The Mérida Initiative, a Flawed Conception?
Implications for Ciudad Juárez

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFI</td>
<td>Mexican Federal Agency of Investigations</td>
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<td>CARSI</td>
<td>Central America Regional Security Initiative</td>
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<td>CBP</td>
<td>United States Customs and Border Protection</td>
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<td>CoL</td>
<td>Culture of Lawfulness</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>United States Congressional Research Service</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>United States Drug Enforcement Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>United States Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>United States Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>United States Department of State</td>
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<td>DTOS</td>
<td>Drug Trafficking Organizations</td>
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<td>ESC</td>
<td>Twenty-First Century Border Bilateral Executive Steering Committee</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>Mexican Federal Police</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>United States Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>GOM</td>
<td>Government of Mexico</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILEA</td>
<td>International Law Enforcement Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>INEGI</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (National Institute of Statistics and Geography)</td>
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<td>INCLE</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement</td>
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<td>INL</td>
<td>United States Bureau for International Narcotics Affairs and Law Enforcement</td>
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<td>LOA</td>
<td>letter of agreement</td>
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<td>LPRs</td>
<td>automated license plate readers</td>
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<td>NGT</td>
<td>Neo-Gramscian Theory</td>
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<td>NIIE</td>
<td>non-intrusive inspection equipment</td>
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<td>NSIC</td>
<td>National Strategy Information Center</td>
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<td>PE</td>
<td>Political Economic or Political Economy</td>
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<td>PFN</td>
<td>Mexican Federal Ministerial Police</td>
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<td>PGR</td>
<td>Mexican Attorney General’s Office</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>United States Bureau of Political-Military Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIEDO</td>
<td>Subprocuraduría de Investigación Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada (Assistant Attorney General’s Office for Special Investigations on Organized Crime)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNSP</td>
<td>Mexican National Public Security System</td>
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<td>SSP</td>
<td>Secretaría de Seguridad Pública (Secretariat for Public Security)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USCFR</td>
<td>United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations</td>
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<td>WHA</td>
<td>United States Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs</td>
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Abstract

This paper explores the convergence of Mexico-US anti-drug collaboration by examining the position of the Mexican economy within the capitalist world-economy, a position which much analysis has neglected within the current war on drugs in Mexico. Ciudad Juárez, the city most affected to date in terms of violence will be examined in relation to the efforts of the bilateral security agreement between Mexico and the US, the Mérida Initiative. The results show that a number of factors related to the structural change that occurred in the Mexican economy increased the power and violence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Also, the conception of the Mérida Initiative is in line with the interests of its creators to keep the existing structure of the economy and will therefore not properly address the violence and drug trafficking in which it is trying to combat causing further unnecessary violence.

Relevance to Development Studies

Understanding a problem is necessary in order to make some kind of useful change that can fix such a problem. Much analysis within International Relations has focused more on events and not on the underlying structure within which those events occur. Therefore many times the symptoms of a problem are treated and not the root, which is why the problem is never solved and arises again and again, time after time. A perfect example of this has been efforts to stop drug trafficking which are simply treating symptoms. The hope of this paper is that deeper analysis of the underlying structures takes place in relation to drug trafficking problems or other fields in order to stop the many injustices that are continued through a mis-understanding of such situations.

Keywords

Merida Initiative, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, United States, Violence, World-systems analysis, Neo-Gramscian, Neo-liberalism, Drug trafficking, Security
Chapter 1
Introduction

Part of the foundation of the Mexico-United States (US) economic relationship has its roots in the smuggling of humans, narcotics, and contraband. The US has long pressured Mexico to combat its internal production and the trafficking of narcotics to the US and has at various moments conducted joint anti-drug operations. After structural adjustment programs, the signing of NAFTA, shift in the cocaine route and the more democratic opening of Mexico, the power of Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOS) has grown significantly, and violence has increased, especially in Ciudad Juarez (Cd. Juarez). US and Mexican collaboration on drug issues also increased during this period. The current Mexican President, Felipe Calderon, not long after his inauguration in December 2006 sent troops to confront the DTOS head on and homicides skyrocketed. Initiated in 2008, the Mérida Initiative is the most recent and comprehensive bilateral endeavor to date, whose main goal is to quell Mexican DTOS 1 and stop the flow of narcotics to the US, while reforming the entire Mexican justice system and at the same time promoting the smooth flow of goods through the border. Like past efforts, the US has done little to curb domestic demand of narcotics and control the flow of arms to Mexico, which has ensured the continued flow of drugs to the US and access of arms to Mexican DTOS. This research aims to shed light on some of the political economic (PE) factors that helped to shape the current conception of the Mérida Initiative and convergence of interests between Mexico and the US, and to show through the case of Cd. Juárez, the city most affected by violence to date and PE factors, that such a conception is missing crucial elements and also an understanding of the problem that will ultimately continue to produce the local expressions of violence that the capitalist world-economy contributes to in Cd. Juárez.

1.1 Research Question

The objective of this research paper is to find out why the Mérida Initiative sees a disconnection between the global dynamics of the capitalist world-

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1 In this research paper it is recognized that drug trafficking organizations (DTOS) do partake in other illicit activities other than drug trafficking. It has been identified that Mexican DTOS are involved in at least 21 other illicit activities, of which it is estimated that 45 to 48 percent of gross income is derived from drug trafficking and 52 to 55 percent comes from the other 21 illicit activities (Buscaglia 2010). Some of these other illicit activities include kidnapping, extortion, piracy, arms trafficking, human trafficking, and counterfeiting (for the complete list of these activities see Buscaglia 2010:101). It is also recognized that there are many terms that can be used to identify organized crime groups such as ‘trans-national organized crime,’ ‘drug cartels,’ and that the use of DTOS in this paper does not restrict the actions of these groups to solely dealing with drug trafficking.
economy and the local realities of Cd. Juárez which have been shaped by such
dynamics. The main research question will be focused on and seek to answer
the question of:

*Why there is a disjuncture between global dynamics of the capitalist world-economy and the
local expressions in Cd. Juárez as viewed through the Mérida Initiative?*

The following sub-questions will help to answer the question:

> What is the Mérida Initiative and how can we characterize the context in
which it has been promoted?

> What are the factors that help to explain why Cd. Juárez has been the most
affected city in Mexico due to the ‘drug war’?

> What is Cd. Juárez’ place in the world-economy?

### 1.2 Hypothesis

The Mérida Initiative as currently conceptualized is based on a flawed notion
of reality due to the elite class who conceived it not digging deep enough to
uncover the root causes of drug trafficking and violence, especially in Cd.
Juárez. Because of such a conception, only the symptoms are being addressed,
and not the actual causes, while elites in both Mexico and the US will continue
to benefit from such a conception of the initiative that keeps intact the existing
order of the Maquiladoras.

### 1.3 Methodology

Due to the nature of this research, secondary data was used through deductive
reasoning. Sources included statistical data and documents from both the
Mexican and US government, NGO’s, articles, books, and online media. For
the document analysis of the Government of Mexico’s (GOM) Mérida
Initiative website’s monthly advances, the *interview* technique was used in which
I searched for information strictly related to Cd. Juárez and the state of
Chihuahua in which Cd. Juárez is located in order to see what has officially
occurred.

The case study focuses on Cd. Juárez because of its high visibility within
academia and the media due to the many problems it has faced and is currently
facing in terms of extraordinarily high violence, the maquiladoras, drug
trafficking, feminicidios etc. Due to this high visibility, a plethora of data and
analysis regarding many aspects of the city’s problems were available that were
useful in the research process. As such my research experience related to both
Cd. Juárez and Mexico is relegated to secondary data. It was determined early
on that I would not pursue primary data from key actors in Cd. Juarez with
knowledge of the programs enacted in the city due to regards for safety
concerns.
1.4 Structure

The structure of the paper is as follows: chapter two sets up the stage by giving background on the theory that guides the research process. Chapter three positions Mexico and Cd. Juárez within the world-economy and its relation to the US by examining the history of their economic structures. Next, the changes in the PE, drug trafficking, and violence are explored in chapter four. Then chapter five will try to understand Mexican and US anti-drug collaboration, especially the Mérida Initiative. And finally, conclusions will be examined.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to deliver some background on the concepts to be used which draw from World-Systems Analysis (WSA) and Neo-Gramscian theory (NGT) in order to answer the research question.

For the research, WSA is relevant within the International Political Economy (IPE) literature because it helps shed some light on the economic relationship between Mexico and the US as a semi-periphery and core relationship respectively. In particular, the relationship before and after the neo-liberal era that is often times overlooked in relation to the drug war, drug trafficking, and the Merida Initiative. WSA is also helpful in order to locate Cd. Juarez’ role in the Mexico-US relationship where its economic characteristics as a periphery have been shaped by the concept of the world-economy.

NG theory will be useful within IPE to understand where the Mexico-US relationship now stands both politically and economically through the rise of a transnational capital bloc and why a change occurred in the economic and political structure of Mexico. As mentioned with WSA, the current approach to security within the Mexico-US context does not explore such relationships. The chapter will first explore WSA and then NGT.

2.2 World-Systems Analysis

WSA is an approach to social analysis and social change, principally developed by Immanuel Wallerstein. This macro sociological perspective strives to explain the undercurrents of the ‘capitalist world economy’ being a ‘total social system’ (Martinez-Vela 2001). It challenges the supposition that state societies constitute independent entities whose development is able to be understood without accounting for systematic ways that societies are connected to each other in the setting of a bigger system of material interactions (Chase-Dunn 1998:1-2). When Wallerstein was developing WSA, the main development theory at the time, Modernization theory, was under criticism from many social scientists, including Wallerstein. Out of this criticism the WSA perspective was developed, coming from three streams of thought: the Annales school (Fernand Braudel), Karl Marx, and dependency theory.

[…] I also protested against a political economy which paid insufficient attention to the ‘longue dureé,’ because it was too wedded to government tasks equally confined to the doubtful reality of the present (Braudel 1980:58).

The Annales School influenced Wallerstein during his time in Paris. In particular this influence is attributed to the classic and powerful book by Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (1949). From this work he borrowed several ideas that are crucial to WSA: la longue dureé (the long term) and économie-monde. The longue
dureé is a process of history where change occurs slowly, happens in recurring cycles, and is in constant repetition. It is argued that in order to reveal the most profound layers of social life, the persisting structures of historical reality, ‘subterranean history’, and totality (mode of production), the study of the long term must be undertaken (So 1990:172). A translation of économe-monde would roughly be world economy, but what Braudel meant was that this was a historical structure that traversed numerous political borders and was intertwined through its economic interdependencies. In Braudel’s previously mentioned book his description of the Mediterranean économe-monde through the lens of the longue dureé was ground breaking because it provided part of the foundation for moving away from the state as the sole unit of analysis to the historical system (Wallerstein 2004). In general the Annales School main influence on WSA is at the methodological level (Goldfrank 2000). The use of the longue dureé and économe-monde is useful in examining the Mérida Initiative precisely because it moves away from a more state-centric and shorter term view and rather focuses on the totality and its relation with the économe-monde which has currently lacked exploration within analysis of the Mérida Initiative and the War on Drugs.

Wallerstein draws on many contributions from Marx, with the following being the most important. First is the social discord amongst materially based human groups. Second is the concern of relevant totality (of which the Annales School shares this concern). ‘Third is the sense of the transitory nature of social forms and theories about them (Goldfrank 2000:163).’ Fourth is the central issue of the accumulation process, alongside the class struggles and competitiveness it provokes.

Fifth, and perhaps most important, is the dialectical sense of motion through conflict and contradiction, slower motion to be sure than most Marxists wish to perceive, but still the impulse to identify emerging social groups that carry forward the world-wide struggle for socialism (Goldfrank 2000:163-164).

