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OBJECTIVE ORIENTED PROJECT PLANNING

IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

A Case Study From The North - Western Province of Zambia

A Research Paper presented by

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(Germany)

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for obtaining the Degree of

Master of Arts in Development Studies

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
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This document presents part of the author's study program while at the Institute of Social Studies; the views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute. Research papers and theses are not made available for outside circulation by the Institute.



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


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List of Abbreviations

ADP	Area Development Program
CCS	Cooperative Credit Scheme
CDS	Cooperative Development Section
CIMMYT	International Centre for Improvement of Maize and Wheat
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IRDP	Integrated Rural Development Program
ISS	Institute of Social Studies
K	Kwacha (Zambian currency)
KTDA	Kenya Tea Development Authority
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
MAWD	Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development
MBO	Management by Objectives
NAMBOARD	National Agricultural Marketing Board
NCWU	North-Western Cooperative Union
NWP	North Western Province
ODA	Overseas Development Agency
OOPP	Objective Oriented Project Planning
PCI	Practical Concepts Incorporated
PCS	Primary Cooperative Society
PMS	Project Management System
PPM	Project Planning Matrix
PPU	Provincial Planning Unit
PS	Primary Society
RDP	Rural Development Program
SSCP	Small scale producer
TNDP	Third National Development Plan (of Zambia)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZCF	Zambian Cooperative Federation
ZOPP	Ziel Orientierte Projekt Planung (German acronym for OOPP)

INTRODUCTION

The reasons why rural development projects in Third World Countries fail are manifold: faulty selection and appraisal processes, defective project design, ineffective project planning, inadequate project execution, operation and supervision could be amongst them, to mention but a few. The lack of effective participation of the target group in the various stages of a project's life cycle is recognised as another important source of failure.

This research paper analyses a widely used project planning and management technique, called the Logical Framework Approach (LFA), which is claimed to offer solutions to some of the above problems and examines how it is being applied to a development project in the Republic of Zambia.

The major problem of rural development which Zambia inherited from its former colonial power, the British, was the gap between the relatively well developed line-of-rail provinces and the remote and backward rural provinces. This uneven pattern of development continued after independence in 1964, as Zambia failed to diversify away from the export-led development strategy, started by the British, based on a single commodity - copper. This resulted in a concentration of population in the country's major towns and mining centres, where employment could be found in the mines, the public service, on commercial farms or in private enterprises. Life in the countryside was perceived to be full of hardships associated with subsistence agriculture. Although there have been many Government attempts to promote various on- and off-farm activities in the rural areas, results have not been very encouraging. A major shortcoming of these development efforts was that only a small minority of the rural population, usually the already well-off, was reached, with the exclusion of most small-scale producers. The decline in copper revenues since the early 70's has put Zambia, once one of the richest black African countries in severe financial problems, further constraining the resources available for rural development and the promotion of small-scale farming.

In 1977 an Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) was started in the North-Western Province (NWP) of Zambia, jointly sponsored by the Zambian and the German governments. This project explicitly had small-scale and subsistence producers as its main target group. To enhance participation of the farming community in project activities and benefits and to improve operational planning and subsequent implementation, the Logical Framework Approach was introduced as a planning and management tool in 1982. LFA claims to incorporate elements of team planning on a participatory basis in the problem solving process.

While working for the IRDP/NWP as a research and extension officer from 1983 to 1987, the author continuously used the LFA for the formulation of annual plans of operation and progress reports. Experience within IRDP has shown however, that although the LFA improved operational aspects in project planning and implementation, it still remained difficult to reconcile the major interests of different groups involved, - target groups, local administration, local elite, national government, development agencies and sponsors etc. In particular adequate representation of interests/real needs of small-scale and subsistence farmers and their participation in the actual formulation of plans have proved to be difficult in the annual planning workshops. The outcome of this inadequate representation of the target groups in some cases resulted in half-hearted compromises agreed upon in the project planning phase. Reality then proved unsatisfactory for the parties involved, especially for the underrepresented target groups.

This weakness of the LFA (inadequate representation of target group in decision-making) became obvious in the planning of IRDP's cooperative and credit program for 1985. Representatives of the farming community were not involved in the actual formulation of the plan (formation of cooperative societies), but peasants were supposed to be the main implementers of the plan (they had to join the coops). The plan stated that only members of cooperatives would receive seasonal credits; farmers' experiences with cooperatives however, have been negative in the past and the agrarian structure of NWP didn't allow the formation of big cooperatives, so more than 80% of them refused to join the cooperative societies when the plan was actually implemented.

In this research paper I will try to analyse the LFA with special attention to the degree of actual participation of rural peasant households in the formulation of goals and objectives and their subsequent implementation in IRDP/NWP of Zambia. As LFA is a technically oriented planning approach it can only work when the characteristics of the socio-economic environment within which it functions are adequately analysed. Attempts will be made to ensure more weight for the 'local' characteristics and to incorporate them at the appropriate steps in the design of the planning process itself in order to enhance target group participation, not only in the project's benefits, but also in the planning, implementation and evaluation stages of the project.

The paper is subdivided into five parts.

Part I examines briefly different planning approaches to rural development projects and experiences of development planning in other third world countries.

Part II presents the Logical Framework Approach and systematically analyses the basic planning steps and methods underlying the technique, with special attention to possible participation of the target group in the entire project cycle.

Part III summarizes Zambia's socio-economic and developmental situation at national and regional (NWP) level, IRDP's history, objectives, strategies and activities and Zambia's cooperative policies.

In **part IV** the role of the LFA as a planning tool in IRDP is examined and the case study of the Cooperative Development Section (CDS) is used to demonstrate the possibilities and limitations of the LFA, at a time when IRDP's activities (formation of coops) started to impact on the socio-economic environment of the target group (without that environment being seriously analysed or the farmers actively participating in decision-making).

The **last part** of this paper suggests some possible refinements in the LFA which could lead to better incorporation of target group interests during planning, implementation and evaluation of development efforts and activities.

Most primary data on Zambia, NWP and IRDP and for the case study of the Cooperative Development Section (CDS) were collected during the author's stay in Zambia. The basic material on the LFA was obtained from the former Senior Planner at the Provincial Planning Unit (PPU) at the regional headquarters of NWP and partly from The German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Secondary literature on alternative planning approaches and rural participation in development projects was traced in the ISS library.

Note

1 - See Rondinelli (1976), pp. 11 - 13;

PART I: APPROACHES TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

*Planning is inseparable from power*²

The above statement is still valid today, especially when it comes to development projects that are sponsored by foreign donors. International and bilateral aid agencies often use highly sophisticated planning and management techniques (to ensure tight control), making developing countries dependent on external knowledge and foreign experts for many aspects of designing and implementing projects. Experiences of the last few decades however, have shown that there is no unique approach to ensure completely successful projects. Already in 1972 Robert Chambers mentioned what lesson could be learnt from experiences with planning in many developing countries, i.e. that the crux of good planning is implementability³. He further distinguished between two main approaches to planning: firstly that of planning without implementation and secondly that of planning with implementation.

1.1 Planning without implementation⁴

Target-setting was a concept that attracted much attention in the mid sixties. The objective was to increase effectiveness of field staff by disaggregating some of the targets set in national plans to sectoral and local-level activities, e.g. district production figures for main crops. In Kenya for example, the Second Development Plan (1966) set agricultural production targets by district for some of the main crops but these were only given for the end of the five-year period and not broken down into annual totals. "...often unrealistic assumptions of this procedure coupled with the almost complete absence of a professional economic planning competence at regional levels made this a largely meaningless exercise" (Chambers, 1972). This approach has never been further developed and remained a rather immature and less effective attempt to stimulate district staff to increase their performance by sticking to and trying to fulfil (often vague) targets. As target-setting was not a comprehensive tool, it focussed more on intermediate activities in mainly quantitative terms and neglected the more qualitative aspects of goal realisation, it soon lost importance.

Preparation of shopping lists of proposals was another form of planning without implementation. This approach in essence was not more than a list of proposals of desired activities compiled by individual districts and submitted to the central planning offices.

A 'bottom-up' type of planning that mostly was unrealistic as it did not comply with national targets and financial availability of resources (Berry et al. 1971:25-26). In Kenia, in the early sixties this approach frequently led to competition between districts and to frustrations of staff when plans were not considered at national level (Chambers, 1972).

Development studies were an early form of assistance to Third World Countries by foreign organisations and experts. Usually extensive surveys were undertaken by short-term consultants and a lot of information and primary data collected about the characteristics of certain areas. In Tanzania for example, the Geita District Plan prepared by a French team has been described as "essentially a compilation of data regarding the district rather than a planning document" (Saylor and Livingstone, 1969:8). Mostly in the appendix of such studies a rather loose and general list of proposals could be found of what could or should be done. In most cases however, detailed programs and costs were not included. The main task of designing projects and activities accordingly still had to be done before actual implementation.

After the short-comings of these approaches have been realised in the early 70's, the most difficult and critical task for development planners had been recognised as the translation of (often general and vague) national and regional plans into operational programs and investment projects ⁵. In short, planners realised that the best plan is only as good as its potential implementability, or in Chambers' words, good planning should include planning implementation.

1.2 Planning with Implementation ⁶

After a series of rural development projects failed in the 60's, partly due to the above mentioned planning deficiencies, many development organisations assumed that classical planning approaches that proved to have been successful for technical and infrastructural projects in developed countries could be transferred to similar projects in rural areas of TWC's.

The blueprint approach originally was derived from civil engineering where a blue coloured dye-line map was used to draw plans for e.g. roads or bridges. A main characteristic of this approach was that, once vital decisions about goals and outputs of a certain project have been defined, the ways and methods of how to achieve them is more or less fixed and will be followed strictly, as usually all information needed for implementation is given in the plan itself.

The planning process is divided into three disconnected segments 7:

- the determination of resource requirements
- the scheduling of implementation activities in space and time
- the establishment of an operational field unit

It further takes the following for granted:

- a clear specification of (agreed) objectives
- firm control over the field units
- project staff realizes targeted outputs on schedule
- a stable environment with operational ancillary linkages

A major criticism raised by many planners about the blueprint approach was the fact that it is rather rigid and technocratic and that evaluation usually is done only in physical and quantitative terms. "The blueprint approach which aims at efficiency and control may lead to budgetary coherence, but not to real-life capabilities" (Moharir, Yap et al. 1988). As soon as the human factor comes in, which actually should be a major concern in rural projects, this approach did not live up to the expectations placed in it. Nor did it adequately consider environmental factors like droughts, diseases or other natural calamities, which are usually much more frequent in developing countries than in developed ones. "Experience has revealed the inherent limitations of the technocratic blueprint in a rapidly changing environment" (Agarwala 1983:11).

Continuous learning and interaction could be considered an alternative to blueprint planning. Rondinelli (1983) has described it as planning process that allows policy makers to readjust and modify programs and projects as more is learned...(about the population and the project area). He sees planning and implementation as mutually dependent activities that refine and improve each other over time rather than as separate functions. This implies however, that 'popular participation' in the formulation of goals, objectives and activities of the project is achieved. The project's target group or the intended beneficiaries must be clearly identified and effectively included in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Effective participation of the target groups in at least some of these processes is not found frequently, though an explicit aim of many projects. Rondinelli & Huddle (1977) identified a number of factors that enhanced local participation:

1. Project area well defined and target group easily identifiable
2. Local leaders and farmers informed about project and given some responsibility in decision-making process (in advance)
3. Farmers actively involved in technological innovation
4. Effective communication between project staff and target group
5. Involvement related initially to single purpose activities and later broadening (... to build up confidence)
6. Organisational arrangements created to give farmers a voice in decisions concerning project management

This list is not complete, but it reveals some of the essential requirements to guarantee effective participation of intended beneficiaries in the planning process and the subsequent implementation of rural programs.

According to Agarwala (1983), the *continuous learning and interaction* has proved to be more effective than the *blueprint* approach during the seventies. He adds examples of Mexico, Venezuela and Turkey where it proved to be extremely difficult to adjust public investment programs to reduced resources, which were not foreseen in the plans that lacked flexibility. Other countries like e.g. Bangladesh identified core programs of high priority investment so that, when resources went short, selective cuts could be undertaken instead of applying the lawn mower principle. Although he refers to national economic management, there is still scope to learn from the lessons of rigid, i.e. blueprint or flexible, i.e. learning and interaction planning approaches for the sake of planning rural development projects.

There is a good number of other planning approaches^o like process planning, comprehensive planning, functional and normative planning, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into further details.

Summarising the above paragraphs it becomes obvious that there have been quite some changes in the opinions of policy makers on how and with whom to plan for rural development projects. It is clear however, that planning should always include detailed proposals for implementation and that the people for whom the plan is intended should have an essential weight in the actual formulation of it. The next paragraph therefore will look at different forms of participation of the clientele in the various stages of a rural development project and what kind of experiences have been made in Third World Countries that seriously attempted to include the target group in the planning, implementation or evaluation of projects.

