NOMADS AND STATE IN SOMALIA:
PARADOX POLICIES TOWARDS NOMADS

A Research Paper presented by

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(Somalia)

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Members of the Examining Committee

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Dr. Jos Mooij

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### Abbreviations.

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFESD</td>
<td>Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRDP</td>
<td>Central Rangelands Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILCA</td>
<td>International Livestock Center for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JASPA/ILO</td>
<td>Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa/International Labor Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>Netherlands Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRDP</td>
<td>Northern Rangelands Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.D.U.</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.N.C.</td>
<td>Somali National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.N.M.</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So.Sh.</td>
<td>Somali Shillings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.P.M.</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.R.C.</td>
<td>Somali Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.Y.L.</td>
<td>Somali Youth League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCOD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Desertification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.C.</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE.

1.1. Statement of the Problem.

In Africa 78 per cent of the land area is used for grazing (Winrock, 1981), where extensive livestock grazing is the major and often exclusive land use. Somalia is an example of a livestock dependent country, where 60 per cent of the population depend largely on nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral production, and a further 20 per cent of the population are mixed crop and livestock producers (World Bank, 1981: Vol.II: p.2). Livestock trade, known to have started in the area of today's Somalia as early as the 1300s, grew rapidly in the 1950s with the oil boom in Arabian countries, which brought increasing demand for live animals in Saudi Arabia and other states on the Arabian Peninsula. Until the mid-seventies Somalia was the world's largest export country for live animals. In 1985 it still ranked third after Australia and Turkey in the exported number of sheep and goats (FAO, 1987). Up to 1.5 million animals are exported annually (Jeffy and Weli, 1985). Yet the policies of Somali governments were always primarily to settle nomads, even when the sector's achievement is very high compared to that of settled agriculture.

Despite this historic vitality of the livestock sector, development planners in the colonial and post-colonial governments saw the system as one of crisis and allocated little fund to improve the sector. The objective of the planners was to sedentarize the nomads (Hoben et al., 1983:71). These dreams were realized in the 1974-75 drought and nearly 200,000 nomads were settled in six settlements in the inter-riverine area of southern Somalia: three agricultural settlements and three fishing settlements. The cost of the settlements was huge and the objectives of the settlements were not realized, and most of the nomads returned to their original places (Lewis, 1972). Other projects of range enclosure and therefore with the aim of settling nomads has also proved to be failure (Aronson, 1980; Hoben et al., 1983; MNP:PIU, 1981: Janzen, 1986; Perrier and Norton, 1996).

This research paper argues that under the ecological and economic conditions now

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1 Livestock production and pastoral production are used interchangeably in this paper, due to the Somali economy, which is based mainly on pastoralism and less on conventional animal husbandry.
existing in Somalia, nomadic use of the land is the best utilization of the available resource. The paper therefore analyzes the origin and the nature of Somali state, pastoral development policies of colonial and post-colonial governments in Somalia, and investigates and develops an explanation of why Somali governments preferred to settle nomads when the majority of the population are nomads, eco-climatical factors are uncertain and the elite themselves are one way or another engaged in pastoral-nomadic system of life. This is politically and ecologically not rational, and it is against self-interest. Therefore, this is the paradox that this paper will investigate.

1.2. Background.

In most colonial countries government policies towards the pastoral sector of the economy have been rather negative. There were several reasons for this:

- Political - an unruly lot not accepting authority easily. Pastoralists as a minority relative to sedentary agriculture;
- Economically - a rather backward form of livelihood;
- Ecologically - destructive practices of nature.

Dominant colonial and post-colonial policy approach was encapsulation (Salzman, 1980). Main elements of colonial and post-colonial policy were: sedentarization, ranches enclosures; commercialization of livestock and its products, and taxation; development of alternative sectors of the economy, leading to relative neglect of the livestock sector.

Research Question.

In Somalia similar policies were pursued with equally questionable effects. This paper puts the following question: Why did Somali state pursue pastoral policies on the whole detrimental to the interests of the pastoralists, despite the fact that Somalia is the only country in Africa where the pastoral sector has been the dominant sector of the economy?
Hypothesis.
The explanation is to be seen, I shall argue, in the nature of the Somali state as it was formed under the colonial period, reinforced by the dominating role of foreign technical assistance and resources after Independence, and the further reinforcement of these policies following the Sahelian drought of the 1970s.

1.3. Objective of the Study.

The paper has the following objectives:

a. To discuss the Origin and nature of the emerging Somali State, and conflicting administrative traditions and policy practices, leading to an ineffective state.

b. To evaluate the pastoral policies of Somali governments and to what extent it changed the pastoral system of production;

c. To investigate and develop an explanation for why Somali governments continue to pursue settlement policies, even though:

- the majority of the population are nomads and resist sedentarization;
- it is not ecologically, politically, and economically viable;
- the state elite itself has a pastoralist background and engaged one way or another in nomadic system of life, and as such would be expected to be against settlement;

1.4. Analytical Methodology and data sources.

For this study, an historical approach to the problem will be used. This will help us to understand how the pastoral system in Somalia has changed in last century. It will also help us to critically evaluate the policies of colonial and post-colonial governments, and whether Somalia is a country where sedentarization is the best solution for the nomads, who form the majority of the population and who live in an uncertain climate. The analytical framework, used in this paper, is the theorizing the nomadic behavior in an ecological setting, and therefore reviews the major debates on pastoral rationality, environmental degradation, and development.

The data used in this paper is secondary data from various sources. The limitation of this study is to get updated data from Somalia. Since the overthrow of the last government in 1991 there is no central government in Somalia.
1.5. Organization of the Paper.

The paper is organized in the following manner. In chapter Two the background to Somalia will be discussed. The chapter will discuss the origin and nature of emerging Somali state, and the legacy of colonial governments and problems of independence. Chapter Three the analytical framework will be discussed: Nomadic behavior is to be seen in an ecological setting, and therefore review of major debates on pastoral rationality, environmental degradation and development, and pastoral development and politics. Chapter Four discusses the integration of pastoralist producers into the wider economy. It also discusses the impact of this integration on the pastoralists, economically, socially and politically. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the importance of the role of women in the Somali pastoral sector. Chapter Five discusses pastoralists and Somali state's pastoral sector policies. The chapter investigates especially the sedentarization policies, which took place in the 1974-75 drought, and the subsequent years of the range enclosures in the northern and central regions of the country. Chapter Six discusses the findings and the lessons for future pastoral policies.
CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND TO SOMALIA

2.1. Origin and nature of the emerging state.

The Somali people form one of the largest single ethnic blocks in Africa, and though sparsely distributed on the ground, live in continuous occupation of a great expanse of territory covering almost 400,000 square miles in the north-east corner or 'Horn', of the continent facing Arabia (Lewis, 1980:1). From the region of the Awash Valley in the north-west, this often arid territory occupied by the Somali stretches round the periphery of the Ethiopian highlands and along the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean coasts down to the Tana River in northern Kenya (ibid). In their dry savanna homeland, the Somali are essentially a nation of pastoral nomads.

The People who live in present-day Somalia have an ancient history. Until the late nineteenth century the history of present-day Somalia in the Horn of Africa is dominated by shifting powers and various rules, including Somali Kingdoms, Galla or present-day Oromo (in present-day Ethiopia), Amhara and Tigray Kingdoms (ethnic groups in present-day Ethiopia), Danakil or present-day Afar (distributed today in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti). The coastal areas of the region were subject to various foreign traders and rules from different parts of the world including the Omanis (present-day Gulf state of Oman), the Zanzibaris (present-day part of the Tanzanian federation), the Sharifs of Mukha (in present-day Yemen), the Ottoman empire, and the Portuguese. Little is known about the sequences and dates of these shifting powers. Nevertheless, various authors (Lewis, 1961, 1965; Laitin and Samatar, 1987; Burton, 1894; and others) have discussed the history of the eastern Horn of Africa. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to go further into detail the debate around this history.

Historically, Somalis have shown a fierce independence, an unwillingness to submit to authority, a strong clan consciousness, and conflict among clans and sub-clans despite their sharing a common language (the Somali), Religion (Islam), and pastoral customs. Despite this clan consciousness, the Somali community historically preserved its basic unity.

As far as the mode of life and social institutions is concerned, nomadism is the prevailing economic response, and mode of livelihood and social institutions in general are adjusted to the scant resources of harsh environment in which the Somalis live. Subject to the vagaries of the seasons and the very variable distribution of rain and grazing, there is some tendency for the
clans\(^2\) to be roughly associated with particular areas of rangelands (Lewis, 1980:9).

### 2.2. The British, French and Italian Rule, and State Formation in the Horn.

#### 2.2.1. Background.

In the years following the middle of the nineteenth century, Somalia was rapidly drawn into the colonial competition between European powers. In January 1839, with the opening of steamer service from India to Suez Canal, Britain needed a coaling station in the Red Sea and therefore captured Aden, with poverty local resources. The British garrison at Aden depended on supply of meat and other fresh produce from Somalia. Britain at first seemed somewhat reluctant to annex the Somali coast, but in view of the coast's economic importance to Aden, British colonial authorities were even more reluctant to let it be annexed by another power hostile to British interests (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 48-49). But although travellers like Burton and local (colonial) officials at Aden might advocate a definite British occupation of the Somali coast, their plans fell on deaf ears in London (Lewis, 1980:40). The British government in London was claiming that it would justify any occupation only if Somalia's meat supply was seriously threatened. However, British entered into direct dealings with the coastal Somali clans and established themselves, through guile and treaty, on the Somali coast by 1884 (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 49). From 1886 onward Britain also began to acquire the extreme southwestern edge of the Somali peninsula, an area that became known as Jubbaland, as part of its East African sphere of influence. Here the overriding British concern was to safeguard the headwaters of the Nile---Egypt's lifeline--and this called for British control of the East African coast from Kismayu (present-regional capital of lower Jubba region of Somalia) to Zanzibar. Part of Jubbaland was later ceded to Italy (1925) and merged with southern Somalia, but retained a vast interior region of shrublands that later became known as the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya (See map C in appendix 2 for details on the colonial partition).

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\(^2\)The Somalis consist of six major clans: Four of the families (Dir, Daarood, Isaaq, and Hawiye) are predominantly pastoral, representing about 75 per cent of Somalia's population, and two (Digil and Rahanwayn) are sedentary cultivators and agro-pastoralists, representing about 15 per cent of Somali's population. The reminder of the population consists of urban population.

The Clans are traditionally led by clan leaders called differently according to the level of the position he (no she, because there is no clan in Somali where women is clan leader) holds and the clans he belongs to (some clans differ the name of their clan leader from other clans—but the reason is unclear). Some of these names are: Sultan, Boqor, Ugaas, Garaad, Malaaq, etc.
Another power involved this partition was France. In 1859 the French consular agent at Aden obtained the cesseion of the Danakil port of Obock (present-day Djibouti). Three years later (1862) France acquired Obock, but exercised little sovereignty until 1881 when the Franco-Ithiopian Company Treaty was sep up there. But why France had interested in this area? French interest in the Somali coast was fueled by France's seizure of Madagascar and much of Indochina in 1870s and by the disintegration of the Anglo-French condominium in Egypt by 1884. In order to facilitate naval communication with their Madagascar and Indochina possessions and to checkmate the formidable British garrison in Aden, the French now sought to establish their own base on the Red Sea (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 49).

While Britain and France had colonies through most of the world, and particularly in Africa, Italy was preoccupied by its own national unification, which was not completed until 1870. Italy's first venture into the Horn of Africa was Eritrea and obtained control of the port of Assab (on the Red Sea) in 1870. In the succeeding years Italy consolidated its influence and declared protectorate on Massawa in 1885. Meanwhile Italy was also active in southern Somalia and extended its colony there between 1885 and 1893. In March 1891 an Anglo-Italian protocol was signed which defined the boundary between East Africa and Italian Somaliland, and the Italian government proceeded to press for a further delimitation between her and Britain's Somali territories (Lewis, 1980: 55).

Ethiopia, on the other hand was actively involved in the participation of Somalia partition. Ethiopia signed agreements with French and this led to the establishment of the rail-way, which was completed in 1917, connecting Djibouti and Addis Ababa. Ethiopia signed also agreements with Britain and this led to the transfer of Ogaden (1948) and Haud (1954) to Ethiopia (both regions form the present-day Somali zone within the Ethiopian federation).

The British and Italians followed different courses in their colonial policies.

Britain’s prime self-interest was to assure that Aden garrison's meat supplies from Somali coast were unhampered. Britain's development policies for Somalia during its first years of Somaliland protectorate, neglected to develop the area. In fact, Britain faced strong resistence from Dervish\(^3\) fight for freedom (1900-20) led by Sayyid Muhammed Abdille Hassan. Therefore all

\(^3\)Dervish from the Arabic Darwiish, pl. Daraawiish, meaning one who is dedicated is service to God and
the efforts of the British protectorate were directed towards the suppression of Dervish movements. However, during that period some changes occurred in the field of agriculture, such as the gradual adoption of sorghum cultivation in the western part of the British protectorate (Borama and Hargeisa Districts). Livestock merchant continued and new merchants formed, such as dilaal (broker) and others (it will further be discussed in chapter 4). Some persons of this class were also part of the protectorate administration, and became after the independence the officials of the Somali Republic. In the field of education little has been achieved. However a more dramatic change has occurred after the end of Dervish war in 1920. Since the home government of Britain refused to provide funds for schools, it raised tax on livestock, (Lewis, 1980: 103), although later it proved a failure when nomads resisted to pay it. In the following years government developed educational system, where the first secondary school was opened in 1953 and a number of students were already attending university courses in Great Britain (Contanzo, 1955: 8). Commerce became a main activity in the British protectorate. As Britain had an experience of pastoralism elsewhere in the world and especially in East Africa, the administration did not interrupt the way of life of the Somalis. A study done by Contanzo (1955: 7) showed the following:

"It would seem that the guiding principles followed by the British government are as follows: as the Somalis are essentially a nomadic stock-owning people and, as there is little likelihood that their means of subsistence will change either through extensive industrial development or through agricultural extension, the government aims at providing general conditions which will fit the autochtons for the standard of life they can reasonably hope to maintain".

Therefore, development is mainly directed towards enlarging and improving grazing lands, and improving stock-breeding and its products (ibid: 8).

However, things changed when Italy occupied the whole region including the British Somali protectorate and whole Ethiopia in the years between 1935-1940. They introduced new systems such as to regulate prices and taxation, to extend large-scale agriculture, to build new roads and markets (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 62). But interrupted the livestock trade, which was the main economic activity in British Somaliland. In 1941 Britain retook the colony and conquered community. The end of 1920 broke dervish resistance, after aerial bombardment was mounted against the Dervish capital at Taleeh and other regional forts in northern Somalia. In December 1920, the founder of Modern Somali Nationalism, Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan aged about sixty-four died in Ilmeey (in present-day Ethiopia). The first phase of nationalist resistance to colonial occupation came to a dramatic halt.
Italian Somaliland, bringing the whole Somaliland, except French Somaliland, under British protectorate, which continued for almost a decade.

As far as Italian policy objection for Somaliland is concerned, Italy's main purpose was to develop a colonial plantation economy that would furnish employment or income for some of the population of the mother country as well as primary materials for its economy (Kaplan et al., 1969: 277). In other words, Italy intended to plant an Italian colony of settlers and commercial entrepreneurs in the fertile interriverine area (Shabelle and Juba rivers⁴) of southern Somalia, partly to relieve population pressure at home, and partly to enhance Italian prestige through overseas colonization (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 59). Plantation agriculture started in the early 1920s with the production of sugar and cotton, but in the 1930s bananas developed as the single most important export crop in Italian Somaliland (Houtkamp, 1996: 76). During the 1930s the production as well as export of bananas from Italian Somaliland to Italy increased rapidly (see table 1 below) and Somalia had became the third most important African banana exporter behind the Southern Cameroon and French Guinea. This development was primarily facilitated by protectionist policies of the Italian government (ibid: 84). Although the banana business were disrupted by the decade of British occupation, the business has been resumed in the 1950s when Italy come back.

