

'Islamophobia' - exploring the concept and its manifestation among the Dutch in The Hague

Chirag Sutar | Student No: 368106

M.A Media Studies

Programme Media, Culture & Society | 2012-2013 |

Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication

Erasmus University Rotterdam

Masters Thesis

October, 2013

Abstract

Social scientists are struggling to define and measure Islamophobia. Answers to questions like - what is Islamophobia? And how much of it exists remain elusive. In the absence of any agreeable definition, exploring this phenomenon from a new viewpoint is essential. This study takes a critical view of the main 'source' – The Runnymede Trust Report (1997) – which is known to have popularized the word. To begin with, a propaganda analysis is conducted on the report to understand what arguments the report makes and what propaganda devices can be identified or interpreted in those arguments. It is also studied whether Islamophobia exists or not at a micro level by conducting interviews with Dutch interviewees (40-65 yrs) living in The Hague. The findings suggest that the existence of 'dread or fear about Islam' could be an exaggerated argument as issues such as 'race' and 'religion' within the Dutch interviewees were of least importance, and so was religion in general. The Dutch focus, largely, is on assimilation and with the main criteria being obeying laws. Some discriminatory attitudes do exist, but there is no alarmism or simplification with it comes to Muslims or Islam.

Keywords: Runnymede Trust Report, Propaganda, Islamophobia, Multiculturalism, Anti-Islam Attitudes, The Hague, The Netherlands

Acknowledgment

From a historical and propaganda point of view - the topic of Islamophobia is relatively easier to articulate and explain. But from a sociological point of view a challenging one to research. I have made an attempt to contribute to this subject from a different perspective and question the phenomenon of Islamophobia.

I would like to thank Professors Augé, Hitters and Janssen for their initial feedback.

CONTENTS

Introduction	1
1.1 The problem of describing Islamophobia	1
1.2 What is propaganda research?	3
1.3 Exploring the Islamophobia phenomenon using propaganda research	3
1.4 Islamophobia in The Netherlands?	4
1.5 Research Question	5
2 Theoretical Framework	7
2.1 Think-Tanks, Propaganda & Techniques	8
2.2 What is propaganda?	11
2.3 The basic techniques of propaganda	13
2.4 What is Islamophobia?	15
2.5 A brief history of term Islamophobia	16
2.6 The Runnymede Report and Islamophobia	16
2.7 Interpretations of Islamophobia	18
2.8 Academic interpretations of Islamophobia	19
2.9 Integrated Threat Theory	21
2.10 Islamophobia in the Netherlands	22
Research design	24
3.1 Operationalization	24
3.2 Propaganda Analysis Methodology	24
3.3 Reliability and Validity	26
3.4 Interviews - Methodology	26
3.5 Validity and Reliability	27
3.6 Researcher Bias	27
4 Findings- Analysis of the Runnymede Report	28
4.1. Propaganda analysis	28
4.2 What propaganda devices are present in the Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia?	35
5 Findings - Dutch beliefs and Attitudes	38
5.1 Interview findings	38
5.2 Relation to possible manifestation of Islamophobia.	46
6 Conclusion & Recommendation	49
References	54
Appendix: Thematic Overview, Interview Transcripts, Runnymede Trust Report (Conway, 1997)	0

Introduction

Islamophobia¹ can be viewed today as an important concept, term or phenomenon in both political and apolitical forums. Globally, debates, viewpoints and interpretations of what constitutes as Islamophobia are usually broad and varied. However, an interesting aspect remains unexplained - there is no acceptable, measurable definition of what Islamophobia is (Bleich, 2011; Lopez, 2011). This leads to a question - why does the use of this term dominate in various sections of discourse in society? The fact that there exists no definition and that Islamophobia is yet to be measured has not stopped the use of the term - it remains contested however. Today, the term Islamophobia is used in a variety of contexts, which will be discussed at some length in the later part of this thesis. However, for now, I begin with how the term Islamophobia is 'described' as there are some inconsistencies associated with it, for which the reason is not known.

1.1 *The problem of describing Islamophobia*

Some scholars choose to describe Islamophobia as 'phenomenon' others describe it as 'concept' or 'contested concept'. I will explore this issue in some more detail as it is of importance from a propaganda researcher's viewpoint. For example, in his dissertation on Islamophobia, Allen (2005) refers to Islamophobia as 'contested concept'. In his book *Islamophobia*, Chris Allen calls Islamophobia as a 'phenomenon' (see Allen, 2010). By definition, a phenomenon² 'is a fact whose cause is not known', and this brings to the fore a question, however insignificant. Previous studies have cited 9/11 as a predominant *cause* of Islamophobia (see Allen, 2004; Abbas, 2004; Larsson, 2005; Poynting, 2007). If one cause (i.e 9/11) is identified - why is Islamophobia still being called a phenomenon? Using the word concept³ (see Richardson & Stone, 2004; Vakil, 2010; Meer & Modood, 2008) to describe Islamophobia also muddles the context. The word 'concept' is defined as that which is a general notion. Is Islamophobia understood as a 'general notion' among the

¹ In this research, when I use/discuss the word Islamophobia, I use the shorthand definition provided by the Runnymede Trust Report defined as "Dread or hatred of Islam and, therefore, to fear or to dislike of all or most Muslims" (Conway, 1997, p 1). Since Islamophobia as a term is discussed and debated in various contexts, it often becomes difficult to understand what a researcher means when he uses the word 'Islamophobia'. Throughout, unless otherwise stated, this research discusses Islamophobia with reference to the short hand definition stated above.

² The definition of the word 'Phenomenon' is taken from Oxford Dictionary (see Oxford Dictionary, n.d.).

³ The definition of the word 'Concept' is taken from Dictionary Reference (see Dictionary Reference, n.d.).

media, politicians, and general population? Is there already a general consensus (empirically substantiated) that most people fear, dread, hate or dislike Islam or most Muslims? It would perhaps be most appropriate to refer to Islamophobia as 'contested concept' [as Allen (2005) refers to] in his dissertation. However, it appears, especially in the subject of Islamophobia that there is rarely any consistency in the way it is described. Among other things, one of the biggest challenges of understanding what constitutes as Islamophobia perhaps arises due to the term Islamophobia being used loosely and sometimes interchangeably to address one or all of the following: 'racism' 'discrimination' 'prejudice' and/or 'stereotypes' against Islam or Muslims (Bleich, 2011; Lopez, 2011). Owing to the multitude of interpretations, Islamophobia is also recognized as a polemic and neologism (Imhoff & Recker, 2012).

Through the past few years, there have been various other contestations when it comes to use of the term. For instance, last year, international news agency AP (Associated Press) removed two words from their editorial policy - Islamophobia and Homophobia. AP style-guide argued that it was inappropriate to use the word "phobia" in social context (Ford, 2012). And though a well-reputed news agency decided to stop the use of the the term, a few years ago, Kofi Anan, the UN General Secretary, used the term in his speech at the United Nations Forum (see UN, 2004) and from a propaganda researchers viewpoint, this can be considered as giving the term and the phenomenon some kind of recognition, acknowledgment, legitimacy at an international level. Islamophobia as a term has a very rare distinction of being accepted and rejected. Which groups accept, and which groups reject can be a difficult question to answer. But acceptance and rejection is not always based on empirical evidence. Furthermore, discussions on and about 'Islamophobia' is more about interpretations than about empirical evidence - academic papers on Islamophobia do reflect a certain vacuum when it comes to this and does critically comment on how and if Islamophobia manifests. The recent development within research is Islamophobia is about 'development of scales' to measure Islamophobia. The measurement is termed as 'Perceived Islamophobia Scale' (see Kunst et al., 2012) and measures the perceived threat perceptions which an group may hold towards another group. However, the instruments designed for empirical researches are yet to be refined, and their reliability is yet to be ascertained. The Kunst et al. (2012) research for instance, only includes Muslim participants, and one that are organized/provided by Muslim groups affecting the reliability and validity of the research to some degree.

Even after years of research, discussions and debates, at this juncture, scholars are largely discussing three main questions - What is Islamophobia, how much of it exists and how it can be

measured (Lee et al., 2009; Bleich, 2011, Lopez 2011). If we look at the nature of these questions they seem to be returning back to questions which aim at improving/understanding the term and the phenomenon at the very 'conceptual level' and focus on developing ways to measure it. This exploratory research, which approaches the subject of Islamophobia from a propaganda researchers viewpoint, aims to add to this discussion from a point of view which takes into account the history of the concept, analyzes the persuasion and propaganda devices found in the most widely cited Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia, and attempts at evaluating the ground situation by interviewing a micro group in The Hague to know and understand their attitude and beliefs on Islam and Muslim and explores if those attitudes and beliefs can be termed as Islamophobia as defined in the Runnymede Report, 1997 (Conway, 1997).

1.2 What is propaganda research?

The term 'propaganda research' may for some be unfamiliar, but, as Silverstein (1987) argues, propaganda research or propaganda analysis is something which is often done in various disciplines including social psychology, political science, journalism, communications, education, semantics or sociology and published in publications such as *Columbia Journalism Review* or journals like *Covert Action Information Bulletin* (defunct since 2005). In many ways Silverstein (1987) arguments are valid as propaganda research continues to be done through various field although not particularly under the head of 'propaganda research' (for example, see Mosier, 2013; Zimmerman, 2013; Enterieva, 2013). Propaganda analysis may be considered similar to textual analysis but involves identifying and critically investigating how communication within a document is designed, how the facts are presented, in what order and how it can persuade audience or readers or decision makers and whether it expects an impact or reaction (more detailed steps of this analysis can be found in the methodology section).

1.3 Exploring the Islamophobia phenomenon using propaganda research

In propaganda research the 'source' of an information is given a lot of importance (see Jowett & O'Donnell, 2011) and holds the key to understanding the propaganda, and helps in putting in context the various propaganda tools. When it comes to Islamophobia, the Runnymede Trust Report titled *Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All* is credited of 'popularising' the term Islamophobia first beginning in UK in 1997 and can be considered as an important or key source. As an important source (of the term 'Islamophobia'), The Runnymede Report is widely known, cited and debated by academics. The report defines Islamophobia as "Dread or hatred of Islam - and, therefore, to fear

or to dislike of all or most Muslims” (Conway, 1997, p 1). The significance⁴ of the Runnymede Trust report increases, especially from a propaganda researcher’s viewpoint, when one reviews it considering the political atmosphere in Britain in 1997 and when demands by certain Islamic lobbies was high to recognize Islam (the religion) in the Race Relations Act ,1976. However, the Race Relations Act, 1976, as the name suggests, only recognized discrimination based on ‘race’ punishable, not ‘religion’. This had led to a certain amount of friction between two groups (1) who wanted Islam to be recognized in the Race Relations Act, 1976 (2) and those who felt such a policy was not required (Samad, 1992; Statham; 1999). If one studies one of the main political upheavals during this phase, it was about Iranian leader Ayatollah Khoumeni’s fatwa on Salman Rushdie for his book *Satanic Verses*. Rushdie’s book had faced immense back lash and violent protests from Muslim communities. The violent protests by Muslim groups, however, were criticized by the western world as considered as against free speech and intolerant (Parekh, 1990; Samad, 1992).The timing of this report, the context, the political undercurrents gives the opportunity to conduct a propaganda analysis and spell-out issues and contexts which may be new. Before conducting the propaganda analysis, a wider context is also discussed about think-tanks. The Runnymede Trust is essentially a think-tank group, and think-tanks have been have a contentious history of influencing public opinion by attempting to propagate or set different kinds of agendas (Bernays, 1928; Rich, 2004; George, 1997). This thesis will attempt to explain the relationship between think-tanks, and particularly Runnymede Trust and the possible agenda it may have served during that time.

1.4 Islamophobia in The Netherlands?

The other half of this research involves interviewing Dutch citizens from The Hague, The Netherlands. The Hague is a city with approximately 50 percent of population who are foreigners or

⁴ The Runnymede Trust definition of Islamophobia is also a definition used in surveys. In one of the latest surveys (see Comres, 2013) undertaken by a research agency in UK, it was found that 5% of those interviewed (1000 respondents) denied existence of Islamophobia (as defined in Runnymede Trust Report, 1997). In the same research, 23% of those interviewed said media was responsible for creating Islamophobia. 26% said internationally-known terror groups such as Al-Qaeda were to be blamed. 21% said it was UK-based Muslims who were to blame for Islamophobia. 4% said the blame could be laid on Muslim community generally. It is can be said that firstly, there is unclarity (see Bleich, 2011; Lopez, 2011) over the term Islamophobia at an academic level, furthermore, surveys presented using Runnymede Trust definition of Islamophobia, suggests varied reasons with majority blaming ‘media’ for creating Islamophobia, followed by internationally well-known terror organizations (generally talked about in the media). The local UK Muslims were also blamed for Islamophobia in the survey (21% UK-based respondents said so). This presents an interesting picture - is discrimination over-exaggerated in news media? And does critically review their own discourse?

immigrants (CBS, 2011). The possibility that the Dutch participants of this city could have critical views about Islam and Muslims and/or foreigners in general is strong. Furthermore, the discourse about Islam and Muslims in The Netherlands and among the Dutch has been an important subject considering The Netherlands has had a history of outspoken politicians such as Pim Fortuyn who was considered to have a critical view on Islam (Van der Veer, 2006). At present Geert Wilders the leader of political party PVV, is largely reported to have an exclusively anti-Islam stand. There have been other incidents of serious nature which involved the assassination of Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh in 2004 by an Islamic extremist. In general, the political discourse in the post 9/11 terror attacks, death of Theo van Gogh, and local incidences which involves hate-speech by clerics have all combined and the belief is that this has created a highly negative public opinion about Islam and Muslims. For instance, in 2008, the ECRI report suggested that 'Islamophobic' discourse has increased in The Netherlands since it released the first report in 2005. However, it was found after reading the Ecri (2008) report that it also used the term Islamophobia interchangeably for racist events, stereotypical discourse found in the Dutch media and among politicians. Undeniably, a certain level of discrimination may exist and has been reflected in previous studies. For example, - to know if the Dutch were supportive about far-right politician Geert Wilders view on deporting Muslims back if they don't assimilate, 71 percent were reported to have said "Good, I can't wait" while 23 percent said "Bad, Moroccans belong here" (Bloss, 2009). A study which used ITT (Integrated Threat Theory) concluded that one in two participants in their study conducted in The Netherlands harbored negative stereotypes about Muslims (González, Verkuyten & Weesie et al., 2008). The Dutch, more than anything else, were found to be worried about radical Islam and the implications of it on life or property (Veldhuis & Bakker, 2009). Among the young Muslims in The Netherlands, the debate is and interesting one where a section of young Muslims find the Dutch view enforcing integration and assimilation on them, whereas another section concedes that Dutch are good to deal with and do not bother until their values or symbolic notions are not interfered with (Brouwer, 2004).

1.5 Research Question

Two questions are attempted to find answers to using two different methodologies (more information in the methodology section) (1) What propaganda devices are present in the Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia? (2) What are the beliefs and attitudes of Dutch citizens in The Hague towards Muslims and Islam and how is this related to the possible manifestation of Islamophobia? This study uses a mixed method study to answer this question (more about this explained in the research design chapter). The attempt is to add to the discussion of Islamophobia

at two levels – (1) at a conceptual level – by investigating one of the popular sources (2) Understand the manifestation of Islamophobia at a ground level by knowing the attitudes and beliefs of Dutch towards Islam and Muslims in The Hague. The findings at both these levels is expected to give a robust overview about Islamophobia and its possible manifestation at a micro level.

Beginning from the next chapter (Chapter 2), I will be covering relevant literature related to propaganda and think-tanks in the chapter Think-tanks, propaganda and techniques, what is propaganda and basic techniques of propaganda, scholarly discussions on Islamophobia and Integrated Threat Theory. Chapter 3 will introduce the research design and explain the methodology. Chapter 4 will present the findings of the Runnymede Trust Report, Chapter 5 will present analysis of the Dutch group interviewed. Chapter 6 will present a conclusion and recommendation.

