

Exchange or Empire?

*The Fulbright Program in the Netherlands
during the Cold War, 1949 -1990*

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Future historians concerned with the relationships between countries and peoples after the Second World War may well consider August 1, 1946, a date of great significance. It was then that the President of the United States – Harry Truman – affixed his signature to Public Law 584 of the 79th United States Congress, which has become familiar to people both in the United States and abroad as the “Fulbright Act.”¹

This is the first paragraph of the booklet “Forty Years Fulbright Program”, published in 1986 for the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the world-wide Fulbright Program. The Fulbright Program is the United States flagship educational exchange program – and the largest in the world. A don at Oxford described it as “the biggest, most significant movement of scholars across the face of the earth since the fall of Constantinople in 1453.”² Since the programs conception in 1946, it has facilitated the exchange of over 325.000 people and it is currently active in over 155 countries around the world. The Program makes it possible for American teachers and students to travel to other countries, to lecture and to study there and vice versa. It is a very competitive, merit-based program. Forty-five Fulbright alumni have won Nobel prizes, eighty have won Pulitzer Prizes and twenty-nine alumni have served as head of state or government, including the current presidents of Colombia and Chile.³ The program is financed by the United States Department of State Bureau of Educational Affairs and last year’s budget was 177.5 million euros.⁴

On August 1st, 2014, the Fulbright Program will celebrate its 68th birthday. Despite its age, there is a surprising lack of scholarly works regarding this immense program. The only history book solely devoted to the Fulbright Program was published in 1965, which means the last five decades have been largely neglected by historians. At the same time, the

¹ Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the Netherlands America Commission for Educational Exchange for the Program Year 1985*, 1.

² Ralph H. Vogel, ‘The Making of the Fulbright Program’ in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 491 (1987) 12.

³ <http://eca.state.gov/fulbright/fulbright-alumni/notable-fulbrighters> (26-11-2013).

⁴ <http://eca.state.gov/fulbright/about-fulbright/funding-and-administration> (19-6-2014).

Committee on Foreign Relations as well as U.S. embassies have rated exchange programs as one of the best tools at their disposal.⁵

Educational exchange is a part of public diplomacy, a concept which defies easy explanation or definition, but can be most easily understood as communication with a foreign public, employed by a state to further its political interests.⁶ Public diplomacy was at its height during the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. Nancy Snow, leading scholar on educational exchanges, wrote in her article 'Valuing the Exchange of Persons in Public Diplomacy': 'The Golden Age of international educational exchange parallels the Cold War period of 1946-1991.'⁷ During this period, the fear of communism was at its peak and for that reason, the U.S. made considerable amounts of funds available for public diplomacy programs.

This led to the creation of the United States Information Agency in 1953. This agency's main purpose was public diplomacy and it was in charge of broadcasting news programs such as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and exchange programs such as the International Visitor Leadership Program and the Fulbright Program.

After the Soviet Union fell apart, the purpose of public diplomacy was less obvious. Capitalism had won, Fukuyama declared the 'end of history', and all seemed to be well in the world.⁸ This led to the disbandment of the United States Information Agency in 1999, when it was incorporated into the Department of State.

On September 11, 2001, public diplomacy was thrust violently into the spotlight. While the U.S. had lulled itself into a false sense of security, Osama Bin Laden had been gathering supporters and planning terrorist attacks on American soil. Perhaps even more surprising than these devastating and heinous acts was the support these attacks got in the worldwide Muslim community. This was not a standpoint of the majority, but it was not in any way negligible either. The Americans were puzzled. As U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke

⁵ Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History* (Chicago 1965), ix and Giles Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire: The US State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, Britain, and France 1950-1970* (Brussels 2008) 23.

⁶ Kenneth Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge, *United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History* (Leiden 2010) 12.

⁷ Nancy Snow, 'Valuing the Exchange of Persons in Public Diplomacy', in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York 2009) 240.

⁸ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York 1992).

wrote in the *Washington Post* on the 28th of October, 2001: 'How could a mass murderer who publicly praised the terrorists of Sept. 11 be winning the hearts and minds of anyone? How can a man in a cave out communicate the world's leading communications society?' He called for a worldwide information campaign to battle Muslim fundamentalism and extremism. 'Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or – if you really want to be blunt – propaganda.' 'The battle of ideas therefore is as important as any other aspect of the struggle we are now engaged in. It must be won.'⁹¹⁰

The Bush administration responded by reinvigorating the public diplomacy division of the United States government, which had disintegrated following the end of the Cold War. This was in many aspects a failure. A prime example of the U.S. government's failure in the arena of public diplomacy was the appointment of Charlotte Beers as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the State Department in October 2001. She had a background in advertising and she tried to 'rebrand' and 'sell' the United States as if it were a product. She produced the 'Shared Values Initiative', an advertising or propaganda campaign aimed at Islamic countries that intended to show them that Muslims in the U.S. were well off. Instead of convincing Muslims that the U.S. were friendly to their beliefs, the intended audience saw how well off American Muslims were compared to how poorly Muslims fared in U.S.-supported regimes. The Shared Values Initiative was cancelled within a month of its release and Beers resigned in March 2003.¹¹

As the United States launched the debatably illegal wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, anti-Americanism rose to unprecedented levels worldwide. The Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project concluded in January of 2005 that 'Anti-Americanism is deeper and broader now than at any time in modern history'.¹² This was not only true for the Muslim world, but even the traditional European allies of the United States mistrusted American foreign policy, viewing the United States as a threat to world peace. The conclusion was clear: The United States had failed to 'sell' itself.¹³

⁹ Richard Holbrooke, 'Get the Message Out', *Washington Post*, 28 October 2001. (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/13/AR2010121305410.html>) (9-6-2014)

¹⁰ Kenneth Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge, *United States and Public Diplomacy*, 1.

¹¹ Nancy Snow, 'Rethinking Public Diplomacy', in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York 2009) 7-8.

¹² <http://www.pewglobal.org/2005/01/24/global-opinion-the-spread-of-anti-americanism/> (9-6-2014).

¹³ Kenneth Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge, *United States and Public Diplomacy*, 2.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism from 2006 identified public diplomacy as one of the core strategies employed in this battle. 'Our strategy also recognizes that the War on Terror is a different kind of war. From the beginning, it has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas,' the report reads. 'In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas.'¹⁴ The concept of the 'battle of ideas' is very reminiscent of the vernacular used during the Cold War. Then too the U.S. was locked into a global battle for the hearts and minds of the world's population, and the American way of life was diametrically opposed to the communist way of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War period, educational exchange was one of the cornerstones of American public diplomacy, although it has not received the attention it deserves. According to Giles Scott-Smith, who holds the Ernst van der Beugel Chair in the Diplomatic History of Transatlantic Relations since WWII at Leiden, exchange programs have provided a much underrated contribution towards meeting the objectives of U.S. foreign policy.¹⁵

Giles Scott-Smith wrote *Networks of Empire*, in which he described the political influence of the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP).¹⁶ The IVLP was an exchange program, yet very different from the Fulbright Program. As part of the IVLP, U.S. embassies would select grantees in their respective countries, looking for up-and-coming individuals. These grantees would be offered a free trip to the United States, to acquaint themselves with that nation. This 'cultivated' these individuals, generating empathy for U.S. interests and establishing 'channels of communication with specific audiences'. As Giles Scott-Smith wrote: "The IVLP has effectively functioned as an ideal tool for managing "informal empire", a phrase that refers to the engineering of favorable political communities and decision-making frameworks abroad which allow for the satisfaction of U.S. interests (political, economic, and military), without the need for direct political control.'¹⁷ By 1997 over 100.000 people had travelled to the United States on the IVLP since the start in 1950, of which 177 would become head of state or government, including

¹⁴ <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/> (19-6-2014).

¹⁵ Giles Scott-Smith, 'Networks of Influence: U.S. Exchange Programs and Westerns Europe in the 1980s' in Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge (eds.), *The United States and Public Diplomacy* (Leiden 2010) 345.

¹⁶ Known from 1950 – 1965 as the Foreign Leader Program, and from 1965 – 2004 as the International Visitor Program. Condoleezza Rice re-introduced the term 'Leadership' when she became Secretary of State in 2004.

¹⁷ Scott-Smith, 'Networks of influence', 347.

Margaret Thatcher, Nicolas Sarkozy, Ehud Olmert, Hamid Karzai, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.¹⁸

The political intent of the IVLP is obvious. Up-and-coming politicians were invited to come to the United States and learn of its culture. The intent of the Fulbright Program is less clear. It is an educational program, so the grantees were students and teachers. Could the conclusions that Giles Scott-Smith reached on the IVLP apply to the Fulbright Program as well? Is it possible the Fulbright Program helps to shape an 'informal empire' in its host countries? Or was it merely an academic program, intended for scholarly pursuits? In this thesis, I will study the Fulbright Programs activities in the Netherlands during the Cold War to answer the question of its political or academic nature. This is relevant, for there has been very little research done on the political influence of the Fulbright Program. I will operationalize the question of the Fulbright Programs academic or political nature by researching what the targets and aims of the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands were, and if these were achieved. This is reflected in the title of this thesis: Exchange or Empire? Was the Fulbright Program an academic exchange program, or a political tool used by the United States government to manage their informal empire?

I have chosen the Netherlands for practical reasons: the papers of the Dutch Fulbright Commission are available at the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg. The Cold War is the 'golden age of educational exchange', so this period will most likely offer me the most information. Rather than focusing on the entire Cold War, I have decided to pay special attention to the two periods in which Dutch-American relations were most strained: from 1965-75 during the Vietnam War and from 1980-83 when there were massive demonstrations in the Netherlands against the placement of American cruise missiles. The wave of Dutch pacifist-neutralism in the early 1980's is often referred to as 'Hollanditis'.

My study will limit itself to the Netherlands. As every participating nation has their own Fulbright Commission, my study will not say anything about how the Fulbright Program has been run in other nations. This is the work of future scholars, who could use this thesis together with other works on the Fulbright Program in other countries to reach more definite conclusions.

¹⁸ http://www.kcivc.org/international_visitor_leadership_program (19-6-2014).

The most important primary sources I will use are the archives of the Fulbright Commission in the Netherlands, which are located at the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg. This includes yearly program proposals, as well as annual reports about the previous year. The notes of the meetings of the Fulbright Commission are included in this archive. Moreover, the Roosevelt Study Center has the records of the United States Information Agency from 1953 through 1973, of which the Fulbright Program was part since 1961. In the second chapter the American foreign policy with regards to educational exchange will be discussed. The historical context in which the Fulbright Program was created and operated will be analyzed, and the concepts of public diplomacy and informal empire will be further elaborated upon. In the third chapter the origins of the Fulbright Program will be studied in detail. How was the program created, and what forces helped shape its creation? The fourth, fifth and sixth chapter will focus on the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands. An overview of the Dutch-American relations at that time will be given, before the day-to-day operation of the Fulbright Commission will be analyzed. The final and final chapter is the conclusion. In which the entire thesis is brought together and the research question is answered.

Chapter 2 Public Diplomacy, Informal Empire and the History of United States Government Exchanges.

In order to fully answer the research questions laid out in the introduction, we need to have a better understanding of the historical context as well as the international political framework that the Fulbright Program operated in. That is why in this chapter I will first discuss the concepts public diplomacy and informal empire. I will end with a discussion of the history of U.S. government exchanges, and how these have played a part in American foreign policy, as to create a clear picture of the historical context that the Fulbright Program was founded in.

Public Diplomacy

Exchange programs, such as the Fulbright Program, fall under the moniker of ‘public diplomacy’. In international relations, public diplomacy is broadly defined as communication with a foreign public by a state in order to inform and influence. There is no set definition and it is easier to describe than to define it, because it covers many layers of activity. Public Diplomacy practices vary from personal contact and exchanges to news programs, to the use of culture and art, all with a certain purpose and intent in mind. Edward R Murrow, director of the United States Information Agency in the Kennedy administration, defined public diplomacy as ‘interactions not only with foreign governments but primarily with nongovernmental individuals and organizations, and often presenting a variety of private views in addition to government views.’¹⁹

While the role of the state is of course a major part of public diplomacy, private institutions play a major role as well, especially in the United States. Many programs could not have succeeded without the support from the private sector. For this reason I will use the definition of public diplomacy as laid out by Giles Scott-Smith in his book *Networks of Empire*, for I believe it to be the most complete:

¹⁹ Joseph S. Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008) 101.

The ways in which both governments and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on other governments' foreign policy decisions.²⁰

There are four main categories that public activities can be divided in: International advocacy and public affairs; cultural diplomacy; state-sponsored news; and government administered exchanges.²¹ A basic differentiation can be made with 'political advocacy' programs related to direct political interests (public affairs, state-sponsored news) and 'cultural communication', intended to foster a climate of understanding (cultural diplomacy, government administered exchanges).²²

Traditional diplomacy is concerned with government-to-government relations. Ambassadors discussing policies with the foreign affairs ministers is one example. Traditional public diplomacy is about government-to-people relations. Through news broadcasting and cultural communication, the foreign audience was reached by the state. A recent change in this discourse is that people-to-people communication is now becoming an important part of public diplomacy, due to the rise of user-friendly communication technologies such as Twitter.²³

Currently, the website of the United States Department of State reads:

The mission of American public diplomacy is to support the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and Government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world.²⁴

²⁰ Giles Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire. The US State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain 1950-70* (Brussels 2008) 26.

²¹ Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 25.

²² Idem.

²³ Nancy Snow, 'Rethinking Public Diplomacy', 6.

²⁴ <http://www.state.gov/r/> (9-6-2014).

This includes, but is not limited to, 'communications with international audiences, cultural programming, academic grants, educational exchanges, international visitor programs, and U.S. Government efforts to confront ideological support for terrorism'.²⁵ It is clear that educational exchanges are mentioned here as an instrument for achieving U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives and advancing national interests.

The phrase 'public diplomacy' was first used by Edmund Gullion in 1965 when Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a career diplomat, founded the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy. He described public diplomacy as such:

Public Diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on the policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.²⁶

While Gullion may have been the first to use this new term in this context, the concept is of course not new. This new term was needed because the older term – propaganda – had fallen out of favor with the general public. Gullion even confessed he preferred the term propaganda, as it was truer to the essence of what he was researching, but it had accumulated too many negative connotations.²⁷

The term 'public diplomacy' took off because there was a need for it in Washington, and the United States Information Agency used the term as a handle. As Nicholas J. Cull explains, the USIA needed an alternative to the terms 'information' or 'propaganda'. 'Public diplomacy' covered every aspect of USIA's activity, giving a 'respectable identity to the USIA

²⁵ Nancy Snow, 'Rethinking Public Diplomacy', 6

²⁶ <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Murrow/Diplomacy> (15-6-2014).

²⁷ Nicholas J. Cull, 'Public Diplomacy before Gullion, The Evolution of a Phrase' in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York 2009) 19.

career officer, for it was one step removed from the “vulgar” realm of public relations, and by its use of the term “diplomacy”, explicitly enshrined the USIA alongside the State Department as a legitimate organ of American foreign relations.’²⁸

Currently Public Diplomacy is more popular than ever and this is in large part due to the success of ‘soft power’, a term popularized by Harvard political scientist Joseph S. Nye, and one of the terms most often used by public diplomacy experts.^{29 30} ‘Soft power’ was first coined by Nye in 1990; he has since expanded greatly on this topic. Nye defines power as the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want. There are three ways of affecting the behavior of others: coerce with threats; induce behavioral change with payments; and attraction and co-opt. The third option is ‘soft power’, a country getting what it wants because other countries ‘want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, and/or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness.’³¹ If a country uses this power in combination with ‘hard power’ this will lead to ‘smart power’. The term ‘soft’ can be misleading. As Nancy Snow, one of the leading experts on public diplomacy, eloquently stated: ‘Soft power is not the same as old ladies sipping tea; it is often used in conjunction with more forceful and threatening forms of compliance and persuasion.’³²

As Joseph S. Nye stated in his article ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’: ‘Public Diplomacy has a long history as a means of promoting a country’s soft power and was essential in winning the cold war.’³³ He notes that the current struggle against transnational terrorism is too reliant on hard power, and that public diplomacy should be used more often.

A country has a soft power advantage when it’s culture and ideas match prevailing global norms; when a nation has greater access to multiple communication channels that can influence how issues are framed in global news media; and when a country’s credibility is enhanced by domestic and international behavior.³⁴ There is a clear link between soft

²⁸ Idem, 21.

²⁹ Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge (eds.), *The United States and Public Diplomacy. New Directions in Cultural and International History* (Leiden 2010) 4.

³⁰ Nancy Snow, ‘Rethinking Public Diplomacy’, in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York 2009) 3.

³¹ Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, 94.

³² Nancy Snow, ‘Rethinking Public Diplomacy’, 3.

³³ Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, 94.

