ibid., p. 65; cf. Arrighi and Saul, op.cit., p. 160.

2) Dumont, ibid., p. 68.

3) It has been asserted that the committees established to investigate cases of corruption in the Cameroons have discovered that embezzlements alone drain a tenth of the country's budget. See Dumont, op.cit., p. 72.

4) Arrighi and Saul, op.cit., p. 147.
incomes from unskilled upwards into question; and given the political influence of urban workers on African governments which are themselves the major employers of labour, there ensued a steady increase in wages. This rise favours the capital intensive bias of investment - investment in which as Arrighi and Saul explain, "labour is a lower proportion of the costs" so that a given enterprise is more willing to concede wage increases (especially foreign oligopolies which can pass increases in costs on to the consumers). This "wage mechanization" coupled with the high rate of population growth and the relatively low rate of growth of per capita real production (increasing at an average rate of 2 per cent per year between 1950 and 1965) has "resulted in a decrease in the proportion of the labour force in wage employment in most countries and has been accompanied by a widening gap between urban and rural incomes." 1)

Although the greatests benefit has undoubtedly gone to the elite groups, all urban classes have gained from this widening gap. It must be noted however, that a large portion of urban workers are semi-proletarianized peasants, engaging in periodic wage labour. Generally, this group does not acquire the stability and specialization necessary for regular employment in industries using capital intensive techniques. In other words, the wage mechanization spiral works to the disadvantage of this class; for high individual "incomes are matched by a reduction in their wage employment opportunities." On the other hand, high wages and salaries "... foster the stabilization of the better paid section of the labour force whose high incomes justify the severance of ties with the traditional economy. Stabilization in turn promotes specialization, greater bargaining power and further increases in the incomes of this small section of the labour force." 2) Workers in this category enjoy incomes three or four times higher than those of unskilled labourers.

1) Ibid., p. 148.
2) Ibid., p. 149.
All this has a significant bearing upon the pattern of surplus absorption in Africa. As noted earlier urban consumptionism, particularly the luxury consumption (satisfied by imports) of the self-indulgent elites absorbs an important portion of the available surplus thereby minimizing its productive utilization in the agricultural sector and consequently contributing to the persistence of stagnation in the peasant world. Similarly much of foreign aid, in many countries helps prop up "tottering budgets", maintain high salaries and sustain a consumptive orientation. 1) When more "appropriately" used, as J.A. Hellen rightly observes, "aid has often been channelized into projects unconnected with agricultural or rural development - the sphere best able to improve the lot of the majority, and has further separated the twin sectors of African economies and sharpened "the polarization in both social and physical terms. 2)"

The few industries established in the urban centres have tended to create others around them, either because of complementarity or because the first industries have in the process of their establishment and expansion led to the development of some necessary infrastructure conducive to industry. By and large, the same tendency also prevails in the case of schools and hospitals. 3) On the other hand, as bureaucratic urban functions become more and more diverse, the extractive weight of the towns on the rural areas becomes even more marked. As in the case of much of foreign aid, however, the resources thus extracted all too often go into urban construction and discretionary urban consumption.

The capitals and other towns (particularly the big ones) thus monopolize the enjoyment of the benefits of whatever economic growth there is. They draw on the rural areas for resources in terms of taxes, interests from loans, and extra-legal elite incomes and the

2) Hellen, op.cit., p. 707.
most active labour force. 1) This means, in other words, that the
countryside is deprived of its small surplus production and that
part of its population which, given the opportunity, could supply it
with dynamic innovative cadres as well as increased economic product-
Hence the "decay of the countryside". The relationship between
town and country has unfortunately become not one from which real
development may be expected but one "which all too often defines the
split between unequal and unconnected spheres of a society falling
short of genuine transformation." 2)

This is as true politically as it is economically. Political
parties as well as the dominant groups able to exert constitutional
and/or extra constitutional demands and pressures on the political
system are largely urban based. This is not to say that the cities
or more restrictively the capitals play decisive roles in African
national political life. Indeed as Professor Lambert has said of
Latin America, "political life is not exclusively or even mainly
national, but political life is too often that of capitals than that
of the country." 3) Groups, such as university and secondary students
and the trade unions etc. represent only a tiny minority - urban by
taste, vocation and aspiration if not by origin. Besides, whatever
their level of political understanding the officer corps wield an
irresistible power of pressure. The influence of students and unions
is not so great; but compared to that of the peasantry it is quite
considerable.

The most important and effective means of political action
is not always constitutional. Participatory political processes
being exceedingly limited governments are sensitive to political
forces liable to operate by the threat or the application of violence.
But the political forces well placed enough to exercise such extra
legal pressures are at present mainly urban-military men, workers,
verandah boys and students etc. The potential or actual capacity of

1) Ibid.
2) Arrighi and Saul, op.cit., p. 142.
3) De Briey, "Urban Agglomeration and the Modernization of the
Developing States (Study of the Social, Economic and Political
Role of Urban Agglomerations in the Developing States)",
these groups to exert violent pressures on the government and the latter's desire to forestall such violence are important factors contributing to the political preponderance of the towns.

Of course, there are other significant factors; and perhaps the most important of them is the urbanism of the ruling elites themselves. The national politicians, "the best journalists, the more forceful lawyers, the politically alert businessmen and technologists, the most eminent professors ... are concentrated in the cities." It is also primarily in the cities that "the undercurrents of thought and sentiment which are regarded as significant public opinion circulate". 1) As we have noted earlier, the urban elites enjoy a standard of living and a pattern of life so different from the rural population as to make the former almost foreigners. The fact of distance together with transport and communication difficulties often cut off the elites so completely from the peasantry that they are not only largely ignorant of the problems, needs, aspirations and thought patterns of the country people but also show practically the same indifference towards them as did metropolitan towards overseas "native" populations.

Thus the gap between town and country can, in a very important sense, be seen as a manifestation of the socio-psychological and physical distance that separates the rulers from the mass of the people. On the one hand, there is a small urban group of educated, relatively well-off persons leading a life of luxury and controlling the machinery of state as well as political processes (not to suggest that this group may not be itself externally controlled), and on the other, a numerically overwhelming (in many cases 90 per cent or more of the total population) but "impoverished, uneducated" and powerless peasantry. The peasant world is a politically inert world. With the exception of election time, when the peasant may obtain some form but no substance of political power, "the countryside leads a slumbering political existence". So much so indeed that at times politicians "act as if it does not exist politically."

Considered together all these well explain the new political alienation that has infected the country people—alienation from the

1) Shils, loc.cit.
rulers, from the major political processes and from the cities where these processes take place. The peasants feel forgotten and forsaken; "they seem to be veering away" from their leaders and from organizations in which they 'took a fairly active part during the liberation movement."

They might be said to have relapsed into an enforced apathy. The mass party which in the pre-independence period was responsible for some contact between the elite and the masses generally became "an ineffective and parasitic body" soon after independence; while participation in elections came to represent a facade behind which hide the voicelessness of the mass of the people.

The political frustration of the country-dwellers is at the roots of a phenomenon which as Pierre De Briey notes, all competent observers have underlined in present day Africa. This frustration and the reinforced distrust of the urbanized elite are usually expressed either through apathy or through refusal to pay taxes or otherwise cooperate with the government. As a consequence of such reactions and also because of its weak power-base, the government becomes increasingly dependent on coercive methods, on a few dominant urban groups as well as on foreign support. In turn this leads to an even more profound alienation. Thus are we presented with a situation whereby the overwhelming majority of the people become not only "voiceless and dazzled" but also a political suspect.

It is manifestly clear that this phenomenon is not just conducive to political education and participation. It is also inimical to the processes which could eventually lead to them. In other

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2) On this question, Professor Dumont writes: "African peasants are becoming more and more conscious of being unfairly treated and looked down upon. Responsible Africans have not realised that the first step in peasant revolt is often refusal to pay the tax. From this standpoint, revolt has begun everywhere, if reports are correct that only 45 per cent of the head taxes are collected in Madagascar, 15 per cent in some districts. At Obala, North of Yaounde, four million were collected out of thirty-six, a ninth of the total, in October of 1961." Dumont, op.cit., p. 74.
words, it is the antithesis of a situation necessary for political development. Thus whatever its past history, whatever the economic and political forces maintaining it the existing urban-rural polarity represents an unmistakable danger. Balanced economic growth as well as political development call for effective rural participation in processes of political decisions and their implementation. This in turn requires putting a stop to the economic and political preponderance of towns and their parasitic influence as well as using both the human and material wealth generated in the countryside primarily for purposes of rural development.

The Tanzanian Attempt at Urban-Rural Integration

The Arusha Declaration explicitly recognized the economic and political preponderance of towns and their exploitative position vis-à-vis the countryside and sought to change this situation by laying emphasis on rural development. In terms of urban-rural integration there was not much to distinguish pre-1967 Tanzania from the rest of Africa. As noted earlier salary cuts had been effected already in 1966 in an attempt to check urban-elite consumptionism and the government had tried to curb elitist pretensions among college students when the latter refused to participate in nation-building projects. However, though significant in themselves these moves did not appear within the framework of an overall development strategy; consequently their effects could not be much more than marginal.

