Role of Japan in Offshore Agricultural Investment
Case of ProSAVANA Project in Mozambique

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List of Acronyms

AAGC - African Agricultural Growth Corridor
ADECRU - Academic Action For the Development of Rural Communities
AoA – Agreement on Agriculture
AU – African Union
CSOs – Civil Society Organizations
FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment
FRELIMO - Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
G8 - Group of Eight
G8NA - Group of Eight New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Africa
IFAD - International Fund for Agricultural Development
IYFF - International Year of Family Farmers
JA - Justiça Ambiental
JBIC - Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JICA - Japan International Cooperation Agency
MAFF – Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
METI – Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MICs - Middle Income Countries
MNCs – Multinational Corporations
MOF – Japanese Ministry of Finance
MOFA – Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MST - Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra
NEPAD - New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO – Nongovernmental Organization
PNISA - Programme National d'Investissement dans le Secteur Agricole
PRAI - Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment
PRODECER – Projeto de Desenvolvimento do Cerrado (Project for the Development of Cerrado)
RENAMO - Resistência Nacional Moçambicana
TNCs - Transnational Corporations
UN - United Nations
UNAC - The União Nacional de Camponeses
USAID - United States Agency for International Development
WTO – World Trade Organization
WWII – World War II
Abstract

This paper analyzes Japan’s role in offshore agricultural investment, based on the case study of ProSAVANA project. ProSAVANA is an ongoing trilateral Public Private Partnership (PPP) project between Brazil, Mozambique and Japan that aims to develop 14.5 million hectares of Northern Mozambique.

This paper constitutes of two sections; the first section asks ‘why’ Japan got involved in offshore agricultural development investment. The second section asks ‘how’ their agro-food strategy appear on the ground, under the nexus of aid, changing food regime, and different agrarian context of partner countries.

The paper argues that ‘aid,’ which was the very factor that created Japan’s dependency structure, became the tool for Japan to promote investment and to create new dependencies. During the postwar food regime, intersection of Japanese development scheme and US food aid created a condition where Japan had to achieve food security through trade. After the global food crises, the same ‘aid’ scheme served as a tool to bridge barriers for accumulation by facilitating and legitimizing ‘profitable’ investment.

Keywords
Japan, offshore agricultural investment, ProSAVANA, Brazil, Mozambique
Chapter 1 Introduction

Background of the study

In the past few decades, the world has witnessed a dramatic change in food and agricultural sector. The rise of transnational agribusiness, coinciding with the technological development in the field of life science, has turned agriculture as a sector of 'industry' that enables intensive capital accumulation. This changing nature of 'food regime' has altered the production, distribution and consumption patterns of the regional and global food system.

One of the linear that characterize the existing food system is that foreign direct investment (FDI) in agricultural sector has increased in an unprecedented scale especially after the 2007-8 global crises of food, finance and energy (FAO 2012). Agricultural trade or investment is nothing new in history (Bonnano et al. 1994; FAO 2012); nonetheless, the driving force, actors and implication of the current offshore agricultural investment are distinct from the past era. Various factors are fostering current agricultural investments; volatility of commodity price, peak oil and rise of biofuels, speculative investments on land, increased meat consumption, population growth, or climate change are drawing attentions of investors to the agro-food sector (Hertel 2010). The major pattern seen in recent agricultural development cooperation is ‘resource-poor, finance-rich’ countries investing in 'resource-rich, finance-poor' countries (GRAIN 2008; Oliveira 2011; de Schutter 2009; World Bank 2010). Traditional donor countries in the North, and emerging countries such as BRICS, MICs, NICs or Gulf states together with financial entities or transnational agro-corporations are involved in the ‘rush’ of farmlands across the globe. The top destinations of these projects are countries in Africa, South East Asia, Latin America or post-Soviet regions, such as Sudan, Mozambique, Myanmar, Laos and Ukraine. The countries that have 'arable' lands for a relatively cheap price are seen as new 'frontiers,' which contribute to the increased agricultural production (World Bank 2010). These investments have created commodity chains that connect distant regions, which accelerate the re-constellation of ecological integrity. This crisis in territoriality is connected to crises of both governance and in human inhabitation of the land (Friedmann 2000).

Japan is currently one of the top food-dependent countries where import more than 60% of the food supply (Kanto Regional Agricultural Administration Office 2013). Despite its significant food-dependency, world's second largest foreign currency reserves, strong international networks of multinational corporations (MNCs) called 'sogo-shosha' and scale of finance, Japan is surprisingly absent from debates on offshore land and agricultural investment (Hall 2012). This absence is partly due to the fact that Japan used to be less active in offshore agricultural production in the past decades. Japanese MNCs tended to avoid investing in agricultural production, due to the risks that agricultural production in developing region may involve (MOFA 2013). Instead,

1 Unpredictability of climate, trade restrictions, and poor infrastructures in developing regions, were considered as major risks for Japanese MNCs to invest in agricultural sector in developing nations.
Japanese MNCs used to hold indirect control over offshore production by investing in infrastructure and technology development. The targets of Japanese investment were mainly focused on Asian region, due to geographical concern and historical ties with Asian countries.

However, 2007-8 global food crisis had created a 'turning point' for Japan's offshore strategy. In 2009, Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) created ‘Council for Promotion of Offshore Investment for Food Security’ to position offshore agricultural investment as a central strategy to achieve food security. In the same year, based on the same premise, Japan proposed the framework of 'Principle of Responsible Agricultural Investment' (PRAI) at G8 L'Aquila summit. In these schemes, there was renewed focus on African countries as a 'frontier.' After 2009, Japan started negotiation for Bilateral Investment Treaties with Kazakhstan, Angola, Ukraine, Mozambique and Uruguay. Japanese MNCs such as Itochu, Sumitomo, Marubeni and Mitsui also became increasingly involved in offshore agricultural production (MAFF 2013). Nevertheless, Japan's overall involvement in offshore agricultural investment is still small in its scale, and whether this shift will make difference in Japan's position as a global investor remains questionable.

In this light, this paper aims to analyze Japan's role in foreign agricultural investments, based on the case study of ProSAVANA project in Mozambique. ProSAVANA is an ongoing trilateral Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) project between Brazil, Mozambique and Japan. The project was initiated in the same year of the launch of ‘Council for Promotion of Offshore Investment for Food Security’ and proposal of PRAI. It aims to develop 14.5 million hectares of 'arable land' in Mozambique, a country where became one of the top destinations of agricultural investment in recent years (FAO 2012). It has been explained that ProSAVANA is based on the experience of Japan-Brazil cooperation of PRODECER (Programme for development of Cerrado) project in Brazil, which was launched after the food crisis in 1973-4.

Does ProSAVANA project present a new model of offshore agricultural investment, or is it another opportunity for capital accumulation? The paper asks two questions to unpack Japan's role in offshore agricultural investment: one is concerned about 'why' Japan got involved in offshore agricultural investment, and the other is concerned about 'how' their agro-food strategy appear on the ground, under the nexus of aid, changing food regime, and different agrarian context of partner countries. For the 'how' question, this paper places special emphasis on the political economy of 'aid.' Japan's motivation and offshore agrarian strategy should be understood from the intersection of Japan's historical experience, political economy of foreign aid, and negotiated framework between the actors with different interests. Encounters of different schemes and forces have created a particular 'twist' that makes Japan distinct from other actors in offshore agricultural investment.

**Previous studies on ProSAVANA**

There has been growing number of studies on ProSAVANA project in recent years (ADECRU 2013; Cabral and Shankland 2013; Castel-Branco 2011; Chicava et al. 2012, 2013; Clements and Fernandes 2012, 2013; Ferrando 2013; Funada-Classen 2013; Hanlon 2012; Ikegami 2013; McEwan and Mawdsley
There are several reasons for ProSAVANA to gain increased attentions. In 2012, Brazilian newspaper reported Mozambique’s large land concession to Brazilian corporations as part of ProSAVANA (UNAC 2013). This has raised awareness of domestic and international social movements that are concerned with large-scale land acquisition by foreign capital. Furthermore, after decades from its implementation, 'unsustainable' dimensions of PRODECER have been revealed through variety of studies (Mendonca 2009; Inocencio 2010; Clementes and Fernandes 2012; Mazzetto Silva 2009; Oliveira 2005; Schlesinger 2014). This reevaluation on PRODECER project has accelerated social movements against the ProSAVANA project, as its model might have a similar effect in Mozambican society. Domestic and international CSOs have been intensely criticizing ProSAVANA project and its related projects since its launch, creating discussions among the researchers and causing suspension for the implementation of the project.

Since ProSAVANA is an ongoing project with many contentions, there exist various views on this project. The previous studies on ProSAVANA mainly focused on Brazil's interests in cooperating with Mozambique (Schlesinger 2014; Ferrando), reactions by Mozambican CSOs (JA and UNAC 2013), examination of relations between PRODECER and ProSAVANA as well as their potential effects (Ekman and Macamo 2014) and the discourses that have been used to justify these projects (Cabral and Shankland 2013; Chicava et al. 2013; Clements and Fernandes 2013; Funada-Classen 2013abc; Nogueira and Ollinaho 2013). Although Japan has played a core role in initiating both projects (Nogueira 2013), existing literatures have paid minimal attention to the position of Japan in PROSAVANA project, except for Funada-Classen (2013abc) and Ikegami (2013). In this regard, this paper sheds light on Japan’s motivation and agro-food strategy in order to contribute to the previous studies.

**Research question and sub-questions**

Thus, the central research question of this paper is: 'why' did Japan get involved in offshore agricultural development investment, and 'how' does their agro-food strategy appear on the ground, under the nexus of aid, changing food regime, and different agrarian context of partner countries? This will be supported by the following sub-questions: How was Japan affected to the global food crises in 1973 and 2007-8, and how did they react to it? Why did Japan partner with Brazil and Mozambique? Who is going to benefit from Japan’s offshore agricultural development projects and how? How does this project correspond to the larger history of global food system and why?

**Food regime**

To answer these inquiries, this paper builds on food regime studies. Food regime is an analytical framework developed by Friedmann and McMichael (1989). Food regime analysis historicizes and politicizes the understanding of the strategic role of agro-food relationships in the world economy. It identifies the relationships and contradictions in the capitalist process across time and
space through the lens of 'food.' Food regime analysis allows us to identify the larger historical pattern that shaped Japan's motivation in joining agricultural development projects. Several key features that underpinned Japan's motivation to be involved in offshore agricultural production become clarified through food regime lens.

This paper views ProSAVANA project as manifestation of both the contradictions and the possibilities of the existing global food system or the capitalist system itself. ProSAVANA and preceding PRODECER project could be situated in different moments of the history of food regime transition. PRODECER was initiated soon after the food crisis in 1974, and ProSAVANA was launched after the food crisis in 2007-8. These successive occurrences are not a set of random events, but together they compose a loose dialectic pattern that forms a part of larger historical cycle of accumulation. Japan's involvement in ProSAVANA, as well as their response to the food crises, represents how Japan positions their offshore agricultural development projects in their food security strategy.

**Focus of the study**

Borrowing Castel-Blanco's word, 'In order to draw experiences from particular cases [...] (w)e need to learn not only about good or bad institutions, but above all about the historical processes and contexts they are part of' (2013: 5-6). Factors that drives each agricultural development cooperation, 'who' gets 'what' from those projects, 'why,' and 'how' (Bernstein 2010) depends on different agrarian contexts of countries involved in each project.

Although ProSAVANA is Japan's first involvement for large-scale agricultural development in African continent, this initiative is the culmination of past attempts by Japan who sought to diversify agricultural import zones since 19th century. In order to shed light upon Japan's motivation for offshore agricultural investment, this paper examines Japan's agrarian trajectory since post-World War II period, political economy of aid, state-capital nexus, relationships of partner countries, and other various factors such as language or geopolitics.