The neo-Marxist Dependency theory also gave some important contributions to WSA, mainly its attempt to explain development by trying to understand the periphery through core-periphery relations. Wallerstein later added a third category to WSA, the semiperiphery.

Besides the basic view on some of the main streams of thought already put forth that heavily influenced WSA, there are a few more thinkers that merit mention based on their contributions to WSA. First is Joseph Schumpeter from whom Wallerstein noted the importance of the Kondratieff wave and business cycles in general of which help to show the sporadic character of capitalist growth. Last is Karl Polanyi who developed the idea of three types of social economy, or ‘basic modes of economic organization’ that he called ‘reciprocal, redistributive, and market modes (Goldfrank 2000:161).’ Of these ‘basic modes of economic organization’, which Wallerstein calls ‘totalities’ are ‘mini-systems, world Empires, and world-economies’ (Goldfrank 2000:161).

So now that we have a basic understanding of where WSA is coming from, it will be useful to dig deeper into some of its concepts. The main concepts include ‘[…] totalities, axial division of labor, international state system, cyclical rhythms, secular trends, and antinomies or contradictions (Goldfrank 2000:166)’, however, we will only focus on a few of these.
As read through Goldfrank (2000), within world history Wallerstein contends that there have only existed three types of totalities, or modes of production, and that perhaps there will be a fourth\(^2\) sometime. In order to study change a totality is used as the basic unit of analysis. This is because a totality contains the basic determinants of change. Wallenstein’s analytic boundary is established by the normal provisioning of essential goods and services, although cultural, political, and luxury trade relations between totalities can have an impact to the gradually transformative internal processes. The three modes of production are ‘mini-systems, world-empires, and world-economies (Goldfrank 2000:166)’, of which the world-economy is important for the analysis in this paper.

The world-economy is different from both mini-systems and world-empires in that they are incorporated not by a single political center, but rather through the market. This social system is marked as having two or more separate cultural and economic areas who are mutually dependent in respect to requirements such as protection, fuel, and food, and that two or more polities contend for supremacy without one or the other being in the more powerful position in relation to the other permanently. World-economies in general had a tendency to become world-empires before the modern epoch. The most well-known case exemplifying this is the classical trajectory of Greece’s multiple polities to the single empire of Rome. For Wallerstein, the distinguishing explanation to the vitality of the modern world is the continuing interstate rivalry contained by the structure of “a single division of labor.” This structure creates an incentive for organizational and technical improvement that allows groups the prospect to further their interests, thwarts the complete stopping of the aspect of production by one system-wide political elite, and negates to the subjugated majority a center of attention for its political opposition. World-economies are in incisive distinction with world-empires in regard to its vulnerability to conquest or rebellion, technological slowness, and its mode of surplus appropriation (Goldfrank 2000:167). The concept of world-economy is useful to give a basis of the underlying economic structure that Mexico and the US work within, while the division of labor is beneficial in understanding the relation of Cd. Juárez with the US as will be touched upon later in this paper.

The last totality, a socialist world-government, although not yet a reality is what Wallerstein hopes and believes will eventually happen. It is presumed that this totality would be different from a world-empire because its appropriation, production, and redistribution of the world’s surplus would not be decided by a bureaucratic layer but democratically and collectively in agreement “with an ethic of use value and social equality.” He thinks that the transition to world socialism is happening right now.

The next concepts to be discussed deal with the division of labor, and what Wallerstein means are the relations and forces of production of the whole of the world-economy. Within the division of labor five aspects of it are

\(^2\) For Wallerstein, the fourth and final totality will be a socialist world-government.
distinguished, namely, capital accumulation, unequal exchange, commodity chains, semi-periphery, and core and periphery.

The heart of WSA deals with core and periphery relations. Core activity is defined as a specific type of production that is of rather capital-intensive commodities that in general employ highly paid and skilled labor. This activity is relative to what is going on in the current world-system as a whole. Because capital intensity normally rises, core activities may become peripheral later on (Chase-Dunn 1998:207). On the other end of the spectrum periphery activity is defined as the production of commodities with low capital intensity technology and low wage labor that is normally coerced politically as compared to labor in the core (Chase-Dunn 1998:347). For Wallerstein, the core-periphery concept illustrates a relational reality in which one cannot exist without having the other. The concept of “commodity chains” is used to illustrate the production of goods where they progress from a raw material to a finished product. This long time structural relationship is thus the result of the ‘backwardness’ of the twentieth century and not the late start of countries in the pursuit of development. The expansion of the capitalist world-economy during the last four centuries has integrated external areas, those previously outside the system, primarily as peripheries (Goldfrank 2000).

Semi-periphery3 is a concept that was developed by Wallerstein. Politically, semi-peripheral states help to stabilize the world-system by absorbing and deflecting part of the peripheries opposition to core states by means of sub-imperial measures. Economically, they are acknowledged as being intermediary among the core and periphery in regards to capital intensity and also the wage and skill levels of their manufacturing processes. They are distinguished as having both peripheral and core-like production, with their trade flowing in both directions, exporting simple manufactured goods to the periphery and little-processed material to the core. It is possible for a state to move in and out of a semi-periphery status, coming from below and above. Moving upward is a challenge and is argued that by such an upward movement of some states comes at the cost of other states moving downward, however, this may not be entirely true as the system itself does expand (Goldfrank 2000:169-170).

Unequal exchange for Wallerstein is related to the mechanisms or processes (transfer pricing) that duplicate the division of labor between the core and periphery. There is a continuing debate about what the exact nature of the mechanisms are, but their result is ‘[…] the systematic transfer of

3 Although this research paper does not fully explore Mexico’s status within the current world-system as a semi-periphery or periphery, it is curious to note that semi-peripheries ‘[…] in the course of the system’s evolution, their transformative potential has gone from providing a stimulus for upward mobility (challenging the core’s hegemony) to engendering antisystemic strategies (Boateă 2006:326).’ The Zapatistas represent an example of such an antisystemic strategy. Perhaps it is no coincidence that some have seen the Mérida Initiative and Calderon’s drug war as a means of quelling opposition groups to the dominant accumulation process (Mercille 2011, Delgado and Romano 2011).
surplus from the subsistence and semi-proletarian sectors located in the periphery to the high-technology, more fully proletarianized core (Goldfrank 2000:170). It is because of this that in the core there is a higher standard of living, where political organization amongst workers, higher wages, and a surplus of capital merge to create pressure for more technical advance, which increases the separation between the periphery and core.

Wallerstein also uses the concept of capitalist accumulation, which was first illustrated by Marx. In his use of it, he sees the accumulation process as a world process instead of a succession of matching national processes. The transformation and appropriation of peripheral surplus in this process is seen as being unavoidable, as an integral part of capitalism where primitive accumulation and geographic expansion take place (Goldfrank 2000:170). What capitalist accumulation focuses on is the complexity and growing extent of the forces of production in the form of ever-increasing mechanization due to the pressures on capitalists to drop the overall costs of production (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982:14). The pressures on capitalists come from two sides. The first is between capitalists in competition to buy inexpensively and to sell exceedingly, always being concerned with maximizing the difference between costs and revenues. Second, workers demand for improved living and working conditions. Two ideas are central to this formulation. One deals with the production of commodities by the work force where the produced commodities value through which labor power was exhausted to produce them is larger than the value of the survival goods that replenish the labor power exhausted during their production with the difference being ‘surplus value.’ The other idea deals with the appropriation and ‘realization’ of the surplus value by capitalists through the sale of the commodities that were produced and the use of part of the realized surplus to spend on additions to capital, primarily fixed capital (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982).

Crucial to WSA is ‘the modern world-system’, of which its main features are its structure and its development. The structure consists of a single expanding economy, growing multiple states, and the relation between capital and labor. The single expanding economy typically appears to us as many national economies interrelated through international trade. The one world-scale economy contains ‘[…] a single or axial division and integration of labor processes (“division of labor”) […]’ (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982:11) that is both paralleled and organized by one set of accumulation-processes amid the core and periphery. Multiple states are growing in the sense that the amount of states becoming part of the interstate system is growing and that specific states are also expanding their jurisdictions. Within the inter-state system, states continually form and terminate through relations of alliance and rivalry, constantly attempting to expand their dominance in relation to each other, and over external areas and people which sets in motion ‘anti-imperial movements’ that results in an increase in the amount of states and interstate interactions forming the interstate-system. The relation between capital and labor is what the accumulation process operates through and repeatedly reproduces on a growing scale.

This is the social-political framework, itself developing through various forms, that progressively organizes (1) production interrelations, and (2) intra-
and interstate politics, so that formally rational considerations, in specific contrast to substantively rational considerations (vide Weber; in Marx, ‘exchange’ versus ‘use’ considerations), thus come increasingly to govern the courses of action pursued by individuals (households), communities, organizations, and ‘states’ (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982:12).

The development of ‘the modern world-system’ is seen in terms of the interrelations of production, the state-system, and the capital and labor relation, which all come together to form exact alternating periods of expansion and stagnation within the system. Included in its development is a contradiction in relation to the development of the multiple states and the one economy, which reveals itself in specific forms during the course of the long-term development of the social system. The underlying theoretical claim regarding the single world-scale economy and the multiple state-jurisdictions is that the expression of processes of the integration of labor and the world-scale division, and the processes of state deformation and formation which constitute the formation of the system and at the general level provide an account for the features and patterns of its development. These processes in theory will result in a network of affairs between political formations that will be patterned similar to the network of affairs between production-accumulation zones (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982).

Within the state system, the concepts of imperialism, hegemony, and class struggle play important political roles. Imperialism is the strong core states domination over the weaker peripheral states regions, and colonies. Class forces use states to alter the world market to their advantage and can do so by diplomacy or through the use of force. Unequal exchange mechanisms are enforced and reinforced by states (Goldfrank 2000:170).

A hegemon is a core state that momentarily is able to outstrip the rest of the other states. Such a state is characterized as having supremacy in the arenas of finance, commerce, and production while having a very strong military. In contrast to other core states, the hegemon is depicted as having a rather shaky and decentralized state apparatus, which has to overcome the smallest amount of internal resistance to its foreign economic policy that is aggressively expansionist. Enforcing free trade and maintaining a steady balance of power in the world’s politics is the hegemonic powers responsibility. A state’s status as hegemon is only temporary, as it never becomes strong enough to grasp the whole world-system and can only police it. There are three reasons why hegemony is only temporary. First, the wage level is raised through class struggles, which lessens its competitive advantage, taking away its power to undersell rivals. Second, technological advantages are spread to other areas through capital export, theft, or imitation. Last, technological advances within the world make larger political units more effective (Goldfrank 2000:171).

The concept of class struggle is vital to the state system because it deals with politics within and between states. Alliances among classes traverse state boundaries, as illustrated by the bourgeois in different areas joining together to protect surplus appropriation, yet at the same time competing over relative portions. The state is conceived as being the mediating actor within the playing out of class struggle in the worldwide economy. Within class struggle,
Wallerstein sees the use of class terminology as being distractive because of it labeling social types at the cost of realizing the consequences of their actions for the running of world capitalism (Goldfrank 2000:172).

2.3 Neo-Gramscian

2.3.1 Introduction

Based on the work of Antonio Gramsci\(^4\), the Neo-Gramscian stream of International Political Economy consists of several conceptual elements that include, ‘[…] state and civil society, hegemony, and the role of intellectuals (Van der Pijl 2009:233).’ Use of NGT will be useful to understand the shift of the structure or mode of production of the Mexican economy.

2.3.2 Hegemony

Hegemony as conceived through a neo-realist lens places importance on a single powerful state (The Hegemon) that has power over the other states due to its superior military and economy, and that a hegemon is necessary in order for international order to exist. The NGT perspective departs from this conception by expanding the realm of hegemony (Bieler and Morton 2003) where ‘Dominance by a powerful state may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of hegemony (Cox 1981:139).’ As articulated by Cox (1981:139):

An alternative approach might start by redefining what it is that is to be explained, namely, the relative stability of successive world orders. This can be done by equating stability with a concept of hegemony that is based on a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of universality (i.e. not just as the overt instruments of a particular state’s dominance).