2 Theoretical Framework

Islamophobia is largely discussed and debated about in a manner which speaks about how it has manifested in the society. However, repeatedly, empirical researches on Islamophobia have concluded that as a concept it is challenging to measure Islamophobia (see Bleich, 2011) with serious questions whether it exists or not. Today, by and large, what constitutes as Islamophobia, and what doesn't, is determined by variety of benchmarks and definitions - media reports, commentary made by popular figures or politicians or sometimes incidences of discrimination at a popular level. The question is whether the "dread" or "fear" of Islam exists or is perceived among the general population? Or is this discourse needlessly alarmist? If we attempt to understand this by taking into account agenda-setting theories (which to a great extent takes inspiration from existing theories in propaganda) it suggests that a certain perception about an issue can be created in the minds of the people by consistently bombarding that issue through various channels - also known as "issue salience". Agenda setting largely relies on positioning an issue in a manner it gets more "importance" compared to other issues (MacCombs, Shaw & Weaver, 1997). Empirical evidence of effectiveness of this (agenda setting) is established - for example, it was found that during the Gulf War the emphasis given on military in the news reports was consistently high by the Bush government. On-ground studies showed that people supported US military for the war without critically reflecting or reviewing the pro and cons of the US military action. In another study conducted in US it was propagated that illegal drug problem was a very serious problem across the country and was positioned as a prominent issue in the media, however, studies showed that merely 5 percent of people in the US related to the problem at a ground level (Iyengar & Simon, 1993). The same concerns can be related to the term or the concept of Islamophobia - is it critically studied and reviewed? Does it reflect the public opinion on the ground?

In the present discourse on Islamophobia, it is observed that a more critical assessment of the term is warranted and this can be achieved using propaganda analysis. The Islamophobia Report was released by the Runnymede Trust Report in 1997 - a well-known British think-tank. Studying this subject through a propaganda viewpoint makes it mandatory that think-tanks and nature of think-tank groups is also studied as think-tanks do utilize propaganda tools to make their point. If we look at the general perception about think-tanks it is that think-tanks produce reports which are of public interest (and of public good) or relevant to specific industries. However, it has also been observed that think-tanks are used by various companies, organizations, politicians to invent an argument, set a tone of a discourse or set an agenda. Furthermore, they are also keenly involved in

popularizing reports by sharing it with media or by employing PR agencies. The data presented by a think-tank is often used to strengthen an argument in the socio-economic-political discourse. This data can be real, completely manufactured or partly manufactured. And this can be determined by conducting a propaganda analysis and understand what are the arguments which a report is making, who sponsored the think-tank report, what was the current issue during the time when the report was released etc. The following paragraph will discuss some of the existing literature on think-tanks and propaganda and will help in understanding and analysing the Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia.

2.1 Think-Tanks, Propaganda & Techniques

There exists no set definition about what think-tanks are, but their characteristics and roles offer some insight into how they function. Rich (2004) provides a politically correct definition of think-tanks - "Independent, non-interest-based, nonprofit, organizations that principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influence policy making process" (p 11). However, to believe in this definition entirely could be misleading as many think-tanks operate as agencies for setting agenda at various levels and that real purpose largely is to influence policy makers (Bernays, 1928; Rich, 2004; Weaver, 1989). There are no reports or statistical figures about how many are partisan think-tanks and how many are non-partisan. However, it appears from the existing literature on the subject of think-tanks and propaganda that this, to some extent, can be determined by the funding sources of think-tanks (Bernays 1928; Kelly, 1988; Weaver, 1989; Rich, 2004). Kelly's (1988) cynical definition of think-tanks encapsulates these notions - he argues think-tanks are "an arrangement by which millions of dollars are removed from the accounts of willing corporations, the government, and the eccentric wealthy and given to researchers who spend much of their time competing to get their names in print" (as mentioned in Weaver, 1989, p 564). On another cynical note, which offers insight into the possible relationships which think-tanks have with corporations or governments, Weaver (1989) mentions that think-tanks, though they claim to be non-partisan, are sometimes known as "beltway bandits-for-profit institutions" (p 571) often centered or located around important diplomatic clusters in cities and whose researches are considered as designed specifically to meet objectives of those who pay for it. In Thomas Medvetz latest book *Think Tanks in America*, Medvetz, offers insight into the functioning of think-tanks. He argues that unlike scholars, think-tanks are not constrained by academic rules and values. The existence of a wide variety of think-tanks allows interested parties to 'shop' for policies and researches and pick a policy or research which supports their view or objectives (Krause, 2013). Weaver (1989) argues the notion that think-tank groups are 'non-partisan' organization, is merely an 'impression', and that it is important for

think-tanks to have such an impression so that policy makers who consume the research feel confident about the data/researches these think-tanks offer.

Historically speaking, think-tanks have played an important role in the US and Britain since the 1940s, and many of them are known to have considerable influence in the political sphere. Some think-tanks are said to have run governments with the strategies they provide and policies they recommend. To give an example: A US based think-tank The Heritage Foundation was renowned for its association with US President Ronald Reagan. It is said that a week after Reagan became president, the Heritage Foundation handed him a 1000 page document, and these recommendations, were passed across various departments for referrals - most, it is said, became laws (George, 1997). In the 60s, President Lyndon Johnson was so much in praise of the Brookings Institute - a Washington-based think-tank - that he felt if an institution like Brookings did not exist, he would have asked someone to create it (Rich, 2004). This may explain to some degree the influence of think-tank groups on important institutions such as government departments. A study, research or article, which covers or explicitly draws relationships between propaganda employed by think-tank groups are rare. But significance of propaganda as practiced by a think-tank group can be sought from work of Bernays (1928) who states that specialized reports⁵, which 'recommend' ideas, policies may be motivated by an interest group and ultimately can serve the interest of the group. For instance, Bernays (1928) cites a hypothetical situation of a symposium of coffee manufacturers releasing a report through a hired agency or a think-tank with testimonials and recommendations by 'experts' or 'doctors' about benefits of 'coffee' drinking. Such a report, for instance, can be used by the interest group to present a favorable argument in a number of scenarios. For example, buying land for coffee plantations at a subsidized rate from the government since 'coffee drinking is beneficial' or it could be for a general purpose like 'correcting' or 'sustaining' or 'improving' the perception people have about coffee and hence retaining the buying habits of people. The way agencies and reports can be used to set agenda is not restricted to business sector alone, but also politics as mentioned earlier (see, George 1997). Weaver (1989) observes that the role of think-tanks is to provide and popularize ideas which can influence policies and policy makers in the long term and persuade the policy makers to meet their agendas. The keyword in Weavers (1989) articulation is 'long-term' as think-tanks can be observed to consistently focus on 'one' issue in various degrees and consistently over a period of time achieve their goals. Weaver (1989) classifies such think-tanks which aim work on a long term goal on a

⁵ Bernays (1928) explains his ideas/theories by using the concept of 'reports' or 'researches' released by organizations. He does not use the word 'Think-Tank'. It is possible that the word think-tank came much later.

single issue as 'advocacy think-tanks'. According to the official website of the Runnymede Trust, it identifies itself as "UK's leading independent race equality think tank which generates 'intelligence' for a multi-ethnic Britain through research, network building, leading debate, and policy engagement" (Runnymede, 1968). Considering the use of keywords such as 'network-building' and 'policy building' and the fact that it is focusing on issues relating to multi-ethnic Britain, the Runnymede Trust may be considered as an advocacy think-tank focusing⁶ on issues of racism and discrimination (Runnymede, 1968a).

It is certainly of interest to explore from a propaganda researcher's viewpoint as to how sociologists view think-tank groups. Rich (2004) argues that sociologists have not paid much attention to how think-tanks can influence or set an agenda. And one of the reasons, according to Rich (2004), is the belief among scholars and researchers that think tanks offer general researches on public policies and their reports may not be as interesting. If the Islamophobia Report by Runnymede Trust think-tank report and the way it is mentioned and discussed by scholars is reviewed, a mixed picture emerges where scholars appear to take the findings of report seriously giving an impression that the report is of considerable academic importance (see Abbas, 2004; Saeed, 2007; NAMP, 2010; Allen, 2008; Allen 2013). Other scholars fall in the band of being skeptical to critical (see Halliday, 1999, Bleich, 2011). Those who view research reports by think-tanks as something of research importance could hold such a view due to the perception that think-tank serve issues of public interest in a non-partisan way (Weaver, 1968). Furthermore, rarely do think-tanks come under the scrutiny of media as it can be that political influence of the think-tank would be high enough to stop a newspaper or an organization from carrying an investigative story or invite litigation. By that means, as Smith & Marden (2007) observe, "Think tanks are strategically placed to parade their own ideology, abstaining from genuine critical engagement or, indeed, any critical self-reflection, and dismiss any contrary opinion as politically motivated" (p 700). These are some of the key ideas around the subject of think-tanks which may help understanding the subject of Islamophobia, from a more holistic viewpoint. It is not the intention to provide the various propaganda techniques which think-tanks may put to practice as they are usually tailored and customized and differ vastly from one campaign or advocacy goal to the other. Some insight into the nature of agenda setting can be found in Smith & Marden (2008) work on conservative think-tanks in Australia and how they function and manner in which they set agenda's or influence policies. I will now discuss some of the relevant ideas about propaganda as very often propaganda techniques are used by various competitive industries as part of their communication.

⁶ A list of Runnymede publication can be viewed on the official Runnymede Trust website (Runnymede, 1968)

2.2 What is propaganda?

The Merriam Webster dictionary defines propaganda as “allegations, facts and ideas which are deliberately spread in order to further or advance a cause or to damage an opposing cause” (Webster, n.d). This is a more general definition of propaganda. To add, dictionaries, more or less, use definitions of words which are relevant in that particular time or decade. In this time and age, the meaning and propaganda is wrought with negativity - this, can be due to the post World War II narrative of the term propaganda (Bernays, 1928). According to Bernays (1928), Hitler's use of propaganda to influence the German population had a considerable impact on the way the term was perceived after World War II- which was largely negative. Edward Bernays was himself a practitioner of propaganda and had the distinction of working on some of the most controversial experiments in both business and political spheres. One of his controversial experiments was helping a tobacco manufacturer sell cigarettes to women - in short, popularizing cigarette smoking among women. Bernays (1928) successfully changed the attitude of women and started a new culture where women associated with smoking were viewed as free and independent (see, Brandt, 1996). His other experiments are at a more political level which involved overthrowing Arbenz government in Guatemala by creating a false perception of him being a communist and a threat for United States and democracy around the world (see Perrucci & Potter, 1989).

The history of propaganda, and how it evolved, suggests that propaganda did not have a negative connotation as majority of people come to associate it with today -it was, for the matter of fact, an honorable word. According to Bernays (1928), Christian Missionaries officially ran ‘ministries of propaganda’ to propagate Christianity across the world. Later, this move of the Churches alerted and discomfited many Protestants (during the phase of reformation). The Protestants considered the Christian churches move as something aimed at unsettling or influence them and people around (Walton, 1997). It can be said that that propaganda then functioned as a way to promote or propagate one group’s agenda or ideology for mobilization and influence. Logically, this also suggests that multiple groups are likely to have multiple agendas, which eventually demand the need for multiple propagandas and the need to devise multiple strategies to meet their goals.

Propaganda, essentially, exists since the time of old Greek democracy and was used in both political and social spheres. Though TV, radio, and think-tanks did not exist then, games, theater, handwritten pamphlets or books were used as medium to shape perceptions (Triadafilopoulos, 1999). Aristotle’s contribution in the study of propaganda can be considered as a significant one. He was the first to identify the concept of ‘rhetoric’. Today, we use the concept ‘rhetoric’

functionally when someone repeatedly or consistently presents one set of arguments refusing to acknowledge anything else, or sharply maneuver around it. Besides Aristotle, Plato too wrote about 'rhetoric' in his famous work 'Republic'. Plato considered 'rhetoric' as a dangerous tool, and a tool for 'manipulation' (Triadafilopoulos, 1999). However, it was Aristotle who analyzed the characteristics of effective rhetoric. These characteristics more or less remain the same and have been used by modern propagandists. Aristotle identified three crucial aspects of rhetoric (1) the speaker's character (ethos), (2) the audience's emotions (pathos), and (3) the rationality of the arguments (logos) (Triadafilopoulos, 1999). In the later years, propaganda came to be looked at from the view of psychology and social psychology. The potential of using a propaganda which effectively manipulates people at a psychological level began to be developed. The research in propaganda revolved around knowing what "affect" propaganda has on audience. However, measuring these "audience effects" is believed to be problematic in the study of propaganda and something which cannot be tested empirically (Ellul, 1973). Bernays (1928) too recognized the veracity of ethos, pathos and logos, and effectively combined the social-psychological⁷ aspects to influence audience. The historical development of rhetoric won't be covered in this paper. However, in case, a more in-depth study in propaganda from a historical view point is sought, please refer to Lasswell (1934), Doob (1949), Lippmann (1954) and Aristotle (1984).

Many scholars have tried to define propaganda, but claim that it keeps on slipping like an eel. The conclusion is there cannot be a summarized definition of propaganda for its applications varies. Lasswell (1934) argues, "Propaganda is the technique of influencing human actions by the way of manipulation of representations" (p 13). Doob (1949) argues propaganda is a "phenomenon" which "attempts to affect the personalities and to control the behavior of individuals towards ends considered unscientific or of a doubtful value in a society at a particular time" (p 240). Goodin (1980) argues that propaganda is "an evil core of the power and something which is not in the interest of the recipient of propaganda" (p 23). There is a focus on multitude of factors - some state that it appeals to "emotions", others state that it appeals to "emotions but it can also appeal to intellect" (for example, with data). In the above definitions, Lasswell (1934) uses the concept of "representation" - which is crucial, and it speaks about the various propaganda tools which a propagandist employs to persuade or convince his target a certain idea or a notion (by using representations which are familiar to the target audience or appeal to him emotionally). Doob's (1949) definition is more specific and attempts to take into account the "time" - "time" is

⁷ Edward Bernays, was the nephew of well-known psychiatrist Sigmund Freud and used many of Freudian theories in his practice.

considered as an important factor in using propaganda. Among all propaganda theorists, Goodin (1980) had an alarming view about propaganda and considered it worse than physical torment.

There are many different ways in which propaganda is spread and public opinion is molded - the many ways are - television news media, newspapers, print magazines, on-line portals (in this time and age). Whichever medium, from which we receive information, can be considered as a source of propaganda - even educational books - and now even scientific papers. The main aim of propaganda is influencing and using whichever instrument is "trusted" "believed" "helps believe" "persuade" people. Each industry - music, NGOs, business, has its own unique ways to influence public opinion. It is important to bear in mind that there is no universal definition of propaganda - however, some of the key words which are repeatedly associated with propaganda is "persuasion" or "appeal to emotions" or "appeal to rationale (with data)"

Propaganda is categorized in three colors in the US PSYOPS⁸ manual - black, white and gray propaganda (Rouse, 2005; Gray & Martin, 2007). In black propaganda, the source of the information is not known/revealed. In white propaganda the source of information is known, and the information provided maybe be considered as close to the real situation. Grey propaganda is a category under which information is falsely attributed or there are doubts about the source (Rouse, 2005; Gray & Martin, 2007). On a day to day basis, it is grey propaganda which people largely deal with - some information provided is correct, whereas some is not.

2.3 The basic techniques of propaganda

The following are some of the most basic techniques of propaganda invented by Clyde Miller. The techniques listed below are identified implicitly by a number of researchers and practitioners in propaganda (see, Bernays, 1928; Thomson, 1977; Taylor, 1998; Jowett, 2011) however, the techniques, at the core remain the same. For this paper, I have used the categorizations⁹ as listed by Lee (1945) on techniques of propaganda in his paper *Propaganda: A Clinical Summary*. (1) *Selecting the issue*: This refers to selecting an issue to set an agenda. The propagandist first selects

⁸ PSYOPS is Psychological Operations. The United States and all other countries around the world use Psychological Operations as a part of their military strategy.

