



Minimum wage policy and domestic workers in Zambia

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Dedications

To My Sponsor, my late parents Christopher Nnadi Onukogu and Florence Nyangu Banda and Igboland.

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List of Acronyms

C189	ILO Convention Number 189
CSO	Central Statistical Office
DW/s	Domestic Worker/s
DWE	Domestic Worker Employer
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FTTUZ	Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
ILC	International Labour Conference
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
LEAZ	Labour Consultancy Employment Agency of Zambia
MOU	Memorandum Of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PF	Patriotic Front Political Party
SI	Statutory Instrument
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
UHDWUZ	United House for Domestic Workers in Zambia
ZCTU	Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
ZFE	Zambia Federation of Employers

Exchange Rate \$1 is approximately equal to K5.5

Abstract

This study examines the role of minimum wage policy in the working conditions of domestic workers in Zambia. The introduction of a minimum wage generally tends to improve domestic worker wages, although an increasing number of domestic workers in the labour market (excess supply) tends to maintain their vulnerability since it reduces their bargaining power. This paper identifies the key actors in domestic work and suggests a model for formalising it that focuses on maid centres (domestic worker agencies).

This paper uses theories concerning the structure and agency of DWs, and discusses issues of asymmetries of power; but there are some differences between live-ins and live-outs. This is related to societal perceptions, as well as weak legal and institutional frameworks.

Relevance to Development Studies

The purpose of this paper is also to inform and intensify policy debates on improving work for domestic workers by analysing the role that minimum wage legislation plays. It attempts to make domestic work more visible by raising awareness so as to influence policy and other practices concerning the remuneration of domestic workers.

Of course, research has already been undertaken into domestic workers in Zambia but relatively little has looked at the relationship that these workers have with their employers in terms of bargaining for working conditions, especially following the amendment to the minimum wage (Hansen 1986a, 1986b, 1990a, 1990b, Rao 2009). Furthermore, such a study is significant for policy makers as they always want to know whether an increase in the minimum wage empowers the worker that it is intended for. For Zambia there are very few who have researched this topic because the amendment to the minimum wage order for domestic workers is quite recent. Therefore, this paper intends to contribute to available knowledge and could be used in further research.

Keywords: Minimum Wage, Informal Sector, Domestic Workers, Domestic Worker Employers, Bargaining, Representation, Awareness, Zambia.

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Domestic work is among the oldest occupations in the world and there has been a rapid increase in terms of numbers (ILO 2010: 6). It was only recently that some countries began to include DWs in national laws that protect workers. Since DWs work in the informal sector they tend to be subjected to exploitation, discrimination, an undervaluation of their skills and harassment due to the privacy of the occupation; this includes them not being granted the right to association, nor the right to create or be part of trade unions, as well as lacking adequate regulation from the government (Kapatamoyo, 2012). This leads to unequal relationships between DWEs and their DWs since their bargaining power may not be equal due to DWs being more desperate, having inadequate awareness of minimum wage legislation, not knowing who represents them and so on.

Additionally, the geographic, economic, social and ideological separation of a public work sphere from the home – which developed with socialised commodity production under capitalism – has led to a decline in the status of domestic labour, for both the housewife and servant. One of the causes of this decline is its invisibility. What makes it invisible physically is the service nature of the work, the products of which are intangible or consumed very quickly. Here, the DW is at a disadvantage compared with the factory worker (Arat-Koc 1989: 37).

Such problems have prompted me to explore the role of minimum wage policy in the working conditions of DWs in Zambia, making comparisons between DWEs and their DWs, looking at live-ins and live-outs in both the rural and urban areas of Mwense and Lusaka districts respectively. I focus on the period January 2010 to August 2013 as it covers the period before and after the adjustment of the SI on the minimum wage for DWs (ILO 2012c).

Defining the occupation, ILO Convention 189 states that a DW is an employee with an employment relationship that is performed in the household or households. Domestic work encompasses tasks such as taking care of children, cooking, cleaning the house, washing and ironing clothes, guarding the house and its assets and looking after pets. This worker may either be a live-in (residing in the employer's house) or a live-out (a commuter). *“Even though a substantial number of men work in the sector – often as gardeners, drivers or butlers – it remains a highly feminised sector: more than 80 per cent of all domestic workers are women. Globally, one in every 13 female wage workers is a domestic worker”* (ILO 2013,

Kapatamoyo 2012). For the purposes of this paper, domestic work is limited to that performed by female live-ins and live-outs.

Accordingly, it is important to know some statistics related to domestic work. In 2010 it was estimated that there were 53 million DWs worldwide (this figure excludes the 7.4 million workers under the age of 15), which could be compared with the workforce of countries such as Nigeria, Mexico or Vietnam. However, due to the nature of their job most DWs are not covered in labour force surveys (Budlender 2011: v). According to ILO (2011b), domestic work is conducted in private and rarely has clearly stipulated terms of employment; it is often omitted from national labour laws with 83% DWs being women (globally). This shows how gendered the occupation is. WIEGO (2013) asserts that male DWs tend to have better jobs and pay as security guards, gardeners and drivers, while females are involved in cleaning and care services with low pay.

For Zambia, IRIN (2012) and Rao (2009: 4) report that there are 50,000 plus DWs in Lusaka, although there are not many recent labour surveys. In an interview with ILO in Lusaka, the officer confirmed that in the next few months they would finalise a survey determining the magnitude of domestic work and the conditions of work. Consequently, the next revision of the minimum wage for DWs will be informed by empirical information. Other actors involved in this sector are ZFE, LEAZ, MLSS, DW unions, DWEs and maid centres, which I find critical for formalising domestic work.

Because the majority of DWs are female this paper defines gender in relation to roles, social descriptions and the responsibilities attached to men and women. Unlike sex, which is a biological fact, gender stems from culture and is controlled by socio-economic factors. There are a number of gender stereotypes that are common, such as women are weak and men are strong, women are nurturers while men are breadwinners, women are emotional while men are rational (Veneklasen et al. 2007: 337).

According to wage indicator (2013f), ILO's main objective with the minimum wage is to protect employees from being exploited by their employers, to help low-paid workers have an acceptable standard of living and encourage fair wages, thereby alleviating poverty (especially among the poor). Furthermore, 90% of countries in the world have a minimum wage policy. I believe this indicates how important the policy is.

The Zambian government defines the minimum wage as the lowest legal wage that an employee will receive and it is based on an agreement between the government, employers' representatives and trade unions (Wage Indicator 2013e). This is the definition used within this paper.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The problem I examine is that domestic work is performed in a private and informal sphere, which makes it difficult for law enforcement, regulation, advocacy, representation and bargaining. This also makes policy makers reluctant to take decisions, for example, reviewing legal frameworks that seem to exclude DWs. Lutz (2002: 97) explains that despite privacy being more of a cover-up for women who work illegally, it is this same isolation that makes them more vulnerable to exploitation, especially live-ins whose freedom of manoeuvre is frequently restricted. This privacy is often considered exploitation, providing a place of social alienation for DWs.

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the role of minimum wage legislation for DWs since they are insecure, unrepresented and excluded. Their work is unregulated, undervalued and therefore more likely to affect their bargaining power with employers (Kapatamoyo, 2012). I also analyse levels of awareness, bargaining dynamics, minimum wage policy effect on DW wages and compliance with the minimum wage by testing its role in improving DWs' working conditions.

In analysing the dynamics of bargaining it is important to define power. Mclean and McMillan (1996: 398-399) break the concept of power into five categories; force, persuasion, authority, manipulation and coercion, with only manipulation and coercion being the undisputed forms. However, because I am looking at bargaining power the definition used for the purposes of this research is that of persuasion, where the group with the least power may be able to persuade the group with more: *"the offering of an idea is not control until it creates a dependency and, therefore, the capacity to manipulate."* Veneklasen et al. (2007: 337) describe this as *"power over"*, which creates a situation where people accept and believe they are inferior within society, especially women: *"Socialisations affirm feelings of entitlement among dominant groups and help to maintain the unequal relationships that determine whose voices are heard in decision-making."*

It is also important to link bargaining power between DWEs and DWs to gender, social structure, education and literacy. Here I hypothesise that structure affects female DWs' agency in bargaining; education and literacy have an influence on DW's bargaining power and so on.

These issues find themselves within international debates; for example, ILO shows major concern over an increase in domestic work problems and notes that these workers are usually excluded from legal protection due to the nature of their occupation, as well as most countries being hesitant to formalise domestic work (Rao 2009: 5-7). Hence the call for the ratification of Convention 189 and Recommendation 201, which advocates for the inclusion

of DW rights in national labour laws so they benefit DWs and these workers are treated like formal sector employees (ILO 2011a: 6-7).

Since domestic work is regarded as informal employment, it is not uncommon to find very few contracts and/or job descriptions. Moreover, DWs do not have any meaningful institutional representation, apart from two existing DW Unions (UHDWUZ), one under FFTUZ and the other under ZCTU; these have struggled to register members due to the informal and private nature of the occupation. IRIN (2012) cites the Zambia Daily Mail, 3 August 2012, which reports that the union under ZCTU only has about 3,000 members with most employers still requesting a grace period of a month in order to start paying the revised minimum wage.

Table 1 shows how DWs have been neglected by policy makers due to having a low-salary occupation, only in 2011 where DWs included in minimum wage law. This wage is still lower than that of other workers in Category I (who earn K700); aside from DWs, these are the lowest paid.

Table 1. Zambia minimum wage rates with effect from July 2012

Category of Workers	Occupations Included	Minimum Wage Per Day	Minimum Wage Per Month	Minimum wage as % of living wage (K2,928.50)
Category I	General worker	K3.646	K700	24%
	Cleaner			
	Handyperson			
	Office orderly			
Category II	Watchman or Guard	K3.646	K700	24%
Category III	Driver	K5.220	K1,002.386	34%
Category IV	Typist	K5.656	K1,085.919	36%
	Receptionist or Telephonist			
Category V	Qualified clerk	K7.527	K1,445.107	49%
Category VI	Domestic worker	K 2.721	K522.4	18%

Source: Wage Indicator 2013d. (Author added DWs, minimum wage as % of Zambia's living wage and adjusted figures to rebased Zambian Kwacha).

Wage Indicator (2013e) also indicates that the living wage for Zambia is estimated at K2,928.50 per month and that 60% of its approximately 13 million population fall below the poverty line. When we compare the living

wage to the minimum wage for DWs (K522.40), the latter is about five times smaller (K2,228.50 difference), and this DW wage is only about 18% of the living wage. This highlights the magnitude of the problem.

Arat-Koc (1989: 42) explains this by comparing factory workers with DWs and says that the latter do not have space after working hours, especially live-ins who often have to share their private space with children and employers. Although the factory worker is subjected to subordination and control while working, she is free once she leaves her workplace. Conversely, live-ins are not free to leave either their workplace or their employer's supervision, making it difficult to obtain privacy.

1.3 Research Question and Sub-questions

1.3.1 *Research question*

What is the role of minimum wage legislation for domestic workers in Zambia?

1.3.2 *Sub-questions*

- How might domestic worker bargaining power be described?
- How aware are domestic workers of the minimum wage?
- Who represents domestic workers?
- What are the effects of minimum wage legislation on domestic worker wages?

In this paper, Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical perspective, Chapter 3 the methodology and study background, Chapter 4 the nature of domestic work in Zambia, and Chapter 5 the minimum wage and the nature of bargaining. Chapter 6 presents a conclusion and recommendations, as well as a model for formalising domestic work.

Chapter 2. Theoretical Perspective

There are several debates surrounding the effect and impact of the minimum wage on wages and employment, and whether it helps the people it is created for in its quest for income re-distribution and uplifting low-paid workers.

According to Wage Indicator (2013f), it is a powerful instrument in reducing wage inequality and raising the wages of the vulnerable. Similarly, it is helpful in reducing poverty as minimum wages in developing countries benefit workers belonging to poor households by raising their income (Luebker et al. 2011: 2). It does not negatively affect low-paid workers since it raises their standard of living, leading to increased consumption levels and thus creating more jobs. It is also an instrument of income redistribution that improves the wages of vulnerable and marginalised workers, especially youth, women and workers not represented by unions (Wage Indicator, 2013f).