Hegemony can then be seen as fitting between ‘material power, ideology and institutions’ (Cox 1981:141). Within a historical structure, hegemony is established through three scopes of activity: ‘social relations of production,’ ‘forms of state,’ and ‘world orders’ (Bieler and Morton 2003).

2.3.3 ‘Social relations of production’

As developed by Cox (1987), in order to analyze the mechanisms and operation of hegemony the ‘social relations of production’ must be examined (Bieler and Morton 2003). For Cox, production is understood in a wide sense

\(^4\) Gramsci was the leader of the Italian socialists who was imprisoned by Mussolini’s fascists in 1926 and died as a political prisoner in 1937. His prison notebooks were produced while in prison and was focused on ‘[…] why the [socialist] revolution that had succeeded in Russia, failed in Italy (and in other countries in Western Europe) in spite of its higher level of development and better organised working class (Van der Pijl 2009:233).’
that ‘covers the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to the production of physical goods (Cox 1989:39 in Bieler and Morton 2003).’ ‘These patterns are referred to as modes of social relations of production, which engender social forces as the most important collective actors (Bieler and Morton 2003).’ The base of the social process is revealed by the social relations of production where ‘[…] the patterns of work which together define which classes of people work for which others, by which means the exploiting classes obtain their share in the social surplus product (Van der Pijl 2009:252-53).’ When different ‘modes of social relations of production’ are examined, it becomes possible to contemplate on how evolving production relations can give rise to specific social forces whom become power bases inside and across states and also within a particular world order (Cox 1987 in Bieler and Morton 2003).

2.3.4 ‘Forms of state’

The ‘forms of state’ is the second scope of activity that establishes hegemony. The fundamental arrangements of social forces are what constitute state power. The state is then not taken as a ‘pre-constituted institutional category’ but rather emphasis is put on ‘the historical construction of various forms of state and the social context of political struggle (Bieler and Morton 2003).’ The features that distinguish these forms are the characteristics of their historic blocs (Cox 1987:105). An historical bloc denotes ‘the way in which leading social forces within a specific national context establish a relationship over contending social forces’ (Bieler and Morton 2003). It goes beyond being just a political alliance among social forces characterized by classes, and integrates a plethora of different class interests (Bieler and Morton 2003). Here Gramsci (1971:181-82) elaborates on the subject:

[…] it is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies become ‘party,’ come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society – bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a ‘universal’ plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups.

In this conception, the different ‘forms of state’ are viewed as the manifestation of certain historical blocs, where such a relationship is called the ‘state-civil society complex’. Gramsci (1971) then understands the state as not only the device of the government which operates in the ‘public’ domain, that is the government, military, and political parties, but also shared with the ‘private’ domain that includes education, the media, and church through which the functioning of hegemony occurs (Bieler and Morton 2003). It follows that the state can be understood as being a social relation, and through it hegemony and capitalism are expressed (Bieler and Morton 2003).
2.3.5 ‘World orders’

‘World orders’ represent phases of conflict and stability and allow for pondering about how different forms of world order may arise (Cox 1981 in Bieler and Morton 2003). The creation of an historical bloc is dependent on a hegemonic social class which has its roots in a nation (Cox 1983), and once hegemony has taken root nationally there is the possibility that it can expand outside of the nation and its social order onto the world scale by ‘the international expansion of a particular mode of social relations of production’ (Cox 1983, 1987 in Bieler and Morton 2003). The expansion of hegemony onto the world scale can be supported through ‘mechanisms of international organisation’ (Bieler and Morton 2003).

The three scopes of activity (‘social relations of production,’ ‘forms of state,’ and ‘world orders’) which constitute hegemony are interrelated, but not in a unilinear way, that is that they all can have an effect on each other as demonstrated in figure 2.1 (Cox 1981). Within the three scopes, there are three more elements which combine to create an historical structure: ideas, material capabilities, and institutions (Bieler and Morton 2003) which also interact within a structure with no one-way determinism as can be seen in figure 2.2 (Cox 1981:136).

**Figure 2.1 ‘The dialectical relations of forces’**

![Figure 2.1](source: Cox 1981 cited in Bieler and Morton 2004)
2.3.6 Ideas

Ideas for Cox (1981:136) consist of two kinds: ‘intersubjective meanings, or those shared notions of the nature of social relations which tend to perpetuate habits and expectations of behavior’ and ‘collective images of social order held by different groups of people.’ Both of these ideas present differing views on the legitimacy and nature of predominant power relations, and the connotations of public good and justice among other things, where ‘intersubjective meanings’ tend to be common throughout a specific historical structure and create the common arena of social discourse, whereas ‘collective images’ can be many and opposed (Cox 1981:136). Because ‘collective images’ can be numerous and in opposition:

The clash of rival collective images provides evidence of the potential for alternative paths of development and raises questions as to the possible material and institutional basis for the emergence of an alternative structure (Cox 1981:136).

2.3.7 Material capabilities

For Cox, (1981:136) material capabilities are destructive and productive potentials that exist in their dynamic form as organizational and technological capabilities and in accumulated forms are natural resources which can be transformed by stocks of equipment, technology, and ‘the wealth which can command these’.

2.3.8 Institutions

Per Cox, (1981:136) the means of perpetuating and stabilizing a particular order that occurs through institutionalization where institutions are a reflection of the power relations ‘prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations’. ‘Institutions are particular amalgams of ideas and material power which in turn
influence the development of ideas and material capabilities (Cox 1981:137).’ Cox further elaborates on institutionalization:

There is a close connection between institutionalization and what Gramsci called hegemony. Institutions provide ways of dealing with the internal conflicts so as to minimise the use of force. (They may, of course, also maximise the capacity for using force in external conflicts, but we are considering here only the internal conflicts covered by an institution.) There is an enforcement potential in the material power relations underlying any structure, in that the strong can clobber the weak if they think it necessary. But force will not have to be used in order to ensure the dominance of the strong to the extent that the weak accept the prevailing power relations as legitimate (1981:137).

2.3.9 New constitutionalism and disciplinary neo-liberalism

The most important further development of the neo-Gramscian perspective comes from the work of Stephen Gill on the concepts of ‘new constitutionalism and disciplinary neo-liberalism’ (Bieler and Morton 2003). Gill’s work regarding the role of the Trilateral Commission (1990) has contributed to the understanding of the process of US-centered hegemony (Bieler and Morton 2004). Like Cox, Gill argues that ‘global restructuring of production is located within a context of structural change in the 1970s’ (Bieler and Morton 2004). Gill contends that ‘an international historical bloc of social forces’ that was established after WWII transitioned to a ‘transnational historical bloc’ setting up the conditions for the ‘hegemony of transnational capital’ (Bieler and Morton 2004). As Bieler and Morton (2004:98) note, Gill departed from Gramsci in his assertion in which a historical bloc ‘[…] may at times have the potential to become hegemonic (Gill 1993:40),’ suggesting that the establishment of an historical bloc may occur without it becoming hegemonic and may give it supremacy, but not hegemony. It is from this supremacy of an historical bloc over opposition that is fragmented, where ‘the politics of supremacy is organised through two key processes: the new constitutionalism of disciplinary neoliberalism and the concomitant spread of market civilisation’ (Bieler and Morton 2004: 96-7).

For Gill, new constitutionalism deals with ‘the narrowing of the social basis of popular participation within the world order of disciplinary neo-liberalism (Bieler and Morton 2004:97).’ As defined by Gill (1992:165):

By this [new constitutionalism] I mean the move towards construction of legal or constitutional devices to remove or insulate substantially the new economic institutions from popular scrutiny or democratic accountability.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter started out by examining some of the main concepts of WSA and then moved onto those within NG. As surveyed, the WSA methodology that seeks to understand the world-economy through the long term or longue durée is useful because it moves away from a state focus and examines the underlying structure of the world-economy in which a state operates and is subjugated to. Several concepts were looked at which explain the relationships between states
and classes within the world-economy such as core and periphery relations, unequal exchange, and class forces, which use states in order to alter the world-economy to their advantage. The use of these concepts later on will be useful for illustrating the Mexico-US relationship within the world-economy.

In NGT, there was exploration of the concept of hegemony which differs from the realist view in that it is expanded beyond the realm of the state where hegemony is established through three activities: ‘social relations of production,’ ‘forms of state,’ and ‘world orders’ (Bieler and Morton 2003). Other important concepts include the historical structure which is created by ideas, material capabilities, and institutions, and an historical bloc which uses new constitutionalism to make sure new economic institutions are safe from democratic accountability and popular scrutiny.
Chapter 3
Mexico and Ciudad Juárez’ Position in the World-economy

3.1 Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to provide a general background to the current position of Mexico and Cd. Juárez in the World-economy. First to be touched upon is what Mexico’s development strategy was before and after its profound structural changes that took place in the 1980s. Then a look at what effects this had on Cd. Juárez and its place in the World-economy.

3.2 Mexico’s development

Mexico’s development from the 1940s until the latter part of the 1970s was characterized by strong intervention by the state in order to nurture industrialization through the use of import substitution, with the strategy in total, being quite successful. The country was changed from an agrarian society to a mainly urban and semi-industrial one with GDP growth averaging 3.1% per capita each year from 1940 to middle of the 1970s (Moreno-Brid et al. 2005).

The maquiladora program, started in 1966, has been a key element in the industrial strategy for many years (Moreno-Brid et al. 2005). Its inception was partly due to the termination of the braceros program which allowed temporary entry of Mexican farmworkers to the US. The braceros program itself alludes to the periphery core economic relationship that Mexico and the US have, with Mexico providing cheap labor to the US. Around 200,000 unemployed braceros scattered the northern border states and the maquila program served as a tool of combating this unemployment, as a policy instrument to contribute to the development of the region, and was designed to imitate the job creation that ‘Southeast Asian in-bond assembly plants’ had achieved and to build on the achievements of Tijuana’s ‘limited free port status (MacLachlan and Aguilar 1998).’ Several years earlier in 1964, the Programa Nacional Fronterizo or National Border Program (PRONAF) was launched in order to help develop the border region without the use of foreign investment and with the maquila program being used to compliment this effort (Weissman 2005).

Serious economic difficulties arose from the import substitution policies starting in the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s. The problems associated with the difficulties were lasting balance of payment problems and overvalued exchange rates, disproportionate dependence on imports of capital and intermediate goods, a limited ability to export manufactured goods, and domestic industries that were inefficiently producing high cost goods for a highly protected Mexican market. The discovery of large oil reserves in the mid-1970s and spike in international oil prices allowed Mexico to sustain large
amounts of borrowing which came to an end in the early 1980s with the drop in international oil prices. These events, coupled with the rise of technocrats within the Mexican state throughout the 1970s (Morton 2003) were the principal facilitators for the ‘market-oriented economic reform in Mexico’ where the Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado and Carlos Salinas de Gortari administrations from 1982 to 1988 and 1988 to 1994 respectively applied structural adjustment policies, the privatization of public enterprises and market reforms which included exchange-rate, industrial, and trade policy liberalization, deregulation of domestic financial and commercial activities, and foreign investment flows. The need for external financing helped to push forward the reform process by the GOM because commercial and multilateral bank creditors made parts of the funds available on conditions that reforms be made (Middlebrook and Zepeda 2003). Essentially, pressures from the world-economy and the advance of technocrats with links to transnational capital led to a preeminence of a neo-liberal accumulation strategy (Morton 2003). One reason for the ascendance of a transnational capitalist class in Mexico had to do with many elites choosing career paths within finance planning and banking which provided career experience that would likely translate into top positions within the government. Another reason was the action during the Echeverría presidency (1970-1976) right after the oil boom in 1975 to 76 to increase scholarships to attend foreign universities as part of a plan to integrate dissidents who were ‘[… ] radicalised by the massacre of students at Tlatelolco on 2 October 1968 (Morton 2003:639).’