1.3 The Concept of Participation

"The 'bottom-up' or participation ideology originated in the reaction to colonial bureaucratic failures in the 1950's. It takes the local community as its frame of reference...and insists that people will not cooperate until they see a good reason to do so" (Moris 1981:91-92). The Rural Development Committee Center for International Studies at the Cornell University has done extensive research and fieldwork about participation and has defined three major dimensions ⁹:

- (1) What kind of participation is under consideration?
- (2) Who is participating in it?
- (3) How is participation occurring?

These dimensions require further careful analysis of the characteristics of the development project in terms of its historical, physical and socio-economic environment. Let us now try to briefly explain what is meant by what, who and how according to the Cornell approach.

What kind of participation?

According to a project's life cycle four different types are proposed. Participation in **decision-making**, in **implementation**, in **benefits** and in **evaluation**. Participation in all four stages, though ideal, does not seem to be common or feasible. Through this distinction it is recommended not to use participation as a global term (what might lead to confusion) but as a rather specific one. Depending on their field of specialisation, political scientists regard involvement in decision-making and to some extent in evaluation as participation, economists participation in benefits and administrators participation in implementation as the real form. The distinction made by the Cornell literature however, seems to be a sound one and should be kept in mind.

Who participates?

Here the Cornell version also specifies quite detailedly, as the category of the 'rural poor' or the 'majority' of the rural population may often be too broad. 'Who' should be further distinguished into - local residents, with subdivisions into age, sex, family status, education, occupation, income and residence; - local leaders, formal and informal; - non and - government personnel and - foreign personnel. It does not have to be such an elaborate distinction in all projects, but a combination of some or most characteristics is advisable when trying to find out who is participating in project activities.

How participation occurs?

The who and what dimensions examine to some extent the amount, distribution and trends of participation, the how dimension might be helpful in finding out the direction. Is participation for example initiated by the administration or the local community? Is it voluntary or coercive? The structure and channels of participation should be analysed in terms of an individual or collective basis, with formal or informal organisation or whether direct or indirect participation is involved? The duration and scope of participation, whether once-and-for-all, intermittent or continuous and over which range of activities should be considered as well. How effective people's involvement in whatever stage of the project is should be judged by the intended and achieved results. The how dimension should help to illuminate the dynamics and consequences of participation and the different forms it can take, depending on the groups and activities involved.

Before looking at experiences with participation in development projects in TWC's, we may take note of the following list of possible problems ¹⁰.

1. The approach idealizes the efficiency of the 'village level worker' or 'barefoot doctor'; in fact it generates technical demand beyond the capability of paraprofessionals
2. Allowing communities to define their own priorities leads to a proliferation of social services without guaranteeing the productive fiscal base to support them
3. Local participation unless tightly supervised puts the public program at the mercy of interest groups already organized in the local community, e.g. exploitative local elites.

Pro's and con's about participation often end in rather extreme, at times ideological standpoints and it is up to the individual to determine his or her position. For our purpose it seems advisable to distinguish between participation as an end in itself, where a political and ideological dimension comes in or, whether participation is meant as a means to achieve certain project purposes or outputs. In this research paper we will concentrate on participation as a means and not as an end in itself.

Experiences in the 1950's and 1960's with community development and 'animation rurale' in the former English and French colonies respectively have not been very successful as they were "essentially top-down systems...(where) in fact participation was quite restricted" (Uphoff et al. 1979:22). These approaches were abandoned in the early 1970's and

participation revised in some aspects. It should not be treated like a separate program (like in community development or animation rurale), but rather as an integrated approach within rural development as a whole.

The more equal the distribution of assets the easier will be a broad-based participation in decision-making and benefits. When trying to stimulate rural participation it is important to strengthen the linkage between rural communities and national and regional centres rather than building on local autonomy only.

As mentioned earlier 'popular participation' in all four stages of a project's cycle is not found frequently, if at all (no evidence could be traced in the literature). Normally participation is restricted to implementation and benefits like in the case of the Kenya Tea Development Association (KTDA), which sponsored small-holder tea production on a group farming basis. The group approach, which is of particular interest for our purpose however, was only extended to extension and marketing, all other activities were done on an individual scale. Through monthly payments, the agency ensured steady incomes to farmers who deliver produce continuously. Farmers with a higher productivity consequently receive a higher income and the expansion of acreage is made possible, if it is not detrimental to the quality of tea. By giving these attractive benefits to farmers, their participation in implementation was also increased. Through representative growers' committees, participation in decision-making was tried to be enhanced, with the result however, that these committees were dominated by larger farmers. The project management for instance, increased the number of minimum seedlings that could be bought at one time, making it difficult for small farmers to join the project. Had there been an effective bottom-up influence by other small farmers participating in the scheme, that policy would most probably have looked differently.

Kenya's (and other countries') experience with group farming led to some consequences concerning the participation of small farmers. The socio-economic structure in terms of distribution of power, prestige, economic resources and particularly the equitable distribution of land seem an essential prerequisite for successful group farming. Programs for groups of farmers with holdings of the more or less same size seem to be more promising than with unequal sizes, as here the larger farmers might dominate the smaller ones. For cash crop production the location is equally important, as access to markets will determine the economic viability. The size of the farming groups should take the economies of scale of mobilizing resources into account and should be adjusted to the environment.

Notes

- 2 - Schumacher (1973), p. 196;
- 3 - Chambers (1972), ch. 2;
- 4 - Based on Chambers (1972) article on planning for rural areas in Africa;
- 5 - See: Rondinelli (1976), p. 314;
- 6 - Based on Moharir, Yap et al. (1987), ch. 3.2;
- 7 - Adapted from *ibid.* whose source is Rondinelli & Huddle; (1977)
- 8 - See: van de Laar (1988), ch. 4, for a detailed presentation of other planning methods;
- 9 - See: Uphoff, Cohen and Goldsmith (1975) p. 5;
- 10 - Moris (1981), p. 94;

PART II: PRINCIPLE PLANNING METHODS OF THE LFA

After this brief review of some planning approaches to rural development programs and the concept of participation, this chapter will try to discuss the method and the main planning steps of this rather complex planning system. The first two sections are basically a summary of recently published, official GTZ literature on the use of the logical framework and partly of earlier, internal drafts on the same issue. These two sections are intended for readers not fully familiar with this approach. Thereafter an analysis of the LFA with special attention to the possible participation of the target group will follow.

The earlier mentioned weaknesses of some planning approaches probably explain why national or international donors are increasingly making use of a comprehensive "Project Management System" (PMS), that applies "Objective Oriented Project Planning" (OOPP) or the "Logical Framework Approach" (LFA) as an essential element. The reason for this being the assumption, that efficient management requires a precise and clear formulation of the goals to be achieved, before and during the implementation of development projects. Only then is it possible to define intermediate objectives and make use of scarce resources in an optimal way¹.

Due to its obvious clarity and logic this approach to development planning and implementation as a tool for **management** has conquered the minds of many organisations, as it also explicitly states the necessity to involve not only individuals, but a **team** and to some extent the **characteristics of the target group** in the planning process.

2.1 Presentation of the LFA

In 1969 the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) asked an American Consultants Company *Practical Concepts Incorporated* (PCI) to analyse its project planning and evaluation system. PCI uncovered the following three major problems².

1. Planning was too vague, i.e. objectives not clearly stated and related to project activities;
2. Management responsibilities were unclear, i.e. managers refused to accept responsibility for impact and results of projects;
3. Evaluation was an adversary process, i.e. in the absence of clear targets evaluation became a sort of gamble and source for further arguments rather than for constructive actions.

The LFA was designed by PCI specifically to overcome the above stated problems. Principal architects of the LFA were Rosenberg and Posner of PCI; they drew heavily on experience gained from the management of complex space age programs such as early satellite launchings or Polaris submarines. The underlying principles of the LFA originally derived from the "management by objectives" (MBO) tradition of American management sciences¹³. The LFA was tested by the USAID in 1970 for evaluation of technical assistance projects. It was implemented in 30 AID countries and extended to loan and centrally funded projects. It is now used by many UN agencies and bilateral donors as a complete PMS. The LFA emphasizes the managerial point of view, focussing on the results of the completed project when it has succeeded and on the strategy for achieving it.

In the GTZ the LFA was introduced on a pilot basis in the early 1980's, and further developed into "Ziel Orientierte Projekt Planung" (ZOPP is the German acronym for OOPP). It was divided into two main categories, i.e. that of project preparation or ZOPP 1, 2 and 3 and that of implementation or ZOPP 4 and 5. In the first round members of relevant GTZ sections and if appropriate other institutions or staff of the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation are involved in appraising potential projects. ZOPP 2 and 3 then define the terms of reference for a team of consultants for project investigation and final discussion of the proposals in the host country with relevant institutions. Once the first 3 steps have been successfully taken it is the responsibility of the project management to plan project implementation (ZOPP 4) and possible readjustments and further activities (ZOPP 5)¹⁴. Through the use of ZOPP it is expected to improve the quality of projects through teamwork and the equal ranking of goal and problem orientation within projects. As an objective the improvement of planning as one form of cooperation with developing countries is mentioned, where these have the possibility to participate in the solution of problems.

In this paper the main concern will be about the actual planning, implementation and replanning (ZOPP 4 & 5) of projects in developing countries, in our case in Zambia. For convenience not "ZOPP" or "OOPP" as developed by the GTZ will be used from now on, but the original term LFA, although in principle the GTZ approach will be dealt with. LFA claims to ensure a consistent train of thought and procedure and uniform understanding of the terms used. It thus is expected to facilitate communication and cooperation between all involved parties¹⁵. LFA is supposed to be a rather flexible and open system;

it builds upon available information, skills and motivation of workshop participants and project staff. The following main elements are, therefore, only meant as the backbone of the process itself and their individual importance may vary from case to case.

LFA consists of five inter-supportive elements ¹⁶:

(1) **The method** as the guideline for work in the planning group; it is based on participant's knowledge, ideas and experience. It thus requires sound and relevant understanding of and about the special features and problems of the project and the project area.

(2) **The team approach** as the framework for studying inter-disciplinary problems and the participation of important interest and target groups. That implies that for complex rural projects not only technical experts like planners and agriculturists, but also social scientist like economists and sociologists should be full time team members. Representatives of local institutions and the farming community are equally required to be involved in the actual planning to complete the team.

(3) **Visualisation** of contributions of planning team members and their results on flip charts and cards; all planning steps are permanently documented and visualized. A flipchart system has been developed ¹⁷.

(4) **The rules of application** which determine timing, participation and purpose of LFA workshops in the project preparation phase, are laid down in a separate internal organisation manual.

(5) **Project management** based on LFA with the task of turning planning into practical project work; here as well a comprehensive implementation guide has been produced ¹⁸.


Through LFA, participants can agree on objectives and ways of realizing them, which could lead to more successful implementation and results of projects. Objectives however, can only be decided and agreed upon if causes and effects of problems to be solved have been properly analysed. The assumption is that cooperation of all involved parties will be smoother if objectives are not dictated from above, but jointly developed by participants. Conformity with national planning objectives and interests of foreign donors however, limits the project's individual freedom of choice. LFA offers the following procedure for objective and target setting.

2.2 Main Planning Steps

At this point the GTZ approach deviates from the original PCI version. PCI was mainly concerned with the actual formulation of plans in the project planning matrix (PPM), based on three, preceding interrelated tools or techniques that should assist in analysing the situation. These are the **problem-, objectives- and alternative tree analyses**. Clientele or participation analysis is part of the problem analysis¹⁹. GTZ has made the participation analysis a separate step at the very beginning of all further actions. This seems logical and vital if the project is to be successful in the long run, as any rural project will ultimately be accepted or rejected by the clientele or target group.

(1) **Participation Analysis** is the analysis of the target group and all other persons, institutions etc. participating and involved in the project's activities. In a brainstorming type of procedure all interest groups, institutions and other in- and external influences of persons or projects are unsystematically listed. According to its homogeneity this list is grouped into institutions, interest groups and subdivided into involved and uninvolved parties. If necessary the group of involved parties can be further subdivided into participants, beneficiaries and affected people. The latter may then distinguish between potential supporters and opponents of project activities.

Figure 1: Proposed Steps in Participation Analysis




The decision whether additional analyses of relations between involved people should be undertaken and whose interests and views have priority is discussed by the planning team. The purpose of this step is to get a clearer picture of the interest and relations that underly certain problems, as these depend on the respective view points. The participation analysis may in some cases be a (preliminary) substitute for the direct support of the target group in the planning process. Members of the planning team may actually try to advocate the interest of the missing parties ²⁰. The same source also stresses that it is vital that not only purely technical, but social and institutional aspects as well have to be considered throughout the entire planning process. Based on the results of this very important first step the problem analysis follows.