Improving the minimum wage thus generates issues of power. Giddens' (1984: 12-18) structuration theory attempts to explain power relations between DWs and DWEs, and how this tends to reproduce inequality and exploitation within such a context. Here, the link between structure and agency is emphasised. In terms of gender relations I consider situations in which women are more submissive (how they are brought up and their roles within their own families) in order to survive; this affects their bargaining power because they tend to have less confidence. The structure itself is a form of domination and subordinate relations between DWs and DWEs because domestic work is viewed as inferior. Hence, it is difficult for DWs to bargain for higher wages. Accordingly, structure is stronger than agency.

Budlender (2011: 3) confirms that domestic work is female-dominated and something that most females learn and perform without pay in their homes due to their gender. It does not require special training, making DWs susceptible to discrimination with regard to working conditions (Lan 2003: 188-189, King 2007: 47, Ray 2000: 693, Oelz 2011: 2, Luebker et al. 2011: 1-5, Tijdens and Klaveren 2011: 19, IDWN 2013). In Zambia high poverty levels make DWs more vulnerable but more damagingly, there is an excess supply of DWs.

Lutz (2002: 90) quotes Hutton and Giddens' conversation on the increase in demand for DWs because of women not being at home anymore. While household chores are considered a woman's natural role, feminists condemn this conceptualisation of labour. When a woman, or "*housewife*", becomes empowered and leaves the home, household chores are not evenly distributed among males and females, and thus labour has to be bought. This is where the DW enters since most household chores are considered too taxing

for family members. Arat-Koc (1989: 4) asserts that domestic work has affected the women's movement since it is seen as generating greater divisions among them, instead of uniting and strengthening "*sisterhood*". We might say that this situation is more of a mistress-DW oppressive relationship. Feminism tends to concentrate more on male to female oppression and analysing such a relationship creates an uncomfortable task.

The two exist with unequal bargaining power through a dependence relationship. The DW decides to persuade her employer to provide a pay rise. According to Lawler and Bacharach (1979: 198), the key aspects of dependence are "*outcome alternatives and value*". Herein, alternatives refer to how available other options are for the two parties, namely the DW and the employer. These are, "*alternative jobs for the employee and alternative workers for the employer and two value dimensions (the importance of the pay raise to the employee and the importance to the employer of avoiding a pay raise).*" The two parties use these dimensions of dependence to bargain and weigh each other's power or "*potential power*". The employee's powers are greater if she has more alternatives compared with those of the employer, for example, if she has unique skills, a representative or is part of a network.

Agarwal (1997: 4-11) uses elements of Nash bargaining to explain that a person's bargaining power depends on their higher "*threat point*" or fall-back position. An improvement in the threat point automatically generates better bargaining power. Bargaining power may also be determined by societal perceptions. Gender perceptions may prompt an undervaluing of a person's abilities and contributions, which links with Giddens' (1984) structuration. Agarwal also gives an example of home-based work as often perceived as being of less value than other jobs that are more visible, demonstrating that women's work (especially in the household) is not only undervalued by family members but also by the policy-makers and bureaucrats who implement the programmes. Cahuc et al. (2006: 328) argue that a worker in employment has more bargaining power than the unemployed; the former has a better fall-back position and might be able to create a situation where two employers compete for her services.


For Arat-Koc (1989: 42), the combination of the class status of the DW and the fact that domestic service takes place in the private sphere creates the potential for a peculiar relation of domination between employer and worker, especially with live-in arrangements. There are social-psychological dimensions to the subordination of a DW that make it different from the subordination of housewives (who do domestic work) and workers (who stand in an unequal class relation to their employers). WIEGO (2013) argues that despite this form of employment being neither protected nor regulated, the DW has a close relationship with the employer. However, this tends to be unequal due to the

two parties belonging to different classes, races, ethnic groups and citizenships, thus leading to exploitation.

Consequently, one hypothesis might be that bargaining power for a DW with many other alternatives should be higher than that of her employer, who is dependent on her services. Therefore, here the minimum wage may not be a ceiling but a floor in bargaining (Bing 2012: 37).

For Bing (2012: 36-37), there exists a transition in power relations between DWs and DWEs when live-ins become live-outs due to their having more room to manoeuvre (free time and space) and it being easy to negotiate with other potential employers with comfort and privacy. The diagram below shows the abovementioned relationships.

Figure 1. Live-in to Live-out



Source: Bing 2012: 37.

The fact that live-outs are able to negotiate with other potential DWEs gives them greater bargaining power, especially while working, since they have a better fall-back position and are less desperate. They are more likely to be less dependent compared with live-ins (with less privacy and space). If one analyses their wage per hour it is not uncommon to find that live-outs are better off. Yet this argument is only suitable when two parties have a bargaining position; the results could be different when considering issues of awareness and access to information.

For married live-in DWs there are usually cases where the husband fails to perform his new gender role, especially with budgeting, thus affecting the DW (Lan 2003: 193). In Zambia, following the announcement of the amended minimum wage some DWs who left their children in the hands of other help complained because this group also started demanding the minimum wage. Lan (2003: 194) calls this “*remote madam, substitute mother*”. Those who are lucky leave their children with relatives who take up a motherly role. Here the DW needs to pay, be it directly or through benefits such as buying them food and clothes. Whatever the pay, it does not negate the emotional cost of being away from family.

Regarding minimum wage, Card and Krueger (1995: 1) explain that half a century earlier Stigler (1946: 361) concurred with economists who argued that increasing the minimum wage reduced employment and decreased employee wages. Most economics textbooks agree with this and polls show that over 90% of professional economists favour this approach.

Card and Krueger's (1995: 1-2) research shows the exact opposite, that the minimum wage tends to have a positive impact on employment. If these findings were accepted they would question the textbook model for the labour market that has dominated economics for years. In their 1992 food industry study, they found that the minimum wage actually improved employment: "*employment growth was higher at restaurants that were forced to increase their wages to comply with the law than at those at stores that were already paying the minimum wage.*"

Dolado et al. (1996: 327-330), Brown et al. (1982: 490) and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995: 245-250) find that the effects of the minimum wage are more dependent on the type of worker, despite having positive effects on total employment. The monopsony model has helped various scholars to question the assumption that minimum wages and employment have an inverse relationship. Dolado et al. (1996: 331-333) find that the minimum wage may not be appropriate for small open economies and, as OECD (1994: 49) states, it is not the only way to support the poor; there are alternative or more direct instruments, such as subsidies and lower taxes. Cahuc et al. (2001: 338) also claim that increasing the minimum wage can raise employment when the minimum is low.

Others, such as William and Mills (1998: 398), disagree with the neoclassical claim that increasing the minimum wage affects females the most because they are the lowest paid. They use Card and Krueger's research findings to claim that the model used by neoclassical economists, such as Stigler (1946: 362), may be inappropriate for studying the minimum wage. Just like Hertz (2005: 1-2), Brown et al. (1982: 524), Neumark et al. (2004: 442-443), Katz and Krueger (1992: 20), Foguel et al. (2001: 31), Rutkowski (2003: 12), Lemos (2004: 15) find wage gain effects for minimum wage legislation, Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012: 6-7) show that in South Africa the minimum wage has had a positive impact on DW working conditions; despite problems with compliance, DW pay rose substantially. In the Indonesian household survey, Bird and Manning (2008: 12-13) find that the poor benefit more after the introduction of the minimum wage. These arguments are strong indicators of the significance of the minimum wage in the informal sector.

Thus, Rubery (2003: 54) supports C189 and criticises the proponents of minimum wage relevance being reduced by the informal sector, calling such arguments misplaced. Instead, the argument should ask how exactly the minimum wage is to be implemented.

Card and Krueger (1995: 3) go on to reveal irregularities linked to the low-wage labour market and the minimum wage. A rise in the minimum wage means that those with a variety of wages all earn a new minimum wage. This causes a “*ripple effect*” where those earning above the minimum wage before its introduction or adjustment demand a pay rise. This happened in my own home a few months after the minimum wage for DWs in Zambia was adjusted from K250 to K522.4. We had two DWs and one was already earning slightly above the minimum wage, while the other was earning below it. When the new minimum wage came into effect we held a discussion with them because the DW earning above the minimum wage threatened resignation; she did not see herself earning a salary equal to her colleague due to the many years she had worked with us. Here the minimum wage was used as a floor, giving DWs a sense of worth and showing that relative wages are also important even in this low occupation.

The other DW did not mind earning less than her colleague as long as she received the minimum wage. Because of the relationship we had with the more experienced DW, and the trust and respect that had been built, we negotiated a pay increase so she could stay. Here, each maid had a different level of bargaining power, providing the long-serving maid with the courage to threaten resignation. The minimum wage gave both workers bargaining power, albeit at different levels, despite their belonging to a different class from their employer.

Despite the subject being divorce, Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979: 950) argue that married couples aware of divorce law will not rush to court (private ordering) before they weigh the costs for after divorce is granted. This is similar to the pre-negotiation strategy of a DW aware of the minimum wage and may help boost their bargaining power. They will probably use the minimum wage as a starting point, compared with one who does not know what the minimum wage is.

Correspondingly, in his defence of the contract at will, Epstein (1984: 947-980) assumes that both employer and employee have full knowledge of the situation prior to negotiation, leaving no need for external intervention. He advocates that the contract should be the guiding principle of the employment relationship because it gives each party the power to retain or break the relationship without being guilty of any offence. Kim (1997; 105) disagrees, stating that this argument tends to take for granted that both parties have the information required for negotiations to take place. With domestic work it is often the case that DWEs have more information than the DW. Therefore, I disagree with the neoclassical reasoning of there not being government

intervention in such a slack labour market, because it could be worse without government intervention.

Notably, most of the minimum wage literature does not discuss the role played by unions in bargaining for workers' wages. Tijdens and Klaveren (2011: 28) and Van Klaveren et al. (2009: 4) note that union representation in Zambia is becoming weaker. Its density is about 10% of the whole labour force or between 60% and 66% of the formal sector. I feel that, to a great extent, this shows that representing informal workers could be an uphill battle.

Nevertheless, general assumption is that unions are for workers with skills. Alternatively put, unions may not find it easy to represent "*unskilled*" workers (Cahuc et al. 2001: 338). As Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012: 4) reveal, in South Africa unions do not find it easy to organise DWEs due to their scale. Perhaps then it is not easy to improve DW wages through bargaining due to low bargaining power. To emphasise the importance of representation and it being able to improve worker situations, Cahuc et al. (2001: 338) quote (Folques: 1996), who gives an example of how France's "*comités d' entreprises*" representation led to over 50% of industries with collective agreement cover having the required minimum wage.

Bonner and Spooner (2011: 87) note a global increase in informal work and argue that this has reduced trade union membership. They stress that there is great pressure for these unions to organise workers in the informal sector, especially after the 2002 ILC ILO resolution on "*decent work and the informal economy*," which they claim raised trade union awareness and stimulated changes in "*international trade union policy*." However, like Zambia, there exists scepticism as to how this is a possibility. They argue (ibid: 88) that most trade unions lack the skills, openness, experience, resources and political determination to organise the informal sector.

This might be the reason why the officer I interviewed from ILO Zambia mentioned that they had identified training needs for the unions because they felt they lacked experience in working with the informal sector and therefore had to move away from traditional approaches. Then again, some DWs may not see the advantage of belonging to a union (Bonner and Spooner 2011: 87). On a macro level, Coriat (1991) argues that democratic institutions tend to induce bargaining, allowing for a movement from implicit to explicit bargaining. Here legislation, such as the minimum wage, increases trade union advocacy, awareness and representation for DWs and may help them develop negotiated forms of bargaining with DWEs.

For Zambia, the minimum wage for DWs already exists but the unions face practical challenges in bargaining because a recognised agreement between

them and DWEs does not exist. Bonner and Spooner (2011: 89-91) argue that it is difficult to bargain for informal workers since they are often outside the country's legal framework. They cite DWs as being in disguised employment relationships, rarely having the power to challenge DWEs. They (ibid: 90) further argue that DWEs are fond of ignoring the law and are easily discharged "*with little or no recourse to legal remedies.*" Additionally, their long working hours and isolation make recruitment difficult. Most are poor, so time spent on organisation could mean a significant loss of income.

In Zambia there is much debate about this legislation, especially among DWEs unprepared to accept change. Generally, DWEs want their salaries to increase before they comply with the minimum wage. This seems to have affected tripartite consultative meetings on the amendment of the minimum wage since the ZFE proposed a small increment and tried to defend it. DWs also seem to wonder the purpose of this legislation if there are few complying with it.

Overall, there is a mutual demand from DWs and DWEs, one reason why the amendment of the SI may have not had a negative effect on DW employment. Table 1 clearly shows that the DW minimum wage is still too low and is the lowest when compared with other minimum wages. However, apart from a weak legal framework, structure is affecting DW bargaining, for example, how people perceive domestic work.