Globalization is a process that continuously transforms its dynamism by corresponding to the regional differentiations (Murdoch et al. 2000). The paper looks into the intersection between 'horizontal' force of global/macro dynamics and 'vertical' force of regional or domestic dynamics that constantly interact and shape each other. The paper positions ProSAVANA in the nexus of global political agenda after 2007-8 food crisis, domestic policy frameworks, accumulation logic of TNC and other various forces. Furthermore, actors involved in ProSAVANA are not homogenous entities; they all have different political and economic interests, ideologies, and understandings on ProSAVANA project that sometimes compete or complement each other. Development cooperation could generate differentiated outcomes when these forces meet on the ground in distinct time/space settings (Scoones et al. 2013: 4).

In order to analyze Japan's strategy in ProSAVANA project, this paper sheds light upon the role of the state that facilitates capital accumulation, state's logic that legitimize those interventions, and the use of foreign aid. In a more general term, the paper examines how did their measures prioritize particular interest while undermining or creating adverse effects for others. Japan's
agro-food strategy contributed in altering the landscape of the existing food system, and the accumulation regimes in respective periods shaped the framework and the trajectory of Japan's offshore agricultural development projects.

Several key features that created Japan's motivation, and development of Japan's offshore agro-food strategy, becomes clarified through the analysis of Japanese agrarian trajectory and the case of ProSAVANA. This paper argues that, the scheme of 'aid,' which is the very factor that created the basis of Japan's dependency structure, has now become a strategic tool for Japan to facilitate Japanese offshore agricultural investment, under a strong nexus with corporate capital. Japan is reproducing dependency structures using ODA, by incorporating regional agricultural system into global value chain.

Structure of this paper

This paper is structured in five chapters. Following this introduction chapter, Chapter 2 outlines the methodology of this research. This section provides an overview of food regime framework, as well as some additional analytical tools that this paper will build on. Chapter 3 asks 'why' Japan got involved in ProSAVANA by examining the background of the project. It examines a) Japanese agrarian trajectory since post-World War II period (including Brazil-Japan agricultural development initiative in Brazilian Cerrado during 1970-90s), b) relationships between Brazil, Mozambique and Japan, and c) Mozambique's agrarian setting that created an intersection with ProSAVANA intervention. Chapter 4 analyzes ProSAVANA project with emphasis on Japan's position. In particular, this chapter looks into the role of the states, their use of aid, and strategies to incorporate Mozambique into global value chain. The paper concludes with Chapter 5 by highlighting this paper's main arguments as well as prospects for future research.

Relevance and justification

Food and agricultural sector expresses the contradictions of the contemporary capitalist development. As Friedmann (1992) argues, food was incorporated into 'commodities' category in the mid-twentieth century. Along with the recent extension of Neoliberal wave and industrialization in the agricultural sector, food and agriculture, which used to be positioned in the margin of the political discussions, is now in a 'contentious' center of the debate (Friedmann 2003). The traditional 'agrarian question' is 'now very much about capital' (Bernstein) as well as about 'politics of land and subsistence' (McMichael), as 'remaining peasants are marginalized by transnational supply chains dominated by capitals of enormous scale and integration' (Friedmann and Kida 2007). The implications of the current food regime transition is not limited in the field of agriculture, food, environment, finance or politics, but it also extends to the field of health, nutrition, labor, and cultures across the rural-urban divide. ProSAVANA could be seen as an expression widening contradictions in the different period of history. ProSAVANA emerged out of the 'crisis' of the existing capitalist system, and have contributed in accelerating intensive capital accumulation and the contentions against it. Whatmore and Thorne (1997) points out that globalization is a heterogeneous and unstable process, where remains some windows of opportunity for resistances and changes. Analyzing
ProSAVANA's case through food regime framework will help us in seeing the recent crises and agrarian issues from a 'broader historical and epistemological' perspective (McMichael 2009: 292) to make differences in the future paths we take.

In addition, this study is also a preliminary attempt to relativize the eurocentrism of food regime analysis. One of the criticisms towards food regime studies is that there exists 'Western-bias' in their focus of analysis (Araki 2012; Friedmann and Kida 2007). Food regime analysis does not offer analysis on particular countries such as China, which was 'almost totally isolated from the US-centred food regime' (Friedmann 1993). Several scholars attempted to overcome such shortcomings (Arrighi and Silver 1999; Arrighi, et.al. 2003; Frank 1998; Friedmann and Kida 2007; Hamashita 1990, 2003; McMichael and Kim 1987, 1994, 2000), but many attempts remained partial in offering a comprehensive reinterpretation of food regime. This paper seeks to contribute to food regime studies by focusing on the countries that have not attained central focus in former studies. Despite its significance, Japan-Brazil partnership, or the agencies of African countries, were not featured in previous food regime analysis. This paper examines the role of Japan and its partnerships in mutually reconstructing the accumulation patterns and power relations within the existing global food system.

**Scope and Limitation**

As a nature of food regime analytical framework, the scope of this research is a macro/meso level analysis of the global food system within modern capitalist history. Geographically, the central focus of this paper will be on Japan, Brazil and Mozambique. The paper highlights Japan's position, logic, and motivation, which previous studies paid less attention to. In order to analyze Japan's involvement in offshore agricultural development projects, this study will focus on interstate power. On the other hand, the study will put less emphasis on the state-society relations and class formations. This paper will not examine the different positions within the social movements against PRODE-CER or ProSAVANA project, or the detailed analysis of their impacts. As for historical periodization, this paper explores the period of 'postwar food regime' during 1947-1973 and the following 'transition' period from 1973. This paper will not go beyond the food regime transition to explore the possibility of 'emerging' food regime. The paper will examine what is changing during this transition period, how, and where they are happening. This research might be an introduction to questioning the possibility of an exit from the cycles of food regime, but the further exploration will be done in the future studies. Lastly, this paper will not provide any policy recommendations. The objective of this research is to achieve better understanding of Japanese position by contextualising their offshore agricultural strategies, in order to contribute to a constructive discussion on this subject.
Chapter 2 Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodology to approach the core inquiries of this paper: 'why' Japan became involved in offshore agriculture investment and 'how.' In order to shed light upon the motivation of Japan, this paper builds on food regime studies, which enables us to understand the historical process that formed current agrarian structure of Japan and politics behind it. In examining Japanese offshore agrarian strategy, this paper looks into political economy of 'aid.' This section explains how foreign aid has served as political tool in different moments of history. This chapter also frames 'crisis,' since succeeding crises in 1973-4 and 2007-8 were key events that created a 'shift' in the landscape of food system; as a response to respective crises, Japan widened its geographical scope for offshore agricultural investment.

2-1. Analytical framework: food regime

The analysis of Japan's motivation is based on food regime analytical framework. A simple definition of food regime is 'rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale' (Friedmann 1993 30-31). Food regime analytical framework provides a meso-level analysis of the global food system that identifies the dialectical pattern of emerging capital accumulation relationships in particular historical junctures. Food regime analysis draws insights from Wallerstein's world systems perspective and Aglietta's French Regulation Theory. It also builds on works by Polanyi, Gramsci, Negri, and other Marxist and Neo-Marxist scholars (Buttel 2001; Friedmann and McMichael 1989).

According to Friedmann (1993: 31), The food regime is 'partly about international relations of food, and partly about the world food economy.' It not only shed light upon the historical pattern of international food relations, but also 'the history of capitalism itself' (McMichael 2009: 292).

Food regime analysis interprets the capitalist history through both cyclic and secular terms (McMichael 2009: 289). Cyclic pattern is underpinned by periods of relatively stable and reproductive accumulation relationships and crises/transition period when those stable and predictable patterns become contested (Busch and Bain 2004: 322; McMichael 2009: 292). On the other hand, those short-term cyclic patterns reflect the secular historical development of capitalism (McMichael 2009: 290).

Food regime analysis identifies two stable periods of accumulation and the transition period following those regimes. The first food regime is UK-centered food regime during 1870-1930s, which Friedmann (1993) calls 'colonial-diasporic food regime,' and the second is US-centered postwar food regime during 1947-1974 that has 'mercantile-industrial' features (Friedmann and McMichael 1989). The possibility of 'emergent' third food regime is still under debate (McMichael 2009). The defining features of regimes include constellations of a) class relations, b) geographical specialization, and c) inter-state powers (Friedmann 1995). Each regime is shaped by the 'implicit rules' (Friedmann 2003: 234) between the states, private corporation, and individuals that constellates accumulation regime.
This paper focuses on the postwar food regime and the following transition period, in order to see the process that formulated current Japanese agrarian structure. In the postwar period, Japan 'seized in specific ways with specific effects on the internal relations of Asia and on the world system as a whole' (Friedmann and Kida 2007: 2). This partially reflected the Asian 'cycles of expansion and national consolidation' that have 'played in counterpoint to Polanyian cycles in the West' (ibid). Japan's motivation to invest in offshore agricultural production stems in social changes that Japan faced during postwar food regime. The following transition period was the time when Japan intensified offshore food sourcing backed by Neoliberal logic. Japan's strategy for offshore agricultural investment was also shaped during this times.

Roughly, there are two approaches in food regime studies; one that emphasizes the stable period of accumulation (seen in McMichael's works) and the one that focuses more on the transition period and the dialectical pattern that stable and unstable creates (Seen in Friedmann's works). This paper takes a position that emphasizes the transition period, based on the perspective that Japanese society is still facing the unfolding crisis of US-centered food regime that involves large contentions.

2-2. Political economy of 'aid'

As described by Wolford et al. (2013), states continuously play crucial roles in shaping agricultural investments. This paper particularly focus on 'aid' as a key political tool that contributed both in creating food dependency of Japan, and in facilitating offshore agricultural investment by Japanese private sector. In this regard, this section outlines political economy of 'aid,' focusing on the changing role of aid during food regime transition.2

Aid has served for various motivations in different historical periods. The scope, role, size and form of foreign aid have changed along with shifting accumulation structure. According to Hopkins (2000: 4), there never existed 'pure economic development assistance regime.' Instead, 'foreign policy has created and sustained various aid regimes among donors.' The motivations of offering aid stems in 'a mixture of alleged altruism, economic interests, historical ties and geo-strategic (imperialist) considerations' (Oya 2006).

Official development assistance (ODA)3 was initially justified as a tool to resolve the 'North-South divide' and to promote economic development in developing world. Multilateral organizations such as World Bank or OECD

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2 Food regime analysis allows us to relativize the categories or the definitions of certain concepts that have been perceived as given or been naturalized through history. Geographical categories such as 'Global North/South,'(which emerged only after 1970s) or definitions of 'food security' or 'aid' emerged at certain points of history. These framings often serve for the interests of powerful actors, and they will be re-shaped when the rules of capital accumulation change. Historical perspective helps to distinguish the discursive dimensions of such categories, and the political power relations at play. It is crucial to recognize their differences, although they cross over on the ground.

3 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) created the term ‘ODA’ in 1969.
have played key role in institutionalizing aid (Hopkins 2000). Despite its altruistic frame, aid has differentiated effects among the recipient countries and it creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ within the society (Milner and Tingley 2010). Interests of donors, or the political elites always matter in shaping those differentiations. Various scholars (e.g. Moyo (2009) as for African context.) criticized the adverse effect of aid, expressed in terms such as ‘aid fatigue.’

In the changing food regime, the role of aid manifests the tensions between the state and corporate capital. While it served as a statecraft tool during postwar food regime, it increasingly became connected to serve for private capital to expand its scope across the globe. During the postwar food regime, 'aid' was an important tool in maintaining the hegemonic structure of the regime. During this period, Cold War rivalry and decolonization process has offered a legitimate ground for offering aid. The aid flows were shaped by foreign policies to expand spheres of influence, or historical ties that dates back to colonial period. US food aid: PL480 was a huge project during postwar food regime, that was dispersed among developing nations and several strategic regions such as Japan, creating food dependent structures and opening markets for US agricultural commodities. With the end of Cold War, the aid became more linked to private capital, 'as a support tool for corporate activities (McMichael 2012, Akram Lodhi 2012). This shift has coincided with dismantling of 'national development' scheme and rise of Neoliberal economy. Rationale of 'aid' has shifted from 'cold war rivalry, North-South paternalism and state-led development to globalization and market-oriented growth' (Hopkins 2000: 26). The traditional donor-recipient relations have also shifted to the ones that reflect geopolitics of market economy (ibid.).

