



**The Use of Facebook for Political Purposes
in Thai Politics: An Analysis of the Yingluck
Government, 2011-2013**

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Aksarapaak Samphaokaeo

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Members of the Examining Committee:

Prof. Dr. Wil Hout

Dr. Rosalba Icaza Garza

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This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

Inquiries:

Postal address:

Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands

Location:

Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands

Telephone: +31 70 426 0460

Fax: +31 70 426 0799

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List of Acronyms

ISS	Institute of Social Studies
PAD	People's Alliance for Democracy
SNS	Social Network Sites
UDD	National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship
PM	Prime Minister
NBTC	National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission

Abstract

Political turmoil and violence has been with Thailand for a decade. People are divided into political camps since 2005 and they become uncertain to discuss about politics in daily life and turn to use online social media. In light of these problems, this paper analyses how Thai use Facebook for political purposes and how it plays role in spreading hatred in Thai politics during Yingluck Shinawatra's Administration. This is to understand and analyse how Thai use Facebook for political purposes; how hatred is provoked among online users though they do not know each other before, and what will be the result of this hatred provocation. The main methodology is qualitative study using the methods of personal interviews with 45 Facebook users and the analysis of contents posted on timeline of political selected Facebook pages., the case study on the Thai PM's speech in Mongolia is brought in to exemplify how Thai use Facebook for expressing political views and how hatred is provoked on Facebook.

The analysis reveals that there are at least two main reasons that divided Thai into political camps: the political conflicts in Thailand that divided people into political camps since 2005 and the taboo in discussing some political issues in real life. This political division becomes more divided in Yingluck's government due to its policies. Therefore, people turn to use online communities to express political views. Facebook gains popularity due to its potential in facilitating political communication and participation; the success of using Facebook among Thai during the 2011 flood; the less risk in discussing politics that is sensitive and tabooed in reality; the availability of internet and low cost of multimedia mobile phones; simplicity of Facebook in using; the collection of like-minded members in the political Facebook pages. The main objectives of political Facebook pages mainly are for publicizing political views; attacking political opponents; sanctioning in online community; threatening to use violence; to mobilize people; and to reproduce political discourses. However, the results from the case study found that in expressing political views, Thai use rude and curse words which results further to the existence of hatred against the political opponents on political Facebook pages. The contents found from the case are full with the uses of hate speech which has potential in leading to violence in reality such as the exclusion, the killing or the genocide of those who are opponents based on nationality, languages, religion or political views.

Relevance to Development Studies

As there are a few studies about this in Thailand, this research is aimed to contribute more understanding on Thai politics and conflicts that lead to political division of people in online communities during the selected period of study which has potential as one of the driving forces that turns people to hate the opponents in online communities which might reflect what happens in the real world of Thai politics and causes the real hatred in offline communities.

Keywords

Facebook, Thai Politics, Social Media, Hate Speech, Political Participation

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

This research studies how Facebook is used for political purposes in Thai politics by narrowing down to during the first two years of PM Yingluck's government (8 August 2011- 30 April 2013) for the following reasons.

First, it is known that the reproduction of any information can cause people to believe such information as truth and disseminate to families, friends, colleagues from generation to generation. This is powerful especially the belief that causes hatred. The 9/11 tragedy in the United States exemplifies this very well. The reproduction of news repeatedly about the death and loss of people that caused by some extremist Muslim terrorists eventually made people around the world have negative opinions against the rest Muslim in the world. To demonstrate, in France the law was issued to prohibit all Muslim women wearing veil claiming for the human rights and the security reasons (Chaisukkosol 2011: p. 23) or the classical example of genocide the Jews propagandized by Hitler (Smith, 2011: 13, Chaisukkosol 2011: 23). Even the case of Rwanda, the reproduction of information via local radio was one of the driving force that made the Hutu genocide the Tutsi (Straus 2007: 632). Undoubtedly, the reproduction of any information can cause hatred among information consumers.

This relates to what have been happened in Thailand in this decade. People are divided into political camps clearly since 2005 after the shares selling of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra to Temasek of Singapore (Foundation for Media Literacy (Media Monitor) 2012: 2; Kummetha 2012: 50) by those who support Mr. Thaksin and those who are against him. There are the studies expose that social media, especially Facebook with the highest percentage of 21.7% (*Matichon Online*, 2012), is one of the major driving forces in dividing Thai and provoking more hatred as words used in online social media are mostly the hate speech and this hatred links to the violence in political conflicts in Thailand (Media Monitor 2012: 4, Taksinwarajan 2011: 220). I myself also experienced the treatment of each opponent against the others like they are not human, calling them with rude words, regarded them as the animals.

Thai politics has been violated and dangerous. The clashes between the opponent demonstrators and the government officers caused at least 100 dead people and a huge number of the injured, including the damage of buildings and public places (Lefevre 2012, King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI) 2012: 6). This led Thai people to become uncertain with their expression of political opinions as they cannot be sure if they are talking with the people who have same political views or not, even with the family members, friends, colleagues, or with other people that they have to interact in everyday life. The different views on politics already divides people into political camps.

Even worse, after the coup d'état in 2006, the political opinion of Thai people are divided more intensively (KPI 2012: 6, Kummetha 2012: 50). Legitimacy of the monarchical institution is questioned as accused of legitimizing

the military, combined with the existing Lese Majeste law that prohibits people to discuss about the monarchical institutions (Kummetha 2012: 50). When the people cannot talk about this in their real life, they moved to the online communities through the use of social media which is safer and less risky in getting caught (Ibid.: 54).

Plus, one of the main policies of Yingluck's government is to restore unity of Thai people from prior political turmoil. However, the implementations of the government are criticized as opposite to reconciliation especially the attempts to issue the amnesty bill to allow exiled Thaksin Shinawatra to come back to Thailand (Lefevre 2012). This even heats up more division among those who support the government and those who are against. The TV programmes, TV series that have contents attack the government (Pakorn, Asina, and Chanikarn 2013) are shut down. People cannot talk about this in their real life. The patterns of protest in Thailand has been shifted to online communities through social media first before mobilizing people to protest on street.

Besides the political situation, the popularity of using social media to express political views is popular in Thailand. The use of social media for political purposes has played role in Thai politics extensively during the flood in 2011 during the Yingluck's government. As the government failed to give reliable and updated information, people turned to use internet to find information about the flood by themselves. Facebook was one of social medias that was used as a tool to collaborate among the people (Kummetha 2012: 112; Russell 2010).

Due to the mentioned reasons, I found this is interesting and wish to understand how Thai use Facebook for political purposes, what causes people to hate against the others that much even they have never known each other before.

In this research, Facebook, as one of the social media tools, launched in 2006, is chosen because it gains popularity from people around the world use (International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 2013). For Thailand, though the total number of population is only 67 million, quite small comparing to other countries that rank top ten, Thailand ranks 13th in the world with 18.20 million users in 2013 (Ibid.) (Appendix 1) or 90.21% of 23.70 million of internet users (Truehits.net, 2013) who have Facebook accounts (Appendix 2 and 3). It can be said that Facebook plays an increasing role as a communicating channel in Thailand.

In Thailand, people access to internet not only via PC (70.9 %) but mobile device (65.9%) (Nielson, 2011: 5), and Tablets (43.3%) (Social Innovation Management and Business Analysis (SIMBA) 2012, National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) 2012: 65). The high number of internet users via mobile is possible as the price of the multimedia mobile device that capable to access internet is affordable (NBTC 2012: 70) about 5,000-10,000 Thai Baht (119 – 238 Euro) (SIMBA 2012). The number of Thai that use internet is 17 hours per week, much higher than other main medias, with 85% for emailing, using SNS for 74% and sharing contents for 69% (Nielson, 2011: 10-12).

As the advantages of social media have double-edged sword, this research pays particular attention to the uses of this space for political purposes which becomes more violent in Thai society as the words used in social media mostly

are the hate speech (Taksinwarajan 2011: 219-220, *Matichon Online* 2012; Media Monitor 2012: 1). The research aims to find out how Facebook is used for political purposes in Thailand, if it is true that it is used to provoke hatred and political divisions among Thai Facebook users; what kinds of violent words are used and what are the evidences of political divisions among Facebook users caused by the use of such hate speech during the first two years of Yingluck's administration.

1.2 Relevance and Justification

Since there are not so many researches on the use of social media for political participation in Thailand, this research is aimed to find out especially how people hate those who have different political views that much without knowing each other before. This research thus examines the behaviors of Thai in using Facebook and analyses how Facebook plays role in Thai politics and how it can be used to provoke hatred among users. This research is also aimed to contribute more understanding on Thai politics and conflicts that lead to political division of people in online communities which has potential as one of the driving forces that turns people to hate the opponents in online communities which might reflect what happens in the reality of Thai politics and causes the real hatred in offline communities.

1.3 Research question

How do Thai use Facebook for political purposes and how does this social media play role in spreading hatred in Thai politics during Yingluck Shinawatra's Administration (8 August 2011 - 30 April 2013)?

Sub-questions:

1. How social media plays roles in political communication and in political participation both online and offline? Are there any uses of social media in spreading hatred against political opponents for political communication in Thai politics? What are their importance on Thai politics in online community and in real world?
2. What causes political divisions and hatred among Thai to hate against the others that much even they have never known each other before?
3. What is the roles of Facebook in Thai politics and how Thai use it for political purposes?
4. What are the example on the use of Facebook for political purposes to spread hatred during Yingluck Shinawatra's Administration (8 August 2011 - 30 April 2013)?

1.4 Research Objective and Hypothesis

The objective of this research is to understand and analyse how Thai use Facebook for political purposes; how hatred is provoked among online users, and what will be the result of this provocation.

My hypothesis is that there are political divisions among Thai due to political conflicts. Apart from this, in using Facebook for political communication and participation, hate speech is used among Thai in discussion, propaganda, attacking the opponents, and mobilization of people. This is another driving force provoking hatred and more division among people in cyber world.

1.5 Framework of Analysis

- Social media as social space for political purposes
- Political participation and the role of social media for political participation
- Hate speeches and its reproduction through the use of social media

1.6 Research Methodology and Methods

1.6.1 Literature Review

The research applies the qualitative methodology by starting with the theoretical literature review on social media and political communication to understand what is social media and how it plays role in politics. Later, the concept of hate speech is explored to understand how it can provoke the hatred against the others. Then the exploration on the political turmoil in Thailand during the first two years of Yingluck Shinawatra's government will be examined to give the background of political problems in Thailand.

1.6.2 Analysis of Contents on Facebook Pages and Timelines

The selected Facebook page for the case of the delivering speech of PM Yingluck in Mongolia will be examined how Facebook is used by Thai Facebook users and illustrated how Facebook is used to spread hatred against the political opponents in online communities.

1.6.3 Interviews

The online interviews were conducted through the selection of 30 members of political Facebook pages (Appendix 4) from the pro and the anti-government in Thailand as they are the biggest active political movement groups that play roles in Thai politics. The random selection was done by visiting the Facebook fan pages of the pro and the anti-government ones, and observing the behaviour of some members, then followed those who left comments that show their political position. Then, private messages were sent to ask for an interview online

Another 15 interviewees (Appendix 5) using the same set of questions (Appendix 6) were selected from my Thai friends on Facebook to inquire them about their experiences on witnessing political activities on Facebook and in their real life especially those whose friends posted, shared or invited to join Facebook pages for political purposes.

The information gained from the interview is used to analyse and reflect a part of reality of what is happened in Thai politics and how Facebook as

one of social media plays role in Thai politics, as well as whether the use of Facebook is abused to provoke hatred and divides people in Thai society.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

- 1.7.1 The analysis of information on Facebook is quite difficult as it is not possible to pause and resume to do on the following days. It needs to start from the beginning again.
- 1.7.2 There are various hot issues and uncategorized posted, shared and commented on the pages; therefore, the collection of one single issue is quite difficult and takes time.
- 1.7.3 There are so many political Facebook pages that the research cannot study them all but selected only some that are registered with Facebook as political community or those that gains a huge number of fan pages.
- 1.7.4 The research can make a case only from one side of a political Facebook page in Thailand due to limitation of the size of the research paper.
- 1.7.5 The Facebook page selected for case study was shut down by the government during the analysis of research, this affects in the loss of data that successfully collected during 29-30 April 2013 from the page. Though there is a new page to replace, the numbers of fan pages has to be restarted counting which is not the same number in this research.

1.8 Outline of the Study

After this chapter, social media and theories of political communication is defined to explore how social media becomes a tool for political communication. In the last section, hate speech is examined to understand how hatred is created among online users. In chapter 3, the background of Thai politics and political conflicts are reviewed followed by the emergence of political Facebook in Thailand. In chapter 4 the general use of Facebook in Thailand is analysed from timelines of some selected pages. Chapter 5 presents a case of Facebook that is used to provoke hatred by Facebook users in the Thai societies with the evidences and processes of their uses in details from interviews and the study of contents posted on Facebook. A case of the Thai PM delivered a speech in Mongolia on 29 April 2013 is chosen to show how Facebook users response to this speech and how they used Facebook to express their opinion in favour of or against this. The last chapter is to conclude this research finding.

Chapter 2

Social media and Political Participation

In this chapter, the literature about social media and political participation will be reviewed to find out their linkages how social media enables people to engage in politics both online and offline participation. Then the exploration on benefits of social media as a tool for political communication will be presented to explain what make social media plays influential roles in political communication in online communities. After that the paper will move to answer, amidst the important roles of social media for political communication, what enable social media to become a tool in spreading hatred among online users who have different political views. The concept of hate speech will be brought in to explain the abusive use of online social space of social media for political purposes by using hate speech. After that, the potential results of using hate speech for political discussion through social media will be explored how hate speech can affect the political communication and participation of online users in online community and in real world.