It was during this period in the 1980s that the maquilas dramatically expanded (Weissman 2005), supported in a large part by US dollars (Weaver 2000). Part of the increase of the maquilas had a great deal to do with the transnational capitalist class shaping this strategy (Morton 2003). Restructuring of ejidos or communal land grants in the Mexican constitution in 1992 for the preparation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), allowed for the sale of these lands (Olson 2001, cited in Weissman 2005) and in essence displaced many Mexicans which led them to pursue employment along the borders which assured a reserve of workers for the maquilas, with thousands of migrants heading to Cd. Juárez (Weissman 2005). NAFTA is an example of new constitutionalism because it locked the Mexican state into the free trade agreement and previous macroeconomic reforms, and would heavily penalize any future government that would return to protectionism (Moreno-Brid et al. 2005). To give some perspective on the scope of change in the maquila industry, in 1975 there were a total of 454 maquilas and 67,214 workers employed in those maquilas, while in 1988 there

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5 Uquidi (2003) has argued that the problems facing the Mexican economy in the 1970s were serious enough that liberalization would have occurred earlier if the finding of petroleum reserves and a steep rise in the international oil prices had not taken place.

6 ‘The total number of state-owned firms, decentralized agencies, and investment trusts fell from 1,155 in 1982 to 232 in 1992 (Middlebrook and Zepeda 2003:8).’
were 1,279 maquilas and 329,413 workers (Sklair 1993), and by 2006 there were 2,783 maquilas and 1,170,962 workers.

3.3 Locating Ciudad Juárez

Cd. Juárez Mexico is located in the north central state of Chihuahua along the Mexico US border. Its geographic border with the US is the Rio Grande River (or the Rio Bravo as it is called in Mexico), with El Paso Texas located on the northern side of the river. The population as of February 2011 was 1,332,131 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI).

![Figure 3 Geographic Location of Ciudad Juárez](image)

Source: The Christian Science Monitor 2010

3.2.1 Economic make up of Ciudad Juárez

Cd. Juárez, Mexico has been described as “the laboratory of our future.” It serves as a prototype of a manufacturing export zone that was developed in conscientious adherence to development policies prescribed by powerful international economic and political institutions. In the course of four decades, Cd. Juárez has been remade in accordance with the directives of economic liberalization and free trade. Conditions in Cd. Juárez are unique only to the extent that the city has fully subscribed to the conventional wisdom dispensed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In varying

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7 Among these workers, 78% or 912,047 are assembly line workers (Comité Fronterizo de Obrer@s (CFO) http://www.cfomaquiladoras.org/numeralia.es.html)
degrees, however, the conditions are reproduced in border cities in northern Mexico and indeed through much of the developing world. That Cd. Juárez represents an experiment conducted so fully in accordance with the protocols of international lending agencies, necessarily calls attention to local consequences of the new global economy (Weissman 2005:1).

Cd. Juárez’ economic make up is explicitly connected to the political economic factors and its geographic location mentioned in Weissman’s quote as well as the interests of a transnational capitalist class. As explained earlier, the Mexican economy shifted its focus from import substitution industrialization to that of a ‘market-oriented’ economy or neo-liberal accumulation strategy. With these changes, and the creation of the border industrialization and maquiladora programs, Cd. Juárez’ size in terms of area and population grew considerably and its makeup of employment by sector changed drastically. Accordingly, many people migrated to the city, where in 2000, 60% of the population of Cd. Juárez consisted of migrants from other parts of Mexico (INEGI 2000). The shift in employment by sector can be seen quite clearly in figure 3.1 depicting these trends from 1960 to 2000. During this period the share of employment in the agricultural sector dropped to almost nothing in 2000 from around 15% in 1960, and the share of the industry percentage grew significantly from around 25% in 1960 to 50% in 2000 while the percentage of employment in trade and services dropped from around 55% in 1970 to 40% in 2000. These changes show the importance that the maquilas have in the local employment percentages of Cd. Juárez, while figure 3.2 supports this with even more recent data from 2008 depicting a more detailed breakdown of employment by sector. As displayed in figure 3.5, in 2008, 60% of employment accounted for “Manufacturing”, with the Regional Stakeholders Committee (2009) noting that a large portion of the persons employed in ‘Transportations and Communications’ and ‘Business Services’ supply the Manufacturing sector with support services.

Since the City depends heavily on the labor from the Manufacturing sector which is essentially Maquilas producing mainly for US corporations, Cd. Juárez is very vulnerable to economic crises. Such risk can be seen in figure 3.3 with the dramatic loss of Maquila employment after both economic crisis’ in 2000 and 2006 which originated in the US, while around the time of the 1994 economic crisis in Mexico, Maquila employment maintained its upward trend. The current crisis produced large amounts of unemployed in the city which coupled with the high levels of violence as discussed earlier produced a massive migration out of the city. In 2010, unemployment in Cd. Juárez was 10.8%, more than double the national average of 5.3% (INEGI 2010).
Figure 3.1 Distribution of percentage of employment by economic sector in Cd. Juárez (1960, 1970, 1990, 2000)

Legend: Blue=Agriculture, Red=Industry, Green=Trade and Services

Figure 3.2 Ciudad Juárez Employment by Sector (2008)

Source: INEGI, cited in Regional Stakeholders Committee, 2009, p.9
Figure 3.3 Employment in the Maquiladoras of Ciudad Juárez (1990-2011)

Employment in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico - Maquilas - from (1990 - 2011)

Source: INEGI

Figure 3.4 Percentage of Employment of Maquiladoras by Region (1990-2006)

Employment in Maquilas by total percentage of Mexico from (1990 - 2006)

Source: INEGI
3.2.3 Trade

Trade between Mexico and the US is substantial in relation to both states total trade. The US is by far Mexico’s largest trading partner with the US receiving 81% of all Mexican exports in 2009 and Mexico receiving 48% of its imports from the US. While in 2010 12% of the US’ total merchandise exports went to Mexico and of its total imports, 12% came from Mexico (Angeles Villareal 2011). In 2011, Mexico was the US’ third largest trading partner accounting for 12.5% or $460.7 billion of its total trade after China, accounting for 13.6%, and Canada, accounting for 16.2%. In terms of US exports in 2011, Mexico was second with 13.4% after Canada’s 19.1% (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). The share of Mexico in the US market has lost some steam after China passed Mexico in 2003 as one of the top suppliers of US imports (Angeles Villareal 2011), now accounting for 12% of US imports behind Canada with 14.3% and China with 18.1%. Mexico also lost its number two status as a trading partner to the US when China overtook them in 2006 (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). These numbers demonstrate the economic importance that Mexico and the US share in terms of trade. A significant portion of the Mexican GDP is accounted for by exports, which is 32% of GDP. With 81% of its exports headed for the US, a change in demand from the US for Mexican exports can and has had strong economic consequences for the industrial sector in Mexico (Angeles Villareal 2011), as demonstrated in figure 3.3 by the amounts of maquila job losses that occurred due to the recent economic crisis in 2008 and also the crisis that took place in 2000. In the Cd. Juárez and El Paso corridor ‘approximately $17.954 billion in merchandise trade’ in 1994 passed through the region, with $38.449 billion passing through in 2002 (Fullerton et al. 2003), with data for 2006 and 2007 showing that the Cd. Juárez and El Paso area accounted for transporting close to $51 billion or 16% of all Mexico-US trade through their ports of entry (Regional Stakeholders Committee 2009).

This trade relationship as demonstrated by the trade statistics is very important. What is certain is that Mexico is far more dependent on the US as a trade partner than the US is with Mexico although they are both well connected to each other through the world-economy.

3.4 Conclusion

As demonstrated in this chapter, there was a drastic change in the development path of Mexico which helped to further push Cd. Juárez into a peripheral position in the world-economy as demonstrated by the majority of its residents primarily working in the export manufacturing sector. The changes in its development path were due to both internal and external factors. The internal factors included problems with the ISI strategy and the rise of the technocrats within the government which initiated market reforms and structural adjustment policies, while the external factors helped to put more pressure on reforms, such as multilateral bank creditors. The rise of maquiladoras were explored both before and after such reforms took place, with data emphasizing

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8 These statistics from 2011 represent trade until November.
that such reforms helped the industry to grow rapidly, especially in Cd. Juárez where its economic structure changed from that of a more service oriented economy to a primarily export manufacturing economy serving the US as a periphery. The structure of Cd. Juárez economy was shown to be highly dependent and vulnerable to the world-economy, especially the US through maquila data on employment where there were large fluctuations in the employment during the past economic crisis’ around 2000 and 2007 and export figures to the US. Lastly, the interconnectedness of the Mexican and US economies as trading partners was demonstrated through the high percentage of trade conducted between the two.
Chapter 4
Changes in the Political Economy, Drug Trafficking, and Violence

4.1 Introduction

Drug trafficking and production have long been activities in Mexico. Such activities came about due to Mexico’s relationship with the US. Although the trafficking and production of drugs\(^9\) has existed for many years and different attempts have been made to combat them, to date, Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s strategy has been the most aggressive and costly, both monetarily and in human life. The Mérida Initiative, the largest bilateral effort between Mexico and the US to combat drug trafficking also came into being not long after the start of Calderon’s presidency. This section will delve into the political economy of why drug trafficking became a larger issue in the Mexico-US security context even though the US has long pressured Mexico on drug related issues. Cd. Juárez will be further examined, as it has been and is currently the Mexican city most affected by violence.

4.1.1 Drug Trafficking

[...] the Mexico-US economic relationship was founded on smuggling\(^{10}\) (Andreas 2011).

The origins of drug trafficking in Mexico dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century when US and worldwide laws started to outlaw the consumption of alcohol, and the consumption, distribution, and production of psychoactive drugs\(^{11}\) (Astorga and Shirk 2010). During this period, the principle trafficking consisted of homegrown opiates and marijuana by Mexican smugglers (family based at that time) (Freeman and Sierra 2005) with the regions in Mexico that first produced opiates and marijuana remain key areas of production. These areas include the “Golden Triangle” region of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua, in the northwest of the country and the

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\(^9\) At times in the Mexico-US relationship certain ‘drugs’ have been legal on the Mexican side of the border and illegal on the US side.

\(^{10}\) After Mexico’s independence from Spain in 1821 much of its cross-border trade was contraband due to the US’ low enforcement capability and high tariffs. Interestingly the first wave of illegal immigration took place during the 1830s, and consisted of US settlers and their slaves moving into Mexican territory. The first flows of migrants smuggled across the border were Chinese after the US passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Andreas 2011).

\(^{11}\) “The term “psychoactive drug” is used to describe any chemical substance that affects mood, perception or consciousness as a result of changes in the functioning of the nervous system (brain and spinal cord) (http://www.nt.gov.au/health/healthdev/health_promotion/bushbook/volume2/ch ap1/sect1.htm).”
southwestern coastal states of Guerrero and Michoacán (Astorga and Shirk 2010). The prohibition of opium and marijuana occurred during the 1920s in Mexico as the perceptions of the political and social elites mimicked those reproduced and created by the elites in both Europe and the US. This took place even though drug abuse and use in Mexico was not as prevalent an occurrence and the amount of people involved was much lower than that of the US. Given the small Mexican market for illegal drugs relative to the US, Mexican drug trafficker’s primary business focus was the US. From the beginning of the Mexican drug business, the most well-known drug traffickers were connected to high level politicians who were suspected of playing a role in the illegal trade and also controlling it (Astorga 1999).