(2) **Problem Analysis** is the identification and analysis of causes and effects of the core problem in the project area. The ultimate outcome of this step should be a generally agreed core problem with systematically analysed causes and effects. A similar procedure as in step (1) is followed. Workshop participants note in a negative state what they assume to be the major problem. Each mentioned problem should be explained shortly and finally the team should agree on one problem only. If no agreement can be reached all core problems should be listed above and below each other into causes and effects. Based on this overview agreement should be sought again; if not, brain-storming, role games and other decision-making aides up to ranking of problems is suggested. If still no agreement can be achieved one or several problems can preliminarily be decided upon; formal voting however should be avoided.

The second part of the problem analysis tries to analyse the causes and effects of the one (or more) core problem(s) in the shape of a tree, with the core problem in the centre. Direct and substantial causes are located next to each other above and effects in the same way underneath the core problem. By further advancing this principle multi-level causal links and branches are created.

At the end of this step the planning team should have gathered all relevant information that is necessary to explain the main cause-effect relationships of the core problem. Bolay (1984) stresses again the importance of including the target group in this process, as other wise the real causes and effects of the core problem will most probably not reflect real-life situations ²¹. Which members of the target group should participate and how they are to be selected however, is not elaborated.

Figure 2: Example of a Problem Tree with one common Core Problem



Source: GTZ (1987), ZOPP - An Introduction....; p. 9;

(3) **Objectives Analysis**, the hierarchy of problems (problem tree) is transformed into a hierarchy of objectives (objectives tree) and the set of objectives are analysed. The problem tree that was produced in the previous step is now systematically transformed into an objectives tree, changing the negative phrases into positive ones, of what should be achieved in the future. The core problem, e.g. stagnating agricultural production is reworded into increasing agricultural production and is no longer accentuated. All cause-effect relationships have to be carefully checked whether they can be changed into means-ends relationships. The aim of the objectives analysis is first of all to elaborate possible objectives; which objectives should receive priority or which are realistic or optimal has to be carefully considered thereafter. In its best form the objectives tree should be a mirror image of the problem tree and to some extent forms the rudimentary basis of the project planning matrix.

(4) **Discussion of Alternatives** is the identification of potential alternative solutions. The outcome of the objectives tree forms the basis of this step. Related means-end branches are marked with a circle and examined as alternative solutions. They are categorized into different fields, e.g. production oriented or health component. For the evaluation of alternatives economic or financial analyses and feasibility studies can assist in the decision. National or regional developmental policies, the availability of human and financial resources, technological and increasingly environmental

factors might play an important role. Further in-depth analyses of target and interest groups may also help in finding out the potential of alternatives. For a sound judgement every discussion of alternatives should at least include the no-option, a real alternative, one or two modifications and the initial approach ²². Alternatives should always be kept in mind as possible options during actual plan implementation.

After completion of the previous four steps details of the plan are worked out that are necessary for implementation. Here a direct link between planning and implementation has been created to overcome the defects of former planning approaches.

(5) **Project Planning Matrix** is the heart or centrepiece of the logical framework. It basically summarizes all previous efforts into one compact frame that includes all necessary information.

It is laid out in sixteen plots with four vertical columns and four horizontal rows which represent the sequence of the planning process (see diagram p. 18). The first column (steps 1 - 4) starts with the overall project goal as being derived (and if necessary reworded) from the objectives tree. Working our way down in the same column the project purpose describes the intended impacts or the expected benefits as a clearly stated future condition ²³. The next plot indicates which results/outputs have to be realised in order to achieve the project purpose. The last column then lists the main activities or strategies that have to be undertaken to obtain the above results. Here the actual logic of this frame becomes obvious. If certain activities are successfully carried out which lead to desired results then the purpose of a project can be achieved which in turn contributes to an overall goal. That sounds logical indeed. The first vertical column entitled summary of objectives and activities must describe the operational means-ends relationships in the project structure.

The second vertical column (steps 9 - 11) is entitled objectively verifiable indicators. It should present sound indicators in terms of quality, quantity, time, place and intended beneficiaries, that prove that goal purpose and results have been achieved.

The third vertical column (steps 12 - 14), means/sources of verification, has to present for goal, purpose and output through which available data, such as reports, surveys, statistics etc. results can be proven.

The last column (steps 5 - 8) is a crucial one, as here important or "killer" assumptions for objectives and activities are mentioned.

Figure 3: Example of a Project Planning Matrix
(extracts from IRDP/CDS 1985)

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p><u>GOAL</u> (step 1)</p> <p>Increased production of SSCP on a long lasting basis</p>	(step 9)	(step 12)	(step 5)
<p><u>PURPOSE</u> (step 2)</p> <p>SSCP enabled...to get access to services by own efforts...and by provision of institutional services to depot level</p>	(step 10)	(step 13)	(step 6)
<p><u>OUTPUTS</u> (step 3)</p> <p>SSCP trained to form & to manage viable P.S. for getting & handling group loans</p>	<p>(step 11)</p> <p>No. of P.S. registered</p> <p><u>85.86.87.88.89.90</u></p> <p>4.13.22.31.40.50</p>	<p>(step 14)</p> <p>Records of Department of Cooperatives</p>	<p>(step 7)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SSCP will be interested to form P.S. - Through reduction of individual loan only few farmers will drop.
<p><u>MAJOR ACTIVITIES</u>(step 4)</p> <p>Identifying & training of groups to form P.S. & handling of group loans</p>	<p>(step 15)</p> <p>Detailed Activities</p> <p>(In Plan of</p>	<p>(step 16)</p> <p>Detailed Input Requirements</p> <p>Operation)</p>	<p>(step 7 cont'd)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SSCP do not need any credit: They produce without loan as now with the Lima Credit Scheme

Usually factors beyond the immediate control of project staff are listed as assumptions, e.g. no outbreak of diseases or droughts, if agricultural production is to be increased.

The two centre plots in the bottom row (steps 15 & 16) are specifications of detailed activities (further elaborated in the plan of operation) and of inputs and cost of each activity, e.g. man months required or fuel cost.

The horizontal rows always should give indicators, means of verification and important assumptions for the relevant plot in the first column.

PPM is the project in a nut shell.

2.3 Analysis of the LFA with Regard to Participation

Based on the previous presentation of LFA in the following section an attempt is made to analyse in how far and how serious this approach incorporates target group participation and interest representation not only in project implementation and benefits but especially in decision-making.

(1) **Participation Analysis** in my opinion is the crucial step, that already from the first moment of a project's life will have a decisive impact on the success or failure of programs that intend to reach directly the rural households in developing countries.

The **planning team** decides on the criteria for analysis of all groups and also discusses whose interests and views should be given priority when it later on comes to problem analysis. That of course takes for granted that the planning team is very familiar with the socio-economic and political situation in the project area (a fact, that most of the time is actually not given at least at the beginning of projects). To substantiate findings of the participation analysis a separate in-depth analysis can be made of the internal situation in the involved groups. That might be sufficient for technical or infrastructural projects where LFA is definitely an improvement compared to previous planning methods. It makes the intended outputs and assumptions explicit and creates a very detailed plan to achieve these, including all the input requirements.

Through the participation analysis, the need to incorporate the clientele in the planning process is taken into account. Participation analysis as it is proposed by LFA however, is not equal to actual, physical participation of the target group (or their representatives) in the formulation of the plan itself.

Here I see one short-coming of the LFA, especially when intended project outputs impact in the social structure of the target group.

Participation analysis by planners alone will not adequately consider the socio-economic environment and the proposed LFA guidelines are not flexible and efficient enough to clarify the internal situation and the relationships within the target and interest groups in advance. That naturally requires quite some inside knowledge of the respective groups, which is best presented by the clientele or their representatives, as otherwise latent problems will definitely arise at any time during project implementation.

Although the logical framework as further developed by GTZ is aware of these necessities, it only remains at a level that gives recommendations to the planning team. It does not make the participation analysis such an elaborate process as, e.g. the completion of the PPM. As we have seen from other approaches however, it is precisely at this stage where success or failure of future project activities is decided. If time is the constraint in the planning workshops, that usually does not allow in-depth analyses of interest and target groups, then means have to be found how this crucial knowledge could be obtained before the planning workshops. That requires good communication and contact with the respective groups and locally experienced staff members that enjoy confidence in the target group. At the initial stage of a project that might not be realistic; once the project is established and contacts have been made on various levels, a pre-planning workshop analysis of target and interest groups could lead to a more real-life plan and reduce potential failures.

(2) **Problem Analysis**, in my opinion is the second crucial step in the LFA. The procedure offered here is similar to participation analysis. Each participant should note down one core problem in a negative state, which should describe the central point of the overall problematic condition. A discussion should then lead to the agreement on one overall core problem. The existence of more than one core problems only temporarily is allowed (what I think more realistically would reflect the real-life situation).

I think that it is quite difficult to agree on only one general core problem, especially when representatives of the actual target group (in this case presumably members of peasant households) are involved. It is difficult to imagine that local bureaucrats will regard the main problem of a peasant, e.g. the lack of adequate institutional support services in due time, as their own as well, which in turn might be the lack of adequate funds from provincial headquarters for travelling allowances to reach the peasants. In complex projects there are always at least two main groups involved, i.e. the ones who plan and implement (and have the funds) and the

ones for whom the plans are meant and who will be mainly carrying the 'burden' of implementation. The relationship between those two main parties can vary as much as the number, that could be higher than two. In order not to overcomplicate matters I think that a kind of competitive problem analysis that allows the equal existence of at least two standpoints at the end of the analysis seems more realistic and still manageable.

Here in my view LFA is too rigid, aims too high and it is too goal oriented, with the goal here however, being the need to complete the planning exercise within a too short and given period of time. This sort of general agreement can only be of a temporary nature, often brought about by capable LFA intermediaries.

The following step, the analysing of causes and effects of the core problem very systematically hinges on the one agreed problem from the previous step. The results however, will stand or fall with the core problem itself. The formulation of the core problem largely depends on the composition of the planning team and its respective bias. The core problem hence could also be looked at as a problem of participation in the planning process. If the core problem proves not to be the real problem for all involved parties, the subsequently derived activities to overcome them will also lead to results that favour the stronger initial core problem presenter, e.g. more travel allowances are paid for officers to render better services to farmers, who in turn only wanted a more reliable input supply and not more visits by District officers.

In my opinion, such a sophisticated planning approach as the LFA is capable of developing alternative strategies for the solution of more than one core problem. The intellectual capacities of the planners and workshop participants are however, more challenged through this two way plan.

(3) Discussion of Alternatives is meant to provide the possibilities to countercheck the validity of initial proposals. In my own experience that step however, was never really taken seriously, as it would in a way put back at least some of the planning results on the discussion floor, leading to further delays. I don't want to put too much emphasis on the time question, but I am convinced that more time for these important steps will also lead to less waste of time later, when unsound projects are implemented and finally turned down by the intended beneficiaries. The discussion of alternatives suffers from the same short-comings as the participation analysis.

The principal tools have been recognized, but their actual use is again not an integral part of the planning process. As much as the participation analysis is not equal to actual participation, the discussion of alternative solutions at this stage of the planning process will not result in more than a discussion only.

The serious consideration of alternatives should rather take place simultaneously with the objectives analysis or through the formulation of and the agreement on more than one core problem. By ways of a 'competitive' problem and objective analyses potential alternatives will be realised much clearer and identified more easily, than by trying to discuss them at this stage.

If time is short in the planning workshops a discussion of potential alternatives could also take place in the field with target and interest groups before actual implementation of plans. Without doubting the professional integrity of most team members, I still think that there should be more time, whether before or in the planning workshops, for all three steps. The final plan formulation will then be based on solid grounds and the chances of unintended backfiring of projects could probably be reduced.

When comparing the major planning steps of the LFA and its mechanisms to incorporate the interests of the target group in the planning process with the concept of participation as developed by the Cornell University, the following can be observed:

- a) The composition of a normal LFA planning team and the preparations for a planning workshop usually don't allow for target group participation in the formulation of plans or the decision-making phase of a project. The same can be stated for the evaluation of project results.
- b) Activities being carried out according to LFA plans reduce active clientele participation mainly to implementation of project activities and under favourable circumstances to its benefits.

Here the technocratic nature of the LFA manifests itself through offering only the administrator's and to some extent the economists perception of the concept.

The need to incorporate and seriously analyse the socio-economic environment is realised in the LFA planning and management technique. The mechanisms offered to ensure this however, are not always effective enough and could be improved.