Chapter 3. Methodology and Study Background


This chapter explains how the literature has been operationalised through data collection, processing and analysis in an attempt to respond to the research questions. It then looks at the laws and institutions in place and their purpose in the domestic work sector.

3.1 Methodology, Data Collection and Analysis

This paper uses qualitative and quantitative data (mixed methods) due to the need to verify findings within different data sources. This allows triangulation and provides flexibility since each selected approach has its own purpose (Patton 1990: 181). The challenges of using mixed methods are that it requires the researcher to analyse both qualitative and quantitative data and requires a massive collection of data, as well as being time consuming in entailing an analysis of both numeric data and text (Creswell 2008: 208). O’Leary (2010: 165) explains that mixed methods may limit sample size unless there are not any time or money constraints, one reason why I chose mixed methods. I was also interested in knowing DW wages and working hours, including average wages, wage differences in urban and rural areas, and between types of DW; these also drove me toward quantitative methods.

According to Clark et al. (2008: 372), triangulation design entails both quantitative and qualitative methods when collecting and analysing data, with each supplementing the other to generate overall findings. The diagram below illustrates this.

Figure 2. Triangulation Design



Source: Clark et al. (2008: 1551) 'Mixed Methods Approaches in Family Science Research'

3.1.1 Sampling

To ensure that the data collected provides a broad picture of Zambia, both rural and urban DWs, and employers were sampled. A total of 30 DWs were interviewed: 12 from Lusaka (urban), comprising 6 live-ins and 6 live-outs; 12 from Mwense (rural), comprising 6 live-ins and 6 live-outs; and 6 others participated in a FGD (Lusaka-Bauleni). This was done to make rural to urban and live-in to live-out comparisons. This stratification ensures that my sample is representative of the main subcategories of DWs (O’Leary 2010: 167). Knowing the actual number of DWs in the country was a challenge; the literature available only mentions that Lusaka has 50,000 plus (IRIN 2012, Rao 2009: 4).

Table 2 shows DW age distribution, which ranges from 18 to 49, with the average age being 23 to 35 for both types of DW.

Table 2. Domestic workers' age distribution

Urban	Live-in	Number	6	Rural	Live-in	Number	6
		Mean	35			Mean	30
		Mode	18			Mode	24
		Minimum	18			Minimum	19
		Maximum	56			Maximum	49
	Live-out	Number	6		Live-out	Number	6
		Mean	31			Mean	23
		Mode	36			Mode	22
		Minimum	20			Minimum	18
		Maximum	38			Maximum	25

Mwense town is about 900 kilometres north of Lusaka. Mwense was selected because I had hypothesized that the minimum wage legislation was playing a better role in Lusaka compared with rural towns (see Appendix IV). In Lusaka I interviewed DWs in Avondale (low-density population), Kabwata (medium-density population) and Bauleni (high-density population); while in Mwense, the targeted areas were Shingwe and Baobab, with the latter being better off in terms of income levels for employers.

3.1.2 Data collection

The main method of data collection for the 24 respondents (12 live-ins and 12 live-outs) was a structured questionnaire (see Appendices) because some could not read or communicate in English (table 4). I read the questions in the

language they were most comfortable with. This questionnaire was comprehensive and divided into four blocks to capture more relevant information:

- Block 1. Background data
- Block 2. Nature of work
- Block 3. Minimum wage awareness and representation
- Block 4. Nature of bargaining

Due to the sensitivity of discussing DW wages, I used snowball sampling for easier identification of households with live-ins and live-outs. In case of a bouncing case, I randomly selected the third nearest house so as to reduce bias. Snowball sampling recognises cases of interest from respondents who understand the type of subject that the researcher is looking for or people who may be able to give information on the topic (O’Leary 2010: 170, Patton 1990: 182).

Furthermore, eight employers (four urban and four rural) were interviewed using a similar questionnaire to collect data that could be compared. Five employers took part in a FGD so that I could gather their views on the topic and thereafter make comparisons, matching (DW and employer from the same household) and reasonable analysis of findings.

While this research was meant especially for DWs, I also saw the importance of DWEs and interviewing them makes the research less biased. I used observations while collecting data. It was not possible to take note of everything but I tried to see how comfortable the DWs were when giving responses, especially those concerning their income. I took note of DWEs who were uneasy when I asked to interview their DWs separately.

It was not easy to know the number of maid centres using secondary data, so I interviewed an officer from the Patents and Companies Registration Agency, Zambia; he said their database showed a total of 845 maid centres countrywide. I visited two maid centres, although I initially had planned to interview one. After the first interview I realised the need to interview a second due to some anomalies. I had the opportunity to give a lift to one of the DWs enrolled for training at the first centre. When I asked her some questions about it and how she felt, she gave me different information regarding the fee that the centre charged them upon recruitment by a client. It was this that made me look for a second maid centre in order to see if this is common.

This is important because maid centres have information about DWs, they bargain for them, have their records and link them to clients. I asked about their objectives, strategies for reaching out to DWs, challenges in working with DWs and their clients, especially after the amendment of the

minimum wage. After interviewing the centres and the other actors below, I observed that most actors, including the government, pointed to how important these centres are in this sector. I found that such centres were placed strategically at nursery schools for DWs to receive practical training in working with babies and young children. This also provided a quick way for the children's parents to recruit them.

I obtained informed consent from the respondents by first explaining the purpose of the interview and how important, confidential and safe it was for them to be honest. When allowed, I recorded in-depth interviews. I had planned to gather about five DWs at the centre for an FGD, asking them about their awareness and experiences before and after the minimum wage amendment. Finally, I decided to have it in Lusaka's Bauleni compound since this is among the areas where most DWs come from. In order to have a balance between the live-ins and live-outs, and obtain a variety of views, I conducted it on a Sunday after the DWs left church; it was not possible to meet them during the week. Patton (1990: 173) explains that FGDs entail gathering people with related backgrounds and experiences to take part in a group interview about a topic they are affected by.

For information on representation, awareness, compliance and the dynamics of bargaining, I interviewed the leaders of the two unions – a member of FFTUZ and a member of ZCTU – to find out what progress had been made since their founding and after the announcement of the amended minimum wage. It was important to understand their challenges in representing DWs, how they hoped to overcome these, what kind of support they received from their mother unions (FFTUZ and ZCTU), what their strategies are and the potential mechanisms for voicing concerns. I initially planned to interview one DW union but after visiting ZCTU, which said it did not deal directly with DWs, I was directed to FFTUZ, which has a union for DWs. I was informed of a second union for DWs independent from FFTUZ after interviewing an ILO officer. After consulting these actors, I found that there was not an NGO working directly with DWs in Zambia.

I then interviewed an officer from the planning division of the Ministry of Labour to learn about the minimum wage policy, the actors involved, who represents DWs, what kind of feedback they had received from the public since the policy's amendment; whether they feel it is being adhered to and if not, what strategies they have in place to punish offenders but protect both the DWs and DWEs. I wanted to know whether this was a political move by the PF government and or whether the institutions were in place for the successful amendment of the SI.

Some secondary data from ILO, Wage Indicator and the Central Statistics Office were used; for example, to find out how living standards

compare for before and after the minimum wage amendment. Additionally, statistics from wage indicator were used to compare the average living wage of the country and the minimum wages for workers in the other sectors to that of DWs. Other sources were newspapers, television programmes, journals and government websites.

Data collected using the questionnaire was analysed using SPSS, while the qualitative data was coded and arranged inline with the research questions. First, the questionnaires were coded then data were entered and analysed, bearing in mind the research questions, methodological constraints and the literature used (O’Leary, 2010: 231). I chose SPSS because it is user-friendly (ibid: 234); my interest was to generate descriptive statistics measuring central tendencies. I used frequency tables showing percentages representing different variables.

3.1.3 Other limitations of the research

Some employers were uncomfortable with me interviewing their DWs. The topic is sensitive and some feared prosecution knowing they were not adhering to minimum wage requirements.

The unavailability of male DWs for equal representation of interviewees in terms of gender was resolved by asking employers, unions and maid centres why there are so few males in the occupation. The general response was that clients prefer females for indoor work.

I planned to interview ZFE to find out what role they play in improving the domestic work sector. When I contacted them they said it was not possible because they do not deal with DWs. I wondered how they contributed to creating a code of conduct for DWEs.

I had limited time for data collection and limited finances. This meant limiting the sample of respondents. Nevertheless, what was planned in the design was met.

3.2 Study Background

3.2.1 Legal framework

According to Zambia’s employers guide (MLSS), labour laws are necessary for both employees and employers to have a foundation in their relationship; this creates harmony, less intimidation, exploitation, discrimination when responding to undesirable outcomes of market mechanisms (imperfect market)

and also creates adherence to international labour laws. This relationship should be steered by labour laws, union agreements, company regulations and ILO.

The Employment Act, Chapter 268, Section 2, states that a labour officer has the power to carry out the inspection of any conveyance or workplace where he/she may suspect people are being recruited, provided that they are not private dwellings (ILO 2012a: 9-10). This explains why the government finds it difficult to enforce minimum wage legislation for DWs.

In the Employment Act, Chapter 276, Section 3 the minister of labour has the power to announce or amend the minimum wages or conditions of employment for any category of worker on the condition that this group is not represented by a trade union, otherwise the minister has to consult with them before passing an order (ILO 2012b: 2).

Employers that fail to comply with the minimum wage and conditions of employment order have committed an offence. Upon conviction they are given a jail sentence that does not exceed six months. This order is relevant for all employers and employees, excluding those engaged in domestic service or employed as civil servants (MLSS: 3-6). This omission could be among the reasons for non-compliance. The law is discriminatory even when it comes to maternity leave for DWs (which can only be granted after a continuous service of more than two years) because they are not entitled to a maternity allowance (Wage Indicator 2013b), especially given that 7.5% of employed women are DWs (Simonovsky and Luebker 2011: 8).

According to Wage Indicator (2013c: 35-36), the Industrial and Labour Relations Act, Chapter 269, Part VII, Section 63(1) under Recognition Agreement, states that whoever employs 25 or more employees (or a lesser number as ordered by the minister) is required to register with the commissioner within three months of operation or from the date that this section applies to the employer. All recognition agreements must be agreed upon by both parties with the employer or employer's organisation recognising the trade union as a representative and agent of bargaining for the employees they represent.

This shows why it is difficult for trade unions to represent DWs and why this occupation does not have a recognition agreement.

3.2.2 Socio-economic characteristics

CSO's analytical report (2012b: 1) shows that Zambia is divided into 10 administrative provinces, reaching 74 districts by 2010. Its GDP was 7.66% while inflation was 7.9%. The proportion of the population living below the

poverty line was 60.5%, with the extremely poor comprising 42.3%. There is more poverty in rural areas (77.9%) compared with urban areas (27.5%); the latter is almost three times smaller than the former. Poverty levels for the provinces under consideration were 80.5% for Luapula (64.9% for extreme poverty) and 24.4% for Lusaka (11.5% for extreme poverty).

Zambia also recorded a total of 2,513,768 households (average household size being 5.2 persons), divided into 1,495,861 for rural and 1,017,907 for urban (ibid: 17).


CSO's (2012a: 1) key findings state that Zambia has about 4.3 million people in the labour force, with 13% (554, 202) being unemployed; Lusaka province has 20% while Luapula province (where Mwense district is found) has 7.7%. ISD (2013) records a 77.47 female labour force participation rate for Zambia in 2010, and CSO (2012b: 36) recorded a labour force participation rate (population 12-plus years) of 60.3% and 48.5% for rural and urban areas respectively, with Luapula province recording 58.6%, a higher rate when compared with Lusaka at 50.6%. Service and sales workers represent about 10% of the total working population (4,259,170), with 2.1% in rural areas and 26.5% in urban areas (ibid: 39-40).

3.2.3 Institutional framework: Actors in domestic work

The actors involved in domestic work are the DW unions, ILO, DWEs, ZFE, MLSS, DWs and maid centres. DWEs and DWs are scattered (not organised) countrywide and recruitment occurs through door-to-door job hunting, peers, DWEs and maid centres. Another smaller number has membership with the two unions, with the rest being on their own. It is unavoidable for DWEs to be part of ILO, ZFE, LEAZ, the unions, maid centres and the MLSS since they are all potential DWEs. I feel the maid centre is at a strategic position because it has direct contact with both DWs and DWEs, and therefore keeps their records.