There were also developments in other fields in Italian Somaliland, particularly in communications such as roads. According to Lewis (1980: 96) between 1932 and 1933, one hundred and fifty wells were constructed to provide a basis for a badly needed well-drilling scheme to aid the nomadic sector of the economy to which little attention has previously been paid. Here one could argue that the intention of doing so by the Italian administration was to attract the majority of the population who were nomads. This attraction is needed to have trained Somalis in the expanding administration and commercial enterprises. Previously Somali nomads were unwilling to work with the Italians because of, among other things, nomads did not favor plantation policies, which thus attracted only a limited number of settled people from the interriverine area.

⁴The Shabelle or 'Leopard' River extends for some 1,250 miles but does not enter the sea; after crossing the southern part of the Ogaden (present-day Eastern Ethiopia) it flows eastwards as far as Balad, twenty miles from the Indian Ocean coast, where it veers to the south to cover a further 170 miles before disappearing in a series of marshes and sandflats close to Jilib on the Juba River. Only with exceptionally heavy rains does the river join the Juba River and thus succeed in reaching the sea. To the south of the Shabelle, the Juba River descends much more directly from the Ethiopian Highlands to the sea near the port of Kismayu (Lewis, 1980: 3).
Table 1. Production and Exports of Somali bananas, 1926-1940.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Cultivated area (Ha)</th>
<th>Production (tonnes)</th>
<th>Exports (tonnes)</th>
<th>Percentage of output</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>2,614</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>3,834</td>
<td>33,100</td>
<td>15,200</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>3,976</td>
<td>38,600</td>
<td>15,700</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>49,600</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>49,600</td>
<td>24,900</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>4,365</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>25,850</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>4,637</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>32,360</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Karp, 1960; Hess, 1966; Bigi, 1963; cited from Houtkamp, 1996: 84, table nr. 27.

Italy undermined the main source of income for the majority of the Somali population—the livestock sector. This can be attributed to not only its colonial objective mentioned above, but also the lack of experience of pastoralism and therefore lack of development expertise in this sector. Other developments in Italian Somaliland include some hospitals, and other social services. Education services has been provided. Mission schools provided the education necessary to supply the Somali clerks and other semi-skilled personnel. There were less public hostility in attending mission schools in the south than in the north (British Somaliland) and therefore mission schools produced high percentage of southern Somalis than the north. This has also contributed to the administration barrier at the unification of the two sides in 1960.

The educational facilities open to Somalis continued to expand and the number of Somali and Arab pupils at elementary schools rose from 1,390 in 1930 to 1,776 in 1939, which in the circumstances, was a considerable achievement comparing favourably with the position at the British Somaliland and French Somaliland (Lewis, 1980: 97). In British Somaliland the position with education was very difficult. British Government tried several times to open schools but people resisted to allow the children to attend schools. In 1935, new proposals were adopted for introducing a rational system of education and work started on the construction of a new government school at Berbera (north coast town), but again people strongly opposed the scheme, and, after a riot at Burao in which three Somalis were killed, the proposals lapsed and
had to wait the reoccupation of British Somaliland in 1941 after the Italian defeat (ibid: 103).

In Italian Somaliland, through economic development and education, a process of social mobilization was started. Therefore the Italian policy was one of creating an urban Somali middle class while at the same time withholding the political consequences of the process. But unlike Italians this middle class was to stay, and eventually become a nascent elite.

After the British administration had taken over (1941-1950) important changes took place in the south. The British stimulated trade and other economic activities, since with the defeat of the Italians the para-statal economic enterprises had all collapsed. At the same time, they removed the restrictions of social and political activities. Out of this climate was born two modern political parties that was to lead the Somalilands to independence. The first party was Somali Youth Club, which formed in 1943 and changed the name to Somali Youth League. The Party was from its inception urban in character and, as the name shows, found many young Somali among its members. It also counted different clans and representatives of Dervish movement. Consequently, other parties also formed. Apart from a number of ephemeral smaller groups, mainly with limited local or particularistic interests, the most important rival was Hizbia Digil-Mirifle Somali (HDMS), representing chiefly southern Rahanwayn and Digil clans of Interverine area. This organisation, with the welcome addition of Italian financial support, favoured a more conservative policy and sought particularly to protect the interests of the southern agricultural clans from domination by the northern nomads who overwhelmingly supported the League (Lewis, 1980: 123).

In the north, Somali National League (SNL) of mainly Isaaq clan and National United Front (NUF) has been formed to wage struggle for Somali independence.

At the end of 1949, things changed again and the United Nations have shown its active role in Somalilands when Somali movements demanded independence. Britain had to return in British Somaliland and Italy had to prepare an independence for Italian Somaliland with a period of Italian Trusteeship (1950-1960). In this period major changes happened in the Italian Somaliland. Italy has to prepare a country where it can influence after independence, therefore it should build an elite favourable to Italy in the future. Italy took major steps and some prominent SYL members who had achieved responsible positions in the civil service under the British were reduced in rank, dismissed, and in a few cases imprisoned (Lewis, 1980: 140). Similar
measures were also taken against all those who opposed Italian policies. Therefore, during the trustsheep period, Italy laid down an economy based on export crops (mainly banana) and less on livestock sector. Italy produced also an elite oriented in this perspective. On the other hand, Italy stimulated the formation of a political middle class consisting of the members of higher representative bodies, of civil servants, teachers, army officers and members of the police force, and in other fields there are less professionals, such as business, agriculture, industry and commerce, medicine, and these positions will be occupied after the independency almost exclusively by non Somalis (Contanzo, 1955: 11).

In contrast, in British Somaliland, middle class businessmen were encouraged, middle class professionals were builted, but the political middle class was not developed as in the Italian Somaliland. This made an obstacle in the unification period when most of policy making positions remained in the hands of southerners.

On the other hand, all the other systems of government were differently developed in the two regions (which would form the future Somali Republic) according to the British and Italian systems. When the two territories joined together in July 1960, there were:
Two different judicial systems; different currencies; different organization and conditions for service for the army, the police and civil servants...The governmental institutions, both at the central and local level, were differently organized and had different powers; the systems and rates of taxation and customs were different, and so were the educational systems (Contini, 1969: 11). And the most important difference was the two administrative languages not spoken by the majority of the Somali population—the English and Italian.

2.3. Problems of Independency.

July 1, 1960 Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland joined together to form the newly independent Somalia Republic. The Republic faced a broad agenda of problems that required immediate attention, such as mechanisms to integrate the two regions, each with a different administrative structure, into a single state. There were several obstacles that the new government had to deal with.
First, economically the country was obliged to rely on Italian and British subsidies. It also had
to obtain other foreign loans to build an infrastructure and other services. Foreign experts from the former two colonizers were fulfilling major professional activities. Lewis (1980: 171) had noted that the various Italian and British expatriate officials, who remained the country after independence as technical experts, were naturally strongly attached to their separate systems of administration and hence, no doubt unintentionally, tended sometimes to hinder rather than to facilitate integration.

Second, to overcome differences between residents of former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. Here two main differences were: (1) Economic: pastoral nomadism with its tending of flocks as opposed to plantation agriculture. The presence in the past of a sizeable settler European community (mainly Italian) in the south, coupled with a wider degree of economic development and education and a tradition of a more pervasive system of rule, reinforced by traditional cultural distinctions between the two regions, had produced subtle but none the less significant differences in the social climates (Lewis, 1980: 169). Lewis adds that as a result, on the whole, the traditional attitudes of pastoral Somali society were more strongly entrenched in the north, while the south, by contrast, appeared in many respects more modernist in outlook, and to northerners these distinctions provided as a set of standards well adopted to express their traditional pride and aloofness. (2). Political: British exclusiveness and empiricism, the accent on quality rather than quantity in educational and social advancement, attachment to British conceptions of justice and ideals of administrative conduct, and the strict separation of politics from administration, all contrasted in northern eyes with the apparently less rigorous standards of political and public service morality in the south and with the involute Italian bureaucratic tradition (Lewis, 1980: 169).

Third, differences of clan and sub-clan rivalries. Fourth, linguistic barriers (it will further be discussed in the next section) further aggravated these differences. In the north the English is the teaching and administrative language, whereas in the south is the Italian language, and this language difference affected all spheres, public as well as private. Fifth, the irredentist pressures to incorporate Somalis living in the various countries in the region. The Somalis have inherited what they see as a dismembered nation—three of whose essential constituent parts are missing—the Ogaden in Ethiopia, the NFD in Kenya, and Djibouti (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 68).

The Somali State in 1960 was hardly in position to find immediate solutions for the above difficulties. Laitin and Samatar (1987: 108) noted that it had almost no access to data specifying
the structure of the economy, and it lacked technical personnel to interpret the data that were available. Nonetheless, the government, as was fashionable in Africa at that time, constructed economic plans, and its first Five Year Plan was for the years 1963-1967, where only about one-half of the planned expenditure had been made, and foreign aid commitments were not put to the service of the plan (ibid).

2.3.1. Language Problem.
The newly independent Somali Republic, which consisted of the former British Somaliland protectorate and the Italian Somaliland, faced among other things problems of administrative language. The administrative language used in the two former territories was the language of the ruling foreign powers. Already before the independence period the language problem were recognized by both foreign rulers and the Somalis. Attempts to write the Somali language were made, especially in Italian Somaliland, but did not succeeded. The practical argument was the fact that the majority of the Somali people with whom the Italian administration had to communicate knew no Italian (Mohamed, 1976: 4). The difficulties, which arose from this situation, were clearly expressed in an editorial article in "Corriere della Somalia" of 14 August 1952:

"Numberless problems arise in the relationships between the citizens and the State. A vast majority of the people speak-- as is well known-- only their mother tongue-- Somali. The result is that when they have to submit a letter or any other papers to a government office, they must turn to a public clerk; in the case of oral discussions, such as for instance in the Courts, they must turn to an interpreter; again, in the schools use must be made of one or the other foreign language, which, not being native to both teachers and students, cannot be fully mastered. These facts occur daily and we all know how often they are a source of inaccuracies, misunderstandings, slow work progress, etc. There is a risk that the schism between the administrative language and our mother tongue may transform itself into a schism between the State and the people, between the "legal" and the actual realities of the country".

The situation became much difficult when the territories joined in 1960. This bilingualism isolated, to a great extent, the two system of administrators from one another. Since the two languages used in the administration were foreign, also the people at large could hardly communicate with the public offices (Mohamed, 1976: 6). Thus, these language barriers existed within the administration itself and between the administration and the people. Furthermore, these barriers were strengthened by the continued presence of Italian-speaking and English-speaking foreign advisers (ibid:7). Mohamed adds that these advisers showed certain linguistic
chauvinism by emphasizing the indispensability either of Italian or English for the development of the country. The Somali administrators, too, were not free of language prejudices. They, too, inclined to defend the language in which they worked. Bilingualism and, to a certain degree, language rivalry became part and parcel of the Somali administration. Therefore, to guarantee the functioning of the administrative machinery, it became necessary to duplicate English-speaking and Italian-speaking personnel in almost all government institutions (ibid). However, this duplication of personnel did not help much, and, left this dilemma of bilingualism, the Somali administrators began more and more to depend upon oral communication.

Unfortunately, the civilian government (1960-1969) was unable to make any progress on the issue of Somali’s language administrative crisis and to come with Somali script alternative. Two prime ministers attempted to resolve the script crisis that was creating a bureaucratic nightmare. The educational system was operating in three languages (English, Italian and Somali) as was the bureaucracy. There were some movements toward the anglicization of both schools (Italian and English system schools) and the civil service, but this process was facing much opposition from the Italian-speaking south. Even several Somali scripts, mainly three (two forms of Latin script, and an Arabic script) proposed by different groups were not accepted because of rivalry between the groups. In fact, two appointed commissions recommended the modified of one of the Latin script, but when findings were leaked, political opposition from advocates of the other two scripts was so strong that both prime ministers suppressed the public announcement of the results (Laitin, 1977). This nondecision was beginning to have adverse consequences for national unity (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 75).

These developments turned the whole issue of a Somali script into a very sensitive and delicate political problem. Moreover, the disintegration of the political climate of the country reached to the highest point. The results were the the coup of the Military, 21 October, 1969, which then followed the socialism doctrine. The Revolution of 21st October 1969 brought the dispute on the choice of a script for Somali to an end.

On 21st October 1972, the President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) announced to the nation that a script had been officially adopted for the Somali language and that the new script would be a modified version of the Latin alphapet appropriately adjusted to the phonetic
peculiarities of our mother tongue. Three months after this announcement, exactly on 21st January 1973, written Somali officially replaced English and Italian, which till then had been the administrative languages of the country.

The linguistic reform made possible that contact with the masses in written form, which socialism made absolutely necessary, could be immediately achieved. A serious literacy campaign has taken place. The application of this campaign followed the radical policy aimed in the Somalization of the administrative machinery. The Campaign was institutionalized as a National Literacy Campaign on 8th March 1973, with the aim to eradicate illiteracy in two years; the First year in the urban areas and semi-urban areas and the second year in the rural areas. The Campaign was started under the motto:

"Haddaad taqan bar, Haddaadan aqoon baro", which means: "If you know teach, if you do not know learn".

Soon after the urban literacy campaign, Rural Development Campaign was launched on 1st August 1974. The aim of this campaign was firstly to start the second face of literacy campaign in rural areas, secondly a general improvement of the revolutionary (socialist) communication with the rural masses (Mohamed, 1975: 18).

2.3.2. The Recent Political History of Somali Crisis (1960-1999).

Competition, hostility, and rivalries which existed in pre-independence Somalia resulted in clan conflict. In British and Italian Somaliland prior to independence, parties were formed along clan lines, except to some extent the S.Y.L. The mobilization of clans to serve political ends began to mount shortly after independence. In fact, the type of electoral system encouraged the formation of parties along clan lines (Randrianja, 1996). Clan identities were further politicized as the electoral system shifted from proportional representation to winner-take all (Lyons and Samatar, 1994: 13). In November municipal elections the government (S.Y.L.) won 665 of the available 904 seats (74 per cent), while its principal rival the Somali National Congress gained 105 seats (Lewis, 1980: 201). In the elections for the national assembly which followed on 30 March, 1964--by which time the long train of border incidents with Ethiopia had erupted into open war and the Ogaden was in resurgence-- the S.Y.L. position was again strongly maintained, though with a slightly reduced majority, S.Y.L., 69 seats; S.N.C., 22; S.D.U., 15; H.D.M.S., 9; others, 8 (ibid). By the time of the March 1969 elections, sixty-four parties contested the elections, and
this large number of parties that suddenly come to existence could be explained by the
conjunction of the kinship structure of Somali society and the proportional representation system
of voting, a system that had been in operation since independence but had not demonstrated its
full effects until 1969 (Laitin and Samatar, 1987: 76). These elections, which brought the S.Y.L.
to power, had left a bitter legacy of discontent. In the opinion of the more disillusioned critics,
democracy had lapsed into commercialized anarchy and strong rule of a new type was urgently
required if the country was to be rescued from the morass of poverty, insecurity and inefficiency
into which it had sunk (Lewis, 1980: 206). On 15 October, 1969, while visiting drought stricken
regions in Las Anod District in the north of the Republic, the president was shot dead by one of
his police guards. On 21 October, 1969, the army forces took power and Siyad Barre became the
president of the country and remained so until the collapse of Somali state in January 1991.

In the period of Barre's rule, the allegiance to one's clan also did not diminish after Barre
adopted scientific socialism, instituted Somali as the official language, and to continue to
champion the ideology of a Greater Somalia (Lyons and Samatar, 1994: 14). Barre's regime is
widely blamed by the Somalis for the tribalization of Somali political life. However, as
Doombos and Markakis (1994: 14) argue, and I agree with them, the pattern that Siad Barre
perfected was laid down before he arrived on the scene. They argue that:

"this pattern was introduced under colonial rule, and was accepted uncritically by the Somali nationalist
movement in the 1950s. It was then that a number of complex, interrelated, but alien concepts were adopted to
govern Somali political life. Among them was the imperative of the 'nation state', the unitary and highly centralized
system of rule, the western model of representative government, the bureaucratic mode of administration, a western
code of law and justice, etc. Most crucial of all was the assumption that a minuscule western-educated class would
rule Somalia, since only they could administer a modern state. What followed is well known; simply put, Somali
traditional institutions and customary authority were discarded, and the degrading of traditional values and norms
began. In the field of conflict resolution, for instance, traditional practice was thought not only irrelevant but a
violation of state authority".