Notes

- 11 - GTZ (1987), Project Management (revised draft), p. 6;
- 12 - See: PCI (1979), The LFA, pp. I-1 to I-3;
- 13 - Wheatley (1984), p. 187;
- 14 - GTZ (1987), Management der Projektdurchfuehrung..., pp. 20 - 22;
- 15 - GTZ (1987), ZOPP - An Introduction..., p. 1;
- 16 - *ibid.*: pp. 1 - 3;
- 17 - GTZ (1987), ZOPP - Flipcharts;
- 18 - GTZ (1987), Management der Projektdurchfuehrung im Partnerland: Ein Leitfaden;
- 19 - PCI (1979), Trees Analysis, pp. 1 - 3;
- 20 - Bolay (1984), p. 9;
- 21 - *ibid.*: p. 15;
- 22 - *ibid.*: p. 33;
- 23 - GTZ (1987) ZOPP - An Introduction..., p. 13;

PART III: RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ZAMBIA

This chapter briefly examines Zambia's development strategies and policies for the small-scale and subsistence sector at the end of the 1970's, the time when IRDP/NWP was started. This will be done at national and regional level in order to put IRDP/NWP in the proper context and hence to be able to better understand its objectives, activities and the results achieved or failures. Thereafter I will briefly look at Zambia's cooperative policy and how this relates to the specific situation of NWP.

3.1 National Policies and Strategies

Zambia's economic situation at the end of the 70's was characterised by the final recognition of the government that world market prices for the country's number one export and government revenue earner, copper, have significantly decreased and would not recover in the foreseeable future. The Third National Development Plan (TNDP) covering the period from 1979 to 1983 stated the following objectives ²⁴:

1. Expansion of the production base in the agric. sector, for self-sufficiency and exports;
2. Provision of a wide range of social and economic amenities and services;
3. Adoption of investment and production programs and creation of credit, marketing and extension facilities which will directly benefit subsistence producers and small-scale farmers.

In this light a two-fold strategy was followed in the agricultural and rural sector. Firstly emphasis was put on the small holder and subsistence farming sector and secondly, because of the anticipated slow initial growth of this sector, "Operation Food Production" was launched. The strategy for the rural sector included decentralisation of the administrative structure, encouragement to increasingly involve rural people in rural reconstruction and decision-making. The need for an integrated program of development was stressed ²⁵. Rural incomes were supposed to become comparable to urban, basic needs in terms of food, health and education of the rural poor should have been satisfied by 1980 already, according to the TNDP. Government expenditure on directly productive sectors like mining, industry and agriculture however, dropped from 46% in 1975 to only 36% (of total budget) in 1980-82. The lion's share had already gone to non-developmental purposes, such as increasing salaries of civil servants, subsidies and debt services ²⁶.

Zambia's financial constraints however, severely hampered the timely achievement of the objectives of the TNDP.

Six integrated rural and three area development programs sponsored by a variety of foreign donors were launched during the TNDP. IRDP were funded under bilateral aid and ADP were under multilateral donors like the IRBD or the IFAD. Both programs concentrated on increase of agricultural productivity and improvement of the quality of life of the rural small-scale producers. One distinct feature of the programs was the fact that they, in addition to agriculture got involved in a good number of other economic and social amenity rural development activities. The various programs differed considerably in their practical implementation strategies but did have some common aims as well ²⁷:

a) *the Zambian institutions should be strengthened*; one of the points where the individual programs differed to a wide extent. In already more developed areas like in parts of Northern Province, the British exclusively worked through existing institutions and the District Councils. Focus was on the support and the building up of a planning/management system and improvement of rural infrastructure through capital investment programs, that are implemented by the District Council in areas where the highest benefit/cost ratios can be expected. The British Overseas Development Agency (ODA) was not getting involved in the actual implementation.

At the other extreme were the Germans in North-Western Province, one of the remotest and most backward areas in Zambia. As hardly any institutions were established here and the councils were poorly staffed, GTZ decided to strengthen the self-reliance of the subsistence farming community first and then hand-over successful activities to District Councils which should have by then upgraded their managerial capacities. Instead of going for high benefit/cost ratios for the councils, the actual target group got the prime support in the first instance.

b) *services to the rural population should be improved*, particularly agricultural research and extension activities were supported and strengthened; the infrastructure was expanded by building feeder roads and bridges and input supply and marketing organisations assisted or built up which will make possible

c) *an increased hectarage* under improved cultivation practices and hence increased agricultural productivity, which then results in

d) *increased incomes for the rural population*, also in the non-farm sector

through rural craft centres with training facilities for young carpenters or the promotion of bee-keeping and this consequently leads to

e) *an improved standard of living* in all fields, e.g. water supply at district and village level improved by new pipe systems and well constructions respectively; primary health care programmes started with rural health centres and emphasis on proper diets, especially for children to help fight malnutrition;

Besides these foreign supported efforts to promote rural development, the Government of the Republic of Zambia concentrated on the Lima Program and the Operation Food Production, partly as laid down in the TNDP. For our purpose however, only the Lima program is of interest, as here the subsistence agriculture was supposed to be promoted and its basic ideas were also applied in the IRDP/NWP.

The **Lima Program** was the major effort geared to boost subsistence agricultural production. *Lima* is a Zambian word and means 'to cultivate or to dig the soil'. In 1978 the central agricultural research station had developed a package that was designed for small-scale farmers on the basis of one Lima (equivalent to 0.25 ha). Exact input requirements for cash crops like maize, sunflower, soya-bean, rice and groundnuts were calculated including seed rates, basal and top-dressing fertiliser, pesticides (if necessary). Some equipment was offered like a beaker for measuring fertiliser and a rope to demarcate fields. The intention was to maximise the efficient use of purchased inputs and hence enable the small farmers to handle these crops better. A major short-coming of this program in the beginning was that the crop recommendations were elaborated in the central research station and they soon proved not to be appropriate for other parts of the country. Another constraint was the fact that only cash crops were involved that needed quite essential purchased inputs and so far credits were only available for above one ha of cash crops, a precondition that most of the small farmers could not fulfill. Therefore, the majority of producers could not be reached by the Lima program in the beginning.

The main idea however, to come up with special advice for the subsistence and small-scale producers continued to be in the mind of researchers and the 'Adaptive Research'-approach as developed by CIMMYT, was gradually introduced in all provinces. The aim was to come up with locally adjusted, economical and ecological viable crop husbandry recommendations for various groups of male and female subsistence and small holder farmers.

3. 2 Integrated Rural Development in NW - Province

North-Western Province of Zambia (see Appendix for a map) is one of the remotest and most backward parts of the country and sometimes has been referred to as the 'Cinderella Province' ²⁸. NWP has a very low population density, very poor infrastructure and besides the fact that it is located in the high rain-fall area has very few advantages to offer. No wonder that migration to urban centres continued with incomes in rural areas (despite some successes) far behind those in towns. The effects of labour migration, especially on poorer rural households has been examined by Hedlund and Lundahl in 1983 and their findings are also relevant to North-Western Province. They conclude that up to 30% of rural households are headed by women and this limitation in available labour has detrimental effects on the size of land that can be cultivated and on the types of crops that can be grown under the traditional hoe and axe cultivation system. The lack of male labour power in the poorer households often leads to serious falls in per capita income of those staying behind. For the opening up or the tillage of new land male labour is essential and normally can not be compensated by additional working hours of women, children or old people. Richer families may be able to substitute these labour constraints through the purchase of e.g. draft animal power or through hiring of labour, options that poorer households normally don't have.

North-Western Province didnot receive much attention from the government when it came to the allocation of investment funds. Opportunities for the rural population to earn minimum cash wages through casual employment, government public work programs or the remittances from migrant labour in the urban areas and the mines decreased constantly. Agricultural services were limited to emergent farmer (above 1 ha of cash crops) resulting in 95% of the peasants excluded from these services ²⁹. The province was a net importer of grains, partly due to the consumption habits of the urban population. Concentration of the population along the main roads with facilities like schools, clinics and markets was leading to partial exhaustion of the sandy soils through semi-permanent cultivation practices.

Due to the above mentioned reasons the Zambian and the German governments in 1977 decided to launch an integrated rural development project (IRDP) in three of the six districts of NWP. The implementation of the program was jointly undertaken by the Zambian Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development (MAWD) and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). After initial quarrels about the approach - MAWD wanted

a limited number of emergent farmers with up to 10 ha to be supported with green revolution types of inputs and equipment, GTZ wanted the majority of subsistence producers to be involved in locally adapted, low external input requiring improved traditional farming - the donor could convince the Zambian authorities to agree to a basic need oriented approach (also in view of stopping the trend of migration to towns if the majority of farmers would be involved).

In this context IRDP started with the main focus on the improvement of services to rural small-scale producers in the fields of crops, cattle, bee-keeping and timber processing. Special credit, input supply and marketing arrangements were launched; adaptive research and extension activities strengthened and a set of complementary projects like a feeder road program, village water supply, primary health care and self-help primary school construction supported.

The basic philosophy underlying IRDP's activities was that of poverty-eradication with maximum clientele participation, the utilisation of local resources and the concept of appropriate technology. A 'sandwich strategy' included two main strategies ²⁰:

1. Enabling the target group to reach the service institutions by their own efforts (e.g. introduction of local ox-drawn transport, improved storage facilities etc. on the basis of group approach for all services, i.e. strengthening the target group's self-reliance) and
2. Enabling the service institutions to reach the majority of the target group (through planning and management support).

The project was planned to be implemented in three major phases:

1. *Expansion phase* (till 1982), where IRDP was directly involved in project implementation in order to test unconventional approaches;
2. *Integration phase* (till 1987), where target group organisations should be strengthened; step wise withdrawal of IRDP from direct involvement in implementation and integration of activities into existing Zambian institutions
3. *Consolidation phase* (till 1990?), should further strengthen target group's organisational structures and institutions' planning and managerial capacities.

Before IRDP started its operations in 1978 the vast majority of the population in the project area was involved in subsistence production of

mainly cassava, sorghum and millet and legumes like beans and groundnuts. Production of maize for the market was negligible. Only about five % of the rural households were regularly selling crops to the parastatal marketing board in the mid-seventies ³¹. Services and credits to the subsistence farmers were virtually non-existent, as the remoteness of the area, the poor infrastructure and the widely scattered villages didnot seem to offer attractive production opportunities. As no Zambian institutions were willing or able to effectively provide services, IRDP initiated a number of agricultural services tailored to the needs of the subsistence farming community. Farmers who only wanted to grow one lima of e.g. maize could now receive seasonal loans. As no functioning input or marketing facilities existed in the area, IRDP decided to organise these activities as well. Inputs according to the Lima program were delivered to the farmers on loan and the produce collected again after harvest. The loans were deducted from the cash-on-delivery payments. These very attractive conditions made the numbers of participating farmers increase tremendously. From only 44 farmers involved in the pilot phase in Kabompo District in 1978/79, the number increased to nearly 10 000 farmers in 1987/88. Rauch (1987:13) estimates that nearly half of the households (49%) in Kabompo District are, at least with one member, involved in the Lima program. The amount of officially marketed maize rose from approximately 12 000 bags in 1979 to 64 000 bags in 1987, which is equal to self-sufficiency in maize for the project area.

The example of IRDP shows that the subsistence farmers were very capable of producing substantial marketable surplus, when given the proper support.

In a detailed household survey in Kabompo District in 1983 ³² the impacts of the Lima program on the incomes of different groups of farmers were examined. The results were quite impressive. Households which didnot participate in the Lima program had an average annual cash income of K 191, out of which K 69 was from crop sales, K 110 from non-farm activities and K 12 from gifts. Lima households with 1 to 2 lima got K 98 from crop sales, K 133 from non-farm activities and K 13 from gifts. Larger households with more than 2 Lima already generated K 614, out of which the largest part was from crop sales i.e. K 319, K 275 from non-farm activities and K 20 from gifts.

It is interesting to note that for the bigger farm households farming already became the largest part of the total income, whereas for the smaller and non-Lima households non-farm activities like bee-keeping, hunting and beer brewing produced more cash income than farming.

Table 1: Annual Cash Income of Village Households by Type (83/84)
(in Kwacha)

Type of Household(HH)	Approx. From Crops	Mean Income per Household	Other sources	Gifts	Total
HH with 1-2 Lima Cash Crops	98	133		13	244
HH above 2 Lima Cash Crops	319	275		20	614
All Lima HH	158	172		15	345
All Non- Lima HH	69	110		12	191

Source: Statistical Handbook North-Western Province 1985, Table 4. 3

(Data from IRDP Lima-Survey in 1983)

(For more socio-economic data on target group see appendix 2.1 to 2.5)

3. 3 Zambia's Cooperative Policy

The first cooperatives in Zambia were formed by white settler farmers as early as 1914, as an organ for marketing their produce to the newly developing mine industry ³³. After independence in 1964, the development of rural areas through cooperatives was given high priority and the government was prepared to support those who were willing to form cooperatives with money incentives (which was still plentiful available at that time). Consequently many coops were formed.

