The Europeanization of the Netherlands’ Development Cooperation Policy:
The Netherlands’ implementation and internalization of EU development policy.

Master Thesis
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Abstract

**Problem analysis:** The EU’s international credibility and legitimacy depend on its ability to meet its self-imposed standards as set forth in the European Consensus on Development (2005) and the European Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (2007). **Research question:** “To what extent has the Netherlands implemented and internalized Policy Coherence for Development and the European Code of Conduct for the Division of Labour in its development policy?” **Theoretical framework:** A constructivist perspective was used where the internalization of PCD and The Code was conceptualized as a form of Europeanization where member states are affected through a process of socialization. **Methods:** The Netherlands was used as a single-case study. Data on the Netherlands’ political discourse, institutional structure and development policy implementation was collected through a policy discourse analysis, a systematic review, and interviews. **Results:** The Netherlands’ development cooperation is gradually transforming due to PCD, but it has only absorbed the EU norms of The Code. **Implications:** The EC is an accepted norm entrepreneur for both PCD and The Code. However, the EU has so far failed to become a legitimate structure for the pro-active coordination of PCD and The Code as its MS consider the coordination for PCD and the selection of sectors and countries a nationally driven process. The normative power of the EU as a policy forum is limited by the “soft” nature of EU development policy. **Future direction:** The author recommends future studies utilize a similar research methodology with a focus on the other Nordic+ countries.
Acknowledgements

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<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
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<td>AIV</td>
<td>Advisory Council on International Affairs</td>
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<td>BIS</td>
<td>Bureau of International Cooperation</td>
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<td>BNC</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Working Group Evaluation of New Commission Proposals</td>
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<td>CU</td>
<td>Coherence Unit</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CoCo</td>
<td>Coordination Commission for European Integration and Association Problems</td>
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<td>CODEV</td>
<td>Development Working Group within the Council of the European Union</td>
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<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives in the European Union</td>
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<td>CSPs</td>
<td>Country Strategy Papers</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the OECD</td>
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<td>DEC</td>
<td>Effectives and Coherence Department</td>
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<td>DEC/CU</td>
<td>The Coherence Unit within the Effectiveness and Coherence Department</td>
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<td>DEK</td>
<td>Effectiveness and Quality Department</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<td>DI</td>
<td>Discursive Institutionalism</td>
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<td>DIE</td>
<td>European Integration Department</td>
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<td>DGBEB</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Foreign Economic Relations</td>
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<td>DGCB</td>
<td>DG for Consular Affairs and Operational Management</td>
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<td>DGES</td>
<td>Directorate-General for European Cooperation</td>
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<td>DGIS</td>
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<td>DGPZ</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DoL</td>
<td>Division of Labour</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>ECDPM</td>
<td>European Centre for Development Policy Management</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FTI</td>
<td>Fast Track Initiative</td>
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<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<td>HGIS</td>
<td>Homogenous Group for International Cooperation</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Head Quarters</td>
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<td>IOB</td>
<td>Operations Evaluation Department of the MFA</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>LFA</td>
<td>Logical Framework Approach</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Member State(s)</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Role Conception</td>
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<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Role Performance</td>
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<td>OCTs</td>
<td>Overseas Collectivities and Territories</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PCD</td>
<td>Policy Coherence on Development</td>
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<td>PRSP’s</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers</td>
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<td>SI</td>
<td>Sociological Institutionalism</td>
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<td>SRHR</td>
<td>Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights</td>
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<td>The Code</td>
<td>The European Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>The Consensus</td>
<td>The European Consensus on Development</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Union</td>
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<td>TK</td>
<td>Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1 Societal relevance

International development cooperation is among the European Union’s (EU) oldest policies and constitutes an important aspect of its external relations. In 2010 the EU’s collective Official Development Assistance (ODA) reached a historical high of 53.8 billion Euros. This makes the EU the largest aid donor in the world with DAC-EU ODA representing 56% of total DAC ODA (OECD Aid Statistics, 2010). As the largest donor, represented in 120 developing countries, the EU appears to be an important actor in the current global aid architecture. However, a high degree of fragmentation has historically undermined the effectiveness of EU aid, hindering the EU from influencing the course of international development.

EU development policy has undergone substantial changes in recent years as a result of the Commission’s efforts to create a more integrated approach to development in the context of global aid effectiveness commitments. The adoption of the European Consensus on Development (The Consensus) in 2005 and the European Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (The Code) in 2007 signify a turning point in European development cooperation. The Consensus follows the approach of other multilateral actors by making poverty reduction and the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) the EU’s main development policy objective. Furthermore, the commitment towards Policy Coherence is embedded in the Consensus as the main guiding principle in all development and external policies of the EU. Moreover, the division of labor among donors has been an important topic in recent global forums on aid effectiveness agreed at the OECD-DAC level. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the High-Level Forum in Busan (2011) advocate increasing donor coordination, reducing transaction costs and addressing the imbalance between “aid orphans and aid darlings.” The Code is a set of operational guidelines for the European Community and its Member States (MS) to follow, and the EU’s response (led by the Commission) to these global concerns and initiatives.

These two policies have endowed the EU with a common position and a set of practices to guide their development policies and actions, which it lacked in the past. Are these policies enough to ensure the credibility of the EU as a normative power, however? EU development cooperation is a shared competence between the Community Pillar and the MS where MS are expected to incorporate development policy made at the EU level (as normative standards) into their respective national development policies. An understanding of the EU’s role in international development thus requires an analysis of the measures MS are taking to make their own bilateral cooperation policies more congruent with those of the EU.