2.1 Social media

Social media is defined as “a group of internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content” (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010 cited in Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan 2012: 2). It encompasses a wide range of online digital medias including websites, blogs, discussion boards, chat rooms, e-mail, and social networking sites (SNS). Social media products are numerous and varied such as MySpace, Facebook, Twitter etc; sharing sites (video sharing like YouTube); photo sharing like Flickr, Picasa; music sharing like 4shared; content sharing; blogs; business network like LinkedIn; collaborative websites like Wikipedia; commerce communities namely eBay, Amazon.com and etc. (Mangold and Faulds 2009: 358).

The immergence of social media has its root from the creation of web 2.0 in 1999 by Darcy DiNucci. Web 2.0 facilitates users to interact, communicate, upload, download information in various forms with greater appearance that much more convenient for users (Alujevic 2012: 466). Users are involved as co-producers both individuals and groups of people who are able to work in network online and through mobile media (Mascheroni 2012: 208). This links to the political ideal of active citizenship for citizens to become active agents by attracting them and widening the participation (Alujevic 2012: 466).

2.2 How is social media different from traditional media?

Social media enables the flexible networks of political organization and communication outside of traditional civil society networks and media centres and reduces the obstacles of institutional mechanisms. It also attracts different people and expands the number of members. With these new opportunities,

the old forms of political participation such as representatives or institutionalized participation has been declining while the non-institutionalized or extra-representative modes of participation has been rising significantly and becomes more individualistic and ephemeral, less elite driven, derive from lifestyle choices. (Perea, Jensen, and Jorba 2012: 5).

2.3 Political Participation

Political participation is often explained as the activities that allow individual to express their needs and desires in ways that influence the public officials and the creation of public policy (Wynyard, 2012: 8). From the observation of Van Deth, the definition of political participation falls into four assumptions, that is, political participation that involves action such as expression of interest; that is undertaken by citizens; that is undertaken freely; and that takes place in a variety of contexts and times (as cited in Ibid.). The measurement of such traditional political participation includes voting, donating, volunteering and etc which these kinds of participation is prerequisite for democracy. For effective democracy, citizens should have their involvement in politics and have equal and sufficient opportunities to influence in the political processes as well as be able to voice their needs via political talk (Barber, 1984; Berelson et al., 1954; Dahl, 1989; Habermas, 1984; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Milbrath, 1965; Putnam, 1995; 2000; Verba & Nie, 1972 as cited in Ibid.). This political conversation will help participants develop their opinion on politics and learn to exchange their views with others while listening and accepting different views of others which will lead further to become more accepting of political differences (Mutz, 2002 as cited in Ibid.).

What is more, political participation can be defined as an action by ordinary citizens directed toward influencing some political outcomes including political attitudes, learning and knowledge, instead restricting the term for active participation to situations where the goal is to influence decisions made by government bodies and/or the selection of government officials (Gustafsson 2012: 1112). The political participation should not cover only the sphere of government but private bodies (Conge 1988: 344f as cited in Ibid: 1113) and be more opened especially the new form of political participation activities emerging with the use of internet (Gustafsson 2012: 1113; Dahlgren 2009: 2-3).

In short, conventional political participation pays attention to the formal institutions and actors in the public political spheres where citizens are limited to participate in political system or can be involved only in formal forms such as voting. However, at present, the natures of political system have been changed significantly and it turns out to be that the traditional political participation is declining (Bennett, 2008; Blais et al., 2004; Delli Carpini, 2000; Harris et al., 2010; Lopez et al., 2006 as cited in Wynyard, 2012: 9). The findings about the decline of traditional political participation are worthy of attention as it proves that we should pay more attention to the non-state actors, informal institutions and other public spheres.

2.4 New Forms of Political Participation

The fact that political participation is on the decline is supported by the study of Joakim Ekman and Erik Amna (2009). The study suggests that it is time to enhance the understanding of the increasing different forms of political participation and civic engagement as citizens have become increasingly disengaged from the traditional channels of political participation (2009: 2); there is the relevance of government and politics for citizens in the modern world; there is a blurring of distinction between political and non-political activities, private and public (Ibid.: 23). Thus, it is suggested to have a new framework for analysing different forms of social engagement and political activities (Ibid.: 3). Ekman and Amna propose to cover more aspects of political activities, not just civic engagement or conventional political participation but also the involvement in society and the non-participation (Ibid.: 23). Accordingly, they categorize new typology of different forms of political participation into two forms (individual and collective) with three different political participations, that is, non-participation (disengagement) which divided into anti-political and apolitical; civil participation (latent-political) which further sub-classified into social involvement (intention) and civic engagement (action); and political participation (manifest) which includes formal political participation and activism both legal and illegal ones (Ibid.: 22) (Table 1).

Table 1: Different forms of disengagement, involvement, civic engagement and political participation in a changing world

	Non-participation (disengagement)		Civil participation (latent-political)		Political participation (manifest)		
	Active forms (antipolitical)	Passive forms (apolitical)	Social involvement (attention)	Civic engagement (action)	Formal political participation	Activism (Extra-parliamentary political participation)	
						Legal/extra parliamentary protests or actions	Illegal protests or actions
Individual forms	<i>Non-voting</i> Actively avoiding reading newspapers or watching TV when it comes to political issues <i>Avoid talking about politics</i> <i>Perceiving politics as disgusting</i> <i>Political disaffection</i>	<i>Non-voting</i> <i>Perceiving politics as uninteresting and unimportant</i> <i>Political passively</i>	<i>Taking interest in politics and society</i> <i>Perceiving politics as important</i>	<i>Writing to an editor</i> <i>Giving money to charity</i> <i>Discussing politics and societal issues, with friends or on the internet</i> <i>Reading newspapers and watching TV when it comes to political issues</i> Recycling	Voting in elections and referenda <i>Deliberate acts of non-voting or blank voting</i> <i>Contacting political representatives or civil servants</i> Running for or holding public office Donating money to political parties or organizations	<i>Boycotting and political consumption</i> <i>Signing petitions</i> <i>Handing out political leaflets</i>	<i>Civil disobedience</i> <i>Politically motivated attacks on property</i>
Collective forms	<i>Deliberate non-political lifestyles, e.g. hedonism, consumerism</i> In extreme cases: random acts of non-political violence (riots), reflecting frustration, alienation or social exclusion	“Non-reflected” non-political lifestyles	<i>Belonging to a group with a certain ideology and/ or party</i> <i>Life-style related involvement: music, group identity, clothes etc.</i>	<i>Volunteering in social work, e.g. to support women’s shelter or to help homeless people</i> Charity work <i>Activity within community based organizations</i>	<i>Being a member of a political party, an organization or a trade union</i> Activity within a party, an organization or a trade union (voluntary work or attend meetings)	<i>Involvement in new social movements or forums</i> <i>Demonstrating, participating in strikes, protests and other actions</i>	Civil disobedience actions Sabotaging or obstructing roads and railways <i>Squatting buildings</i> <i>Participating in violent demonstrations</i> <i>Violence confrontations with political opponents or the police</i>

Note: The usage of social media for political participation in this table is in italic.

Source: edited from “Typology of different forms of disengagement, involvement, civic engagement and political participation,” in “Political Participation and Civic Engagement: Towards a New Typology,” (Ekman and Amna 2009: 22)

The meaning that this research paper will use is the political participation as redefined by Ekman and Amna which the use of social media as a tool for political participation is included and well explained as a new forms of political participation in a changing world as exemplified in *italic* in Table 1.

2.5 Social media as a tool for political participation

The internet and social networking is playing a crucial role in nurturing and enabling democratization in many part of the world such as in Tunisia, Egypt, China or political mobilization in many areas such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Myanmar, Iran or Malaysia (Abbot 2012: 334). This means democratization is not only the process of political transition and regime transformation but a process in which the aggregation of public opinion serves to challenge and level existing hierarchies which results in the emergence of an online space where citizens can exchange their views. This space is resemble to what Habermas characterizes about a public sphere which is a disregard for status; a domain of common concern; and inclusivity (Ibid: 334). With the advantages of social media as a tool in political participation, it can be concluded that social and political reform or revolution cannot occur without the internet and social networking (Ibid: 334).

Some studies about the use of social media as a tool for political participation includes the research of Pew Internet and American Life Project in 2008 which finds that ‘political engagement on blogs and social networking sites clearly overcomes the historical underrepresentation of younger citizens with respect to political activity’ (Gustafsson 2012: 1113); the study of Zhang et al. (2010) in United States which concludes that using social networking sites has a positive effect on civic participation (Ibid.: 1113); or the study of Park et al. (2009) on Texan students which finds that using Facebook for political purposes is positively correlated with political participation offline (Ibid.: 1113).

2.6 How does social media promote political participation?

Firstly, the expression of speech on politics can be done online with less barriers than in real life. This encourages the users to exercise expressing their voice and political participation in real life (Media Monitor 2012: 24) such as monitoring the work of the government or showing the positions in favor or against to the government’s policies in cyber world. This can affect the decision of the government (Ibid: p. 23).

Plus, offline political participation can be promoted with the help of social media (Mascheroni 2012: 221); for example, in Italy, the involvement in Facebook groups requires the development of collective identities that are embedded in offline practices and places (Ibid: 221) or the case of Arab Spring that people came out to rally against the government through Twitter (Abbot 2012: 335).

Besides, social media can attract those previously less active members (Cantijoch 2012: 118) by democratizing the public sphere (Abbot 2012: 334, Dahlgren 2009: 2-3), increasing users’ base (Dahlgren 2009: 3) and facilitating

the development of horizontal political networks (Perea, Jensen, and Jorba 2012: 5) which further allows for grassroots processes (Ibid: 6).

Social media also has potential in collaborating the mass of individuals and groups who become the source of new innovations and ideas in democratic practices as social media technologies give way to users in the co-construction manners not just one way communication like before. (Charles Leadbeater 2008 as cited in Loader and Mercea 2012: 3)

Moreover, social media opens and requires political institutions to integrate digital media into governance practices and service provision (Perea, Jensen, and Jorba 2012: 6). Thus, it lowers barriers to access the information of the state (Dahlgren 2009: 2-3). It is more difficult for government to restrict the use of social media of its citizens as social media can be accessed through internet which is broadly provided by computers or mobile phone (Abbot 2012: 335). This allows citizens to monitor the state easier and more actively, not just the consumers of the information provided by the state but the producers of information by their own like in the case of Myanmar in 2007 or Arab Spring in 2011 (Ibid.: 335).

2. 7 Who are active on social media for political participation?

The most active political users on social media are found to be those who are social movement activists, politicians, party workers and those who are already fully committed to political causes (Loader and Mercea 2011: 4; Perea, Jensen, and Jorba 2012: 7) as well as the youth as they tend to use more digital media in multiple ways of life including politics (Ibid).

However, it should be noted that the use of digital media for political participation depends on various factors of the users namely the familiarity, the skills in using digital media, the motivations like political interests, the accessibility to internet (Ibid: 6), and the development of digital media (Ibid: 7).

2. 8 Observations on using new online social media in political participation

Though it encourages people to engage more in politics, there are some issues that should be noted.

First, it can disconnect people from traditional politics (Alujevic 2012: 466) with the rise of new practices of citizenship online. This causes the shifts in the networked character of society, the development of personalised, ego-centred communities which find a material support in online and mobile technologies. The relationship among members will be more privatised and will generate contradictory outcomes (Ibid).

Secondly, the internet-enhanced politics may only improve democratic participation at the centre but not to the periphery and this cause digital divide as the online political participation depends on the income, education, age, race and predisposition to participate in the real world politics (Davis 2010: 747). Plus, those who already engaged is becoming denser, more pluralistic and in-

clusive while those unengaged become exclusive and experience increasing disengagement (Ibid.).

Thirdly, as online communities provide opportunities for users to express free speeches with less barriers than in real world politics. This can cause the use of free expression without recognizing the limitation of the rights in expression; for example, some free speech that online users talk in online community may violate others' rights such as destroying someone's dignity or image, by using rude words against others, by accusing someone. Therefore, from free speech, it becomes hate speech. Plus, sharing opinions in the subscribed online communities where there are only those who have similar opinions encourages those online users to participate more especially if they gain positive feedbacks from the group members. The users may misunderstand that their opinions are right and justified to say so and publicize further. This is important as there are no one that can actually control the conversation in the online communities which are unlimited. Too much openness of free speech on online communities makes it difficult to control (Kummetha 2012: 50).

2.9 Hate Speech

After reviewing about the contents found on social media in Thailand, the research finds there are the hatred originated among the online users as there are the use of hate speech (Media Monitor 2012: 4).

According to the study on "the Use of Hate Speech in Websites and Satellite TV in Thai Politics", hate speech is defined as, "words that threaten to incite 'imminent unlawful action,' which may be criminalized without violating the First Amendment" and "speech that creates a climate of hate or prejudice, which may in turn foster the commission of hate crimes" (National Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA), United States Department of Commerce as cited in Media Monitor 2012: 4). It also explained as any expression such as words, photos, gestures (Ibid: 23) against individual or groups of people based on nationalities, beliefs, genders, cultures, political beliefs and this expression is aimed to provoke hatred against such individuals or groups of people by using rude or curse words such as defamation, destroying images of people, dehumanizing, violating human rights (Ibid: 10). This study puts an observation that the problem on the use of hate speech rises from the advantage of free speech and hate speech as they are problematic, complicated, and sensitive in being controlled. This is because hate speech is used under the umbrella of human rights in expressing free speech; thus, controlling hate speech unavoidably affects human rights of people (British Institute of Human Rights as cited in Ibid: 4). As a result, the boundary of free speech and hate speech is based on the law of each country (Ibid:7).

