Paradox of scholarship aid

Examining the donor’s motivation of educational aid with a focus on Japan and South Korea

A Research Paper presented by:

Kohei Yamada
Japan

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Major:

Social Policy for Development
(SPD)

Members of the Examining Committee:

Andrew Fischer
Mahmoud Meskoub

The Hague, The Netherlands
December 2014
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This document represents part of the author’s study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

Inquiries:

Postal address:
Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands

Location:
Kortenaerkade 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands

Telephone: +31 70 426 0460
Fax: +31 70 426 0799
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List of Acronyms

DAC                    Development Assistance Committee
MOFA                 Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MITI               Ministry of Internal Trade and Industry of Japan (Former Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry)
OECD                 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODA                   Official Development Assistance
UN                     United Nations

Acknowledgement

First, I would like to express my appreciation toward Andrew Fischer for being a supportive supervisor during the process of writing. I also need to thank Mahmoud Meskoub for giving me critical and helpful comments on a draft.

My parents in Japan have been giving me a great support both financially and mentally that led me have a precious life experience in ISS for this 15 months. I also want to give my appreciation to my grandparents for always being supporting and caring about me, especially when I am in a distance.

At last, a presence of my girlfriend Min Jee Park was crucial in the process of research paper and the whole study period in ISS. She has been encouraging, caring and also cooperative for discussing the ideas on the paper. I would like to give a great appreciation to her presence next to me.
Abstract

A contemporary global trend in educational development has been placed on basic education as international consensus emphasises. Particularly, an effort for universalisation of basic education has become a prioritised issue in social development field. However, being the only non-Western donors in major donor’s club, Japan and South Korea have been significantly focusing on higher education in their educational aid while little attention is given to basic education in developing countries. Also, empirical research in this paper reveals that a significant level of aid for higher education takes a form of scholarship for university. Having this obvious inconsistency to current international trend, this paper examines the donors’ motivations for emphasising scholarship form of aid with an investigation of the relevance of their own development experience to aid practice.

Evidences support that there is a certain degree of linkage between their aid practice and the distinctive experience during industrialisation process, which can validate ‘developmentalist approach’ implied by the governments. On the other hand, however, a series of evidence and research findings suggests that the donors are engaging in scholarship aid in order to achieve network building that is expected to bring about diplomatic benefits to donor countries in a long term. It is also clarified that scholarship aid creates an arena for soft power exercise that significantly contributes to network building, therefore policy goals. Moreover, the overemphasis on such practice focusing on scholarship aid for the own interest rather than promoting the development of local educational institutions- generates the dependency of recipients on knowledge production and reinforces the existing dependency. Thus, this paper looks at the contradiction of ‘development assistance’.

Relevance to Development Studies

Education is a crucial aspect of social development. Social policy concerns education where people’s lives are largely shaped.

With its relevance to development, foreign aid is an ongoing phenomenon. Paying attention to educational foreign aid in contemporary era, this paper concerns the political aspect of social policy.

Keywords

Foreign aid, education, soft power, industrialisation. Japan, South Korea
Chapter 1: Introduction

1-1 Placing the research in the context

Foreign aid is a common topic in the daily news. I hear it every year when the aid budget bill passes through the Diet (Parliament in Japan), or when the government reaches a bilateral aid agreement with a recipient country. Most of the time when the government, news and scholars talk about foreign aid, they mean by the Official Development Assistance (ODA), the largest aid flow between donor and recipient governments. A precise definition of ODA is provided by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The DAC defines ODA as the aid flow given by official agencies of donor countries; whose main objective is to support the economic and social development of recipient countries; and that is “concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 percent” (OECD 2008).

A focus of this paper is educational foreign aid of Japan and South Korea. While education is a critical dimension of social development, the Japanese government has been giving little attention to the social development sector with its aid. Instead, a large part of Japanese aid has been placed on the economic infrastructure of recipient countries, and this led scholars to primarily focus on the economic dimension when they discuss Japanese aid. Therefore, the social aspect of Japanese aid is relatively neglected in aid discussion. Similarly, joining the DAC in 2010, South Korean aid has also shown a tendency of high expense on economic sector with the lower attention given to social infrastructure. Not only sector distribution, these two countries share many characteristics in their aid pattern such as regional distribution, distribution by recipient’s income level a ratio of loans and grants, which are often distinctive among other donors.

In the field of the development of education, basic education has come to receive the most attention. The importance of basic education is now widely recognized in international community as several consensuses have been made on making an effort for universalising basic education in the developing world. Nevertheless, looking at the educational aid practice of donor countries, a few donors have been criticised because of their low contribution to the basic level of education with the high proportion of foreign aid

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1 Currently 29 countries are recognised as member states of the DAC.
flow to higher education. Japan and South Korea are the two of these donor countries with little attention to basic education and a strong emphasis on higher education while most of donors in the DAC are primarily focusing on basic education. Sharing this commonality in the practice of educational aid, both countries also have a large part of its aid directed to higher education takes a form of university scholarship for students who come from recipient countries and study in donor countries.

This aid practice is severely criticized that their attention is at university scholarship while not responding enough to the need of basic education in recipient countries. The donors’ emphasis on the higher level of education is considered to be inconsistent to international norms that strongly focus on basic education. Despite the criticism from international community, the donors seem not to change this tendency to emphasize the university scholarship. For instance, the Japanese government has launched ‘A Plan for 300,000 Exchange Students’ that aims to increase a number of foreign students by 2020, for which the government scholarship will be partly used. Hence, starting from the criticism towards the donors’ aid practice, this paper is to look into donors’ motivations of this form of aid.

1-2 Aim of the research

In many sense, foreign aid practice of Japan and South Korea is distinguishable to that of other major donors as being the only non-Western donors in the DAC. Their development experience is often considered to be ‘unique’ to other western donors, as labelled as a ‘developmental state’. The government of both countries also acknowledge it and use the language such as ‘from a recipient to a donor’ or ‘shared experience’ to make themselves distinguished from other donors when it comes to foreign aid. This throws an implication to their aid practice in a sense that the distinguished characteristics and inconsistent practice to international norms are based on their developmental process, which is often considered to be different to other major donors. However, contemporary literatures fail to address this linkage between their aid practice and their development experience. Therefore, this research is also to fill the ‘gap’ by examining the linkage between them.

Regarding the motivations of scholarship aid, there is an economical motivation of donors pointed out, that is, by accepting foreign students and letting them study in donor countries, the money circulates within the country. Therefore, when the government allocate aid budget to education sector in a form of scholarship, it assumes that that money can be ‘recycled’ within the countries. In contrary, when aid goes to primary education or basic education, which usually does not take a form of scholarship, money is just
spent in recipient countries, meaning that money is going out of donor countries. This is considered to be the economic motivation driving donors to focus on higher education where they can take a form of scholarship, as the UN criticizes “the money often never actually leaves the donor country” (World Education Blog 2014). It is important to note that, however, the objective of this research is to look beyond the economic motivation and see other motivations of engaging in scholarship aid. Simultaneously, it also examines the influences that can be produced by emphasising this form of education aid.

1-3 Research questions

Considering these points above, the main research question this paper addresses is:

Why do Japanese and Korean governments put a significant level of emphasis on scholarship within educational aid?

Also, following analytical questions support examining this main research question:

To what extent is ‘developmentalist approach’ valid in explaining the aid motivation?

Are Japan and Korea acting on their own self-interest, or are they disregarding the dominant consensus of international community and acting their own development experiences, or both, or neither?

What is a possible influence on recipient countries produced by the emphasis on the scholarship form of aid?

1-4 Method of approach

This research includes a wide range of secondary quantitative data that have been obtained from various sources; books, websites, journal articles and official reports. Some of the quantitative data incorporated in the research are primary data that has been processed by the author. These data are mainly used in empirical research and analysis chapter in order to support and strengthen arguments.
At the same time, this study also employs qualitative data. The combination of quantitative and qualitative method, what is called “mixed methodologies”, can contribute to the research in terms of triangulation (Flick 2009: 32). Kale and Brinkmann (2009: 54) state that interview knowledge is generated through questions and answers, in other words, the “knowledge is socially constructed in the interaction of interviewer and interviewee” and in this sense, it is a “co-authored” product by the both. Qualitative data have been collected by conducting qualitative interview during the field research in Japan and South Korea. Considering this research is addressing scholarship aid that involves ‘students’. Therefore, in the process of investigating donors’ motivation of scholarship aid, the information obtained from those who are actually involved is useful in examining influences on themselves in terms of future job or emotional change, which I found relevant to the regard to the research questions. The interviews have been conducted toward international students who are receiving government scholarship and an informant who is involved in the research issue to certain extent. Based on a voluntary participation, I have done the interview on four international students who are currently studying at university in Japan. The informant is an advocate of Korean aid who also works for NGO related to aid. Each interview took about thirty minutes to an hour. I employed a semi-structured form of interview without tightly binding the interviewees with predetermined questions. It primarily contained an open question, which may be spontaneously answered based on the knowledge that interviewee has at the moment, and it gives interviewees more space to speak on their story and experience (Flick 2009: 156). Some of the questions concerned about the job that they have previously been doing, a career path, a story of how they happened to come to study, a life experience in donor countries broadly and any influence of scholarship aid on them.

Flick (ibid: 41) mentions informed consent as the important aspect of an ethical issue of interview research, pointing out that the consent should be provided on voluntary basis and enough information has to be given to the person. Kale and Brinkmann (2009: 70) elaborate this point that information on objective of study, confidentiality and the research design should be given to an interviewee prior to interview when a briefing takes place. They (ibid: 72) also mention that the significance of confidentiality that any information that can identify a participant should not be publicly opened unless there is an agreement on it. With the understanding of these points, interviews have been conducted in July and August 2014.

A methodological challenge should be noted here. Due to the exam period and the beginning of summer holiday, it was difficult to arrange interviews with students in university in Japan. As a result, a number of inter-
viewees was less than it was initially planned. Also, being a ‘foreigner’, the research in South Korea was practically challenging, especially with the time constraint. Furthermore, a collection of statistical data in South Korea was hard because of language barrier and the fragmented system as Watson (2014: 109) notes “South Korean aid institutions are too fragmented”. Therefore, due to the lack of central organising institution and transparency, some of the data was not reachable.

