Research Paper

on

Incremental Dynamics of Resolving India-Bangladesh Border Issues:
Re-thinking the Past to Construct the Future.

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Abstract

This research paper enquires about the reasons for non resolution of the border issues between India and Bangladesh over a period of over six decades, even though the two countries claim to be friendly countries. This paper finds out that it is not possible to draw a single general border theory. Each border has something special to offer. Thus, both local as well as broader context of creation of a particular border is important to understand genesis of border issues between the countries. Thus, this paper considers that the borders are not only the political creation, but the social and cultural factors plays even bigger role.

This paper investigates the reasons for delay in resolving the border issues between India and Bangladesh by using primarily the governance and policy analysis concepts/ tools. For policy analysis, it uses various Discourse Analysis methods also in additions to the concepts of policy cycle. It finds out that the most important part of the policy cycle is policy implementation where strategic management of reaction to the policy is vital for successful implementation of the policy.

This paper finds out the reasons for delay in resolving the border issues between the two countries related to partition of British India and subsequently the partition of Pakistan, demarcation of boundary at the time of its creation, role of political regimes and fundamentalist forces, and also flaws in strategic management of various policy interventions (bilateral agreements) between the two countries.

Keywords: Policy Intervention, Border Issues, Policy Cycle, Policy Analysis, Governance, stakeholders, Floating Identities, Political Regimes, Discourses Analysis, Two Nations’ Theory.

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# Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Awami League</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bhartiya Janta Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>Bangladesh Nationalist Party</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>EAM</td>
<td>External Affairs Minister</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>Erasmus University Rotterdam</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>FICN</td>
<td>Fake India Currency Notes</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>GoI</td>
<td>Government of India</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>International Institute of Social Studies</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>JBWG</td>
<td>Joint Boundary Working Groups</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>LBA</td>
<td>Land Boundary Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>MEA</td>
<td>Ministry of External Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>United Progressive Alliance</td>
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Background

1.1 Introduction:
Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) was part of British India until partitioned India (India and Pakistan) got independence in 1947. This partition was primarily on the ‘two nations theory’ basis (Muslim nation and non-Muslim nation) (Peshkin 1962: 158; Chakrabarty 2003: 207; Ahmed 2002:13). Initially, Pakistan consisted of two geographically separated territories (West Pakistan – present Pakistan and East Pakistan – present Bangladesh). Bangladesh got separated from Pakistan with the help of India after a war in 1971 and became an independent state (Hossain 1981: 1116). Though, a large number of border issues between India and Bangladesh have been sorted-out post-partition, certain very important issues still remain unresolved even after over six decades. This is an interesting issue for research for finding out the reasons for delay in resolving these unresolved boundary issues even when the two countries claim to be in friendly relationship at least after creation of Bangladesh.

1.2 Background:
India shares its longest border of 4,097.7kms\(^1\) (over 25% of India’s total land boundary 15,106.7kms) with Bangladesh as shown in Figure-1 (MHA\(^2\) 2013: 28). As per MHA (2013: 29), five Indian states, namely - West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram share the boundary with Bangladesh. India-Bangladesh border is characterized by topographies like plains, river-bed, hills and forests, and at many stretches cultivation as well as settlement is there till the last inch of the border(ibid). India-Bangladesh border is the third largest border in the world after United States-Canada and Russia- Kazakhstan. Bangladesh shares most of its international land border with India and is almost encased in the north eastern part of India. Further, generally the countries has national boundaries similar to their colonial jurisdiction, but this boundary was newly created on account of partition of British India (Schendel 2002: 117-18).

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\(^1\) Kilo meters
\(^2\) Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India
The History of the India-Bangladesh border dates back to the partition of erstwhile British India into India and Pakistan in 1947 as per the Indian Independence Act-1947. The international boundaries between India and East-Pakistan (present Bangladesh) were determined by an award of a Boundary Commission3 (chaired by Sir Cyril Radcliffe). (Pattanaik 2011:746). However, before the boundaries between the two countries were demarcated on ground, some disputes arose on the interpretation of the award. To resolve these disputes on ground, a Tribunal4 (Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal) was constituted. The decision of the tribunal was announced in February 1950. (Ahmad 1953:329-30).

After liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, the Radcliffe line5 was inherited as border between India and Bangladesh. Consequently, a major step in the direction of settlement of the border issues between India and Bangladesh was taken with signing Land Boundary Agreement 1974 (LBA-1974) covering all the unresolved boundary issues and way forward for their resolution (LBA 1974). With exchange of letters and other instruments over a period of four decades, almost all the issues have been resolved, but the following:

**Un-demarcated Boundary**: There was dispute over the interpretation of boundary in stretches of 6.5 kms (3kms in Assam, 1.5kms in West Bengal and 2kms in Tripura) which still remain un-demarcated on ground (Pattanaik 2011:747).

**Adverse Possession**: The term adverse possession looks as if one country has forcefully occupied the land of another. Traditionally, even before partition of British India, some of the lands in each country were being cultivated by the people of other

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3 established by Lord Mountbatten then British Governor General of India.
4 chaired by Honorable Algot Bagge, former member of the Supreme Court of Sweden and two High-Court Judges namely Honorable C. Aiyar (India) and the Honorable M. Shahabuddin (Pakistan)
5 As per the Radcliffe Boundary Commission Award.
country (Chatterjee 2011:3). It is said that India is in adverse possession of 2922 acres of Bangladeshi land while Bangladesh 2267.49 acres of Indian land (ibid).

**Enclaves:** An enclave is a portion of one state completely surrounded by the territory of another state (Schendel 2002: 116). There are 51 Bangladeshi Enclaves\(^6\) in India and 111 Indian Enclaves\(^7\) in Bangladesh (Pattanaik 2011: 747). These enclaves are located deep in the territory of other country with no access from the parent country.

If the said enclaves are exchanged as per LBA-1974, India stand to lose 17,160.63 acres\(^8\) of land and in return gain 7110.02 acres of land (The Government of India 2013: 7-14). Latest estimates are that about 51000 human beings (about 37000 in India enclaves and 14000 in Bangladeshi enclaves) are living in stateless conditions in these enclaves (Tuteja 2011).

**Further Developments:** After the assassination of the father of the Nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 (Bhardwaj 2009:3), Bangladesh was pushed into the military dictatorship until 1991 when the democratic process was restored (Bhardwaj 2009: 23). Thereafter, there were regime changes between political parties Awami League headed by Sheikh Hasina and Bangladesh Nationalist Party headed by Khaleda Zia. In 2009, government headed by Sheikh Hasina (Prime Minister) took over and she visited India in January 2010. This visit gave new lease of life to the process of settlement of long pending aforesaid boundary issues and a protocol to LBA-1974 was signed during the visit of Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Man Mohan Singh to Bangladesh in September 2011 (MEA\(^9\) 2011). As full implementation of LBA 1974 along with its protocol of 2011 requires cessation and acquisition of territory, it will require Amendment to Indian Constitution as per Article 368 (The Constitution of India 2007: 240-41). Accordingly, the Government of India has introduced the Constitutional Amendment Bill 2013 in Upper House of Parliament (Rajya Sabha) (the Government of India 2013). However, this Bill is yet to be passed by the Parliament before it become an Act and implemented.

### 1.3 Problem Statement:

India-Bangladesh boundary issues are not new, but were inherited from the erstwhile East Pakistan. Attempts were made for resolving the border issues even prior to creation of Bangladesh through Nehru-Noon agreement 1958. Though, the exchange of enclaves was agreed in this agreement, it ran into problems due to legal cases in Supreme Court of India who gave verdict in favour of exchange of enclaves on 29 March 1971 after Bangladesh declared its independence from Pakistan on 26

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\(^6\) The residents of these enclaves are citizens of Bangladesh. However, geographically these enclaves are fully surrounded by India territory.

\(^7\) The residents of these enclaves are citizens of India. However, geographically these enclaves are fully surrounded by Bangladesh territory.

\(^8\) 1 acre = 43,560 square feet.

\(^9\) Ministry of External Affairs – this ministry is responsible for the foreign relation of India.
March 1971 (Jones 2009:375). Thus, a new agreement was negotiated with the new sovereign country and LBA-1974 was signed (Jones 2009). It took so long to partially resolve the problems of only two Bangladeshi enclaves (Dahagram and Angarpota) by opening access to mainland Bangladesh through Tin-Bigha corridor (a stretch of 178mx85m of Indian land). Keeping in view the slow pace of resolution, it resulted into a grave situation, primarily when it comes to the basic rights of about 51,000 people living in these enclaves as also concluded by Jones (2009: 374) in his article that, “the failure to exchange the enclaves after 60 years demonstrates the powerful role nationalist identity politics of religion and homeland play in institutionalizing the concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity, often at the expense of basic human rights.” Further, the adverse possessions were to be handed over to countries to which they belonged to as per LBA-1974 which means uprooting the people living in these adverse possessions which was a difficult proposition to implement. However, this was rectified in the protocol to LBA-1974 signed in September 2011, but still the ground situation remains the same. Further, the un-demarcated boundaries are making the situation even worse.

All the unresolved border issues together have wider security and other implications. There are lots of illegal activities like human trafficking, smuggling of live stocks and fake Indian currency and so on take place. Till these border issues (adverse possessions and un-demarcated boundaries) are resolved, fencing, being carried out by India along India-Bangladesh border to check cross-border illegal activities, cannot be completed. In addition, in spite of restrain being observed by the border guarding forces of two countries, there are incidents of firing to check the illegal activities and at times innocent people living near the border also gets affected or even killed. (Jamwal 2004).

It is, therefore, of great importance to investigate the process of resolution that had happened till now and find out as to how and why the border issues could not be resolved even after passage of over six decades in spite of three major policy interventions; i) Nehru-Noon Agreement 1958, ii) Land Boundary Agreement-1974, and iii) Protocol 2011 to LBA-1974.

This research will investigate the design and outcomes of the above three successive policy interventions to resolve these issues. It will also investigate as to why some issues got resolved while above issues remained unresolved.

1.4 **Objective of Research:**

Objective of this research is to find out the reasons for delay in resolving the long pending border issues between the two friendly countries. Understanding of this may facilitate resolution of these issues without further delay not only in overall interests of the population residing in the border areas who are the victims of the circumstance, but also in broader interests of the two countries.
1.5 **Research Question:**

What factors explain why India and Bangladesh failed to resolve their border issues in a long period of over six decades in spite of three distinct sets of policy interventions?

**Sub Questions:**

1) What is the background and contextual history of construction of India-Bangladesh border and border issues thereof?

2) What is the nature of each of the three policy interventions and which issues were solved and left un-resolved?

3) Who are the (changing) stakeholders in each of the three policy intervention moments and what was their role in successive policies?

4) What factors explain that each policy intervention failed to resolve all the issues?

1.6 **Research Methodology:**

1.6.1 **Sources of Data and mode of data collection:** In my research, I will be using secondary data only. Sources of empirical data collection primarily are the following:

- Government of India (GoI) documents like the Constitution, Act(s) and Bill(s)
- MEA, GoI- data related to high level visits between India and Bangladesh, Agreements between the two countries, and other similar documents.
- Academic literature from the following sources:
  - International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague, Library
  - Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Rotterdam, On-line library
  - Search Engines like ‘Google Scholar’ and ‘J-Store’ search engine

1.6.2 **Research Techniques:** I will be dealing the research question primarily from the policy analysis and governance perspective. As can be seen from the background, there were three major policy interventions by the two countries for resolving the border issues. The position in respect of the different issues has been changed from one agreement to other, still even after over six decades, this issue remains unresolved. Major part of the policy analysis will be using the Discourse analysis techniques.

1.7 **Relevance and Justification of the Research Topic:**

The people living in the border areas are the victims of the situations and sometimes, the anti-social elements are taking advantage of the situation. Border enclaves’ issue
is also a humanitarian issue as inhabitants of the enclaves are living in sub-human conditions. The Indian populations residing in Indian enclaves in Bangladesh have no access to India and similar is the situation of Bangladeshi enclaves in India. These populations are cutoff from the basic amenities and rights available to the citizens of the respective countries.

Due to economic development differences between the two countries and other socio-cultural reasons, there are lots of illegal activities across the border like smuggling of cattle (cows) from India to Bangladesh for meat purpose (cows are holy to Hindu religion people and they do not eat cows’ meat), liquor smuggling from India to Bangladesh (as it is prohibited in Bangladesh due to religious reasons), Fake India Currency Notes (FICN) smuggling from Pakistan (through Bangladesh) to India and illegal migration of people. Thus, security agencies have tough time in dealing with the illegal trans-border activities.

Resolution of unresolved border issues is the need of the time so that the government and people of both the countries will be able to engage in more constructive activities. Thus, the research topic is important and is justified for enquiries into the reasons for delay in resolving the unresolved border between these two countries.

1.8 Risks, Ethical Challenges, Limitations in Carrying Out the Proposed Research:

As primary source for my research is based on the secondary data and no field visits are involved, I do not perceive any physical risks. Further, I may confront certain ethical challenges, as I dealt with the India-Bangladesh border issues while working with Government of India. It would be challenging for me to carry out an impartial research. However, with selection of suitable theoretical and conceptual frameworks, my endeavor is to mitigate any risk of being biased and I will be objective in my research process. In addition, there is limitation that I have joined back with Government of India in September 2014 and will have to carry out my research work along with performing my job related duties. Thus, I will have to face time constraints and put-in extra efforts for completing the research in time.

1.9 Structure of the Research Paper:

Chapter 2 will define the conceptual and theoretical framework for the research. The next chapter will set the historical contextual framework. The two subsequent chapters will focus on the three policy interventions of 1958, 1974 and 2011 and chapter 6 will focus on the recent visit of the external affairs minister of newly constituted BJP led government of India to Bangladesh. Finally, chapter 7 will conclude the research findings.
Chapter-2
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

2.1 Background:

The research topic relates to the border issues. Thus, it is important first to come up with an appropriate theoretical framework relating to borders which can be used in this research paper. In a traditional sense, the borders are politically constructed. However, viewing borders with political lenses may provide only a narrow picture. Further, the main focus of this research is resolution of border issues and thus, the affected population residing in the border areas who are struggling with ‘floating identities’ between nation, state, nation-state, sovereignty, citizenship and religion. Matters of resolving the border issues is also a governance issue and thus, the concepts like policy analysis, political regimes, and international relations will be discussed under the umbrella of ‘governing borders’ in this chapter. A complete picture of the theoretical and conceptual framework used in this paper has been shown in figure-2.

2.2 Theorizing Borders:

In old classical terms the borders were thought to be lines on the sand or on the maps. These were thought to be rigid and inflexible (Newman 2011:13). In most part of the twentieth century (until Second World War), the world has mostly been viewed as national-states, national-economies and national-societies with protectionist measures by their rulers. As a result, the terms ‘society’ and ‘state’ became synonymous to each other encircled by the same boundaries defining people’s identity in a nation-state. “These borders paradoxically were relatively ignored, taken-for-granted and seen as peripheral, not just in the literal geographical sense but in political and social terms.” (Anderson et al. 2002:3). In Africa, 42% of the international borders are demarcated by geographical ease without minding the social realities. 37% of their boundaries were imposed on them by their colonisers (British and French) who cared only about their divide and rule policy (Kolossov 2005: 628-29).

Paasi (2005: 668-9) has further stressed that a general theory of borders is a problematic idea as each border is unique as related, in different ways, to local, regional, state-bound, and supranational processes, and contexts are more often located in broader social world. Accordingly, it is necessary to look at the borders in broader context –social, economic, geographical, cultural, historical, and also concentrate on the key contexts such as state, nation, nationalism, identity and ethnicity (Paasi 2005).
Agreeing to Paasi (2005), Wilson and Donnan (2012: 20) concluded that it is not sufficient to focus on localized issues only of a particular border without framing the context in relation to other borders. Today, the field of border studies includes both comparative (comparison of different borders) and multidisciplinary (economic, social, cultural, geographical, cultural, historical and so on) approach. “Border studies show that all continents, all nations, all states have something to offer in the quest to understand the changing nature of territory, power, governance and identity” (ibid). The fall of Berlin wall is a strong example of the social construction of borders (Rumford 2006: 166).

Thus, in this paper, I will consider India-Bangladesh border in its broader context as per Paasi (2005). Though, comparative border study as per Wilson and Donnan (2012) may be useful, it will become a separate research topic in itself. Thus, I will not be applying comparative study of borders, but I will be using the multidisciplinary concept of borders.

2.3 Social-Political Dimensions- Floating Identities and Sovereignty:

Rejai and Enloe (1969:141) defined a ‘nation’ “as a relatively large group of people who feel that they belong together by virtue of sharing one or more such traits as common language, religion or race, common history or tradition, common set of customs, and common destiny”. ‘Nation’ is different from the ‘State’ which is an autonomous political structure over as specified territory with defined legal system and centralized power & authority to maintain the law and order in that specified territory (ibid: 143). Thus, ‘State’ is a political-legal concept while ‘nation’ is more related to social-cultural environment (ibid). When the boundaries of state and nation coincide, it becomes a ‘nation-state’ or ‘state-nation’ depending upon whether nation evolves before the ‘state’ or other way round. Generally, in the post-colonial states are ‘state-nations’ as leaders after liberating from the colonial rulers use the ‘nationalism’ as a tool to legitimize the authority of the ‘state’ (ibid: 151-52).