As Scoones et al. (2013:11) points out, 'the political economy of aid and investment is increasingly intertwined' in the current period. Japanese ODA was once criticized for its 'tied' form with vested interests, but recent ODA reform enabled to enforce the ties between public and private capital. This nexus of aid and private capital and aid was featured at the 2011 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) held in South in Busan. Through this process, aid has restructured 'the state system as an instrument of privatization and redefinition of land and territory' (McMichael 2014).

In the post-WWII period, Japan was a recipient country US food aid, and now Japan has become one of the largest ODA donor country. ProSAVANA can be seen as a project where Japanese ODA is supporting Mozambican state to channel private money to achieve national development goals.

2-3. Framing the 'crisis'

Since Japan initiated ProSAVANA and its preceding project PRODECER as responses to the food crises in 1973-4 and 2007-8, it is important to frame the 'crisis' through food regime lens. The stable pattern of food regimes 'unfold through internal tensions that eventually lead to crisis' (Friedmann 2003:

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4 In 2010, Japanese ODA in agricultural sector marked world's second highest amount (560 million dollars) following the US (MAFF 2012).
Crises of regimes express 'an inability of the key relationships and practices to continue to function as before' (ibid).

The food crises that occurred in 1973-4 and 2007-8, which had distinct nature and implications, were not mere 'food price rise'; rather, they were 'expressions of a far wider and far more persistent underlying crisis' (van der Ploeg 2000: 98). According to van der Ploeg, these crises indicated the 'global agrarian crises' that have roots in 'industrialization of agriculture, the liberalization of food and agricultural markets and the rise of food empires' (ibid). McMichael (2009: 281-2) also argues that these crises were expressions of contradictions within 'the longue durée of capitalism.' Accelerating commodification and financialization of agriculture, increasing rift between natural dynamism and human activity, and widening rural-urban divide have asserted itself through the form of 'crisis' in respective periods. Arrighi (1993) saw these crises as signs that express the limitation of accumulation cycle. He called the 1973-4 food crisis as 'signal crisis' and 2007-8 crisis as 'terminal crisis,' which indicate the deepening of financialization and the coming of 'autumn' (Braudel 1958) of the existing accumulation system.

From food regime perspective, after the crisis of a regime comes a period of 'contests over new directions' that determines the formation of new regimes. This 'transition' period consists of two strands: One is the attempt to restore the old structure, and the other is the movement by the new social actors that proposes alternative possibilities for creating new food regimes. Emerging regimes reflect the schemes that were contested and negotiated through the previous times (Friedmann 2003: 234).

After the food crisis in 2007-8, largely two directions of agro-food strategy have appeared in international level. One strand was formed by political elites and TNCs that seek to utilize crisis as business opportunity, which their activities seems to accelerate the deepening of social rift. The other strand aims to re-situate agriculture within regional socio-ecological contexts. There have been an increasing number of agriculture-related initiatives and investment schemes after the 2007-8 food crisis, with special emphasis on Sub-Saharan Africa (Amanor 2013). The initiatives include World Bank's 'New Deal on Global Food Policy,' 'New Vision for Agriculture' in Africa led by agribusiness and G8, and 'Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP)' by New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Africa draws attention by actors who seek for profitable opportunities, as a source of abundant natural resource where most farmers rely on subsistence farming (ACB 2012). The actors often emphasize the 'scarities' and 'deficiencies' in the recipient countries, and crisis serves as a legitimate basis for Neoliberal interventions. On the other hand, International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) submitted a report in 2008, addressing the limitation of industrial agricultural production. The report calls for governments and international organizations to redirect their attention towards a 'holistic, or systems-oriented approach' (IAASTD 2008 Global Summary SR Summary: 17) and farming models that supports agroecological systems, biodiversity, local community-based approaches and food sovereignty. Although narratives of ProSAVANA look similar to what IAASTD report is advocating, their scheme is more sympathetic to the former corporate-led initiatives. International CSOs and farmers organizations are also increasing their
voice to address the flaw of industrial model of agriculture, while claiming for peasant's autonomy and agroecological production (La Via Campesina n.d.).

In the era of crisis and transition, what used to be unrecognized and unquestioned in the stable period becomes manifest and questioned. How each actor reacts to the crisis may largely determine the future trajectory of the systems. The crises revealed the shaky foundation of Japanese agrarian structure that lacks resilience to the sudden food price rise. After the crises, Japan initiated PRODECER and ProSAVANA as a means to achieve food security. This paper questions Japan's strategy by contrasting Japanese agrarian trajectory to a larger dynamism of global food system.

2-4. Research method

Food regime is a ‘conceptually grounded historical analysis’ (Friedmann 1994). In this regard, the study attempts to depict the dialectics of historical process by bridging analytical concepts and empirical materials. The approach is inductive rather than reductive; it attempts to depict the whole picture through critical examination of empirical data (Ralph et al. 2014).

In analyzing the empirical data, this study takes the perspective of 'critical research.' Critical research undertakes an effort to 'delve' deep into the structure of the society to reveal the social relationships and process where power plays part (Harvey 1990). It examines the origins and historical development of particular social conditions, to reveal how knowledges and ideologies reproduce inequalities and imbalances, while specifying conditions that could be changed (Comstock 1994; Muncie 2006). The study is qualitative in nature, since the aim of this study is to understand the complexity of nested reality that Japan and ProSAVANA project are situated. This view is reflected upon the method of data collection and analysis.

The analysis of paper is largely divided into two sections, which focuses on a) historical contexts and their intersections and b) Japan's strategy to promote offshore agricultural investment in the case of ProSAVANA. In order to account to respective sections, the paper utilizes historical research method and case study method. The first section of analysis is based on critical examination of historical materials collected through official bodies of Japanese government and international databases such as FAOSTAT, as well as academic literatures. Regarding Japan's involvement in offshore agricultural investment, it is difficult to quantify the amount of FDI in agricultural sector, due to the lack of dependable data (FAO 2012). Hence, this paper will not illustrate the quantified figure of trend and flows of Japanese FDI in agricultural sector; instead, this study focus on its qualitative dimension, drawing upon narratives and relations between events. The second section builds on qualitative data collected through the author's involvement in this project during 2013-2014. In addition to official documents and statements regarding ProSAVANA project (including JICA's preliminary field study report in 2010 and leaked Master Plan in 2013), this sections utilizes official presentations at Tokyo International Conference on African Development V (TICADV) where I worked as a support staff, records from meeting with MOFA that I attended as part of CSO advocacy campaign, and records from various conferences and seminars organized by Brazilian, Mozambican and Japanese CSOs during 2013-2014 (Including multi-stakeholder conference: 'Conferência Internacional dos Povos- Moçambique,
Brazil e Japão: 'Por uma Reflexão Profunda do Prosavana' held in Maputo in August 2013. The author also conducted a short field research in 2013 under the support of JICA, Mozambican farmers’ organizations and CSOs such as União Nacional de Camponeses (UNAC), Justiça Ambiental (JA), Associação Rural de Ajuda Mútua (ORAM) and Plataforma Provincial da Sociedade Civil de Nampula (PPOSC-N) and Forum Terra-Nampula. The author conducted semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders during this fieldwork. Participating in the field research, conferences, meetings, participant observation and conversations with different actors largely shaped the author's view upon ProSAVANA project. Informal semi-structured interviews that the author conducted with Mozambican CSOs, JICA and JIRCAS staff are not directly cited in this paper, but the insights gained from those interviews are reflected upon this paper’s perspective and arguments.
Chapter 3 Development and Encounters of Japan's Agrarian Trajectory since Post-WWII Period

This chapter examines 'why' Japan plunged into offshore agricultural investment. This chapter looks into the nexus of historical experience, changing characteristics of aid, and negotiations between countries with different agrarian contexts and interests, which formed the motivation of Japan to promote offshore agricultural development. The chapter constitutes of three sections: the first section illustrates Japan's agrarian trajectory since post-WWII period, with special focus on PRODECER project in Brazil, which is claimed as a 'prototype' of ProSAVANA project. The second section examines the relationships of three countries that are involved in ProSAVANA project, to see how their interactions have shaped the general direction and framework of ProSAVANA project. Framework of ProSAVANA was constantly negotiated between actors with different interests. The third section looks into agrarian setting of Mozambique, which is a ground where intervention by Japan-Brazil partnership will create an intersection. Role of Mozambican state that pursues national development through attracting FDIs reinforced market-oriented nature of ProSAVANA. On the other hand, contentions among past donor-led projects, widespread social inequality and organizational corruption are creating hindrances for Japan to implement ProSAVANA.

3-1. Origin and development of Japan's food-dependency

The current Japanese agrarian structure was largely determined during the post-WWII period. This section examines the origin and deepening process of Japan's food-dependent structure after WWII. It looks into four components: a) origin of Japanese food dependency under the influence of US food aid, b) Japan's offshore food sourcing strategy in Asian region during postwar food regime, c) PRODECER project (1974-1999) as Japan's key involvement in offshore agricultural development, and d) offshore food sourcing after 1974 and changing nature of Japanese ODA. The reason for Japan to be involved in offshore agricultural investment becomes clarified by tracing Japan's agrarian trajectory.

Origin of Japanese food dependency under postwar food regime

The basic agrarian structure of Japan, as well as their offshore agricultural development strategy, was largely shaped during the postwar food regime.

The postwar food regime (1947-1973) was underpinned by US hegemony in the world order of Cold War era. The accumulation pattern was shaped by US-centered monetary order, 'Fordist' intensive production and consumption (which Lang and Heasman (2003) called the 'Productionist' paradigm) and Keynesian state regulations (Friedmann 1982). In this period of post-World War II nation-state building, there was a shared vision of national development
Based on industrialization. Agricultural trade in this period was regulated by the states, with emphasis on import controls and export subsidies.

During the postwar food regime, transnational agricultural corporations gained power within the agricultural sector. These actors connected various firms specializing in 'machinery, chemicals, livestock feeds, veterinary medicines, and a variety of other inputs related to industrialization of agriculture' into agro-food complexes (Friedmann 2003: 245). The farmers were either 'sandwiched' between those firms as contract farmers or were pushed out of 'backward' farm sector, to become 'proletarianized' as wage laborers in the other industries (ibid). Transnational integration of industries created tensions between corporate logic and state-led protection policies (Friedmann and McMichael 1989).

As for technological dimension, Green revolution technology has spread across developing countries in order to address widespread food shortage and communism (Amanor 2013). Green Revolution assisted agribusiness expansion by introducing new technologies and promoting monocultural production. This had increased dependency among farmers and lead to the loss of biodiversity and traditional knowledges (Shiva 2000).

In this period, US distributed wheat to Europe and Third World through 'Foreign Assistance Act to Aid European Recovery' framework, known as Marshall Plan (1948) to Europe, and PL480 (1954) to Third World Countries. This US 'food aid' was a huge project that enabled US to become the central hegemon in the postwar food regime. The food aid was designed to create US agrofood markets worldwide, utilizing the domestic surplus wheat that has been bought up by the government in 1930s to support the farmers during the depression (Friedmann 1993, McMichael 1999). During this time, 'instead of the rhetoric of 'trade,' food crossed the borders under the rubric of 'aid'' (F 1993: 235). PL-480 was also used as part of US containment strategy to compete with the Soviet bloc. The payments for PL-480 were made by the local currencies, which were called 'counterpart funds' (ibid.). With this policy, US became a 'breadbasket' of the world. For the recipient countries, this food aid was a double-edged sword. On one hand, it supported recipient countries’ economic growth by provisioning the urban population and introducing new technologies. On the other hand, it lowered the global agricultural commodity price, pressuring domestic agriculture of the recipient countries.