Moreover, the cold war had tremendous effect on Somalia and the Horn of Africa as a whole.
The former Soviet Union assisted Somalia during 1960s and more intensively in 1970s in
building highly trained army with modern weapons. The Soviet Union builded a strategic base
on the Red Sea coast town of Berbera. However, things changed when the Somali-Ethiopian
war was erupted in 1977 in the Ogaden territory. The Soviet policy became clear when Russian
and Cuban army helped the Ethiopia army, and consequently Somalia cut the relations with the Soviets. The United States took the chance and came to Somalia, building more the strategic position of Berbera.

Mainly as a result of the Soviet switching its allegiance to Ethiopia, Somali troops were defeated in 1978, causing a severe blow to the reputation of Barre’s military regime. Drought compounded with the effects of the fighting caused large numbers of refugees (estimates vary from 0.4 to 1.6 million) to flee from the Ogaden to Somalia in 1979-1980 (NDC, 1994: 58). In the wake of the defeat of the Somali troops in 1978, political unrest in Somalia intensified, and armed opposition movement based on clan lines have been formed. The main armed movements were Somali National Movement (SNM) of the northern Isaaq clans, Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) of the dissatisfied Ogadani in the defeat of 1978, and United Somali Congress (USC) of mainly Hawiye clans. In the years of 1980s Somalia experienced hard decade, caused internal conflict, droughts, corrupted and malfunctioning government, the IMF-ism decade, etc.

In the second half of 1990, the major armed opposition groups agreed to an informal alliance and fighting against the government forces increased. The SNM operated in the north, and the USC and SPM in the south. At the end of 1990 the capital mogadishu became a battle field, and the 26 januari Siad barre fled from the capital to his homeland Gedo in the south-west of the country. Unfortunately, as has been expected, the forces that ousted Siad Barre turned to fight against each other, and the country entered in catastrophic humanitarian crisis. The results were that the international community had to interviene. On 3 december, 1992, the UN Security Council, in resolution 794, authorized the Secretary-General and Member States to 'use all necessary means' to establish a secure environment for humanitarian releif operations in Somalia, as soon as possible. The United States of America has taken the lead and the "Operation Restore Hope" was called in 9 December, 1992, at the time of the landing of a US-led multinational task force in Mogadishu and the rest of the country, mainly in the south. In the North of the country things were different. On 18 may 1991, the SNM declared the self-proclaimed Somaliland Republic covering the area of former British Somaliland.

The hope that Somali people expected from the United Nations was not verified. The UN
remained only in distributing food, medicine, etc. The UN tried to find political solutions for the conflict, but lacked the appropriate approach. It tried to establish a Somali state dealing with warlords without considering the participation of civil society, such as intellectuals, women organizations, community elders, etc. The warlords were only interested in power and were ready to do everything in reaching that objective. The results were that the UN operation terminated in 1995 when armed conflict erupted between UN and warlords.

The situation in Somalia at the end of 1999 is one of without central government. The civil war continuous though some regions in the north and north-east established some form of government. In the near future and perhaps for a long time (may be another 10 years), Somalia will remain without central government. But the question is what kind of government would be established in Somalia, if central government has to come. However, one thing is sure, Somalia has experienced something that most African countries have not yet experienced, and perhaps some African states would do so in the near future, because of the legacy of the colonial and cold war period.
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK


Research of African pastoralists flourished in the last three to four decades. At present there are very good recently published books, articles, etc., of pastoralism from a social science perspectives. Major publications are:


And this chapter draws extensively on these key surveys.

In the historical materialist perspective, the pursuit of animal domestication was once thought to represent a transitional stage between hunting of animals and the domestication of crops. This myth has been put to rest through the archaeological study of the Neolithic coevolution of animal and plant domestication in central and southwest Asia. While aridity most likely played a role in the secondary diffusion of livestock throughout Africa, the somewhat contradictory myth of the nomad as the "father of the desert" has been used to explain the desiccation of the Saharan/Sahelian zone (Galaty and Bonte, 1991). This is a viewpoint far from academic which influences national and international development policy towards pastoralists throughout the arid zones of Africa5 (ibid).

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5 In recent years, viewpoints have polarized over the communal nature of pastoral production, with communal appropriation of pastures being seen as an obstacle to any "rational" form of rangeland development (Hardin and Baden, 1977). Before the consequences of widespread drought in Africa led some developmentalists to radically-question their perspective, this ideas was quite influential in the design of programs of rangeland development financed by the World Bank and many bilateral aid agencies in the 1960s and 1970s; in some countries (e.g. Kenya), it remains influential today (Bonte and
Moreover, African pastoralism occurs within a political ecology (Bennett, 1984), of local power, state influence, markets, ideological commitments and ethnic values, as well as of arid land resources. Therefore, if one wants to intervene the nomadic system of life, one should have to consider the complexity of the issue.

The way that livestock keeping peoples use the land and the consequences of land-use strategies have played a central role in the literature concerning Africa's pastoral nomads for over fifty years (McCabe, 1994:69). In this context, there are two ways of defining a pastoralist. The first is more narrow and takes as its basis the actual degree of material dependence on livestock as the main source of livelihood. The other definition is based more upon the cultural self-definition of a person or a social group (Dahl, 1991:39). Pastoralists are those who feel that they can best achieve a secure subsistence and best live a worthy life through dependence on livestock, and that such dependence supports what they consider to be fundamental human values (ibid). However, just as the fit of a particular person to the first definition is a matter of degree, a dispossessed person's belief in his or her own possibilities to re-enter pastoral life may vary. It is, however, essential to recognize that the idea of a pastoral identity sometimes is an "ethnic badge" which does not necessarily correlate with actual dependence on livestock (ibid).

However, any definition of pastoral nomadism must include two basic concepts: the raising of livestock and the movement of livestock and people. Although there is extensive literature on pastoral peoples, there is a surprising lack of detailed information on specific patterns of mobility for specific pastoral peoples (McCabe, 1994:70). Within the African context, some authors have cited this lack of information as directly contributing to the faulty design and ultimate failure of livestock development projects (Horowitz, 1981). This failure has its roots in the colonial period. During that period the dominant image of pastoralists was of lazy, warlike, lawless people who wander around looking for pasture for their herds (McCabe, 1994). This perspective was supported by Herkovits's 1926 publication on the "cattle complex", which presented a picture of East African pastoralists as having an "irrational" attachment to their cattle. Such views hold that endemic conflict and expansionism among pastoralists stems from the exigencies of herding or from the ethos or cultural character shaped

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"cattle complex: the idea that cattle are accumulated in excess of carrying capacity merely because of the prestige derived from cattle wealth, endangering their environment through overgrazing."
by herding (Bonte and Galaty, 1991:18). Colonial administrations, acting on such assumptions, sought to separate pastoral groups, but in trying to prevent conflict also inhibited interchange and exchange between them. Similarly, the notion that pastoralism is "non-progressive" has influenced the development of national and international policies toward nomadic, arid-land dwellers, for socialist and market-oriented countries alike, that promote sedentarization, which, when carried out, tends to undermine the livestock economy through inhibiting mobility (ibid). Therefore, for many years, mainstream views have held that African pastoralists overgraze; that their husbandry increases soil erosion and causes thicket encroachment on grassland (Brockington & Homewood, 1996:91). Pastoralists' stocking rates have been held to exceed the ecological carrying capacity (ibid). Moreover their land tenure practices have been seen as discouraging private investment and encouraging higher stocking rates in a classic "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968). This view of pastoralists' impact on the environmental is still manifest in popular as well as scientific literature (Sinclair and Fryxell, 1985).

Hardin (1968) was attracted by the work of mathematical amateur named William Forster Lloyd (1794-1852) who developed an argument on the unmanaged commons, which was published in 1833 with the title: Two Lectures on the Checks to Population. Hardin called it "the tragedy of the commons", using the word "tragedy" as the philosopher Whitehead used it.

The tragedy of the commons develops in this way as Hardin (1968:1244) argues:

Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.

As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "what is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one
positive component.
The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsmen receive all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.

The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of −1.

Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another....But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

This argument of Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ has dominated the future of the commons over the past 31 years. It is one of the most cited articles in the social sciences.

A. van de Laar (1990: 36) argues that Hardin’s solutions to his tragedy may only be pseudo-solutions, and that may be the real tragedy of some types of commons.

In fact, new ecological theories suggest that many pastoralist practices, until recently seen as leading to environmental deterioration, are sustainable (Homewood and Rodgers, 1987; Behnke and Scoones, 1993). In semi-arid and arid environments it is rainfall rather than levels of grazing that determines productivity. Therefore, the deterministic successional theories that once dominated rangeland ecology are now largely discredited (Smith, 1988). During the later half of the 1980s, the picture of poverty-stricken pastoralists destroying their land began to change (McCabe, 1994:84). This change resulted from a number of studies conducted in East Africa in the early and mid-1980s, and the results showed that pastoralists did not cause environmental degradation, and were adept decision-makers and environmental managers, and had viable economy and a healthy human population (McCabe, 1987, 1990; Dyson-Hudson and McCabe, 1985; Ellis and Swift, 1988; Fratkin and Roth, 1990, and others).

In the case of Hardin (1968), the 'tragedies of the commons' are not a necessary consequence of 'communal' ownership. This is to confuse resource held in common, which may be managed to prevent selfish use, with open access (Brockington and Homewood, 1996:97). Alternative theories of communal resource management and pastoral production systems suggest that pastoral people act to ensure that grazing is controlled (Berkes, 1989; Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Lane and Swift, 1989; McCabe, 1990; Homewood and Rodgers, 1991).
2.2. Pastoral rationality and environmental degradation.

Official criticism of pastoralists is that their lack of interest in exchanging cattle for cash prevents their obtaining the benefits of the cash economy in the form of consumer goods, and that their 'cattle complex' has led them in many areas to accumulate excessive numbers of cattle, endangering their environment through overgrazing (Livingstone, 1977:209). According to Livingstone, this explanation is challenged by two alternative views. The first argues that social objectives need to be taken into account, and that the numbers of cattle are not necessarily excessive if these other, perfectly rational, aims are considered. The second, 'economic' explanation is that overstocking actually follows from economic motivation: specifically, from the pursuit of private economic interests rather than social benefit.

In assessing the second, 'economic rationality' of pastoralists Livingstone (1986:6) distinguishes between the rationality of individual households and the 'collective rationality' of a community of pastoralists. The common property problem indeed assumes utility maximization by individuals, in line with economic theory (ibid).

'Economic rationality' may be used to refer to different aspects of behavior, including adherence to the profit motive or exhibition in the market of 'normal' supply responses. What is in question here is rationality with respect to cattle numbers (ibid). On the other hand, collective irrationality, defined to refer to a situation where group behavior and organization is not such as to secure the group's long run economic interest is thus synonymous with 'economic shortsightedness' (ibid). As a basis of these definitions it is necessary to examine first individual rationality.

According to Livingstone (1986:6), two important motives of why individual owners expand their cattle holdings are insurance against risk and investment for economic return.

Widstrand (1973) and others mention risk as a good reason for holding large numbers of cattle. In fact, given the risk faced by the pastoral producer in the environment in which he finds himself, the rational first objective must be survival (Livingstone, 1986:7).

The second motive, investment, can be understood in giving closer consideration of the basis of pastoralism. 'Investment is associated with the fact that livestock can, in favorable circumstances, multiply, bringing a positive rate of return (ibid). In Kenya, for example, Henriksen (1974) refers to the fact that through livestock 'the pastoralist can increase his capital without the presence of any market institutions' and that animals represent the best investment
object for practically all Turkana, giving the greatest increase on a man’s capital.
Livingstone (1986) argues that this high rate of return has been difficult to reconcile with
periodically quite serious economic situation of many pastoral groups and it is perhaps for this
reason, as well as the perceived commercial rate of off-take, which has led governments to think
of investment in pastoral systems primarily in social terms, and to look for economic returns in
non-pastoral projects such as ranches.

The second explanation given by Livingstone (1986) in holding livestock is social objective.
Holding large number of livestock may provide direct utility to the owner as a form of
demonstrable wealth and source of prestige (ibid). Livingstone argues if this motive is
irrational, it is not more than so than the purchase of large houses and expensive cars in Western
countries. However, one aspect of prestige in the case of Somalia is having more wives because
of the person’s wealth. Another social objectives are prideprice, use of cattle for ritual
purposes (such as Id-adha after Hajj in the case of Somalia, etc.). What ever is said about
pastoral rationality and reasons for holding large animals, one basic pastoralist aim is the
ensuring of continuity.

However, conventional range management never worked very well on Africa's open ranges
(Oxby, 1981, 1982; Perrier, 1990). With hindsight, this failure can be attributed to an attempt to
impose equilibrium-style management regimes --including exclusive tenure --in predominantly
non-equilibrium environments11 (Behnke, 1994:9). Current ecological research and theory no
longer support this endeavor. The advantages of herd mobility in a non-equilibrium setting are
now recognized, as are the virtues of non-exclusive tenure arrangements that make mobility
possible (ibid). Once considered to be an impediment to scientific management, 'customary'

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11Equilibrium environments are those that show the classic feedback mechanisms normally assumed in
mainstream range management. In such settings vegetation change is gradual, following classical
successional models (Clements, 1916; Stoddart et al., 1975). Livestock populations are in turn limited by
available forage in a density-dependent manner, so that excessive animal numbers, above a 'carrying
capacity' level, result in negative effects on the vegetation. In the longer term this is assumed to cause more
or less permanent damage --degradation or desertification. Such environments are typically found in wetter
areas with more predictable patterns of rainfall (Scoones, 1994). By contrast, in non-equilibrium
environments range degradation is not such an issue. Production potentials of both grassland and livestock
are so dominated by rainfall (or other external variables) that the livestock populations are kept low through
the impact of drought or other episodic events. Livestock, under such conditions, do not have a long-term
negative effect on rangeland resources (However, impacts on tree resources are more complex, as heavy
browsing or extensive lopping may affect long-term productivity due to slow regeneration rates [Bayer and
Waters-Bayer, 1994]). Such non-equilibrium environments have highly dynamic ecosystems and are
typified by the arid or semi-arid zones where rainfall variability is high (Scoones, 1994).
pastoral tenure arrangements are now seen to provide an appropriate foundation for formal programmes of resource management (Lane and Moorehead, 1993; Lane and Scoones, 1993).

Having said this, however, as Bonte and Galaty have critically examined the pastoralism in Africa, myths, misconceptions, simplifications and overgeneralizations about pastoralists pervade our popular and academic vision of Africa. Indeed, Horowitz and Little (1987) trace this view back to the fourteenth century. One common denominator of the received ideas considered here is that they rest on neo-Malthusian assumptions concerning the relationships between society and environmental change (Leach and Mearns, 1996:4). However, attention to historical detail, and the shedding of theoretical straitjackets in ecology, have converged with a better understanding of the land-use practices of Africa's farmers and herders, and of their own ecological knowledge and views of landscape change (ibid: 5). This is simply provided in recent work by social anthropologists and others (e.g. Croll and Parkin, 1992; Richards, 1985; Ellis and Swift, 1988; Fairhead, 1992; Chambers et al., 1989; Warren et al., 1995), following some notable precedents (e.g. Allan, 1965; De Schlippe, 1956).

However, the stabilizing assumptions of policy makers substitute for the rich diversity of people's historical interactions with particular environments (Leach and Mearns, 1996:8). Even when they embrace debate, such debates often reduce the world to two dimensions in a simplified and ultimately unhelpful way. Environment and development discourse is replete with examples, frequently taking the form of 'bad'/good' dichotomies: 'tragedy of the commons' versus common property resource management; farmers' ignorance versus 'indigenous technical knowledge'; Malthusian degradation versus Boserupian intensification, and so on (ibid).