After the Mexican revolution in 1929 the National Revolutionary Party was created, and would later be renamed the Partido Revolucionario Institucional or Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (O’neil 2009). The PRI was in power for seven decades until it lost the presidency to the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) in 2000. During the PRI’s party rule, the Mexican power structure was tremendously hierarchical and centralized, which contained significant implications for the effects and locus of official corruption. ‘With a complete lock on control of the Mexican state, the PRI held a strong monopoly on legitimate use of force, territorial control, and the power to grant impunity to organized crime (Astorga and Shirk 2010:8).’ An informal system was overseen whereby the relevant actors from the police, military, national and local political officials, and traffickers took a piece of the drug trafficking pie (Mercille 2011). This was all going on despite Mexico having signed all international agreements related to the ‘global anti-drug regime’ (Chabat 2010:2). During most of the PRI period, the policy of tolerance by the government was an efficient way of keeping drug related violence low where business occurred in a stable and predictable manner (Chabat 2010, Mercille 2011).

4.1.2 What happened to the relative peace?

Several factors are generally cited as playing a role in the changes of the Mexican Drug Trafficking organizations. The first has to do with the change in the drug business, mainly the increase of U.S. demand for drugs, in particular cocaine, starting in the 1970s (Astorga and Shirk 2010, O’neil 2009, Shirk 2011). Another factor contributing to the change in the business was that of drug flows. The Caribbean route of Andean-produced cocaine headed for the US shifted its path to go through Mexico because of increased US efforts in combating the Colombian DTOS during the 1980s and 1990s (Andreas 1998, O’neil 2009), have only produced a ‘balloon effect,’ and redirected drug flows (Astorga and Shirk 2010). These conditions allowed the Mexican DTOS to increase their power and control over smuggling routes to the US increasing the share of cocaine headed to the US through Mexico with 50 percent passing through in 1991 and 90 percent passing through in 2004, thus the Mexican DTOS like other industries in Mexico learned to capitalize on the comparative advantage they had in having a border with the largest consumer of illegal drugs on the planet (O’neil 2009). Around the same time this shift was occurring, both ‘[…] the Bush and Clinton administrations
conveniently downplayed the profound consequences of this geographic shift for Mexico in order to assure the smooth negotiation and passage of NAFTA (Andreas 1998:161).

Another factor deals with the changes in the administration and scope of drug enforcement within Mexico. The US for a long time has pressured Mexico to do more to fight drugs (Morris 2010). The murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena in 1985 provoked the Reagan Administration to ‘establish the so-called anti-drugs certification process’ in which the DoS would evaluate the efforts of producer and transit countries of illegal narcotics (Chabat 2010). The Dirección Federal de Seguridad or Federal Security Directorate (DFS) who oversaw matters of domestic security was disbanded in 1987 amid pressure from the US as it was seen to be complicit in the murder of Camarena. The function of the DFS during the 1980s was said to have further ensured the protection of Mexican DTOS activities (Astorga and Shirk 2010). Around the same time the GOM took different actions in order to fulfill the US requirements for its certification process and receive approval of its anti-drug program and tripled its federal anti-drug budget from 1987 to 1989 and then again tripled it in the 1990s amid deep cuts in the governments overall spending and in the middle of structural adjustment programs and neo-liberal restructuring (Andreas 1998) which is coherent with the states turn to the political right. The shake up and termination of the DFS helped to disturb the system of protection and coordination amongst DTOS. Coupled with the break down in the system of protection for DTOS Andreas (1998) argued that with the increase of enforcement came an increase in corruption as drug traffickers needed to secure trafficking routes for their products12. The political opening of Mexico occurred during the 1990s when the PRI lost some of its power through opposition victories at the state and local levels. As with the effects of enforcement, Rios and Shirk (2011) contend that the political changes disrupted the previously established agreements between drug traffickers and the government because new political actors either renegotiated or rejected such agreements.

Over the long term, in this context of political diversity and uncertainty – among other factors – the state no longer served as an effective broker and criminal organizations began to splinter and battle each other for turf (Rios and Shirk 2011:16).

The political opening can be attributed as an effect of the neo-liberal reforms that transformed the Mexican economy starting in the early 1980s as the state took on a different role. During the time of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model, from the 1940s to the 1970s the Mexican state was very strong as it interfered in the main economic activities and sectors. With the economic reforms the Mexican system of state corporatism had been damaged by a lack of resources to maintain such relations and harmed the political cooperation between the working class, business circles, and the state

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12 Andreas (1998) makes sense of the act of corruption by seeing it as paying a tax, where the increased enforcement capacity has incremented its ability ‘to tax the trade in the form of corruption.'
(Hogenboom 1998). However, the state remained strong in other aspects, as demonstrated by the passing of structural adjustment programs and NAFTA.

4.1.3 Violence

The start of more escalated violence in Cd. Juárez has its roots in the early 1990’s, with the principle victims being murdered women (whose killers are unknown), famously known as feminicidios (femicides). From 1994 to 2009 more than 500 women have been murdered (Sweet and Escalante 2010). Another figure, from the report of Amnesty International, states that as of February 2005 over 800 bodies have been found and more than 3,000 women remain missing (Sarria 2009). It has been brought to the attention by some that in only a third to a fourth of all the murders of women in Cd. Juárez that the killer is unknown, and that the remaining 2/3rds to 3/4ths of the murders are related to domestic violence13 (Staudt 2008, Driver 2011). The main cause is cited as having a direct relation to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which officially came into force January 1st 1994 (Weissman 2005, Staudt 2008, Hill 2010, Pantaleo 2010). Wiessman (2005) links the augmentation in violence to NAFTA because it increased cross-border commerce which brought more criminal activity related to drug trafficking due to ease of using NAFTA commerce to smuggle drugs. Also stated is that the opening of the Mexican economy prior to NAFTA was essential in damaging social protections for vulnerable populations, especially women, and that NAFTA had exacerbated the situation in Cd. Juárez by bringing in an increasing migrant population to work in the maquilas (Weissman 2005). ‘The stress and disorder of the market have been reproduced as stress and disorder in households manifested itself in increased rates of divorce, separation, household volatility and gender violence (Weismann 2005:54-5).’

Currently, the most frequent violence is related to the ongoing war against organized crime. Starting in 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderon deployed tens of thousands of troops to combat organized crime (Shirk 2011). Cd. Juárez has by far seen the most violence, and murders out of any region or city in Mexico (Valencia and Chacon 2011), and has been cited (Borunda 2010) as being the most dangerous city on the planet. The fight for the Cd. Juárez Plaza or drug trafficking route between the Sinaloa and Juárez organizations has been by far the most violent conflict between DTOS in terms of killings as shown in table 4. From December 2006 to December 2010, as reported by the Calderon administration, around 35,000 homicides that are presumed to be related to organized crime have occurred in Mexico (HRW 2011). Of these homicides during the same period, 6,437 have been reported in Cd. Juárez alone (Presidencia de la Republica 2011). The latest statistics now state that a

13 Staudt (2008) argues that because most of the attention on the murder victims who were mutilated and raped, and whose killer is unknown, which account for 1/3rd of total causes people to miss seeing the other 2/3rds of the victims, whose killers are known (Staudt 2008:2). Bowden in an interview with Alice Driver (2011) says that he prefers the term ‘homicide’ because they know in most cases who the killer is.
total of 47,515 people have been killed in violence related to the drug war from 2006 till September of 2011 (BBC 2012), and that there has been a decrease in homicides in Cd. Juárez in 2011. Drug trafficking expert Bruce Bagley suggests that the decrease in violence in Cd. Juárez in 2011 was due to a deal made between the competing Juárez and Sinaloa organizations (Johnson 2011). In a report by Stratfor Global Intelligence (2012), it is stated that violence is likely to continue to drop in Cd. Juárez as the Sinaloa organization gains more control of the city. Interestingly it has been reported that violent murders in Tijuana dropped after peaks in 2008 and 2009 after a deal between the Sinaloa and Tijuana organizations, and an approach from authorities that included not interfering with the organizations operations which was common practice prior to the start of the drug war with Felipe Calderon (LAHT 2011). In the 2011 Human Rights Watch Report, ‘Neither Rights Nor Security Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico’s “War on Drugs”,’ the data compiled by the Mexican Government is regarded as ‘[…] a grossly inadequate basis for assessing the causes of casualties in the “war on drugs.”'(164).’ They say this because as outlined in the methodology of the Government’s study, that the data does not include killings by public officials as executions (which the report has a full section dedicated to evidence of extrajudicial killings performed by Soldiers and Police).

Using a variety of different sources as can be seen in figures 4.1 and 4.2, there is an overall trend of rising homicides in all of Mexico starting around 2006.

The violence contributed to a mass migration of people and many businesses. During the period of 2007 to 2009 some 230,000 people migrated out of Cd. Juárez, with 54% having migrated to the US, mainly to El Paso and the rest returning to their places of origin within Mexico, primarily to the states of Veracruz, Coahuila, and Durango (Observatorio 2010). Such a massive migration has left up to 116,000 homes uninhabited in Cd. Juárez (IDMC 2010).

Figure 4.1 ‘Long Term Trends in Homicide’ (1990-2010)

14 When I last visited the Cd. Juárez/El Paso area in 2010 (These cities are divided by the Rio Grande River which serves as the border) I was told that many businesses in Cd. Juárez had relocated to El Paso, Texas and actually dined at a restaurant that had relocated to El Paso which is one of the safest US cities.
Source: Reforma, SNSP, and INEGI cited in Rios and Shirk, 2011, p.5

Figure 4.2 ‘Drug-related Killings in Mexico’ (2001-2010)

Source: CNDH, Reforma, and SNSP, cited in Rios and Shirk, 2011, p.5

Table 4 ‘Organized Crime Killings Resulting From Specific Conflicts among Drug Trafficking Organizations’ (2006-2010)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups in conflict</th>
<th>Killings</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sinaloa vs. Juárez</td>
<td>8,236</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinaloa vs. Beltran Leyva</td>
<td>5,864</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinaloa vs. Gulf-Zetas</td>
<td>3,199</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinaloa vs. Tijuana</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Familia vs. Zetas</td>
<td>1,744</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf vs Zetas</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12,442</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Organized Crime Killings</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,611</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 4.3 Deaths due to alleged criminal rivalry in the municipality of Juárez (2006-2010)
4.2 Conclusion

This chapter first outlined the history of drug trafficking in Mexico and the effect the political situation of having one ruling party had on the relationship between the government and DTOS. Such an arrangement ensured low violence and a predictable method of business and flow of narcotics to the US for many years. The next issue explored how a change in the political economy of Mexico due to neo-liberal reforms changed the previous agreements between the government and DTOS and the shift in the cocaine market around the same time led to an increase in violence.

A focus was then placed on the statistics of violence in Mexico and Cd. Juárez and some of the linkages to why violence increased, such as NAFTA and the GOM’s military strategy to combat the cartels. The beginning of increased homicides in Cd. Juárez starting with the ‘femicides’ was looked at and then organized crime related homicides in Cd. Juárez in order to give some perspective on the city’s violence. Finally, the effects that such violence had on outward migration were briefly touched upon.
Chapter 5
Understanding Mexico-US Anti-drug Collaboration

After decades of immense social destruction, the highest incarceration rate in the entire world, and the failure to make any progress against drugs, the unrelenting official position of the U.S. government must express something other than rational policy (Neilson and Bamyeh 2009:7).

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will start by giving a brief section on the background of Mexico-US anti-drug collaboration and why this collaboration has steadily increased. The next section lays out the beginning of the Mérida Initiative and its original conception. The following section shows what the updated and current Initiative is, and the last section takes a look at some of the views surrounding the Initiative, the ‘war on drugs’, and what is missing from these views.