After this report, there are at least four factors that facilitate the use of hate speech in the society, that is, the society that has a lot of divisions of people; the society that faces with crisis that never faced before in the history; the sudden and unavoidable changes of culture in the society. All of these factors will lead people to be uncertain about their life security and with the spreading of hate speech, the society has high risk to become more divided or even collapsed (Ibid: 10).

2.10 Hate Speech in Thailand

Hate speech in Thailand can be divided into two categories according to the Thai constitution, that is, the speeches that violate the stability of the state and the speeches that violate the rights, the dignity of individuals or groups of people (Pornson Liengboonlertchai as cited in Media Monitor 2012: 7).

In analysing how hate speech is used on the selected case, the research applies similar method adopted from the study on “the Use of Hate Speech in Websites and Satellite TV in Thai Politics,” as it examines the causes of hatred among Thai people on politics in online community which the report found that it is due to the use of hate speech on social media. In this report, hate speech is defined, categorised comprehensively into 3 sub-categories as follows (Media Monitor) 2012: 10):

1. Dehumanizing by regarding human as disgusting, inferior, compare them with animals such as crock coach; buffaloes or lizards
2. Devaluating human value of the opposite side such as regarding them as slaves; regarding as non-human: ghosts; and discriminating such as the origin of birth or defaming as brutal/cruel, hellish, foolish, ignorant, deceitful, selfish, coward, thieving, disgusting, insane, crazy, and shameless
3. Using contents to stimulate the violence: the contents of languages that aim to stimulate the violence such as threatening, agitating, provocative, stimulating

2.11 How are these concepts relevant to the research paper?

The concepts of social media and the political participation are significantly relevant to this research paper which deals directly with the use of Facebook as one of social medias for engaging people in political activities. Understanding what is social media and how social media plays roles in everyday life of people as well as how it connects people with political participation is a foundation for further understanding the new forms of political participation outside the conventional political system in these days. What is more, the reviewed literatures explain the importance and influences of social media as a tool for communicating among people and political agents to take part in political participation. Although there are few of literatures reveals the drawbacks of social media in political participation, this research paper is conducted to find out about that especially how social media affects the exiting conflicts in Thai politics. This is because this research observes that the advantages of social media have double-edged sword, the overwhelming and abusive uses of social space for free speech and for political purposes which becomes more violent in Thai society and turns free speech into hate speech will be paid more attention.

After the literature review, there are some points that this research should take into consideration to answer the main research question such as the issue about the use of social media for political purposes; the use of hate speech; the digital divide in Thailand; the online participants; the formation in the real world; and how social media plays role in Thailand.

Chapter 3

Historical Background of Thai Politics and Background of Political Conflicts

This chapter is to explain what causes political division and hatred among Thai though they have never known each other before. The historical background of Thai politics and conflicts will be explored first to understand the existing conflicts in Thailand and the roots of problems. The exploration of divided people in Thai politics will also be presented to support one of the hypothesises that there is the existence of the political division among Thai people. The importance of the Yingluck's administration will be justified why it is suitable to study and how social media plays roles in political communication and participation in her period.

3.1 A Brief Historical Background of Thai Politics

Siam (the former name of Thailand before 1939) was ruled by the absolute monarchical regime since the 13th century (Cavendish 1999). The monarchy especially the kings played important roles in developing the nation, maintaining the sovereignty of the kingdom from the neighbouring invaders. The most outstanding role of the kings in the history included the protection of the kingdom from being colonized by the British and French colonisation during 19th century which made Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that was not colonized, and emerged as one of Southeast Asia's most modern nations (Paireepairit 2012: 7). With this long existence of the monarchical regime, Thai people have been familiar with this ruling system and worshiped the kings as a living god.

3.1.1 From Absolute Monarchy to Constitutional Monarchy: The Changes of Thai Politics in 1932

However, on June 24, 1932, there was the bloodless revolution known as Siamese Revolution, led by *Khana Ratsadon* (People's Party), a group of militarists and a group of bureaucrats who graduated from Europe, mostly from France, adopted the westernized ideas about democracy to be applied in Siam. This revolution turned Siam into democratized country, changing from absolute monarchical regime which lasted for almost 700 years of Siamese history to a constitutional monarchy. The country was introduced with the democratic system. The first written constitution was issued with the king as the head of state and the limited power and a prime minister as the head of government (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 14).

During this earliest of democratic government, there was an attempt of the royalist to make a rebellion in 1934 but failed. This unsuccessful coup d'état worsened the relationship between the king and the government as the government understood that the king tried to get the power back from the government. This led to the abdication from the throne of King Prajadhipok (King Rama VII of Chakri Dynasty) in the following year and marked the beginning of the King Ananda Mahidol (King Rama VIII) (Ibid).

Though the country entered the democratic system, Siam struggled with its practices as there were different understandings and interpretations of democratic system between the leaders of the *Khana Ratsadon* group, Mr. Pridi Phanomyong, a leader from bureaucrat side who believes democracy should be based on laws and constitution; and then-Lieutenant Colonel Plaek Khittasangkha, a leader from military side, who supported fascism and nationalism (Ibid: 13). This later led to the friction among the Thai leaders from the *Khana Ratsadon* group during the World War II (Ibid: 14).

3.1.2 The Relationships between the Monarchy and the Government

When Mr. Phibunsongkhram became a Prime Minister in 1939. He launched a series of nationalist policies to modernize the country including changing the name of country from Siam to Thailand. The power of the king was limited, the royal activities and the photos of the king also were banned (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 14-15). The relationship between the monarchical institution and the government was in the worse situation and the country was governed by the military dictatorship more than democratic system.

3.1.3 Thailand under the Military Regime (1957-1973)

Mr. Phibunsongkhram's government was ended by the coup d'état led by Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 80). During the military regime, under the government of the royalist militarists, Thailand, for almost 16 years, between 1957 and 1973, had been ruled by the militarists who were an alliance with the royal family and was under the absolute authoritarianism (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 14-15) of the belief in democracy in Thai styles, that is, the ruler should be the king, who possesses the special characteristics and fortune. Mr. Sarit also used the monarchical institution as a symbol for unity of the nation.

3.1.4 The Relationships between Monarchy and Military

Consequently, the king's power which was suppressed since the 1932 coup was gradually revitalized, the royal activities, the royal visits to rural areas in the country, and the royal visit to foreign countries were supported and promoted by the government. A lot of traditional royal activities were reactivated to perform to rehabilitate the monarchical institution (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 82). At the same time, the royal family with the support from the militarist government, played roles in uplifting the better quality of life of the people in the rural and remote areas and initiating more development works to help the poor farmers (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 82). This enabled the royal family gained highly respect from Thai people.

During those long years under the authoritarian regime, it is clear that the roles of army was very influential to Thai politics, thus the army and the politics were really close. Thai people got used to have a government under the military regime or having militarists as politicians. As they feel that military protects the monarchical institution. Apart from that, the army initiated to revive the relationship with the bureaucrats by using the National Defence College as a tool to connect the high level of bureaucrats and the army (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 64-65).

However, the authoritarian regime was ended by the bloodshed democracy movement in 1973 led by university students who were against the military junta (Paireepairit 2012: 8) that led the country to become Americanized, allowing the United States to use the military bases in Thailand to attack Vietnam to get money from the United States. Moreover, the rapid economic development and the imbalance of economic distribution provoked various social problems and the feeling of inequity among the poor. Accordingly, these people together with the university students cooperated to topple the government which finally succeeded in October 1973 (Morell and Samudavanija 1981: 99). These students were mainly from Bangkok and some of them play significant roles in Thai politics in the following period (Ibid: 150).

3.1.5 The Return of Democracy

After the fall of the military from power in 1973, Thailand had a lot of reforms such as the restructuring of politics; the absence of the military leaders; the roles of the king; the new student elements in politics; the drafting of constitution (Ibid: 99). Although it took several years for this process, but the reform has led Thailand to enter the fully democratic for some time.

Thailand became fully democratic in 1988 under the government of General Prem Tinasulanonda, an army chief who was close to the royal family, whose his government lasted for 8 years (1980-1988). However, the peaceful democratic period was interrupted by another coup in 1991. Then, there was the bloodshed Black May incident in 1992, finally the military leader stepped out from political position and Thailand has entered a peaceful democratic period once again (Paireepairit 2012: 8)

3.1.6 The Monarchical Institution and Thai Political Conflicts

In the work of Paireepairit, democratic landscape in Thailand was described as the fights among the three factions of the royalists, the pro-democracy *Khana Ratsadon* group; and the military (2012: 8). The pro-democracy was ousted by the royalist military, then the military itself lost its power in 1992. The royalists reacquired their influence but only with limited power under the constitutional monarchy system (Ibid: 8).

However, David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija criticized the role of monarchical institution in explicitly involving in political turmoil. According to these authors, the king is not just apolitical figurehead but always behind the scenes of the military groups. What's more, in 1973, the king, in order to end the upcoming violence, intervened in political turmoil and this was criticized about the role of the king that is beyond the constitution (Morell and Samudavanija 1981: 271-272).

Morell and Samudavanija further argued that the king never led requested or received opinions from other movement groups such as the student reform group leaders or the farmer leaders such as during the violence of October 1976 as the palace was afraid that the reformers which included the student and the farmer groups would turn to communism which was considered a threat to the country at that time. Accordingly, most of the messages

that the king got are from those who are close to him who were mainly royalist bureaucrats, military, and privy councillor (1981: 272).

3.2 New Page of Thai Politics: Thaksin's Period

After the Siamese revolution in 1932, Thailand's democracy was full of ups and downs, after a brief period of the democratic reform in 1932, the country was ruled under the 20 military coups, 18 constitutions and 27 prime ministers most of whom were military generals (Schmidt 2011: 321). Contrary to this, Thailand in 2001 experienced the changes in democracy and in the characteristics of the country leaders from military to a billionaire typhoon whose populism policies attract a huge number of Thai people especially the poor and the middle class.

Thaksin Shinawatra, a former policeman and successful businessman, entered Thai politics in 1994. He was a member of parliament for the *Phalang Dharma* Party and became Foreign Minister and later Deputy Prime Minister during the Democrat Party's coalition government (Paireepairit 2012: 10). After the financial crisis in 1997, Thaksin resigned from *Phalang Dharma* Party and formed his own political party named *Thai Rak Thai* Party (TRT) in 1998. The opening of his political party marked the history of Thai politics since it was the first time in Thailand that a political party collected a large number of outstanding scholars and successful businessmen in the political party (Paireepairit 2012: 10) with less involvement with the military.

The most superbly prominent characteristics of the TRT party were the policies that emphasized to help the poor by providing healthcare reform, education loaning and scholarship, and funding local economic sectors (Paireepairit 2012: 10). With these appealing and convincing policies, the image of Thaksin as a successful businessman who promised to bring the better life to the people based on his success in business, TRT party won a landslide election in 2001 and became the government with Thaksin Shinawatra as the prime minister.

During the Thaksin's administration, the economy of the country started to recover from the financial crisis as Thaksin launched a lot of economic policies to drive the economic growth both internally through the populist policies (Paireepairit 2012: 10) and externally through the initiatives of setting up free trade areas with various counterparts in the world. As a result, Thaksin's government gained acceptance from people especially the poor in the rural areas. Thaksin's government is the first elected one in Thai politics that completed four-year term and won three elections in a row (2001, 2005, and 2006) with the majority of the seats in parliament in Thai history (Paireepairit 2012: 10)

3.3 The Emergence of the Yellow Shirts

However, Thaksin's government was criticised for various accusations especially the enormous corruption and a plan to change the country into a republican country (Paireepairit 2012: 11) which means the monarchical institution will not exist in the new regime anymore. The end of Thaksin's government was in 2006 when he sold the shares in Shin Corporation for 1,487,740,000 shares (49.595% of the whole shares), a share for 49.25 Thai Baht (1.02 Euro, 1 Euro

is 48.12 Thai Baht as of the date of selling, 23 January 2006), totally for 73,271,200,910 Thai Baht (1,522,676,661 Euro) to Temasek Holdings which is the national company of Singaporean. This provoked a huge critique that he sold the national asset to other country. Even worse, his deal was tax-free under the new market regulation but for many Thai people (Ibid: 11), Thaksin was accused of planning to do this by amending the market regulation on 20 January 2006, just three days before the date of selling on 23 January 2006 to avoid paying tax. This became the turning point of Thaksin's popularity. The media especially the ones that are nationalist and conservative heavily attacked him about this and forced him to resign from the position. Finally, Thaksin decided to dissolve the parliament on 24 February 2006 (Ibid: 11).

The campaign against Thaksin started in 2005 led by a media tycoon Sondhi Limthongkul from the Manager Group which is the company that produces mass media like newspapers, TV and radio programmes. Sondhi used all channels of media that he owns to publicize the scandalous corruption of Thaksin and gained a huge number of supporters. As a result, a TV programme of Sondhi was removed from the national channel by Thaksin's government. Sondhi then alternated to organize his mobile TV programme on street and on air using cable network and changed the places of organizing from times to times. The programme was supported by a great number of people especially the royalist as Sondhi also attacked Thaksin about the plan to change the country to be republican without monarchical institution. This mobile TV programme became famous and gained morally and financially supported from a lot of people and finally changed to form the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) as a movement against Thaksin (Ibid: 11). The movement was participated by people from all walks of life especially the middle class, the pensioners, and people in Bangkok and in other provinces. PAD used yellow as the colour to gather people as it is the colour on king's birthday. In later years, the palace avoided the use of yellow to prevent the misunderstanding that the palace support the PAD and the king himself changed his dress code to pink instead (Ibid: 12).