Moreover, many of the colonial (recent) scientists to whom have been referred as having a disproportionate influence over the early origins of received wisdom about African environmental change were not only scientists (Leach and Mearns, 1996:18-19). In most cases, they were employed as public servants, and played decisive roles in colonial policy formulation and administration. The botanist Pole Evans, for example, is also credited with having shaped the draconian Natural Resources Act (1942) in Rhodesia and the Swynnerton Plan (1954) for agricultural intensification in Kenya (Scoones, 1996), and in Nigeria, the forest conservation enthusiast Moloney came to be Governor of Lagos Colony (Grove, 1994), and many others.
Nevertheless, the hypotheses of these colonial scientists became institutionalized in the colonial agricultural, forestry, livestock and wildlife departments, forming the rationale for intervention (Leach and Mearns, 1996:19). Thus even if the scientific analyses to provide empirical support to early contentions about the relationships between rainfall and deforestation, or stocking density and range condition, had not yet been carried out, the agenda for such analysis was already set through the establishment of these institutions. And in turn, the persistence of these institutional structures provided a context in which their analysis could remain dominant (ibid).

In fact, national governments in Africa in the 1970s were searching for a justification to maintain their preeminent position in rural development, and to rescue an ideology, already failing at that time, of authoritarian intervention in rural land use. 'Desertification' was the crises scenario they used to claim rights to stewardship over resources previously outside their control (Roe, 1995). Pastoralists came in for special blame. Although the UNCOD\textsuperscript{12} plan of action performed a delicate balancing act between those (mainly governments) who wished to settle pastoralists, and those who considered mobility an advantage in using extensive and variable rangelands, national plans to combat desertification generally took a simpler view: pastoralists were prime culprits in the 'tragedy of the commons', structurally unable to manage the land conservatively; their goats were especially damaging and they themselves lopped and felled trees indiscriminately; and their irrational attachment to livestock numbers and unwillingness to sell animals quickly led to overgrazing in the fragile marginal dry environments of the desert edge. This 'mainstream view' (Sandford, 1983) underlay most national plans about the rangelands and their extensive pastoral economies in the 1970s and 1980s, and to some extent still does.

\textsuperscript{12} UNCOD= United Nations Conference on Desertification.
2.3. Pastoral development and politics.

The critical fact of recent and modern times for pastoral peoples is the rise of the state and its consolidation of control through military means (Salzman, 1980:131). A dominant concept related to this is that of *encapsulation*. This refers to the encapsulation of a pastoralist way of life by the broad processes of technological, social and political change, as especially manifested in the actions of the state (Kavoori, 1996:7). In other words, indigenous pastoral politics is basically decentralized segmentary politics involving autonomous, contingent groupings, whereas the politics of encapsulation is a struggle for control, for domination on one side and autonomy on the other, between a vast, supraregional, centralized entity and smaller local and regional populations (Salzman, 1980:131).

Throughout the colonial period in Africa, received wisdom about environmental change served to justify the formation and funding of national-level executive agencies with responsibility for environmental management (Leach and Mearns, 1996: 20). As Leach and Mearns (ibid: 23) argue, the reliance of African governments on foreign assistance for environment-related ‘development’ activities is by no means new. In the colonial period, for example, following the attention generated by Africa-wide environment conferences, funding envelopes often became available for which colonial administrations could apply (ibid).

Sedentarization has been the preferred policies to achieve full control of pastoralists. Like their colonial predecessors, post-colonial governments encouraged the settlement of pastoralists as they saw in it important economic and political benefits (Azarya, 1996:76). They pushed for the commercialization of stock and tried to take over the land in order to put it into more profitable use. Nomads clinging to their way of life saw their freedom of movement and their access to pastures steadily diminished (ibid).

Moreover, forced to contend with nomads’ tendency to ignore international borders and elude taxation or customs regulations, they also have to answer to politicians’ concern that nomads are unproductive elements in societies that desperately need the participation of all members (Gunn, 1990:30). Therefore, not surprisingly, sedentexarization as mode of nomad development has taken place in many African countries including Algeria, Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mali, etc. (ibid).

The literature is full of examples of post-colonial governments attempts to induce or to force
pastoral people to settle permanently, and adopt new herding and marketing techniques, combine animal husbandry with agriculture, send their children to school, in short realign themselves with centrally determined priorities and policies (Salzman, 1982; Galaty, 1980; Hedlund, 1979; Fumagalli, 1978; Arhem, 1985a; Monod, 1975; Frantz, 1975). However, these schemes were motivated by a vision of developing the land rather than the people and paid little attention to local wishes and interests (Galaty, 1980).

In the case of Somalia, Italian companies in the south of Somalia launched the first formal projects in the early 1890s. Their objective, however, was not development (Karp, 1960). The intention of the large banana and sugar plantations which were being established was to support the domestic Italian fruit industry and absorb Italian emigrants; money was invested to create profitable companies, not to develop Somalia (Gunn, 1990:46). Only later, in the first decades of the twentieth century, were efforts made to link these schemes to the maintenance of the colonial government (ibid). A “development” strategy, however, clearly existed under the Italians: irrigated plantation agriculture based on mechanization and a large corps of unskilled workers, producing export commodities (ibid). However, the strategy remained very much the same even after the independence. The theory underlying it at this time, as Gunn (1990:47) argues, was that the necessary precondition for improving the welfare of the nation was self-sufficiency. By substituting local foods, textiles, and machinery for imported ones, the economic benefits could be widely spread throughout the society through employment in the industries, which produced them, and through lower consumer prices (ibid).

In the case of British Somaliland, before the independence, different policies were followed by the British administration. The nomadic way of life remained the main economic activity of the colonial government. Development is mainly directed towards enlarging and improving grazing lands, and improving stock-breeding and its products (Contanzo, 1955: 8).

However, the development plans of the post-colonial governments, in practice, meant concentration of all efforts on the urban areas, and to a lesser extent rural areas, particularly not included in the process of development was the nomadic majority of the population. This can be attributed to the fact that the southern elite, with its larger population and greater political maturity, pressed for the adoption of institutions that it inherited from the Italian administration, mainly the development of modern high technology agriculture and a sophisticated bureaucracy.
The adoption of these institutions has left little room for manoeuvre for the policies, which Contanzo (as mentioned above in chapter 2) ascribed to the British for the benefit of the northerners. As a result the nomads have been excluded from political recruitment and as a group of accountability, and the little benefit that nomads received was some water-wells here and there, even when nomadic sector has been contributing the lion share of country’s foreign earning, to enhance the nomads’ loyalty to the government. On the other side, the government’s relationship with the cultivators was in the opposite direction, where substantial share in resource allocation went mainly to the cultivators of export crops (such as banana, sugar, cotton, etc.) and they have been considered by the government as a group of accountability. This has led to somewhat larger inclusion of this group in political recruitment and government’s legitimacy has been increased in this area, which means that things continued in the same direction of Italian policies.

Therefore, the colonial and post-colonial development strategies in Somalia have undermined the reality of the Somali population and that of Somali economy. The majority of the population is engaged in pastoral-nomadic activities, and the economy of the country depends heavily on this sector. However, all the governments, colonial and post-colonial alike, pursue similar strategies mentioned above. But the question is: why the post-colonial governments of Somalia preferred to settle nomads when the majority of the population are nomads, eco-climatical factors are uncertain and the elite themselves are one way or another engaged in pastoral nomadic system of life and their recent background is nomadic life?

The answer of this question lies in the nature of the Somali State (partly discussed in chapter two of this paper). However, a clearer understanding could be obtained looking at the recent changes in Somali pastoral sector (This issue is further elaborated in chapter four and five of this paper).

According to Gunn (1990:43, citing from Samatar, 1987:IV-2), rapid change has occurred mainly since 1950s when the livestock industry became increasingly commercialized and a new trader class, brokered by government civil servants, began to monopolize economic and political channels and to appropriate previously communal resources for their own use. Ultimately, these forces --commercialization without substantive improvements in production methods, coupled with privatization of land that alienates poorer agricultural producers from the land --has led to overuse of the pastures. This in turn has contributed to desertification and to the creation of a
marginal class whose members in times of drought become refugees, as is amply proven by recent events (ibid). Swift has constructed a rough terms of trade table and cost of living index using official statistics from five different periods during the last 130 years. He has used these to show that the nomads' purchasing power has eroded, leaving livestock sellers in a "precarious position with regard to household cereal requirements....[which] goes a long way towards explaining the famine" of 1974-1975 (Swift, 1979). Aronson (1980), building on this argument as well as his own field study in connection with a World Bank Agriculture Sector Review, emphasizes the role that this process has played in creating a bourgeois broker class. He concludes that a very small group of traders (at most 150, of whom 50 dominate the rest) have come to control livestock export and importation of goods, with the active complicity of the government. They are supported in this by a rising bourgeoisie centered in the central government bureaucracy which depends on this trade to supplement their modest salaries and enable them to acquire Western goods.

Therefore, part of the explanation of the question raised earlier could be that such bourgeoisie group controls the livestock policies and thus foster sedentarization and range enclosure to ensure their wealth growth. Part of this group is rooted in the colonial government's indigenous civil servants, and the other part of the group has formed during the two Somali successive governments since independence (1960-69 and 1969-1991).

Moreover, a further implication was the relative shift of the locus of power and power relations away from the interaction between the various pastoral groups within what was basically a stateless society (Doombos and Markakis, 1994: 14). Instead, significant aspects of this power were transferred to the urban-based administrative and political centre, which thus became an important new element and player in the field (ibid). Doornbos and Markakis argue that this centre soon began to relate and to respond more to the needs and interests of emerging new categories like merchants, traders, exporters and urban property owners, than to the ongoing requirements of pastoralism. Within the perspective of the new classes, pastoralism began to be treated less as a distinct way of life and more as an economic resource to be tapped. The political initiative was taken away from the pastoral sphere and the political marginalization of the pastoralists began (Doornbos, 1993).

Moreover, Salzman (1979: 434) noted that an important consequence of state encapsulation of pastoralists was the creation of a new group who depended much less on their kinsmen than on
resource suppliers from outside their native society. In this context, Swift (1979) reported on the Somali that the rapid increase of livestock sales tended to strengthen the economic position of intermediaries and rich owners and introduced much greater division and inequality into the pastoral society, which was fairly egalitarian in the past. In this context, also Ahmed Samatar (1988) argues that the commercialization of pastoralism and its integration into the global economy, and its subordination to a centralized state have changed the structure of the Somali traditional system. He argues that the traditional kinship structure was based on the communal mode of production, governed by cultural and political norms and institutions.

These developments led to more political and economic unrest throughout the first nine years of civilian government’s rule (1960-1969) and even throughout the period of socialist government (1969-1991). As the urban sedentary population tried to assert its leadership position, nomadic pastoralist groups found themselves increasingly marginalized in the independent state even though they formed the majority of the population (Doornbos, 1993: 114-119). The result is the breakdown of the Somali state. The pastoral and decentralized northern and central Somali became peripheral participants in the post-colonial state, and therefore the former British Somaliland have proclaimed to have been regained its independence from the south (the former Italian Somaliland) in May 1991. However, whether the justification is true or not, the north experienced peace and stability in the last years, whereas the south (consisting of population of nomadic majority and minority of settled agriculture) is still unstable.
CHAPTER FOUR: INTEGRATION OF PASTORALIST PRODUCERS INTO THE WIDER ECONOMY

The Chapter discusses the integration of pastoralists into world economy. It discusses the precapitalist trade and its organization. It then discusses the changes of this trade, and how the sector became integrated into the wider economy during the colonial and post-colonial period. The impact of this change on the pastoralists and the environment in which they live, is then analyzed, with emphasis on the position of women.

4.1. Background.

In almost every country in the world, nomadic pastoralists are a small and economically relatively unimportant minority, but in Somalia they are nearly two-thirds of the population and about two-thirds of the country's exports originate from this sector (JASPA\ILO, 1977:71). Clearly, Somalia's present structure of climatic, physical, and human condition is a pastoral country (see table 2). In fact, livestock is the mainstay of Somalia's economy, where 2.5 million people, approximately 60 per cent of the population, depend largely on nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral production, and a further 0.8 million, approximately 20 per cent of the population, are mixed crop and livestock producers (World Bank, 1981:Vol.II: p.2). Regrettably, as for other aspects on Somali social and economic life, there have been few good studies of the production systems of these 80 per cent of the population of Somalia (Hoben et al., 1983:54). Furthermore, another considerable number of people are dependent on the livestock commerce in Somalia and added this number to that of 80 per cent one could estimate that 85-90 per cent of Somali population are economically dependent on the pastoral sector. Moreover, the pastoral sector of Somalia provides 38 per cent of the preferred live-slaughtered meat for the whole Arabian Peninsula and holds first rank there as source of livestock imports (Hoben et al., 1983:53).

Surprisingly, despite the tremendous importance of pastoralism for the majority of the population and of the livestock sector for the country's economy, only a very small percentage of the national budget is allocated (it will further be elaborated in Chapter Five of this paper) to programs benefiting pastoralists (Samatar, 1985), which are badly needed to improve the living standards of the nomads.
Table 2. Some important features of Somalia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population:</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pop. estimate 1994: 8,954,000; growth rate: 3.1%; population under 15 years: 46.0%</td>
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<tr>
<th>Social and Economic Indicators:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP per capita ($US): 120 (1990); fertility rate (1993): 7.0; infant mortality per thousand: 121.7; life expectancy (1992): 47</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total area (sq.km.): 637,657; arid land (% of total): 75; cropland (% of total): 2</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livestock:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle: 5,000,000; camels: 6,000,000; sheep: 13,000,000; goats: 12,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: John Markakis, 1998: table nr. 1.1, p. 8; table nr. 1.2, p. 9; table nr. 2.1, p. 30; table nr. 2.2, p. 42.

In Somalia, there are at least three traditional livestock production systems in the country, mainly (i). Nomadic pastoralism exercised in most of the country, especially in the central and northern parts; (ii). Agro-pastoralism exercised in the southern part, especially in the inter-riverine area; and (iii). Specialized dairy (milk) production by urban and peri-urban dwellers. Since the third category is marginal and not developed in Somalia, in this paper, the first and to some extent the second will be analyzed.

4.1.1. Ecological and Climatic conditions.

If one wants to understand the Somali pastoral system, one should have some knowledge of the Somali's ecological and climatic conditions, which influence the pastoralists' way of life. The quantity of pasture and water available for the livestock depends on the rainfall. The country's climate is hot and dry: the average annual temperature is about 27 °C and annual rainfall averages less than 430 mm (NDC\(^\text{13}\): 49). In Somalia there are four seasons: the main rains or wet season is called Gu (from April to June); the dry season is called Jiilaal (from January to March); coast-rains season is called Xagaa (from July to September) and lastly, subsidiary or short rains before Jiilaal called Dayr (from October to December).

Eco-climatically, Somalia can be divided into three major zones (World Bank, 1981:5-6), which are:

1. The North-West Zone. This zone has an average rainfall 400 mm/year, and a semi-Mediterranean climate. This zone people engage in agro-pastoralist activities and cattle, goats and sheep are the main livestock;

2. Central and Northern Zone, which has an average rainfall between 50-100 mm/year. The

\(^{13}\) NDC= Netherlands Development Cooperation
majority of the population engages in nomadic pastoralism, rearing mainly goats, camels and sheep;

3. Southern Zone. The average rainfall is 600 mm/year. Here people engage different activities, some are mainly farmers, some agropastoralists, and others exclusively are nomadic pastoralists (see Maps A, B, and E in Appendix 2).