³⁴ Nancy Snow, ‘Rethinking Public Diplomacy’, 4.

power and public diplomacy, but there needs to be a clear understanding of the importance of culture, values, and the attractiveness of policies as well. As Nye notes, if the content of a country's culture and values are not attractive, public diplomacy that broadcasts them cannot produce soft power. It may, in fact, produce the opposite. Think about the impact that a Hollywood blockbuster full of gratuitous violence and nudity would have in a conservative Muslim country for example.³⁵

The appreciation of Joseph S. Nye's work has grown since he first introduced the term in 1990, and this is reflected in what public diplomacy experts call a 'public diplomacy revolution', which has been taking place in the last ten years. When President Barack Obama of the United States was first elected in 2008, he immediately went on a charm offensive, giving speeches around the world, trying to mend America's tarnished image abroad. China has been establishing Confucius Institutes – which promote Chinese language and culture – around the world. The first institute opened its doors in 2004, and at the end of 2014 there were 440 Confucius Institutes in 93 countries around the globe.³⁶ Their operation is similar to that of Britain's British Council, France's Alliance Française, Germany's Goethe Institute and Spain's Instituto Cervantes. These European institutions have been around for much longer, so in that sense it is not a new development, but the growth of the Confucius Institute has been remarkable. Public diplomacy is now a global phenomenon, with Indonesia and Turkey creating public diplomacy departments, and countries as Botswana, Bahrain, Uganda and India launching nation-branding activities in order to attract foreign investment and tourists.³⁷

Public diplomacy is closely related to propaganda and psychological warfare, although there are fierce debates among scholars on how closely propaganda and public diplomacy are related. According to Joseph S. Nye, if you regard public diplomacy as a euphemism for propaganda, you are missing the point. 'Simple propaganda often lacks credibility and thus is counterproductive as public diplomacy,' he writes in his article 'Soft Power and Public Diplomacy'. 'Good public diplomacy has to go beyond propaganda. Nor is public diplomacy merely public relations campaigns. Conveying information and selling a

³⁵ Nye, 'Public Diplomacy and Soft Power', 95.

³⁶ <http://www.chinesecio.com/> (15-6-2014).

³⁷ Osgood, *United States and Public Diplomacy*, 4.

positive image is part of it, but public diplomacy also involves building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies.’³⁸

There are two schools of thought on how public diplomacy should be used; the tough school and the tender school. The tough minded school holds that the purpose of public diplomacy is to exert an influence on attitudes of foreign audiences using persuasion and propaganda. In this view, objectivity and truth are considered important tools of persuasions, but not regarded as virtues in themselves. The tender-minded school on the other hand argues that information and cultural programs must bypass current foreign policy goals to concentrate on the highest long-range national objectives. The goal is to create a climate of mutual understanding. Truth and veracity are considered essential, much more than a mere persuasion tactic.³⁹ The tender minded school is characterized by programs such as the International Visitor Leadership Program and the Fulbright Program. An example of the tough minded school is the now defunct PR-firm Lincoln Group, which the United States employed to perform public relations in Iraq during the Iraq war. Their motto was ‘Insight and Influence. Anywhere, Anytime’, this stands in sharp contrast with the mutual understanding approach of exchange programs. Joseph S. Nye denotes this differentiation with exchange programs and culture and broadcasting news as ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ diplomacy. The slow media – art, books, exchanges – which had a trickle-down effect, were focused on building and maintaining understanding. On the other hand the fast media of radio, movies and newsreels had an immediate and visible ‘bang for the buck’.⁴⁰ Slow programs had to battle with fast programs for funding, as during the Cold war, these programs were all run by the United States Information Agency.

Now that we have a clear picture of what public diplomacy is and is not, we can answer the question as to how educational exchange fits in with public diplomacy. As shown by the differentiation made at the start of this chapter, educational exchange stands apart from the other categories in public diplomacy. While state-sponsored news and cultural diplomacy are aimed at reaching the masses, exchanges are an individual, private

³⁸ Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, 101.

³⁹ B.H. Signitzer and T. Coombs, ‘Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Convergence’, *Public Relations Review* 18 (1992) 137-147.

⁴⁰ Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, 98.

affair. Furthermore, by their nature they defy social scientific analysis. That they have an impact on the participating individuals is undeniable; William J. Fulbright's exchange to Oxford had a profound impact on the course of his life, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. However, how does one measure such a personal experience, especially on the long term? Social scientists have struggled with this question for decades. As exchanges are focused on personal experiences, their contributions to international politics have often been neglected.

Informal Empire

The concept of informal empire refers to the engineering of favorable political communities and decision-making frameworks abroad which allow for the satisfaction of political interests (political, economic and military) without the need for direct political control.⁴¹ De Grazia, in her book *Irresistible Empire* calls for a broader definition:

If we hold to orthodox definitions, we miss the specific power accumulating to the leading capitalist state in the twentieth century. These powers derived ... from recognizing the advantages that derived from that position and developing these into a system of global leadership.⁴²

In his book *Networks of Empire*, Giles Scott-Smith takes this concept of informal empire as described by de Grazia and applies it to the International Visitor Leadership Program, concluding that the IVLP, in combination with the Fulbright Program, 'was successfully employed to establish and build transatlantic "channels" of informal empire in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives.'⁴³

De Grazia described several different characteristics of U.S. informal empire, of which Scott-Smith found these three the most important for this study: It 'regarded other nations as having limited sovereignty over their public space', it involved the export of U.S.

⁴¹ Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 29.

⁴² Victoria De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire, America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge 2006) 6.

⁴³ Giles Scott-Smith, 'Networks of Influence: U.S. Exchange Programs and Western Europe in the 1980s' in Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge (eds.), *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History* (Leiden 2010) 347.

civil society ('meaning its voluntary associations, social scientific knowledge, and civic spirit'), and it projected 'the power of norms-making'.^{44 45} According to Scott-Smith, exchange programs played a vital role as the channels of empire in this format:

Thousands of talented and influential individuals went to the United States and experienced at first-hand the dynamism and openness of its civil society, learned about American world-views, trained in specific skills, and inculcated its attitudes. In the longer term it also laid the ground for further contacts in their respective professional networks.⁴⁶

This applies as much to the Fulbright Program as to the IVLP.

First Steps

Public and cultural diplomacy have been used by states to influence public opinion abroad since the late nineteenth century. It did not reach its height until the Cold War, but from the late nineteenth century on, programs and projects have been run that paved the way for the Fulbright Program. The French were the first to institutionalize cultural diplomacy when they founded the Alliance Francaise, which promoted the French language and literature abroad, in 1883, after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War.⁴⁷ Italy, Germany and other nations followed this example.

The United States' first experiment with government led exchanges took place in 1888. Before the first Inter-American Conference in Washington DC on the 2nd of October 1888, seventeen Latin-American delegates received a 6000-mile, six-week tour by rail in order to 'impress them with the economic resources and commercial advantages of the United States, and to attract the interest of the people throughout the country in the proceedings of the conference'.⁴⁸ In 1908, the United States once again dabbled in exchanges. In 1908, Elihu Root, Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of State, used the money

⁴⁴ De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire*, 6-7.

⁴⁵ Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 29.

⁴⁶ Idem.

⁴⁷ <http://www.alliancefr.org/en/who-are-we> (15-6-2014).

⁴⁸ Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 49.

paid by the Chinese as indemnity for the 1900 Boxer Rebellion to create a fund for Chinese students to study in the United States. China set up Tsing Hua College at Peking, where 400 students annually prepared for admission to an American university.⁴⁹ In a similar vein, following World War I, Herbert Hoover used the fund not used by the Commission for Relief in Belgium to found the Belgian-American Educational Foundation in 1920, which facilitated 762 exchanges during its 25 years of existence. By the outbreak of World War II, one quarter of the faculty at Belgium universities, one prime minister and six cabinet members had studied in America.⁵⁰

The political intent of these exchange programs becomes clearer when we look at the undertakings during the two world wars. In 1917, the Committee for Public Information (CPI) was founded by President Woodrow Wilson. Also known as the Creel Committee, named after its chairman, George Creel. He initiated a series of tours through the United States for journalists from Mexico, Italy, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries. Creel reported to Congress on 'the signal success of these visits, for the effect of them was instant and lasting'.⁵¹ Despite this, the CPI was disbanded following the Armistice of November 1918.

While incursions into government-led exchanges were taking place, the United States governments efforts in this field were not motivated by any underlying long-range objective or policy. Nor did they represent commitments to any continuing program, or recognition of the significance of such activities.⁵² The exchanges that were taking place were firmly in the hands of the private sector. The Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment and the American Field Service Fellowships are only a few examples of the many private sector exchange programs that were founded following World War I. The private sector also founded many institutions in this period in order to facilitate and organize these exchanges. The American Council on Education (ACE) was founded in 1918, and the Institute for International Education (IIE) and the American Council for Learned Societies (ACLS) were founded in 1919.

⁴⁹ Randall Bennett Woods, 'Fulbright Internationalism' in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 491 (1987) 24.

⁵⁰ Idem.

⁵¹ Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 50.

⁵² Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program*, 19.

This lack of government involvement can be explained by the traditional isolationism of the United States as a whole and by the tradition that education should remain outside the competence of Federal government. When Stephen Duggan, founder and director of the Institute for International Education asked someone in the State Department why a letter he had addressed had not been answered, he was reminded that ‘the Department paid attention only to communication from other governments’.⁵³ This cleared the way for private organizations to fill this void.

In his book *Networks of Empire*, Giles Scott-Smith identified several impulses that lay at the heart of these efforts. One was the belief in the modernization of ‘backward’ communities, through scientific and industrial progress. There was a strong belief in the free flow of trade and information, in order to undermine stereotypes and contribute to peaceful international relations. As most fundamental, Scott-Smith identified the ‘strong sense of Mission to promote civilization and project the nation abroad “as the exemplar of democracy and individual liberty”’.⁵⁴ American corporate philanthropy projected the USA around the world as the source of knowledge and universal model for Modernity and Progress.⁵⁵

With the global reach of the United States rapidly expanding in the twentieth century, it was inevitable that the spheres of private and political exchanges would meet. The ‘catalyst’ that would bring the public and private sectors together in a ‘coordinated structural relationship’ was the threatening international environment of the 1930s.⁵⁶ Totalitarian nationalist regimes were on the rise in the world, even challenged the United States in its own backyard. The State Department followed up on President Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy by ‘actively seeking new mechanisms to favorably influence public opinion south of the border’⁵⁷.

This led to the creation of the Division of Cultural Relations in 1938. This agency facilitated international exchanges with Latin America and it was the United States first

⁵³ Idem, 18.

⁵⁴ Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 51-52.

⁵⁵ Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (Cambridge 1981) 22-23.

⁵⁶ Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 52

⁵⁷ Idem.

government agency to structurally govern exchange programs. Frank Ninkovich refers to this as the moment the U.S. entered the 'diplomacy of ideas', this was the beginning of the transformation of 'foreign policy passivity into global activism'.⁵⁸ On this basis other exchange programs, such as the Fulbright Program, would be built. The aim of this program was explicitly political. The focus was on making contact with 'the molders of thought and opinion among the educated elite in the Latin American countries, the 10 per cent that shaped the destinies of the other 90 per cent of the Latin American public'.⁵⁹ Secretary of State Cordell Hull was quoted saying the new approach was 'designed to control the governments from within by building public opinion in this hemisphere on the friendship and understanding of the common people.'⁶⁰

With the advent of World War II, the strategic value of influencing public opinion abroad rose rapidly. In 1942, a new agency was created to deal with this massive undertaking: the Office of Wartime Information (OWI). This office was tasked with gathering support for the U.S. war effort abroad, and among other public diplomacy efforts, carried out exchange programs to this effect. By now, there was 'an awareness that tours and traineeships had a profound psychological effect on the recipients, resulting in the likelihood that they would become good will ambassadors from the United States to their own people'.⁶¹ Once again private enterprise was closely involved in running American public diplomacy efforts, as the OWI co-operated closely with Hollywood. 'American corporate and advertising executives, as well as the heads of Hollywood studios, were selling not only their products but also American culture and values, the secrets of its success, to the rest of the world'.⁶² The anthropologist Ruth Benedict studied Japan and several European countries, including the Netherlands, for the Office of Wartime Information. Her research question was: What propaganda would be most effective in these countries, and how should American troops behave to cause as less friction as possible with

⁵⁸ Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas*, 22-23.

⁵⁹ Jose Manuel Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy 1936-1948* (Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State 1977) 98-102.

⁶⁰ Richard T. Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (Washington D.C. 2005) 57.

⁶¹ Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 54.

⁶² Nye, 'Public Diplomacy and Soft Power', 95.

the indigenous population as possible?⁶³ This illustrates that the OWI was not merely managing information and communication in a benign way, but was actively a part of American foreign policy during the Second World War.

The experiences of World War II were paramount in shaping the future of American public diplomacy. The approach of the OWI convinced many in U.S. government circles that exchanges should be utilized as an explicit tool of U.S. foreign policy, and should be designed and pursued with U.S. national interest in mind.⁶⁴ The end of World War II ushered in a new era in international politics. Throughout the entire world there was an understanding that following World War 2, the United States had assumed a dominant and commanding position in international politics. However, there were wide-spread doubts about America's ability to lead, especially among the left-wing elite in Europe.⁶⁵

The reasons for mistrust were plentiful. The intense anti-Communist sentiments in the U.S. frightened many political leaders, as it made war with the Soviet Union seem inevitable.⁶⁶ The American political system, with its separation of powers between the Executive branch of government and Congress was foreign to those raised on the parliamentary system, and the division of power on the federal and state level was another mystery to politicians used to a centralized state. How could the United States act decisively in regards to foreign policy with its power so divided?⁶⁷ Socialists and liberalists worldwide viewed America's love for capitalism and materialism with disdain and were wary of being Americanized and financially exploited for Wall Street's benefit.⁶⁸ The backwards position of African-Americans was another point of critique, making the discrepancy with what the United States preached and practiced painfully obvious. In the 1950's, Senator McCarthy began his smear campaign against all he deemed 'un-American', and this greatly damaged the image of the United States in the world.⁶⁹ In 1945, the United States was faced with the task of developing alliances worldwide, with the 'old world' of Europe as well as the new post-colonial nations emerging in Asia. After two world wars, history had proven that the

⁶³ Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946).

⁶⁴ Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 55.

⁶⁵ Walter Johnson and Francis J. Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History* (Chicago 1965) 7.

⁶⁶ Idem.

⁶⁷ Idem.

⁶⁸ Idem.

⁶⁹ Idem, 8.

isolationism that was the cornerstone of American foreign policy during the last century was no longer a valid strategy. The United States was forced to take a leading role in international politics to safeguard its interests. This meant re-educating the world on what America stood for, as well as dispelling and defusing the negative viewpoints mentioned earlier.

Although the United States and the Soviet Union had laid down their weapons, the battle for the 'hearts and minds' of the world's population was only now beginning. Understanding other nations, as well as having American society understood by others, became of vital importance to the national security of the United States, unlike any other period in history. In order to shape the new world order under the leadership of the United States, the world's population had to willingly absorb the American values of democracy and free trade. Exchange programs, such as the Fulbright Program, would play a vital part in this. As Giles Scott-Smith concludes: 'Increasing contacts between peoples could, if managed successfully, enable the fostering of a worldwide network of elites with a first-hand knowledge of US affairs, a sympathy for US interests, and a commitment to the US model of modernization.'⁷⁰

It was under these circumstances that the Fulbright Program was founded in 1946.

Conclusion

Public Diplomacy is defined as 'The ways in which both governments and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on other governments' foreign policy decisions'.

There are four main categories that public activities can be divided in: International advocacy and public affairs; cultural diplomacy; state-sponsored news; and government administered exchanges. A basic differentiation can be made with 'political advocacy' programs related to direct political interests (public affairs, state-sponsored news) and 'cultural communication', intended to foster a climate of understanding (cultural diplomacy, government administered exchanges).

⁷⁰ Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 56-57.

The phrase was first used in its current form in 1965, but the practice of using one's culture to influence others is much older, and already practiced by France and the United States in the 19th century. The term rose into prominence because it was a much more delectable term than propaganda. Public diplomacy and propaganda are not synonyms, but they are both communication employed by the state to further foreign policy interests; while they are not identical twins, they are most surely siblings.

Currently public diplomacy is more popular than ever and this has everything to do with the popularity of Joseph S. Nye's concept of 'soft power'. Coined by Nye in 1990, and since then greatly expanded upon, soft power is defined as a country achieving the outcomes it wants by means of attraction. Other countries 'want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, and/or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness'.

Government-led exchanges stand apart from other categories in public diplomacies. While state-sponsored news and cultural diplomacy are aimed at reaching the masses, exchanges are an individual affair. By their nature they defy social scientific analysis, and for this reason their contribution to international politics has often been neglected.

Informal empire is defined as the engineering of favorable political communities and decision-making frameworks abroad which allow for the satisfaction of political interests (political, economic and military) without the need for direct political control. Giles Scott-Smith argues that that International Visitor Leadership Program, a United States government-led exchange program that operated alongside the Fulbright Program, was 'successfully employed to establish and build transatlantic "channels" of informal empire in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives.'

Public and cultural diplomacy have been used by states to influence public opinion abroad since the late nineteenth century. It did not reach its height until the Cold War, but the U.S. government has a long history of using exchange programs to further foreign policy aims. In 1908 Elihu Root, Theodore's Roosevelt Secretary of State, used the money paid by the Chinese as indemnity for the 1900 Boxer Rebellion to create a fund for Chinese students to study in the United States. Following World War I, Herbert Hoover used the funds not used by the Commission for Relief in Belgium to found the Belgian-American Educational Foundation in 1920, which facilitated exchanges between Belgium and the United States for 25 years. These programs were the first entrees of the U.S. government in exchanges, but

these were not motivated by any underlying long-range objectives or policies. This changed during the Second World War: In 1938 the Division of Cultural Relations was founded, in order to combat Nazi propaganda in Latin-America. This agency was the first United States government agency to structurally govern exchange programs with a clear long-range objective. In 1942, the Office of Wartime Information was founded, and tasked with gathering support for the U.S. war efforts abroad. Among other public diplomacy efforts, the office carried out exchanges to achieve their aims.