The Zambian cooperative system has a three-tier structure ³⁴:

1. Primary societies (single and multi purpose) are formed by members country wide in different fields of activities.
2. 9 provincial cooperative unions (secondary societies) which are formed by primary societies.
3. 1 country wide tertiary cooperative union, i.e. the Zambian Cooperative Federation.

The legal basis for the cooperative system is formed by the Cooperative Societies Act, 1970 (Act No. 63) which comprehensively governs all aspects and all kinds of cooperative activities.

The foundations of the primary societies however, were weak. Reasons for early coop failure were mainly poor planning, lack of cooperative training and unprofessional supervision of loans. Therefore many loans landed in the pockets of the local elites, who didn't repay them; small farmers often were not considered and hence were never much in favour of coops. After this failure of the coop movement during the FNDP, emphasis was laid on the economic viability of cooperative societies, on training and competent management of involved staff during the SNDP. The main weaknesses, i.e. that mainly the better-off farmers benefitted from the coops however, could not be eliminated. In the TNDP the coop idea was hoped to be reinvigorated by correcting the mistakes of the past and by making the coops self-reliant entities. Local participation of members in the affairs of the societies was encouraged. A strong agricultural economy was supposed to be created, based on Rural Reconstruction Centres, where villagers and school production units should be regrouped and organized on a cooperative basis. These centres should act as nucleus for cooperative development in the rural areas.

In NWP the cooperative union (NWCU) was the sole successor of the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) and since 1982 is in charge of handling all agricultural inputs and produce. For the three IRDP Districts that was done by the LIMA Marketing, Credit and Input Supply Section. Seasonal credits to farmers up to 1 ha of cash crops (above this area the Zambian Agricultural Finance Company provided individual loans) were dealt with on an individual basis, input supply and marketing was managed on a group basis. Small-scale farmers were asked to join loose bodies, called LIMA groups in order to facilitate these activities. It was exactly the future of these LIMA groups that caused considerable problems. In view of integrating IRDP activities into existing Zambian institutions during phase II of the program, NWCU was the only option for IRDP's marketing and credit activities. The extensive way in which IRDP had organised these activities however, could realistically not be maintained by the NWCU. The IRDP group approach for input supply and marketing was therefore envisaged to be extended to loans as well. The main problem was the transformation of the LIMA groups into legal bodies, i.e. the formation of primary cooperative societies. This was necessary due to the following reasons ²⁵:

- to introduce a block loan system, the recipient has to be a legal entity.
- for groups a legal status is needed for all legal actions

for and against the group.

- a legal status is needed for joining the Cooperative Credit Scheme system and to make use of the promotional measures of NWCU.
- whereas groups are functioning as long as the number of members is small, bigger formations need a legal set-up for their numerous activities.
- group cohesion is closer if there is a fixed set of rules ascertained by law and administered by a legal institution.

These reasons for the formation of cooperative societies were very much in line with the Zambian cooperative policy and also reflected IRDP's priorities of rather quickly withdrawing from its implementation functions. In a detailed study about the promotion of the NWCU, Stiliz and Muziol (1983) however, clearly warned that the formation of primary societies cannot be decreed, but rather is an evolutionary process. If this is not remembered, societies will only function as long as benefits can be expected and will dissolve or become inactive as soon as benefits are withdrawn. Therefore the formation of societies should be started from below and members should be made aware of potential benefits based on common and joint activities and efforts.

In an internal discussion paper about the establishment of primary societies Rauch, the senior regional planner of NWP (1984) prepared a guideline of how this could be achieved. He clearly states the necessity of these societies as otherwise the NWCU would not be able to continue IRDP's extensive service system. He also mentions that 'group self-administration' is essential to enable the present LIMA groups to further receive credits, inputs and marketing facilities. Important assumptions for the establishment of primary societies were ^{as}:

- Sound economic advantages for primary societies
- Self-administration considered an extra burden shifted onto the back of the society members from the government
- self-administration could be achieved either by withdrawing services from non-members or tangible incentive to members
- Technological advantages to groups like preferential supply of e.g. ox-drawn transport or hammer mills to members
- the size of groups has to be small to ensure active participation, social control and cohesion; size of Lima groups can only slowly be increased into bigger PS

The strategy to achieve the successful formation of groups included the step wise transformation of loosely bound LIMA groups into study groups and a mixture of incentives and compulsory measures in order to transform producer groups into self-administered units. Only groups with some degree of self-administration should be supplied with work-oxen or hammer mills. Direct financial incentives for the handling of produce could be another tool of promoting group formation. A closely monitored pilot phase is recommended before further attempts to stimulate PS. A major obstacle for group formation was the fact that IRDP study groups were not recognised as legal bodies by the Zambian Cooperative Credit Scheme (CCS), which only accepts registered PS for group loan disbursements. For their own convenience the CCS preferred PS of at least 200 members which would facilitate administration considerably.

The agrarian structure and the scattered population patterns in NWP however did not allow for such big entities and individual farmers are unwilling to accept responsibilities for other members in other villages. Rauch's proposed solutions hence were twofold. Study groups should be recognised as legal units by CCS and hence qualify for group loans; if they manage, then they should be officially registered. The second solution was that IRDP would step in and provide group loans to unrecognised study groups out of their own funds until these formations are finally registered. The latter solution however would seriously hamper the integration process.

With these recommendations of the feasibility study and the internal discussion paper on the promotion of the NWCU and the Zambian cooperative policies in mind, the next section of this paper analyses how the IRDP staff with the help of the LFA tried to solve this problem of how to promote the formation of cooperative societies.

Notes

- 24 - TNDP (1979), p. 22;
- 25 - *ibid.*: pp. 26 - 27;
- 26 - Simson (1985), p. 61;
- 27 - MAWD (1984), pp. 5 - 7;
- 28 - Oppen von (1987), p. 2.
- 29 - Weyl & Rauch (1978), pp. 66,75;
- 30 - Rauch (1987), p. 2;
- 31 - *ibid.*: pp. 3 - 5;
- 32 - Oppen von et al. (1983), IRDP LIMA Survey;
- 33 - Ncube et Aulakh (1983), p. 321;
- 34 - ZCF (1982), p. 7;
- 35 - Stiliz et Muziol (1983), pp. 69 - 69;
- 36 - Rauch (1984), pp. 2 - 3;

PART IV: THE COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT SECTION (CDS)

In this chapter I will try to analyse the contributions and limitations of the LFA in the real context of a development project using the case of the CDS of IRDP/NWP. For this purpose I will briefly look at the role and the weight of the LFA as planning tool in the IRDP. Thereafter the plan of operation of the CDS 1985, as developed with the LFA and its impact on the cooperative movement in the project area and the individual small-scale producer will be analysed.

4.1 The Logical Framework as planning tool in IRDP/NWP

The LFA was introduced in IRDP in early 1982, after the program has been in operation for more than four years. Based on the first logical framework on program level of february 1982, an analysis of strategic constraints was undertaken for each sub-project. These were summarized in strategy discussion papers, which then served as source for modifications of targets on project purpose level. According to these revised goals and purposes, IRDP projects and sections elaborated for the first time individual plans of operation with modified (where required) outputs and key operations which took into account the new project purposes. This exercise then led to the first IRDP long term strategy with the following program objectives and characteristics ³⁷.

The general *goal* of IRDP is the improvement of the living conditions of the majority of the rural population by mobilizing their productive potential; at national level this is supposed to stabilize the socio-economic situation in the rural areas, reduce the rural exodus, increase regional food self sufficiency and reduce food imports into Zambia. To achieve these goals, the productivity of the majority of small-scale producers had to be increased, which is the *purpose* of IRDP. Here the basic need approach is mentioned, as activities should be based on local resources, low level of external inputs and should lead to satisfaction of local needs first. The program's *output* then was defined as extending reliable services of local institutions to the intended target group. *Activities* to achieve this output were supposed to be limited to planning-, management- and material support.

As neither appropriate local technologies nor reliable service institutions were available or existing in the project area, the 'sandwich strategy' in three major phases had to be applied.

This summary of objectives and outputs, developed with the help of LFA in 1983 then formed the basis of all future activities of the IRDP.

Figure 4: IRDP Long Term Project Planning Matrix

Level	Narrative Summary ('ideal strategy')		Strategy Characteristics	Crucial Assumptions	Adjustments to Conditions
Super goal	Increase of regional self-sufficiency	Reduction of rural exodus	'Regional self-reliance		
Goal	Improvement of living conditions of rural majority a. More cash b. Better Subsistence		'Poverty group Orientation'		
Purpose	Increased productivity of majority of small-scale producers (SSP) by programmes based on local resources, intermediate level of technology and directed towards local needs		'Production Orientation' 'SSP-Orientation' 'Low Input' 'Basic Needs'		- Agricultural programme based on external inputs (hybrid maize, fertilizer) - SSP's self-reliance strengthened by group approach
Output	Services of local development agencies expanded to SSP target group and reliability of services increased		<u>Institutional Strategy:</u> - 'Integrated approach' - 'bottleneck elimination approach'	- Appropriate extension packages available (with ref. to utilization of local resources)	- Services provided directly by IRDP - Knowledge for package adjustments improved by trial-programme - Programmes for local transportation, local processing and local storage elaborated
Activity	Give planning, management and material support			- Development agencies prepared to follow SSP approach (with ref. to expansion of services) - Limited amount of external funds (with ref. to limitation to bottleneck elimination)	Direct implementation support

With IRDP activities being further integrated into local institutions, participation of these and the target group made the annual replanning sessions a difficult exercise. It had to be flexible, according to results obtained and analysed in the annual program assessment (firmly established since 1986 only, after failure of cooperative plan). The re-planning approach is divided into three stages ³⁰:

1. **Assessment phase**, which includes field visits with respective IRDP section and meetings with target groups; discussions with District authorities and members of staff of Government Departments; assessment of section achievements and constraints based on formalized procedure (see appendix 3.1).
2. **Decision-making phase**, where formal re-planning sessions are held on project and section level in presence of respective government officials and representatives of the target group; achievements and constraints are analysed with the help of LFA and divided into purpose-output link, activities-output link and the implementation of key events. Necessary modifications of the logical framework are noted in special forms and possible alternatives are laid down in another format, called the 'decision-making options format', which should carefully weigh advantages and disadvantages of the proposals (appendix 3.2).
3. **Specification phase**, where detailed plans of operation and budget proposals are elaborated for the coming implementation stage by the individual projects and sections.

The re-planning approach is expected to fulfill the criteria of a participatory and result oriented approach in an effective way ³⁰, as here all relevant parties, from the target group, political leaders, implementing agencies up to planning units from regional and national level and other relevant implementing agencies are supposed to be involved.

Besides the annual re-planning exercise, which includes an assessment of results and a detailed formulation of plans of operation and budget proposals with all relevant parties involved, LFA as developed by GTZ also makes use of an intensive monitoring and evaluation system. In this system key events are formulated that are vital for the achievement of the individual project's outputs; in addition monthly management meetings are held for which monthly section reports have to be prepared, stating main achievements or failures and reasons for it. Half- and annual progress reports round up that evaluation system.

This project management system, based on the LFA allows the respective sponsors to effectively control all major activities and resource flows. That it is a tool for the management and has limitations in its practical application with regard to clientele participation in decision-making, the following section tries to document.

4.2 The LFA in its Practical Application

The promotion of primary societies, as one essential prerequisite to facilitate the already accomplished integration (at least on paper) of IRDP's marketing and credit activities into the NWCU, was one of major tasks of the planning workshop in early 1985. The workshop participants could build on good results from the implementation of the previous plan (1984), which had the following objectives and outputs ⁴⁰:

The *goal* was the improvement of the standard of living of the participating SSP on a long lasting basis and support to the institutions providing services to the small-scale producers.

The *purpose* was increased income in cash and kind of SSP and their increased production and productivity. *Sub-purposes* were the further integration of activities into existing government institutions and the strengthening of LIMA groups' and primary societies' (at this stage no functioning PS existed in the project area) self-reliance and viability.

The major *outputs* of the section were the timely provision of credits and inputs to the SSP and the reliable marketing of produce. For the cooperative development aspects, LIMA groups were to be prepared with respect to their future status as legal entities, i.e. trained in self-administration.

The results for the 1984/85 season showed that 5059 LIMA farmers were supplied with inputs on loan. Of the 30 groups that were supposed to receive group loans, none of them participated ⁴¹. That indicated that IRDP's marketing and credit activities were attractive to farmers, that the provision of group loans however, was not yet accepted by farmers.

The 1985 plan of operation, in view of integrating IRDP projects, was elaborated on individual section level by workshop participants ⁴².

The *goal* of the MCS/CDS was reduced to increased production of SSP on a long lasting basis (the previous goal of improvement of standard of living was the general, overall IRDP goal and had not to be reflected anymore in the individual section plans).

The *purpose* was that SSP should be enabled by adequate organisational means to get access to necessary services by their own efforts and by provision of institutional services at depot level (depots were supposed to be erected within a 10 km range from producer groups).