Pastoralists use also other terms, speaking about *DOOG* (fresh grazing- which correspond the wet season) and *ABAAR* (drought- which correspond the dry season). In other words one is the season of happiness and plenty, while the other is the season of struggle for survival of both human and livestock. The *Gu* season, the production of milk and meat is the highest. It is also the time, as Lewis (1961:50-56) has observed, when the nuclear family is united as the separation of the two herding units (Camel constitute one type of herd and graze long distance than home-base, and goats and sheep constitute the other and graze smaller distance) is not practiced; when previous social disputes are settled and bride-contracts established in the *Jiilaal* are finalized; when ritual and religious ceremonies are set up, more guests are accepted and hence, more animals are slaughtered or sold and debts are repaid. On the opposite, the *Jiilaal* time stocks are dispersed to graze in the pastures of distance places, surplus animals are sold or slaughtered, if old or weak, and stored on the roof. Social disputes around the water points are common in the *Jiilaal*.

4.2. Pre-colonial livestock trade and its organization.

For centuries, Somali nomads have exchanged pastoral and wild products for agricultural and manufactured goods. Local exchange was part of a long-distance trading network linking the north-east coast of Africa, Egypt, the coasts of Arabia, Persia and India (Swift, 1979:448). Indian cloth from Gujerat was sent to East Africa by the thirteenth century. Ports such as Zeila and Berbera in the north, and Mogadishu in the south, provided the link between foreign traders, Somali local produce and caravans of goods from the interior of Africa. When Ibn Battuta traveled from Aden to Zeila and Mogadishu in January 1330 A.D., all three towns where rich from commerce in ivory, rhinoceros horn, gums, ostrich feathers, and hides and skins. In 1511 Jedda (Saudi Arabia) imported meat from Zeila and Berbera, and Indian cloth, glas beads, raisins and dates were sent to Somalia from Aden (ibid).
However, this trade changed after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, increasing the strategic value of the region. Britain, which occupied Aden long before the opening of Suez Canal, has expanded its strategic interest in the region and therefore come now to colonize north Somalia. The first objective of British colonization in Somalia was to procure meat for the British garrison in Aden (see Chapter Two). The central rationale for establishing the colony was to secure trade routes and merchant capital, as the agent of the colonial empire was left alone to engage the pastoral society and find ways to secure the livestock (Samatar, 1987:360).

A stated goal of livestock policy in Somalia and throughout tropical Africa by colonial and post-colonial governments is to increase the exploitation of existing animal resources and improve the marketing efficiency of traditional livestock marketing circuits. Put simply, the government hopes to be able to increase offtake, improve the quality of marketed livestock, decrease marketing costs and expand the capacity of the marketing network (Abdullahi, 1990:145). A comprehensive of the workings of the current marketing systems is critical if policy makers want to implement useful policies for the pastoralists. It needs to understand fully the organization of traditional livestock trading.

Institutions to organize this commerce were established at early date, more than 700 years ago. The passage of wealthy caravans through the territory of several potentially hostile nomad clans was made possible by the employment of a patron or abbaan, who brought the full force of his lineage to the protection of the caravan; an attack on the caravan would be an attack on the honor of the abbaan's lineage and appropriate reparations would be demanded (Lewis, 1962). In the ports, the abbaan acted as lodger, commission agent and guarantor, through whom all foreign trade was transacted. This system is of considerable antiquity, since it was described in detail by Ibn Battuta during his visit to Mogadishu in 1330 (Swift, 1979:449). Although the ability of the abbaan to act as intermediary with foreign traders depended in part on his position in relation to a Somali pastoral lineage, the gulf between nomad and sophisticated urban dweller widened at early stage, to the disadvantage of the nomad (ibid: 450) as Burton (1894, vol.1: 19) has observed in 1854 at the port Zeila.
4.3. Integration of Pastoralist Producers and Social Impact During the Colonial and Post-colonial Period.

The establishment of the colonial state, improvements in communication, and the steady penetration of merchant capital into the pre-capitalist economy began to alter the organization of pastoral/livestock trade. The old *abbaan*-based system was gradually displaced by the *Dilaal-Sawaaqui*-merchant chain ("dilaal" means broker, "Sawaaqui" is the drover) (Geshekter, 1985). This change has led to the creation of new class of merchants in the livestock sector, replacing even the foreign traders who was importing grain, sugar, cloths, and many other commodities. In later years, some of these merchants were involved in the political system of the post-colonial governments.

The livestock trading chain is very sophisticated. Tiny trading settlements - a teashop, a provision shop or two, and perhaps a few craftsmen's workshops- have grown up in a fine network. In these settlements, intermediaries in the livestock trade begin the assembly of commercial herds (Hoben et al., 1983:67). Herders may bring their animals into sell and consign the animals to a *dilaal*, who can be trusted both to know the details of market conditions (including the reliability of the buyers, promises of later payment) and to secure the best deal for his principals. In the north each transaction is a private bargain; in the southern agricultural areas the market is by auction. Middle links in the marketing chain may be roving agents of major traders or exporters, or sedentary speculators called *gedisley* who buy on their own account, recondition weaker animals around the settlements, and resell to traders' agents late in the rainy season. Once in the export channel, traders have the animals they have bought trekked or trucked to the major holding areas outside the port towns, above all to the lands around Burao and Hargeisa in the north, but also to the Afgoi areas outside Mogadishu in the south. Except for a variety of tax payments at the various markets, financial transactions routed by licensed exporters (called *ganacsato*) through governments banks, a final government inspection, and shipment abroad, all of the fundamental marketing operations are privately organized and managed (ibid: 68). The ganacsato are linked with the Arabian countries' licensed importers or *ganacsato*, especially Saudi Arabia.

This complicated system of livestock trading is affecting the nomads negatively because they receive very low prices for their animals. The traders involved in the different levels of the chain
(see figure 1 below) want to get more profits and in this way the nomads were exploited by these traders. Moreover, the little benefit that the nomads receive has to be given back to the traders for exchange of water and other commodities such as grain, clothes, etc. Since the arrival of colonial powers new systems of collecting water have developed and investments in water have been undertaken by the rich herd-owners or merchants. They invested in cement water tanks and own lorries to transport water in the dry season in the remote areas where nomads seek for pasture.

Figure 1. Present Livestock trading chain

In spite of this tremendous commercialization of the pastoral economy, the colonial, post-colonial and even the private merchants have not altered the pastoral production system. Swift (1979:453) argues that the increase of livestock trade did not reflect a sustained increase in pastoral production, but rather that the demand-led boom in marketed livestock, especially notable after the 1950s (Oil boom in Arabian countries), has been created by superimposing a modern marketing operation on a largely traditional production system; this has induced a shift from a principally subsistence economy to a much more market-oriented one, without real development. There has been investment in new water supplies and in control of animal diseases, but there were few other planned changes in pastoral production, and thus little increase in the productivity of land or labor. As a result, Swift argues, as pastoral producers
were drawn further into the market they become increasingly vulnerable to changes in the relative prices of their products and those they bought. This has social and economic consequences and it can be argued that Somali pastoralists are in fact fighting for survival in politically and socio-economically.

In a pastoral economy, each year the herds produce young animals. The females are retained to replace old females and to build up breeding stock; a few males are needed for reproduction, but except for male camels or cattle used for transport (which happens only on small scale in Somalia), the remaining male animals can be disposed of without affecting the reproductive or milk-producing capacity of the herd (Swift, 1979:453). These surplus male animals can be eaten, exchanged for necessary goods or stored "on the hoof" to be sold or eaten at some future date in case of emergency.

As Swift (1979:454) argues, increased demand for livestock, and increased perceived needs by herdsmen as a result of greater contact with the modern world, lead to changes in this strategy, and the beginning of a shift from a principally subsistence to a more commercial pastoral economy. This generally leads to a shift away from risk-avoiding strategies and a reduction in the ability of the pastoral economy to protect its members in times of crises. I agree with Swift who adds that where these changes are accompanied by the formation of a modern state, the authority of which is simultaneously spreading in pastoral areas, some of the political, social and economic functions of the pastoral society may also be shifted to the machinery of a central government.

However, in Somalia case, livestock marketing remained with less control of the state. In Somalia not only are there no marketing boards for livestock exports, but export take place at essentially free-market exchange rates and the resulting prices are passed on to the livestock owners (Jamal, 1988:244). As Jamal observed, the only control government maintained was that the total quantity of exports should be reported officially and earnings should be remitted at the official exchange rate. Here Jamal has not considered that the state controlled to whom would be given the license for livestock export and he also did not consider that nomads are not really part of this free-market. Swift has strongly discussed on this point.

I Agree with Swift (1979:463) who argues that, with the rapid rise in livestock sales, during
1950s, the position of the intermediaries class (the abbaan and later the dilaal, gedisley, ganacsato) was consolidated and their economic power strengthened. Somali pastoral society, which had been politically and economically egalitarian, became increasingly divided and unequal. Swift adds that the beginnings of a process of economic and social differentiation appear in the formation of a wealthy urban livestock trading class, with strong links to the post-colonial governments, and in the progressive breakdown of the former collective obligations and social and economic organization of the traditional pastoral economy.

This class of petit bourgeoisie wanted always to settle the nomads for reasons mentioned in Chapters Three and Five in this paper, and the governments was willing to support this objective because livestock rearing was the most significant economic activity in Somalia, and the economic surplus generated by pastoral production was the main source of finance to run the state machinery and to invest in development (but not invested in the real sector which contributed the most- the livestock sector).

Somalia exported live animals to the Gulf States and assures good place in Arabian markets since the 1950s. Livestock trade to the Arabian countries was stimulated by Somalia's comparative advantage for those markets to which Somalia exports live animals. Shipping routes to the Arabian countries are short and less costly. The preference for live animals rather than for dressed meat can be explained by the lack of adequate refrigeration facilities and the requirements of the Muslim ritual slaughter, about which the importing on the Pan-Arabian Peninsula, are particular (Konczacki, 1978). It is widely recognized that the Somali pastoralists are the exception to the rules of traditional pastoral societies in other parts of the world which are typically not commercially oriented but rather subsistence producers of dairy products who rarely sell livestock (Konczacki, 1978; Swift, 1979; Holtzman, 1982). As figure 2 below shows Somalia was the major exporter of live animals to Saudi Arabia. Some commentators argue that the willingness of pastoralists to market large number of livestock was because of the good prices they received (Reusse, 1982). Swift (1979) contradicts this contention by noting that the pastoralists had lost ground to the merchants. As a result of the buoyancy of the Saudi market and Somali state's encouragement of free livestock market, Somali livestock exports increased phenomenally after independence (Samatar, 1985). The figure 2 below shows that livestock exports between 1972 and 1981 showed no increase for the sheep and goats. This can be attributed to the 1973-74 drought (or better known Dabadheer- the long-tailed drought). Due to
the fantastic increase in demand for meat in Saudi Arabia, by the late 1970s, few Somali animal exports were generating more than three and half times the revenue of 1972 (JASPA/ILO, 1982:10). It is apparent from the increases in the prices of livestock exports that pastoral production, despite the quantitative decline in live animal exports, had done very well against inflation (Jamal, 1983:297). However, it is unclear the proportional gains of livestock merchants and producers from the windfall. Jamal (1983), Reusse (1982), and Holtzman (1984) estimate that producers benefited from the price surge; Swift (1979), Samatar (1985), and Aronson (1980) suggest that pastoral terms of trade have progressively deteriorated.

Figure 2


Source: Samatar, Salisbury, and Bascom, 1988:p.87, table nr.1. (see appendix I, table 2)

As can be seen from the two figures 2 (above) and 3 (below), livestock exports stagnated in the period between 1974 and 1980. However, Somalia's share in the Saudi market for small
livestock has continued and maintained to occupy in a good place. Saudi’s import statistics for small ruminants in 1970s and 1980 shows that, despite the 1974-75 drought, and the war with Ethiopia, Somalia was always in first place, while Australia was second, and Sudan occupied third place. Syrian small ruminant export to Saudi Arabia was increasing but not as much as the Australians. Although Australia constitutes the largest potential competitor, most of its livestock exports go to the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula while virtually all Somali exports go directly to the Red Sea port of Jeddah (Samatar, et al., 1988:94). This Saudi market provides for Somalis good opportunities in economic development but it increased greatly the one-sided economic dependence on Saudi market.

Figure 3

Number of small ruminant imports into Saudi Arabia by country/region, 1970-1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Syria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3,400,000</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>3,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>3,400,000</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The following scenario, given by Samatar (1989:126), shows how the pastoral terms of trade has deteriorated. A pastoralist sells sheep to trader and usually gets no more than 50 per cent of the price paid at the livestock market in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia)\(^4\). The trader must remit a portion

\(^4\)Jamal (1983:298-299) indicates that in most years the pastoralists receive two-thirds of the full price.
of the foreign exchange (usually 70%) back to Somalia through the national bank at the official rate of exchange. Through taxes, the government gets about 10-15 per cent of the total value. The trader then invests the unremitting foreign exchange 20-25 per cent, in merchandise such as rice and sugar, which are imported at undervalued prices to Somalia and then sold at exorbitant prices in the "open" market. The pastoralist, who is a consumer of these commodities, must pay these prices. Moreover, the commercialization of livestock in Somalia has changed the type and composition of herds that nomads are keeping. The number of small ruminants has increased, as can be seen from table 3 below, since this provided good market in Saudi Arabia. The trend to small ruminants has especially negative effects on the ecological balance (Janzen, 1986:49). Grazing as a rule in large herds, these animals not only increase the danger of erosion through loosening the soil with their hooves but also, in contrast to the camel, tear out plants by the roots and nibble the bark from trees, thus causing a high degree of damage to the vegetation and contributing to the desertification process (ibid.).

Table 3. The increase of the livestock number in Somalia, 1977, and 1983-1991 (Million head).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camels</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the light of the above facts it appears that with the increasing market integration of the pastoral system its dependency on market prices and terms of exchange steadily increases. As a result, pastoralists are increasingly vulnerable to changes in relative prices for their products and for those they buy (Abdullahi, 1990:163). Therefore, I agree with Samatar, Aronson, and Swift, who argue that the Somali nomad is left without any ability to break the government alliance with the traders.

Moreover, the contacts arising through the stock trade with and labor migration to the oil-producing countries have had an immense influence on the traditional economic and social structure of Somali nomad society (Janzen, 1984; Swift, 1977). This commercialization of livestock sector has led the formation of a class of bourgeoisie as has been discussed in the previous sections of this paper.
4.4. The role of women in the Somali pastoral society.

While increased attention has been focused on the way in which changes during and since the colonial era have impacted on pastoral societies, the position of women in these societies has received relatively little attention (Joekes and Pointing, 1991:1). By contrast, during the same period, the deleterious impact on women of continuing processes such as increasing monetization of the rural economy, privatization of land, and commercialization of agriculture has been well documented (Palmer, 1985; Henn, 1984; Whitehead, 1987; Guyer, 1984). In pastoral society women do most of the labor needed to sustain the subsistence way of life of the nomadic households.

In the Somalia case, the smallest children, both male and female, take care of the newly born livestock, usually within view of the adults in the camp (Kapteijn, 1991:2). As boys and girls approach their teens, it is social preference that girls herd the flocks and help their mothers, while boys join the camel camp, which often bring together the camels of a wider kin group than represented in the base-camp and which is, in the dry season, often far removed from both the base-camp and the wells (ibid.). On the other hand, women's responsibilities in the pastoral societies include the on-going and time-consuming task of house building and maintenance. For nomadic women, this entails dismantling the houses, loading them on the donkeys (and in the Somalia case on camels) for transportation, and rebuilding them at the next camp (Joekes and Pointing, 1991: 6). Women perform all domestic chores such as preparation of food, hides and skins, fetching firewood and water, and are responsible for the rearing of children, and they are also often closely involved in the care of livestock, being responsible for the feeding, watering and care of young and sick animals, as well as for herding those kept near the homestead, and they are responsible often for milking and marketing of dairy products (ibid.).