After World War 2 came to an end, the United States was thrust into a new situation. After centuries of isolationism it now had to take a leading role in international politics, in order to safeguard its interests. There was doubt about America's ability to lead, especially among European elites. The United States had to educate the world on its core values and norms. It was in these circumstances that the Fulbright Program was founded in 1946.

Chapter 3: History and Origin of the Fulbright Program

Now that we have a clear picture of the specific historical circumstances that gave life to the Fulbright Program, we need to know more about the Program itself, in order to adequately answer the research question laid out in the introduction. For this reason, I will first discuss the legislative origin of the Fulbright Program with the Fulbright Act of 1946. I will analyze the factors that shaped its growth from a piece of legislation into the world's largest educational exchange program, paying special attention to William J. Fulbright himself and the Board of Foreign Scholarships.

Legislative origins

The Fulbright Program found its start when on a September afternoon in 1945 during a session of the Senate, freshmen senator William J. Fulbright addressed the chair:

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to introduce a bill for reference to the Committee on Military Affairs, authorizing the use of credits established abroad for the promotion of international good will through the exchange of students in the fields of education, culture and science.⁷¹

The description of the bill read: 'A Bill to amend the Surplus Property Act of 1944 to designate the Department of State as the disposal agency for surplus property outside the United States, its Territories and possessions, and for other purposes.' The Surplus Property Act of 1944 allowed for the 'orderly disposal' of surplus war material after World War II to foreign governments. Fulbright's Bill would amend the Act in three major ways. First of all, it made the Department of State the disposal agency for the property located outside the borders of the United States. Secondly, it authorized that this property could be paid for in foreign currencies. Third, it authorized the Secretary of State to enter into agreements with foreign governments for the purpose of providing educational activities for American citizens in foreign countries, and vice versa.

⁷¹ Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History*, 12.

The bill was introduced in a quiet way, reflecting Fulbright's experience as a congressman, university president and law school professor. He successfully navigated the bill through both houses, avoiding controversial pitfalls such as the jurisdiction of the federal government in international education and the possible cost to the American taxpayer. The timing of the amendment also proved impeccable. Riding right on the coattails of World War II, there was a widespread desire in American society to immediately undertake something that could help insure the world against further wars and catastrophes. The amendment went through both houses without a hitch, and was signed into law on August 1st 1946 by President Harry S. Truman.

William J. Fulbright

The Fulbright Program was shaped, first and foremost, by William J. Fulbright himself. He introduced the legislation that would lead to the creation of the world's largest educational exchange program and he did this without any institutional backing or pressure from educators and certainly without any pressure from the Truman administration: it was of his own design.

Born in 1905 in Missouri, USA, William J. Fulbright received a degree in political science from the University of Arkansas. His student advisor advised him to apply for a Rhodes Scholarship, which Fulbright did, and much to his own surprise he was awarded the scholarship.⁷² He left for Europe at age twenty, spending three years studying at Oxford, and one year in Vienna, the cultural and political crossroad of interwar Europe. This was the period 1925 – 1929, which means that in the roaring twenties, Fulbright was exploring the continent. Before sailing off to Europe he had never journeyed east of the Mississippi river, let alone seen the ocean, so it is understandable that this exchange experience had a profound impact on him personally. It opened his eyes to a world existing beyond the borders of Missouri and Arkansas, and it shaped him into an internationalist and multilateralist.

In 1939 Fulbright would become the President of the University of Arkansas at age 34, becoming the youngest university president in the country at that time. In 1942

⁷² Woods, 'Fulbright Internationalism', 26.

Fulbright was elected to the United House of Representatives, serving one term. Now he had the opportunity to turn his multilateral ideas into actual legislation. The House adopted the Fulbright Resolution, supporting international peace-keeping initiatives and laying the groundwork for the United States' participation in what would become the United Nations.⁷³

After that short stint in the House of Representatives, Fulbright would be elected as the Democratic Senator of Arkansas, serving in the Senate from 1945 until 1975. He became a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, eventually becoming the longest serving chairman in this committee. Fulbright's multilateralism is reflected in his entire congressional career, opposing McCarthyism and the Vietnam War.

Fulbright's congressional career isn't without controversy however. In 1956, Fulbright signed the Southern Manifesto, a document created by Congress in opposition to racial integration of public places. It was intended to counter the landmark 1954 Supreme Court ruling *Brown v. Board of Education*, which determined that segregation of public schools was unconstitutional. This segregationist standpoint stands out like a sore thumb compared to the progressive and internationalist views he is most well known for. Biographers argue that his support was purely political and practical and not in line with his personal beliefs, aimed at pleasing the voters in his home state of Arkansas and securing another term for him.⁷⁴ None the less, a political vote for segregation is still a vote for segregation, no matter how half-hearted.

Luckily for Fulbright, this black mark is not what he would be remembered for. His legacy is creating the Fulbright Program, the world's largest educational exchange program, in his first year as a Senator no less. His own experiences as a Rhodes Scholar have clearly been instrumental in shaping the Program, but Fulbright himself also singled out the lessons learned from the war debts of the First World War as a reason for introducing the Fulbright Program: 'It was a combination of those two thoughts which led me to introduce the legislation to try and make use of the results of the war to improve the cultural relations in an area in which we could do the most for promoting better international relations.'⁷⁵

⁷³ Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History*, 14.

⁷⁴ Randall Bennett Woods, *Fulbright: A Biography* (Cambridge 1995) 230.

⁷⁵ Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History*, 14.

Fulbright specifically stated that academic excellence was not the purpose of the Fulbright Program: its main goal was to make the exchange experience possible and available for as large a public as possible. Randall Bennett Woods, Fulbright's biographer, concludes:

The Fulbright Exchange Program was undeniably a reflection, a projection of William J. Fulbright's personal experience. What he proposed in 1946 was the institutionalization of his own overseas odyssey. It would do for thousands of young people what it had done for him – remove cultural blinders and instill tolerance and a sense of public service.⁷⁶

But besides removing 'cultural blinders' and 'instilling tolerance', the Fulbright Program had another, even loftier goal: Educating the elite of tomorrow. As Fulbright himself has said:

Conflicts between nations result from deliberate decisions made by the leaders of nations, and those decisions are influenced and determined by the experience and judgment of the leaders and their advisers. Therefore our security and the peace of the world are dependent upon the character and intellect of the leaders rather than upon the weapons of destruction now accumulated in enormous and costly stockpiles.⁷⁷

This quote clearly illustrates that Fulbright believed that by educating the leaders of tomorrow on other cultures by means of exchange, the Fulbright Program could play a part in making the world a better and safer place. Several events in 1945-46 greatly alarmed the senator: The intense opposition in Congress to the Bretton Woods legislation irritated Fulbright, but what really disturbed him was the seating of Argentina at the United Nations Conference on International Organization that started in April 1945, despite strong objections from the Russians. American diplomats caused a storm of controversy by

⁷⁶ Woods, *Fulbright Internationalism*, 35.

⁷⁷ William J. Fulbright, 'Preface' in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 491 (1987) 10.

sponsoring Argentina for full membership, despite its previous strong diplomatic ties with the Axis powers. The United States outvoted the Soviet Union on this issue, and rather than seeking consensus the American diplomats had engineered a power play. Fulbright was livid, placing the burden of the blame on the inexperienced Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, the General Motors executive with 'little intellectual ability and with even less academic attainment and diplomatic experience.'⁷⁸ Stettinius was part of a larger problem. Fulbright believed that, 'at this crucial juncture in the history of the world, with the god of internationalism standing in the doorway beckoning with a loud voice, and with humanity suspended over the pit of nationalism and war, America was being led by a combination of empty-headed bureaucrats and the relics of ancient régime who knew only power politics backed by arms and treaties.'⁷⁹ In order to combat this weakness in public service, Fulbright proposed the Fulbright Program. Randall Bennett Woods concludes:

[The Fulbright Program] was also a specific response to a specific set of circumstances and perceived shortcomings. Events of 1945-46 convinced the junior senator from Arkansas that the United States and particularly its leadership either did not understand or did not accept internationalism. If nationalism and isolationism were not to reappear as the dominant strains in American foreign policy, the United States would have to raise an educated, enlightened elite with extensive firsthand knowledge of at least one other culture. The Fulbright exchange program was designed to bring just such an elite into existence.⁸⁰

Board of Foreign Scholarships

The Board of Foreign Scholarships was created by the House of Representatives, who distrusted the State Department. They inserted a provision into the Fulbright legislation establishing an independent Board to supervise the program, which members would be appointed by the president. By doing so they successfully insulated the program from the influence of domestic politics on the selection of American participants, and prevented

⁷⁸ Woods, 'Fulbright Internationalism', 34.

⁷⁹ Idem.

⁸⁰ Woods, 'Fulbright Internationalism', 35.

short-term foreign policy goals interfering with the nature of the program. Senator Fulbright would define the purpose of the Board in front of the House Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments as 'selecting students and educational institutions qualified to participate in this program and to supervise the exchange program authorized.'⁸¹ In 1966 the Board chairman Oscar Handlin would confirm that the Board existed as 'the product of an intention to keep the program free of either political or bureaucratic inference.'⁸²

The Board of Foreign Scholarships was tasked with creating the Fulbright Program; taking a piece of legislation and turning it into the world's largest educational exchange program. The Board met for the first time in October 1947 and had to make immediate decisions with far-reaching consequences for the future of the program. It was the first Board that decided who could apply for a Fulbright grant, what kind of institutions would be eligible for participation, and what amount of dollars a grant would amount to. Since this first Board has been so instrumental, its membership deserves attention. It consisted out of five administrators of education, such as Francis Spaulding, commissioner of education of the state of New York, and Sarah Blanding, president of Vassar College. Three noted scholars were also on the Board, as well as General Omar Bradley, administrator of veteran affairs and John W. Studebaker, U.S. commissioner of education.⁸³

Thousands upon thousands American and foreign students and scholars would soon be applying for Fulbright grants, and the Board was acutely aware of the fact they could not screen every single applicant. For this reason they called on cooperating agencies to assist them. The Institute of International Education agreed to screen U.S. student grants. The U.S. Office of Education would screen grants for teachers and administrators in elementary and secondary education, and the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils agreed to establish a screening procedure for U.S. senior scholars. This was all volunteer work, and without the countless hours poured into the program by volunteers the Program could not have existed. Private institutions were extremely important to the success of the Program as well. While American grantees would get a full scholarship, foreign grantees coming to

⁸¹ Vogel, 'Making of the Fulbright Program', 15.

⁸² Idem, 16.

⁸³ Idem.

the U.S. would only get a travel grant. Private organizations such as the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment, as well as American universities, assisted the visiting scholars in financing their accommodations. The total amount of money spent on educational exchange is therefore much larger than the budget of the Fulbright Program itself.

The Smith-Mundt Act

The 1948 'U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act', also known as the Smith-Mundt Act, further legitimized educational exchange as a part of American foreign policy. This act authorized the State Department to run public diplomacy campaigns similar to what Wilson's Committee for Public Information and Roosevelt's Office of Wartime Information had done in the past. The legislation specifically prohibited the domestic access to information intended for foreign audiences, in effect banning the domestic use of propaganda. This act was important for the Fulbright Program, as in the Fulbright Act of 1946 the Program was limited to the Lend-Lease nations specified in the Surplus Property Act of 1944. The Smith-Mundt Act opened the door for the Fulbright Program to act on a global scale, and allowed for the establishing of foundations around the world to facilitate the Fulbright Program.

Binational Commissions

The initial intention of the Department of State, which was in charge of establishing contacts with foreign governments, was to make the Fulbright Foundations around the world a completely American affair, like the study centers American universities would found around the world with support of the American government after World War II. It was agreed by the Board of Foreign Scholarships that the U.S Educational Foundations 'should have an American educational flavor'. The program was considered to complement the 'general aims of U.S. foreign policy', although care was to be taken 'to avoid all appearances of cultural imperialism.' The United States Department of State negotiators were instructed to achieve American majorities on the foundation boards and to keep them free of foreign educational control. This did not go over well with the receiving nations, and especially the French and Italians balked at this suggestion. The French succeeded in

getting the foundation renamed as a 'commission' and achieved equal representation on this commission. The Italians followed this example, other nations followed suit.⁸⁴ These commissions would become the focal point for the Fulbright Program in these nations. The commissions would facilitate the program in the host country, arranging the visits of American scholars and students and nominating local scholars and students for Fulbright grants. The members of the board were appointed by the American ambassador and the minister of foreign affairs or education in the host country. Nowadays, over fifty of such commissions have been established around the world.

In time, the reciprocity of the Commissions would be exalted as one of the fundamental principles of the Fulbright Program, but reciprocity had in fact been demanded by the cooperating countries, and was certainly not a given. In 1970 the Board of Foreign Scholarships directly referenced the binational character of the program:

The uniqueness of the exchange program is enhanced by the strong strain of binationalism that infuses it. Citizens of both countries share in its planning and administration, and bring talent and breadth to this responsibility. They protect its quality. They insulate it against partisan pressures. They keep it flexible and responsive to new ideas. They enlist many talents in support of its activities. They move a program that is governmental in origin outside the routine processes and controls of government; this condition makes participation in it more attractive to some, and makes it less likely to be affected in passing periods of political strain.⁸⁵

The binational nature of the Fulbright commissions has been important in insuring the longevity of the program. Had these commissions been a purely American affair, they would have been much more susceptible to the conjecture of the political climate in the United States, and as a result, may have been eliminated by a budget cut. As the commissions were binational, the host countries also jointly financed the Fulbright Program in their respective countries, plus it made the program more acceptable in the host countries as well. While the

⁸⁴ Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas*, 141-142.

⁸⁵ Board of Foreign Scholarships, *A Statement on Educational Exchange in the Seventies*. <http://www.fulbright.org/ec/web/pag.php?c=659> (2-7-2014).

binational nature was not part of the original planning of the Board of Foreign Scholarships and the State Department, it has turned out to be a blessing for the program.

Regions

The first binational agreement would be made with China in 1947, which was not a coincidence, as the Division of Cultural relations had already begun to administer exchanges there in 1942.⁸⁶ However, the figures show that the Fulbright Program was initially geared towards Europe, as table 1 shows. In the period 1949-1959, exchange to and from Europe dominated the Fulbright Program. In the 1960's and beyond other continents started playing a bigger part, but Europe has remained the dominant continent.

Table 1. Number of Fulbright scholarships awarded to American citizens and to citizens of concerning region of the world, per category, 1949 – 1959.

	<i>Americans</i>			<i>Foreign citizens</i>		
	students	researchers	teachers	students	researchers	teachers
<i>Africa</i>	3	3	3	11	2	
<i>Latin America</i>	64	154	50	300	71	139
<i>East Asia</i>	521	764	286	2.899	854	402
<i>Europe</i>	8.408	2.548	2.452	9.268	3.365	2.447
<i>Middle East</i>	197	517	100	1.436	280	268
<i>Total</i>	9.193	3.986	2.891	13.914	4.572	3.256

Source: Own calculation, based on Jan C. Rups, 'The Fulbright Program, or the Surplus Value of Officially Organized Academic Exchange' in *Journal of Studies in International Education* 3 (1999) 57-81.

⁸⁶ Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas*, 55-60.

Table 2 shows that a few core-countries have made up the bulk of the exchanges. The most important are the United Kingdom, Germany and France. Japan and India are only non-European countries that form a substantial part of the Fulbright exchanges. The Netherlands is situated in the semi-periphery:

Table 2. Number of total Fulbright scholarships (primary and secondary teachers, students, lecturers and researchers) awarded to American citizens and to foreign citizens of nations of the Program, 1949 - 1959.

	<i>Americans</i>	<i>Foreign Citizens</i>
<i>France</i>	3.278	3.030
<i>West-Germany</i>	2.069	1.710
<i>United Kingdom</i>	3.354	3.916
<i>Italy</i>	1.827	1.488
<i>India</i>	346	978
<i>Japan</i>	413	2.120
<i>Austria</i>	541	680
<i>Netherlands</i>	633	829
<i>Australia</i>	407	556
<i>Norway</i>	405	1.029
<i>Denmark</i>	273	480
<i>Finland</i>	171	554
<i>Spain</i>	-	34
<i>Brazil</i>	20	106
<i>Greece</i>	447	585

Source: Own calculation, based on Jan C. Rups, 'The Fulbright Program, or the Surplus Value of Officially Organized Academic Exchange' in *Journal of Studies in International Education* 3 (1999) 57-81.

Politicization and the United States Information Agency

In spite of Senator Fulbright's attempt to keep the Fulbright Program free of political influence and a focus on short-term foreign policy goals, the Board of Foreign Scholarships was unable to resist the political pressure of the Cold War. On January 13th, 1951, the Board of Foreign Scholarships held a special meeting. A few weeks earlier, Chinese troops had entered the Korean War, and there was a sense of crisis in the United States government. As a response, the Department of State had restated its objectives, which were among others:

1. To demonstrate to other people, by every possible means, the evidence of our own moral, spiritual and material strength, our determination to support the free nations of the world so that we may gain and hold the confidence of all free peoples in our efforts to halt Soviet aggression and Communist infiltration
2. To assist, by every possible means, the free peoples of the world to strengthen those attitudes and institutions which are part of the fabric of a free society and a bulwark against Communist encroachments.
3. To develop, by every possible means, an awareness on the part of the free peoples of the world, of their common interests in defense of their freedoms and of the necessity for common and united effort.⁸⁷

The Board of Foreign Scholarships approved of these objectives, and made the following decisions:

1. The Foundations and Commissions overseas should be requested to develop their programs in relation to the current world situation, the immediate needs of their countries and the achievement of immediate and short-range results.

