

Balancing and ranking: an exploratory study on party lists in the Netherlands

ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM
Erasmus School of Economics
Department of Economics

Supervisor: Dr. B.S.Y. Crutzen

Name: Myora Kuipers
Exam number: 311647
E-mail address: 311647mk@student.eur.nl

Balancing and ranking: an exploratory study on party lists in the Netherlands

Myora Kuipers

February 26, 2014

Abstract

This paper is an exploratory, broad and novel study on party lists in the Netherlands and aims to empirically assess how balanced party lists in the Netherlands have been in terms of gender, ethnicity, seniority, educational backgrounds and geography during the elections of 2003 to 2012. Next, an extensive dataset was created to study the determinants of party list rankings. The main findings are that party lists are not as balanced as the empirical literature would suggest and that legislative effort has no robust effect on party list positions. Seniority of candidates is positively associated with higher party list positions, but popularity is affected by the ranking rather than the reverse. However, more empirical research is required to uncover the true determinants of party list positions of Dutch political parties.

Keywords: *party lists, balancing, legislative effort*

Contents

1	Introduction	4
2	Related literature	7
2.1	Candidate selection	7
2.2	Balancing	8
2.3	Legislative effort	9
3	Methodology	10
3.1	The dataset	10
3.2	Dependent variable	10
3.3	Independent variables	11
3.4	Hypotheses	13
4	Results	15
4.1	Balancing	15
4.1.1	Gender	15
4.1.2	Ethnicity	17
4.1.3	Seniority	18
4.1.4	Educational backgrounds	20
4.1.5	Geography	22
4.2	Party list positions	22
4.2.1	Seniority and popularity	22
4.2.2	Legislative effort	26
5	Discussion	35
5.1	Balancing	35
5.2	Party list positions	36
6	Conclusion	40
7	References	42

1 Introduction

For candidates who stand for elections to parliament, the importance of their party list position depends on the country's electoral system. For the Netherlands, the electoral system can be qualified as open-list proportional representation (PR).¹ In this system, political parties determine the order of candidates on the party lists, but the voter is given the opportunity to change the ranking through preferential voting. Votes are cast on individual candidates of parties, rather than on parties. This way, a candidate that is listed on a low position can still be elected autonomously into parliament. According to Dutch law, this requires a candidate to receive at least 25 per cent of the electoral quota.² The method of preferential voting seems to suggest that voters have a greater say in who makes it to parliament and who not. Candidates also seem to be more accountable to the voter than to the party leader.

In practice however, Dutch voters usually wish to vote for a party yet do not have a preference for a certain candidate. They then vote for the first person on the party list, the list-puller. Consequently, most preference votes are effectively counted as votes for parties. This is supported by the fact that political parties do not encourage preference voting and that individual campaigning by candidates prior to the election is rare. In the past, some parties even made their candidates sign an undated letter of resignation, or a pledge not to accept election by preference votes without the approval of the party executive (Andeweg, 2005).

As a result of this, voters rarely influence the order of the submitted party lists: since the introduction of the open-list PR system in 1917, only twelve candidates would not have been elected had it not been for preference votes. Interestingly though, seven of these twelve candidates were elected after 2000. Figure 1 suggests that 'real' preference votes (i.e. votes not cast on the list-puller) are becoming more important in recent years. At the same time, the parties' candidate selection methods that used to be heavily under the control of party elites, have become more democratic. Party members now have a larger say in determining the party list than ten years ago (Lucardie and Voerman, 2006).

¹The electoral system was changed radically from a majoritarian system to the current proportional representation in 1917. Before 1917, members of parliament were elected by absolute majority from electoral districts. This district system was abolished in the historic event known as the Great Pacification (Loots, 2004).

²The Dutch electoral system uses the Hare quota and is given as: $totalvotes/totalseats$. The total number of seats in parliament is 150. The required percentage to be elected into parliament directly was changed from 50 to 25 per cent of the electoral quota in 1995 (Deschouwer, 2002).




Figure 1. Source: Van Holsteyn and Andeweg (2012).

The candidate nomination procedures were mostly subject to change due to internal party studies after election defeats that some parties have faced (CDA in 1994; PvdA and VVD in 2002). Most changes were made in the election procedure of the list-puller, but CDA, PvdA and VVD also gave members more influence on the party list rankings. The most far-reaching changes to member influence were implemented by VVD. Each member received suffrage in the party congress, as was already the case at CDA. But unlike PvdA and CDA, members of VVD were also given the possibility to register their order of preference for the party list ranking, starting at the second position. During the election of 2006 however, only 20 per cent of approximately 42.000 members had chosen to do so and the preferences diverged little from the advisory list of the central board.

Because preference voting still rarely leads to changes in the submitted party lists rankings, parties have some sort of monopoly over the process of recruiting the politicians that end up in government or parliament (Andeweg, 2005). And while party list rankings are still mostly determined by party elites, little empirical research is available on the determinants of these party list rankings. This worrying combination is the motive for writing this exploratory paper. This paper focuses on four big-tent parties that participated in the last four elections for the House of Representatives in the Netherlands: *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD), *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA), *Christen-Democratisch Appel* (CDA) and lastly *Socialistische Partij* (SP).

The first aim of this paper is to empirically analyse how balanced party lists in the Netherlands are in terms of gender, ethnicity, geography, seniority and educational backgrounds. The second aim is to find the determinants of party list positions. A broad dataset that includes legislative effort indicators is developed to study the effects of popularity, seniority and legislative effort on a politician's rank in the next election. Multiple analyses are performed to increase the robustness of the results. The ranking positions and the changes in ranking positions between elections are used as dependent variables. Additionally, a distinction is made between all party list positions, the top

10 positions and the safe 10-24 positions. To my knowledge, this methodology has not been used before. The results of this exploratory, broad and novel study on party lists in the Netherlands are that party lists are not as balanced as the empirical literature would suggest and that legislative effort has no robust effect on party lists positions. Regarding seniority and popularity of candidates, seniority seems to be linked with a higher ranking position, while popularity seems to be dependent on the ranking position rather than the reverse.

The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will first cover the related literature on balancing, candidate selection and legislative effort. Section 3 describes the dataset that was created for this study and the methodology used for the analyses. The results will be presented in Section 4, after which Section 5 discusses these results. The last section, Section 6, concludes.

2 Related literature

2.1 Candidate selection

One of the first things that political parties need to do prior to an election is selecting candidates for their party lists. Each party has its own procedure, laid down in the statutes and bylaws. These candidate selection methods can be classified for study purposes. Hazan and Rahat (2010) have created a framework of candidate selection methods and distinguish four dimensions. The first dimension, candidacy, answers the question who is an eligible candidate for the party and makes a distinction between the level of inclusiveness or exclusiveness. An example of a more inclusive candidacy requirement is that all citizens may become candidates, while the requirements are more exclusive when a party requires a two-year membership period and a record of party activities. Catch-all parties tend to pursue more inclusive candidacy requirements, while more ideological (both far-left and far-right) parties are inclined to adopt exclusive restrictions to ensure that a candidate fits in the party culture. The selectorate, the second dimension, concerns the persons who are responsible for the selection of candidates and can also be divided into levels of more inclusive or exclusive selectorates. Here, a high level of exclusiveness could mean that party elites are responsible for nominating candidates.

The third dimension is decentralisation and is about the place of selection. Are candidates selected by local branches or by the central party office? Lundell (2004) assumes that preferential voting has a decentralising effect on candidate selection, since individual voting requires local knowledge of the candidates. The opposite hypothesis is that parties in a closed-list electoral system are willing to compensate voters' lack of influence on candidate selection and are therefore more likely to adopt decentralised methods. In his study, Lundell (2004) examines whether party characteristics and political context explain differences between parties and countries in the dimension of decentralisation. Using a large dataset that consists of 94 candidate selection methods in 90 parties in Western democracies, he finds that only party size matters: large parties tend to apply more centralised selection methods. An explanation for this is that large organisations have to deal with complexity, hierarchy and bureaucracy to a greater extent. He finds no evidence for the assumption that preferential voting has a decentralising effect on candidate selection.

Lastly, the fourth dimension, appointment and voting, is about the procedural aspects of candidate selection. Voting and appointment are two different systems that can be used separately, but can also be mixed. Using a voting system means that voters determine the party list positions, while in an appointment system only an appointed selectorate

can decide on the party list.

Of course, these dimensions are connected with each other. A candidate selection method can only be democratised when both the candidacy and selectorate dimension become more inclusive: creating a larger pool of potential candidates is only relevant if the selectorate, that makes the ultimate decisions, is also less exclusive.