Major political processes as well as the groups that influenced them to a significant degree were mainly urban. The industries that existed in the country were concentrated in the towns where only about 4 per cent of the people live. And the same was largely true of schools, hospitals, tarmac roads etc. despite the fact that the responsibility to pay for these either directly or indirectly rested upon the countryside. It was in recognition of this situation that the Tanzanian leadership declared: "if we are not careful we might get to the position where the real exploitation in Tanzania is that of the town dwellers

exploiting the peasants." 1) The policy paper, "Socialism and Rural Development" put the problem thus:

"Life in the towns has come to represent opportunities for advancement, a chance of excitement, and the provision of social services, none of which is easily available in the rural areas. Most of all, there is an almost universal belief that life in the towns is more comfortable and more secure—that the rewards of work are better in the urban areas and that people in the rural parts of the country are condemned to poverty and insecurity for their whole lives." 2)

Much of Arusha's answer to this has already been noted and those aspects which relate to education will be dealt with in the following chapter. Here, therefore, only a few points will be taken up very briefly.

The Tanzanian attempt at urban-rural integration derives directly from the theory of social organization which defines development in human terms. Given this man-centred theory no serious development effort can disregard or relegate to a position of marginality the overwhelming majority of the people who live and work in the rural areas. The doctrine of self-reliance also helps to underscore this; for if the country is to be truly self-reliant the countryside must receive added economic and political significance. The logic is simple. As the Arusha Declaration notes Tanzania stands a good chance of being self-reliant mainly because it is agricultural and only to the extent that the people's energies are effectively mobilized. It may be fair to say that, by and large, Tanzania is its rural population (in numerical terms) and, therefore, it cannot be much more energetic or indolent, self-reliant or dependent than its peasants. The enthusiasm of the countrypeople and their intelligent hard work thus becomes indispensably important for economic growth. This in turn necessitates not only that the productive labour force not be unduly drawn away from the rural areas but also that the income generated in the agri-

1) Ibid.
2) Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development, op.cit., p. 5.
cultural sector be used primarily for purposes of rural development and not (as was the pre-Arusha practice) be drained away to satisfy urban consumptionism.

On the other hand, the Tanzanian leadership proposes to make those industries that are or will be established in towns more meaningfully geared to the realization of urban-rural complementarity. But it is also intended to bring industrialization to the rural areas, particularly the heavily populated parts. This is possible, it is argued, within the framework of Ujamaa communities in which people live and work together cooperatively.

"If people start working together in this way, it will be possible for these densely populated areas to become areas of rural industrialization, thus reducing their dependence on world prices of their cash crops, and also providing a new impetus to community activity and community life." 1)

However, it needs to be stressed that no grand rural industrial projects are foreseen. What is intended is not the establishment of "large modern factories" - though these are not excluded – but small projects (such as manufacturing blankets, sweaters etc.) utilizing labour intensive techniques and producing goods and services mainly for rural use. These industrial enterprises should be organized on the same basis as the Ujamaa community farms, that is with the members making their own decisions and electing their own leaders – leaders who must be directly answerable to them. 2) In other words the ethos of participation should also be operative at this level. And this does not only enjoy theoretical justification; though on a limited scale its efficacy has already been empirically demonstrated.

The number of Ujamaa villages presently in existence is uncertain. Some people claim that they are more than 150 while purists hold that they are no more than 20. However few they may be these villages have accumulated "an invaluable store of practical experience" which has entered the Arusha Declaration and subsequent formulations.

1) Ibid., p. 28.
2) Ibid.
As already noted what is particularly interesting about the history of these community settlements is the fact that those which were started and run by the government bureaucracy suffered from "poor management and dishonest use of funds". On the other hand, what distinguishes the successful villages like the ones at Mbambara and Litowa from "so many defunct or presently debilitated schemes" is the demonstrated capacity of their members to get rid of inefficient and corrupt bureaucrats, and to put forward among their own midst "rival leaders who after a struggle ousted the old" ones. Writing of Mbambara's experience Roger Lewis notes that in this process of struggle "valuable bonds of trust were forged between the new leaders and the persevering settlers", adding that:

"This well-tempered trust goes for to explain the success of Mbambara which, since 1965, has been progressing slowly but steadily. Its experience once again demonstrates the importance of securing leaders from the people rather than imposing leadership on them." ¹)

Though emerging primarily from the basic acceptance of the imperative of equality, participation thus also draws its sustenance from Tanzanian experience. So much so indeed that acute observers of the Tanzanian scene have come to look upon the emphasis placed on democratic participation as being the greatest strength of the new move not only at the theoretical level but also and even more important

¹) Roger Lewis, "Ujamaa Village Living at Mbambara, Tanga Region", Nbioni, 4, 8(February 1968), p. 3. Mbambara's governing body is the general Assembly of all members. This body meets "as often as twice a week though it reviews the affairs of the scheme thoroughly once a month". It also elects executive officers to implement policies under its own guidance and a seventeen - man committee which "resolves itself into smaller work, education and development, finance, health and cooperative store committees". Ibid.
on the practical plane. As shown earlier such participatory democracy is not limited to the farm and enterprise level. It is imbeded, for example, in the whole concept of local self-government and as such poses as an important aspect of the attempt at curbing the political preponderance of the towns.

The essential feature of Ujamaa communities is the equality of all members and their self-government in all matters that concern their own internal affairs. Such democratic villages would form the basis of a local self-government also to be marked by the principles of equality, participation and cooperation. Local communities can tax themselves for purposes of development and the provision of social services and a number of these communities can come together and cooperate on projects of wider significance. All these, when and if implemented, will not only minimize the need for bureaucratization but also will offer the peasantry a means of practical education - both in technical and political terms. And the results expected: more rural productivity and the increased political significance of the countryside.

It is recognized, however, that for this to be realized the national government must help these self-reliant villages and local communities and encourage their cooperation with others. In particular it should provide agricultural and other types of technical advice as well as materials which cannot be procured out of village or local funds. Moreover, the existing expert oriented transport networks need to be readjusted with an eye on inter-communal, inter-local and inter-regional linkages and urban-rural complementarity. A redirection in the whole range of formal and informal educative efforts is also called for. The pre-Arusha system of education which imposed on the students what has been characterized as the "worst of both worlds" (African and Western) has, as noted earlier, been rejected and another integrative system been devised to prepare the young primarily productive work and effective citizen roles in the rural areas and not as in the past for the largely unproductive urban elite-positions. All these are closely interrelated and the success of the new development strategy will, it seems to me, depend largely on how effectively they are brought together at the level of practice. For example, villagers can more
easily make full use of services the national government offers if they are living and working together in Ujamaa communities. Such togetherness is also important for two other reasons:

(a) it makes possible a more effective organization of community and local productive and educative efforts and,

(b) it enables communities and localities not only to deal with their own internal affairs but also to influence national political processes in a more meaningful way.

On the other hand, the people's level of consciousness must be raised. Hence the crucial role of political education.
CHAPTER V

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

In the process of political development political socialization plays a critical role. This is certainly not a new discovery. Systematic thought about political socialization is as old as Plato's Republic - in essence a treatise on a suitable system of education for the purpose of arresting change. 1) Aristotle was also deeply interested in civic education which he regarded as a preparation for active participation in the city-states of his day. Every political system, it seems both before and after Plato and Aristotle, has had to devise some way through which its basic belief-systems and behavioural patterns could be imparted to the youth and other new comers. Internalization of these by the new comers appears as the single most important means of social control. It contributes significantly to the maintenance of the system. Apparently, however, political systems do not succeed in matching the ideas taught with concrete political practice. This means that the general social structure imposes so many constraints that everywhere the desirable becomes greater than the obtainable. Hence the struggle to expand the realm of the possible makes change inevitable.

Political socialization may be defined in terms of that process by which individuals are prepared for effective political participation. As such it refers not only to the individual's acquisition of attitudes and feelings towards the existing or future political system and toward their own roles in it but also, and perhaps more important, to the mastery of a philosophical framework within which socio-attitudinal and political problems are raised and answered. In this sense, it includes the capacity to analyse a given socio-political situation and pass judgements upon it, what one knows and believes about the system (both in the present and futuristic sense) and its mode of operation as well as a sense of one's own political competence.

This view of political education betrays, to be sure, a definite bias of future orientation - and to that extent differs from the

system-support or system-legitimization approach of the functionalists. David Easten, the first systematizer and exponent of the system-function analysis looks at political education as a means of bolstering support - a process of steadily manufacturing support for the system in operation. Members of the system learn the patterns of political life, they absorb political attitudes and orientations. Common expectations are reinforced by a network of rewards and punishments as well as by the communication of myths, doctrines etc.; and the system thus comes to be accepted as legitimate. In other words the purpose of political socialization is "to assure the growth of diffuse support in the maturing members of the system ... The child in any system needs to be bound for the first time to the regime and its authorities through perception of their legitimacy." 1) This reinforces Easten's basic stand that "one simply ought to obey the authorities and abide by the basic rules; no alternative is conceivable since it is the right thing to do so." 2)

Similarly Almond and Coleman have defined political socialization as "a process of induction into a political culture," its end product being a set of attitudes "toward the political system and its various role incumbents." 3) This, as Almond is quick to recognize, refers to the perpetuation of systems' "cultures and structures through time." 4)

Some of the basic assumptions underpinning these functionalist predilections have already been discussed in the first part of this study, and a further criticism however brief will inevitably carry us far afield into the system-function approach - a task we cannot

2) Ibid., p. 280.
4) Almond, loc.cit.
assume in this brief analysis. Only be it said that viewing political socialization as an induction into a political structural and value set up that is overlooks another aspect — viz., the capacity of education to induce a new political culture and to overcome existing psychological and structural rigidities thereby facilitating the process of economico-political transformation. Surely a system of education which helps inculcate system — legitimizing attitudes into maturing members without simultaneously cultivating in them the capacity to understand the subject of legitimization, to question the system either wholly or in part must be a poor one indeed.