Despite these heavy tasks, women are excluded from major decision-making and control over livestock. On the other hand, the pastoral policy-makers exclude also the role of women from the design and implementation of pastoral projects. Moreover, commercialization of the economy, sedentarization, and introduction of new economic opportunities and activities, such as wage labor and agricultural production, all imply substantial changes within the pastoral social system and, in particular, in the opportunities and resulting role and status of women...
(Broch-Due, et al., 1980: 251). These change means more hard work for women for several reasons. Firstly, increasing sedentarization and degradation of grasslands means that the herds tend to be kept at cattle posts in remote areas, away from the homestead. Secondly, the growing importance of beef production and marketing of stock is adversely affecting women's property rights in livestock. Women now complain that their animals are among the first to be sold (Ensminger, 1984: 64). There appears to be a tendency for men to appropriate women's rights to livestock without negotiation or permission, as traditionally required (Dahl, 1979; 261; Talle, 1988: 224).

In the Somalia case, the commercialization of livestock had a significant impact on the division of labor in three main ways. First, the introduction of cement water reservoirs (called berkad), mainly after 1950s, led the formation of small settlements around this berkad, where small shops were opened mainly to sell grain, clothes, and qaat (Catha edulis)¹⁵ and thee (shaah). This has attracted more males to spend their days in these small settlements, and thus leaving more work for women in looking after the herds and the family. Second, the livestock trade with the Arabian Peninsula has led to the migration of pastoral young men to seek wage labor in the Gulf States (mainly after 1975). This has brought far-reaching changes in social and family structures that have hardly been researched thus far (Janzen, 1986: 49). Many married women see their husbands only once every one or two years, and family conflicts are intensified when returned migrant is wealthy enough to be able to afford an additional, younger wife (ibid.). Janzen adds that since women are obliged to take on the tasks of the absent men, their workload has intensified considerably, but their greater independence strengthens their social standing.

Third, the commercialization of livestock has increased the men's control over livestock and therefore women have been marginalized.

Therefore, it is very important that a policy design or an analysis of pastoral society and its production system should take into account women's role in the pastoral society. However, pastoral women are by no means an undifferentiated, homogeneous group, and it is therefore essential that policies address the different needs of different groups, and thus targeting can be effectively aimed at the poorest and most vulnerable (Joekes and Pointing, 1991: 24).

¹⁵ Khat or Qaat is a natural stimulant from the Catha Edulis plant, found in the flowering evergreen tree or large shrub, which grows in East Africa and Southern Arabia. It reaches heights from 10 feet to 20 feet. Fresh Qat leaves, which are typically chewed like tobacco, produce mild cocaine- or amphetamine-like euphoria.
CHAPTER FIVE: SOMALI PASTORALISTS AND STATE'S PASTORAL SECTOR POLICIES.

This Chapter discusses the pastoral policies of colonial and post-colonial governments. It discusses how the first post-colonial Somali government undermined the pastoral sector in terms of fund allocation or investment in this sector other than sedentarization. The Chapter discusses also the agricultural crash programmes and integrated projects, and how the later socialist government (1969-91) intensified these projects. The settlements of drought-stricken nomads in 1974-75 and their results will also be discussed.

5.1. Pre-colonial Pastoral Economy.

Analyzing precolonial pastoral economy is important to understand the real survival strategies of Somali pastoralists and their effectiveness. The economic and social logic of the pre-colonial Somali pastoral economy was geared principally towards minimization of risk to ensure the reproducibility of the pastoral community (Lewis, 1962; Samatar, 1985). The pre-colonial Somali pastoral economy was far from self-sufficient as Samatar (1987) argues, adding that this society bartered pastoral products such as ghee, skins, and livestock as well as products from the range such as gum, incense, ostrich feathers, and ivory for grain and clothing. In fact, the centrality of "safety first" had conditioned the organization and management of the precolonial pastoral capital, the herd, and the family's response to drought. Diverse herds, large herd size, reciprocal stock exchange between families, and geographic dispersal were elements of their risk-avoidance strategy (Samatar, 1989:24). In general, the drier the area is the larger is the size of individually held herds; the risks are higher for small herdowners than for those with larger herds in unpredictable climates (Abdullahi, 1990:28). The species-composition of herds is a reflection of their surrounding ecosystems and of the product mix required by herding households from livestock, which in turn may be a function of the size of the livestock holding. Dual-purpose multi-species herding in Somalia is the norm as a response to droughts which may affect one but not other species and to exploit fully often varied grazing niches in the mixed grass-, shrubland and wood-land range areas (ibid: 29).

Moreover, the Somali people were very active in the Nineteenth Century Commerce as Richard Burton declared over 144 years ago about the Somali mentioning that "The natives of the
country are essentially commercial" (Burton, 1894), referring in part to the fact that trade has flowed over and around the Somali country for centuries. And here the notion of irrationality was not and never existed in the Somali nomadic system. Given the eco-climatical circumstances, in which Somali pastoralists live, there were problems, which demanded always very tough solutions. The problems were conflicts between clans mostly based on pasture and water, other problems were droughts. Such problems were solved or mediated by institutions set by the pastoralists themselves. It has been noted that JILIB\textsuperscript{16} (dia\textsuperscript{17}-paying group) was the most stable and fundamental political institution (Samatar, 1989:26). The group was united by contract or XEER, which was a pledge of mutual support among the members against other Jilibs or against natural disaster such as drought. When conflicts arose elders from various levels of political segmentation gathered in a Shir (elders' council) to mediate the concerned parties and this shir was the forum in which the problems of the political unit(s) were discussed and settled (Samatar, 1989:24). One of the major agenda of the shir was to establish good ways of using the pasture and water and to care the ecology in order to live longer in that area.


The pastoral system has been changed by the interventions of colonial and post-colonial states in Somalia. However, the pastoralists managed to adapt to the new circumstances as they were adapting the eco-climatical conditions in which they lived for long time. Therefore Somali pastoralists continued their way of life even when their system of life have been seen as one in crisis by policy makers and others. The perpetual claim of crisis has justified a great variety of interventions, and almost all have failed, at least in the sense of having a positive impact on the pastoral production system(s) actually in place in Somalia (Hoben et al., 1983:53). The "pastoral problem" has been seen successively as a crisis of veterinary health, a crisis of immobility, a crisis of social control, a crisis of overpopulation, and a crisis of overgrazing. The themes have been intertwined, and the actions that were supposed to quell the particular crisis at hand have been diverse. The total contribution of these interventions to sectoral development has been negligible (ibid: 70). Therefore, both colonial and post-colonial governments saw the system as one of crisis and allocated little fund to improve the sector. These governments focused

\textsuperscript{16} jilib consisted and still consists of a number of families whose alliances were essentially based on the security needs of the member families and as the group grew in number new jilib were formed.
primarily on the settlement of nomads and put substantial amount of money into this. Despite the historic vitality of the livestock trade and the dynamic adaptation of Somali nomads to their fluctuating ecological conditions, development planners have portrayed pastoralists- like farmers- as stubbornly bound to tradition and incapable of change. This is obvious in observing the views of planners in 1960s. In fact, at independence, one zootechnician (Bozzi, 1960) held that Somali pastoralists were so constrained by climate and destructive economic competition that only radical intervention policies could enable any economic development at all. Indeed the first Minister of Agriculture, Salad Abdi Mohamud (1960) wrote at the same time of the need to regulate and rationalize land use and to sedentarize the nomads in order to increase yields and benefit pastoralists' living conditions (Hoben et al., 1983:71). Yet, the livestock exports was increasing year after year despite the colonial and post-colonial governments' interest in cash crops such as banana, sugar, etc. As shown in Table 4 below, livestock exports accounted for more than 80 per cent of the export trade in the north of Somalia, and in the south livestock export was second only to bananas in the late 1950s. Five years later (1962), however, live animals and livestock products had come to account for more than 44.6 per cent of the total value of all exports and thus competing the bananas, which accounted 44.5 per cent.

Table 4. Main Export Commodities of Somalia, 1957-1962 (Thousands of Somali Shillings).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Live animals: Amount &amp; % of total</td>
<td>20,372 (19.6%)</td>
<td>22,117 (21.6%)</td>
<td>32,920 (22.6%)</td>
<td>40,927 (24.9%)</td>
<td>51,476 (27.4%)</td>
<td>66,648 (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Products*: Amount &amp; % of total</td>
<td>14,816 (14.2%)</td>
<td>16,133 (12.4%)</td>
<td>23,303 (16 %)</td>
<td>18,271 (11.1%)</td>
<td>15,128 (8 %)</td>
<td>13,644 (7.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals: Amount &amp; % of total</td>
<td>3,177 (3.1 %)</td>
<td>2,436 (1.9 %)</td>
<td>129 (0.1 %)</td>
<td>57 (&lt;0.1 %)</td>
<td>116 (0.1 %)</td>
<td>95 (0.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar &amp; sugar products: Amount &amp; % of total</td>
<td>1,554 (1.5 %)</td>
<td>336 (0.2 %)</td>
<td>148 (0.1 %)</td>
<td>26 (&lt;0.1 %)</td>
<td>2 (&lt;0.1 %)</td>
<td>11 (&lt;0.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas: Amount &amp; % total</td>
<td>45,859 (44.2 %)</td>
<td>58,906 (45.3 %)</td>
<td>65,001 (44.6 %)</td>
<td>74,430 (45.3 %)</td>
<td>90,286 (48 %)</td>
<td>80,14 (44.5 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Animal products include meat & meat products and hides, leather, skins, & untanned products.

Dia refers to blood money for blood compensation in feuds.
Unfortunately, despite these achievements, the pastoral sector received little attention, other than sedentarization, from the newly independent government of Somalia as can be seen from table 5 below. The total agricultural budget of the First Five Year Plan was 250 millions of Somali Shillion, where the total budget for all sectors was 1400 millions of Somali Shillion (Somali Republic, 1963:97). The share of the budget towards livestock was only meant for settlement of nomads and that was 25 million So.Sh. or 10 per cent of the total expenditure of the agricultural budget as can be seen from table 5.

The entire budget (prepared by the colonial government) for agricultural development was designed to be used to establish modern agricultural enterprises and to develop “modern islands” amidst the vast traditional sector (Samatar, 1989:99). The most of the budget was allocated to an already declining sector of cash crops such as banana and other export crops. In fact, since the early 1960s and the first development plans, the Somali government has enunciated a goal of sedentarizing the nomads (Hoben, et al., 1983:71). Investment for this goal has included the provision of stock-water points, in the late 1960s with European assistance (the EEC Pilot Project) and with USAID funds, on the assumption that more water near “home” (dry season) grazing areas would induce greater stabilization of the nomadic population (ibid: 72).

Table 5. Allocation of the Agricultural Budget of the First Five-Year Plan, 1963.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Millions of So.Sh.</th>
<th>% of total expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State farms</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement of nomads</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural research</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central machinery pool</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain storage &amp; marketing</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant protection</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural extension</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date cultivation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal husbandry</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for other uses</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total agricultural budget</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Somali Republic, First Five-Year Plan, p.47. (Extracted from Samatar, 1989:table nr. 20,p.99)
However, while there may be good reasons for providing water points, sedentarization can only be contemplated, as Aronson (1980) argues, when it makes greater economic sense to feed animals year-round without nomadizing that with it—and at that point, nomads are very likely to sedentarize themselves without government intervention.

Some authors (Lewis, 1972; Samatar, 1989 and others) explain the nature of the civilian government’s crisis (in late 1960s) in terms of the competition of clans for the state apparatus, and they argue that this has led to the fragmentation of national politics. Although I agree with them to some extent in that perspective, one could argue that most of the crisis can be attributed to the degree of negligence of pastoralists by their government. Whenever policies towards pastoralists became harmful, the country was entering more and more crisis. This can be seen in the fact that the livestock merchants and traders on one side and the civil servants on the other side were losing confidence not only between them but also that of pastoralists. In fact, in the absence of other major sources of accumulation, other than banana, which was declining and which was in the hands of Italians and very few Somalis connected with Italians, the livestock sector was the only sector to build a base in order to get more power in the state apparatus. Therefore, when pastoralists did not support the policies of petite bourgeoisie, state revenues, including foreign assistance, became the target and profitable state offices had to be fought among the petite bourgeoisie. This has led to the increase of the number of political parties (see more details in Chapter 2 of this paper) in order to win a seat in the parliament or, even better, to hold a cabinet post. In fact, Lewis (1972) has noted that:

The democratic parliamentary system, which had seemed to combine so well with traditional Somali institutions, and had begun with such verve and promise, had turned distinctly sour. The National Assembly was no longer the symbol of free speech and fair play for all citizens. On the contrary, it had been turned into a sordid marketplace where deputies traded their votes for personal rewards with scant regard for the interests of their constituents.

Equally, Lewis (1972:391) notes that, although it had become fashionable to invest in banana plantations (even though they were not promising), rich and powerful men often continued to maintain profitable livestock interests (and therefore viable social and political connections) in rural economy. The wealthy townsman was frequently not only a nomad at heart but also in pocket, and in urban life itself kinship continued to play an important role. So, for instance, in the absence of any general system of comprehensive motor insurance, the traditional (dying-paying group) procedure of life insurance was extended in the towns to cover traffic accidents. In this and many other respects the continuities between town and country were more binding.
and significant than discontinuities (ibid).

Also Abdi Samatar (1992:632) argues that the imposition of a state on the old Somali order has eroded pastoral democratic practices with far-reaching and lethal repercussions. He adds that one of the legacies of colonial administrations was the neglect and commercialization of pastoralism and peasant agriculture, and the absence of any vibrant new productive enterprises. The leadership in both the public and private sectors was dominated by a group of Somalis who had little experience of, let alone much attachment to, either livestock and/or peasant agriculture. Moreover, they were overwhelmingly ill equipped to devise and implement a successful strategy for development (ibid).

Therefore, it was imperative that important changes in the political process be brought about to save the system from consuming itself (Samatar, 1989:112). The result was that the military intervened on October 21, 1969 and imposed a strict dictatorial military rule. The Military government, which adapted the so called Scientific Socialism, has not much changed its policies towards pastoralists, despite its scientific socialism ideology, which was supposed to develop its internal resources and minimize dependence on foreign assistance. In the next section, the policies of post-civilian (or post-coup socialist) government towards pastoral sector will be analyzed.


The policies of socialist government were not much different from that of civilian government in terms of pastoral sector. The post-civilian government had nationalized all sectors, which were in the private hands except the livestock sector. This sector was dispersed and controlled by subsistence oriented nomads, although it contributed the lion share of country’s foreign earning. The most of the investment went to the agricultural irrigated crops, mainly cash crops, such as banana, sugar cane, and others (see table 6).

The post-civilian government introduced the creation of state farms. The workers were mostly nomads taken from Northern and Central regions of the country fulfilling the Scientific Socialism ideology and the self-help programmes (or Iskaa wax u gabso).
Table 6. Post-civilian Sectoral Development Allocations 1971-73 and 1974-78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1971-73 expenditure (Million So.Sh &amp; %)</th>
<th>1974-78 expenditure (Million So.Sh &amp; %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>51.1 (7.8%)</td>
<td>162.1 (4.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry and Range</td>
<td>5.0 (0.8%)</td>
<td>51.2 (1.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture &amp; irrigation</td>
<td>83.2 (12.7%)</td>
<td>1,124.5 (29.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishery</td>
<td>4.5 (0.7%)</td>
<td>78.0 (2.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural water supply</td>
<td>64.2 (9.7%)</td>
<td>85.2 (2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All rural sector</td>
<td>208.0 (31.7%)</td>
<td>1,500 (38.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and Mining</td>
<td>117.5 (17.8%)</td>
<td>770.5 (19.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>331.4 (50.5%)</td>
<td>1,592 (41.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>656.7 (100.0%)</td>
<td>3,863.4 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JASPA/ILO: Table 5.1.73

The above Table 6 shows that the expenditure for livestock sector is low compared to agricultural sector, industry, services and rural water supply. This means that the expenditure is meant for settled people or in other words for urban people. The table shows also a dramatic decline of the expenditure for livestock sector in the 1974-78 plan. The motive of this decline has been attributed (Samatar, 1989:121) to the government’s low priority to the pastoral sector, as also is demonstrated in figures 4 and 5 below. Here there is a decline in the proportion of development funds allocated to the pastoral sector in the third and fourth plans (5.9 % and 4.2 % respectively).