1-5 Outline of the paper

This paper is presented with five chapters. Chapter One gives a brief understanding on the context where the research is addressed and clarifies the objective of study as well as method employed. Chapter Two provides a range of literatures discussing a debate on aid for education, which is also important as an elaboration of research problem, and motivations of foreign aid primarily from the perspective of international relations. Chapter Three, then, suggests empirical study that concerns the contemporary educational aid practice of Japan and South Korea and their development experience, particularly paying attention to industrialisation process. Chapter Four, divided into four parts, involves the analysis on research findings with relevant concepts and the discussion explored in Chapter Two. Chapter Five concludes the study with wrapping up the discussion and suggesting last thoughts as well as further research implication.

Chapter 2: Setting a stage: Literature review

2-1 Debate involving educational aid

A debate on aid for education has been argued for decades especially to the extent that which levels of education should be prioritised in a context of developing countries. The importance of higher education to development is widely recognised. Lall (1992: 170) discusses that while a role of basic education is necessary and essential for all the forms of efficient industrialisation, especially in early industrial stages where relatively simple technology is employed, higher levels of education and advanced skills of both workforce and managers appear to be significant in later stages in which more complex technologies are applied. Higher education is also important in generating human capitals needed in key area of development and making
the country more self-reliable (Lewis 2009). Mamdani (2008: 1-2) refers to higher education in developing countries as “the strategic heart of education” in a sense that it is where a curriculum is developed, educators are trained, a research is done and a sense of independent country is developed. Furthermore, the World Bank (1994: 15) recognises its importance in relation to a correspondence to economic growth and place for cultivating national identity.

During 1950s and 1960s, higher education sector in developing countries had been largely paid attention and supported by foreign aid, but after decades it has increasingly become a subject to be neglected. This shift was primarily led by the World Bank by publishing an influential study and it came to be a sort of ‘recommendation’ for donors not to prioritise higher education with foreign aid. On one hand, the Bank acknowledges the significant contribution of higher education, it criticises and problematises the focus on higher education in developing countries. The main rationale for taking this position is that investment on higher education in the context of developing countries was considered to be regressive and not productive to the potential contribution to development, and it was also regarded to be elitist.

Based on the human capital approach, the Bank estimated social rate of return of higher education in developing countries being 13 percent lower than the returns generated from basic education (Psacharopoulos et al. 1986 cited in Kapur & Crowley 2008: 11). Psacharopoulos (1994: 1328) also reveals that social rate of return of higher education is lower than that of primary education to a significant extent. For example, social rate of return of higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa was 11.2 while a counterpart value for primary education was 24.3 (ibid: 1328). Furthermore, an updated observation from 1960 to 1997 demonstrated that the social rate of return from basic education was 18.9 percent while higher education had only 10.8 percent of return (Lewis 2009). As a result of the study, Psacharopoulos (ibid: 1335) concludes that primary education should be given the highest priority among all levels of education. Therefore, the World Bank (1994: 25) proposed that higher education should not be the priority because of low social rate of return, and the investment on primary education can contribute to poverty alleviation and reduction of income inequality.

Also, the aid for higher education was considered to be elitist in nature. As a result of higher education being heavily dependent on public resources and costly, a large part of public spending ends up favouring elites who typically have the access to university education while people from poor families largely remains excluded. The World Bank (1994: 2) argues that in spite of the rapid increase in enrolment rates among developing countries, which
brought about more access to traditionally less privileged people such as women or students from rural area, the fact that the majority of students are from wealthier families proves that higher education in these countries still continues to be elitist. Therefore, from the equity concern, aid for higher education was assumed to widen and reproduce social and economic disparity between the rich and poor (Kapur & Crowley 2008: 11).

A series of discussion shaped a focus on primary education and the basic human needs in general when it comes to development debate. Rather than policies that aim at long-term development, the focus on sectors that directly and immediately bring about profits to the poor has increasingly become a global trend and priority (Lancaster 2007: 40). This focus is widely shared in international community, and this created a ground for criticism of focus on higher education rather than basic education in foreign aid.

2-2 Motivations of foreign aid- what drives donors to foreign aid?

The debate on the motivation of foreign aid is not new and has been given an extensive attention for a long. Throughout the history of aid giving, a simple-looking question of “Why do donors give foreign aid” has been involving controversial discussions, attempting to examine what exactly drives donors toward foreign aid.

Being the largest transaction between the global “North” and “South”, it is now widely argued that foreign aid involves several ‘purposes’, to which aid can supposedly serve. I, here, briefly go through some purposes of foreign aid because obviously the purpose of aid is relevant to the discussion aid’s motivation. Observing the aid history, Lancaster (2007: 13) suggests four main purposes of foreign aid: diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian relief, and commercial. In term of diplomatic purpose, foreign aid serves to strengthening international security and developing inter-governmental relationships. From the perspective of developmental purpose, which is commonly perceived as the means and end of aid giving, aid from foreign countries is believed to contribute to the economic and social development of recipient countries. Aid for humanitarian relief, the least controversial purpose of aid, is given in order to assist recipient countries in the case of emergency such as a natural disaster because poor countries often confront a scarcity of resources and capacities to relieve damages (ibid: 14). The commercial purpose of foreign aid explains that aid can also serve to donors’ economic consideration, which includes to broaden out export market and to obtain the access to natural resource imports (ibid: 14).
Acknowledging these purposes for which aid can actually work helps in considering why states provide their own limited public resources for people out of national boundaries with a form of ‘development assistance’.

Taking these purposes into consideration, there has been a controversial debate on donors’ motivation for aid. Many see foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy while there is a view that foreign aid is an end in itself, reflecting moral obligation of donors to give a help to recipient countries, therefore, is independent of foreign policy.

**National interest of donors- foreign aid as an instrument**

Looking at foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy, Radelet (2006) emphasises the political consideration as a determinant of aid, stating that foreign policy and political relationships are undoubtedly the most important determinants of foreign aid with less concern on recipient’s development (ibid: 6). He demonstrates this point of view with numerous examples; aid behaviour by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War for gaining the support of recipients; China and Taiwan giving aid for in order to get the governments’ recognition; and an enormous aid flow toward former colonies for maintaining political influence. Similarly, those who understand relations between states through realist lenses in a school in international relations, which sees that states act in the anarchic environment where they primarily concern about their security, power and survival, principally conceive of aid as a tool for diplomacy on the basis of donor’s national self-interest (Lancaster 2007: 3). Pointing out the origin of foreign aid as an instrument of Cold War diplomacy, Lancaster (ibid: 25) refers to “aid is, in short, a child of hard-headed, diplomatic realism”. Observing foreign aid from the realist perspective, it merely comes to be an instrument of diplomacy in order to achieve national self-interest of donor countries. According to the realist understanding of the international politics, a nation-state is the most important actor, given the absence of any higher authority such as the world government. Therefore, any politics happening beyond the national sovereignty is to seek for ‘power’ that brings about national security and contributes to state’s interest in the anarchical international environment. In this understanding, the interaction between states is “best understood by focusing on the distribution of power among states” (Griffiths et al. 2008: x). Hence, in this line of thoughts, realists believe that foreign aid is practiced on the basis of the strategic interest of donors with the predominant regard to national security and self-preservation, and therefore “foreign aid is perceived [by realists] as only minimally related to recipient economic development and the humanitarian need of recipient countries are down-
played” (Schraeder et al. 1998: 296). Some claim that humanitarian approach to considering foreign aid is faulty.

It is also possible to see foreign aid from neo-realist perspective. Derived from realism, neo-realism largely shares a fundamental understanding of international relations with realism. However, whereas the traditional realism perceives security as alliance or military power, the neo-realism focuses on the significance of the economic aspect of national security (Schraeder et al. 1998: 296). Therefore, whilst national security remains as the basis in consideration of foreign aid, the neo-realist interprets aid with more emphasis on economic interest of donor countries. Neo-realist argues that aid decision is strongly connected to recipient’s potential to contribute to donor’s economy in terms of securing export markets or raw materials, which often becomes a determinant of foreign aid. Radelet (2006: 6) also mentions that bilateral aid is often designed in a way that it can help the private sectors of donor countries achieve their economic interests. Thus, despite the difference in perception of national interest and security, both realism and neo-realism heavily emphasise the role of donor’s interest in considering the motivation of foreign aid.

**Norms and values- donors’ moral obligation**

In the contrary to those who claim that self-interest consideration is principal in the anarchical international environment where the distribution of and seek for power only come to be important in illustrating international politics, scholars labelled as idealists or constructivists in the field of international relations challenge this view toward foreign aid held by realists, putting a central focus on humanitarian concerns of donor countries. Scholars in this view are optimistic about the nature of international politics and the ability of foreign aid in contributing to the development and needs of recipient countries. A critique of the constructivist school on the national interest theory gives the explanation of foreign aid in terms of the donors’ sensitivity to need and the poverty-orientated understanding of wealthy countries (Nielsen 2010: 3).

Lumsdaine (1993), a prominent work on this view, suggests the significance of moral obligation in donor’s motivation of foreign aid. He (ibid: 3) states a series of evidences claim that “foreign aid cannot be explained on the basis of donor states’ political and economic interests, and that humanitarian concern in the donor countries formed the main basis of support for aid”. Those who interpret foreign aid through the lens of ‘constructivism’ in international relations emphasise the influence of norms and values in international community, arguing that donors are driven to provide foreign aid in
response to the presence of international norm that wealthy countries ought to give support to poor countries in order to help them improve the living standard of their citizens (Lancaster 2007: 4). Also, this view sees the aid flow from donors to recipients as positive in terms of stabilising world peace and prosperity, and widely shared among policy makers and statesmen from donor countries (Pankaj 2005: 117).