Liberation of India from the British colonial rule was a result of nationalist movement against the foreign domination (ibid: 149-50) while the ‘two nations theory’ of the partition of India and Pakistan identifies ‘Muslims’ (Religion) as identity and thus, constitute a separate nation (Peshkin 1962: 158; Schendel 2002). In fact, the terms of reference for Radcliffe were ‘to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims while taking into account other factors’ (Pattanaik 2011: 745). Further, creation of Bangladesh was based on the common identity of language (Bengali speaking people). Construction of nation-states brings about the concept of fixed land borders where the movement of goods and human beings across the nation-states are regulated. Thus, the people living in India-Bangladesh border areas borne the ‘floating-identity’ between its nation (Bengali speaking), state (Citizenship-Indian
and Bangladeshi) and religion (proxy-citizenship: Muslims are Bangladeshi and non-Muslims are Indians) (Schendel 2002).

While talking about the concept ‘nation-state’, the important, but much controversial, concept of sovereignty also comes in the picture. In traditional sense, the concept of ‘sovereignty’ recognized no bigger power than the ‘nation-state’ (within a particular territorial jurisdiction) whether foreign or international unless specifically agreed by the ‘nation-state’ (Jackson 2003: 782). Thus, in traditional concept of ‘sovereignty’, validity of an international law also depends on the specific consent of the ‘nation-state’ (ibid). Thus, “sovereignty in world politics is a distinctive way of arranging the contacts and relations of political communities, or states, such that their political independence is mutually recognized and they co-exist and interact on a foundation of formal equality and a corresponding right of non-intervention” (Jackson 1999: 434). However, the concept of sovereignty is not constant, but a variable one and in the globalized world, the international norms legitimize the state (external sovereignty) rather than the national (internal) sovereignty (Barkin and Cronin 1994: 108; Jackson 1999: 433; Heywood 2004:92-97). Though, Bangladesh declared itself as an independent sovereign entity in March 1971 itself, it really integrated into the world system as a sovereign state when recognized by the international community like other countries and international institutions like United Nations. Thus, ‘sovereignty’ is not merely the national sovereignty (people legitimize the state), but also international sovereignty when legitimized by the international community which, in fact, signifies the foreign relations of a ‘nation-state’ (Jackson 1999: 455-56). In this, research paper, I will normally be using the concept of ‘sovereignty’ in the traditional sense as attempts have been made to resolve the border issues between India and Bangladesh through bilateral agreements which were suitably modified over a time period to accommodate various social and political concerns.
2.4 Governance and Policy Analysis Dimensions- Governing Borders:

Governance is a very broad term carrying different meanings in corporate, politics, international relations and other fields. Kjaer (2004: 2) has observed: “The usage of concept of governance, then, is applied in many different contexts and with as many different meanings”. Governance also looks at changes or shifts in the governing methods. This may be through implementation of new policies or enactment of new
Acts or amendment to the existing ones or similar other changes. Rhodes (1996) has viewed: “Governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to new processes of governing; or changed conditions of ordered rule; or new methods by which society is governed” (as cited in Levi-Faur 2012:7). Thus, between India and Bangladesh, the changing international relations through various bilateral agreements to resolve the pending border issues signifies the governance of unresolved border issues between the two countries. The three agreements signed between the two countries in 1958 (with Pakistan), 1974 and 2011 signify change in governance of border issues between the two countries.

As per Kjaer (2004: 59), the management of international relations were traditionally the affair of the government. International relations may include waging wars, doing diplomacy, negotiate and sign agreements. However, in the era of globalization, the concept of international relations is to be seen with different lenses due to interdependence. International relations are no longer instruments of conflict resolutions; rather they play alliance building to channelize energies. However, if we see the security sector, the state has very important role to play (Kjaer 2004: 97). Thus, from the security perspective, state (also governments and political regimes), as major stakeholder, has vital role to play in resolving border issues between India and Bangladesh.

Democratic peace literature talks that the democracies are less likely to take radical paths for resolution of their border conflicts; rather, they take negotiation route (Gibler 2007; Ray 1998; Oneal and Russett 1997). As per Gibler (2007:529), lack of border conflicts facilitates the states to concentrate on the economic developments without concentrating on securing their borders and development led to conducive conditions for the democracy. Oneal and Russett (1997: 267) provided evidences to the effect that the democracies are less likely to enter into conflicts with each other than democracy and autocracy, or autocracy dyads. The economic interdependence also lead to reduction in conflicts (ibid: 287-289). Further, Ray (1997:43) concluded that democracies are more likely to cause the peace. Thus, all these literature review indicates that there is relationship between the type of regimes and resolution of border conflicts. In this research, I would be looking at the political regimes in India and Bangladesh and try to find out empirically as to how the political regimes in these countries have affected resolution of the border issues between the two countries.

As per Colebatch (2009:10-13), the ‘policy’ is related to the governance of a particular problem. Over past about six decades, there have been three major policy interventions for governance (resolution) of India-Bangladesh border problems. These are Nehru-Noon Agreement in 1958, Land Boundary Agreement in 1974 and protocol to Land Boundary Agreement in 2011. According to Colebatch, there are three types of processes involved in policy making; (ibid: 24-33). These are:
• Authoritative choice-Policy making as deciding: It focuses on the choice by the government.
• Structured Interaction-Policy making as negotiating: Policy emerges from the interplay of different stakeholders.
• Social Construction-Policy making as collective puzzling: Various activities in the process of policy making are based on the shared understanding, values and practices.

Further, to explain a policy making process, more than one type may be drawn upon (ibid: 24). In this research, I would try to explain the aforesaid three major policy interventions through above three types of processes.

According to Jann and Wegrich (2007:45-53), in simplified model, there are four stages in a policy cycle; agenda setting, policy formulation and decision making, implementation, and evaluation and termination. As per Grindle and Thomas (1991:125-126), a stage of equilibrium is reached with the existing policy for the people who are affected by that policy and if there is policy change, it will again meet with resistance. Further, the reaction to the policy change can come during any of the first three stages from agenda setting to implementation. The reaction at later stages is stronger.

Grindle and Thomas (1991:121-22) found that, at times, the result of a policy implementation are quite different from the anticipated results. However, most of the existing literature only talks about the complexity in policy implementation and not suggestions to the policy makers to tackle such situation. To enable the policy maker to handle such situations in the changing contexts during the implementation process, they developed interactive model of policy implementation (Figure-3). This model facilitates the policy makers to anticipate the reactions to the policy and adapt to the changing situations and contexts during the process of policy implementation and make necessary changes en-route to ensure implementation of the policy (ibid: 126-128). This is in contrast to the linear model of policy analysis where the results are assessed in terms of success or failure of the policy after implementation of policy and then find out the reasons. Further, strategic management of any policy intervention is of utmost importance for the policy makers as any policy intervention generates opposition by different stakeholders and it is possible to predict and appropriately manage these resistances to successfully implement the policy intervention depending on the type of reaction whether in public or bureaucratic arena(Grindle and Thomas 1991: 131-41). If reaction is in the public arena, there are more political stakes and strong political support, considerable regime stability and legitimacy is required for implementing the policy successfully (ibid:135-36). In this research, I will also identify as to what were the failures of the strategic management of policy interventions which led to delay in resolving the border issues between India and Bangladesh.
In this paper, I will be using several Discourse analysis tools for analyzing various policy interventions to resolve the India-Bangladesh border issues as well as discourses (speeches) delivered during high level visits between the two countries. “Discourse analysis is the study of language in use” (Gee 2005: 8). According to Gee (ibid), some look at the content of the language used and others may look at the structure of the language used. As such, there is no foolproof scientific method or tool for Discourse analysis. It is the interpretation by the researcher by using different tools of Discourse analysis. In this paper, I will be using various tools of Content Discourse analysis. I will be using concepts from Hsieh and Shannon (2005) for qualitative content analysis of speech discourses (in chapter 6), Schimdt (2006) for the comparative framing analysis of the various policy interventions (in chapter 4), and Schön and Rein (1994) for looking at the changes in the framing patterns during policy implementations as well as from one policy intervention to another (in chapter 3).
5). Discourses cannot be understood without proper social, political & cultural contextual understanding in which discourses have been created. Thus, I have devoted one full chapter-3 on the contextual historical background.
Chapter-3

Contextual Background

3.1 Importance of Contextual Background:

As mentioned, I will also apply discourse analysis methods for analyzing various policy interventions to resolve the India-Bangladesh border issues. Discourses cannot be understood without proper contextual historical knowledge. “What is needed is a deeper scrutiny of the social practices and discourses in which boundaries are produced and reproduced. […] the ideas of sovereignty, citizenship and identity still provide the social, political and cultural framework for ‘reading’ the contextual but simultaneously rescaling meanings of boundaries and the power relations that are involved in the very constitution of them.” (Paasi 2005: 18). There existed about 200 states with over 300 borders and each of them have unique history (ibid). Also, as per Phillips and Hardy (2002: 19), the local context may be useful, but the broader context (like social class, the ethnic composition, or site where the event took place and so also the regional and cultural) is more meaningful.

Thus, it is necessary and useful to understand the unique broader historical context - social, culture, geographical, sovereignty, state, nation and identity- for analyzing unresolved problems and to find out solutions. Accordingly, the broader context of creation of India-Bangladesh border, running from partition of British India to partition of Pakistan and finally creation of Bangladesh will be discussed in this chapter.

3.2 Partition of British-India:

According to Paasi (2005:17), the modern states are not truly nation-states as several nations co-exist within them, either peacefully or in conflict with each other. Some of these nation groups may be struggling to get autonomy or even for their own nation-state. The decay of Moghul Empire created many Hindu and Muslim Kingdoms who tried to put check on the expansion of British-Empire over them, but could not stand long in front of strong British Empire (Peshkin 1962:153). Thus, the Muslim and Hindu nations were in existence long before the partition of British-India. However, these could not become the nation-states.

Though, Hindus aligned themselves with the new education system, the Muslims continued with their traditional Islamic education system. Slowly, Muslims fell behind and got alienated from the mainstream developments in British-India while Hindus continued to rise in their positions. (Peshkin 1962: 154-155). Around 1930s, Muslims were about 30% of total population of India, but their enrolment in higher education was merely 13% (ibid: 157-158). In view of the political and economic developments in the 20th century, the difference between the two communities/ nations grew wider.
According to Gilmartin (1998: 1081), Jinnah’s\textsuperscript{10} ‘two nations theory’ did not embody the territorial space for a separate Muslim-nation (Pakistan), but for special provisions for Muslims. However, with the modern concepts of sovereignty, Jinnah also modified his views that the nation must have territory. Initially, Muslim league had an idea of a separate Muslim-nation in the North-Western part only. However, in 1947 when the partition issue was peaking, the movement got wider support from Bengal and thus, a portion of Bengal was also included in Pakistan (ibid: 1083). Therefore, Pakistan consisted of two geographically separated territories; West-Pakistan (present Pakistan) and East-Pakistan (Now Bangladesh).

3.3 Creation of Bangladesh:

Though Pakistan was created on the basis of the ‘two nations theory’ based on religion identity, it was not actually a true single nation-state. There was one more identity based on the language which was in offering even before creation of Pakistan as “besides the territorial elements of administration and governance, crucial practices in the construction of a nation are economics and culture, particularly control over education and language” (Paasi 2005: 23). This was Bengali speaking people who formed a separate nation within the state of Pakistan. Bengali language identity was so strong that Mountbatten\textsuperscript{11} had proposed Bengal as third dominion during partition which was opposed by Nehru\textsuperscript{12} (Chakrabarty 2003: 210). Further, the Bengali language gathered movement in Pakistan when in 1952, the Prime Minister of Pakistan declared in Decca that Urdu should be the sole state language in Pakistan (Rashiduzzaman 1970: 581-582).

In the newly created Pakistan, 55% population was in East-Pakistan who were primarily Bengali speaking while West-Pakistan had a larger geographical area. Two parts of Pakistan were thousands of miles apart and they had less common things (like appearance, culture and language) than most of their neighbouring countries other than the religion (Maron 1955:132, Schuman 1972: 290). Centre-state of Pakistan considered Bengal as one of the many provinces and ignored the fact that it consisted of majority of population and earned most of the foreign exchange (Maron 1955:132, Ahmed et al. 1973: 7).

In fact, most of the administrative and military positions were filled by the people from the West-Pakistan who considered themselves superior race than the Bengali speaking populace and never developed bond with them (Choudhury 1972: 243). In fact, while East-Pakistan comprised 55% of the total population, only 10% of military jobs and 16% of civil services posts were held by people from the East-Pakistan (Ahmed 1973:6).

\textsuperscript{10} Leader of Muslim League. He became the first Prime Minister of Pakistan. He is also known as the Father of Nation in Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{11} The last Governor General of British India.

\textsuperscript{12} Nehru was the first Prime Minister of India after India got independence from the British rule.
In addition to above social, cultural and political reasons, economic reasons also contributed to alienation of Bengali people as there was less budget allocation for development in East-Pakistan, though it generated majority of its revenues. Major budget allocation was for the Defence which was dominated by people from West-Pakistan and concentrated within West-Pakistan. Figures tell themselves; in 1959-60, the per capita income of West-Pakistan was 32% higher than East-Pakistan and by 1969-70, this figure rose to 61%. (Choudhury 1972: 246; Khan 1972:296).

With the above picture of East-Pakistan within Pakistan, Choudhury (1972: 249) concluded that the real reason was that the East-Pakistan people were continued to be treated like colonial people even after two decades of independence (also mentioned by Rahman (1997:836) as ‘internal colonialism’). He further pointed out that “Jinnah’s demand for a state appealed to the Bengali Muslims, not because of the ‘two-nations theory’, but because they looked upon it as a protective wall against the wealthy and privileged Hindus” (Choudhury 1972: 247).

In a quest for separate Bengali-nation, the initial proposal of Bengali leadership was more autonomy to East-Pakistan within Pakistan-state13 (Rashiduzzaman 1970: 583). However, instead of adopting a negotiation route, the military dictator Ayub Khan responded with force, and Mujibur Rahman and other leaders were put behind the bars implicating them for anti-national activities. After fall of Ayub Khan, new ruler of Pakistan General Yahiya Khan made some appeasing gestures towards the East-Pakistan and democratic elections were carried out in 1970 in which Awami League secured absolute majority. Awami League wanted to implement the six point agenda of Mujibur Rahman, but this was also not allowed and again Pakistan leadership resorted to military crackdown which resulted in massive bloodshed. This time, India also intervened as there was lots of migration from East-Pakistan to India, and Pakistani Army surrendered and Bangladesh was born in December 1971. (Khan 1972: 319-320).

3.4 Creation of India-Bangladesh Border:

The international boundaries between India and East-Pakistan (now Bangladesh) were determined by an award of a Boundary Commission14 (Pattanaik 2011:746). However, some disputes arose on its interpretation. To resolve these disputes on ground, a Tribunal15 (Indo-Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal) was constituted. The decision of the tribunal was announced in February 1950. (Ahmad 1953: 329-30). After liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, the Radcliffe line was inherited as border between India and Bangladesh.

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13 which was evident from the six point agenda of Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman in 1966
14 chaired by Sir Cyril Radcliffe and established by Lord Mountbatten then British Governor General of India
15 chaired by Honourable Algot Bagge, former member of the Supreme Court of Sweden
3.5 Policy Interventions to Resolve India-East-Pakistan (now Bangladesh) Border Issues:

In all following major policy interventions took place to resolve the border issues between India and Bangladesh (also earlier East-Pakistan).

3.5.1 Nehru-Noon Agreement-1958: This agreement was signed on the instance of the Prime Ministers of India (Nehru) and Pakistan (Noon) on 10th September 1958. This agreement contained various issues between the two countries and way for their resolution. Text of the agreement as downloaded from MEA’s website is placed at Annexure-II. Pakistan was under military dictatorship regime under General Ayub Khan at that time.

3.5.2 Land Boundary Agreement (LBA)-1974: After Bangladesh was liberated; a major step in the direction of settlement of the border issues between India and Bangladesh was taken with signing of LBA-1974 covering all the unresolved boundary issues and way forward for their resolution. With exchange of letter and instruments over a period of four decades, almost all the issues have been resolved leaving three issues as detailed in Chapter-1 (i. Un-demarcated Boundary, ii. Adverse Possessions, and iii. Enclaves). Text of the agreement as downloaded from MEA’s website is placed at Annexure-III. Bangladesh was under democratic regime under the Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Awami League.

3.5.3 Protocol to LBA(-1974)-2011: Within four years after its liberation from Pakistan, the father of the Nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh was assassinated in 1975 and Bangladesh was pushed into the successive military dictatorships. It was only in 1991 when the democratic process was restored in Bangladesh. (Bhardwaj 2009: 3, 23). In 2009, democratic government headed by Sheikh Hasina (Prime Minister) took over and she visited India in January 2010. This visit was very important for settlement of long pending aforesaid boundary issues and during he tenure, a protocol to LBA-1974 was signed during the visit of Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Man Mohan Singh to Bangladesh in September 2011. Text of the agreement as downloaded from MEA’s website is placed at Annexure-IV.

