Perceptions of Pan-Americanism: U.S.-Latin American Relations c. 1900-1945

Master Thesis

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Chapter One: Introduction

Latin Pan-Americanism

‘We know that there are different ideas and even differences among ourselves, but CELAC has been built upon a heritage of two hundred years of struggle for independence and is based on a profound commonality of goals. Therefore, CELAC is not a succession of mere meetings or pragmatic coincidences, but a common vision of a Greater Latin American and Caribbean Homeland which only has a duty to its peoples.’

Raúl Castro, President of Cuba, January 28th 20141

The Cuban President delivered these words at the latest summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in Havana. CELAC was established in 2010 with the purpose of promoting Latin American integration and solidarity, whilst simultaneously excluding the United States and Canada. It is a modern alternative to the Washington-based Organisation of American States (OAS), accused of having served the interests of the United States rather than the interests of the region as a whole.2 The organisation can be viewed as part of a regional movement that has in recent years looked to integrate, strengthen, and free Latin American states from the dominating influence of their northern neighbour.

In the last 15 years, in what some have called the ‘Pink Tide’, numerous Latin American states have elected left-oriented governments, often with anti-American tendencies. Former rebel, Salvador Sánchez Cerén, is the latest leftist politician to take power in Latin America, narrowly defeating the right-wing opposition in the elections of February 2014. The new president of El Salvador developed his political ideology as a youth during the Cold War, and later became one of the original five ‘commandants’ of the Frente Farabundo Martí

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para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), the umbrella organisation of guerrilla groups fighting the U.S.-backed governments in the 1980-92 civil war. In contrast to the opposition, the FMLN party favours a strong government role in the economy. The leftist governments present difficulties for the United States economically and politically, with many states nationalising large industries, making efforts to distance themselves from U.S. dominated institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and denying the United States use of military bases. The movement has also been said to represent a break with the ‘Washington consensus’ of the 1990s, a mixture of open markets and privatisation advocated by the United States that was deemed to have failed to bridge the chasm between rich and poor.

Sánchez Cerén joins a long list of left-wing leaders currently in power. In fact, right-leaning governments remain only in Paraguay and a few small Caribbean states. Obviously, leftist governments harbour varying degrees of leftist conviction and anti-Americanism, but some of the most radical and outspoken critics of the United States are Evo Morales, of Bolivia; Rafael Correa, of Ecuador; and Nicolas Maduro, the Venezuelan president struggling to maintain the legacy of his famous predecessor, Hugo Chávez, who inspired and organised the creation of CELAC. Morales has regularly been critical, citing the need for Latin America to break free of U.S. imperialism as well as nationalising the oil and gas industries, showing little commitment to America’s war on drugs, expelling the U.S. ambassador in 2008, and threatening to close the U.S. embassy after an incident in 2013 in which Morales’ plane was grounded in Europe following rumours that CIA whistleblower Edward Snowden was aboard.

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Ecuador's government declared the expulsion of the U.S. military from the Manta air base in 2009 a 'recovery of sovereignty.' Such examples indicate that an integral characteristic of the leftist movement is that it is a backlash to a perceived period of exploitation and imperialism by the 'Colossus of the North', the United States.

The very existence of CELAC and the seemingly unstoppable momentum of the 'Pink Tide' raise important questions about the nature of American power. In the 20th century it would have been impossible to imagine Washington allowing so many states in its own 'backyard' to fall into the hands of unfriendly governments, nor that it would have allowed an exclusive organization like CELAC to exist. Time and again we witnessed, either through military interventions or covert operations, the United States exercise its vast power and shape Latin America to its needs. So what has changed? Has American power dwindled? Is its focus elsewhere? In Europe? In Asia? Whatever the answer to these questions, the United States will likely have to continue to face the threat of potential exclusion from affairs in the Western Hemisphere.

As we watch the political situation in Latin America develop, it strikes me that an entirely different kind of Pan-Americanism is emerging. This new movement has retained the fundamental principles espoused by the inspirational revolutionary, Simón Bolívar, though differs from the Pan-Americanism championed by the United States over the last two centuries. It now takes the form of Latin Pan-Americanism, with an obvious focus on excluding the United States and escaping from its dominating character.

Raúl Castro’s choice of vocabulary at the CELAC summit presents us with a telling image of how Latin Americans have viewed their recent history. ‘A heritage of two hundred years of struggle for independence’ suggests that in the opinion of many Latin Americans, the wars of the early 19th century represented not the liberation of Latin America, but simply the substitution of one imperial power, Spain, for another, the United States. This being said, the general consensus is that the United States only truly rose to its preeminent position in the early 20th century, although the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823

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suggests that they at least saw themselves in that role long before. In my selected period of 1900-1945, Pan-Americanism was (albeit to varying degrees depending on the administration) a major feature of the political rhetoric in the United States. In light of the budding 21st century Latin Pan-Americanism, a study of historical Pan-Americanism in relation to American imperialism should prove an interesting and fruitful task. Harold Molineu maintains that the importance of this regional history deserves attention because of what he calls the ‘historical imperative’: the belief that ‘the origins of crucial events today are directly linked to the experiences of the past.’When thinking about contemporary attempts at Latin American integration, we cannot dismiss the dynamic role that the United States has historically played in the region.

The following historiographical review will give a brief introduction to the literature that exists on the subject of American imperialism and the relationship between the United States and the states of Latin America. It is within this field that a study of the role of Pan-Americanism in U.S. foreign policy will find its relevance. I aim to assess how American leaders perceived Pan-Americanism, how it developed from its Bolivarian origins, and most importantly, how it was used to achieve foreign policy goals.

**Historiographical Review**

*An American Empire?*

Considering the fact that my hypothesis rests upon a few specific presumptions, this section will be devoted to engaging with the current historiography of the subject to see where I place myself within the debates. In my view, the United States is an empire, but not all agree. I also believe that the United States’ foreign policy towards Latin America in my period can legitimately be described as informal imperialism. Two main questions usually arise with regards to American imperialism: Is the United States an empire? If so, is this necessarily a bad thing? For a long time these questions have divided opinion

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among scholars. With regards to whether or not the United States is an empire, the answer tends to boil down to what definition one chooses to use. Philip Pomper states that when defined, the meaning of the word ‘empire’ can generally be attributed to one of two ways of thinking: formal definitions which require certain and decisive features to be present, or broader definitions that give the status of ‘empire’ to states that demonstrate perceived imperial characteristics derived from great power.\[10\] David Abernethy falls firmly into the first category, defining empire in political terms ‘as a relationship of domination and subordination between one polity (called the metropole) and one or more territories (called colonies) that lie outside the metropole’s boundaries yet are claimed as its lawful possessions’; Michael Doyle offers a similar definition.\[11\] Under such a rigid definition of empire, one must conclude that the United States is not an empire, or at least not a great empire - Puerto Rico, Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands remain the only unincorporated territories.

But this is merely one definition of empire. At the other end of the spectrum lies Charles Maier, who claimed that ‘the inequality of power, resources, and influence is what distinguishes an empire from an alliance.’\[12\] The definitions for empire have been stretched from the narrowest of the narrow to the broadest of the broad... and everywhere in between. Without a universal definition this problem looks set to continue, and has even led Alexander Motyl to declare empire’s analytical utility to be ‘close to nil.’\[13\] Though as Maier sensibly observes, the real objective of the question is not to discover what to call the United States but to ascertain what structural and behavioural characteristics resemble those of earlier entities that we have so confidently named empires.\[14\]

There is a vast array of differing approaches to the American Empire though they can, according to Paul MacDonald, be generally categorised into

three main groups: imperial enthusiasts, imperial critics, and imperial sceptics.\textsuperscript{15} Those in the third category argue against the existence of an American Empire, and so are relevant here to the first main question. In addition to those mentioned above, Anna Simons, who claims that international norms against conquest prevent the United States from acting like an empire, and John Ikenberry, who believes that the tendency to act through multilateral alliances and institutions distinguishes the United States from empires past, fall into this category.\textsuperscript{16} It is true that international norms against conquest prevent the United States from acting like a colonial empire in the classical sense but this does not mean that it is not one, simply that the form of imperialism has changed from colonialism to informal imperialism. Ikenberry’s argument is dubitable, as the United States has often shown its willingness to operate unilaterally if supranational institutions do not fall in line with U.S. interests and even when allies join them it is the United States that initiates action and provides the bulk of troops and resources.

Robinson and Gallagher’s work on the imperialism of free trade highlights the flaw in using narrow definitions for empire. As they stated, judging an empire only by its formal colonies is ‘rather like judging the size and character of icebergs solely from the parts above the water-line.’\textsuperscript{17} Past empires have exercised both formal and informal control, choosing different strategies where it suits them best. As the United States was rising to power the Old World powers were in decline and anti-colonialism thriving, making a policy of informal imperialism a more appropriate course of action. Julian Go tackles differing methods of imperialism with a ‘global fields’ approach.\textsuperscript{18} This method analyses policy choices considering the contemporary state of global conditions and in this way he presents a strong explanation for the United States’ choice to

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\textsuperscript{15} P. MacDonald, ‘Those who forget historiography are doomed to republish it: empire, imperialism and contemporary debates about American power’, Review of International Studies 35 (2009), pp. 48-49.
\end{flushleft}
generally pursue informal imperialism rather than colonialism. The ‘global fields’ approach will feature in my comparison in Chapter 5.

Imperial enthusiasts claim that the United States is an empire and that it will have a positive effect on the world.\textsuperscript{19} Neoconservative Robert Kagan argues that America plays a key role in maintaining international security, and that those who complain of ‘U.S. hegemony’ forget the importance of the American presence.\textsuperscript{20} Others like Niall Ferguson and Michael Ignatieff are liberal imperialists, who promote an American Empire because they believe it will have a positive effect on the world in moral and humanitarian sectors. Ferguson’s \textit{Colossus} urges the United States to act more like an empire of old, to accept the responsibilities that come with being a liberal empire and sustain interventions and nation-building efforts to ensure success as opposed the current tactics of leaving conflict zones at the first available opportunity.\textsuperscript{21} This rather controversial view of empire has been accused of being so for the sake of popularity, and imperial sceptic Alexander Motyl has other issues with it too. Ferguson criticises the United States for not acting like an empire, leading Motyl to ask the pertinent question: if the United States does not act like an empire, is it one? I do not agree with Ferguson’s call for more imperialism nor his claims that the United States does not act like an empire. Nor do I agree with Motyl’s claim that empires can only differ from one another in ‘nonessential, nondefining characteristics’.\textsuperscript{22} Selecting which characteristics one deems ‘essential’ is no different than selecting a definition for empire; it hinges on the presence or absence of formal colonies as an ‘essential’ characteristic.

In opposition to the imperial enthusiasts are the imperial critics who recognise the imperialism of the United States but believe it has a detrimental effect on the world. Liberal critics argue that the aggressive imperial strategy of the United States threatens to undermine the liberal global order. Marxist historians question the moral implications of an American Empire because of their interpretation of its economically exploitative form of dominance that

\textsuperscript{19} MacDonald, ‘Those who forget’, p. 48. 
\textsuperscript{22} Motyl, ‘Is Empire Everything’, p. 245.
seeks to take resources and impose free-market capitalism.\textsuperscript{23} This is a particularly relevant criticism with regards to Latin America. To this category I would add the ‘Wisconsin school’ scholars that build on the work of William Appleman Williams. They also stress the economic form of U.S. imperialism but also highlight the subordination of cultural and political life that is inherent within such a policy.\textsuperscript{24}

The focus of my thesis between the years 1900-1945 falls within the formative period of the American Empire in the Americas, so I must note here that many writers from all three categories accept that the United States had an imperial phase (in the traditional sense of colonialism and military occupations) in the late 18\textsuperscript{th} and early 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries. The United States annexed Hawaii, the Philippines, and Guam, though much of this expansion was focused in the Western Hemisphere; the years 1898-1933 saw the United States exercise its ‘hard power’ with at least 35 military interventions in Latin America.\textsuperscript{25} Among historians the ascendancy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the White House is often considered to mark the end of this phase, as the Good Neighbour Policy that ensued is regularly portrayed in the mould of the Good Samaritan.\textsuperscript{26} It is now in with this narrower focus that I must specifically deal with the historiography of U.S.-Latin American relations and, within this, Pan-Americanism itself.

\textit{A Hemisphere to Itself?}

The field has undergone change over time and critical accounts now seem to dominate it due to the evolving image of U.S. power. As Louis Pérez Jr. put it in 1982, ‘[the passage of] Time has permitted this generation of scholars to see the contemporary fruits of American intervention sixty years ago, and for many it has been a grim harvest indeed.’\textsuperscript{27} Certainly, events since the end of the Second

\textsuperscript{23} MacDonald, ‘Those who forget’, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
World War have cast shadows over the United States’ identity as an altruistic role model for other states. The motives behind U.S. policy are questioned more today than they were half a century ago; in Western Europe, a traditional stronghold of support for the United States, interests have diverged significantly, surveys show that this is even true for the other half of the Anglophone ‘special relationship’, the United Kingdom. More strikingly, and more importantly for the understanding of the historiographical developments in this field, is the current transformation in Latin American politics.