A fifth dimension, the degree of institutionalisation, can be added to the framework of Hazan and Rahat (2010) and is given by Norris (1996). She makes a distinction between more formal versus more informal candidate selection methods, in which rules are either detailed, standardised and clear to outsiders or less bureaucratic and rather inexplicit. An example is the tradition of ‘zipper-placement’, which means that male and female candidates appear alternately on party lists. The Dutch PvdA has a history of zipper-placement, but did not lay the rule down in its statutes or bylaws.

2.2 Balancing

All these dimensions of candidate selections have their effect on balancing. Balancing concerns the endeavors of a party to create party lists on which all sorts of groups in society are being represented. Parties can decide on a wide range of groups that they feel need to be balanced on their party lists: men and women; ethnic minorities; high- and low-educated people; citizen’s from urban as well as rural areas; young and old people. Parties can use quota to safeguard these groups. A commonly used quota is the female quota.

Regarding the dimension of decentralisation, decentralised selection methods are linked with less balanced candidate lists. When candidates are selected at local branches, the party leaders have less control over quota (Hazan and Rahat, 2010).

The inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the selectorate, the second dimension, also has its effect on balancing. A study by Rahat, Hazan and Katz (2008) shows that Israel had one of the highest levels of female representation in the world in the 1950s. But when parties made their nomination selectorates more inclusive, the ability to ensure sufficient female representation decreased over the years and Israel now has one of the lowest levels.

Regarding the fifth dimension of institutionalisation, Reiser (2014) explains that empirical research on balancing almost exclusively focuses on quotas for women and ethnic minorities, and merely on formal rules. It is stressed that it is also important to look at informal party rules and practices, even if they are not written into party statutes. The

study makes it clear that informal, highly institutionalised quotas and rules predominate within German political parties, thus proving that empirical research should not neglect informal aspects of balancing.

A study that indeed focuses merely on formal quota for women is from Besley, Folke, Persson and Rickne (2012). They investigate the consequences of zipper-placement of women on party lists of the Swedish Social Democratic party. They find that the quota raised the competence of men in municipalities where the initial share of women was low. This supports the argument that achieving gender parity through quotas can promote competence by reducing the number of mediocre men.

2.3 Legislative effort

Candidate selection methods can be linked to legislative effort as well. Legislative effort includes all endeavors from members of parliament (MPs) in parliament to influence the legislative process. Shomer (2009) tries to find evidence for the argument that inclusive and decentralised candidate selection methods create greater incentives for MPs to boost their personal reputation. This can also be extended to an open list PR system, in which party leaders have no control over the final ranking of candidates. Candidates will then have to compete with not only candidates of rival parties but also with fellow candidates. To distinguish themselves, candidates will emphasise their personal reputation and exert more legislative effort. Even though Shomer (2009) does not find support for the connection between candidate selection methods and vote-seeking behaviour, she does find that an MP's seniority can help explain the vote-seeking behaviour both at the individual as well as the aggregate level. Since new MPs need to enhance their reputation more than senior MPs, they exert more legislative effort through the formal-institutional procedures such as motions, petitions and questions. Senior MPs however are able to use more informal mechanisms to exert legislative effort.

3 Methodology

3.1 The dataset

This paper focuses on four big-tent parties that participated in the last four elections for the House of Representatives in the Netherlands: *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD), a conservative-liberal party, *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA), a social-democratic party, *Christen-Democratisch Appel* (CDA), a christian-democratic party and lastly *Socialistische Partij* (SP), a social-democratic party. To make a distinction in the analysis, VVD and CDA can be categorised as right-wing, while PvdA and SP can be categorised as left-wing.³ The last four elections took place on 22 January 2003, 22 November 2006, 9 June 2010 and 12 September 2012. In total, 611 individuals were placed on the party lists of the aforementioned political parties in the election period of 2003-2012.

The official party lists and the number of preference votes were collected from official documents of the Dutch Electoral Council. The official party lists contain information on each candidate's gender, age and place of residence. Other personal information on politicians was mostly collected from the online database *Parlement & Politiek*⁴ of Leiden University, that collects data on each MP. For the rookies, personal information was found via newspaper articles, websites of the political parties and the social networking website LinkedIn. Statistics regarding the Dutch population were retrieved from the website of Statistics Netherlands (CBS).

The indicators for legislative effort of MPs were collected from the parliament's internal databases *Parlis* and *VIP*. The indicators were compiled over the legislative years of 2008/2009 and 2010/2011 and were linked to the elections of 2010 and 2012 respectively. MPs that did have a seat in parliament but did not complete the full year due to sickness or maternity leave were deleted from the dataset. The chairman of the parliament was deleted as well, since he or she performs distinctly different activities than all other MPs.

3.2 Dependent variable

One purpose of this paper is to find the determinants of party list positions. The ranking position (*rank*) is therefore used as the dependent variable in the analysis. This variable is ordinal and can take on values ranging from 1 to 80. Given this wide span of possible ranking positions, the use of an ordered logistic model as analytical tool is problematic. This is also due to the fact that the number of observations per rank is limited (between

³See also Poguntke and Web (2005).

⁴Website: <http://www.parlement.com>.

1 to 16 observations). Because *rank* is not normally distributed and can only take on positive values, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis is not suitable either. Another issue that must be accounted for, is the fact that the dataset partly consists of repeated measures of individuals and that these within-subject observations may be correlated. Lastly, since not all individuals have participated in all four observed elections, the dataset is unbalanced.⁵

To overcome these issues, the generalised estimating equations (GEE) is considered to be the most appropriate analytical tool. The GEE approach was developed by Liang and Zeger (1986) to produce more efficient and unbiased regression estimates when analysing a repeated measures research design with a dependent variable that is not normally distributed. Another advantage of GEE is that it does not require a balanced dataset.

To extend the analysis and examine how party list positions change over time, an additional analysis is done in which the change in ranking position (*change in rank*) is used as the dependent variable. This also increases the robustness of the results. Since the variable *change in rank* has a normal distribution and can take on both negative as positive values, an OLS regression analysis is considered to be suitable.

3.3 Independent variables

Several independent variables are used. The variable *popularity* is measured in number of preference votes and divided by 1,000 to improve interpretation of the coefficients. I use the number of preference votes at two different points of time: first, the number of preference votes that candidates received in the same election (*popularity_{t=0}*) and second, the number of preference votes that candidates received in the previous election (*popularity_{t=-1}*). The intuition behind this, is that the differences in the coefficients of these variables can tell something about reversed causality between rank and popularity. It might be that a candidate receives many votes because of his rank, rather than that the candidate is placed at a high position due to his popularity. A Granger causality test is problematic due to the limited number of years that the dataset covers, so the two measures of popularity are compared to check for reversed causality.

Seniority is measured in years of experience as an MP or member of government (MG) prior to the election, while rookies are controlled for with the dummy variable *rookie*. Other dummy variables include *ethnic minority* (defined as having at least one parent that is not born in the Netherlands, following the CBS definition of the Dutch term for

⁵Issues regarding nonrandom missing observations are discussed in Section 5.

immigrant, *allochtoon*), *university degree*, *law degree*, *male* and *coalition* (for parties that belong to the government coalition). *Age* is also added as an independent variable (defined as year of birth). The squared variable *seniority*² is added to control for a possible decreasing marginal nature of the relationship.

Legislative effort is specified by several independent variables. The first four variables consist of attendance rates on four types of committee meetings: *committee's general meeting attendance*, *committee's nota meeting attendance*, *committee's legislative meeting attendance* and *committee's procedural meeting attendance*. These parliamentary committees are created by the parliament for special topics for which not all MPs can acquire in-depth knowledge of. For an MP, becoming member of a committee is a tool for specialisation. The committee meetings attendance can be defined as *passive* legislative effort.

Active legislative effort indicators are also added. *Petitions* is defined as number of petitions offered to parliament by an MP. They are set up by collective pressure groups but must be adopted by an MP to be discussed in parliament. The number of *motions submitted* and the number of *motions approved* are also active indicators: the first is an instrument for MPs to introduce a point of discussion during a plenary debate and the latter measures the effectiveness of these motions. A motion is approved if the majority of the present MPs votes in favor of the motion. The quorum for plenary debates is 76. The last active indicator is the number of formal *questions* submitted to a member of the government.

To control for possible interaction effects, the following variables are added: *male * seniority*, *opposition * questions* and *opposition * petitions*. By doing so, I check for the possibility that parties of the opposition are more inclined to be critical towards members of government. MPs from the opposition parties are expected to not only ask more questions regarding policy choices, but also to be more open towards petitions from pressure groups. The interaction effects regarding the male dummy variable is added to check for the possible effects of overrepresentation of men in parliament.