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Chapter-4


4.1 Schimdt’s Value Critical Policy Analysis:

Schimdt (2006) carries out the Value Critical Policy Analysis process in five steps as follows:

Step-1: Identify issue and protagonist (paras 4.2 to 4.4)

Step-2: Describe context and protagonists policy proposal (paras 4.2 to 4.4)

Step-3: Describe the argument and core values (para 4.5)

Step-4: Value Critical Analysis of core arguments and values (para 4.5)

Step-5: Drawing conclusions (para 4.5)

4.2 Background- Identifying and Contextualizing the Issues:

There were two major border disputes related to the East Pakistan border; Berubari Union-12 and Enclaves. None of these issues were referred to Indo-Pakistan Boundaries Disputes Tribunal headed by Honourable Algot Bagge who gave decision in February 1950. In fact, the issue of enclaves was created with the accession of the princely state of Cooch Behar into India in September 1949 (The Berubari Union And ... v. Unknown 1960: 4). The Berubari Union was under administrative control of India, Pakistan raised this issue only in 1952 claiming that this should be part of Pakistan as per Radcliffe Award (The Economic Weekly 1960). These issues remained alive until some correspondence took place between the two Prime Ministers; Nehru and Noon in 1958 which resulted in comprehensive discussions on all the border issues between the two countries and an agreement was reached on 10 September 1958 (Nehru-Noon Agreement-1958) (The Berubari Union And ... v. Unknown 1960: 4).

Text of the Nehru-Noon Agreement is placed at Annexure-II which consisted of ten border issues. While other issues were presumably implemented16, item 2(iii) relating to Berubari Union-12 issue and item 2(x) regarding Enclaves issue remained unresolved in spite of long implementation period (1958 to 1971). In this chapter these two issues will be discussed in detail. Following are the provisions in the agreement for above two issues.

4.2.1 Item 2(iii) Berubari Union-12: “This will be so divided as to give half the area to Pakistan, the other half adjacent to India being retained by India. […] and Berubari

16 As were not carried forward to LBA-1974.
No. 12 will be exchanged along with the general exchange of enclaves and will go to Pakistan.”

4.2.2 Item 2(x) Enclaves: “Exchange of old Cooch Behar enclaves in Pakistan and Pakistan enclaves in India without claim to compensation for extra area going to Pakistan, is agreed to.”

4.3 Berubari Union-12 and Exchange of Border Enclaves:

Thus, through the above agreement, India agreed to transfer southern part of Berubari Union-12 to go to Pakistan along with the general exchange of enclaves. The above two issues are being discussed in details as follows.

4.3.1 Berubari Union-12:

According to the Radcliffe award, Berubari Union No. 12 (an area of 8.75 sq miles) was located in Jalpaiguri district of the then Rajshahi division with a population of 10-12 thousand people (The Economic Weekly 1960, The Berubari Union And ... v. Unknown 1960: 2). Figure-4 shows the location of Berubari union on the map. It was described as part of West Bengal as per the First Schedule of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, but it never came in operation as the Radcliffe award came before this Act came into force (The Berubari Union And ... v. Unknown 1960: 2). The Boundary Commission was to demarcate the boundaries on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims while taking into account other factors (Pattanaik 2011: 745). As the definition of ‘area’ was not clear, the Commission “decided to take thanas (criminal jurisdiction in a district) and not unions (administrative boundary) as units separating the Muslim majority population from the Hindu majority population, based on the 1941 census” (ibid).

The Boundary Commission was also in dilemma while taking decision on demarcation of district Jalpaiguri where Muslim population was 23.08%, but it was not in natural sense contiguous to another non-Muslim area of Bengal (The Berubari Union And ... v. Unknown 1960: 3). The Commission decided on above as well as other such issues as follows:

"The demarcation of the boundary line is described in detail in the schedule which forms annexure A to the award and in the map attached thereto, annexure B. The map is annexed for the purposes of illustration, and if there should be any divergence between the boundary as described in annexure A and as delineated on the map in annexure B the description in annexure A is to prevail." (as quoted in The Berubari Union And ... v. Unknown 1960: 3).

The Supreme Court of India observed that since the award came, there was no dispute that Berubari Union-12 was part of West Bengal province and it was governed accordingly (ibid). However, the map annexed in Annexure-B to the award, showed almost whole the Berubari area as part of East Bengal and description in
Annexure-A provided otherwise (ibid:7). The Supreme Court also found out some lacunae in the description of the boundary in Annexure-A as there was no mention of boundary between police stations (Thanas) Boda and Jalpaiguri (ibid).

4.3.2 India-Bangladesh Border Enclaves:

There are 51 Bangladeshi Enclaves in India and 111 Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh (Pattanaik 2011: 747). Some of the major enclaves have been shown in Figure-4. It can be seen that these enclaves are located inside the territory of other country with no access from the parent country.

The history of these enclaves goes back to pre-colonial periods when Mughals could not occupy the kingdom of Cooch Behar. However, some landlords loyal to Mughals existed in the Cooch Behar kingdom by force or by compromise and vice versa and they paid taxes to the rulers to which they were loyal (Schendel 2002: 118-19). At the time of partition, the territory was divided into India and Pakistan, and 565 princely states having option to merge in future with either of the countries. The Princely state of Cooch Behar was merged with India two years after in September 1949 (ibid).

Lives of inhabitants of the enclaves were inhuman as state was not able to provide basic services which are generally able to citizens like health, sanitation, education and so on. To avail these basic services from the state enclosing the enclaves, they had to cross the sovereign borders many times a day illegally. Thus, Schendel (2002: 124) has observed that “criminalised the enclave people’s daily routines without offering them any alternatives. If they were to survive, […] and to face the peril of being defined as smugglers”.

Dinesh Mahur (SB-2132)
4.4 Major Stakeholders, their Interests and Power Play:

The above issues almost got settled as per Nehru-Noon Agreement\(^{17}\) 1958 through the ninth Constitutional (Amendment) Act 1960 (the Government of India 1960). However, due to litigation, this amendment Act could not be made operational (the Government of India 2013: 15).

It may be seen from the text of the Nehru-Noon agreement (Annexure-II) that in accordance with the directives of the Prime Ministers of India (Mr. J. L. Nehru) and Pakistan (Mr. P. K. Noon), Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan discussed various border issues and agreed on their resolutions. It seems that the then Indian Government headed by Mr. J. L. Nehru took a policy decision to implement the aforesaid agreement through an executive order. As the implementation of this policy decision involved transfer of territories to Pakistan (in cases of Berubari Union and exchange of enclaves’) and thus, displacement of people, it met with the opposition and resistance by the affected stakeholders. In the present case, the first three stages (agenda setting, policy formulation and decision making, and implementation) of Jann and Wegrich’s (2007: 45-53) simplified model of policy cycle were in top-down approach. The agenda was set at the prime ministers’ level and directions were issued to discuss all the border issues and find solution. In the process even

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\(^{17}\) Nehru was the then prime minister of India and Noon was the then prime minister of Pakistan.
the affected states primarily West Bengal was not consulted even for their opinion leave apart the actual affected population. In this policy intervention, the decisions were made at the decision making authority level and directions were transmitted to the subordinate officials for implementation. Thus, the formulation of Nehru-Noon agreement of 1958 can be categorized as ‘authoritative choice’ policy making as text of the policy itself says, ‘in accordance with the directives issued by the Two Prime Ministers […]’ (Colebatch 2009: 24-26). Having passed through the first three stages of a policy cycle, now, we can only evaluate the policy as to why it has failed or has been partial success?

As per Grindle and Thomas (1991: 125-126), the reaction to the policy change can come at any of the first three stages from agenda setting to implementation. However, the reaction at later stages is stronger. They further mentioned that in the interactive model of policy implementation, changes may happen at any stage to accommodate the people who oppose it. In the present case, resistance first came from the state government of West Bengal and then the people18 who were likely to be affected by the policy intervention. Subsequently, with the influence of these primary stakeholders, the President of India19 and the Supreme Court 20 also got involved. Accordingly, to examine the policy in retrospect, major stakeholders, their interests and the power-play has been evaluated to look into the policy failure or a partial success in the following paragraphs.

4.4.1 **Interest-Influence Matrix**: Various stakeholders are categorized in the 2x2 interest-influence21 matrix in Figure-5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Level</th>
<th>Influence Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of India</td>
<td>Opposition Political parties and Affected People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Government of West Bengal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of India</td>
<td>Government of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court of India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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18 the people residing in the Berubari Union-12 and in the enclaves
19 who made a reference to the Supreme Court of India, under Article-143 of the Constitution of India, to get advice as to how the Nehru-Noon agreement brought to force.
20 who first checked the Government of India to implement the agreement and then, on a reference gave advice to the President of India.
21 Power to influence the outcome of the policy intervention
4.4.2 The Government of India headed by Mr. J. L. Nehru: As Primary Stakeholder and with the view to minimize the tension and conflicts between the two countries, the prime ministers of the India and Pakistan entered into the 1958 agreement (The Berubari Union And ... v. Unknown 1960: 5). The government of India is responsible for maintaining the foreign relations, entering into international agreement and implementing the same as per the entry-14 in the List-I of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court observed that the executive powers of the government of India with regards to the foreign agreements are “co-extensive and co-incidental with the powers of Parliament itself”. (The Berubari Union And ... v. Unknown 1960: 6). Thus, the Government of India may enter into international agreements with or without consulting the state governments. Accordingly, the Government of India commenced its proceedings to implement the agreement by an executive order contending that the case is simply regarding the determination of the international boundary between the two countries in accordance with the Radcliffe award and not transfer of any territory to Pakistan.

However, the decision to transfer a portion of Berubari Union-12 was soon contended by public and the State Government of West Bengal. A Berubari Defence Committee also came into existence. “On an application made under Art 22b of the Constitution, Mr Justice Sinha issued an injunction on the State of West Bengal and the Union of India restraining them from giving effect to the proposed transfer” (The Economic Weekly 1960). The process went into suspension till the Supreme Court gave advice to the President on 14 March 1960 (The Berubari Union And ... v. Unknown 1960). As per the advice of the Supreme Court, the Government of India came up with the Constitution (ninth Amendment) Act, 1960 (The Government of India 1960). However, due to litigation, this amendment Act could not be made operational (the Government of India 2013: 15) and in the mean time, East Pakistan got freedom from Pakistan and a new country- Bangladesh took Birth in 1971.

4.4.3 Government of Pakistan: Once agreement was signed between the two countries, the implementation of the same by India was an internal affair of India. Thus, Government of Pakistan was a secondary stakeholder in the process. All through the time since independence, political situation in Pakistan remained fluid. Politically, there has been interplay of religious fundamentalism, ethnic cleavages and regional economic disparities which made the country volatile and unstable. There was no democratic election after independence and there was frequent change in the governments. In fact, Noon was the seventh and the last prime minister within a decade of independence before Pakistan was brought under the military rule in 1958 (CSS Forum n.d.). Pakistan did not have its own Constitution till 1956 which was then dismantled by the military ruler Ayub Khan (ibid). Military ruler entered into extension of Nehru-Noon agreement with detailed modalities on 23 October 1959. This agreement was also part of the Constitution (ninth Amendment) Act, 1960 (The Government of India 1960).
4.4.4 The President of India and the Supreme Court of India: They were the secondary stakeholders. They did not get involved directly. The Nehru-Noon agreement was signed in September 1958 and within a short while in December 1958, the West Bengal Assembly resolved that Berubari should remain part of India and made representation to the President of India got involved who referred the matter to the Supreme Court for legal advice (The Economic Weekly 1960). They were the influential stakeholders who changed the course of whole process. It forced the Government of India to come up with the amendment to the Constitution for transferring the territory to Pakistan. This amendment also went into legal hassles in the Supreme Court (Jones 2009: 375) for the next full decade.

4.4.5 The State Government of West Bengal: A primary stakeholder with high interest, but low influence. But they managed to influence through their assembly resolution and representation to the President who right earnestly pursued the matter further. Signing the agreements with the foreign governments is in the purview of the central government and state government has no say in it (Item 14 of List-I under Seventh Schedule in the Constitution of India). Further, while the central government came up with the Constitution (ninth Amendment) Act, 1960, again the Constitution of India provides no powers to the state governments in case of acquisition and transfer of territories.

4.4.6 Opposition Political Parties and the Affected People: There were about 10-12 thousand inhabitants in the Berubari Union-12 and about 51 thousand human beings are living in stateless conditions in the India-Bangladesh border enclaves. The inhabitants of Berubari got united to oppose the Nehru-Noon agreement and Berubari defence committee got into existence (The Economic Weekly 1960). Opposition political parties also jumped into (Schendel 2002: 126), mainly the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (now BJP). They were the stakeholders with high interest and low influence, but they influenced the proceedings through pressure tactics like mass meetings, protests, court cases, and representations.

4.5 Core Values, Arguments, Value Critical Analysis and Conclusions:

It may be seen from the above discussions that the main protagonist in the whole policy making was the population residing in the disputed territories who raised their voices through the other stakeholders like opposition political parties and the State Government of West Bengal. The government of India as the main assimilationist, after lots of opposition to the policy intervention, came up with the Constitution (ninth Amendment) Act, 1960 as per the advice rendered by the Supreme Court. However, it again ran into legal hassles with lots of litigation in the Supreme Court of India. Finally, this amendment could not be made operational as before the verdict of the

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22 Main stakeholder opposing the policy intervention
23 Main advocate of policy intervention
Supreme Court in 1971, the East Pakistan got independence and Bangladesh came into existence. The core values in the arguments of the protagonists were their identity (religion, citizenship) and human rights. The government of India cannot be seen to apply an interactive model of policy implementation in true sense as it did not address the core issues of the protagonist and their main arguments, but only adapted to the policy changes to set the procedures right as per the advice of the Supreme Court (The Berubari Union And ... v. Unknown 1960). In the process, time and again, the stakeholders with high interests like state government and the opposition political parties were not managed properly. The governance of the problem was carried out in the traditional sense that the governance as the affair of only government (Kjaer 2004:1). This was a case of partial success and not a complete policy failure (in the sense that at least the exchange of enclaves was continued to be progressing on the same lines as envisaged in the policy). The frame used for policy formulation was ‘political frame’ and obscuring the ‘social’ and ‘human-rights’ values. Some of these values were taken care in next policy intervention of 1974 by suitable re-framing.

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Chapter 5
Policy Interventions with Bangladesh: Policy Re-framing, and Role of Political Regimes

5.1 Background:

After Bangladesh got freedom, there was a spate of bilateral visits and agreements between India and Bangladesh with Bangladeshi Prime Minister’s (PM’s) visit to India in February 1971 and Indian PM’s visit in March 1972, signing of friendship treaty in March 1972, other treaties like telecommunications, water sharing, power sharing, and the visit of Bangladeshi President to India in December 1972 (MEA n.d.). In continuation, the prime minister of Bangladesh again visited India in May 1974 and the historical Land Boundary Agreement was signed detailing all the pending border issues and their solution (India 1974; LBA 1974). The Government of Bangladesh ratified this agreement through the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act 1974 (The Government of Bangladesh 1974). However, the same was not ratified by Indian Parliament (Schendel 2002: 126), and efforts were made to resolve the matter through exchange of letter to effect various provisions of the agreement where ratification of Parliament was not required

24. As a result, many major provisions of the agreement remained unresolved and a new lease of life was given with the visit of Bangladeshi PM to India in January 2010 and Indian PM to Bangladesh in September 2011. During the visit of Indian PM, protocol to LBA-1974 was signed detailing the pending issues and their solution. This time India tabled the Constitution (One Hundred and Nineteenth Amendment) Bill 2013 to ratify the provisions of the agreement and its protocol where there is transfer of Indian Territory (The Government of India 2013:1).

This chapter will analyze the developments that took place during the period from 1974

25. when LBA was signed

26. when the protocol to the LBA was signed

beginning with the major provisions of these interventions and their comparative with 1958 intervention with specific reference to changes in the framing patterns as per Schön and Rein (1994). Further, the focus will be to identify the factors responsible for partial failure of policy intervention of 1974 using the concepts of policy cycle and interactive model of policy implementation (Jann and Wegrich 2007; Grindle and Thomas 1991) and what measure were taken in the policy intervention of 2011 to mitigate the risks of policy failure? Towards the end, as to how the political regimes affected the development of bilateral relations and resolution of various border issues.

24 As per the Constitution provisions, the international agreements where there is any transfer of Indian territory by India.

25 when LBA was signed

26 when the protocol to the LBA was signed
5.2 Major Provisions of LBA-1974 (and its Protocol-2011) and their Interactive Implementation:

5.2.1 Berubari Union-12: The provisions in the agreement are as follows:

“India will retain the southern half of South Berubari Union No. 12 and the adjacent enclaves, measuring an area of 2.64 square miles approximately, and in exchange Bangladesh will retain the Dahagram and Angarpota enclaves. India will lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area of 178 metres x 85 metres near ‘Tin-Bigha’ to connect Dahagram with Panbari Mouza (P.S. Patgram) of Bangladesh.” (LBA 1974: item 14 under Article 1).

There are three issues covered in the above item; i) Enclaves (Dahagram and Angarpota enclaves), ii) Berubari Union-12, and iii) Leasing of Tin-Bigha land to Bangladesh.