Japan was one of the key recipient countries of PL-480, as a foothold of containment policy in Asian region. Japan took advantage of this aid to pursue industrialization – which was successful – but Japan had to pay a high price. Japanese agricultural sector declined rapidly in the postwar period, creating massive 'abandoned farmlands' across the country. Sarcastically, Japan had to seek for available farmlands outside the country, because changes during postwar food regime created various hindrances for domestic agricultural sector to revitalize.

During the postwar period, Japan underwent substantial agrarian policy reforms. These policy reforms should be understood in relation to the broader objectives relating to the national industrialization policy and US's containment strategy (Cumings, 1984; Friedmann 1993; McMichael 1987, 2000; Ufkes 219).

Japanese policy since Meiji era (1862~) focused on economic development based on industrialization, undermining the agricultural sector. To feed the
population during the WWII, Japan relied on offshore resource supply. Japan colonized Taiwan, Korean peninsula, Manchuria, and South East Asia to organize an empire named ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.’ During the war, 80% of soybeans consumed in Japan were imported from this ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ (Inyaku 2012; McMichael 2000, 2013). After the WWII, Japan’s imperial system collapsed, and Japan came under the US military occupation. The network created through the ‘Co-Prosperity Sphere’ was appropriated by the US as a ‘foundation’ to reign over the Asian countries during the Cold War. Japan, Korea and Taiwan became the strategic foothold for the US, while China allied with the Soviet bloc (Friedmann and Kida 2007). During this time, Japan imported substantial amount of grain and animal protein from the U.S. under the food aid program. (Friedmann 1982, 1994; McMichael 2007).

In 1946, under US military’s rule, Japan carried out a redistributive land reform that reduced the areas of land holding per capita from 5ha to 1ha. This tore down the landed class and increased the number of petty commodity producers (Kosaka 1982, Yagi 2014). The scale of farmland still remains as an obstacle for current Japanese agricultural sector in scaling-up the production.

Japan also underwent a nutrition transition to adapt the massive inflow of wheat and animal protein from the US. ‘US-Japan Mutual Security Act’ concluded in 1954 and ‘Law of Orientation of Agriculture’ adopted in 1961 created a favourable environment for Japan to import more wheat through PL-480 program. In order to make payments through counterpart fund, the government encouraged increased wheat consumption. Bread replaced rice in public school meals, and rumors were spread that wheat is better for children’s physical growth (Shinohara, 1964; Suzuki 2003). Animal protein consumption also boosted along with the introduction of the western diet, which required increased imports for industrial feedstuffs (mainly maize and soybeans) (McMichael 2013). The government continuously intervened in organizing this emerging intensive livestock sector (ibid.). This way, Japan became the ‘largest single-country market for US agricultural exports’ in the postwar period (Ufkes 1993: 219).

By 1990s, Japan achieved rapid economic growth under the US’s containment policy. Japan followed the path of ‘East Asian Miracle’ (World Bank 1993) together with the neighbouring countries. On the backdrop of industrial development, agricultural sector continued to decline in a rapid pace (MAFF 2012). Increased number of farmlands became abandoned, and GATT agreement in 1990s further pressured domestic farmers by warranting dumping of surpluses (Okada 2014; Watkins, 1996). Japan is currently one of the top food-dependent countries in the world. The food self-sufficiency rate (caloric based) declined from 73% to 40% during 1965-2010 (MAFF 2010). Hirano (2013) from Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) explains that countries in East Asia are ‘destined’ to become food dependent countries, due to its population density and ecological limit.

Japan’s food dependency is generally understood as a consequence of industrialization, but in fact it was shaped by combination of factors including US food aid, industrialization policy and Japan’s ecological limitation.
In order to achieve food security, Japan increased food imports instead of providing extra support to domestic agricultural sector.

During 1970s-80s, Japan promoted 'Kaibatsu-Yunyuu' scheme (developing raw material production in recipient countries and importing them) for ODA projects (Hongo and Hosono 2012: 3). Japanese ODA initially targeted Asian region, since ODA originally functioned as postwar reparation to the former colonies (Burma, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Mongolia, Micronesian islands) (Watanabe and Miura 2003). Later this network became the basis of Japan's business expansion, and ODA shifted its role as support tool to facilitate corporate activities. Government promoted increased importation of agricultural commodities through Maekawa report (1986) and provided tax incentives to facilitate investment. High yen price was also an advantage during this period.

Japanese ODA and private capital tends to indirectly control the regional resource and agricultural production 'through minimal investment' to 'multiple sources of supply' (Bunker and O’Hearn 1992, cited in Friedmann 1993: 44). This way, Japan can secure diversified supply zones and select the most advantageous import channel as exporters 'compete for Japanese import market' (ibid). Traditionally, Japanese ODA and private investments in agricultural sector focus on infrastructure improvement and agricultural technology transfer. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (2013) explains the difficulty of facilitating private investments in agricultural sector, since Japanese agroindustries see higher risks in agricultural production. Agriculture could be influenced by weather conditions that are unpredictable, and there is a possibility that exporting countries might set export controls. In addition, transportation cost could be higher in developing countries sue to lack of infrastructures (ibid.).

**Japan’s involvement in offshore agricultural investment: case of PRODECER (1974-1999)**

The US-centered postwar food regime saw its end with the global food crisis in 1973-4. Global grain stock ratio temporarily declined sharply in 1972, due to worldwide production failure after El Niño, and increased grain importation by Soviet Union's under détente. This was combined with oil crisis, and the price of grain and oil tripled between 1972-1974 (Friedmann 1993). In 1974, concept of 'food security' was presented for the first time at World Food Conference in Rome. This concept has ‘forced international leaders to reevaluate their approach to food and hunger’ (Fairbairn 2010: 21).

In 1973, the US imposed the soybean embargo to Japan after the grain price rise in Chicago, which caused ‘not only scarcity, but also a sharp increase in the international price of soybeans’ (Schlesinger 2014: 19). Japan, who depended 90% of its soybean supply from the US at this moment, had to search for an alternative source of supply. On the other hand, US soy embargo created a 'boom' in soybean production in Brazil. Soybeans shipment from port in Rio Grande do Sul created a new record, and Brazilian media reported that, 'even graveyards were occupied with soybeans' (Aoki 2001: 8).
In 1974, Japan partnered with Brazil for PRODECER\(^5\) agricultural development in Midwest Brazil. The project ran for 25 years (1974-1999) and transformed the area of 334,000 hectares of Cerrado\(^6\) biome into mono-crop farmlands.

PRODECER was legitimized as a project that contributes to the ‘global food security’ and ‘national economic development’ in Brazil (JICA 2012). It took a form of Private-Public Partnership (PPP)\(^7\) and it was based on other Brazilian state-based projects such as PADAP\(^8\) and POLOCENTRO.\(^9\) Japan contributed 28 billion dollars of ODA\(^10\) for PRODECER.

Initially, Japanese Ministry of Agriculture proposed Indonesia, African countries such as Madagascar, and Brazil for the implementation of this project, as they possessed large arable land. Nevertheless, in 1974 there was an anti-Japan riot in Indonesia, and African countries lacked basic social infrastructures to initiate large-scale agricultural projects. On the other hand, Brazil had agribusiness foundation (social infrastructure, farming equipment, transportation, marketing) relatively established by 1970s (JICA 2010: 4-4). Brazil’s land, labour and production cost were cheaper than the US (Baumel et al. 2000). Most importantly, Brazil was under military dictatorship during 1964-85, which enabled state to suppress civil voices and to consolidate land for large-scale farming. Brazil’s land property is highly concentrated since colonial times, which was exacerbated through the introduction of Green Revolution (Sauer and Leite 2012: 894).

In addition, Brazil had a long-standing relationship with Japan since the beginning of 20th century. When Japan was promoting immigration in late 19th century due to domestic food shortage and poverty, Brazil was in need of labour force after banning slave trade. Japan-Brazil migration project to started in 1908, and within 100 years, approximately 1.4 million Japanese migrated to Brazil, making Brazil as the home of largest Japanese settlers (IBGE). Japanese immigrants or their descendants were involved in PRODECER. (e.g. farmers cooperatives ‘Cooperativa Agricola de Cotia,’ which dissolved in 1980s during the hyper inflation.) The institutions that supported this migration project were reformed in to the national bilateral agency: Japan International Cooperation

\(^{5}\) Although the 'success story' of Japan-Brazil partnership in PRODECER was frequently mentioned to legitimize 'triangular' scheme of ProSAVANA in its initial stage, it is better to evaluate PRODECER and ProSAVANA as distinct projects, as their scale and scope largely differ. Nonetheless, PRODECER was an important stepping-stone that led to ProSAVANA project.

\(^{6}\) To implement PRODECER, Cerrado region was described as 'barren' land, although the region is considered as one of the world's biodiversity hotspots with rich water resource. According to Hongo from JICA, the word 'barren' derived from the expression by Levi-Strauss’s book 'Tristes Tropiques' published in 1930s (Hongo and Hosono 2010). The same pattern was repeated when JICA identified the Northern Mozambique savannah as 'arable, marginal land.'

\(^{7}\) Brazil and Japan founded a quasi-governmental company CAMPO (Companhia de Promoção Agrícola) as an implementation body in 1978. Research institute such as Brazilian EMBRAPA and Japanese JIRCAS also played key roles.

\(^{8}\) Settlement Program in Alto Paranaiba

\(^{9}\) Cerrado development program

\(^{10}\) out of total program budget 68 billion dollars (MAFF 2013).
Agency (JICA) in 1974, as a coordination body of this PRODECER, with a budget of 300 million dollars (JICA 2013).

PRODECER was launched in the intersection of Japan and Brazil’s respective objectives. For Japan, PRODECER project was anchored in the diversification strategy that sought exit out of the US-centered food regime. It extended the method that has been used in Asian region, utilizing ODA in supporting agricultural production to diversify their supply zones. JICA involved in targeting the project areas and farmers, technical support, infrastructure improvement, and coordinations (JICA 2010; Pires 2000).11 For Brazil, PRODECER was embedded in the state-building model under military regime. Government aimed to increase exports in agricultural/livestock sector and to reduce the balance of payments deficits (Schlesinger 2014). The state targeted Cerrado region as an agricultural frontier to build agricultural and livestock sector, and PRODECER constituted a small part of this initiative.

This project partially supported Brazil to become second largest producer of soy (USDA 2013). Japan succeeded in ‘bi-polarizing’ their soybean supply zones through PRODECER.12 The soybeans produced in the region were export-oriented (Sauer and Leite 2012), and the region imported food from Southeast Brazil (Schlesinger 2013a). Agribusiness such as ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Dreyfus entered the region and created an oligopolistic economy.13 After public financial support in PRODECER ended in late 1980s, TNCs took over the control of food production in the region. Brazil joined Mercosur trading bloc in order to support those corporate activities (Patel 2008). During this period, Brazilian agricultural policy shifted its focus ‘from agricultural subsidies to agroindustry’ and ‘from the management of surpluses to commercial exports’ (Friedmann 1993: 46). The rise of Brazil as net grain exporter has altered the global distribution pattern of soybeans; it divided the supply zones in the Northern and Southern hemisphere, and stabilized annual soybeans supply. The boost in soybean production contributed in the creation of international ‘livestock complex.’

However, not all the population in Brazil benefited from PRODECER. Although Brazil has become a net agro-food exporter, approximately one-third of the population still faces food insecurity (IBGE 2010). PRODECER pro-

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11 Although official explanation for Japan’s motivation is described as ‘increasing soybeans production in order to stabilize global market price’ (JICA n.d; Kojima 2002), Japan initially attempted to directly import the soybeans produced in Cerrado. JICA negotiated with Brazil for a year, but President Geisel persuaded JICA that they do not need to make agreement for direct imports, since Japan could benefit through the stabilization of global commodity price (Hongo and Hosono 2012)

12 In 1977, Japan depended on 95.2% of soybean supply (approximately 3.4 million tons) from the US with 1.6% from Brazil (58,000 tons). In 2008, dependency on US lowered to 74.5% (2.7 million tons) and import from Brazil increased to 15.3% (568,000 tons) (MAFF 2013).