The crumbling strength of the United States’ moral standing has affected the historiography of U.S.-Latin American relations as a whole; unpopular overseas interventions have impacted interpretations of ‘American exceptionalism.’ The actions of the United States face worldwide scrutiny and they are now on the receiving end of a barrage of anti-imperial diatribes from the inhabitants of its own ‘backyard’. In this climate, with the leaders of Latin America reconsidering their position vis-à-vis the United States, it should follow that a reevaluation of the history of the troubled relationship should take place... and it has. Traditional accounts of U.S.-Latin American relations always portrayed the United States as a benevolent protector. Publications during the Wilson administration supported this view. Charles Chandler’s work of 1917 stressed the Pan-American origins of the Monroe Doctrine, whilst Frederic Paxson’s work of 1916 praised the historically ‘disinterested’ nature of the United States in the Western Hemisphere – this perhaps influenced President Wilson’s Pan-American rhetoric (see Chapter 2). These traditional accounts were challenged in the 1960s by post-war revisionists including Williams. These views of American history struck ‘at the heart of U.S. society’, questioning the established moral foundations of U.S. foreign policy. Williams’ claimed that opening and controlling foreign markets was essential to domestic well-being, and therefore the driving force behind U.S. expansion. Following the ‘Wisconsin

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31 Williams, The Tragedy, pp. 10-11.
school’s work in the 1960s on the transitional period that saw the United States turn to policies of informal empire, the ideas of Williams and his protégés like Walter LaFeber have permeated historical literature and become widely accepted.\textsuperscript{32}

Various other approaches also confirm the importance of economic factors in U.S.-Latin American relations during this period. Michael Krenn argues that it was in the post-First World War period that the United States established its hegemony over Latin America, with corporate industrialism being the driving force.\textsuperscript{33} We must also recognise the pivotal role that U.S.-Latin American relations played in the emergence of dependency theory, sponsored by Andre Gunder Frank and others.\textsuperscript{34} The crux of the dependency theorists’ argument is that economic development and economic underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin, because the very process of development in the centre leads to underdevelopment in the periphery.\textsuperscript{35} This is the result of the structures of the state system and the capitalist global division of labour, as the peripheries are incorporated into the system of production. Mechanisms of dependence, including unequal trade relations, transnational investment, and global financial arrangements, condition the peripheries’ development prospects by ensuring domination by the system’s centres.\textsuperscript{36} The peripheries then enter an inferior position where they are exploited for cheap labour and natural resources whilst serving as a new market for exports from the centre.

As a result of the extensive and varied work questioning the motives behind U.S. policy, negative accounts of U.S. imperialism seem to have become the norm. One such work is Frank Niess’ book, from which I have borrowed the title for this section, entitled \textit{A Hemisphere to Itself: A History of U.S.-Latin American Relations}. The title itself is suggestive of the uneven relationship and the book is laden with Marxist subtext. For Niess, U.S. policy towards Latin America has always been directed by a relentless urge to open and exploit new

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\item Randall, ‘Ideology’, p. 207.
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markets. His opinion of one of the earliest and most regularly referenced endeavours of Pan-Americanism, the Monroe Doctrine, is that it concealed their designs on Latin America ‘under a cloak of legitimacy.’ Niess’ underlying methodology places him largely in line with the dependency theorists; the most notable point to make here is that he sees periods of amicable relations in a negative light, arguing for example that the years of the Good Neighbour policy greatly increased economic dependency. Though critical accounts do not necessarily have to focus exclusively on economic factors; Stephen Randall in his work on the historiography of U.S.-Latin American relations observes that most recent scholarship is both pluralist and critical.

Works of this nature mark a distinct break from pro-United States views and emphasise American imperialism. As it is now common in academic literature to refer to the United States as an empire, and not always pejoratively, it is interesting that the term rarely features in U.S. politics. The United States is still an ‘empire in denial.’ With recent scholarly trends in mind, claims like that of Ezequiel Padilla, who declared that the Good Neighbour policy represented a ‘radical break from history’ because of the uniqueness of the United States’ ‘unequivocal repudiation of imperialism’, seem somewhat naïve. The titles of most recent works suggest a more general shift towards narratives that seek not to deny U.S. imperialism in the Western Hemisphere but explain it.

Naturally, critical accounts are not immune from criticism themselves. James Cochrane has argued that what many perceive as U.S. imperialism can more accurately be explained as ‘the results of the vast disparity in power and wealth between the United States and the Latin American countries.’ Ironically, this is Maier’s very definition of empire. I struggle to recall any states in history that have wielded magnificent wealth and power and managed to refrain from

40 Ferguson, Colossus, pp. 3-7.
(what most would call) imperialism towards far weaker neighbours. Furthermore, if Cochrane is arguing that the intentions were not imperialist but the results were, well then I would counter by arguing that U.S. foreign policy was rarely explicitly imperialist and that simply being in denial of imperialism does not grant one immunity from the accusation.

_The Meaning of Pan-Americanism._

Pan-Americanism as a concept or movement has not regularly appeared as the primary focus of academic works, though it (or the ideals it represents) is present in almost all studies of U.S.-Latin American relations. The term is representative of an idea that had an extremely strong influence on U.S. foreign policy from the times of Simón Bolívar and José de San Martín, which saw huge swathes of the region break free from the shackles of the imperial powers of Europe, to the Second World War and beyond. However, tracking the evolution and pinpointing the meaning of Pan-Americanism can be problematic; the origins of the term and its defining characteristics are made known to us with astounding variety. Joseph B. Lockey, one of the few who has written extensively on Pan-Americanism, conducted a study in 1925 to ascertain the meaning of the term. From a variety of dictionaries and encyclopedias he concluded that the only trait that all the definitions shared was that pan-Americanism was limited in scope to the states of the New World.\(^{45}\) Given the diversity of meanings attributed to the term in the past, it is unsurprising that today's most frequently used sources of information offer broad and inoffensive definitions of the term. The Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines Pan-Americanism simply as ‘a movement for greater cooperation among the Pan-American nations’ whilst Wikipedia offers roughly the same definition, adding only that greater cooperation should be achieved ‘through diplomatic, political, economic and social means.’\(^{46}\)

Yet in the past, meanings of the term have taken on far more specific dimensions. One of Lockey’s more intriguing discoveries was found in *La Grand Encyclopédie* and claims that Pan-Americanism groups the American republics under the hegemony of the United States.\(^47\) This is a far cry from the broad definitions found on today’s most popular online sources. Though it’s meaning remains unclear, as hegemony here could refer to no more than the theoretical protection of the hemisphere declared by the United States by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. Lockey himself offers a meaning of his own, stating that ‘Pan-Americanism is a moral union of the American States, based upon a body of principles’, the rather idealistic list of principles being as follows, ‘Independence’, ‘Representative government’, ‘Territorial integrity’, ‘Law instead of force’, ‘Non-intervention’, ‘Equality’, and ‘Cooperation’.*48\(^*\) This type of principled definition was common among academics and politicians alike. Woodrow Wilson took a similar attitude in a speech delivered on the 7\(^{th}\) December 1915, naming it not a moral union but the ‘effectual embodiment’ of a shared spirit ‘of law and independence and liberty and mutual service.’\(^49\)

Such definitions of Pan-Americanism were certainly uplifting oratory tools, though they reveal little about the realities of Pan-American policy because as we know the principles of ‘Law instead of force’ and ‘Non-intervention’ were applied sparingly by the United States. The prominent practical recommendation of such Pan-American ideologies was that the Western Hemisphere distance itself from the Old World, which was deemed incapable of upholding such moral and virtuous principles, so that the New World might develop its civilisation without interference from outside.\(^50\)

Ezequiel Padilla, a Mexican politician known for being extremely pro-American, wrote in 1954 that the essence of Pan-Americanism was economic solidarity. He felt that a Pan-American society based primarily on economic interdependence would eventually eradicate the problems of ‘slave wages,
unemployment and fear." Here we encounter one extreme of a debate that divides historians of U.S.-Latin American relations. Padilla stands firm on one side that sees Pan-Americanism as a way to a mutually beneficial union of states in which all parties grow stronger as a result of increasing interdependence. Dependency theorists occupy the other extreme, proposing that Latin American states were incorporated into the world economy on the terms of the United States and European powers. In this view, interdependence has not brought mutual benefits but instead has nurtured economic underdevelopment in the region. These are of course the two poles of the debate; most writers plant their flag somewhere between them. In her study of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy, Amy Spellacy states that the initiative, clearly drenched in Pan-American sentiment, served both ‘to promote a sense of inter-American unity and facilitate continued U.S. economic and political domination of the hemisphere.’

In light of the historiography of U.S. foreign policy and Pan-Americanism, I feel it appropriate now to clarify my position. American work published during my period of study tended to be flattering, and it has even been asserted that the scholarship at the time served to lend intellectual credibility to the political premises of policy and moral support to the actions of the State. A positive view of U.S. policy towards Latin America is no longer the norm, and for good reason. Current affairs in the Western Hemisphere serve only to highlight the realities of the rocky history between north and south. Pan-Americanism was not the driving force of foreign policy in the United States. The United States was and is a Western power, acting more like the Old World powers of Europe than as part of a new and distinct society of the Americas, though their neighbours in the Western Hemisphere were key sources of raw materials, important for national security, and vital as markets for surplus goods. For the United States, Pan-Americanism was a constructed concept that allowed for it to assert its authority within a specified spatial boundary; the very notion of the Western Hemisphere as a meaningful entity is a shaky one, with arguably not even geography

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53 Pérez, 'Intervention', p. 172.
presenting strong arguments for hemispheric solidarity.\textsuperscript{54} I therefore consider myself to be in line with a strong contingent of scholars, notably the ‘Wisconsin school’, which objects to the premise of American exceptionalism and is aware of the imperialist nature of the United States. This imperialism has nowhere has been more evident than in its revealingly named ‘backyard’, in the states of Latin America.

**Hypothesis and Research Questions**

‘Between 1900-1945, Pan-Americanism served as a legitimising concept in U.S. foreign policy, disguising its intentions of establishing political and economic dominance in the region.’

The above statement is my hypothesis that I aim to prove in this thesis. It has been formulated following my research into the topic using both primary and secondary sources. The hypothesis naturally possesses certain assumptions, the most obvious being that the goal of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America was to assert political and economic control. The inspiration behind this assumption is derived from William Appleman Williams’ *The Tragedy of Diplomacy* and was confirmed in my own primary research. Across a broad time period I found that U.S. policymakers possessed what Williams’ called the ‘dogmatic belief’: that continuous overseas expansion was essential to domestic well-being. I also believe that security concerns also played an important role in U.S.-Latin American relations, and though Williams approaches the issue from an economic perspective, he acknowledges that open-door imperialism naturally incorporates a level of cultural and political subordination.\textsuperscript{55}

What really strikes me when reading Williams is that it is strangely prophetic. He argues that the open-door expansion that was the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy had a limited shelf-life, and that in time the practice of informal imperialism would breed resentment. The Latin American ‘shift to the

\textsuperscript{54} Spellacy, ‘Mapping the Metaphor’, pp. 43-44.
\textsuperscript{55} Williams, *The Tragedy*, p. 10, 300.
left’ appears to be part of a reaction against a century of open-door imperialism. Could this be the belated realisation of Williams’ warning that continued open-door expansion would lead to contempt and the isolation of the United States?56

My research into primary sources and current events in the Western Hemisphere has led me to attribute a great quality to the work of Williams, and it has influenced my own personal worldview when approaching the subject of Pan-Americanism. Additionally, I have formulated a number of research questions designed to focus my research and thus draw more specific and accurate conclusions. They are as follows:

1. What were the origins of Pan-Americanism and what did it mean to the United States by the 20th century?
2. How large a role did Pan-Americanism play in the formulation of U.S. policy towards Latin America?
3. Was there striking changes or continuities in the Pan-American rhetoric employed by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt?
4. To what extent was Pan-Americanism just a useful ideological tool that helped the United States to achieve foreign policy objectives?

This thesis will show the manner in which Pan-Americanism was morphed by the United States and utilised in pursuit of the expansion of American power in Latin America. As Latin America today experiences a revival of Pan-Americanism in its classic sense, it is important to consider how the movement was misused by the United States as this will provide some insight into why they are becoming increasingly excluded from Latin American politics.

56 Ibid., p. 300.
Chapter Two: American Pan-Americanism

This chapter aims to track the origins of the Pan-American movement in order to evaluate its role in U.S. foreign policy in the 19th and early 20th century. It will trace the Americanisation of the movement and its interaction with another political philosophy: the ever-present ideology of manifest destiny. It will then seek to evaluate the position of the United States as it stood before the Wilson administration, and the role of Pan-Americanism within this position. This chapter should help us to understand where Pan-Americanism came from and to what extent it influenced foreign policy in the 19th century. This will give us the basis to continue into a deeper analysis of the role of Pan-Americanism in the first half of the 20th century, when it came under the direction of Woodrow Wilson and later, Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The Origins of Pan-Americanism

The Spanish American wars of independence that raged in the early 19th century generated a host of new independent states, as well as new ideas. The Great Liberator, Simón Bolívar, envisaged a New World that would stand against the evils of imperialism. Bolívar himself was of Spanish decent and a leading member of the white elite in his native Venezuela.57 Raised mostly by an enslaved black nurse, inspired by the revolutions of France and the United States and exposed to the ideas of the Enlightenment during his time in Europe, Bolívar returned to Venezuela in 1807 with a mission to liberate his homeland and end slavery.58 Politically ahead of his time, his dream for the Western Hemisphere inspired the Pan-American movement.59 Writing in 1815 from Kingston, Jamaica, to a British citizen, Henry Cullen, Bolívar laid out his vision for the future of the Americas. Though he acknowledged that the unification of all the Americas into one single state was a ‘grandiose’ but implausible idea, he did set his sights on a

58 Ibid., pp. 15-24.
community of free and independent states that might have the fortune to meet in
‘an assembly of representatives of republics, kingdoms, and empires to
deliberate upon the high interests of peace and war with the nations of the other
three-quarters of the globe.’ The dream of this type of assembly was realised at
the 1826 Congress of Panama, organised by Bolívar, and continued to influence
the succession of Pan-American conferences and organisations that came to pass
thereafter. Despite these first Pan-American steps being more dream than reality
(only four states were represented at the first conference), the influence Bolívar
had on the future of inter-American relations was huge.

Bolívar’s vision for the future focused on cooperation to achieve his
liberal goals, ‘Is it not unity alone that is needed to enable them to expel the
Spaniards, their troops, and the supporters of corrupt Spain and to establish in
these regions a powerful empire with a free government and benevolent laws!’
Cooperation, unity, and equality would go on to become the defining
characteristics of Pan-Americanism. The emphasis on inter-American harmony
led to the abundance of family and neighbour metaphors that would later
become associated with the Pan-American movement.

Whilst Bolívar was embroiled in war, the United States was showing signs
of a shared desire to realise the possibilities of the New World. Washington,
Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, Clay, and Monroe all expressed strong Pan-
American sentiments in the early years of the Union. Jefferson supported the
liberation of the Latin American states so that a new international community
might come to exist, with ‘separate systems of interest, which must not be
subordinated to those of Europe.’ Later John Quincy Adams’ Secretary of State,
Henry Clay, would ardently support the Pan-American movement and pushed for
American involvement at the Congress of Panama.