Some DWs seek protection from MLSS, the unions and maid centres, while others lack awareness of their rights and entitlements. This diagram explains the delays and difficulties in formalising the sector, as the open space denotes the informal economy. No proper linkage exists between maid centres and ILO, since ILO tends to deal directly with the unions and ZFE. Then again, the relationship between the unions and ZFE also seems unsteady, hence the dotted lines.

Figure 3. Actors in Domestic Work



Source: Own construction

Asked whether they work with the maid centres, union (FFTUZ) representatives said there had been some collaboration though most fear such a partnership due to the charges DWs have to pay upon recruitment. Yet what these partners do not realise is that the union does not investigate them but rather tries to bring them on board since they deal directly with the DWs.

This unions' core mandate is to consider the plight of all DWs. They negotiate for DWs and have signed an MOU with the maid centres in Lusaka due to the realisation that these centres represent an entry point by virtue of being frequently in contact with DW employers.

ILO uses ZFE to strengthen the maid centres, preparing a code of conduct for DWEs (Wage Indicator 2013b). The officer I interviewed informed me that ILO also works with ZFE to train maid centres in business management, the SI on the minimum wage for DWs and the DW employer code of conduct, with the aim of helping DWEs form an association so that they become affiliated to ZFE. Such training has been conducted in Ndola and Lusaka with about 25 maid centres.

Maid centres are also encouraged to register as private employment agencies with the Ministry of Labour. Most have joined LEAZ, an affiliate of the ZFE, an outcome of the intervention. With this, ILO hopes to develop an association that unions will use to form a collective agreement with DWEs.

3.3 Setting the Minimum Wage

As an SI, the minimum wage is often established by the government through consultations with stakeholders or trade unions (collective bargaining). This wage differs from country to country and sector to sector, just like within occupations, but it is not uncommon that it is rarely applied in the informal sector. ILO Convention 131 states that economic factors – such as productivity, creation of employment and competitiveness, and social factors like inflation, the living wage, workers’ and family needs, social security benefits and more – should be considered when determining the minimum wage. It should not be too high and destabilise job opportunities, thus making firms close because of failing to compete (Wage Indicator: 2013f).

In an interview with FFTUZ, the explanation provided was that the government had realised that these workers are neglected, underprivileged and vulnerable. These reasons were behind the government’s decision to review the then SI, which had a minimum wage of K250 per month. He said, “*The minister has, from time to time, announced the minimum wage but what is sad is it takes a long time to review these wages. This government has prioritised the sector and things seem to be improving, although there is a lot to be done.*”

The labour movement, the government and ZFE sat in a tripartite consultative meeting to create a fair minimum wage. The government and the labour movement’s proposals were similar, but the ZFE disagreed. Despite discussions, they could not agree on one figure; the others did not accept ZFE’s proposal. Ultimately, the ministry made the final decision. The union officer said:

After the minister’s announcement, ZFE complained about not having been given a grace period, but that was not true because they were part of the tripartite consultative meetings and when the unions tried to ask ZFE to persuade its members to improve DWs’ wages, they said they were waiting

for the minister to announce the revised minimum wage. This shows that they were aware even in the first place and it's unfortunate that they were not being truthful.

In an interview with the officer from the Ministry of Labour, he stated that there had been a commitment from the government to ratify C189. Due to problems faced in the informal sector the government had to intervene in the market by reviewing the minimum wage. He confirmed what FFTUZ stated above. The unions had proposed K1,500, while ZFE's proposal was a 15% increase on the then minimum wage (K250). Finally, the minister announced a minimum wage of K420 (making it K522.4, including K104 for transport) (GRZ 2012, also see appendix VI).

3.4 Working in the Informal Sector

My observation is that DWs are usually recruited through networks, such as family, friends, neighbours, fellow DWs and maid centres. These workers are based in the informal sector, which makes it important to explain what it is like to work in the informal sector in Zambia.

There are certain factors that help measure the impact of the minimum wage, such as how the minimum wage is enforced and the size of the informal sector. For Zambia, about 80% of workers are from the informal sector. Furthermore, it is said that the minimum wage's role in improving the lives of low-paid workers will be limited. This might be because of the weak legal and institutional framework surrounding it that affects the efforts of actors involved in domestic work. Concerning law enforcement, any impact will be minimal if force is used through penalties and sanctions for would-be offenders (Kapatamoyo 2012).

Due to such informality, the government is trying to protect employee wages from unlawful deductions and by providing minimum wage legislation with required conditions of service (Kapatamoyo 2012). Additionally, it has worked with ILO and ZFE to develop a code of conduct for DWEs (Wage Indicator 2013c). DWs are among the lowest paid and the fact that what occurs in this sector is not regulated makes things worse because the employee is at the mercy of the employer, who tends to have more bargaining power when determining wages is concerned (Kapatamoyo 2012).

To summarise, a number of challenges were encountered when collecting the data. Furthermore, legal and institutional frameworks are weak since they largely exclude DWs, while the links between actors do not seem strong. DWEs and DWs are scattered, thus making organisation, representation and formality within the sector difficult.

Chapter 4. The Nature of Domestic Work in Zambia

As explained earlier, DWs in Zambia are mostly female due to social structure. Here I discuss DWs' working hours, overtime, the perception of the occupation, reasons for becoming a DW, literacy levels and day-to-day tasks.

Most females are groomed to babysit and perform household chores. When I asked the maid centres and unions why the occupation had more females than males they considered men to be more suited for outside work, such as gardening and landscaping, while women were used for indoor work since they had been raised for it. Most DWEs prefer females to males for household work, which has somehow forced maid centres into enrolling females. When I asked DWEs about this during the FGD, one said, "*how do you employ a man to do a woman's job? It is just like employing a woman to do your gardening and landscaping.*" It shows that – just as Giddens (1984: 12-18), Budlender (2011: 3), Lan (2003: 188-189), King (2007: 47), Ray (2000: 693), Oelz (2011: 2), Luebker et al. (2011: 1-5) Tjidsens and Klaveren (2011: 19) and IDWN (2013) state – societal perceptions of domestic work (structure) are stronger than DW agencies. Even if a man decides to become a domestic worker he may not find it easy to get a job despite being able to perform the tasks well.

Consequently, I had to find out why people choose to be a domestic worker (table 3). 41.7% of urban DWs said it is because they have to look after their children, 33% because they are poor and the remaining 25% because they are not educated.

Table 3. Reasons for becoming a domestic worker

Location of domestic worker		Frequency	Percent
Urban	I am poor	4	33.3
	I am not educated	3	25
	I need to look after my children	5	41.7
	Total	12	100
Rural	I am poor	6	50
	I am not educated	2	16.7
	I need to look after my children	4	33.3
	Total	12	100

In rural areas, those who said it is because they are poor were 50%; another 33.3% said it is because they have to look after their children, while the remaining 16.7% because they are not educated. Here then, most people become DWs because they are poor and need to look after their children. Thus, I might argue that most become DWs because of hardship; they would rather become DWs than steal to survive. It might also mean that if they were not poor or uneducated they would choose another occupation (they have a constrained choice).

There is a common view that most DWs are less educated, and the data collected shows that in urban areas 50% of DWs reached the primary school level, with only 33% attending secondary school. Out of 24 respondents only 1 DW (8.3%) received a higher education. This might be because there are more schools in urban areas and free primary education; thus attendance should be improving. This is compared with rural areas, with 33.3% receiving primary and 58.3% secondary education. With its small population, there is less competition at secondary schools compared with urban cities like Lusaka.

With literacy levels, another surprising thing is that DWs in the rural areas are more literate than those in urban areas (table 4). This is an ambiguity that might stem from rural-urban migration, meaning that migrants usually go to urban areas in search of employment and not necessarily for education, thus increasing the number of “illiterate” people in urban areas.

Table 4. Literacy for domestic workers

Location of domestic worker		Frequency	Percent
Urban	In local language	6	50.0
	Both English and local language	4	33.3
	Not at all	2	16.7
	Total	12	100.0
Rural	In local language	4	33.3
	Both English and local language	7	58.3
	Not at all	1	8.3
	Total	12	100.0

When asked whether they liked their job, 66.7% of both live-ins and live-outs state they do. This shows that the majority like their job, despite its challenges, since it is not new but something they grow up doing for free in their own home.

Table 5. Do you like being a domestic worker?

Type of DW		Frequency	Percent
Live-in	Yes	8	66.7
	No	4	33.3
	Total	12	100.0
Live-out	Yes	8	66.7
	No	4	33.3
	Total	12	100.0

During the DW FGD one participant said, “*this occupation is very important because if it didn’t exist, our bosses would have nobody to look after and clean their houses, cook, babysit, etcetera, and they would have no time to relax after work.*” This might indicate why 83.3% and 75% of live-ins and live-outs respectively wish to continue domestic work despite the occupation seeming undervalued in terms of learning and social reproduction.

Their day-to-day job description (Appendix I) is mainly cooking, sweeping, doing the laundry and babysitting, which represents 58.3% for both the live-ins and live-outs. This is similar to the responses received from both the DWE and DW FGD, although some DWEs said their DWs had obvious everyday tasks with some ad hoc duties, for example, they may not need to do the laundry every day unless the household has a baby.

The DWs also felt their occupation was looked down upon and discriminated against (table 6). The data collected show that live-ins who say they are discriminated against and looked down upon represent 16.7% and 50% respectively (urban area), with the rural reaching 33.3% and 50% respectively. For live-outs the figures are 33.3% and 50% respectively (urban area), with those in rural areas reaching 33.3% (looked down upon). Here we see that rural live-outs are more respected when compared with the others. This might be because rural people may not look at DWs as inferior due to the inadequate employment opportunities available (Agarwal 1997: 4-11).

Table 6. Perception of domestic work

Type of DW	Location of DW		Frequency	Percent
Live-in	Urban	They respect it	2	33.3
		They discriminate against us	1	16.7
		They look down on us	3	50.0
		Total	6	100.0
	Rural	They respect it	1	16.7
		They discriminate against us	2	33.3
		They look down on us	3	50.0
		Total	6	100.0
Live-out	Urban	They respect it	1	16.7
		They discriminate against us	2	33.3
		They look down on us	3	50.0
		Total	6	100.0
	Rural	They respect it	4	66.7
		They look down on us	2	33.3
		Total	6	100.0

In terms of their tasks being predetermined, 91.7% of live-ins and live-outs state that their tasks are predetermined. 75% of live-ins say their employer might change their tasks, compared with live-outs at 58.3%. This means that live-ins are more likely to experience changes in their daily tasks at their employers' wishes when compared with live-outs. This might be because live-ins have longer working hours and thus more work. They are present even after their employers finish working and are more likely to receive further instructions in the evening. They seem to have lower agency and self-esteem (Lutz 2002, Giddens 1984).

We also find that 41.7% of live-outs, compared with 33.3% of live-ins, receive further instructions from other family members. One FGD participant said, *"I am okay with my employer but her relatives want to make use of me as much as possible before I knock off. With this minimum wage, they do not want me to rest."* This is another example of low agency.

Table 7. Domestic workers' working hours

		Number	6	Hours			Number	6	Hours	
		Live-in	Urban	Mean			14	Live-out	Urban	Mean
Median				14	Median		10			
Mode				14	Mode		10			
Minimum				12	Minimum		9			
Maximum				16	Maximum		12			
Rural	Number		6	Hours	Rural	Number		6	Hours	
	Mean		14			Mean		10		
	Median		13			Median		10		
	Mode		13			Mode		10		
	Minimum		12			Minimum		7		
	Maximum		16			Maximum		11		

On average, live-ins work 14 hours a day compared with 10 hours for live-outs. When we consider minimum and maximum working hours, urban live-ins work 12 and 16 hours respectively compared with urban live-outs at 9 and 12 hours respectively. Most live-ins work 13 to 14 hours a day compared with about 10 hours for live-outs. According to the SI on minimum wages (ILO 2012c), a DW's normal working hours should not go above 48 hours a week. But looking at the two averages, the average weekly hours are approximately 60 hours for live-outs (who normally work 6 days a week) compared with the live-ins who work approximately 97 hours (7 days a week). The latter is double that which is stipulated by law, meaning that live-ins are overworked despite their monthly wages being slightly higher than those of live-outs.

Nevertheless, it is not incorrect to conclude that live-outs' wages are much better than those of live-ins due to hours of work, even though both types of worker seem to be working beyond normal working hours. After comparing DW working hours in eight countries (Belarus, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Ukraine and Zambia) Tijdens and Klaveren (2011: 28) conclude that Zambia has the longest working hours, estimated at 46 to 60-plus hours a week.