Because the data on legislative effort is limited to the elections of 2010 and 2012, the analysis is split into two parts. First, an analysis on the effect of seniority and popularity on party list positions from 2003 to 2012 is performed. Second, I perform an analysis on the effect of legislative effort on party list positions from 2010 to 2012. Additionally, a distinction is made between *all* party list positions, *top* (1-10) party list positions and *safe* (10-24) party list positions. Hazan and Rahat (2010) use the term *realistic* seats: all positions that are seen at least as winnable before the elections. They use the existing

number of seats that the party has as a fixed criterion.

However, making a distinction between *all*, *top* and *safe* party list positions will make the results more robust. I assume that the determinants for the top 10 candidates are different than for the safe positions. Candidates that are on safe positions have a high chance of getting into parliament, while they do not have such high positions that they can be qualified as party elites. Next, the top of the party list usually includes candidates that become minister or secretary of state when the party becomes a coalition partner after the election. The characteristics for these candidates could be different.

In total, the following five regression analyses are performed:

1. Regressing *rank* on seniority and popularity_{t=-1} for all, top and safe positions (2003-2012).
2. Regressing *rank* on seniority and popularity_{t=0} for all, top and safe positions (2003-2012).
3. Regressing *change in rank* on seniority and popularity_{t=-1} for all, top and safe positions (2003-2012).
4. Regressing *rank* on legislative effort for all, top and safe positions (2010-2012).
5. Regressing *change in rank* on legislative effort for all, top and safe positions (2010-2012).

3.4 Hypotheses

Three hypotheses are formulated to specify the analysis of the paper. Since the aim of this paper is to deliver a broad and exploratory analysis, other related findings will be discussed as well.

Hypothesis 1 *Balancing in terms of gender, seniority, ethnicity, geography and educational backgrounds matters for party list rankings*

Balancing in terms of ethnicity and geography is tested by comparing Herfindahl indices. The Herfindahl index uses the formula

$$H = \sum_{i=1}^N s_i^2$$

where s_i is the proportion of the group i compared to the whole population and N is the number of groups.

For ethnicity, groups are defined as minority groups in the Dutch population in accordance with statistics of CBS. For geography, groups are defined as the twelve Dutch provinces. Each candidate's place of residence is linked to its province. To check for balancing in terms of gender, seniority and educational backgrounds, several graphs are created to visually compare parties.

Hypothesis 2 *The more senior and the more popular the politician, the higher the rank*

Politicians that have already participated in previous elections and have been in parliament in previous years, are likely to be placed at higher positions than politicians with a 'new face'. Popularity, defined as number of preference votes, is expected to contribute to a higher position as well. This will be tested with the GEE regression model discussed in the previous subsection. To analyse movement in party list positions, the change in rank will be regressed on the same indicators in an OLS regression model.

Hypothesis 3 *The more legislative effort an MP exerts in his or her time in parliament prior to the election, the higher the rank*

For MPs, their time in parliament is an effective way to gain expertise, to create a network, to attract media attention and to get familiar with the mores of Dutch politics. This way, exerting legislative effort can contribute to an MP's party list position. The legislative indicators are used in a GEE regression model to test the hypothesis. To analyse movement in party list positions as well, the change in rank will be regressed on the same indicators in an OLS regression model.

The first hypothesis will be addressed in Section 4.1. The second and third hypotheses are tested by the regression models in Section 4.2.

4 Results

4.1 Balancing

4.1.1 Gender




Figure 2

The results on balancing are presented in Figures 2 to 5 (for Figures 3 to 5, see page 16). Figure 2 shows the male-female ratios of the party lists of all four parties. As can be seen, PvdA has had steady shares of women of around 50 per cent, while VVD has kept shares around 30 per cent. For both CDA and SP the ratios have varied, but while for CDA the share of women has dropped, for SP the ratios seem to vary over time.

Figure 3 shows the male-female ratios in the top positions. *Top* is referred to as being in place 1-30 (VVD, PvdA and CDA) or place 1-16 (SP). The definition for SP is different, because this generally is a smaller party in parliament and always has been an opposition party, meaning that zero candidates on the party list will become a member of government. Compared to the whole party lists, VVD had larger shares of women in top positions over time. PvdA kept the ratios similar to the party lists as a whole. Both CDA and SP show a decrease in the share of women in top positions over time.

When looking at the top 5 (Figure 4) and top 10 (Figure 5) positions, it is interesting to see that the top 5 of VVD's party lists are better balanced than PvdA, while the opposite is true in Figure 2 and Figure 5. Finally, Figures 4 and 5 show that SP does not balance the male-female ratios of their top candidates.




Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5

4.1.2 Ethnicity




Figure 6

Figure 6 shows the Herfindahl indices (HIs) regarding ethnicity of all four parties from the party lists of the last four elections, as well as the Dutch average HI in this time period (66 per cent). An observed HI near the Dutch average means that the share of groups of ethnic minorities on the party list was near the average share of groups of ethnic minorities in the Dutch population.

The HIs of PvdA show a steep line downwards to a HI of 63 per cent in 2012, 4 per cent lower than the Dutch average. This means that ethnic minorities were relatively overrepresented in the last election. The low HIs of 2010 and 2012 were mainly driven by a large share of Turkish and Moroccan candidates on PvdA's party lists: in 2010, 8 per cent of the candidates was Turkish and 4 per cent Moroccan. In 2012, the percentages were 11 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. In this time period, the average share of Turks in the Dutch population was 4 per cent and the average share of Moroccans 2 per cent.

The HI of SP shows an increase from 71 per cent in 2003 to 92 per cent in 2006, meaning that the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities worsened. The HIs of VVD and CDA have all been around 80 per cent or higher.

4.1.3 Seniority

Seniority, measured as having been in parliament or government prior to the election, is shown per party in Figures 7-10 on page 19. For all parties it holds that the top positions were occupied by more senior people. Figure 7 shows that the share of rookies on VVD's party list in 2006 was larger compared to the party list of 2003. In 2006, Mark Rutte had replaced Gerrit Zalm as the list-puller. The share of rookies increased further in 2010. The share of people who had been in government before also dropped in the years 2006-2012. For PvdA, the share of experienced members of government has been low, but was relatively high for the top positions in 2010. PvdA was a governing party in the period prior to 2010. The most notable result of PvdA is the large share of senior candidates in the top positions in 2012 compared to the overall party list. PvdA elected a new list-puller in 2010 (Job Cohen) and 2012 (Diederik Samsom).

Figure 9 and 10 show larger differences than Figure 7 and 8. For CDA, a lot changed after the elections of 2010: rookies entered the party in 2012, and no former members of governments were placed on the party list in 2012. This does not tally with the fact that CDA has a longstanding tradition of governing: CDA has been a government party in the time period of 2002 to 2012. In 2012 however, the new list-puller Sybrand Haersma van Buma replaced Jan Peter Balkenende. This had a negative effect on seniority balancing.

SP, in contrast to CDA, has always been an opposition party and therefore only has senior candidates in terms of parliamentary experience. The overall share of rookies remained quite constant over the time period, but during the elections of 2010 and 2012 most top positions were occupied by candidates who had been in parliament before. SP had a huge electoral success in 2006, when the party won a total of 25 seats in parliament, while in previous elections the party obtained 9 seats at the most. This led to a sharp increase in the number of senior candidates. In 2010, SP elected the list-puller Emile Roemer, who replaced Jan Marijnissen.




Figure 8




Figure 10




Figure 7




Figure 9

4.1.4 Educational backgrounds




Figure 11

Figures 11 and 12 show that all political parties have a high share of candidates with a university degree. SP had the overall lowest share of 44 per cent in 2006, but the share of university-educated candidates increased in the years thereafter. Candidates with an mbo degree were present in top positions of VVD and PvdA, even though the overall shares have been low for all parties. At the same time, PvdA had the overall highest share of candidates in top positions with a university degree: 90 per cent of the top positions in 2012.




Figure 12




Figure 13




Figure 14




Figure 15




Figure 16

Figures 13-16 show the average share in educational backgrounds of party candidates in the last four elections. The educational backgrounds are divided into groups in accordance with the definitions of CBS.

As can be seen in these figures, all parties have large shares of candidates with a degree in human and social science or arts and candidates with a legal, administrative or public security background. The latter are best represented at VVD, with 49 per cent of the candidates having a legal, administrative or public security background. SP shows a relatively large share of candidates with a background in teaching and health care. The

right-wing parties VVD and CDA have a higher share of candidates with a background in economics, management and administration than the left-wing SP and PvdA.