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60 S. Bolívar, ‘To H. Cullen, Kingston, Jamaica, September 6, 1815’,
61 Ibid.
62 J. Barrett, ‘Pan-Americanism and its Inspiration in History’, Records of the Columbia Historical
63 T. Jefferson, ‘To A. von Humboldt, December 6, 1813’,
At this point, about a quarter of the way through the 19th century, the United States occupied an interesting position within the Western Hemisphere. In many ways it possessed a shared heritage with its southern neighbours: it was a newly independent state with a robust distaste for Europe’s empires. Yet it was also differentiated from Latin America in many ways: racial demography, language, religion, wealth, and culture to name but a few. Nonetheless, the United States took up the cause of Pan-Americanism, inevitably branding it with its own style. The seminal moment of the United States’ participation in the Pan-American movement arrived in 1823 in the form of the Monroe Doctrine. President Monroe stated in his Annual Message to Congress that ‘the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.’

The proclamation adhered to the anti-imperialist conviction from which the Pan-American movement was born, but disregarded its emphasis on cooperation due to its unilateral nature and the fact that it was aimed at Europe rather than Latin America. Supposedly intended as a benevolent statement of protection, the Monroe Doctrine would raise suspicions among Latin Americans for more than a century; many believed that the United States was actually trying to demarcate the Western Hemisphere as a sphere for its own hegemony, taking on the mantle of ‘New World exclusivism’ previously championed by the Spanish. The suspicions proved not without merit; a number of events associated with the Pan-American movement only deepened suspicions that the United States’ was beginning to visualise an empire of its own in Latin America.

Little is said of Pan-Americanism in the mid-19th century. The United States was occupied with its own westward expansion and played no great part in the two inter-American conferences in 1847-1848 and 1856, which were held primarily to deal with Latin American worries about the expansion of the United States; they were not invited to the latter. The Pan-American policy of the United States began to take shape in the 1880s as it sought to develop its navy, but it

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66 Molineu, U.S. Policy, p. 16.
was in the 1890s when Pan-Americanism really found itself a home in Washington.

In 1895, the long-running border dispute between Britain (British Guiana) and Venezuela came to a head when the United States intervened to protect their interests. The British backed down following Secretary of State Richard Olney's infamous declaration that the United States was ‘practically sovereign’ on the continent.\(^68\) The audacious statement reflected the confidence of the United States at this time, though its rising power and boldness only raised additional doubts about the pretension of equality in the Western Hemisphere.\(^69\) However, the United States did prevent a British encroachment of Latin American territory, whether its motives were altruistic or not.

Four years later the United States displayed its willingness to partake in, or rather lead, the Pan-American movement by hosting the 1889 Pan-American Conference in Washington. The outcome of the conference, overseen by Secretary of State James G. Blaine and attended by representatives of seventeen American states, was the agreement to establish the Pan-American Union (PAU). Seemingly a victory for the cause of Pan-Americanism, the conference actually reveals how Washington was distorting the movement’s original principles: ‘Blaine’s ideal was not Bolívar’s.’\(^70\) The PAU established a permanent chairman, always to be the United States’ Secretary of State, and has fallen victim, like the 20\(^{th}\) century’s OAS, to criticisms that it served the needs of the United States first and foremost. Harold Molineu has asserted that Blaine’s interest in self-promotion and desire to pursue a more aggressive trade policy had motivated him to organise the Pan-American Conference, rather than a genuine desire to unite the American states for the common good.\(^71\) In light of the apparent focus on expanding foreign markets and the expressions of American ambition that were present in the 1890s, this is a valid assertion.

Richard Olney’s view of American power, so tenaciously announced during the Venezuela dispute, was further enunciated by Theodore Roosevelt’s

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\(^{68}\) Niess, *A Hemisphere*, pp. 51-52.
The Roosevelt Corollary, like most proceedings related to the Western Hemisphere, was dressed in a typical veil of Pan-American sentiment and a moral certainty that masked the true nature of the proclamation: that the United States was awarding itself exclusive rights to intervene in Latin America as an ‘international police power.’ The corollary was almost threatening, ‘If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters...it need fear no interference from the United States.’ ‘Reasonable efficiency and decency’ equated to no more than what the United States decided was acceptable; the corollary was declared unilaterally and consequently there was no higher authority that set such standards. Roosevelt stated that failure to meet such standards anywhere in the world would ‘ultimately require intervention by some civilised nation’, and in the Western Hemisphere that meant the United States and the United States alone. The additional implication that the states of Latin America were still ‘uncivilised’ makes the corollary as a whole a remarkable statement about how the United States viewed itself and its hemisphere. As Ninkovich put it, ‘Roosevelt was speaking as if America was the executor of an estate held in common with the Old World.’ William Taft would continue on the path of ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ with seemingly little regard for the true principles of Pan-Americanism, ignoring calls for a multilateral response to the Mexican Crisis from John Barrett, Director General of the Pan-American Union.

By 1913, Pan-Americanism had strayed far from the original ideas espoused by the Great Liberator, Bolívar. Rather than a movement that brought together the United States and Latin America, it had become more a policy of the United States towards Latin America, a national ideology that allowed for the rationalisation of relations with inferior neighbours. The Monroe Doctrine – and its subsequent amendments – was publicised as the height of munificent

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
protection and Pan-American spirit, but in reality it disgraced the equality that was supposed to be at the heart of the movement and cemented the hemispheric hierarchy that placed the United States at the top; a colossus to which all others were answerable. The lasting impact this doctrine had on U.S.-Latin American relations cannot be understated; writing in 1939, William Castle stated that the Monroe Doctrine remained the ‘cardinal principle’ of American foreign policy.\footnote{Castle, 'The Monroe Doctrine', p. 111.}

**Manifest Destiny**

‘Our national birth was the beginning of a new history, the formation and progress of an untried political system, which separates us from the past and connects us with the future only; and so far as regards the entire development of the natural rights of man, in moral, political, and national life, we may confidently assume that our country is destined to be the great nation of futurity.’


The concept of manifest destiny emerged in a clear form in the 1840s, and arguably is still a hugely important component of the American psyche.\footnote{John Wickham has seen a revival of these ideas in the words of George W. Bush. See J. Wickham, ‘September 11 and America’s War on Terrorism: A New Manifest Destiny?’, *American Indian Quarterly* 26:1 (2002), p. 116.}
The above quotation from O’Sullivan’s ‘The Great Nation of Futurity’ summarises the nature of manifest destiny. It was penned by the man widely recognised to have first coined the phrase itself, in a later article of 1845 denouncing opposition to the annexation of Texas.\footnote{J. Pratt, ‘The Origin of ‘Manifest Destiny”, *The American Historical Review* 32:4 (1927), p. 797.} Such an image of the United States as a uniquely favoured nation, destined by God to fulfil greatness, had been growing since the birth of the nation, and once O’Sullivan gave it a name it entered immediately into the political rhetoric and featured heavily in the Oregon debates of 1846. Julius Pratt, writing in 1927, described the manifest destiny concept as ‘a
convenient statement of the philosophy of territorial expansion in that period." There is certainly a truth in Pratt’s interpretation, as manifest destiny became a primary justification for territorial expansion – a way to fuel the desire for empire without renouncing the anti-imperialist principles upon which the United States was founded.

The annexation of Texas in 1845, justified by O’Sullivan as the ‘fulfilment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions’, was one part of the United States’ unstoppable expansion towards the pacific coast. As we know by the end of the 19th century the United States had consolidated their territorial claims in North America; the success of the ‘experiment’ of the young nation only strengthened conviction in the premises of manifest destiny and furthered the belief that its principles were and ought to be universal and permanent. Indeed, the growing power of the United States and its accompanying confidence in the principles of manifest destiny meant that by the 1890s, when its natural boundaries had been reached, the concept had outgrown its North American beginnings and took on a new expansionist meaning as the ‘continent allotted by Providence’ increasingly came to represent the entire Western Hemisphere.

It is likely that many had already thought in this manner earlier in the nineteenth century although there was little reason to act upon it with such vast areas of land to take on the doorstep. In ‘The Great Nation of Futurity’, O’Sullivan says of ‘the new era of American greatness’ that ‘its floor shall be a hemisphere – its roof the firmament of the star-studded heavens, and its congregation a Union of many Republics.’ The use of the word ‘hemisphere’ implies that both Americas were already being divinely designated as land and peoples soon to be enlightened. There is thus a parallel to be drawn with Pan-Americanism as both conceptualised a Western Hemisphere that, because of its

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82 Ibid., p. 795.
84 Niess, A Hemisphere, p. 23.
85 Ibid., p. 24.
rejection of the poisonous influences of European imperialism and the sovereign youth of its inhabitants, was destined to achieve a higher civilisation.

Manifest destiny may have reflected the philosophy of territorial expansion in the 19th century, but we must not assume that conviction in the mission was universal. Virtually all Whigs opposed the concept and it is possible that the United States was led by manifest destiny towards imperialism mainly in certain episodes, as in the 1840s and 1890s.\(^7\) In the 1890s, when continental expansion had reached its physical frontiers, the manifest destiny concept evolved to incorporate more forms of expansion than just direct territorial. In attempts to drag the United States out of economic depression, the merchant and the manufacturer ‘invaded Latin America with the cheers of commercial manifest destiny ringing in his ears.’\(^8\) Manifest destiny thus displayed its potency and versatility as a justification for policies that sought to expand U.S. influence at the others’ expense.\(^9\) However, even if backing for manifest destiny was by no means unanimous, it was at the very least a recurring theme in American politics with the ability to arouse the unwavering support of many influential men, including presidents, particularly when its dogmas could be employed in pursuit of practical policy goals.

### Conceptual Fusion

One would assume that the concepts of Pan-Americanism and manifest destiny would be mutually exclusive. One is deeply rooted in unity and equality; the other promotes the belief that the United States is greater and more civilised than all others, destined by Providence to show the rest of the world how to live. Yet remarkably, both featured simultaneously in the political rhetoric of the early 20th century. The juxtaposition of the two seemingly incompatible

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concepts suggests that the meaning of one or both must have been adapted for more liberal use.

It seems to be Pan-Americanism that carried the heavier weight of change. The Pan-American push from the United States certainly aimed for closer political and economic relations, though the establishment of a regional hierarchy can hardly be said to be part of the original Pan-American vision. The United States demonstrated their superiority by unilateral action, the Monroe Doctrine, and the establishment of the PAU (with offices in Washington and a permanent American chairman). Besides the obvious practical motives for such action, the reason that Pan-Americanism became an entirely new creature under American direction was the existence of a stronger, more widely-applicable philosophy that had originated at home in the United States. Manifest destiny necessitated a policy in which the United States took the lead.

Just as manifest destiny became the philosophy of territorial expansion in the 1840s, American Pan-Americanism – the fusion of the two concepts – became the philosophy of expansion in the Western Hemisphere in the early 20th century, albeit taking the form of informal imperialism as opposed to unambiguous land-grabbing. The lack of desire for formal colonialism altered the nature of manifest destiny; rather than looking to directly ‘overspread the continent’ in order to fulfil the destiny of the United States and bring the rest of the hemisphere up to American standards, they approached the task indirectly by imposing its economic and political philosophy through informal methods of empire. Following the Roosevelt Corollary, manifest destiny also incorporated the ‘entire freedom to play the impartial role in this hemisphere and in the world which we all believe to have been providentially assigned to it.’ This expression of manifest destiny in 1915 was delivered to Congress in President Wilson’s State of the Union address. Only a few sentences earlier Wilson was proclaiming how his actions epitomised the inter-American spirit, ‘This is Pan-Americanism. It has none of the spirit of empire in it.’

The 1915 address is a prime example of how the two concepts came to coexist, and even complement each other in the justification of intrusive

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91 Ibid.
expansionist policies in Latin America. Wilson claimed ‘This is Pan-Americanism’ whilst simultaneously acknowledging that the United States occupied a superior position derived from God, displaying how the development of Pan-Americanism in America had departed from its roots based on equality; the movement was undoubtedly permeated by the domineering and self-aggrandising philosophy of manifest destiny.

Pan-Americanism in Foreign Policy

Pan-Americanism and manifest destiny had together formed the ideological foundations of expansion in the Western Hemisphere, but their malleable substance suggests that rather than being the driving force behind foreign policy, they were adapted to legitimise the action of the day that might otherwise be perceived as imperialistic or solely in the interests of the United States. The image projected by the United States was that it, unlike other states, acted not in pursuit of self-interest but in line with its high ideals of anti-imperialism and democratic mission. However, the historical record suggests that lofty principles were not the sole determinants of policy.92 In general, it seems that ideological motivations took on a secondary importance to practical concerns such as economic growth and regional political stability.

President William McKinley like many others emphasised economics as a primary policy objective, not only for its direct impact on American prosperity but also because he knew that economic depression threatened the ability to effectively pursue other objective like spreading democracy and social peace.93 Were lofty principles behind this goal, or was it the influence of powerful American businessmen? Walter LaFeber argues that under McKinley’s leadership the government and business community were working ‘in tandem’ to solve the nation’s problems. This was the culmination of a period in which the foreign aspirations of business and government had aligned and worked for each other; Richard Olney and Grover Cleveland had already been using foreign

93 Williams, The Tragedy, p. 30.
policy to aid the ambitions of the business community who, in the clutches of depression, had come to believe that their survival depended on foreign markets.94

The mid-1890s, a crucial period in the developing relationship between the White House and the business community, saw the United States in the midst of economic depression. Panic set in as gold reserves depleted; the United States was importing far more than it was selling in international markets. European investment capital became harder to find as confidence in American economic power wavered and if the growth of industry in the United States were to continue then a solution would have to be found.95 The expansion of foreign trade thus became essential to American growth and prosperity; a fact recognised by the business community and government alike.96 This fact represents a very practical concern that motivated expansion. The mentality of overseas expansion that thrived in the United States on the verge of the 20th century is well summarised by McKinley’s 1896 campaign poster (see Figure 1) that made a succinct promise of ‘Prosperity at home, Prestige abroad.’ The poster fantastically displays the outward-looking approach; the two-fold benefits of expansion spelled out for the American voter.