⁸⁷ Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History*, 69.

2. The Fulbright Foundations and Commissions and the cooperating agencies in the United States should be requested to exercise greater care in the selection of grantees and the screening of projects in terms of the needs and objectives of United States policy in the current world crisis.

3. Greater emphasis should be given to:

- a. Insuring that foreign grantees in the U.S. be provided an opportunity better to understand the elements of U.S. democratic strength and obtain the maximum value from their stay in this country; and
- b. Insuring that American grantees be given an opportunity to assist more effectively in fulfilling U.S. objectives.⁸⁸

These decisions made the political intent of the Program clear. Country projects had to be defined 'in terms of the needs and objectives of United States policy'.

During the Korean War, Congress pressured the federal government into creating a separate information agency. In 1953, when the Korean War had come to an end, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was established by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This agency would be focused completely on public diplomacy. Its mission statement was 'to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of the national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and U.S. institutions, and their counterparts abroad. Specifically, the USIA worked: 'To explain and advocate U.S. policies in terms that are credible and meaningful in foreign cultures; To provide information about the official policies of the United States, and about the people, values, and institutions which influence those policies; to bring the benefits of international engagement to American citizens and institutions by helping the build strong long-term relationships with their counterparts overseas; and to advise the President and U.S. government policy-makers on the ways in which foreign attitudes will have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of U.S. policies.'⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Idem.

⁸⁹ <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/oldoview.htm#overview> (13-6-2014).

Overseas the USIA would be known as the United States Information Service (USIS). Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty all fell under the control of the USIA. The International Visitor Leadership Program was also run by the USIA. The Fulbright Program would remain a part of the State Department, although the program and USIS officers worked closely together. After the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, the Fulbright Program would be incorporated into the USIA.

The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 constituted an endorsement of educational exchange programs in general and the Fulbright Program in particular.⁹⁰ It removed burdensome limitations, such as allowing tax exemptions on grants from foreign governments and multinational educational foundations, and allowing the wives and husbands of foreign grantees to obtain the same type of visas as the grantees themselves. It also eliminated the provision in the Fulbright Act that permitted foreign grantees funds for travel only, and the new act authorized the financing of the Fulbright Program in dollars as well as in foreign currencies.⁹¹

Goal and targets of the Fulbright Program

While Senator Fulbright intended to use the Program to create a new elite of multinationalist, civil-service minded individuals, it was rapidly adopted by the State Department and later the United States Information Agency to achieve foreign policy goals. The Fulbright Program was different in every nation. The local Fulbright Foundations and commissions were tasked with creating yearly program proposals, which the Board of Foreign Scholarships would judge. These projects had to address both the local needs, as well as United States foreign policy. From the 1950's on the USIA produced a 'country plan' for each nation, in which it made clear the American foreign policy goals in that nation. While every country is different, and so, the needs as well as the foreign policy needs of the United States differed as well, there were in fact a few constants: The teaching of English and the founding of American Studies as an accepted field of study at Universities became important features of the Fulbright Program, universally represented in almost all country programs. American Studies was intended to demonstrate the 'moral, spiritual and material

⁹⁰ Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History*, 295.

⁹¹ Idem, 305-306.

strength' of the United States and illustrate their technological, scientific and cultural achievements, as well as their 'belief in education to solve our problems'.⁹²

While mutual understanding was the foundation of the Fulbright Program, in reality public diplomacy as a whole and exchange programs in particular were greatly influenced by findings stemming from psychological warfare and communications research. In the 1940s U.S. communications researchers developed the concept of the 'opinion leader', who could figure as a key transmitter of information within a community. Exchanges with this purpose in mind were applied to Germany after the second world war, as part of the 're-education' of Germany, with success. Lucius Clay, U.S. Military Governor in Germany from 1947-49 has stated that the exchange program was 'the foundation upon which our reorientation program was built.'⁹³ Scholars and teachers were important opinion leaders that could be reached and 're-educated' by the Fulbright Program.

Another important finding by U.S. communications researchers was that exchanges were best suited to reinforce existing beliefs, rather than trying to sway opponents. This is illustrated by Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian civil servant who travelled to the U.S. in 1948 in order to study the American education system. Rather than opening up to American society, Qutb was disgusted by the 'immoral materialism', and the exchange furthered him down a path of Islamic extremism, becoming a major influence on anti-Western fundamentalism.⁹⁴ Christopher Simpson sums this up well:

At heart modern psychological warfare has been a tool for managing empire, not for settling conflicts in any fundamental sense. It has operated largely as a means to ensure that indigenous democratic initiatives in the Third World and Europe did not go 'too far' from the standpoint of US security agencies.⁹⁵

The Fulbright Program was used to this effect: Managing empire. By stimulating American Studies, the Americans used the Fulbright Program to legitimize American leadership,

⁹² Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History*, 69.

⁹³ Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 62.

⁹⁴ Giles Scott-Smith, 'Exchange Programs and Public Diplomacy' in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy* (New York 2009) 52.

⁹⁵ Scott-Smith, *Networks of Empire*, 58.

sought support for its foreign policies and stimulated the Atlantic alliance. As U.S. diplomat William Draper expressed in 1952: 'This circulation of students and teachers and knowledge is the bloodstream, or I might call it the thought stream, of the Atlantic Community, essential to its growth.'⁹⁶

Conclusion

The Fulbright Program has been shaped by the legislation that gave it life, and the specific historical circumstances of that moment. It has been shaped first and foremost by Senator Fulbright himself, who penned the legislation, and played an instrumental part in getting the legislation through both Houses. The Fulbright Program was a reflection of Senator Fulbright's personal experiences as a Rhodes scholar, and is to be considered an institutionalization of his own adventures. Senator Fulbright was also worried by the strain of nationalism and isolationism in the United States government, and hoped that the Program could help educate and enlighten a new elite.

It was the Board of Foreign Scholarships who transformed the Fulbright Program from a piece of legislation into the world's largest educational exchange programs. Private and educational institutions have also played an important role in making the Program a reality. Without their support, the Program would not have been a success. The Department of State also had a crucial role in forming the connections with governments around the world, and getting these foreign governments to support the program.

Binational commissions have played an important role in the Fulbright Program. They were in charge of writing the local program proposals that the Board of Foreign Scholarships judged. The reciprocity of these commissions have been made one of the fundamental principles of the Program by the Board, as it is this characteristic that has helped insulate the Program from partisan pressures, made it more readily acceptable to foreign nations as well as lessen the financial burden on the United States as foreign nations were willing to help finance these commissions. However, this reciprocity was demanded by the cooperating nations, and was certainly not a given. U.S. negotiators had been instructed to achieve American majorities on the foundations, and that the foundations

⁹⁶ Johnson and Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History*, 69.

'should have an American educational flavor', and be in line with 'general aims of U.S. foreign policy.' From the beginning on, the political intent in the Fulbright Program was clear. This is further illustrated by the regions the Fulbright Program has been active in. The figures show that the focal point of the Fulbright Program has been Europe, where the United States sought approval of its leadership and support for the Atlantic alliance.

While Senator Fulbright tried to insulate the Fulbright Program from political influence, the Board of Foreign Scholarships could not withstand the pressure of the Cold War. In 1951, when the Cold War heated up, the Board made the decision that the programs should fit 'the needs and objectives of United States policy', and should strive to achieve 'immediate and short-range results.' From 1952 onward the Fulbright Program worked closely together with the United States Information Agency, and the Program was incorporated into the USIA in 1961. The teaching of English and the founding of American Studies as an accepted field of study at Universities became important features of the Fulbright Program, universally represented in almost all country programs. American Studies was intended to demonstrate the 'moral, spiritual and material strength' of the United States and illustrate their technological, scientific and cultural achievements, as well as their 'belief in education to solve our problems'.

Chapter 4: The Fulbright Program in the Netherlands, 1949 - 1965

Now that we've discussed the history of American government led academic exchanges, public diplomacy and informal empire in the first chapter, and have learned the history and development of the Fulbright Program in the second chapter, we reach the heart of this study: The Fulbright Program in the Netherlands during the Cold War.

The following chapters are split into three separate, chronological pieces. First up is the post-war period of 1949-1965. This period starts with 1949, because that was the year the Dutch-American Fulbright Foundation was founded as the 'United States Educational Foundation in the Netherlands'. The second period, 1965-1975 is the tail end of the sixties. This was the period of the Vietnam War, and Dutch-American relations were strained because of this conflict. The third and final period is 1975-1990, when Dutch-American relations reached their low point with the massive protests in the Netherlands against the placement of American cruise missiles.

Accompanying each chapter will be a table with various details about the awarded Fulbright scholarships in the Netherlands. These tables are from the historian Jan C. Rups' article 'The Fulbright Program, or the Surplus Value of Officially Organized Academic Exchange' which was published in the *Journal of Studies in International Education* in 1999.⁹⁷ The periodization that I and Jan C. Rups use do not align. He has split the tables into four decades (1949-1959, 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989) which makes the most sense from a statistical perspective. I have decided to split my thesis along different lines, for I am studying the relation between Dutch-American relations and the Fulbright Program. Therefore I have edited these tables so they only show the data for the time period I will be discussing in that particular chapter. The unaltered tables can be found in the appendix.

At the beginning of each chapter I will first discuss the historical context of that period, and the state of the Dutch-American relations during this timeframe. After that has been established, I will discuss and analyze the workings of the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands in that period. After doing this for all three periods, I will be able to draw my

⁹⁷ Jan C. Rups, 'The Fulbright Program, or the Surplus Value of Officially Organized Academic Exchange' in *Journal of Studies in International Education* 3 (1999) 57-81.

conclusions on whether or not the Fulbright Program has acted as a scholarly program, or has been an extension of American foreign policy.

Dutch-American relations

The United States has a longstanding alliance with the Netherlands that can be traced back to April 19th 1782 when the Netherlands were the first nation in the world to recognize the newly founded United States of America. In October of that year John Adams, who would later become the second president of the United States, signed a treaty 'of amity and commerce' in The Hague with the Dutch republic.⁹⁸ This was the start of a long and fruitful alliance for both parties. As the following chapters will show, the alliance between the Dutch and the Americans has known some rough periods in the second half of the twentieth century. Immediately following the Second World War, America and Dutch interests clashed. The Dutch made claims for Nazi war damage, and wanted Germany to cede part of its territory to the Netherlands as compensation. The United States and the United Kingdom made it clear that annexation was highly unacceptable, as in their view, Germany was to play an important role within postwar Europe.⁹⁹ In response, the Dutch government amended their claims, in order to create American goodwill and support for their claims on Indonesia. On August 17th, 1945, Sukarno and Hatta declared the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, while the Dutch government viewed the East Indies as a crucial part of the postwar reconstruction of the Netherlands, and as such were unwilling to surrender their colony. At first the Americans supported the Dutch claims on Indonesia, as the U.S. feared a communist takeover of Asia and knew that with the Dutch, they had an ally. However, when it became clear to the Americans that the Indonesian regime was anti-communist, the Americans withdrew their support of the Netherlands. The Dutch waged a colonial war in Indonesia, alienating their allies, and the Netherlands had the dubious honor of being the first country condemned by the United Nations for its hostile actions. The New York Times disclosed on January 13th, 1949 that the Netherlands had received \$400 million

⁹⁸ Hans Loeber, 'Dutch-American relations 1945-1969' in Hans Loeber (eds.) *Dutch-American Relations 1945-1969* (Maastricht 1992) 5.

⁹⁹ Idem, 11.

in Marshall Aid, and spent \$436 to finance its military.¹⁰⁰ This put extra pressure on the U.S. administration, and the American government threatened to cut the Dutch Marshall Aid if the Dutch would persist with its violent actions.¹⁰¹ Eventually, the pressure of the United States and the United Nations became too much to bear for the Dutch, and on December 30th, 1949, sovereignty of the East Indies was transferred to the Republic of Indonesia. This was considered by some Dutch politicians a humiliating defeat.¹⁰²

The Second World War had proven that the Dutch policy of neutralism had failed, and the Dutch government realized it had to create alliances in order to provide security. In April of 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded by the U.S., Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Iceland and Denmark. This was a military treaty that provided collective defense. This treaty was a way for the Dutch to accomplish its goals in regard to Germany and Indonesia. The Indonesian conflict had politically isolated the Dutch, and the NATO provided an opportunity for the Netherlands to strengthen the bonds with its allies once again.¹⁰³ Those bonds would soon be tested, as the Korean War started when in June 1950, North-Korea invaded South-Korea. The Dutch Prime-Minister Drees condemned this attack as an 'assault on peace'.¹⁰⁴ The United States came to the aid of the South-Koreans, and asked the Dutch to contribute as well. The Dutch Government was not pleased, as it was in the middle of reconstruction following World War Two, and the colonial war in Indonesia had only ended 6 months prior. The humiliating loss of Indonesia was still a fresh wound for the Dutch politicians, and they had not forgotten the role of the United States in this. At first the Dutch contribution was merely symbolic, but this invited strong pressure from the United States to commit troops to the war. The Dutch Prime-Minister Willem Drees was convinced and the Dutch sent a detachment of volunteer troops to Korea in in October 1950. Drees admitted in a cabinet meeting in August of 1950 that he sent troops because other nations sent troop as well, and he feared that if the Dutch refrained from supporting

¹⁰⁰ Idem, 27.

¹⁰¹ Pierre Van Der Eng, 'Marshall Aid as a Catalyst in the Decolonization of Indonesia, 1947-1949', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 19 (1988) 335-352.

¹⁰² Robert Stiphout, *De bloedigste oorlog. Het vergeten bataljon Nederlandse militairen in Korea* (Amsterdam 2009) 22.

¹⁰³ Duco Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld. De buitenlandse politiek van Nederland* (Houten 2010) 152-153.

¹⁰⁴ Stiphout, *De Bloedigste Oorlog*, 19.

the United States the shaky Dutch international position would be further weakened.¹⁰⁵ This was the state of Dutch-American relations when the Fulbright Program started in the Netherlands.

Focus of exchanges

The Fulbright Program started in the Netherlands in 1949 as the 'United States Educational Foundation in the Netherlands'. In the first few years of the Fulbright Program, the focus of exchanges was on technical studies and natural sciences. Especially Dutch academics were interested in this field. Table 3 illustrates this. In the period 1949-1959, 75% of all the Fulbright Scholarships awarded to Dutch academics were in the fields of medicine, engineering, agriculture or one of the natural sciences. For American academics travelling to the Netherlands, the figures are much more even. 55% of American academics were in the humanities and social sciences, and 45% were in the technical and natural sciences. The absolute numbers of scholarships were 184 for Dutch academics, and 161 for American academics for exchange to the Netherlands. This interest of Dutch academics towards natural sciences can be explained by the large steps the United States had taken in these departments during the Second World War. Dutch (and other European) scientists were eager to learn of the American achievements. Table 4 shows that the interest of students was much more geared towards social sciences. In the period 1949-1959, 62% of Fulbright scholarships awarded to Dutch students were in the social sciences and humanities. Outlier in this category was business administration. 22 of the 127 social science students came from this field. Business administration was in this time not a serious field of study in Europe, and it makes sense that students pursuing this field wanted to travel to the United States.

¹⁰⁵ National Archive, The Hague, The Netherlands, Minutes of Council of Ministers, 2.02.05.02, inv.nr. 394, 2 august 1950.

Table 3. Number of Fulbright Scholarships awarded to Dutch and American academics, per academic field and period.

	1949 – 1959		1960 – 1969	
	Dutch	American	Dutch	American
<i>Social Sciences</i>	37	89	24	74
<i>% of Total</i>	25	55	23	66
<i>Natural Sciences</i>	147	72	88	38
<i>% of Total</i>	75	45	79	34
<i>Total</i>	184	161	112	112

Source: Own calculation, based on Jan C. Rups, 'The Fulbright Program, or the Surplus Value of Officially Organized Academic Exchange' in *Journal of Studies in International Education* 3 (1999) 57-81.

In the period 1960-1969, the focus of the academic exchanges compared to the decade preceding it stayed roughly the same, with no major changes. The percentage of Dutch academic scholarships in the social sciences and humanities dropped down from 25% to 21%, and likewise, the percentage in the technical and natural sciences rises from 75% to 79%. The absolute number of exchanges does decline by a large amount, from 184 total Dutch academics in '49-'59 to 112 in '60-'69. Compared to '49-'59, the percentage of American academics travelling to the Netherlands in the fields of social sciences and humanities in '60-'69 rose from 55% to 66%, solidifying this sector of science as the most important for the Americans. The absolute number of exchanges also shows a decline, from 161 in the '49-'59 to 112 in '60-'69 – which was exactly the same amount as Dutch academic scholarships. The percentage of scholarships for Dutch students in the social sciences and humanities increased in this decade as well, rising to 70%, up from 62% in 49-'59. In absolute numbers there was quite a decline. In '49-'59 the total number of Dutch student exchanges were 611, while in the decade '60-'69, this dropped down to 477.

Table 4. Number of (mostly) Fulbright scholarships awarded to Dutch students per academic field and period.