Development presupposes some degree of innovative strain in a system — and that this inheres only in those responsible for the creation and/or maintenance of the structures of the system cannot be supported on reasonable grounds. For can innovation be understood in purely technical terms. Be it in science or in art what we call progress refers, as I see it, not only to the superficial but also to the fundamental, not only to the form but also to the substance, not only to techniques but also to the very purposes these are supposed or put to serve. It is true that a scientist who formulates a new theory may not earn a patent for it while the technologist who happens to work out its application may find himself rich therefore. However, this is a legal matter; it does not mean that the theory is any less significant than its actual application. But we are already too far afield. Time and space demand restraint and turning to the strictly political. Simply put, the point we have been trying to make is that any system of education that enables maturing individuals to think cannot be purely imitative. In other words, whatever else it may do, it cannot but entail itself being rethought. This also applies to the general political system.

To obey, to be loyal to either structures or those who created, them or those who control them would, I maintain, presuppose some understanding of what is obeyed or what one is loyal to. Even if this burden may be safely assumed away for the many some of the time or for the few most of the time it is really difficult to see how it can be for the whole all the time. Nevertheless, given their point of departure the functionalists’ concept of education is quite
understandable. For them, as we have seen, the system is justified on the basis of its functions and the latter on grounds of the structures of the system. Broader questions of purpose vis-à-vis the interests of the mass of the people thus drop out of the equation. On the empirical plane, however, the functionalist's view of education as a mechanism of systems—maintenance remains to be shown as universally valid. Indeed that this is impossible is arguable unless we start from a position that denies the potency of human intelligence.

At any rate, whatever this conception may be worth elsewhere, its utility to Africa is nightly limited, if not for anything else for the very fact that in that continent it is not so much the systems in operation that are at the heart of the problem as what shape they should assume in future. The task of education is not to perpetuate existing social structures but to create conditions under which they may be transformed. In other words educative efforts and services should be geared to a future objective; "to a society and an economy yet unknown". This is because the existing society is everywhere regarded as decidedly unsatisfactory—acceptable only as a transitional phase in the progress toward a wealthier, healthier and more just society. This is also why African leaders, however nationalist and whatever their theoretical persuasion represent two sets of ambitions (apart from the one pertaining to self-perpetuation): the desire to retain the best of "our culture", and at the same time to induce new innovative psychological and structural elements. Of course, whether traditionalism or innovation receives greater emphasis depends on the orientation of the particular group in power and the dominating influences within it. Besides, the desire for self-perpetuation as much, if not more than traditionalism per se, may limit the group's innovative capability in the sense of keeping change within bounds reasonably manageable by the political authority. Indeed, at least in part, this explains why some African leaders who in their speeches and writings assume decidedly innovative postures, at times fall back on traditional mythic-o-religious practices to ritualize their power positions. These, however, only help emphasize the need for future orientation in African education.

In the literature on political socialization the relationship between formal education and political participation has not been firmly
established. One group of scholars, including Almond, Verba and V.O. Key, have by and large tended to look upon education as a decisive factor in the development of the sense of citizen duty and the sense of citizen efficacy. On the ground that there is a positive correlation "between education and political cognition and participation" Almond and Verba reached the conclusion "

"... that educational attainment appears to have the most demographic effect on political attitudes ... The uneducated man is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a higher level of education." 1)

The major reason for this is that

"... people do learn in schools: they learn specific subjects as well as skills useful for political participation. And they learn the norms of political participation as well. Much of this learning may be through direct teaching, some of it may be more indirect." 2)

Having analysed educational groups in five Western countries, Almond and Verba reported their findings that the educated person has nine advantages over the uneducated. Among these: that the educated person enjoys more knowledge of the impact of government on the individual, more general political information, opinions on a wider range of subjects, more possibilities to follow politics and participate in a number of political and semi-political associations and that he is more likely to have an advanced sense of political competence and confidence in himself as well as in his social environment. 3)

This confirmed earlier studies in which similar conclusions were reached. For instance, V.O. Key had stated that "higher levels of political participation, a high sense of citizen efficacy, and a high sense of citizen duty occur far more frequently among persons with college training than among those whose formal education ended at the elementary state." 4) Education is thus thought of as producing

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2) Ibid.
3) Ibid., pp. 380-1.
qualitative changes in the educated, with the degree of change varying, on the average, in proportion to the educational level attained. In other words, other things being equal, the more protracted people's exposure to the most important socializing agent - the school - the more politically involved, the more impelled by a sense of citizen duty and the more animated by a sense of political competence they become average wise. 1)

On the other hand, writing about higher education, Robert E. Lane expressed the view that "the longer a student stays in college, the more he expresses cynical views on politics and a disinclination to take part in civic or political affairs." 2) Regarding this as a contradiction of the findings of key, Almond and Verba, Coleman came out with some doubts as to the correlation between formal education and political participation. However, the question that should be asked here is whether students can be expected to internalize political values and norms and live by them whatever the actual political situation. In other words, the question must be raised and answered as to whether ideals taught do in fact occur in political practice. The congruence or incongruence between theory and practical politics can neither be disregarded nor relegated to a position of marginality. Cynicism or even apathy can be expected from educated members of a system where for instance, equality and liberty rank high in the scale of values but where there are flagrant inequalities and vivid deficiencies in civil rights. And this is one weakness of theories centred around the inculcation in the student of political attitudes and sentiments supportive of the system in operation, in statu nascendi. Weilenmann's thesis about nation choosing minus its self-contradness and its overemphasis on power, may be applied to a theory of social organization. 3) For surely, even the

1) Ibid., pp. 324-30.
Horst systems of education cannot successfully bar all students from critically examining their social frameworks. Thus viewed, student dissent should be followed not by a conceptual de-emphasis of education but by re-thinking of its basic assumptions and a critical study of the social setting in which it functions.

So far as I can see, there is a basic weakness in those who have viewed formal education as a prime factor in political participation as well as those who have chosen to doubt its significance. This is that both start from a basic acceptance of a system of education geared to filtering a few students through to the highest levels of academic achievement. This seems to have led them, among other things:
(a) to concentrate on the length of time spent within the educational pipe line almost at the exclusion of the intensity of effort on the part of educators and students alike;
(b) to largely overlook the critical importance of the content of education and the form in which it is offered.

These factors are by no means marginal and should, therefore, be regarded as data to be imputed into theories of political socialization.

Education in Africa

In the discussion of political education in Africa as elsewhere in the Third World, two basic characteristics must be noted. The first, i.e. the primacy of the family in the process of socialization underlies Robert Levine's statement that "parents socialize their children for participation in the local authority systems of the rural areas rather than for roles in the national citi zenry." 1) This pre-eminence of the family seems to originate from lack of mass education, limited nature of social mobility and discontinuities in the systems of communication. It is as a result of this that formal education in Africa bears a heavy burden, a burden made all the more heavier by the limited availability of other cultural agencies. And this is the second feature. The imperative of "nation-building" calls for countering, both the continued pre-eminence of the traditional parochial agencies of socialization and

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the continued existence of debilitating colonial experiences. This means that new educational systems must be devised for the purpose of politically educating children as well as counter socializing individuals whose orientations have already been formed along colonial and parochial lines. The formal educational system is best suited for this task because, at least potentially, it is capable of great manipulability.

However, the existence of formal educational structures per se does not tell us much about the process of political education. Due weight must be given to its content and form plus the percentage of the population affected by it. The correlation between the theories taught and the actual political practice, the presence or absence of other socializing agencies as well as the congruence or incongruence of these with the education schools offer also need to be considered.

I assume that within a philosophy that accepts the equality and dignity of all men, the political and technical aspects of education cannot be separated. All students must master the philosophy; but equally all need be subjected to the requirements of production. This means that some cannot be expected to learn politics, while others acquire techniques and skills which will prepare them for economically productive roles. In other words, if we accept work as necessary for the continued development of society, the dignity of man must form a tight fit with the dignity of work. Or we will find ourselves in the position of sanctioning labour only in terms of a section of the population, albeit the largest section, while simultaneously freeing another from its hardships — a phenomenon which inevitably leads to a basic distortion in the imperative of equality. The inculcation of a sense of self-respect and self-confidence must of necessity aim at the production of people competent in both the political and the economic spheres. This seems what James O'Connel was speaking about when he wrote: "together with its value for economic growth education is the key factor in developing human personality and culture, promoting a sense of national dignity and purpose ..." 1)

From this vantage point, one should think that the systems of education in Africa must completely be rethought, remoulded and cast in new frames. That these systems are basically defective has been amply demonstrated by a number of competent observers. 1) The defects detected relate to the colonial determinism underpinning the structure, content and form of education, its basic "anti-peasant", "anti-agricultural" bias, as well as the bookish abstractness and the depressed status of manual labour resulting therefrom.