As per the Nehru-Noon agreement of 1958, all the enclaves were to be exchanged including biggest Bangladeshi enclaves, Dahagram (or Dohogram) and its contiguous enclave Angarpota (Cons 2012: 537, 543; Jones 2009: 376; Schendel 2002: 136). Speciality with these enclaves was that the state existed only in these enclaves as it is just 170 meters away from main Bangladesh territory (official India-Bangladesh Border) and state administration was possible by Bangladesh (Cons 2012: 534). Location of Dahagram enclave vis-à-vis Bangladesh territory and also the Tin-Bigha territory can be seen in the Figure-6. It may also be seen that the Tin-Bigha area also connects a portion of Indian territory (Kuchlibari) with the rest of India. Thus, Tin-Bigha land has strategic value to both India and Bangladesh. In respect of Berubari Union-12, the southern half was to be transferred to East Pakistan as per 1958 agreement while 1974 agreement envisages no transfer of land from India to Bangladesh (Jones 2009:375).

Above provision in the agreement was a well thought position taken by India through minimizing the frame conflicts through socio-political re-framing of the solution from the only political framing as follows (Schön and Rein 1994):

a. Dahagram and Angarpota are Bangladeshi enclaves and thus, there is no transfer of territory from India to Bangladesh. The lease of Tin-Bigha corridor also not involves transfer of territory without compromising sovereignty over this land. Thus, no legislative action is required by India.

b. In exchange, India will retain its territory of South Berubari which it promised to transfer to erstwhile Pakistan through the Nehru-Noon Agreement of 1958 which met with high political and social resistance.

As the implementation of this policy decision did not involve any transfer of territories to Bangladesh and thus, displacement of people, it met with the little opposition and resistance (frame conflicts) by the affected stakeholders.

27 about 18 square kilometre area and having population of about twelve to sixteen thousands
As per Grindle and Thomas (1991:133-141), the reaction to each policy intervention depends on its characteristic. The present policy can be characterized (in respect of Tin-Bigha) for causing the reaction primarily in the public arena. This was due to dispersed costs\(^{28}\), concentrated benefits and broader participation. This policy intervention met with socio-political resistance from the local populace and Hindu groups (Schendel 2002: 140; Jones 2009:375-76; Cons 2013:40). In fact, Indian side, the Kuchlibari Sangram Shamiti\(^{29}\) approached opposition party BJP\(^{30}\) to nationalize the issue and on Bangladesh side, the Dahagram Sangram Shomiti aligned with the Jatiya Ganotantri Party to seek national level support in Bangladesh (Cons 2012: 551; 553-54). According to the Economist (1992) (quoted in Jones 2009: 376), opposition projected this as selling of sovereignty of India to Bangladesh (also Cons 2013:40).

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\(^{28}\) though primarily the residents of Berubari Union-12 were affected, there was opportunity for the opposition parties to exploit the situation against the ruling party by uniting the broader public opinion against the policy intervention using the concepts of nationalism and religion.

\(^{29}\) They were affected as giving Tin-Bigha on perpetual lease to Bangladesh will isolate Kuchlibari from rest of India.

\(^{30}\) Bhartiya Janata Party- a political party in India
Finally, the corridor was opened in 1992, but with far from the agreed terms of perpetual lease of land as agreed in LBA-1974 through continuous strategic management of the policy intervention. In fact, during the military rule of General Ershad, in 1982 the term of agreement was diluted and it was agreed that the sovereignty of Tin-Bigha will remain with India (Cons 2012: 553). The opening period of the corridor was gradually increased and finally opened for 24 hours in 2011 at the time of visit of Indian Prime Minister (Cons 2013:40). As per Grindle and Thomas (1991:125-126), in the interactive model of policy implementation, changes may happen at any stage to accommodate the people who oppose it and this is what precisely happened in opening of Tin-Bigha corridor which gradually took close to three decades for implementation as per terms of the 1974 policy intervention. To summarize, the aforesaid provisions of the 1974 policy intervention were implemented through slow but strategic management of policy intervention.

5.2.2 Exchange of Enclaves: The provisions of the agreement are as follows:

“The Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and the Bangladesh enclaves in India should be exchanged expeditiously, excepting the enclaves mentioned in paragraph 14 without claim to compensation for the additional area going to Bangladesh.” (LBA 1974: item 12 under Article 1).

The provisions of the 1974 agreement and the 1958 agreement were similar in respect of the exchange of enclaves except the position on the Dahagram enclave as discussed above (Cons 2012: 537). This issue relates to only West Bengal state of India. Now, it is a matter of a research enquiry as to what prompted India and Bangladesh to keep the provisions on exchange of enclaves similar to the provisions in 1958 agreement which could not be implemented? Is there any way out other than exchange of enclaves? What further changes in the 1974 policy intervention were carried out over past close to three decades?

Jones (2009: 378-79) tried to identify reasons for delay on behalf of India to implement the policy intervention of exchange of enclaves (LBA-1974):

- In the proposed exchange, more area would be transferred to Bangladesh than to India (India is net loser of land).
- The exchange of enclaves may have spiraling impact as it may promote the separatist forces and weaken its stand on issues like Kashmir and North-East India. Similar conclusions have been drawn by Walter (2003:149-150) that governments invest in their reputation by not giving into negotiation to give tough signals to such other challenger elements.

However, Chatterjee (2011:5) and Pattanaik (2011:746) argued that while Bangladesh ratified the 1974 agreement subject to the condition of demarcation of entire border, India delayed for want of the on ground demarcation of complete boundary before ratification. Further, ratification by Bangladesh did not mean much

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31 and Angarpota
as till whole process is completed, it cannot be published in the Gazette and made effective (Pattanaik 2011:747). But, Jones (2009:378) argued that as several aspects of 1974 agreement have already been implemented (like lease of Tin-Bigha corridor), there was no reason to delay the exchange of enclaves pending other issues unresolved.

Nations are socially and culturally constructed through common identities and need not to have contiguous land-mass while states are political construction with concepts of territory, sovereignty and state institutions. The construction of India and Bangladesh (former East Pakistan) was based on Jinnah’s ‘two nations theory’ (Bangladesh- ‘Muslims’ (Religion) identity and India- ‘non-Muslims’) (Peshkin 1962: 158; Schendel 2002). The India-Bangladesh border was drawn by Sir Radcliffe by ‘on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims’ (Pattanaik 2011: 745). In fact, the people living in India-Bangladesh border enclaves bear the floating-identity between its nation (Bengali speaking), state (Citizenship-Indian and Bangladeshi) and religion (proxy-citizenship: Muslims are Bangladesh and non-Muslims are Indians) (Schendel 2002). Though the policy intervention of exchange of enclaves was under implementation for long time (but could not be implemented due to social and political opposition), nobody bothered to take views of the people living in these enclaves and the issue was dealt more in political frame than social frame. Moreover, such issues dealing with the nationalism and sovereignty are easily exploited by opposition political parties to corner the government and gain the political mileage (Jackson 2003: 783). Of late, during 1996-97, there was joint identification and verification of enclaves and their actual area (on ground) (The Government of India 2013: 7-14). Necessary policy change in this respect has been done in the protocol to the 1974 agreement through re-framing inclined towards social framing (MEA 2011:Article 2 Clause (III)). In 1974 policy intervention through Article 3, people were given right to stay where is basis along with transfer of the land with full citizen rights of the country to which the land is transferred. However, language used was of compulsion not voluntarism. It is also understood that in 2011, India and Bangladesh conducted joint survey in the enclaves and obtained the opinion of the people living therein. General opinion of the people was not to dislocate and go to the other country along with exchange of the enclaves (as also observed by Jones 2009:378-79). This seems to be logical also as at present the state is almost non-existent and people are more often than not, are dependent on the other country (which is surrounding the enclave) for their daily socio-economic needs (Schendel 2002: 124). At times, this situation is exploited by anti-social elements as “lack of legitimate means of livelihood has forced many to engage in smuggling and other illegal activities. Given that there are no law enforcement agencies present in these enclaves, most have become havens for criminals and anti-national elements” (Das 2010). Thus, amicable solution with high socio-political acceptance was necessary for the enclaves.
In view of the above discussions, except for some political issues, all the other factors favour the exchange of enclaves which will make the de-facto reality into de-jure situation. “The absence of a home country’s rule of law and the irregular presence of the host country’s sovereign power and control construct, [...] where everyday life is characterised by exclusion from legal rights, but nonetheless subject to law, socio-political exploitation and gendered violence” (Shewly 2013: 23). Thus, exchange of enclaves is also likely to reduce the sufferings of the residents of these enclaves and will also be detrimental to the anti-social elements due to presence of the state.

5.2.3 Adverse Possessions: Provisions of the agreement are as follows:

“The Governments of India and Bangladesh agree that territories in adverse possession [...] shall be exchanged [...]” (LBA 1974: Article 2).

The term adverse possession should not be confused as if one country has forcefully occupied the land of another. Traditionally, even before partition of British India, some of the lands in each (India and Bangladesh) country were being cultivated by the people of other country (Chatterjee 2011:3).

It may be seen that the 1958 agreement did not include the resolution of adverse possessions and thus, it was a new addition in the 1974 agreement. The adverse possessions were created at the time of demarcation of the boundary by the Radcliffe Commission which did not take the on-ground situation into the account (Chatterjee 2011:5). A pictorial conceptual view of adverse possession is shown in Figure-7. It is said that India is in adverse possession of 2922 acres of Bangladeshi land while Bangladesh in adverse possession of 2267.49 acres of Indian land (ibid:6-7). Exact details on the maps were agreed by India and Bangladesh with field surveys during December 2010 to August 2011 (MEA 2011: Article 3).

![Figure-7: Adverse Possessions](image-url)
5.2.4 Un-demarcated Boundary: All items under Article-1 of the 1974 agreement except item 12 were related to demarcation of boundary between India and Bangladesh. Over the period of time, almost all the items were resolved or implemented except three (items 5, 14 and 15). As per Grindle and Thomas (1991:133-141), in the interactive model of policy implementation, the changes in the policy can be made at any point of time during implementation. The above three remaining issues were addressed by updating and augmenting the 1974 policy document with the protocol signed during the visit of Indian PM to Bangladesh in September 2011 (MEA 2011).

5.3 Impact of Changing Political Scenarios in India and Bangladesh:

The policy intervention of 1974 (LBA 1974) was an attempt to resolve all the boundary issues through single policy intervention. This policy intervention not only included the issues, but also the way forward to resolve them. However, during implementation, some hiccups were encountered (resistance to policy), at times due to the local population residing in the border areas. Over the period of time, most of the issues were resolved barring the three issues; exchange of enclaves, adverse possessions and demarcation of boundary in few stretches as discussed in details in the previous section. In the previous section, some of the reasons for long implementation period of the policy have also been discussed. We can now look at the effect of the political regimes in India and Bangladesh on implementation of policy.

The political scene in Bangladesh was characterized by instability, violence and Islamic fundamentalism. Initial regime changes in Bangladesh were through assassination and military coup. In 1975, the first prime minister of independent Bangladesh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated and there was regime change from a democratic government to military rule by General Zia-ur-Rahman (Pant 2007: 232). This regime was also not long lasting and met with the same fate and General Zia-ur-Rahman was assassinated and General Hossain Mohammad Ershad took over as another military ruler in 1981 (Cons 2012:552). General Ershad’s regime continued the initiatives of General Zia away from secular Bengali nationalism towards a more Islamic radical Bangladesh (ibid). This period of 1980s of Islamic radicalization in Bangladesh coincided with attempts of Hindu nationalism by BJP in India who was graduating to the main opposition party to the Congress party at national level in India (ibid: 553).

There was a major role of India in the liberation war of Bangladesh and the beginning of India-Bangladesh foreign relations was on this positive knot. “But friends are as temporary as enemies in international politics” (Pant 2007: 232). However, this relationship has gone through highs and lows during different political

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32 which was related to exchange of enclaves
33 who could have social and economic interest across the border and the resolution as envisaged in the policy intervention of 1974 may affect them adversely
regimes in India and Bangladesh (Gulati 1988:67 as quoted in Vinayaraj 2009:103). More-over, majority of whom who fought for an independent Bangladesh had roots in the partition of British-India and by nature feared and hated India for known reasons (Wright 2002: 381). In fact, Bengalis constituted majority who favoured partition to create a separate dominion for Muslims (Pant 2007: 232). Though, there were geographical and cultural linkages between the two countries, perhaps history prevailed. “India-Bangladesh relations began deteriorating after the coup in Bangladesh in 1975 and remained tense till the end of military rule” (Das 2010).

The democracy returned in Bangladesh in 1991 with institution of BNP34 led democratic government headed by Khaleda Zia. Perhaps, as a positive signal to the democratic government, in India, the Congress government implemented the modified provisions of 1974 policy in respect of Tin-Bigha corridor (as agreed with General Ershad’s military government in 1982 that sovereignty of the corridor will remain with India (Cons 2012: 553)) were implemented in 1992.

Disintegration of the Soviet Union led to a variety of Muslim nationalism around the world which was further strengthened by the Gulf war and Bangladesh also got affected by the same (Wright 2007: 282). BNP has been traditionally more aligned towards the political Islamization at least when compared to its rival Awami League( ibid). Thus, BNP government was in a way continuation of Islamic radicalization in Bangladesh which was also responsible for rise of Hindu nationalism in India( ibid). This long period under military rule as well as BNP government gave rise to Islamic radicalization in Bangladesh which also strained the India-Bangladesh foreign relation (Vinayaraj 2009:111). It was only during the next Awami League government headed by Sheikh Hasina which took over in 1996, there were more developments in the India-Bangladesh relations including resolution of border issues like list of enclaves to be exchanged was reconciled and jointly agreed in 1997 and in 2000 a mechanism to resolve all the border issues was instituted in the form of Joint Boundary Working Groups (JBWGs) (Das 2010). Thus, the political regimes in Bangladesh had effect on the India-Bangladesh relations on resolution of border issues as shown in Table-1.

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34 Bangladesh Nationalist Party- One of the two major political parties in Bangladesh. Another party is Awami League (AL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Political Regime in Bangladesh</th>
<th>Major Bilateral Visits, Agreements and Implementations</th>
<th>Political Regime in India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-75</td>
<td>Democratic Awami League government headed by Mujibur Rahman</td>
<td>1972-visit of Bangladeshi PM and President to India, visit of Indian PM to Bangladesh, Signing of Friendship treaty, telecommunications/ trade/ water trade agreements, Constitution of River Commission. 1974- visits of Indian Foreign Minister and President to Bangladesh, visit of Bangladesh PM to India, Signing of historic Land Boundary Agreement 1975- visit of Bangladeshi Foreign Minister to India</td>
<td>Congress government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-81</td>
<td>Major Part-General Zia ur Rahman headed military government</td>
<td>1977-78- visit of Bangladeshi President to India, air services agreement. 1979-80- visit of Indian PM and Foreign Minister to Bangladesh 1981- visit of Bangladeshi Foreign Minister to India</td>
<td>Upto 1977 and again from 1980 Congress government 1977-80- Non Congress coalition government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-90</td>
<td>Major part-General Ershad headed military government</td>
<td>1982- visit of Indian Foreign Minister to Bangladesh, Bangladeshi President to India. 1990- visit of Bangladeshi Foreign Minister to India</td>
<td>Upto 1989 – Congress government 1989-90- non Congress, non BJP coalition government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-96</td>
<td>BNP led democratic government headed by Khaleda Zia</td>
<td>1991- visit of Bangladeshi Foreign Minister to India 1992- visit of Bangladeshi PM to India, opening of Tin Bigha Corridor</td>
<td>Congress led UPA35 government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35 United Progressive Alliance- Congress led pre-poll political alliance
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997-visit</td>
<td>Barrage signed 1997- visit of Bangladeshi PM to India joint verification of enclaves for exchange of enclaves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 onwards onwards</td>
<td>government 1998-onwards onwards BJP led NDA36 government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-08</td>
<td>Major part- BNP led democratic government headed by Khaleda Zia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-visit</td>
<td>Visit of Bangladeshi PM to India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-visit</td>
<td>Upto 2004 BJP led NDA government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-</td>
<td>Awami League led democratic government headed by Sheikh Hasina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-</td>
<td>2010- Visit of Bangladeshi PM to India, details of adverse possessions jointly agreed and marked on the maps (MEA 2011: Article 3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-</td>
<td>2011-Visit of Indian PM to Bangladesh, signing of Protocol to Land Boundary Agreement 1974 and host of other agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-</td>
<td>2014- visit of Indian Foreign Minister to Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-</td>
<td>Upto 2014 Congress led UPA government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 onwards BNP led NDA government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 Conclusions:

5.4.1 It may be seen from the above discussions that attempts were made to change the nature of the policy discourse by re-framing it in socio-political terms by including the voice of the people as affected stake-holder. This shows the shift of policy making account from authoritative choice towards the social construction-policy making as collective puzzling (Colebatch 2009:23-41).

5.4.2 From the Table-1, following conclusions can be drawn:

a) Most of the major developments in India-Bangladesh bilateral relations took place when there were democratic governments in Bangladesh. This is consistent with the democratic peace literatures which say that democratic governments are more likely to negotiate (Gibler 2007: 511; Ray 1998:43; Oneal and Russett 1997: 267). Further, more development can be perceived under democratic regime government led by Awami League which is labelled as pro-India political party due to its proximity from the time of independence war of Bangladesh.

b) The Military regime used Islamic fundamentalist forces to legitimize their positions (internal sovereignty). In the process, they antagonized India and India.