Hence, we find that only 8.3% of DWs are paid overtime. The SI states that a DW must be paid overtime at a rate of one and half times the DW's hourly rate for hours exceeding normal working hours stipulated by law. If she works on a Sunday she should be paid at a rate that is double the DW's rate of pay per hour (ILO 2012c).

Table 8. Overtime Pay

Type of DW		Frequency	Percent
Live-in	No	12	100.0
Live-out	Yes	1	8.3
	No	11	91.7
	Total	12	100.0

During the DWE FGD, one said that “*the live-outs have time to rest when they knock off and do not really need leave days nor overtime because we also provide lunch for them which is an expense, despite us not making them account for it.*”

This has been a descriptive chapter concerning the nature of DWs’ work in Zambia. I find that most DWs like the occupation and become DWs because they are poor and have to look after their children. Rural DWs seem more literate than urban DWs and all feel that very few people respect their job. DWs (especially urban live-ins) tend to have abnormal working hours and overtime is given by only a small fraction of DWEs. They also seem to have low agency and self-esteem due to the occupation being structured.

Chapter 5. The Minimum Wage and Nature of Bargaining

This chapter provides an analysis of the aforementioned hypotheses by testing, for example, if level of education influences DW bargaining power, or whether live-outs have more bargaining power than live-ins; the minimum wage plays a better role in the urban as opposed to rural areas. This chapter also provides a more dynamic view of bargaining, possibilities and outcomes.

5.1 Minimum Wage Effects on Domestic Worker Wages

There is much debate surrounding the effects of the minimum wage on wages and employment. Overall, my findings agree with Brown et al. (1982: 524), Neumark et al. (2004: 442-443), Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012: 6-7), Bird and Manning (2008: 12-13) and Card and Krueger (1995: 3) that minimum wage legislation tends to increase the targeted group's wages.

My findings (table 9) show wage increases for live-ins (represented by 83.3% in the urban area and 66.7% in the rural area) compared with those of live-outs (66.7% in the urban area and 50% in the rural area). This shows that the amendment in the minimum wage necessitates an increase in DW wages, despite some (especially in rural areas) not knowing what this is or receiving it.

Table 9. Wage increase after the minimum wage amendment

Location	Type of DW Wage Increase	Frequency	Percent	
Urban	Live-in	Yes	5	83.3
		No	1	16.7
		Total	6	100
	Live-out	Yes	4	66.7
		No	2	33.3
		Total	6	100
Rural	Live-in	Yes	4	66.7
		No	2	33.3
		Total	6	100
	Live-out	Yes	3	50
		No	3	50
		Total	6	100

This might be because those who were aware had to bargain for a wage higher than that which they initially earned. Yet some DWEs also felt the need

to increase wages due to emphasis from the government, especially via public media. We also see that more live-ins have benefitted from the increase in wages compared with live-outs. Among the responses received from the DWE FGD was the statement that they prefer live-ins to live-outs because they seem cheaper (due to longer working hours). I see some mutual dependency between DWEs and live-ins, perhaps because DWEs may find it costly and risky to change their DWs (they also develop bonds).

When DWs were asked if they found the minimum wage helpful (those that knew what it was), 75% of urban live-ins said “yes” compared with 66.7% for urban live-outs, with the rest saying “no” (table 10). Even if most live-ins say this, their average wage per hour is lower than that of live-outs. Subsequently, I think they tend to accept this low position in society (low agency and self-esteem) and seem to bargain from a position of lower power (implicit cohesion).

Table 10. Helpfulness of the minimum wage

Type of DW	Location of DW		Frequency	Valid Percent
Live-in	Urban	Yes	3	75.0
		No	1	25.0
		Total	4	100.0
		Missing	2	
	Rural	Total	6	
		No	2	100.0
		Missing	4	
		Total	6	
Live-out	Urban	Yes	2	66.7
		No	1	33.3
		Total	3	100.0
		Missing	3	
	Rural	Total	6	
		No	3	100.0
		Missing	3	
		Total	6	

In an interview with ILO its officer said,

The minimum wage is helpful because it has made DWs be regarded as workers. On the contrary, some DWEs started thinking they were overpaying their DWs; other households cannot afford it, making adherence difficult. There are reports that some employers have become stricter.

In another interview a FFTUZ officer said,

The minimum wage has improved but is still far from being helpful as it is too little and the cases of non-compliance that reach the office are on the increase. Unemployment levels of the country also contribute to DWs' low bargaining power as the situation of having too many of them desperate for jobs makes them more vulnerable.

In addition, both DW unions said the minimum wage was helpful, could be sustainable and was okay for a start. One union representative said, *“Because of this, we also encourage them to have written contracts so that there’s evidence of compliance.”*

In relation to the minimum wage there is the issue of contracts. According to ZFE (Wage Indicator 2013b) it is recommended that DWs have a written contract to avoid misunderstandings. My findings indicate that 100% of DWs have verbal contracts; only one (live-in) out of the 24 interviewed (16.7%) had a signed contract.

Table 11. Domestic workers with written contracts

Location	Type of DW	Frequency	Percent	
Urban	Live-in	Yes	1	16.7
		No	5	83.3
	Total	6	100.0	
Rural	Live-in	No	6	100.0
		No	6	100.0
	Live-out	No	6	100.0

This shows us that most DWEs avoid having signed contracts with their DWs because it could be used as evidence of non-compliance (Bonner and Spooner 2011: 90). Therefore, the formalisation of this occupation would be a problem. *“From the number of problems we have received especially concerning the minimum wage, the majority of DWEs that are failing to comply with the law are Zambians, as compared with foreigners,”* said an MLSS officer.

One reason could be that foreigners tend to fear being on the wrong side of the law (IRIN 2012), while Zambians tend to ignore it; the fact that there is no penalty makes things worse. This is in line with Bonner and Spooner’s (2011: 90) argument that DWEs are fond of ignoring the law.

Unions also encourage DWs to record their daily working hours and make their employers accountable at the end of each month. They said a few had done this and succeeded, but many had experienced problems due to their vulnerability and they therefore prefer to stay quiet until they are “unfairly” relieved of their duties and then decide to report to the union showing the hours worked. Most DWs in Zambia fear losing job opportunities the moment

they raise issues relating to having signed contracts; this leaves them where they are in society since they have low agency.

Conversely, DWEs argue that it might be helpful if their wages were increased. I link this to Agarwal’s (1997: 4-11) argument concerning societal perceptions because it seems the general public do not want the gap between them and DWs to be bridged; they thus feel the need to have their wages increased too. When DWs were asked what they know about the minimum wage and how helpful it is, only one out of six did not understand what it really was but had heard a rumour that the government had announced it. One said, *“it is helpful, but only for those whose employers meet it, but again even for those that cannot, at least they have seen their salaries improve despite them still being below the minimum wage. By the way, none of us are getting a salary above the minimum wage or rather the minimum wage itself.”*

To understand the role of the minimum wage it is important to carry out various tests, such as, whether level of education has any influence on DW wages (table 12). My hypothesis is that those who have at least a secondary education have a greater ability to obtain higher wages compared with those who do not. The average wage (means) for those who had attended secondary education (K445.45) was lower than those who had attended primary school (K486). Despite one respondent with higher education and an average wage of K560, comparing primary education against secondary education reveals that level of education does not determine DW wages. There may instead be other key factors, such as experience, previous pay and particularly, how the employer perceives domestic work (Agarwal 1997: 4-11) (table 6).

Table 12. Level of education and domestic worker wages

Wage			Wage		
None	Number	2	Secondary	Number	11
	Mean	400		Mean	445.45
	Median	400		Median	300
	Mode	300		Mode	300
	Minimum	300		Minimum	150
	Maximum	500		Maximum	1,500
Primary	Number	10	Higher	Number	1
	Mean	486		Mean	560
	Median	450		Median	560
	Mode	300		Mode	560
	Minimum	250		Minimum	560
	Maximum	1,000		Maximum	560

5.2 Dynamics of Awareness

When we look at DW awareness of the minimum wage, the findings in Table 13 show that there is greater awareness among live-ins compared with live-outs in both rural and urban areas.

Table 13. Domestic workers' awareness of the minimum wage

Type of DW	Location of DW		Frequency	Percent
Live-in	Urban	Yes	4	66.7
		No	2	33.3
		Total	6	100.0
	Rural	Yes	2	33.3
		No	4	66.7
		Total	6	100.0
Live-out	Urban	Yes	3	50.0
		No	3	50.0
		Total	6	100.0
	Rural	Yes	3	50.0
		No	3	50.0
		Total	6	100.0

Conversely, when we come to a rural to urban comparison we find that, despite rural DWs being more educated than their urban counterparts, there is greater awareness of the minimum wage in urban compared with rural areas. This might be an ambiguity since we could normally expect that the most educated are more aware. Yet then again, those in urban areas are perhaps more exposed to sensitisations carried out by the unions, MLSS and ILO through outdoor events and television or radio programmes. Those in rural areas tend to miss out on information because such places lack union and labour office presence, while they rarely have access to radio stations available in big cities.

This shows that there is greater access to the media in urban areas compared with rural areas (table 14). It now makes more sense to see that the highest source of minimum wage information in urban areas is the media for 100% of live-ins, while for live-outs their sources are friends (33.3%) and a combination of media and friends (66.7%). On the other hand, data from rural areas show that there is less peer-to-peer sharing of information, perhaps because some houses are not often near each other; here we also see that for live-ins media information is represented by 100%.

Table 14. Domestic workers' awareness of the minimum wage (source of information)

Location	Type of DW	Source	Frequency	Percent
Urban	Live-in	Media	4	100
		Missing	2	
		Total	6	
	Live-out	Friends	1	33.3
		Media and Friends	2	66.7
		Total	3	100
		Missing	3	
Total	6			
Rural	Live-in	Media	2	100
		Missing	4	
		Total	6	
	Live-out	Media and Friends	3	100
		Missing	3	
		Total	6	

Note; Missing represents DWs that said they did not know about the minimum wage

This can be linked to Bing's (2012: 37) argument that live-ins have less time for peer-to-peer discussions compared with live-outs, who have more room to manoeuvre after work. Because live-ins are more isolated they have to rely on media at their workplace.

When asked what they know about the minimum wage, 25% of live-ins in the urban area said it was the lowest possible pay, 50% said it was pay stipulated by law, and the remaining 25% said it was the lowest possible pay stipulated by law. This is important because the media might be the least expensive mode of transmitting information about the minimum wage.

Conversely, data from the rural area show that for live-ins 100% of those that said they had heard of the minimum wage called it pay stipulated by law. This could be because they were aware of the Minister's announcement of the amended minimum wage in 2011. Data from the DW FDG reveals that they did not know about the minimum wage before the minister's announcement (table 15).

Table 15. What domestic workers know about the minimum wage

Location of DW	Type of DW		Frequency	Valid Percent
Urban	Live-in	Lowest possible pay	1	25.0
		Pay stipulated by law	2	50.0
		Lowest possible pay stipulated by law	1	25.0
		Total	4	100.0
		Missing	2	
		Total	6	
	Live-out	Lowest possible pay	1	33.3
		Pay stipulated by law	1	33.3
		Not sure	1	33.3
		Total	3	100.0
		Missing	3	
		Total	6	
Rural	Live-in	Pay stipulated by law	1	50.0
		Not sure	1	50.0
		Total	2	100.0
		Missing	4	
		Total	6	
	Live-out	Pay stipulated by law	3	100.0
		Missing	3	
		Total	6	

When I tested whether literacy levels lead to increased awareness of minimum wage legislation, I found that those who were able to read and write in both the local language and English had the highest awareness levels with 63.6%, compared with 40% for local language only and 33.3% for those who could not use either language (33.3%). Therefore, there is a positive relationship between one's literacy and awareness levels since the most literate DWs have more awareness.

Table 16. Literacy levels of domestic workers and awareness of the minimum wage

Literacy for DW		Frequency	Percent
In local language	Yes	4	40.0
	No	6	60.0
	Total	10	100.0
Both English and local language	Yes	7	63.6
	No	4	36.4
	Total	11	100.0
Not at all	Yes	1	33.3
	No	2	66.7
	Total	3	100.0

5.3 Dynamics of bargaining

When it comes to bargaining, the findings show that this is not easy in domestic work; the DW is disadvantaged compared with her employer. The DW FGD reveals that the main challenge in bargaining is excess supply of DWs, which also contributes to their exploitation by employers since they tend to be desperate for work (slack labour market). One participant went on to say,

When we decide to leave one job for another, for better pay, our new employers usually find it difficult to meet what we used to get from our former employers so we are now forced to lie about how much we got so that when it comes to negotiations, our pay does not fall too low. If we try to stick to this high figure, it is very rare that we are recruited, and they often remind us that there are others who would quickly accept such an offer.