Another main goal of foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere was to ensure political stability, and to make clear that the United States was the top player in the region. Of course, the two objectives are inextricably linked; much worry about South and Central America in a political sense was related to key economic areas such as the Isthmus of Panama and American investments in Cuba. The islands of Cuba and Hispaniola, divided into Haiti and the Dominican Republic, were also considered crucial to the defence of the region.97

So how does the ideological synthesis of Pan-Americanism and manifest destiny fit into this foreign policy drive to open Latin American markets and assert the United States’ authority in the Western Hemisphere? Were the principles of regional unity or manifest destiny the key forces behind policy

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94 For a conclusive look at the attitudes of the business community during this period see Walter LaFeber’s analysis of contemporary business journals in LaFeber, The New Empire, pp. 176-196, 326-327.
95 Ibid. pp. 176-178.
96 Ibid. p. 176.
97 Ferguson, Colossus, p. 54.
formulation or were practical needs dictating action? In certain ways, it can be said that this transitional period, that began what Molineu calls ‘The Interventionist Period’, adhered to the values laid out by the Pan-American movement and the principles of manifest destiny. The establishment of the PAU may appear a significant step forward for inter-American unity, though the United States imposed more than their fair share of control and it was initiated more than anything else out of a desire to increase American exports. It marks the beginning of a changing role for the United States, whose goals in the region had moved past merely the exclusion of European powers and now aimed to play a more active role and to transform the old Latin-American-European current of goods into a Latin-American-United States stream – ‘to make the flow of trade run uphill, as one critic observed.’ A revitalisation of the Pan-American movement here served as not just a rhetorical tool for justifying action, but as an active vehicle for implementing key economic objectives for the United States.

At first glance the Spanish-American war of 1898 may appear to adhere to the anti-imperialist values enshrined in the United States’ philosophy of American Pan-Americanism. Certainly it struck a blow to the Spanish Empire and sent out a warning sign to the other Old World powers, but it also marked the beginning of an imperialist streak in American history; the common exclusion of Cuba from the war’s name is simply one sign that this was not an intervention in aid of liberation, but a fight between two empires over valuable territory. To argue that the war was fought in aid of the Pan-American cause would be extremely naïve. Ardent supporters of the manifest destiny concept may have thought Cuba was always destined to join the United States, but it is clear that action was taken because Cuba was so economically and strategically important. The war can be viewed as a passing of the torch; Spanish dominance in the New World had withered and died, but the United States in 1898 was at last ready, with enough economic, political and military clout to take up the torch of ‘New World exclusivism’ and run with it. The relative ease with which the United States ousted the Spanish from Cuba (the war lasted just 113 days) cemented

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Figure 1: William McKinley’s Campaign Poster, 1896.

Source: Wikipedia\textsuperscript{102}

their self-belief and persuaded them, if they did not already believe it, that they were about to emerge as a powerful, if not the most powerful state in the world.

Mary Ann Heiss’ study on the evolution of the ‘imperial idea’ offers an intriguing insight into the relationship between practical foreign policy needs and the righteous American principle key to the Pan-American movement: anti-imperialism. She convincingly purports that the United States, like every other state, has first and foremost acted in its own interests and is willing to contradict its high principles to do so, despite portraying the image that it acts for the benefit of all.103 Up until the 1890s there was regularly a convergence of practical needs and idealistic anti-imperialism, as the United States was a developing nation, occupied with consolidating its own continental landmass and trying to diminish the European presence in the region.104 Following the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States was ready to play a larger role in world and regional affairs and looked to assert its dominant power in the Western Hemisphere. But how to approach such a policy, which required firm-handed action in order to keep up with the Europeans who at this point still commanded vastly greater empires than the United States, without betraying their commitments to anti-imperialism?

Disguise. Presenting one thing as another. As it entered the 20th century, Pan-Americanism, infused with a hint of manifest destiny, provided the perfect cover for an aggressive hemispheric policy. The political rhetoric of American leaders continued to stress the unwavering moral fibre of the state, though it became an increasingly intimidating presence. As Heiss observes, historians have been presented with ‘a confusing historical record in which deeds did not always match words.’105

104 Ibid. p. 520.
105 Ibid. p. 512.
Chapter Three: The Disinterested Friend

This chapter will present an analysis of Woodrow Wilson’s interpretation and utilisation of Pan-Americanism with regards to his Latin American policy. It will introduce the man and his vision of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and the world, before demonstrating the frequently confusing role that Pan-Americanism played in both his rhetoric and agency. Through a study of primary documents spanning his presidency, this chapter aims to enlighten the reader to the contradictory nature of Wilson’s policy towards Latin America, and in particular his tactical use of Pan-American themes to justify the extension of U.S. dominance in the political an economic spheres.

Wilsonian Internationalism

Woodrow Wilson is revered by many historians as one of the United States’ greatest presidents. Frank Ninkovich argues that his understanding of the self-destructive nature of modern international relations and his crusader-like devotion to democracy recast the nation’s global outlook and shaped U.S. foreign policy for years to come; this view of Wilson’s impact is reflected in the title of the book: The Wilsonian Century.\(^\text{106}\) Even George Kennan, a staunch realist and critic of Wilson, revealed in 1991 that he believed Wilson was ‘ahead of his time’ and that his ideas had had ‘a great and commanding relevance’ later in the 20th century.\(^\text{107}\)

Not all share in the notion of Wilson’s greatness. Kendrick Clements determined that ‘the scholar was wiser than the statesmen’, whilst William Appleman Williams believed that ‘Wilson’s liberal practice was not in keeping with his liberal principles.’\(^\text{108}\) Such conclusions are seemingly based upon a view that Wilson’s idealism never translated into successful governance. Evidently

when it comes to judging Wilson on his foreign policy it boils down to whether you judge him on his actions whilst alive or the legacy of his ideas; both arguments have merit. That being said, this thesis is limited by both spatial and temporal boundaries and will not feature a full debate of Wilson’s legacy, as that subject is far too large to tackle here. This chapter seeks to analyse the execution of Wilson’s interactions with Latin America and should lend credence to the argument that Wilson was ill prepared and ill suited for foreign policy.109

In terms of the global situation – or ‘global field’ – during Wilson’s term in office, there are a number of points to consider. In Europe, the great powers were experiencing what Ninkovich called ‘the turbulent side of modernity.’110 Industrialised states engaged in the most terrible war the world had yet seen. In Russia and China class revolutions posed an ideological threat to Wilson’s cherished democratic ideals.111 With regards to economics, Wilson was of the common opinion that the United States’ rapid industrialisation and prosperity required the expansion of foreign markets.112 In this ‘global field’ it is logical that Wilson attempted to use and promote Pan-American ideas. The world outside the Western Hemisphere was threatening; pushing for greater inter-American unity would help to keep unwanted influences out and American business in.

The Disinterested Friend

‘I may, I hope, be permitted with as much confidence as earnestness to extend to the governments of all the republics of America the hand of genuine disinterested friendship and to pledge my own honor and the honor of my colleagues to every enterprise of peace and amity that a fortunate future may disclose.’

Woodrow Wilson, March 12, 1913.113

112 Williams, The Tragedy, pp. 22-23.
This section will analyse a number of stylistic elements to President Wilson’s Pan-American rhetoric. His recurring phrases and terms were clearly intended to portray a certain image of himself and the United States, and to cement the desired image in the minds of world leaders through repetition. The above quotation is drawn from Wilson’s speech on the state of present and future relations with Latin America, released shortly after his inauguration, which set out his expectations that the Latin American republics would draw closer to the democratic principles of the United States.\footnote{D. Wolfensberger, ‘Congress and Wilson’s Military Forays Into Mexico: An Introductory Essay’, Congress Project Seminar on Congress and U.S. Military Interventions Abroad, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 17, 2004, pp. 1-2.} The statement was intended to reveal the position of the United States, to declare the manner in which it would act towards the states of Latin America under Wilson’s leadership, to explain that cooperation would be achieved through ‘the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force.’\footnote{Wilson, ‘A Statement on Relations with Latin America’.} This statement reflected Wilson’s revulsion for dictators, though it was also an odd statement with which to begin a presidency in which relations with Latin America would be defined precisely by the arbitrary use of force on the part of the United States, with interventions in Mexico, Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.\footnote{Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century, pp. 51-52.} If the statement failed to set out a template for action during Wilson’s presidency, it at least set out the rhetorical template, which would go on to become the most consistent aspect of Wilson’s Latin American policy.

Wilson’s metaphor of the ‘disinterested friend’, eminently less catchy and influential than Roosevelt’s ‘good neighbour’, became the foundation for a Pan-American rhetoric that would stress the high principles of democracy, respect, and impartial aid, always remembering to remind everyone that the United States had no selfish interests. Crucially, he did not explicitly waive the rights to interfere that had been exercised by his predecessors. Instead he gave only the impression that this was the case, ‘the United States will never again seek one
foot of additional territory by conquest.’\textsuperscript{117} Military action does not lead necessarily to conquest. In actuality, inferences that military force could be used in the pursuit of democracy can be found. In his 1913 statement he declared that there would be ‘no sympathy for those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition’, and that the United States would lend its influence ‘of every kind’ to the realisation of democracy in the Western Hemisphere.\textsuperscript{118}

Upon his ascendency to the White House Wilson was presented with a crisis in Mexico, a bordering state in which the United States had a vested interest; U.S. companies controlled 70 percent of Mexico’s oil production.\textsuperscript{119} The Díaz regime was overthrown in 1911 by Francisco Madero, who was in turn overthrown and murdered in February 1913 by the forces of General Huerta, whose leadership had received only de facto recognition from the Taft administration.\textsuperscript{120} Wilson offered Washington’s good offices (services as a mediator) and emphasised – as he always did – that his interest in Mexican affairs was ‘genuine and disinterested’ and that peace in Mexico meant much more than ‘merely an enlarged field for our commerce and enterprise’.\textsuperscript{121} He then proceeded to discuss the vital new position of Mexico in terms of world trade due to the opening of the Panama Canal. Some historians may feel that Wilson’s global frame of reference – the notion that the benefit of mankind was preferable to the benefit of the United States – dictated his action and that he was not motivated by selfish interest.\textsuperscript{122} Yet in this instance, his outright denial of selfish interests seems somewhat nullified by his acknowledgement of U.S. economic interests in the very same sentence. These interests are of course articulated on a great deal of other occasions, such as in 1914’s Annual Message

\textsuperscript{117} W. Wilson, ‘An Address on Latin American Policy in Mobile, Alabama, October 27, 1913’, \textit{The Papers of Woodrow Wilson}.
\textsuperscript{118} Wilson, ‘A Statement, March 12, 1913’.
\textsuperscript{120} Niess, \textit{A Hemisphere}, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{121} W. Wilson, ‘An Address on Mexican Affairs to a Joint Session of Congress, August 27, 1913’, \textit{The Papers of Woodrow Wilson}.
\textsuperscript{122} Ninkovich, \textit{The Wilsonian Century}, p. 51.
to Congress: ‘What interests us now... is our duty and opportunity. Here are markets, which we must supply.’

The metaphor of the ‘disinterested friend’ looked to position the United States as a respectable and trustworthy member of the Pan-American family. Within this family, Wilson envisaged the United States as the ‘big brother’, which had protected its ‘sister’ republics since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine almost a century earlier. On the part of the Latin American states, this ‘big brother’ role was often interpreted negatively, more in line with the Orwellian connotations that we have with the phrase today than with the image of the protector that Wilson wished to portray. In a 1916 speech given in New York on national security and preparedness, Wilson declared that it was the ‘obligation’ of the United States ‘to stand as the strong brother of all those in this hemisphere who will maintain the same principles and follow the same ideals of liberty.’

On the surface this may appear as a reiteration of the United States’ altruistic commitment to the ‘sister’ republics of its Pan-American family, but at the same time it reveals that American friendship was not unconditional and that it required a commitment to the principles and ideals held by the United States. In this sense it was in line with the manifest destiny-infused idea of Pan-Americanism that had developed in the decades preceding Wilson’s presidency. The terminology used by Wilson is also revealing; the somewhat emasculating use of ‘sister’ republics, whilst referring to the United States as the solitary ‘brother’, exposes the fundamental perception of American superiority.

It is wholly understandable that Wilson’s perception of Pan-Americanism was closer to the *La Grand Encyclopédie*’s ‘grouping of American republics under American hegemony’ than Simón Bolívar’s vision, or even that of contemporary American writers like Joseph B. Lockey. Wilson was raised as a Presbyterian, a firm believer in the divine destiny of the United States, and a racist. As President of Princeton University he worked to keep blacks off the campus and out of the student body, before pushing for institutionalised segregation in the federal civil...

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service as president of the nation. In the body of sources relating to Wilson’s Latin American policy, clues exist that suggest the president’s racial judgments extended beyond the nation’s borders. In his early dealings with Mexico there are references to Mexico’s ‘civilised development’ and ‘the civilised world’, which Mexico was evidently not a part of and to which it had to answer to. To Wilson, the United States was not only superior in terms of wealth and power, but also in terms of civilisation and race. As such, they required guidance and leadership in order to follow the democratic example of the United States; as Wilson famously said, he was ‘going to teach the South American republics how to elect good men.’

The few instances in which Wilson’s personal attitudes reveal themselves certainly aid our understanding of U.S. behaviour in the Western Hemisphere, though they do little to disturb the overall impression of the rhetoric, which was laden with unambiguous but ultimately fictitious expressions of Pan-American enthusiasm. ‘This is Pan-Americanism.’ ‘The object of American statesmanship on the two continents is to see to it that American friendship is founded on a rock.’

Generally, Wilson’s political rhetoric depicted the United States in a favourable light as a nation that aspired to Pan-American ideals and worked for the benefit of all rather than solely in pursuit of its own interests; ‘common interest, not selfish interest.’ Every opportunity to promote this image was seized upon; the Pan-American Financial Conference and the Pan-American Scientific Conference, held in 1915 and 1916 respectively, provide good examples of such platforms. Ultimately though, this method was flawed because Wilson’s portrait of the United States as the leader of the Pan-American movement, the friend and protector of all in the Western Hemisphere, was bound by rules. Territorial integrity, the right of self-determination, equality and

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126 W. Wilson, 'Instructions to John Lind (Mexico), August 4, 1913', *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*.
127 W. Wilson, 'To W. Tyrell, November 22, 1913', *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*.
128 W. Wilson, 'Annual Message, December 7, 1915.'
independence; these were all rules laid down in Wilson’s Pan-American rhetoric, though he applied these rules selectively. These were rules that the United States – an emerging superpower with global ambitions – could simply not live up to. Argentine newspaper *La Crítica*, commenting in 1933 on the first pronouncements of the Good Neighbour Policy, summarised Wilson well: ‘the first of the North American presidents who had fortunate accuracy in expression – perhaps only in expression – of a new era for Inter-American relations.’