36 National Democratic Alliance- BJP led pre-poll political alliance
also were major reason for rise of Hindu nationalism in India (Cons 2012: 552; Wright 2007).

c) India, being regional power, played important role in domestic political affairs of Bangladesh. This can be seen that whenever there was government/ regime change in Bangladesh, the head of the government visited India (external sovereignty), but not always other way round.

d) BNP governments also used anti-Indian sentiments in Bangladesh for their political gains. In fact, BNP’s coalition partners included Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Assembly) and Islami Oikya Jote (Islamic Unity Front), both were ideologically connected to various radical Islamist organizations (Pant 2007:238). As such, there was little progress in bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh during BNP government. Only exception was 1992 opening of Tin-Bigha corridor. However, this may be more attributed to India’s signal to Bangladesh and international community as to how much it values the democracy. Further, the visit of Khaleda Zia (PM in BNP led government) during her second term (2001-06) was in 2006 towards the end of her term that too was more of a formality without any major development (Pant 2007:231). This can also be seen that she visited other states many times like China, Thailand, Pakistan and Burma (ibid).

e) From India side most of the developments took place during the democratic political regime when the congress party was in power. But, no direct conclusion can be drawn from this as almost two-third of the period after formation of Bangladesh, Congress dominated the political scene in India.

5.4.3 Now, in May 2014, new Government led by BJP has come in power. After a long period in Indian political scene, in this government, though a coalition government, BJP has majority on its own. This time, it was initiative by new Indian government to pay high level visit by EAM to Bangladesh. It seems to provide conducive environment for the resolution of these long pending border issues and new lease of life to thousands of human beings stuck in floating identities.

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Chapter-6
Coalitions, Political Ideologies, BJP Led New Government in India, Visit of Indian External Affairs Minister to Dhaka and Resolution of Border Issues

6.1 Coalition Politics in India:

Indian political scene at the centre has been primarily dominated by the Congress Party since independence barring a small period of about 11 years out of total 67 years period (Kumar 2011, Hardgrave 1993:56). During this period, except for full length tenure of NDA\(^{37}\) government during 1999-2004, there were few other coalition governments, but none has completed its full tenure. There were 18 regional parties in BJP\(^{38}\) led NDA government instituted in 1999 (ibid: 27). Post independence, for about three decades (up to 1977), there was single party government formed by the Indian National Congress (Kumar 2011: 26-27, Seshia 1998:1038). Of late, after 1977, the Indian politics has been dominated by the coalition politics due to emergence of stronger regional or state level political parties (Hardgrave 1993:56-57). Now, after a long period of time (after 1989 when Congress Government headed by Rajiv Gandhi was in office), the Indian voters have given a clear verdict to BJP (lead constituent of NDA) (Wikipedia n.d.).

6.2 Political Ideology, BJP and Congress:

As can be seen from the above, for most of the time after the independence the political scene in India was dominated by the Congress party. Though, there was multi-party democracy in India, for first three decades after the independence it was a single party regime at the centre level in absence of any other major viable alternative to the Congress (Seshia 1998:1038).

BJP was founded in 1980. It was known as Jan-Sangh\(^{39}\) before its merger with Janata Party in 1977 while uniting against the congress (Malik and Singh 1992:319, Seshia 1998:1039). Traditionally, perhaps due to its roots into the Jan-Sangh (which was founded in 1951 with national aspirations (Seshia 1998:1039)), BJP has been described as communal (Hindu religious fundamentalist) and reactionary organization by its political competitors. However, others describe it as “a nationalist party that aims to impose a theocratic Hindu state on the multicultural and multi-religious society of India” (Malik and Singh 1992:319).

There is fundamental difference between, the nationalism and secularism, as adopted by Congress and BJP. Congress’s adoption was from the Nehruvian nationalism which was also incorporated in the Constitution of India. (Seshia 1998: 1039). “In Nehru’s framework of Indian nationalism, there was no place for religion or

\(^{37}\) National Democratic Alliance- political alliance of several political parties like Shiv Sena, Telegu Desam Party and more).

\(^{38}\) Bhartiya Janata Party – a political party in India

\(^{39}\) Peoples’ Association
religious orientations.” (Malik and Singh 1992:319). BJP’s adoption was from Gandhi’s concepts which “did not exclude the role of religion in the social and political life of the country” (ibid: 320). In fact, Gandhi tried to find common values in all religions (ibid). As Nehruvian concepts were adopted in the national structure of the independent India, any organization going against is not only treated anti-congress, but also anti-national (Seshia 1998: 1039). This was, perhaps, the reason behind BJP’s political isolation and ostracizing for long time in Indian politics.

BJP’s nationalism was centered on Hinduism. BJP tried to organize and unite the Hindus through the common identity of Hinduism. In a country where 80% population is Hindu, the BJP efforts had only been partial success. Ramachandran (1999) found out in his paper that the growth of Hindu nationalism has close links with the illegal migration of Bangladeshi Muslims to India primarily for economic reasons. Gillan (2002) has further found out that BJP also got some political mileage campaign against illegal Bangladeshi migrants. However, according to Seshia (1998: 1037), Hindu nationalism could never been a political success due to lack of clear hierarchical formal religious organizational authority, internal division based on castes and language, and hence, could not unite under any common identity (also Hardgrave 1993:54-55; Ahmed 2002:12). BJP always faced difficulties in making pre or post-election coalitions or alliances due to this kind of division and also with the view of not alienating the minorities mainly the Muslims. If we go back to the history of partition of British India based on Jinnah’s ‘two nations theory’, it was basically not Hindu and Muslims, but partition was based on Muslim and Non-Muslim nations. Thus, there was common Muslim religion based identity, but there was no common identity for the Hindus (Peshkin 1962: 158).

BJP had two internal faction; one led by Vajpayee which was moderate Hindu nationalist and the other which had more influence of RSS. Moderate Hindu nationalist faction was primarily responsible for changing the name of the party from Jan Sangh to BJP. (Malik and Singh 1992:322). This section, in fact, downplayed the Hindu nationalism to avoid complete alienation of the religious minority (Seshia 1998: 1041). John Wood (1998) observes that "as ideologically principled parties get closer to power, they are forced to abandon much of their ideological baggage and revert to moderate and pragmatic policies" (Quoted in Seshia 1998: 1050). Thus, in the process of negotiation for alliance building, BJP had to shun three of its key issues from their coalition’s national agenda; Kashmir’s autonomy status, construction of Lord Ram temple in Ayodhaya, and promulgation of Uniform Civil

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40 a dominant religion in Indian sub-continent  
41 Three time prime minister of BJP lead coalition governments  
42 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.  
43 At present Kashmir (one of the Indian states) has special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. BJP wished to do away this special status and Kashmir should also be treated as any other state of India.  
44 Lord Ram is a Hindu God. Ayodhaya is a place in India which has mythological association with the birth of Lord Ram. In Ayodhaya, there is a mosque known as Babari Masjid which Hindu organizations like RSS claim as to be converted from Lord Ram temple to a mosque during Moghul rule over India (Hardgrave 1993:66).
Code\textsuperscript{45}(Seshia 1998: 1047). It may be seen that all these issues have something to do with the religion and religious minority, and Indian Constitution provides special status to religious minorities under its secular structure (Hardgrave 1993:55).

\subsection*{6.3 BJP Led new Governments and its Policy towards Bangladesh:}

As per its election manifesto for the general elections held in May 2014, BJP is committed to revive the regional organizations like SAARC\textsuperscript{46} (BJP 2014:40). Bangladesh is part of SAARC. As a first step in this direction, all the SAARC heads were invited at the swearing-in ceremony of the new Prime Minister, Narendra Modi in BJP led government (The Times of India 2014). There was conspicuous absence of head of the state of Bangladesh while other SAARC leaders were present at the ceremony. The prime minister of Bangladesh was on a pre-planned state visit to Japan and she was represented by Speaker of Bangladesh.

BJP and its sister organizations like RSS opposed opening of the Tin-Bigha corridor as agreed in the LBA-1974 which was opened only in 1992 (18 years after the agreement) that too for meager period of one hour daily (Cons 2013:40). Now, BJP has herculean task of improving relationship with Bangladesh as also with other SAARC countries keeping in view its past image. As an image building initiative, the External Affairs Minister (EAM), Ms Sushma Swaraj had her first standalone visit to Bangladesh after assuming the new office. Though, there were bilateral meetings, it was basically a goodwill visit and no agreement were signed. However, EAM assured the Bangladesh government of the commitment of Indian government to sort-out the pending issues of LBA-1974 and its protocol signed in 2011. In this respect, a speech by EAM, at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, delivered on June 26, 2014 is placed at Annexure-V. I will be carrying out the discourse analysis of this speech primarily using content analysis from the point of view of resolving the border issues between the two countries.

\subsection*{6.4 Discourse Analysis (Content Analysis) of the Speech of EAM:}

Content Analysis consists of a range of analytic approaches including intuitive, interpretive analysis to systematic and strict textual analysis (Rosengren 1981 as cited in Hsieh and Shannon 2005:1277). Further, Hsieh and Shannon (2005:1279-1286) talked about three approaches to content analysis. Keeping in view the contextual background, I will be using ‘Summative Content Analysis’ approach to analyse the aforesaid speech of EAM. In this approach, the analysis commences with frequencies of the selected words (Hsieh and Shannon 2005:1285). The focus of the approach is ‘discovering the underlying meanings’ of the contents within the

\textsuperscript{45} At present, in India, there is Muslim personal law applicable to Muslim religious minority which provides different level of freedom to women primarily in the matters of divorce and alimony. Other minorities and majority Hindus are clubbed together in Uniform Civil Code laws (Hardgrave 1993:65). BJP was striving to bring uniform laws irrespective of religion so that citizens are not discriminated on the basis of religion.

\textsuperscript{46} South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
given context (Babbie 1992; Catanzaro 1988; Morse and Field 1995 as cited in Hsieh and Shannon 2005:1278).

6.4.1 Background of Speaker (MEA n.d.): Ms. Sushma Swaraj, External Affairs Minister of India, was born on 14 February 1952. She has been elected three times as a Member of the Legislative Assembly and seven times as a Member of Parliament. She is an Advocate by profession. She began her political career with a student body, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad in the 1970s and became a member of the Haryana State Legislative Assembly and a Cabinet Minister in Haryana at the age of 25\(^47\) in 1977 and held 7 portfolios. She was Union Cabinet Minister for Information and Broadcasting in the BJP Government in 1996 and again in 1998 in the next BJP Government. She became the first woman Chief Minister of Delhi in October 1998. She again became the Minister for Health and Parliamentary Affairs in the third BJP’s national government in 2003. She also served as the Deputy Leader of BJP in the Upper House and Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha.

6.4.2 Word Cloud: The text of the speech as available at Annexure-V is spreading in seven pages with word count of over 2400 words. This is fairly long text. It would be useful to look at the word choices by the speaker and their relative frequencies (no. of times specific word appeared in the text). “Wordle is a toy for generating “word clouds” from text that you provide. The clouds give greater prominence to words that appear more frequently in the source text.” (Wordle, n.d.). Accordingly, a cloud has been created through the Wordle web site placed at Figure-8.

\[\text{Figure-8: Wordle Cloud of EAM's Speech}\]

\(^{47}\) This is the minimum age required to become member of a State Legislature.
6.4.3 Word Frequencies, their Contextual Interpretation of contents:

Frequencies of the important words in the text of the speech along with their contextual interpretation have been compiled in Table-2 (in Annexure-I). Further, para-wise content analysis of the complete speech is provided in Table-3 (in Annexure-I).

The content analysis of the speech clearly indicates authoritatively conveying the intension of the present government in India to take the resolution of issues between the two countries on priority. The past image of the present political party in power will not come into the way of resolution of the issues. Focus is also on the infrastructure creation and cooperation building and pending issues will not come in way of economic and other co-operations between the countries. The speech clearly indicates regional leadership of India.

6.5 Comparative Analysis of EAM’s Speech in 2014 with the then PM’s Speech during Bangladesh Visit in September 2011:

Indian PM Dr. Man Mohan Singh visited Bangladesh in September 2011 when protocol to LBA-1974 was signed. He delivered speech in the Dhaka University on 7th September. The text of the speech is placed at Annexure-VI. The word count of the PM’s speech is 2400 which is similar in length of EAM’s speech. A comparative discourse analysis of the the PM’s speech with that of EAM’s speech will give some clues on the future prospects of resolution of issues between the two countries. This I will do briefly based on the word count and phrase usage. A comparative frequencies of important words and their comparative interpretation is given in Table-4 (in Annexure-I).

It may be seen from the comparative content analysis of EAM and PM’s speeches in Table-4 that EAM’s speech was more authoritative and emphatic about equal efforts required by both countries to build relationship and mutual cooperation. EAM’s speech also shows leadership position of India in the region.

6.6 Conclusions:

BJP, as main opposition party in Indian Parliament, had earlier opposed opening of the Tin-Bigha corridor which was a sensitive issue for Bangladesh. Now, it is turn of BJP as party in power. EAM’s standalone visit to Bangladesh sends a positive signal to Bangladesh. From the above content analysis of the speech of EAM as provided in Table-2 and Table-3, it can be concluded that EAM has given clear signals to the people of Bangladesh of the commitments of the newly formed government of India (who got clear mandate from the people of India) to enhance the mutual cooperation between the two countries in-spite of change in regime. It also indicates the leadership position of India in the affairs of South Asia. There is beautiful use of language of praise. Also, there is frequent use of terms cooperation and relations/relationship which shows India’s eagerness to improve relationship.
between two countries. This standalone visit of EAM is likely to boost the confidence of people of Bangladesh as well as its government’s seriousness to resolve the long pending boundary and water issues. This assurance is associated with the use of authoritative language by EAM which has been drawn on historical clear mandate given by people of India to the present government. The authority is more evident when we see comparison of PM and EAM's speeches in Table-4.

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Chapter-7
Conclusions

After looking at the contextual background of the problems, the analysis of three policy interventions to resolve the border issues between India and Bangladesh, and other analysis of some important discourses, some major reasons have been identified which are responsible for long delays in resolution of issues. These reasons are being briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.

7.1 Flawed partition and Identity-Crisis of Border Population:

As borders are not only politically constructed, they need to be studied in broader historical context -social, culture, geographical, sovereignty, state, nation and identity- as each border is unique. Thus, to resolve the border issues, it is necessary to look into the social and cultural construction of specific border. (Paasi 2005; Wilson and Donnan 2012; Rumford 2006; Phillips and Hardy 2002). It has been seen that India-Bangladesh border was constructed primarily due to Muslim League’s demand for separate nation (Jinnah’s ‘two nations’ theory’) with clear sovereign territorial jurisdiction for Muslims (Gilmartin 1998). Now the bigger question is whether the partition of India took place according to Jinnah’s ‘two nations’ theory’ which advocated separate nations for Muslims and Non-Muslims when close to 40% of total Muslim population in the sub-continent remained in India (Sridhar 2003)? Did the haste of top leaders for self-rule led to the creation of borders politically without taking overall socio-cultural context into consideration?

The pathological socio-political system inculcated over decades before and after the partition also played vital role in sufferings of the people in the border areas from the floating identities between its nation (Bengali speaking), state (Citizenship-Indian and Bangladeshi) and religion (proxy-citizenship: ‘Muslims’ are Bangladeshi and ‘non-Muslims’ are Indians) (Ahmed 2002: 10; Schendel 2002). At times people (mainly criminals) take advantage of floating identities to take benefits from both the countries and become the stakeholders with interests to oppose policy intervention of resolving the issues.

Thus, it can be concluded in this research that the partition did not take place as per the very basic foundation of it (‘two nations theory’) and people, at least in border areas continued to struggle with identity crisis.

48 A system in which people not only prefer or like the people of their own ethnicity, but also intolerant about the people of other ethnic identities (Ahmed 2002: 10)
7.2 Hasty Demarcation of Boundaries on Maps:

The India-Bangladesh border was drawn by Sir Radcliffe ‘on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims’ (Pattanaik 2011: 745). All the members of the Boundary Commission were the judges and the chairman was a lawyer. The different stakeholders presented their case as legal cases fought in the courts. (Chatterji 1999: 196-97). When borders are seen as the social construction (Paasi 2005), why there was no representation of social actors in the Commission? Radcliffe himself was an outsider to India with little administrative experience (Chatterji:186).

The border created by Radcliffe on maps separated markets from their buyers and sellers, people from their families, students from schools, farmers from their lands and so on, the legal activities became illegal overnight and converted the normal citizens to criminals (Chatterji:225-31). Radcliffe used Thanas (criminal jurisdiction) for which census (1941) details were available, but used settlement maps to mark boundaries on the map at many places (Chatterji:221; Pattanaik 2011: 745-746). Chatterji (1999:221) observed that if Radcliffe could have visited the actual border on ground, the picture could have been quite different. However, was it possible for him to go for on ground survey when he was given only two months time to demarcate the border? Moreover, Radcliffe came to India only on 8th July 1947 and completed the job only in little over one month time (ibid:224). He did not attend any of the public hearings in person rather depended on the submissions made by various stakeholders (ibid). Is Radcliff solely responsible for this? Radcliffe even did not have maps of the entire region as they were not available (Pattanaik 2011: 746). Political parties who engaged in freedom struggle were in haste to eat the fruits without delay and British government was in hurry to leave as post World War-II, it was becoming difficult for them to administer their colonies. In fact, Nehru was convinced that for transferring the power, make shift border will do and issues could be resolved in future bilaterally (Chatterji:193; Pattanaik 2011: 746).

