



**NGO project serving the voices of local
communities and donor corporations**
The perspectives of field offices of a Korean NGO in Kenya

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List of Acronyms

CDC	Community Development Committee
CDP	Community Development Project
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
IHQ	International Head Quarter
KCOC	Korean NGO Council for Overseas Development Cooperation
KHO	Kenya Head Office
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OD	Operation Department
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAP	Participatory Appraisal Process
POA	Plan of Actions
PPP	Public Private Partnership

Abstract

Nowadays, NGOs have become one of the main players in Korean development practices, and increasing social awareness on development NGOs has led to significant increases of donations on NGO development projects over developing countries every years. Especially, increases of individual donations and corporation donations tend to have impacted on enlarging of significant numbers of NGO development projects gradually. However, in deep insights, it may be asked whether the increasing numbers of projects are well-interacted with local desire in project processes, especially, in the complicated aid-relations conditions between donors and beneficiaries, as well as, whether the projects intended for development of beneficiaries are well-reflected to their voice or not. Therefore, in order to find the factors impacting on engaging with locality in project processes, this research explores that NGO management in different types of projects consisting of Korean development, which are projects funded by individual donations and projects funded by corporations, with NGO field office perspectives by examining the causality between autonomy, accountability, and ownership, and then this research will suggest the ways of strengthening the local voice in NGO project process.

Relevance to Development Studies

In contemporary development practices, it is founded that not only increases portions of donations on NGO development projects, but also, enlarging of various kinds of donations on NGO development projects. Particularly, compared to the history of development NGOs who used to rely on mainly Government subsidies, increases of individual donations and corporation donations tends to give more opportunities for NGOs to take their roles in developing countries. Nonetheless, compared to the quantitative growth of NGO projects, the quality of the projects which are supposed to embed in local needs still remains many doubts. In Korean development discourse as well, the discussion on the quality of projects based on locality has shown still many limitations to catch up the fast quantitative growth of NGO, specifically, discussion with field levels perspective where is a main space interacting with communities has not done yet. Therefore, this research will explore the undiscovered points in Korean development discourse, but should be discussed, by comparing between projects donated by individuals and projects donated by corporations, and the investigation on the research will bring out the recommendation how development agencies need to go forward their ways maintaining local voice in their development projects in the conditions of increasing various other voices.

Keywords

Korea, NGOs, Field Office, Autonomy, Accountability, Ownership, Corporation, donation, Community, Local voice

1. Introduction

Initially, my interest in this research questions were raised from my past experiences in Korean NGO field office in developing countries. Usually, whole development project implements in NGO field offices are basis on a year plan which is often called 'Plan of Action (POA)', and generally, the POA was developed through meetings between community development committee (henceforce, CDC) and field office in the developing countries. Then, after getting approval by NGO Head quarter, projects based on POA runs in field office throughout a whole year. Usually, the POA format itself has certain classifications such as health section, education section, advocacy section, water and sanitation section on the basis of the NGOs general development picture, but, each specific plan for the every section in POA tool are developed at local level. In this planning process, usually field offices take roles of discussing about budget plans, and project implementation plans with local people. Although there is Head quarter approval system for the POA once a year, normally the approval procedure is considered as the mechanism for administration procedures, not the mechanism for examination of the projects' plans, and the POA plans itself remain flexible during the project year. After accomplishment of all projects, field office usually conducts evaluations on the basis of the POA in end of the year. Here in the paper, whole projects implemented based on POA will be named 'regular projects'

Beside of the regular projects in field office, many kinds of corporation funded projects also have proceeded at local level, and the number of corporation funded projects tends to increase every year. (Son and Sin 2012:4) Generally, if the regular projects are explained as whole year development plans at local level, in corporation funded projects case, it could be explained, by and large, as 'short term designated projects' in a particular place with corporation donation. For example, many schools, community centers, wells etc. have been established in NGO development projects through corporation donations. Actually, the corporation funded projects are not planned on the basis of POA, because it is hard for NGOs to pre-estimate when they can access new corporation donation, how much they can get, and also, although NGO generally says that the projects are planed on the basis of agreement between local desire and corporation desire, sometimes in the reality, in order to deal with corporation desires such as strong demands for establish schools in particular places, field offices had to search for local needs for new school in a short time without careful assessments. Furthermore, in the whole process from planning, implement to evaluations, strikingly many instructions tend to be delivered from a head quarter to field offices, compared to the process in regular projects, accordingly, these differences between regular projects and corporation funded projects tend to lead field office to different approach at local level during managing projects by showing that, on the one hands, the field office tends to give a weight to the initiative of community during the regular projects, on the other hands they tends to give a weight to the initiative of corporation or higher levels' instruction(Head quarter) during corporation funded projects.

The field office experiences in developing countries, especially in terms of considering different managing ways of the field office in different kinds of projects have brought me to think about field office project process in managing different kinds of projects-‘regular project which is planned based on local desires’ and ‘corporation funded project which has designated natures from corporations’, and how the different ways of the project processes impact on engaging in local voice during the projects. According to Keystone (2006 pv cited in Jacobs and Wilfold 2010:139), ‘the quality of and NGOs field work is primarily determined by the quality of its relationships with its intended beneficiaries’, that is, engaging with locality such as how field offices listen local voice, how field office response to local people during the project process is not only just meaningful in development projects but also important elements determining the quality of projects.

However, although roles of development NGOs have being increased in Korean society as a main actor of development agencies, and the number of Korean development NGOs projects in developing countries have being increased every years (Kim 2003)¹ not only by the increasing funds, but also by enlarging various types of funding sources (KCOC 2012:20), unfortunately, quality of the Korean development/aid ranked last within OECD-DAC countries (Center for Global Development n.d.), moreover, the careful discussion on the NGO project process oriented toward local voice which was recognized as important factors impacting on the quality of projects has not enough addressed yet since ‘the main focuses of Korean NGOs have been put on enlarging funds and effectiveness of the funds based on outputs’ (Han interview), and especially the discussion from field office perspectives are almost nil, despite field offices are main actors interacting with locality, and also key arenas responding to local desires during project process at local level. In the reality, the field office managements on project processes tend to show dynamic depending on the character of the projects-the regular project and corporation funded project-, in these points, the consideration of different field office management on each of the projects are worth to be explored, and it can help to analyze the causality between the ways of field office management and its impact on locality.

Therefore, this paper will explore Korean development NGO project processes oriented toward local voices through comparison between regular projects and corporation funded projects with three key development elements, which are firstly, autonomy existed in different types of projects, secondly, accountability presented in field office during managing the different types of projects, thirdly, local ownership which is impacted by field office accountability, and then lastly, will suggest how the local voice can increase in field office project processes.

¹ 79 Korean NGOs operated their projects in 95 developing countries around World in 2011(KCOC 2012:54)

1.1 Questions of Methodology

The Key objective of this research is to understand the impacts of NGO field office project processes at local level through looking at different types of projects, regular projects and corporation funded projects. Particularly, through the analysis of field office project process in comparison between two different types of projects, the paper will find ways to encourage local voices during development project processes.

To achieve the objective, this research will explain main question, which is 'How do Korean NGO field offices manage local voices in different types of projects?'

Detailedly, the related questions will be answered to lead up to the main question,

- 1) How do field offices characterize autonomy in different types of projects?
- 2) What kinds of field office accountability mechanisms are presented at the projects?
- 3) How do field offices generate ownership at local level?
- 4) What are the factors hindering local voice during project processes and what are the alternative ways to strengthen local voice in projects?

The methodology of the research aims to analyse NGO Field office project process in comparison between regular projects and corporation funded project with main three concepts, which are 1) Autonomy, 2) Accountability, 3) Ownership, for the analysis, the research investigated in two project sites named A project site (henceforth, Case 1) and B project site (henceforth Case 2) in one field office of Korean Development NGOs in Kenya and the reason of the selections are below:

- 1) The NGO itself has relatively long history amongst Korean Development NGOs since established in 1991 in Korea, and also, among 29 field countries within the NGOs, the Kenya field office has the second longest history as a field office of the NGO since established in 1995. Therefore, I expect that the Kenya field office has relatively stable development strategies in their project process and the relationship with community also was expected to be solid relatively than other field offices.
- 2) The second reason is that, according to pre-short my survey, the corporation funded projects is increasing in the Kenya office in the NGOs, therefore, the cases on the issue of both general projects and corporation funded projects can be found effectively.
- 3) The third reason is that, when compared to other Korean NGOs in Kenya, the volume of NGO Kenya office is biggest one in terms of the number of beneficiaries, budgets, and corporation funded pro-

jects etc. Therefore, the sample projects can be found in an effective way.

- 4) The case will be explored in two project sites of the NGO where manage both of 'regular projects' and 'corporation funded projects'.

To explore the selected cases in detail, both primary data and secondary data were used. Firstly, the primary data was collected through interviews in different level

- 1) Field office: 5 Interviews
Semi-Structured Interview: The director of the Kenya field office, one Korean staff in charge of corporation funded projects, a general manger in project operation department in Head Office in Kenya Field office, the project managers in Case1,2
- 2) Community level: 8 Interviews
Semi-Structured Interview: Four CDCs; two in Case 1 and two in Case 2, Four regular community people; two in Case 1 and two in Case 2
- 3) Head Quarter in Korea : 2 Interviews
Semi-Structured Interview via open questionnaire: Two staffs in different departments (Regular project department, Corporation funded project department)
- 4) Expert interview: 1 Interview
Semi-Structured Interview via open questionnaire: One secretary general in ODA Watch

Secondly, as secondary data, previous studies on the issue of NGO autonomy, accountability and ownership were reviewed carefully, and then the following organizational reports were reviewed:

Organization introduction paper, field office introduction paper, Mission statement, Code of Conducts, Plan of Actions, corporation funded projects proposal, evaluation paper of both regular projects and corporation funded projects, and project guidelines of both projects.

Nonetheless, the research is limited to only one Korean development NGOs in Kenya. The paper will explore the field office conditions during managing two different types of projects with exploring two different projects site in deep way, in the sense, the selected Korean NGO field office has many relevant cases since it is the biggest field office that has a relatively long history compared to other Korean NGOs in Kenya. However, it is true that there is certain limitation to make the cases generalized for all Korean development NGOs or for nature of regular projects and corporation funded projects. Therefore, the purpose of the research will be concentrated on the field office conditions in managing project process and its impacts at local level, rather than making it generalized. Secondly, the research will be focused more on field office perspective on how organization impacts on local voices in project


processes in detail, rather than focus on whole organizational perspective, or other various aspects impacting on local ownership such as nature of areas (urban and rural) thus, other aspects will need to be addressed in further research. Thirdly, the research will explore focusing on streams how different types of projects which has different level of autonomy impact on local voices through different levels of field office accountability mechanisms, rather than focusing on only ownership fully, therefore elite capture, gate keeper issues need to be discussed in further research.

2. Conceptual framework

2.1 Conceptions of NGO Field Office Project Process

This research will explore NGO Field office project process in comparison between regular projects and corporation funded projects with main three concepts, 1) Autonomy, 2) Accountability 3) Ownership, and through the main concepts, try to looking for ways to encourage local voices during projects.