5.2 Beginning of Mexico-US Anti-drug Collaboration

Anti-drug collaboration between Mexico and the US started in the 1970s with the goal of eradicating opium poppy and marijuana fields through the US providing training and equipment. This collaboration came after great pressure from the US, where in particular, the use of Operation Intercept in 1969 by then Republican President Richard Nixon was used as a tool to coerce Mexico into taking a strong stance on the production and trafficking of narcotics (Doyle 2003). Operation Intercept15 was a program that produced the inspection of every single vehicle and person crossing the border from Mexico to the US, whose stated goal was to intercept illegal narcotics. Although its main goal was not to intercept the flow of drugs. G. Gordon Liddy, then senior advisor in the Department of Treasury, who was later convicted for the Water-gate scandal stated, ‘For diplomatic reasons the true purpose of the exercise was never revealed. Operation Intercept, with its massive economic and social disruption, could be sustained far longer by the United States than by Mexico. It was an exercise in international extortion, pure, simple, and effective, designed to bend Mexico to our will (in Doyle 2003).’ There was a dramatic decline in collaboration after the 1985 assassination of Enrique Camarena, an agent of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), who was working in Guadalajara Mexico at the time. Coupled with the

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15 Doyle (2003) also notes that Operation Intercept marked the beginning of the global war on drugs.
assassination and a deep mistrust from the US towards Mexican officials for their inclination to accommodate drug leaders, was Mexico’s lack of enthusiasm to consent to US assistance owing to concerns of sovereignty and opposition of US drug certification procedures (Seelke and Finklea 2011).

Not surprisingly, relations between Mexico and the US improved after the structural changes that took place in both Mexico and the US during the 80s and the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the neo-liberal regionalist project (Icaza Garza 2008) between Mexico, the US, and Canada. As previously mentioned, Mexico’s development strategy significantly shifted during this period from ISI to a market led economy spurring both economic and political changes. The US at the same time went through drastic changes as well with the shift to the right with Ronald Reagan taking office in 1981. Improvement of US-Mexican relations was marked by several developments including the signing of the Binational Drug Strategy in 1998. From 2000-2006, US aid to Mexico for programs intended to combat the trafficking and production of methamphetamine, opium poppy, and marijuana, and also to intercept cocaine totaled $397 million (Seelke and Finklea 2011). A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report from 2007 that detailed the accomplishments of US aid to Mexico from 2000 to 2006 detailed that the capacity of Mexican law enforcement to intercept illegal drugs had improved,16 but that the strategy had failed in halting the production and flow of illegal drugs headed for the US. For example, it was estimated in 2000 that around two thirds of South American cocaine destined for the US passed through Mexico, and that in 2006 it had increased to 90 percent while the amount of both heroin and marijuana produced had increased during the same period (GAO 2007:2).

5.3 Creation of the Mérida Initiative

On December 1st 2006 Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa undertook office as President of Mexico. From the very beginning of his presidency he demonstrated an interest in collaborating with the US on fighting mutual threats and expressed his specific desire to work in cooperation with the US on fighting organized crime and drug trafficking during a visit to Washington in November of 2006. In a report to the US senate Committee on Foreign Relations discussing funding for the Mérida Initiative, President Calderon’s reaching out to the US was seen as an excellent opportunity to build sustained cooperation with Mexico and:

To pass on this opportunity would represent a significant blunder that would have a negative impact on the bilateral relationship, as well as broader U.S. interests in the region. (USCFR 2007:2).

Also reported was the fact that the Bush administration did not have much time left in office and wanted to proceed as quickly as possible in doing more

16 However, it was also noted that corruption within the Mexican government presents a major challenge in its efforts to fight drug trafficking and organized crime (GAO 2007).
in Latin America, which President Bush sees as his legacy, as described by one state department official. In March of 2007, a ‘Bilateral Presidential Summit’ took place in Mérida, Mexico, and it was here that both presidents agreed to move ahead with creating a specific plan for improved cooperation between both nations. An initial proposal by the Mexican Government (GOM) was developed during interagency meetings that took place between April and May of 2007. Mexican and US foreign ministers began bilateral discussions related to the foundation of the Mexican proposal in Washington on May 22nd 2007 (USCFR 2007:4). Several other meetings took place until the formal announcement of the Mérida Initiative and its presentation to the US Congress on October 22nd. During this period several democratic congressman, including at that time, the chairman of the house committee on foreign affairs, Tom Lantos, criticized President Bush for his lack of coordination with congress during the negotiations (GOM 2008). Because of its limited time left, the Bush administration request for an emergency supplemental budget for this project came as no surprise, instead of pursuing it ‘[…] through the regular budget appropriations cycle’ (USCFR 2007:4).”

17 (include note on what the regular cycle is)
### Table 5 Events leading up to the Mérida Initiative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First presidential meeting</td>
<td>Nov, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Presidential Summit</td>
<td>March, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive call from President Bush</td>
<td>13th July, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merida Initiative</td>
<td>22nd Oct, 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**President Felipe Calderon conveys interest in bolstering regional and bilateral cooperation to fight organized crime and drug trafficking**

**Decision made in Merida to develop a specific plan for improved Mexico-US cooperation**

**GOM and US foreign ministers meet in Washington to discuss the Mexican proposal**

**Technical meetings held in Mexico city**

**Certain members of the Mexican Congress and the Calderon administration hold "select consultations"**

*Source: USCFR, 2007*
5.3.1 Initial Mérida Agreement

The initial agreement was a US aid package for both Central America and Mexico that would start in FY2008 and continue until the end of FY2010. As initially conceived, the Mérida Initiative was intended to:

1. Break the power and impunity of criminal organizations
2. Strengthen border, air, and maritime controls
3. Improve the capacity of justice systems in the region
4. Curtail gang activity and diminish local drug demand (Seelke and Finklea 2011:8)

According to the GAO (2010), the US Congress appropriated around $1.6 billion to fund the Mérida Initiative from FY2008 through FY2010 through various appropriations within public laws. Before the funds can be spent, they first have to be obligated, which takes place through three different United States Department of State (DoS) bureaus that manage different funding accounts. The DoS Bureau for International Narcotics Affairs and Law Enforcement (INL) is responsible for the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, of which the INL cannot start to implement programs until a letter of agreement (LOA) that specifies the programs to be implemented is signed by the beneficiary country and the US. The DoS Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) is responsible for the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is accountable for the implementation of the ESF. Last, the DoS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), which is the DoS’ main link to the Department of Defense (DOD), is responsible for the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account, where the funds depend on the allotment to the DOD. Of these funds appropriated, 84% or $1.322 billion were allocated to Mexico, with the remaining going to Central America. From the $1.322 billion, $669.7 million was obligated, and $121.2 million was expended as of March 31st 2010 (GAO 2010). Therefore, the expended amount was about 11% of the funds that were allocated.

As mentioned in the 2010 GAO report, it is not very reliable to determine the status of how a program has been delivered based on looking at expenditure because it does not mean that a program has or has not been implemented. Funds may be used throughout the duration of a project or completely paid out when the final delivery has been made. Some projects may have been paid for but not yet delivered on. All of this makes it difficult to determine what has actually happened.

5.4 ‘Beyond Mérida’

In 2010, the Mexican and US governments ‘[…] began to revise the strategic framework underpinning U.S.-Mexican security cooperation […]’ (Seelke and Finklea 2011:19), which was partly in response to criticisms about not enough promotion of institutional reforms inside Mexico and focusing primarily on counterdrug efforts waged by Mexican security forces. These meetings also
took place in preparation for FY2011 budget. The result of these consultations was an agreement on a new approach, called ‘Beyond Mérida.’ The new approach, which was announced on March 23rd 2010, ‘[…] broadens the scope of bilateral security efforts and focuses more on institution-building than on technology transfers (Seelke and Finklea 2011:19).’ The DoS has stated that assistance for the new approach is intended to go beyond 2012, the year President Calderon will leave office. Despite a few strains in recent Mexican-US relations18, both governments at the moment are still committed to the Mérida Initiative. In early 2011 it came to the public attention that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) was running a gun tracking program in which they sold guns which would then make their way into Mexico in an effort to track them to DTOs. However, the program backfired because many of the guns were lost track of and that in December 2010 a US border patrol agent was killed and weapons that had been sold in this program were found at the crime scene (Murphy 2011). In 2010 with the creation of the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), Central America no longer falls under the Mérida Initiative (GAO 2010).

The new ‘Pillars,’ or goals of ‘Beyond Mérida’ are:

1) Disrupting the Operational Capacity of Organized Crime
2) Institutionalizing the Rule of Law in Mexico
3) Creating a ‘21st Century Border’
4) Building Strong and Resilient Communities (Seelke and Finklea 2011)

5.4.1 The first pillar, ‘Disrupting the operational capacity of organized crime’

Most of the GOM’s effort has been focused on disrupting the power of organized crime. It has probed and indicted public officials alleged of complicity, carried out joint military and police operations to apprehend cartel leaders, and started going after Cartels illicit assets. To support such efforts during the Mérida Initiatives first phase, a considerable proportion of the US budget was appropriated and obligated to provide equipment, which included helicopters and aircraft valued at $590.5 million. From the viewpoint of the GOM, DTO’s have been increasingly conceptualized as ‘for-profit corporations (Seelke and Finklea 2011:20).’ Because of this conceptualization, the approach to combat DTO’s is now being more targeted on disrupting the finances of these organizations. Coupled with disrupting finances, increased cooperation through cross border law enforcement maneuvers, investigations, and intelligence sharing has been suggested to help further disrupt organized

18 Other events that strained relations were the resignation of the U.S. Ambassador Carlos Pascual due to comments revealed in wikileaks criticizing the Mexican government, and the shooting of two US ice agents in Mexico, in which one was killed.
crime. Since September 2009, the Mexican Federal Police under the Secretaría de Seguridad Pública or Secretariat for Public Security (SSP), and the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have been carrying out parallel patrols alongside the Sonora and Arizona border.

5.4.2 The second pillar, ‘Institutionalizing the rule of law in Mexico’

Addressing weak judicial and law enforcement institutions within Mexico is what many security experts suggest the GOM needs to focus on more. Reform of the federal police has been underway for some time and questions remain about how and when the Mexican military will shift anti-drug efforts to the federal police. As indicated by President Calderon, the Mexican military will continue to assume public security operations throughout the end of his presidency in 2012. Another key challenge deals with the expansion of current efforts in relation to police reform, and implement this at the municipal and state level. Currently, Mérida funding is being used to expand prison reform and police training efforts to municipalities and states, starting with the state of Chihuahua and Cd. Juárez (Seelke and Finklea 2011).

Judicial reforms were passed during the summer of 2008, with experts saying that it is essential that these be implemented and to prioritize combating corruption at all government levels, as impunity rates in Mexico at the moment are around 98%. Judicial training programs may also need to be considerably expanded in order to shift the current Mexican criminal justice system to that of an accusatorial system containing oral trials by 2016. Federal and states prisons may warrant more attention as well due to a surge in inmates due to the increased use of pre-trial confinement and drug-related arrests.