⁹ The categorizations or the definitions are not tampered with or rephrased extensively on purpose. The existing words used by Lee (1945) are appropriate and changing or rephrasing them too much could dilute its meaning and context.

an issue and fine-tune's his goals according to the situation - the appropriate propaganda is then designed accordingly. According to Lee (1945), "propagandists consider selecting the issue an important step -in reality it is like selecting the battleground (p 133)." (2) *Case-making or card-stacking*: This believed to be the second step in creating propaganda. In this step a strategy is developed about what ideas to present and how. According to Lee (1945), "this includes the ordering of facts or falsehoods; Case-making is frequently the second step in propagandizing. It is the ordering of facts or falsehoods, illustrations or distractions or distortions, illogical statements in such a sequence that the best or worst possible impression will be made (p.133)". Case-making is used by speech-writers and lawyers and a factual selection is made for the case. (3) *Simplification*: Simplification entails simplifying and diluting the argument by including "perhapes" or "maybes". Simplification reduces a strong argument into something trivial or less worthy than it is. Lee (1945) argues, "In his language, everything tends to become black or white, good or bad, yes or no. Simplification short-circuits the sound common sense of medical evidence, of psychiatric findings, or engineering principles, because such common sense involves approximations, and which may "confuse" a public (p 133).

(4) *Name calling*: Name calling is one of the commonly used techniques in the political circles. The technique entails associating someone with a "label" - often derogatory (for example: calling someone a terrorist or a Naxal or a Maoist). Name-calling is aimed at raising questions on the person's character and trivializing his arguments by associating him with ideologies or characters which are derogatory to the person at the receiving end (Lee, 1945). (5) *Glittering generality*: According to Lee (1945), "Glittering generality is the practice of short-cutting discussion by associating an idea with a "virtue concept" in order to make us accept and approve the proposal with-out examining the evidence further (p 134). Examples of virtue concept would be "good", "democracy", "motherhood", "patriotism". (6) *Transfer*: In the technique of Transfer a propagandist uses prestige or authority as a tool to communicate his message. To find if this technique of propaganda is used, a "valid" connection between what the propagandists proposes and "authority" or "prestige" he associates with must be established. (7) *Testimonial*: Testimonial technique is employed to make a propaganda believable - it uses the prestige of an authority or an expert or a purported victim to endorse the propaganda and bring about a shift in loyalties (and consequently public opinion) Lee (1945) argues, "Both transfer and testimonial thus function to bring about shifts in the loyalties of groups; (here) they are means for identifying new groups with the propagandist's project" (p 135). While investigating whether this technique is used, it must be investigated whether the opinion of the authority presented as an "expert" reliable. (8). *Plain folks*

and Bandwagon: In the plain folks technique, emphasis is given on presenting propaganda as something for “a common good” or a “common cause”. Here, the propagandist identifies and relates with his audience. In the bandwagon technique, the propagandists gives an impression that “since everybody is joining, you must to (Lee, 1945, p 136)” (9) *The Two Extremes Fallacy* (False Dilemma): Linguists, have noted one of the drawbacks of English language which can be used for creating a situation of dilemma. The English language holds in it polar opposites - black and white, tall or short, left or right, good or bad, yes or no, open or close, guilty or not guilty. Cros (1997) argues, “We can ask for a “straightforward yes-or-no answer” to a question, the understanding being that we will not accept or consider anything in between. In fact, reality cannot always be dissected along such strict lines. There may be (usually are) more than just two possibilities or extremes to consider. We are often told to “listen to both sides of the argument.” But who’s to say that every argument has only two sides? Can’t there be a third-even a fourth or fifth-point of view? (p 6)”. In the next section, I will be discussing how Islamophobia as a term is discussed and what are the broad interpretations about what constitutes as Islamophobia.

2.4 What is Islamophobia?

To a large extent, google searches can be considered as an important measure of ‘public curiosity’ - for example - the analysis of the keyword ‘Islamophobia’ on Google Trends gives a fascinating insight into what the Internet audience is looking for when it comes to knowing about Islamophobia and the related terms. The Google Trends data (see Google Trends, 2013) reveals that ‘Islamophobia’ is the most searched term in Malaysia, UK, Canada, US, Australia (in order of interest). Some of the cities (also in order of interest) curious about what is Islamophobia are Birmingham, Kaula Lumpur, London, Toronto, New York. The exact methodology of how these regions and cities are short-listed is not known (it perhaps has to do with google algorithms). Then there is also what Google Trends recognizes as ‘breaking searches’, and ‘breaking searches are ‘search terms’ related to the term Islamophobia which according to google keywords are gaining interest among the internet audience. These breaking ‘searches’ include keywords such as ‘Islamophobia definition’, ‘Islamophobia Europe’, ‘Islamophobia America’, ‘What is Islamophobia’ and ‘Islamophobia Watch’. The curiosity around the term suggests that it is an issue of sizable public importance at a general level, however, it perhaps also means that the present literature or viewpoints on the subject may be insufficient or is not convincing considering that breaking searches such as ‘Islamophobia definition’ and ‘What is Islamophobia’ are still some of the questions frequently searched for.

2.5 A brief history of term Islamophobia

There have been considerable debates about Islamophobia being invented by Islamists. For example, scholars such as Fourest & Venner (2003) and Brukner (2003) have argued that the term is intended to divert/defend any criticism of Islam (as mentioned in Lopez, 2011). From a propaganda researchers perspective and considering the historical narratives presented by Allen (2005) such a possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. Researcher Allen (2005) has mapped the history of the term 'Islamophobia', and according to him, it was first used in 1925 by French authors Etienne Dinet and Alima Ben Ibrahim – the two authors used the line 'accus de delire islamophobe' in one of their articles. Both the French authors claimed that the term "Islamophobe" was first used during the Iranian Revolution by clerics for women who did not comply with wearing the *hijab*. A term, used in this context, comes across as a "name-calling" device. According to Lee (1945), "Name-calling is the practice of giving a bad label so that people condemn or reject it without examining the evidence (p 135)." It is not known or studied why Islamic clerics chided women who were opposed to wearing *Hijab* as "Islamophobe". Was it a concept which was used by clerics to short cut a discussion and give the woman a bad label? Allen (2005) maps another connotation of this concept that clerics used this term for Muslims who were afraid of Islam. What was the rationale behind "Muslims" feeling afraid of Islam in first place? The historical information could not be found. Here, prima-facie, "Islamophobe" comes across as a "name-calling" device which clerics used because they felt those Muslims, who were opposing Islam for some reason, shouldn't. For clerics, Islamophobia as a term may have served as "word" to short-cut a discussion. It is up to the historians to investigate the context in which this term was used then. What were the situations in Iran like during that time and whether there was any rebellion/criticism among some Muslims against their religion. Interestingly, this context evolves differently in Britain in the 90s. Allen (2005) notes that Britain's far right Muslim group Al-Muhajiroun and Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) gave the word a new meaning– IHRC suggested that it was not about Muslims fearing Islam but about non-Muslims hating Islam. These historical developments and connotations are important to be understood in order to understand in what purpose Islamophobia term serves/may serve.

2.6 The Runnymede Report and Islamophobia

Some pointed discussion is also warranted on the two definitions which the Runnymede Trust Report presents (1) a short-hand definition which is presented as "Dread or hatred of Islam - and therefore, to fear or to dislike all or most Muslims" (Conway, 1997, p 1). And (2) a more elaborated

definition which presents 'Open' and 'Closed' views. According to the Runnymede Trust Report, 1997 an individual with 'closed views' can be classified as an Islamophobe and an individual with an 'Open' view may not be. These categories (Open/Closed) have been commented on, discussed, reviewed and criticized before (see Bangstad, 2012). One of the key argument/criticisms of the 'Open' and 'Closed' views is that while the taxonomy presented through these categorizations can have some uses, it is difficult to measure Islamophobia (Larsson, 2007). Here is what the Open and Closed views, as stated in the Runnymede Trust Report offer:

Open views (1) Islam seen as diverse and progressive, with internal differences, debates and development. (2) Islam seen as interdependent with other faiths and cultures – (a) having certain shared values and aims (b) affected by them (c) enriching them. (3) Islam seen as distinctively different, but not deficient, and as equally worthy of respect. (4) Islam seen as an actual or potential partner in joint cooperative enterprises and in the solution of shared problems. (5) Islam seen as a genuine religious faith, practised sincerely by its adherents (6) Criticisms of 'the West' and other cultures are considered and debated (7) Debates and disagreements with Islam do not diminish efforts to combat discrimination and exclusion (8) Critical views of Islam are themselves subjected to critique, lest they be inaccurate and unfair (Conway, 1997, p 5).

Closed views (1) Islam seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities. (2) Islam seen as separate and other – (a) not having any aims or values in common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing them. (3) Islam seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist. Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in 'a clash of civilisations'. (4) Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage. (5) Criticisms made by Islam of 'the West' rejected out of hand (6) Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards (7) Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society (8) Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and 'normal' (Conway, 1997, p 5)

It has been argued by other scholars that the categories slot individuals in extremes. For instance, Allen (2007) argues that Runnymede Trust Report ends up focusing entirely on 'Closed Views' and though this can be unintentional, it eventually leads to all moderate opinions towards dilution solely and ends up focusing the discussion on love/hate viewpoints. Richardson (2005) argues that the Islamophobia report by Runnymede Trust presented a reductionist and inflexible viewpoint and that criticism is not against Islam as a religion but *some* Islamic beliefs and particularly against

fundamental Islam and that people who are critical about some Islamic beliefs are equally critical about violence or human right issues in other religions. Halliday (1999) too has criticized one of the aspects mentioned in the Open/Closed views arguing that though there are prejudices against Muslims as people, the objection is not necessarily against the religion Islam. Other scholars have criticized the Islamophobia reports accusing them of exaggeration. For example, scholars such as Malik (2005) have argued that instances of discrimination against Muslims are blown out of proportion in most reports and that physical violence or verbal violence against Muslims is by far very less.

2.7 Interpretations of Islamophobia

To begin with, the confusion surrounding the term Islamophobia is understandable considering that there is no consistency in how it is used. I had earlier mentioned that there is inconsistency in how the word is 'described'. I will now present some contexts, as discussed by scholars, journalists, media, politicians, as examples which reflect inconsistencies both at academic and non-academic level.

For example, Allen's (2001) paper on Islamophobia comes with an empathetic title *Islamophobia in the media since September 11th: Exploring Islamophobia: Deepening our understanding of Islam and Muslims*. Here, Allen's (2001) does not define what is Islamophobia, but if we try to understand his interpretation, for Allen (2001), newspapers with headlines such as "In London demands for Holy War" (p 2) constitute as Islamophobia. The debate becomes interesting and contentious when political problems of Israel-Palestine conflict too invite the use of the term Islamophobia. For example, Bayefsky (2001), who documented the discourse on United Nations World Conference on Racism, mentions one of the speakers at this forum arguing - "Combating terrorism means looking for root causes. America support for Israel is at fault. A war against terrorism is Islamophobia. The root causes of terrorism reveal true victim to be Palestinian (p 349). Here, the concept is used as a tool by the speaker suggesting US war in Afghanistan and Iraq is tantamount to Islamophobia. Merali & Shadjareh (2002) make the broadest of all interpretations - they argue that Islamophobia has been in existence since the time of Christian crusades of the late 13th century - a viewpoint, which according to Halliday (1999) is convenient, but misleading as contemporary history is far different than it was in the 13th century. Among the non-academics, Toynbee (2005), in her column in *The Guardian* takes an opposing stand to the term Islamophobia, she argues, "Race is something people cannot choose and it defines nothing about them as people. But beliefs are what people choose to identify with: in the rough and tumble of argument to call people stupid for their

beliefs is legitimate (if perhaps unwise). And now the Vatican wants the UN to include Christianophobia in its monitoring of discriminations (para 8)” Here, a more comparative and political context emerges where Toynbee (2005) rubbishes the concept of Islamophobia and in way that reflects her disinterest for other religions as well. All contexts of how the concept of Islamophobia is discussed at a popular level cannot be possibly listed as it is varied, and at times ambiguous in nature. I will now list some of the criticism of the term Islamophobia as recognized and identified by scholars.

The overall discussions about Islamophobia, at a theoretical level can be said to be something which mirrors the various interpretations positioned in the Runnymede Trust report on Islamophobia - The Runnymede Trust Report, for instance, presented Islamophobia (predominantly) as a fear against Islam (a religion) - but also presented the same term as discrimination based on race and comparing and drawing similarities with other types of discrimination such as 'Xenophobia' (interestingly, Xenophobia is something which is not based on religion) - it's contradictions like these, and the ambiguities and interpretations listed earlier which make it not just a contentious, but also a confusing term. What qualifies as Islamophobia is a developing, varied, and often ambiguous debate - given the nature of the term and new ideas which are regularly associated with it (Bleich, 2011; Lopez, 2011)

2.8 Academic interpretations of Islamophobia

Among scholars, the use of term Islamophobia is highly debated for the reason that there is a great deal of confusion about what Islamophobia is based on – race, religion or something else. Halliday (1999) attempts to distinguish between the two (race and religion)- according to him - if it is racism against Muslims, term it as 'Anti-Muslimism' and if it is solely 'fear' of Islam, it may be called as Islamophobia. Modood & May (2001), however, does not believe that Islamophobia is due to religious intolerance, for them, it is 'cultural racism'. Cultural racism is racism in which cultural differences are used to marginalize and or to demand assimilation from the vilified group - this racism is especially directed at someone who is believed to be culturally distinct and who seeks to retain some (if not all) his or her cultural differences. The need for this new concept of racism is because it is believed that traditional forms of racism which largely was about categorizing groups according to their biological history and race are increasingly becoming irrelevant especially in the post Holocaust and post -Colonial era. Cultural racism is discrimination d based on 'cultural backgrounds' - for example, the British feeling threatened by those British who are Asians (Barkan,

1992; Gilroy, 2005). Gottschalk & Greenberg (2008) recognize Islamophobia not so much of a psychological issue at an individual level as the term tends to indicate, but as 'social anxiety' towards Islam and Muslims. Gottschalk & Greenberg (2008) discuss a more nuanced point, and emphasize on the assimilation aspect - for instance, if an American Muslim shows his 'Americanness, social anxiety about such Muslims will be less, if not, there could be more anxiety. While Gottschalk & Greenberg (2008) change the definition of the term (from 'dread' to less intimidating 'social anxiety') they do not propose an alternative term. Bleich (2011) does not offer to change or discontinue using the term Islamophobia, but proposes a social scientific usable definition and proposes Islamophobia as "indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims" (p 1585). At a general level, what many scholars agree on is that race and religion are mixed up in the discussion of Islamophobia as proposed in the Runnymede Trust Report (see Werbner, 2005; Meer and Noorani, 2008; Meer and Modood, 2009).

There are very few scholarly debates when it comes to discussion of Islamophobia which offer a deeper analysis of the term and which is useful for a micro level study. Halliday (1999), for instance, observes two predominant tendencies when it comes to attitudes about Islam and Muslims - (1) Alarmism (2) Simplification. 'Alarmism' focuses on the narrative that Islam is a threat to the western society, and 'simplification' is that most Muslims are terrorists. If we analyse the Runnymede Trust short hand definition of Islamophobia - which is - "Dread or hatred of Islam therefore, to fear or to dislike of all or most Muslims" (Conway, 1997, p 1). It can be identified that there is an assumption, and a certain level of 'simplification' that exists which suggests that there is 'hatred against Islam *all or most* Muslims'. While studies (see Gonzalez et al., 2007; Verkuyten et al., 2008) have shown that there are certainly prejudiced and stereotypical views about Muslims and Islam in The Netherlands and in Europe, the possibility of an outright 'dread' or 'hatred', as stated in the Runnymede Report, against all or most Muslims has not yet been found. As far as 'alarmism' is concerned, according to Halliday (1999), 'alarmism' is caused due to lack of information about Islam and Muslims, and not knowing that there exist, for example, multiple sects which operate within Islam, and that there are differences within these sects and that Muslims, as it is often viewed, are not a 'unitary' force or who are beyond geographical limitations¹⁰. These are some of the key debates arguments which are found to be relevant for the study of Islamophobia at a micro level.