First, autonomy is an important element for NGO field office to decide what to do according to own priorities. In the sense, comparisons between regular projects and corporation funded projects will show how different levels of autonomy exists in the different types of projects, and in turns, it can help to understand why the different level of autonomy are presented in the projects. Second, in order to examine the field office functions-especially toward locality-in a different set of projects in which have a possibility to show different levels of autonomy, field office accountability can be considered as main mechanisms to manage the project processes, and we can find causality how the different level of autonomy in each projects impacts on field office accountability, especially, downward accountability toward communities. Third, through looking at the accountability presented in the each project processes, it helps us to understand how the field office accountability impacts on communities in terms of local ownership, considering factors strengthening/hindering local voices in NGO project processes. Like this, the three key concepts are inter-related each other in project processes, on the basis of the concepts, the framework will be set up as below. [Figure 2.1]



[Figure 2.1 Framework]

2.1.1 Autonomy

In development discourse, 'NGO autonomy is seen as an organization's freedom to determine its own strategic direction and development without undue pressure from external actors' (Brehm 2004:1) and it can be increased by having a diversified range of funding, and enable them to have greater freedom of choice. Also it supports that diversification of funding sources can give NGOs more incentive to maintain autonomy, while focusing their own activities on local priorities. (Parks 2008:219) Previous studies, by and large, discusses on the concept of the autonomy in terms of relations between 'have' and 'have not' or relations between the North and the South (Brehm 2004:3).

According to the previous discussions on the relations between 'have' and 'have not' in development context, Morse and Mcnamara (2012:910) notes that those who 'have resources' can make decision resulting to what agencies to allocate the resource and how these are used, also Burbules (1986, cited in Morse & Mcnamara 2012:910) discusses, 'consent' from relations between 'have' and 'have not' can be considered as a result of domination by the 'have' over the 'have not', in this relations, autonomy refers to 'the ability to say no to certain forms of funding' (Brehm 2004:3) and the high level of autonomy tends to be found where overall resources dependence is lowest.(Brehm 2004:4)

However, in the bigger picture meaning, Kuper (1990, cited in Abrahams 2008:44) discusses that autonomy exists in social interaction in which autonomy exercise in relations to others. In this sense, complete autonomy is impossible in social interaction, but different level of autonomy can exist in different interdependent nature of development environment. (Abrahams 2008:44)

In the sense, beyond the fragmentary classification on autonomy in a relation between donor and beneficiaries, autonomy can be considered in a way that different natured projects-'regular projects' and 'corporation funded projects' can show different levels of autonomy in their different interdependent nature of development environment. In other words, although the diversification of funding source might increase NGO's autonomy, when taking a careful look at the different types of projects within the NGOs, different levels of autonomy can be predicted within them, as well as, although the two different types of projects presented in this research seems to be existed in one unified place (field office), the different levels of autonomy each of them have, tends to impact to NGO development process in different way. For example, when compared to high autonomy level of projects, low autonomy level of projects can 'cause through short-term, *ad hoc* funding practices' relatively (Brehm 2002:7) and also make NGO less concentrate on beneficiaries in order to respond to the donor's pressure to show results quickly. (Sanyal 1997:31)

In this manner, here in the paper, the classification between regular projects and corporation funded projects can help to understand 1) the nature of autonomy each projects have based on the different funding source, 2) what

kinds of components make up the autonomy in different natured projects, and then 3) can help us to understand how the existed level of the autonomy impact on the rest of the project processes. Indicators of autonomy used include:

1. Different paths of Project planning procedure,
2. Possibility of initial plans changes in processes: flexibility in implementing process.

2.1.2 Accountability

In contemporary development discourse, the question of ‘Who do NGOs represent?’ (Murtaza 2012:111) is one of the raising issues, and the question has led to discussions on NGO accountability in development projects. Generally, the accountability is understood as being generated in relations between two or more actors (Jacobs and Wilford, 2010:799), in which the relations and the generated accountability are likely to interact each other. In the sense, NGO accountability generated in relations between donors and NGOs, also between NGOs and communities (beneficiaries) have being risen as important issues in NGO project processes.

In previous studies, the accountability has been explained with notion of ‘responsibility’. Fox and Brown (1998:12 cited in Ebrahim 2003:814) describe accountability as ‘the process of holding actors responsible for action.’ Cornwall, Lucas, and Pasteur (2000:3 cited in Ebrahim 2003:814) define that ‘accountability is both about being “held responsible” by others and about “taking responsibility” for oneself. Edwards and Hulme (1995:9 cited in Edward and Hulme 1994) also point out ‘accountability is held responsible for their action’. In a similar way, according to Jagadananda and Brown’s definition (2010:118), accountability is ‘a responsibility to answer for performance expectations, which may be seen as an identity issue in the sense of feeling responsible to one’s ideals and commitments. It may be seen as a relational issue in the sense of being answerable to and held responsible by other actors.’ However, here, the explanations of the ‘responsibility’ lead us to bring out a crucial question, which is ‘to whom NGOs responsible?’ in the complex and tensed aid chains between donors, NGOs, and communities, and the question leads us again to classifications between upward accountability and downward accountability.

According to Jacobs and Wilford (2010:799) ‘upward accountability is associated with relationships that face up existing power relationship, where a more powerful actor uses accountability mechanisms to influence the actions of a less powerful actors’, and Edwards and Hulme (1994; 1996:967 cited in Ebrahim 2003:814) points out ‘the accountability is generally interpreted as the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority and the upward accountability usually happens in relationships with donors, foundations and governments.

On the other hand, ‘downward accountability is associated with relationships that face down against existing power relationships, where a less powerful actor uses accountability mechanisms to influence the actions of a more powerful actor.’ (Jacobs and Wilford 2010:799), and it often happens in relationships with their local partners, beneficiaries, staffs and mainly ‘groups to whom NGOs provide services’ (Edwards and Hulme 1995; Najam 1996:345 cited in Ebrahim 2003:815). Many studies emphasis on downward accountability by saying the accountability can enhance NGO performance with community perspectives (Wenar 2006 cited in Murtaza 2012:112) through avoiding the imposition of inappropriate and top-down accountability mechanisms by external. (Wenar 2006; Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006 cited in Murtaza 2012:112), and it can help NGOs to be closer local desire through be responsible toward local levels.

However, although the importance of the downward accountability has been emphasized in tension between donors and communities (beneficiaries) contemporary development discourse, most of time, the upward accountability toward donors desire tends to power over the downward accountability toward community needs (Wallace et al 2006; Fowler 2010). For instance, in order to keep pace with donors, ‘priorities included a pressure to focus on fast track projects, achieve targets, and spend budgets within fixed time scales’ (Jacobs and Wilford 2010:808) in the NGO projects, inversely, the pressure tends to discourage from promoting local participation which generally needs long term perspectives and flexibility depending on changeable local situations. Furthermore, even the downward accountability in community-oriented NGOs as well often tends to remain at the lowest level (Kilby 2006; Mulgan 2003; Najam 1996; Salamon et al. 2000 cited in Murtaza 2012:122) by showing contradiction between agency’s overall project mission/goal and practical activities and project implementation (Cavill and Sohail 2007; Ebrahim 2003; Edwards and Hulme 1995 cited in Murtaza 2012:115).

Nevertheless, in development perspective, the important elements of NGO development project process need to include local voice in developing countries, and the downward accountability is crucial factors determining NGO development project process (Eyben and Ferguson 2004:164; Jacobs and Wilford 2010:138). According to UNIFEM’s progress of the World’s Women Report 2008/2009 (cited in Jacobs and Wilford 2010:799), ‘if gender-responsive accountability mechanisms could make powerful actors more answerable to women, then this could influence women’s subordinate position in public and private decision making and, as a result, improve women’s condition and access to relevant services.’ In other words, the projects based on local voice though NGO accountability mechanism can lead more powerful local actors, more to the points in the paper, the accountability mechanisms can be selected by the NGO according to what their priority is.

On the basis of importance of downward accountability in the paper, NGO field office accountability can be shown in different ways in managing different types of projects, which has different level of autonomy in their projects. When compared between regular projects and corporation funded projects, the

levels of autonomy in each projects can influence on field office accountability mechanisms, in turns, it can affect local level in different ways. In other words, relatively high level of autonomy presented in field office project has more possibility to bring downward accountability relatively, while low level of autonomy in the project has less possibility to bring low level of downward accountability relatively. Furthermore, the different ways of field office accountability can impact on local ownership in different ways.

Therefore, by analyzing the connection between autonomy coming from project characters and accountability presented in field office, particularly field office downward accountability in comparison between regular projects and corporation funded projects will assist to understand 1) how the autonomy presented in different kinds of projects impacts on field office accountability, 2) Why field office shows different accountability, especially in terms of downward accountability. The indicators used in this paper include:

1. The existence of institutionalized accountability mechanisms practically in use in projects,
2. Using of downward accountability by Leadership decision

2.1.3 Ownership

Since the mid-1990's, the notion of local ownership has risen in development discourse (Saxby 2003:1) in reasons that the problematic donor driven development and the north driven aid in contemporary development practice, and it has brought the global attentions to importance of local engagement and local initiative in the development processes. The Paris Declaration points out the importance of ownership by identifying 'Ownership is one of the five key principles to make foreign aid more effective' (CDA 2011:2). Also, the Accra Agenda for Action also emphasized the importance of ownership as 'countries have more say over their development processes through wider participation in development policy formulation, stronger leadership on aid coordination and more use of country systems for aid delivery and the role of civil society organizations as development actors with a legitimate role to play-not only in delivery services, but also in formulating policies and strengthening local capacities and ownership.'(CDA 2011:2) Although sometimes doubts on ownership's validity and importance in development practice are addressed (Shinoda 2008:98), when we consider of the development not only as aid delivery, but also as empower local capacities, strengthening local ownership is inevitable factors in development.

The ownership has been described in many ways, in spite of absence of one single definition, most of studies on the ownership focus on power influencing on development processes. For example, Jerve et al. (2005:11 cited in Verduijn 2006:22) identify that 'roles and responsibilities and ultimately to power, and denotes a bundle of rights in a process of planned development; in setting the agenda, in allocating resources, and in designing and implementing development programmers', and Saxby (2003:2) explains as 'their respective capacity,

power or influence to set and take responsibility for a development agenda, and too must and sustain support for that'. Coriolo et al. (2011:20) addressed that 'ownership is one of the main elements to achieve sustain outcomes on a development project by providing equitably represented communities with control and authority over decisions and resources throughout all phases of the program ensuring that local knowledge is incorporated into design.' However, in a more practical way in NGO development projects, local ownership means that 'local people's actual leading role as well as their feeling about their leading role in the process' (Shinoda 2008:99)

However, in the real development process, the local ownership tends to be very often prevailed by both development agencies desire and donors' demands (Verdujin 2006:8). According to the one of the local people interview conducted by CDA(2011:3), 'many local people felt that information about projects, approaches and timeframe is often controlled by outsider agencies and not share with community.' and by and large the local ownership remains weak level in unequal power relations between providers and receivers in NGO project process, however, the more focused points of local ownership in this paper is the fact that the local ownership can be selected by NGO's will in project processes, and the concept of local ownership is interpreted strictly in the sense here. According to Valk (2004:13, 17)

Despite the adverse conditions of ambiguous, multi-level objective of aid and unequal power relations between the providers and receivers of aid, intentions to enhance local ownership can be genuine expressions of commitment at individual as well as organizational level, commitment based on (partial) identification and (partial) understanding of receivers of aid: inter-subjective and intercultural awareness... Only the elements of the project that corresponds to the priorities of the receiving organization and individuals will be locally owned. This implies that ownership cannot be caused but must be selected either as existing priorities or as potential priorities. It also means that not all elements that are locally owned are necessarily desirable for the donors' perspective. Thus the selective selection of elements that can be locally owned brings in the donor priorities.