4.1.5 Geography




Figure 17

Figure 17 shows the HIs regarding geographical balancing of all four parties over the last four elections, as well as the Dutch average HI in this time period (13 per cent). Geographical balancing is measured as representation of the twelve provinces.

The HIs for VVD show a decrease from 25 to 16 per cent in this time period, meaning that the representation of all provinces has improved. The values of the HI for CDA have all been lower than the Dutch average, except for a slightly higher HI in 2012. Thus, rural areas of the Netherlands are overrepresented on the party lists of CDA.

The HIs of the other three parties are higher due to overrepresentation of people living in the provinces South Holland (The Hague area) and North Holland (Amsterdam area). SP had, on average, a higher HI than PvdA.

4.2 Party list positions

4.2.1 Seniority and popularity

First, the hypothesis that more senior and more popular candidates have higher ranking positions on the party list is tested by the following regressions analyses:

1. Regressing *rank* on seniority and popularity_{*t*=-1} for all, top and safe positions (Table 1).

2. Regressing *rank* on seniority and popularity_{*t*=0} for all, top and safe positions (Table 2).
3. Regressing *change in rank* on seniority and popularity_{*t*=-1} for all, top and safe positions (Table 3).

Please note that a negative (positive) correlation in the models indicate a positive (negative) correlation in real terms. Thus, when *rank* is used as the dependent variable, a negative coefficient for an independent variable means that this negative correlation results in a lower number on the party list, i.e. a higher ranking position (1 being the best position). When *change in rank* is used as the dependent variable, a negative coefficient for an independent variable means that this negative correlation results in a lower number on the party list of the next election, i.e. an increase in the ranking position.

Table 1: Rank on seniority and popularity_{*t*=-1} 2003-2012

	All positions		1 to 10		10 to 24	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
votes _{<i>t</i>=-1} (x1.000)	-0.007** (0.00)	-0.006* (0.00)	-0.002*** (0.00)	-0.002*** (0.00)	-0.091 (0.11)	-0.082 (0.11)
seniority	-1.427*** (0.25)	-3.065*** (0.75)	-0.143* (0.08)	-0.088 (0.30)	-0.128 (0.15)	-0.938** (0.38)
age	-0.372*** (0.09)	-0.374*** (0.09)	-0.017 (0.04)	-0.017 (0.04)	-0.053 (0.05)	-0.061 (0.05)
male	-3.566** (1.67)	-3.607** (1.65)	0.234 (0.69)	0.229 (0.69)	0.629 (0.87)	0.484 (0.86)
rookie	10.256*** (2.42)	6.255** (2.96)	-1,582 (1.96)	-1,426 (2.11)	2,246 (1.53)	0.069 (1.77)
ethnic minority	5.013* (2.78)	4.984* (2.75)	-0.651 (1.42)	-0.668 (1.42)	-0.050 (1.68)	0.135 (1.64)
university degree	-1,460 (1.90)	-1,589 (1.88)	-1,009 (0.73)	-0.997 (0.73)	-0.652 (0.96)	-0.596 (0.94)
law degree	-3,132 (2.32)	-3,601 (2.30)	-0.813 (0.89)	-0.795 (0.89)	-0.430 (1.19)	-0.758 (1.17)
seniority ²		0.115** (0.05)		-0.004 (0.02)		0.053** (0.02)
Constant	759.870*** (182.67)	769.971*** (180.66)	40,704 (73.47)	40,139 (73.41)	122,521 (92.93)	139,462 (91.22)
N	311	311	96	96	114	114
chi2	116,178	124,248	20,224	20,322	8,342	14,137
Prob>chi2	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.016	0.401	0.118
DF	8	9	8	9	8	9

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level

The results of regression 1 are presented in Table 1. Table 1 shows that a higher amount of preference votes in the previous election correlates with a higher ranking position for all positions and top positions, yet the coefficients are small. Seniority is strongly corre-

lated with ranking when looking at all positions. The decreasing marginal nature of the relationship is confirmed by the significant coefficients of the squared variable *seniority*² in models 2 and 6.

Regarding age, the regressions show that the correlation is strong and negative only when looking at party lists as a whole. The same holds for the male dummy variables. The rookie and ethnic minority dummies are both significant and positive for all positions, but the correlation is stronger and larger for rookie candidates. Lastly, having a university or law degree do not seem to be correlated with the ranking position.

The Wald chi-square test results on the bottom of the table indicate that the null hypothesis that all estimated coefficients except the constant are simultaneously equal to zero can only be rejected in models 1 to 4.

Table 2: Rank on seniority and popularity_{t=0} 2003-2012

	All positions		1 to 10		10 to 24	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
votes _{t=0} (x1.000)	-0.012*** (0.00)	-0.012*** (0.00)	-0.003*** (0.00)	-0.003*** (0.00)	-0.161*** (0.05)	-0.153*** (0.05)
seniority	-1.393*** (0.23)	-2.311*** (0.60)	-0.109** (0.05)	-0.177 (0.15)	-0.023 (0.12)	-0.878*** (0.31)
age	-0.008 (0.06)	-0.004 (0.06)	0.004 (0.02)	0.007 (0.03)	0.006 (0.03)	0.002 (0.03)
male	-0.594 (1.35)	-0.519 (1.34)	0.545 (0.47)	0.570 (0.47)	0.315 (0.60)	0.299 (0.58)
rookie	9.366*** (1.58)	7.260*** (2.10)	0.288 (0.59)	0.074 (0.73)	0.552 (0.81)	-1,812 (1.13)
ethnic minority	-0.845 (2.24)	-0.855 (2.23)	-0.405 (1.00)	-0.447 (1.00)	0.214 (0.99)	0.263 (0.97)
university degree	0.388 (1.50)	0.387 (1.49)	-0.411 (0.49)	-0.390 (0.49)	0.076 (0.66)	0.066 (0.64)
law degree	0.100 (1.88)	-0.013 (1.86)	-0.551 (0.60)	-0.539 (0.60)	-0.298 (0.81)	-0.725 (0.80)
seniority ²		0.061* (0.04)		0.004 (0.01)		0.058*** (0.02)
Constant	45,745 (126.38)	39,050 (125.78)	-0.568 (48.10)	-6,561 (49.59)	4,978 (58.12)	14,864 (56.78)
N	844	844	160	160	237	237
chi2	267,488	275,790	68,739	69,069	14,789	23,931
Prob>chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.063	0.004
DF	8	9	8	9	8	9

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level

The results of regression 2 are presented in Table 2. Here, I use the number of preference votes of the same election year as the party list ranking as a measure of popularity. The coefficients for preference votes are larger and strongly significant in all models. Only the sizes of the coefficients for the top positions are similar to the sizes in Table 1.

The results of the other variables are comparable to the results in Table 1. Only the significance of the ethnic dummy variable has disappeared in Table 2 and age is also no longer correlated with the party list position.

Lastly, the Wald chi-square test results show that the null hypothesis that all estimated coefficients except the constant are simultaneously equal to zero can be rejected in all models, also 5 and 6.

Table 3: Change in rank on seniority and popularity $_{t=-1}$ 2003-2012

	All positions		Positions 1 to 10		Positions 10 to 24	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
votes $_{t=-1}$ (x1.000)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.003** (0.00)	0.003** (0.00)	0.187 (0.24)	0.185 (0.24)
seniority	0.264 (0.21)	0.317 (0.67)	0.515** (0.21)	0.301 (0.88)	0.730** (0.35)	0.922 (0.89)
age	-0.199*** (0.07)	-0.199*** (0.07)	-0.222** (0.09)	-0.223** (0.09)	-0.021 (0.10)	-0.019 (0.10)
male	-1,824 (1.29)	-1,822 (1.29)	1,014 (1.65)	1,032 (1.66)	-1,471 (1.90)	-1,435 (1.91)
rookie	-6.248*** (2.12)	-6.110** (2.70)	-37.191*** (5.22)	-37.809*** (5.80)	-2,569 (3.48)	-2,044 (4.14)
ethnic minority	4.822** (2.18)	4.825** (2.18)	3,814 (3.38)	3,886 (3.41)	6.292* (3.65)	6.246* (3.67)
university degree	-2,125 (1.47)	-2,121 (1.48)	-1,778 (1.77)	-1,828 (1.79)	-1,920 (2.10)	-1,931 (2.11)
law degree	-2,020 (1.78)	-2,007 (1.79)	-4.001* (2.06)	-4.051* (2.08)	-2,246 (2.59)	-2,173 (2.62)
seniority ²		-0.004 (0.04)		0.014 (0.06)		-0.013 (0.05)
Constant	388.498*** (142.44)	388.275*** (142.70)	428.205** (179.46)	430.112** (180.60)	33,641 (204.29)	29,408 (206.00)
N	311	311	96	96	114	114
R-squared	0.142	0.143	0.550	0.551	0.151	0.152
DF	8	9	8	9	8	9

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level

The results of regression 3, using *change in rank* as the dependent variable, are presented in Table 3. The coefficients of votes are only significant for the top positions and have small positive values. Seniority has a positive correlation with the change in rank for the top and safe positions, but the decreasing marginal nature of the relationship has disappeared.