¹⁰ The Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia, while it mixes race and religion, it also acknowledges that not all Muslims, for instance, are practicing Muslims and for the matter of fact states that seeing Islam and Muslims as someone with internal differences, debates and development, is an 'Open view' (Conway, 1997)

2.9 Integrated Threat Theory

Whether 'Islamophobia' exists or not is largely disputed, but there is little doubt that stereotypes and prejudices exist against Muslims. In the Netherlands, a study which used integrated threat theory, found that one in two among the Dutch adolescents hold negative stereotypes about Muslims. The reason for this are symbolic threats perceived by the Dutch about Islam or Muslims which eventually lead to prejudiced attitudes (Gonzalez, Verkuyten et al., 2008). The integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 1996) has been tested in a number of different scenarios ranging from multicultural issues, gender attitudes and to predict and understand attitudes which lead to race and religion. It was considered best to use the Integrated Threat Theory to understand what are the different perceived threats among the Dutch group, and whether it leads us to understanding the subject of Islamophobia - especially understanding whether there is "fear" or "dread" about Islam, and what it is based on, particularly, realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety.

According to Stephan & Stephan (1996) prejudicial reactions are a defense mechanism when the individuals feel that their beliefs and values are under a threat. Stephan & Stephan (1996) emphasized on 'perception' according to him, the mere perception of threat is enough to produce/give rise to prejudice. Prejudice is defined as a set of negative attitudes and or beliefs which a in-group may hold towards the members of out-group (Duckitt, 1992). The key factors leading to prejudice are varied and range from cultural differences between the in-group and the out-group, differences between the value system or beliefs and social identity defined by memberships to social groups (McConahay & Hough, 1976; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Sears, 1988; Stephan & Stephan, 1996).

In the Integrated Threat Theory, three mediators are put forward by Stephan & Stephan (1996) - Realistic Threats, Symbolic Threats and Intergroup Anxiety which will be used to evaluate understand the Dutch views. Realistic Threats are perceived threats that economic, physical and political resources will be exploited by the out-group (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). It is believed that since resources are limited, there is always a conflict for them, and who has the rightful authority control over the resources. Individuals and groups compete for these resources and this leads to prejudice or discrimination. Symbolic Threats are perceived differences in beliefs, values and norms between two groups. Both groups may have different world views and can lead to negative attitudes between two groups (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). An intrinsic part of what leads a group to experience a symbolic threat is the belief that its own group is "right" about its stand. Intergroup

anxiety occurs when an individual is unsure about how to behave towards a member of the out-group. The concern and anxiety is about feeling rejected or embarrassed. It is studied that anxiety and prejudice increases if there is no communication between two groups/individuals, and decreases if there is communication. However, Stephan & Renfro (2002) emphasize that distinction must be made if an individual is feeling threatened or an entire group. Intergroup anxiety is about an individual feeling personally threatened during his interaction with member of an out-group.

2.10 Islamophobia in the Netherlands

This research attempts to connect to the dots between the concept of Islamophobia and Dutch attitudes, and while there is plenty of discussions in popular media about the subject, to the best of my knowledge, Islamophobia at a micro level, has not been explored in a manner this research attempts to explore. There are many different researches on subject of Dutch attitudes towards out-groups. One of the biggest such study analysed pre-existing data from 1979 to 2002 and concluded that there was a drastic shift in Dutch attitudes towards immigrants from multiculturalism to assimilation. It was also found that there was strong support for discrimination during the times of economic crisis and high unemployment figures, but not otherwise – thus strongly indicating the role which realistic threats play in defining attitudes. The study concluded that ethnic discrimination was not static and that discriminatory attitudes increased only when there was competition for resources (Coenders, Lubbers et al., 2008).

Another study on Dutch attitudes towards Muslims argued that though immigration and issues relating to Muslims were discussed more regularly, there was little evidence which helped identify the actual determinants. The study concluded that two patterns were observed where friendships with members of an out-group existed, but so did a perceived threat and those having contact with members of an out-group were reported to have less negative attitudes towards them (Savelkoul, Scheepers, & Tolsma et al., 2011). One of the most interesting study, which attempted to measure the attitudes examining biological functioning have Dutch males shots of Oxytocin, and later recorded their responses on how they judged immigrants. The results showed in-group favoritism – which means –preference for fellow Dutch citizens had increased, but there was no out-group derogation the result concluded (Dreu, Greer, van Kleef et al., 2011).

In another relatively niche study, native and non-native Dutch entrepreneurs were studied and it was found that there was trust deficit among these two groups of entrepreneurs, and as a result of which collaboration between non-native and native Dutch entrepreneurs suffered (Thijs &

Verkuyten, 2013) suggesting that there is some intergroup anxiety.

The existing researches measuring the attitudes of the Dutch in The Netherlands largely revolve around the issue of multiculturalism and influx of immigration. From a preliminary assessment of the present literature, the concern among the Dutch largely seems to be realistic threats and symbolic threats.

Research design

This thesis uses mixed methods to explore the contested concept of Islamophobia. The two methods used are (1) Propaganda Analysis of the Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia and (2) Qualitative Interviews with a Dutch group which analyses their attitude, threat perceptions, about Islam and Muslims in The Hague. Though there are many discussions on the subject of Islamophobia, this research is first (to the best of my knowledge) which takes into account some of the basic debates on Islamophobia, analyzes it from propaganda viewpoint, and attempts to relate it to a micro level sample. This thesis may be considered as an exploratory study useful in understanding and researching Islamophobia as a concept at a basic level, its manifestation as a concept, and manifestation at a micro level. While exploratory researches are characterized as brief or fleeting in nature, they are also recognized for providing or assisting with information which eventually leads to more precise understanding (Stebins, 2001).

3.1 Operationalization

This research is divided into two sections - one section is dedicated to the propaganda analysis of the Runnymede Trust Report, and the other section is dedicated to identifying the attitudes and beliefs of the Dutch towards Islam and Muslims in The Hague. A qualitative approach and a propaganda analysis approach were considered as a best alternative so as to further the research on the phenomenon of Islamophobia. The exact process is discussed further.

3.2 Propaganda Analysis Methodology

The subject of Islamophobia was thoroughly studied - the history of the term, the motivation of the Runnymede Trust Report, and how it is discussed. As far as propaganda analysis is concerned, there exist no hard and fast rules about recognizing or analyzing propaganda, however, some guidelines, about researching on a subject with a propaganda perspective was followed. The following points were attempted to answer while analyzing the Runnymede Trust Report and which were prescribed by Jowett & O'Donnell (2011).

1. The ideology and purpose of the propaganda
2. The context in which the propaganda occurs
3. Identification of the propagandist
4. The structure of the propaganda organization
5. The target audience

6. Media utilization techniques
7. Special techniques to maximize effect
8. Audience reaction to various techniques
9. Counterpropaganda, if present
10. Effects and evaluation

(Jowett & O'Donnell, 2011, p 270).

According to Jowett & O'Donnell (2011) the researcher must try to answer as many questions to present and let a thorough picture emerge. However, all the information required to analyze the complete situation may not be available or may emerge later. In that event, some conclusions may have to be altered. The above questions are answered in the analysis of the Runnymede Trust Report Analysis section.

It was found that the Runnymede Trust Report (1997) was one of the key reports which holds answers to how Islamophobia as a term was propagated. The entire report was read and re-read in the context of the events surrounding the report (propaganda is only released when it has some objective to meet - taking into account the surrounding events is crucial). One of the reasons why this report was singled-out was because Runnymede is a "Think-Tank", and think-tanks set their agendas and release specific reports to support their agendas. The Runnymede Trust Report was studied for various clues relating it to basic propaganda techniques. For example: (1) How are the facts ordered in the report (2) What are the things which are highlighted and whether the names and sources mentioned are precise (3) Are there any fallacies or faulty comparisons in the report (4) What are the demands being made and other minute observations which puts the report, and its purpose in perspective.

Propaganda analysis may be considered somewhat similar to textual analysis – textual analysis, as McKee (2003) argues is "making an educated guess at some of the most likely interpretations of the text" (p 1). However, the propaganda analysis method (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2011) requires one to also draw deeper interpretations taking into account historical contexts, current news and events, to come to something concrete.

3.3 Reliability and Validity

Analysis based on propaganda is largely interpretive. The reliability may be determined after similar analysis is carried by another propaganda researcher. More the similarities between this study and the other researcher's findings more could be the reliability. As far as validity goes, the Runnymede Report forms one of the most crucial documents in Islamophobia, and which has led to the popularity of the usage of the term Islamophobia, and which has not be analysed in this way before. It is the right concept to be analysed from a propaganda perspective and to come to some conclusion. There is, however, no literature which mentions how reliability of a propaganda-based analysis can be tested and this research must only be viewed as a perspective to understand possible power-play at a social and political level between various representative groups who use the term Islamophobia.

3.4 Interviews - Methodology

Six Dutch citizens from the city of The Hague, The Netherlands were interviewed to know their view on Islam and Muslims. These are in-depth interviews which are first recorded and then transcribed (see Appendix III for transcripts). The Dutch interviewees from The Hague were sampled through chain referral, and fall under the age group of 40-65 years. The Hague is a city with growing number of foreigners and has a sizable number of immigrant and Muslim population (CBS, 2011). It was expected that a sample living in such an environment is likely to have an opinion more pointed than other groups and compared to other parts of The Netherlands.

For the in-depth interviews, which lasted from 40 minutes to one hour, a semi-structured theme-based questionnaire was used where the Dutch group was posed questions in various pocketed topics such as jobs, social security, safety & security, resources, burqa, hijab, halal shops, Islamic culture, differences between Islamic culture and Dutch, their own interactions with Muslim community, about Turkish or Moroccans, political events - Van Gogh assassination, Geert Wilders, 9/11. The discussions of various topics were kept open as this thesis was aimed at exploring a propagated phenomenon. This approach is what Kvale (1996) summarizes as miner metaphor where the interviewer takes the position of a miner extracting data which can be later used for analysis. By conducting the interviews around the themes mentioned above, it was expected that it would help in identifying key attitudes which can be related to the subject of Islamophobia and its possible manifestation at a micro level (Kvale, 1996). The topics discussed also included questions on realistic threats (ex: question on terrorism), key symbolic threats (ex: question on burqa, halal

shops) or intergroup anxiety situations (ex: questions on personal experience/interactions). The interviews were first transcribed, and were then open coded using Atlas.ti line by line. Some codes emerged from my own theoretical understanding of the subject while others were based on what the interviewees expressed (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Following Braun and Clarke (2006) guideline for thematic analysis, codes were truncated until a theme or a pattern emerged. It was expected that emerging themes would help in exploring the research question and identify key patterns when it comes to Islamophobia. For a comprehensive overview, Atlas.ti software function 'codes primary documents table' was used to generate a report which counted quotations, words, existing in a particular theme (refer to the last page of the thesis for chart).

3.5 Validity and Reliability

All the interviews were personally recorded. The Interviews were conducted in a very casual setting (home or at work place). Time was sought so that interviewees could talk freely and share their views (Kvale, 1996). The approximate age of the participants in this research is 40-60 years and included two males and four females. All interviewees were promised confidentiality before the interviews began. Validity, in an exploratory research is different than confirmatory researches - the idea is to convey and get the processes of the phenomenon. As Stebins (2001) argues - several exploratory researches, eventually help in making the picture clear. As far as generalization of the research goes, this is a very small sample of Dutch men and women and the results about their views cannot be generalized.

3.6 Researcher Bias

In a concept of this nature, there is a possibility of researchers bias, and more so because this is a qualitative research. Islamophobia as subject is unique, but more so from the point of discussion issues of researcher bias. Researcher bias largely begins from the moment a researcher chooses a topic – also sometimes known as selection bias (Collier & Mahoney, 1996). And much of it can be avoided by being transparent about the process which involves framing the question, gathering data and analysis. This thesis, and the concept of Islamophobia is likely to be questioned about bias, however, the topic was largely guided by theories in propaganda. All the limitations of the research are discussed in the conclusion and recommendation section. Care was taken to understand all the viewpoints - scholarly and political relating to the subject. Since this is an exploratory research, this research may be only viewed as a critical discussion/perspective on the concept of Islamophobia at a micro level.

4 Findings- Analysis of the Runnymede Report

I will now present the analysis of the Runnymede Trust Report and identify some of the propaganda techniques and some contexts which can be analyzed from a propaganda viewpoint.

4.1. Propaganda analysis

The “title” of this report is “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All”. This may qualify as ‘Bandwagon’ (see Lee, 1945) a technique in propaganda where communication is articulated in a manner which suggests that ‘the message is a fact and deserves or is given attention by all’. Firstly, the term Islamophobia has a contentious history and this aspect is omitted in the report.

The Data

It is found that this report had only collected data from UKs Tower Hamlets in Britain where a large majority of Muslims belonging to different races lived (and continue to live). This report also does not state the exact methodology or the number of participants which were interviewed and the time period. Statement on information relating to methodology is as follows:

As a part of consultation exercise members of the commission visited Bradford, Waltham Forest and Tower Hamlets. In both places we had opportunities to engage in lengthy conversations and discussions with young Muslims in the 17-24 age range as well as with community leaders. In addition, members of the commission addressed a range of meetings and seminars throughout the country, including a large gathering in Waltham Forest (Conway, 1997, p 2)

Based on above methodological description, some approximations can be reached that this sample was collected at a micro level and is perhaps insufficient to make the claims the report claimed at that time. Furthermore, the 17-24 age group interviewed, which is predominantly Muslims, presents a very small window to reach to any conclusion of an entire group in UK who are likely to belong to different age groups, faiths, beliefs, race etc. Therefore, the title of the report ‘Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All’ gives an impression that findings were implicitly extrapolated to an entire population.

Media coverage

That the Islamophobia report has emerged from a think-tank can be approximated by the media attention it seeks to draw by the way of distribution of this report. The reports public relation strategy was as follows, and can be interpreted from the following statement found in the report.

The commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia was set up in 1996 by the Runnymede Trust. We held series of one-day and half-day meetings between May and December 1996 and in February 1997 published a consultation paper entitled 'Islamophobia: it's Features and Dangers. Over, 3,500 copies of this were distributed - to country councils and metropolitan authorities, police forces, government departments, race equality councils, a wide range of Muslim Organizations and a range of professional associations, universities, unions and think-tanks. There was widespread media interest. Copies were requested by several hundred individuals (Conway, 1997,p 2).

The strategy of distribution the study - around 3,500 copies - suggest an organized structure to generate public opinion around the issue. However, it can also be argued by the think-tank group that the report was in public interest, non-partisan, and hence more the people know about it, the better - these arguments are usually the "grey" and no conclusion can be reached over such arguments.

On Islamophobia

The Runnymede Trust Report, 1997, acknowledges that the concept 'Islamophobia' is not their coinage. However, it does not mention the history which Allen (2005) notes in his study (mentioned in the theoretical framework section) - which also includes how Muslim far-right groups like Al-Muhajiroun are believed to have given a spin to the term Islamophobia. On the coinage of the concept of Islamophobia, the report mentions:

We did not coin the concept Islamophobia. It was already in use among sections of the Muslim community as a concept describing the prejudice and discrimination which they experience in their everyday lives. For some of us in the commission it was a new concept, a rather ugly concept, and we were not sure how it would be

received by the readers of our document. However, it is evident from the responses which we received that Islamophobia describes a real and growing phenomenon - an ugly concept for an ugly reality. Hardly a day goes by without references to Islamophobia in the media (Conway, 1997, p 3).

It is possible that the history of the term may not be known to those who worked on this report, furthermore, in this report the usage of the term Islamophobia was believed to be popular only among Muslims who used the term when they felt prejudiced or discriminated - this to some extent also offers insight into how the term was used interchangeably and colloquially for everything that encompassed or reflected anti-Muslim discrimination. In the sentence in the report *“it is evident from the responses which we received that Islamophobia describes a real and growing phenomenon - an ugly concept for an ugly reality. Hardly a day goes by without references to Islamophobia in the media”* can be related to bandwagon technique (see Lee, 1945) in propaganda where the underlying message is presented as “everyone is talking about it and therefore it is important”.