Political Position of the Yellow Shirts

The Yellow Shirts suggested the ideology of the "New Politics". The "New Politics" is based on elite (monarchical institutions, privy councillors, bureaucrats, and others as elements of society that will be honest to the country and loyalty to the monarchical institution (Ibid: 12).

3.4 The 2006 Coup D'état

On 20 September 2006, the PAD called its supporters for a big rally while Thaksin was at the United Nations in New York. According to the National Intelligence Agency of Thailand, there was an attempt of a group of people who supported Thaksin to come out on the same day as PAD and, there may have a clash between the two opposite sides that would cause a lot of death and casualties. Accordingly, the military calling themselves the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR) led by Army Chief General Sonthi Boonyaratglin made a bloodless coup d'état on 19 September 2006 accusing the Thaksin's government on corruption; capital cronyism; abuse of power; as well as the

behaviours and policies of the government that challenged the traditional practices of Thai politicians (Bunyavejchewin, 2011: 49). The coup was supported by some scholars, the middle class people and major Thai media, including the PAD which played an important role in publicizing the appropriate reasons for making coup d'état (Schmidt 2011: 327).

After the coup d'état, Thailand was ruled under the temporary government. The header of the coup d'état invited General Surayud Chulanont, former Army Chief and Privy Councillor to the king, to become a prime minister to gain acceptance from people with his royalist image and good background. The acceptance to become a prime minister of General Surayud was also criticized as the acknowledgement of the palace for the coup d'état as he had to ask for resigning from the position of Privy Councillor from the king first. This has created the sense that the palace cycle, through the privy council's actions (Schmidt 2011: 327), has been dragged into politics and become both solutions and problems in the current conflicts in Thai politics (Bunyavejchewin, 2011: 49; Thongchai 2006; Ukrist 2007; Hewison 2008: 200; Thompson 2008 cited in Schmidt 2011: 324).

On these grounds, Schmidt summarized about Thai politics after Thaksin's premiership that Thai politics after Thaksin's government led to the conflicts between the Red and the Yellow shirts within elite, civil society and bureaucracy (Schmidt 2011: 322).

3.5 The Emergence of the Red Shirts

After the new 2007 constitution was passed by the referendum approval, the Surayud's government dissolved the parliament in January 2008 to have a general election according to the democratic regime. The Democrat party gained support from other political parties to form the coalition government with Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva as the prime minister.

The formation of the pro-Thaksin movement or the so-called Red Shirts originated after the order of the court to dissolve the Thai Rak Thai party of Mr. Thaksin. The movement of this group was highly intensified after the coup d'état in September 2006. The group called themselves the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) (Schmidt 2011: 322) targeted what they regarded illegal and military installed democrat led coalition government of the Abhisit's Government (Schmidt 2011: 322). In driving its supporters, the UDD uses red as its symbolic colour, publicized its activities via TV programmes, Truth Today, through cable network (*The Nation*, 22 March 2010). The UDD is composed of mostly rural people from the Northeast and the North regions of Thailand, of urban lower classes from Bangkok and of some intellectuals, and the elites in Central region, and those who are against the Yellow Shirts and the Democrat Party (IRIN 19 May 2010).

The movement receives support from former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatt who regularly phoned in to give moral support to the group. (NBC News.com 14 April 2009). The UDD called its supporters for a large number of people to rally against the Abhisit's Government for 6 times in 2010 and in May 2010, it led people to fight with the Army, resulting in 91 death and 2000 injured (Schmidt 2011: 322) According to Schmidt's observation, the bloodshed demonstration of the Red Shirts in May 2010 and the establishment of

the Democrat coalition government was the outcome of the military in 2006 which is important to understand the connected and causes of these events. (Schmidt 2011: 327).

Political Position of the Red Shirts

The formation of the Red Shirts was originated to change the economic and social structure of Thai society especially in the rural areas. For the Red Shirts, the revolution of the country should start at the structure of economy and society, in particular the poverty problems. The Red Shirts do not pay attention to the army, courts, privy councillor or the power of the king under the monarchical institution (U-Chain Chiangsaen 2010).

3.6 The Power Transformation to Yingluck

Yingluck Shinawatra is a daughter of a former member of parliament for Chiang Mai (*The Economist* 15 June 2011) and a sister of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra. She grew up in a province in the North of Thailand. She graduated with a BA in Political Sciences and MBA in Management Information Systems. Her career started as a managing position at her family company and finally became the CEO of Advanced Info Service (AIS), which is Thailand's largest mobile phone operator (*Bangkok Post* 16 June 2011). During the time of Mr. Thaksin sold the shares to Temasek Holdings, Yingluck was investigated by Thailand's Securities and Exchange Commission about the possible insider trading. This is because she sold shares of her stock prior to the sale of the Shin Corporation to Temasek Holdings as well (Srimalee 2007).

After the People's Power party was dissolved and the executive board was banned from political activity for five years by the Constitutional Court on 2 December 2008 (*AFP* 2008), the party formed the Pheu Thai Party with Yingluck as the top candidate under the party list system (*Matichon Online* 2011).

Though Yingluck denied to become the party leader, she finally accepted to the position on 28 January 2011 and gained votes from the party to be the top candidate under the party list system which means if the party wins the election, she will become the prime minister. As Yingluck is one of Thaksin's siblings who entered politics without prior professional background on politics after her brother was ousted of the country, she has been criticized as nominee of Thaksin since then (*Bangkok Post* 2011).

As Thailand faced with political crisis since 2008, Yingluck's main campaign thus put an emphasis on the reconciliation. Absolutely, another proposal of her campaign was a general amnesty for all political incidents that took place since the 2006 coup including the coup, the banning of Thai Rak Thai and People's Power Party leaders, the seizures of Government House and Don Muang and Suvarnabhumi Airports by the PAD, and the conviction of Thaksin Shinawatra for abuse of power (*Xin Hua* 2011). This was attacked by the then government as it means to give amnesty to Thaksin and the return to him of the 46 billion Thai Baht (1,025,402,004.19 Euro) that had been seized by the government as a penalty (Ibid.).

Finally, after the general election held in early of 2011, Pheu Thai won 265 seats out of 500-seat parliament.[31] and can form a coalition with other small parties, giving her a total of 300 seats with Yingluck as prime minister (*BBC News* 2011)

However, there was an investigation on Yingluck's bank accounts before she entered politics according to the accusation of the Abhisit government that she funded the Red Shirts protesters in 2010 to overthrow the monarchy. The accusation was based on the finding of the Department for Special Investigation that there was 150 million Thai Baht (3,495,688.65 Euro, 1 Euro is 42.91 THB as of 28 April 2010) was deposited into one of her accounts while 166 million Thai Baht (3,868,562.11 Euro) was withdrawn during the demonstration period. On 28 April 2010, 144 million Thai Baht (3,355,861.10 Euro) was withdrawn (*Post Today* 2010).

3.7 The Clash between the Yellow and the Red Shirts: The Two Main Divided Groups

The clashes between the UDD supporters and the PAD's took place from time to time. For example, the attack of a PAD rally in Udon Thani in July 2008 caused injury to several PAD supporters or the meeting of the PAD members in Chiangmai was also aggravated by the UDD (Nirmal 2008).

The conflicts between the UDD and the PAD were worsened on 2 September 2008 when the UDD demonstrators moved to attack the PAD supporters at the latter base, left injured on both and a dead on UDD. The government under the new constitution 2007, within five years (2007-2011) Thailand had four prime ministers, not single government could control the violence and the clash between these two opposite sides. Sometimes, the army was asked to temporarily control the situation by stopping the clash between the two (Ibid.).

Now, the present government under the premiership of Mrs. Yingluck Shinawatra (2011 – present), the conflicts among people in Thai politics still exists obviously. The Yellow Shirts transformed into the anti-government group while the Red Shirts became the Pro-government group. The patterns of attacking are more various, not only demonstration on street but more on mass media and social media such as websites, social media networks like Facebook, twitter, YouTube and many others.

3.8 The Importance of Yingluck's administration and the Use of Facebook for Political Purposes

This research chooses to study Yingluck's government for the following reasons.

First of all, it is crucial to recognize that after a decade of political turmoil in Thailand with at least 100 dead and a huge number of the injured, the damage of buildings and public places (Lefevre 2012, KPI 2012: 6), led Thai people to become uncertain with their expression of political opinions as they cannot be sure if they are talking with the people who have same views or not,

even with the family members and among friends. The different views on politics already divides people into political camps.

Moreover, Yingluck's government comes from the general election after the coup d'état in 2006 during which the freedom in expression of Thai people were more limited. Her government promised to bring back the unity of Thai people after a decade of political turmoil that provoked death and injuries to a lot of Thai people. However, the actions of the government is criticized as opposite to reconciliation as the government attempts to issue the amnesty law to allowing exiled Thaksin Shinawatra to come home (Lefevre 2012).

At the same time, during her administration, social media has been used as a tool for political mobilization which can be seen from the creation of various Facebook pages for political purposes which mostly were in the late 2010 (during the preparation for general election) and the early 2011 onwards. As internet is popularly used to express political opinion, the government shut down those that are against the government; for example, some websites, removing TV programme, or even threatening to check the conversations of people on the application of the smartphone such as Line (Pakorn, Asina, and Chanikarn 2013).

Consequently, when the people cannot talk about the politics in their real life, they turn to express in the online communities through the use of social media as it is safer and less risky to get caught (Kummetha 2012: 54) by law. There are more than 1,000 political Facebook pages in Thailand (Taksinwarajan 2011: 219). The opinions about politics shared on Facebook in Thailand is exposed to be tensed and mostly rude with the contents aimed to stimulate hatred against the opponents (Chaisukkosol 2011: 24). Accordingly, this research is put an emphasis to examine more about this if it leads to the division among Thai Facebook users during the first two years of Yingluck's Administration.

To conclude, political divisions in Thai politics originate from the political conflicts in Thai politics. These divisions divide people against each other and at the same time the clash between the opponents reveals the hatred that exists in Thai society. The transformation of power from Mr. Thaksin to Ms. Yingluck and her government's policies in bringing back Mr. Thaksin provokes more intense of hatred among the opponents. The discussion about political conflicts is less safe in everyday life. As a result, this opens the door to the use of Facebook as alternative political communication and participation in online communities.

Chapter 4

The Role of Facebook in Thai Politics: the Findings from Research

Chapter four is still aimed to answer the sub question about what causes political division and hatred among Thai to hate against the others that much even they have never known each other before by literature review; studying content on timelines of political Facebook pages with the captured pictures from Facebook pages to demonstrate the finding; and through personal interviews.

The first part in this chapter is to explain how Facebook becomes engaged in Thai politics. Several selected political Facebook pages that are registered as political communities in Thailand will be explored such as their names; the number of Fan pages; and the objectives of pages' creation. Then the process of using Facebook of Thai users will be explained in details by using the information gains from 45 interviewees. After the analysis on the content of Facebook timeline and the interview, the paper will reveal if there are any opponent political groups of Facebook pages and users. The exploration on how the interviewees become engaged in political Facebook pages will be presented and explored if they are on any political sides. In this part, the emphasis will place on the analysis of contents found on the pages' timeline by examining if there are any use of hate speech. The finding about hate speech will serve as the introduction to the following chapter to support the main question of research about how Facebook users who have different political views use Facebook and how hatred is originated among the opponents.

4.1 How Facebook plays role in Thai politics?

In Thai society at present, the emergence of online communities and the expression of opinions through social media does not only bring about the interaction among people on online communities but also offline ones (Kummetha 2012: 122). It is important to note and accept that the boundary between online and offline communities cannot be clearly separated. What happens in the online communities mostly come from the reality of the society. For this reason, only online communities themselves cannot exist but they are mirrors that reflect the on-going events in society in the reality one or the offline communities (Chuwat, 2554: 136).

In fact, main media in Thailand is not tabooed except for the Lese Majeste law (Paireepairit 2012: 33; Kummetha 2012: 50). However, it is indirectly controlled as the broadcasting controlling by the government agencies while the printing media is mostly dominated by some large corporates that also own TV and radio programmes including magazine publishing (Paireepairit 2012: 14 and 33). As a result, whenever, there is a change in political power, the control of media will be changed to the leader too (Ibid.: 33). Accordingly, online communities gain interest from online users. To be exact, the use of social media in Thailand was highly boomed among Thai politics after the inspiration of the successful election of Obama in 2008 (Ibid.: 37). In 2009-2010, there were some Thai politicians joined more social media. At the same time,

during the 2010 protests between May and March in Thailand, the trend of citizen journalism was created to report live situation from the frontline of the protests (Ibid.: 43). Together with the huge flood in 2011, the use of Facebook and Twitter proved to be successful in giving information and provide help among the sufferers (Kummetha 2012: 122; Russell 2010). Social media is therefore become really famous in Thailand.

From the research, it is also found that several opinions and campaigns on social media lead to the gathering of people in various patterns according to their tactics and objectives such as flash mob which is the collection of people to conduct some activities in public and will be separated after the mission completes. The objectives may be various such as for entertainment, advertisement, or expression of political opinions. All of these firstly are based on like-minded opinions they express through social media in online communities. There are a lot of cases of movements in offline communities that were originated from the formation of people's ideas on social media such as the political mobilization of the Yellow Shirts, the Red Shirts during Thaksin's and Abhisit's administration; the Pro and the Anti-government groups during Yingluck's administration demonstration against the coup d'état, the campaign on protecting the monarchical institution and many others (Paireepairit 2012: 3, Kummetha 2012: 50).

Facebook, as one of social media, was launched in 2006. With its friendly interface and usage, Facebook attracts people's interest so rapidly it becomes the most social network site that people around the world use (International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 2013). Thailand ranks 13th among the countries that use Facebook in the world, with 18.20 million users in 2013 (Ibid.) or 90.21% of 23.70 million of internet users (Truehits.net, 2013) who have Facebook accounts. As Facebook is used to be social space of online communities with various purposes according to the users' interests, consequently, it is undeniable that Facebook plays an increasing role as a communicating channel in online communities in Thailand.