In the sense, the local ownership in NGO development projects can increase on the basis of not only local people's own capacity and power, but also how much NGOs field office cede the power to local though providing space for empowerment and increasing local participation. In other words, local ownership tends to be on high level when intended beneficiaries substantially influence the conception, design, implementation, and review of development strategies, and when NGOs are rooted in the recipient areas and represent the interests of the local people. (Saxby 2003:2)

Therefore, the research will investigate on 1) how local ownership is selected by different level of NGO field office accountability mechanism in different types of projects-regular projects and corporation funded projects, and then 2)

will explore different elements affecting local ownership between the different types of projects, and the analysis will help us to understand ways of increasing local voice in NGOs development projects processes. The indicators used for assessing local ownership in this paper include:

1. Local awareness on project details and budgets,
2. Local participation in different size of spaces given by field office.

Synthetically, firstly, I will analyze key elements impacting on the different autonomy levels in different types of projects through exploring the nature of the projects caused by different funding sources, Secondly, through examining the causality between different autonomy levels and its impact on field office accountability mechanisms, I will analyze the factors impacting on field office downward accountability, thirdly, I will examine the field office factors affecting on local ownership by looking at causality between presented field office accountability and its impact on local level, and then, will suggest alternative ways to increase local voice in project processes in conclusion.

3. Present state of Korean Development

3.1 Enlarging donation funds and its influence on NGO sector

Since South Korea has joined in the United Nations in 1990, the role of Development Korea NGOs has increased over developing countries (Kim 2003:45). Also, social awareness toward development NGOs has been increasing significantly over Korean domestic society, as a result, the increasing social awareness has influenced to enlarge various kinds of funding sources to development NGOs. According to survey (KCOC 2012:20) on total funding portion that made up NGOs in 2011, 38.6% donated by individual donation, 15.7% came from Government, 15.0% donated by corporations and 30.7% came from other sources, and each funding sources tends to increase significantly every year, especially, when compared to 2009 figure, individual donation increased 71% in 2011, and also corporation donations also increased 47% in 2011. These increasing trends are expected to be continued.

Firstly, the increasing individual donations are expected to provide the higher level of NGO financial self reliance. (KCOC 2012:20) This is because individual donations generally tend to be spent for development projects without strong conditions, and the individual donations usually make up 'regular projects' budgets which was planned on the basis of field office POA in developing countries.

Secondly, the increasing corporation donation has also become one of the increasing alternative funds influencing on NGO development projects in developing countries. On the one hands, the increasing corporation donation tends to enable NGO field offices to accomplish various construction projects such as school, community canters, which was not possible done within the field offices' limited regular project budgets based on POA. According to survey of Korean NGO council for Overseas Development Cooperation membership NGOs (KCOC 2012:26), around 190 corporations contributed their resources to development projects through NGOs in 2011.

Consequently, by and large, all the increasing funds lead to increase NGOs development projects budgets in developing countries: 62,908,277(USD) in 2006, 127,516,778(USD) in 2009, 253,691,275(USD) in 2011(KCOC 2012: 30), and the NGO development projects budget will be expected to increase more by enlarging fund sources. According to 2011 figure (KCOC 2012: 30), 79 Korean NGOs operated their own many kinds of projects in 95 developing countries around world.

However, although the rapid growth of development NGOs in Korea, still many issues have to be addressed. According to KCOC research (2012:17), over 75% of Korean development NGOs surveyed has established within past 20 years, and among them, around 90% of the development NGOs has begun

to their development works (projects) in developing countries since 1990s, which shows that the Korean development NGOs has relatively short history, and the interests of NGOs tends to be focused on a quantitative increases. According to Han,


‘...the interests of Korean NGOs tend to be concentrated on enlarging funds and effectiveness of the funds based on results rather than considering of project quality based on local ownership through downward accountability, and the discussion of downward accountability and local ownership in Korean NGOs development discourse are almost nil...they are talking about local ownership in projects, but it still remains as an ideal idea...’ (Interview, Han, 30th August 2013)

In this stream, rather than building a partnership with local NGOs in developing countries, most of Korean NGOs manage their own field offices under Head quarter which is an umbrella organization (Han 2010:31), and ‘...focus on achieving project outputs through dispatching Korean leadership in the field office...’.(Han’s Interview)

All things considered, in contemporary Korean development NGOs shows, although the various numbers of development projects have been increasing by enlarging donations in Korean societies, generally many of NGOs tends to focus on increasing quantitative achievements and effectiveness based on outputs, rather than considering of quality of projects based on local ownership and its accountability issue in their development projects.

3.2 Overview of the selected NGO

The NGO was established in 1991, which is one of the longest development NGOs in South Korea. 171 project sites (henceforth, CDPs) are operated in total 29 field countries, mainly focusing on projects which are education, health, sanitation, etc. [Table 3.1]. Importantly, the whole projects are emphasized on the value of local initiatives by being stressed on organization introduction as ‘local people have initiative through active local participation.’ (NGOK n.d.) Majorities of income resources consisting of the whole organization budgets are come from individual donators who mostly donate small amounts every month (76.4%), and then private donations such as corporation (15.1%), donation in kinds (4.9%), Government subsidy such as PPP, ODA projects (3.1%), and etc. such as interests (0.5%) are followed. Here, the individual donation forms regular project’s budgets in field countries, and other funding resources such as corporation funds, ODA funds form specific designated projects. In Kenya field office case, since established in 1995, it has operated five project sites including a Head office and four CDPs, with 109 local staffs under organization structure as [Figure 3.1]



[Figure 3.1 Organization Chart]

3.2.1 Regular Project and Corporation Funded Project in the Field Office in Kenya

	Regular Projects	Corporation Funded Projects
General explanation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The official common classifications in the POA form which are shared over all field offices, are as below: Education, Health, Water and Sanitation, Income Generation, Community Partnership and Network Building, Advocacy, Environment, Emergency Relief, Research and Development, Child management, and <i>others</i>. And within the classification, CDPs make plans according to local desires. ‘Others’ column in the form: ‘Others’ column in POA enables to fill in local desires which is unspecified in POA forms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No specific classifications for the corporation funded project’s items, but it is decided through the negotiation processes. ‘Remark/Comments’ column in the form: ‘Remark & Comment’ column enables to fill in the person in charge’s comments
Case 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project is focused on Education: Providing education materials to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project is focused on -A School reconstruction in Nairobi

	<p>schools, and supporting exam expenses, teacher salary to local schools, School activities,</p> <p>Health: Feeding programs, maternal health education,</p> <p>Water & Sanitation: Fixing tap water systems at school</p> <p>Income generation: Micro finance,</p> <p>Community Partnership & Network Building: Organizing CDC and regular meetings, Community leader workshop,</p> <p>Advocacy: Campaign for child right campaign, campaign against gender based violence, AIDs,</p> <p>Environment: Cleaning towns,</p> <p>Child management</p> <p>•Period:1st of Jan, 2013~31st of Dec. 2013</p> <p>•Total year budget: 217,806 USD</p>	<p>area,</p> <p>•Period: 12 month (1st of June, 2012~31th of May, 2013),</p> <p>•Total Donated Budgets: :260,000USD by S1 corporation</p> <p>-B School reconstruction in Nairobi</p> <p>•Period:1st of May, 2012~30th of April, 2013</p> <p>•Total Donated Budgets: 125,000USD by S2 corporation</p>
Case 2	<p>•The project is focused on</p> <p>Education: Providing education materials, school activities, supporting community library, training eradication of illiteracy to local people, supporting local school teacher salary,</p> <p>Health: Feeding programs at local schools, Supplying of sanitary towels,</p> <p>Water & Sanitation: Installing of water tanks in local school, protection of two community springs,</p> <p>Income generation: Supporting school farming to boost the feeding programs</p> <p>Community Partnership & Network Building: CDC meetings</p> <p>Advocacy: Campaign for International women day, child right,</p> <p>Environment: Tree planting at the dam site for dam conservation, mobilizing community in clean up road, repairing of drainage systems in local schools</p> <p>•Period: 1st of Jan, 2013~31st of Dec. 2013</p> <p>•Total year budget: 291,332 USD</p>	<p>•The project is focused on</p> <p>-School construction in Transmara area,</p> <p>•Period 12 month (1st of July, 2012~30th of June, 2013),</p> <p>•Total Donated Budget Total Donated Budget: 166,666 USD by D corporation</p>

[Table 3.1 Regular project and Corporation Funded project]

As can be seen in [Table 3.1], the regular projects are planned based on the POA classification which is used over all field countries officially, and on the basis of the forms, field offices design their own plans in communication with local level. When local desires are not specified in POA classification, the ‘other’ sections provide to flexibility for reflecting local desires on the plans. The regular project in Kenya field office shows that each of Case 1, Case 2 have the different programs and the different details on their plans, which means, the


plans are developed according to different local desires embedded in different local conditions, and on the basis of the plans described in [Table 3.1], the regular projects are processed throughout the period. In corporation funded projects case, it shows the designated nature on it, so the plans are accomplished according to the designated nature. In Kenya field office case, school construction/reconstruction projects were processed during the periods in each Case1 and Case2. Generally, Case 1 (reconstruction schools) was planed according to IHQ and donor's requests initially, while Case 2 (a construction school) was planed according to local desires. On the basis of the general picture, the more details will be explained in the analysis parts.

4. Autonomy in Regular project vs. Corporation funded project

Mainly, autonomy presents different levels in regular project and corporation projects by showing 1) Different paths of project procedure: initiative and 2) Possibility of plan changes: flexibility. In order words, who takes the initiatives on project planning processes, and how much the flexibility is available in changeable local conditions throughout processes, are founded as main factors affecting the different levels of autonomy in each of the projects. Therefore, in this section, firstly, both 1) who takes the initiatives in the planning procedure, and 2) the possibility of flexibility in implementing processes in regular project and corporation funded project will be explained, and then 3) will analysed the factors impacting on components forming the different level of autonomy in detail.