Denying the element of national self-interest of donors in foreign aid, Lumsdaine’s (1993: 3) view that the basis of foreign aid has been humanitarian and ethical concerns and the moral obligation shared among donor countries is standing upon some evidences that he observes.

First, looking at the allocation of foreign aid by donors, Lumsdaine (ibid: 39) argues that aid was not mainly directed to recipients with economic and political significance for donors but to needy countries, and aid programs are implemented in order to promote the development of recipients, not to enhance donors’ benefit. Showing a weak correlation between aid and trade, and he concludes that aid was not allocated in accordance with a concern on economic relationship between them. The evidence is also suggested on the allocation of aid by the income level of recipient countries over time. Since there has been a gradual change in donors’ aid allocation to put more on the poorest countries, he claims that the humane values have been increasingly becoming a core of aid motive, which were accepted in principle in donor’s community like DAC, that has actually influenced the pattern of aid spending in most donors (ibid: 50). In terms of the agreement among donors community, scholars standing on this view also tend to reference the establishment of a 0.7 percent benchmark, in which donors are advised to contribute more than 0.7 percent of their Gross National Product, as a reflection of moral obligation shared by donor countries (Pankaj 2005: 117). Undermining the element of national interest of donors, Lumsdaine (1993: 50) says “if aid had been given to secure economic advantages or political leverage, it would have been sensible for the donor countries to move aid in exactly the opposite direction”.

The second evidence he suggests was a phenomenon of growing proportion of aid given by donor countries to multilateral institution such as the United Nation organisations or the World Bank. Lancaster (2007: 42) refers to aid from multilateral institutions as the most development-based aid program because these organisations does not have specific self-interest motives that can often affect decision-making in a case of bilateral aid. Multilateral institutions are also known for favouring to target poor countries more than bilateral donors (Lumsdaine 1993: 41). Observing the growing contribution to multilateral aid institutions over time since 1950s, he (ibid: 41) argues that there should have been a more increasing focus on aid “di-
rected primarily to economically and strategically significant states” if the aid has been structured in a way that it serves economic and political interests of donors.

Thirdly, taking into account that more and more aid has been taking a form of grant while less and less aid has been tied to donor countries, he (ibid: 52) mentions that the way aid was provided “makes perfect sense if the aim of aid was to promote development, but no sense if the aim was to gain advantages for particular donor states”. Overall, suggesting and primarily relying on quantitative evidences, Lumsdaine draws arguments on how the self-interest consideration in foreign aid is neither adequate nor convincing, by constantly underestimating the element of national self-interest. In fact, Lumsdaine (ibid: 4) conceives of foreign aid as a result of the reflection of donors’ humanitarianism and their perception of the world as an interdependent community. Furthermore, he insists that “foreign aid cannot be explained on the basis of economic and political interest of the donor countries alone, and any satisfactory explanation must give a central place to the influence of humanitarian and egalitarian convictions upon aid donors” (ibid: 29). This statement can be interpreted as that while Lumsdaine may admit the role of economic and political interest of donors in foreign aid, he observes foreign aid primarily from the perspective of moral obligation held by donors.

**Morality or interest?**

Despite the two different discussions, some of those who advocate the centrality of national interest of donors in foreign aid acknowledge the element of developmental motivation in aid giving. Radelet (2006: 6) mentions that although the moral criterion is less influential than political considerations in decision-making of foreign aid, it still plays an important role. Lancaster (2007: 43) also recognises the rise of developmental rationale among donors as observed in increasing aid allocation to poorer countries and multilateral aid institutions over time. Analogously, it is interpreted from the aforementioned Lumsdaine’s (1993: 29) quote: “foreign aid cannot be explained on the basis of the economic and political interests of donor countries alone [...]” [emphasis added], that he seems to acknowledge the influence of donor’s interest in foreign aid to certain extent while extensively undermining the importance of it. Hence, there seem to be a grey zone between them.

While the constructivist approach is lying on the assumption of a high-level of need-orientation, people speaking on behalf of realism takes it away from aid debate (Nielsen 2010: 5), and vice versa. Nielsen (ibid: 5), howev-
er, states “it seems likely that the truth lies between each of these extreme theoretical approaches”. A similar argument is proposed by Riddell (1987: 65), referring that “the national self-interest argument […] would tend to suggest two propositions which are necessarily mutually exclusive: either aid should be granted on the basis of moral criteria or it should be granted on the basis of national interest criteria. However, the dichotomy is not so simple: it conceals a variety of different views about the relationship between morality and national interest”. Therefore, he conceives of this distinction as a “false dichotomy”, and argues that the element of morality and self-interest interplay in a complex way (ibid: 65). Emphasising that it is rather relational, he suggests different views on what drives donors to foreign aid from the ones discussed above.

According to the Riddell’s classification of relationship between moral criteria and national interest of donors, the view that is most commonly held by donor governments is: “national interest considerations are fundamental in decisions on aid, but the needs of the Third World provide an important moral perspective and to the extent that the provision of aid on the basis of this moral perspective is in harmony with pursuing the national interest, then aid should be granted; to the extent that it is not, then aid should be withheld” (ibid: 65). In this view, moral question is taken into account, yet, it largely remains secondary and becomes less important in a centrality of the pursuit of national interest. Also, he argues that some governments share a view: “national interest considerations are important in aid decisions but the needs of the Third World create such an overriding moral imperative to assist that prior consideration should be given to helping to solve these problems even if this results in conflicts with the broad national interest of the donors” (ibid: 65). Thus, there is no simple dichotomy, and both elements have the influence with a different degree. Although he thinks that donor’s political benefit is primary in determining foreign aid, one cannot take away the relevance of the moral criteria of donors and “questions of morality are not thereby forgotten or eliminated” (ibid: 73).

**Structuralist view**

Structuralist sees aid as an instrument of neo-colonialism that is ultimately utilized for donor’s interest (Pankaj 2005: 118). While the advocates of the developmental foundation of foreign aid establish the recognition of moral obligation among donors based on the contribution to multilateral aid institutions, a criticism is held that this is merely to increase the presence of themselves in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations in order to gain a supportive voice from others (ibid: 118). Aid concentration on former colonies can be explained from this perspective that aid remains as
an effective and convenient way to sustain donor’s influence on the recipients (Hook 1995: 39). Based on the understanding of the relationship between elites in donor and recipient countries, the structuralist sees foreign aid as a tool for widening and keeping an inequality between countries (ibid: 38). It is argued that foreign aid is essentially used to preserve structural superior of donors to recipients, and aid has come to be an instrument to contribute to securing donor’s interest, influence and dominance (McKinlay 1979 cited in Hook 1995: 38). Therefore, focusing on the centrality of donor’s interests, this view looks foreign aid through a notion of highly exploitative North-South relations as it is expressed in the theory of dependency or world system (Schraeder et al. 1998: 296). Foreign aid reinforces “the role of capitalist exploitation in enhancing the power of elites in both industrialised and developing countries”, in other words, in the capitalist centre and developing periphery (ibid: 296). The structuralist holds a negative perception towards the ability of foreign aid to actually contribute to development rather than fostering an existing dependency and inequality, and claims that aid should be abolished because “aid is fundamentally incompatible with international development” (Hook 1995: 39).

Chapter 3: Empirical research

3-1 Empirical study on the context where Japan and South Korea are placed in educational aid

Looking at educational aid practice of donor countries, several donors have been criticized because of their low contribution to the basic level of education in recipient countries and the large proportion of foreign aid flow to the higher education. Japan and South Korea are two of these donor countries with little attention given to basic education and a strong emphasis on higher/post-secondary education.
Figure 1 shows the proportion of aid directed toward basic education in total educational aid budget, with a comparison of Japan, South Korea and the DAC average. At a first glance, it is possible to see a huge gap in the proportion of basic education aid between two East Asian donors and other major donors’ average. Looking at the graph of Japan, the basic education aid budget has been staying in much lower level than the other major donors, which makes an average of 13 percent between 2003 and 2011\(^2\). It is important to note here that there is a sudden increase in the Japanese aid budget for basic education in 2012, which is a totally opposite trend as preceding years show and makes it close to DAC average on that year. This might be a temporary increase due to some causes or response to criticisms, but in any cases, this paper treats this short-term sudden increase as exception as the historically continuing tendency is explicitly presented by observing the data. It is obvious that to what extent Japan has been giving little attention to basic level of education in recipient countries in its foreign aid. The same trend can be seen in a graph of South Korea, but it is even more outstanding than that of Japan. The proportion of aid for basic education has been moving between 0.6 and 11.7 percent, which is far below the DAC average of 27.1 percent between 2003 and 2012. This graph clearly demonstrates how much basic education is not emphasized in their educational aid.

\(^2\) Calculated by the author
Figure 2 suggests the change in the allocation of Japanese aid to basic and higher levels over the period. While figure 1 showed how Japan has been giving little attention to basic education, it illustrates how much higher education has been emphasized. Simply calculating, higher education has been given approximately 3.5 times more aid budget than basic education during the period of between 2005 and 2012, even taking into consideration that of 2012\textsuperscript{3}.

\textsuperscript{3} Calculated by the author
Similarly, South Korea shares the same characteristics of extensively focusing on higher education rather than basic education as shown in figure 3, and the gap between two sectors is even bigger than that of Japan. Through the period given, aid for higher education in South Korean aid has been averagely about 5.8 times quantitatively more than the budget for basic education. Thus, it is now clear that both countries have been largely allocating aid budget to higher education with little regard to basic education where most of donors in DAC are prioritising in their educational aid. Although the international community have agreed to make an effort for the universalisation of basic education through various commitment including Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education For All (EFA), these numbers are considered to be not enough. Therefore, this tendency of not primarily focusing on the basic level of education has been often criticized because it is not consistent with global norms.