What characterizes the schools and universities in present day Africa is the uncritical adherence to the educational philosophies and structures transferred from metropolitan countries in the wake of colonialism and, as Coleman notes, "designed essentially to serve evangelizing or imperial purposes." 2) What is wrong with sticking to the colonial pattern, one may ask. A number of scholars have provided the answer. G. Myrdal has noted for example:

"... the colonial tradition derived from the Western classical concept of a liberal education - was a means of cultivating the freeman, the man who by virtue of the ownership of property or some other form of wealth, did not have to work for his living,"

adding that this colonial system of education

"was developed for different purposes and for different children. ... until recent times, secondary schools in the West were intended almost exclusively for the children of the upper class." 3)

Thus at the heart of the problem lies, to say the self-evident, the fact that this type of education cannot prepare students to be productive and participant citizens. Instead of preparing the


many for economically productive roles and citizen functions what it does, in fact, is to turn out a few "clerks" and officials "with clean hands" who work much less and earn much more than the peasants who pay for their education. In other words, it has the effect of alienating the educated from production and from agriculture, the sector which provides often as high a proportion as 90 per cent of the population with their means of sustenance.

African education is primarily, if often not exclusively, an academic enterprise. This is evident at all the various levels and in all the different fields. Science teaching, for example, concentrates on the results of experiments conducted elsewhere rather than the performance of the experiments themselves. Even when the latter is attempted, its effect is minimized since there is virtually no attempt at investigating and utilizing the local environment. Nor do the social sciences focus attention on the immediate physical and social environment. In general it is true to say that African education is severed from work. Working with the ten fingers is not regarded as a necessary ingredient of education; it is rather allowed to pose as something degrading - something not too rarely used as a form of disciplining and punishment. The result is evident everywhere. Students and graduates lack basic practical skills be it in farming or in carpentry. In fact there is a clearly discernible anti-agricultural bias in African systems of education. Institutions of learning, particularly at the secondary and higher levels are concentrated in the cities. While 75 per cent of the school age children in Bamako go to school, for example, "only 3 per cent are enrolled in the bush in Mali." 1) Even when peasants' sons do get to school "the teaching offered them is much too abstract being servilely copied from French, British, Belgian or American manuals. As Professor Dumont clearly argues, this pattern of education "in no way prepares students for the agricultural profession, but in fact turns them away from it." 2) A Nigerian leader

1) Dumont, op.cit., p. 74.
2) Ibid.
corroborates this:

"Our people are lethargic about agriculture. To our school children, in our primary and secondary schools, when we talk of going back to the land it seems to them like a fairy tale, because we have been so saturated with the colonial type of education, which is the education of pen pushing. There is no technical touch in our educational system - it is all pen-pushing, all recitation - so that when we talk about going back to the land, even our sons laugh at us." 1)

In general what is taught - be it European history, European languages, literature, or as in the case of Malagasy the reproductive organs of the chestnut (a tree unknown on the island) 2) - is rarely what is needed, what is relevant or what can be easily grasped and profitably applied. Indeed the question of application often does not even arise simply because the education offered is literary as opposed to practical, the aim implicit in the educational structure, and curricula being the "gentleman" and not the producing man. A recent portrayal of an African school engagingly characterizes African education as follows:

"Education in Africa is not just something your parents want you to have and which you go on getting until you can decently give it up ... Rather it is a means to an easy, easeful life, away from the toil and soiled hands and monotony of life in the village. It makes a person modern, up-to-date, enables a man to wear gloves, carry a brief case, and look like the young man in the advertisements." 3)

What James Coleman calls the "unritical importation of the school curricula of imperialist countries" has resulted in the under emphasis or neglect of the national culture and history. As a consequence when a child goes to school in Africa his understanding of his past, his own roots, is rarely thereby fostered. The contribution of schools and universities to the strengthening of a sense of national identification is, therefore, greatly in doubt. In fact Peter Lloyd,

2) Ibid., loc.cit.
3) Sutton, op.cit., p. 72.
Ken Post and particularly Professor Dumont have cogently argued that as they stand the systems of education in Africa fall far short of playing an integrative role - particularly in the vertical sense. The factors leading to this conclusion may be briefly summed up in the following manner.

Each if the major categories in the educational hierarchy is supposed to be a preparation for the next higher stage. None is self-sufficient. Not even university education (with the possible exception of some specialized schools) is designed to prepare students for fulfilling social tasks. Rather is it a preparation for still higher education. What we are confronted with, thus, is not simply a question of a malfunctioning school system; it is more fundamentally one of social policy - or more broadly development strategy. This is shown by the fact that African societies are unable to provide employment for those with primary education - a phenomenon gradually permeating the secondary level in some countries. ¹) The respectable education, indeed the one worth the name, is that which is offered at the apex of the educational pyramid; anything short of that is transitory and provisional. In other words, African education is elitistic; it does not aim at preparing the whole or a great majority of the people for the various societal tasks; it prepares a fortunate few for positions of power and prestige attainable on completion of the highest available level of education. A primary educated man is fast becoming a man who has "dropped out", a man who has failed; and of course with all the accompanying psychological complexes. The illiterate poor peasant, on the other hand, is the man who matters very little, if at all, in

¹) Regarding West Africa Ken Post writes: "The young West African on leaving school usually expects to find a job for which literacy is a special qualification; this is true even in Ghana, where by 1963 nearly fifty percent of school age children were being educated. Such jobs, in Ghana as elsewhere, are most likely to be found in the towns, and so the young Ghanaian goes there and wonders about looking for employment, lodging where he can, eating when he can, haunting offices for vacancy. "He continues to state: "There are unemployed youths in Banako and Porto Novo as well as in Acora and Lagos; no one knows how many, though at the end of 1966 it was estimated that there were some 20,000 unemployed young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five in Abidjan." Post, op.cit., pp., 159-160. For similar accounts see: Dumont, op.cit., p. 73; cf. Lloyd, op.cit., p. 26."
the calculations of the ruling urban elite - to the highest ranks of which the highest educated are often recruited. All these factors are well-known. The important point here is that instead of exploiting in favour of change the susceptibilities inherent in the elite-mass gap, education actually reinforces it, thereby insuring its continued entrenchment.

Closely bound up with these considerations is the highly individualistic nature of African education. Being designed to filter away a small number of students for a few given posts, it is both competitive and selective. 1) Among those who manage to go to school, the dominant drive is for individual achievement and distinction - the basis for winning privileges both within the educational system and the society at large. This is not altered by the consideration that in Africa where education is provided by the great majority of the poor an educational system which furthers the values of individual achievement which are rewarded by personal power and prestige is absurd. Once the student obtains a position in the bureaucracy or in the few expatriate concerns much of his energy is directed at obtaining better paying and more prestigious positions - often regardless of whether climbing the ladder would mean pulling others down and keeping still others in a position of stagnating poverty. The spirit of cooperation and communal service so often called for by the leaders in their declarations in either minimal or absent. The schools do not cultivate and develop social responsibility nor foster commitment to social justice. Professor Dumont illustrates how far reaching the consequences can be when he writes that on leaving school a youth "is contemptuous of his younger brother still hosing the ground." 2) It must be pointed out, however, that the elitism and the individualism that have so permeated education in Africa are only effects of the educational structures transferred from Europe through colonialism.

1) The systems of education leave a great deal to chance and the pattern of teaching often encourages rote learning as opposed to understanding and problem solving. The few who make it through the educational hierarchy may, therefore, justifiably be regarded as the most fortunate rather than the ablest.

2) Dumont, op.cit., p. 75.
and uncritically adhered to after independence. They do not represent the application of a theory of social organization to the sphere of socialization. Indeed in most countries, contrary to all expectations serious attempts at using the schools and universities as agencies of deliberate political education have been noted by their conspicuous absence. Only in a very few states, notably pre-1963 Guinea and present day Tanzania, have the ruling elites actively sought the politicization of school curricula. As Coleman notes, "the remarkable fact is that in only a few instances have schools been made agencies for manifest political socialization by governing elites." 1)

Why is political education so neglected? Most of the reasons are implicit or explicit in our previous discussions. One of the most overpowering factors is that efforts so far made by the ruling elites of African (with the exception of Tanzania) to develop a comprehensive and coherent theory of social organization have been entirely unimpressive. Moreover, most countries remain heavily dependent upon other nations for a large portion of their teaching personnel. "Such dependence", as Coleman notes, "particularly at the post–primary levels, is primarily placed upon the former metropolitan country. In many former French dependencies, for example, a majority of the secondary school teachers are French nationals, provided by France under various forms of technical assistance." 2) As a result both broad structural changes and the conscious injection of political content into the curricula are obviously made difficult. Furthermore, effecting some of the necessary changes will inevitably pose as "a challenge to the standards of the old elite." Having gone through the colonial system of education, to which they largely owe their positions and privileges, members of the African politico-administrative elites tend to identify any serious change with the lowering of standards. 3) Regarding this point Professor Dumont could simply ask: "how can they question in depth a method of teaching that enabled them to do so well?" 4) The Senegalese

1) Coleman (ed.), "Education and Political Development, op.cit., p.47
2) Ibid. In 1965 only seven per cent of all the secondary school teachers in the Ivory Coast were Africans, see Efrem Sigal, op.cit., p. 48.
3) Dumont, loc.cit.
4) Ibid., p. 75.
Minister of National Education, he goes on to add, "has accumulated a good number of doctorates. When the preparatory report of the CINAH Plan proposed that rural teaching be overhauled, he rejected the idea with horror." 1) And this is neither a rational expression of group self-interest, nor crude Machiavellism alone. The existence of intellectual and psychological rigidities themselves effects of the colonial system of education, offers at least part of the explanation.