**Wilson the Non-Interventionist**

An intriguing part of the American Pan-Americanism that had come to exist in the Wilson administration was that it was evoked to justify military interventions that clearly contradicted Pan-American values. As previously mentioned, the first issue that required the president’s attention was the crisis in Mexico. Shocked by the brutal murder of Madero, Wilson refused to officially recognise the government of General Huerta. This was largely because of a desire not to support revolutionaries and usurpers, but perhaps also because Huerta’s regime favoured British over American capital in the exploitation of natural resources, particularly oil. Nevertheless, the dislike of Huerta’s regime did not lead to an immediate military intervention. In August 1913, John Lind, former Governor of Minnesota, was sent with instructions from the president demanding that Huerta immediately hold free elections and not run himself; demands that were of course rejected.

In April 1914, a number of American sailors were briefly arrested in the Mexican port of Tampico, before being released with an apology. Admiral Mayo, the fleet’s commander, demanded that the flag of the United States be saluted in a special ceremony. Wilson and Congress supported Admiral Mayo’s demand and agreed they should use the armed forces to obtain a satisfactory fulfilment of

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131 Unknown author, ‘La Crítica, December 29, 1933’, *President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Office Files, 1933-1945*.
132 Wolfensberger, ‘Congress’, p. 3.
134 Wolfensberger, ‘Congress’, p. 4.
135 Ibid. p. 5.
these demands by General Huerta. The retaliatory 7-month U.S. occupation of Vera Cruz was justified by the apparent need to maintain U.S. ‘dignity and authority’, so that its ‘great influence’ remained ‘unimpaired for the uses of liberty.’\textsuperscript{136} This belief that unquestionable U.S. authority was essential for the good of the Americas was tied in with manifest destiny concept; 'the impartial role in this hemisphere... providentially assigned.'\textsuperscript{137}

In his Annual Message to Congress in 1915, Wilson praised the conduct of the United States in Mexico, ‘we have at least proved that we will not take advantage of her in her distress and undertake to impose upon her an order and government of our own choosing.’\textsuperscript{138} The irony here lies in the fact that 5 months prior to this speech in August 1915, the United States began a military occupation of Haiti and had installed a government of their choosing, led by Philippe Sudré Dartiguenave. This action was part of the long-term development of U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean and displayed the inconsistencies of Wilson’s Latin America policy as the strategy of ‘watchful waiting’ was simultaneously employed alongside a strong-handed approach in Haiti.\textsuperscript{139} The praise Wilson poured on himself and his country for their handling of the Mexican crisis, which he clearly deemed a Pan-American success story, helped to reinforce the desired image for the nation; rather unsurprisingly, Haiti did not merit a mention in the Annual Message. For 20 years after Wilson’s intervention, U.S. policy toward Haiti would be based upon the pursuit of selfish financial and political interests whilst the national interests of the Haitian people would be sorely neglected.\textsuperscript{140}

Haiti’s neighbours and co-occupiers of the island of Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic, did not escape interference from the United States either. Having been a U.S. protectorate since 1905, when Theodore Roosevelt had stepped in to stop European powers from obtaining debts they were owed by force, the Dominican Republic in 1914 found itself in the midst of a revolution. Wilson intervened to protect the U.S.-backed government from being

\textsuperscript{136} W. Wilson, ‘An Address to Congress on the Mexican Crisis, April 20, 1914’, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson.
\textsuperscript{137} Wilson, ‘Annual Message, December 7, 1915.’
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Niess, A Hemisphere, p. 79.
overthrown. There was nothing temporary about the United States’ occupations of the two states of Hispaniola; they would last throughout Wilson’s presidency and beyond, being lifted in 1924 in the Dominican Republic and 1934 in Haiti. Frank Ninkovich states a common view that Wilson’s Caribbean policy was justified by his ‘desire to spread law, order, and constitutional democracy’, but the length of the occupations and the manner in which the United States controlled the economic and political affairs of the occupied states suggests that they were part of a larger policy of expanding U.S. dominance in the region. The occupations also make Wilson’s praise of American conduct with regard to Mexico and the declaration that his Pan-Americanism had ‘none of the spirit of empire in it’ seem rather hollow.

The Wilson administration held the right to intervene in Cuba that was stipulated in the conditions of the Platt Amendment, which stated the terms of the U.S. withdrawal from Cuba following the Spanish-American War and was incorporated into the Cuban constitution in 1902. Under this law, the United States reserved the right to intervene ‘for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty.’ The amendment also precluded any bilateral agreements with other powers, giving the United States an effective veto on Cuba’s foreign policy. As the Cuban government struggled to control rebel action in 1917 Wilson exercised the special right and authorised the sending of American troops to Cuba ‘for the purpose of protecting sugar, and other industrial properties.’ President Menocal, favoured by the Americans, allowed the troops into Cuba as they protected both his own position and the

144 Wilson, ‘Annual Message, December 7, 1915.’
145 Ferguson, Colossus, p. 54.
146 Transcript of Platt Amendment, 1901, Accessed 10/05/14.
147 Ferguson, Colossus, p. 55.
economic interests shared with the United States. When most of the marines left in 1919, the U.S. influence remained in the form of a ‘civil occupation’ of an army of financial and other ‘advisors’, which ensured the Cuban government remained pliable to U.S. economic interests.149 Frank Niess upholds that one of the key motives behind the original Platt Amendment was that the right to intervention guaranteed the protection of American investment in Cuba’s rich sugar industry.150 This guarantee of protection applied under Wilson’s leadership and successfully protected U.S. interests, though the presence of American marines generated resentment amongst the Cuban population.

One cannot doubt that Wilson had a genuine passion for constitutional democracy and wished it to spread over the Americas and the world. His distaste for dictators and revolutionaries was clear to see. When the Costa Rican military dictator, Federico Tinoco Granados, seized power and established a repressive regime in early 1917 his opponents, led by Alfredo Volio, formulated a plan to overthrow him with an invasion through Nicaragua. Contemplating support for this coup d’état against Tinoco the dictator, Wilson seemed torn between his head and his heart. ‘To have anything at all to do with this is to play with fire and to risk incurring the suspicion of every state in Latin America; and yet, if the man is sincere, what he purposes (always provided his programme does in all good faith include a free and constitutional election) must of necessity claim our sympathy.’151 Wilson was coming to realise that frequent interventions, even if in the name of democracy and liberty, could have a detrimental effect to perceptions of the United States.

Niall Ferguson describes Wilson’s policy as ‘the paradox of dictating democracy, of enforcing freedom.’152 This could be considered an apt description of the policies aims, at least in one sense, though the inhabitants of Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic may have disputed the level of freedom experienced under U.S. occupation. Furthermore, this neat summary of Wilson’s policy pays insufficient attention to U.S. economic interests. Something tells me that Wilson

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150 Ibid. p. 63.
152 Ferguson, Colossus, p. 54.
may not have been so hesitant to support Alfredo Volio’s invasion if American investment in the country was comparable to that of Cuba.

Wilson’s interventions produced fear and suspicion in the Latin American states because it revealed the United States as an untrustworthy neighbour. The president’s decisions to exercise force were based in part on historical precedent, but principally because he harboured an unmistakably American perception of Pan-American principles. The inherent sense of U.S. superiority was partnered with an overemphasis on the principle of representative government (at least in theory), so much so that other key elements of Pan-Americanism – territorial integrity and independence – were disregarded. Furthermore, the economic motives for military action that were totally denied by the president, but clear to see nonetheless, only deepened concerns that the United States was barely motivated by high principles at all, and instead strove towards material goals.

The Pan-American Pact and the Monroe Doctrine

Perhaps the greatest failure of Wilson’s Latin American policy was his inability to conclude the historic treaty that he dreamed of: the Pan-American Pact. Initially extended only to the ABC powers – this comprised of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the three greatest powers in Latin America – the pact looked to enshrine in international law the principles of territorial integrity, political independence, and peaceful methods by which any inter-American dispute would be resolved. Such a union would also strengthen the American position with regard to the First World War. It was also the expression of the president’s global ambitions on a regional scale, as the fundaments unsuccessful Pan-American Pact would later come to constitute Wilson’s visions for the League of Nations.

There are a number of reasons for the failure of the treaty negotiations of which some cannot be attributed to the president; the guarantee of territorial integrity was troublesome to Chile, who was pursuing territorial ambitions in an
on-going dispute with Peru. However, Wilson insisted upon a guarantee of republican forms of government by all signatories, something that other states felt was an internal matter and denied them the right to self-determination. This was a major stumbling block in Wilson’s efforts to form a political union, once more demonstrating the almost religious value he placed on the cause of democracy.

In his address to the Pan-American Scientific Congress in January 1916, Wilson appealed to the states of Latin America to support his plans, claiming that previous fears and suspicions about ‘what the United States would do with her power’ had prevented greater intimacy and cooperation. Despite arguing here that during his presidency there had been an ‘increasingly sure appreciation of the spirit’ in which U.S. action had been undertaken, Wilson’s intrusive Latin American policy had done little to reassure the states of the Western Hemisphere that the United States was a trustworthy friend. His failure to convince the Latin American republics that a great deal had changed from the time of Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ was a contributing factor to the failure of the Pan-American Pact.

Also key to this sense of continuity in U.S. policy towards Latin America was Wilson’s reverence for the Monroe Doctrine, a document that had long been viewed with a degree of contempt by the states of South and Central America. Seemingly aware of the negative reputation the Monroe Doctrine possessed, Wilson continued to profess its great worthiness. The mutualisation of the Monroe Doctrine also became part of the Pan-American Pact negotiations, looking to engage the other republics in the defence of the hemisphere, ‘because such a recognition of the doctrine would prevent for the future any misunderstanding of its purpose and underestimating of its value.’ It was however, a topic he should have rather avoided, because simply stating that it had been misunderstood did nothing to correct such misunderstandings, particularly as Wilson had proved himself liable to wield the power of the

154 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
Monroe Doctrine in a similar fashion to the man whose famous 1904 corollary had heightened its threat.

Yet for Wilson, Monroe’s declaration remained a treasured doctrine, an altruistic burden that the United States had ‘borne alone’ for a century.\textsuperscript{158} Wilson believed in the Monroe Doctrine so much that he envisaged its principles as the basis for world peace, ‘I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine for the world.’\textsuperscript{159} He pressed this point at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, ‘The Covenant provided that the members of the League should mutually defend one another in respect to their political and territorial integrity (Article 10 in the covenant). The Covenant was therefore the highest possible tribute to the Monroe Doctrine. It adopted the principle of the Monroe Doctrine as a world doctrine.’\textsuperscript{160} Not all shared Wilson’s enthusiasm for or understanding of the doctrine; whereas Wilson believed it to be a regional understanding and therefore acceptable to the Covenant of the League of Nations, but his Republican opponent, Henry Cabot Lodge, argued against participation in the League because he believed it would commit the United States to overseas wars and nullify the Monroe Doctrine, which was not a regional understanding but a unilateral declaration.\textsuperscript{161} The United States refrained from joining the League of Nations for many reasons that I shall not go into here, but Wilson’s position would certainly have been strengthened had he successfully concluded the Pan-American Pact.

\textbf{A Contradictory Character}

Although President Wilson endeavoured to appropriate Pan-American ideals and language to further U.S. economic and political goals in the Western Hemisphere,

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\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{159} W. Wilson, ‘A World League for Peace Speech, January 22, 1917, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson.  \\
\textsuperscript{160} Unknown author, ‘League of Nations Commission, April 10, 1919’, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson.  \\
\end{flushright}
his success was mixed and the image he tried to portray of the United States – the head of a Pan-American family devoted to liberty and equality – was less than convincing. His policy was an expression of the Americanised version of Pan-Americanism that had developed from the 1890s, steeped in notions of superiority and manifest destiny. The shortcomings of Wilson’s Latin American policy can be largely attributed to his failure to convince the republics of Latin America of his good intentions, which in turn can be attributed to four main issues:

1. The denial of material interests.
Repeatedly denying that the United States had any material interests at all was simply a lie that must have been apparent to anyone with an education. Wilson as much as anyone recognised the need for economic expansion so that the United States could continue to grow as a world power and remain domestically prosperous, ‘Our domestic markets no longer suffice. We need foreign markets.’\footnote{W. Wilson, 1912. Quoted in Williams, \textit{The Tragedy}, p. 52.} He expressed such a desire for expansion on a number of occasions. Additionally, it is clear that the business community had a great effect on Washington’s foreign policy around this time and in most respects, the Wilson administration agreed with big business about the best means to facilitate overseas expansion.\footnote{Williams, \textit{The Tragedy}, p. 79.} Add to this concrete evidence of economic motivation behind Wilson’s military interventions in Latin American – for example to protect sugar in Cuba – and you are presented with a confusing picture in which Wilson professed disinterestedness, but continuously undermined himself through words and action.

2. The selective adoption of Pan-American principles and the pre-eminence of the democratic mission.
Although Wilson portrayed an image of Pan-American unity, his fervent belief in democracy as the purest form of government trumped many other of the key characteristics of the Pan-American movement. In fact, democratic government was arguably not a key feature of Pan-Americanism outside of the United States;
let us think back to Bolívar’s dream of ‘an assembly of representatives of republics, kingdoms, and empires.’ Nevertheless, for Wilson it carried a disproportional value and led him to disregard the meaningful Pan-American principles of independence and self-determination, which because of a colonial history were held dearly in the Americas. The president’s devotion to democracy caused him to act in a manner that aroused fear in his neighbours and proved a crucial obstacle in his pursuit of what would have been his ultimate Pan-American success: the Pan-American Pact.

3. The superiority complex.
There was of course no doubt that the United States was the Western Hemisphere’s economic and military superpower, though Wilson’s sense of superiority stretched beyond these material benchmarks. As such, his idea of help and friendship in practice meant the Americanisation of Latin American populations and institutions. So assured in the virtue of his nation’s mission and the fabled Monroe Doctrine, he failed to consider the negative perceptions of his policy; in Latin America there had been an awakening to the fact that America’s anticolonialism did not offer from freedom from extensive foreign influence.