Major *outputs* amongst others were the training of SSP to form and to manage viable primary societies for getting and handling group loans or taking up any other business; the provision of IRDP group credits to study groups (the pilot phase before forming PS) and the provision of CCS loans to registered PS.

Activities to achieve these outputs included the specifying of (potential) study groups, their motivation and training for self-accounting and the handling of group loans. The same activities were specified for the (non-functioning) existing primary societies. At this moment (1985) only 4 PS were registered in the entire project area!

Objectively verifiable indicators to measure the achievement of outputs and activities were the no. of registered PS that actually receive group loans PS, and the reduction of individual loans to 0% in the coming 2 or 3 years.

Important assumptions for the achievement of objectives and outputs were that SSP will be interested to form PS, that SSP would not need credit to produce cash crops and that, despite the stepwise reduction of individual loans only very few farmers would drop out of the program.

These extracts of the section's project planning matrix in the plan of operation 1985 (see also Project Planning Matrix on page 18) were elaborated in an official LFA planning workshop. Participants were IRDP members of staff (Zambian and expatriate), members of the Marketing and Cooperative Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, members of the provincial and national planning units and GTZ headquarters. It was not common practice in IRDP that members or representatives of the target group were participating (the fact, that staff members of other government and parastatal organisations were present, was already considered an important step towards participation in the planning of IRDP activities). An important observation to be made is the fact that both, the Zambian and the expatriate staff seemed to have this formation of primary societies very much in their minds. For the Zambians the reinvigoration of the cooperative movement was an explicit objective of national agricultural policies. For the expatriates the formation of these PS was essential to guarantee the successful taking over of former IRDP's activities by the NWCU. The foreign donor agency was urging the program to come up with

tangible results in the integration process. This probably explains why so much emphasis was laid on PS in this plan of operation, despite the discouraging results of previous attempts to form and keep alive such societies. This poor record of the cooperative movement in the project area was not considered adequately and only mentioned in the PPM as 'killer' assumption which says, that farmers will be interested in forming PS.

In this joint elaboration of the plan of operation 1985, the interests of the target group have not been considered. The small farmers however, were very seriously affected by this plan. The alternative for them was now either to join study groups or registered primary societies or trying to plant their cash crop fields without loans to buy the inputs. Although not explicitly stated in the operations of the section, this more or less forced membership in cooperatives in order to obtain inputs on loan, was limited to 5 selected agricultural camps in Kabompo District. In these camps ox-drawn transportation of inputs and produce was also undertaken on a pilot basis. This pilot scheme for study groups was a kind of informal compromise as some workshop participants already 'smelled' the probable reaction of the farming community on these drastic changes in the loan policy. Without any changes the plan was consequently implemented and led to some very surprising results.

4.3 The Impact of one LFA implemented Plan on the Target Group

The plan of operation 1985, which had the formation of PS as an explicit output, then was implemented according to schedule. One of the first tasks was to inform the five selected camps in Kabompo District about the change in the loan policy. In these pilot camps only farmers who were members of study groups or registered primary societies qualified for IRDP or CCS group loans respectively ^{4a}. By the time the recruitment for the 1985/86 season was completed the formerly impressive growth rates of farmers participating in the LIMA program turned in the opposite direction. Table 2 speaks for itself and impressively indicates farmers' opinion about joining study groups or primary societies; they would rather reject seasonal loans than joining into cooperatives.

The figures are only from five camps where the cooperative movement was supposed to be tested in that season. In the remaining camps and Districts of IRDP's project area everything was supposed to remain unchanged; farmers however, were informed about the possible changes in the loan policies for the next season, after the pilot scheme.

Table 2: Farmers' Participation in Pilot Camps

Agricult. Camp	1984/85		1985/86		% Change Farmers / Limas
	Farmers	Limas	Farmers	Limas	
Kabulamema	143	229	21	47	- 85.4 / - 79.5
Manyinga	426	954	41	126	- 90.4 / - 86.8
Kapembe	145	247	55	121	- 62.1 / - 51.1
Kawanda	338	596	70	183	- 79.3 / - 69.3
Kasamba	178	385	44	124	- 75.3 / - 67.8
Total	1230	2411	231	601	- 81.3 / - 75.1

Source: Internal IRDP assessment of drop-outs in 1985/86 season

Without being forced to join cooperatives, only with the perspective of having to do so in the coming season the farming community reacted as summarized in table 3.

Table 3: LIMA Loan Participation in all 3 Districts

District	Kabompo		Zambezi		Chizera		Total	
	84/85	85/86	84/85	85/86	84/85	85/86	84/85	85/86
Groups	144	86	111	91	50	47	305	224
Loanees	2446	836	1716	846	897	728	5059	2410
Limas	4482	1793	3230	1635	1841	1599	9558	5027
/loanee	1.8	2.1	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.2	1.9	2.1

Source: IRDP Progress Report No. 17, p. 42, 1986;

The figures also represent the number of farmers who received inputs like fertilizer and seed through IRDP. Another factor that probably contributed to this massive drop was the change in maize seed offered to the farmers in that season. Instead of the hybrid variety, familiar to farmers, a newly developed composite variety, suitable for NWP condition was more or less forced onto the farmers by IRDP. The expected changes in the loan policy and at the same time the distribution of hardly known seed, led to results in participation in the credit scheme, summarized above.

Not only in the pilot scheme camps were farmers faced immediate changes, but also in all other camps of Kabompo and Zambezi Districts severe drops of participating farmers could be noted. Only in Chizera, the smallest District changes were rather insignificant, due to the fact that the project area was increased considerably (without this extension figures for Chizera would be only 435 farmers planting 959 limas). Another interesting finding of this table is the fact that although participation went down to about 50% compared to the previous season, the numbers of limas per loanee increased slightly on average. This suggests that it was mainly the smallest farmers who dropped and that the already bigger farmers could increase their acreage. This is also an indication for the earlier assumption that the cooperatives were always more favoured by the already better off farmers and that small peasants never really got access to benefits related to the membership in coops.

After years of constant increases of farmers' participation in the LIMA credit scheme, this development meant a serious set back in meeting IRDP's overall goal of improving the living standards of the majority of SSP by increased production and productivity. This case is an example of how the output of one project, in this case the MCS/CDS, can endanger the overall goal of the program, if adequate interest representation of the target group is not ensured in the actual planning of outputs. From the farmers' reaction it becomes obvious that they were not interested or willing to join a movement, which they didn't trust and which was more or less 'decreed' upon them. Their interest continued to be the planting crops for the market in order to raise their cash income.

Table 4: No. of finally producing farmers in all Districts (85/86)

District	Kabompo	Zambezi	Chizera	Total
Preliminary Crop Forecast				
Farmers	1108	1617	1613	4338
Limas	2593	3160	3415	9160
Final Crop Forecast				
Farmers	1486	1968	1892	5346
Limas	4261	4296	5068	13962

Source: IRDP progress report no. 17, pp. 20-25

The figures in table 4 include farmers who participated in the IRDP loan scheme on individual basis, in the five pilot camps on a group loan basis (which is insignificant) and all other farmers who planted their fields with inputs bought for cash. It is surprising to note how the figures continuously increase from the preliminary to the final crop forecast. This reflects some of the characteristics of the IRDP project area, which except for areas along the main roads is extremely scarcely populated and settlements are very scattered. This makes it difficult for the extension staff to always be up-to-date with the development in their camp area. It also might be a reason why farmers donot like the idea of being joined with other farmers whom they probably don't even know and who live away quite far. The advantage of the IRDP LIMA groups was that always farmers of the same village were members allowing for some social control. While the no. of farmers participating in the IRDP LIMA program decreased by more than 50%, compared to the previous season, the number of farmers who actually planted and produced even increased (farmers buying inputs on cash were negligible in the IRDP area before, amounting to only 189 in 84/85 season).

The results of this plan of operation are indeed surprising, especially when compared with the important or 'killer' assumptions of the PPM. Three interesting observations can be made:

1. The assumption that farmers will be interested in forming cooperatives proved to be a real 'killer'; the opposite was the case.
2. The other assumption that not too many farmers would drop when having to join also turned out into the opposite.
3. The third assumption that farmers would continue planting their fields when individual credits are step wise withdrawn proved a very realistic one.

This last assumption can be regarded as a strong indicator that IRDP, though unvoluntarily, had achieved one of its main objectives. The fact that already a good number of the poorer parts of the farming community had reached a stage where they are no longer dependent on initial credits to produce cash crops. As a matter of fact the unintended outcomes of this plan of operation should have led to a modified continuation of the cooperative development. The main incentive of joining coops would be the provision of loans to its members, meant however as a positive one this time. On the other hand positive incentives could be given to farmers

buying their inputs on cash, such as e.g. a bonus on fertilizer.

The reaction of the IRDP management during this particular season varied considerably. Firstly the development of the participation figures were quite uncomfortable; then it was stated that only because the Zambian cooperative policy guidelines have been strictly followed that could happen. When the final crop forecast figures were available relief was felt that the damage was rather limited. Instead of trying to incorporate these important outcomes in the replanning for the next season and hence strengthen farmers self-reliance and reducing their dependency on loans, it was decided to reverse the policies and untie the availability of credits from the membership in study groups or primary societies. The fear to probably scare away more farmers from the program seemed to have overruled the possibility of really strengthening farmers' self-reliance. The number of farmers then participating in the LIMA credit scheme on an individual basis as before hence increased again tremendously.

Table 5: Participation in LIMA credit scheme 1986/87

District	Kabompo	Zambezi	Chizera	Total
Farmers	3300	2330	1622	7252
Groups	122	133	82	337
Limas	6553	6010	4301	16864

	Loan Disbursement in Kwacha per District			
1984/85	270.955	180.665	113.333	564.954
1985/86	75.169	107.355	70.985	176.767
1986/87	404.559	176.676	37.898	619.134

Source: IRDP progress report no. 18, pp. 35 & 50, 1987.

Everybody was happy again after these impressive increases in participants and area cultivated. Only in Chizera farmers seemed to have realised that inputs on cash are actually cheaper as no interest rates have to be paid. It is really amazing how farmers in Kabompo District judged the situation correctly and reacted promptly by spiraling the loan disbursements to an all time high. In the previous season the area cropped was lower by one third only and the credit required for that was less the one fifth;

this probably reflects realistically the credit requirement of the farming community. As most farmers still see credits as some kind of a gift (although interest rates were quite high at around 17%), not the need but the willingness to accept loans is very high. The problem now was on the NWCU which faced severe difficulties to raise the required funds for the loans (NWCU actually has to pay about 25% bank charges for their own loans) and therefore is constantly in financial calamities. A situation that could have probably been remedied after this miraculous 1985/86 season.

What lessons could be learnt from this case, where the implementation of a Logical Framework Plan led to others than the intended results.

Remarkably is the fact, that the participants of the 1985 planning workshop didnot at all foresee the reactions of the farming community. Staff members of many different government departments, the local administration and IRDP officers jointly elaborated this plan and agreed on quite some common objectives. This probably not so frequent conformity of national and donor objectives led to the complete neglect of the interests of the target group, which was not adequately represented. The interests of the clientele were cynically incorporated in the important assumptions, that farmers would be interested in forming cooperatives. Farmers however, only with the future vision of having to join coops to qualify for group loans in the next season, preferred to immediately refuse these services. The mistrust in these institutions must have been so high that only the perspective sufficed. Such a distinct aversion of the target group should have definitely been identified in the participation-, problem- and objective analysis in the planning workshop. More so, as nearly all project outputs and activities were geared to that very aim of promoting the formation of cooperatives, an aim so effectively opposed by the intended project beneficiaries.

Similar findings can be made at purpose level. That SSCP should be enabled by organisational means to get access to services by their own means is exactly what actually happened, i.e. farmers bought their own inputs from their own funds from union depots; what was intended however, was that farmers would form legal entities that would considerably decrease the administrative burden of handling loans, inputs and marketing for the executing institutions. The provision of these services only to depot level was yet another means of further reducing the unions efforts. As a matter of fact the entire purpose only related to problems and objectives of the institutions involved and not at all referred to farmers' problems and interests.

Consequently the further steps of the logical framework, i.e. at output and activity level were based on the wrong or half-wrong (from the institutions' point of view) purpose of the project.

Had the target groups been really and seriously involved in the participation and problem analyses, the project purpose and the subsequent outputs and activities would most probably have looked differently. This indicates that the provisions made in the LFA to take into account the socio-economic environment and the interests of the project clientele are not always sufficient. Especially where project outputs and activities interfere in the agrarian structure the LFA participation analysis is not a substitute for true participation of the target group in the decision-making process. If the agrarian structure and the resulting relations are not analysed seriously by, e.g. a socio-economic survey before the actual planning takes place, similar effects as demonstrated by the case study will not be an exceptional case. Although the LFA does not claim to ensure adequate participation of the target group in the actual planning, the participation analysis alone is not always a good enough tool to at least consider the interests of the intended project beneficiaries.