The coefficients of the dummy variable for rookies have now become negative. The correlation is especially large and strongly significant for the top positions, while the coefficients of the dummy variable for ethnic minorities are positive and only significant for all and safe positions.

A small negative correlation is found for having a law degree when looking at the top of the party list. Lastly, it can be noted that the R-squared value is considerably higher in the models of the top positions.

4.2.2 Legislative effort

The hypothesis that MPs who exert more legislative effort in his or her time in parliament prior to the election have higher ranking positions on the party list is tested by the following regressions analyses:

1. Regressing *rank* on the legislative effort indicators and additional variables for all positions (Table 4).
2. Regressing *rank* on the legislative effort indicators and additional variables for the top (1-10) positions (Table 5).
3. Regressing *rank* on the legislative effort indicators and additional variables for the safe (10-24) positions (Table 6).
4. Regressing *change in rank* on the legislative effort indicators and additional variables for all positions (Table 7).
5. Regressing *change in rank* on the legislative effort indicators and additional variables for the top (1-10) positions (Table 8).
6. Regressing *change in rank* on the legislative effort indicators and additional variables for the safe (10-24) positions (Table 9).

Again, please note that a negative (positive) correlation in the models indicate a positive (negative) correlation in real terms.

The results of the first regression are presented in Table 4 on page 28. Table 4 shows that when the focus is on all party list positions, none of the legislative effort indicators are correlated with party list positions, except for the number of motions submitted. The level of significance is not consistent for these coefficients, yet the coefficients remain significant at a 10 per cent level in models 2 and 3 when controlling for MPs from coalition parties. The value of the coefficients of the coalition dummy variable are highly significant and have a positive value.

The coefficients for preference votes of the previous election are slightly negative and significant, except for the last model. The coefficients of seniority are only significant

in models 4 and 5 and again have a negative value. Age is strongly correlated with the ranking position in all models and the coefficients are similar to the coefficients in Table 1.

Interestingly, in this regression, the coefficients of the dummy variable for a law degree turn out to be large and strongly significant. The coefficients of the dummy variable for ethnic minorities are again significant and positive, and the values are larger than in the previous tables.

Regarding the interaction effects, the *male * seniority* variable is slightly significant. *Opposition * petitions* is slightly significant, the correlation being positive. Lastly, the results of the Wald chi-square tests show that the null hypothesis that all estimated coefficients except the constant are simultaneously equal to zero can be rejected in all models.

The results of the second regression, that focuses on the top positions on party lists, are presented in Table 5 on page 29. The coefficients for the legislative effort indicators in these models are strikingly different than the coefficients in Table 4. Especially the variable on procedural committee meetings is strongly significant. Correlations also seem to be present for the coefficients on general committee meetings, petitions and submitted motions.

Additionally, the number of votes of previous elections has a strong yet slightly negative correlation with party list positions. There seems to be support for the interaction effect between MPs from opposition parties and the number of questions. Lastly, the results of the Wald chi-square tests show that the null hypothesis that all estimated coefficients except the constant are simultaneously equal to zero can only be rejected in the models 2 to 5.

The results of the last regression on party list positions and legislative effort are presented in Table 6 on page 30. The results are again completely different from Tables 4 and 5. The coefficients for the safe positions show very little significance. Regarding the legislative effort indicators, only the number of questions in model 4 is significant. The level of significance however is low.

The coefficients of seniority, age and the male dummy variable are all slightly yet inconsistently significant. As in Table 5, there seems to be some support for the interaction effect *opposition * questions*. The results of the Wald chi-square tests show that the null hypothesis that all estimated coefficients except the constant are simultaneously equal to zero can only be rejected in model 3.

Table 4: Rank on legislative effort 2010-2012 (all positions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
committee general	-0.097 (0.08)	-0.086 (0.08)	-0.089 (0.08)	-0.084 (0.08)	-0.078 (0.08)
committee nota	-0.080 (0.79)	-0.460 (0.77)	-0.443 (0.75)	-0.439 (0.76)	-0.423 (0.75)
committee legislative	0.835 (0.74)	0.725 (0.69)	0.634 (0.65)	0.751 (0.65)	0.780 (0.65)
committee procedural	0.046 (0.09)	0.040 (0.09)	0.044 (0.09)	0.046 (0.09)	0.041 (0.09)
petitions	-0.158 (0.37)	0.111 (0.35)	0.071 (0.34)	0.135 (0.34)	-0.437 (0.45)
motions submitted	-0.192** (0.09)	-0.156* (0.09)	-0.151* (0.09)	-0.138 (0.09)	-0.198** (0.09)
motions approved	0.324 (0.25)	0.204 (0.26)	0.218 (0.25)	0.139 (0.26)	0.257 (0.26)
questions	-0.039 (0.04)	0.045 (0.04)	0.044 (0.04)	0.131 (0.09)	0.043 (0.04)
coalition		6.165*** (2.26)	6.155*** (2.18)		
votes _{t-1} (x1.000)		-0.019* (0.01)	-0.019* (0.01)	-0.019* (0.01)	-0.017 (0.01)
seniority		-0.952 (1.16)	-0.459 (0.45)	-1.153*** (0.27)	-1.161*** (0.27)
age		-0.326*** (0.10)	-0.290*** (0.10)	-0.341*** (0.10)	-0.330*** (0.10)
male		-1,961 (1.71)	3,661 (3.48)	-2,085 (1.68)	-1,556 (1.72)
university degree		0.843 (1.92)	1,031 (1.91)	0.662 (1.91)	0.790 (1.91)
law degree		-5.621** (2.41)	-5.059** (2.41)	-5.664** (2.36)	-5.703** (2.38)
ethnic minority		8.183*** (2.95)	6.793** (2.99)	8.283*** (2.90)	8.092*** (2.90)
seniority ²		-0.012 (0.08)			
male*seniority			-1.005* (0.54)		
opposition				-4,512 (2.88)	-8.111*** (2.44)
opposition*questions				-0.104 (0.10)	
opposition*petitions					1.022* (0.56)
Constant	20.382*** (2.11)	660.969*** (190.27)	587.933*** (192.64)	695.406*** (188.06)	676.739*** (189.12)
N	147	144	144	144	144
chi2	17,701	79,479	83,333	84,118	83,529
Prob>chi ²	0.024	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
DF	8	17	17	17	17

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level

Table 5: Rank on legislative effort 2010-2012 (positions 1-10)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
committee general	-0.024 (0.03)	-0.118*** (0.04)	-0.087** (0.04)	-0.056 (0.04)	-0.136*** (0.04)
committee nota	0.123 (0.40)	0.531 (0.35)	0.206 (0.38)	0.054 (0.38)	0.860** (0.43)
committee legislative	0.119 (0.26)	0.201 (0.19)	0.178 (0.22)	0.189 (0.24)	0.066 (0.19)
committee procedural	0.130*** (0.04)	0.190*** (0.04)	0.151*** (0.04)	0.139*** (0.04)	0.189*** (0.04)
petitions	-0.404** (0.17)	-0.457*** (0.16)	-0.533*** (0.17)	-0.480*** (0.16)	-0.286 (0.23)
motions submitted	0.041 (0.03)	0.042 (0.03)	0.052* (0.03)	0.062** (0.03)	0.081** (0.03)
motions approved	0.112 (0.10)	0.148 (0.10)	0.160 (0.11)	0.073 (0.11)	0.078 (0.11)
questions	-0.010 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.02)	0.114** (0.05)	-0.001 (0.01)
coalition		-0.480 (1.16)	0.090 (1.14)		
votes _{t=-1} (x1.000)		-0.011*** (0.00)	-0.010*** (0.00)	-0.007** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)
seniority		0.716 (0.51)	-0.192 (0.16)	-0.005 (0.11)	-0.090 (0.10)
age		-0.112*** (0.04)	-0.080* (0.05)	-0.047 (0.04)	-0.073* (0.04)
male		-0.551 (0.85)	-0.662 (1.87)	-0.186 (0.93)	0.183 (0.75)
university degree		-0.841 (0.87)	-0.423 (0.96)	-0.050 (0.97)	-0.703 (0.87)
law degree		1,202 (0.97)	0.449 (1.04)	-0.272 (1.03)	1,451 (0.96)
ethnic minority		-1,140 (2.03)	-1,182 (2.02)	-0.101 (1.85)	-1,447 (1.98)
seniority ²		-0.052* (0.03)			
male*seniority			0.113 (0.21)		
opposition				1,293 (1.31)	0.981 (1.22)
opposition*questions				-0.125** (0.05)	
opposition*petitions					-0.407 (0.28)
Constant	3.877*** (0.77)	223.984*** (83.00)	163.436* (89.03)	95,748 (87.47)	148.967* (82.05)
N	50	50	50	50	50
chi2	12,665	97,797	50,594	36,734	94,927
Prob>chi ²	0.124	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.000
DF	8	17	17	17	17