From the number of internet users by region and area in Thailand between 2010 – 2012 (Appendix 7), people in the central region including Bangkok area are the major number of internet users in Thailand, followed by the north-eastern region. One of observation from this statistics is that central region are mostly residential areas of the middle class, the educated ones while the north-eastern part are consisted mostly the farmers and the common people. These two regions are claimed to be solid base to support two opposite sides: the central people are more anti the government while the north-eastern people more support the government.

Moreover, the growth of smart phones which have more function that enable the people to access to internet more conveniently also become another channel for people to get access to internet, social media, and thus more active in political activities (Kummetha, 2012: 122). In the case of Thailand, it is clear that the number of smart phone users rose since the flooding in 2011 as people needed to update information about the flood situation and the flood control from various sides as they did not believe in the government information (Kummetha, 2012: 122; Russell 2010).

With the internet provided and the capability of the mobile phone to access to the internet, it is no surprise that Thailand ranks 13th of Facebook users in the world. The fans growth rate of Facebook in Thailand is as high as 3,295

person per week. The largest group using Facebook is aged 18-24, followed by 25-34 age group. Both male and female are using Facebook almost the same number which is 50% (Facebook Statistics of Thailand, 2013) (Appendix 8).

4.2 Introduction of Facebook pages of Thai Facebook Users for Political Purposes

The latest research on Political Facebook conducted in 2012 found that there are 1,308 Facebook fan pages and can be divided into 19 categories according to the objectives of the pages' creation (Taksinwarajan 2011: 219). These political Facebook pages mainly comprise the pro government groups, the anti-government groups, the Red Shirts, the Non-violence campaign groups, the groups that created to be sarcastic on Thai politics (Media Monitor 2012: 1). This study also reveals that there is the linkage of those who formed and contacted online to meet and gather in the real world to show their online power on Thai politics by organizing political activities such as street protests for political purposes (Facebook Statistics of Thailand, 2013) that registered their categories as political communities or political organizations. The research found that there are two main sides of political groups, that is, the pro government group and the anti-government group. Selected examples include both group with the names, main position, number of members, and their main activities as summarized in Appendix 9.

However, in reality, there are more than that which can be identified that the pages were created for political purposes by the name of the pages which clearly identify the political side. However, some Facebook pages for political purposes do not declare themselves as political pages to avoid being shutting down by the government. Plus, there are much more number of Facebook pages that were not registered (Appendix 10, Picture 1).

4.3 How Facebook is used by Thai for Political Purposes

The main purposes on using Facebook for political purposes is observed from timelines of 13 selected pages as shown in Appendix 9 during Yingluck's government (August 2011-April 2013). The main objectives of these pages are found as follows:

4.3.1 To publicize political views

One of the main messages that each Facebook pages on politics have done are to publicize the information about the situation of the Thai politics in their views; to clarify the accusation by the opposite side; to inform some knowledge to their members supported by the evidences or photos. The tone of message is, mostly, biased if the messages are against the opposite side. The posts also requested the members to click 'like' on their pages and share on the members' wall and invite their friends to become members of the pages (Appendix 10, Picture 2). Other pages that have similar political views and become alliances will be suggested to members to subscribe as members too.

Moreover, each page will not only inform their members only its own news or movements but also the opposite site. Sometimes there were polls on the pages asking the members about the solutions to the problems for each hot issues at that time.

4.3.2 To attack the political opponents

The posts to attack the opposite side are found in all of 13 pages. The posts can be done with other evidence, photos, video, or diagram to support the accusation (Appendix 10, Picture 3). The accusations are various and linked to the past events using the rude words to discredit the opposite. The pages also asked members to repost and share this accusation on their walls to discredit and to make public known about this which they believe it is the truth that people in society should know.

For each page, its members do not consist of only the people who have the same views but also the opposite one who join the page to follow the movement of the opponent. Accordingly, there are always the interactions among these users through comments that attack each other with hot talks and rude words and link to the quarrel on online community.

4.3.3 To sanction in online community

The online social sanction posts are found to serve as online punishment against the political opponents by posting individuals' photos with name, age, occupation, captioned with the accusation which mostly about those who oppose to the royal family or those who support former PM Thaksin. The captions are used with rude words such as the "ungrateful", "the thief", "the tyranny," and etc. (Appendix 10, Picture 4).

4.3.4 To threaten or to use violence

The worse cases are the posts that threaten to use violence which are found both verbally and physically such as accumulate people to face with the opponents on street mobs (Appendix 10, Picture 5). Other verbal violence cases include the call of the opponents as animals that are unwanted in the houses such as rats, cockroach.

4.3.5 To mobilize people

Apart from the general information about politics that each pages publicize, the page also acts as the centre that collects people when it is time for showing their power to protect their rights, to voice their opinion to be heard to the government or to help each other who are in the same side. The mobilization of people have been done in several parts of the country. After people came out and joined, the page would upload photos of activities to encourage other members in other areas to come out and join the demonstration (Appendix 10, Picture 6).

4.3.6 To reproduce the politicalized discourses

On various pages there are the reproduction of discourses to divide between 'us' and 'the others'. For example, on Facebook page of the royalist that pro-

tect the monarchical institution. The word about being ‘Thai’, is highly emphasized to create “nationalism” (Appendix 10, Picture 7). According to them, being ‘Thai’ is to be a Thai in Thailand under the constitutional monarchy, paying respect to the monarchical institution, if accuse or damage the image of the institution will be regarded as ‘not being Thai’, ‘bad Thai’, (Kummetha, 2012: 57), ‘the ungrateful to the nation’, ‘the useless Thai’, ‘the deadwood of the country’, and ‘the tyranny’ (Ibid.: 58).

4.4 Main messages found on timeline of the selected Facebook pages

Main messages and/or conflicts found on timeline of the selected Facebook pages include the anti-coup d’état in 2006, the disapproval of different opinions in politics among people, and political sides, provoking the street demonstration every time the opposite side gains power or being government; the inequity, the conflicts in Thai society among the elite and the grass root people; the legitimacy of monarchical institution under Article 112 of the Criminal Code (the Lèse-majesté law), its offence and its abuse for political gains; and the case of Thailand-Cambodia dispute.

4.5 How do Facebook members get engaged with Facebook of each side?

In this part, the research presents how the interviewees became members of Facebook pages for political purposes.

4.5.1 Create Facebook account

Most of interviewees created Facebook accounts for personal uses and for social connection with friends, colleagues and family. In giving details about themselves, it is found that there are only two person use real name and surname on Facebook (Appendix 10, Picture 8). Mostly, they used nicknames and/or their real name or surname to identify who they are among their friends. When the interviewees were asked about the reason, some gave opinions that they do not want their names to be searched by Google. Moreover, it is not safe to expose their personal information too much on internet.

For profile pictures, there are both that use their real photos as profile and use other photos that they think will represent themselves or just because they like the photos. Profile photos will be changed from time to time for those who are actively on political activities according to the situation or hot issues at that time.

Contrarily, after observed the comments on the selected pages of their members, it is clearly shown that using invented names on Facebook enable them to post comments more conveniently without worrying about the exposure of their real identity. The contents of messages are also quite long and hot, sometimes even impolite.

4.5.2 Posting or sharing political views on status

One of the interviewees shared his experiences in sharing his political views on Facebook that it started from his posting on his own status during the huge flood in Thailand in 2011. He posted about how worse flood management the government did and how he and his neighbours affected from such carelessness. After posting, his friends gave him support by clicking like that he has never got before from other posting (Appendix 10, Picture 9).

4.5.3 Observing the political views of friends on Facebook

As Facebook users can see the updated status or reposting messages of their friends on Facebook, they start to observe the position of their friends on politics. Sometimes, their friends express their political views strongly which might be the same view of the users or totally against them. An interviewee gave information that he was even removed from friend list by his friend because he declares himself as the pro government and always post or repost messages that support the government or attack the anti-government.

4.5.4 Become members of Political Communities through Facebook fan pages

After consuming political messages from their friends, the interviewees informed that they learn to know the sources of information and get interested to receive the updates as well. At this stage, it is very easy to get news update from the pages that they are interested (Appendix 10, Picture 10). They just click 'like' and then they can browse for further pages that are alliances with the liked pages. The interviewees also share that most of the time after they become members, they will invite their friends who have the same political view to join the pages too.

As members of the page, some of the interviewees joined the activities arranged by the pages such as sharing information of the pages, inviting their friends to become members (Appendix 10, Picture 11), helping translate Thai information into English, making attractive logos/slogan for each campaigns.

4.5.5 Join activities organized by Facebook pages

After becoming the fan pages, the members will get information from the pages, the news that the pages want to publicize or to attack the opposite, the sharing of video, the evidences of the people who get into trouble because of the other side. If the issue is the talk of the town, the mobilization of people will happen through the post of admin of the page and asked the members to share and come out to show their existence and power (Appendix 10, Picture 12-13).

After the findings, it is found that Facebook serves as a tool for political communication and participation in Thai politics as it obviously promotes online political participation by encouraging Thai to practice expressing political views in cyber space which is more influential than the political communication in the past. It also attracts both those who are already active in political participation and those who never joined. The creation of political Facebook pages demonstrates the process of online political participation of the Thai

very well as it collaborate the mass of individuals and groups (Charles Leadbeater 2008 as cited in Loader and Mercea 2012: 3) in monitoring the works of the government.

The study also shows that the reasons that Thai use Facebook for online political participation due to its potentials in facilitating political communication and participation as follows:

First, due to political conflicts and some issues that are tabooed to talk in real world such as about the royal family, the defamation of the present government or the issues that are the interest of the mass in Thailand which is the amnesty bill, Thai use Facebook for discussing those issues as it is less riskier and less barriers to discuss on Facebook than in real life. Thus, many political Facebook pages were created in Thai online communities and Facebook users are encouraged to become members to get information, share their political opinions and get feedbacks from others in a real time.

Second, Facebook pages collect those who have same opinions together, as a result, when users posted comments, they will get positive feedback and supports from other members who have same opinions, this further encourage users to participate more on Facebook pages where the activities on pages include publicizing, making propaganda, and even defaming the opposite side.

Third, Facebook as social media promotes social engagement among online users; for example, the start of using Facebook for political purposes in Thailand was the case of the flood. This further leads to civic engagement such as the coordination among people and the government and finally develop to more political engagement of those who already active both in online and in real world. Plus, with the help of social media and internet, offline political participation is also enhanced to join starting from online communities which can lead to the participation in offline communities later (Cantijioch 2012: 118). This potential of social media plays role in nurturing democratization in Thai online communities.

Apart from that, the accessibility to the internet and the cheap service and price of multimedia mobile phone; the simplicity of Facebook in using; the rapidity in publishing information are also important factors that enable Thai to use Facebook for political purposes.

Chapter 5

A Case on the Use of Facebook for Expressing Political Views

This chapter will answer sub question about how Thai use Facebook for expressing political views and how Facebook is used to spread hatred against the opponent during Yingluck government. The research will conduct by applying the case study of Ms. Yingluck, Thai PM, in delivering a speech in Mongolia. The close attention will devote to the examination on how Thai Facebook users discuss upon the case, what kind of language they use, and if there is any existence of hatred and what provoked such hatred among Facebook users.

The case of PM Yingluck Shinawatra delivered the speech on 29 April 2013 at the 7th Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies in Mongolia, is chosen as the PM is highly criticized as a tyranny against Thailand, claiming she attempted to whitewash the accusation of Former PM Thaksin Shinawatra, her brother, while accusing her own country for not being democratic and stealing democracy from people by the coup d'état which caused former PM Thaksin was ousted of Thailand (Appendix 11).

The Facebook page “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen,” is selected as it is a registered Facebook page as political community and it gains popularity from people as high as 116,227 likes. Most importantly, the page is identified as against Ms. Yingluck and her government. Therefore, this page is highly suitable to observe how online users discussed their opinions on the selected case.

The research observes the feedback of Facebook users on this case for 2 days between 29-30 April 2013 to make sure that all data can be collected. The number of posts, the feedback of members through posting, liking, giving comments and sharing will be categorized and calculated into the percentages for clearer understanding.

5.1 The Finding

The research finds that only 2 days after PM's delivering the speech, there are 210,814 responses from 116,227 members (134.18%), comprising 13 issues from 104 posts with the number of 129,989 likes, 17,498 comments and 46,791 shares on Facebook timeline (Table 2 and Figure 1). The discussion is mostly aimed to attack not only at the PM but the government, the former PM Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra, and their supporters (the Red Shirts) for almost 90% of 104 posts (Figure 2). Rude and curse words are found in the post as high as 78% (85 out of 104 posts). This finding is similar to that of the Foundation for Media Literacy in 2012 that hate speech is used on social media to attack the political opponents.