Sharing the characteristics in level allocation of educational aid, moreover, a large part of aid for higher education in these two countries has been spent on the scholarship for foreign students in universities (students from recipient countries who are studying in donor countries). While there is no an extensive degree of study exactly calculating the proportion of scholarship in the whole educational aid, according to Global Campaign for Education (2013), it is estimated that about 40% of Japan’s total aid budget for

*Figure 3 Allocation of South Korean aid to basic and higher education over time

Source: OECD, processed by the author

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4 Calculated by the author
education in 2010 was spent on scholarship. Furthermore, based on the estimation done by Global Campaign for Education (2013), considering that 59% of total educational aid budget was allocated to higher education in 2010, scholarship aid appeared to have a dominant allocation in aid for higher education. Analogously, in spite of the absence of the exact calculation for the case of South Korea, taking into account the fact that South Korea has been mostly focusing on higher education as much as Japan does, or even more, and what Chung (2014: 52-53) says, “the post-secondary support is almost comprised of the scholarship”, it is safely estimated that South Korea also predominantly allocates the budget for higher education to the scholarship. These countries that emphasise higher levels of education in education aid, especially, with a form of scholarship have been exposed to severe criticisms. Regarding this donors’ aid behaviour, the United Nation has expressed a criticism, claiming “their [wealthy countries’] focus in on university scholarships rather than help for schools in the poorest nations” (THE 2014). Moreover, it continues “a quarter of all educational aid takes the form of scholarships for students to study at university in rich countries, which amounted to $3.2 billion in 2010-11, meaning that the money often never actually leaves the donor country” (ibid). In this type of aid, money circulates domestically. The criticism on this ‘recycling’ foreign aid budget becomes more severe for donors such as Germany, Japan, Canada and France, whose scholarship aid occupies more than four-fifth of all of it given by donors (ibid). Japan is being criticized also because the scholarship aid does not necessarily direct toward low-income countries. On the other hand, South Korea does not get much criticism compared to these donors, but this is simply because of a small scale of aid in absolute term, even though its engagement in scholarship aid in higher education is more outstanding than Japan as I mentioned.

3-2 Tracing back the development experience of the donors

It is often argued that countries that went through the late industrialisation, especially those in East Asia have a developmental experience that is different in many aspects from that of the earlier industrialisation in the West, as labelled as 'developmental states’ or 'the successful experience of Korea’. In this context, it is necessary to understand how Japan and South Korea have experienced ‘development’ through industrialisation to examine the relevance of their experience to current aid practice. In other words, this examination is important because it underlies the question asking if they are acting based on their development experiences in foreign aid.
‘Learning’ as the central

Going through the first industrial revolution in Britain in the end of the eighteenth century, the second industrial revolution in the United States and Germany in the nineteenth century and the one followed in twentieth century, the process of industrialisation has been gradually changing. The earlier industrialisations were standing upon the generation of new processes, what is called inventions or innovations. In the industrialisation occurred in the twentieth century, however, the element of ‘learning’ has played a central role in the process of industrialisation compared to the earlier ones (Amsden 1992: 4). Therefore, the effort of states in the late industrialisation was on the basis of rather learning than inventions or innovations.

Later the states head to industrialise, a gap between them and the earlier industrialisers becomes greater. To narrow this gap, learners tend to rely on foreign technology to ‘catch up’ frontrunners. Due to the widening gap, the late industrialisers had to rely on foreign technology transfer more heavily than the earlier industrialisers such as Germany and the U.S. The elements of learning and foreign technology transfer are both closely connected. According to Amsden (1992: 233), in terms of ‘learning from abroad’, emulation in the late industrialisation, primarily Japan and South Korea, took a different form to that in the nineteenth century in Europe. In earlier industrialisation in Europe, whereas there were British expertises traveling to other countries to teach their techniques, the extent of people from the continent going to the Britain on the purpose of learning was not significant at all (ibid: 233). In the contrary, a number of managers and engineers who went to abroad to obtain advanced skills were enormous in Japan and South Korea (ibid: 233). Thus, the characteristic of industrialisation in terms of the outflow of human resources as a means of learning from foreign countries is significantly distinct in the early and late industrialisation.

The significance of engineers in development process whose high educational attainment was high

Amsden (1992: 9) quotes “salaried engineers are the key figure in the late industrialization because they are the gatekeepers of foreign technology transfers”. The process of industrialisation has not remained the same over time, and a central character in industrialisation has been shifted from one to another. Figure 4 shows how different players have played a central character in the early and late industrialisation process. As it presents, the entrepreneur has initially played the central character of industrialisation in the late eighteenth century in the U.K., and the corporate manager followed it in the late nineteenth century primarily in the U.S and Germany. The central
figure, then, has been shifted to the engineers in the late industrialisation in the twentieth century. Amsden (ibid: 159) explains that the large industrial enterprises appeared in the U.S and Europe in the nineteenth century that called for a role of managers, noting “since the late nineteenth century, industrialisation has been executed by the salaried manager, including and increasingly the salaried engineer”. It is considered that the industrialisation in Japan has been even more increasingly characterized by the salaried engineers than that in the U.S and Europe because Japan was later to industrialise.

In response to a phenomenon that industrial enterprises were becoming much larger and more complex, there was a rise of managers who have appeared to be the key player in not only in decision-making but also in the whole industrialisation process. The rise of manager is what characterises the industrialisation that has happened around the late nineteenth century in the U.S and Europe. In contrary to these earlier industrialisers, Japan and South Korea, which tend to be categorised as the late industrialisers, have a different experience in this point. Amsden (ibid: 160) mentions “defining characteristics of late industrialization is the abundant supply of managers salaried from the start of accelerated growth”. However, as distinguished characteristics of Japanese and South Korean cases, even though the role of managers was essential in the economic development, “they have not driven overhead costs through the roof” (ibid: 160). She (ibid: 160), then, continues that in South Korea, the ratio of managers to production workers remained stable and the increase in a number of engineers comparative to administrators were remarkable.
Table 1 shows that data on the employment of manufacturing sector in South Korea between 1960 and 1980, with differentiated employment categories. Paying attention to the number of employees in engineers and managers, both have increased their numbers in absolute term since 1960. However, the increase in engineers is much greater than managers. While engineers boosted its employees 10.2 times more during the period, managers only increased 2.2 times more than that in 1960, which resulted in the decline of the ratio of managers to engineers from 7.0 to 1.5 during the period. The statistical evidence demonstrates that how the manager, a key character in previous industrialisations, was not emphasized in number in the industrialisation process of South Korea. This data implies that there is a difference in perception of role played by managers to the early industrialisers. In the case of South Korea, it is argued that this difference is attributed to the corporation system. Since modern era, the corporations in South Korea have often taken a form of ‘chaebol’ in which decision-making is done by original founders or family in a significant level (ibid: 167). Therefore, under this system, decision-making power is distributed between owners and managers, which undermines a relative importance of managers (ibid: 170). The same story is expected in Japan, since the ‘chaebol’ was established on the basis of ‘zaibatsu’, a family-run corporation system that was prevailed during the industrialisation process of Japan.

Table 1 Data on manufacturing employment between 1960 and 1980 in South Korea (Amsden 1992: 171)

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</table>

*Includes transportation and communication workers in the manufacturing sector.
*b Includes engineers, managers, sales, and service workers.

Table 1 Data on manufacturing employment between 1960 and 1980 in South Korea (Amsden 1992: 171)

Thus, the late industrialisation in Japan and South Korea is characterized by the rise of engineers rather than corporate managers. Technology transfer
was a key factor in the late industrialisation because the gap between the ‘frontrunners’ and the ‘catching-up’ countries was greater than in earlier industrialisation, therefore learning from abroad through technology transfer have appeared to be an important means to catch up. The engineer was a key player in the process of late industrialisation because the technology transfer rests on a role of them. Hence, both Japan and South Korea emphasised the education for engineers in order for the nationally directed industrialisation. In Japan, during the industrialisation process after the Meiji Restoration, a new government recognized the “urgent need of all kinds of modern skills and knowledge” through engineers and managers with university education, some of who were sent abroad to learn the management in advanced countries (ibid: 227). Toyoda (1987: 10) says that engineering was a crucial factor in early stage of industrialisation so that building a foundation of education for engineering was a top of the list right after the Meiji Restoration.

In the case of South Korea, although the relevance of general educational attainment to economic expansion was rather passive, managers and engineers had a high educational attainment, and especially, the role of engineers in South Korea was enormous as a result of a massive investment of society on education (Amsden 1992: 239). The drastic increase in a number of engineers in South Korea (table 1) was backed with a formal university education. Recognising the role of engineers that was essential for the late industrialisation in relation to technology transfer, the education served to ensure the sufficient quantity. Thus, in the late industrialisation in Japan and South Korea, the engineers, its education and technology transfer interplayed in a way to support nation-driven industrialisation plan.

Chapter 4: Figuring out the donors' motivations-Morality or national interest basis?

4-1 Supporting developmental story?

Implication in policies

This chapter begins with the examination of governments’ foreign aid policy in order to explore what governments say about what they are doing with foreign aid. Considering the aid motivation, there is often an important clue or implication in official statement or documents which officials might not always explicitly disclose (Lancaster 2007: 17). Therefore, examining the foreign aid policy of Japan and South Korea may give a clue to under-
stand how the governments perceive their development experiences in relation to a way aid is given.

To understand their perceptions of development experience, this section looks into the each government’s official policy statement of foreign aid. First, observing the statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea gives a significant implication on the way the government perceives its development experience. Its statement begins with:

“The development of the Republic of Korea is one of the most successful stories in the history of international development” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea 2013).

Also, it mentions one of the key strategies to strengthen capacity of Korea in international development as “systematically documenting the development contents of successes and failures derived from Korea’s development experience” (ibid). Furthermore, using a phrase ‘as a recipient-turned-donor’, it closes the statement with:

“Making the best use of its unique development experience, the Republic of Korea will exert every effort to make meaningful contributions to the international community by playing a bridging role between developing and developed countries” (ibid).