4. The incomprehensible disparity between words and action.
To illustrate this point I shall use a quote from a speech Wilson delivered in Pittsburgh on January 29th, 1916. ‘We do not stand for occupations. We do not stand for material interests. But we do stand for this – that we are banded together in America to see to it that no man shall serve any master who is not of his own choosing.’ Admirable words from the president, though when the situation in January 1916 is considered it is hard to believe how he could decently make such bold claims. At the time of the speech, United States forces occupied Nicaragua and Haiti (the Dominican Republic would join this list in May of the same year, and Cuba in 1917) in addition to their colonial possessions of the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam. Material interests were inextricably linked with these events. Furthermore, the United States had imposed a government of its choosing in Haiti and would protect a pro-American regime in

164 Bolívar, ‘To H. Cullen, September 6, 1815’.
the Dominican Republic, as it had done in Nicaragua. Accordingly, it is hard to interpret the righteous words of Wilson as anything other than elaborate fabrications. The example above is representative of a rhetorical fiction that spanned the entirety of the Wilson administration with regard to Latin American policy.

In summary, Wilson’s policy goals in Latin America were generally in line with his predecessors; he wanted to increase the United States’ economic and political influence in the region and keep the European powers out. He differed from his predecessors in the way he presented this mission, and also put a huge emphasis on the spread of democracy in the region, though in reality his faithfulness to this second mission could waiver if material interests took precedence. Because of his distorted perception and misuse of Pan-Americanism, his enduring belief in manifest destiny and American superiority, and the extreme lack of consistency between his rhetoric and his action, he ultimately failed to earn the trust and friendship of his neighbours, which resulted in limited success with regards to his policy objectives.
Chapter Four: The Lost Weekend

When Woodrow Wilson lost American support for his greatest project, the League of Nations, the United States entered a period that many people today view as the ‘Lost Weekend in international affairs.’\(^{165}\) The general consensus being that the First World War had left the American public with distaste for foreign entanglements and the nation recoiled from Wilson’s internationalism. That being the general consensus, though many now see this interpretation of the United States’ inter-war years as ‘simply wrong.’\(^{166}\) Many cite the failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles as a signal of the United States’ return to isolationism, though in fact the treaty had majority support but lacked the supermajority of two-thirds required by the senate.\(^ {167}\) Isolationists were certainly vocal in this period, but they did not dominate the politics of the 1920s. Isolationist sentiment may have been more prevalent in the general public as Republican Warren G. Harding won a landslide victory in the election of 1920 with a campaign boasting the slogan ‘A Return to Normalcy’ and posters (see Figure 2) depicting a flag-bearing Harding with the words ‘America First.’ However, the rejection of Wilsonianism did not signal a return to 19\(^{th}\) century isolationism, but to the pre-Wilsonian internationalism exercised by the likes of Taft.\(^ {168}\) Technological advances in transport and communication, or the ‘abolition of distance’, meant there was no possibility of a return to classical American isolationism.\(^ {169}\)

With regards to Latin America, little had changed between the 1910s and the 1920s; the aversion to foreign entanglements that had swung the nation’s favours away from Wilsonian internationalism was primarily directed towards the destructive wars of Europe. Latin America was the laboratory of U.S. foreign policy for all underdeveloped areas and its efforts focused on expanding American exports, developing and controlling raw materials, and initiating

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\(^{165}\) Williams, *The Tragedy*, p. 106.  
\(^{167}\) Ibid., p. 355.  
Figure 2: Warren G. Harding’s Campaign Poster, 1920.

Source: National First Ladies Library

corporate enterprises.\textsuperscript{171} Between 1914 and 1929, U.S. investments in Latin America increased from $1.5 billion to over $3.5 billion, more than in any other geographical region.\textsuperscript{172} During the 1920’s the administrations of Harding and Coolidge did not recall the occupying marines from Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, or Panama, and instead used their intimidating presence in Latin America to continue the policy of economic expansion, which led to a growth in Latin American anti-Americanism.\textsuperscript{173} The unfortunate fact was that more money was flowing out of Latin America in the form of profits than flowed in as new investment capital; by this point economic interdependence between the two continents had reached new heights.\textsuperscript{174}

When the stock market on Wall Street crashed in September 1929, Latin America suffered. Most of the states in Latin America were reliant on the sale of raw materials and most on only one or two main commodities, which made them incredibly vulnerable to economic shifts.\textsuperscript{175} Numerous revolutions occurred, requiring a reversal of the United States’ policy of non-recognition of regimes that had taken power by force.\textsuperscript{176} In these times of turmoil, the President-elect Herbert Hoover embarked on a tour of several Latin American countries late in 1928 in a bid to improve relations though in the short years of his presidency – marred by depression, revolution, and a vigorous dislike for Americans – little could be achieved to this end.

In the 1920s, a faceless, behind-the-scenes pursuit of traditional goals in Latin America, reliant on the old methods of the Big Stick and ‘Dollar Diplomacy’, had left rapport between the two continents at an all time low. Hoover may have showed signs of a new approach, but his inability to display adequate progress with domestic issues meant that the task of overseeing a new era in inter-American relations would fall to his political opponent, Franklin D. Roosevelt.

\textsuperscript{171} Williams, \textit{The Tragedy}, p. 148.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{174} Niess, \textit{A Hemisphere}, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{175} A. DeConde, \textit{Herbert Hoover’s Latin American Policy} (Stanford, 1951), p. 66.
\textsuperscript{176} LaFeber, \textit{The American Age}, p. 341.
Chapter Five: The Good Neighbour

This chapter will present an analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s interpretation and utilisation of Pan-Americanism with regards to his Latin American policy. It will introduce one of the United States’ most famous presidents and his hemispheric programme: the Good Neighbour Policy. A study of the policy through primary sources aims to show how Roosevelt successfully adapted existing Pan-American ideas to reinvent the United States’ position vis-à-vis Latin America. By contrasting this Pan-American construction with an analysis of the actions and policy objectives of the Roosevelt administration, this chapter should suggest that the president was far more adept at utilising the Pan-American movement than his predecessors, though policy goals in Latin America remained largely the same.

FDR

Franklin D. Roosevelt is widely acknowledged as one of the greatest presidents in American history and considering he is known for leading the nation out of the Great Depression before defeating the fascists in the Second World War it is not hard to see why. Roosevelt was an internationalist by nature; as a child he enjoyed annual trips to Europe with his parents where they socialised with their European counterparts.177 He believed that the Americans should play a major role in world affairs for the benefit of both the United States and the rest of the world.178 Naturally, there is more scholarly work dealing with his involvement in the Second World War than with his Latin American policy, though in this field too he is particularly noteworthy.

The Good Neighbour Policy is universally acknowledged as a period of improved inter-American relations, though debate lingers. Hoover’s role in the making of the Good Neighbour Policy is contested, but it is evident that Roosevelt

177 R. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York, 1979), p. 3.
178 Ibid., p. 8.
had long envisaged such a policy and truly made it his own. Some historians, including Wood and Guerrant, argue that collective security was the main thrust of the policy; others feel that it was designed to advance economic ambitions in the hemisphere.

Roosevelt’s ‘global field’ was a troubling one. The United States, and the world, was struggling to cope with the economic crisis that had begun with the Wall Street Crash of 1929. The militarisation of Hitler’s Third Reich and Japan’s expansion into China dominated global politics. The spread of fascism and communism worried the United States greatly. In these circumstances, a Pan-American policy was well suited to the times in order to protect the values of capitalism and democracy, to aid in the economic recovery of the United States, and to block the influence of threatening nations from permeating Latin America.

The Good Neighbour

‘In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor – the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others – the neighbour who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.’

Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 4, 1933.

This section will analyse Roosevelt’s arsenal of rhetorical techniques employed to promote a favourable image of the United States, to declare what type of policy his administration would pursue, and to win the trust of the Latin American republics. The above quote, taken from Roosevelt’s inaugural address, is the first

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182 F. Roosevelt, ‘First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933’, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration.
time that the metaphor of the good neighbour was heard in a public sphere; the iconic phrase, here applied in a global context, would feature throughout the administration and come to define Roosevelt’s Latin American policy above all. The new president evidently saw the need for a remodelling of the United States’ image in the Western Hemisphere, and in the metaphor of the good neighbour he found the perfect solution that revolutionised the face of U.S.-Latin American relations and facilitated the continued economic and political domination of the region. The metaphor of the Pan-American neighbourhood was effective because it did not emphasise U.S. leadership, protection, or aid to other less-advanced states, but instead created the image of a community – closer to the Bolivarian vision than the Americanised Pan-American hierarchy – to which all in the Western Hemisphere belonged equally. It also created an environment in which interaction and aid was not justified by way of one state having lots and another little, but by the universal guidelines that one would apply to neighbours of a real neighbourhood, as you might expect a neighbour to lend a cup of sugar or participate in a neighbourhood watch. The metaphor thus did a great deal to eliminate on the surface the inherent sense of superiority that had plagued previous administrations’ Latin American rhetoric.

This imagery empowered the Latin American states and also put pressure on them to act as good neighbours too; as they might expect to borrow a cup of sugar, they were also expected to lend. In her study of the Good Neighbour Policy, Amy Spellacy wrote, ‘Through the creation the construct of the Pan-American neighborhood, the United States participated in a process of imperial mapping that conveniently justified U.S. appropriation of Latin American resources during World War II. Because we are neighbors, the United States argued, we have a right to your political allegiance and your natural resources.’ Roosevelt’s construction of the good neighbor metaphor was therefore a great success because it stimulated the involvement of the Latin American states; it created the feeling that it was a policy of all in the hemisphere as opposed to a national policy towards Latin America.

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184 Spellacy, ‘Mapping the Metaphor’, p. 44.
The incorporation and participation of Latin America in Roosevelt’s policy is what distinguishes it from previous approaches, though many of his rhetorical elements have a familiar feel. At the 1935 San Diego Exposition, Roosevelt declared in a distinctly Wilsonian fashion that ‘This country seeks no conquest. We have no imperial designs. From day to day and year to year, we are establishing a more perfect assurance of peace with our neighbors.’ In a very un-Wilsonian fashion, his claims could be backed up with evidence; by signing the Montevideo Convention in December 1933 in Buenos Aires, which stipulated that no nation was to interfere in the internal or external affairs of another, the Roosevelt administration had already proved these were more than empty words.

Roosevelt’s reimagining of a hemispheric community appealed to a more classic sense of Pan-Americanism that was less influenced by the nationalist sense of manifest destiny and did not compromise on principles like non-intervention and equality. His good neighbor rhetoric was accompanied with an acceptance of the misgivings of his predecessors in this respect, ‘I hope from the bottom of my heart that as the years go on, nation will follow nation in proving by deed as well as by word their adherence to the ideal of the Americas – I am a Good Neighbor.’ The president clearly had an appreciation for the fact that empty words had been better at breeding resentment than promoting trust and friendship.

As part of a concerted effort to redesign perceptions of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt ousted other elements from his Pan-American rhetoric that had been prominent in earlier administrations. Gone was admiration for the United States’ role as the ‘big brother’, replaced by a simple ‘sisterhood of the Americas.’ This was a constant in the Roosevelt administration; removing the imposing and self-aggrandising undertones of the

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187 Roosevelt, ‘Speech at San Diego Exposition.’
188 F. Roosevelt, ‘Speech before the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires, December 1, 1936’, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration.
‘big brother’ and presenting the United States as no more than another ‘sister’ state helped to create an atmosphere of equality, much in the same way as the neighbourhood construction. The rhetoric was characterised by moderate tones and treatment of southern neighbours as equals.\textsuperscript{189}

Also lacking from Roosevelt’s Pan-American rhetoric was mention of the Monroe Doctrine. Despite having a personal appreciation for the benefits that the doctrine brought to the cause of continental peace, the president did not preach about it.\textsuperscript{190} Even before Roosevelt moved into the White House, the Hoover administration had become alarmed at the resentment and distrust that Latin Americans ascribed to the Monroe Doctrine and recognised a need to remedy the situation.\textsuperscript{191} In 1938 a military report on attitudes towards the Monroe Doctrine in Guatemala advised the president that ‘a ratification of the principle of the Monroe Doctrine by the Latin American nations under an ‘American Doctrine’ would be a wise move; such an event never came to pass.\textsuperscript{192} Because an understanding of different perceptions of the Monroe Doctrine, knowing that not all observed it so fondly as the Americans, Roosevelt tactically excluded it from his good neighbour rhetoric, even though its basic principle of keeping the Old World powers out of the Americas was to remain in place.

With knowledge of international affairs – he penned no less than 22 articles on foreign affairs before entering the White House – and the ability to reflect upon the past; Roosevelt was able to craft a new rhetoric with which to improve relations with his hemispheric neighbours.\textsuperscript{193} His success in this endeavour can be measured not only by the treaties he concluded with Latin American states, but by the rapturous reception he received during his visits and the lip-service he was paid in Latin American newspapers. ‘I wish you could have seen those South American crowds. Their great shout as I passed was ‘viva la democracia’ he here reminisced about his visit to Buenos Aires for the Inter-

\textsuperscript{189} Niess, \textit{A Hemisphere}, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{190} Roosevelt, ‘Our Foreign Policy’, p. 574.
\textsuperscript{191} Duggan, ‘The New Orientation of the Western Hemisphere’, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{192} Sgt E. Hardy, U.S. Marine Corps, Guatemala City, ‘To M. LeHand, Private Secretary to the President, March 21, 1938’, \textit{Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration}.
American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace.\(^{194}\) *El Mundo*, an Argentine newspaper, hailed Roosevelt as a ‘defender of liberties’ upon his second election victory, whilst another praised ‘the moral value of the word of a Roosevelt.’\(^{195}\) Of course such a remarkable response would not have existed had the president not backed up his promises with action, but if we judge purely the rhetorical aspect of the Good Neighbour Policy, it is clear to see that he had learnt from the faults of his predecessors; his shrewd and tactful use of imagery created a suitable atmosphere for unprecedented cooperation.