	1949 – 1959	1960 - 1969
<i>Social Sciences</i>	127	147
<i>Natural Sciences</i>	79	63
<i>Other / Unknown</i>	405	267
<i>Total</i>	611	477

Source: Own calculation, based on Jan C. Rups, 'The Fulbright Program, or the Surplus Value of Officially Organized Academic Exchange' in *Journal of Studies in International Education* 3 (1999) 57-81..

The importance of the Netherlands

As shown in the previous chapter, the Netherlands was an important part of the Fulbright Program. But why? According to the historian Jan Rups, this has to do with Dutch expertise in the sciences with a strong military-strategic importance.¹⁰⁶ The Netherlands had a strong scientific presence in mathematics, aeronautics, and agriculture. Directly after the war, the Dutch state had founded two research institutes in the Netherlands in atom physics (Instituut voor Fundamenteel Onderzoek der Materie) and mathematics (Mathematisch Centrum). The Netherlands cooperated with Norway in its nuclear research. The Americans were very keen on keeping all the knowledge, materials and technology on nuclear research within the Atlantic alliance, and having a monopoly position within this alliance. They offered to cooperate with the Netherlands in researching peaceful applications of nuclear energy. This included American financial support. The Netherlands agreed, and in doing so became dependent on American installations and know-how.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Jan C. Rups, *Van oude en nieuwe universiteiten: De verdringing van Duitse door Amerikaanse invloeden op de wetenschapsbeoefening en het hoger onderwijs in Nederland, 1945 – 1995* (Den Haag 1997) 214.

¹⁰⁷ Rups, *Van oude en nieuwe universiteiten*, 215.

The USIA, which was founded in 1953 as has been discussed in the previous chapters, constantly reported on the ongoing nuclear research in the Netherlands to the State Department. The importance of the scientific research in the Netherlands for the United States is clearly reflected in this. Between 1952 and 1956, the American embassy in The Hague wrote 19 reports to the State Department, detailing the state of Dutch research with regards to its nuclear program, its aeronautical research, as well as its mathematics.¹⁰⁸

The United States Information Agency

An intense scientific cooperation in such strategic areas as nuclear physics and aeronautics could only be possible if the Dutch public, and Dutch universities in particular, held a positive view of the United States. It was the goal of the Fulbright Program and the USIA to instill confidence in American leadership. The United States Information Service Country Plan for the Netherlands of 1961 reflects this.¹⁰⁹ Country Plans were written by the USIA and reflected the foreign policy goals of the United States in its particular country. The Dutch Country Plan shows the Netherlands was a committed, yet difficult ally to work with. The Dutch are described as ‘political realists, stubborn, energetic and shrewd’. ‘Their talents as traders have made them known as the “Chinese of Europe”’ the report reads. ‘They are known as careful planners, frugal, conservative and with an ingrained respect for law.’ The Dutch were ‘on a whole well disposed towards the United States and the United States’ foreign policy in general’. Despite their good dispositions, the Dutch could also be very critical of the United States, according to the country plan:

The Netherlands is often rightly cited as a staunch ally in NATO but this does not mean that the Dutch do not resent any indications that the United States take their support for granted. (...) From a USIS point of view, it is important to remember that this ally of the United States can be very outspoken when it feels that US leadership of the Western world is flagging or that Dutch vital interests are being ignored. The conclusion can be drawn from the foregoing is that USIS activities in the Netherlands

¹⁰⁸ *Idem*, 216.

¹⁰⁹ Roosevelt Study Center, Middleburg, The Netherlands, U.S. Information Agency Country Plans, Western Europe, 1958-1973, Box 4, 110, *Revised Country Plan for the Netherlands, July 28, 1961*, 1-24.

must be geared towards a people who are tenacious, energetic, proud, shrewd, religious, legal-minded and literature – a people who are innately conservative but accept change realistically if it be dictated by national interest. The Dutch are resistant to high pressure techniques from foreign governments, quick to resent superficiality in any form, suspicious of persuasion which is not backed up by facts. They are internationally minded and more likely to support undertakings in the cultural field of which they are a part in a cooperative venture than government labeled programs of the same nature.¹¹⁰

The last sentence seems to directly reference the Fulbright Program. While it is more of an educational than a cultural program, the Dutch-American Fulbright Foundation was in theory a cooperative venture. As we've seen in Chapter 2, these Foundations were not intended to be cooperative; the intention was for them to be a strictly American affair. As Frank Ninkovich shows in his book *The Diplomacy of Ideas*: 'In all cases the United States negotiators were instructed to achieve American majorities on the foundation boards and to keep them free of foreign educational control.'¹¹¹ While exchange is a two-way street, the focus of the Fulbright Program was on supporting American foreign policy. The Fulbright Program successfully portrayed itself as a cooperative venture, while being an American government led program.

Keeping this information in mind, the United State Information Service laid out several country objectives for the Netherlands, and these were:

1. To bring constantly to the attention of the Dutch people American foreign policy, of which NATO is the keystone in Europe, and to provide balanced information on foreign policy development and execution which will create confidence in American leadership in world affairs.

¹¹⁰ Idem.

¹¹¹ Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas*, 141.

(Which reference to the above stated objective, it should be emphasized that, as strong participants and supports of NATO, the Dutch do not automatically accept American leadership as infallible. (...) And they also recall the United States part in the loss of Indonesia.)

2. To portray American scientific achievements and international cooperation in the service of mankind in order to bolster belief in the United States as a leader of the free world
3. To stimulate greater understanding of characteristic American social, political and economic institutions; to show that the process of solving problems arising from the United States diversity and size is a part of American society.
4. To provide a broader appreciation of the intellectual, spiritual and cultural achievements of American civilization and its creative arts in order to engender respect as a basis of understanding.¹¹²

These objectives show a large overlap with the goals laid out for the Fulbright Program, as discussed in Chapter 2. The only difference is that the Fulbright Program does not explicitly try to defend American foreign policy, but the Fulbright Program is intended to portray American scientific achievements in a positive light. The Fulbright Program does stimulate greater understanding of American social, political and economic institutions, and it does provide a broader appreciation of the intellectual, spiritual and cultural achievements of American civilizations, and in doing so engender understanding. This shows that the USIA and Fulbright Program were closely intertwined, often working towards the same ends, which further discredits the Program's claim of being academic and working towards 'mutual' understanding.

Already in the 1950's there was a tendency in the Netherlands towards neutralism/pacifism, which increased as the Netherlands recuperated economically. This

¹¹² Roosevelt Study Center, Middleburg, The Netherlands, U.S. Information Agency Country Plans, Western Europe, 1958-1973, Box 4, 110, *Revised Country Plan for the Netherlands, July 28, 1961*, 10.

would eventually lead to the largest demonstrations in Dutch history in the 1980's against the placement of American cruise missiles, but in 1953, this was already a concern for the American government. The Americans strived, through the USIA and the Fulbright Program, to convince the Dutch that NATO and the Atlantic community were a better option than pacifism. The Country plan of 1953 identified the following groups as the most important targets of the USIS programs:

1. Labor (including trade union officials, government and parliamentary officials representing labor groups, and the broad mass of employees in industry, agriculture and commerce);
2. Educators and students;
3. Women;
4. Government and Military (personal in general);
5. Management (business officials and employees important for their influence on production policy and methods).¹¹³

'Educators and students' were identified by the USIS as the second most important group in the Netherlands to reach, and that was the exact group the Fulbright Program was targeting. Each group required their own approach. Dutch society was very fragmented in this period, along religious and social boundaries. This was the period of 'pillarization', in which society was, from top to bottom, divided in several religious and social pillars. 'Relatively little can be done to break down the denominational factionalism rampant here', a 1951 evaluation of the Netherlands reads.¹¹⁴ This hindered the USIS and Fulbright Program's attempts to influence Dutch education, as it was also divided among different pillars. The American Embassy in The Hague recognizes it will have difficult time in changing this: 'Church groups, an important political factor, are suspicious of American secularism.'¹¹⁵ The importance of church groups will ring true in the 1980's, when they take a leading role in the aforementioned demonstrations against the placement of American cruise missiles.

¹¹³ Rups, *Van oude en nieuwe universiteiten*, 218.

¹¹⁴ *Idem.*

¹¹⁵ *Idem.*

The Fulbright Foundation

The Fulbright Foundation played an important part in steering the exchanges to the areas they found important. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Fulbright Foundation reflected American interests. The Foundation would create program proposals in areas in which they thought the Americans could help the Dutch. In theory they would come to these projects after consulting with the Dutch universities. The Fulbright Foundations around the world would formulate 'projects' in terms of where the host country had 'needs'. This choice of words was perhaps a poor one, as several members of the Foundations around the world objected to these terms, resenting them for implying their country was underdeveloped.¹¹⁶ For this reason the Dutch Fulbright Foundations added to the report of 1953-54 a statement saying that the Netherlands was in fact a highly developed nation, and that its 'needs' were not comparable to that of developing countries.¹¹⁷ The key focus was 'cooperation in exchange of information and experience in scientific and cultural fields', according to the report. The social sciences and Dutch education were indeed in need of help, as they were not as well developed as their American counterparts.

While in theory the Fulbright Program was one of mutual exchanges, the focus laid heavily on the American needs, and it was for all intents and purposes an American program. All the projects were about facilitating the exchange of Americans to the Netherlands, not vice versa. As stated, the Fulbright Foundation would take note of the wishes of Dutch universities and other institutions, and would create several program proposals, made up out of several projects. These proposals are sent over to the Board of Foreign Scholarships in Washington D.C. After they've been approved, American academics can apply for one of the positions. This does not happen for Dutch scholars going to the United States. As a result, the Dutch universities were not enthusiastic about the Fulbright Program. They were afraid of being 'overrun' by American students and scholars.

Working on a project basis such as this is a purposeful and guided way of influencing the scientific world in the host countries of the Fulbright Program. This stands in sharp contrast with the principles of open competition that is held in particular high regard in the United States. The American universities had no say in these program proposals

¹¹⁶ Johnson, *Fulbright: A History*, 47.

¹¹⁷ Rups, *Van oude en nieuwe universiteiten*, 220.

whatsoever. What happened is that a large amount of the positions in the programs proposals did not receive any applications from American academics, as there was a large discrepancy with the supply and demand of American academics. As much as 30% of the positions went without any applications.¹¹⁸

A few examples of these projects were 'Education', 'Social Sciences', 'Environmental Studies' and 'Economical Studies'. These projects changed every few years, as needs and interests shifted. The first focus of the Fulbright Foundation was influencing secondary education in the Netherlands. American academics in the fields of educational psychology, curriculum development and teaching methods were invited to travel to the Netherlands and help modernize Dutch education. F.B. Davis, professor in educational psychology from Hunter College in New York developed the first Dutch methods for evaluating education at the Pedagogical Didactic Institute in Amsterdam in 1957.¹¹⁹

One project has remained constant since its introduction in 1954: American Studies. In 1954 this project was first included by the Fulbright Foundation, and since then it has remained the principle project of the Fulbright Program, appearing in every single program proposal. During the 1950's this Program did not pay much dividend, but in the 1960's, it started to pay off. There was a particular focus on Leiden University and Dr. Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, as he was identified by USIS officers as being an opinion leader. He received a Fulbright Research grant in 1954, and published *Het volk dat in duisternis wandelt (The People that Walk in Darkness)* in 1956 as a result. USIS cultural affairs officer Earl Balch was not pleased, as the book provided an 'unbalanced picture'. In the following years the USIS tried to persuade Schulte Nordholt's opinion, and secured a year-long guest lectureship for him in New York in 1962-63. Using the rivalry between the universities of Utrecht and Leiden, USIS encouraged the creation of a chair in American history at Leiden, which was founded in 1963 for Schulte Nordholt.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Idem, 224.

¹¹⁹ Idem, 220.

¹²⁰ Giles Scott-Smith, 'American Studies in the Netherlands' in Hans Krabbendam, Cornelis A. Van Minnen and Giles Scott-Smith (eds.) *Four Centuries of Dutch American Relations* (Amsterdam 2009) 986.

Conclusion

In the years immediately following the Second World War, the longstanding alliance between the United States and the Netherlands was seriously tested. Dutch claims of German soil were denied by the Americans, and the Dutch made a serious misjudgment in trying to wrestle back control of Indonesia from its indigenous population. The era of colonialism had come to an end, and the hostile Dutch actions led to denouncements from the newly formed United Nations, and the United States. The Netherlands was one of the founding members of NATO, eager to regain the goodwill of its Atlantic partner. The Dutch-American alliance was once again tested when the U.S. asked the Dutch to send troops to assist in the Korean War. The Dutch were initially reluctant, the loss of Indonesia only six months prior still a fresh memory. However, the Dutch Prime-Minister Willem Drees was convinced to commit troops as he feared the failure to do so would further damage the Dutch precarious international position. This was the international situation when the United States Educational Foundation in the Netherlands was founded in 1949. This Foundation would oversee the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands. The first focus of the Foundation was secondary education in the Netherlands, as it was not considered to be up to international standards. American educational psychologists and curriculum developers were flown to the Netherlands to help modernize Dutch education. From 1954 onward, American Studies became one of the top priorities of the Foundation.

The Foundation's work was closely related to that of the United States Information Agency, which was founded in 1953. The USIA produced Country Plans, in which the foreign policy goals of the United States in that country are defined, and important groups and targets are singled out. Educators and students are identified as the second most important group in the Netherlands by the USIA, and this was the target of the Fulbright Program. The USIA goals for the Netherlands were among other 'to bring constantly to the attention of the Dutch people American foreign policy, of which NATO is the keystone in Europe', to 'create confidence in American leadership in world affairs, and 'to portray American scientific achievements and international cooperation in the service of mankind in order to bolster belief in the United States as a leader of the free world.' These objectives overlap with the goals laid for the Fulbright Program, as discussed in Chapter 3. The only difference is that the Fulbright Program does not explicitly try to defend American foreign policy, but it is in

fact intended to portray American scientific achievements in a favorable light, and to create confidence in American leadership in world affairs. It is for this reason that American Studies became the principle project of the Fulbright Foundation in the Netherlands.

Chapter 5: The Fulbright Program in the Netherlands, 1965 - 1975

The late sixties and early seventies were an eventful period in the history of Dutch-American relations. The Dutch public became increasingly critical of the United States as the horrors of the Vietnam War reached Dutch households. The Watergate scandal further damaged the reputation of the American government. If the Fulbright Program was a political instrument for the American government, than it stands to reason that this will be reflected in the operation of the Program .This chapter will analyze the workings of the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands during this troubled period.

Dutch-American relations, 1965-1975

On March 8th, 1965, the first American troops set foot on Vietnamese soil. This was the start of a massive build-up of troops, with over 180.000 American troops being staged in Vietnam at the end of 1965. The United States tried, with all its might, to contain the spread of communism in Asia. The conflict in Vietnam itself had been raging since 1946, when the indigenous Vietnamese population rose up against the French colonial power. This escalated into a civil war with global ramifications, as South Vietnam was backed by the U.S. and North Vietnam was sponsored by the Soviet Union and China. American involvement in the conflict lasted a decade, until the superpower had to admit defeat in April of 1975 when Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese. Vietnam became a symbol of American failure and weakness. The loss of the war showed the world that the United States was not infallible.

The Vietnam War became a contentious topic around the globe, including in the Netherlands. While in the first few years the Dutch general public supported the American war effort, as the U.S. was one of the Netherland's major allies in the Cold War, the tide of the public turned during the war. This was due to the massive and excessive force that the Americans used against the technologically inferior Vietcong. The My Lai massacre, the use of Agent Orange, and the Christmas bombing in 1972 raised objections. This culminated in massive protests in the Netherlands in January of 1973. These protests were the largest

since the Second World War.¹²¹ Whereas in the period 1965 – 1968 the Dutch police would arrest and fine protestors who called the American President Johnson a murderer, there were no arrests made at the January '73 protests.¹²² In only a few years, the tide of public opinion had turned against the United States.

The Dutch government was not as outspoken as the Dutch public. The government refrained from condemning the American hostile actions, and stated it was 'sympathetic' of the military actions of the U.S.¹²³ The Dutch remained a faithful ally of the United States, as the alliance of the U.S. and the Dutch membership of the NATO were the cornerstones of the Dutch defense policy. There were tensions in the Dutch-American relationship, when in 1973 the democratic-socialist Den Uyl became the Prime-Minister of the Netherlands, which constituted a shift to the political left for the Netherlands. However, the anti-American protests of the public brought no political changes in the relationship of the Netherlands and the Americans.

Focus of exchanges

In the period of 1970-1979, the trend of Dutch academic exchanges being heavily focused on technical and natural sciences is showing signs of reverse, as table 5 illustrates. The percentage of Dutch academic scholarships in the social sciences and humanities rose to 40%, up from 21% the decade earlier. In absolute numbers the amount of scholarships in the social sciences and humanities more than doubles, going from 24 in '60-'69 up to 49 in '70-'79. The total number of scholarships awarded to Dutch academics stays exactly the same in this decade as the one preceding it: 122 Dutch scholarships are awarded. The percentage of American academics travelling to the Netherlands in the fields of social sciences and humanities stays nearly the same: 64% in 1970-1979, as opposed to 66% in 1960-1969. In absolute numbers there is quite a decline, as the total number of American academics drops down from 112 to 89.