13 It has been criticized in Japan that Japanese MNCs did not benefit from PRODECER (Hongo and Hosono 2012: 149), but Inyaku (2012) analyzes that it was difficult for Japanese companies to compete with grain majors such as Cargill, which already had a strong network in Latin America. There is also a view that Japanese companies considered that there are fewer risks when the production is controlled by TNCs (Aoki 2001: 12).
moted 'agriculture without farmers' through industrial monocropping of soybeans (Schlesinger 2013a). PRODECEm was based on 'colonization model,' which hires 700 households of large and middle-scale settler farmers (colonos) from the South, who were selected by different stakeholders based on their capacity. This has displaced peasants and indigenous tribes from the region to favelas, as Green Revolution did in previous decades (Homem de Melo 1986; Schlesinger 2014). It also had negative impacts on natural environment, such as deforestation, soil degradation, water pollution, and biodiversity loss (JICA 2010). Cerrado development had ignited strong social movements in Brazil, such as In 1984, landless farmers's movement 'Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra' (MST), which now became one of the largest social movements in the world.

Japan's offshore agro-food sourcing strategy after 1974 and changing role of Japanese ODA

The landscape of global food system has been constantly changing after the 1973 food crisis. This period's key features were 'state deregulation, growing international free trade, as well as fracturing in the market place for food' (Lawrence and Vanclay 1994). 'National development' scheme of postwar period dismantled with the rise of TNCs and Neoliberal capital restructuring. Agribusiness integrated 'the whole supply chain from seeds, chemical inputs, production, processing, transport and trade to supermarkets,' based on cost-benefit considerations (Exonexus 2013; Ufkes 1993). 'For the fist time in history,' money has become the dominant factor that decided what people produce and consume (Friedmann 2003: 39). Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1995 institutionalized corporate dumping, and trade liberalization agreements allowed TNCs to erode domestic agricultural sector. 'Aid' became a tool to support these corporate activities (McMichael 2012; Akram-Lodhi 2012). This contemporary state-capital nexus is 'seen as instrumental to an ongoing globalization of capital, notwithstanding significant power shifts arising out of this contradictory process' (van Apeldoorn et al. 2012). Forms of agricultural development partnerships became more complex, connecting public and private actors, pension funds and CSOs from diverse regions (Dauvergne and Neville 2010, Cotula 2012, White et al. 2012). New form of development partnerships such as 'South-South cooperation' emerged, reflecting the 'polycentralizing' trend of the food system.

Food-dependent countries in East Asia expanded its scope for agro-food sourcing outside Asia since 1970s: while Japan was working in Brazil, South Korea started to invest in Africa and Post-Soviet region. China also became a large investor after 1990s. Geopolitical significance of East Asian countries in creating multiple supply zones has been described by McMichael and Kim (2002, 2004) as 'East Asian food import complex.' Liberalization of global food market backed by FTAs and WTO agreements assisted their offshore

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14 Brazilian state claimed to gather farmers across the country, regional government pushed regional farmers, and Japanese counterpart wished to hire Japanese descendants (Hongo and Hosono 2010: 92-93).
sourcing. Japan has joined 14 FTAs since 2000s and 10 FTAs are under negotiation, including the controversial Trans-Pacific Partnership (MOFA 2014).

Japan’s agricultural development projects inside and outside the county are the different side of the same coin. Japanese agrarian strategy is underpinned by the premise of liberalization, intensification, and industrialization. Along with the deregulation of agricultural trade, Japanese government has been promoting large-scale intensive farming in order to make domestic agricultural sector to become more competitive (Ouse 2013). More private corporations are involved in agricultural production, which turned family farmers into farm labourers. Such strategy is reflected upon both domestic and foreign policy in the agricultural sector.

Japanese MNCs played a key role in Asian region, cooperating with the regional agro-food sector, and Japanese ODA was utilized to support their activities. Like Western foreign aid, Japanese aid had once avoided projects that are tied to vested interests of Japanese private sector. There was a large budget cut during the ODA reform between 1990-2000s especially in the agricultural sector (Oshima 2011), but since 2000s, ODA has once again become recognized as a tool to facilitate offshore business expansion to pursue national interest in partnership with private sector (MOFA n.d.: 17-18-21). This view to see ODA as business support tool was enforced at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) 2011, which pronounced the need of expanding ODA’s role beyond traditional development assistance (MOFA 2011). In the agricultural sector, Japanese ODA focus on creation of value chain, technology transfer, infrastructural improvement, and agrarian extension. The ongoing ODA reform is also manifesting such change.

Japan’s offshore agricultural strategy has shifted after the global food crisis in 2007-8. This crisis was a conjuncture of finance, energy, and climate, food. Multiple factors, such as poor harvest in production regions, peak oil affecting agro-industry, economic growth and nutrition transition in burgeoning countries, rise of biofuels, climate change, export restriction by the producers, speculative investment in commodity crops, together caused rise of grain price. Framing of ‘food security’ has been changed to reflect the changing nature of food regime, and alternative concepts such as ‘food sovereignty’ also emerged from CSOs.

Japan corresponded to 2007-8 food crisis by temporarily setting export restriction and controlling speculative investment. In 2009, Japan established ‘Council for Promotion of Offshore Investment for Food Security’ and ‘Principle for the Promotion of Offshore Investment for Food Security.’ The council is constituted of MOFA, MAFF, Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF), Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), JICA, JETRO, and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI). The council identifies two pillars of the role of the state in contributing to food security, which are a) to use ODA for low-cost projects, such as infrastructure and technology development, and b) to create an environment that facilitates private investment through deregulation and

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15 Substantial ‘Neoliberal turn’ arrived in Japan in the early 2000s, during the Koizumi administration (Watanabe 2007).

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liberalization (MAFF 2013). The framework strengthens Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in offshore agricultural development. State assists ‘profitable’ investment (Harvey 2010) by providing incentives and creating favourable environment for private sector, considering the fact that Japanese corporations tend refrain from investing in offshore agricultural production. Their priority is to diversify the supply source of crops, especially corn and soybeans (IBIC 2011, MAFF 2013). The launch of ProSAVANA and proposal of 'Principle for Responsible Agricultural Investment' (PRAI) also took place in 2009. Reflecting such activities, the slogan of TICADV conference was 'Shift from "aid" to "investment"' (TICADV 2013).

Under such situation, food movements started to appear on Japanese media, but the scale of those movements are still too small to create policy changes.

In sum, the fragility of Japanese domestic agricultural basis and its dependency, which has been created under the influence of US-centered post-World World II food regime, 'in turn gave Japan power as a major importer paradoxically to change the map of world food system' (Friedmann 1993: 10). This was accelerated after 1970s in the era of liberalization. Japan's diversification strategy to shift away from US dependency created food production platform in Asia, as well as Brazil, which contributed in altering the food system to a more polycentric, multi-polarized structure.

3-2. Relationships between Brazil, Mozambique and Japan

Japan-Brazil partnership and Mozambique as target country

ProSAVANA is underpinned by the bilateral agreements between Brazil and Japan, which has been continuing since postwar period. ProSAVANA was planned within the scheme of Japan-Brazil partnership that has been continuing for decades. In 1985, Brazil and Japan started triangular cooperation projects involving countries such as Indonesia or African countries, mainly in human resource development area. In 2000, they agreed on strategic Japan-Brazil Partnership Programme (JBPP), under the purpose of achieving UN reform and gaining position in the international society (JICA-RI 2009). By 2011, Brazil and Japan jointly implemented 13 development projects through this JBPP framework (Hosono 2012).

In 2005, President Lula and Prime Minister Koizumi started discussing for a joint project in 2008 to commemorate the 100th year of Brazil-Japan diplomatic relationship. In 2007, triangular project with Mozambique was raised as a...
commemoration project between JICA board and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brazil (Oshima 2011). The plan was materialized in 2009, responding to the food crisis in 2007-8.

Clearly, Mozambique was absent in the early phase of ProSAVANA planning. Mozambique was selected as a target country after Brazil and Japan agreed on cooperating in tropical savannah development. Hongo (2012), a JICA personnel who was involved in the implementation of PRODECER and planning of ProSAVANA, claims that the choice of target country was based on the FAO statistics. He states that Mozambique was the country that had the largest potential in agricultural development with vast arable land, water source, labour force and a port to export the products (ibid.). Japanese Foreign Minister also points out that 'Mozambique possesses the world's largest reserves of natural gas and the biggest reserves of coal in Africa' (AIM n.d.). This resonates with the tendencies after collapse of postwar food regime, which food production sites are selected 'within a global framework, with an eye on the social and political attributes of production.' Those areas function as 'production platforms' that serves for 'particular market niches' or 'mass market commodities' (Ufkes 1993: 218).

Japan and Brazil often mobilize 'Win-Win' rhetoric to justify this cooperation. Japan started to use the 'Win-Win' rhetoric since 2000s, as part of government's effort in this period to achieve coherence between the foreign and domestic policy. This rhetoric served to legitimize the Japan's contradicting position in protecting the domestic agricultural sector while promoting export-oriented production in offshore farmlands. (IDC 2007). However Win-Win scenarios often 'neglect, silence, or misrepresent' unequal power relations (Oya 2009:598). The term ‘partnership’ instead of ‘assistance’ also depoliticizes power imbalances by presenting a ‘natural’ congruity between the different states (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012). According to Nogueira (2013), there is a lack of involvement by the Mozambican government in shaping ProSAVANA project, but this fact is obscured by 'triangular' 'Win-Win-Win' framework.

Japan- Mozambique relationship

ProSAVANA stems in its renewed focus on African agriculture in recent years. Historically, Japan paid low attention to African countries in development cooperation, due to the lack of historical ties and geographical distance. However, after many of the traditional recipient countries 'graduated' Japanese assistance in 1990s, JICA's scope shifted from Asian region to African countries. In 1993, Japanese government launched Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) to be held every 5 years with African countries, UN, UNDP, African Union Council (AUC), and World Bank in order to encourage Japan's involvement in the development field of African countries. At TICAD V in 2013, Japan confirmed that Africa is a 'business partner' instead of aid recipient, and promised that Japanese government will promote private investments based on 'Win-Win' partnerships (JETRO n.d.).

Japan has been providing ODA to Mozambique since 1994, but compared to major donors such as the US, Sweden, Norway or Denmark, Japan's involvement was relatively small (MOFA n.d.c). ProSAVANA project is the first large Japanese ODA project in Mozambique, and Japanese government stated that Japan should make this ProSAVANA project as an 'initial point' for Japan
to expand the business in Africa (MOFA n.d.b). Related to this statement, during TICAD V 2013, Mozambique and Japan signed on the 'Agreement on the Reciprocal Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of Investment' (MOFA 2013. In 2014, Japanese Prime Minister and government officials visited several African countries and Latin American countries including Mozambique and Brazil, and asserted that 'promoting the development projects in Portuguese-speaking countries will contribute to gaining more allies in the international society' while enabling Japanese private sector to expand extractive business in those areas (Kuwahara 2014).

The presence of China is Mozambique is one of the factors that pushed Japan (as well as Brazil) in their involvement in ProSavana. In Japan, China is considered as main 'rival' for offshore agricultural investments. The rise of China in African continent is conceived as 'obstacle' for Japan to initiate business in Africa (Nikkei BP net 2013; Ikegami 2013; Uchida 2013; Sankeibiz 2012 8/20). In order to overcome the lack of experience in African countries, Japan appropriated Brazil's South-South partnership scheme with the African countries that places special importance on Lusophone countries. Oshicma (2011) from JICA claims that, if this project succeeds, it will become an agricultural development model that could be applied in other Lusophone African countries such as Angola, where also has high potential for development.

Brazil-Mozambique relationship

Recently, Brazil has been actively involved in South-South partnership with African countries. Brazil and African countries have strong historical linkages since the colonial period ('historical debt'), but their development cooperation started only recent, during President Lula’s administration (Amanor 2013: 7). President Rousseff took over Lula’s position in strengthening partnership with Africa, with emphasis on market expansion (Leite 2013: 7; Cabral and Shankland 2013: 5).