4.1 Initiative and Flexibility

4.1.1 Regular Project



[Figure 4.1 Regular Project Planning Procedure]

Firstly, planning processes in regular projects represent high local initiative by showing that most of plans are developed from ground levels through community meetings. As mentioned above briefly, although the POA form itself is classified by particular sections such as Education, Health etc. [Table 3.1], it does not mean that community must operate all programs based on the given sections on the POA form, but they can select what they want to focus on through considering local needs, as well as priorities are decided through community meetings. According to look at two selected CDPs' planning procedure of the regular projects, every end of the year, OD manager in KHO and CDP office staffs, community people(including CDC members) all together organize meetings to discuss about following years' plans, and usually PAPs (Participatory Appraisal Process)² mechanisms, such as mainly chapatti dia-

² As approaches, methods and behaviour that enable community people to express and analyse the realities of their lives and conditions to plan themselves what action to

gram³, livelihood analysis⁴ and semi-structure group interviews are used in order to identify local needs and to decide the priorities for the following year. Then, the draft are developed in each of CDP offices based on the assessment from PAP, after reviewing the draft with CDC members of the community, it is submitted to OD manager in KHO. When the draft is clearly reviewed by KHO level, the plan is submitted to IHQ, what's important is in the process, although IHQ has a final authority of approval for the plans, practically, unless numerical errors in calculating the budget are founded, IHQ approves the plans which were developed at ground. One different thing between two selected CDPs in developing plan drafts is, official development plans published by local government are reviewed by staffs in Case 2 in order to grasp local government ideas on the area, as well as in order to build a bridge of cooperation with them whereas absence of those processes in Case 1. However, expect the one difference, the planning processes of both Case1 and Case 2 shows the similar flows on the basis of community initiatives having less of an IHQ, other donor's interventions, and the processes tend to stimulate actors at field level including local people, CDP office staffs, and KHO staffs to boost more dialogues on the planning with their own desires. As described in [Table 3.1], the reasons why two each CDPs have different programs and different focuses on the regular projects are because of these processes.

Furthermore, in terms of flexibility, the regular project shows higher flexibility in project process than those of the corporation funded project, through field office's own discretion in plan changes in changeable local conditions. In the regular projects, the discretionary authority tends to be more focused on field office level who are more well-aware of local conditions than IHQ level, hence, without passing through IHQ' approval procedure, field level can adjust changes within POA forms depending on local conditions. IHQ staff said:

‘...the initial approved POA has many possibilities to be changeable over the project periods, mostly changes are decided at field office level, however, if the field office are unable to handle the changes because of big size of changes compared to initial levels, or because of over-the-country-year-budgets, still IHQ systems such as supplementary budgets systems support the field office decisions...I understand the local conditions are always changeable...’(Interview, IHQ staff in regular project department, 31th August 2013)

In addition to the IHQ interview, the field level including KHO, CDPs, they all responded, ‘...the plans of regular projects are changeable without getting

take and to monitor and evaluate the results through developing local perspective by becoming more responsive to local people and local situations (NGOK 2010:45)

³ As a tool of participatory map representing the community's priorities or importance degree of issues by its space on the purpose that community enable to focus on the more important issue or prioritize major issues(NGOK 2010:82)

⁴ As a tool of PAP, in order to understand all the means of livelihood of community people, spreading cards written with all the income sources of the community people(NGOK 2010:95)

permission by IHQ and it is possible to be decided within field level according to changeable local needs...’


Both the high local initiatives presented in the planning processes, and the high possibility of allowing to changes of initial plans depending local conditions (called flexibility in the paper) shows higher levels of autonomy in regular projects, which is much higher level of autonomy compared to those of corporation funded projects.

4.1.2 Corporation funded Project

However, when compared to the regular projects, the whole process of corporation funded projects tends to request other considerations which are not only local needs, but also donor’s desires. IHQ staff in the corporation funded project department said,

‘...Corporation funded projects are usually planned with consideration of three elements which are field office/local needs, projects’ validity, and donors’ desires, and the projects have usually passed through mutual agreement between local needs and corporation desires, but, in case disagreement occurs between them, IHQ staffs try to do our efforts to mediate in the disagreement, or sometimes the plans are abandoned or are postponed...’ (Interview, IHQ staff in corporation funded project department, 14th August 2013, E-mail)

That is, the nature of the projects includes not only local needs, but also donor’s desire, the judgment of validity based on IHQ perspective, which tends to make IHQ to consider the project planning as mutual understandings processes. Unlike the regular project planning processes in which basically community actors and field staffs are involved in, the planning processes in the corporation funded project are mainly focused between KHO, particularly Korean staff and IHQ. [Figure 4.2]



[Figure 4.2 Corporation Funded Project Planning Procedure]

In Case 2, the needs of school construction had been addressed by local people for last 3 years, and end up, the local cherished desires met the donors in 2012. For this reason, when having interviews with local people, even CDP staffs,

they clearly believed that the school construction was the response by donors according to local requests, however, according to the Korean staff in charge of the project, initially IHQ and donors requested KHO to build the school in urban slums, not in the rural area, and the decisions were already made up between IHQ high level and corporation high level. He mentioned, the persuading processes from field office to IHQ was quite complicated not only by preparing many documents to prove validity of the school in the Case 2 area, but also by exacting processes between IHQ questions and KHO responses. Fortunately, the complicated process led the community people to achieve their dreams, but they haven't known the truth so far, which is because the whole proposal was prepared by only the Korean staff. Although the data for preparing the proposal such as land size, numbers of students was collected by field staffs following the Korean staff's instructions, it was likely to fragments of the information consisting of proposal, in these conditions, and the Korean staff was the only one who understands whole project picture.

‘...I have not understood about the corporation funded projects well, I just followed fragment instructions from what Country director and the Korean staff requested me...for the reasons, I also could not give any feedback or comments about the projects to CDP staffs...’(Interview, OD manager in KHO, 4th August 2013)

Case 1 also had school construction projects, but the different thing from Case 2 is that the desire of school construction was delivered from IHQ requests initially. According to the Country director, IHQ itself has an annual plan on particular numbers of school targets which will be constructed by corporation funds, and the targeted number tends to give pressures on actual results to the appropriate department in IHQ. Actually, he mentioned that the needs of school constructions are quite different depending on local conditions, and even depending on country conditions. For example, in Chad country cases, because of significant lacks of school numbers, the local desire tends to show very high, while the desires in Kenya are not as much higher as those in Chad, especially in urban areas where are already supported a lot of school buildings by many NGOs. However, IHQ itself is likely to make the needs of school constructions generalized over all of field countries, and within this organizational atmosphere, field offices as well often feel invisible pressures from IHQ, consequently, sometimes field office have to put their efforts into searching places to spend the funds serving the IHQ, donors purposes in a very short time. In the stream, the Case 1 shows, the field staffs and local people's responsibility in planning and implementation remains very low level, especially, the CDP managers was just involved in figuring out specific information such as land size for school constructions, student numbers of the schools, which are all requested by the Korean staff, and then on the basis of the specific information, the proposal are prepared by the Korean staff. The Korean staff also argued,

‘...the general plans including total budget amounts and targeted area confirmation for the school, was already decided by IHQ, and according to the IHQ

decision, I had to prepare a proposal within 3~4days...'(Interview, Korean staff in KHO, 10th August 2013, Google chat)

Obviously, it shows the needs assessment were not fully examined through local views, but the needs of constructions are reflected by what the field office was obliged by higher level's strong requests. Furthermore, besides the planning processes, additional plans for Korean visitors of the donor corporations, IHQ filming schedules on the projects as well affects to field office strongly. For example, when donor corporation visitors came to visit the construction places in Case 1, IHQ asked for field office to build new two classrooms within two weeks, but, at the same time, the left of old buildings needed to remain without demolition in order to let the visitors compare 'before and after'.

In terms of flexibility, corporation funded projects show a significant low flexibility, compared to the regular projects, since it has not only strong designated natures, but also very complicated procedures for changing plans. According to country director, he often gives directions for all field staffs to do just follow initial plans, although sometimes changes are needed in the implementing processes. He mentioned,

'...if we change a slight plan, it will give us much more works to let IHQ understand why the changes are needed, and the validity for changes require complicated bureaucratic procedures with frequent questions, which make us be harassed...'(Interview, Country Director, 19th August 2013)

Here, an interesting thing from the interviews is, when each the IHQ staff and the KHO staffs (Korean staff, Country director) described 'discussion processes on changing project plans between IHQ and the field office', the IHQ staff considered the discussion process as 'mediating process to meet the mutual desires' while field office staffs regarded the process as 'being harassed from a lot of additional questions and papers and endless questions from IHQ', and the burdened feelings presented in field staffs tend to do just follow IHQ initial instructions, rather than raising their own opinions.

As mentioned in chapter 2 by describing 'although the two different types of projects seems to be existed in one unified field office, it shows different level of autonomy', the different levels of autonomy was apparently presented by showing the different initiatives in planning procedures and different flexibility in implementing processes in different types of projects. And the analysis helps us to find the higher level of autonomy in regular project while the lower level of autonomy in corporation funded project relatively. Then, what elements impact on the different levels of autonomy in each of projects?

4.2 Key elements impacting on different level of autonomy

Regular Project	Corporation funded Project
<p>Security: Secure perceptions on consistent funding sources</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Many donors on the projects - Long term with monthly income 	<p>Security: Fear perceptions on insecure funding sources</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One donor on one project - Short term with big amount
<p>-IHQ's perception on undesigned nature of the projects, acceptable the changes easily</p>	<p>-IHQ's perception on designated nature of the projects, hard to be acceptable the changes</p>

[Table 4.1 Elements impacting on autonomy]

The field research shows, the main factors affecting the different levels of autonomy on the projects are, firstly, the degree of security on the funding sources. In fact, field research shows that the field staffs have different perceptions on each project, which are secure perceptions or insecure perceptions (they used the word '*fear*') from different funding sources. Unlike the regular projects being comprised of numbers of individual donators who promise small amount donations to support the regular projects monthly, mostly the corporation funded projects are supported by one (or very few numbers, very rarely) sponsor who promises big amount donations to support designated projects. In this situation, although one or two individual donators stop their donations to regular projects, still organization can make up the losses by replacing other donators who are willing to donate their small money, and it enables to guarantee the consistency of the funding sources for field offices to keep up the regular projects. Yet, in corporation funded project, if big donors change their mind to stop their donations, or change their mind to donate to other organizations which provide the corporation with fast-responses, meeting deadline sharply, well supported additional information, P.R, meeting the goal promised in initial proposals, the projects are unable to be continued. Moreover, project outcomes and well responded processes to the corporations also tend to impact on future donations from the corporation by maintaining 'good relationships' on the basis of donor's satisfactions, hence, for the reasons, from the point of view of field office, the regular projects are likely to give 'secure perceptions' to them during doing their projects through consistent funds being less of effects from donors satisfaction, while corporation funded projects are likely to give 'fear perceptions' to them considering about donors' satisfaction throughout whole processes.