Thus, it can be concluded that if adequate time would have been given to Radcliffe so that he could have managed to consider the realities on ground, then many of the issues which existed now, might not have come up at all.

7.3 Lack of Strategic Management of Policy Interventions:

It has been seen in this research that there were three major policy interventions to resolve the border issues. The policy intervention of 1958 was ‘authoritative choice’ as the decision was taken at the PM level of the two countries (Colebatch 2009:24-33). As per Grindle and Thomas (1991: 125-26), any policy intervention disturbs the equilibrium and meet with the reaction by who are affected. This policy intervention also met with reaction from the public, state government of West Bengal and the opposition parties. As the reaction was in the public arena, there were more political
stakes and strong political support was required for implementing the policy successfully (Grindle and Thomas 1991: 135-36). However, still the policy makers came up with procedural modifications only (Constitution was amended as per the advice of the Supreme Court in 1960) and there was no proper strategic management of the further anticipated reaction in the public arena. Again, it met with even more severe reaction and legal cases ran for next full decade. Next policy interventions of 1974 and its modifications in 2011 as part of interactive model of policy implementation can be qualified as social construction of policy (Colebatch 2009: 24-33). I find that now all possible steps have been taken for the strategic management of the policy intervention and there is considerable regime stability and legitimacy for implementing the policy intervention successfully (BJP government, though it is a coalition government, it has majority on its own also). Such conditions are conducive for a successful policy implementation as per Grindle and Thomas (1991: 135-36).

Thus, it can be concluded that the lack of a proper strategic management of public reactions during the implementation of policy was responsible for delay in resolution of the border issues. In other words, the expectations of various stake-holders were not properly taken into consideration and suitably managed.

7.4 Role of Political Regimes and Coalition Politics:

Though coalition politics in India landed in late 1970s, its perpetual continuance came in only in 1989 (Kumar 2011; Hardgrave 1993:56). This was almost simultaneous to emergence of coalition politics in Bangladesh with re-emergence of democracy in 1990s. The political scenario in Bangladesh has been characterised with the military dictatorship, coups and mutinies since assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 (Rahman 2010:1-2). In fact, the democracy in Bangladesh did not stand even during the period of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as he amended the constitution in 1974 to curtail the legislative power of Parliament and towards the single party regime, and assumed the supreme power under the amended constitution as President (BBC Asia News 2014; Rahman 2010:1-2). Majority of Bangladeshi freedom fighters also had roots in the partition of British-India and by nature feared and hated India (Wright 2002: 381). These anti-Indian sentiments in Bangladesh were exploited by consecutive regimes to legitimize their un-democratic regimes (internal sovereignty). Empirically (in chapter-5), it has been found that most of the major developments in India-Bangladesh bilateral relations took place when there was democratic government in Bangladesh which is also as per the democratic peace literatures which say that democratic governments are more likely to negotiate (Gibler 2007: 511; Ray 1998:43; Oneal and Russett 1997: 267).

49 when in India and the monopoly of congress government was challenged together by coalition of a large number of political party and they formed a coalition government in 1977
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the progress in resolving border issues post 1974 was slow as there were primarily undemocratic regimes in Bangladesh till 1990. Subsequently, the Indian politics was perpetually characterized by coalition politics where major policy decisions were difficult and it took time and other resources to strategically manage the opposition to the policy decision as the reaction was in public arena (Grindle and Thomas 1991: 131-41). If reaction is in the public arena, there are more political stakes and strong political support, considerable regime stability and legitimacy is required for implementing the policy successfully (ibid:135-36). This kind of political support and regime stability was lacking in the scene of successive coalition governments in India and Bangladesh. Now, the present BJP government\(^{50}\) seems to provide such favourable conditions for successful implementation of policy.

7.5 Impact of Muslim Fundamentalism in Bangladesh and Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India:

Shortly after its creation, the political scene in Bangladesh has seen instability, violence and Islamization\(^{51}\). Initial regime changes in Bangladesh were through assassination and military coups. In 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated by a group of military officers (Pant 2007: 232) and the next military regime of General Zia-ur-Rahman met with the same fate and he was assassinated in 1981 to be succeeded by another military dictator General Ershad for the next decade (Cons 2012:552). These military rulers took away Bangladesh from secular Bengali nationalism to Islamic Bangladesh (ibid). The anti-Indian sentiments rooted in society since before partition of British India were exploited by consecutive regimes to legitimize their un-democratic regimes.

The period of 1980s of Islamic radicalization in Bangladesh was coincided by attempts of Hindu nationalism in India (ibid:553). The growth of Hindu nationalism also has close links to the illegal migration of Bangladeshi Muslims to India primarily for economic reasons (Ramachandran 1999). The 1974 policy intervention met with socio-political resistance from the local populace and Hindu groups (Schendel 2002:140, Jones 2009:375-76, Cons 2013:40). Opening of Tin-Bigha corridor was also much contested by these groups (Schendel 2002:140).

Thus, it can be concluded that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh and Hindu nationalism in India are linked and together are responsible to delay the resolution of the issues to some extent as they became stakeholder who opposed the successive policy interventions.

\(^{50}\) Though the government is still coalition due to pre-poll alliances.

\(^{51}\) Extensive application of Islamic teaching in politics or politics centered around Islamic principles.

Dinesh Mahur (SB-2132)
References:


The Berubari Union And ... v. Unknown on 14 March (1960) AIR 1960 SC 845


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Annexure-I

Table-2: Important Words and their Contextual Interpretation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word/phrase/metaphor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Contextual Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>The metaphor ‘building’ has been used in conjunction with other words/ context like capacity, relationship, partnership and infrastructure. Focus is basically on mutual cooperation between the two countries and also regional cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship/ Relations</td>
<td>7/ 13</td>
<td>Region has been used more frequently than the countries which show India’s intention towards overall regional cooperation and development as a leading economy in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries/ Region</td>
<td>5/ 10</td>
<td>Development focusing on infrastructure building, economy and trade relationship building. Economic relationship and cooperation between the two countries may help in confidence building between the people of two countries and progress without full-fledged agreement on the contagious issues like illegal migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic/ Trade</td>
<td>7/ 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Term ‘border’ has been used in relation infrastructure, border management and illegal activities. It shows Indian concern over border issues and intention to resolve the same. In fact, BJP’s election manifesto also throws light on their concerns over border infrastructure development, border management, border security and cross border illegal activities (BJP 2014:4, 8, 32, 37-38).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>These are two long pending issues between the two countries, Teesta river water sharing and implementation of Land Boundary Agreement of 1974. Though, these issues have been discussed during Indian prime minister in September 2011, there was no visible progress during past three years. As this was the goodwill visit of EAM, these contagious issues were given only the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
passing reference, but with the Indian government’s commitment to resolve them sooner than later.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>My Government</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This is use of authoritative language. She has also mentioned in para 6 of the speech that she is representing the newly instituted government in India. This authority may be driven by the clarity of government of India on resolution of pending issues and also from the fact that the present Indian government is, though, a coalition government, BJP on its own has the majority in the lower House of parliament which may be reason for confident signals to the people of Bangladesh.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Para no.</td>
<td>Content Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Stressing that though she is visiting Bangladesh after a gap of 16 years, she has been in contact with prominent leaders and personalities during all these years due to her different authoritative positions in the political sphere in India. Also stress on ‘standalone’ visit which is showing importance of Bangladesh in Foreign Policy of India.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mention the names of Gurudev(^{52}) Rabindranath Tagore and Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Gurudev is a much respected name among Bengali people (West Bengal in India and Bangladesh). Gurudev has written national anthems of both countries. This points-out the common identity and bonding between two countries. At the end of this para, name of Bangabandhu has been mentioned which is highly respected name in Bangladesh and also known as the father of the nation due to his contribution to the independence of Bangladesh. He was also the first prime-minister of Bangladesh. LBA-1974 was also signed during his tenure as first prime minister of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Coveys message of friendship and goodwill. Further, use of ‘our’ represents unity and inclusiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Clearly reminding that India has helped Bangladesh to gain freedom. Further, beautiful use of language of praise for Bangladesh on its achievement in the areas of ‘poverty alleviation, food production, education, health, women’s empowerment, social inclusion and deepening the economic base of the country’. Further, praised Bangladeshi people that in spite of odds, their country is the ‘fastest growing economies of Asia’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>Conveying special authoritative status of the present Indian government which has been formed on the basis of clear mandate given by the people of India after a gap of three decades in Indian politics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Indicated that all SAARC leaders were there at swearing-in ceremony except Bangladesh. Indicating the Indian influence/position in SAARC region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-12</td>
<td>Use of language of cooperation and inclusion. Shows importance of its neighbouring countries in India’s overall development. India is for peaceful resolution of issues and also indicates lots of opportunity for economic cooperation between the two countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-14</td>
<td>Reference to long pending issues of Bangladesh’s interest like LBA-1974 and its protocol of 2011, and Teesta river water sharing. Assuring people of Bangladesh on its commitment to resolve the long pending issues. This has been done by use of authoritative language by using ‘my</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{52}\)This is a much respected title.
<p>| 15-16 | Again use of language of praise for Bangladesh on its contribution in controlling the trans-border crimes and terrorism. This also indicates that these issues are of utmost importance to India. |
| 17-19 | Highlights the importance India gives to people to people contact and economic relations, and also, inclusion of youths in mainstream development. |
| 20    | Assures that India is standing by the side of Bangladesh in its development and achieving its ambitious plans. |
| 21-22 | Language of praise and cooperation, by using authoritative language. |
| 23-24 | Ending the speech with language of praise and common identity by referring again to Gurudev who has written national Anthems of both the countries. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word/phrase/metaphor</th>
<th>EAM’s Visit June’ 2014</th>
<th>PM’s Visit September’ 2011</th>
<th>Comparative Interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Both leaders put equal emphasis on mutual cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The metaphor ‘building’ gives emphasis on mutual efforts. EAM put more emphasis on efforts by both countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries/ Region</td>
<td>5/ 10</td>
<td>8/7</td>
<td>EAM’s emphasis more on the region indicates India’s leadership position in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Both the leaders were talking of economic cooperation and Infrastructure development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic/ Trade</td>
<td>7/ 5</td>
<td>5/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Visibly more emphasis on border by the PM, as the protocol to LBA-1974 was signed during his visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Use of the word by PM may be to appease Islamic forces and to indicate India respects Islamic teachings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We/I</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>More use of ‘we’ indicates mutual cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>More use of ‘I’ indicates speaker’s authority. EAM delivered speech in more authoritative manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Government</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Use of authoritative language by EAM which was lacking in PM’s speech.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nehru-Noon Agreement-1958

Agreement relating to Border Disputes (East Pakistan)

September 10, 1958

AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN ON BORDER DISPUTES (EAST PAKISTAN)

New Delhi

In accordance with the directives issued by the Two Prime Ministers, the Secretaries discussed this morning the following disputes.

1. West Bengal - East Pakistan
   I. Bagge Awards in disputes I and II.
   II. Hilli.
   III. Berubari Union No. 12.
   IV. Demarcation of Indo-Pakistan frontier so as to include the two chitlands of old Cooch Behar State adjacent to Radcliffe Line in West Bengal.
   V. 24-Parganas-Yhulna - Jessore 24-Parganas Boundary disputes Assam-East Pakistan
   VI. Pakistan claim to Bholaganj.
   VII. Piyain and Sumra-Boundary disputes Tripura-East Pakistan
   VIII. Tripura land under Pakistan railway and Tripura land to the west of the railway line at Bhagalpur.
   IX. Feni river-Boundary dispute. West Bengal-East Pakistan
   X. Exchange of enclaves of the old Cooch Behar State- in Pakistan and Pakistan enclaves in India. Claim to territorial compensation for extra area going to Pakistan.

2. As a result of the discussions, the following agreements were arrived at:

   I. Bagge Awards on disputes I and II.
      It was agreed that the exchange of territories as a result of demarcation should take place by 15 January, 1959.
   II. Hilli.
      Pakistan Government agrees to drop this dispute. The position will remain as it is at present in accordance with the Award made by Sir Cyril Radcliffe and in accordance with the line drawn by him on the map.
   III. Berubari Union No. 12.
      This will be so divided as to give half the area to Pakistan, the other half adjacent to India being retained by India. The division of Berubari Union No. 12 will be horizontal starting from the north-east corner of Dobiganj thana. The division should be made in such a manner that the Cooch Behar enclaves between Pachgar thana of East Pakistan and Berubari Union No. 12 of...
Jalpaiguri thana of West Bengal will remain connected as at present with Indian territory and will remain in India. The Cooch Behar enclaves lower down between Beda thana of East Pakistan and Berubari No. 12 will be exchanged along with the general exchange of enclaves and will go to Pakistan.

IV. Pakistan Government agree that the two chitlands of the old Cooch Behar State adjacent to Radcliffe Line should be included in West Bengal and the Radcliffe Line should be adjusted accordingly.

V. 24-Parganas-Khulna 24-Parganas--Jessore Boundary disputes
   It is agreed that the mean of the two respective claims of India and Pakistan should be adopted, taking the river as a guide, as far as possible, in the case of the latter dispute. (Ichamati river).

VI. Pakistan Government agrees to drop their claim on Bholaganj.

VII. Piyainan & Surma river regions to be demarcated in accordance with the relevant notifications, cadastral survey maps and, if necessary, record of rights. Whatever the result of this demarcation might be, the nationals of both the Governments to have the facility of navigation on both of these rivers.

VIII. Government of India agrees to give in perpetual right to Pakistan the land belonging to Tripura State to the west of the railway line as well as the land appurtenant to the railway line at Bhagalpur.

IX. The question of the Feni river to be dealt with separately after further study.

X. Exchange of old Cooch Behar enclaves in Pakistan and Pakistan enclaves in India without claim to compensation for extra area going to Pakistan, is agreed to.

3. The Secretaries also agreed that the question of giving effect to the exchange of territory as a result of the demarcation already carried out, should be given early consideration.

M.S.A. BAIG,
Foreign Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan.

M.J. DESAI,
Commonwealth Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

New Delhi, 10th September, 1958
Land Boundary Agreement-1974

Indo-Bangladesh Border

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh concerning the demarcation of the land boundary between India and Bangladesh and related matters.

New Delhi, May 16, 1974

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh,

BEARING IN MIND the friendly relations existing between the two countries,

DESIRING TO define more accurately at certain points and to complete the demarcation of the land boundary between India and Bangladesh,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article I

The land boundary between India and Bangladesh in the areas mentioned below shall be demarcated in the following manner:

1. **MIZORAM-BANGLADESH SECTOR,**
   
   Demarcation should be completed on the basis of the latest pre-partition notifications and records.

2. **TRIPURA-SYLHET SECTOR**
   
   Demarcation which is already in progress in this area on the agreed basis, should be completed as early as possible.

3. **BHAGALPUR RAILWAY LINE**
   
   The boundary should be demarcated at a distance of 75 feet parallel to the toe of the railway embankment towards the east.

4. **SIBPUR-GAURANGALA SECTOR**
   
   The boundary should be demarcated in continuation of the process started 1951-52 on the basis of the District Settlement Maps of 1915-1918.
5. **MUHURI RIVER (BELONIA) SECTOR**

The boundary in this area should be demarcated along the mid-stream of the course of Muhuri River at the time of demarcation. This boundary will be a fixed boundary. The two Governments should raise embankments on their respective sides with a view to stabilising the river in its present course,

6. **REMAINING PORTION OF THE TRIPURA-NOAKHALI/ COMILLA SECTOR**

The demarcation in this sector should be completed on the basis of Chakla Roshanabad Estate Maps of 1892-1894 and the District Settlement Maps of 1915-1918 for areas not covered by the Chakla- Roshanabad Maps.

7. **FENNY RIVER**

The boundary should be demarcated along the mid-stream of the course at the time of demarcation of that branch of the Fenny River indicated as the Fenny River on Survey of India Map Sheet No. 79M/15, 1st Edition 1935, till it joins the stream shown as Asalong C on the said Map. From that point on, downstream, the boundary should be demarcated along the mid-stream of the course of the Fenny River at the time of demarcation of the boundary. The boundary in this sector will be a fixed boundary.

8. **REST OF TRIPURA-CHITTAGONG HILL TRACT SECTOR**

The boundary will follow the mid-stream of that branch of the Fenny River, referred to in para 7 above, upto Grid reference 009779 (Map sheet as in para 7 above) from where the boundary will follow the mid-stream of the eastern-most tributary. From the source of this tributary, the boundary will run along the shortest distance to the mid-stream of the stream marked Bayan Asalong, on the map referred to above, and thence will run generally northwards along the mid-stream of this river till it reaches its source on the ridge (indicated by grid reference 046810 on the map referred to above). From there it will run along the crest of this ridge upto Boghoban Trig Station. From Boghoban Trig Station upto the tri-junction of the Bangladesh-Assam-Tripura boundary (Khan Talang Trig Station), the boundary will run along the watershed of the river systems of the two countries. In case of any difference between the map and the ground, the ground shall prevail. The boundary will be a fixed boundary in this sector.
9. **BEANIBAZAR-KARIMGANJ SECTOR**

The undemarcated portion of the boundary west of Umapati village should be demarcated in accordance with the agreed basis of demarcation, leaving Umapati village in India.