Table 2: 13 Issues and 104 posts with the number of likes, comments and shares on Facebook timeline for 2 days after PM's delivering the speech (April 29 – 30 2013)

Issues	Posts	Likes	Comments	Shares
1. About the PM and link to the Speech	42	19,567	8,953	28,428
2. Discredit/attack opponents (the Red Shirts) and also link to the PM's speech	32	43,548	4,597	7,371
3. Attack Mr. Thaksin and relate to the content of PM's speech	3	7,858	282	1,371
4. Social sanction on Mr. Thaksin as the controller of the content on PM's speech	1	21,004	1,761	2,993
5. Sarcastic the government politicians as stupid, crazy, uneducated and relate to the stupidity of the PM in delivering the speech	2	859	123	176
6. Update politics news	8	14,846	904	3,699
7. Criticize about the rotten rice given to people	6	2,093	135	374
8. Social sanction on some of Red Shirts' supporters	2	1,856	398	660
9. Honour the King	2	12,726	95	471
10. Campaign calling for morality and asking the silent power to rise	2	2,860	50	1,004
11. Praising good people in society	2	1,614	52	205
12. Entertainment	1	871	44	34
13. Share the information that was attacked by the opponents	1	287	104	5
Total	104	129,989	17,498	46,791

Source: Timeline of Facebook page “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen,” between April 29 - 30 2013

Note: The use of hate speech are found in issues number 1-5 (in bold)





Figure 1: Charts shows proportion of likes, comments, and shares of 104 posts between 29-30 April 2013

Source: Timeline of Facebook page “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen,” between April 29 - 30 2013

Figure 2: Charts shows percentage of issues discussed on Facebook timeline for 2 days (29-30 April 2013) and proportion of likes, comments, and shares of 104 posts (in the shading orange areas and the charts within the orange circles)



Issues discussed on Facebook

- About PM and link to the speech
- Discredit/attack opponents (the Red Shirts) and link to the PM's speech
- Attack Mr. Thaksin and relate to the content of PM's speech
- Social sanction on Mr. Thaksin as the controller of the content on PM's speech
- Sarcastic the government politicians as stupid, crazy, uneducated and relate to the stupidity of the PM in delivering the speech
- Update political news
- Criticize about the rotten rice gave to the people
- Social saction on some of the Red Shirts' supporters
- Honour the King
- Campaign calling for morality
- Prase good people in society
- Entertainment

Source: Ibid.

5.2 General characteristics of languages and main messages found from 5 issues of the case

As summarized in Table 3, there are 85 posts that talk about PM's speech. The characteristics of language and main messages used are various. No single post gives opportunities for the opposite side to explain the accusation or clarification. Interestingly, no posts use polite words. Some are informative, still, full with bias, sarcastic opinions with curse and rude words especially when call the political opposite side. The examples will be illustrated in details in the following section of analysis.

The objectives of posts can be classified into 10 as seen in Table 3. Most is aimed to defame and discriminate. The finding reveals there are two online social sanction posts on some of Red Shirts' supporters as online punishment.

The main targets of the posts are the PM, the government, the former PM Thaksin and the Red Shirts.

Table 3: Characteristics of content and objectives discussed about the PM's speech found on 85 posts with the number of posts, likes, comments, and shares on Facebook timeline between 29 – 30 April 2013

Characteristics of content and objectives discussed about the PM's speech	Posts	Likes	Comments	Shares
Attack the PM that white-washes Mr. Thaksin; attacked her as the stupid like buffalo; bad luck; ungrateful to the country, communist like the North Korea leader	30	79,596	8,095	25,917
Defaming Mr. Thaksin as the one who controls the script of the speech, regarded him as an animal who is ungrateful to the country	3	7,858	282	1,371
Reproduce by cutting some parts of the speech and post and gave rude comments such as calling the PM as the prostitute the tyranny, compromised with Cambodia on the dispute case between Thailand and Cambodia to get personal benefits	32	43,548	4,597	7,371
Sarcastic PM and Mr. Thaksin that also get the	6	5,710	519	1,079

benefits from coup d'état				
Discredit/attack opponents by linking to content of PM's speech	4	2,475	122	145
Online social sanction by relating to the PM's speech	2	1,856	398	660
Provide information about the speech to the members to argue with the one that the PM delivered	1	1,062	34	671
Discredit/attack the Red Shirts' supporters by referring back to their demonstration during the coup d'état that they used violence such as arms, bombs (with 2 video clips and photos as evidences)	3	3,337	225	924
Attack Mr. Taksin that is the one behind the turmoil in Thailand and the tyranny of the country by supporting Cambodian PM to take advantages of Thailand	3	7,858	282	1,371
Attack the whole family of the Shinawatras as the cheaters, the tyranny	1	2,652	183	616
Total	85	155,952	14,737	40,125

5.3 Analysis of the Findings

The analysis will be conducted based on the information gains from timeline of the page. The main analysis includes how hate speech is used in the case by applying the definition of hate speech before characterized into 3 hate speech types with examples found from the case before ending with the analysis how hate speech plays role in political discussion in the case.

5.3.1 How is Hate Speech used in the posts and comments of the case?

From the findings, 3 types of hate speech are found to use against individual or groups of people based on nationalities, beliefs, genders, cultures, political beliefs and this expression is aimed to provoke hatred against such individuals or groups of people by using rude and curse words such as defamation, destroy images of people, dehumanizing, violating human rights as further sub-classified as follows (Media Monitor 2012:) 2012: 10):

1. Dehumanizing by regarding human as disgusting, inferior, compare them with animals such as crock coach; buffaloes or lizards
2. Devaluing human value of the opposite side such as regarding them as slaves; regarding as non-human: ghosts; and discriminating such as the origin of birth or defaming as brutal/cruel, hellish, foolish, ignorant, deceitful, selfish, coward, thieving, disgusting, insane, crazy, and shameless
3. Using contents to stimulate the violence: the contents of languages that aim to stimulate the violence such as threatening, agitating, provocative, stimulating

Accordingly, the proportion of 3 types of hate speech found to be dehumanizing speech for 38.82%; devaluing for 52.94%; and speech that leads to violence for 8.24%. Interestingly, the posts that use hate speech gain a lot of feedbacks as high as 134.18% of the total number of members as shown in Table 4 and Figure 3.

Table 4: Types of hate speech found a case between 29 – 30 April 2013


Types of hate speech found on Facebook (85 from 105 posts)	Characteristics of content and objectives discussed about the PM's speech	Posts	Likes	Comments	Shares
Dehumanizing speech 38.82%		33	87,454	8,377	27,288
35.29 %	Attack the PM that whitewashes Mr. Thaksin; attacked her as the stupid like buffalo; bad luck; ungrateful to the country, communist like the North Korea leader	30	79,596	8,095	25,917
3.53%	Defaming Mr. Thaksin as the one who controls the script of the speech, regarded him as an animal who is ungrateful to the country	3	7,858	282	1,371
Devaluing speech 52.94%		45	54,651	5,670	9,926
37.65%	Reproduce by cutting some parts of the speech and post and gave rude comments such as calling the PM as	32	43,548	4,597	7,371

	the prostitute the tyranny, compromised with Cambodia on the dispute case between Thailand and Cambodia to get personal benefits				
7.06 %	Sarcastic PM and Mr. Thaksin that also get the benefits from coup d'état	6	5,710	519	1,079
4.71 %	Discredit/attack opponents by linking to content of PM's speech	4	2,475	122	145
2.36%	Online social sanction by relating to the PM's speech	2	1,856	398	660
1.18 %	Provide information about the speech to the members to argue with the one that the PM delivered	1	1,062	34	671
Speech that lead to violence 8.24%		7	13,847	690	2,911
3.53%	Discredit/attack the Red Shirts' supporters by referring back to their demonstration during the coup d'état that they used violence such as arms, bombs (with 2 video clips and photos as evidences)	3	3,337	225	924
3.53%	Attack Mr. Taksin that is the one behind the turmoil in Thailand and the tyranny of the country by supporting Cambodian PM to take advantages of Thailand	3	7,858	282	1,371
1.18 %	Attack the whole family of the	1	2,652	183	616

	Shinawatras as the cheaters, the tyranny				
100%	Total	85	155,952	14,737	40,125

Source: Timeline of Facebook page “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen” between April 29 – 30 2013

Figure 3: Proportion on the use of hate speech from 85 out of 105 posts (78%)



Source: Ibid.

5.3.2 Types of Hate Speech Found on the Case in Details

Dehumanizing speech

38.82% of posts is found to be dehumanizing speech as there are the uses of words of disgusting, inferior, regarded the PM and former PM as crock coach; buffaloes and lizards while those who support them are regarded as animals like lizards, cockroaches, insane people and should not be born as human as illustrated in Apendix 12, Picture 1 and 2.

Devaluing speech

This is the biggest proportion (52.94%) of hate speech found in the case, mostly is the devaluation on human value of the PM, the government, the former PM and their supporters for more than 90%. Some parts of speeches are re-posted with sarcastic comments which gain huge number of likes, comments, and shares from members. The devaluing speech found from the case are:

- calling the PM as prostitute, the idiot; the brainless Barbie doll, “the idiot woman”. (Apendix 12, Picture 3)
- defaming the PM and former PM Thaksin such as calling “a daughter of a prostitute”; the bitch and the tyranny (Apendix 12, Picture 4 and 5).
- calling the supporters of PM and Mr. Thaksin as the thieves, the ignorant, the rude people and the animals (Apendix 12 Picture 6)
- discriminating the origin of birth of the supporters and not are human. (Apendix 12, Picture 7)

Speech that leads to violence

There are 7 posts (8.24%) that aimed to provoke violence by threatening such as accusing the supporters of PM and the government (mostly are The Red Shirts) of using arms and bombs during their demonstration in 2006 coup d'état such as the photos of a person use a foot stamped on the face of the politicians posted with the caption that now the Cambodian also realizes about the corruption of their leader which is exactly the same as Thailand experiences (Appendix 12, Picture 8). Another example is the post of a photo to accuse that the opponent used violence, possessed arms during the protests against coup d'état (Appendix 12, Picture 9) or the repost of picture of executing Mr. Thaksin (Appendix 12, Picture 10).

Moreover, the research also finds the verbal violence especially when there are the opponents that leave the comments to against the accusations. Those who are in the same side will come to attach that person heavily, using hot words (Appendix 12, Picture 11).

5.3.3 How hate speech and Facebook provokes hatred among Facebook users?

After the finding, it is obvious that Facebook users from the case use Facebook for expressing political views using rude words to dehumanize and to devalue the opponents due to their different political views, this undoubtedly regarded as hate speech. According to the study of Foundation for Media Literacy (Media Monitor), the use of hate speech is dangerous especially in discussing the sensitive topics in the society particularly the society that people are already divided (2012: 10) like in Thailand. The reproduction of hate speech by a huge number of people from time to time especially with the help of online social media. Within one click, it can disseminate such hate speech to at least 100,000 members. Absolutely, this can cause the exclusion of people who have different views in society easily (Ibid: 13). In the worst case, it can even stimulate the violence such as the threatening that found in the case.

For example, in this case, the Facebook users called the PM and the Red Shirts who are the supporters of the PM and former PM Thaksin as the 'Buffalo,' and the 'Red Buffaloes'. In Thailand, buffaloes are regarded as stupid animal. When the Facebook users in this case called the 'others' as the 'Red Buffaloes', it implies that for those who support the PM are the uneducated people or if educated, they are still silly and stupid. When considering who are uneducated, mostly they are the poor as they do not have enough money to go to universities. This kind of thinking will lead further to insult the dignity of human being and division among the poor and the rich. When reproducing this thinking and calling over and over, it will make the callers truly believe that the 'Red Buffaloes' are not human like them. This create 'us' and the 'others'. 'Us' will be treated as the same side while 'the others' will be poorly treated or even violated physically and verbally (Ibid).

Another example got from the interviewees is the taxi service. If the drivers have any signs that he is the Pro-government, the customers who are anti-government will avoid using the service (Appendix 12, Picture 12). On the contrary, if they cannot tell which side they are since the start, and have some talk on the way, they can have dispute and some passengers are asked to get off

from the taxi (Yupin Kongsuntornkij, Art Woradech and Mee Adisorn 2013, personal interview)¹.

In sum it can be said that, apart from the political conflicts that divide Thai, the use of hate speech with the help of social media is another driving forces to originate the phenomenon of hatred among different political views in Thailand in real time with a large number of online users as demonstrated in the case.

5.3.4 Evidences of violence caused by the use of hate speeches on Facebook

Though there is no violence found from the case study caused by the use of hate speech in inviting to attack the political opponents, there are obviously the violence in using words to hurt others' feeling such as dehumanizing and devaluing the human being of the opponents. This can be agitated more violence in reality supposing the political situation in Thailand turns worse than present. Facebook becomes a social space to throw the feeling of hatred against the opponents and this hatred was welcomed greatly by a huge number of people as can be seen from the case. It is interesting to think further the possibility of turning this hatred into a real violence (Chaisukkosol 2011: 23) as hate speech can lead to the exclusion or genocide of those who have different nationality, language, religion. This is well exemplified from the cases in the past such as the genocide of the Jews or in Rwanda (Ibid: 24).

To conclude, the internet and mobile media phone provision sufficiently are important factors that encourage the Thai to participate in online communities for a large number. Moreover, the popularity and the easiness in using social media is also another important factors that plays role. Apart from this, the political situation in Thailand is the main cause that divides people into political camps. At the same time hatred against those who are opposed has been gradually originated. Amidst this situation, especially in Yingluck government, Thai have difficulty in expressing their political views. Accordingly, online social media like Facebook becomes alternative choice to express political views as it is less risky and less barriers to discuss than in real life. This can be seen from the study that found many political Facebook pages were created and gain interest from Thai. Plus, Facebook pages complies the liked-mind people together, this further encourage them to participate more in online communities.

However, in discussing about politics, Thai use rude and curse words in online community which possesses the characteristics of hate speech. This hate speech can lead to violence both in cyber word as found in the case study and in reality as it provokes the exclusion and genocide of the opponents based on differences such as nationality, languages, religions and many others.