One final feature of African education must now be noted - its extent. Although the situation varies from one country to another, generally, school enrolment is very slow. Only 9.1 per cent of the school age children in Upper Volta and 7.7 per cent in Niger could go to primary school in 1963. 2) From the moment of self-government some countries, notably Ghana and Tanzania have made a vigorous attempt at numerical expansion. In Ghana primary school enrolment jumped up two and half times and the secondary school population increased by three fold in a decade. 3) Between 1961 and 1966 the number of children attending primary schools in Tanzania rose from 486,000 to 747,000 while that of completers of primary education increased from 12,000 to 57,000. 4) In the first four post-independence years Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania) more than tripled the number of its secondary graduates. 5) Still, however, countries where enrolment exceeds the 50 per cent level are very few, despite the fact that education in Africa absorbs between 15 and 25 per cent (40 per cent in Western Nigeria) of the national budgets. 6) The extent to which secondary education lags behind even the primary is bewildering. Only a small

1) Ibid.
2) See Post, op.cit., p. 151.
3) Lloyd, op.cit., p. 22.
5) MacDonald, Tanzania: Young Nation in a Hurry, op.cit., p. 175.
proportion of those fortunate enough to get to primary school — "one in fifty in Ghana in 1963, say, or one in twenty in the Ivory Coast — could hope to get any more than the minimal degree of schooling. In those countries where even primary schools are few and far between, the chances to get any sort of more advanced education are fantastically small . . ." 1) Such are the facts which have impelled Professor Dumont to deplore that African education costs far too much "particularly in relation to results obtained with it." 2)

It thus becomes clear that African education must be thoroughly rethought. To be socially relevant it must be more widely diffused. But even more important it must be practical — bearing a direct relationship with the pressing needs of African societies. In other words, it ought to be geared to the mobilization of the mass of the population, which is rural, for the purpose of increasing their economic productivity and political capabilities. This can succeed, it seems to me, only if education is offered within the framework of a coherent and elaborate theory of social organization of the type we have outlined earlier and if a bold step is taken in the direction of a radical break with the colonial heritage.

At this juncture, it must be cautioned that the stress on formal education may easily lead to the minimization of informal educative efforts. The wide gap separating the traditional and the modern sectors of African countries elevates the significance of the schools vis-à-vis the family and the village. The political system is far removed particularly from the rural family, a fact which necessitates socializing agencies closer to the polity both in time and structure. Nevertheless, the danger of leaving the adult population outside the impact of these agencies can be quite immense, as the experiences of some European countries has shown. This is so for two reasons. First in the immediate sense the adult section of the population must be prepared for active participation in economic and political affairs, both at national and local levels. This calls for a concentrated literacy campaign and post-literacy education embodying new economically

1) Post, op.cit., p. 150.
2) Dumont, loc.cit.
productive skills, a rational-scientific outlook and political attitudes necessary for effective exercise of citizenship. Mass literacy makes a modern system of communications possible and the latter is critically important in the process of social change.

The second reason emerges from the realization that experiences in the family and the local community can either reinforce or negate the political education which schools might impart to the young. There is a tendency to generalize from non-political experiences (family, church etc.) to the polity - a phenomenon that makes the orientational and attitudinal impact of these socializing agencies very important. If experiences in schools and those in the family and the village are congruent there is a cumulative effect the latter reinforcing the former. This is why even when we have only the education of school children in mind, we cannot possibly disregard that of their parents, their elders and guardians.

In this sphere as in so many others, whatever the declarations of intention - and these are often beautiful in forms - and whatever the efforts expended (often minimal) the results achieved have not been very impressive. In the early part of this decade the average rate of literacy in Africa as a whole was estimated to be 15 per cent. Madagascar had the highest rate with 30 - 35 per cent of literate people. Southern and Central Africa come second in line with rates of above 20 per cent. North Africa had slightly more than the continental average and East Africa 9 - 14 per cent. 1)

Generally the school in Africa is almost completely divorced from the community; its educative effort is often limited within the school compound. Projects such as the students' anti-illiterary activities are not part of the educational structure and are often conducted in spite of it. Schools utilizing their students to offer education in night classes or otherwise engage in social services are unusual. One very seldom hears of a rural school, for example, which has contributed a community centre, a road, a bridge or an irrigation system to the community around it. Equally rare are instances of educated members

of a community using school facilities to teach other members of the community or school administrations encouraging the communities around to use their schools.

Given all the factors discussed in this and in the previous chapters, hardly any better can be expected, though certainly much more must be called for. The spread of education at the base is intimately intertwined with such questions as the urban-rural gap, the elite - mass dichotomy, and what John Hatch has called an imitation "aristocratic educational system" and the scale of values it represents. If for example, the intense desire on the part of the educated is to use their education "as a passport to the towns" to the easy life of the urban elite, as a means of escape from "the dull and hard life of the village"; they can hardly be expected to establish fruitful relations with the mass of the people in the countryside. Even to make education at the lowest level accessible to the broad masses, then, the fundamental changes earlier called for would recommend themselves.

Education in Tanzania

The Tanzanian leadership seems to have firmly grasped the essence of this. The immediate post-independence Tanzanian educational system fell in line with the general African pattern. Inspite of reforms, the schools continued to function within the limitations imposed by assumptions of a colonialist society. The education they offered induced attitudes of human inequality and competitive individualism, and as Wnyere ere later recognized "in practice underpinned the domination of the weak by the strong, specially in the economic field". Students continued to be alienated from all types of manual work and from agriculture - the labouring activity in which the immense majority of the people are engaged. The primary school prepared students either for secondary schools or white collar employment and post primary education for "high level manpower" employment. 1) "Meanwhile even the primary school pupils were becoming misfits in their own agricultural environment after a few years of education had set their sights on" urban elite

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privileges. 1) And this is of critical importance; for as Idrian N. Resnick notes, apart from the fact that 50 per cent of school age children never succeeded in going to school and hence harboured no illusions about being appointed "high level manpower" the majority of primary school leavers had little prospect of obtaining paid employment. 2) Having been cultivated for white collar and high level employment, however, they were left too ill-prepared to return to the village and to agriculture for their livelihood. This ill-preparation had another dimension. The whole educational structure having been geared to producing people for high elite positions, intellectual efforts "directed toward anything but passing over examination hurdles" were regarded as risky by the students at all levels. In other words the system of education discouraged not only work but also the capacity to think, question, experiment, understand and solve problems.

Having thus uncritically followed the beaten track Tanzania could not escape the thrust of the colonial inheritance. The country could not offer secondary school places comparable to the number of elementary graduates. The few who succeeded to be enrolled in secondary schools had to go through a boarding experience (as in many other African countries) which cut them off too effectively from their own rural roots. Unable to be absorbed in wage employment or return to the land the rest constituted the famous problem are - "school leavers". Moreover, the college students' rebellion (October 1966) against National Service indicated just to what extent education had failed to instill in the educated an ethic of social service and a sense of responsibility, the extent to which students had escaped an awareness


2) It was estimated that 110,000 new jobs would be available over the five plan years as against a total of 250,000 primary school leavers on the labour market. Ibid.
of the immense problems and needs of the country. 1)

The Post Arusha Education

All these, however, were inevitable manifestations of an educational system which having been based on colonial assumptions could neither be appropriate nor adequate for the development of an independent country. And this fact, with all its ramified implications, posed as one of the gravest challenges confronting Tanzanian leaders assembled at Arusha in February 1967. Previous reforms focused on the most obvious defects of the system - its racial structure and limited scale. Attempts to make the education offered more relevant to the needs and requirements of the society was impeded, among other things, by the lack of a full and clear definition of the nature of society it was intended to build.

This, the Arusha Declaration, now, largely overcome by providing an overall perspective for educational thinking and practice. It spelt out a new awareness of the social importance of education. The school system is no more to serve as "a necessary filter or ladder of privilege" nor "as an agency of social division or differentiation." The new direction of educational policy which this consciousness underpinned has been elaborated in a presidential paper - Education for Self-Reliance - which having subjected the old system to a frank and thorough criticism outlined a new approach to the whole question of education for agricultural Tanzania. Not typically for Africa, more-

1) In 1966 a legislation was drafted requiring students in form VI and above to do National Service for a period of two years - 6 months at National Service camps and 18 months at normal jobs. During the camp months they would receive National Service pay and during the other 18 months 40 per cent of the pay normally commensurate with the jobs they were to do (the remaining 60 per cent going to the National Service Programme). After months of informal discussion and protest 3,935 students of the University College of Dar-es-Salaam demonstrated against the bill on October 22, 1966, whereupon President Nyerere sent them home for two years. In April 1966, the President, however, reversed his earlier decision and allowed the students to resume their studies starting July 1967. This crisis seems to have acted as an important eye opener for the government of Tanzania.
over, determined efforts have since been made to insure that the execution aspect is not left out of the equation. Within a month of the publication of the President's paper a conference on education was convened and having studied the new policy within the country's general development-strategy, worked out its mode of application, determining so far as possible the practical implications thereof.