When we make a rural to urban comparison (table 17) we find that the DW's average starting point is K663 and K345 for urban and rural respectively. The most common is K450 and K300 for the two areas respectively. In urban areas, at least 50% start at K580 while the other 50% start lower. This is compared with rural areas where 50% start at K300 or above, and the remaining 50% start lower. As expected, the highest starting point in the rural area is K560, slightly above the minimum wage, compared with K1200 for urban areas, with the minimum being K400 for urban and K200 for rural. This again shows that DWs in urban areas tend to have greater bargaining power than those in the rural areas, the reason perhaps being that there is more awareness in urban areas; this may give them more power to bargain compared with their counterparts in rural areas.

Table 17. DWE and DW starting point (bargaining) and DW wage

Location of DW		DW's starting point	DWE's starting point	DW wage
Urban	Number	12		
	Mean		663	521
	Median		580	450
	Mode		450	350
	Minimum		400	300
	Maximum		1,200	1,200
Rural	Number	12		
	Mean		345	283
	Median		300	300
	Mode		300	300
	Minimum		200	150,00
	Maximum		560,00	450,00

It might also be the reason why, on average, urban areas have higher wages (mean K635) than rural areas (mean K291.67). This indicates that most DWEs tend to ignore the law, as argued by Bonnie and Spooner (2011: 90). Another reason could be that DWEs also realise that the standard of living in urban areas is higher than in rural areas, leaving more room for bargaining. Rural wages show a high level of non-compliance with a highest wage of K450. This might also be because of the inadequate presence of maid centres, unions and labour officers in rural areas – most employers take advantage of this. Another reason could be that penalties for non-compliance do not exist.

It could also be because there are larger houses to work in within urban areas; this makes urban DWs' bargaining power greater and their employers tend to understand. Another reason could be due to the higher level of awareness in urban areas because of the presence of unions, with greater access to sensitisation programmes both through the media and at public events. Both maid centres interviewed explained that they negotiated wages on behalf of the DWs. When asked who does the bargaining for the DWs' wage and working conditions, they said the client was allowed to interview the DW but that the maid centre ensures that both parties are aware of the minimum wage and comply with it. They also explained that what is experienced at times is that the two parties may agree and then later re-negotiate a different wage.

Responses from the DW FGD in Bauleni compound of Lusaka state that most employers say they cannot meet the minimum wage, which is among

the reasons why some DWs have either resigned for “greener pastures”, been relieved of their duties or now gone on a part-time basis.

As expected, table 17 again shows that DWEs’ starting point in bargaining was lower than the DWs’. In rural areas their highest starting point in bargaining was K450, which is well below the minimum wage (K522.4). In the urban areas we see that the highest starting point is K1200, but again 50% of employers started bargaining at K450 and above, while the other 50% started at K450 and below (median in urban areas); this is compared with the rural median for DWEs of K300. The average starting point (mean) is K521, which is slightly lower than the minimum wage (K522.4), while it is K283 in rural areas. With this we might again argue that DWEs in urban areas tend to appreciate their DWs more than in the rural areas, despite their average starting point falling slightly below the minimum wage.

Among the arguments from the employers, one DWE during their FGD stated that it is not fair for rural areas to be subjected to the same minimum wage when it is clear that there are very few working in formal employment, their houses are smaller and this means less work for the DWs. One DWE said, “*Why should I pay the same wage to my DW when my house is way smaller than the average house in Lusaka?*” They said that they think the minimum wage is a good thing, but the majority of those in rural areas are civil servants and consider it to be too high. I think there may be fewer problems if pay is offered per hour. Oelz (2011: 4) gives the example of South Africa and Austria, both of which have managed to set regional, urban and rural minimum wages. To a certain extent I concur with the DWEs’ arguments since I also observed a clear distinction between house sizes in Lusaka and Mwense. Furthermore, the estimated salary for a clerk is approximately K1500 (table 1) and that of a university graduate at entry point is approximately K5,000.

For a live-in and live-out comparison (table 18), the average starting point (mean) for live-ins is K566, slightly above the minimum wage, compared with that of K443 for live-outs, which is well below the minimum wage. On average, live-ins tend to have more bargaining power when compared with live-outs, but then again, when we consider the longer working hours of live-ins this could be a significant reason behind their higher bargaining power.

Despite this, in the end I think that live-ins are still at a disadvantage; this is indicated in their average wages, which are K521.67 for live-ins compared with K405 for live-outs, and average wages per hour of K1.24 for live-ins and K1.62 for live-outs (calculated using average working hours in table 7). I also find that for both, 50% started bargaining above K450 while the other 50% started below it. In both cases this is well below the minimum wage and also shows that the DW’s starting point is very low. This may once again indicate that they are afraid of bargaining too high because they will not be offered employment.

Table 18 clearly shows that DWEs offer live-ins more than live-outs – as explained in the FGD, they are cheaper because they have longer working hours. This clearly shows that power relations in bargaining do not take place at the same level, perhaps due to levels of poverty, unemployment in the countryside and excess supply of DWs desperate for jobs, thus making them more vulnerable. This also agrees with the power dependence theory (Lawler and Bacharach 1979: 198), which states that employers tend to have better fall-back options compared with DWs.

Table 18. DWE and DW starting point (bargaining) and wage

Type of DW		DW starting point	DWE starting point	DW wage	DW wage/hour	
Live-in	Number	12				
	Mean		566	460	521.67	1.24
	Median		450	375	400	
	Mode		300	300	300	
	Minimum		250	200	200	
	Maximum		1200	1200	1,500	
Live-out	Number	12				
	Mean		443	344	405	1.62
	Median		450	300	375	
	Mode		300	300	300	
	Minimum		200	150	150	
	Maximum		750	560	700	

On a monthly basis, I find that live-ins earn more than live-outs. This could be because live-ins end up with longer working hours compared with live-outs. However, when this is critically analysed by looking at hourly wages, it is clear that live-ins actually earn less. Hence DWEs try to avoid search costs and tend to pay the live-ins more per month, knowing it would cost them more if they hired extra labour for the gap left by the live-out. Live-outs seem happier because they have more free time. During the DW FGD the explanation provided was that they are in a better bargaining (less desperate) position when they have a job elsewhere and are just trying their “luck”. This tends to be in line with Cahuc et al.’s (2006: 328) argument that an employee who already has a job tends to have more bargaining power than the unemployed due to a better fall-back position.

Comparing live-ins’ and live-outs’ actual average wages as a percentage of their average starting points, I find that those of live-ins (92.2%) are relatively high compared with those of live-outs (91.4%). If this were to be suggested on a broader basis then, in a sense, there is a closer match of

bargaining strategies between employer and employee for live-ins than live outs. This is simply (due to a lower hourly wage) because live-ins seem not to have the power, confidence or agency to push for more, and this might be due to how they perceive themselves.

The above in some way also agrees with part of Bing’s (2012: 37) findings that the live-outs have more free time. In some cases, these live-outs may have other jobs after they finish. From the DWE FGD I found that a number of them had arrangements with the live-outs where they could work for a couple of hours and thereafter be free to work elsewhere. For example, one had a DW working three days a week who could then work elsewhere during the free days. What the employers were not sure about is whether it was legal to have such arrangements as they argued that it was better than keeping labour they could not afford. The legislation on the minimum wage only stipulates that a DW’s working hours should not exceed 48 hours a week, as the rest is deemed overtime (ILO 2011c: 1).

On the employer’s side, the average starting points were K460 for live-ins and K344 for live-outs. We also see that these averages are not only well below the minimum wage (K522.40) but they fall below the DWs’ starting points in both cases. During the DW FGD, they explained that this was why they felt that bargaining was not fair but they needed the jobs so they often accept what is offered.

In relation to whether a DW’s level of education leads to greater bargaining power, I find that those who attended higher education had the highest average starting points in bargaining (K600), while those who had not attended school had the least, with K440. At first glance this makes sense, yet there is ambiguity when we compare the average starting points (mean) between those who attended primary school (K542) and those who attended secondary school (K473).

Table 19. Level of education and bargaining

None	Number	2	Amount	Secondary	Number	11	Amount
	Mean		440		Mean		473
	Mode		380		Mode		300
Primary	Number	10		Higher	Number	1	
	Mean		542		Mean		600
	Mode		400		Mode		600

We also find that the most common starting point for those who attended primary school (K400) was higher than that of those who attended

secondary school (K300). Therefore, level of education among DWs may have less explanatory value.

When the MLSS officer was asked how compliance is monitored, he said that the government had not employed labour inspectors to conduct labour inspections because legislation in its current form does not allow inspections of private dwellings. Hence an emphasis on awareness creation is needed, especially for unions, maid centres and DWEs so that they understand the conditions their DWs are entitled to. Wage Indicator (2013a) also states that there is no system in place to make follow-ups regarding compliance, which is left in the hands of the employer. Therefore, compliance needs state regulation that works.

In order to test whether literacy levels influence bargaining power, I compared DW ability to read and write in either English or the local language with their starting point in bargaining.

The findings below show that, on average, those able to read and write in both English and the local language had lower bargaining power than those able to read and write in their local language. On the other hand, those who could not read or write in either their local language or English seemed better off than those who could read and write in both English and the local language. I find this very interesting and it might indeed be country specific. Perhaps most DWEs do not need their DWs to read or write because most of the work is manual, such as sweeping, though it may become a little complicated for a DW who cannot read English to operate certain machinery and utensils, especially electric ones.

Table 20. Literacy level, starting point (bargaining) and wage

Literacy for DW		DW starting point in bargaining	DW wage
In local language	Number	10	
	Mean		546
	Median		485
	Mode		450
Both English and local language	Number	11	
	Mean		473
	Median		300
	Mode		300
Not at all	Number	3	
	Mean		480
	Median		500
	Mode		380

Therefore, literacy, just like education, has low explanatory value because it seems to me that it does not affect the DW's bargaining position in terms of wages. I think this is because it is already assumed that DWs are less literate. This could be among the reasons why DWs' skills do not seem valued, as explained earlier (Budlender 2011: 3, Oelz 2011: 2, Luebker 2011: 1-5, IDWN 2013, Ray 2000, Tijdens and Klaveren 2011: 19).

5.4 Dynamics of Representation

It has been found that most DWs do not really know who represents them (table 21). The findings show that for live-ins only 50% of those in urban areas know who represents them, compared with 16.7% of urban live-outs; finally, none of the rural DWs knew.

This also shows that if one is a live-in and based in a rural area, the likelihood of accessing such information is very low. In as much as Bing (2012: 37) argues that live-outs tend to be better off because they have free time and space, this may only be in cases of bargaining. Indeed, my findings show that live-outs do not seem to be more aware of issues that concern them compared with live-ins.

Table 21. Domestic workers' awareness of representation

Type of DW	Location of DW		Frequency	Percent
Live-in	Urban	Yes	3	50.0
		No	3	50.0
		Total	6	100.0
	Rural	No	6	100.0
Live-out	Urban	Yes	1	16.7
		No	5	83.3
		Total	6	100.0
	Rural	No	6	100.0

Among the reasons for this could be that even though they seem isolated, they may have more access to media sources (at their workplace), although this depends on the degree of freedom their DWE grants. Because most DWs are poor, live-outs might not be able to afford access to the media despite having free time and private space. In some cases they may finish work late and may not have enough time for peer-to-peer talk because they have to attend to their own family needs. Another reason might be due to the lack of

or inadequate presence of the unions, maid centres and labour offices in rural areas.

The UHDWUZ (ZCTU) claims that it at times represents DWs in courts of law, especially when they fail to reach an agreement with the employer, in the union's presence. However, this representation only seems to benefit a small fraction of urban DWs. They have about 3,000 real and paid-up members, but what is not certain is whether these are still in employment or not. One representative said, "*This does not mean that the union only represents its members, but we also fight for the rights of non-members in the hope of winning them over to the union.*" The membership fee for each DW is K10 per annum, with a monthly subscription of 3% of their salary. The poor appreciation received from DWs makes it difficult for membership to grow (see Bonnie and Spooner (2011: 87), and this has also affected the retention of clerks who work on commission.