The ultimate outcome of this LFA implemented plan after all was not too negative and this is only one example that could have had negative impacts. There are probably much more positive experiences with the practical application of the LFA, examples are many in IRDP. The idea behind this paper is only to detect some shortcomings in the LFA with regard to clientele participation or at least representation in the decision-making and to suggest tools or mechanisms that could facilitate this. The approach itself is flexible and is as good as the people who use it. Every concept that is practically used also reveals through its use where it could be altered or where priorities should be shifted to.

The case study of the CDS can be regarded as an example where the necessary participation of the intended beneficiaries was neglected. When decisions about such drastic policy changes are envisaged where the target group is supposed to be the main implementer, then it is only logical to include them in the planning process. If this is not possible means have to be found to effectively represent the views of the farmers and also to include their main problems at the beginning, during the formulation of the important planning steps like project purpose and outputs.

Notes

- 37 - Rauch (1983), pp. 1 - 12;
- 38 - *ibid.*: (1987), Assessment..., pp. 2 - 6;
- 39 - *ibid.*: p. 4
- 40 - Marketing and Credit Section (IRDP), Plan of Operation 1984, PPM;
- 41 - IRDP (1985), Progress Report No. 16, pp. 33 - 38;
- 42 - Marketing and Credit Section (IRDP), Plan of Operation 1985, PPM;
- 43 - No agreement could be reached during the planning workshop, that CCS would recognize study groups as legal bodies, so IRDP stepped in with their own funds to provide group loans;

PART V: SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS

From the analysis of LFA's main planning steps and from the case study of IRDP's cooperative development section evidence emerges that effective participation of the target group during the main planning workshop is difficult to ensure or was neglected due to unknown reasons; hence the formulation of project purposes might be biased from the administrative and institutional side which in turn may lead to project outputs and activities that are not in line with real constraints and interests of intended beneficiaries. The case study demonstrated this convincingly. As a kind of safety mechanism these 'biased' outputs and activities should therefore be counterchecked in a sample survey with the target group.

In this chapter proposals are made for possible improvements of the LFA with special attention to participation or at least effective representation of those parts of the population that usually don't have strong lobbies in the planning process. The formulation of disaggregated core problems with the help of a temporarily separated planning team to ensure realistic and 'competitive' planning will be a further suggestion. Finally an ex-ante verification of important project outputs with the involved target group will be looked at as an alternative means of project appraisal.

The following proposals are rather meant for re-planning sessions of already reasonably established programs that have built up contacts and communication channels with the target group, than for the initial planning of new projects.

5.1 Participation or Representation during Planning

Participation in IRDP planning workshops of people not directly involved in the program started in 1984. Participation meant that staff members of all relevant government departments and parastatal organisations were invited to join. This ranged from District Executive Secretaries, Union managers, provincial Under-Secretaries and planners, to representatives of other executing organisations. The reason for this participation of other institutions and departments was mainly the need for integration of crucial IRDP activities into the existing structures. The NWCU e.g. should be involved in planning those activities which it should continue thereafter. Direct participation of members or representatives of the target group were never involved during the workshops. Presumably staff members of IRDP and government departments were confident enough with their knowledge and anticipated understanding of the problems of farmers.

In the case of the CDS this proved to be an enormous misconception on the side of the planners, although the aversion of the farmers to cooperatives was so explicit.

It is of course extremely difficult to include the target group in a planning workshop. The target group in the case of IRDP consists approximately 100.000 people or 20.000 households, 10.000 of which have been directly reached by IRDP ⁴⁴. The total IRDP area comprises about 50.000 sqkm, that is a population density of around two people per sqkm, with the population extremely scattered all over the project area. The target group as such can not physically participate in the planning workshop. Their views, problems and real interests however, could very well be effectively represented.

In a target group analysis the homogeneity and the degree of social differentiation has to be defined through cluster sample surveys or more refined statistical methods. This allows to group the population in social strata where applicable. In the case of NWP where IRDP only dealt with farmers up to 1 ha of cash crops, a relative homogeneity of the target group could be anticipated. By identifying a selected number of representative villages, meetings with the more or less entire farming community of this area could be organized with the help of the extension worker. In these carefully prepared meetings an in-the-field step of the LFA can be undertaken. A similar exercise like the problem analysis in the planning workshop should enable local and expatriate staff members to identify the target group's core problem and causes and effects of it in the form of a problem tree. If coordinated properly, not a 'shopping list' of wishes of the farmers will be the result, but a solid gain of insight knowledge of the real situation of the farmers in this village can be achieved by the project staff. If this exercise is repeated by the same staff, with the possibility of other members also taking part, in the selected villages throughout the project area a comprehensive picture of the intended beneficiaries could be drawn. In the assessment phase of the official re-planning mission these findings can be counterchecked and further refined.

The members of this in-the-field problem analysis and possibly selected representatives of the target group can then form this part of the planning team that reasonably well should guarantee that problems and interests of the farming community are adequately considered in the official planning sessions. If the planning team is now separated into one part planning for the target group and the other part planning for the

administration/institution, both teams should be composed in such a way that representatives of either side are involved in both 'sub-teams'. This proposes that not one team, but two 'competing' parts of the whole team should then go through the LFA planning process. This temporarily separated planning process will probably be a bit more time consuming and also will lead to some conflicts amongst the team members. The chance that these conflicts are solved by the team however, are greater at this moment than during implementation. This proposal in my opinion also more realistically reflects normal life situations where always at least two parties are involved, e.g. the cooperative union and the farmers.

If this set-up of the planning team is followed, some changes in the problem and objective analysis seem necessary.

5. 2 Disaggregated Problem Analysis

During the participation analysis (most) probable differences in the stand- and viewpoints amongst the two sub-teams would have crystallized. The following problem analysis is practised according to LFA rules. If no agreement on one core problem is reached, the existence of a second one should be permitted on equal grounds. Bolay (1984) gives good reasons however, why only one core problem is desirable ⁴⁵. He argues that through the agreement on one problem the concentration and consensus as well as objective oriented work amongst participants is encouraged and stimulated. If such an agreement is reached in the beginning already, this then demonstrates the participants' willingness to come to terms and to reach certain outputs within a given time frame. He continues that it is usually not possible to find optimal solutions and that the sub-optimal results then have to be refined during the following planning work.

The counter argument however, is that when no consensus is reached at this stage it has proved to be very difficult to later on guarantee incorporation of deviating interests at output and activity level. If the purpose is weak, the subsequent outputs do not reflect the real distribution of various interests. The proposed alternative solution in my opinion, does not significantly reduce the teams' ability and willingness to reach objective efficiently. A 'decreed' consensus is more detrimental to participants' creativity than a healthy competition for the achievement of own goals in the form of compromises.


If we now disaggregate the purpose of the CDS plan of operation 1985 into its original contributions we find the following.

The first part deals with the target group, as it says that farmers should be supported by organisational means to get access to agricultural services "by their own means". The farmers main problem therefore is the delivery of reliable services to them. "By their own means" request for some efforts by themselves. At depot level, exactly where the institutional support of these services stops, due to limited administrative and organisational capacities of, in this case the union, which is the second part, i.e. the institution's core problem. That implies that farmers collect their inputs and deliver their produce by themselves to the union depot, and the union assures that they guarantee well operated depots. So far both parties could compromise.

The enablement of the farmers by adequate organisational means however, was understood by the union that farmers would form legal units that qualify for group loans, to further reduce the workload of the union staff. The farmers, or their representatives in the planning workshop would point out the reluctance to join such societies, due to known reasons. Their own understanding of organisational means is that they are provided with sufficient means of local transport to organise the collection and delivery of items from and to the depots (another IRDP output was the provision of ox-carts to these camps to effectively organise the transport of produce; this worked very well, as it tried to solve one of the core problems of the target group). The original purpose was biased from the institutions side and only considered the farmer's view marginally leading to the known results.

It is not always realistic to merge more than one constraint or problem into an overcomplicated purpose. These planners' formulations might disguise original concerns of overruled opinions. These disguised facts then result in weak grounds for further outputs and activities.

Figure 5: Disaggregated Problem Tree



The separate analysis of different core problems by identifying their relevant causes and effects might produce different means-ends links or objectives, when these two problem trees are visually placed next to each other. In this visualisation only the major causes and effects should appear (five or six for each), not to make the following group discussion too complicated. In this discussion the team tries to identify possibly related and interdependent causes and effects, that refer to both core problems. The accordingly composed means-ends relations can then form the basis for a joint elaboration of project outputs and activities.

This proposal only becomes valid, if in the initial problem analysis no convincing agreement on one core problem could be reached. The above proposed method could however, be used for a serious discussion of alternatives already at this step of the logical framework. Experiences in IRDP have shown that an effective discussion of alternatives after the completion of the first three steps was often considered an extra burden, at a moment when participants were prepared to start with the completion of the project's planning matrix. When alternatives however, are incorporated already in the problem and objective analysis they might still be looked upon as real options and influence the later planning steps. At a later stage, if taken seriously, potential alternatives would draw the team back at least to the objective analysis.

The impression that these proposals might further complicate and delay the planning workshop are only half-true. Through the case study we have seen that crucial elements, disguised in the PPM may easily backfire to such an extent that plans have to be reversed to their opposite. If better plans result in less failures and time losses, I think it is justified to spend a little extra time in the preparation of workshops through, e.g. in-the-field problem analyses and spend relatively more time on the formulation of the project's purpose. The next proposal offers an additional safety mechanism on the validity of project outputs, before agreed plans are implemented.

5.3 Pre - Implementation Verification

The completed plan of operation of a project lists detailed activities with quite accurate timing for the whole duration of the plan. In the case of the CDS this meant that at first study groups had to be identified, informed and adequately prepared for the future impacts of planned activities. It is amazing that staff members at this stage did not realize

farmers reluctance to join these groups or primary societies in order to receive inputs on loan. Either there was a misunderstanding between staff and farmers or the intentions of the plan have not been explained to the farmers properly (or staff was not aware of the implications themselves). The message however, that from next season onwards only group loans would be disbursed spread very fast even to the remotest areas, as could be seen from farmers' reaction. There should be a possibility to 'catch' these informations about the target group's reaction on intended activities of plans, before it is too late.

If now the first proposal of in-the-field problem analyses has been conducted and contacts been made with representative villages, these people should also be informed about the outcomes of the planning seminars. Through their participation in these pre-analyses their problems, needs and interests should have led to some impacts in the formulation of the plans. It then is only logical to inform them how their interests have been incorporated and what the planned activities are for the next season. It has to be explained in normal, understandable language, i.e. not in the planners' language with complex sentences like being used for the purpose or outputs. The point has to be made clear that from next season onwards only cooperative members receive inputs on the basis of group credit and that by their own efforts means that inputs and produce are only handled at depot level. After intensive discussions with representatives of the target groups the general approval or rejection of essential outputs or policy changes has to be sought. Arguments for and against project activities have to be carefully weighted and cross checked in all cluster villages. If this is done at an early enough stage there should be still time to react accordingly. In our case of the CDS one could have considered the reversal of the 'forced' membership in coops into availability of individual credits to all LIMA farmers, what actually happened when the next plan of operation was prepared for 1986/87 season ⁴⁶.

These additional contacts with representative villages of the target group can, under normal circumstances, be easily incorporated into the usual field work of project staff. These extra activities can basically be undertaken by all projects on their own. As a coordinating office, the extension department however, seems appropriate as here contacts throughout the project area is daily business. If the first proposal has been adapted, then the necessity for this pre-implementation verification of LFA plans would become only little more than routine. If not, then it could be regarded as an efficient tool to judge the possible reaction of the target

group on changes in project policies. As between the completion of plans and their implementation usually a couple of months pass, this opportunity should not be underestimated. Good contacts and regular communication with the target group, their representatives and local leaders is anyway beyond any doubt one of the most efficient ways of guaranteeing adequate interest representation of the farming community in project planning, implementation and evaluation.

All the above proposals for refinements of the logical framework are meant as a contribution to the ongoing discussion of how to better incorporate target groups' interests in rural development projects. That this has not yet successfully been ensured in many projects and does need improvement is generally accepted. The suggestions are mainly based on my own experience of working with the LFA in a big integrated rural development program in Zambia. It is therefore natural that the proposed improvements are very much related to the specific situation and problems in this program and look for solutions in this context. The idea to work out a Master's thesis on this subject mainly is due to the fact that the case of the cooperative development section in my view so obviously demonstrated that actual participation of the clientele in decision-making is not incorporated in the LFA.