Secondly, on a similar line, but with other aspect, in addition to perceptions on consistency of funding sources, organizational perspective on each of projects are also a very important factor impacting on the different autonomy, apparently it was revealed that the formed organizational perception impacts on field level. The emphasizing on local initiatives in planning process and the discretionary authority of field office for the flexibility are naturally accepted within

the whole organization structure in the regular projects, and also it is operated within the systems, while, meeting initial plans and following higher level's instructions are stressed in the corporation funded projects naturally in the whole organization structure. From this point of view, the factors impacting on different levels of autonomy are not just because of impacts of donor power who 'has a resource power', but also because of bureaucratic organizational elements such as different organizational perspectives on judging field office's attitude toward high level's instructions during processes, and on judging project outcomes in the regular projects and the corporation funded projects, it shows, the organizational perspective is on the basis of the undesignated nature with accepting changes depending on local conditions in the regular projects, while of the designated nature without accepting changes easily in corporation funded projects⁵. That is, in the field office view, mainly two factors which are 'sense of fear' coming from funding sources, and formed organizational awareness on each of projects are founded as the crucial elements impacting on different level of autonomy, and the field research shows that the two key factors are interacted closely within organization, in turns, it affect forming the different level of autonomy in each of projects.

⁵ Leadership mechanism is strongly related in field office accountability, it will be discussed in accountability chapter.

5. Accountability in Regular project vs. Corporation funded project

The field research finds, field office accountability presents various dynamics in the different types of projects by 1) institutionalized accountability mechanisms practically in use, and 2) leadership. On the basis of these indicators, in this chapter, the findings will lead to deep-understandings on different types of accountability mechanisms, more focusing on 1) downward accountability in managing different types of projects, and 2) how the autonomy presented in each of projects which was discussed in autonomy section impacts on the downward accountability mechanisms presented in different projects, and then 3) the factors impacting on the differences will be analyzed by looking at institutionalization and leadership.

5.1 Regular Project

5.1.1 Institutionalization

The field office accountability mechanisms in regular project shows two major classifications, which are upward accountability mechanisms such as POA, Monthly reports etc.[Table 5.1] for the purpose of reporting to high levels, and downward accountability mechanisms such as PAP in POA, community meetings, etc.[Table 5.1] for the purpose of discussing with/responding to local levels. Firstly, the upward accountability mechanisms are shared over all field offices as official mechanisms within the organization, since it has developed by IHQ level, and mostly the functions of the upward accountability in the regular projects are operated through the institutionalized mechanism in official ways. Here, one interesting finding is, the regular project upward accountability mechanisms itself try to include downward accountability functions within the upward accountability systems by formalizing CDCs, monthly meetings within POA tools, and it can be considered as the organization has attempt to maintain local initiative value in their practical ways. When taking a close look at the regular project downward accountability mechanisms, however, although it has been institutionalized by formalization on the POA system, which means field office including CDP offices, uses the mechanisms obligatorily, the frequency of (how often), and the size of (how much) utilizing the mechanism in practice tends to be determined by field level's (KHO, CDP offices) own volition, which is impacted by its leadership.

	Classification of Accountability	Regular Project	Corporation funded Project
HO	Upward Accountability	POA, Monthly Report, Quarterly Report, Annual Country Report	Project Proposal, Interim Report, Result Report, Additional documents, Frequent informal contacts via phone, email, chatting program
	Downward Accountability	Monthly Manager Meeting, Monthly Staff Meeting, Monthly OD Meeting	Frequent informal contacts via phone
Case 1	Upward Accountability	POA, Monthly Report, Quarterly Report, Annual Country Report	Project Proposal, Interim Report, Result Report Frequent informal contacts via phone, email, chatting program
	Downward Accountability	Organizing CDC, Monthly Meetings (Once a month)	Frequent (In)Formal Meetings
Case 2	Upward Accountability	POA, Monthly Report, Quarterly Report, Annual Country Report	Project Proposal, Interim Report, Result Report, Frequent informal contacts via phone, email, chatting program
	Downward Accountability	Organizing CDC, Monthly Meetings (Twice a month), Frequent (In)Formal Meetings	Frequent (In)Formal Meetings

[Table 5.1 Field Office Accountability Mechanism]

5.1.2 Leadership

In comparison with the upward accountability of regular projects which are operated as strong institutionalized mechanisms, the degree of downward accountability institutionalization is not as high as those of upward accountability, in this condition, leader's decision tends to impact on the use of the downward mechanisms in the gaps of institutionalization. As discussed in [Figure 4.1], since the presented power has been focused on local level in regular project planning processes, the leadership who determine decisions during the projects is also founded at field level, especially, is concentrated on CDP managers, in this point, the CDP manager's attitude on how much put their values on downward accountability, more importantly, how much they put their efforts to transform from the abstract value to practical ways are founded as very important elements impacting on the downward accountability. Mostly, the different levels of the efforts for the downward accountability are founded through levels of information disclosure (also, emphasised by Owusu 2004:113) and levels of responsive to locality in two cases. Generally the Case 2 shows higher levels in both information disclosure and response to locality then Case 1.

Firstly, in terms of information disclosure, most regular project information in Case 2 tends to be disclosed to CDC members by sharing not only project

plans, implementation, but also budgets details. The CDP manager said,

‘...mostly, the projects are operated with local people, and not only program details such as schedule, programs contexts, but also program budgets are disclosed to them. Except the administration budgets such as staffs’ salaries, whole project budgets on the POA are shared with them. I had an episode, when they were not well aware of the concepts of floating exchange rates before, they used to ask questions to me ‘why are the balances between ‘remaining in our calculations’ and ‘actual remaining in the account’ different?’ and I believe, the question was raised by the awareness on the regular project budgets which we shared with them, and this is the way how we work together...’ (Interview, Case 2 manager, 7th August 2013)

However, unlike Case 2, information disclosures in the Case 1 are very limited to community since they tends to share parts of POA information to CDC members. This is, although community people are involved in designing POA according to organizational regular project guideline which emphasizes on local initiative, also although official CDC meetings are operated monthly according to institutionalized mechanisms, the functions of community shows quite big limitations, because of both the information limitations and limited arenas in which community people can be involved in. According to the CDC member,

‘...we are partly involved in the programs but it is ok...we had monthly meetings but sometimes the CDP office manager left early, for me the biggest problem is a lack of communication between local people and the office. We need more spaces to talk each other and need to share each others’ idea together...’(Interview, Case 1 local people, 8th August 2013)

Secondly, in terms of responsive, the levels of mutual understanding between the CDP office and the CDC show a stable relationship by well-respond to local level in Case 2. It does not mean that the office always respond to community with positive answers, but, even though the office is hard to make local people feel satisfied, still the mutual understandings such as why the CDP cannot fulfill the desire at the moment, are well established in their relationship through frequent community meetings, moreover, the well responsive attitude of the CDP office tends to lead to increase more local involvements in the regular projects.

However, the local people’s discontent over the Case 1 CDP office responses was expressed. Furthermore, in spite of the monthly meeting system existence, still the functions of the meetings are likely to be inactive, compared to Case 2. One of the CDC members said,

‘...few months ago, I sent letters twice to the project manager to discuss issues about providing education materials to the local school, but still couldn’t get any response from her...I am not saying about the positive answers from the office, but we still need to talk...’ (Interview, Case 1 CDC, 8th August 2013)

During the interview, it was founded that the local people tends to have more disappointed feelings in the lacks of response of the CDP offices than in the lacks of information disclosure, but both of information disclosure, responsive

similarly underlines the importance of mutual-communication between the CDP offices and the local people, and here, particular leadership emphasizing on the importance of downward accountability affect the downward accountability strongly in the project reality.

Therefore, all things considered in regular projects, upward accountability is more institutionalized than the level of downward accountability institutionalization in the organization, interestingly, the less institutionalized condition in downward accountability tends to provide more spaces for particular leadership (leaders' agency) to determine uses of the downward accountability mechanisms in project process. Here, the particular leadership emphasizing on the downward accountability, and putting their efforts to use the downward accountability are founded as important factors through looking at two cases.

5.2 Corporation funded Projects

5.2.1 Institutionalization

When compared to the regular project, the corporation funded projects shows very weak level of institutionalized accountability mechanisms in both upward and downward significantly. Instead, most of communications on the project process are focused on informal mechanisms. [Table 5.1] Particularly, even though the institutionalized upward mechanisms are existed within the systems, most of time informal communications tends to prevail over the official mechanisms in the usual manner. More to the point in the corporation funded project, it is within bounds to say, there is almost no formal downward accountability in the process.

Firstly, exploring the formal upward accountability mechanisms helps us to understand the way of how the NGO approaches to the corporation funded projects. The field research finds that the types of main reporting systems such as proposals, result reports are divided into two types of forms, which are 'more than 10,000 USD project budget forms', and 'less than 10,000 USD project budget forms', and here, the 'more than 10,000 USD form' provides more details such as budget details, schedules, regional information, management plans, P.R plans, budget details then the 'less than the 10,000 USD projects form' which describes simple information like project periods, numbers of beneficiaries, simple budget plans. In other words, it shows that amounts of donation takes the role of reference points providing more reliable information details to donors from the point of view of donors. However, what's more interesting is the informal upward accountability mechanisms such as frequent contacts via chatting programs, a skype, e-mailing are likely to overwhelm not only over the institutionalized mechanisms, but also over the whole project processes with the purpose of providing additional information to donors.

Furthermore, in order to manage the projects smoothly according to IHQ's instructions with minimizing possible-risks such as time delay, over-expenditures, the Korean staff was dispatched to the field office, and most of time, all decisions regarding the corporation funded project are decided between the Korean staff and IHQ, then the instructions are delivered to field staffs. Korean staff said,

‘...mainly, the reason of dispatching Korean staffs is to cope with donors’ needs. In corporation funded project cases, usually the donors’ powers tend to impact on whole project cycle, in the situation, the Korean staff can easily catch up IHQ/donor’s needs and also can reflect it in a short time. For example, how fast field office can give feedback to IHQ requests, and how fast the output come out are important issues in ‘Korean working style’...but I think, projects can still run without the Korean staff. It will just take more time...’ (Interview, the Korean staff in KHO, 10th August 2013, Google chat)’

However, when investigated over the downward accountability in the corporation funded projects, the institutionalized mechanisms are almost not found, instead, field staffs themselves tends to regard following higher level’s instructions as natural during the project processes, which also lead that the frequent instructions and communications through informal mechanisms are naturally accepted to field levels. In the atmosphere, without fully understandings of whole plans which are mostly developed by the Korean staff, both field staffs and local people tends to be aware of few parts of the project plans by following fragment instructions delivered via informal mechanisms. The OD manager commented,

‘...I never thought about giving my comments to IHQ during the project implementation, I, myself and other staffs as well just tried to meet their requests like deadlines, budgets and visiting programs schedule...maybe unconsciously, I had some fear if I gave comments to them, it can make donors feel uncomfortable, which can lead to stop funding in the future...’ (Interview, OD manager, 4th August 2013)

Like the regular project downward accountability which is less institutionalized than its upward accountability mechanisms, but even much worse in the corporation funded projects, the downward accountability shows the weakest institutionalized conditions, and the very weak institutionalized mechanisms impact on giving big spaces for the leaders to decide their mechanisms toward locality during the project processes.