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level

Table 6: Rank on legislative effort 2010-2012 (positions 10-24)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
committee general	-0.021 (0.06)	-0.047 (0.06)	-0.059 (0.06)	-0.026 (0.06)	-0.056 (0.06)
committee nota	-0.209 (0.47)	-0.523 (0.47)	-0.217 (0.46)	-0.245 (0.44)	-0.209 (0.49)
committee legislative	0.090 (0.54)	-0.072 (0.57)	-0.374 (0.57)	-0.095 (0.58)	-0.078 (0.57)
committee procedural	0.000 (0.06)	-0.018 (0.07)	-0.006 (0.06)	-0.005 (0.06)	-0.011 (0.07)
petitions	-0.092 (0.22)	0.008 (0.23)	-0.156 (0.23)	-0.126 (0.23)	-0.345 (0.32)
motions submitted	-0.031 (0.05)	-0.075 (0.06)	-0.035 (0.05)	-0.079 (0.05)	-0.074 (0.05)
motions approved	-0.008 (0.17)	0.102 (0.18)	0.101 (0.17)	0.125 (0.18)	0.031 (0.18)
questions	-0.023 (0.04)	-0.030 (0.04)	-0.038 (0.04)	-0.156* (0.08)	-0.039 (0.04)
coalition		-1,834 (1.51)	-0.942 (1.39)		
votes _{t=-1} (x1.000)		0.107 (0.15)	0.095 (0.14)	0.094 (0.15)	0.136 (0.15)
seniority		0.290 (1.06)	0.245 (0.37)	-0.200 (0.26)	-0.451* (0.23)
age		-0.134** (0.06)	-0.111* (0.06)	-0.097 (0.06)	-0.129** (0.06)
male		0.421 (1.14)	5.576** (2.56)	0.665 (1.15)	0.580 (1.13)
university degree		-1,259 (1.21)	-1,297 (1.15)	-0.769 (1.23)	-1,037 (1.17)
law degree		-0.284 (1.53)	0.027 (1.50)	0.180 (1.61)	-0.601 (1.53)
ethnic minority		2,186 (2.20)	0.638 (2.18)	1,158 (2.20)	1,780 (2.15)
seniority ²		-0.063 (0.09)			
male*seniority			-1.047** (0.46)		
opposition				-1,606 (2.38)	0.307 (1.63)
opposition*questions				0.161* (0.09)	
opposition*petitions					0.606 (0.42)
Constant	17.928*** (1.68)	284.595** (116.27)	237.236** (113.40)	212.249* (123.48)	275.891** (114.63)
N	65	62	62	62	62
chi2	6,339	21,548	26,902	21,230	23,079
Prob>chi2	0.609	0.203	0.060	0.216	0.147
DF	8	17	17	17	17

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level

The last part of this subsection presents the results of regressions 4, 5 and 6 for using the *change in rank* as the outcome variable.

The results of regression 4, that focuses on all party list positions, are presented in Table 7 on page 32. In this table, none of the coefficients for the legislative effort indicators are correlated with a change in rank. The coefficient of age is slightly negative and significant. As in Table 4, the coefficient of the dummy variable for law degree has a significant and negative correlation and the values are comparable to Table 4. The dummy variable for ethnic minorities is still significant, but the level of significance as well as the values are lower. Lastly, the R-squared values in all models are low.

The results of regression 5, that focuses on the top (1-10) party list positions, are presented in Table 8 on page 33. Here, the coefficient on approved motions is significant in model 1, but this disappears when the control variable for coalition parties is added in models 2 and 3. This coalition dummy variable is significant and negative. The significance of the coefficient of the number of questions is inconsistent and small. The only variable that seems to have a consistent significant correlation with the change in rank is the dummy variable on ethnic minorities. Interestingly, the value here is highly positive. Lastly, the R-squared values are higher than in Table 7.

The final regression of this paper is on the safe (10-24) party list positions. The results are presented in Table 9 on page 34. The interesting results here are that the coefficients of procedural committee meetings have positive and significant values in models 2 to 6. The number of votes of the previous election are also strongly and positively correlated in all models.

The last significant correlation is for the dummy variable for coalition parties. The values are large and negative. A final note should be made on the R-squared values of models 2-6. They are, as in Table 8, considerably higher than the R-squared values in Table 7.

Table 7: Change in rank on legislative effort 2010-2012 (all positions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
committee general	-0.029 (0.08)	-0.021 (0.09)	-0.017 (0.09)	-0.017 (0.09)	-0.015 (0.09)
committee nota	-0.426 (0.80)	-0.476 (0.80)	-0.499 (0.79)	-0.473 (0.79)	-0.489 (0.79)
committee legislative	0.383 (0.67)	0.436 (0.70)	0.483 (0.67)	0.484 (0.67)	0.497 (0.67)
committee procedural	0.079 (0.09)	0.135 (0.09)	0.131 (0.09)	0.137 (0.09)	0.133 (0.09)
petitions	-0.228 (0.36)	-0.293 (0.38)	-0.316 (0.37)	-0.292 (0.37)	-0.563 (0.50)
motions submitted	0.034 (0.08)	-0.026 (0.09)	-0.022 (0.09)	-0.009 (0.09)	-0.041 (0.10)
motions approved	-0.241 (0.23)	-0.105 (0.27)	-0.101 (0.27)	-0.156 (0.27)	-0.069 (0.27)
questions	0.024 (0.04)	0.025 (0.04)	0.025 (0.04)	0.088 (0.09)	0.025 (0.04)
coalition		-2,425 (2.36)	-2,317 (2.31)		
votes _{t=-1} (x1.000)		0.003 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)
seniority		0.223 (1.22)	-0.040 (0.46)	-0.075 (0.28)	-0.078 (0.28)
age		-0.185* (0.10)	-0.183* (0.10)	-0.192* (0.10)	-0.187* (0.10)
male		-2,551 (1.74)	-2,454 (3.58)	-2,639 (1.73)	-2,379 (1.75)
university degree		-1,097 (1.98)	-1,089 (1.98)	-1,252 (1.98)	-1,067 (1.98)
law degree		-5.119** (2.44)	-5.159** (2.45)	-5.158** (2.42)	-5.199** (2.42)
ethnic minority		5.279* (3.02)	5.164* (3.09)	5.187* (2.99)	5.203* (2.99)
seniority ²		-0.020 (0.09)			
male*seniority			-0.020 (0.55)		
opposition				3,838 (2.99)	1,494 (2.57)
opposition*questions				-0.080 (0.10)	
opposition*petitions					0.446 (0.61)
Constant	-2,724 (2.05)	364.152* (192.89)	360.945* (196.43)	374.209* (193.20)	365.640* (192.61)
N	143	143	143	143	143
R-squared	0.027	0.121	0.121	0.126	0.125
DF	8	17	17	17	17