10. **HAKARKHAL**

The boundary should be demarcated in accordance with the Nehru-Noon Agreement of September, 1958, treating Hakar Khal as a geographical feature distinct from the Ichhamati River. The boundary will be a fixed boundary.

11. **BAIKARI KHAL**

In the Baikari Khal, the boundary should be demarcated on the agreed basis and principles, namely, that the ground shall prevail, i.e. as per the agreement reached between the Directors of Land Records and Surveys of West Bengal and erstwhile East Pakistan in 1949. The boundary will be a fixed boundary.

12. **ENCLAVES**

The Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and the Bangladesh enclaves in India should be exchanged expeditiously, excepting the enclaves mentioned in paragraph 14 without claim to compensation for the additional area going to Bangladesh.

13. **HILLI**

The area will be demarcated in accordance with Radcliffe Award and the line drawn by him on the map.

14. **BERUBARI**

India will retain the southern half of South Berubari Union No. 12 and the adjacent enclaves, measuring an area of 2.64 square miles approximately, and in exchange Bangladesh will retain the Dahagram and Angarpota enclaves. India will lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh an area of 178 metres x 85 metres near ‘Tin Bigha’ to connect Dahagram with Panbari Mouza (P.S. Patgram) of Bangladesh.

15. **LATITILLA-DUMABARI**

From point Y (the last demarcated boundary pillar position), the boundary shall run southwards along the Patharia Hills RF boundary upto the point where it meets the western boundary of Dumabari Mouza. Thence along the same Mouza
boundary upto the tn-junction of Mouzas Dumabari, Lathitilla and Bara Putnigaon through the junction of the two Mauzas Dumabari and Lathitilla. From this point it shall run along the shortest distance to meet the mid-stream of Putni Chara. Thence it shall run generally southwards along the midstream of the course of Putni Chara at the time of demarcation, till it meets the boundary between Sylhet (Bangladesh) and Tripura (India).

Article 2

The Governments of India and Bangladesh agree that territories in adverse possession in areas already demarcated in respect of which boundary strip maps are already prepared, shall be exchanged within six months of the signing of the boundary strip maps by the plenipotentiaries. They may sign the relevant maps as early as possible and in any case not later than the 31st December, 1974. Early measures may be taken to print maps in respect of other areas where demarcation has already taken place. These should be printed by 31 St May 1975 and signed by the plenipotentiaries thereafter in order that the exchange of adversely held possessions in these areas may take place by the 31st December, 1975. In sectors Still to be demarcated, transfer of territorial jurisdiction may take place within six months of the signature by plenipotentiaries on the concerned boundary strip maps.

Article 3

The Governments of India and Bangladesh agree that when areas are transferred, the people in these areas shall be given the right of staying on where they are, as nationals of the State to which the areas are transferred. Pending demarcation of the boundary and exchange of territory by mutual agreement, there should be no disturbance of the status quo and peaceful conditions shall be maintained in the border regions. Necessary instructions in this regard shall be issued to the local authorities on the border by the two countries.

Article 4

The Governments of India and Bangladesh agree that any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement shall be settled peacefully through mutual consultations.

Article 5
This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by the Governments of India and Bangladesh and Instruments of Ratification shall be exchanged as early as possible. The Agreement shall take effect from the date of the exchange of the Instruments of Ratification.

SIGNED in New Delhi on May 16, 1974, in two originals each of which is equally authentic.

For the Government of the Republic of India
Sd/-
INDIRA GANDHI
Prime Minister of India.

For the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh
Sd/-
SHEIKH MUJIBUR RAHMAN
Prime Minister of Bangladesh.
Annexure-IV

Protocol (to LBA-1974)-2011

Protocol to the Agreement between India and Bangladesh concerning the demarcation of the land boundary between India and Bangladesh and related matters

September 06, 2011

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh,

Bearing in mind the friendly relations existing between the two countries,

Desiring to define more accurately at certain points and to complete the demarcation of the land boundary between India and Bangladesh,

Having regard to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh concerning the demarcation of the land boundary between India and Bangladesh and related matters, May 16, 1974 and Exchange of Letters dated December 26, 1974; December 30, 1974; October 7, 1982; and March 26, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the 1974 Agreement),

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The provisions of this Protocol shall form an integral part of the 1974 Agreement.

ARTICLE 2

(I) Article 1 Clause 5 of the 1974 Agreement shall be implemented as follows:

Muhuri River (Belonia) sector

Boundary in this segment shall be drawn westwards from the existing Boundary Pillar No. 2159/48-S along the agreed line as depicted in the index map prepared jointly till it meets the southern limit of the Burning Ghat as shown in jointly surveyed map of Muhuri river area in 1977-78. Thereafter it shall follow the external limit of the Burning Ghat in South-West direction and then turn northwards along the external limit of the Burning Ghat till it meets the centre of the existing Muhuri River. Thereafter it shall run along the mid stream of the existing Muhuri River upto Boundary Pillar No. 2159/3-S. This boundary shall be the fixed boundary. The two Governments should raise embankments on their respective sides with a view to stabilising the river in its present course as stipulated in the 1974 Agreement. The Parties agree to fencing on ‘zero line’ in this area.

(II) Article 1 Clause 12 of the 1974 Agreement shall be implemented as follows:
Enclaves
111 Indian Enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladesh Enclaves in India as per the jointly verified cadastral enclave maps and signed at the level of DGLR&S, Bangladesh and DLR&S, West Bengal (India) in April 1997, shall be exchanged without claim to compensation for the additional areas going to Bangladesh.

(III) Article 1 Clause 15 of the 1974 Agreement shall be implemented as follows:

Lathitilla and Dumabari
Line drawn by Radcliffe from Boundary Pillar 1397(point Y) i.e. the last demarcated boundary pillar position, straight southward to the tri-junction of Mouzas Dumabari, Lathitilla and Bara Putnigaon i.e upto iron bridge, and thence it shall run generally southwards along the midstream of the course of Putni Chara as already demarcated on the ground, till it meets the boundary between Sylhet (Bangladesh) and Tripura (India) i.e. Boundary Pillar No. 1800.

(IV) The land boundary in the area mentioned below shall be demarcated in the following manner:

Daikhata 56 (West Bengal-Jalpaiguri) / Panchagarh
Boundary in this segment shall be drawn as fixed boundary from existing Boundary Pillar 774/32-S in the strip sheet 444/6 along the mouza boundary of Daikhata-56 as surveyed in 1997-98 and thereafter will follow the southern boundary of Daikhata-56 (from east to west) upto Point No 18 and therefrom it will follow the western boundary of Daikhata-56 (from south to north) till it meets the center of River Sui at Point No 15 and thereafter, will run along the center of the River Sui upto Point No 1, the points as depicted in the sketch map jointly prepared and mutually agreed on August 3, 2011. Thereafter the International Boundary shall follow the already delineated boundary through Main Pillar (MP) 775.

ARTICLE 3
(I) Article 2 of the 1974 Agreement shall be implemented as follows:

The Government of India and the Government of Bangladesh agree that the boundary shall be drawn as a fixed boundary for territories held in Adverse Possession as determined through joint survey and fully depicted in the respective adversely possessed land area index map (APL map) finalized by the Land Records and Survey Departments of both the countries between December 2010 and August 2011, which are fully described in clause (a) to (d) below.
The relevant strip maps shall be printed and signed by the Plenipotentiaries and transfer of territorial jurisdiction shall be completed simultaneously with the exchange of the enclaves. The demarcation of the boundary, as depicted in the above-mentioned Index Maps, shall be as under:

(a) West Bengal Sector

(i) Bousmari – Madhugari (Kushtia-Nadia) area The boundary shall be drawn from the existing Boundary Pillar Nos. 154/5-S to 157/1-S to follow the centre of old course of river Mathabanga, as depicted in consolidation map of 1962, as surveyed jointly and agreed in June 2011.

(ii) Andharkota (Kushtia-Nadia) area The boundary shall be drawn from existing Boundary Pillar No 152/5-S to Boundary Pillar No 153/1-S to follow the edge of existing River Mathabanga as jointly surveyed and agreed in June 2011.

(iii) Pakuria (Kushtia-Nadia) area The boundary shall be drawn from existing Boundary Pillar No 151/1-S to Boundary Pillar No 152/2-S to follow the edge of River Mathabanga as jointly surveyed and agreed in June 2011.

(iv) Char Mahishkundi (Kushtia-Nadia) area The boundary shall be drawn from existing Boundary Pillar No 153/1-S to Boundary Pillar No 153/9-S to follow the edge of River Mathabanga as jointly surveyed and agreed in June 2011.

(v) Haripal/ Khutadah/ Battoli/ Sapameri/ LNpur (Patari) (Naogaon-Malda) area The boundary shall be drawn as line joining from existing Boundary Pillar No 242/S/13, to Boundary Pillar No 243/7-S/5 and as jointly surveyed and agreed in June 2011.

(vi) Berubari (Panchagarh-Jalpaiguri area) The boundary in the area Berubari (Panchagarh-Jalpaiguri) adversely held by Bangladesh, and Berubari and Singhapara- Khudipara (Panchagarh-Jalpaiguri), adversely held by India shall be drawn as jointly demarcated during 1996-1998.

(b) Meghalaya Sector

(i) Lobachera-Nuncherra The boundary from existing Boundary Pillar No 1315/4-S to Boundary Pillar No 1315/15-S in Lailong -Balichera, Boundary Pillar No 1316/1-S to Boundary Pillar No 1316/11-S in Lailong-Noonchera, Boundary Pillar No 1317 to Boundary Pillar No 1317/13-S in Lailong-Lahiling and Boundary Pillar No 1318/1-S to
Boundary Pillar No 1318/2-S in Lailong-Lubhachera shall be drawn to follow the edge of tea gardens as jointly surveyed and agreed in Dec 2010.

(ii) Pyrdiwah/ Padua Area The boundary shall be drawn from existing Boundary Pillar No 1270/1-S as per jointly surveyed and mutually agreed line till Boundary Pillar No 1271/1-T. The Parties agree that the Indian Nationals from Pyrdiwah village shall be allowed to draw water from Piyang River near point No 6 of the agreed Map.

(iii) Lyngkhat Area
(aa) Lyngkhat-I / Kulumcherra & Lyngkhat-II/ Kulumcherra
The boundary shall be drawn from existing Boundary Pillar No. 1264/4-S to Boundary Pillar No 1265 and BP No 1265/6-S to 1265/9-S as per jointly surveyed and mutually agreed line.

(ab) Lyngkhat-III/ Sonarhat
The boundary shall be drawn from existing Boundary Pillar No 1266/13-S along the nallah southwards till it meets another nallah in the east-west direction, thereafter it shall run along the northern edge of the nallah in east till it meets the existing International Boundary north of Reference Pillar Nos.1267/4-R-B and 1267/3-R I.

(iv) Dawki/ Tamabil area The boundary shall be drawn by a straight line joining existing Boundary Pillar Nos 1275/1-S to Boundary Pillar Nos 1275/7-S. The Parties agree to fencing on ‘zero line’ in this area.

(v) Naljuri/ Sreepur Area
(aa) Naljuri I
The boundary shall be a line from the existing Boundary Pillar No 1277/2-S in southern direction upto three plots as depicted in the strip Map No 166 till it meets the nallah flowing from Boundary Pillar No 1277/5-T, thereafter it will run along the western edge of the nallah in the southern direction upto 2 plots on the Bangladesh side, thereafter it shall run eastwards till it meets a line drawn in southern direction from Boundary Pillar No 1277/4-S.

(ab) Naljuri III
The boundary shall be drawn by a straight line from existing Boundary Pillar No 1278/2-S to Boundary Pillar No 1279/ 3-S.

(vi) Muktapur/ Dibir Hawor Area
The Parties agree that the Indian Nationals shall be allowed to visit Kali Mandir and shall also be allowed to draw water and exercise fishing rights in the water body in the Muktapur / Dibir Hawor area from the bank of Muktapur side.

(c) Tripura Sector
(i) Chandannagar-Champarai Tea Garden area in Tripura/ Moulvi Bazar sector
The boundary shall be drawn along Sonaraichhera river from existing Boundary Pillar No 1904 to Boundary Pillar No 1905 as surveyed jointly and agreed in July 2011.

(d) Assam Sector
(i) Kalabari (Boroibari) area in Assam sector
The boundary shall be drawn from existing Boundary Pillar No 1066/24-T to Boundary Pillar No 1067/16-T as surveyed jointly and agreed in August 2011.

(ii) Pallathal area in Assam sector
The boundary shall be drawn from existing Boundary Pillar No. 1370/3-S to 1371/6-S to follow the outer edge of the tea garden and from Boundary Pillar No. 1372 to 1373/2-S along outer edge of the pan plantation.

ARTICLE 4
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of Instruments of Ratification.

Signed at Dhaka on the Sixth day of September, 2011, in two originals in the English language.

For the Government of the Republic of India
For the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh
June 26, 2014

1. Thank you for your warm words of welcome. I am honoured to be invited to speak to this august gathering. I bring to you the greetings of the people and Government of India.

2. My last visit to your beautiful country was sixteen years ago in 1998, when I had come as Minister for Information and Broadcasting to attend SAARC Information Ministers meeting. In the past few years, as Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha and as Member of Parliament, I have had the opportunity to meet several distinguished Bangladeshi leaders and personalities. I am delighted to be able to renew acquaintance with you now as the External Affairs Minister of India. Given the closeness of our relationship, the bonds of history and culture that unite us and the importance that we attach to building a strong and enduring bilateral relationship, it is but fitting that I am on my first standalone visit abroad, as External Affairs Minister of India, to Bangladesh.

Distinguished Guests and Dear Friends,

3. When we talk of India-Bangladesh relations and the great people of Bengal we cannot but recall the names of Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore, Swami Vivekananda, Kazi Nazrul Islam, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerji and Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Gurudev Tagore's compassion, humanism and belief in the oneness of humankind were an important guiding force of our freedom struggle. Swami Vivekananda was a great exponent of universal brotherhood and exhorted humanity to rise above petty differences. Bangladesh's national poet Kazi Nazul Islam espoused enlightenment and spiritual rebellion against the oppressors. His epochal poem 'Bidrohi', (The Rebel), inspired countless men and women to assert their individual human capacity for heroic action and human unity. Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerji was a great Indian patriot, legal luminary and freedom fighter. Of course, we cannot forget Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who was the architect of Bangladesh.
4. I come to Bangladesh with a message of friendship and goodwill from the newly elected Government in India. I come with the goal of enhancing our relationship and mutual understanding. I come with the belief that the potential of our partnership is vast. I come with the faith that the people of both our countries desire and deserve closer relations and concrete results.

5. Today marks the completion of exactly a month since our Government came to office on May 26th. On this special day, I feel fortunate to be in the midst of those with whom we shed blood together in 1971. India marvelled at your courage then, and we marvel at your achievements today. You can justly be proud of the progress your country has made since attaining independence. Your achievements in the areas of poverty alleviation, food production, education, health, women's empowerment, social inclusion and deepening the economic base of the country, to name but a few, are worthy of emulation. You have set an example of how a nation devastated by war and suffering can rise to become one of the fastest growing economies of Asia. You have lived up to the faith that your founding Father, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had in his people and in the righteousness of his cause. You have justified the sacrifices that were made by millions of other martyrs under his inspiring leadership.

6. I am aware that the Indian general elections in April and May this year were followed closely in Bangladesh. I thank you for all the good wishes that we received. These elections were not just the largest democratic exercise in the world. They mark a turning point in the evolution of India's democratic polity. They were an election of Hope. I stand before you as the representative of a Government that has come to power through an election process, in which, after a gap of nearly 30 years, the people of India have given a clear verdict in favour of a single political party.

7. My Government is committed to pursuing new approaches and fresh thinking and will be guided by the core values of our civilisation. We will strive to shift our model from youth development to youth-led development. My Government's foreign policy will be based on the principles of developing peaceful and friendly relations with all countries, anchored in enlightened national self-interest. It will combine the strength of our values with pragmatism, leading to a doctrine of mutually beneficial relationships.
8. We will pursue a policy of active engagement with our neighbours with the aim of ensuring security, stability and prosperity for all. In a unique and bold signal of our commitment to this policy, we invited leaders of all South Asian countries for the swearing in ceremony of our new Government on May 26. **This was the first time in independent India that such a gesture was made.** We are honoured that our invitation was accepted. The presence of all the South Asian leaders, including the Hon’ble Speaker of Bangladesh Her Excellency Shirin Sharmin Chaudhury, on this occasion was suggestive of the commonality of our hopes and aspirations and of our desire to join hands to overcome the challenges that face us.

9. We are convinced that India’s development cannot be complete and sustainable unless we succeed in building productive partnerships with our immediate neighbours. We will, therefore, devote our energy to working much more closely with our neighbours in pursuit of our development goals. We will walk the extra mile to create opportunities and to build virtuous cycles of prosperity in the region. We will pursue the goal of economic integration and interconnectedness through trade, investment, transportation, capacity building, environment friendly practices and means that promote equitable development in the region.

10. Building a comprehensive and equitable partnership with Bangladesh is essential for the realization of our vision of a stable, secure and prosperous South Asia. **History and geography have destined us to live together.** How we do so is within our hands, and our hands alone.

11. We know from experience that democracy requires building strong institutions and promoting a culture of tolerance, inclusion and respect for differences. The strength of democracy lies in its ability to manage differences and resolve them through peaceful means. We all espouse same universal values where there can be no place for violence. We will be glad to share our experiences and best practices, if asked to do so.