Figure 4

Development Funds of 1963-1986

The civilian government’s development fund for livestock is very low compared to that of post-coup government. However, there is a decline of development funds for livestock in 1970s as both figures 4 and 5 show and then an increase of funds in 1982-86 for livestock sector (14.9 %). I argue that the decline of funds in 1970s for livestock sector can be attributed to, apart to the above-mentioned reason given by Samatar, two things. First, the decline of funds has coincided with the drought period of 1973-75. The drought has caused heavy losses both animals and humans, which could mean that government has spent a lot of resources to cope with this problem including the settlement of nomads, which has been a dream for colonial and post-colonial governments. Second, in the 1977-78 Somali-Ethiopian war, government has used the development funds for military purposes. After the drought and then the war, the development funds has increased but the policies of settling nomads and range enclosure intensified.

In fact, the death of large numbers of animals in recurring droughts, assumptions that backward and anarchistic methods lead traditional graziers to exploit rangelands destructively, judgements deduced from the worldwide population crisis that the rangelands must also be full to bursting, and optimism that ecologically oriented specialists could suggest immediate technical “solutions” to rangeland problems have all conspired in the creation of the perception of an
overgrazing crisis in Somalia, as in other nomadic pastoral areas of Africa (Hoben et al., 1983:73).

5.3.1. Rangeland Projects in Northern and Central Somalia.

The response to this supposed overgrazing crisis has included two major projects, in the Northern and Central Rangelands (ibid). The hypothesis of the Northern Rangelands Development Project (NRDP), which was the first project (1975-1980), was that a system of range management can both restore the rangelands and lead to a secure future for the range-based livestock industry (ibid: 75). However, despite its ambitious goals, the project was deemed a near total failure from the vantage point of the traditional pastoralists (Samatar, 1989:123). In effect, the project intensified range expropriation by individuals who were more involved in livestock trade (Aronson, 1980:21).

More surprisingly, despite of the failure of NRDP, the same polices have been used in central Somalia. The reason could be, as the NRDP wound down in 1979, the National Range Agency, which had been created to implement the NRDP, needed another infusion of donor funds to maintain its existence (Perrier and Norton, 1996:79). Thus the CRDP was born, as Perrier and Norton noted, out of a desire to patronize rangeland development in a critical pastoral area and a need to preserve and empower a government agency that should take care of range/livestock issues. It did not arise from the felt needs or demands of producers in the target area; on the contrary, an early design team remarked on the lack of information available on pastoral systems in the central region (World Bank, 1979). The project did, however, meet the needs of the key actors in the design process, the National Range Agency, and its mentor, the World Bank (Perrier and Norton, 1996:80), but failed to achieve the improvement of pastoral system of production and has caused clan conflict because of the implementation of borehols and range enclosure. The control of these resource were previously in the hands of the clan system but the project changed this control to the hands of the project administrators, which abused the system allowing some clans to use the borehols and rangelands and ignoring the others. The model of Central Rangelands Development Project (1980-1988) is borrowed directly from NRDP and its central intervention component was the creation of three types of grazing reserves (Hoben et al., 1983:75): (a) town and village reserves, each 400 square kilometers in size with an internal system of rotation for grazing improvement; (b) 20 range grazing reserves of 900 sq.km. each,
located around a major water point, and again with internal rotation among four blocks of grazing; and (c) twelve 600 sq.km. famine reserves, closed (except for bush control) until needed in exceptional drought conditions.

The analysis offered by experts of the Project Implementation Unit of the Ministry of National Planning (MNP:PIU, 1981:6) indicated that the NRDP has failed because: (a). Famine reserves sites were identified, but no water points or grazing restrictions were implemented; (b). the few seasonal range grazing reserves that were created were simply versions of the traditional transhumance system under which pastoralists left their home grazing areas for the rainy season. Therefore, to announce those areas “closed” means recognizing existing management system. It is only losing more funds to nowhere. (c). the town or village reserved has been used only those settled around and the project staffs who are themselves often stock owners. Therefore, the intended pastoralists were excluded the benefits of the project. Moreover, government officials abused the system by running their animals in the “closed” areas or informally selling access to others. In short, the NRDP’s intended purpose has not been achieved but it brought in more other problems, which did not existed in the rangeland system, such as heavily environmental degradation, destruction of the social structure like Xeer.

On the other hand, as Janzen (1986:48) has noted in the Central and Northern Somalia, numerous new settlements have taken place near the wells, and therefore the increase in stock density near the settlements has led to overgrazing. He adds that also the demand for fire and building wood in the settlements has risen. Destruction of tree vegetation is manifest in many places as a result.

5.3.2. Policies of Pastoral-nomadic Sedentarization.

This section looks at the forms and policies of sedentarization in the context of Somalia case. Sedentarization refers here to the partial or complete change from a nomadic life to a temporary or permanent settlement way of life.

Settled farmers and pastoralists have developed, through many years of trial and error, strategies\(^\text{18}\) to cope with the environments in which they live. A choice should have to be made between opposite extremes that best fits into the advantages and disadvantages of a particular

\(^{18}\) Strategy can be defined (Sandford, 1983:30) as a pattern of behaviour, on the part of individuals, groups, or organizations, in which a set of actions and decisions have a common purpose running through them and have a
situation like, as Sandford (1983:30) gives: (a) mobile versus sedentary forms of pastoral land-use. The choice between them is often debated in terms of ‘the settlement of nomads’; (b). Conservative stability versus opportunistic fluctuation in livestock numbers – the ‘control of livestock numbers’ issue.

Therefore, the sedentarization issue can be looked from many angles but in the context of Somalia three of sedentarization policies would be discussed. These are:

a. Voluntary Sedentarization: sedentarization by pastoralists at the extreme ends of the distribution of livestock wealth;

b. The Agricultural Crash Programme and Integrated Agricultural Projects;

c. Mass sedentarization of the pastoralists following an event such as the drought of 1974-75 or epidemic.

5.3.2.1. Voluntary Sedentarization.

This form of sedentarization takes place when pastoral household becomes richer or poorer. As has been observed, in the African context, by Baxter (1975) for the Boran, by Burham (1972) for the Fulani in northern Cameroon and by Lewis (1961) for the Somali, the richest and the poorest households tend to leave the pastoral sector, but for different reasons. The richest herd owners are faced with declining marginal rates of profit on their flocks once livestock numbers expand beyond the level at which they may be cared for by household’s labor force, because the use of hired herding labor has high risks. Therefore, livestock wealth is converted into other assets, in particular land, and the richest herd-owner is transformed into settled landowners (Toulmin, 1983:45). However, in the Somali context family labor is not confined to that of the household. The Clan system with its Xeer arrangements allows for the richer herd-owner to expand his livestock because the extended family, which is often several hundreds of people, offers labor and the richer does not necessarily hire them. What happens in Somalia is that the richer becomes involved in the political power, starting first to settle partially in the village or district towns, investing in urban property, shops, etc. and often coming closer to the government administration.

Sedentarization by the poorest household takes place when pastoralists loose their subsistence base – the animals, or the terms of trade deteriorate the household’s capacity to feed itself and the absence of alternative source of support (such as other assets or assistance from Clan harmonious combined effect greater than the sum of their individual effects taken one by one.
members—which mostly assists, with its ability, its members in such a situation).

The policies of voluntary sedentarization by the post-colonial Somali governments were carried out through the provision of water, education, health, infrastructure and other government facilities.

While settlement by the poorest households out of pastoral production may be hoped to be a temporary by the actors themselves, settlement by the rich is likely to be more permanent, involving the diversification of wealth and activities into a number of economic and political fields (Toulmin, 1983:47). In the case of Somalia, the later group formed the majority of the elite of petite bourgeoisie, which become connected with the colonial governments and later on become the strongest group in the state affairs regarding among others to speed the sedentarization of nomads. The reasons they do so include: that they wanted to get large landholdings; that they wanted to increase their livestock holding because they would buy the animals from poor families once settled; that they were willing to get more consumers for the luxury commodities they were importing, etc. (in the last section of this chapter would further be discussed the consequences of settlement policies).

5.3.2.2. The Agricultural Crash Programme and Integrated Projects.

The Agricultural Crash Programme Farms were introduced in early 1970, in the area of the two main rivers Shabelle and Jubba, and has taken in 1974 the form of a State-owned Autonomous Agency with the aim to improve the occupational agricultural attitudes and skills of the nomadic people, so as to ameliorate their chance of successfully settling as farmers, with the following aspirations (SDR19, 1974:89-93):

a. Need for food self-sufficiency and import substitution;

b. Availability with arable land which is not cultivated

c. Unemployed people whose productive capacity could be utilized for increasing current production and capital formation in the economy.

However, these unemployed people were used as “volunteers” from nomadic sector and were introduced to practice of irrigated agriculture and modern methods of cultivation, harvesting and crop storage without giving appropriate training for these activities.

One of the Crash programme’s policies was that of having influence on the attitude of the

19 SDR= Somali Democratic Republic
nomadic population towards settled agriculture. Crop cultivation was considered by nomads as an inferior activity, and therefore the crash programme has changed this attitude as the government claimed.

The post-coup government has expanded the Crash programme’s objectives and the area and the labor force have also increased as table 7 shows. For instance, in 1970, the cultivated area under Crash Programme was 1000 ha with labor force of 2500 workers while that number increased to 15000 ha with labor force of 12000 workers/volunteers during the Five-Year Plan of 1974-78 (see table 7). However, the programme has been intended for among others the substitution for imports particularly cotton, rice, wheat, oilseeds and tobacco (Africa, 1973: No.26:63). This shows that the export crops have been encouraged, while the food crops mainly maize and sorghum had received little attention and this contradicts the first objective of the programme, which was the achieving of food self-sufficiency.

Table 7. Overview of Agricultural Crash Programme, 1970-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cultivated area (Ha)</th>
<th>No. Volunteers</th>
<th>Cost of the programme (million of So.Sh.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrigated</td>
<td>Rain-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>grown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4050</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>7550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>10500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>12000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>13500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>15000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With regard to the assessment of the programme one can find that the nomad “volunteers”, used for the implementation of the programme, their labor have been exploited by the crash programme policy. The volunteers undertook three types of activities: Agricultural work (clearance of land, cultivation, harvesting); self-help construction of community facilities (constructing their own dormitories, community centers, dispensaries, water supply, storage facilities, classrooms, etc.); and attending orientation (mainly Socialism) and literacy classes (Africa, No.26:61). Moreover, the farms were owned by the state and the benefits of the
programme went to the state. Although the programme wanted to shift people from nomadic sector to mainly settled agricultural sector, the programme continued with government subsidy, therefore it could not be sustainable for long time. Despite that nomadic people learned something about modern irrigated agriculture, they would not benefit from this high technology agriculture for, my opinion, two reasons. First, the volunteers come directly from nomadic environment and they didn’t engaged in settled agriculture, and this makes them difficult to adapt the new situation in a very short time with very much activities, mainly the above mentioned three types of activities. Second, the high technology agriculture would be beneficial for already settled farmers than nomadic volunteers because the settled farmers have some idea about the modern agriculture and they could participate in a very fruitful manner and with high productivity than nomadic volunteers. Moreover, the settled farmers could gain much knowledge of modern agriculture to use if necessary in the future if the programme terminates or be transferred to the volunteers, which did not happened.

According to ILO/JASPA (1977:50), about 4000 of the volunteers have already left the programme for practicing their own farming and about 2000 have joined other government agencies. However, it is not clear here whether these volunteers continued to farming and those with government agencies whether their jobs were temporary or permanent. On the other hand the programme proved to be very expensive and consumed a lot of government subsidy transferred from poorer sectors and from the livestock sector, which received very few investments.

5.3.2.3. Mass Sedentarization: Emergency Settlements.

Settlement by pastoral society as a whole or in large party may follow a major crisis such as drought or an epidemic, or it may by the result of the alienation by the government or private interests of land that had formerly been used by pastoralists, to an extent that jeopardizes the future of livestock keeping by traditional producers (Toulmin, 1983:53). The emergency settlements, which will be analyzed in this section, are those of 1974-75 drought period in Somalia.

The government took a bold and imaginative decision to settle nomads, made destitute by the 1974-75 drought, in agriculture and fishing (ILO/JASPA, 1977:45). The Abaar (drought) has caused tremendous losses of both human and animal losses. According to AFESD\(^2\) (1976:11),

\(^2\) AFESD = Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
the livestock loss has been estimated some 40% of goats and sheep, 30% of cattle and 20% of camels. Thus, the reaction of different households to high livestock losses will depend on the alternative means open to them by which they may gain support, such as receipt of famine relief, sale of assets, possibilities of doing some farming or earning a wage (Toulmin, 1983:53).

The pastoralists’ strategies in times of drought has been noted by various writers among them Helland (1980) for the Afar of north-east Ethiopia, Martey (1975) for the drought in the Sahel, Henriksen (1974) for the Turkana in northern Kenya, Dahl and Hjort (1979) for the Boran in the Horn of Africa, and others. In the case of Somali 1974-75 drought, 250,000 people entered in northern relief camps, and government has rapidly identified settlement sites, and about 118,000 people were transferred by the end of 1975, as can be seen from table 8, to three agricultural settlements in the south of the country and three fishing centers (ILO/JASPA, 1977:45).

Table 8. The settlement schemes, their population and type of settlement, 1975.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dujuma</th>
<th>Kurtunwarey</th>
<th>Sablale</th>
<th>Brava</th>
<th>Adale</th>
<th>Eyl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultivated area (ha):</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigated Rainfed</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of settlement:</td>
<td>agricultural</td>
<td>agricultural</td>
<td>agricultural</td>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>fishing</td>
<td>fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Fishing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>48,014</td>
<td>26,620</td>
<td>29,937</td>
<td>6370</td>
<td>5011</td>
<td>3156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table shows that Dujuma has the highest cultivated area and highest population, however, the Dujuma settlement converted into scheme of wage-laborers in the Marerey Sugar Cane project, near the Jilib district in the south of the country, and there are no data available for this group. The settlement areas are situated along the flood plains of the two rivers Jubba and Shabelle in the south of the country (Dujuma, Kurtunwarey and Sablale, see Map D in Appendix 2), and along the coastline of the Indian Ocean (Brava, Adale and Eyl, see Map D in Appendix 2). The total population for these settlement areas is 119,108 people as the table 8 shows, while the estimated drought-stricken nomad population is about 600,000 (Somalia, 1977:233), which means that the majority of the population remained in the nomadic sector. This means that nomads would continue their way of life and would develop survival strategies...
to cope with the difficult times. In fact, this drought is not the first and the last in Somalia. There have been severe droughts, and among the recorded happened in the years 1847, 1855, 1871, 1911, 1929, 1950/51, 1969, 1974-75, 1984-85, 1991-92 (the period of Operation Restore Hope of the United Nations). But the question is why the government has selected to settle the drought-stricken nomads, knowing that this costs too much? Why not look for other options including assisting nomads in their way of life, providing them some animals to restart their activities? The colonial and post-colonial governments’ dream was always to settle the nomads and foster modern agriculture, therefore the drought of 1973-75 accelerated the realization of the government’s ambitions to settle nomads and this time in the irrigated agriculture and fishery. The settlement programme, which started in 1975, had, according to Ministry of Information’s objectives & policy of resettlement (1977:4), three main components:

1. To create self-sustaining communities for the former nomads;
2. To organize massive settlement of peoples who are vulnerable to drought and diseases;
3. To increase food production and food reserves in the case of emergency.

These objectives sound good but the reality was that the contrary has taken place. Despite the lack of detailed data about the success or the failure of the settlement programmes, Lewis (1981:31) has noted about the Somali settlement programmes, that the majority of Somali pastoralists went back in their nomadic life. He observed that as the home grazing areas have improved in the cycle of good seasons men drifted back to resume herding, leaving women and children behind in the settlements, where they receive food, health care, and education. Lewis adds that some nomads have apparently saved enough from settlement wages, rations, and other sources to send money to distant relatives, instructing them to invest in livestock on their behalf. In due course, when the makings of a new herd have been put together, men leave the settlement covertly and move back to their familiar pastures, where sheep and goats reproduce quickly under optimal conditions. Others have joined the “muscle drain” of migrant workers in the Gulf States in the Middle East, an option no less than easy to pursue because of the Somali government’s tighter passport control (ibid).