Police Reform

Corruption within the Mexican police has produced hurdles in combating DTOS. An elite police unit, Subprocuraduría de Investigación Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada or Assistant Attorney General's Office for Special Investigations on Organized Crime (SIEDO) was severely tainted by the arrest or firing of at least 35 officials for leaking information to the same traffickers whom they were conducting investigations on (Wilkinson 2008 in Seelke and Finklea 2011). The Federal Agency of Investigations (AFI) created in 2001 under the Attorney General’s Office (PGR) was disbanded in June 2009 amid corruption. The Municipal, state, and federal police forces have also been plagued by corruption19. Steps have been taken by President Calderon to reform municipal, state, and federal police forces, namely by stepped up implementation of a registry for national police, the creation of a national database where police sharing of intelligence and information can take place,

19 I have been the victim of corruption by public officials in Cd. Juárez, namely Mexican customs, and have also seen practices by police forces in Cd. Juárez in extracting a bribe from a friend of mine and many others.
and at the federal level increasing police training. The DoS said in a 2010 report that up to $8.8 million in funding would go to improving the registry for the national police. Two laws passed in 2009 created a Federal Ministerial Police (PFM) within the PGR to replace the AFI and a Federal Police (FP) within the SSP. Mérida support has helped initiatives to train, equip, and recruit for the FP, while the PFM has lagged in its progress even though it also has recently been supported by Mérida assistance. More Mérida support to improve the FP will provide for courses for specialized training related to investigations, anti-money laundering, intelligence analysis and collection, and for the erection of regional control and command centers. The Calderón administration in October 2010 turned in a proposal that would reform article 115 of the Constitution and allow all municipal police forces to be absorbed by police agencies at the state-level which would then synchronize efforts through the SSP. Said proposal has been met with substantial resistance in the Mexican Congress. Currently the National Public Security System (SNSP) is responsible for supervising local and state police reform. It reports that only 9.2% of the Mexican police force has met the professional standards that were outlined in 2009 public security law that was passed in January, and that merely a third of Mexican states remained on track to confirm the law’s standards would be met by their police forces by January of 2013. Assistance for municipal and state police forces could be affected by the outcome of the constitutional reform. Currently the state of Chihuahua is receiving such assistance. Both governments are growing training programs established for the training institute of the SSP at San Luis Potosí to help the national police academy now under erection in Puebla, with the help of Mérida assistance amounting to around $4 million. Training of the local and state police forces would likely emphasize on street crime and be adapted to community policing (Seelke and Finklea 2011).

**Judicial and Penal Reform**

After approval from Mexico’s states and Congress to amend the Mexican Constitution, a judicial reform declaration was signed by President Calderón in June of 2008. In the reform, as previously mentioned, close door trial procedures would have to be shifted to a public one with oral arguments (Seelke and Finklea 2011). In accordance with this reform President Calderón presented the Federal Penal Procedure Code before the Mexican Congress in September 2011. The code will be based on an accusatorial system where oral trials will take place and the accused will be presented as innocent until proven guilty (Justice in Mexico Project 2011). Major challenges have arisen in relation to such reform, including building new courtrooms, advancing forensic technology, bringing up to date law school curriculum, revising state and federal criminal process codes, and updating existing legal professionals. Since 2004 USAID has supported five Mexican states in a number of efforts related to judicial reform and is currently working in seven states with around $19 million appropriated through the ESF, with $11.5 million more appropriated through FY2010 supplemental funds to expand reforms (DoS 2 in Seelke and Finklea 2011). The Department of Justice is overseeing a minimum of 19$ in funding of the DoS and USAID, covering areas that include:

(1) prosecutorial capacity building
(2) strengthening the internal control systems of the SSP and the PGR
(3) extradition training
(4) asset forfeiture
(5) forensics
(6) witness protection (DOJ 2010)

5.4.3 The Third Pillar, ‘Creating a “21st Century Border”’

The 21st century border is centered on:

1. enhancing public safety via increased information sharing, screenings, and prosecutions
2. securing the cross-border flow of goods and people
3. expediting legitimate commerce and travel through investments in personnel, technology, and infrastructure
4. engaging border communities in cross-border trade
5. setting bilateral policies for collaborative border management (DoS 2
in Seelke and Finklea 2011)

Both the GOM and the US released a joint declaration on May 19th 2010 in regards to 21st century border management and expressing their commitment to bolster collaboration in the many issues regarding the border (The White House 2010). A ‘Twenty-First Century Border Bilateral Executive Steering Committee’ (ESC) was established to direct this plan. The ESC met on December 15th 2010 and agreed on a plan for bi-national action. The concentration of the plan is on the improvement of sharing information between law enforcement agencies, creating cargo pre-clearance pilot projects, collaborating on development of infrastructure, and increasing programs for trusted shipments and travelers (Seelke and Finklea 2011). In the ESC’s most recent meeting on December 15th 2011 several steps to be taken regarding Cd. Juárez were mentioned, one dealing with infrastructure planning, another with the construction of a bridge with El Paso, and the last about identifying the causes of waiting times at the border and providing solutions to those problems (ESC 2011). Part of this bi-national effort helped produce three new border ports of entry in 2010 (Seelke and Finklea 2011).

A considerable amount of money not related to the Mérida Initiative has been spent on border security by both Mexico and the US. Both countries approaches to this security have been quite different. As mentioned in the

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20 In my experience of crossing the US-Mexico border by both foot and car there is never a problem going into Mexico, that is to say nobody will stop and ask you where you are from, what you are going to do there, where you are going, and what you are taking with you as opposed to crossing into the US. This goes for the entire border region. For example you can be within the city of Cd. Juárez until you reach the outskirts of the city in which you will need a travel visa if you are not a Mexican
2011 CRS report, the US border strategy is not distinguishing between deterring illegal activities related to drug trafficking and other illegal activities occurring at the border, i.e. illegal immigration.

It is still not clear how both sides will divide the tasks of inspection while having little burden on the legal flow of goods and stopping the illegal flow of goods and avoiding the doubling of efforts. Southbound inspections of cargo, vehicles, goods, and people are on path to increase, given the evidence of US weapons and drug proceeds being trafficked into Mexico. At the moment all rail shipments headed for Mexico are screened for illegal goods by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), while the CBP with help of ‘automated license plate readers’ (LPRs), scans the license plates of vehicles crossing the border.

In the past, Mexican Customs has not carried out neither southbound nor inbound inspections. The CBP is now helping Mexican Customs to establish a training academy to assist in its new role of inbound inspections and to develop a program for investigator training (Seelke and Finklea 2011). Mérida funding so far has provided over $80.8 million for non-intrusive inspection equipment (NIIE), with over $60 million delivered in 2011. NIIE helps authorities to unobtrusively inspect and scan freight trains, cargo containers, and passenger vehicles, for a number of illicit goods (U.S. Embassy Mexico 2011).

Of deep concern regarding the third pillar is that of corruption on both sides of the border. The testimonies of three US government officials, one from the FBI within the DOJ, and two from DHS attested to this during a March 2010 hearing before a committee and subcommittee in the US Senate by citing a number of instances of corruption and investigations that have occurred involving a number of agencies. In FY 2009, there were a total of 839 investigations of DHS employees of which the vast majority dealt with CBP employees at 576 (Frost 2010). In response to such corruption, a National Border Corruption Task Force was established at FBI headquarters (Perkins 2010). It remains unknown whether the US congress will provide Mérida or separate funding to address the issue of corruption along the border.

5.4.4 The Fourth Pillar, ‘Building Strong and Resilient Communities’

This pillar represents a new focus of the Mérida Initiative. Its goal is to construct ‘strong and resilient communities’ in Mexico which are able to endure the burdens of violence and crime. This includes programs already underway, such as the school based ‘culture of lawfulness’ courses in addition

resident. On the other side of the border, the US side, you have to have the proper visa or be an American to get in. Many Mexicans have a special travel visa only for areas just within the US border that allow them to cross up to 30 days to shop and do business (McKinley 2010). Going even further into the US interior there are more border patrol stations similar to what you would find along the border.
to recent ‘culture of lawfulness’ courses given to state and federal police in the
five states on the northern border. The CRS defines ‘culture of lawfulness’ as:

[…] a culture in which the overwhelming majority of the population is
convinced that the rule of law offers the best long term chance of securing
their rights and attaining their goals. Culture of Lawfulness (CoL) programs
aim to combine ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to educate all sectors
of society on the importance of upholding the rule of law. Key sectors that
CoL programs seek to involve include law enforcement, security forces, and
other public officials; the media; schools; and religious and cultural
institutions (Seelke and Finklea 2011:28).

Other programs under this pillar touch on the issue of demand reduction of
illegal drugs. The programs are assisting in developing a network to link
Mexican treatment and prevention centers which number 334, helping to
certify drug counselors, and creating curricula for volunteers and drug
counselors at these centers.

New programs that are said to be implemented under this pillar will be
primarily aimed at:

(1) improving strategic planning and communication to reduce risk factors
that lead to crime/violence

(2) helping subnational governments to collaboratively address community
needs

(3) preparing youth to be responsible members of their communities
(Seelke and Finklea 2011:29)

The GOM will be predominantly responsible for the implementation and
funding of these programs, with some help from multilateral institutions such
as the World Bank. Efforts began with programs in Cd. Juárez and have
begun to expand into other cities, while funding from the US has focused on
pilot programs in Cd. Juárez with the possibility of extending to other cities in
Mexico.

The escalating violence in Cd. Juárez increased attention and new efforts
aimed at assisting the city. In particular, there was increased international and
national attention after the killing of 15 people at a teenage birthday party in
Cd. Juárez on January 30th 2010. Comments made by President Calderon
ignited national outrage when he stated that the victims of the massacre were
gang members, when in fact they were ‘promising students and athletes
(Ellingwood 2011).’ The event also revealed the strong criticism for President
Calderon’s military-led antidrug strategy and the mistrust between government
officials and citizens of Cd. Juárez which was hampering efforts from law
enforcement. As a result of this, the Calderon Administration began to revise
the military-led approach for Cd. Juárez by consulting with local and state
officials, which resulted in the Calderon Administration’s launch of a new
approach in mid-February of 2010 titled ‘Todos Somos Juárez’ or We Are All
Juárez. The We Are All Juárez plan is said to consist of substantial federal
government investments, $274 million (Corcoran 2011), for job training,
community development, and education programs that is intended to ‘[…]’
help address some of the underlying factors that have contributed to the
violence (Seelke and Finklea 2011:29).’ Some Juarenses on the We Are All Juárez roundtables say that these investments will not have an impact if impunity and crime continue. Work is being made on creating ‘security corridors’ within the city with 9 of these promised and 3 having been named by January of 2011 (Corcoran 2011). Efforts from the US in Cd. Juárez have included the expansion of pre-existing Mérida initiatives, like supporting treatment and demand reduction, and CoL programs within schools. USAID has funded a Mérida project for urban mapping and a non-Mérida program for at-risk youth which is directed by international organizations. Cd. Juárez social development projects have also been funded by USAID through the Mérida Initiative, and in April of 2010 a program for Cd. Juárez was launched where civic organizations can receive up to $100,000 in grants by submitting proposals for community development projects. As of October 2010, around $1 million in funding had been appropriated for close to 17 grants. FY2010 supplemental funding of $14 million was received by USAID specifically for pillar four undertakings in Cd. Juárez, of which may support a number of programs including backing of human rights NGOs, crime prevention, and aid for civic organizations to influence state and local politics among others. As requested for FY2012 from the Obama Administration, part of the ESF funds of $33.3 million would support activities related to pillar four in selected areas (Seelke and Finklea 2011).

5.4.5 Mérida efforts in Ciudad Juárez and Chihuahua

The GOMs Mérida Initiative website has partially tracked some of the progress that has been made through the publication of monthly advances starting with January 2011 and the latest being for November 2011. In these reports we can see some of the programs and projects specifically targeting Cd. Juárez and the State of Chihuahua. During this period there was a strong emphasis on pillar four activities, of which the majority was related to CoL activities. While less than pillar four, pillars one and two received an equal amount of attention, while there was no mention of pillar three activities. Of great importance is that there is no mention of any programs related to Maquilas or implying any kind of structural change in Cd. Juárez.

2011

February: Related to the fourth pillar, The National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) helped provide support for the Chihuahua state police in the development of their education programs on CoL of which they have the objective to provide courses to all of the state police force by the end of 2012.

March: Related to the fourth pillar, on the 14th and 15th of the month various civil society organizations from Cd. Juárez participated in a course on how to understand methodology focused on improving citizen participation and quality of life from a participatory community perspective.