Observing the perception of development experience, as seen through the statement, one would recognise a strong emphasis of Korean development experience by the government in foreign aid policy paper. It refers that sharing the view of both recipient and donor countries, South Korea can play a significant role in bridging between developed and developing world because it has a unique experience of development, which has allowed it to be ‘a recipient-turned-donor’. It hints the differentiation of itself with other major donors, primarily the western donors, in undergoing different development experience and also infers the relevance of this experience to a way it contributes to international development by claiming “making the best use of its unique development experience”. Overall, perceiving its development experience as “the most successful”, “unique” and bringing about a bridging role to itself, the government of South Korea strongly makes a reference of its own experience in foreign aid policy.
Analogously, although it is not as explicit and repetitive as the South Korean government, the Japanese government also shows the implication of the relevance of its development experience in aid policy paper. Specifically referencing educational aid policy, the government asserts “Japan has shared its own experiences in education since its success in education is considered one of the critical factors for its modernization and the post-war economic growth” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2010). This statement can be interpreted that it perceives the education was successful in Japan in terms of state’s development and it has the experience of having education that was effective in promoting economic growth. As explored, both governments have some references and make an allusion to their development experiences in their foreign aid policy paper, and this remains a space for investigation regarding the linkage between their development experiences, which is already covered in the last chapter, and their contemporary aid practice, with a scope of this paper- the scholarship aid within educational aid.

Relevance to development story?

It was already made clear by the empirical research in the previous chapter that both Japan and South Korea have been heavily emphasizing higher education rather than basic education in their educational aid, and the aid flowed into higher education predominantly takes a form of scholarship for foreign students. Considering the development process that both Japan and South Korea have gone through, this section of chapter scrutinizes the possibility of the relevance of their development experiences to the way they give aid.
Figures above (5 and 6) show an aggregate statistics on the distribution of donor government scholarship. A counterpart data was not available for South Korea. The data is separated to the scholarship for undergraduate and graduate (and Ph.D.) students and sorted by majors of student. Figure 7 presents the regional distribution of recipient countries of Japanese government.
scholarship. There are several points that need to be noted. At the first glance, one would recognize that the government scholarship is primarily distributed to graduate students rather than the undergraduates. Also most importantly, the scholarship is predominantly provided to those who are majoring engineering. In 2013, 36 percent of government scholarship for graduate students was given to students studying engineering while the counterpart ratio for undergraduate was even greater - 52 percent\(^5\). In terms of the regional distribution, China is the largest recipient country while it is directed mainly among Asian neighbours as the tenth biggest recipients are all from Asia.

![Figure 7 Regional distribution of Japanese government scholarship in 2013 (Undergraduate and graduate school)](image)

Source: The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan (2011), processed by the author

It has been explored that one of the factors that characterise the late industrialisation is the element of learning due to a widening gap between frontrunners. In the context where the late industrialisers had to depend on the foreign technology or knowledge more than in the earlier industrialisations in order to catch up, learning through technology transfer has come to play an important role. Therefore, the previous chapter has talked that the engineers were the protagonist in the process of late industrialisation because they were the gatekeepers of technology transfer (Amsden 1992: 9).

\(^5\) Calculated by the author based on the source from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan (2011).
During the process of nationally directed industrialisation, the role and significance of engineers have been emphasised as it is shown in the drastic increase in number of engineers with high educational attainment in South Korea. Together with managers, engineers were sent to abroad to learn the advanced technology and know-how from developed countries as a means of emulation in both Japan and South Korea. This whole phenomenon was distinctive to the industrialisation in earlier days.

Regarding these features of development process of late industrialisation, there seem to be the some degrees of linkage with the way Japan gives educational aid in contemporary era. The outstanding emphasis on student majoring engineering with scholarship aid can be explained by the late industrialiser’s own experience in the development process, in which the rise of engineers was significant in terms of contribution to state’s economic development as a result of an extensive focus on education for engineers. Also, one may establish an explanation of taking a form of scholarship in terms of the central role of learning or emulation from advanced countries in late industrialisation. As mentioned earlier, both Japan and South Korea have sent thousands of engineers to abroad in order to obtain advanced skills and knowledge. It is possible to build an assumption that since a ‘gap’ now may be even greater than the time the late industrialisation has occurred in several decades ago, the role of the accumulation of knowledge and technology through foreign technology transfer may be even more significant in catching up. All of these can only be achieved in higher levels of education.

In addition to this, apart from scholarship aid, the Japanese government has launched ‘ASEAN University Network/ Southeast Asia Engineering Education Network’, which aims for the improvement of the research and educational capacities of Southeast Asian countries, as one of the core program while consistently claiming for the importance of higher education with a ‘holistic approach’ in its educational aid policy paper (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2010). Thus, the emphasis of engineering can be seen not only in the statistics of scholarship, but also in a general attitude of Japanese educational aid. These factors suggest the possibility that the donor is engaging in foreign aid in a way that it helps the development of recipient countries whose rationale and evidence come from donor’s own experience. In other words, a series of finding may support the argument that donors’ experience is underlying their aid practice.
Some argue how beliefs and values derived from donors’ experience can influence to the way aid is given. Chung (2014) discusses how the development experience shapes the beliefs and values that are deeply rooted in the South Korean aid. Chung (ibid: 46) argues that the idea that South Korea can most effectively contribute to the development of recipient countries because of the experience of being developing and developed is underlying and strongly affecting the way Korea gives foreign aid. For example, the tendency of the Korean aid highly focusing on economic dimension of development reflects its own belief that “without economic growth other developmental goals would be unachievable”, which is backed with the practice of ‘successful’ government policies during the development process (ibid: 49). People supporting this view have an idea that ‘this is the effective way to achieve development’, and it clearly demonstrates how a belief or value created from the actual practice or experience shapes a basis of the motivation of aid policy. For another case, emphasising the ‘unique’ and ‘successful’ development experience of South Korea, it has a technical cooperation program called ‘Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP)’, in which it shares the knowledge of Korean development with recipient countries in order to promote development (ibid: 49). This type of aid program directly comes from the notion of ‘successful’ development, and explicitly shows how the notion and idea are reflected to actual aid policy.

Lancaster (2007) pays attention to ideas as a part of the domestic political forces that affects foreign aid. He (ibid: 19) raises three types of idea in donor countries that can influence foreign aid: ‘worldviews’- widely shared values such as a view that all human beings are entitled for liberty,: ‘principled beliefs or norms’- whose example may be a notion that rich countries have an moral obligation to give a help to poor countries,: and ‘causal beliefs’- such as the idea regarding what kind of policies bring about the effective development. Thus, for Lancaster, ideas matter in terms of the impact of domestic setting on foreign aid. When applying this argument, especially in the perspective of causal beliefs, to the discussion of the Japanese and South Korean educational aid, the overlaps of contemporary aid practice in scholarship aid to own development experience may be explained by the presence of idea involving how development can be effectively achieved. Along this line of argument, donors establish the causal belief that the strengthening of education for engineers should be done in order for the effective and efficient development, recognising the significant role of engineers in the process of rapid development from experience. Therefore, the donors are offer-
ing what they think it is meaningful to the development of recipient countries and what actually was effective to their own development. Discussion of how donor’s experience produces beliefs and values that give an impact on the motivation of aid policy was presented in the case of South Korean aid, in which the notion of ‘successful’ development model strongly underlies the aid policy. In this sense, the ‘developmentalist approach’ seems to be a possible way to see to justify the aid practice of late industrializers, having the motivation influenced by beliefs and values derived from own development experience.

Also, this developmentalist approach implies the relevance to the moral discussion of foreign aid. It is already explored in Chapter Two that many argue the influence of moral obligation of donor countries to help poor countries with a different degree of its significance. Claiming the moral foundation of foreign aid, Lumsdaine (1993: 3) states “foreign aid cannot be explained on the basis of donor states’ political and economic interests, and that humanitarian concern in the donor countries formed the main basis of support for aid”. The developmentalist approach is lying on the basis of moral obligation. It is because donors give aid in accordance with a supposedly effective way, which was appeared as a result of their own development experience, in order to promote development of recipient countries. Therefore, this argument supports the explanation that the experience of late industrialisation brought about the value, based on which Japan and South Korea are offering educational aid with a goal of helping development of recipients.

In this perspective, the developmentalist approach seems to be valid in explaining why the donors are emphasising scholarship aid in the higher level within educational aid despite the presence of international consensus to prioritize basic education. Regarding this point, the developmentalist approach gives an explanation that based on own experience, the donors are engaging in educational aid in a way to contribute to the development, which might be different from what is discussed among international community because they have a distinctive development experience to other donors. At the same time, this approach sheds a light on “the predominant Euro-Americanism of the discipline within the existing aid debate” (Robinson 2003 cited in Kim 2011: 804). This may justify the frictions or contradictions with ‘international consensus’ in a sense that because aid debate is largely occupied by the West so that it tends to marginalize outside of the West within donor’s community. Therefore, the developmentalist perspec-
tive suggests that on the basis of moral obligation of the rich, Japan and South Korea are giving educational aid in a way that it can help development of recipient, whose rationale and supporting evidence are based on their own development experience that is not commonly shared by other major donors in the West.

4-2 Establishing a rationale for looking beyond

While the developmentalist approach holds some points and gives a justification to the donors when considering the contemporary educational aid practice, some evidences and discussions illustrate that they are primarily acting on the basis of national self-interest consideration. Historical and contemporary observation of the donors’ aid practice and policy demonstrates their emphasis on national interest in foreign aid.

Regarding the historical Japanese aid practice, it is argued that the economic interest plays a big role in the Japanese foreign aid. Observing the Japanese aid attitude in the 1980s, Hook (1995: 89) states that there is a strong relationship between Japan’s national interest consideration and its aid policy, especially in terms of a centrality of the economic benefit brought about by providing foreign aid, which has been seen as a “primary vehicle of its re-emergence as an influential political power”. Moreover, Schraeder et al. (1998: 297) refer to its aid policy as “business foreign policy” in which it actively engages in a coordination of public and private sectors’ interests in order to expand an export market through aid. They also reveal that the based on the business foreign policy, Japan’s aid to Africa during 1980s was mainly used for obtaining resources necessary for domestic industries and securing potential raw materials (ibid: 302). Considering this regard, Lancaster (2007: 132) also asserts that the pervasive use of aid for commercial purpose is influenced by the demand of raw materials and export market that ensures its own economic security. It is mentioned that the strong focus on bilateral aid, Asian regions and sector allocation based on the domestic enterprises’ interest were the “indicators of the primacy of commercial purpose”, which sees aid as an investment rather than the means for poverty alleviation (ibid: 116).