¹²¹ Peter van Eekert, Duco Hellema and Adrienne van Heteren, *Johnson Moordenaar! De Kwestie Vietnam in de Nederlandse Politiek 1965 – 1975* (Amsterdam 1986) 16.

¹²² Idem, 16.

¹²³ Kim van der Wijngaart, *Bondgenootschap onder spanning. Nederlands-Amerikaanse betrekkingen, 1969 – 1976* (Hilversum 2011) 219.

Table 5. Number of Fulbright scholarships awarded to Dutch and American academics, per academic field and period.

	1960 – 1969		1970 – 1979	
	Dutch	American	Dutch	American
<i>Social Sciences</i>	24	74	49	57
<i>% of Total</i>	21	66	40	64
<i>Natural Sciences</i>	88	38	73	32
<i>% of Total</i>	79	34	60	36
<i>Total</i>	112	112	112	89

Source: Own calculation, based on Jan C. Rups, 'The Fulbright Program, or the Surplus Value of Officially Organized Academic Exchange' in *Journal of Studies in International Education* 3 (1999).

The percentage of scholarships for Dutch students in the social sciences and humanities in this decade stays more or less the same at 71%, as opposed to 70% in the '60's. In absolute numbers the decline in exchanges continues in this decade, with 429 Dutch students getting a Fulbright scholarship in total. In '60-'69 this was 477. Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, the NWO displaced the Fulbright Program as the main exchange program for the natural sciences. The Fulbright Program focused more and more on social sciences and humanities, as these were most conducive to learning about each other's societies.

Table 6. Number of (mostly) Fulbright scholarships awarded to Dutch students per academic field and period

	1960 - 1969	1970 - 1979
<i>Social Sciences</i>	147	238
<i>Natural Sciences</i>	63	95
<i>Other / Unknown</i>	267	96
<i>Total</i>	477	429

Source: Own calculation, based on Jan C. Rups, 'The Fulbright Program, or the Surplus Value of Officially Organized Academic Exchange' in *Journal of Studies in International Education* 3 (1999).

American Studies

As discussed in the previous chapter, American Studies was the premier program of the Fulbright Program. Dr. Schulte Nordholt received a Fulbright Research grant in 1954, and Leiden University founded a chair in American History in 1963 for him. In 1965, USIA officers reported extensively on Schulte Nordholt, as the following message, sent by the U.S. Embassy in The Hague to the USIA in Washington D.C. shows:

USIS officers spent considerable time developing close personal contacts with Dr. Schulte Nordholt because he is no doubt the single most important and influential person among the target audience. (...) Until about a year ago, Dr. Schulte Nordholt was often extremely critical of the United States with regards to race relations and US defense policies. We gave him the material to re-study the progressive tradition in America as represented by Lincoln, Roosevelt, Kennedy and Johnson and eventually interested him in coming to terms with the necessity for a strong Atlantic

Community so that he is now a sympathetic interpreter of American history, present conditions and the 'strategy for peace.'¹²⁴

This message clearly illustrates how the Fulbright Program and the USIA were intertwined, working together toward common goals: finding support for the United States in the Atlantic alliance, and shaping opinion leaders into sympathetic interpreters of American policies.

In 1964 the University of Utrecht received a five year grant from the American Council of Learned Societies to develop a chair in American literature and history, and in 1966 J.G. Riewald became a lector in English and American literature at Groningen University. In 1965 the USIA reported that 'all Dutch universities recognize American literature as an official subject'.¹²⁵ The Fulbright Commission reported the purpose of the American Studies project in 1967 as 'reflecting the Foundations interest in encouraging an extension of the knowledge of American civilization, literature, history, language and linguistics at Netherlands universities and secondary schools. More particularly it is directed towards the establishment of permanent courses and chairs in American literature and American history at the Free University of Amsterdam and the State University at Utrecht respectively.'¹²⁶ This once again shows that the Fulbright Foundation was working purposefully with several universities, as the USIA was doing as well.

This triumph of American Studies would be cut short from 1968 onward when a radical wave went through Dutch universities. The Vietnam War was heavily criticized by the Dutch public and academics alike, and American Studies was regarded as tool of American hegemony. As table 4 shows, student participation in the Fulbright Program dropped in the 1970's as well. The Annual Report of the Fulbright Commission of 1972 mentions an incident at the University of Amsterdam, where Professor Tanter from the University of Michigan was invited by Amsterdam's political science department: 'Unfortunately a difficult situation arose in the political science department and especially

¹²⁴ Rups, *Van oude en nieuwe universiteiten*, 241.

¹²⁵ Scott-Smith, 'American Studies', 988.

¹²⁶ Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the United States Educational Foundation in the Netherlands for the Program Year 1967*, 4.

at the Institute which hosted Professor Tanter, caused by rebellious students who violated freedom of speech shouting down professor Tanter's first public lecture and questioning him on his previous research activities at the Pentagon. This also led to serious interference with his work.' As a result, Tanter left the University of Amsterdam prematurely, and never handed in an evaluation with the Fulbright Foundation.¹²⁷

Netherlands America Commission for Educational Exchange

Another problem the Fulbright Foundation was facing was the weak position of the dollar. The cost of living in the Netherlands in the period 1968 – 1970 increased by 12%, making every dollar less valuable.¹²⁸ On top of this, the Fulbright Program faced a severe budget cut in 1970. According to the report of the Foundation in the year 1970/71, these 'radical changes in the year 1969/70, necessitated by the severe decrease of funds appropriated by the United States Congress for the Foundation's educational and cultural exchange programs, seriously impaired the Foundation's schedule of procedural activities for that year and entailed time-consuming efforts to alleviate the adverse effect of the reduction in funds'.¹²⁹ The yearly funds appropriated to the Foundation in the Netherlands by the United States Congress dropped down to \$37,268 in 1969, while in 1967 they received \$154,375 annually. In response, the Dutch government increased its funding of the foundation, from \$27,625 in 1967 up to \$75,555 in 1969. As a result, 1970 and 1971 were tough years for the program in the Netherlands. The teacher exchange program was discontinued due to lack of funds, and the number of grants had to be toned down. Luckily for the program this severe budget cut's effect would be only temporary, as its fortunes would turn in 1972.

1972 was a landmark year for the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands. On October 16th, 1972, a new agreement was signed between the government of the Netherlands and the United States. Under this new agreement the Dutch government promised to share the cost of the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands on a 50/50 basis. The 'United States

¹²⁷ RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the NACEE for the Program Year 1972*, 12.

¹²⁸ RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 2. A.1 Program Plans 1970 – 1997, *Annual Program Proposal of the NACEE for the Program Year 1972*, 7.

¹²⁹ RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the USEFN for the Program Year 1970*, 1.

Educational Foundation in the Netherlands' was changed to the 'Netherlands America Commission for Educational Exchange'. The U.S. State Department brokered such agreements all across Europe in the early 1970's, and this was the culmination of the binational commissions. Nations now pledged to share the cost of the Fulbright Program in their nation with the United States, and in return, received equal representation on the commissions. Germany went as far as to fund 80% of the German Fulbright Commission's budget for a period of 5 years, as a sign of good will, but the Netherlands did not take it that far.¹³⁰ Alongside American Studies in the Netherlands, the Fulbright Commission now also had a project for facilitating Dutch Studies in the United States.¹³¹

These agreements have to be viewed in the light of the Vietnam War. This disastrous war had greatly damaged the reputation of the United States around the world, and cost the U.S. billions of dollars. By signing these new agreements, the United States showed that it was open to foreign influences and that it could learn from other nations as well, rather than being the only source of knowledge. At the same time, the agreements allowed the United States to cut back on funding, as the host nations were now sharing the burden.

The U.S government did not cut back funding in the Netherlands, as the amount of funding for the newfound commission was improved: The U.S. government made \$78,340 available in 1972, while the Dutch matched this at \$74,842, bringing the total amount of funds (including a bit of interest) to \$153,182. This but the Commission back at the level it was before the budget cut.¹³²

1973/1974 was another important year in the history of the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands, as 1974 marked its 25th anniversary. These anniversaries were generally a reason for festivities, and the Netherlands was no different in this aspect. A commemorative session was held on the 20th of May in the historical knights hall of the Dutch parliament building to celebrate this occasion. It was attended by representatives of the American and Dutch government, Dutch universities, other exchange organizations, as well as many alumni and current American grantees. Guests of honor were, among others, the U.S.

¹³⁰ Vogel, 'The Making of the Fulbright Program', 19.

¹³¹ RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the NACEE for the Program Year 1972*, 6.

¹³² *Idem*, 11.

ambassador to the Netherlands, the Dutch minister of Education and Sciences, and American congressman Wayne Hays. This occasion was also used to raise funds: Dutch and American companies donated to the 'silver opportunity scholarship', an initiative taken by the commission. The commission also made the first step in cooperating with the Belgium Fulbright commission to start a new program: a joint seminar on the art of the Low Countries for U.S. teachers.¹³³

1974/1975 was a year of smooth proceedings for the program, as the financial struggles were now a thing of the past. The teacher exchange, eliminated in 1969 as a result of the budget cuts, was now reinstated, and the number of participants in the programs increased. This was partly due to a shorter duration of the grants: several U.S. grantees preferred coming for a single semester, but also due to the increased funding. This year marked the first instance of the multinational project with the Belgian Fulbright Commission. Eighteen American art teachers were recipients of the joint Belgian-Netherlands Fulbright-Gays grants for participation in a summer program on the art of the Low Countries. The program consisted of three weeks in each country, and included lectures on history, paintings, modern arts, architecture, eight excursions and in total twenty-four visits to museums and other historical monuments. Each national commission took care of the full group during their sojourn in their respective countries.¹³⁴

Conclusion

In the period 1965 – 1975 the views of the Dutch general public with regards to the United States changed dramatically, due to the Vietnam War. When the U.S. first entered the conflict the Americans were generally supported by the Dutch public, but the brutality of the conflict, with the My Lai massacre and the 1972 Christmas bombings as its low point, changed this. This culminated in the massive protests against the Vietnam War in January of 1973. This anti-American sentiment is reflected in the Fulbright Program. The amount of

¹³³ RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the NACEE for the Program Year 1973*, 2.

¹³⁴ RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the NACEE for the Program Year 1974*, 5.

students who travelled to the United States on a Fulbright grant dropped from 611 in the 1950's and 477 in the 1960's to 429 in the 1970's.

The focus of the Fulbright Foundation in this period remained on the American Studies program, and it started to pay dividends, as Schulte Nordholt received a chair in American History at the University of Leiden in 1963. The University of Utrecht received a five year grant from the American Council of Learned Societies to develop a chair in American literature and history, and in 1966 J.G. Riewald became a lector in English and American literature at Groningen University. By 1965 the USIA reported that 'all Dutch universities recognize American literature as an official subject.'

The U.S. Embassy in The Hague reported back to the USIA in Washington D.C. that they had developed close personal contacts with Schulte Nordholt as he was 'the single most important and influential person among the target audience'. From being critical of the United States, USIS officers had managed to turn him into a 'sympathetic interpreter of American history' who had come to terms with the 'necessity for a strong Atlantic Community'. This clearly illustrates how the Fulbright Program and the USIA were intertwined, working together towards common goals: finding support for the Atlantic alliance and shaping opinion leaders into sympathetic interpreters of American policies.

This triumph of American Studies would be cut short from 1968 onward, when a radical wave went through Dutch universities. The Vietnam War was heavily criticized by the Dutch public and academics alike, and American Studies was regarded as tool of American hegemony. Another issue that the Fulbright Foundation faced was the weak position of the dollar. The cost of living in the Netherlands in the period 1968 - 1970 increased by 12%, and to add to this, the Foundation was faced with a severe budget cut in 1969. Rather than an increase in budget to combat the growing Anti-Americanism in the Netherlands, the United States Congress decided to cut the budget of the Fulbright Program, as the Vietnam War was costing the Americans billions of dollars. This budget cut seriously hampered the operation of the Foundation, and several programs had to be cut as a result.

In 1972 the tide would turn for the Fulbright Foundation as the Dutch and American government signed a new binational agreement. The United States Educational Foundation in the Netherlands was changed to the Netherlands America Commission for Educational Exchange. The Dutch and American government would finance this Commission on a 50/50

basis, and hold equal representation on the commission itself. Alongside American Studies in the Netherlands, the Fulbright Commission would now facilitate Dutch Studies in the United States as well. As a result, the budget of the Commission was restored back to the pre-budget cut level. This new binational commission was part of a series of binational commissions that the United States Department of State would sign with countries around the world in the early 1970's, with a focus on European nations. The conflict in Vietnam had alienated many of the United States' allies, and by signing these new agreements the United States showed that it was opening up to foreign influences. It showed that it was willing to learn from other nations, rather than being the only source of knowledge, and at the same time, the U.S. got other nations to share the burden of financing the Fulbright Program.

Chapter 6: The Fulbright Program in the Netherlands, 1975 - 1990

In the last and final period of this thesis, 1975 – 1990, the anti-nuclear movement reached its high point in the Netherlands with the massive protests, unprecedented in scale, against the placement of American cruise missiles in the Netherlands. This wave of pacifism spreading throughout Europe was famously coined ‘Hollanditis’ by American historian and political commentator Walter Laqueur. If the Fulbright Program has indeed operated as a political instrument to influence public opinion, then surely this will be reflected in the operation of the Dutch Fulbright Commission. This last chapter will analyze the workings of the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands during this period.

Dutch-American relations, 1975-1990

In December of 1979 the ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs of the NATO countries met in Brussels for a decision that would have a major impact on the transatlantic relations as well as the domestic affairs of the NATO countries. The decision was made to modernize the European nuclear missile arsenal, in response to the continuing military build-up of Warsaw Pact countries. The ‘Double-Track’ decision was made, which meant that in total 572 middle-range missiles would be stationed in the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, West-Germany and the United Kingdom. Forty-eight of these missiles would be stationed in the Netherlands. At the same time, NATO offered negotiations with the Warsaw Pact countries in order to ban nuclear armed middle-range missiles in Europe completely.¹³⁵

This decision caused an uproar in the Netherlands the like of which had never been seen before. A grass root movement arose that vigorously protested the placement of these cruise missiles, led by the Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (Interchurch Peace Council). This movement was not limited to traditional peace protestors, but managed to reach all layers of society. The USIA kept a close eye on this situation, polling the Dutch public six times from the fall of 1980 until July 1981. Majorities ranging from 53 to 68 percent opposed the stationing of the weapons in the Netherlands in each survey. After analyzing the different

¹³⁵ Hans Righolt, ‘Dutch-American Relations During the Second Cold War’ in Hans Krabbendam, Cornelis A. Van Minnen and Giles Scott-Smith (eds.) *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations* (Amsterdam 2009) 706-707.

polling data the USIA concluded that of the Dutch public four out of ten were 'hard-core opponents', one out of ten outright supported the deployment of the missiles, and the remaining four out of ten were 'lukewarm' on the issue.¹³⁶

It is important to note that the peace movement was anti-nuclear in character, and not anti-American. While the weapons in question were American-produced, American-owned and American-controlled, the peace movement was dominated by issues of nuclear weapons policy, and not by anti-Americanism.¹³⁷ A large majority of the Dutch population remained in favor of NATO membership.¹³⁸ Regardless, the anti-nuclear movement interfered with American security interests and as such were a matter of concern for the American government.

In 1981 400.000 people protested the Double-Track decision in Amsterdam, and the peace protest in 1983 in The Hague attracted over 550.000 people, making it the largest Dutch protest in history. In 1985 the peace-organizations held a petition against the placement of the cruise missiles which got over 3,75 million autographs – over a quarter of the total Dutch population signed this petition. These massive protests had a great influence on the Dutch government's policies. At the 1979 meeting of the NATO the Dutch agreed 'under reservation', wanting to see the results of the American negotiations about disarmament before accepting the American missiles. In 1981 and in 1984 the Dutch government postponed the decision to accept placement of the missiles because of the intense public pressure. Despite the enormous protests, the Dutch government accepted the American proposal to store its nuclear weapons in 1985, as the last nation in the Double-Track decision.¹³⁹

The Netherlands was not alone in facing domestic opposition. The other countries of the Double-Track decision were also faced with protests. This was commented on in 1981 by the American historian and political commentator Walter Laqueur, who coined the wave of pacifist neutralism sweeping the continent 'Hollanditis'. According to him, this was a

¹³⁶ Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Records of the U.S. Information Agency Part 1: Cold War Era Special Reports Series B: 1964-1982, Reel 21, 0959, S-28-81 *The Dutch and LRTNF Deployment: About Four in Ten are "Hard-Core" Opponents*, August 1981.

¹³⁷ Koen Koch, 'Anti-Americanism and the Dutch Peace Movement' in Rob Kroes and Maarten van Rossem (eds.) *Anti-Americanism in Europe* (Amsterdam 1986) 97-111.

¹³⁸ Righolt, 'Dutch-American Relations', 715.

¹³⁹ Remco van Diepen, *Hollanditis. Nederland en het kernwapendeбат 1977 – 1987* (Amsterdam 2004) 9-21.

return to the mistakes Dutch had made leading up the Second World War, ignoring the precarious international situation and neglecting its defenses.¹⁴⁰

In the end the cruise missiles were never placed in the Netherlands because the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987, providing for the destruction of all middle ranged nuclear weapons. By this time, the missiles intended for the Netherlands had yet to arrive. During this whole ordeal, the Dutch government remained a loyal ally to the NATO and the United States.