5.2.2 Leadership

Unlike the leadership described in the regular projects, in which mostly the location of leadership is focused on CDP manager levels, in the corporation funded project case, the country director leadership tends to impact strongly over the whole project cycle, which is because the main actor in planning process is focused on Korean staff level [Figure 4.2]. For example, the country director instructed field staffs to follow IHQ instructions by reasons of taking an easy way without conflicts in their relationship(IHQ-the field office), which also can help to protect his reputation within the organization. Also, he choose the way working with Korean constructor without giving field staff's control power on the projects to meet IHQ's instructions in easy and in fast ways. (Interview, the Korean staff) The significant lacks of interventions of field staffs result in decreasing CDP manager's leadership to decide level of information disclosure/responsive which used to be decided by themselves in the regular projects.

Nonetheless, interestingly, when compared between two sampled cases, even though the two CDP offices are in equally significant shortages of formal downward accountability mechanisms conditions and also are controlled under same KHO leadership, Case 2 shows a little bit higher downward accountability in the project process by organizing their own construction committee for the purposes of increasing local ownership through local participation in the project, rather than Case 1 in which most of local people including even CDC did not know about constructions issues at all. According to two interviews from the different cases,

‘...I tried to encourage local people to be involved in the projects, even though they could not participate in the construction fully, local people tried to put their efforts into carrying bricks, following Korean constructor's instructions in regular meetings...it was important because the school was their long-cherished desire, and the school is theirs, not ours(NGO), so, even it was small participation, I tried to give them spaces to be involved...’(Interview, Case 2 manager, 7th August 2013)

‘...I didn't know about the construction at all, maybe only school teachers knew about new constructions. Actually I am very happy to have new school in good conditions, but the classroom size is too small, maybe only 35 students can sit inside one class room, if they discussed about this before with us, maybe we could get much better results...’(Interview, Case 1 school committee member, 13th August 2013)

Compared to the regular projects in which mostly CDP manager's leadership operate inside in the gaps of institutionalized accountability mechanisms, ‘strong country director leadership’, and ‘less strong but still influential CDP manager leadership’ are presented in the corporation funded projects, and as discussed, these leadership shows strong connections to the level of accounta-

bility mechanism’s institutionalization. In summary, all discussions considered, the field office accountability presented on the different types of projects can be organized as [Table 5.2].

	Upward Accountability	Downward Accountability
Regular Projects	-Strong Institutionalization	-Institutionalization (but less than upward accountability in regular projects), -Impacts of CDP managers’ leadership on the project
Corporation Funded Projects	-Weak Institutionalization -Impacts of HO leadership, particularly the Country director’s leadership on the project	-Very Weak Institutionalization -Impacts of KHO leadership, particularly strong country director’s leadership (but less strong but still influential CDP manager leadership on the project)

[Table 5.2 Institutionalization and leadership]

5.3 Autonomy on field office downward accountability in different types of projects

The analysis of field office accountability presented in each of the projects shows different degree of institutionalization and different types of leadership [Table 5.2], and the discussion on autonomy shows different levels of autonomy, which explained high autonomy in the regular projects, while low autonomy in the corporation funded projects in the previous chapter. On the basis of the analyses, in the section, the causality how the different level of autonomy in different types of projects impacts on the discussed field office accountability mechanisms [Table 5.2], especially more focusing on downward accountability will be explained.

		Upward Accountability	Downward Accountability
Regular Project (High Autonomy)	Combination	High Autonomy + Strong institutionalization	High Autonomy + Institutionalization (But, less than upward accountability in regular projects)
	Analysis	:Most stable project management among four classifications	:High autonomy provide chances (authority) to field office/CDP to select downward accountability even they are in the less institutionalized conditions
Corporation funded project (Low Autonomy)	Combination	Low Autonomy + Weak institutionalization	Low Autonomy + Very weak institutionalization
	Analysis	:Very frequent strong informal mechanisms overwhelm the project processes as means of supporting IHQ/Donors desire and instructions :Impacts of HO leadership, particularly the country director's leadership, but low autonomy affect to country director decision to follow IHQ decision)	:Low autonomy is hard to provide chances (authority) to field office/CDP to select downward accountability, rather, the combination between low autonomy and low institutionalization threaten downward accountability easily. :Impacts of HO leadership, particularly the country director's leadership, but low autonomy affect to country director decision to follow IHQ decision, yet CDP leadership can somehow contribute downward accountability)

[Table 5.3 Combination between Autonomy and Accountability]

Firstly, the high autonomy with high institutionalized upward accountability mechanisms tend to lead to most stable conditions by the predictable regular mutual-communication procedure in the regular projects. Secondly, in downward accountability of the regular project case, although its degree of the institutionalization is not as much higher as the upward accountability, still, a certain degree of institutionalized accountability mechanisms tend to support downward accountability as a safety device maintaining local initiatives. More to the point, the high autonomy presented in the regular projects are likely to offer authority for the field office to 'can select (high possibility to select)' downward accountability in the project process without considering other interventions. Thirdly, the condition of combination between low autonomy presented in the corporation funded projects and upward accountability which shows low institutionalization on it, tends to push field level to keep up with IHQ/donor's perspective through unpredictable rambling communications, here, since the (Korean) country director's leadership who is also one of the IHQ employees,

has been also functioned within bureaucratic organization system, the low autonomy presented in the projects makes the country directors leadership follow IHQ's decision most of time. Inversely, lastly, the combination between low autonomy presented in the corporation funded projects and the absence of institutionalized downward accountability in the corporation funded project is likely to hinder field office from making own decision on working ways with locality in return for concentrating on donor's desire, moreover, here, the absence of institutionalized downward accountability is not able to protect even the minimum level of local initiatives as if losing a shield.

That is, the degrees of the institutionalization tends to impact on stabilization of field office project processes, particularly, the institutionalized downward accountability have influence on maintaining the organizational value which is rooted in local initiatives. Here, interestingly, in case of low degree of institutionalized downward accountability mechanisms, high autonomy existed in the projects tends to provide high possibilities for field offices to make own decisions on the basis of own approaches toward locality, with their discretionary authority.

However, although the autonomy remains low level hence the arena in which field level can make own decision is relatively small, as compared with Case1, Case 2, still how much leadership emphasizes on downward accountability, and how much put the efforts to fulfil the value impacts on downward accountability, even within limited conditions caused by both the lacks of institutionalized mechanisms and low level of autonomy.

6. Ownership in Regular project vs. Corporation funded project

Deep-considering of local ownership in both the regular projects and the corporation funded project helps to understand that the each of projects present different types of local ownership during the project process, which are indicated by 1) local awareness on projects, and 2) local participation within different spaces given by field office. Firstly, local awareness refers to how much the locality understands the project processes through shared information from NGO. CDA (2011:9) points out ‘...supporting local ownership of developments efforts requires a commitment to share information...’also, Rousseau et al. (1998:400 cited in Lachapelle 2008:56) mentions, ‘...shared information, status and concern is viewed as trust, which lead to...the potential for ownership in the process and outcome of a community development efforts...’ Secondly, participation is strictly used in terms of means of ownership here on the basis of ‘weak sense of ownership links to lack of participation in development process.’ (CDA 2011:5) and ‘participation in decision-making, influencing the policies and processes affect their lives, does pave the way for an increased ‘sense of ownership.’ (Verduijn 2006:27)

Interestingly, the field research found that both local awareness and participation are very much directly related to the field office accountability mechanisms, particularly the downward accountability mechanisms presented in each of projects, which are discussed the previous section. And this is closely connected to ‘*creating space* for citizens...helps to deepen the ways in which ordinary people can effectively participate in and influence policies which directly their lives’ (Fung and Wright 2001:7 cited in Verduijn 2006:27) Therefore, local ownership will be explained exploring the relations how the field office accountability impact on the local ownership in each of projects by looking at local awareness and participation.

6.1 Local Ownership as a Value

IHQ	<p>‘...increasing ownership through local participation is one of the very important factors determining the project success, it is because. satisfaction of locality and their thought tends to determine both projects’ sustainability and achievement of projects purpose...’(Interview, IHQ Staff in regular project department)</p> <p>‘...local ownership through increasing participation is important during managing projects, and the meaning of ownership needs to be applied for every projects of our organization because it is related to organization identity...’(Interview, IHQ staff in corporation funded project)</p>	<p><i>“Local Ownership is important”</i></p>
Field office	<p>‘...in order to be sustainable projects, local ownership is very crucial...’(Interview, OD manager in KHO)</p>	
Community	<p>‘...increasing ownership is very important, sometimes projects can meet challenges, and sometimes community can figure out the challenges which NGO can’t, for example, security in our area is very crucial issue. We can handle the issue and it can help to protect the projects, that is why local involvement is very important...’(Interview, Case 1 CDC member)</p> <p>‘...even it is small contribution, always it can help us to feel self-reliance and feel being considered...’(Interview, Case 1, CDC member)</p>	


[Table 6.1 Local Ownership as a value]

The importance of local ownership is strongly emphasized by all of interviewees [Table 6.1], which is also supported by the NGO project guideline, ‘...values empowerment of local staff and community people for their self-reliance and self-government and respects their ownership in every step of the project cycle...’(NGOK 2010:12). This show, regardless of project types, and regardless of positions within the organization, the meaning of ownership has been stressed in common as their value. Nevertheless, unlike the almost same responses underlining the importance of local ownership, the local ownership presents in various faces in the real-project process.


6.2 Local Ownership

Firstly, the interview with the IHQ staffs in both of departments-the regular project department and the corporation funded projects, helps to understand the meaning of local ownership in the projects. The IHQ staff in the regular project department said, ‘not only achievement of projects output/outcome, but also increasing ownership through local participation is regarded as important elements estimating successful results of regular project’, while the IHQ staff in the corporation funded project department said, ‘satisfaction feelings coming from the results to both donors and community people are very important elements determining the project successes or failures,’ that is, the estimating successful results tends to be more focused on ‘visible outputs’ in the corporation funded projects rather than considering about the ownership which requests additional efforts such as more time and more energy.

Secondly, as considering of big picture, when looked at the negotiation processes in each of the projects, main actors expressing their own ideas could be founded through observing the level of contrasting feelings on negotiating processes of the projects. In the Figures [6.1, 6.2], the size of the ‘star’ reflects the degree of ‘concerns on the projects based on own awareness of the projects’ expressed in the fieldwork interviews. As a general description, the contrasting feelings are founded throughout whole related actors in field levels, from KHO to locality, in the regular projects [Figure 6.1], while the contrasting feelings on the negotiations are concentrated on the Korean staffs very strongly in the corporation funded projects. [Figure 6.2]



[Figure 6.1 Regular project]



[Figure 6.2 Corporation funded project]

This is strongly related to different power positions in which show who say their idea or who obey higher level’s instructions, and here, the contrasting feelings generated from expressing own ideas on the negotiation process are founded in the similar patterns of planning process in autonomy. [Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2] Nonetheless, in reality, the local ownership was presented in more dynamic ways depending on various conditions which are impacted from not only the nature of different projects, but also field downward accountability mechanisms.