Large part of Brazilian ODA is allotted to African countries, with special emphasis on Lusophone countries. Mozambique is the largest recipient of Brazilian aid, as well as important business hub. Brazil's Embrapa conducts agricultural research projects, in collaboration with Mozambique's public institute of agricultural research (IIAM) (Chicava et al. 2013: 9). Their increasing participation in those partnerships could be understood as a partial means to enforce autonomy by diversifying their channel, which is similar to what Japan has been doing to shift away from the US hegemony (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007; Cabral and Shankland 2013). Brazilian development cooperation is co-

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17 China has political and economic linkage with many African countries that dates back to postwar independence.
18 Language is one of the key factors that create changes in geopolitics (Burges 2014). Brazil emphasizes the affinity between Brazil and Lusophone African countries in terms of socio-economic, cultural and environmental conditions, that makes their partnerships in agricultural sector easier, especially in training and extension programs (Cabral and Shankland 2013: 5). There is also a ‘quiet colonization of the national elites through scholarship programs,’ like how Latin American elites were trained in the US or UK in the past (Burges 2014: 367).
ordinated by Agência de Cooperação Brasileira (ABC), which used to be the agency that was in charge of handling the ODA, which Brazil used to receive (Amanor 2013: 7). ABC contributes in 'building up international bureaucratic experience inside the country and helping national firms internationalize their market activities' (Nogueira 2013). The partnership between Brazil and Mozambique is often described as 'solidarity' between the emerging countries that provides 'mutual benefit' (Scoones et al 2013: 9), but Clements and Fernandes (2012: 12) point out that their relationships is often 'asymmetric.'

3-3. Agrarian settings in Mozambique

Mozambique is currently facing rapid social change due to the large inflow of private investments, after rich natural resource (coal, natural gas, rare earths) and arable land have been identified. Under relatively stable governance of FRELIMO administration, Mozambique's GDP is growing in 6-10 % rate per year during the 2000s (IMF 2014). On the backdrop of its rapid economic growth, Mozambique's poverty rate remains high, and inequality is widening (Burr et al. 2011; Castel-Branco, 2010; Mosca 2013). Mozambique ranked 178 out of 187 countries according to the estimation of United Nation's Human Development Index in 2014 (HDRO 2014). Mozambique's poverty stems in colonial rule, and was aggravated by three wars after their independence during 1964-1992, and structural adjustment in the 1990s (Oakland Institute 2011: 4). After the civil war, Mozambican soon became flooded with financial assistance, and Mozambican state budget still largely depends on foreign aid (Batley 2005; JICA 2000). Mozambique has relatively weak democracy and there exists organizational corruption and social differentiation, which affects policy implementation.

In 2009, the World Bank published a report named ‘Awakening Africa's Sleeping Giant’ (World Bank 2009). The report implied the potential of agricultural development in the savannah area of African countries, including the one in Mozambique. Mozambique's state of 'underdevelopment' with low institutional capacity, lack of infrastructure, underutilization of land and natural resources, low productivity, weak research capacity is giving grounds for foreign investors who seek to initiate business in Mozambique (Suárez and Borras Jr. 2010; Rosario 2012: 2). Intensification of farming, development of processing industries, improved technology, increased access to the market, are often

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19 This economic growth owes to the 'mega-projects' that focus on extractive and energy industries. In 2013, extractive business showed rapid growth of 22% supported by coal industry (African Economic Outlook 2014).

20 There is lack of information and resources in the rural areas, and the people who could participate in social movements are limited. Furthermore, there are possibilities where civil voices are silenced under the unequal power relations within communities (Inyaku 2012; Mosca 2013). The issue of social differentiation is also crucial. In Mozambique, more women are involved in farming than men, counting 96% of the female population compared to the male, 67% (IFAD 2013: 8). Nonetheless, in many cases women are disadvantaged due to 'limited access to education, reduced or limited control over natural resources on which they depend, and little or no participation in decision-making processes' (JA and UNAC 2011: 23).
the solution to tap its potential. However, 'the balance between small and large-scale, between foreign and domestic investment, and between food and other crops, is subject to intense debate' (Oakland Institute 2011: 3).

According to the African Economic Outlook (2014), 70% of the Mozambican population work in agricultural sector. Most of them live in rural areas and rely on subsistence farming. Mozambique has not achieved self-sufficiency in agricultural products: the country imports large part of staple crops, such as rice, maize and wheat (FAOSTAT 2014). Rural communities in Mozambique are relatively new, since they were once damaged by the war (JICA 2010: 6-21). Peasant farming has been largely neglected by the state, both during and after colonial period (Castel-Branco 1994).

Currently, Mozambican government promotes private investment as a central means to achieve national development and food security (Chicava et al. 2013: 6; Oakland Institute 2011: 2). This strategy was one of key factors that shaped the ProSAVANA framework and its trajectory. Especially after 2009 when ProSAVANA project was launched, agricultural sector is attracting attention of many TNCs, foreseeing the development of infrastructure and processing industry in the region (Kuyek 2013). Since 2000, Mozambique has been attracting several foreign businesses in the field of forestry, agrofuels and mining, but many projects contain contentions with local habitants (JA and UNAC 2009, Nhantumbo and Salomão 2010, FIAN International 2010, Borras et al. 2011, and Oakland Institute 2011).

The existing agricultural policy framework in Mozambique that adjoins to ProSAVANA includes 'Strategies for green revolution in Mozambique (Estratégia da Revolução Verde em Moçambique),' Action Plan for Food Production (Plano de Acção para a Produção de Alimentos, PAPA), Research strategies, Agrarian Extension Strategies, and Strategic Plan for the Agriculture Sector Development (Plano Estratégico para o Desenvolvimento do Sector Agrario : PEDSA 2010-2019). (JICA 2010: 6-4). JICA claims that the aim of ProSAVANA project is coherent with these existing policies and will contribute the country's 'superior objective' to eradicate poverty (JICA 2010: 6-5).

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21 Agricultural sector contributes to 20-30% of GDP in Mozambique (FAOSTAT; MINAG 2014).
23 Some of the prominent projects are Chikweti forestry project in Niassa, sugarcane production in Gaza (ProCANA) and Rei do Agro’s soybean production in Gurre, banana plantation in Nampula, and coal mining in Tete. All these projects provoked local protests for its lack of compensation or forced displacements. ProSAVANA’s project teams also mentioned that there exists 'serious land conflict between local farmers and corporate farmers' in the country (ProSAVANA 2013: 2-28). Vice-Minister of Tete province where local people protested against Vale's mining project, stated that ProSAVANA project team should learn from their experience (Asahi 2013).
24 ProSAVANA project is considered as part of PEDSA framework. The core objectives of PEDSA framework are to ‘increase productivity,’ ‘ensure access to markets,’ ‘use natural resources in a sustainable manner’ and ‘strengthen the business skills of farmers’ (JICA 2010) through public-private partnership and private investment. This framework ensures increased intervention in agricultural sector (Hanlon 2011).
This chapter examined 'why' Japan became involved in offshore agricultural investments. Japan's motivation for offshore agricultural investment was shaped under the nexus of historical experience, changing characteristics of aid, and negotiations between countries with different agrarian contexts and interests. The key factors that formed Japan's motivations were a) shift away from US hegemony, 2) diversification of soybean supply zones, and 3) Japan-China rivalry. Japan's long-standing cooperations with Brazil and Mozambique's agrarian settings were also key factors that shaped ProSAVANA's framework.

The following chapter analyzes ProSAVANA project to see how the motivation explained above manifested on the ground.
Chapter 4  Analysis of ProSAVANA Project

This chapter analyzes ProSAVANA as a key case to see how Japan's off-shore agricultural development strategy appears on the ground, under the nexus of foreign aid, competing interests and changing food regime. The chapter is divided into four sections. First section offers an overview of the project. Second section looks into the intersection of different stakeholders’ interests that shaped ProSAVANA framework. Third section examines the role of the states and their use of aid. The states play a key role in ProSAVANA, and ODA serves as a tool to channel private capital for the project implementation. This section also focuses on the discourses that Japan utilizes to justify their intervention. Fourth section analyzes ProSAVANA’s strategies to incorporate Mozambican agricultural sector into global value chain. The section focuses on ‘cluster’ method and outgrower scheme, which is meant to serve for different interests while creating legitimate basis. Last section outlines the social movements and proposed alternatives that might shape the future direction of this project.

4-1. Overview of ProSAVANA

Launch of the project

President Lula and Prime Minister Aso agreed on 'The Triangular Cooperation Program for Agricultural Development of the African Tropical Savannah in Mozambique: ProSAVANA' at the G8 L’Aquila summit in July 2009. Lula stated that he expects EMBRAPA to create another 'agricultural revolution' in Mozambique, after the experience in Cerrado development (Oshima 2013). In September 2009, ABC, JICA, and Ministry of Agriculture in Mozambique (MINAG) jointly signed for the implementation of ProSAVANA. In January 2014, Prime Minister Abe visited Mozambique and earmarked 70 billion yen (approximately 700 million dollars) of ODA, which made Mozambique to become one of the top recipient countries of Japanese ODA (MOFA 2014).

Outline of ProSAVANA

ProSAVANA plans to cultivate 14.5 million hectares of Savannah area in Northern Mozambique. It covers 19 districts of Nampula, Niassa and Zambé-

25 There are several Japan-Mozambique agreements that supports ProSAVANA: e.g. ‘AMIZADE’ partnership (Japão-Moçambique Iniciativa para Dinamizar e Acelerar o Desenvolvimento; Japan-Mozambique Initiative for revitalize and Accelerating the Development, meaning 'friendship' in Portuguese) between the states, or memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Mozambican government and Mozambican Ministry of Mineral Resources (MIREM) that supports mineral resources-related Projects by Japanese corporations (JBIC 2014).
zia province alongside the Nacala Corridor. The targeted area is often described as 'idle' and 'underused' land where contains fertile soil and rich water resource. Nonetheless, the region has largest farming population in the country; mostly subsistence farmers with small land holdings, which their holdings are below the national average (1.3 hectares per household). Many of the farmers in this region were once displaced during the civil war and resettled in the region recently (JICA 2010: 6-20). The poverty rate is higher than the national average. Regional economy depends on large-scale livestock industry and forestry business managed by large landowners, which represents less than 1% of the total households in the region (JICA 2010: 6-1). It is also a region where FRELIMO and RENAMO are under political strife (AJF et al. 2014).

Institutions responsible for the promotion of ProSAVANA are Brazilian Corporation of Agricultural Research (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária: EMBRAPA) and Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) on the Brazilian side, Institute of Agrarian Research (Instituto de Investigação Agrária de Moçambique: IIAM) that is affiliated to Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) on the Mozambican side, and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japan International Research Centre for Agricultural Sciences (JIRCAS) on Japanese side. ProSAVANA's coordination committee locates in Mozambique's capital Maputo, representing the different counterparts. In 2012, Brazil and Japan launched a private fund: 'Nacala Fund' to mobilize the budget of 2 billion USD to support corporate activity in value chain development. In the same year, Mozambican counterpart (MINAG, Mozambican investment company GAPI) and JICA launched 'ProSAVANA Development Initiative Fund (PDIF)' to support the project with initial fund of 750,000 USD (ProSAVANA 2013).

According to the official ProSAVANA website, the ‘vision’ of ProSAVANA project is to ‘improve the livelihood of inhabitants of Nacala Corridor through inclusive and sustainable agricultural and regional development’ (ProSAVANA n.d.). Their proclaimed mission is 1) to ‘modernize agriculture to increase productivity,’ and 2) to ‘create employment through agricultural investment’ in Mozambique (ibid). JICA (2010) claims that ProSAVANA could also contribute to achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). ProSAVANA framework emphasizes compatibility of Neoliberal policy, increased food production, poverty reduction and environment conservation (ProSAVANA 2013; Schlesinger 2014).