In the case of South Korean aid practice, it has been criticized because of a high proportion tied aid. Table 2 shows the macro-level comparison of the Japanese and South Korea aid. At the first glance, the emphasis of South Korean aid on tied aid is outstanding compared to other donors. Together with Japan, its high ratio of concessional loan is much higher than the DAC average, and the tendency of focus on Asian regions and economic infrastructure resembles to that of Japan. Watson (2014: 109) argues that eco-
onomic interest and soft power diplomacy are conflicting among aid institutions in South Korea.

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<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
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Source: OECD.stat.

* Values in parenthesis indicate the average of the years from 1998 to 2001. These are presented to correct a shock arising from a temporary rise in the aid to Afghanistan and Iraq after 2002.

Table 2 Macro-level comparison between the Japanese and South Korean aid (table from Kang et al. 2011: 20).

Thus, the emphasis of national interest, especially national economic security reminds of the discussion of neorealist approach in chapter Two. As explored, neo-realist focuses on the significance of economic security of donor countries when talking about foreign aid motivations, sharing a fundamental basis of the pursuit of national interest with realism. The historical behaviour of Japanese aid perfectly fits into the neorealist explanation of aid motivation. In fact, the MOFA (2014) openly states that providing foreign aid promotes the development of Japanese corporation by establishing the basis of investment and it also contributes to securing raw materials. In the case of South Korea, it has been not criticized as much as Japan in terms of

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* Numbers in parenthesis in sector allocation of South Korean aid shows the adjusted values from a temporary change caused by the aid for Afghanistan and Iraq, as noted by Kang et al. (2011).
national interest seeking in foreign aid, but this might be due to a small contribution in absolute term and being a relatively new donor. As mentioned, indeed, it shares many features of foreign aid in macro comparison with Japan, which is considered to be the expression of the centrality of national economic interest in aid, and the emphasis on the conditionality of tying was striking. All of this implies the prominence of national interest consideration in South Korean aid.

The tradition of neo-realism in Japanese aid was largely influenced by aid institutions. Hook (1995: 76) discusses that the Ministry of Internal Trade and Industry\(^7\) (MITI) has been influential in the decision-making of aid, which saw foreign aid as a tool for fostering export market and domestic production and cultivating the supply of natural resources and raw materials. However, Lancaster argues that there has been a shift in power structure among Ministries responsible for aid. He (2007: 139) discusses that a role of the MITI, which has been representing the economic orientation of foreign aid, declined after untying Japanese aid was massively advanced, and the rise of MOFA in aid debate, which reflects the diplomatic interest, led the Japanese aid to be more direct diplomatic orientation. As a result, foreign aid was primarily seen as an effective instrument for managing and building relationship with countries in strategically important position to Japan (ibid: 139).

Regarding the core question of this paper that is asking the donors’ motivations for the scholarship form of educational aid, it was previously explored that the developmentalist approach holds a certain degree of validity in explaining the rationale of donors by observing and establish a linkage between the their development process in the past and their contemporary aid practice. Through the discussion, it was also argued that giving a justification of their aid activity, the developmentalist approach can be explained on the basis of donor’s morality that donors choose an ‘effective’ aid policies, whose effectiveness was built upon their own experience, when it comes to the determination of a way aid is given. However, historically and contemporary following the Japanese and partly South Korean aid practice and, there has been the explicit and implicit tendency of neorealist approach to foreign aid. It has been highly focusing on the economic potential of recipient countries in terms of the contribution to its own economic interest when it comes to the determinants of foreign aid, which has been shifted to more focus on diplomatic perspective in recent decades as Lancaster (2007)

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\(^7\) It is now called the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
notes. The centrality of national interest is well expressed in its ODA Charter (2003) that begins with;

“The objectives of Japan's ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity” [Emphasis added] (MOFA 2003: 1).

Explicitly stating such interest in the axis of foreign aid policy already reveals how much the government places its significance on the centre of a priority in aid.

Moreover, in spite of the little criticism due to its small contribution in absolute term and being a relatively new donor, South Korea shares some tendencies in foreign aid with Japan, which implies the strong element of national self-interest in aid. It was also discussed that the predominant presence of tied aid within South Korean aid is outstanding among other major donors. Hence, it is still argued that Japan and South Korea is inclined to national interest in considering foreign aid and sees it as a tool for diplomacy. Therefore, this calls for a need for looking beyond the developmentalist approach since this approach does not place national interest perspective in a centre.

4-3 Scholarship aid on the basis of national self-interest?

Taking into consideration the historical observation of Japanese aid does not grant a full credit to the developmentalist approach, which explains the Japanese aid on the perspective of recipient or on the basis of moral obligation. Hence, this section critically looks into the governments’ motivation of scholarship aid from the perspective of national interest.

Analytical lens- soft power

As an analytical tool to employ in order to examine donors’ motivation, this paper uses a concept of soft power. Introduced by Nye in 1990, a concept of soft power has been increasing its presence in the field of international politics. In the discussion of power in international politics, the traditional discussion has been largely concentrating on so-called ‘hard power’ that refers to economic and military power of the states. Nye (2008: 94) perceives power as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want”, with the understanding of three ways to achieve this: threat of coercion, inducements and payments, and attraction. The traditional power dis-
Discussion has emphasized the aspect of power that moves others toward a direction you want through coercion or payments, which is usually tangible. However, Nye (1990: 160; 2008: 94) states that the states today “are less able to use their traditional power resources to achieve their purposes than in the past”, and this shift suggests another aspect of power, soft power, that can be defined as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment”. Despite the same result produced, this notion of power is contrasted, in terms of a process in which the power is used, to the nature of traditional notion of power that demands others to do what you want by relying on the hard resources. Nye (1990: 166) says that the soft power is effective in shaping others’ preference or setting an environment in the politics. The contemporary states tend to rely more on intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions, and in this sense, the power is becoming more intangible and less coercive in nature. Soft power, which can also be interpreted as the ability to establish the preference of others, is associated with intangible assets including “an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and the policies that are seen as legitimate” (Nye 2008: 95). When it comes to the resources of soft power, it has to be something that produces ‘attractiveness’.

In terms of the relevance to the understanding of foreign aid, Watson (2014: 76) states that foreign aid has often been laid on the state’s soft power strategy. It is interpreted that understanding foreign aid through the lens of soft power is standing upon, or inclined to the argument made by realists, which is explored in literature review chapter. Those who are speaking on behalf of realism in international relations illustrate foreign aid largely in terms of power relations among states and national security perspective, claiming that political actions made outside of national boundary are to seek for power that contributes to achieve national interest and security in the anarchical international environment. As literally meant by soft ‘power’, it sees international relations as well as foreign aid from the perspective of power, but focusing on the different aspect of power. Therefore, soft power emphasizes the national strategy or diplomacy when talking about foreign aid, just as realists suppose that aid is practiced with the regard to national security and self-preservation (Schraeder et al. 1998: 296). Thus, it is a useful concept to understand foreign aid from the aspect of national interest, paying attention to how this particular type of power plays in educational foreign aid.

Network building through exercising soft power
The relevance of soft power to higher education is often argued and well established, and not new. Many conceive of higher education as a source of soft power. For example, it is claimed that higher education in the United States has become an important arena for exercising soft power (Nye 2004). Then, how exactly is soft power exercised in higher education? A key concept here may be public diplomacy, which is deeply related to the concept of soft power, in understanding how soft power is expected to work in education field, especially in relation to a focus of scholarship aid. Public diplomacy is defined as “an instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources [that produce soft power] to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments” (Nye 2008: 95). In contrast to traditional way of looking at diplomacy in which the central focus is merely on the government, public diplomacy pays attention to interactions not only with foreign governments, but primarily with nongovernmental individuals and organisations (ibid: 101). According to Nye (ibid: 101-102), one of the dimensions of public diplomacy is “the development of lasting relationship with key individuals over many years through scholarship, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels” that leads to the building of “long-term relationships that create enabling environment for government policies”. In terms of establishing an enabling policy environment, Nye (2004: 43) makes an example out of the soft power in higher education in the U.S, mentioning that many of former student will be in an influential position so that they can make an impact on policy change that is important to Americans. For another instance, Times Higher Education (2014) says that approximately one in five of the central bankers in the world, 32 of the 177 central bankers, used to get education at UK universities, stating that UK benefits from educating these elites through the effect of soft power because the component of UK education can get people to make decisions favourably towards UK. The concept of public diplomacy involves how soft power is exercised as a means of diplomacy in order to achieve national diplomatic goals. Therefore, it is to argue that Japan and South Korea are engaging in aid for higher education, especially in a form of scholarship aid, to pursue national diplomatic interest by building a network with key individuals who will be able to affect policy environment involving donor countries in a long run through exercising soft power. In other words, donors are motivated to the scholarship form of aid because they can influence on and settle a lasting relationship with key human resources from recipient countries, therefore on the basis of national self-interest.

A line of evidence shows that the East Asian donors are inclined to soft power diplomacy in foreign did. Watson (2014: 76) argues that the particu-
lar language is used in foreign aid in order to convey a vision by promoting soft power. On this understanding, the use of rhetoric such as ‘recipient from donor’ or ‘bridging developed and developing world’ already demonstrates that the donors’ conscious effort for soft power strategy. Similarly, abundant evidences support the argument that donors are employing soft power in the framework of scholarship aid in order to establish a diplomatic or private network that will bring about national benefit to the donor countries. In addition to this, there is a firm evidence that demonstrates that donors are aware of this benefit, which can be achieved through aid, and acting on it. For instance, the Japanese government has launched an aid program called African Business Education Initiative for Youth (ABE Initiative), which provides the opportunity of Masters degree education in Japan and of internship at Japanese private corporations, whose objectives are stated as;

“The objective of the ABE Initiative master’s degree and internship program is to support young personnel who have the potential to contribute to the development of industries in Africa […]. This program intends to foster excellent personnells…[and,] […]he expected outcome of this program is a network of potential contributors to the development of African industries who will also lead Japanese private sector to engage in economic activities in/ towards Africa” (Japan International Cooperation Agency 2014).