6.2.1 Regular Project

Firstly, the Case 2 local people represent high sense of ownership by showing strong understanding on their regular projects. When interviews had with local people in field research, their explanations about regular projects was right off the reel with strong confidence, which helps me to understand how the locality have been well aware of the projects deeply. One of the local people said,

‘...awareness is very important to increase local ownership, in this point, I would say, our awareness on the projects is high through sharing ideas together, and this is coming from leadership of the CDP manager, and also leadership of local people. I think the office (CDP office) and community are ‘*moja*’ (which means ‘one’ in Kiswahili)...’ (Interview, Case 2, CDC member, 8th August 2013)

The interview shows the locality have high confidence in awareness on the projects through sharing large portion of information between the CDP office and the community, the high sense of awareness definitely leads to increase deep levels of participation in the project processes. In case 2, the shared information was not only project items which is mentioned in [Table 3.2], but also even budget plans on the each programs, and these deeply shared information between them tends to impact on the locality to pre-estimate what kinds of contribution the community can do to achieve their goals, even through contributing local financial resources, material supports on the projects. As an example, they had plans for making community fence, but the budgets they made on the POA was not enough for the fence, so community meeting decided to contribute labour resources, and material resources, even small amounts of budgets for making the fences. Whole interviews explained, most of time, the regular projects were operated in the way in case 2. Furthermore, the high awareness and the participation on the projects tend to increase more activeness to locality as main actors on the projects. This year, although they had plans for growing maize, but owing to infections disease on maize, the harvest expectations was miserable. So the several community meetings decided to change the crops from maize to been, end up they could get successful harvests. One local people said,

‘...each of us knows something and we can also contribute...’ (Interview, Case 2, CDC member)

On the other hands, the local awareness on the regular projects in Case1 represents quite low level compared to Case 2 by showing limited understanding on the projects, which tends to be caused by lacks of communications and lacks of spaces for the locality to be involved in. One of the CDC member commented,

‘... the plans were developed by us, and it’s true that we have many benefits from the NGO, however, although the plans are on the basis of our priorities, I often feel that we are aware of parts of projects, I think local people needs to be more involve in the process with more understandings on the projects, and for this, more communications and meetings are needed between community and the CDP office. Even though sometimes the local desires are not able to be reflected, no problem, but we need more mutual-understandings between us...’ (Interview, Case 1 CDC member, 13th August 2013)

The interview shows low levels of the local awareness caused by lacks of shared information, which leads to strong local wishes for more participation in the project by increasing sharing ideas between community and the CDP office, during the interview, the interviewee was believing strongly that more meetings in which both of them together can bring out mutual understanding, help to increase local ownership. The importance of communications are also strongly stressed by other studies as ‘...When engaged in dialogue, participants explore the root of the challenges they face, are open to real inquiry, explore ideas, rather than debate and let a common meaning for issues arise from their shared willingness to explore...’ (Bohm et al. n.d. cited in MaMahon 2010:86), and also ‘...dialogue is the art of thinking together...’ (Isaacs, 1999:2 cited in MaMahon 2010:86)

6.2.2 Corporation funded Project

‘...in the corporation funded projects, I can strongly say, local ownership has been unrealized. It is because that, without local participation, proper-identifying local desire and needs is impossible, moreover, without listening local people’s voice, we are not able to aware how much local people’s life has been improved, as well as, if the local people are not involved in management of the projects, it will be much harder to maintain...all those points make me think strongly, the local ownership has not been achieved at all in the projects...’(Interview, the Korean staff in KHO, 10th August 2013)

In the corporation funded project case, sharing information with locality, even field staffs, presents a significant limitation compared to the regular projects, which means that the local awareness on the projects is quite limited in both case1, case2. This is because, as discussed in the previous sections, the main actor who makes negotiations is focused on the Korean staff, and the others including field staffs and local people just follow the fragment instructions without understanding the full picture of the projects.

In spite of the solid conditions in which have a significant lacks of sharing information caused by the nature of the corporation funded project, interestingly, the comparison between two cases show different types of local ownership by presenting different degrees of local participation, even both of cases are equal-

ly in lacks of information conditions. Here, the local ownership of case 2 is founded stronger than case 1.

Firstly in case 1, the low levels of both local awareness on the projects and local participation on the projects have very closely impacted on low level of local ownership, in fact, it shows 'almost non-presented' (but, which does not mean non-existence of ownership) One of the local people in the school committee in case 1 mentioned,

'...even though I am a member of school committee, I was not told about the new school construction, when I came to visit to school after summer vacation ends, I recognized the constructions were ongoing...' (Interview, School committee member, 13th August 2013)

However, even though the school head teacher was aware of the fact of school construction, the information he had was very limited, since he has been informed from the NGO about only general information such as construction schedule, yet, other details have been not discussed to the head teacher, and the lacks of shared information cause 'no-idea' for local people how to get involved in the projects. The head teacher also mentioned,

'...we could have contributed on the projects with iron sheets, and cements, I believe it could help the constructions...but I was afraid if I discuss these ideas, it might give burden feelings to the donor...so I couldn't say...also, I didn't know whom I talked to'(Interview, Case 1 school head teacher, 13th August 2013)

Yet, interestingly, it was founded that the country director who has most power at field level tends to recognize the weak local ownership in the projects most strongly than the sense of local people on the weak local ownership. He said,

'...I would say, the project shows only building changes, nothing else...the school construction desires were came from the donor, actually at the first time, the needs of the school wasn't recognized by local people, moreover, we (field office) also haven't put any efforts into local ownership, participation in the project processes...the construction has completed few weeks ago, but already water taps in the toilets are out of order, and they asked us to fix it because we built the school. They themselves don't recognize the school is theirs...their responsibility for the managing school remains very weak level...' (Interview, Country director, 19th August 2013)

This explains, the most important reasons generating the weak local ownership of the projects are not only structural problems such as '*construction desires were came from the donor*' but also, field office's efforts such as '*haven't put any efforts into local ownership*'. And the lacks of efforts of the field offices were mentioned sev-

eral times over all interviewees from country director to local people by stressing on ‘more communications’ between the community and the NGO.

However, although, the condition in the shortages of the shared information which led to discourage local awareness on the project was equally applied in case 2, interestingly, the CDP office and locality together mobilized construction committees by themselves for the purpose of carrying the instructions out as ‘supporters’⁶. That is, under the Korean constructor’s supervision, local people used to take responsibilities on the projects communicating local labours, checking constructions materials, keeping the security on the project sites, and those efforts tend to lead to increase senses of belongings to the projects(interview with local people), at the same time, it strongly effect to increase ownership on the projects.

‘...we divided the roles within community such as checking construction materials, collecting receipts, security, talking with labours, and we had meetings once a week with the Korean constructor, and we share our ideas together through the meetings ...’(Interview, local people, construction committee, 7th August 2013)

However, compared to the case 1, the reasons of the active local participation in case 2 are not only by locality’s strong desire for the school constructions, but also, more importantly, the CDP office’s leadership encouraging local ownership through ‘creating space’ (Fung and Wright 2001:7 cited in Verduijin 2006:27) for local people for the purpose of increasing local ownership.

‘...I tried to provide spaces for local people to be involved in the school construction, even just simple things like carrying bricks...these days, we are preparing the official school hand-over ceremonies, I believe that official ceremony is very important in terms of making them feel that the school belongs to community...’ (Interview, Case 2 manager, 7th August 2013)

Ownership	Regular Project	Corporation funded project
Case 1	Local ownership based on local initiatives ‘ <i>partly</i> ’	Almost non presented
Case 2	Local ownership based on local initiatives	Local ownership based on supporter’s functions

[Table 6.2 Dynamic ownership]

The comparison of two cases explains more dynamics on the local ownership presented in each of the projects. Shortly, when field office (including CDP

⁶ ‘Supporter’ refers as ‘sub-contractors’ and extension agencies of the local government performing particular services on the agency’s behalf. (Krishna 2003:369), here, ‘supporter’ is used as ‘sub-contractors’, and extension agencies of the NGO.

offices) try to encourage the local ownership in project processes, the local ownership is presented on the basis of local initiatives in the regular projects, and also it is founded on the basis of supporting functions in the corporation funded projects. In deep ways, the functions of field office (including CDP offices) creating the spaces to locality through sharing information, and encouraging participation, are very crucial factors determining different types of local ownership, and the field research explains that it impacts on the different levels of size/deep of local involvement in the regular projects, and impacts on realizing the potential ownership be latent in community in both the regular projects and the corporation funded projects.

6.3 The causality generating the dynamic local ownership

		Upward Accountability	Downward Accountability	Ownership
Regular Project (High Au- tonomy)	Combi- nation	High Autonomy + Strong institu- tionalization	High Autonomy + Institutionalization (But, less than upward accountability in regular projects)	High autonomy +Institutionalization (downward accountabil- ity)
	Analysis	:Most stable pro- ject management among four clas- sifications	:High autonomy provide chances (authority) to field office/CDP to se- lect downward account- ability even they are in the less institutionalized conditions	:The combination can lead to increase local ownership as ‘deepening role of community’ Yet, the participation scopes are likely to be decided by leadership
Corpora- tion fund- ed project (Low Au- tonomy)	Combi- nation	Low Autonomy + Weak institu- tionalization	Low Autonomy + Very weak institutionalization	Low autonomy + Very weak institutional- ization
	Analysis	:Very frequent strong informal mechanisms overwhelm the project processes as means of sup- porting IHQ/Donors desire and in- structions :Impacts of HO leadership, par- ticularly the country direc- tor’s leadership, but low autono- my affect to country director decision to fol- low IHQ deci- sion)	:Low autonomy is hard to provide chances (au- thority) to field of- fice/CDP to select downward accountabil- ity, rather, the combina- tion between low auton- omy and low institutionalization threaten downward ac- countability easily. :Impacts of HO leader- ship, particularly the country director’s lead- ership, but low auton- omy affect to country di- rector decision to follow IHQ decision, yet CDP leadership can somehow contribute downward accountability)	:The combination have high possibility to threaten local ownership Yet, through strong CDP leadership mecha- nisms emphasizing on local ownership, it can lead local ownership as ‘stretching role of com- munity’

[Table 6.3 The causality generating the dynamic local ownership]

Firstly, in the regular projects, the combination between high autonomy presented in the regular projects and institutionalized accountability mechanisms which were discussed in accountability section leads to increase local ownership through increasing deepening role⁷ of local participation based on deeply shared information between the field office and the locality. And the local ownership presented in the regular projects is close to the explanation of Shinoda (2008:99) on local ownership which is 'local people's actual leading role as well as their feeling about their leading role in the process.'