12. It is well known that a great deal has been accomplished in the India-Bangladesh relationship in the last few years. Progress has been made towards settling long-pending issues. Fresh ground has been broken in the areas of security, economic development, sub-regional cooperation, opening of the Indian market to Bangladeshi goods, border infrastructure, energy and people-to-people exchanges. There is forward movement on accessing the hydel energy potential of our North
East by Bangladesh. The first step in building an energy corridor has been taken with the commissioning of the Behrampur-Bheramara power interconnection, supplying 500 MW to Bangladesh. We will be working to promote more interconnections to facilitate supply of 100 MW power to Bangladesh from the Palatana project and to enable mutually beneficial cooperation in tapping the vast power potential in North Eastern India. Recognising the need for us to catalyse sub-regional cooperation, India and Bangladesh have taken the lead to initiate talks at the sub-regional level on power, water, trade and connectivity. India is prepared to host the next meetings of the sub-regional groups in the last week of July, subject to the agreement of all our partners. We will build upon this, and promote the establishment of telecommunications, diesel and LNG highways.

13. I am aware that there are issues of concern to Bangladesh which remain unresolved, such as the sharing of the Teesta waters, implementation of the Land Boundary Agreement and its Protocol, and better border management. My Government is committed to addressing all these in a manner that improves the welfare & well being of both our people.

14. There is extensive high-level bilateral interaction between our leaders that is planned over the next few months - we hope that our Prime Ministers will meet soon. We have agreed to hold the next meeting of the Joint Consultative Commission in Delhi for which I have invited His Excellency the Foreign Minister Mr. Abul Hassan Mahmood Ali to visit India. Our Ministers and senior officials from a number of Ministries will be taking discussions forward. This includes the Joint Rivers Commission. We anticipate that all this will help us to break fresh ground in our relationship.

15. We are grateful for the cooperation we have received from Bangladesh in combating trans-boundary crime, insurgency and terrorism. Indeed, our cooperation in this regard is a model for others. We need to continue and further strengthen our cooperation so as to ensure a long-lasting safe, secure and peaceful neighbourhood. We know from experience that policies that seek to harm others only perpetuate a cycle of violence & underdevelopment that will undoubtedly boomerang on those who propagate them. Rather, we must dedicate our resources to channelling the energy of our youth into productive activities and development which can touch and benefit every single person in our region.
16. Fruitful and constructive interaction by way of promoting tourism, business, social linkages and the like between our people and countries holds the key not only to better understanding at the popular level but to economic and commercial opportunities beyond our imagination. We owe it to our people to put in place a legal and administrative regime which encourages adherence to rule of law and discourages illegal actions, be it smuggling, trafficking or illegal movement of people. Our objective must be to not only reduce incidents on the border but also enhance peace, stability and goodwill.

17. People to people and cultural exchanges are the bedrock of mutual understanding and mutual awareness about each other. We should especially focus on our youth and make them stakeholders in the relationship. We should bridge knowledge and information gap through greater exchanges and capacity building. In this context, we look forward to welcoming a 100 member youth delegation from Bangladesh in the second half of the year. We have also increased the number of training slots to 215 this year from 185 under our Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme. We will also facilitate the establishment of a Bangladesh Bhaban in Shanti Niketan, believing that activities of the Bhaban will help draw our people closer together.

18. As our countries grow economically, our priority must also be to create inter-linkages and to fill the gaps, both in policy and in infrastructure. We will expedite our border infrastructure projects. Simultaneously, we should work to decongest existing trading routes, largely roads, and encourage more trade through railways, waterways and coastal shipping. We should further expand our air links. In this context, I am happy to announce that we will augment the popular Maitree Express service by increasing the number of air conditioned coaches and by increasing the frequency of the service. We are also looking forward to starting a Guwahati-Shillong-Dhaka Bus Service.

19. We will work with Bangladesh to move beyond the quota free duty free regime to facilitate trade and address the trade imbalance. Greater Indian investments will also help to augment Bangladesh's export basket and contribute to a reduction of the imbalance. There are a number of industries such as textiles, where Bangladesh has a comparative advantage. Our businessmen can join hands in this and other sectors,
for mutual benefit and success. India stands ready to open more Border Haats and Land Customs Stations.

20. Bangladesh has ambitious plans to develop infrastructure and become a knowledge based and technology driven middle income country by 2021. India would like to be your partner of choice in this endeavour. Indian companies have today developed world class capabilities and are in a position to contribute to Bangladesh's economic expansion and modernisation. We are committed to supporting your development efforts within our resources for your success. In this context, I am extremely glad that out of the 15 projects agreed under the existing 800 million dollar Line of Credit, 7 have been completed, 4 are under execution and 4 are in the process of being tendered. I am happy to announce a grant of 60 crore Indian Rupees for implementation of various Small Development Projects in Bangladesh in the current financial year.

21. I would also like to congratulate the Government of Bangladesh for the opening of the BIMSTEC Secretariat in Dhaka, and for hosting the next BCIM Working Group meeting. India will work with all partners to carry these initiatives forward. India and Bangladesh share a contiguous coastline and a common maritime space. We would like to enhance our cooperation with Bangladesh in the maritime sector in general, and in the Bay of Bengal in particular.

22. Bangladesh & India should further intensify our dialogue and actions for the collective development of the South Asian region. We should diversify our cooperation to other areas and share best practices. We face similar challenges of providing quality education, health care, raising agricultural productivity, rapid urbanization, poverty reduction and inclusive growth. My Government is ready to work with other South Asian leaders to revitalise SAARC as an effective instrument for regional cooperation and as a united voice on these global issues.

23. I have spent a very productive day in Dhaka. In my meetings with the Bangladeshi leadership, I have found a strong desire to further strengthen relations with India. I have listened carefully & we have also shared our thoughts and priorities. I am optimistic about our relations and confident that we will not only continue but also build upon the momentum that has characterized our relations in the last few years.
24. Today when we are at the cusp of a new beginning, Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore's words, "At the dawn of a new age, Do not fritter away your time pondering the right time." from the poem, 'The Dawn of a New Age' inspire us. Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore was the first Asian poet to win the Nobel Prize in 1913 and the Poet who has penned our national anthem as also the national anthem of Bangladesh, Amar Sonar Bangla. This shared power of pen must write a new song of cooperation and progress. Our desire is that India and Bangladesh should flourish together as two equal partners. We share not just our past but also our future. We have a vision for the future development of our region. Our people have given us the mandate to make a difference in their lives. We are determined to fulfil that mandate.

I wish you all Ramadan Kareem.

Long live India-Bangladesh friendship.

Thank you.
I am delighted to be here today in the hallowed precincts of Dhaka University. We have just celebrated the holy festival of Id and I bring with me the good wishes, prayers and greetings of the people of India.

I thank the Vice Chancellor Professor Arefin Siddique and all students and faculty for inviting me to one of the finest seats of higher learning in South Asia. Many renowned scholars and thinkers have passed through its portals and brought glory to their motherland. As a teacher myself, I feel truly at home in this environment.

Dhaka University is more than just an institution of higher learning. It was here that the language movement began, culminating ultimately in the birth of a new proud nation and bringing a new dawn for a proud people.

Every year on Ekushey, thousands of people gather at the Shaheed Minar to pay homage to the martyrs of the language movement. It is an emotional outpouring of their love for their language, their country and their unique culture. It is a renewal of the dedication to the values and aspirations that guided you in your years of national struggle.

The Ekushey Book Fair has become among the largest attended literary events in the world, symbolizing Bangladesh’s love for literature, fine arts and poetry.

It was here, at the University of Dhaka, that the fires of intellectual awakening and freedom began to glow.

I pay tribute to the memory of the students and teachers who were killed here defending what they believed in and to the memory of all those who laid down their lives for the liberation of Bangladesh.

I pay tribute to Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who fought for his convictions and led the nation to freedom.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Bangladesh has firmly rejected extremist ideas and achieved success as an open, moderate and vibrant society and democracy.

India and Bangladesh share these values. Our people have a common civilisational heritage.

Both our countries have been deeply influenced by the tenets of Islam, which teaches peace, compassion and virtuous living. For centuries, our people have lived and worshipped together in harmony. Even today thousands of Indians and Bangladeshis from all creeds go to seek solace at the dargah in Ajmer Sharif.

Our lands and people have been sustained by the common waters of the mighty Ganga and the Brahmaputra. The verses of Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore and Kazi Nazrul Islam are read and revered on both sides of the border. This year we are jointly celebrating Gurudev’s 150th birth centenary in a befitting manner.

We fought shoulder to shoulder during the struggle for liberation. Now we must join hands to meet the challenges of equitable social and economic development. We must fight poverty, hunger and disease.

We must live in peace and harmony as good neighbours just like our forefathers did. We must stand by each other in good times and in times of crisis as we have done in the past.

Ladies and Gentlemen:
India celebrates and takes pride in the achievements of the people of Bangladesh. The world has watched with great admiration Bangladesh stand on its feet in the face of great odds.

The people of India have watched with admiration as the people of Bangladesh have fought poverty, overcome the vagaries of nature and survived political upheaval. And through all this, their faith in democracy has been strengthened. They have turned out in record numbers in every election to exercise their democratic franchise.

The poor in the villages are finding new livelihoods. Women have become the back
bone of the micro-credit sector and the textile industry. The middle class is growing rapidly. Social indicators are improving and in some cases are better than those in India.

Like India, Bangladesh has an active civil society and a vibrant and free media. The institutions of pluralistic democracy are gaining in experience and strength.

These are not small achievements for a young country.

Bangladesh is an influential member of the Islamic world where it is a voice of moderation and reason. It is the largest troop contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Bangladesh is an important voice of the developing world. It has much to say and contribute in the comity of nations and the affairs of the world. India will support Bangladesh’s efforts to play its due and commensurate role in regional and global affairs.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
I have always believed that the destinies of the nations of South Asia are interlinked. We must believe in the vision of a shared future of common prosperity and fulfillment.

It was Bangladesh which proposed the creation of a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to give shape to a common South Asian identity and regional cooperation.

I have often said that the people of South Asia are second to none when it comes to their talent, their enterprise or their ability to cope with adversity. But to realize the potential of the region we have to believe in the power of cooperative effort. We have to learn to trust each other and work with each other in our enlightened self-interest.

There are difficulties and obstacles in the way of greater regional cooperation. But the people of our region have the imagination and maturity to find our own solutions to our own problems.
Our borders are a sovereign reality but we can make them frontiers of hope and opportunity as we work to build our common prosperity.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The effective management of our borders is probably the biggest challenge we face in developing our bilateral relations.

The first essential step is to create a defined and peaceful boundary that will provide a stable and tranquil environment for cross-border cooperation.

That is why both our governments have worked hard to resolve the outstanding boundary issues in the spirit of give and take.

A Protocol was signed yesterday to finalise the unresolved issues of the enclaves, areas under adverse possession and undemarcated areas. This will be done without dislocating people living in the border areas. I congratulate both sides for arriving at this historic agreement in a spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and a desire to put these issues behind us.

India has agreed to 24 hour access across the Tin Bigha corridor. We have facilitated the electrification of Dahagram and Angarpota as a step towards improving the conditions of the people living there.

I am acutely conscious of the problems that arise due to the incidents on the border. We have now put in place mechanisms which we hope will greatly reduce the scope for such incidents and strengthen mutual trust and goodwill among the border guarding forces and people living in the border areas.

There must be even greater co-operation between our respective border forces to ensure that illegal trans-border activities do not cast any shadow on our bilateral relations.

Both India and Bangladesh are vulnerable to the forces of extremism and terrorism. Such forces sap the strength of our societies, threaten our state systems and impede our social and economic progress. It is therefore of paramount importance that we work together to confront this challenge.
I would like to acknowledge the immense cooperation India has received from Bangladesh in this area, which is in the interest of both India and Bangladesh.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Our economic cooperation is growing but is well below its potential.

We recognize the sensitivity of our Bangladeshi friends over the large bilateral trade deficit. We will work sincerely to address this issue.

I commit the Government of India to providing greater market access to Bangladeshi products in India by removing both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade.

Yesterday the Government of India issued a notification removing all 46 textile tariff lines of greatest sensitivity to Bangladesh from the negative list for Least Developed Countries under SAFTA. There will be zero duty on Bangladeshi exports of these items to India with immediate effect. There will be no quota restrictions on these items.

In my view, what is of greater long-term importance is increased Indian investment in Bangladesh. This will not only lead to greater economic activity but also increase Bangladeshi exports to India and other countries. We should work on both fronts not only to reduce the trade deficit but increase and even multiply total trade.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
The world is in rapid ferment. Globalization and the growing inter-dependence of economies are creating new challenges and opportunities.

It is imperative for India and Bangladesh to find new pathways of cooperation to deal with the common challenges of development. The governments of both countries have the unfinished agenda of providing adequate food, adequate shelter and adequate healthcare to their people; protecting them from floods and other natural disasters and empowering them to earn a decent living.

Yesterday our two governments signed a Framework Agreement for Cooperation on Development. This agreement commits the two governments to work together in areas such as agriculture, health, education and culture. We have identified other
areas where cooperation will provide direct benefit to our people. These include power transmission, management of common rivers, road, rail and water transportation and protection of the environment.

**We have mutually agreed** on projects worth over 750 million US dollars under the 1 billion US dollar credit line India has provided to Bangladesh. These projects, I sincerely believe, will help in strengthening Bangladesh’s transport infrastructure, especially the railway sector.

**We will further** strengthen our cooperation in the area of flood forecasting, disaster warning and disaster management. We will collaborate with Bangladesh to cope with the threat of climate change. This is an area where we should pool our scientific knowledge to develop new joint strategies for adaptation and mitigation.

The management of our common resources is vital for sustainable development in both countries.

**Ladies and Gentlemen,**

Water is a very sensitive subject in both our countries. But we have shown that, in a spirit of friendship and mutual accommodation, we can agree on cooperative arrangements based on the principles of equity, fair play and no harm to either party. The Ganga Water Treaty signed in 1996 is one such example which has stood the test of time.

I was hopeful that during this visit we would be able to come to an agreement on the sharing of the waters of the Teesta. Both sides worked very hard to arrive at a solution that would be acceptable to all. Unfortunately these efforts did not meet with success within the time available. I have asked all the concerned officials to intensify their efforts towards finding a viable formula which does not cause undue distress to all those, in India or in Bangladesh, who are dependent on the flows of the river.

Concern has been expressed from time to time on the Tipaimukh dam project in India. I wish to make a public statement and make it clear that India will not take steps that will adversely affect Bangladesh.

**Ladies and Gentlemen,**
We are making serious efforts to improve border infrastructure, particularly the Land Customs Stations. New Integrated Check Posts are coming up at Petrapole in West Bengal, Agartala in Tripura and Dawki in Meghalaya. The border haat at Kalaichar-Baliamari in Meghalaya has been inaugurated, and procedures for movement of trucks from Bhutan and Nepal to Bangladesh have been finalized.

Power connectivity and energy cooperation are emerging as major pillars of our economic relationship. Work on a transmission line which will evacuate up to 500 megawatt of power to Bangladesh from India has begun. A feasibility study for the establishment of a 1320 megawatt power plant in Khulna has been completed.

We have set up a Joint Empowered Group to reduce travel time for passengers on the Maitree Express between Dhaka and Kolkata.

We have agreed on the need to enhance greater exchanges at all levels to foster deeper understanding. We have agreed to further intensify academic, cultural, sports, and youth exchanges.

I am aware that many Bangladeshi citizens are disappointed when they are unable to see their favourite local channels when they visit India. There is no rule which prevents the broadcast of Bangladeshi channels in India. I hope that commercial arrangements can be worked out so that Indian viewers have the opportunity to listen to the great contemporary exponents of Rabindra Sangeet and Baul in Bangladesh or see the films of the late Tareque Masood.

I hope that with all these steps we can make an irreversible shift in India-Bangladesh relations. We seek to build our relations on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and respect for each other.

If we can make a habit of cooperating with each other, the possibilities for mutually reinforcing growth and development are limitless.

I compliment Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina for the statesmanship she has shown in breaking new ground in our bilateral relations. This is what people on both sides of the border want - to turn a new leaf and look ahead.

Our friendship is with the people of Bangladesh. We wish to work with all sections of
the people and all shades of public opinion in Bangladesh to foster multi-faceted cooperation between our two countries.

We will always be neighbours and remain friends. If we can make a success of building a new cooperative model for India-Bangladesh relations, it will have a tremendous impact on the fortunes of South Asia.

I believe in all sincerity that India will not be able to realize its own destiny without the partnership of its South Asian neighbours. Therefore, establishing relations of friendship and trust with our neighbours, particularly with Bangladesh, and the creation and consolidation of a peaceful and prosperous regional environment in South Asia are the highest priority of our government.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Both India and Bangladesh have young populations. The young faces I see here today represent the hopes and aspirations for our future. They will soon take over the mantle of carrying forward the sacred legacy of trust and amity between our two countries that was built by our great leaders. To my young friends gathered here today, I say – just as you work hard to build the Sonar Bangla of the poet’s dreams, I urge you to work with the same passion and same sincerity to usher in a golden era of peace, prosperity and friendship among the people of India and Bangladesh.

I thank you for your attention.

Dhaka
September 7, 2011