In general this approach has proved very efficient when being applied properly in IRDP and most results have been quite satisfying for project staff, government institutions and the target group. Whether or not these proposed improvements are also valid to other programs using the LFA or similar planning approaches has to be decided on an individual basis. Where the effective representation of the interests and problems of the target group pose ongoing problems in other rural development programs these suggestions are hoped to assist in finding adequate solutions. Through more intensive training of professional planners not only in technical and economic terms, but also in the field of sociology, a major improvement in rural development planning could be reached. Planners then would be in a better position to incorporate the socio-economic environment in technically and economically sound plans for the benefit of the improvement of the living standards of the the rural population.

Notes

44 - Rauch (1987), Assessment..., p. 13;

45 - Bolay (1984), p. 16;

46 - Cooperative Development Section (IRDP), Plan of Operation 1986, PPM;

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

During the 60's and 70's a good number of serious efforts to develop rural areas in developing countries have failed. Reasons for unsuccessful programs often were traced to planning and management techniques that missed a strong link between the planning and the subsequent implementation, or so called blue-print approaches that did not adequately consider the socio-political environment in the project area. The lack of effective participation or representation of the real problems and interests of projects' intended beneficiaries in the planning and evaluation is recognized as another important reason for many failures.

The Logical Framework Approach, as originally implemented in USAID assistance projects and further developed by GTZ into a comprehensive project management system, offers good possibilities of incorporating tools to successfully overcome some of the above mentioned constraints.

In the Integrated Rural Development Program in the North-Western Province of Zambia the Logical Framework Approach was used to plan, implement and evaluate all major project activities and proved to be an efficient method, as long as target group could realise direct benefits, like reliable agricultural services. The need to directly involve the the target group in the planning and evaluation of project activities therefore did not arise.

When more fundamental changes were required in the project's policies like that of integrating IRDP's Marketing and Credit Section into the North-Western Cooperative Union limitations of the LFA as a technocratic planning technique became obvious. IRDP adjusted its loan policy according to the Zambian cooperative guidelines. These request the formation of primary cooperative societies to reduce the executing agencies' administrative and organisational burdens. From this moment onwards IRDP farmers would only receive inputs in group loans, i.e. they had to become members of such societies. Due to poor records of coops and the scattered population patterns which inhibits formation of bigger societies to some extent, farmers refused to accept these new rules and the majority withdrew from the credit scheme.

The objective of forming coops was explicitly stated in the project planning matrix. The interest of the target group however, was not considered in the actual planning, nor did planners anticipate this very strong reaction. The plan after having failed was cancelled after one season and the old individual loan system reinstated.

In this case it became obvious that the participation analysis of LFA is not a substitute for real participation in decision-making. When project purposes are defined that interfere in the agrarian structure of the rural population, adequate representation of interest of the target group is vital in order to avoid biased project purposes and outputs which later on might be rejected by the target groups.

LFA is a useful tool for RDP's, especially for technical, infrastructural and production-oriented projects, where participation of the clientele at least in decision-making is not so important. More information about the real interests and capacities of the involved target groups seem necessary when project purposes interfere in the social structure. Here socio-economic factors have to be safeguarded from the start onwards, as social change can not be prescribed or decreed.

This research paper is suggesting three possibilities how this could be more effectively ensured.


(1) By temporarily separating the planning team into one group planning for the target group and one planning for the administration/institution, 'competitive' planning is proposed to strengthen the initial assumptions of planned activities. Representatives of the target group and members of the project and administration/institution are equally represented in both 'sub-teams'. For this exercise in-the-field problem analyses in representative villages are required, to enable project staff to identify problems of the target group more effectively and to select potential participants for the planning workshops.

(2) If no agreement can be reached about the area's one core problem, a disaggregated problem analyses should be undertaken for the target group and the implementing agency. When comparing and opposing these problem trees interdependent means-ends relationships could be identified, which then form a more realistic basis for further planning.

(3) Finally a pre-implementation verification of intended outputs and activities should serve as an additional mechanism to ensure smooth project implementation.

These suggestions are based on experiences in IRDP/NWP, but might be of value for other projects, where participation of the target group in planning, implementation and evaluation can not be adequately guaranteed.

Finally it will be through education of the rural people and planning and implementation with and not for the people that will ensure long lasting impacts and improvements.




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APPENDICES

Maps


- 1.1 Map of Zambia;
- 1.2 Map of North - Western Province of Zambia;
- 1.3 Map of IRDP Project Area;

Socio - economic Data on North-Western Province


- 2.1 Total Population by District and by Urban/Rural settlements, 1963, 1969, 1980;
- 2.2 Population by Sex and Age by District, 1969, 1980;
- 2.3 Employment 1984 by Type and Sector of Employment;
- 2.4 Land use: Area by Type of Utilisation and by District, 1984;
- 2.5 Farming Population by Type of Farming and Area under Cultivation 1983/84 by District

Replanning Formats

- 3.1 Program Assessment Form;
- 3.2 Decision-Making Options Form;




Appendix 1. 1: Map of Zambia, with relative position of MWP




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
Appendix 1. 2: Map of North - Western Province





Appendix 1. 3: Map of IRDP Project Area

MAIZE SALES TO IRDP CAMPWISE 1982



IRDP: LIMA PROJECT AREA AGRICULTURE CAMPS



Appendix 2. 1: Population by District and by Rural/Urban Settlements

DISTRICT	1963 CENSUS	1969 CENSUS	1980 CENSUS	AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH % 1963-69	AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH % 1969-80	AREA 1000 SQ.KM.	DENSITY POP. PER SQ.KM.
SOLWEZI Township ¹ Kansanshi Rural	44,712 2,060	52,979 5,182 218 47,579	92,380 15,032 865 76,843	2.9	5.2 10.2 13.3 4.4	30,3	3,0
MWINILUNGA Township Rural	45,991	51,398 1,472 49,926	67,423 3,169 64,254	1.9	2.5 7,2 2,3	21,1	3,2
KASEMPA Township Rural	23,780	22,880 1,612 21,268	28,023 3,063 24,960	-0.6	1.9 6,0 1,5	41,6	1,0
CHIZELA Township ¹ Kalengwa Rural	10,161	9,776 324 895 8,557	14,566 577 1,816 12,173	-0.6	3.7 5,4 6,6 3,3		
KABOMPO Township Rural	32,956	33,376 2,964 30,412	40,992 5,357 35,635	0.2	1.9 5,5 1,5	14,5	2,8
ZAMBEZI Township Rural	53,589	61,324 3,134 58,190	58,293 8,166 50,127	2.3	-0.5 9,1 -1,3	18,3	3,2
N.W.P Urban Rural	211,189	231,733 15,801 215,932	301,677 38,045 263,632	1.6	2.4 8,3 1,8	125,8	2,4

Appendix 2. 2: Population by Sex and Age by District, 1984

DISTRICT	1969 CENSUS				1980 CENSUS			
	Total Popu. '000	% Fem	% 15-64	% Fem.out of 15-44	Total Popu. '000	% Fem.	% 15 - 64	% Fem out of 15-44
SOLWEZI	53,0	51,1	51,9	55,4	92,4	50,6	nk	nk
MAINILINGA	51,4	52,2	52,0	58,8	67,4	52,0	nk	nk
KASEMPA	22,9	52,6	50,5	59,0	28,0	52,7	nk	nk
CHIZELA	9,8	52,0			14,6	52,2	nk	nk
KABOMPO	33,4	53,7	61,2	62,1	41,0	54,1	nk	nk
ZAMBEZI	61,3	54,2	58,1	61,7	58,3	53,7	nk	nk
TOTAL NWP.	231,7	52,7	54,7	59,3	301,7	52,3	nk	nk

NK

nk : Not known; data on age structure 1980 not yet released by COS

TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT	TOTAL	NO. OF EMP. Urban:	NO. OF EMP. Rural
Employees with regular income -	8,830	7,000	1,830
therefrom:-			
- Central Govt.	5860	nk	nk
- Local Authorities	1280	nk	nk
- Parastatal	1270	nk	nk
- Private	420	nk	nk
Self-employed in trade & industries	609	609	- a
Casual Labourers	3,800	3,800	- a
Self-employed in ¹ Agriculture	50,896	-	50,896
T O T A L	64,135	11,409	52,726

MAJOR INDUSTRY & DIVISION	No. of Employees with regular incomes
Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries	810
Mining & Quarrying	210
Manufacturing	100
Electricity & Water	140
Construction & Allied Repairs	1,600
Distribution, Restaurants & Hotels	770
Transport & Communications	50
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate & Business Services	190
Community, Social & Personal ¹ Services	4,960
T O T A L	8,830

nk : not known

1 : By number of Farm households (estm.)

a : Included in number of self-employed agricultural households as most of members of rural households have got various income sources

1 : Excluding domestic service

Source: Report on Employment and Earnings

Appendix 2. 4: Land Use by Type of Utilisation and by District, 1984

DISTRICT	FOREST RESERVE & PROTECTED FOREST AREA		GAME MANAGEMENT AREAS ²⁾ EXCL. FR/PFA		NATIONAL PARKS		ACTUAL CULTIVATED AREA				OTHERS		TOTAL	
	('000ha)	%	('000 ha)	%	('000 ha)	%	Subsistence Farmland (est.) ¹⁾ ('000 ha)	%	Cash Crop Farmland ('000 ha)	%	('000 ha)	%	('000 ha)	%
SOLWEZI	902	30	159	5.4	-	0.0	12.3	0.4	1.3	0.04	1,894	63.8	2,969	100
MWINILINGA	330	18	510	24.4	210	10.0	19.6	0.9	0.4	0.02	971	46.4	2,091	100
KASEMPA	621	29	476	22.6	252	11.9	2.6	0.1	0.6	0.03	758	35.9	2,110	100
CHIZELA	372	18.1	508	24.8	230	11.2	5.6	0.3	0.6	0.03	934	45.6	2,050	100
KABOMPO	127	8.7	215	14.8	-	0	11.9	1.1	0.9	0.06	1,098	75.6	1,453	100
ZAMBEZI	199	10.4	-	0.0	-	0	20.9	1.1	0.9	0.05	1,686	88.4	1,907	100
TOTAL	2,604	21	1,968	15	692	5.5	72.9	0.6	4.7	0.04	7,341	58.4	12,580	100

Source : Forestry Department.

1) Based on the assumption of 1 ha under subsistence crops per average farm household

2) Abbreviations : FR - Forest area
PFA - Protected Forest areas

Appendix 2. 5: Farming Population by Type and Area, by District 1983/84

DISTRICT	NO. OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS (Est.) ¹	NO. OF FARMERS REG. BY DEP. OF AGRIC.	NO. OF FARMERS DEALING WITH NWCU (incl. IRDP)	FARMERS BY CATEGORY (Est. in %)				NO. OF FARMERS WITH AFC LOANS		NO. OF CATTLE FARMERS	AREA UNDER CULTIVATION	
				Subsistence farmers (No reg. cash crops)	LIMA farmers (0.25-1ha cash crop area)	Emergent farmers (1.1-10ha cash crop area)	Commercial farms (over 10ha)	Appr.	Given		Total esta ² (ha)	Cash Crops (ha)
Solvezi	15,300	834	972	94%	4.3%	1.5%	0.2	257	88	8	10,286	1,286
Mwinilunga	12,900	423 ^c	400 ^b	92%	7.2%	0.7%	0.1	109	45	253	19,589	389
Kasempa	5,000	566	396	91%	6.5%	2.2%	0.3	163	163	7	2,591	591
Chizela	2,400	670	654	73%	26.2%	0.8%	0.0	- ^a	- ^a	2	5,583	583
Kabompo	7,100	1,597	1,660	77%	22.0%	0.9%	0.1	72	37	165	11,863	863
Zambezi	10,000	1,506	1,244	86%	13.0%	0.9%	0.1	101	35	368	20,911	911
T O T A L	57,700	5,596	5,326	90%	8.7%	1.2%	0.14	702	368	803	70,823	4,623

1. Based on no. of rural households and divided by av. household size of 5
 2. Based on the assumption of 1ha under subsistence crops per average household
- a. Covered by Kasempa
b. Estimated
c. Not including pineapple farmers

SOURCE: NWCU, IRDP, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Appendix 3. 1: Program Assessment Form

IRDP/NWP - Zambia

Section:		District:		Year:
TARGET 19..	Achievements	CONSTRAINT	identified by ²⁾	Positive Experiences 1); 3)
PUPOSE LEVEL		with regard to output - purpose link		
OUTPUT LEVEL		with regard to achievements of outputs		
KEY EVENTS				
Important achievements, constraints, pos. experiences not related to purpose, output, key events as specified in Plan of Operation;				

- 1) Use backpage for remarks; 2) e.g. target group, implementing agency or IRDP staff;
 3) Indicate those experiences which should be considered for further planning;

Section:		District:	
Constraint/positive Experience: -Alternative Solution Adjustment proposed	A D V A N T A G E S	D I S A D V A N T A G E S	D E C I S I O N 1)

1) For minority statements use backpage!