Comparison with Anti-Semitism

The Runnymede Report presents the Islamophobia term as an equivalent, similar to, like anti-semitism, and this context is of crucial significance from a propaganda researchers viewpoint. The comparison is articulated in the following way.

Islamophobia has been coined because there is a new reality which needs naming. Anti-Muslim prejudice has grown so considerably and so rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed so that it can be identified and acted against. In a similar way there was a time in European history when a new concept, antisemitism, was needed and coined to highlight the growing dangers of anti-jewish hostility. The coining of the new concept and with it the identification of a growing danger, did not in that instance avert eventual tragedy. By the same token, that mere use of the concept Islamophobia will not in itself prevent tragic conflict and waste. But, we believe, it can play a valuable part in the long endeavour of correcting perceptions and improving relationships. This is why we use it continually throughout this report (Conway, 1997, p 4)

A comparison is made between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, and a suggestion is made that just like “anti-semitism” was coined and was relevant to the social setting, the term and concept of “Islamophobia” is too relevant and “needed”. These articulations can also be interpreted from a more political viewpoint - for instance - the equation between both Muslims and Jews are contentious at international political level: the Israel and Palestine the situation has remained a contentious issue. The concept Islamophobia could be an attempt by select Muslim lobbies to maintain a status quo who may feel that the Jewish lobbies stand to have an undue advantage due to existence of the concept of anti-semitism. There are other arguments in this report which are ambiguous. For instance, in the above paragraph, the report also mentions that *“The coining of the new concept and with it the identification of a growing danger, did not in that instance avert eventual tragedy. By the same token, that mere use of the concept Islamophobia will not in itself prevent tragic conflict and waste”* - it is unclear then - what is the purpose of the term or concept of Islamophobia?

Legitimization for lobbying?

In this section of the report, the report uses propaganda of ‘Transfer’ where it states (based on assertion) that there is a ‘need to create a lobby’. The report mentions:

The formation of media lobbying groups has proved effective for minorities who feel that the media misrepresents them. The Muslim community could learn from the experience of these groups. We recommend that Muslims consider forming their own media lobby. A better approach is to agitate to have more positive images in soap operas and TV drama and to ensure that newspapers are kept informed of the creative activities of Muslims. The only way to oppose the media's negative images is to provide them with positive ones. This will be more successful in generating more sympathetic images of the Muslim community than accusing editors of racism or Islamophobia everytime a legitimate news report is filed that points up the activities of Islam's more extreme adherents throughout the world.
Source: a national secular organization - (Conway, 1997, p 21)

The message presented in the above paragraph is for crucial significance from a propaganda researcher's viewpoint as an attempt is being made to persuade an audience or to convince readers of the idea of importance and need for a lobby. While the objectives stated are noble

(positive image) usually objective stated are not always black and white. This can also be related to 'integration propaganda' (see Ellul, 1963) where the report aims to integrate, convince people a 'need' for one of their demands. At the end of the above paragraph, the report attributes the quote to "a national secular organization" - a question is - what kind of secular organization? If it is a secular organization, why wasn't it named? Since the exact detail of which organization quoted is not known it may be considered as a grey propaganda.

Symbols

The Runnymede Trust Report mentions some points which are very specific. For example the articulation in the paragraph mentioned below:

(1) Civic religion: the representation of Islam in official ceremonies and symbols of state, and in civic occasions at local levels (2) Chaplaincy and pastoral arrangements: in health care, prison, schools and universities (3) Grants to voluntary organizations: provided both by public bodies and by charitable foundations (4) Consultation: the extent to which Muslim organizations are routinely and equitably consulted by public bodies, both locally and nationally (5) Immigration policy; the extent to which Muslims may be unfairly affected (Conway, 1997, p 32)

From a propaganda point of view, point (1), is interesting. Symbols prove as an influential source of propaganda, and as a medium to convey the existence of an ideology, a religion, a group or institution. From a historical viewpoint, symbols have been extensively used on stamps as tools for integration propaganda, and mediums like state symbol serve as an excellent method to show or maintain a status quo (see Stoetzer, 1953). Here, it can be interpreted that through the agenda of 'racism' or 'discrimination', several other agenda's/demands are made.

Other contradictions and inconsistencies

Take the following paragraph, for example, merges more than one concepts without explaining the rationale:

In recent years, a new concept has gained currency which evokes the outlook and the world view of that officer. The concept is Islamophobia. It's first known use in

print being in February 1991, in a periodical in the United States. The concept is not ideal, but is recognizably similar to 'Xenophobia' and 'Europhobia' and is a useful shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam - and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims. Such dread and dislike have existed in western countries and cultures for several centuries. In the last twenty years, however, the dislike has become more explicit, more extreme and more dangerous (Conway, 1997, p 1)

'Xenophobia' is irrational fear of foreigners - it is a broad concept with religion not a criteria for discrimination. A 'Xenophobic' would, for example, fear someone from Africa, but not necessarily because he is a Christian from Africa. Europhobia, on the other hand, is defined as 'dislike for Europeans'. In the above paragraph it appears that attempt (read: persuasion) is being made to draw similarities between 'Xenophobia' and 'Europhobia' with that of 'Islamophobia' - the comparisons of the concepts appear to be forced. Furthermore, the concept of Islamophobia is presented as something which has been existing for several centuries - thus complicating, simplifying, and broadening the meaning of the term Islamophobia. It is also not clear from this report if this view comes from those who were interviewed for this research or if it belongs to those who worked on this report.

The report has few other ideas which makes it difficult to define Islamophobia from a scholarly viewpoint. And this aspect comes across through the below mentioned paragraph in the report.

Throughout we use the concept 'Muslim' to refer to people who describe themselves as Muslims, or who were born to families where Islam is the household faith. Such a definition does not assume that all Muslims are observant in their religious practice to the same extent and in the same ways. On the contrary, it acknowledges that Muslims vary in the ways they interpret and practice their faith and that Islam has non-observant adherent just as do all other religions. An analogy may be drawn with the situation in northern Ireland, where to refer to some as Protestant or Catholic is to refer to their identity within a broad cultural gradation, not necessarily to their personal attitudes and beliefs (Conway, 1997, p1)

On one hand, the report mentions that "Islamophobia- is the dread hate of fear of Islam or Muslims". On the other hand, it also argues that Muslims vary in the ways they interpret and

practice Islam and there are also non-adherent practitioners. In this scenario, the question is - does the concept of "Islamophobia" then imply that - even a Muslim who is not adherent of Islam, in any case, is discriminated on the basis of religion?

Finally the definition or categorization which the Runnymede Trust presents - "Open view" and "Closed view" of Islam. The "Closed view" of Islam is what the report calls as "Islamophobia".

The Runnymede Trust Report lists the "Open" and "Closed" view in the following ways:

Closed view: (1) Islam seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to new realities (2) Islam seen as separate and other – (a) not having any aims or values in common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing them (3) Islam seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist. Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in 'a clash of civilizations' (4) Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage (5) Criticisms made by Islam of 'the West' rejected out of hand (6) Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards (7) Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society (8) Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and 'Normal' (Conway, 1997, p 5)

Open view: (1) Islam seen as diverse and progressive, with internal differences, debates and development (2) Islam seen as interdependent with other faiths and cultures – (a) having certain shared values and aims (b) affected by them (c) enriching them (3) Islam seen as distinctively different, but not deficient, and as equally worthy of respect (4) Islam seen as an actual or potential partner in joint cooperative enterprises and in the solution of shared problems (5) Islam seen as a genuine religious faith, practised sincerely by its adherents (6) Criticisms of 'the West' and other cultures are considered and debated (7) Debates and disagreements with Islam do not diminish efforts to combat discrimination and exclusion (8) Critical views of Islam are themselves subjected to critique, lest they be inaccurate and unfair (Conway, 1997, p 5)

In the above paragraph, the Runnymede Trust report gives two options - "open" or "closed" views. In propaganda techniques, this is identified as two extremes fallacy (see Cross, 1997) which

compels reader to choose between one thing between two options and rejects any notion of a middle ground. The points mentioned under each of these “open” and “closed” categories are not analysed as they are not clearly defined. For example: Point (8) Critical views of Islam are themselves subjected to critique, lest they be inaccurate and unfair (open views) - what does “inaccurate” and “unfair” constitute here - is largely a subject of interpretation. It is not the objective of this research to analyze each and every point mentioned under “Open” and “Closed” view, but instead to see it as it is presented. The attempt to analyze each individual point can move discussion into theological direction for which there is no scope in this study nor the expertise. The above listed observations may be one of the reason why the concept or phenomenon of Islamophobia remains elusive to a clear definition.

4.2 What propaganda devices are present in the Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia?

This section will attempt to answer the Jowett & O’Donell (2011) propaganda analysis questions which largely require the researcher to critically review the sources provided in the Runnymede Trust Report, how the communication is executed in the report, review how the communication presented.

Through this analysis, it appeared that the purpose of the Runnymede Trust Report, implicitly, was to persuade the British government to include religion in the Race Relations Act 1976. However, explicitly, the arguments were shouldered on ‘discrimination’ against Muslims articulated as a certain “fear” or “hatred” against Islam or all or most Muslims (Conway, 1997). And though there could be genuine cases of discrimination cited in the report, the report tends to generalize its findings - particularly since it conducts the research at a very small/micro level and within a specific community.

The Jowett & O’Donell (2011) propaganda analysis questions also require to identify the ‘propagandist’ and this can be a challenging task. However, after reading the Runnymede Trust Report, some approximations about this can be reached by reviewing who financially supported the Runnymede Trust for publishing this report. The report thanks an influential arms dealer, Mohamed Al-Fayed for his financial support to the report among other list of funding sources such as Ashdown Churches Commission, Lyndhurst Settlement, G K Noon, Sir Sigmund Sternberg Charitable Trust. It is not be directly apparent if any particular individual or group is involved - yet it cannot be overlooked, that the report was presided by a number of individuals (as members) of

significant influence and may have different agendas in political terms. The consultants included names such as Zaki Badawi (Principal of Mulsim College, London), Hamid Qureshi (Director of Lancashire Council of Mosques), Nasreen Rehman (Trustee of Runnymede Trust), Imam Dr Abduljalil Sajid (Director of Sussex Muslim Society).

A significant finding is that The RT report mentions around 3500 copies of *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* were sent to various organizations, press, media, security agencies. For a think-tank group which aims at influencing a policy, press, media and security agencies would count as the first line of 'target audience' to familiarize them with the term, the different arguments and the need for it. It is possible that the final target audience were British policy makers and to convince them that a law that protects Muslims from discrimination based on religion is need of the time. Other findings include using special techniques in the report to maximize the effect - these techniques, as discussed earlier, largely includes presenting the arguments in a manner which is generalised. It was also found that the data was collected at a micro level, and the the exact number of people interviewed was not disclosed. The final definition and categories created - particularly the Open and Closed Views can be categorised as 'false dilemma' as no middle part is suggested recommended in the report.

Over the years, the Runnymede Trust Report has received feedback and criticism from all quarters and this continues in different degree's till date. A more long term impact, on 'Islamophobia' as a term is profound and it can be said that the use of the term Islamophobia has also become a 'sociological propaganda' (Ellul, 1975) with a surge in Islamophobia magazine (see Imagine 2050, n.d), Islamophobia TV (see Islamophobia TV, n.d), among other things etc. Besides this, another important factor to consider in propaganda analysis is the existence of any 'counter propaganda' - in this respect the term has evolved in a fascinating way where Islamophobia report cited that the term Islamophobia was required just as 'anti-semitism' was required once upon a time. It can be said that the term Islamophobia was a counter-propaganda to the term 'anti-semitism'.

The way things have developed with respect to the term islamophobia, interestingly, there is a counter propaganda to the term Islamophobia and it is termed as 'Islamorealism' (see CBS, 2012). Islamorealism, is roughly positioned as the threat of Islam and Muslims as something "real" and not a "phobia". Broadly speaking, and on its entirety, the Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia qualifies as grey propaganda (sources not clear, inappropriate comparisons, order of facts, difficult to reach conclusions with respect to financial funding of the report, the logos of presiding

members).

To maintain a objective research stance, and give a benefit of doubt, an assumption could also be made that the author of this document used propaganda devices in absence of having access to relevant and accurate facts. However, it is, and at all times the responsibility of the author of the report (in this case Runnymede Trust Report) to establish the validity of ideas. To conclude, the Runnymede Trust Report cannot be considered as an authoritative unbiased research report on anti-Islam or anti-Muslim attitudes owing to many different inconsistencies present in the report.

5 Findings - Dutch beliefs and Attitudes

In the last chapter, I discussed the different caveats found in the Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia which came to the surface after conducting a propaganda analysis on the report. In this chapter, I will present my findings about the Dutch citizens who were interviewed to know their beliefs and attitudes about Islam, and to see in what way it has any bearing to Islamophobia, as mentioned in the Runnymede Trust Report.

5.1 Interview findings

On the whole, it was experienced that the Dutch citizens were open to discussing the subject of Islam/Muslims in The Netherlands with little discomfort about the subject. As expected, there were some reservations, resistance, and observations and these contours help in understanding the concept of Islamophobia. There was certainly a small level of "anxiety" expressed on a variety of issues and which was identified to be a result of realistic threats, symbolic threats and inter-group anxiety. As explained in the introduction, for this research, The Hague was considered as an interesting place to study and investigate the concept of Islamophobia.

Religion is not important

During the interviews it appeared that religion as a subject matter of practice, is of least importance. Religion, possibly does not dominate or steer the general discourse within a native Dutch group about immigrants, foreigners or Muslims. At the most, religion was looked at with curiosity, and at worst with skepticism. Usually, discussions ended with conceding that it was up to the people what religion and belief system they wanted to follow.

JB (55) shared his views on Islam and Muslims in The Hague, The Netherlands: *"Religion, and I have no problem. I have no problem with the minarets too. In this country, we have separated religion from life, so when you want to believe it, it is yours. I would not like the Azaan. I would prefer that they don't do that because I don't like ringing bells in church too."* The critical attitude, it appeared, was not simply towards Islam but also other religions. For others, religion was only a subject matter of curiosity. MG (62), for instance, did a personal study on religion out of curiosity and eventually reached the conclusion that religion was used negatively. She argued, *"I was curious what was the religion about. And it was a non- political curiosity. In my 30s I realized that religion were also*

political and I started to look religions in a different view. I have to say I don't like any religion. Religion itself is not negative. But how people use it makes it negative. And when you see 80 percent of world has a negative religion. But the people use it negatively.

Besides exploration about religion in personal capacity, and a general accommodative attitude, past experiences with religion among the Dutch interviewees perhaps still play a significant role in how religion in general is viewed among the native Dutch group. JB (55) immediately recalled his past experience with religion when asked about Islam, which according to him, as he grew older, repelled him from religion as a subject of practice. He says, *"I was raised very religious. In a village south of Rotterdam very fundamentalistic protestant village and when you see the Dutch history- the protestant religion - they were always fighting and defining and debating about inni pinni (small things) because when you are raised in such environment. You are learned how to discuss things precisely. You have to know what you believe..."* JB (55) suggested that he had had enough of religion and this eventually repelled him. Consistently, it emerged that those who were interviewed were not interested in religion as a subject of practice and were not devout followers of any particular faith.

One interviewee opined that religion no different than bondage - AD (55) shared his past - *"In the time I grew up, I was obliged to go to the Church. When you are you don't want to be obliged. It must come from inside. So people have to get free from their own thoughts."* AD (55) gave more emphasis and importance to deriving freedom from your own ideas as compared to ideas occurring in religious books. The Hague is a city with multiple cultures, and some of the interviewees have had the opportunity and know in person people who are not native Dutch or who are immigrants. MG (62) shared, *"I know people who do not go to the mosques because they think that whatever the imam is saying is only the negative things. And those are modern Muslim people. They don't want to give up their religion. They don't have to give-up their own religion. But they have an open mind to their own religion."*

It emerged that believing in religion, especially Islam, where religious clerics can have substantial influence, was viewed as a handicap and inability to think for yourself. To some degree, it also emerged that any kind of symbolism, which the native Dutch group believed can be a matter of discomfort to the majority or common culture, was not needed. The key pattern which emerged was that there was a general disinterest in religion as a subject matter of practice owing to personal experience with religion and personal outlooks.