The project is constituted of phase one (planning) and phase two (implementation). The first phase has three components: ProSAVANA-Projecto de Investigação (ProSAVANA-PI) aimed for research development, ProSAVANA-Plano Director (ProSAVANA-PD) aimed for creation of 'Master Plan' of overall development strategy in the Nacala corridor area, and 'ProSAVANA-Projecto de Extensão (ProSAVANA-PEM), an initiative for community development (ProSAVANA n.d.). ProSAVANA does not involve private investment

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26 Several other organizations such as Getúlio Vargas Foundation (Brazilian business school), CAMPO (quasi-private company that was responsible for implementation of PRODECER), Technical Assistance and Agricultural Extension Company (EMATER), National Service for Rural Training (SENAR) are also involved (JICA 2010).
in its framework, but ProSAVANA-PD utilizes corporate capital in its implementation (Chica et al. 2013: 10; MOFA 2013).

The key principle of ProSAVANA is promotion of Green Revolution and export-oriented production (ProSAVANA 2013: 3-27). According to Minister of Agriculture in Mozambique, 'ProSAVANA provides opportunity to increase productivity more than ten times' (Asahi 2013). The strategies include promotion of large-scale monocrop agriculture, provision of improved inputs and machineries, introduction of modern technology, and land use change (ACB 2012; Ekman and Macamo 2014). ProSAVANA aims for 'development of competitive agricultural sector based on the principles of free market' (JICA 2010), and it pursues exported-oriented production as a means to 'overcome the bottleneck of small market' (GRAIN 2012). Japanese counterparts were initially opposed to the promotion of large-scale agribusiness per se, claiming that such mode of production 'would not be feasible in Mozambique' (Nogueira 2013). Nonetheless, regardless of their stance towards large-scale agricultural production, the framework of the project was shaped through the negotiation with different stakeholders including TNCs and counterparts of AAGC or G8NA.

**Narratives on PRODECER and ProSAVANA**

Whether ProSAVANA transplants the development model of PRODECER or not remains a controversial issue, as seen in many studies (Clements and Fernandes 2013; Ekman and Macamo 2014; Funada 2013a). Although the states claim that ProSAVANA will build on the experience of PRODECER project, it is better to consider that the two projects are connected only in discursive dimension, and they are distinct projects on the ground.

In the initial phase, linkage of PRODECER and ProSAVANA was emphasized in order to legitimize triangular partnership (World Bank Institute 2009; allafrica 2012; JICA 2009). However, the World Bank report in 2009 pointed out that Cerrado development model might not be applicable in African context due to its incapability in supporting small-scale farmers (World Bank 2009). ProSAVANA's Minutes of Meeting in 2009 indicated that ProSAVANA needs to create a new model that meets the socioeconomic differences between the regions (ProSAVANA Minutes of Meeting 2009). In addition, ProSAVANA preparatory study in 2010 by JICA, ABC and Embrapa revealed that '(t)here is no land proper to develop large-scale agriculture' in Nacala Corridor, and that there were only limited areas that shares agronomical features with Cerrado (JICA 2010). The research team considers that there is an 'evident limitation' for the introduction of Brazil's genetic resources and technologies in Mozambique (ibid.).

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27 As Mozambican CSO points out, emphasis of investment in infrastructures such as roads, railway and port, implies that the commodities produced through ProSAVANA are not aimed for domestic use (Adriano 2013).

28 There also needs attention for use of terms. Brazilian counterparts stress their support for 'family farming' or 'smallholders' in Mozambique, but the situation and scale of small holders or family farmers in both countries largely differ (Scoones et al. 2013).
Nonetheless, although two projects have different scopes, ultimate principles of these projects are the same; both projects pursue industrialization, modernization, and intensification of agriculture, which aims to an opposite direction from what 2008 IAASTD report has suggested.

4-2. Intersections of different interests

Geopolitics

Mozambique and Nacala corridor has a geopolitical significance in creating a value chain. Nacala corridor cuts across the Northern region of Mozambique from Malawi border on the West to Mozambique Channel on the East. It connects coal mining sites in Tete Province (where Brazilian company Vale invests), natural gas production site in Nampula (Japanese company Mitsui & Co., Ltd. is investing with Anadarko Petroleum Corporation in Cabo Delgado region) and agricultural production sites in Nampula, Niassa, Zambezia to Nacala port via highways, railways and airports. Agricultural commodities and other natural resources produced in this region are aimed for global market. Japan and Brazil considers Nacala Port as a potential international port that has good access to China and Europe where large market exists (Paul and Steinbrecher 2013: 3). The port is also considered as a 'gateway' to the inland countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia (MOFA 2013c: 2). From diplomatic point of view, Japan considers Mozambique as a key hub for initiating business expansion in African continent, while Brazil considers that Mozambique has a 'geopolitical significance as a southern ally' (Matos 2011: vii).

Motivations of each state

ProSAVANA was formed under the combination of different stakeholders’ interests. Since countries involved in ProSAVANA are not homogenous entities, it is difficult to simply describe the aims and motivations of each actor. The gap between discursive dimension and what they pursue on the ground also requires careful attention. However, there are several key factors that underpin each country’s motivation.

For Japan, this project was fundamentally an extension of Japan's import diversification strategy. After 'bi-polarizing' the soybeans supply zone to US and Brazil through PRODECER, Japan sought to 'tri-polarize' it with ProSAVANA (JICA 2013). Unlike PRODECER project that Japan initially tried to figure a way to import the crops directly from Cerrado, production in ProSAVANA is aimed at global market from its initial phase. Japanese MNCs can also benefit from trade with China, and Japan can benefit from stabilized international commodity price by increasing overall agricultural production. Japanese MNCs such as Itochu, Sumitomo, Mitsui, and Marubeni are involved in this project (Sankeibiz 2013). ProSAVANA is also considered as 'important diplomatic tool' for Japan (JICA 2011). According to Oka (2007), 'gaining recognition in the international society' was the central focus of ProSAVANA project in its early phase (Oka 2007).
For Brazil, 'solidarity' based on South-South cooperation, business expansion of Brazilian private sector, and availability of land are key factors (JICA 2013). Carlos Ernesto, president of Augustin Associação Matogrossense dos Produtores de Algodão (Ampa) in Brazil claimed that 'Mozambique is a Mato Grosso in the middle of Africa, with land for free without so much environmental obstacles, and much cheaper shipping to China' (quoted by Schlesinger 2013b). The price of land in Brazil, as well as in other Latin American countries has been rising in recent years. In this regard, Mozambique, where offers vast farmlands for agribusiness is seen as a new 'frontier' for agribusiness expansion (Clements and Fernandes 2012: 18).

On the Mozambican side, there is a central interest in attracting foreign direct investments. Calisto Bias, the director general of Agricultural Research Institute of Mozambique (IIAM), stated that this initiative will contribute to national food security and economic development (African Farming 2013). On the other hand, Chicava et al. (2013b: 112) pointed out that this cooperation scheme 'chime with the interests of the political and business elite in Mozambique,' which in turn forming 'an alliance of elite interests.'

Under these different motivations of three pivot countries, JICA claims that it is Japan's role to coordinate three countries to make ProSAVANA into a 'Win-Win-Win' project among the different stakeholders (JICA 2013). However, there exists power imbalance between countries obscured under 'triangular' 'Win-Win-Win' scheme, and the project is recently becoming more demarcated among Brazilian and Japanese side, due to the difference in their aims and scopes (Kondo 2014).

Relation with other initiatives

ProSAVANA project is considered as part of larger frameworks of agricultural development initiatives in African countries. At World Economic Forum (WEF) 2009, an initiative called 'African Agricultural Growth Corridors' (AAGC) has been proposed, as part of corporate-led 'New Vision for Agriculture' framework. The plan create 'Growth Corridors' that cuts across the countries to connect the key natural resource sites with secondary industries and ports for exportation, aiming 'comprehensive' economic growth. (Paul and Steinbrecher 2013:13). Promoters include the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), Alliance for a New Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and Grow Africa. This framework was extended to the 'G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (G8NA)' initiated at G8 summit in 2012. G8NA is a joint initiative between public and private sector (PPP) including World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), World Food Program (WFP), African Union (AU), NEPAD, G8 countries, 10 African countries, and 45 private corporations. Their goal is to 'lift 50 million people out of poverty by 2022' by 'catalyzing responsible private sector investment' in African agriculture (G8 2013, n.d.; USAID 2013). USAID's Bureau for Food Security stated that 'Mozambique has the potential to grow into

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29 UNAC explains that Mozambican farmers have fear over land acquisition, regarding past experiences with foreign investors (UNAC 2013).
a breadbasket for the region’ through this G8NA initiative (USAID 2013b).
The framework demands African countries to reform domestic policies, includ-
ing land reform, zoning, establishment of land banks, introduction of new
technologies and deregulation of trade policies (G8NA n.d.; ACB 2012). These
initiatives were widely criticized by international civil societies as ‘a new form
of structural adjustment’ (GRAIN 2013: 3) that 'do more harm than good'
(Gimenez 2012).

ProSAVANA constitutes agricultural sector of AAGC initiative, and its
framework crossovers with G8NA. Such multi-layered structure is providing
ProSAVANA a legitimate basis but it is also obscuring the boundaries and ac-
countability of the project.

4-2. Role of the states

This section illustrates how states play key roles in ProSAVANA by assisting
corporate activities while legitimizing them.

Role of the states and use of ODA

States play key roles in implementing ProSAVANA. ProSAVANA project
is fundamentally a top-down project, which its framework has been negotiated
through intergovernmental arrangements. The important decisions are gener-
ally made at high-level panels between the states. ODA functions as a tool to
outstretch national interests of donor countries and to channel private capital
for project implementation.

Regarding ProSAVANA, JICA (2010) claims that, 'considering the fact that
agriculture is an economic activity, ODA could only play a small part in this
project. Private investment is indispensable for the agricultural development in
the Nacala Corridor.' Japanese ODA mainly functions as a tool to create fav-
orable environment for private investment. Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
mentioned that Japanese private sector expects this project to support 'liberal-
ization, promotion and protection of investments’ in Mozambique (AIM n.d.).
Japanese government assists corporate activities in Mozambique by providing
financial supports such as yen loans for agricultural investment (Sankeibiz
2012). JICA also places importance on technological assistance and human re-
source development to distinguish their activities from China and the US (ibid.).
With AMIDAZE partnership signed in 2014, Japan positioned Mozambique as
'business partner' instead of 'aid recipient.' Japan refrains to use the terms such
as 'aid' or 'development assistance' in ProSAVANA framework, in order to
avoid the image of traditional ‘North-South’ development cooperation (JICA
2010).

Brazil also extends their national interest and pro-market policy through
ODA. In South-South cooperation scheme, there is 'mutual advantage at play,
with state and commercial elites benefiting locally from investments by external
agribusinesses, who were able to establish themselves under preferential terms'
(Scoones et al 2013: 13).
Mozambican state also plays crucial role in shaping ProSAVANA project, notwithstanding the 'unequal power relationships through exercising influence' (Scoones et al. 2013: 12). Mozambique's role is to coordinate institutions, to supply financial resources and personnel, and to make 'modifications in the regulations concerning the assurance of budget' (JICA 2010: S-17). To support the 'cluster' model of Master Plan (to be explained later), Mozambican government has mechanisms (GAZEDA) to establish special economic zones (SEZ). Mozambican state also holds control over land and natural resources. Although Mozambique has the 'most progressive land law' among African countries (Fairbairn 2013), land is fundamentally managed by state, and many foreign governments and corporations are taking lease on their land. In addition, political faction is largely affecting the implementation of ProSAVANA (AJF et al. 2014).

**Discourses for justification**

The state mobilizes various discourse to justify their intervention. The core rationale for ProSAVANA's implementation pivots around food security discourse. Since the time of 1973-4 food crisis, there has been a Neo-Malthusian logic in JICA's claims, that 'Japan need to contribute to increasing global food production in the era of Population bomb' (JICA 2011).