As shown, it explicitly states network building as an expected outcome, regarding that those who are selected by this program are expected to be ‘excellent’ with a ‘potential’ in the future. Furthermore, there are some scholarship programs specifically designed for those who have been working for public administration, one of whose objective is stated that;

“[It] aims to cultivate national leaders of the future in Asia and around the world […]. While enhancing the participants’ understanding about Japan, it should help form a network among national leaders, contributing to the establishment of friendly relations and improved policy planning activities between worldwide, including Japan” (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan 2014).

These are just a few examples of various scholarship programs, but observing these clearly illustrates the government’s attitude that is seeking for the opportunity to build a network in both public and private sectors through providing scholarship.
While the donor government is highly focusing on ‘obtaining’ a ‘quality’ human resource as a key individual that might affect its diplomatic relationship or policy environment in a long term, it is important to look from a recipient view, that is, concerning that how getting scholarship and studying in donor countries itself has an influence on each individual who is actually receiving scholarship. Regarding this point, one of the interviewees gives a crucial clue in considering the influence on them. He is a graduate school student in university in Japan who has been receiving the government scholarship from the Japanese government. He has previously been working for the Indonesian local government where he will return to after getting a degree.

“This experience of studying in Japan will give an impact on my future promotion. It is because the promotion is based on a seniority system that considers how long you have been working and plus how higher degree you have. Getting a degree in abroad is more valuable than graduating from local universities in terms of promotion. Therefore, I, as a graduate from Japanese university with a Masters degree, will have higher chance to be one of the high officials compared to other people who do not have a degree from abroad. Many of my bosses have the experience of studying abroad. Having the experience of studying abroad was, indeed, crucial to their promotion and they are allocated to a position according to their thesis topics. Therefore, a lot of bureaucrats in government would like to study abroad in order to get future promotion” (Personal interview 2014).

Of course, this is not to generalize a context of recipient countries, but this rather presents how scholarship aid may affect individuals in terms of career pursuit, in this case, in the recipient government. While the donor countries are trying to select key individuals from recipient countries with scholarship aid, expecting them to be influential on the relationship with the donors in the future, those who receive scholarship may have a higher possibility to get promoted in their jobs compared to others as expressed in the interview. In such context, having that sort of objective in the framework of scholarship aid achieved by public diplomacy seems to be under its way if the donors also recognize this ‘cycle’.

Establishing the soft power dynamics

By this point of time, there is an arising question asking how, then, soft power can be exercised in this particular context. In other words, there is a need for considering a mechanism of soft power dynamics in the context
where scholarship aid is taking place. As mentioned, soft power is interpreted as the ability to get others to do what you want them to do and the ability to shape others’ preference, paying an important role in public diplomacy. Regarding these points, Lee and Melissen (2011: 39) illustrates a “causal path through which a sender’s soft power can get others to emphasise and support the sender’s way of life, thus securing policy goals”, as presented in Figure 8.

![Diagram of causal mechanism of soft power as productive power](image)

**Figure 8 Causal mechanism of soft power as productive power (Lee & Melissen 2011: 39)**

He argues that the process differs depending on whether persuasion occurs or not. In terms of a typology of power, Barnett and Duvall (2005: 13) establish four categories of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive form of power. These different forms of power are distinguished by which effect is produced as a result of power conduct (direct or diffuse) and how power is exercised (through interactions of specific actors or social relations of constitution) (ibid: 12). According to this classification, compulsory power is exercised when power is directly addressed to determine other’s behaviours through the direct interaction with another actor. This refers to a direct control of a receiver of power by a sender. Institutional power takes place where an actor influences other in indirect and diffuse ways through the interactions with others in formal and informal institutions. This type of power has an indirect effect because it has an institution between a sender and receiver. While both compulsory and institutional power concern about the interactions with specific actors, structural power works through “internal relations of structural positions that define what kinds of social beings actors are” (ibid: 18). Lee and Melissen (2011: 39-40), then, states that the operation and nature of soft power is well understood from the perspective of productive power, which is exercised through “diffuse social relations of constitution”. Productive power concerns the diffuse “social processes and the system of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed” (Macdonell 1986 cited in Bar-
nett & Duvall 2005: 20). In this respect, soft power is also best understood to work through socialisation process that results in shaping receiver’s empathy of and getting receiver to support for a sender’s value, practice and policy, hence leading to policy change (Lee & Melissen 2011: 40). Thus, understanding soft power as productive form of power, which is exercised through diffuse (indirect) social relations of constitutions that entails socialisation processes, interprets a causal mechanism of soft power as Figure 8 shows. This causal path demonstrates how soft power delivered by a sender eventually affects policy of a receiver via socialisation of source of soft power by the receiver. Here this soft power dynamics can be applied to the discussion of educational aid of Japan and South Korea in order to capture the mechanism of how scholarship aid generates soft power that possibly leads to change in policy environment in recipient countries through establishing a network. In other words, it shows how soft power occurring in the arena of scholarship may result in shaping the preference of others through socialisation processes, which is considered to be a part of public diplomacy.

To begin with sources of soft power in the figure, it comes to be scholarship aid not in the sense of simply giving opportunity to study in the donor countries, but also including the sense that giving an opportunity for individuals from recipient countries to reside in the donor countries. In the phase of socialisation of sources by a receiver, the grantees of scholarship from recipient countries would go through various socialisation processes. These may include education in donor countries, life experiences and social interactions in the donor societies, or more broadly the exposure to culture and society. These are all potential sources of soft power and soft power can be exercised through the socialisation of these elements. Considering this point, some of the interview outcomes provide important and relevant clues. One of the interviewees, a graduate school student in Japan from Indonesia, who has been formerly working for the parliament in Indonesia and been staying in Japan for two years with the Japanese government scholarship, mentions that;

“People like me, I’ve got the scholarship from Japan. Now I feel Japan is my second home country. Taking me this country builds not only physical attachment, but also mental attachment. It’s very difficult to forget and deny that Japan is becoming a part of my life. I’m very much inclined to Japan. I brought my family here. So it’s not only me who changed, but also my family” (Personal interview 2014).
Furthermore, another foreign student from Mexico, who has been previously working for the Ministry of Economy of Mexico and been in Japan for a year with the scholarship, states that;

“[Regarding a future career] I definitely want to have a contact to Japan in some way, actually visiting Japan or being in Japan. Regardless of whether public or private sector, I would still want to do something about Japan and keep a connection with Japan. In terms of this, I can have an advantage because I already ‘know’ Japan, its culture and language, and people also want a person with experience” (Personal interview 2014).

What can be observed from these interviews is that there is a certain degree of emotional attachment or inclination to the donor country after/while staying in the country for years. It is important to note here that this focus of the influence of foreign aid on individuals is significantly lacking among present studies. While foreign students are given opportunity to study and obtain an academic degree with scholarship aid, they are also going through various social interactions and life experiences. This should be held on because at the end of the day, scholarship involves ‘human beings’ that have subjectivity that can be developed through subjective experiences. This is significant in considering how soft power works through socialisation of sources of soft power by a receiver, which may generate emotional inclination that fosters and reinforces the process of power dynamics. Moreover, in this sense, soft power is exercised through the diffuse and indirect social processes rather than direct interactions with a specific target, therefore, the diffusion of sources takes place prior to the socialisation stage.

All these processes can lead to securing a policy goal of a sender, that is, development of lasting relationship with key individuals in the recipient countries through network building. Through the socialisation process of sources, especially, the donors are able to establish a ‘precondition’ of policy change or persuasion. In this regard, the emotional inclination to donors generated in the phase of socialisation process plays an important role in fostering network building that can be precondition of getting them to emphasize and support the donor country’s practice. This network is often retained by alumni association, which is maintained by the governments. Also, reminding the earlier interview that presents how studying abroad may affect individual’s promotion in the recipient government, this whole process is considered to be an investment for the future diplomacy because those people with emotional inclination may have higher chance to be a key figure in the recipient countries in a long term. Importantly, the emotional inclina-
tion demonstrates that soft power is in effect, regarding that soft power as productive power is to shape the preference of others through socialisation processes. Kirkland (2014) argues that higher education is a ‘good focus’ for a source of soft power partly because higher education typically gives an influence to students in the intellectually and socially critical period of life. The concentration of scholarship distribution on neighbour regions implies the government’s strategic and political intention to establish a network that is valuable in national diplomatic interest. Considering the development of long-lasting diplomatic relationship with recipient countries as a policy goal, the analysis explains how the donors achieve public diplomacy through exercising soft power in the framework of scholarship aid. The donors are clearly motivated by diplomatic national interest under the name of scholarship ‘development’ assistance while this sort of effort can only be made in higher levels of education.

4-4 Looking over influence

Critically examining the donors’ motivation from the perspective of national self-interest, it was argued that they are emphasising higher education with aid especially in a form of scholarship aid in order to achieve the establishment of network, which they expect to be beneficial in the future policy or diplomacy, through the effect of soft power. It is now clear that why the donors prefer a higher level of education to basic education in relation to their diplomatic intention, how the aid for higher education made into an arena for exercising soft power and how soft power actually works in a framework of scholarship aid. While the previous section mainly focused on the governments’ intention of the engagement of scholarship aid, this section looks into the influence of this donors’ activity.