¹ Personal interview with Yupin Kongsuntornkij, Art Woradech and Mee Adisorn via Facebook private message, 15 September 2013.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This paper has provided a study on the use of Facebook for political purposes in Thai politics by choosing to study during Yingluck's Administration (8 August 2011 - 30 April 2012). The research aims to understand the phenomenon of hatred in Thai online communities as found in the literature review. The research analysed how Thai use Facebook for political purposes; how hatred is provoked among online users, and what are the results of this provocation. This chapter will conclude the findings and reflect the analysis from the case study. The answers to research question and sub-questions will be summarized here briefly once more. To answer these questions, the research has thoroughly examined several factors.

Chapter Two explored the literature on social media and political participation to find out their linkages in bringing people to join politics both online and offline. The advantages of using social media as a tool for political communication were presented and explained why it plays crucial roles in online communities. To support the hypothesis that social media is used in spreading hatred in Thai politics, the paper explored the dark sides of social media when it is abusively used for political communication such as spreading hatred against the opponents of online users. The concept of hate speech was presented and characterized. After the literature review found it is one of the factors that is used to spread hatred in Thai online communities apart from the political conflicts in Thailand. Here the explanation how hate speech can provoke hatred among online users for political purposes with the help of online social media was analysed through the review of studies about hate speech in Thailand.

Chapter Three explained what causes political division among Thai to hate against the others that much even they have never known each other before. The review of literature on historical background of Thai politics and conflicts was explored to understand the conflicts and the roots of problems in Thailand. The exploration of divided people in Thai politics was presented. The importance of the Yingluck's administration was justified why it is suitable to study and how social media plays roles in political communication and participation in her period.

Chapter Four still conducted to answer the same sub question with Chapter Three. The method used here included the literature review; the study of content on timelines of political Facebook pages with the captured pictures from Facebook pages to demonstrate the finding; and through personal interviews. The chapter started with the explanation on how Facebook becomes engaged in Thai politics. Several selected political Facebook pages were explored namely their names; the number of Fans; and the objectives of pages. The process of using Facebook was explained in details after the information gained from 45 interviewees. The analysis on the content on timeline and the interview reveal that there are at least two big opponent political groups of Facebook pages and users. Then, the closer examination on how the interviewees become engaged in political Facebook pages was presented and found the existence of political sides among Thai Facebook users. As the sub question is about hatred among Thai, the paper examined if there are any uses of hate

speech which the paper revealed its existence. This finding about hate speech served as the introduction to Chapter Five to support the main question of research about how Facebook users who have different political views use Facebook and how hatred is originated among the opponents.

In Chapter Five, the case study of the PM in Thailand delivered a speech in Mongolia is selected to demonstrate how Thai uses Facebook for expressing political views on this case. The contents, the main message and the characteristics of language found on a selected Facebook page, “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen,” was carefully collected and analysis before explaining based on the concept of hate speech to support the hypothesis that there is the use of hate speech in discussion politics on Facebook. The findings show that there are all of three types of hate speech found in the selected Facebook page which consist the contents of dehumanizing, devaluing and contents that lead to violence such as threatening.

All in all, the research findings are in accordance with the hypothesis, that is, in general, Thai use Facebook for political purposes to express political views namely for publicizing, propaganda, attacking the opponents, and mobilization of people.

However, the research found that online users use hate speech in discussion politics and this hate speech is reproduced and politicalized repeatedly on different existing conflicts for propaganda, attacking the opponents, and mobilization of people. All of this results in the division of political camps among Facebook users in cyber world.

By studying the use of Facebook in Thailand for political purposes, this research has aimed to contribute the findings to support the existing studies about the violence provoked both verbally and physically in online communities. The research reveals that the characteristics of contents on political Facebook page of the case study are full with hate speech that are reproduced and politicalized repeatedly and link to any events both in the past and present to support the discussion among the like-minded Facebook users for propaganda, attacking the opponents, and mobilization of people. Besides, this research, in general, help explain what happened in Thai politics especially the violence that is ready to happen in reality between those who has opposite views on politics. Also, the research can demonstrate the phenomenon that is happening in Thailand right now that a huge mass of people are mobilized starting from Facebook page “Million names to Anti Amnesty Bill,” to protest against the amnesty bill, Yingluck government and Former PM Thaksin.

Lastly, the research has some observations on the findings that should be noted. No posts gives opportunities for the opposite side to explain the accusation or clarification. Thus, the posts and comments on the timeline cannot be counted as reliable. Apart from that the rapid posts of information sometimes are done without re-examination. Plus, if the research about this in the future should select more types of social media which will make the research more complete and convincing.

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Appendix 1

Largest countries on Facebook 2013

Largest countries on Facebook		
1.	<u>United States</u>	159,950,040
2.	<u>Brazil</u>	73,457,620
3.	<u>India</u>	63,793,540
4.	<u>Indonesia</u>	48,295,600
5.	<u>Mexico</u>	42,571,380
6.	<u>Turkey</u>	33,542,820
7.	<u>United Kingdom</u>	30,868,180
8.	<u>Philippines</u>	30,284,800
9.	<u>France</u>	25,392,180
10.	<u>Germany</u>	24,970,100
11.	<u>Italy</u>	23,345,360
12.	<u>Argentina</u>	21,297,740
13.	<u>Thailand</u>	18,550,740

Source: Facebook Statistics of Thailand, 2013 (Socialbakers.com)

Appendix 2

Percentage of individuals using the internet in Thailand between 2006-2011

Year	Value
2006	17.16
2007	20.03
2008	18.20
2009	20.10
2010	22.40
2011	23.70

Source: International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 2013

Appendix 3

Number of Facebook users in Thailand between 2008 – 2013

Number of Facebook users in Thailand between 2008 - 2013						
Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013*
Number of users (Million)	0.17	1.96	6.73	13.28	17.47	18.20
World Ranking	27	23	21	16	15	13
Percentage of increasing number	n/a	1,063.80	242.89	97.18	31.60	4.18
<i>Note: *As of 22 February 2013</i>						

Source: Facebook Statistics of Thailand, 2013

Appendix 4

List of interviewees who click ‘Likes’ Facebook pages ‘Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen’

1. Suntad Srijarupurk, 28, Master Student, allowed to be referred
2. Chalerm Sri Chantasingh, 62, Retiree/Government Pensioner, allowed to be referred
3. Pattapong Tainsri, 49, government officer director of personnel group, allowed to be referred
4. Saetapol Rattanakitsoontorn, 33, Government Official, allowed to be referred
5. Kanokporn Pongpetbandit, 32, Self-employed, allowed to be referred
6. Arraya Thimrengvej, 25, Public Relations Officers
7. Yupin Kongsuntornkij, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
8. Pat Krab, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
9. Art Woradech, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
10. Siriyubol Kasiyaphong, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
11. Soontaree Kasiyaphong, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
12. Me me meow, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
13. Mee Adisorn, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
14. Taa Ronn, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
15. Champ Vanaphol, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
16. Note Supparerg รักในหลวง (in Thai), age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
17. Ping Teerayut, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
18. Boat Pitikan, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
19. สักวันฉันจะเลิกเกรียน ถ้าทำได้นะ (in Thai), age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
20. Ton Kunjara, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
21. Maem Amnatcharoen, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
25. Kim Jinwin, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
23. Donnu Kma, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred
24. Kate Panphan, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred

25. Dena Wimaleen, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred

26. Nongbo Bo, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred

27. Noo -Noo, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred

28. สุรศักดิ์ คงสุนทรกิจ (in Thai), age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred

29. Pimlapat charoenthawornsook, age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred

30. กฤตพร ชุมสุวรรณ (in Thai), age and occupation unidentified, allowed to be referred

Note: List of the names above is the user names of the interviewees, some use in English, some use in Thai. For those who use usernames in Thai, the research chooses to keep the original as it is user name and can be found online.

Appendix 5

List of interviewees from my friend's list on Facebook

1. Anuchat Khongma, 34, Employee, allowed to be referred
2. Assanee Sangkhanate, 39, Civil Servant, allowed to be referred
3. Mrs. Nongpun Kosolsak, 32, Government Official, allowed to be referred
4. Ms. Cheewarat Kaewsangkwan, 32, Office employee, allowed to be referred
5. Jiraporn, 30, PhD student, allowed to be referred
6. Pipawin Leesamphandh, 35, Civil Servant, not allowed to be referred
7. Kongkrit Traiyawong, 34, University Lecturer, allowed to be referred
8. Pataraporn Laowong, 33, Civil Servant, allowed to be referred
9. Wichaya Rosy, 32, Currently taking a career break, allowed to be referred
10. Nattika Nitayaphorn, 36, Legal officer, allowed to be referred
11. Amara Chunplang, 33, Policy Officer at The European ASEAN Business Centre, allowed to be referred
12. Chol Bunnag, 30, University lecturer, a Ph.D. student, allowed to be referred
13. Mrs. Wirayar Chamnanpol, not identified, Civil Servant, allowed to be referred
14. Kamonwan Petchot, 26, NGO worker/consultant, not allowed (prefer to be referred as anonymous)
15. Naphongthawat Phothikit, 36, Government Officials, allowed to be referred but with confidential

Appendix 6

Questions for the Interviews on the Use of Facebook for Political Purposes

1. Name
2. Age
3. Occupation
4. Permission to refer to the interview/opinion
5. How often do you use Facebook per week? For what reasons?
6. Do you use your real name or invented one?
7. Have you ever used Facebook for political purposes? For example, to follow your favorite politicians, or update on the political news
8. Have you been any member/fan of any Facebook fan pages?
9. Have you been any member/fan of any Political Facebook fan pages?
10. If yes, what are their names? And how long have you been members? How did you become a member of that page?
11. What are the activities of your political Facebook fan pages? Such as updating news, publicizing some events for members to join
12. Have you ever joined any activities on Political Facebook? If yes, what are the activities that you join? How did you join?
13. Have the political page you are membered mobilized members to join the demonstration on street or organized to do some activities together? If yes, what are they?
14. On the pages that you are fan, are there any debates on politicalized discourse of Thai politics? What are the examples of such politicalized discourses?
15. What do you think when you see your friends post or repost some political messages? What is your reaction? Have you ever left comments or reposted? Were they in positive or negative responses?
16. On your new feeds, how many groups of political camps do you find? What are they? Can you give a brief description of each camp?

17. Do you think people become divided by the different political views especially the views they shared on their own timeline, the fan page that they are members?
18. Have you experienced any division of people in your society? Like in the workplace, at home?
19. In your opinion, is Facebook useful for political purposes? How?
20. Have you ever experienced the use of rude or curse words in discussing political views of your friends or other online Facebook users on Facebook? If so, how?
21. What do you feel when you see the use of rude and curse words in discussing political views or to attack the people who have different political views?
22. Do you think Facebook is used in an abusive way? How?
23. Any other comments? Please feel free to express.

Appendix 7

Number of internet user by region and area in Thailand
between 2010 – 2012


Year	Total	Percentage	Whole Country
2010		100	13,844,121
Bangkok	2,514,782	18.16	
Central Region	3,285,096	23.73	
Northern region	2,406,755	17.38	
Northeastern region	3,961,485	28.61	
Southern region	1,676,003	12.11	
2011		100	14,773,403
Bangkok	2,594,413	17.56	
Central Region	3,448,181	23.34	
Northern region	2,636,240	17.84	
Northeastern region	4,297,349	29.09	
Southern region	1,797,221	12.17	
2012		100	16,632,908
Bangkok	2,848,286	17.12	
Central Region	4,131,640	24.84	
Northern region	2,867,098	17.24	
Northeastern region	4,568,734	27.47	
Southern region	2,217,150	13.33	

Source: The Information Communication Technology Survey in Household, National Statistical Office Ministry of information and communication technology

Appendix 8


User age distribution and gender user ratio in Thailand in 2013

User age distribution



Thailand Facebook demographics is other social media statistics we monitor. The largest age group is currently **18-24**, followed by the users in the age of **25-34**.

Male/Female User Ratio



There are **49% male users** and **51% female users in Thailand**, compared to 53% and 47% in **Italy** and 52% and 48% in **Japan**.

Source: Socialbakers, 2013?

Appendix 9

Selected political Facebook pages from top ten ranks according to Facebook Statistics of Thailand in 2013

Political Pages of the Anti-Government Groups

Name	Joined Facebook	Number of Members	About
Abhisit Vejjajiva	19 June 2008	1,143,650 likes	This is private page of Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva. The page chose to give information about the page as the page of the leader of Democrat Party and former the 27 th Prime Minister of Thailand. According to the statistic, the fan growth of this page is fan growth by day is +1,421.
Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen	19 September 2011	116,227 likes	The page explains itself as the alternative source of information which will be different one from what government presented.
Million names to Anti Amnesty Bill (ล้านชื่อต้านล้างผิด)	14/08/2013	236,105 likes	The page aimed to publicize the person who destroy the stability of the country especially those who burned the city (which means the Former Red Shirts or the Pro-government at present)
Free Thai movement on Facebook (ขบวนการเสรีไทย เฟซบุ๊ก)	May 2011	158,859 likes	The page is explained to be a space in express opinions of its members, anti-dictatorship, creating effective norms to Thai politics
V For Thailand	4 December 2011	128,156 likes	Called themselves as an army of people or V For Thailand [The Anonymous Thailand], created to publicize the information that will bring back the good morality to Thai society. The pages claimed not to take side. The information that is posted on the pages involving the information that the page understand to be able to call for unity among Thai

			<p>people under the monarchical constitution.</p> <p>The page uses profile picture of Guy Fawkes which is the main actor in V for Vendetta who plays role in mobilizing people to fight against the corrupted government that limits the freedom of people and mass media.</p> <p>According to the statistic, the fan growth of this page is +126 people by day.</p>
Watch Red Shirt	10 March 2010	119,373 likes	Thailand Political News Update.
The Watch Dog (ปฏิบัติกรหมาเฝ้าบ้าน)	2012	25,857 likes	The page introduces itself as the dog that guard the corruption in Thailand by publicizing information about corruption.
Social Sanction: SS (ยุทธการลงทัณฑ์ทางสังคม)	23/03/2011	599 likes	<p>The page is created to anti-corruption and protect monarchy. According to the page, the country is on fire and weak because of those who are in power. The corruption arises because the government officials are careless; the corrupters fear no law.</p> <p>The page and its members will thus rise to protect and serve the kingdom and the monarchy for the brighter future of Thailand by increasing public awareness of corruption and creating pressure to combat the corruption, and to stop the crime of lese majeste.</p>

Note: the number of 'Likes' is as of 30 August 2013

Source: Thailand Facebook Pages Statistics & Number of Fans, 2013

Political Facebook Pages from the Pro Government Group

Name	Joined Facebook	Likes	About
Yingluck Shinawatra	2010	816,871	This is indicated as official fan page of Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra, the present Prime Minister of Thailand.
Red Democracy (ประชาธิปไตยในทัศนะของคนเสื้อแดง)	15 March 2010	26,092	To publicize the democracy according the belief of the Red Shirts
Voice TV	29 June 2009	189,023	News station facebook fan pages (supports former PM Thaksin Shinawatra)
Bo Kor Lai Chud [บก.ลายจุด] (in Thai)	2010	30,314	Not identified
Red Intelligence	15 March 2010	18,398	Red Intelligence was created during the protest of the Red Shirts in 2010 to publicize news and give information to the Red Shirts supporters

Note: the number of Facebook fan pages of the Red Shirts are less than the Yellow Shirts' (Taksinwarajan 2011: 219).