According to the Tanzanian leadership the place of genuine work in Tanzania is in the farms and in the factories. It is around these tasks that the new educational system is being structured. There is no kind of labour that is deemed to be unimportant; nor is this meant to signify any vague notion of the dignity of manual labour. Every job should be done with the necessary knowledge and skill and, equally important, with a thorough understanding of the social purpose it is meant to serve. The new system of education should consequently aim at the production of working and responsible citizens; not an elite distinguished by privileges. In every citizen, it must encourage, in the words of President Nyerere, the development of "an acquiring mind; the ability to learn from what others do and reject or adapt it to his own needs; and a basic confidence in his own position as a free and equal member of society, who values others and is valued by them for what he does and not for what he obtains." 1)

This requires, it is recognized, a radical change both in the educational structure and in community attitudes. The call is not simply for a balance between practical and theoretical learning, nor for allocating for agriculture a place in the school curriculum. It is in addition, and more significantly, for the reversal of a whole set of social priorities revealed in the organization and content of education; in the position of the school in relation to the community, in "the vertical, upward direction of all hopes and efforts". It is a revaluation of the working man, particularly the hitherto forgotten peasant farmer. The implications of opting for a practical, self-sufficient and integrated system of education are farreaching, permeating as they do the whole fabric of social relationships. We can discuss here, only a few of the more prominent features.

One of these features is that the various levels of education have to be self-contained. Primary education is no longer seen as a preparation for high schools and universities but as a full education in itself, "training people for the life they must lead" in their own society. A person with six or seven years of education should not represent a social burden. He must be able to acquire sufficient knowledge for productive engagement and service to his society. To this end, therefore, the new educational policy aims at enabling every student, as part of his training, to master a skill in farming, industrial arts, carpentry etc. This is coupled with an emphasis on developing egalitarian, cooperative attitudes and a social service ethic in the student as well as his potential capacity for creative thinking, so that after the termination of his formal schooling, he would be capable of self-instruction while at the same time directly contributing towards production and serving society by training others. A similar preparation and employment is envisaged for those who complete part or the whole of secondary education.

Secondary schools should not be a mechanism of selecting students for colleges and universities. The rationale for this is not different from the one advanced in the case of primary education. As President Nyerere clearly argues the overwhelming majority of those entering secondary schools will never be doctors, engineers, economists or any of such things. Therefore, educative efforts at this level must also aim at the majority, at the type of life they will lead and the services expected of them. It needs be pointed out, here, that the purpose is not to provide an inferior education to that of the pre-Arusha period. It is rather to make schooling more relevant to the needs of the Tanzanian society. It is held that the only justification for taxing the many who are poor to make high school and further education available to "a few" is that "it is needed by the few for service to the many." ¹ This does not mean that education at these levels will be curtailed. What is meant is that it will be different. Those suitable for higher education will still be evident and will be encouraged to proceed.

¹) Nyerere, Education for Self-Reliance, op.cit., p. 18.
However, the difficulty of this approach, in a situation where the democratic right of all to education has not been ensured must not be underestimated. As recommended by the Conference of Educators (already referred to) at all levels, selection procedures for further education must be changed. Greater emphasis should now be placed upon such attributes as "initiative, participation in and contribution to community work and willingness to serve, in addition to academic ability." 1) Such a move, it must be recognized, will be able to offer only a partial solution; for the fact of the case is that in the short run education, particularly secondary and post-secondary, will remain a scarce resource in Tanzania. Part of the problem is, thus, how to prevent this fact of scarcity from being used "as an instrument of consolidation of a privileged, salaried elite." In a society where education is paid for by the overwhelming majority (the poor) the people have the right to require that those they educate should work for their advancement. 2) But dedication to social service cannot simply be assumed; it has to be cultivated through political education. This has been recognized and, consequently, an orientational transformation called for. But this is not all. The pattern of recruitment into the bureaucracy and the economic concerns has to be reconsidered. Not degrees, diplomas and the like but the capacity to do a job effectively and commitment to societal betterment must serve as criteria for employment as well as for further advancement. As already noted the Tanzanian leadership has taken concrete steps to insure that the wage and salary structures be more consonant with the general level of income prevalent in the society at large. However, this is not understood as a once and for all affair; for as development proceeds and this income rises adjustments will have to be made at least in the short run with an eye constantly on the propensity of the educated to justify income differentiation on the basis of their education. In other words, as requirements for arresting the divisiveness discernible in the hitherto existing educational system continued


2) At the opening of the University College of Dar-es-Salaam in 1964 Nyerere disclosed that the cost of maintaining a single college student for one year - approximately T. 1,000-was equal to the yearly per capita income of 50 average Tanzanians. See Lonsdale, _op.cit._, p. 339.
thought; detailed policy revision and action should be sustained.

In economic terms Tanzania, like all independent African states, is "a poor underdeveloped" country, with over 90 per cent of its people living and working in the rural areas. For agriculture and for the peasantry, therefore, a clear priority has been maintained. This is the second important feature of the new educational policy. The Tanzanian leaders have agreed that education should produce young people with a "healthy attitude towards agriculture." It is from the farmer that must come the means of feeding the population and financing import requirements for purposes of development. It is stressed, therefore, that the student must be taught that farming is not only a way of life but also an economic enterprise. The new education must lead him to appreciate the value of the land and inculcate a scientific approach to agriculture.

What this adds up to is not a casual and marginal concern with farming and the farmer. It is that agriculture should be a prominent part of school curricula. Nor is this a repetition of the colonial concept of agricultural education as A.K. Thompson seems to suggest. 1) The new policy requires that all subjects taught in the primary school "should be related to agriculture" 2) and that wherever possible both primary and secondary schools have sizeable farms

"where cash and food crops should be grown and modern farming techniques practiced. ... School farm activities should include the maintenance of proper records and all members of the school - both teachers and pupils - must be fully involved in the project." 3)

The practice, current in most African countries, of centralized agricultural schools producing people for the bureaucracy is inadequate for Tanzanian needs. Historically such schools have only had marginal influence on the African agricultural population. Teaching has been

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3) Ibid.
largely abstract even at this level. Moreover, the possibility for such schools to be familiar with local problems around the country is necessarily limited. Centralized, relatively well-equipped schools must, therefore, be very few, addressing themselves to research work which needs a concentration of both equipment and expertise.

The attempt of the colonial administration to include agriculture in education did not register any success. Because even if agriculture as a school subject was encouraged (and this was both marginal and inconsistent) the then prevailing value system could not but make it unacceptable. As Walter Hosney notes "agriculture was the lowest form of labour activity with regard to prestige, in view of the dominant colonial culture." 1) The attempt now is not only to make it an important part of what students learn at school but also to upgrade it in public and government esteem. However, to the extent that colonial attitudes still persist, its acceptability cannot be taken for granted even today. Efforts must be made to make it genuinely felt in all corners of the nation "that agricultural labour has the highest dignity and will receive the highest social recognition and rewards".

Rosney has stated that the most progressive parts of Tanzania developed through agriculture and are proud of their association with it, adding that, therefore, the struggle is not against an objective reality but against a colonial ideology the more strongly held the higher the educational level attained. 2) This conclusion corroborates a study on "Political Development in Rural Tanzania." In this study Goran Hyden found out that the people in Ruhaya (a region in the north west of Tanzania) while most dissatisfied with regard to the pre-Arusha education showed least discontent with their jobs. This is, as Hyden notes,

"... largely due to the fact that so many respondents are farmers. They take a pride in their occupation and are less likely to express dissatisfaction than representatives of other occupations. This feeling is particularly

1) Hosney, op.cit., p. 77.
2) Ibid.
strong in Eastern Buhaya ... where the agricultural tradition is most deeply rooted."

As already noted the new Tanzanian approach to education is an attempt to make schooling a means of enriching rural life. The majority of primary and secondary school students will be absorbed into agriculture - a task for which they shall have been prepared, given effective policy application. The problem, however, is to convince those few who will pass through the whole educational system and enter the bureaucracy or the different "professions" that, in a predominantly agricultural society, an understanding and appreciation of agriculture is highly relevant whether their own specific field of specialization will be directly related to farming or not. This problem, in effect adds up to nothing less than a transformation of consciousness. Ultimately success will depend not only on structural changes introduced but also on the effectiveness of political socialization. In societies like Tanzania where the concern of the polity is clearly with the common man it cannot be too often repeated that, as John Lonsdale aptly observes, education "must stress concepts of equality and the responsibility to give service which goes with any special ability whether it be in carpentry, in animal husbandry, or in academic pursuits." It should in particular counteract "the intellectual arrogance which leads the elite to despise those who are less well-educated, those who are 'just' 'human beings' including their own parents."