It is to argue that a pursuit of national interest by prioritising scholarship aid fosters an existing inequality in higher education between developed and developing world, donors and recipients, or the North and South. Pointing out that the distribution of academic resources in world’s higher education is highly unequal, Altbach (2004: 7) indicates that a means of knowledge production is dominated by a few wealthy countries, primarily in the West, while higher educational institutions in developing countries can only play a limited role. He (ibid: 8) argues that higher educational institutions in developing countries are largely disadvantaged in many aspects, for instance, many of them scarce research facilities or do not give education beyond the undergraduate level, referring that this relationship is deep-rooted, which makes it hard for developing countries to play a powerful role in global knowledge network. Given this current academic landscape, the donor’s
practice to emphasize scholarship aid with little attention to the higher educational institutions in recipient countries further enlarges the disparity of academic resource between countries. In other words, focusing on the scholarship form of aid on the basis of national interest instead of providing aid for building a ground for a sustainable development of recipients’ higher education does not deal with this inequality or may even serve to strengthen it.

Altbach applied a ‘centre-periphery’ framework to interpret the outlook of global academic world, illustrating how the inequality, dependency and dominance are taking place in the structure in a way that it benefits the ‘centre’. He (ibid: 7) argues that the influential universities in the academic ‘centre’ have a dominant role in the production of knowledge, and the ‘centre’ tend to be located in rich countries that benefit from the plenty of resource, which results in the separation of the ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ in academic world. He (ibid: 8) uses the word “structural dependency” to the ongoing situation where it is difficult for developing countries to obtain the centre status, and the many of these countries in the periphery don’t have access to enough resources to develop their own higher education so that this disparity and inequality foster the dependency. According to him (ibid: 7), the world academic ‘centre’ is typically occupied by the Western countries such as the United States, UK, France and Germany. For Lo (2011: 210), a platform of ‘centre-periphery’ in academia is primarily led by the U.S and UK in order to keep the dominance of these powers over the knowledge production and dissemination in higher education. However, focusing on the inequality in social science field, Alatas (2003: 606) argues that the dichotomy of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ is not simply Western and non-Western and claims a need for a third category, ‘semi-periphery’. A ‘semi-periphery’ is an academic community that while it itself is dependent on the knowledge produced from the ‘centre’, it has a certain degree of influence on ‘periphery’ communities (ibid: 606). Taking various views into account, Japan and South Korea are considered to fall into the category of ‘semi-periphery’ because they have a certain level of influence on developing countries through for example, transferring the research fund and the grant of scholarship in foreign aid.
Figure 9 demonstrates how the existing inequality in academic world can be understood through the lens of ‘centre-periphery’ with the additional group of ‘semi-periphery’. Through the lens of ‘centre-periphery’, it is drawn that how ‘periphery’ states are dependent on both ‘centre’ and ‘semi-periphery’ in terms of knowledge production. Under this structure, universities in developing countries either only copy development from those they are dependent on or generate little original knowledge that can only have a limited role (Altbach 1998 cited in Quy 2010: 23). Regarding the aid practice of Japan and South Korea in ‘semi-periphery’ group, they provide primarily the scholarship form of aid to higher education in recipient countries, which does not directly take into account a capacity building of local institutions. It makes recipients more dependent on them for a certain knowledge production and serves to maintain this structure, hence the generation and reinforcement of dependency. It is important to note that countries in ‘semi-periphery’ are also made serve to preserve the dominant influence of ‘centre’ in various ways. For instance, some argue that global university ranking is one of the agenda setting that affects counters out of ‘centre’ in order to keep its dominance. Deem et al. (2008: 88) states that governments and universities in Asia take the ranking seriously to be ‘world competitive’, which is largely occupied by a few powerful countries. This exemplifies how countries are made to engage in the agenda that structurally serves to maintain the position of ‘centre’.
Further considering the effect of agenda setting on ‘periphery’, Tikly (2004) identifies the World Bank’s practice as a form of oppression of developing countries through agenda setting. Largely inclined to human capital theory, which insisted the relative importance of primacy education that led to little attention given to higher education in developing countries, he (ibid: 190) mentions that the Bank’s approach has resulted in further lowering the capacity of developing countries to educational agenda setting and taking away the ground for local research and innovation important to future development. Tikly (2004 cited in Lo 2011: 213) states “this form of power and oppression is disciplinary rather than political rationales”. Together with the regard to agenda setting by the World Bank, the donors’ practice of emphasis of scholarship in educational aid also serves to ignore the capacity building for knowledge production or innovation in local level. Significantly, such the persistent aid practice may weaken an intellectual autonomy of recipient countries in ‘periphery’ that reinforces the effect of dependency between donors and recipients. Also, the “acceptance [means] increased ties to the donor countries and institutions and long-term dependence on the countries providing the aid” (Altbach 2004: 9). Therefore, it keeps the relative dominance to ‘periphery’. Just as Tikly notes, even though this may not be a direct political rationale of aid, this is the influence of disciplinary oppression caused by the over-emphasis on scholarship in their educational aid in order to establish network with recipients on the basis of national self-interest, that is, reinforcing the structural dependency and inequality between the donors and recipients.

**Chapter 5: Concluding remarks**

This research was to examine the motivations of the Japanese and South Korean governments to emphasize scholarship form of aid and influences produced by it on recipient countries. The study has begun with the exploration of influential educational aid debate primarily led by the World Bank, which has shaped a ground for criticising the emphasis of aid for higher education. The elitist nature of aid for higher education was pointed out. Also, aid for higher education was considered to have less potential to contribute to recipient’s development because of a low rate of social returns. The empirical research chapter clearly presented the ‘inconsistency’ of educational aid practice of Japan and South Korea with the international consensus to give a priority to basic education. Statistical data suggested that the proportion of aid for basic education in Japanese and South Korean aid have been
significantly lower than the DAC average over time. It was also revealed by evidences that both donors enormously emphasize aid for higher education with a form of scholarship.

Considering the donors’ motivation for engaging in scholarship aid despite severe criticisms based on the global dominant trend, this research looked at the development experience of donor countries, a relevance of which to their aid practice is implied. Some of the important points to note about their industrialisation process were; an element of learning from advanced countries was crucial in the late industrialisation; and a role of engineers was a key factor in the process of development in both Japan and South Korea. These are well illustrated by a work of Amsden and these characteristics are very much distinctive industrialisation in earlier days.

The research finding showed that the scholarship has been predominantly distributed to students majoring engineering, which implies the overlap with their preceding development experience whose key figure was engineers in relation to a relative importance of technology transfer in late industrialisation. Based on the idea of “causal beliefs”, it was argued that if the donors believe how states can achieve an effective development from their own experience, this idea might probably be reflected in their aid practice. A series of evidence and discussion leaves a space for governments to advocate developmentalist approach that gives them a justification of their practices.

However, observing the historical aid behaviour of donors revealed an explicit tendency of traditionally taking neorealist approach in foreign aid, and this called for the need of looking beyond the developmentalist approach and investigate the motivation on the basis of national interest. The paper, then, moved on to the analysis of donors’ motivation through the lens of soft power. It was argued that the donor governments are strongly engaging in scholarship aid to achieve a network building in order to make an enabling policy environment, which is a part of public diplomacy. It was followed by examining how exactly soft power is exercised in the context of scholarship aid in a way to help the donors accomplish an enabling diplomatic environment through building a network. Using a model of a causal path of soft power elaborated by Lee and Melissen (2011: 39), it was made clear that how the life experience in donor countries brought about by scholarship grant (the source of soft power) is experienced by students who receive scholarship (a receiver of soft power) through socialisation process. Numerous interview outcomes demonstrated a presence of a certain degree of emotional inclination to donor countries and robustly proved that soft power was under effect through the socialisation process. The emotional influence of students is significant because it obviously contributes to the
network building and the development of relationship with donor countries, and also in terms of the probability of students’ future promotion in recipient countries as explicitly expressed in the interview, which would raise the importance of this whole process for donors to reach its policy goals. A possible consequence of over-emphasis of scholarship aid as a means to achieve national interest was examined by employing a ‘centre-periphery’ framework. It was argued that how the emphasis on scholarship without paying attention to a capacity building of local institutions reinforces the structural dependency of knowledge production and inequality between donors and recipients.

Regarding the research question concerning donors’ motivation of scholarship aid, it was able to establish a certain degree of linkage between the donors’ development experience and their current aid practice from the perspective of developmentalist approach. This approach can be valid to the extent that the donors are emphasising the factor that was crucial to their development. However, numerous evidences supported a view that a core motivation remains on the basis of national self-interest. The donors are primarily seeking for diplomatic benefit by using scholarship aid because it becomes a favourable arena for a soft power strategy. Yet, it doesn’t mean that these two are mutually exclusive, and a centrality of national interest in motivation doesn’t deny the presence of developmentalist approach. Riddell (1987: 65) notes that the elements of national interest and moral consideration are relational and they coexist. As explored, one of the views made by him (ibid: 65) is that the moral consideration is relevant in decision-making of aid and not forgotten or eliminated though it is less important while the national interest consideration remains fundamental in determining aid. This suggests that the developmentalist approach and the aid motivation based on national interest are not in ‘black and white’ relationship. However, it was made clear in the arguments of paper that developmentalist approach, indeed, remains very much secondary in considering aid motivation, even if the governments may be able to establish a rationale out of it because of its certain ‘validity’. In this sense, the donors primarily perceive the scholarship form of aid as a tool for ensuring national diplomatic interests with an obvious contradiction to the term ‘development assistance’.

**Contributions of the research**

Despite the implication of the donors’ their own development experience to their contemporary aid practice in political sphere, current studies have failed to pay attention to the linkage between them. Therefore, by ex-
plicitly examining this relevance (developmentalist approach), this research gives an academic examination to the implication in the political statement.

Also, in spite of its quantitative significance for a few donors, academic study on scholarship aid has been largely neglected. In this sense, this is one of a very few studies that focuses on and problematize the donor’s aid practice on scholarship. The originality can also be derived from the analysis of scholarship aid through the soft power dynamics that entails the investigation of the influence on individuals, which is often a subject to be undermined in aid discussions.

**Implication for further research**

It was pointed out in the paper, but there is a sudden increase in the Japanese aid for basic education in 2012, which almost brought itself up to the DAC average. At this point of time, it is hard to know whether this was just a temporary shock for some factors, or as a result of international pressure on the Japanese government. Hence, the observation of future change may imply a need for the later study.
References