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level

Table 8: Change in rank on legislative effort 2010-2012 (positions 1-10)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
committee general	0.021 (0.08)	-0.088 (0.09)	-0.095 (0.09)	-0.090 (0.09)	-0.107 (0.10)
committee nota	-0.509 (1.01)	-0.993 (0.92)	-0.738 (0.93)	-0.829 (0.93)	-0.650 (1.01)
committee legislative	-0.664 (0.63)	0.019 (0.61)	-0.222 (0.62)	-0.067 (0.61)	-0.161 (0.63)
committee procedural	-0.095 (0.11)	-0.067 (0.10)	-0.059 (0.10)	-0.042 (0.10)	-0.035 (0.11)
petitions	0.536 (0.43)	0.127 (0.40)	0.399 (0.43)	0.195 (0.40)	0.433 (0.58)
motions submitted	0.067 (0.07)	0.013 (0.07)	-0.022 (0.07)	0.002 (0.07)	0.012 (0.09)
motions approved	-0.423* (0.24)	-0.083 (0.26)	-0.132 (0.27)	-0.100 (0.26)	-0.152 (0.31)
questions	0.051 (0.04)	0.067* (0.03)	0.071* (0.04)	0.151 (0.11)	0.064* (0.04)
coalition		-4.721* (2.61)	-4.989* (2.64)		
votes _{t=-1} (x1.000)		0.001 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.000 (0.01)
seniority		-1,366 (1.15)	0.449 (0.44)	0.207 (0.28)	0.174 (0.28)
age		-0.138 (0.11)	-0.151 (0.11)	-0.161 (0.11)	-0.160 (0.11)
male		1,753 (2.42)	4,407 (4.72)	0.571 (2.35)	0.854 (2.37)
university degree		-0.054 (2.39)	-0.074 (2.43)	0.147 (2.43)	0.139 (2.45)
law degree		-4.939* (2.55)	-3,997 (2.65)	-4.649* (2.58)	-4,410 (2.61)
ethnic minority		-10.298** (4.51)	-9.130* (4.68)	-9.825** (4.59)	-9.924** (4.62)
seniority ²		0.099 (0.07)			
male*seniority			-0.506 (0.57)		
opposition				6.525** (3.15)	5.599* (2.84)
opposition*questions				-0.096 (0.12)	
opposition*petitions					-0.314 (0.67)
Constant	-5.980*** (1.92)	271,037 (218.47)	291,042 (221.65)	306,781 (219.16)	306,066 (222.96)
N	50	50	50	50	50
R-squared	0.225	0.577	0.564	0.562	0.556
DF	8	17	17	17	17

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level

Table 9: Change in rank on legislative effort 2010-2012 (position 10-24)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
committee general	0.167 (0.13)	0.083 (0.12)	0.098 (0.12)	0.070 (0.12)	0.081 (0.12)
committee nota	0.495 (1.06)	0.922 (0.96)	0.793 (0.97)	0.953 (0.94)	1,009 (1.02)
committee legislative	-0.263 (1.18)	-1,114 (1.19)	-0.913 (1.21)	-1,163 (1.17)	-1,123 (1.19)
committee procedural	0.241 (0.15)	0.344** (0.14)	0.330** (0.14)	0.339** (0.14)	0.346** (0.14)
petitions	-0.485 (0.51)	-0.776 (0.51)	-0.714 (0.50)	-0.645 (0.51)	-0.908 (0.75)
motions submitted	0.012 (0.12)	-0.018 (0.12)	-0.032 (0.11)	0.010 (0.11)	-0.018 (0.11)
motions approved	-0.541 (0.39)	-0.470 (0.37)	-0.467 (0.37)	-0.504 (0.37)	-0.483 (0.38)
questions	0.085 (0.08)	0.024 (0.08)	0.031 (0.08)	0.177 (0.17)	0.022 (0.08)
coalition		-6.970** (3.12)	-7.274** (3.02)		
votes _{t=-1} (x1.000)		0.913*** (0.31)	0.921*** (0.31)	0.942*** (0.31)	0.924*** (0.31)
seniority		1,272 (2.29)	0.634 (0.80)	0.785 (0.55)	1,051** (0.49)
age		0.029 (0.12)	0.021 (0.12)	-0.008 (0.13)	0.031 (0.12)
male		-0.983 (2.37)	-4,338 (5.45)	-1,341 (2.31)	-0.909 (2.39)
university degree		1,067 (2.64)	1,330 (2.49)	0.610 (2.52)	1,198 (2.50)
law degree		-1,282 (3.18)	-1,521 (3.17)	-1,742 (3.16)	-1,375 (3.19)
ethnic minority		1,913 (4.57)	2,626 (4.63)	2,611 (4.51)	1,751 (4.52)
seniority ²		-0.018 (0.19)			
male*seniority			0.657 (0.98)		
opposition				10.939** (4.95)	6.531* (3.40)
opposition*questions				-0.202 (0.20)	
opposition*petitions					0.200 (0.94)
Constant	-8.871** (3.90)	-65,712 (242.34)	-48,213 (240.18)	-1,781 (247.53)	-75,764 (239.25)
N	61	61	61	61	61
R-squared	0.149	0.454	0.460	0.467	0.455
DF	8	17	17	17	17

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level

5 Discussion

5.1 Balancing

The first hypothesis of this paper is that balancing in terms of gender, seniority, ethnicity, geography and educational backgrounds matters for party list rankings and was tested in the previous section. The results of Section 4.1 are diverse and show the differences in party list balancing of the four political parties. Regarding gender for example, only PvdA has steady and large shares of women on their party lists due to zipper-placement. PvdA also has the most balanced party lists in terms of ethnicity, due to an (over)representation of Turkish and Moroccan candidates.

Interestingly, while I would expect the other left-wing party SP to balance their party lists in terms of gender and ethnicity as well, the findings suggest the opposite. Here it could be argued that SP is less a catch-all party than the other three parties and therefore has a more exclusive candidate selection procedure. A candidate's fit is in that case more important than his or her gender or ethnical background (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). SP is also a relatively small party with a decentralised candidate selection method. This means that candidate supply is likely to be lower than for the other parties and that the central party board has limited control over the extent to which party lists are balanced. VVD and CDA are also unbalanced in terms of gender and ethnicity, but the difference between these two right-wing parties is that VVD places relatively more women on top positions, while female candidates of CDA are less concentrated in the top positions.

The findings on balancing of senior candidates suggest that seniority comes in waves. Electing a new list-puller resulted in an inflow of rookies on the party lists of VVD and CDA, while this was not the case for PvdA and SP. The effect was most extreme for CDA, for which a new list-puller in 2012 corresponded with a drastic increase in the number of rookies and the disappearance of experienced members of government on the party list. This suggests that when the list-puller is being replaced, fellow party elites also decide to step back. This creates space for 'new blood' in a party. However, this effect is only visible at party lists of VVD and CDA. Another effect is that very successful election results in previous years lead to a larger supply of candidates with parliamentary experience, as was the case for SP after the elections of 2006.

The common criticism that education levels of politicians do not reflect the Dutch average is confirmed in the figures on educational balancing. Having a university degree seems to be the standard in Dutch politics. While the share of people with an mbo degree in the Netherlands is approximately 34 per cent according to statistics of CBS, mbo-educated

people have been highly underrepresented on all party lists. The findings on educational balancing also show that all candidates of the four the parties have had various types of education. But the party lists of VVD are least balanced in terms of education type, with half of its candidates having a degree in legal, administrative or public security studies.

Finally, the findings suggest that all party lists except for CDA are unbalanced in terms of provincial representation. An explanation for this is that CDA has its roots in the agricultural, less populated countryside. The other party lists are overrepresented by candidates from The Hague and Amsterdam.

5.2 Party list positions

The second hypothesis of this paper is that more senior and more popular politicians are placed at higher ranking positions on party lists. Regarding seniority, the findings suggest that seniority matters when we look at party lists as a whole, but that the effect of seniority in the top and safe positions is smaller. The effect of seniority is marginally decreasing. I also looked at popularity of candidates, and made a distinction between popularity in the previous election and popularity in the election of the associated ranking position. The correlation between number of preference votes and ranking positions was stronger when looking at the popularity in the same election year. The correlation was about 50 times stronger for the safe positions than the top positions. When looking at the correlation of popularity in the previous election with the party list positions, the correlation had disappeared for the safe positions. For the top positions, the results were more or less the same.

A possible explanation for these findings is presented in Figures 18 and 19 on page 36. Here, I plotted the party list positions against the number of preference votes. All positions are plotted in Figure 18, while Figure 19 only shows the top 24 of the lists. What these figures show is that the number of preference votes are extremely concentrated in the first position of the list. Hence, voters almost exclusively vote for the list-puller and rarely on other candidates. The fact that the safe positions are not significant correlated with the popularity variable of the previous election but does have a significant correlation with the popularity variable in the same electoral year, can indicate a reversed causality between popularity and party list positions. Thus, candidates receive a large share of votes due to their ranking position, rather than that their ranking position is explained by their popularity in the previous election.




Figure 18




Figure 19

Another variable that has an important impact on all party list positions is the age of the candidates: younger candidates are placed at higher positions. However, this effect disappears when focusing on the top and safe positions. This suggests that older people on the lowest levels of the party lists are driving this effect. The same holds for rookies: they are placed at lower positions when we look at the entire party lists, but

the effect disappears when focusing on the top and safe positions. So again, rookies on the lowest positions are driving this effect.