Certainly this alone does not define the aim of political education in Tanzania. Bridging both the economic and psychological distance between the elite on the one hand and the masses on the other is a very important aim of Arusha. Equally important is the cultivation of an alert citizenry animated by a sense of national and individual self-respect, dignity and confidence. It is held that a society whose members lack these attributes can hardly build and sustain an independent and democratic political system. Unlike most other African countries, Tanzania has escaped the grip of pragmatism; there is now a fairly coherent theory of social organization which must be firmly
grasped by children and adults alike.

Making the concepts of socialism, democracy and self-reliance so much stressed in this theory living realities requires the participation of the mass of the people. This implies that the "success and coherence of institutions depend heavily upon how adequately they are understood and how readily they are accepted by the majority of the people ...". In order to survive socialism, self-reliance or any other institution must enlist the participation of the people. But commitment to principles and the practices based on them is necessary for a meaningful participation. On the other hand, commitment in turn requires consciousness and understanding of both the principles and practices one is called upon to uphold. This is why post-Arusha Tanzania has listed political education among the "first things to be done."

The basic aim is the development of citizens conscious not only of political trends but also of their own worth; citizens committed to the principles of equality, co-operation and self-reliance, but also citizens who are alert and prepared to play a meaningful role in shaping the destiny of the country. This is true for school pupils as well as for the public at large. As a school subject political education is to be offered "as part and parcel" of civics. This is held to be the most effective "vehicle" through which correct Tanzanian ethics, economic problems, attitudes, politics and national aspirations can be conveyed to the child. In recognition of its importance it has been decided that it should be given due prominence on school time tables particularly between primary 4 or 5 up to form 4. 1) During civics lessons care must be taken (as in all other cases) not to allow a give and take relationship to develop between teacher and student, with the latter at the receiving end; free discussions must be encouraged, particularly at the secondary level, and students should actively participate. Moreover, the impact of these lessons is to be made even more dynamic and diffuse through the encouragement given to local leaders to participate in the discussions. It needs be noted,

however, that though civics is regarded as the most important means of directly offering political education the significant educative value of other subjects (particularly history) as well as of cultural activities has been recognized and efforts made to utilize them.

Those who having gone through such educational experiences enter the colleges, it is believed, will not require as direct a political education as the one just discussed. Nevertheless, although civics may not be offered as a subject at the post secondary level, "every college should provide the opportunity for students to discuss current economic and political problems of the country," and sharpen their understanding thereof. Participation in nation-building projects, in communal farming and other activities both on and off the college campus should be vigorously encouraged. Wherever possible teachers must make use of materials derived from the local environment and students "should be made to study the community in the neighbourhood."

The attempt at forging closer relations between the individual educational institution and its immediate environment — the local community — has been even more pronounced at the primary and secondary levels. The school "must strive, as far as possible, to integrate itself" within the community around it. The most effective means of bringing this integration about is held to be "shared work and activity" be this in the form of school participation on community farms, local construction and improvement projects or partaking in literacy work and adult education programmes. In this respect, perhaps, as Henry Biennn notes, "the greatest changes have taken place in the primary schools in Ujamaa villages" 1) such as the one at Litowa in the Ruvuma Region. 2) There students are part of a whole community, and thus "farm work, academic work and direct participation in communal living can be tied together." 3)

3) Bienen, loc.cit.
Another important aspect of the post-Arusha educational policy is that in their organization and everyday activities schools must themselves "exemplify socialism and self-reliance." The congruence between school culture and the country's overall social goals is deemed indispensably important. Independent, vigorous egalitarian and participant citizens can hardly be expected to emerge from schools run on bureaucratic and authoritarian lines or, as the former Secretary General of TANU noted, from schools that "constantly reinforce in various ways notions of hierarchy, seniority, status, privilege etc. among the pupils." 1) Hence the recognition of the importance of school democratization. Although guidance must be given by teachers and school authorities and a certain amount of discipline exerted, students should be encouraged to widen "their area of democratic participation in school affairs." 2) In a society dedicated to equality and self-reliance, the development of a sense of social justice and responsibility the politically educative value of this new approach should not be underestimated. Participation does not mean only using what you have in terms of human resources; it also means developing what you have - human capabilities. To the extent it enhances equality, it also is an expression of social justice and as such interlocked with the enhancement of social responsibility. Regardless of whether the concrete experience enjoyed is negative or positive its educative efficacy can hardly be in doubt. On the other hand, the sense of confidence emanating from the process of participating has a clear bearing on the working of the concept of self-reliance and vice-versa. In other words, any serious concern with such values as equality and self-reliance cannot but necessarily engender a parallel and equally pronounced concern with effective participation.

The essence of this seems to have been firmly grasped by the Tanzanian leadership. In "Education for Self-Reliance, Nyerere argues:

"Schools must, in fact, become communities and communities which practice the precept of self-reliance. The teachers, workers, and pupils together must be the members of a social unit in the same way as parents, relatives, and children are of the family social unit ... And the former community must realize just as the latter do, that their life and well-being depend upon the production of wealth - by farming or other activities. This means that all schools, but especially secondary schools and other forms of higher education, must contribute to their own upkeep; they must be economic communities as well as social and educational communities. Each school should have, as an integral part of it, a farm or workshop which provides the food eaten by the community, and makes some contribution to the total national income." 1)

To the extent possible every school is called upon to lead a self-reliant existence, with teachers and students also becoming producers - farmers and workers. What is thus cooperatively produced should be used for the benefit of the entire school community. On the other hand, decisions both as to production and allocation ought to be democratically arrived at. As members of the community, students are to be given "every opportunity to participate in decision-making, in planning and implementation." 2) And this is deemed important not only in the short run sense - for the success of school activities, but also and more important to prepare the young for active citizen roles.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In his speech at the Conference of the African heads of state and government at Addis Ababa in May 1963, Nkrumah stated:

"Our people supported us in our fight for independence because they believed that African governments could cure the ills of the past in a way which could never be accomplished under colonial rule. If, therefore, now that we are independent we allow the same conditions to exist that existed in colonial days, all the resentment that overthrew colonialism will be mobilized against us." 1)

Failure to heed this warning in a consistent way and to bring about the sweeping changes in the economic and political structures which that would have entailed, failure to come to grips with the Ghanaian national edifice as a whole not unexpectedly led to the demise of Nkrumah's own government. The wave of military coups which this decade witnessed in several parts of Africa proved how fragile were "conservative" and "progressive" regimes alike. Of the "radical" leaders, Sekou Touré has successfully been brought into the acquiescent fold; Nkrumah and Modibo Keita have equally successfully been overthrown.

While the allegation of the former Ghanaian President — i.e. that the military and police officers responsible for his ejection were actually instigated, encouraged and materially supported by foreign forces may be dismissed as being apologetic or propagandistic, the fact that immediately after the military take-over some Western powers rushed to Ghana with food and other types of aid (largely denied to Nkrumah's government) to insure the success of the new regime seems to indicate that this would not be altogether correct. Nevertheless, to the extent that coup making ventures of foreign powers can succeed only when they are directed against regimes with narrow and weak power bases a full explanation for the phenomenon of coup d'état cannot be obtained outside the domestic social reality. In other words, this reality, as I have tried to suggest in this study, is what lies at the heart of the "African predicament".

1) Idris Cox, Socialist Ideas in Africa, Clarke Doble and Brenton Ltd., Cattledown, 1966, p. 10.
By and large, political independence has not brought fundamental alteration either in the social structure or in the visible landscape. True, it did allow a group of civil servants more share in whatever political power is available to the national politicians and as Pierre de Brissy notes, "to put the state machinery at the service of their specific" elite interests. Though civil service salaries are well attended to by the various governments, in most cases, members of the politico-administrative elite have not shown themselves incapable of augmenting their incomes either by corruption and speculation or by collaborating with foreign capital or both, however negative the impact of this on the masses. The pattern in many countries is quite discernible. Increased coercive measures are employed to strengthen the elite's political and administrative power and conditions offered by this are exploited for the conquest of more economic power. What is equally significant: large parts of the domestically extracted resources being either channelized into discretionary consumption or remitted abroad in the form of profits accruing to various forms of foreign capital, the general pattern of surplus absorption has had negligible positive effects on rural drudgery." One expresses little wonder then, that "rural animation", a concept so often used by so many African politicians has not proved capable of transcending the realm of slogans and acquiring any concrete meaning.

Africa is not yet free - not from internal authoritarianism and not from external domination. It is easy to agree with Peter Worsley when, in a recent work he states (shall we say the obvious?) that "men have minds ... they can innovate and introduce new ranges of human vision". For the optimum utilization of their mental and physical capabilities, however, men need a particular condition of human existence - independence. They must be free men conscious of their worth. In a situation such as that prevailing in most parts of Africa where internal autocracy combines with external domination to contain the liberation of human energies one fails to see how men's potential capabilities can be so expressed as to engender and accelerate development. To develop Africa must break the firm grip of colonial determinism and opt for a thorough transformation of the existing structures. However, the task of rooting out the legacies of colonialism has proved so gigantic that former illusions are being crushed. The belief that
political independence puts an end to foreign domination is being thrown overboard as new and subtler methods of external control are discovered, applied and defended. It seems clear, today, that general decolonization calls for a decolonized leadership, a leadership which is of the people, which identifies itself with their interests and which is both willing and able to work for their advancement. With the possible exception of Tanzania, such a leadership has not yet emerged in Africa.