**Roosevelt the Non-Interventionist**

Frank Niess’ history of U.S.-Latin American relations features a chronology of major armed U.S. interventions in Latin America from 1853 to the 1980s.\(^{196}\) The list is naturally a long one, but significantly there is nothing listed between 1933 and 1954. In fact, the Roosevelt administration not only refrained undertaking new interventions but also actively ended existing occupations and situations of obvious interference. The surrender of the most imperialistic aspects of previous policy towards Latin America won tremendous goodwill in Central and South America.\(^{197}\) However, it has been argued that it took years of meddling and interference before Washington started acting as well as talking like good neighbours.\(^{198}\) There is certainly evidence to support this view; intervention should not only be measured in terms of military excursions. Although the record in the early years may have been mixed, what it did was create concrete examples of positive action that could be used to defend the position of the good neighbour, whilst most of the meddling could more easily be swept under the carpet.

\(^{194}\) F. Roosevelt, ‘To W. Dodd, Ambassador to Germany, January 9, 1937’, *Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration*.

\(^{195}\) Unknown authors, ‘El Mundo, January 20, 1937’; ‘La Critica, January 21, 1937’, *President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Office Files, 1933-1945*.


\(^{198}\) Williams, *The Tragedy*, p. 173.
The benefit of such tangible action was not lost on the Roosevelt administration; William Phillips, Undersecretary of State, declared in a letter to the president that ‘the early withdrawal of our forces from Haiti will greatly enhance the prestige of this Government throughout Latin America. It will be a signal example of practical application of your policy of the ‘good neighbor.’\textsuperscript{199}

The final withdrawal of U.S. troops from Haiti in August 1934 marked the end of a 19-year occupation initiated by Woodrow Wilson and was certainly a bold statement of intent by the new government. This being said, behind the scenes interference persisted as the United States continued to assert control over Haiti’s financial operations.\textsuperscript{200}

In the early days of his presidency Roosevelt’s most pressing domestic issue, the Great Depression, had also created pressing foreign policy issues in Cuba. Due to its inseparable economic and political ties to the United States, Cuba had suffered dearly from the depression, heightening opposition to the U.S.-backed dictator, Gerardo Machado.\textsuperscript{201} As Machado failed to repress the opposition to his leadership (despite violent attempts to do so) Sumner Welles, Roosevelt’s special envoy to Cuba, prepared for a regime change. The Cuban dictator, unwilling at first to relinquish his power, resigned and fled the country in August 1933 after the arrival of 30 American warships around Cuba.\textsuperscript{202} After a failed attempt to install a new U.S. puppet, the Cubans gave power to a reformer, Ramón Grau San Martín, who by his reformist nature and nationalist political programme was deemed unsuitable to protect U.S. interests and was not recognised by Roosevelt’s government.\textsuperscript{203} The result of this Cuban affair was that the Grau government was forced out and replaced by Mendieta Montefur, deemed acceptable to the United States, and in May 1934 a treaty was signed abrogating the Platt Amendment and thus U.S. rights to intervention.\textsuperscript{204} The Cuban Revolution therefore provides an example of how Washington was coming to terms with the Good Neighbour Policy in its formative years; they had

\textsuperscript{199} W. Phillips, ‘To Roosevelt, August 3, 1933’, \textit{Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration}.
\textsuperscript{200} Niess, \textit{A Hemisphere}, pp. 105.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., pp. 101-103.
\textsuperscript{202} Williams, \textit{The Tragedy}, p. 174.
\textsuperscript{203} Niess, \textit{A Hemisphere}, pp. 102-103.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid.
shown some restraint and goodwill by not putting troops on the ground and by abrogating the Platt Amendment. On the other hand they had intimidated President Machado with naval force, orchestrated from within the succession of a suitable president, and retained in the 1934 rights over the naval base at Guantánamo.

In addition to the withdrawal from Haiti and the ‘restraint’ shown during the Cuban Revolution, the first years of the Good Neighbour Policy offered up another important event that could be cited as evidence that the new government was as good as its word. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, a vital force behind the Good Neighbour Policy, was head of the U.S. delegation at the Seventh Pan-American Conference held in Montevideo in 1933. Here he agreed to the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which legalised the principle of non-intervention between the 19 signatories. The move was designed to restore to the Monroe Doctrine its quality that had been marred by the corollaries of the early 20th century. Hull and Roosevelt were admired in the Latin American media for the progress and vision that had been expressed at the conference, but Hull had signed with the reservation that it did not conflict treaty obligations it had to protect American lives and property. Furthermore, speaking in private, Hull stated that the non-intervention pact was ‘more or less wild and unreasonable.’

Nevertheless, Hull further committed the United States to the principle of non-intervention at the Buenos Aires Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in 1936. Roosevelt himself attended the conference opening ceremony before heading home to the United States. In his message, filled with the usual family and neighbour metaphors, he proclaimed, ‘Each one of us has learned the glories of independence. Let each one of us learn the glories of interdependence.’ The conference ended with little real progress in terms of economic or political agreements, but an overwhelming atmosphere of confidence and goodwill.

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205 ‘Montevideo Convention.’
207 Impressions of the Latin American media’s response to Hull and the conference were gathered from a number of articles translated in *The Papers of Cordell Hull*; Niess, *A Hemisphere*, p. 101.
209 Roosevelt, ‘Speech before the Inter-American Conference.’
Though this should be considered progress, as the president's goal of interdependence, that would ensure U.S. primacy and demarcate the resources of Latin America for American use, required an atmosphere of goodwill. At that time, strong relations with the states of the Western Hemisphere took on further importance as tensions between the powers of Europe increased.

The United States’ pledge to non-intervention would be tested immediately as valuable economic interests in Mexico came under threat. The Mexican government supported the Union of Oil Workers of the Mexican Republic in their claims of poor treatment by the American oil barons, who had invested around $100 million in Mexico. As the workers grievances were not addressed President Cárdenas announced on the 18th March 1938 that the oil industry was to be nationalised.\(^\text{211}\) This was a difficult test of Roosevelt’s commitment to the principle of non-intervention that formed the foundation of his Good Neighbour Policy. Yet the president stayed strong, despite pressures coming from the business community and even the other champion of the Good Neighbour Policy, Cordell Hull.\(^\text{212}\) Fearing that foreign powers (including Nazi Germany) might gain power over Mexico’s oil if they decided to play hardball, Washington backed down and received $69 million in compensation for the oil and farmlands that had been nationalised – significantly lower than the $262 million they had originally demanded.\(^\text{213}\) The aversion of a more serious political confrontation allowed for the United States to weather the storm and increase its economic standing in Mexico later on; as Clayton Koppes argues, the tactical decision was made not in restraint of capitalism, but to ensure its long-term viability.\(^\text{214}\)

The Mexican case shows how the Good Neighbour Policy had developed from its formative years; the long-term benefits – and short-term benefits if you consider the impending war in Europe – of the improved relations with Latin America were now perceived as so great that the principles of the good neighbour had now become a binding force. A letter to the president from


\(^{213}\) Ibid.

Josephus Daniels, ambassador to Mexico, illustrates this development: ‘we should do everything we can short of Dollar Diplomacy and the use of the Big Stick to secure payment for our nationals. The Good Neighbor policy forbids our going further.’

After an analysis of some of the key events during Roosevelt’s presidency that either displayed the new nature of his Latin America or tested its robustness, it is clear to see that a dramatic break from tradition had occurred with regards to use of the Big Stick, though interference of the less obvious variety persisted. Where occupations or similar situations had been lifted, other forms of control remained, and closer relations with other nations inevitably led to increased economic dominance of the hemisphere. As Koppes states: ‘The Good Neighbor Policy was the United States hemispheric hegemony pursued by other means.’

Those Who Do Not Know History...

It is said that those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it. Such an aphorism certainly did not apply to Franklin D. Roosevelt. The formulation of the Good Neighbour Policy relied upon a profound understanding of the shortcomings of earlier approaches to hemispheric relations, rooted in both personal experience and diplomatic education.

Of particular interest in this regard is an event in Roosevelt’s younger years, during the Wilson administration, that he later pointed to as the moment when the idea of the Good Neighbour Policy hatched in his mind. A young Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the Tampico Affair of 1914, in which the Mexicans refused to salute the American flag after misguidedly arresting some U.S. sailors, prompting Wilson to order a reactionary occupation of Vera Cruz. When asked by Vice-President Henry A. Wallace for a few words on the origin of the Good Neighbour Policy, the president referred to the Tampico Affair specifically. Roosevelt was dismayed by the ‘bad feeling throughout Latin

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American caused by the event and it was at this moment that ‘the germ of the Good Neighbor Policy’ originated in his mind.\textsuperscript{217} Although Roosevelt gravitated towards Wilsonianism in many ways, there was a clear recognition of his failures in foreign policy, particularly in Latin America.\textsuperscript{218}

The flaws of former approaches to inter-American relations were discussed at length in Roosevelt’s 1928 article for \textit{Foreign Affairs}. Here he lamented Taft’s ‘Dollar Diplomacy’, presented a mostly favourable account of Wilson’s foreign policy, and decried the uninterested approach of Harding and Coolidge to international affairs that he had witnessed in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{219} Following his analysis of foreign relations, the future president concluded, ‘The net result of these instances... is that never before have we had fewer friends in the Western Hemisphere... and in the sixteen Republics of Central and South America the United States by its recent policies has allowed a dislike and mistrust of long standing to grow into something like positive hate and fear.\textsuperscript{220}

Evidently Roosevelt’s deep knowledge of foreign affairs contributed to his formulation of the Good Neighbour Policy, though it should be noted that the Good Neighbour Policy constituted a change in methods rather than a change in policy goals. Even through the 1920s, when the United States was seen to have shunned foreign entanglements and responsibilities, the perennial mission remained the employment of economic power and ideological attractiveness to the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{221} Roosevelt believed that better relations in the Western Hemisphere would lead to better trade, and thus the expansion of American power. He wrote in his 1928 article, ‘a lack of good will in the long-run must affect our trade... Neither from the argument of financial gain, nor from the sounder reasoning of the Golden Rule, can our policy, or lack of policy, be approved. The time is ripe to start another chapter.’\textsuperscript{222} This objective of improving trade had turned from a goal into a need by the time he entered the White House and the world was gripped by depression. Roosevelt’s knowledge

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{218} Ninkovich, \textit{The Wilsonian Century}, p. 107.
\bibitem{219} Roosevelt, ‘Our Foreign Policy’, pp. 575-577.
\bibitem{220} Ibid., p. 584.
\bibitem{221} Williams, \textit{The Tragedy}, p. 108.
\bibitem{222} Roosevelt, ‘Our Foreign Policy’, p. 586.
\end{thebibliography}
of history in international affairs enabled him to pinpoint the source of bad relations, which he recognised as the key stumbling block to the realisation of long-term U.S. policy objectives, and craft his Good Neighbour Policy accordingly. The Good Neighbour Policy was thus an original and well-planned strategy designed to tackle the same issues that had been present since the end of the 19th century.

A Success Story

Roosevelt’s successes in inter-American affairs can be observed in two main ways. Firstly, he greatly improved trade with the Latin American states – this will be discussed in the following chapter – that helped to bring the United States out of depression and created long-standing economic ties that would ensure the United States’ dominant position for the rest of the century. Secondly, he dramatically improved political relations, organised the American republics to resist European influences at the Lima Conference in 1938, and formed closer institutional links with the Latin American republics, many of which were consolidated in the Rio Pact and the charter of the OAS after the war.223 These gains were made possible because of three key elements of Roosevelt’s Latin American policy:

1. The knowledge of past failures.
Roosevelt’s acute awareness of history prepared him well for foreign affairs. Whereas earlier presidents had tried to operate on unequal terms with their less powerful neighbours, Roosevelt had witnessed the negative effects and altered policy accordingly. He was the first to fully understand that a perceived equality with neighbouring states would have greater long-term benefits than the might-is-right approach that had underpinned decades of inter-American relations.

2. The neighbourhood metaphor.

The construction of the neighbourhood was key to Roosevelt’s success. The metaphor created the impression of a community of equals, each owing the others friendly assistance. In this manner, he established a situation in which closer trade relations, access to raw materials, and influence over political events could be justified not by intimidation or unilateral declarations of ‘obligations’, but by the simple code of the good neighbour. The metaphor was accompanied with a cleverly assembled Pan-American rhetoric that retreated from the American mutation of the movement that had existed earlier in the 20th century, and instead returned to the classic principles upon which the movement was founded.

3. Supporting words with action.

The rhetorical innovation and metaphorical constructions would have been for nothing had Roosevelt not backed up his words with firm action. After a shaky start in Cuba, the Roosevelt administration began to stick to its Pan-American commitments with greater assurance. Honest action and the pledge of non-intervention was tested and confirmed during the Mexican oil crisis; the trust gained through sincere deeds undoubtedly played a great role in facilitating greater economic and political union which aided recovery from the Great Depression and bolstered the allied war effort.

Roosevelt’s policy objectives differed little from any other president since the 1890s, yet with he was able to utilise the Pan-American movement far more effectively in pursuit of these goals and as a result had far more success. It was his inventive use of the movement, that seemed to bring about a return to its classic roots, that allowed the United States to increase its political and economic standing whilst they continued to interfere in Latin American affairs behind the scenes. As Niess writes, ‘the U.S. political establishment exchanged the big stick for the white glove in its relations with the Latin Americans without, however, thereby relinquishing its hold over the region.’

225 Niess, A Hemisphere, p. 110.
Chapter Six: Perceptions of Pan-Americanism

This chapter will present a comparison between Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The success of the two presidents in achieving their policy goals in Latin America will be contrasted, as will their choice of methods. Their respective ‘global fields will be compared to see if there were particular circumstances that led to Pan-American policy. Finally, this chapter will compare how different perceptions and constructions of Pan-Americanism were employed to justify and advance the expansion of U.S. political and economic power in the Western Hemisphere.

The Expansion of Economic Power

As I have previously outlined, the most striking continuity in foreign policy towards Latin America between 1900-1945 was a constant desire to expand and develop economic interests. Both Wilson and Roosevelt had professed the need to open foreign markets to U.S. products, ‘Foreign markets must be regained if America's producers are to rebuild a full and enduring domestic prosperity for our people.’

In Latin America were markets, preordained by the Americans for this purpose. But how did the two presidents compare in this respect?