21 Demonym for people from Cd. Juárez
May: Related to the first pillar, on the 12th the first phase of the anonymous complaint program was launched in Cd. Juárez. From that date residents of the city can call in with complaints and emergencies through a single number, 066. Technical systems provided by the Mérida Initiative will later guarantee the anonymity of the callers. Related to the second pillar, in the first week of the month, judges from the state of Chihuahua met with federal and state judges from the US in El Paso, Texas to exchange views and experiences related to the accusatorial justice system. The Mexican judges also had some meetings with US public prosecutors. From the 9th to the 20th some of the Cd. Juárez FP took part in survival and criminal investigations courses.

June: Related to the first pillar, the previously mentioned technical system to provide anonymity to callers with complaints and emergencies in Cd. Juárez began operation on the 15th.

July: Related to the fourth pillar, summer camps for at risk adolescents and youth began on the 4th and took place in Cd. Juárez. The camps were oriented towards providing the participants 'herramientas para la vida' or tools for life. From the 11th to the 15th the NSIC provided training to Chihuahua state officials on CoL.

August: Related to the second pillar, a part of the municipal police of Cd. Juárez along with several other municipal police forces participated in a course on homicide investigation at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in El Salvador from the 29th to the 31st. Related to the fourth pillar, the NGO ‘Arte en el Parque’ or Art in the Park held an event on the 16th in one of the colonias or neighborhoods of Cd. Juárez that involved approximately 100 at risk children and youth. From the 22nd to 26th a contest entitled ‘Mi Grafiti es Legal’ or My Graffiti is Legal was held, and sought to instill in teens the importance of respecting public and private property and to resolve their conflicts through art.

September: Related to the fourth pillar, the Government of Chihuahua with the support of the Mérida Initiative organized a binational summit on values and CoL in Cd. Juárez on the 20th and 21st that included the participation of representatives of civil society organizations. ‘El Consejo de Participación Ciudadana para el Desarrollo Social’ or Council of citizen participation for social development organized a forum about ‘Política social y participación ciudadana’ or Social policy and citizen participation in Cd. Juárez for the purpose of promoting dialogue and cooperation between civil society and the government.

October: Related to the first pillar, from the 10th to the 12th officials from the SSP, FP, and Attorney General’s office of the State of Chihuahua and state and municipal police from Chihuahua and Cd. Juárez participated in a conference on policy creation materials for community security organized by the Miami, Florida police department. Related to the fourth pillar, the second phase of activities began for the violence and accident prevention program in Cd. Juárez

22 All translations made by the author.
during the 1st to the 8th coordinated by the Pan American Health Organization with the help of the Mérida Initiative.

**November:** Related to the second pillar, part of the state police of Chihuahua and other state police participated in a basic survival course for police from the 1st to the 25th. Related to the fourth pillar, the Government of Chihuahua launched a 60 hour educational program covering CoL in which all high school students must participate. In the first week of the month 5 employment pilot programs were launched to initially benefit 150 at-risk youth who were at the time unemployed or not going to school. On the 26th a training workshop was held for the anonymous complaint systems and emergency services which were aimed at youth in Cd. Juárez (Gobierno de Mexico 2010).

### 5.5 Views Regarding the Mérida Initiative and the Drug War

#### 5.5.1 Mérida Initiative

Critics see this initiative as another way ‘[…] to secure the free-market context that ensures U.S. access to Latin America’s strategic resources […] (Delgado-Ramos, Romano 2011),’ a part of the ‘narco-carceral complex’, ‘the for-profit industrialization of the drug war (Schack, 2011)’ and often call it Plan Mexico with reference to Plan Colombia, who the U.S. Government Accountability Office has confirmed did not fully achieve its goals. In an August 2011 congressional research service report for congress regarding the Mérida Initiative it is acknowledged that ‘Mexico and the U.S have discussed the possibility of launching pilot programs to strengthen communities in the Ciudad Juarez-El Paso and possibly Tijuana-San Diego areas (p 38),’ thus alluding to the structural deficiencies particularly in the border region.

#### 5.5.2 War on Drug Trafficking Organizations

The current war on drug cartels in Mexico has received much attention from journalists, politicians, academics, activists, and ngo’s, of which certain viewpoints have been articulated in relation to what is transpiring at the moment and what needs to be done to win this conflict.

Within the mainstream view, the cause of violence and drug trafficking varies. One view focuses mainly on the cartels as the problem (Joyce 2009) while another sees it related with a plethora of issues ranging from political development (democratization), economic globalization, free market reforms, economic crises, the US’ role as a consumer of drugs and provider of firearms, and corruption within Mexico (Shirk 2011, O’neil 2009). It is understood by all parties that US efforts to combat the principal route of cocaine smuggling to the US through the Caribbean during the 80’s shifted it to Mexico, greatly increasing the amount of drug trafficking from then on. The purpose for US involvement is seen as being crucial for a number of reasons. Mexico is an extremely important trading partner and market for the US and because of this poses destabilizing consequences if the situation were to get out of control. There is also a potential threat to US security if violence were to spill over the border (Joyce 2009, Shirk 2011, Seelke and Finklea 2011). The views on
solutions to the problem include tackling sensitive issues within the US such as drug policy (demand reduction), firearms, and money laundering (Joyce 2009, Shirk 2011, Seelke and Finklea 2011, O’neil 2009). Along with helping to reform the Mexican judicial system, providing economic assistance to bolster communities resistance to violence and crime through educational programs and job creation is seen as a compliment to the former (Shirk 2011, Seelke and Finklea 2011). Economic development through facilitating more NAFTA trade is also called for.

Both the mainstream and critical views share an understanding of what the causes of violence and drug trafficking are: free market reforms, the US’ role with drug consumption and as firearm provider, corruption, and Mexico’s political development. The critical view, in the sense that it dismisses the current development strategy for Mexico, places more focus on the US Mexico relationship, seeing it as US hegemony over Mexico through NAFTA and other neo-liberal economic reforms, and questions the motives of the US. NAFTA and other reforms helped to aid the smuggling of large amounts of drugs by augmenting trade across the border, and by freeing up labor for the drug trade through the negative effects of free trade on the Mexican population (Mercille 2011). US involvement is understood as an expansion of its hegemony in Latin America in order to preserve its economic interests and part of the military-industrial complex (through the purchasing of military equipment through the Mérida Initiative) which is explained partially by the history of US foreign policy and current measures. Some of the perceived solutions to the problem consist of promoting policies that would make a helpful difference by supporting growth and development (reducing work force for drug cartels), and prevention of drug use and treatment of drug addicts in the US (Mercille 2011).

5.5.3 What’s missing

The literature pertaining specifically to the Mérida Initiative seems to not directly mention structural violence that is produced because of the economic structure of Cd. Juárez in relation to the U.S. as a periphery, however, there is literature discussing structural violence in Cd. Juárez before the inception of the initiative (Hill 2010, Swanger 2007, Weissman 2005).

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has given some basic background on why anti-drug collaboration between Mexico and the US has increased, what the Mérida Initiative embodies, some of the initiatives efforts in Cd. Juárez, and views of the Initiative, the drug war, and what’s missing in those views. It was shown that that as Mexico and the US became more connected economically and that collaboration on anti-drug operations increased amid failures to diminish the supply of narcotics. The Merida Initiative was examined, in both its original and updated form which does not allude to changing any dynamics within the world-economy. Primary funding was shown to go to military and inspection equipment, followed by judicial reforms and CoL courses. Efforts tied to the initiative in Cd. Juarez were analyzed showing that CoL courses were the
primary focus. Last, some views surrounding the Merida Initiative and War on Drugs were explored.
Chapter 6
Conclusions

In the second chapter, the theoretical framework was laid out. It was established that in order to answer the research question the use of the methodology of WSA and some of its concepts would be useful in order to create a starting point. The methodology included looking at the deep structure of the Mexican economy through the longue durée and placing it in relation to the US. Several concepts within NG theory were explored, primarily hegemony, and how a historical bloc creates the form in which states find themselves, which was determined to be important in order to show how a change in the development path of Mexico was able to take place and keep this path through the use new constitutionalism.

Chapter three gave a better understanding of the position where Cd. Juárez is located within the world-economy and how it was transformed by the world-system and more recent global dynamics. The Mexican development strategy was shown to have changed courses during the early 1980s. These changes were marked by internal problems which arose from the ISI model and the rise of the technocrats in economic policy making of Mexico, while outside forces in the form of multilateral bank creditors converged with internal forces to overhaul the entire economic strategy of Mexico. This change can be explained by a rise in the transnational capitalist class from within and without. It was shown through the sectorial makeup of labor that Cd. Juárez’ vulnerability to economic crisis because of its ties to the US as a periphery. Further questions left open regarding this chapter would be to dig deeper on how the transnational class from with

The next part, chapter four, probed the reasons behind the escalation of violence starting in the early 1990s. It was determined that there was a mixture of ingredients that led to such an outcome. Those ingredients included a massive shift the in the cocaine trafficking route from the Caribbean to Mexico due to US interdiction efforts in the region, an increase in the US demand for illegal drugs, the shift in the development strategy and political climate due in part to economic crisis, a change in the structure of the Mexican economy, the relations between the DTOS and public officials, and the most recent Mexican strategy of full on confrontation of DTOS.

The PE of Mexican and US counter drug collaboration was explored in chapter five. It was determined that as PE interests increased, so did collaboration. The pinnacle of such collaboration to date, The Mérida Initiative, was examined as well. The Initiative, whose goals are listed as: (1) Disrupting the Operational Capacity of Organized Crime, (2) Institutionalizing the Rule of Law in Mexico, (3) Creating a ‘21st Century Border,’ and (4) Building Strong and Resilient Communities (Seelke and Finklea 2011), made little assessment of the violence as pertaining to world economic factors but did initiate the We are all Juárez program to target the specific needs of the community, however, in the GOM’s monthly updates related to the initiative, no attempts were made at addressing Juárez’ position in the world-economy.
As was expected, the interests of the elites in keeping the capitalist world-economy intact was expressed in the Mérida Initiative by its lack of focus on the deep structures of the world-economy that would have revealed why there has been an increase in overall violence and drug trafficking, but especially in the case of Cd. Juárez.

What questions still remain? As was demonstrated in chapter five, the majority of the budget for the Initiative actually goes to the purchase of equipment\(^{23}\), so it would be interesting to explore the links between the military industrial complex and the current war on drugs in Mexico as further promotion of this complex. Another interesting question would be to explore who actually came up with the Initiative and their links across states.

\(^{23}\) A list of NIIE equipment and costs can be found in the appendices.
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Northern Territory Government of Australia

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Appendices

Mérida Initiative NIIE Funds

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<th>Description</th>
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Source: US Embassy NIIE pamphlet 2011

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*Pre-Merida funds

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Source: US Embassy NIIE pamphlet 2011
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<td>IP600 X-Ray VACIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SAT</td>
<td>December 5, 2011</td>
<td>$3,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ion chamber survey meter</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>SAT</td>
<td>December 5, 2011</td>
<td>$62,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ion chamber survey meter</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>SEDENA</td>
<td>December 12, 2011</td>
<td>$25,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SEDENA</td>
<td>December 14, 2011</td>
<td>$160,222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Pre-Morita funds

**TOTAL** $99,956,497

Source: US Embassy NIIE pamphlet 2011
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Estimated delivery date</th>
<th>Total amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interphase with SSP Bunker to remote NIIE operations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>Jan-13</td>
<td>$11,117,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Package*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>Jan-13</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Packages*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>SEMAR</td>
<td>Jan-13</td>
<td>$ 635,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil works and installation of NIIE portals</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>SAT</td>
<td>Jan-12</td>
<td>$1,285,051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Complemented with Pre-Merida funds

**TOTAL** $14,047,090

Source: US Embassy NIIE pamphlet 2011
Merida Expenditures Against Available Funds: December 2008 - June 2012
(Including FY2010 Supplemental)

Available Funds
Cumulative Deliveries
% Deliveries from:
App. Funds
Unapp. Funds
% Preliminary Estimate of Deliveries for 2012

Source:

59