The Settlements have not been properly designed and implemented, and the operations were very quick, and this, among other things, made the programme a failure. In fact, as the table 9
below shows the population of the two major settlements, Kurtunwarey and Sablale, decreased after four years to nearly half of its original settlement. The people originally settled in Kurtunwarey on 1975 (table 8 above) was 26,620, while its population had decreased to 16,802 in 1979, and the number of settlers in Sablale in 1975 was 29,937, while in 1979 its population decreased to 16,541.

Another observation that can be seen from table 9 is that the age group 0-5 forms new people who born between 1975 and 1979. This means that the population of 1979 should have been increased in Kurtunwarey to (26,620 + 2056) 28,676 persons and that of Sablale to (29,937 + 2076) 32,013 persons. That means that the same number of people of the newborn group (0-5) has disappeared.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Kurtunwarey M</th>
<th>Kurtunwarey F</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Sablale M</th>
<th>Sablale F</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-15</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>2056</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>2076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-14</td>
<td>3653</td>
<td>2992</td>
<td>6645</td>
<td>4358</td>
<td>3326</td>
<td>7684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-30</td>
<td>2297</td>
<td>2242</td>
<td>4539</td>
<td>1719</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>3644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-45</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>2682</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>1512</td>
<td>2224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-60</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8157</td>
<td>8645</td>
<td>16,82</td>
<td>8260</td>
<td>8281</td>
<td>16,54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The tremendous decline of settlers from 1975 to 1979 can be calculated from the two tables 8 and 9. Therefore the total number of disappeared people from Kunturwarey settlement until 1979 represents about 36.9 percent of the original settlers plus 12.2 per cent (=49.1 %) of disappeared persons who gave place the newborn group (0-5) or 11,874 (or 9818 + 2056) persons, while that of Sablale represents about 44.7 per cent plus 12.6 per cent (=57.3 %) or 15,472 (or 13,396 + 2076) persons. The males are probably the most disappeared group as Lewis has noted. There is no data available, which indicates to what happened to the disappeared people. However, one could imagine that they might joined with the army forces (voluntarily or forced), because in 1977 was erupted the deadly war between Somalia and Ethiopia and continued till mid 1978. Another probability is that the disappeared people might
dead because of the diseases in the river areas, where the two settlements (Kurtunwarey and Sablale) are found, such as malaria and other diseases, which the nomads are not familiar with. But the most probable that one could imagine is that they returned to their original nomadic life. This means that agricultural settlements have lost tremendous labor force, and it would mean failure of settlement programmes as the number of people going back to the nomadic life would increase. There is no data available about the situation of the other three fishing settlements (Brava, Adale and Eyl). Moreover, the cost of the programme was very high and the yields per hectare were very low compared to its costs. Therefore evaluation of the programme done by the State Planning Commission (1979:90;112) showed that the programme had negative benefits as can be seen from tables 10 and 11 below.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Settlement Headquarter</th>
<th>Agricultural production</th>
<th>Livestock &amp; poultry</th>
<th>Other activities</th>
<th>Total settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost:</td>
<td>5,349,278</td>
<td>6,248,750</td>
<td>211,960</td>
<td>10,198,033</td>
<td>22,008,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross output:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>824,192</td>
<td>259,323</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>1,363,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit:</td>
<td>-5,349,278</td>
<td>-5,424,558</td>
<td>+47,363</td>
<td>-9,918,033</td>
<td>-20,644,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost:</td>
<td>2,475,905</td>
<td>5,519,446</td>
<td>234,040</td>
<td>8,807,634</td>
<td>17,037,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross output:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,373,911</td>
<td>324,154</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>3,048,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit:</td>
<td>-2,475,905</td>
<td>-3,145,535</td>
<td>+90,114</td>
<td>-8,457,634</td>
<td>-13,988,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost:</td>
<td>946,819</td>
<td>2,991,471</td>
<td>93,272</td>
<td>2,897,581</td>
<td>6,929,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross output:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,328,700</td>
<td>162,077</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>3,665,777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SDR: an evaluation of Kurtunwarey and Sablale settlements, Mogadishu, 1979,p.90.

The table 10 shows that, despite the positive gross output of livestock and poultry production already in the beginning and the positive agricultural production in the last year, the overall profit of settlement programme in Kurtunwarey is negative, because the unproductive costs (costs of the settlement headquarter, staff salary, and costs of other activities) are very high.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Agriculture &amp; poultry</th>
<th>Livestock &amp; poultry</th>
<th>Other activities</th>
<th>Total settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Headquarte</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Cost:</td>
<td>2,035,550</td>
<td>4,111,370</td>
<td>95,348</td>
<td>6,384,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gross output:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,350,030</td>
<td>172,800</td>
<td>782,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Profit:</td>
<td>-2,035,550</td>
<td>-2,761,340</td>
<td>+77,452</td>
<td>-5,602,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Cost:</td>
<td>2,820,055</td>
<td>5,822,086</td>
<td>209,894</td>
<td>9,048,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gross output:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,166,515</td>
<td>216,000</td>
<td>978,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Profit:</td>
<td>-2,820,055</td>
<td>-4,655,571</td>
<td>+6,106</td>
<td>-8,070,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Cost:</td>
<td>830,735</td>
<td>1,766,118</td>
<td>77,716</td>
<td>2,622,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gross output:</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,552,125</td>
<td>86,400</td>
<td>391,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Profit:</td>
<td>-830,735</td>
<td>+3,786,007</td>
<td>+8684</td>
<td>-2,231,409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SDR: an evaluation of Kurtunwarey and Sablale settlements, Mogadishu, 1979, p112.

The table 11 shows that profit of Sablale settlement is not much different from the Kurtunwarey settlement. The overall profit of Sablale settlement is negative, although in the last year it begins to be positive.

One remarkable observation that can be seen from both tables 10 and 11 is that the livestock and poultry production have already from the beginning to the last year a positive gross output. This can be attributed to, among other things, the familiarity of the nomadic settlers to this activity. Therefore, it can be concluded that the nomadic resettlement programmes in Somalia have failed and can not be carried out with such a high costs, which cannot be met by the limited financial resources of Somalia. It needs to have enough financial, expertise, sustainability vision (economically, socially, and environmentally), and the most important, the fully participation of the pastoralists in such programmes.

After 1970s, mass sedentarization activities did not took place. However, projects of rangelands enclosure has taken place in the northern and central parts of the country in the period 1975-1980 and 1980-1988 correspondingly (see section 5.3.1.)
5.4. The Consequences of Sedentarization Policies.

There has been little research about the consequences of nomadic settlement policies in Somalia. However, there are various consequences identified by researchers of sedentarization elsewhere in the world, mainly those areas with similar eco-climatical conditions with Somalia, such as Sudan, Kenya, and Sahel countries. There are various consequences but we consider here the ecological, economic, and socio-political effects.

As far as the ecological consequences is concerned, a number of writers such as, Haaland (1977); Behnke and Scoones (1993); Berkes (1989); Leach and Mearns (1996); Galaty and Bonte (1991); Swift (1996); and many others showed that sedentarization has a negative effects on the ecology of nomadic pastoral dryland because of ever-increasing pressure and degradation. Haaland’s work in the Sudan emphasizes that in the mixed production systems (livestock and crops) there is no tendency for the system to maintain balance between livestock and range resources and rangelands will be subject to ever-increasing pressure and degradation. However, Toulmin (1983:57) argues that where settlement takes place at lower densities (in relation to population that may be maintained with given resources and levels of technology) and where herds can be taken to less heavily used forage resources by household or hired labor, then degradation of pastures does not necessarily follow from settlement and cultivation by pastoral households.

On economic impact, the main elements that bear consideration are income stability and livestock productivity. Bonte (1977) sees the incorporation of agriculture into the production activities of pastoral groups as one means by which they may reduce their vulnerability to wide variations in labor productivity that are the result of rapid growth or decline in herd numbers, but he notes that this increased stability of incomes in agro-pastoral systems will be at the expense of lower potential rates of herd growth. Livestock productivity could decrease as consequence of reducing herd mobility. In extreme cases, as forced settlements, which took place in different places, the prohibition placed on migration may cause very high rates of animal mortality (Toulmin, 1983:58). Scarcity of grazing and an increased incidence of disease and parasitic infection due to overcrowding of animals cause high death rates (ibid). In less extreme cases of reduced mobility, the nutritional and health implications of settlement upon animals are also often mentioned.
As far as social effects are concerned, the social institutions and organizations would decline or completely change. In the case of Somalia, the Xeer system is the main institution that pastoralists use in every aspect of their livelihoods. As a consequence of settlement this system (described in previous sections) would disappear. Fortunately, the Somali society succeeded in one way or another to adjust the Xeer system into the new circumstances including to use by force if necessary to defend some aspects of the Xeer, which are very important for the community, such as the management of conflicts between nomadic communities during the dry season. This Xeer system made possible for the Somali community to live without central government in ten years (from 1991-the collapse of the last Somali State- up to date) in the modern world where every society lives under modern laws and systems.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS.

In Africa, extensive grazing is the major land use where pastoralism is the dominating activity. Somalia is the only country in Africa where nomadism predominates the economy of the country, and where the vast majority of the population is engaged in nomadic activity. However, this sector has not received the corresponding share of foreign earning, which the sector contributes to the Somali economy. The modern agricultural sector, which contributes to the Somali economy less than that of livestock, has received the most of the investment. This contradiction can be attributed to the nature of the Somali State.

The country has gone through different systems of administrations since the arrival of colonial powers in the middle of the nineteenth century. During the colonial period the country was divided in five parts in the Horn of Africa under three European powers, and later Ethiopia joined with them. This division has led to the fragmentation of families into artificial borders with different administrations, where the nomads’ mobility became limited. Under the different administrations, Britain and Italy were the main players in the formation of Somali State, and followed different systems of administration. Britain had an experience of pastoralism elsewhere in Africa, and its main objective of coming to Somalia was to safeguard the meat supply and other fresh produce coming from Somalia for its garrison at Aden. Therefore Britain had developed an economy based on livestock business in the British Somaliland, and stimulated commerce. On the other side, Italy had developed an economy based on export crops, mainly banana, sugar, and cotton. Italy also developed an elite oriented in this business. Therefore, when two of the five parts of Somaliland came independent in 1960, they were totally different in all aspects of administration. The newly established Somali Republic (former British Somaliland and former Italian Somaliland) had faced very difficult situation. The economic, political, and language barriers were so intensive, and Italian bureaucratic tradition of the south dominated the policies of the 1960s, and even until the collapse of Somali state in 1991. This Italian system had left little room for maneuver for the Somali Republic government to establish an economy based on the reality on the ground—the livestock sector.

This colonial heritage and the presence of foreign experts from the former colonizers made difficult the design of new direction of the Somali economy and the development of nomadic sector. The Socialist government from 1969-1991 was not different from the civilian
government (1960-1969) in terms of the livestock sector policy. Both governments’ policies towards the livestock sector were that of settling the nomads. However, the settlement of 1974-75 drought-stricken nomads in the south, and crash programmes and integrated projects all have shown that the livestock policy need another direction different from what has been followed so far by post-colonial governments. The cost of the projects of nomadic settlements was very high, and it is a lesson for future policy makers that it cannot be carried out again because the Somali pastoralist had not demanded it. Therefore these projects had a vision of developing the land rather than the people.

Moreover, the historical context from which the livestock merchant is developed during the colonial period is another factor, which contributes to the deterioration of the terms of trade of the nomads. During that period a class of merchants emerged, which linked to the colonial administration and later on most of them became part the post-colonial government. This group, which in number increases day after day, dominated the policy of livestock sector and they were in favor of settling the nomads to increase their wealth and power. This petit bourgeoisie was an amalgam of truck owners, traders, clerks, teachers, drivers, and livestock brokers. The trade chain of this group is so complicated that new comers had a difficult to join it without having connections with them. Furthermore, this class is connected deeply to the Arabian Gulf States, especially the Saudi market, where thousands of life animals from Somalia were exported every year. This Saudi market increased the one-sided economic dependence of Somalia. This has led to the increase of Somali economy’s vulnerability. Saudi Arabia have banned several times the livestock import from Somalia, and the last ban was in 1998 when Saudi Arabia introduced livestock import ban from the countries of Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen. The ban was imposed after an outbreak of the so called Rift Valley Fever disease in Kenya and has been lifted after 16 months when the World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned the Saudi administration of imposing ban on Somali livestock without any evidence that the disease is found in Somalia. Therefore diversified markets is needed in the future to overcome such one-sided market.

The future Somali government has to develop the livestock sector in a way that the pastoralists would become the beneficiaries and not the exploited victims, especially women. Such government needs to have a democratic and decentralized system, where each community will
deal with its problems. The local governments should have the responsibility of allocating funds to where the demand of its people lies. It should have the full participation of its people including the pastoralists in the design and implementation of policies.

It is difficult to establish such a government without revising all political and economical strategies inherited from the colonial powers followed by former Somali governments. It should be established a strategy based on the available Somali resources under its ecological conditions. It should be established a new democratic system different from the previous system (1960-1969 period, after 1969 there were no democratic government), which was based on the Western model of winner-take all. The new democratic system has to be based on the Somali traditional system, and therefore the proportional representation of groups. In my opinion, these groups would not have the form of clans but other forms of organizations such as community leaders, women organizations, intellectuals, pastoralists (such as in the case of Australia), farmers, and finally political parties.
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Subtropicale e Tropicale, 54: 403-410.


Ministry of National Planning (1981). "Implementation Status of the Northern Rangelands
Mohamed, O. O. (1975). From Written Somali to a Rural Development Campaign. Somali Institute of Development Administration and Management, Mogadishu, Somali Democratic Republic.


Subtropicale e Tropicale, 54: 164-170.


Appendix 1.

Table 1. Proportion of Development Funds for Agriculture and Livestock, 1963-1982.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Plan Period</th>
<th>Agriculture (Millions of So.Sh &amp; % of total)</th>
<th>Livestock (Millions of So.Sh &amp; % of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-coup</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-67</td>
<td>250.0 (17.8 %)</td>
<td>43.0 (3.0 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-70</td>
<td>53.9 (7.7 %)</td>
<td>45.9 (6.5 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-coup</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-73</td>
<td>146.6 (14.7 %)</td>
<td>59.4 (5.9 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-78</td>
<td>1,124.5 (29.1 %)</td>
<td>162.1 (4.2 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-86</td>
<td>4,782.8 (29.1 %)</td>
<td>2,433.3 (14.9 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Samatar, 1989: Table 23:121.

Table 2. Live animal exports from Somalia 1950 and 1958-1984 (in 1,000 head).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Goats</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Camels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(in 1,000)</td>
<td>(in 1,000)</td>
<td>(in 1,000)</td>
<td>(in 1,000)</td>
<td>(in 1,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>49</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>1,097</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>1,282</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>1,184</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
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<td>789</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>1,617</td>
<td>77</td>
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<td>684</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td>70</td>
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</tr>
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<td>655</td>
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<td>1,211</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>1,550</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>Value5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>1,451</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>1,195</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>85</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2.

2A. Map: Pattern of Economic Activity in Somalia
2C. Map: Partition of the Somalis into Five Imperial Zones.

1. Italian Somaliland; 2. British Somaliland Protectorate; 3. French Somaliland (later French Territory of the 'Afars and 'Issas); 4. Ogaadeen Somalis conquered by Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia at the end of the 19th c.; and 5. The British Northern Frontier District (NFD), later the Somali areas within the NFD became Kenya's Northern Province.
2D. Map: Administrative Regions and Districts in Somalia (1982), indicated with Settlement areas discussed in Chapter Five of this paper (such as Kurtunwarey, Sablale, Dugiuma or Dujuma, Eyl, Brava, and Adala or Adale).
2E. Map: Modes of Production in the Horn of Africa.