Just like UHDWUZ (ZCTU), the UHDWUZ (FFTUZ) also depends on membership, although admits that it sometimes mobilises resources from donors. The membership subscription is K5 per annum and K2 per month, while it has about 1,200 paid-up members. Its union leader had this to say: "*I feel like most policy makers are hesitant to ratify Convention 189 and review the current SI so it allows for a recognition agreement to be signed with the DWEs, because they are also DWEs. What is required is more political will.*" When I compare the two, the union under ZCTU has higher membership fees than the other, despite it having more members. It could be because of its initiative of using clerks to carry out door-to-door recruitment.

He said that because DWEs are not organised, the union is forced to deal with individuals, very few of whom are willing to register their DWs with the union, less still pay membership fees. The union does not therefore negotiate with these but tries to help DWs who approach them when they face difficulties.

ILO also mentioned weaknesses in trade unions (refer to Tijdens and Klaveren 2011: 28, Van Klaveren et al. 2009: 4) and was preparing training for capacity building so that they could move from being traditional trade unions to modern ones and adapt to working with workers from the informal sector, such as DWs. There is also a call for the DW unions to merge so that they become stronger, especially in terms of capacity, coverage and representation. This falls in line with Bonner and Spooner's (2011: 88) argument that unions tend to find it difficult to represent informal workers and are used to traditional methods.

This on its own does not present a good picture for representation, which might have something to do with the labour movement not reaching out

to more DWs and the general public. For those who said that they know who represents them (table 22), 33.3 % of urban live-ins said it was the labour office while 16.7% said it was the union, with the other 50% not knowing at all. For urban live-outs, 16.7% said it was the labour office, with the other 16.7% saying it was the union and the remaining 66.7% not knowing at all. As explained in table 21, none in the rural area had any idea. This also shows that DWs know of the labour office at MLSS more than they do of the unions. In defence, the union leader (FFTUZ) said,

Despite the DWs' low literacy levels and the union's financial problems, the government has assisted in terms of carrying out campaigns, especially through public and private media, and this has made the work easier. Although the message is usually about what the minimum wage is and has nothing to do with the DWs being encouraged to be members of the union. But with assistance from ILO we carried out sensitisation campaigns on the DW minimum wage in Lusaka's Mthendere, Mandhevu, Ngómbe, Garden and Chawama, where most of the DWs reside.

Thus, the framework for internalising bargaining for domestic work seems poor at the moment due to its nature of work and the way the worker is perceived by government, civil society only makes things worse.

Table 22. Domestic worker representation

Location of DW	Type of DW	Frequency	Percent	
Urban	Live-in	Labour office	2	33.3
		Union for domestic workers	1	16.7
		Total	3	50.0
		No idea	3	50.0
		Total	6	100.0
	Live-out	Labour office	1	16.7
		Union for domestic workers	1	16.7
		Total	2	33.3
		No idea	4	66.7
		Total	6	100.0
Rural	Live-in	No idea	6	100.0
	Live-out	No idea	6	100.0

The union leader went on to state (see also Bonner and Spooner 2011: 87):

During this process the challenge we faced was that most employers did not give their workers permission to attend our events, and re-organising them is not easy due to the nature of their work, and low levels of education, and this may reduce their confidence in the union.

Even though the maid centres claim to assist and reach out to DWs, I observed that the first centre I interviewed was not honest about how much they charged DWs upon recruitment. They said they charged both the DW and the client a fee of K120. However, when I was leaving their premises I had the opportunity to give a lift to one of the DW trainees whom I asked about how she felt to be enrolled there and what fee they charged; her answer differed from the centre's for the latter question. This may question the maid centres' reliability, yet with both government intervention and regulation they are still key within this sector.

The DW said that the centre was helpful because it emphasised the client meeting the minimum wage, although they leave it open for the client to decide whether to give above the minimum or not: *"The recruitment fee is 50% of my first pay and this is too much, especially when we are asked to attend training for about two weeks requiring us to work for the maid centre's nursery school (babysitting, cleaning and any other tasks)." This is the same complaint that came from the DW FGD when I asked why some DWs felt the maid centres were not being helpful despite them helping with minimum wage compliance.*

Here, I find that despite minimum wage legislation seeming to increase DW wages, the level of non-compliance is still high, especially in rural areas. This is perhaps due to the weak institutional and legal framework surrounding this occupation, and society's perception of this occupation (female dominated). The rural DWs seem more educated than the urban ones (an anomaly), which I think is due to rural-urban migration since most would generally move for employment purposes and not education. Nevertheless, the urban DWs, especially the live-ins, seem more aware of the issues affecting them when compared with live-outs (both rural and urban); this occurs despite the latter having more free time, better wages per hour, and so on. Education and literacy seem to have less explanatory value in relation to the dynamics of bargaining, but awareness.


Within this context of constraints, what would need to be changed to provide dignity and a voice? What is needed to bring them into an equal position when bargaining (something much needed for the minimum wage to have an impact)? From the research herein we see that changing the role of maid centres could alter this. In my recommendations I suggest a model that tries to picture of a way for this sector to be formalised. I also note certain avenues through which the current situation might improve.

Chapter 6. Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Recommendations

Because of the market, civil society and government failures identified, I would like to suggest a model that shows how DWs and DWEs could be organised, with maid centres providing the focal point.

Figure 4. Suggested Model for Formalising Domestic Work



The labour movement should advocate for the government to make it mandatory that DWEs recruit their DWs from maid centres (who should be members of LEAZ) and also pay for union membership and recruitment charges through maid centres before hiring DWs. Oelz (2011: 3) also suggests that DW bargaining might be strengthened by making DW skills professional and their qualifications more recognised (also see ILO 2010: 56). I link this with my suggested model since maid centres could be the right place through which to offer such training.

When it is made mandatory that DWs are part of the maid centres – indeed with the government (regulation) making sure that DWs are no longer exploited by the centres – this will not only empower DWs, but also make it easier for the unions to increase and maintain their membership. Furthermore, they will be able to represent the DWs more effectively as the DWEs would be members of LEAZ (a member of ZFE) through maid centers. This could bring the parties closer to signing a recognition agreement since membership would exceed the required 25 plus. Bonner and Spooner (2011: 91) also stress the difficulty of organising informal workers since most of them are poor and cannot afford membership fees. The unions would also find it easier to bargain for DWs, and employers would be more accessible since they would belong to an agency that is a member of ZFE, unlike in the current situation.

Of course, there would be challenges in this model, such as the possibility of a number of maid centres becoming monopolies; DWEs not registering with maid centers and so on. However, I am confident the government could regulate this. Some DWs may still shun maid centres due to a fear of recruitment fees, but with proper awareness and government regulation this could be reduced.

Such a model would give greater protection to DWs, especially as DWEs would not have any excuse but to have signed contracts and thereby also comply with the SI on minimum wages; also make the unions financially stronger through increased membership.

6.1.1 Other recommendations

1. For the government:
 - The government should consider increasing funding to the Ministry of Labour for better implementation of its projects. The Ministry provides a huge percentage of Zambia's revenue through income tax and yet it is amongst the least funded. This is an anomaly.

- My observation is that in as much as the government is decentralising by forming more districts, this has not gone hand-in-hand with the creation of labour offices in the new districts, thus hampering the efforts of the ministry.
- Statutory Instrument Number 3 (ILO 2012c) states that a DW will not be paid her salary while on maternity leave. I think this is discriminatory and indeed, these are not the conditions that other workers are subjected to. There should be a review of this statutory instrument and the ratification of C189 should be quickened.
- If possible, the government should think about learning from countries that have made progress in this sector, such as South Africa, Uruguay and Brazil. This way they would see which policies and strategies might be made domestic and also come to know of potential and unforeseen challenges that these example countries have encountered and how they have, or intend to, overcome them.
- Another suggestion would be to tie the DW wage to hours worked to curb low pay. Written contracts stipulating not only working hours and pay but also overtime and leave, etcetera, are essential for empowering workers and informing employers (Oelz 2011: 4-7). In as much as this sounds good, especially if employment contracts are made mandatory and are adhered to, it could still prove challenging in Zambia since it is capable of generating greater strictness and/or exploitation from DWEs.
- The government should continue raising awareness through the media, especially the radio, but should also do this in rural areas. With cheap cellular phones available, it could provide a 24 hour toll-free line (in English and local languages) that DWs can access for more awareness and legal advice, if necessary (e-governance).

2. For trade unions and maid centres:

- Another strategy is that maid centres and unions should emphasise raising DWs' awareness about their working conditions. They should develop a culture of writing down the hours of overtime worked per week and have their employers sign this; that is, of course, after having agreed on such terms from the beginning. This could help DWs make DWEs accountable for the extra hours worked.
- Maid centres should realise that although they are profit oriented, the fees some of them charge make some DWs shun them, causing them to both lose out. They should therefore try to reduce the recruitment fee on the DW side so as to encourage more to join. I support this because they at least help DWs bargain for the minimum wage and ensure compliance.

- Trade unions should try to build relations with civil society in order to increase advocacy for the ratification of Conversion 189, which could be an important step in helping to review current labour laws that exclude DWs. There could be NGOs that are interested in working with DWs, so it is important to build relationships. I also believe that ZCTU and FFTUZ should try to merge the two DW unions so that they become stronger and achieve a common goal. Advocacy from such partnership and collaboration could force policy makers to amend the current legal framework.

6.2 Summary Conclusions

Despite this occupation being among the oldest in history, domestic work does not seem to be receiving the respect and recognition it deserves, both from the general public and policy makers. I have found that most DWs like their occupation, although society (structure, especially perception) seems to not respect it. However, DWs still opt for such work because they are poor, need to look after their children and are less educated. Otherwise, they would be in different occupations.

Minimum wage legislation seems to have a positive effect on DW wages, although the level of compliance is very low. This is especially true of rural areas, perhaps due to the weak institutional and legal framework surrounding this occupation, as well as society's perceptions, especially that the work is female dominated (asymmetries of power, structures are very powerful). Rural DWs seem more educated than urban ones (an anomaly), which I think is due to rural-urban migration, since most would generally move for employment purposes and not education. Nevertheless, urban DWs, especially live-ins, seem more aware of issues affecting them compared with live-outs (both rural and urban); this occurs despite the latter having more free time, better wages per hour, and so on.

Education and literacy seem to have less explanatory value in relation to the dynamics of bargaining, but awareness. It also seems that minimum wage legislation benefits urban DWs more, as I initially hypothesised. This could be due to higher awareness levels, proximity to representation and higher standards of living. There are ambiguities concerning education and literacy, since I find that rural areas seem to be doing better than their urban counterparts.

However, despite live-ins getting higher monthly wages than live-outs, I find that their hourly wages are lower than those of live-outs. Both tend to have abnormal working hours, with only a few benefitting from overtime. They have low agency and self-esteem, especially live-ins.

I have also found that the main reason why Zambia has more female DWs is because it is viewed (perception) by most as a woman's job (structure). Therefore, they are more vulnerable in domestic work. Henceforth, I recommend a model that might contribute to the formalising of the occupation. Then again, with an excess supply of DWs this reduces their bargaining with DWEs, who are less desperate since they have a better fall-back position.

I therefore feel it is difficult for minimum wage legislation to play its intended role when both the country's legal and institutional frameworks are weak. Unless this is changed, or the roles and agendas of these actors are altered (in particular, the government and the maid centres) the situation may not improve and will remain in stalemate.