Focus of exchanges

In the period from 1970-1979, the trend of Dutch academic exchanges being heavily focused on technical and natural sciences is showing signs of reverse. The percentage of Dutch academic scholarships in the social sciences and humanities rose to 40%, up from 21% the decade earlier. In absolute numbers the amount of scholarships in the social sciences and humanities more than doubled, going from 24 in '60-'69 up to 49 in '70-'79. The total number of scholarships awarded to Dutch academics stayed exactly the same in this decade as the one preceding it: 122 Dutch scholarships were awarded. The percentage of American academics travelling to the Netherlands in the fields of social sciences and humanities stayed nearly the same: 64% in 1970-1979, as opposed to 66% in 1960-1969. In absolute numbers there was quite a decline, as the total number of American academics dropped down from 112 to 89. The percentage of scholarships for Dutch students in the social sciences and humanities in this decade stayed more or less the same at 71%, as opposed to 70% in the '60's. In absolute numbers the decline in exchanges continued in this decade, with 429 Dutch students getting a Fulbright scholarship in total. In '60-'69 this was 477.

¹⁴⁰ Idem, 13.

Table 7. Number of Fulbright scholarships awarded to Dutch and American academics, per academic field and period.

	1970 – 1979		1980 – 1989	
	Dutch	American	Dutch	American
<i>Social Sciences</i>	49	57	92	60
<i>% of Total</i>	40	64	61	74
<i>Natural Sciences</i>	73	32	58	21
<i>% of Total</i>	60	36	39	26
<i>Total</i>	122	89	150	81

Source: Own calculation, based on Jan C. Rups, 'The Fulbright Program, or the Surplus Value of Officially Organized Academic Exchange' in *Journal of Studies in International Education* 3 (1999).

The period 1980-1989 was the first time in the history of the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands that Dutch academic exchanges in the social sciences and humanities outnumber those in the natural sciences. 61% of all Dutch academic scholarships were awarded to academics in the social science and humanities. In the '70s this was 40%, and in the '60s it was down to 21%. In absolute numbers there was an increase as well: 150 scholarships were awarded to Dutch academics in the '80s, which was an increase of 28 compared to the 122 exchanges in the '70s. The percentage of American academics travelling to the Netherlands in the fields of social sciences and humanities in the 1980s rose up to 74%, which was an increase compared to the 64% in the '70s. In absolute numbers there was a decline, with the total number of scholarships awarded to American academics for the Netherlands being 81 in total. There has been a steady decline in the number of American academics travelling to the Netherlands since the Fulbright Program began: 161 in the '50s, 112 in the '60s, 89 in the '70s and 81 in the '80s. The percentage of scholarships for Dutch students in the social sciences and humanities in the '80s stayed roughly the same at 65%, down from the 71% the decade earlier. In absolute numbers

there was a slight increase, going from 429 scholarships in the '70s to 468 scholarships in the '80s.

Table 8. Number of (mostly) Fulbright scholarships awarded to Dutch students per academic field and period.

	1970 - 1979	1980 - 1989
<i>Social Sciences</i>	238	271
<i>Natural Sciences</i>	92	145
<i>Other / Unknown</i>	96	52
<i>Total</i>	429	468

Source: Own calculation, based on Jan C. Rups, 'The Fulbright Program, or the Surplus Value of Officially Organized Academic Exchange' in *Journal of Studies in International Education* 3 (1999).

Fulbright Program in the Netherlands

In the program year 1975/76 a few major changes took place in the Fulbright commission. The Netherlands-America Institute was liquidated on March 31st, 1976, and the commission assumed the counseling services. The commission also took over several student exchange programs which until that time had been handled by the NAI, including the Harkness Fellowship Program of the Commonwealth of New York, the IIE Graduate and Undergraduate Student Program as well as a few other individual graduate fellowship programs. This year was the first year that U.S. graduate students once again participated in the program, since the budget cut of 1970. An inter-university pilot was started between the Catholic University of Nijmegen and the State University of New York. Five students of the English language received a six-week seminar in American Studies, and spent two weeks visiting places of historical interest. This program was introduced and supported by Fulbright funds for transportation. The Belgium-Netherlands joint summer program for U.S.

art teachers was organized for the second time. The American and Dutch recipients of the two Silver Opportunity Scholarships awarded on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands were included in this year's program. Their studies concerned the history of American and Dutch relations, tracing the origin of Dutch emigrants to the United States.¹⁴¹

In 1976/77 the program 'continued along the line of the previous years'. Once again, the importance of the American Studies project is stated in the annual report, and it's highlighted that this project is stimulated by the commission, and not requested by Dutch universities:

Over the years, a certain pattern of projects has evolved, consisting partly of fields in which the Program can be of assistance to Netherlands universities and partly of subjects which the Commission feels should be encouraged. Among the latter "American and Netherlands Studies" should be mentioned.¹⁴²

In 1976 was also the year of the bicentennial of the American Revolution. The preparation for this had dominated the American Studies project in the 1970's.¹⁴³ From this moment on, the American Studies project was focused on preparing for the 1982 bicentennial of Dutch-American relations. Dr. J.W. Schulte Nordholt would lead this project, as the Dutch specialist in American history, and in that role he became a member of the Fulbright Commission in 1977. He would serve on the board until the celebrations in 1982, after which he retired.

The annual program report for the year 1977/78 differs completely from the usual reports, containing reflections on the nature of the work of the commission. Its goals 'do not change and continue to be the cultivation of longstanding educational and cultural ties

¹⁴¹ Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the Netherlands America Commission for Educational Exchange for the Program Year 1975*, 1-5.

¹⁴² RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the NACEE for the Program Year 1976*, 1.

¹⁴³ RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the NACEE for the Program Year 1975*, 3.

between The Netherlands and the United States.’¹⁴⁴ This report also touches upon the threat of the decreasing exchange rate of the dollar in this period. The exchange rate of the dollar is an important issue for the commission, as they are paid by the United States in this currency, but have to spend guilders. The value of the dollar has plummeted since the NACEE was founded in 1972. In that year, 1 guilder was worth 3,2 dollars. This steadily declined until 1 guilder was only worth 2 dollars in 1979. This was a serious issue for the Commission, as it increasingly needed more dollars to achieve the same amount of funding in guilders, but it received a yearly increase in funding to compensate for its loss of purchasing power.

The year 1978/79 was another landmark year in the educational and cultural relations between the United States and the Netherlands, as May 17th, 1979 marked the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Fulbright Agreement between the two countries. This was celebrated with a dinner with the board and staff of the NACEE as well as Mrs. Geri M. Joseph, United States ambassador to the Netherlands and Dr. Aäron Pais, Dutch Minister of Education and Science. This official commemoration ‘once more gave evidence of the significance attached to the exchange program and of the esteem in which it is held in both countries’.¹⁴⁵ This year’s report also calls for flexibility in handling applications, as it happens that no candidates applied for the priority fields that the commission has selected. In such cases ‘applications of well-motivated, highly qualified candidates who want to pursue research or lecture in fields that were not listed among the priority fields would be most welcome’.

In the fall of 1981, the U.S. government proposed a 53% over-all budget cut in the Fulbright Program. This of course had far reaching consequences for the operation of the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands. As a result, the operational years 1979-80, ’80-’81 and ’81-’82 are all reported on in one single report. The report defends itself from the focus on ‘fast’ public diplomacy programs such as television broadcasting. It notes that the world in 1981 is very different from 1949, when the Fulbright Program was established:

¹⁴⁴ RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the NACEE for the Program Year 1977*, 2.

¹⁴⁵ Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the Netherlands America Commission for Educational Exchange for the Program Year 1978*, 1.

Communication between nations has obtained amazing speed in the recent past, with a rapid flow of ideas and influences as a result. But with this speed, there is a danger of reaching superficial judgments concerning other countries, based on communications which are short, swift and not always objective.

The Commission believes that, by providing opportunities for scholars, teachers and students to spend extended periods of time in either the United States or The Netherlands, it helps to supplant superficial judgments with substantial ones.¹⁴⁶

Without saying it forthright, this passage is obviously aimed at the reliance of Congress on (and preference of) fast media. The Fulbright Program has to defend itself and justify its existence, year in year out, in Congress, in order to secure its funding and its future. In 1981, it seemed this battle had been lost, as the 53% budget cut would have had detrimental results. This cut caused an enormous commotion with Fulbrighters around the world, as well as with the Board of Foreign Scholarships, the United States Information Agency, the Council for International Exchange of Scholars and the Institute of International Education, to mention a few influential institutions that rallied to the cause of the Fulbright Program. After an intensive campaigning period, Congress reversed the budget cut, and in the program year 1982-1983 the funding level had been restored. The funding for the Dutch Fulbright Commission had not been interrupted. Besides the very gloomy perspective caused by a possible severe financial cutback there was also cause for celebrations, as 1982 marked the bicentennial of Dutch-American diplomatic relations, and this was extensively celebrated on both sides of the Atlantic, including a visit of Queen Beatrix to the United States. The Fulbright Program had been intensively involved in planning these celebrations.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Dutch-American relations were seriously strained during the 'Hollanditis' of the early 1980's: the massive protests, unprecedented in scale, against the placement of American cruise missiles in the Netherlands. This crisis was

¹⁴⁶ Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the Netherlands America Commission for Educational Exchange for the Program Year 1979, 1980 and 1981*, 2.

also clearly reflected in the Fulbright Program. In 1983 U.S. Ambassador Paul Bremer arrived in the Netherlands, and revitalizing the Fulbright Program was one of his top priorities.¹⁴⁷ As a result in 1983 the Program was thoroughly re-examined in Washington, and the director-general of Dutch Ministry of Education and Science, J. Veldhuis, was called to Washington.¹⁴⁸ He would be appointed to the board of the NACEE in 1984.

The Board of Foreign Scholarships was very critical of the Fulbright Commission in the Netherlands. The Dutch members stayed on their posts in the board for too long, against the regulations set forth in the 1972 NACEE agreement, and American Studies in the Netherlands was in bad shape. The chairs in American history and literature created in the 1960's in Leiden and Groningen had been discontinued, and Utrecht did not develop its own chair with the five-year Council of Learned Societies grant it received in 1964.¹⁴⁹ These problems were exacerbated by the political unrest surrounding the placement of American missiles in the Netherlands.

This 'thoughtful re-examination of the bilateral relationship' as the Fulbright Commission described it led to the creation of a new policy statement and new program goals.¹⁵⁰ From 1983 onward, the Fulbright Commission would focus its attention on members of the 'successor generation': graduate students, teachers and young scholars. Furthermore it would direct all its attention to the social sciences and particularly American Studies, as these were most conducive to 'mutual understanding', and achieving American foreign policy goals. In January of 1984 almost the entire board was replaced, and the Commission pledged in its proposal to 'strictly follow the by-laws and the binational agreement'. The funding of the program was also increased. The U.S. Government funded the Dutch commission with \$157,000 in 1978, which increased to \$325,000 in 1985. The Dutch government matched these figures.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Scott-Smith, 'American Studies', 989.

¹⁴⁸ RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the NACEE for the Program Year 1983*, 1.

¹⁴⁹ Rups, *Van oude en nieuwe universiteiten*, 248.

¹⁵⁰ RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the NACEE for the Program Year 1984*, 1-2.

¹⁵¹ RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 2. A.1 Program Plans 1970 – 1997, *Program Plan for the NACEE for the Program Year 1978 and 1985*.

In order to revitalize American Studies in the Netherlands, the Fulbright Commission took a step in a new direction. The Commission established prestigious research chairs, starting with the John Adams Visiting Scholar in American Civilization at the University of Amsterdam. The holders of this chair were 'expected to provide outreach to other Dutch universities and teacher training colleges.'¹⁵² With this new research chair the Commission was taking an active approach to American Studies in the Netherlands, which was a change of course. The approach of the last few decades, facilitating exchanges and stimulating universities to develop chairs in American history, had not achieved its desired results. In 1985 the Walt Whitman Chair in intellectual history, literature, civilization and the arts in Leiden was added, and in 1990 the Thomas Jefferson Chair for a junior scholar was created at the University of Utrecht.¹⁵³ By doing so the Fulbright Program had finally achieved its goal of establishing American Studies as a prominent feature in Dutch higher education, as the prestigious research chairs were popular with the Dutch universities.¹⁵⁴

In 1986 there was, once again, cause for celebration, as the Fulbright Program celebrated its world-wide 40th anniversary. The official commemoration celebration took place on April 19th, 1986, in the Ridderzaal in The Hague, in the presence of Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands herself. Senator William J. Fulbright was a guest of honor as well. Dr. J.W. Schulte Nordholt, emeritus professor of American Studies at the University of Leiden, gave a speech. Other attendees were the 'regular guests: Dutch government and U.S. Embassy officials, rectors and deans of the Dutch universities, and present and former 'Fulbrighters'.

Conclusion

In this last and final period of this thesis, 1975 - 1990, the anti-nuclear movement reached its height in the Netherlands with massive protests, unprecedented in scale, against the placement of American cruise missiles in the Netherlands. Over 550.000 people protested the placement of the Missiles in 1983 in the Hague. Over a quarter of the Dutch population, nearly 4 million people, signed a petition against these missiles in 1985. It is important to

¹⁵² RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 4. A.2 Annual Reports 1969 - 1986, *Annual Report of the NACEE for the Program Year 1984*, 1-2.

¹⁵³ RSC, Middelburg, The Netherlands, Fulbright Archives, 1949 – 2009, Box 2. A.1 Program Plans 1970 – 1997, *Program Plan for the NACEE for the Program Year 1985 and 1990*.

¹⁵⁴ Scott-Smith, 'American Studies', 990.

note that the peace movement was anti-nuclear in character, and not anti-American. While the weapons in question were American-produced, American-owned and American-controlled, the peace movement was dominated by issues of nuclear weapons policy, and not by anti-Americanism. A large majority of the Dutch population remained in favor of NATO membership. Regardless, the anti-nuclear movement interfered with American security interests and as such were a matter of concern for the American government, and they acted accordingly. In 1983 U.S. Ambassador Paul Bremer arrived in the Netherlands, and revitalizing the Fulbright Program was one of his top priorities. In that same year, J. Veldhuis, director-general of the Dutch Ministry of Education and Sciences, was called to Washington D.C. for a major re-evaluation of the Fulbright Commission. The Board of Foreign Scholarships was dissatisfied with the way the Dutch Fulbright Commission was run. The Dutch members stayed in their posts too long, against the regulations said forth in the 1972 agreement, and American Studies in the Netherlands was in deplorable shape, as the chairs in American history and literature established in the 1960's had been discontinued.

In 1984 almost the entire board of the Dutch Fulbright Commission was replaced, and J. Veldhuis was appointed to the board. Under his leadership the Fulbright Commission would now focus on the 'successor generation': graduate students, teachers and young scholars. Furthermore it would direct all its attention to the social sciences (and particularly American Studies) as these were 'most conducive to mutual understanding.' The funding of the Commission was also increased in order to revitalize American Studies.

In order to achieve this the Fulbright Commission took a step in a new direction. It established prestigious research chairs, starting with the John Adams Visiting Scholar in American Civilization Chair at the University of Amsterdam in 1984. In 1985 the Walt Whitman chair in American Culture Studies at the University of Leiden was added, and in 1990 the Thomas Jefferson Chair for junior scholars was established at the University of Utrecht. This was a new, active step in promoting American Studies, and a successful one. The research chairs were very popular with Dutch universities, and the Commission achieved its goal of establishing American Studies as a prominent feature of Dutch higher education.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Now that public diplomacy has been defined, the origin of the Fulbright Program has been discussed and the operation of the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands has been studied, the question as to its academic or political nature can be answered.

The program started out idealistic, influenced by the internationalist ideals of Senator Fulbright. The program was his attempt to institutionalize his personal experiences as a Rhodes scholar, as well as educate a new political elite open to multilateralism. The Board of Foreign Scholarships was created to oversee the program and transformed the program from a piece of legislation into the world's largest educational exchange program. The Board decided on such matters as who is eligible for a grant, how much these grants would be, etcetera. In order to oversee the Fulbright Program in other nations the United States Department of State negotiated with foreign governments with the goal of setting up American-led foundations. The negotiators were instructed to achieve an American majority on these foundation boards, that these foundations 'should have an American educational flavor' and would be in line with the 'general aims of U.S foreign policy'. From the very beginning, however, the political intent of the Fulbright Program was clear. France and Italy rejected these foundations, and succeeded in negotiating binational commissions, with equal representation. The reciprocity of these commissions have been made one of the fundamental principles of the Program by the Board, as it is this characteristic that has helped insulate the Program from partisan pressures, made it more readily acceptable to foreign nations as well as lessen the financial burden on the United States as foreign nations were willing to help finance these commissions. However, this reciprocity was demanded by the cooperating nations, and was certainly not a given. The Program was geared towards Europe where the United States sought approval of its leadership and support for the Atlantic alliance, with the core countries of the United Kingdom, Germany and France making up the bulk of exchanges. Japan and India are the only non-European countries that formed a substantial part of the Fulbright exchanges. The Netherlands was in the semi-periphery of the program.