Regarding the change in rank, the findings suggest that popularity is not influencing the changes in the party list positions. Seniority however does have an effect: in the top and safe positions, the more senior candidates go further down the list in the next election. This can be related to the fact that rookies go higher up the list, though this is not true for the safe positions. Lastly, ethnic minorities in the safe positions are being placed in relatively lower positions in the next election.

The third and last hypothesis of this paper is that MPs who exert more legislative effort in their time in parliament prior to the election are placed at higher ranking positions on party lists. Surprisingly, the findings suggest that legislative effort has very little effect on the party list rankings. Only the number of submitted motions has a small but positive effect on a candidates' rank, yet only when the focus is on party lists as a whole. When the focus is on the top positions, the procedural committee meetings are strongly linked to the ranking positions. The coefficients suggest that more procedural work is done by candidates on lower positions. Petitions on the other hand are handed in by the leaders of the party, suggesting that this is more interesting for a party leader than the procedural work. Petitions are a way to attract more media attention.

The findings regarding the other variables suggest that younger people in all party segments take on higher positions on the party lists, while ethnic minorities are placed at lower positions when we look at party lists as a whole. Overall, having a law degree proves to be beneficial for an MP. Intuitively this makes sense, since MPs with legal knowledge and experience will work more easily in the legislative process. Thus, their cost of effort is lower. But the effect only holds when focusing on all party list positions. Regarding the change in rank and legislative effort, the findings suggest that only the legislative effort on procedural committee meetings in safe positions is affecting the change in rank. The relation however suggests that attending more procedural committee meetings results in a lower rank in the next election.

MPs with a law degree rise on the list in the next election, but this is not true for the safe positions. For the safe positions, the findings suggest that popularity leads to a lower position in the next election. An explanation could be that popular candidates are placed at lower positions in the next election to give rookies a chance as well.

Some limitations to the analyses must be addressed as well. Most importantly, the dataset is unbalanced. Not all candidates have participated in all four elections, while

the GEE method assumes that the data are missing completely at random. It is most likely that this is not the case. Politicians may decide to step out of politics after candidacy for reasons that are inherent to the determinants of party list positions. If this is the case, the dataset is unbalanced due to nonrandom sampling and the results may not be interpretable (Ballinger, 2004; Goodman and Blum, 1996). Some reservation is therefore recommended when interpreting the results of this paper.

Another limitation is that the sample size is low. This is especially the case for the regressions that focus on the top and safe party list positions. I am therefore also careful in interpreting these regressions and making firm conclusions. Though this paper has a broad design, it could be beneficial to include all political parties and its candidates in a future dataset and extend the analysis to a larger timeframe.

Finally, data on more electoral years also creates more possibilities to analyse the reversed causality issue of popularity and party list positions. With a larger timeframe, a Granger causality test would improve the robustness of the results.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, I have examined how balanced party lists are as well as what the determinants of party list positions are of four big-tent parties during the last four elections in the Netherlands. The determinants that were studied included popularity, seniority and legislative effort. Since empirical research on party list positions is scarce, the aim has been to create an exploratory, broad and novel study and it should therefore be seen as a first step towards more extensive research.

The empirical findings regarding balancing have shown that gender and ethnical balancing is not a matter of being a left-wing or right-wing party; rather, only PvdA has a clear vision on gender balancing by using the method of zipper-placement and selects shares of ethnic minorities comparable to the average share of ethnic minorities in the Dutch population. It was also shown that seniority balancing is affected by a change in the top of the party and good election results in the past. I found that when a list-puller is replaced, a larger share of rookies usually finds its place on the party lists. An important conclusion therefore is that selecting a new list-puller also has its effect on the rest of the party list ranking. Another finding is that politicians are mostly university-educated, yet the educational backgrounds of the candidates are diverse in all parties. Also, parties are overrepresented by candidates from The Hague and Amsterdam.

The findings on the determinants of party list positions vary to a great extent. Distinct differences have been found between determinants of all, top and safe party list positions. When looking at the time period 2003 to 2012, the findings are that more senior candidates are placed at higher party list positions, but that this effect fades in the top and safe positions. Popularity and party list positions are highly correlated, but the data suggests that party list rankings affect the number of preference votes rather than the other way around. Overall, ethnic minorities and rookies are placed at lower positions, while again this does not hold for the top and safe positions of the party lists. Interestingly, when looking at the time period 2010 to 2012 and the exerted legislative effort, I found that the legislative effort indicators have little to no effect on party list positions. Only the number of motions submitted has a small but positive relationship with the ranking position if the focus is on the whole party list, while a high attendance rate of procedural committee meetings is linked to a relatively lower position on the party list for the top positions.

At the same time, the less dynamic determinants turn out to be more relevant. When looking at the overall party list rankings, having a law degree contributes to a higher

position as well as a positive change in party list position, while ethnic minorities are placed at lower positions and fall down the list in the next election. Thus, while parties might make an effort to balance their party lists in terms of ethnicity, the ethnical minorities are disadvantaged. Of course, this can also be due to a lower competence of the candidates with a non-Dutch background, but that has not been examined in this study.

At the beginning of this paper, I explained that the Netherlands has an open-list PR electoral system and that most political parties have central candidate selection methods. The related literature on this topic suggests that this both should lead to more balanced party lists and candidates who are incentivised to exert more effort to make it to a safe position on the list. At the same time, I argued that party list positions are in practice determined by party committees, advisory councils or other party elites, rather than the electorate so that the system resembles more to closed-list PR. The conclusion of this paper is therefore that Dutch party lists are not as balanced as the empirical literature would suggest and that legislative effort has no robust effect on party list positions. As a result, this paper can be seen as evidence that more research on party list positions and candidate selection methods is required to reveal the true determinants of party list positions. A good start would be to expand this analysis to other parties, other countries and a larger timeframe.

7 References

- Andeweg, R.B. (2005). The Sanctity of Proportionality: The Netherlands, in: M. Gallagher and P. Mitchell (eds.) *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 491-510.
- Ballinger, G.A. (2004). Using Generalized Estimating Equations for Longitudinal Data Analysis, *Organizational Research Methods* 7(2), p. 127-150.
- Besley, T., O. Folke, T. Persson and J. Rickne (2012). Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden. Working paper, Stockholm University.
- Deschouwer, K., (2002). The Colour Purple: The End of Predictable Politics in The Low Countries, in: P. Webb, I. Holliday and D. Farrell, *Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 151-180.
- Goodman, J.S. and T.C. Blum (1996). Assessing the Non-Random Sampling Effects of Subject Attrition in Longitudinal Research, *Journal of Management* 22, p. 627-652.
- Hazan, R.Y. and G. Rahat (2010). Democracy Within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Holsteyn, J.J.M. van and R.B. Andeweg (2012). Tweede Orde Personalisering; Voorkeurstemmen in Nederland, *Res Publica* 54, p. 163-191.
- Liang, K.-Y., and S.L. Zeger (1986). Longitudinal Data Analysis Using Generalized Linear Models, *Biometrika* 73, p. 13-22.
- Loots, J. (2004). *Voor het Volk, Van het Volk; van districtenstelsel naar evenredige vertegenwoordiging*. Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek.
- Lucardie, A.P.M. and G. Voerman (2007). Op Weg Naar De Verkiezingen: Partijprogramma's en de Selectie Van Kandidaten, in: K. Aarts, H. van der Kolk and M. Rosema (eds.). *Een Verdeeld Electoraat. De Tweede Kamerverkiezingen Van 2006*. Utrecht: Spectrum, p. 74-96.
- Lundell, K. (2004). Determinants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of Centralization in Comparative Perspective, *Party Politics* 10, p. 25-47.

- Norris, P. (1996). Conclusions: Comparing Legislative Recruitment, in: J. Lovenduski and P. Norris (eds.). *Gender and Party Politics*. London: Sage, p. 309-330.
- Poguntke, T. P. Webb (2005). The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis, in: T. Poguntke and P. Webb (eds.). *The Presidentialization of Politics*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rahat, G., R.Y. Hazan and R.S. Katz (2008). Democracy and Political Parties: On the Uneasy Relationships Between Participation, Competition and Representation, *Party Politics* 14, p. 663-683.
- Reiser, M. (2014). The Universe Group Representation in Germany: Analysing Formal and Informal Party Rules and Quotas in the Process of Candidate Selection, *International Political Science Review* 35, p. 55-66.
- Shomer, Y. (2009). Candidate Selection Procedures, Seniority and Vote-Seeking Behavior: Lessons from the Israeli Experience, *Comparative Political Studies* 42(7), p. 945-970.