We have argued earlier in this study that, by and large, the politics of liberation did not prove conducive to a redefinition of internal social organization nor to a critical analysis of the reality of Africa's international position. Nevertheless, "the emphasis after independence on non-alignment and economic development" seemed to suggest that there was some appreciation of the exigencies involved. If taken seriously and implemented in any meaningful way these concepts would have meant some real changes in Africa's international position. As Catherine Hoskyns notes, it soon became clear, however, that most states were in no position to give them any real application. The majority, therefore, "settled rapidly for a situation where non-alignment was affirmed by a slight widening of the sources of foreign aid and by militant speeches in the United Nations, and development by the use of foreign aid to disguise a state of virtual stagnation."

Presently to this general pattern there exists one interesting exception: Tanzania. At this juncture it is perhaps necessary to say that one must not delude oneself into thinking that Tanzania has been able to effectively decolonize itself or that fundamental changes in social organization have been realized. What this study has attempted to show is that in that country efforts are being conscientiously exerted to these ends. Indeed, it has been noted that even at the theoretical level contradictions such as that between democratic, development oriented educational structure on the one hand and an elitist bureaucracy and its method of recruitment on the other have not been resolved. Moreover, implementing the structural and curricular changes called for in the new education policy inevitably involves difficulties. There, is, for example, a shortage of trained and experienced agriculturalists to teach and advise on school farms. As the Tanzanian President suggests,
this problem may be lightened through a more effective use of the services of agricultural and community development field workers and the utilization of knowledgeable and progressive local farmers. And this may indeed "break down the notion that only book learning is worthy of respect". But still, another problem asserts itself: the limited availability of teachers who understand and are committed to the new approach. Most of those now teaching in the secondary schools are either expatriates or university graduates—products and "major beneficiaries of the old system". While the attitudinal disposition of some expatriates may not contradict the changes envisaged and whereas the possibility of reorientation on the part of high school and university graduates may not be apriori excluded there is sufficient ground to believe that the road ahead will be rough and difficult. The pre-Arusha student rebellion against the introduction of national service is an important reminder against any glib identification of the available "middle- and high-level manpower" as well as students who are presently in institutions of higher learning with progressiveness.

Another indication of possible difficulties comes from parliamentarians. That at least some of these were worried about the leadership code which sought to minimize the practice of using political positions for private economic gains was made clear when President Nyerere answered questions from the H.P.'s in April 1967. Almost all the questions related "only to one section of the Arusha Declaration—that on qualifications for leadership. There was not even one question on socialism and self-reliance." 1) Of course, the reason as to why resistance should come from such quarters is not difficult to see. Arusha struck at what has been an important means to self-enrichment in Africa, viz. wealth through politics. Even with the new restrictions members of the Tanzanian politico-administrative elite will be able to live much better than "all but a few of their countrymen". But as Henry Bienen notes, "They are no longer supposed to feather their nests for the future".

On the other hand, to such resistance based on narrow interests there seems to be a significant countervailing influence—that of the mass of the people whose response to Arusha has been described by Knud

Erik Svedsen as being both positive and "great". There has been "a very high level of political activity in the towns", Svedsen notes, and TANU is now launching "a programme of political education and reinforcing its socialist leadership". In the countryside too, "we have enough indications to show how popular the Declaration is," 1) Given, then, the enthusiasm of the mass of the population, and the reinforcement and elevation of this to new and higher levels of political consciousness as well as a rapid implementation of the policy of democratic participation the resistance of some politicians, and bureaucrats may be overcome, albeit with some difficulty.

Still, however, there is one complicating factor – the army. The British model on the basis of which the small Tanzanian army was created and trained emphasises distance between, on the one hand, officers and soldiers and, on the other, the military and the mass of the civilian population. Prepared for war the military has little real function in a situation of peace apart from the task of buttressing the police force - if and when this need arises - in maintaining law and order. In other words, a combination of productive roles with defence requirements can only be incidental or dependent upon direct military-strategic considerations. This would have suggested, in the Tanzanian situation, a structural and attitudinal reorientation of the army towards linking up with the civilian population in national development efforts. The need for such changes was in fact made obvious in 1964 when mutinies in the three East African armies had to be put down by the invitation of British troops.

Following the experience which the Tanzanian President characterized as "humiliating" China's offer of military advisers was accepted in an effort to break away from the British tradition. However, this attempt proved short lived. Under the heavy diplomatic, press and economic pressures brought to bear on Tanzania by the West, Nyerere's government soon convinced itself that this was an area where compromise was necessary. Put under Canadian advisory authority the army, after a brief shock, continued its elitist tradition, hardly affected by the stream of change, largely separate from the people, their problems and development efforts. Despite the fact that some TANU youth leaguers

1) Svedsen, Socialist Problems after the Arusha Declaration, op.cit., p. 3.
had been recruited into the army following the 1964 mutiny, this situation has not been conducive to an effective political education. Will the military strike again? And if it tries what will be its chances of success? Such were the grave questions the Tanzanian polity confronted.

The Tanzanian army is small. This may mean very little, however, since whatever its size, it enjoys a monopoly of weapons of destruction. On the other hand, faced with a conscious and alert citizenry its impact can be quite minimal. But this is a consideration which may hold only some years hence — after the spread of the new type of political education in the urban and particularly in the rural areas. Thus, it has not been possible to answer these questions in any definitive way. Nevertheless, that internal possibilities for an attempt, on the part of members of the military, at coup making has not yet been eliminated was attested to by the recent unsuccessful endeavour of a handful of officers and politicians to usurp political power. The problem is not entirely internal. It does not pertain only to the strength of the army, the influence of some officers within it and collaboration on the part of certain members of the politico-administrative elite. One has fresh examples of officer corps successfully overthrowing civilian governments or putting in power civilians of their own choice. To this, add possible external encouragement and support for power seekers in the country and the range of the problem becomes apparent.

In analysing possibilities of foreign intervention in Tanzania Catherine Hoskyns places a sharp accent on "the homogeneity and relative lack of class differentiation" and from this proceeds to suggest that the process of transformation can go a long way "without antagonizing already established interests" which might ally themselves with foreign interests in undermining the present regime. Despite her otherwise penetrating analysis, Hoskyns here seems to have minimized the problem. Any thorough going economic and political change is bound to antagonize existing interests. The crucial question should, therefore, refer to the relative strength of the forces committed to change and those opposing it.

In contrast to many other African countries, Tanzania has no "pronounced ethnic differences and no regional separatist movements"
which can be exploited by foreign powers. Apart from the diamond mines which, at any rate, are limited, the country does not enjoy important mineral resources and whatever agricultural development there is has been realized without much foreign involvement. This coupled with the absence of foreign military bases and "communication centres" means that there are few assets which external interests may "manoeuvre to protect". Particularly true is this after February 1967 when the key enterprises in the industrial and commercial sectors (which were largely foreign owned or controlled) were nationalized.

But it is not only direct and observable economic and military interests that impel foreign powers to interfere in the internal affairs of Third World countries. Two other factors of import seem to suggest themselves: the strategic significance of any one of such countries to the powers and the exemplary value of its changes to the technologically underdeveloped world. In the case of the first, there exists hardly any doubt that with the creation of the Organization of African Unity's Liberation Committee based on Dar-es-Salaam, with TANU's commitment to the total liberation of Africa, its strong stand on the Rhodesian question and its bitter opposition to apartheid Tanzania, today, holds a strategically important position vis-à-vis the racist regimes in Southern Africa, Portugal and the Western powers. The second consideration is closely related to this. If successfully applied Tanzania's new development strategy may not only enable it to decolonize itself effectively but may also prove a model which other African countries can utilize to the same effect. This will certainly not be in the interest of the powers which have a stake in the persistence of the existing situation in Africa. The reason for the pronouncedly negative response with which the Tanzanian act of nationalization was greeted in the West, for example, can hardly be explained by the number of foreign firms affected; nor by the size of their capital (for which, at any rate, full compensation was to be paid) - for the truth is that these were very small. Rather the explanation should be sought in the fear that successful nationalization in one country may lead to similar moves elsewhere.

These considerations do not seem to have entirely escaped Tanzanian leaders. Nor have they forced the latter to back down on
the most crucial tasks they have set themselves and the nation to accomplish. One notes, however, a discernible tendency towards compromise on some questions such as the role of the army and an attempt to maintain a "careful balance". Thus, the effect abroad of the nationalization and the Chinese loan of £100 million to Tanzania and Zambia was supposedly counteracted by the restraint placed upon the more radical members of the polity and "the signing of the East African Treaty of Co-operation which - while it certainly made some adjustments in the structure of economic cooperation between the three countries - meant that Tanzania's economy, especially in the crucial sphere of industrialization, was still closely tied to that of Kenya and Uganda."

In view of all this it becomes impossible to predict, with any degree of certainty, whether Tanzania would be able to consolidate the changes that have been introduced. Internal and external interests opposed to the changes may combine in frustrating its efforts. Equally important, fear of antagonizing these interests may end up by preventing the government from taking further steps to insure success. On the other hand, the country has established certain conditions which if exploited with creativity and firm determination would give it both the independence and the mobilized energies of the mass of its people necessary for accelerated development.
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