Obeying laws

A dominant attitude among those interviewed was about obeying laws, and obeying laws was one of the most important barometers which indicated assimilation, integration, and respect towards the Dutch society. The articulations in favor of this were usually without mincing any words. SN (42) said- *"I respect Islam, as they want to be. But just respect, and if you don't and you put your ass in it or turn your back, then leave this country, and go back to your own country, it is black or white - to me. The last few years what happened. We used to be very tolerant. Everybody can come in and everybody is welcome, and now I think there is a difference"*. The interviewees said that they were open to a multicultural society and this included Muslims, albeit with condition of mutual respect for norms and values and which applied to all and any group. SN (42) says, *"I am open minded about them. I like it that. It is all cultural and I think that it is very important that my children sit in the class without thinking - who are they? I don't mind it. People are people. But I think and that is the common thing that they came in our country, so I think they have to respect our way of doing things. And if they don't like it, then leave the country - that I would have done."* This attitude can be translated as, 'as I'd do to you, you must do for me'. The views often shifted from general view on immigrants to that of specifically Muslims (more on that futher).

The Dutch people interviewed were well aware of the issues (mostly those shown in the media) relating to Muslims and Islam in The Netherlands and recounted that while shops or religious practices like wearing a cap was fine, to run a parallel system, insulating, or encouraging ghettos was unacceptable. AD (55) argued, *"We also have to things like bioscope, shops, we have to use it together the buses the trams...whatever."* As much as the emphasis was on assimilation and integration, it was largely so as to people can share things and work together equally. The perception that Dutch are not open to foreigners was countered by recalling historical and colonial identity of "travelers" which essentially involves Dutch trade relations across the world and which existed for much of the 16th century in Asia. At present, sizable number of migrants from Dutch colonies are now citizens and living in The Netherlands. Through the interactions, and on the subject of integration, assimilation and multiculturalism, the Dutch identity, came out strongly. BR (55), commenting on the influx of immigrants and the impact on law and order proposed a solution that only foreigners who follow law consistently must be allowed to continue to live, rest must leave - *"You are guest here in the Netherlands for 10-20 years... and when you obey our rules and our values you can stay here."*

The emphasis on obeying laws and respecting Dutch values was at the pivot of most discussions which were aimed at understanding Dutch attitudes towards Islam and Muslims.

“Spreek Nederlands, alstublieft!”

Most of those who were interviewed emphasized on speaking the Dutch language. SN (42) argued, *“People who come here should try to learn the language, and there should be rules... You can say that they live here... they can speak their own language at home. I think wait a minute - you have to learn the language - you don’t have to be a protestant or a catholic - I am not.”* The emphasis on learning the language was put across as an important requirement for practical reasons and one which can potentially open up communication channels with those who come from other cultures, religions and backgrounds in The Hague. The practical reasons mentioned were for formal settings such as being able to communicate in Dutch schools (for immigrant parents) to informal setting in a market place. MG (62), for instance, suggested, *“We all live in the same town, suppose tomorrow I see an old Moroccan lady buying herbs and I want to ask her what is that you are making, I would like to make it too... she is in Holland for 30 years, and she cannot speak Dutch!”* A key concern among some of those interviewed was that the second and third generation of immigrants may not be integrated into the Dutch society, and this, the interviewees assumed, was because the immigrants spoke their native language at home, and not Dutch. BR (55), for instance, pointed, *“There is a group who is not integrated.... Of course they go to Dutch schools because they are obliged to do that.... It is very difficult.... You can say that they live here they speak their own language at home.... That is not a big problem.... But when they go and commit crime.... That is a big problem.... It’s not my job to think about it.... But I’ll definitely be creative here.”* The lowest bar set for immigrants was to obey law, being able to speak the Dutch language was considered as an asset and an important barometer which helped evaluate respect among Muslims for Dutch beliefs and values.

We avoid generalization...

There was sensitivity, and generalizing or equating or painting all Muslims as fundamentals was avoided. A common view was that most people who practice Islam are normal good people, and like anyone else, work and support their families. Often it was described that a “very small minority” was involved in fundamental Islam - a point of contention at a global level for over a decade now. AD (55) opined, “there is a little group and that is what you read about. The thing you

read in Syria. I don't know the word [Jihad]?" It was suggested that the information presented in the news media can be one that is too much focusing on the negative. AD (55) suggested that, *"They have to write about positive things about Islam, more and more that they are taking care of the people... they are working to support people or have no money... or through their foundations with food... they can also integrate and work together I don't know if it is possible.... They can also talk about positive things... But to always combine it with religion is something... I have problem with religion"*. As discussed earlier, due to general disinterest in religion, mingling religion with social service initiatives was discouraged. The role of media, and the emphasis given on negative aspects was disputed by most who were interviewed. MG (62) argued, *"The media has a special role in this. Because good news is no news... So the smallest bad things will be on newspapers and television. If you really are interested in things you have to pass your fear, and that is what most people will never do... maybe the best thing is to read the Koran, and read it. It is one way to see what the religion is and what the politics are."*

During the interviews, very often, Islam was equated with other religious practices such as Catholicism or Protestantism and having more or less similar grey areas. It appeared that those interviewed were more thoughtful in processing information and news relating to Islam or Muslims by themselves rather than believing everything that they read in the news media. It was also said that the violence committed by Muslims or in name of Islam is more detectable compared to other religions. One interviewee suggested that perhaps too much of question begging or demanding answers from Muslims was unwarranted and led to anxiety. JB (55), for instance, pointed, *"Things like terrorism and violence, defined in the name of Islam, is more [compared to] say than in Buddhism or Hinduism. You see less violence, and there are other pressures. I feel really sorry because I have a lot of Islamic friends. And former employees and who has children and they are contributing so much to this society, and they are very peaceful and they are very cooperative. But okay, and every day they have to defend a little bit. Why should they? People ask them to defend them."* While on some issues (assimilation, integration) the native Dutch groups argument appeared upfront and direct, they appeared protective against what they felt was "indiscriminate criticism of Muslims or Islam". For instance, while discussing the subject of Geert Wilders, Wilders was criticized for crossing the line of decency and being far too intolerant. While some conceded he was right in criticism of fundamental Islam, others opined that he could have articulated himself in a better way and avoided an extreme stance.

Turkish vs. Moroccans

In the debate about Islam in The Netherlands, relationships with the Turkish and the Moroccans form an important contour and was reflected in the interviews conducted. The general opinion was that the Turkish are open, and better to deal with while the Moroccans are not. The Turkish were associated with better ethics and work principles while the Moroccans were associated with crime and aggression. SN (42) opined *“Turkish I don’t have any [problem]... they are nice people. But the Morocco people, I don’t have a good word about it... Lot of pain, lot of murders, people who are killed by Moroccan people... Younger Moroccan people... Turkish not... I studied one year in England. I studied with Turkish people, not the lower class but the upper class.... And they are very nice, nice people, lovely, sweet - nothing wrong with them. But I don’t like Moroccan people. They are so aggressive...”* The aggressive or crime-related perception can be considered as one of the most dominant factors which determine relationship between the Moroccans and the Dutch. A general idea which emerged was intolerance for anything that was threat to equality and common culture. However, what was also interesting was that news media framings, dictated (if not all all) how Moroccans, for instance, were viewed. SN (42) opined, *“I have never spoken to a Moroccan. It is always what you read in the newspapers. Then I think Moroccans have troubles with behavior, and couldn’t settle themselves here... but they are frustrated here somehow... and then they can’t behave.”* It occurred that the comparison between the Moroccans and Turkish was one of the pivotal points when it came to discussion of Islam and Muslims in The Netherlands. The Islamic communities were not deemed to be the only closed society in The Hague, it was also suggested by an interviewee that it was difficult to enter into the Chinese societies for the kind of insulation they enforced. Interviews become more emotional while discussing Moroccans as they recalled (immediately) news items about Moroccans harming old Dutch people. Over all, the impression that Moroccans are not appreciated, and Turkish are was clear. The deciding factor about the liking and disliking was not religious (most Turkish and Moroccans follow Islam) and neither race, but ability to confirm to Dutch laws and adapt to Dutch values.

No Burqas please!

It was found that the Dutch interviewees had no problem with Muslim women/girls wearing scarves, however, reservations were expressed when it came to Burqas - clothing which completely covers the body from head to toe. A question which was raised by an interviewee was *“What is the purpose of wearing a Burqa?”* MG’s (62) opinion showcased some curiosity and a

rather insightful interpretation - *"My question is why are you wearing a Burqa - is it because the men like it? Is it because the religion likes it? Or is it because the women like it. If the women likes it, then it is OK."* A symbolic aspect like wearing a Burqa, according to some of those interviewed, was a sign of being suppressed. SN (42) opined that *"Because they think they are obligated to wear head covers and that kind of stuff, but I think they do it because they want it. When they are forced to do it, it isn't good."* A somewhat general opinion was that those interviewed found women wearing Burqa scary and the practice of wearing a Burqa was considered as backward.

The wearing of Burqas and scarves lead one of the interviewees to retreat, and not visit areas where she finds people only wearing Burqas. EM (52), for instance, was vocal about her views on Burqa and the impact it has on how she experienced the city of The Hague. She shared, *"I don't come anymore in areas where there are Muslims. You only see burqa, burqa, burqa... you think - where am I, is this Holland? It has nothing to do with Holland!"* While criticisms were registered, there was also an attempt to analyse the situation from a holistic viewpoint. JB (55), for instance, who claimed to have Muslim friends and who understands what's going on within the Dutch community, suggested that people are afraid because they are not used to it. He argued, *"Maybe in 20 years from now Islamic people will complain that nobody is talking about them... we are complaining about East Europeans, but people who are a little bit afraid who see their circumstance change, and see their city changing and they cannot relate it, they cannot see it in a broader or wider context, and their daily lives is changing very much - other friends, other shops, other languages. In their street, people they cannot communicate."* SN (42) says, *"I am open minded about them. I like it that it is all cultural and I think that it is very important that my children sit in the class without thinking - who are they. I don't mind it. People are people. But I think and that is the common thing that they came in our country, so I think they have to respect our way of doing things. And if they don't like it, then leave the country - that I would have done."*

Until 2012, one of the key debates in The Netherlands was about banning Burqas (the Burqas since 2012 are banned). The interviewees proposed a solution as to whether wearing a Burqa should be accepted or not, and suggested that people must ultimately decide things through 'vote' and in a democratic manner. AD (55) was confident, at least when it comes to making a vote on Burqa - *"Most people don't want that in the country - if you make a vote of it, I am sure about it."* What was interesting was that there were different reactions to Burqas and to Scarves. Burqas were completely unacceptable, scarves were fine, but still, for some, indicated a certain "closed" behavior. SN (42) opined, *"I have to laugh if I see a hoofduk because I have to laugh. It doesn't look*

good. It is funny to look at... I don't know why... But I think if you use a hoofduk in way it feels not lower. I think you don't open up when you are using it. Although they do...because they are protecting themselves. But when you see it behind the wheels it is funny.... But I respect them...it is ok. They have to do what they have to do..." Most discussions on symbolic issues and values ended with suggesting that it is a matter of their (Muslims) personal choice and their own interpretations and views - the only condition proposed, and which emerged was it should not be a safety issue, the women must wear it out of her own free will, and burqas must not dominate over the cityscapes.

Key Realistic threats, Symbolic Threats and Intergroup Anxiety

Some of the points discussed earlier can be associated with realistic threats, symbolic threats and inter-group anxiety. However, some key threats are being separately discussed to understand alarmism of any kind.

Some of the key threats which some interviewees experience from Muslims living in the The Netherlands and which they associate with Islam is that of the promulgation of sharia law, possibility of violence, draining of social security, and resources such as education system. On the topic of sharia law, AD (55) doubts whether there is a undercurrent or favor among Islamic community for a law like sharia, *"In the Netherlands we want to live together. Sometimes you think, I don't hope that it happens here that they come here and they make cruelties or attacks."* The anxiety caused due to these realistic threats (and to some degree, laws are also symbolic threat because 'change of law' marks/challenges in beliefs/ideology within a society) were to some extent blamed on news media influence. AD (55) opined - *"Sometimes it bothers... It is more when I see in all the other countries..."* AD (55) even suggested that a lot of Dutch people will move if something like sharia was really introduced.

In some interviewees the extremism and the violent aspect of Islam as found in the news media brought to the fore past memories which triggered them to be more protective of their values. BR (55) opined, *"If Europe will get this sense from extreme Muslims, then I think a lot will happen... I think the fear from the old days will come back"*. BR (55) was hinting at a Europe when Hitler was set out to dominate Europe and the world using his propaganda that supremacy of one race over everyone else. Fearing this, "equality", irrespective of nationalities, race and religion was given prominence. BR (55) argued, *"I like to work with all cultures but if one think that it is better than the*

rest, then it is not good..."

Few interviewees had personal interactions with Muslims - while some shared amiable relationships with Muslims in their personal lives, others had difficult experiences. MG (62), for instance, narrated an incident which according to her was representative of not respecting the symbolic notions and beliefs of The Dutch - *"I visited a house here in The Hague, it was a Morocco family, and I was not allowed to enter the house because I was not wearing anything over my head... I said, "excuse me?"... That is what is making things a bit uneasy..."*. Personal experiences may be considered as an important factor which shapes the attitudes of how the Dutch view Islam and Muslims. However, irrespective of the personal experiences, it was not found that this led to Dutch being indiscriminate towards an entire group of Muslims. For example, Geert Wilders, who is believed to be an anti-Islam politician, was criticized for his aggressive stance and attitude by most interviewees.

The issue of education was an important one and it was suggested by one interviewee that education was free in The Netherlands, and the constant influx of immigrants, irrespective whether they were Muslims or not was affecting the quality of education. The subsequent burden on social system, and resource of Dutch safety and security was also discussed by some citing that Muslim immigrants were draining their social security by various means. SN (42) argued, *"Turkish people have lots and lots of children and the government paid for also those children. We have to pay taxes for all these things, and this is really ridiculous"*. Some interviewees criticized the government for not building a robust system which keeps a check on flaws and one that ensures equal distribution. Realistic threats, symbolic threats and intergroup anxiety was not experienced particularly towards Muslims, but also Bulgarians who, it was argued, by EM (54), that *"they want to work as hard as we can so that we dont have energy to open our mouth"*. Overall, violence by extremists, concern over an unknown legal proposition like Sharia, violence read about in newspapers, personal experiences, and issues which threatened jobs and social security of the native Dutch were some of the key perceived threats.

5.2 Relation to possible manifestation of Islamophobia.

As discussed above, it was not found that there was "fear or dread of Islam or Muslims" among the Dutch citizens interviewed. What was identified that there was anxiety due to a variety of reasons ranging from cultural differences, differences in value system, realistic threats such as fear of

violence from fundamental Islamists etc. Halliday (1999) idea of alarmism and simplification was also not prominent - 'alarmism', which suggests that all Muslims are threat to the Western society or 'simplification' that all Muslims are terrorists or generalizations similar on these lines. For the matter of fact, 'simplification' or generalization was avoided by suggesting that majority of Muslims, or those who practice Islam are good citizens and live a normal life. Others acknowledged that discrimination may exist, especially against those immigrants who are involved in lower jobs. Some aspects of their lifestyles were commented on and criticized. The most criticism was reserved for practice of wearing of Burqa, among other things - wearing of scarves was not considered problematic. Emphasis was given on ability to work together, speaking the local language (Dutch), and scrupulous following of Dutch laws.