Under Wilson, U.S. exports to Latin America increased considerably, from $343 million in 1913 to over $1.5 billion in 1920 (see Figure 3). Roosevelt’s years as president also saw a dramatic increase in exports to Latin America, from a meagre $240 million in 1933 to nearly $1.4 billion by the end of the war. This indicates that both presidents were successful in their economic ambitions, though there are other factors that we must consider when using statistics such as these. In the 1910s, the Latin American countries experienced considerable economic growth; Americans felt the biggest benefit from this increased buying power as Europe was devastated by war.

226 F. Roosevelt, 1936, Quoted in Williams, The Tragedy, p. 160.
227 Niess, A Hemisphere, p. 94.
Roosevelt administration faced a Latin America that was gripped in the clutches of economic depression, perhaps worse than the United States itself, yet due to the reciprocal trade agreements signed with many nations in the mid 1930s, steady gains were made.\textsuperscript{228} It also is clear from that the two world wars enabled the United States to increase its exports to Latin America. Imports from Latin America rose in a similar fashion to exports.

**Figure 3: U.S. Trade with Latin America 1913-1945**

![U.S. Trade with Latin America 1913-1945](image)

Source: *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945*\textsuperscript{229}

Evidently both presidents managed to increase the U.S. economic presence in Latin America, though we can learn something from looking at the statistics for after each administration. Following Wilson's defeat in the election of 1920 growth in trade with Latin America stagnated. Rather than continuing to

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid., pp. 115-117.

\textsuperscript{229} See Appendix 3.
grow, exports shrunk to $882 million in 1925, only increasing slightly to $973 million in 1929.\textsuperscript{230} Not that impressive for the ‘Roaring Twenties’, though it is perhaps reflective of the return to the Big Stick policy operated by Harding and Coolidge. Following Roosevelt’s death, the growing trade with Latin America continued to rise and rise, export figures reaching around $2.8 billion in 1950 and $3.5 billion in 1955.\textsuperscript{231} This may suggest that Roosevelt was more successful in ensuring long-term economic gains in Latin America, potentially because of the increasing direct U.S. investment in the region. Under Wilson, direct investment peaked at around $2.4 billion in 1919 whereas Roosevelt had surpassed this figure by 1940. By 1950 it had reached nearly $4.5 billion and continued to grow exponentially.\textsuperscript{232} His policy allowed for more investment and American enterprise to be established, and events such as the Mexican oil crisis of 1938 displayed his willingness to compromise for long-term benefits. After the Second World War, Latin America was so dependent on the United States that even a return to an aggressive policy in the Cold War did not prevent the growth of trade between north and south.

Wilson’s economic gains in Latin America were gradual and took place in a favourable environment (War in Europe and relative Latin American economic growth), but the growth stagnated in the 1920s. Roosevelt managed to improve trade in the difficult circumstances of the Great Depression and his gains led to continued growth over the next decades. Both had some success in achieving their economic goals, but it appears Roosevelt laid down stronger foundations for sustained U.S. economic supremacy in the region.

**Political Ambitions**

After the Monroe Doctrine was declared in 1823, it was clear that United States viewed Latin America as part of its own sphere of influence; the aim was to keep European powers out. The political aims of the United States in the Western Hemisphere had changed little by the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century as political

\textsuperscript{230} *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945.*

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid.

goals remained focused on keeping the Latin American states under American influence. Additionally, both presidents desired a political alliance that would prevent wars from coming to the Americas by keeping the states together in a regional bloc. In terms of achieving these political goals, Roosevelt fared far better than Wilson.

The Pan-American Pact was Wilson's ultimate political objective in Latin America; incorporating guarantees of territorial integrity, political independence, and rules for third party arbitration of inter-state conflicts, the failed agreement reflected the president's dream for the League of Nations on a regional scale. He was, however, unable to conclude the treaty. Wilson had given Latin America no concrete evidence that the United States was a trustworthy ally, and it is likely that his repeated interventions and occupations had ruined his chances of accomplishing the political union. 'Dollar Diplomacy' and the tendency to resort to the Big Stick were detrimental to efforts to establish political unity designed to further tie Latin America to the United States. Furthermore, the United States did not manage to rally Latin America to its side when it entered the First World War, though there was no significant intrusion by the Axis powers in the Western Hemisphere. Declarations of war against Germany came only from Brazil and a few small states in Central America (see Figure 1).

Roosevelt was able to form far stronger political ties with Latin America precisely because he was able to provide concrete evidence that there was substance behind his promises. The Latin Americans would have seen it as a 'triumph' when the United States signed the Montevideo Convention and committed to non-intervention, albeit with reservations. After 30 years of the Big Stick, such a move was surprising to say the least. The new Pan-Americanism championed by the Roosevelt administration led to political advances at Montevideo in 1933, Buenos Aires in 1936, and at the Eighth Pan-American Conference in Lima in 1938. No Pan-American conferences took place during the Wilson administration apart from in the subjects of science and finance. Politically, the Good Neighbour Policy paved the way to closer relations and brought the United States nearer to its goal of maintaining the Western

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233 Molineu, U.S. Policy, p. 23.
Figure 4: Participants in WWI

Entente and Allies (some entered the war or dropped out later)
Central Powers
Neutral Countries

Figure 5: Participants in WWII

Allied Powers
Allies (entered after attack on Pearl Harbour)
Axis Powers
Neutral

Source: *Wikipedia*²³⁴

Hemisphere as a regional bloc whose shared interests were largely dictated by Washington. A look at the maps (Figures 4 and 5) reveals the extent to which Roosevelt’s policy had been a success. By creating an atmosphere of equals, the president had softened Latin America to the prospect of U.S. leadership.

**Global Fields**

A small comparison of the ‘global fields’ surrounding each president offers some insight into why a Pan-American policy may have appeared desirable. Actually, both presidents had extremely similar ‘global fields’, with comparable threats and necessities. Both had to deal with European tensions between military superpowers and Pan-American policy was thus aimed at keeping Latin America under U.S. influence and following its lead with regards to war. For both Wilson and Roosevelt, there were perceived dangerous influences that they wished to exclude from the Western Hemisphere. Wilson was hugely concerned by revolutions in China (1911) Russia (1917) and wished to suppress the ideas that threatened the United States’ democratic world-view. The last thing he wanted was revolution in his own ‘backyard.’ German influence in Latin America was also a worrying prospect. In the 1930s Roosevelt too had concerns about undesirable influences in the region. Hitler’s Germany announced rearmament in 1934 and remilitarised the Rhineland in 1936 as Europe edged closer to another destructive war. Roosevelt did not want the Nazi’s to find allies in Latin America. In the Far East, Japan’s expansion continued whilst the League of Nations slowly withered and died. Furthermore, the tensions that directed world politics at this time were in no way helped by the dire economic situation.

In both cases, it appears that the ‘global fields’ made favourable a Pan-American policy that looked to increase hemispheric unity. Such a policy would help both presidents to deal with the challenges of their contemporary circumstances, both economically and politically. The key factor was the presence of competing political ideologies and powerful military dictators; the

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United States looked to protect Latin America from negative influences of this nature. This ‘global fields’ analysis suggests a number of reasons why a policy drawing on Pan-American ideas may have been a sensible political move and supports the argument that the Pan-American policies of these two presidents were pursued in the interests of the United States rather than because of a genuine Pan-American spirit.

The Pan-American Construction

Comparing attempts to utilise the Pan-American movement to improve inter-American relations leaves us with one clear victor. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbour Policy was substantially more effective than Wilson’s confused, half-formed rhetoric. Impeded by inherent racism, a deep belief in American superiority and manifest destiny, and by an overly vigorous devotion to the spread of democratic government, Wilson’s deformed interpretation of Pan-Americanism was a far cry from the authentic principles of the movement. Though Wilson recognised that a thrust towards more amicable relations based around the notion of a Pan-American family would prove beneficial in terms of achieving economic and political goals, his execution left a lot to be desired.

Roosevelt’s attempt at Pan-American imagery was far more conducive to better relations because it created an impression of equality in Americas. Wilson’s ‘big brother’ became a ‘sister’ under the imprint of the good neighbour. This change swept away intrinsic notions of superiority as well as ‘obligations’ to lead and play the role of hemispheric policeman. These features were replaced with only mutual obligations between neighbours, a community of equals that maintained respect for each other’s independence. The neighbourhood metaphor demanded a far greater amount of respect than Wilson’s barely plausible ‘disinterested friend’ because it offered more respect.

Although Wilson’s vision of a Pan-American community was perhaps an improvement from the traditional Big Stick wielders that preceded him, it was limited in its appeal because of its tendency to highlight American leadership and superiority. In this sense it was not fully formed, though probably even a
stronger rhetorical basis would have been let down by repeated military interventions. Roosevelt’s success was rooted in a well-rounded Pan-American rhetoric that appealed to a truer form of Pan-Americanism and a policy of backing his words with action – at least on the surface. The Pan-American policies of Wilson and Roosevelt met with varied success because they stood for two different visions of Pan-Americanism. Wilson’s envisaged the United States as the leader of the Pan-American family, who should guide – and if necessary push – the states of Latin America towards its own universal principles. Roosevelt’s positioned the United States as a member of the Pan-American community, a leader by example and a promoter of values that were genuinely shared by all – non-intervention and independence.

A Strategic Masterstroke?

What can we conclude from this comparison? Both Wilson and Roosevelt viewed the Pan-American movement as an expedient vehicle with which to further the constant American goals of expanding economic and political power throughout its ‘back yard.’ Economically speaking, both achieved a level of success. However, Roosevelt began in difficult economic circumstances, and the unprecedented growth of U.S. economic power in Latin America after his death suggest that strong foundations were laid during his presidency. Politically, Wilson’s policy alienated the United States from Latin America. Tensions and mistrust prevailed, proving a major contributing factor to the failure of the Pan-American Pact and the lacklustre support the United States gathered during the First World War. The Roosevelt administration attended a number of inter-American conferences at which progress towards political unity was achieved; the improved relations manifested themselves in the Allied war effort.

Considering that both presidents pursued remarkably similar foreign policy goals and both made efforts to use the Pan-American movement in pursuit of these goals, we must conclude that misinterpretations and misuse of the Pan-American movement played a key role in the differing levels of success. Roosevelt was a gifted diplomat who executed the Good Neighbour Policy with
aplomb whilst Wilson's policy languished in confusion and disparity between action and rhetoric. His own ideologies were incompatible with a Pan-American idea of which he had little understanding.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Peter Hakim claimed in 2006 that after 9/11, ‘Washington effectively lost interest in Latin America.’\(^{238}\) As the focus of the United States lingers in the Middle East and increasingly turns to developments in Asia and Europe, inter-American relations have deteriorated. Many leaders have turned to populist and anti-American rhetoric to win supporters and U.S. interests in the region or becoming less secure.\(^{239}\) In the current climate, the United States’ self-proclaimed position of leader of the Pan-American movement seems to lack substance as a new breed of Latin Pan-Americanism appears to be capturing the imaginations of those in Central and South America.

Molineu states that Simón Bolívar's original concept of Pan-Americanism was ‘for Spanish America only’ and that the goal of Latin American unity was ‘the ability to deal with Europe directly and without U.S. participation.’\(^{240}\) By uniting, they would be powerful enough to act in their own interests in world politics and not be led by another; that was the dream. By adopting the Pan-American movement and making it its own, the United States was able to create immense economic and political ties with Latin America, cementing its own power and undermining the ability of the Hispanic peoples of the Americas to act independently.

Writing about the first CELAC summit, held in December 2011 in Caracas, Venezuela, Elvio Baldinelli wrote, ‘The representatives who were present expressed hope that the consolidation of CELAC could entail the liberation of the Latin American countries from the traditional guardianship of the U. S. and Europe, making possible an advancement in the integration of their peoples, the resolution of their conflicts, and the promotion of their economic development.’\(^{241}\) Thus it appears that as the United States loosens its grip over

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\(^{239}\) Ibid., pp. 39-41.
Latin America, we are witnessing a return to the original values of the Pan-American movement; a community of states with a common interest, strengthened by cooperation to the point that they can stand on their own in world politics. Already, the Havana Convention that emerged from the recent CELAC summit in January 2014 has shown a unified stance supporting Argentina’s claim to the Falkland Islands and rejecting the U.S. blockade of Cuba.\textsuperscript{242} The United States may no longer be able to champion its own version of Pan-Americanism that has sought to further its own interests.

When thinking about these historical interpretations of Pan-Americanism it is not hard to see why the states of Latin America were distrustful of their northern neighbour, and why initial advances of friendship met with a degree of scepticism. Originally, the Latin American dream was to integrate and strengthen exclusive of the United States, though the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 quickly diminished the possibility of doing so. The American Pan-Americanism espoused by Wilson and Roosevelt, cleverly designed to increase the influence of the United States in the region, was therefore Pan-Americanism’s antithesis; rather than providing the ability to deal in global politics without U.S. participation, it provided cover for the establishment of unbreakable political and economic ties between the two continents. William Appleman Williams believed that the nature of U.S. foreign policy in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century would ultimately bring about its isolation in the future.\textsuperscript{243} The same line of thinking can be applied here; by twisting Pan-Americanism and using it to extend political and economic control over Latin America, the United States has created a wave of anti-Americanism and ensured its exclusion from modern regional organisations.

Given the current resurgence of interest in Latin American integration and the increasing isolation of the United States, we must conclude that rather than experiencing a new kind of Pan-Americanism, Latin America is experiencing a revival of the original movement. Modern efforts to cooperate reflect the mood that existed two centuries ago, before the movement was distorted by the United States.

\textsuperscript{243} Williams, The Tragedy, p. 300.
States and used to nurture dependency and consolidate the power of the ‘Colossus of the North.’ An image from the first CELAC summit (see Figure 6) captures the return to Pan-Americanism’s Latin roots perfectly as the leaders of all 33 states of Central and South America stand together under an large statue of a triumphant Simón Bolívar upon his horse. Since the United States first declared its involvement in Latin American affairs with the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the true form of Pan-Americanism has lain beneath the ground, like a dormant seed, waiting for the right conditions to emerge once more. If recent efforts at Latin American integration can be seen as an indicator, there is a feeling in the Western Hemisphere that the time has come.

Figure 6: Image from the CELAC summit in Havana, Cuba, January 2014.

Source: Venezuela Analysis

Appendix

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