In detail, the values emphasising on local ownership which were founded from both of staff interviews and the organization's guideline, are like to be maintained in high autonomy conditions presented in the regular projects by the field office's volition on project process decisions, without considering of other interventions. Furthermore, the institutionalized downward accountability mechanisms support the abstract ownership value to be maintained in the reality, through taking protection functions against other external interventions. When analysed the regular project upward accountability mechanisms, it was founded that the organization tried to include the downward accountability into upward accountability tools, for instance, mobilizing CDC, monthly meetings have to be done, and have to be included in POA tools which is the main upward accountability mechanism of the regular projects. And the organizational efforts for the merger between upward accountability and downward accountability tend to enhance common connection throughout all different levels. Consequently, all these conditions together lead the local ownership by increasing 'deepening roles' of community, which is on the basis of strong local initiatives from the designing the plans to the ends in project processes. Krishna comments, (2003:366)

‘...CBOs performing deepening functions will need considerably more flexibility and authority. Citizens are not usually willing to contribute their time, money and other resources according to a programme laid out entirely by some external authority. They do so more readily when they have some control over these activities. The larger their deepening role, the more CBOs needs to be involved not just in project identification but also in design, implementation and budget management...’

What is interesting is here, the fact that the functions of leadership tends to impact on determining the size of local ownership in the regular projects. In other words, even through the projects are operated within the same institutionalized systems developed from the organization, types of leadership, and its strategies tends to affect the scopes of local ownership by the leader decision such as how much share their information with locality, and how deeply let local people be involved in the projects, which were discussed through the comparison between case1 and case2.

⁷ Krishna explains 'the larger deepening role, the more community need to be involved not just in project identification but also in design, implementation and budget management'(2003: 366)

Secondly, on the other hand, in the corporation funded projects, the combination between low autonomy presented in the corporation funded projects and the very weak institutionalized accountability mechanisms tends to threaten the local ownership strongly following rambling instructions without well functioning-protection mechanisms for locality. Yet, in spite of the weak mechanisms conditions, particular leadership stressing on local ownership during the project process tends to lead to enlarge local ownership through increasing ‘stretching role of community’⁸ (Krishna 2003:365)

Minutely, the low autonomy nature in the corporation funded projects hindering field office’s discretionary authority tends to let field office be compelled to follow instructions made by high level such as IHQ, donor, without considering local conditions deeply. More importantly, the donor driven process is naturally accepted to both field staffs and local people as a *fait accompli*. In the conditions, the very weak institutionalized downward accountability mechanisms are unable to do even minimum levels of protection functions for locality, as a result, the combination between low autonomy and very weak institutionalized downward accountability shows high possibility to threaten local ownership. Nevertheless, the functions of leadership mechanisms stressing on local ownership enable to raise local ownership, even in the weak institutionalization condition. This is as discussed, although both sharing information, full-local participation throughout whole the corporation funded project process tends to be limited to local people relatively compared to the regular projects, the comparison between case1 and case2 shows that the particular leadership considering the local ownership as important elements for the development projects lead to enlarge local ownership through increasing stretching role of community, which was founded in case2, while ownership was not presented in case1 in which the leadership did not put the effort to create the space for locality. As Valk (2004:3) said, ‘ownership is already there, to be selected’, the two cases shows how the local ownership is selected by particular leadership within the similar limited conditions, which are generated by low autonomy and low institutionalized downward accountability mechanisms. However, unlike the local ownership presented in the regular projects through increasing ‘deepening role of community’, as mentioned briefly, the local ownership presented in the corporation funded project in case 2 is likely to be shown through ‘stretching role of community’. Krishna explains, (2003:365)

‘... in a stretching role, they can be engaged to function mostly as sub-contractors...technical capacity of CBOs is of primary importance in these cases, and their ability to mobilize and organize collective action is relatively less important. Consequently, even very new CBOs can be entrusted with such tasks including those that have been formed specifically for this purpose, provided that they have (or can assisted to

⁸ Stretching roles of community refer to the role of sub-contractor (Krishna 2003:365).

acquire) the technical skills required for the particular task...they are engaged primarily as sub-contractors, project activities can also commence relatively rapidly...where CBOs play stretching roles, they act mainly as sub-contractors...performing particular service on their behalf...'

Like this, the local ownership shows various faces depending different conditions presented in different types of projects, yet, all those things considered, beyond many contemporary discussion on local ownership focused on local people's capacity building (Cavaye 1999 cited in Simpson et al. 2003, 278;Labonate 1999 cited in Simpson et al. 2003:278), the research emphasize 'the local ownership can be selected', by putting the efforts to create space in which local people can be involved in, and also by building up well-developed institutionalized accountability mechanisms. These points are very crucial elements not only for encouraging local ownership, but also for realizing the local voice into NGO development projects.

7. Conclusion

This research explored how Korean NGO field offices engage with local voice in different types of projects, which are regular project and corporation funded project, with two selected cases in Kenya. The comparison of two different types of projects helped us to consider about the factors of development agency impacting on locality, in turns, it developed understandings about the ways to strengthen the engagement with locality in NGO project process in field office perspectives.

As mentioned, since the role of development NGO has been increased in last 20 years over Korean society, the increasing awareness on the development NGO strongly has led to enlarge various funding resources to NGOs, especially, the increasing both individual donation and corporation donations have boosted the numbers of NGO development projects in developing countries. Nonetheless, in spite of increasing the quantitative growth, the short history of learning process of Korean NGOs seems to need more efforts to focus on qualitative development which is generated by deep-engagement with locality, this is as Keystone (2006 pv cited in Jacobs and Wilfold 2010:139) pointed out, the quality of the projects and the quality of relationship with beneficiaries are very strongly inter-related, as well as reinforced each other. Particularly, the perspective of field office which is the arena interacting with locality directly helped us to have a close look at the project process in the complicated dynamic conditions generated by different natures of projects and different management on it.

Therefore, to explore the different field office's ways of engaging with locality, and more to the points, to find the ways to strengthen local engagement in projects, this research compared three dimensions 1) autonomy, 2) accountability 3) ownership in two different types of projects-regular project and corporation funded project-consisting of increasing Korean NGO projects, with two selected cases in Kenya.

Interestingly, the causality between autonomy presented in the different types of project, field office accountability mechanisms, especially downward accountability mechanisms, and local ownership, has founded in different ways in regular project and corporation funded projects, and the analysis of the causality showed that generally, the corporation funded projects are based on the strong donor-driven development management while the regular project tended to be based on local initiatives management relatively. In short, firstly in autonomy sections, it was founded that high autonomy was presented in regular projects, whereas low autonomy was presented in corporation funded projects relatively. Secondly, in accountability sections, mostly downward accountability mechanisms existed in field office level which is the most impactive mechanisms affecting local ownership showed lower institutionalized, compared to upward accountability mechanisms. However, even low institutionalized conditions, the fact that particular leadership emphasizing on downward accounta-

bility can help to increase use of the mechanisms in project process was founded, especially, when high autonomy is presented in the projects, high possibility for leader to choose the downward accountability was founded. Thirdly, in ownership sections, it was discussed that mainly conditions of the field office downward mechanisms impact on local ownership. As discussed, the comparing between case 1 and case 2 helped us to understand that the particular leadership emphasising on local ownership brought out certain types of local ownership in both regular project and corporation funded project. The Case 2 in which presented high leaders awareness on the local ownership in both of projects, gave interesting understandings about local ownership having various faces, which are local ownership based on local initiative throughout whole processes in regular projects, and local ownership based on role of supporters in corporation funded projects.

Like this, the exploring research helped us to understand different ways of field office toward locality in different types of projects, within the structure, it was founded 'autonomy presented in projects', 'accountability existed in field office' and 'ownership at local level' are strongly interrelated each other in casual connections, and mostly, the connections showed us that the combination between 'high autonomy presented in projects' and 'strong downward accountability mechanisms' lead to 'high local initiative ownership' in NGO project process. Furthermore, the lessons from the research suggest three levels of ways to strengthen local voices.

Firstly, community capacity building is one of the elements encouraging local ownership. Eade and Williams (1995:5 cited in Eade 1997:23) stresses as 'strengthening people's capacity to determine their own values and priorities, and to organise themselves to act on these, is the basis of development.' Yachkaschi(2010:195) also points out 'strengthening community capacity for self-sustaining development', like this, as a micro level, community capacity building need to be considered in order to engage with locality in projects.

However, more importantly, the research suggests at meso level, besides of focusing on community capacity building, the spaces how much/how deep localities are involved in, tends to be created by leadership at field level (Valk 2004; Fung and Wright 2001 cited in Verduijin 2006). That is, when field offices try to put more efforts into uses of downward accountability mechanisms, the projects can absorb local voices in processes more and more. Therefore, well-awareness on the importance of downward accountability mechanisms, specifically, the leadership based on the awareness of importance of locality (Jacob and Wilford 2010:808) is needed to be realized in project process.

Last but not least, at macro level, no matter the field office itself may try to emphasize on the local ownership in project processes, if entire organizational system do not supports, the field office's efforts end up facing limitations. That is, organizational strategies which refer 'translations into how the organization designing the organization around, particular methodologies of practice, with adaptation to particular circumstances. Strategic thinking involves prioritizing

certain activities and approaches over other' (Fowler and Ubels 2010:14), need to be set up to support their value based on locality through 'using long term time-frame, local ownership necessitates a clear accountability structure and process embedded in the local value system.' (Fowler and Ubels 2010:14) Particularly, this research suggests institutionalized mechanisms-especially more focused on downward accountability- developed by entire organization system is needed depending on the different types of projects. In detail, the regular project accountability mechanisms which tried to reflect the merge between upward accountability and downward accountability are likely to provide common understandings among all related stake holders, which can increase mutual understandings in project processes.

In conclusion, the research explained the different ways of field office toward locality in the different types of projects, regular projects and corporation funded projects. Mainly, this research emphasizes local ownership is not only about the issue of locality itself, but also, it is more about NGO's selections. Especially, the comparing between regular projects and corporation funded projects reminds us to consider how NGO have to manage their development projects in the increasing streams of corporation donations as well, in which give us important points to remind of NGO's 'Agency' in increasing involvement of other sectors in NGO development projects. According to previous studies (Morse and Mcnamara 2012; Mohan 2002; Robb 2004; Burbules 1986 cited in Morse and Mcnamara 2012), the contemporary development NGO projects tends to be explained by looking at the relations between donors and beneficiaries focused on the asymmetric relations between 'have' and 'have not'. However, beyond this point, the lessons from the causality between autonomy, accountability and ownership in comparison between the different types of projects give us very critical points, which are, the ways of development NGO's thinking, and the ways of development NGO's action are very important factors determining which way forward for their project process in the contemporary complex development environments caused by increasing involvement of various sectors in the name of partnership, and this research pointed out throughout the paper, the functions of field office management is very important to increase local voices in NGO project processes, yet, in addition to field office, IHQ which is the umbrella organization of the field offices also have to back up the field offices in order to fulfil the value cited in their vision statement. Lastly, I strongly say, the lessons from exploring the Korean NGO case is, not only the issue of Korean NGOs management, but also it is worth keeping in mind in contemporary international NGO development practices toward local voices.

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