The Dutch, and the city of The Hague, comes across as an ideal city when it comes to discussing or researching Islamophobia as it challenges the concept at multiple levels. To begin with, the Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia (Conway, 1997) has been largely accused of mixing race and religion - sometimes claiming, Islamophobia is about race (Muslims), and in some sections claiming Islamophobia is about fear of Islam (religion) and sometimes both. Through this research it was found that both these concepts may not apply, and particularly on the Dutch who were interviewed for a number of reasons. For instance, the Netherlands is home to both Turkish and Moroccan nationality - both races are believed to have practitioners of Islam. It was found that the Dutch had good things to say about Turkish immigrants, whereas critical observations were made about Moroccans. The "hard-working" "easy to interact" impression of the Turkish, and the "crime-related" "aggressive" impression of the Moroccans suggested that the Turkish were believed to integrate faster, were not associated with crime, and respected symbolic values associated with the Dutch culture. Whereas the Moroccans were associated with "crime", giving an impression that they don't respect or follow Dutch laws. Therefore, at least through the group interviewed, it was found that "race" was not a criteria. The concept of Islamophobia as defined in the Runnymede Trust Report (Conway, 1997) is also equally anchored as discrimination based on "religion". In the Dutch interviews in it was found that religion did not play any significant role whatsoever in the lives of the Dutch who were interviewed, it was not a subject matter of practice and hence played no role in determining their attitude towards Muslims or Islam - at the pivot of all discussions and debate was the idea to obey Dutch laws. Owing to this finding, one of the basic question which proponents of Islamophobia may have to answer is why do the Dutch appear to be supportive about one race (Turkish) and not the other (Moroccans) even though they practice the same religion?

The Dutch do have critical views about Islam, and some ideas which are used in the study of Islamophobia may be of some help in discerning the attitudes. For example, Halliday's (1999) argument that the discriminatory attitudes may be termed as "Anti-Muslimism" may be relevant to only those Dutch views which consistently discourage wearing even of scarves (something which was also followed in Christianity). However, with regards to burqa, it is difficult to reach to a conclusion whether criticizing the practice of wearing a burqa, which is identified as a realistic threat by some, and a symbolic threat by others, can be termed as "Anti-Muslimism" as the idea is not to discriminate on the basis of race, but symbolic ideas associated with it. To some extent, this Dutch view on scarves, shows what can be identified as shades of "cultural racism" where assimilation is demanded citing cultural differences and not necessarily based on race (Modood, 2001). Whether this view is because of "race" must be investigated to reach to any concrete conclusion about the same. It is ideal that this aspect is investigated by interviewing members of the Muslim community and know their opinion on the same whether they experience cultural racism in any sense (for example, Turkish with Dutch citizenships or Indonesians with Dutch citizenships). Gottschalk & Greenberg (2008) interpretation that Islamophobia is nothing but social anxiety is also relevant to this study as the Dutch interviewees emphasized and expected that non-native Dutch must confirm in a certain way, and when they did not, it caused social anxiety. This can be related to how the Dutch viewed Turkish and Moroccans where Turkish somehow cause less social anxiety, but Moroccans in comparison cause more social anxiety in the minds of the Dutch.

In the propaganda analysis section, it was mentioned that the Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia cites certain "Open" and "Closed" views about Islam and Muslims. It appeared that the Dutch have, what can be termed as both open and closed views about Islam and Muslims. It would be rare that a person could have only open views or only closed views. This aspect to some degree strengthens the argument of these categories being a 'Fallacy of Extremes' (see Cross, 1997) from a propaganda viewpoint. For example, one of the Runnymede Trust closed views argument was that *Islam is seen as barbaric, irrational, primitive and sexist* was unable to be entirely related to as interest in religion as a subject matter of practice was low or only a matter of curiosity. The generalization or simplification through this construct virtually dilutes all arguments because the Dutch were mindful of not generalizing their views and critical views expressed were categorically aimed at fundamental Islam only. The Runnymede Report also states an "open view" *Islam is seen as an actual or potential partner in joint co-operate enterprises and in solution of shared problems* - A Dutch interviewee suggested that Muslims must enter politics and raise their

demands through democratic means and dialogue. It was not possible to identify or relate to all the “Open” and “Closed” view categories, nor was it the goal, however, this is indeed an interesting insight into the entire concept.

There were different realistic threats which the Dutch respondents experienced namely threats of social security being siphoned off, threat of violence or terror attacks and perception of changes in law (sharia) which can be both a realistic and symbolic threat (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). The symbolic threats were largely about burqas and their irrelevance in the Dutch society. There occurred no other symbolic threat - shops, restaurants, mosques (without the azaan) were not considered as a symbolic threat (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). It was noticed that inter-group anxiety situations were experienced by few interviewees where they felt other members of the Muslim community were not respectful to them (not allowed in house without head cover) or they felt unequal or overpowered in cultural settings (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). The emphasis on Dutch language, and the ability to speak Dutch was a way to communicate and reduce the inter-group anxiety, the speaking of the Dutch language, also gave Dutch an impression that their values, language, culture was respected.

6 Conclusion & Recommendation

The Runnymede Trust Report (Conway, 1997) is cited as one of the most important sources of information by many scholars. While the report has been critically reviewed by various scholars from a sociological viewpoint, it was never critically reviewed from a propaganda perspective. This research argues that the notion that Runnymede Trust is a non-partisan organization could merely be an impression (Weaver, 1989; Rich, 1984), and the Runnymede Trust Report 1997 on Islamophobia could be propaganda designed to meet specific objectives – specifically the Race Relations Act 1976. This research also attempted to fill that gap and put in context the roles of think-tanks, and explore possible objectives which could be associated with it. It was found that there are strong reasons to be skeptical about the report as the information presented is largely “grey” (Rouse, 2005; Gray & Martin, 2007) and positions its arguments in a manner which appears to be well-designed for persuasion. It was found that the Runnymede Trust Report attempted to convince the reader of the concept of Islamophobia through various means - misrepresenting or misreporting data and by emotions - both considered as important tools for persuasion (Lasswell, 1934; Doob, 1949; Goodin, 1980). Furthermore, the report was very well publicized (3500 copies sent to policy makers, law makers etc) and this suggests a PR machinery and goal was in place. While the issue (hatred against Muslims) may have veracity during that time, it occurred

while conducting this research, that the label and use of the “term” Islamophobia did much more than simply address or raise the “issue” (of anti-Islam/anti-Muslim attitudes). For example, the timing when the report was when there were indeed frictions amid the native British citizens and the Muslims over the release of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses and a section of Muslim were criticized for being intolerant and indulging in violence. However, this was not the only issue in Britain - Muslims, not protected under the Race Relations Act, 1976 against hate crime in Britain was also a matter of contention, and the Runnymede Trust on Islamophobia also argued to include “religion” (Islam) in Race Relations Act to insulate, and punish hate-speech or crime against Islam and Muslims. It was also found that arguments presented in the report mix and shift goal posts too often with the intention to persuade - for instance, the comparison of Islamophobia with Anti-Semitism (another term which may be considered as something used for victim propaganda) and justifying the “need” to have such a term. In some sections of the report Islamophobia was positioned as “somewhat” similar to “Xenophobia”. Overall, the arguments presented in the report, the way they were presented, and the timing, raises some concerns of the objective. Furthermore, this was a “think-tank” report, and as explained earlier, think-tanks are not always non-partisan, and are often used for setting agenda. Lastly, The Runnymede Trust Report was presided by a body of scholars who were immune from peer reviews and largely funded, and advised by members of Muslim community this increases the chances of the report being subjective to some degree. Halliday (1999) had already raised concerns, though not evaluating the report by the way of propaganda analysis, and suggested that these reports do have a chance of being influenced even though they maybe presided by scholars or academics.

The historical context (Allen, 2005) of the word Islamophobia was also briefly discussed in this study, however, The Runnymede Trust Report is vague about the history of the term, the brief history (see Allen, 2005) which suggested that the term ‘Islamophobia’ has been used as a “name-calling” device by Muslim clerics in Iran against those Muslims who were afraid of Islam is not mentioned in the report. It is also not mentioned that the term Islamophoba was positioned and re-defined by British group Al-Muhajiroun as ‘Non-Muslims being afraid of Islam’. The Runnymede Trust Report disowns inventing the term Islamophobia, and broadly suggests that the term is a used colloquially by Muslims who experience discrimination in UK. It has been well established that the underlying political implications of using this term are many especially in academic research, and may lead to incorrect measurements of racism, discrimination, prejudices or stereotypes. Using the term itself stands a chance giving the Islamophobia an impetus and converting it into a sociological propaganda (Ellul, 1963). The term, it was observed, as it is used now, is used to

suggest anything and everything from racism, discrimination, prejudice or stereotypes - thus muddling the boundaries between these concepts. Some of the interpretations, especially in the political realm were also discussed in this study which suggested that the term is continued to be used on international forums like UN, and on the other hand has been discontinued by news agencies like Associated Press – suggesting that the contestation is too high and polemic.

The second part of the thesis, explored Dutch beliefs and attitudes on Islam and Muslims, and how these could be related to the manifestation of Islamophobia . On the whole it was found that the Runnymede Trust definition of Islamophobia of “dread”, “fear”, “hatred” towards all or most Muslims does not apply on the Dutch sample interviewed. Taking into account the various scholarly discussions, there was no indication of “alarmism” or “simplification” in the views presented by the Dutch respondents about Islam or Muslims who live in The Hague. The alarmism was largely about ‘realistic threats’ (see Stephan & Stephan, 1996) experienced through news media (example: about promulgation of sharia law or existence of violent or fundamental Islam in The Hague or The Netherlands. The “simplification” (see Halliday, 1999) that most people believe all Muslims and Islam are the same also did not occur. Interestingly, the city of Hague proved to be an ideal city to explore this phenomenon of Islamophobia as The Hague consists of Muslims from various backgrounds. It was possible to gain some empirical insight over the argument (as presented in The Runnymede Trust Report) that Islamophobia being both about hating Muslims as race and Islam as religion. The data gathered suggested that race and religion were not the criteria. For instance, the Dutch respondents appreciated the Turkish, but despised the Moroccans – even though both Moroccans and Turkish are known to practice the same religion. It was also found that religion had very little or no space among the Dutch interviewed therefore that is not the criteria of evaluation of an out-group. The criteria, it emerged, were following of rules and laws, mutual respect and tolerance. Certain, what may be considered as critical views also were found when wearing of “scarves” was considered as not a sign of integration, and apparently, caused “social anxiety” (Gottschalk & Greenberg, 2008) but ultimately it was left up to the individual what they want to wear or not wear. The idea of wearing Burqas in public places, however, was strongly resisted and discouraged as some believed it is a sign of women being repressed, while others called it simply too backward. There was strong emphasis on learning the Dutch language for practical reasons and a way to communicate during formal and informal situations.

The previous studies on Islamophobia in The Netherlands, had suggested that ‘Islamophobic’ discourse has increased in The Netherlands (Ecri, 2008). As my findings do not confirm this, it may

be needed to reevaluate these reports. It may for instance have to be studied how Islamophobia was defined or interpreted to begin with. The findings of this research were similar to Bloss' (2009) research where the Dutch gave a lot of prominence and importance to assimilation and integration.

Limitations

Like any other research, this research had its own limitations – beginning with limitation of time. For instance, only six interviewees could be interviewed. For that reasons none of the findings of the interviews study are representative. Another limitation was since the sample was acquired via snow-ball sampling, the responses and the attitudes mentioned may only be relevant to a typical Dutch group in the age group of 40-65. For example, some interviewed had professional engagements with security establishments and others were involved in departments such as public health care in The Netherlands. Another limitation I would consider is because I am a non-Dutch or foreign researcher, it can be argued that some interviewees may have simply said things which are politically correct or sound impressive. These are some of the practical limitations and self-criticism of the study.

Recommendation

I am inclined to make two kinds of recommendations for future research on Islamophobia. (1) Broad recommendation (focused on the post 9/11 scenario), and a narrow recommendation which may be relevant to studying Islamophobia at a micro level. The broad recommendation specifically includes taking into account a more historical assessment. My assessment, from a historical viewpoint, is that the Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia 1997, and the term Islamophobia was particularly talk of the town only in the UK. The term became popular, and as if received a new life (in UK and globally) after the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 attacks by itself is an event which is of interest to many propaganda researchers, and it has been largely established that the post 9/11 discourse, where all the blame was put on Al-Qaeda, was a communication spin by the US, when actually, the incident was a CIA blow-back (see Weaver, 1996), and the real reason why America was attacked was not it's democracy or freedom but the US foreign policy in the Middle-East (see Day, 2000; Dube, Kaplan & Naidu, 2011; Jarecki, 2006; Powers & Officer, 2010; Scheuer, 2002). Very broadly speaking, democracy and freedom are 'symbolic' terms, and Islam, in the post 9/11 environment, was largely considered as a 'symbolic threat', as it was considered that Islam or particularly fundamental Islam was threat to the global value system. These frictions began to be

known as 'Islamophobia', thus giving the term a new life and at a global level. The initial context of the term, which is discussed in this thesis, and which suspects that the term Islamophobia was used to influence (at least partly) the Race Relations Act, 1976, in the post 9/11 environment began to be used as more victim propaganda and perhaps as a fancy/new term by the news media to denote anti-Islam attitudes. To add to this, there could be oversight, perhaps due to the post 9/11 high energy environment when different kind of researches came to the fore, there is a possibility that there was oversight in media to critically examine the definition of the term, and this led to continued use of the term in a variety of loose contexts [what Ellul (1973) terms as sociological propaganda]. The variety of Islamophobia conferences, Islamophobia TV are but a result of sociological propaganda, and propaganda researchers may like to explore in this direction.

As far as the Netherlands goes, it is predicted that by 2015, 15 percent of the population of the Netherlands will constitute of people from Islamic background (Bloss, 2009). Therefore a regular monitoring of changing attitude, beliefs, perceived threats, is warranted and may help in making policy decisions that involve community cohesion, multiculturalism, immigrations among other issues. However, these policies will only be effective if they are formed on precise understanding and measurement of ground situation. It may also be useful to conduct a research on what impact the use of the term 'Islamophobia' has on people, do people know what it means, what are the interpretations which they draw etc.

This exploratory study suggests that there could be vast differences at a ground level, and what is written or interpreted on their behalf in the news media and labeled as Islamophobia. It is likely that the "alarmism" in the news or the "simplification" by certain section of Muslim about the existence of Islamophobia could be an exaggeration or simply a convenient interpretation by select lobbies. The solution to actually understanding genuine cases and themes of anti-Muslim attitudes is to stick to known concepts like racism, discrimination, prejudice or stereotypes which have less political implications associated and provide realistic assessment at a micro level for scholarly studies. In the last one year there are some debates that the term Islamophobia must be dropped from academic use, and considering the various findings discussed in this research, such a proposition could be a step in the right direction.