The politicization of the Fulbright Program became explicit on January 13th 1951 when, a few weeks after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the Board of Foreign Scholarships held a special meeting. The Board approved a set of objectives laid out by the United States Department of State, which were among others 'to demonstrate to other people, by every possible means, the evidence of our own moral, spiritual and material strength'. In response, the Board decided that 'the Foundations and Commissions overseas should be requested to develop their programs in relation to the current world situation, the immediate needs of their countries and the achievements of immediate and short-range results.' Foundations and Commissions were requested to 'screen projects in terms of the needs and objectives of United States policy in the current world crisis.' Greater emphasis was to be laid to 'insure that American grantees be given more opportunity to assist more effectively in fulfilling U.S. objectives'. The political intent here is clear. In 1953 the United States Information Agency was founded by President Eisenhower. This program focused completely on public diplomacy; its targets were to 'explain and advocate U.S. policies'. The USIA worked closely together with the Fulbright Program during its existence, and the Fulbright Program was incorporated into the USIA in 1961.

The USIA wrote Country Plans in which the foreign policy goals of the United States in each nation were made clear. The Country Plan of the Netherlands defined 'educators and students' as the second most important target group, which were the targets of the Fulbright Program. The USIA goals in the Netherlands were to 'bring constantly attention of the Dutch people to American foreign policy, of which NATO is the keystone', to 'create confidence in American leadership in world affairs' and to 'portray American scientific achievements and international cooperation in the service of mankind in order to bolster belief in the United States as a leader of the free world'. These goals showed a large overlap with the goals of the Fulbright Program.

The main goals of the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands has been advocating American Studies. Introduced in 1954 this project has remained constant throughout the decades, appearing in every single program proposal. Dr. Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt of Leiden University was identified by the USIA as being 'the single most important and influential person among the target audience'. He received a Fulbright Research grant in 1954, and a year-long guest lectureship in New York in 1962-63. In 1963, Leiden University

created a chair in American history for Schulte Nordholt. In 1965 the USIA reported that 'until about a year ago, Dr. Schulte Nordholt was often extremely critical of the United States', but by persuasion and giving him material to re-study the progressive tradition, he had come to terms with 'the necessity for a strong Atlantic Community' and he had become a 'sympathetic interpreter of American history, present conditions and the strategy for peace.' This illustrates how closely the Fulbright Program and the USIA were intertwined, and how they were working together towards the common goals of finding support for the United States in the Atlantic alliance and shaping opinion leaders into sympathetic interpreters of American policies.

In 1964 the University of Utrecht received a five year grant from the American Council of Learned Societies to develop a chair in American literature and history, and in 1966 J.G. Riewald became a lector in English and American literature at Groningen University. In 1965 the USIA reported that 'all Dutch universities recognize American literature as an official subject.' This triumph of American Studies in the Netherlands was cut short from 1968 onward when a radical wave went through Dutch universities. The Vietnam War was heavily criticized by the Dutch public, and student participation in the Fulbright Program dropped in the 1970's.

Rather than increasing the budget of the Fulbright Program in order to safeguard American interests the Dutch Fulbright Foundation was faced with a budget cut in 1970, as Congress drastically lowered the appropriation for the Fulbright Program. However, the funding of the program would soon again increase, as the United States Department of State negotiated new binational commissions with foreign governments in the early years of the 1970's. In the Netherlands the 'United States Educational Foundation in the Netherlands' was renamed to the 'Netherlands America Commission for Educational Exchange' in 1972. Under this new agreement the Netherlands and the United States pledged to fund the Program on a 50/50 basis. In response, the 'American Studies' project was renamed 'American and Dutch Studies', and Dutch Studies was now developed at American universities as well. These binational agreements have to be viewed in the light of the Vietnam War. This disastrous conflict had greatly damaged the reputation of the United States around the world, and cost the U.S. billions of dollars. By signing these new

agreements the United States showed that it was theoretically open to foreign influences and that it could learn from other nations, rather than being the only source of knowledge.

In the 1980's this pattern repeated itself. In the early 1980's there were massive protests in the Netherlands against the placement of American cruise missiles. Nearly four million people, or a quarter of the Dutch population, signed a petition against these missiles. This was a major concern for the United States. However, in 1981 the Fulbright Program was faced with a 53% program-wide budget cut by Congress. The Board of Foreign Scholarships, the USIA, the Council for International Exchange of Scholars and the Institute of International Education campaigned fiercely against this decision, and with success, as the budget cut was quickly reversed. In 1983 the Dutch Fulbright Commission was thoroughly re-examined by Washington for the first and only time. The director-general of the Dutch Ministry of Education and Science J. Veldhuis was called to the United States to discuss the Commission. The Board of Foreign Scholarships was dissatisfied with the Dutch Fulbright Commission, as the Dutch members of the board stayed on their posts for too long, ignoring the regulations set forth in the 1972 NACEE agreements, and American Studies in the Netherlands was in a deplorable shape. The research chairs established at the Universities of Leiden and Groningen in the 1960's had been discontinued. As a result of this re-examination almost the entire board of the Dutch Fulbright Commission was replaced in 1984, with J. Veldhuis joining the board. New policy goals and program goals were stated; from now on the commission would focus its attention on members of the successor generation: graduate students, teachers and young scholars. Furthermore the commission would direct all of its attention and resources to the social sciences (particularly American Studies). The funding of the commission was also increased.

In order to insure the revitalization of American Studies in the Netherlands the Commission took a step in a new direction and founded prestigious research chairs. In 1984 the John Adams Visiting Scholar in American Civilization Chair at the University of Amsterdam was founded. The holders of this chair were expected to provide outreach to Dutch universities and promoted American Studies. In 1985 the Walt Whitman Chair in American Culture Studies at the University of Leiden was founded, and this was followed up in 1990 with the Thomas Jefferson Chair for junior scholars at the University of Utrecht.

These chairs were a success, and the Fulbright Commission achieved its goals of establishing American Studies as a prominent feature of Dutch higher education.

Despite the budget cuts in 1970 and 1981, there has been a positive correlation between the state of the Dutch-American binational relationship and the operation of the Fulbright Program. In 1972 the NACEE was founded, and in 1983 the Program as thoroughly evaluated in Washington D.C. The aforementioned budget cuts were made by the United States Congress and applied to the entire Fulbright Program, and Congress' horizon was much broader than the relationship of the United States with the Netherlands. The budget cuts therefore were not an invalidation of the political and diplomatic use of the Fulbright Program. Instead, it shows that for funding it depended on an institution largely out of its own control. The fact that the budget cuts coincided with a drop in the Dutch-American relationship was a historical contingency.

In conclusion, it has been the goal of the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands to legitimize American leadership by showcasing American culture as well as advances in science and technology, and to create understanding for American policies. Furthermore the Fulbright Program sought approval of the Atlantic Alliance and the American leadership thereof. It tried to achieve this by targeting educators and students and influencing them to become sympathetic interpreters of American history and policies. Tangibly the Commission sought the establishment of American Studies as a prominent feature of Dutch higher education. With the establishment of prestigious research chairs in American history and culture, the Fulbright Commission had achieved these goals by 1990. During the 1970's and 1980's, when the respective anti-American and anti-nuclear movements gained traction, the Fulbright Program was re-evaluated in order to better achieve its aims. This confirms that the Fulbright Program in the Netherlands has been political in nature, rather than academic, and has been used by the United States government to manage their informal empire.

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Appendix

Source: Rups, Jan C., 'The Fulbright Program, or the Surplus Value of Officially Organized Academic Exchange' in *Journal of Studies in International Education* 3 (1999) 57-81.

Appendix

Table 1. Number of Fulbright scholarships awarded to American citizens and to citizens of the concerning region of the world, per category (students, lecturers/researchers, teachers), per period.

Period	Americans			Foreign citizens		
	students	lecturers/ researchers	teachers	students	lecturers/ researchers	teachers
1949-1959						
Africa (excl. N-Africa)	3	3	3	11	2	-
Latin America	64	154	50	300	71	139
East Asia/Pacific	521	764	286	2.899	854	402
Europe (excl. East-Europe)	8.408	2.548	2.452	9.268	3.365	2.447
Middle East/South Asia	197	517	100	1.436	280	268
Total	9.193	3.986	2.891	13.914	4.572	3.256
1960-1971						
Africa (excl. N-Africa)	84	283	76	1.468	81	228
Latin America	954	1.299	356	3.775	687	3.860
East Asia/Pacific	337	1.256	337	4.255	1.469	1.018
Europe (excl. East-Europe)	6.279	3.088	2.785	13.484	4.349	3.706
Middle East/South Asia	448	1.223	321	3.522	660	923
Total	8.102	7.149	3.875	26.504	7.246	9.735
1972-1982						
Africa (excl. N-Africa)	40	365	3	808	422	158
Latin America	382	839	13	1.856	581	315
East Asia/Pacific	222	1.167	95	2.007	978	139
Europe (excl. East-Europe)	2.593	2.331	2.257	6.330	3.356	2.340
Middle East/South Asia	108	677	3	836	827	61
Total	3.345	5.389	2.371	11.837	6.164	3.013
1983-1992						
Africa (excl. N-Africa)	327	898	12	1.078	534	173
Latin America	695	1.956	157	4.304	1.056	277
East Asia/Pacific	593	1.752	15	1.556	1.502	176
Europe (excl. East-Europe)	3.226	3.586	2.419	7.450	4.660	2.706
Middle East/South Asia	413	1.450	28	872	1.644	72
Total	5.254	9.642	2.631	15.260	9.396	3.404

Source: Board of Foreign Scholarships, Fulbright Program Exchanges, Annual Reports, Washington DC.

Table 2. Number of Fulbright scholarships awarded to American citizens and to foreign citizens of core nations and semi-peripheral nations of the Program, per category (primary and secondary schoolteachers, students, lecturers and researchers), and total number, per period.

1949-1959	Americans					foreign citizens				
	teachers	students	lecturers	researchers	total	teachers	students	lecturers	researchers	total
France	254	2,654	165	214	3,278	326	2,253	107	344	3,030
BRD	208	1,555	177	129	2,069	213	1,200	28	269	1,710
UK	1,159	1,643	231	321	3,354	1,130	1,695	326	765	3,916
Italy	263	1,138	175	251	1,827	185	815	55	433	1,488
India	31	133	127	55	346	120	744	39	75	978
Japan	79	103	138	93	413	172	1,449	27	472	2,120
Austria	43	381	64	53	541	53	495	23	109	680
Netherlands	163	308	93	69	633	98	523	46	162	829
Australia	56	203	70	78	407	78	287	48	143	556
Norway	36	216	63	90	405	104	669	36	220	1,029
Denmark	16	155	59	43	273	42	319	17	102	480
Finland	12	63	64	32	171	112	338	10	94	554
Spain	—	—	—	—	—	—	30	1	3	34
Brasil	—	6	10	4	20	43	48	3	12	106
Greece	233	88	69	57	447	59	463	2	61	585
1960-1971	Americans					foreign citizens				
	teachers	students	lecturers	researchers	total	teachers	students	lecturers	researchers	total
France	225	1,710	248	213	2,396	436	2,436	282	459	3,613
BRD	457	1,812	314	208	2,791	755	4,441	157	418	5,905
UK	955	742	181	78	1,956	1,005	1,187	332	680	3,304
Italy	353	652	191	190	1,386	242	774	100	402	1,518
India	129	351	273	184	937	301	1,222	77	226	1,826
Japan	38	52	175	94	359	205	1,474	122	692	2,493
Austria	43	292	70	39	444	62	510	76	111	758
Netherlands	56	195	96	63	410	78	420	36	116	650
Australia	86	141	189	116	532	150	322	57	268	797
Norway	22	104	40	71	237	73	570	35	131	809
Denemark	27	103	85	73	288	52	321	45	132	550
Finland	62	51	136	47	296	165	516	17	176	874
Spain	235	268	176	79	758	84	440	65	62	651
Brasil	76	137	149	17	379	275	663	35	116	1,089
Greece	113	54	43	4	214	61	450	11	72	594

1972-1982	Americans					foreign citizens				
	teachers	students	lecturers	researchers	total	teachers	students	lecturers	researchers	total
France	37	113	282	93	525	176	528	163	415	1,282
BRD	616	1,199	234	297	2,346	335	1,866	93	340	2,634
UK	1,255	279	102	100	1,736	1,254	341	144	411	2,150
Italy	133	353	155	88	729	152	605	78	442	1,277
India	—	42	158	57	257	10	166	33	381	590
Japan	—	51	110	73	234	8	370	71	186	635
Austria	2	206	96	22	326	12	405	61	180	658
Netherlands	32	20	44	73	169	50	273	10	171	504
Australia	3	27	132	114	276	45	238	41	304	628
Norway	1	26	51	28	106	1	218	9	79	307
Denmark	26	34	42	20	122	2	179	21	64	266
Finland	1	29	80	15	125	32	179	2	122	335
Spain	—	122	64	7	193	18	321	—	85	424
Brasil	—	83	121	22	226	17	230	33	52	332
Greece	19	25	43	23	110	5	152	13	62	232
1983-1992	Americans					foreign citizens				
	teachers	students	lecturers	researchers	total	teachers	students	lecturers	researchers	total
France	183	170	98	139	550	297	200	152	289	938
BRD	292	1,551	504	536	2,873	453	2,638	276	282	3,649
UK	1,388	285	186	161	2,020	1,396	307	174	299	2,176
Italy	119	283	184	109	695	66	490	44	260	860
India	8	65	293	248	614	8	103	47	532	690
Japan	—	148	99	222	469	—	329	32	356	717
Austria	—	175	154	31	360	—	412	74	93	579
Netherlands	197	59	53	83	392	106	194	40	169	509
Australia	8	48	167	88	311	46	119	10	213	388
Norway	9	39	64	47	159	19	217	20	110	366
Denmark	25	49	51	22	147	31	243	19	159	452
Finland	7	72	72	52	203	10	183	1	115	309
Spain	—	126	116	31	273	11	591	4	892	1,498
Brasil	3	88	379	79	549	10	222	17	248	497
Greece	—	89	29	75	193	21	113	3	127	264

Source: Board of Foreign Scholarships, Fulbright Program Exchanges, Annual Reports, Washington, D.C.

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Table 3. Number of Fulbright scholarships awarded to Dutch and American academics, per academic field and period.

Period	1949-1959		1960-1969		1970-1979		1980-1989	
	Dutch	American	Dutch	American	Dutch	American	Dutch	American
<i>I. Humanities</i>								
fine arts (incl art history)	3	6	2	2	3	2	3	2
history	4	4	4	5	3	6	15	20
language & literature	4	15	3	14	5	5	12	13
linguistics	-	-	1	1	2	2	2	3
philosophy	5	2	3	2	-	1	3	1
theology	2	7	-	4	-	4	3	-
other	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-
total HUM	19	35	13	28	14	20	38	39
<i>II. Social Sciences</i>								
law	2	-	1	5	3	3	5	1
bus.adm.	-	-	-	3	1	1	2	2
economy	3	7	1	5	2	1	10	3
polit.sc.	-	9	2	8	3	16	4	3
anthropology	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
psychology	7	6	6	11	12	3	12	7
sociology	5	10	-	5	5	3	11	3
other	-	11	1	2	3	2	4	1
total SocSc	18	44	11	40	29	29	48	20
<i>III. Education</i>								
	-	10	-	6	6	8	6	1
Subtotal I - III	37	89	24	74	49	57	92	60
% Total	25	55	21	66	40	64	61	74
<i>IV. Medicine</i>								
	32	8	15	4	18	4	32	3
<i>V. Engineering</i>								
	10	14	2	6	4	6	3	3
<i>VI. Agriculture</i>								
	1	6	-	-	1	3	1	1
<i>VII. Sciences</i>								
biology	13	12	12	9	9	6	7	9
biochemistry	7	-	9	-	8	1	2	1
mathematics	12	7	9	5	7	5	9	-
astronomy	7	-	6	-	-	3	-	-
physics	32	11	22	9	15	2	2	1
chemistry	30	12	12	3	10	2	2	1
geology	3	2	1	2	1	-	-	2
total Sciences	104	46	75	28	50	20	22	14
subtotal IV-VII	147	72	88	38	73	32	58	21
% Total	75	45	79	34	60	36	39	26
Total	184	161	112	112	122	89	150	81

Source: Fulbright Archives, University of Arkansas.

Table 4. Number of (mostly) Fulbright scholarships awarded to Dutch students per academic field and period.

	1949-1959	1960-1969	1970-1979	1980-1989
<i>I. Humanities</i>				
fine arts (incl art history)	7	4	15	65
history	4	7	14	18
language & literature	6	11	35	30
US history/language & lit.	15	21	17	13
philosophy	—	2	4	10
theology	8	9	1	2
total <i>Humanities</i>	40	54	86	138
<i>II. Social Sciences</i>				
law	13	30	29	16
bus.adm.	22	5	12	30
economics	20	18	28	40
polit. sc.	4	10	16	18
anthropology	—	—	—	4
psychology	12	11	15	18
sociology	9	11	13	2
other	5	5	35	5
total <i>Soc Sc</i>	85	90	148	133
<i>III. Education</i>				
	2	3	4	—
Subtotal I - III	127	147	238	271
% Total	62	70	71	65
<i>IV. Medicine</i>				
	20	1	7	6
<i>V. Engineering</i>				
	12	19	23	17
<i>VI. Agriculture</i>				
	8	3	5	4
<i>VII. Sciences</i>				
	39	40	60	118
subtotal IV - VII	79	63	95	145
% Total	38	30	29	35
Total	206	210	333	416
liberal arts	32	32	48	28
non-university	34	13	10	19
unknown	339	222	38	5

Source: International Institute for Education Archives, New York.