Source: Thailand Facebook Pages Statistics & Number of Fans, 2013


Appendix 10

List of Captured Photos from Some Political Facebook Pages



Picture 1: The captured picture shows the similar Facebook pages on politics when searching using the same name

Source: Captured from my own Facebook wall, Accessed 15 September 2013
<<https://www.facebook.com/ouieng>>.



Picture 2: Page administrator asks members to invite their friends to join the page

Source: “Million names to anti-amnesty bill,” Accessed 15 September 2013 <https://fbcdn-photos-b-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-prn2/1381366_210740862427562_787672918_a.jpg> (in Thai).



Picture 3: Example of the page “Million Names to Anti-amnesty Bill” explaining to its members about the importance of their mission in anti-amnesty against former PM Thaksin

Source: Captured from “Million Names to Anti-amnesty Bill” Facebook page, 15 September 2013 (in Thai)



Picture 4: Example of the sanction against a person who is against the king of Thailand. The photo stated the name and surname of the person with the statement ‘remember this bad guy, he is against the King.’

Source: Captured from “Watch Red Shirt,” Facebook Page, 31 December 2011 (in Thai).

To threaten




Picture 5: The message uses rude words threatening to accumulate 1,000 people of the red shirts to face with the protest of the opponent which claimed to have only 40 people

Source: Captured from Facebook page “Free Thai movement on Facebook” (in Thai), 15 September 2013.



Picture 6: The picture of demonstration on street of members from the page “Million Names to Anti-amnesty Bill” on 22 September 2013

Source: Captured from “Million Names to Anti-amnesty Bill” Facebook Page, 22 September 2013 (in Thai)



Picture 7: The reposted picture to campaign used the image of Ernesto Che Guevara stating “if you cannot endure to the injustice, then we are friends”

Source: Captured from Facebook page “Free Thai movement on Facebook” (in Thai), 15 September 2013.



Picture 8: The identity of interviewed Facebook users, a few use real names and surnames, most of them use nicknames and real names/surnames or invented names.


Source: Captured from Facebook wall of Chalermsri Chantasingh (15 September 2013) and Wichaya Mungreongskul (15 September 2013)



Picture 9: The captured picture from the wall of Chalermsri Chantasigh² (2013, personal interview) who reposted one of the criticized policies of the government with message of a food street vendor asking for increasing the food prices as the PM cheats the people by taking the money of people from taxing for traveling abroad.

Source: Captured from Facebook wall of Chalermsri Chantasigh (15 September 2013), Accessed 15 September 2013
 <<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10151062250698509&set=a.10151013259238509.427438.597513508&type=1&theater>>(in Thai).

² Personal interview with Chalermsri Chantasigh via Facebook private message, 15 September 2013.



Picture 10: Page administrator invites its members to invite their friends to become members

Source: Captured from “Million Names to Anti-amnesty Bill” Facebook Page, 22 September 2013 (in Thai)




Picture 11: The captured picture of the page invited its members to increase the number of fan pages to reach 200,000 to show their power of 200,000 people that do not agree with the amnesty bill

Source: “Million names to Anti-Amnesty Bill,” Facebook Page, 30 August 2013, (in Thai)



Picture 12: the campaign posted on “Million names to Anti-Amnesty Bill,” page calling members to come out to anti-amnesty bill against Mr. Thaksin

Source: “Million names to Anti-Amnesty Bill,” Facebook Page (15 August 2012) (in Thai).



Picture 13: The captured picture of street demonstration of people who are mobilized from Facebook page “Million names to Anti-Amnesty Bill”.

Source: “Million names to Anti-Amnesty Bill,” (22 September 2012), Accessed 15 September 2013
 <http://fposts.com/fbpost/506011549479687_527073130706862> (in Thai) .

Appendix 11

Statement of
Her Excellency Ms. Yingluck Shinawatra
Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand
at the 7th Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 29 April 2013

Mr. Chairman,
Excellencies,
Delegates to the Conference,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I wish to begin by expressing my appreciation to His Excellency the President of Mongolia for inviting me to speak at this Conference of the Community of Democracies.

I accepted this invitation not only because I wanted to visit a country that has made many achievements regarding democracy, or to exchange ideas and views on democracy. But I am here also because democracy is so important to me, and more importantly, to the people of my beloved home, Thailand.

Democracy is not a new concept. Over the years, It has brought progress and hope to a lot of people. At the same time, many people have sacrificed their blood and lives in order to protect and build a democracy.

A government of the people, by the people and for the people does not come without a price. Rights, liberties and the belief that all men and women are created equal have to be fought, and sadly, died for.

Why? This is because there are people in this world who do not believe in democracy. They are ready to grab power and wealth through suppression of freedom. This means that they are willing to take advantage of other people without respecting human rights and liberties. They use force to gain submission and abuse the power. This happened in the past and still posed challenges for all of us in the present.

In many countries, democracy has taken a firm root. And it is definitely refreshing to see another wave of democracy in modern times, from Arab Spring to the successful transition in Myanmar through the efforts of President Thein Sein, and also the changes in my own country where the people power in Thailand has brought me here today.

At the regional level, the key principles in the ASEAN Charter are the commitment to rule of law, democracy and constitutional government. However, we must always beware that anti-democratic forces never subside. Let me share my story.

In 1997, Thailand had a new constitution that was created through the participation from the people. Because of this, we all thought a new era of democracy has finally arrived, an era without the cycle of coups d'état.

It was not to be. An elected government which won two elections with a majority was overthrown in 2006. Thailand lost track and the people spent a most a decade to regain their democratic freedom.

Many of you here know that the government I am talking about was the one with my brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, as the rightfully elected Prime Minister.

Many who don't know me say that why complain? It is a normal process that governments come and go. And if I and my family were the only ones suffering, I might just let it be.

But it was not. Thailand suffered a setback and lost international credibility. Rule of law in the country was destroyed. Projects and programmes started by my brother's government that came from the people's wishes were removed. The people felt their rights and liberties were wrongly taken away.

Thai means free, and the people of Thailand fought back for their freedom. In May 2010, a crackdown on the protestors, the Red Shirts Movement, led to 91 deaths in the heart of the commercial district of Bangkok.

Many innocent people were shot dead by snipers, and the movement crushed with the leaders jailed or fled abroad. Even today, many political victims remain in jail.

However, the people pushed on, and finally the government then had to call for an election, which they thought could be manipulated. In the end, the will of people cannot be denied. I was elected with an absolute majority.

But the story is not over. It is clear that elements of anti-democratic regime still exist. The new constitution, drafted under the coup leaders led government, put in mechanisms to restrict democracy.

A good example of this is that half of the Thai Senate is elected, but the other half is appointed by a small group of people. In addition, the so called independent agencies have abused the power that should belong to the people, for the benefit of the few rather than to the Thai society at large.

This is the challenge of Thai democracy. I would like to see reconciliation and democracy gaining strength. This can only be achieved through strengthening of the rule of law and due process. Only then will every person from all walks of life can feel confident that they will be treated fairly. I announced this as part of the government policy at Parliament before I fully assumed my duties as Prime Minister.

Moreover, democracy will also promote political stability, providing an environment for investments, creating more jobs and income. And most importantly, I believe political freedom addresses long term social disparities by opening economic opportunities that would lead to reducing the income gap between the rich and the poor.

That is why it is so important to strengthen the grassroots. We can achieve this through education reforms. Education creates opportunities through knowledge, and democratic culture built into the ways of life of the people.

Only then will the people have the knowledge to be able to make informed choices and defend their beliefs from those wishing to suppress them. That is why Thailand supported Mongolia's timely UNGA resolution on education for democracy.

Also important is closing gaps between rich and poor. Everyone should be given opportunities and no one should be left behind. This will allow the peo

ple to become an active stakeholder in building the country's economy and democracy.

That is why my Government initiated policies to provide the people with the opportunities to make their own living and contribute to the development of our society. Some of these include creating the Women Development Fund, supporting local products and SMEs as well as help raising income for the farmers.

And I believe you need effective and innovative leadership. Effective in implementing rule of law fairly. Innovative in finding creative peaceful solutions to address the problems of the people.

You need leadership not only on the part of governments but also on the part of the opposition and all stakeholders. All must respect the rule of law and contribute to democracy.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Another important lesson we have learnt was that international friends matter. Pressure from countries who value democracy kept democratic forces in Thailand alive. Sanctions and non-recognition are essential mechanisms to stop anti-democratic regimes.

An international forum like Community of Democracies helps sustain democracy, seeking to promote and protect democracy through dialogue and cooperation. More importantly, if any country took the wrong turn against the principle of democracy, all of us here need to unite to pressure for change and return freedom to the people.

I will always support the Community of Democracies and the work of the Governing Council. I also welcome the President's Asian Partnership Initiative for Democracy and will explore how to extend our cooperation with it.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to end my statement by declaring that, I hope that the sufferings of my family, the families of the political victims, and the families of the 91 people, who lost their lives in defending democracy during the bloodshed in

May 2010, will be the last.

Let us continue to support democracy so that the rights and liberties of all human beings will be protected for future generations to come!

Thank you.

Appendix 12

List of Captured Photos from Facebook Page “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen”



Picture 1: The picture posted by a member from the page “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen” being sarcastic that the dead lizard is former PM Thaksin with the postures of people who are pretending to cry due to sadness

Source: “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen” Facebook page, 29 April 2013, (in Thai).



Picture 2: The capture of reposted picture on the page “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen”, illustrated the contents of message that dehumanized the Red Shirts who use violence should not be born as a human.

Source: “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen” Facebook page, 29 April 2013 (in Thai)



Picture 3: The reposted picture on a case study's page showing a protestor wrote the word, "a daughter of a prostitute" to attack the PM after her speech

Source: "Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen" Facebook page 30 April 2013, (in Thai)



Picture 4: The repost of picture on "Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen" page. The picture shows the results searched from Google with the Thai word [the Idiot woman] (โง่ง) and the results show the photos and the contents link to PM Yingluck.

Source: "Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen" Facebook page, 29 April 2013, Accessed 15 September 2013 <<http://pantip.com/topic/30961077>> (in Thai).



Picture 5: The repost of picture of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra hugged with PM Hunsen of Cambodia, the picture was stamped with Thai words ‘the tyranny’; in the middle is the picture of PM Yingluck with the word ‘Supported by the Idiot Buffaloes’; followed by the picture of Mr. Thaksin with the word “tyranny” and “the most wanted,”


Source: “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen” Facebook page, 30 April 2013 (in Thai).



Picture 6: The reposted picture on the timeline of the case, the caption stated the “new opening zoo of the Red Shirts”

Source: “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen,” 29 April 2013

<https://scontent-b.xx.fbcdn.net/hphotos-prn2/v/972781_545776525508221_1629324322_n.jpg?oh=f813ffbb217bf5114d8ea651708bf643&coe=5282EB42> (in Thai).



Picture 7: The captured picture with caption “the Tyranny” to attack the PM in delivering the speech. This picture is reposted with the comment discriminating those who are supporting the PM as the bitch, the unlucky to the country. *Source:* “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen,” page, 30 April 2013, Accessed 15 September 2013, <https://scontent-b.xx.fbcdn.net/hphotos-prn1/v/1415704_545776402174900_598403465_n.jpg?oh=90c65cd8fc3a0dba e364e8f959213b93&coe=5282F67B> (in Thai).



Picture 8: The reposted picture on the timeline of the case of a person uses a foot stamped on the face of Cambodian and Thai politicians (left and right respectively) posted with the caption that now the Cambodian also realizes about and furious on the corruption of their leader which is exactly the same as Thai experience.

Source: “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen” Facebook page (30 April 2013)



Picture 9: The picture reposted from other website on “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen” page to attack the opponent that used violence, possessed arms during the protests against coup d’état.

Source: “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen” Facebook page, 30 April 2013, (in Thai).



Picture 10: The photo reposted from other website on the Facebook page, captioned “Live Execution of the Tyranny,” with the photo of Mr. Thaksin is being beheaded.

Source: “Dislike Yingluck For Concentration Citizen” Facebook page (29 April 2013), Accessed 11 September 2012. <<https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=472201589564917&set=a.471934372924972.1073741828.471906636261079&type=1&theater>>(in Thai).