References

- Abbas, T. (2004). After 9/11: British South Asian Muslims, Islamophobia, multiculturalism, and the state. *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 21, 26-38. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/kOx3h2>
- Allen, C. (2001). *Islamophobia in the media since September 11th*. University of Westminster, UK. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/2zRS7n>
- Allen, C. (2004). Justifying Islamophobia: a post-9/11 consideration of the European Union and British contexts. *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 21, 1-25. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/l5aNfO>
- Allen, C. (2005). *Islamophobia: Contested Concept In The Public Space* (phd thesis). University of Birmingham. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/5o00F1>
- Allen, C. (2007). The First Decade of Islamophobia: 10 Years of the Runnymede Trust Report. *The Runnymede Trust*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/M3zXeN>
- Allen, C. (2008, May). KISS Islamophobia (keeping it simple and stupid). *Thinking Thru Islamophobia*. Poster Presentation at a conference for Center for Ethnicity and Racism, Leeds, UK. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/is25XC>
- Allen, C. (2010). *Islamophobia*. London: Ashgate Publishing
- Allen, C. (2011). Opposing Islamification Or Promoting Islamophobia? Understanding the English Defense League. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 45, 279-294. doi: 10.1080/0031322X.2011.585014
- Allen, C. (2013). Passing the Dinner Table Test Retrospective and Prospective Approaches to Tackling Islamophobia in Britain. *Sage Open*. doi: 10.1177/2158244013484734
- Miles, M.B. & Huberman, M. (1994). *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook*. Thousand Oaks. California: Sage

- Aristotle, S. (1984). *The Politics* (Trans. Benjamin Jowett), USA: Batoche Books. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/aAyJjy>
- Bangstad, S. (2012). Review of Chris Allen, Islamophobia. *Contemporary Islam*, 1-6. doi: 10.1007/s11562-012-0203-1
- Barkan, E. (1992) *The Retreat of Scientific Racism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bayefsky, A. F. (2001). Panel on the Responses to the Recent Terrorist Attacks on the US. *ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L.*, 8, 349. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/WGfzQa>
- Bernays, E. (1928). *Propaganda*. New York: Horace Liveright. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/OfkQWt>
- Blass, M. (2009). Last Moroccan leaves the Netherlands. *Radio Netherlands Worldwide*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/JAnMFP>
- Bleich, E. (2011). What is Islamophobia and how much is there? Theorizing and measuring an emerging comparative concept. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 55, 1581-1600. doi: 10.1177/0002764211409387
- Bötticher, A. (2009). Islamophobia? The German Discussion about Islamophobia. *Středoevropské politické studie (CEPSR)*, 210-229. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/INOqR6>
- Brandt, A. M. (1996). Recruiting women smokers: the engineering of consent. *Journal of the American Medical Women's Association*, 63-66. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/pifSuZ>
- Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Analysis in Psychology*, 3, 77-100. doi: 10.1191/1478088706qp063oa
- Brouwer, L. (2004). Dutch-Muslims on the internet: a new discussion platform. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 24, 47-55. doi: 10.1080/1360200042000212250
- CBS (2011). The Hague to surpass the 500,000 mark in September. *CBS*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/ikwC1E>

CBS (2012). Anti-Islamic ad claiming “it’s not Islamophobia, it’s Islamorealism”. *CBS News*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/7ryTn2>

Coenders, M., Lubbers, M., Scheepers, P., & Verkuyten, M. (2008). More Than Two Decades Of Changing Ethnic Attitudes In The Netherlands. *Journal of Social Issues, 64*, 269-285. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/o607oM>

Comres (2013). *BBC Radio Newsbeat Discrimination Poll*. Comres Polling Agency. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/vbezbv>

Collier, D., & Mahoney, J. (1996). Insights and pitfalls: Selection bias in qualitative research. *World Politics, 49*, 56-91. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/kG0bW7>

Conway, G. (1997). *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*. The Runnymede Trust. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/R1HScU>

Cross, D. W. (1997). Propaganda: How not to be bamboozled. *Isaacs et al*, 39-47. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/k1IE7J>

Croucher, S. M. (2013). Integrated Threat Theory and Acceptance of Immigrant Assimilation: An Analysis of Muslim Immigration in Western Europe. *Communication Monographs, 80*, 46-62. Doi: 10.1080/03637751.2012.739704

Day, J. K. (2000). The United States Media and the Guatemalan Coup d'état of 1954. *Delaware Review of Latin American Studies, 2*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/D8eRhT>

De Dreu, C. K., Greer, L. L., Handgraaf, M. J., Shalvi, S., Van Kleef, G. A., Baas, M., & Feith, S. W. (2010). The neuropeptide oxytocin regulates parochial altruism in intergroup conflict among humans. *Science, 328*, 1408-1411. doi: 10.1126/science.1189047

Dictionary Reference (n.d.). Definition of concept. *Dictionary.reference.com*. Retrieved from <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/concept>

Doob, L. W. (1949) *Public Opinion and Propaganda*. London: Cresset Press.

Duckitt, J. (1992). *The Social Psychology of Prejudice*. New York: Praeger

Dube, A., Kaplan, E., & Naidu, S. (2011). Coups, corporations, and classified information. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126, 1375-1409. doi: 10.1093/qje/qjr030

Ecri (2008). *Third Report on the Netherlands* [Publication no. CRI2008]. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/R4s2L7>

Ellul, J. (1973). *The Formation of Men's Attitudes*. California: Vintage Books

Enterieva, I. (2013). *Analysis Of Propaganda Techniques Used In Political Campaign Videos By Runners To Bishkek City Council In 2012* (Masters Thesis). Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/OK34op>

Ford, Z. (2012). AP drops homophobia and Islamophobia from its style guide. *Think Progress*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/6NDc9x>

George, S. (1997). Winning the war of ideas. *Dissent*, 44, 47-53. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/PdtQeX>

Gilroy, P. (2005 [1987]) *Ain't No Black In The Union Jack (2nd Ed)*. London: Routledge.

Goodin, R. E. (1980) *Manipulatory Politics*. London: Yale University Press.

Google Trends (2013) Trend for keyword Islamophobia. *Google.com/trends*. Retrieved on September 30, 2013 from <http://www.google.com/trends/explore?q=islamophobia#q=islamophobia&cmpt=q>

Gottschalk, P., & Greenberg, G. (2008). *Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.

Gray, T., & Martin, B. (2007). Backfires: White, Black & Grey. *Journal of Information Warfare* 7, 7-16. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/DNsHc5>

Halliday, F. (1999). Islamophobia Reconsidered. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22, 892-902. doi: 10.1080/014198799329305

Hekma, G. (2002). Imams and homosexuality: A post-gay debate in the Netherlands. *Sexualities*, 5, 237-248. doi: 10.1177/1363460702005002006

Imagine 2050 (n.d.). Islamophobia Magazine. *Imagine 2050*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/xenSNX>

Islamophobia TV (n.d.). Islamophobia TV [Youtube Channel]. *Youtube.com*. Retrieved from <http://www.youtube.com/user/theislamophobiatv/about>

Imhoff, R., & Recker, J. (2012). Differentiating Islamophobia: Introducing a new Scale to Measure Islamoprejudice and Secular Islam Critique. *Political Psychology*, 33, 811-824. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00911.x

Iyengar, S., & Simon, A. (1993). News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing. *Communication Research*, 20, 365-383. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/4stTKC>

Jarecki, E. (Director) (2006). *Why we fight* [Motion Picture]. United States: Sony Pictures. Retrieved from <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TO7-GBRx1xM>

Jowett, G. S., & O'Donnell, V. (2011). How to Analyze Propaganda? In *Propaganda & Persuasion* (p 269-287). CA: Sage Publications. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/uy3T2S>

Krause, M. (2013). *Think Tanks in America by Thomas Medvetz*. Chicago University Press. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/NOXbhe>

Kunst, J. R., Sam, D. L., & Ulleberg, P. (2012). Perceived Islamophobia: Scale development and validation. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/mWaUCc>

Kvale, S. (1996). *InterViews. An Introduction to Qualitative Research Writing*. California: Sage. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/qrxgl>

Larsson, G. (2005). The impact of global conflicts on local contexts: Muslims in Sweden after 9/11—the rise of Islamophobia, or new possibilities? *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations*, 16, 29-42. doi: 10.1080/0959641052000313228

- Larsson, G. (2007) 'Cyber-Islamophobia: The case for WikIslam. *Contemporary Islam*, 53-67. doi: 10.1007/s11562-007-0002-2
- Lasswell, H., D. (1934) Propaganda, in R. Jackall (ed) *Propaganda* (13-25), 1995 Edition, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.
- López, F. (2011). Towards a definition of Islamophobia: approximations of the early twentieth century. *Ethnic & Racial Studies*, 34, 556-573. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/54EQYI>
- Lee, A. M. (1945). The analysis of propaganda: a clinical summary. *American Journal of Sociology*, 126-135. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/la9jjb>
- Lee, S. A., Gibbons, J. A., Thompson, J. M., & Timani, H. S. (2009). The Islamophobia scale: Instrument development and initial validation. *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 19, 92-105. doi: 10.1080/10508610802711137
- Lippmann, W. (1954) *Public opinion*. New York: Macmillan
- Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M., & Scheepers, P. (2002). Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41, 345-378. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/nuw6Un>
- MacCombs, M. E., Shaw, D. L., & Weaver, D. D. H. (Eds.). (1997). *Communication And Democracy: Exploring The Intellectual Frontiers In Agenda-Setting Theory*. UK: Psychology Press.
- Malik, K. (2005). Islamophobia Myth. *Prospect Magazine*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/NdNdSz>
- Meer, N. and Noorani, T. (2008). 'A sociological comparison of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain', *Sociological Review*, 56, 195-219. doi: 0.1111/j.1467-954X.2008.00784.x
- Meer, N., & Modood, T. (2008, May). *Thinking Thru Islamophobia*. Poster Presentation at a conference for Center for Ethnicity and Racism, Leeds, UK. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/Ysm590>
- Mepschen, P., Duyvendak, J. W., & Tonkens, E. H. (2010). Sexual politics, orientalism and multicultural citizenship in The Netherlands. *Sociology*, 44, 962-979. doi: 10.1177/0038038510375740

- Merali, A., & Shadjareh, M. (2002). *Islamophobia: The New Crusade*. Islamic Human Rights Commission. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/5O8smo>
- Modood, T., & May, S. (2001). Multiculturalism and education in Britain: An internally contested debate. *International Journal Of Educational Research*, 35, 305-317. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/PqoQQx>
- Mosier, J. (2013). *E-Mails, Propaganda, And The 2012 Presidential Election: A Content Analysis* [Master's thesis]. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/t9ceSR>
- National Association for Muslim Police [NAMP] (2010). Report on Key Islamophobia Research. April, 2010. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/fQUVtP>
- Oxford Dictionary (n.d). Definition of Phenomenon. *Oxforddictionaries.com*. Retrieved on July 3, 2013 from <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/phenomenon?q=phenomenon>
- Parekh, B. (1990). The Rushdie affair and the British press: some salutary lessons. *Free Speech*, 59-79. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/R2fkGq>
- Petrucci, R., & Potter, H. R. (Eds.). (1989). *Networks of power: organizational actors at the national, corporate, and community levels*. US: Transaction Publishers.
- Poynting, S., & Mason, V. (2007). The resistible rise of Islamophobia Anti-Muslim racism in the UK and Australia before 11 September 2001. *Journal of Sociology*, 43, 61-86. doi: 10.1177/1440783307073935
- Powers, J., & Officer, C. O. (2010). Oil addiction: Fueling our enemies. *Truman National Security Project*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/yI5gqM>
- Richardson, J.E. (2005) Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism – or what? – concepts and terms revisited. *Insed Consultancy*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/VzYLQt>

Richardson, R., & Stone, R. (2004). *Islamophobia-Issues, Challenges And Action: A Report By The Commission On British Muslims And Islamophobia*. USA: Trentham Books. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/jlJXo4>

Rouse, E. (2005). History of Psywars. *Psywarrior.com*. Retrieved July 26, 2013 from <http://www.psywarrior.com/psyhist.html>

Runnymede Trust (1968), Runnymede Trust [About Page]. *Runnymedetrust.org*. Retrieved on September 23, 2013 from www.runnymedetrust.org/about www.runnymedetrust.org/about.

Runnymede Trust (1968a), Runnymede Trust Reports [List]. Retrieved on September 23, 2013 from <http://www.runnymedetrust.org/projects-and-publications/publications/currentPublications.html>

Saeed, A. (2007). Media, racism and Islamophobia: the representation of Islam and Muslims in the media. *Sociology Compass*, 1, 443-462. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00039.x

Samad, Y. (1992). Book burning and race relations: political mobilisation of Bradford Muslims. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 18, 507-519. doi: 10.1080/1369183X.1992.9976326

Savelkoul, M., Scheepers, P., Tolsma, J., & Hagendoorn, L. (2011). Anti-Muslim attitudes in the Netherlands: Tests of contradictory hypotheses derived from ethnic competition theory and intergroup contact theory. *European Sociological Review*, 27, 741-758. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcq035

Scheuer, M. (2002). *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, And The Future Of America*. US: Potomac Books. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/CVlFpQ>

Silverstein, B. (1987). Toward a science of propaganda. *Political Psychology*, 49-59. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/OfE2GS>

Smith, M., & Marden, P. (2008). Conservative think tanks and public politics. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 43, 699-717. Retrieved from: <http://goo.gl/2djy7j>

Statham, P. (1999). Political mobilisation by minorities in Britain: Negative feedback of race relations? *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 25, 597-626.

doi: 10.1080/1369183X.1999.9976706

Stebbins, R. A. (Ed.). (2001). *Exploratory Research In The Social Sciences* (vol. 48). UK: Sage.

Stephan, W.G., & Renfro, C.L. (2002). *The Role Of Threat In Intergroup Relations*. New York: Psychology Press.

Stephan, W.G., & Stephan, C.W. (1996). Predicting Prejudice. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 20, 409-426. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/piablm>

Stephan, W.G., Ybarra, O., & Bachman, G. (1999). Prejudice toward immigrants: An integrated threat theory. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 29, 559_576. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1999.tb00107.x

Taylor, P. M. (1998). *The Encyclopedia Of Propaganda* (vol. 3). New York: Sharpe Reference.

Thijs, J., & Verkuyten, M. (2013). Multiculturalism in the classroom: Ethnic attitudes and classmates' beliefs. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 37, 176-187. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/swx5TC>

Thomson, O. (1977). *Mass Persuasion In History: An Historical Analysis Of The Development Of Propaganda Techniques*. Edinburg: Paul Harris.

Toynbee, P. (2005). My right to offend a fool: race and religion are different—which is why Islamophobia is a nonsense and religious hatred must not be outlawed. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/Ux6E9S>

Triadafilopoulos (1999). Politics, Speech, and the Art of Persuasion: Toward an Aristotelian Conception of the Public Sphere. *The Journal of Politics*, 61, 741-757. doi: 10.2307/2647826.

UN (2004). Addressing Seminar on Confronting Islamophobia [Press Release]. *Un.org*. Retrieved on September 19, 2013 from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9637.doc.htm>

Van der Veer, P. (2006). Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh, and the politics of tolerance in the Netherlands. *Public Culture*, 18, 111-124. doi: 10.1215/08992363-18-1-111

Velasco González, K., Verkuyten, M., Weesie, J., & Poppe, E. (2008). Prejudice towards Muslims in the Netherlands: Testing integrated threat theory *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *47*, 667-685. doi: 10.1348/014466608X284443

Veldhuis, T., & Bakker, E. (2009). Muslims in the Netherlands: Tensions and violent conflict [Policy paper]. *Ethno-religious Conflict in Europe: Typologies of Radicalisation in Europe's Muslim Communities*, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/TJfQx>

Verkuyten, M., & Yildiz, A. A. (2007). National (dis) identification and ethnic and religious identity: A study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *33*, 1448-1462. doi: 10.1177/0146167207304276

Walton, D. (1996). What is propaganda, and what exactly is wrong with it? *Public Affairs Quarterly*, *11*, 383-413. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/gc51ur>

Weaver, M. A. (1996). Blowback. *Atlantic-Boston*. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/f0cBCr>

Webster (n.d) Meaning of Propaganda. *Merriam-Webster*. Retrieved July 26, 2013 from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/propaganda>

Weaver, R. K. (1989). The changing world of think tanks. *Political Science and Politics*, *22*, 563-578. Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/uK0AQO>

Werbner, P. (2005) 'Islamophobia, incitement to religious hatred-legislating for a new fear?' *Anthropology Today*, *21*, 5-9. doi: 10.1111/j.0268-540X.2005.00323.x

Zimmerman, V. C. (2013). *Analysis Of Propaganda Structure: Developing The Interpersonal Paradigm Of War Propaganda* (phd thesis). Retrieved from <http://goo.gl/K0UmOf>

Thematic Overview

Figure 1.

The graph below indicates the various themes which emerged from computed analysis of atlas.ti and the emphasis which was given to each topic/issue by the Dutch interviewees.





Figure 2:

The above pie-chart indicates the perceived threats which the Dutch interviewees from The Hague had discussed about Islam and Muslims. The figures are computed by Atlas.ti according to the codes symbolic threats, realistic threat, intergroup anxiety and the number of average percent of times the issues relating to RT, ST & IA about Islam and Muslims in The Hague were discussed.