Hirano (2013) from JETRO explains the correlation of food dependency in Africa and Japan. While Japan is a large net food importer since postwar period, food dependency of Sub-Saharan Africa is also increasing in recent years. Sub-Saharan Africa's net grain import has exceeded that of Japan in 2009, creating a structure where East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa dividing the share of world grain market. Hirano states that underdevelopment of African agriculture is a global issue, as Africa's growing food dependency could pressure the world grain market, which could largely affect food security of East Asian countries. Supporting the development of agricultural sector in Africa would not only support the economic development of Africa, but also benefit for food security in Japan (ibid.).

Aside from food security issue, Mozambique's economic stagnation, low productivity and lack of competitiveness of agricultural sector are often emphasized as 'issues to be solved' (JICA 2010 6-11,17). The counter measure to these are liberalization, modernization and industrialization of agriculture as well as increased private investment. The state often focuses on the shortcomings of the region's agriculture, but not on their positive aspects, nor on peasants' rights and autonomy.

**4-3. Strategies to incorporate Mozambique into global value chain**

The key feature of ProSAVANA is that it aims to incorporate Mozambican agricultural system into global value chain. This section features 'cluster' model and 'outgrower' scheme, which are meant to serve for different stakeholders while creating a legitimate basis.
Creation of agricultural 'clusters'

Creation of agricultural 'clusters' constitutes core part of ProsAVANA-PD. According to the leaked Master Plan (ProsAVANA 2013), 'cluster' originally refers to a strategic grouping of industries, but in ProsAVANA it refers to a scheme that vertically integrates value chain from upstream to downstream, based on particular crops. Clusters 'encompass a variety of agricultural, industrial and service providers companies, where will be involved corporate domestic and foreign producers up to the Mozambican smallholders working together in synergy between components' (ProsAVANA 2013: 2-14). The crops for respective clusters were selected under the consideration of final value-added products to be exported from the region (ibid: 6-10). Among all the varieties of crops, JICA positions soybeans as key crops, regarding its flexible usage for oil, livestock feed, and food (JAICAF 2006). Soybeans are also crucial as rotation crops that have nitrogen-fixing ability (Hongo 2002: 367).

Cluster strategy includes zoning (Ecological Economic Zoning: ZEE) of the region for respective clusters. This process determines the land use based on agronomical conditions. This is claimed as an effort to prevent environmental degradation by restricting agrarian activities in vulnerable areas (JICA 2010: 6-7). However, CSOs claims that ZEE delimits local farmers' autonomy over land and crops by imposing monoculture (Yoshida et al. 2013). This scheme also aims to create several Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Cuamba, Ribaue, Majune and Lioma (Gurue). The SEZs provide business incentives such as tax, financial and technical support, and social infrastructures to support 'efficient value chain operation' (ProsAVANA 2013: 2-2).

Outgrower scheme and labour relations

ProsAVANA pursues 'responsible agricultural model' that supports both large-scale and small-scale farming (Oshima 2011). Mozambican Minister of Agriculture notes that, 'to develop agriculture, we are betting heavily on the small farmers. […] We want these small farmers to become commercial farmers on a small, medium and eventually even large scale' (Pacheco 2012, quoted in allAfrica 2012).

To achieve this model, Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) is considered as a key institutional tool. JICA (n.d.) argues that ProsAVANA can 'prevent' land acquisitions by promoting 'appropriate' land investments. Other supports for smallholders include promotion of land titling, reinforcement of legal institutions, organization of farmers' cooperatives, agricultural loans, and infrastructure improvements (JICA 2010; ProsAVANA 2013). ProsAVANA's basic principle of 'Neoliberal agricultural development' prevails in these measures.

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30 This 'support for small-scale farmers' feature of ProsAVANA appeared only after CSOs raised their voice against ProsAVANA's initial focus on large-scale agricultural production (Funada 2013a).

31 Wide-spread criticisms over PRAI for its function to legitimize land acquisitions seems to be less considered by JICA (JICA 2013).
In addition, there is a special emphasis on incorporation of individual farmers to the global market (ProSAVANA n.d.) through 'outgrower scheme' (contract farming) (JICA 2013b; Nogueira and Ollinaho 2013). Outgrower scheme transforms subsistence farmers to commercially viable farm workers. The selection of growers will be made upon the business plans of each cluster (JICA 2010). Generally, contract farming is perceived as a model that creates win-win situation between corporation and farmers (IFAD 2009), allowing farmers to gain cash income while companies can cut down external costs (Da Via 2011: 13).

However, contract farming will not always lead to win-win relationships. There are several flaws in contract farming scheme in how they create change in social relations of labour (De Schutter 2011). Da Via (2011: 12) explains controversial effect of contract farming scheme by citing studies by Raynolds (2000), Taylor and Bending (2009), Watts (1994) and White (1997). Studies show how contract farming will place farmers in weak positions, subordinating farmers under powerful corporate actors. In many cases, contract farming proletarianize farmers and create dependence among farmers to the volatile price of international markets. Indeed, recent studies showed that contract farming scheme in ProSAVANA-PEM is putting small farmers under exploitative conditions (AJF et al. 2014). Contract farming scheme is based on the premise of 'adverse incorporation' (Akram-Lodhi 2008, 2009); there are increased risks and vulnerability of small-scale farmers in the scheme of 'inclusive growth' that incorporates small-scale farmers into global value chain.

The scheme also imposes shift in farming styles. The project perceives that there is 'an urgent need' for a 'transition from shifting cultivation to settled farming,' and the farmers who abandoned their traditional farming practice will be awarded as 'leading farmers' (JA et al. 2013; ProSAVANA 2013). Araghi (2000) called this type of projects as 'global enclosure' of the world peasantries, as it places control over existing peasants.

Within the current 'cluster' model and outgrower scheme that ProSAVANA proposes, small-scale farmers will become dependent to agro-food industries who control the whole value chain in each cluster.

### 4.4. Criticisms, social movements and proposed alternatives

Since 2012, ProSAVANA has attracted attention from domestic and international CSOs. National Union of Peasants (União Nacional de Camponeses: UNAC), the largest farmers' union in the country that affiliates to La Via Campesina, has been working actively to oppose the implementation of the project under collaboration with social movements in Brazil and Japan. In 2013, they submitted an open letter to the governments of three countries to call for immediate suspension of the project, addressing that the project is designed to benefit foreign capital and will undermine the local peasants production

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32 Contract farming is not new in the region. In Gurue province, Rei do Agro from the US is pursuing contract farming as 'a solution for local farmers' (Kuyek 2013).
In June 2014, they initiated a nation-wide protest campaign 'Não ao ProSavana (No to ProSAVANA)' (UNAC 2014). The situation of social movements is becoming increasingly complexed, as the implementation of ProSAVANA is linked to the political strife in the target region (AJF et al. 2014).

There are several critical concerns raised in relation to ProSAVANA, regarding its impacts on local economies and socio-environmental dimensions such as land concentration, oligopoly by transitional agribusiness firms, marginalization of small-scale farmers, undermining of peasant production over large-scale agribusiness and environmental destruction (UNAC 2013; FIAN 2013). As former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food points out, 'one potential danger of development aid, in particular of private-led projects, is that the goals of poverty reduction and rural development could be relegated below the goal of raising food production' (De Schutter, cited by Henriques and Campeau 2013: 6). Corporate or market-led projects often fail to account socio-environmental aspects of their propagated goals since those costs are not accounted in Neoliberal economic model.

UNAC and other CSOs propose several alternatives to ProSAVANA project, based on concepts such as 'right to food' or 'food sovereignty.' Vicente Adriano from UNAC states as follows:

'And, what we defend? First of all, we are not against the investment. I will not against development. Development is important. But what kind of development and development for who? Development in what perspective? [...] we recommend and demand that those investments be made in development peasant farming, and the peasant economy, [...] not on crop production like soy beans, maize. [...] our agriculture is more sustainable, because we look for agriculture like agroecology and conservation agriculture. We don't take (commercial) seeds because they are not sustainable' (UNAC 2013).34

The open letter submitted in 2013 demanded that the resource for ProSAVANA project should be 'reallocated to define and implement a national plan for the support of sustainable family farming' with more 'focus on (Mozambican) people' (UNAC 2013). UNAC claims that their traditional family farming style is the 'only kind of farming capable of producing high-quality foods in sufficient quantities for the entire Mozambican nation' while assuring sustainability and creating rural employment (UNAC 2013). The viability of proposed alternatives requires further examination, but considering the fact that the past food regimes were shaped by the suppressed social groups in the preceding regimes, their voices should not be neglected.

33 Response to this letter by Mozambican government was provided through ProSAVANA official website in August 2014.
34 Quote from conference on 29 May 2013.
Chapter 5 Conclusion

This paper explored 'why' Japan got involved in offshore agricultural investment, and 'how' their strategy appeared on the ground. During the postwar food regime, intersection of Japanese development scheme and US food aid created a condition where Japan had to achieve food security through trade. After the global food crises, the same 'aid' scheme served as a tool to bridge barriers for accumulation by facilitating and legitimizing 'profitable' investment.

Japan’s motivation and strategy for offshore agricultural investment are historical and social product. Japan’s motivation for ProSAVANA stems in their renewed focus on Africa after the global food crisis in 2007-8. In the unfolding crisis of postwar food regime, Japan aimed to shift away from single-dependence on the US by diversifying the supply zones. Food crises provided a legitimate basis for geographical expansion of Japan’s accumulation network. After respective crises, Japan extended geographical scope for offshore agricultural investment from Asia to Brazil and then to Mozambique. Japan’s relationships with Brazil and China were key factors that led Japan to invest in African agriculture. ProSAVANA is created under nested interests of various stakeholders, which powerful political elites and corporate capital determine who produces what, where, how and for whom. In ProSAVANA, Japan utilizes ODA as a tool to territorialize agribusiness in Mozambique, and JICA functions as an institute that channels private investment.

Here exists a pattern of 'reproduction of dependency'; through ProSAVANA project, Japan is creating new dependency structure in Mozambique, replacing the original dependency on hegemonic states with a dependency on global market. ProSAVANA causes changes in social relations both in quantitative and qualitative terms, by integrating different actors into global accumulation chain. Current framework is likely to deepen the rift between natural dynamism and human activity, as well as rural-urban divide. However, ProSAVANA is still in its early phase of implementation, so it requires further research in order to examine its implications.35

From old times, colonialist or capitalist logics let human to draw a straight line on land with little consideration on environmental impact (Amino 2012). Roads that cut across the Brazilian Amazon to transport soybeans, or Nacala Corridor that connects key natural resource sites, farmlands and port resemble what human has been repeating from colonial times or even before.

In the period of crisis and transition, various features of the system, which were not evident or unrecognized during the stable period become visible. Japan’s dependency structure and its vulnerability have come to light with the global food crises in 1973-4 and 2007-8. In these times, Japan chose a food security strategy that increases dependency and deepens the social and ecological rift. If we see the global food crises as ‘signs’ that expressed the limitation of the existing accumulation pattern, Japan’s response through ProSAVANA

35 The Master Plan is planned to be completed soon, which might provide a new view on this project.
was to accelerate the unfolding ‘global agrarian crisis,’ rather than to seek for an alternative agricultural development model.

According to Senge (2011), 'crises are enormous spaces for opening' to create new social relationships because it 'pierces through habitual pattern.' Crises also 'make people aware of how interdependent they are with one another,' since 'civilization is nothing but relationships' (ibid). Distortion of wider systems often appears in the most vulnerable parts of the system. How each actors perceive and react to the crises - whether to patch over the defect by soft law or renewed explanations, or to change the rules or formulation of the project - will largely shape the path that society will proceed.

Currently, Japan is relatively small actor in offshore agricultural development, especially in Africa. Nonetheless, regarding its level of food dependency and scale of economy, it has a potential to transform the dynamism of food provisioning in regional and international scale. Regarding ProSAVANA, the current situation where frictions and contentions are arising both from inside and outside the country indicates that there is a room for improving its policy direction. Especially since 2014 is FAO's International Year of Family Farming (FAO 2014), it is crucial for Japan to consider which direction their intensive model of offshore agricultural development projects may lead to, both in short and longer term view.

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