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Appendices

Appendix I. Domestic Workers' Everyday Tasks

Type of DW	Location of DW		Frequency	Percent
Live-in	Urban	Cooking, sweeping, laundry, babysitting	4	66.7
		Cooking, babysitting, laundry	1	16.7
		Babysitting	1	16.7
		Total	6	100.0
	Rural	Cooking, sweeping, laundry, babysitting	3	50.0
		Cooking, laundry, sweeping, housekeeping	2	33.3
		Laundry, housekeeping, sweeping	1	16.7
		Total	6	100.0
Live-out	Urban	Cooking, sweeping, laundry, babysitting	2	33.3
		Babysitting	1	16.7
		Cooking, laundry, sweeping, housekeeping	3	50.0
		Total	6	100.0
	Rural	Cooking, sweeping, laundry, babysitting	5	83.3
		Cooking, laundry, sweeping, housekeeping	1	16.7
		Total	6	100.0

Appendix II. Domestic Worker Questionnaire

Serial number



DW Questionnaire

IDENTIFICATION	
PROVINCE: _____	PROVINCE: <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
DISTRICT: _____	DISTRICT: <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
SITE: _____	
URBAN/RURAL: _____	URBAN/RURAL
LIVE-IN/LIVE-OUT _____	(URBAN=1, RURAL=2) <input type="text"/>

(A) Background

No.	Questions and Filters	Coding Categories
101.	Sex	Male..... 1 Female..... 2
102.	How old were you on your last birthday?	Age in completed years.... <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
103.	What highest level of education have you attended?	None..... 0 Primary..... 1 Secondary..... 2 Higher..... 3
104.	Can you read and understand a letter or newspaper with ease in English or the local language?	In English..... 1 In local language..... 2 Both English and local..... 3 Not at all..... 4
105.	What is your marital status?	Single..... 1 Married..... 2 Widowed..... 3 Separated..... 4 Divorced..... 5
106.	If married, where does your spouse live?
107.	Do you/your household own the following? [Record only items which have been functioning within 6 months] Radio? Television? Mobile Phone?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>

(B) Nature of work

108	When did you become a domestic worker?
109	Why did you become one?	I am poor..... 1 I am not educated..... 2 I need to look after my children.... 3 I like it..... 4 Other..... 5
110	How long have you been a domestic worker?
111	Is this your first job?	Yes.....1 No.....2

112	If no, what other jobs have you done?	
113	Do you like being a domestic worker?	Yes.....1 No.....2	
114	Do you wish to continue being a domestic worker?	Yes.....1 No.....2	
115	If yes or no, why/why not?	
116	How do you think other people look at your occupation?	They respect it.....1 They discriminate against us...2 They look down on it.....3 Other.....4	
117	How would you describe your work?	
118	Are your tasks and hours pre-determined?	Yes.....1 No.....2	
119	If yes, can the employer change them when he/she feels like it?	Yes.....1 No.....2	
120	Do you get instructions from other family members?	Yes.....1 No.....2	
121	What time do you start and stop working?	
122	If you happen to work overtime, are you paid for it?	Yes.....1 No.....2	
123	Do you have any leave days?	Yes.....1 No.....2	
124	Are you encouraged to do any training?	Yes.....1 No.....2	
125	If yes, what?	

(C) Minimum wage awareness & representation

126	Have you ever heard of the minimum wage for domestic workers?	Yes 1 No..... 2
127	If yes, how?	Media 1

		Friends.....	2
		Relative	3
		Employer.....	4
		Other.....	5
128	What do you know about the minimum wage?	Lowest possible pay.....	1
		Highest possible pay.....	2
		Pay stipulated by law.....	3
		Other.....	4
129	Has your wage increased since the minimum wage was in effect?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
130	If yes, by how much?	
131	If no, what is the reason given?	
132	Approximately how much is your wage?	K300-K400.....	1
		K400-K500.....	2
		K500-K600.....	3
		K600-K700.....	4
		>K700.....	5
133	Do you find the minimum wage helpful to domestic workers?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
134	If yes, in what way(s)?	
135	Has there been any change in your tasks due to the minimum wage?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
136	Did you sign any contract with the employer at the beginning of your employment?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
137	Do you know who represents you?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
138	If yes, who are they?	
139	Have you ever contacted them?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2

(D) Nature of bargaining

140	Did you negotiate your wage with your employer?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
141	If yes, what factors did you consider?	Experience.....	1
		Education.....	2
		Skills.....	3
		Language.....	4
		Others.....	5
142	What was your starting point in negotiating for the wage?	K300-K400.....	1
		K400-K500.....	2
		K500-K600.....	3

		K600-K700.....	4
		>K700.....	5
143	What was your employer's starting point?	K300-K400.....	1
		K400-K500.....	2
		K500-K600.....	3
		K600-K700.....	4
		>K700.....	5
144	Do you feel the bargaining was fair?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
145	If no, why?	I was nervous.....	1
		I just needed the job.....	2
		I just accepted the employer's offer.....	3
		I was not given chance to bargain.....	4
146	Was your work experience considered in bargaining?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
147	Do you have a contract?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
148	If yes, what does it show?	Duties.....	1
		Wages.....	2
		Leave.....	3
		Hours of work.....	4
		Reasons for contract termination.....	5
		Duration.....	6
		Signatures.....	7
		Other.....	8

Appendix III. Domestic Worker Employer Questionnaire

Serial number



DWE Questionnaire

IDENTIFICATION	
PROVINCE: _____	PROVINCE: <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
DISTRICT: _____	DISTRICT: <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
SITE: _____	
URBAN/RURAL: _____	URBAN/RURAL
LIVE-IN/LIVE-OUT _____	(URBAN=1, RURAL=2)
	<input type="text"/>

(A) Background

No.	Questions and Filters	Coding Categories
101.	Sex	Male..... 1 Female..... 2
102.	How old were you on your last birthday?	Age in completed years.... <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
103.	What highest level of education have you attended?	None..... 0 Primary..... 1 Secondary..... 2 Higher..... 3
104.	Can you read and understand a letter or newspaper with ease in English or the local language?	In English..... 1 In local language..... 2 Both English and local..... 3 Not at all..... 4
105.	What is your marital status?	Single..... 1 Married..... 2 Widowed..... 3 Separated..... 4 Divorced..... 5
106.	Do you/your household own the following? [Record only items which have been functioning within 6 months] Radio? Television? Mobile Phone?	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>

(B) Nature of work

107	Why did you recruit a domestic worker?
108	How do you perceive DW?	I respect it..... 1 I discriminate against it..... 2 I look down on it.....3 I like it..... 4 Other.....5.
109	How would you describe your relationship with your DW?
110	Are their tasks and working hours pre-determined?	Yes.....1 No.....2
111	Do they get instructions from other family members?	Yes.....1 No.....2
112	If yes, can you change them	Yes.....1

	when you feel like it?	No.....	2
113	What time do they start and stop working?
114	If they happen to work overtime, are they paid for it?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
115	Do they have any leave days?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
116	Do you encourage doing any training?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
117	If yes, what?	

(C) Minimum wage awareness & representation

118	Have you ever heard of the minimum wage for domestic workers?	Yes	1
		No.....	2
119	If yes, how?	Media	1
		Friends.....	2
		Relative	3
		Employer.....	4
		Other.....	5
120	What do you know about the minimum wage?	Lowest possible pay.....	1
		Highest possible pay.....	2
		Pay stipulated by law.....	3
		Other.....	4
121	Has your DW's wage increased since the minimum wage came into effect?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
122	If yes, by how much?	
123	If no, what is the reason given?	
124	Approximately how much is your wage?	K300-K400.....	1
		K400-K500.....	2
		K500-K600.....	3
		K600-K700.....	4
		>K700.....	5
125	If yes, by how much?	
126	Do you find the minimum wage helpful for domestic workers?	Yes.....	1
		No.....	2
127	If yes, in what way(s)?	

128	Has there been any change in their tasks due to the minimum wage?	Yes.....1 No.....2
129	Did you sign any contract with the employee at the beginning of their employment?	Yes.....1 No.....2
130	Do you know who represents them?	Yes.....1 No.....2
131	If yes, who are they?
132	Have you ever contacted them?	Yes.....1 No.....2

(D) Nature of bargaining


133	Did you negotiate your DW's wage?	Yes.....1 No.....2
134	If yes, what factors did you consider?	Experience.....1 Education.....2 Skills.....3 Language.....4 Others.....5
135	What was your DW's starting point in negotiating for the wage?	K300-K400.....1 K400-K500.....2 K500-K600.....3 K600-K700.....4 >K700.....5
136	What was your starting point?	K300-K400.....1 K400-K500.....2 K500-K600.....3 K600-K700.....4 >K700.....5
137	Do you feel the bargaining was fair?	Yes.....1 No.....2
138	Was the DW's work experience considered in bargaining?	Yes.....1 No.....2
139	Do you have a contract?	Yes.....1 No.....2

140 If yes, what does it show?

Duties.....	1
Wages.....	2
Leave.....	3
Hours of work.....	4
Reasons for contract termination.....	5
Duration.....	6
Signatures.....	7
Other.....	8

Appendix IV. Map of Zambia Showing Mwense and Lusaka Districts

MAP Percentage share of population by District, Zambia



Source: CSO (2011: 7).

Note: The black arrow points to Mwense district in the north and Lusaka in the central part of the country.

Appendix V. Interview Questions for Actors in Domestic Work

Maid Centre

1. What exactly do you do?
2. What are your policies and what do you prioritise?
3. What are your objectives and strategies?
4. What efforts do you make to meet and work with DWs?
5. What are your main challenges?
6. What do you know about the minimum wage for domestic workers?
7. Has it been helpful to the domestic workers? If yes, how?
8. Do you include the minimum wage in your trainings for DWs?
9. If yes, what do you tell them about it?
10. Do you help them to have contracts, leave days and further training?
11. Do you bargain for them? Do you use the minimum wage as a ceiling or floor?

Focus Group Discussion

Domestic Worker

1. What do you know about the minimum wage for domestic workers?
2. What wage are you supposed to get?
3. Who represents you?
4. Do you negotiate your wages?
5. If yes, what strategies do you use to negotiate your wages?
6. Do you use the minimum wage as the starting or finishing point in these negotiations?
7. What else is considered when negotiating your wages?
8. How helpful has the minimum wage been to you as domestic workers?
9. Do you have contracts of employment agreed upon with your employers?
10. How detailed are they and are they adhered to?

Domestic Worker Employer

1. What do you know about the minimum wage for domestic workers?
2. What wage are DWs supposed to get?
3. Who represents them?
4. Do you negotiate for their wages?
5. If yes, what strategies do you use?
6. Do you use the minimum wage as the starting or finishing point in these negotiations?
7. What else is considered when negotiating for their wages?
8. How helpful has the minimum wage been to your domestic worker?
9. Do you have contracts of employment agreed upon with your employee?

10. How detailed are they and are they adhered to?

Zambia Congress of Trade Unions/Federation of Free Trade Unions

1. What role did you play in the minimum wage for DW policy making?
2. Who else was involved in policy making?
3. Do you have any union for domestic workers?
4. Do you think DWs need union representation?
5. If yes/no, why?
6. How do you support them?
7. Are there any NGOs you work with?
8. Do you think the minimum wage policy is helpful to domestic workers so far?
9. Have you received any complaints from employers and DWs?
10. Ratification of convention C189. What you think would be the best way of representing DW?
11. What challenges do you face in your efforts to represent DW?
12. Do DW agencies bargain well for the DW in line with the minimum wage?

United House and Domestic Workers Union of Zambia (UHDWUZ)

1. What exactly do you do?
2. What are your policies and what do you prioritise?
3. What are your objectives and strategies?
4. What efforts do you make to meet and work with DWs?
5. What are your main challenges?
6. What do you know about the minimum wage for domestic workers?
7. Has it been helpful to domestic workers? If yes, how?
8. Do you include the minimum wage in your training for DWs?
9. If yes, what do you tell them about it?

ILO

1. What role did you play in the minimum wage for DW policy making?
2. Who else was involved in policy making?
3. Do you have a union for domestic workers?
4. How do you support them?
5. Are there any NGOs you work with?
6. Do you think the minimum wage policy has been helpful to domestic workers so far?
7. Have you received any complaints from employers or DWs?

Appendix VI. Domestic Workers Order 2012 Statutory Instrument Number 45

*Supplement to the Republic of Zambia Government
Gazette dated Friday, 6th July, 2012*

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GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBIA

STATUTORY INSTRUMENT NO. 45 OF 2012

The Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment Act (Laws, Volume 15, Cap. 276)

The Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment (Domestic Workers) (Amendment) Order, 2012

IN EXERCISE of the powers contained in section *three* of the Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment Act, the following Order is hereby made:

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------|
| 1. This Order may be cited as the Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment (Domestic Workers) (Amendment) Order, 2012, and shall be read as one with the Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment (Domestic Workers) Order, 2011, in this Order referred to as the principal Order. | Title
S. I. No. 3 of
2011 |
| 2. Paragraph 5 of the principal Order is amended, in subparagraph (1), by the deletion of the words "two hundred and fifty thousand" and the substitution therefor of the words "four hundred and twenty thousand". | Amendment
of paragraph
5 |

LUSAKA
4th July, 2012
[MLSS/64/9/9]

F. SHAMENDA,
*Minister of Information,
Broadcasting and Labour*

*Copies of this Statutory Instrument can be obtained from the Government Printer,
P.O. Box 30136, 10101 Lusaka. Price K1,000 each.*