It is not possible to conduct a thorough analysis of the development policies of all MS given the scope of this paper. This paper will focus on the Netherlands, a progressive MS that has historically taken an active role in development cooperation outside the EU and continuously seeks to build on best practices. The ensuing analysis is built on the premise that if the EU is a credible normative power, “old” MS like the Netherlands will endorse development policies made at the EU level. Furthermore, if the Netherlands is to become, or remain a leader in EU development cooperation, it should implement and endorse The Consensus and The Code. It is therefore relevant to see to what extent the Netherlands is endorsing and implementing important aspects of The Consensus and The Code.

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1 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is the main international forum consisting of the largest donors of aid. There are 26 DAC members in total including 15 member states of the EU.


3 Aid orphans are countries which have been neglected by the donor community. Aid darlings are partner countries favored for ODA by the donor community (OECD, 2009: 18).
1.2 Academic relevance
Scant research exists on the nature and degree of policy convergence between the EU and its MS in the field of development cooperation policy. An exception is a study which assessed the scope of the “Europeanization” of the Czech development cooperation using a top-down approach (Horký, 2012: 57-73). Horký concluded that the EU’s impact on the “new” MS development cooperation policies is “shallow” by using the Czech Republic as a case study (ibid., 70). However, new MS are not as active in this policy area as older MS (especially Nordic countries) tend to be. The extent of Europeanization of other MS, whether “new” or “old,” has not been studied so far. There is insufficient knowledge regarding the extent to which countries implement and internalize the principles embedded in recent EU development policies. This paper will contribute to Europeanization studies in the field of development cooperation by using a constructivist and sociological institutionalist approach to study the extent of norm internalization.

The Netherlands is among the best performers in foreign aid in terms of both quality and quantity. However, there has not been a comprehensive study that examines to what extent the Netherlands endorses and implements European development policies. Furthermore, most Europeanization research focuses on the process rather than the effect of Europeanization. This investigation will shed light on the extent normative standards affect a progressive donor who has been active in this area prior to a common EU development policy.

1.3 Problem analysis & research questions
The EU’s international credibility and legitimacy as a normative power depend on its ability to meet its self-imposed standards as set forth primarily in the European Consensus on Development (2005) and the European Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (2007). The adoption of The Consensus (2005) and The Code (2007) indicate a turning point in European development cooperation. These policy programs have been spearheaded by the European Commission (EC), which has taken on a role as promoter of coordination and complementarity in the global development effort for more effective aid. However, the EU consists of 27 MS each with their own national interests, which may or may not reflect those of the European Commission. Will these efforts suffer from “policy evaporation – the failure to transform rhetoric into reality in the long run?” (Dearden, 2008: 123). This would weaken the EU’s credibility as a major promoter of aid effectiveness and call into question its international normative power status. It is therefore essential that MS align their respective development policies with that of the EU and coordinate with each other. However, EU development policy is voluntary and as such regarded as “soft law” with low enforceability.

This paper uses the Netherlands as a single-case study to assess the extent of implementation and internalization of EU norms and standards in the area of development cooperation. For the purpose of this paper, two aspects will be investigated: Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), an important aspect of the European Consensus on Development; and the European Code of Conduct on the Division of Labour. The analysis herein seeks to unravel to what extent the Netherlands has implemented and internalized PCD and The Code. This would reveal the degree to which the Netherlands has internalized EU development norms domestically and what the Netherlands may do in order to improve its development cooperation policy through an EU framework. This paper will thus contribute to the knowledge regarding both the normative power of the EU in the area of development cooperation and the Netherlands’ implementation of two key EU development policies.

The overall research question this paper strives to answer is:

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4 A distinction is made between implementation and internalization. The internalization of EU norms involves both implementation (in structures and policies) and an acceptance of EU norms on normative and cognitive grounds. This theoretical framework will be discussed in chapter 2.
To what extent has the Netherlands implemented and internalized Policy Coherence for Development and the European Code of Conduct for the Division of Labour in its development policy?

In order to address this overall question, the analysis will be divided into two parts; one pertaining to PCD (5 sub-questions) and the other to The Code (4 sub-questions). The following sub-questions have been formulated based on the available EU policy documentation:5

1. What measures has the Netherlands taken to adopt PCD?
   A. To what extent is PCD present in the Netherlands’ political discourse?
   B. How is PCD institutionalized to ensure coherence and how has this changed over the past decade?
   C. Are the Netherlands’ thematic priorities for achieving PCD consistent with those advocated by the EU?
   D. What methodologies does the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) employ to evaluate PCD and what indicators (if any) are in place to measure PCD performance?
   E. Through which EU channels does the Netherlands interact with other MS to share its national implementation experiences regarding PCD?

2. What measures has the Netherlands taken to adopt the in-country, cross-country and cross-sectoral dimensions of the Code?
   A. To what extent is The Code present in the Netherlands' political discourse?
   B. What progress has the Netherlands made in in-country complementarity of The Code with other MS in the context of European joint-programming efforts? (in-country dimension)
   C. How has the Netherlands established its priority partner countries and how does the Netherlands address the “orphan gap”? (cross-country dimension)
   D. Is the Netherlands analyzing and expanding on its comparative advantage regarding sectors and modalities? (cross-sectoral dimension)

1.4 Outline of the paper

Chapter 2 will discuss the theoretical framework used in the analysis. Chapter 3 will outline the research design, unit of analysis and the methods used to collect and analyse the data. The definitions and theories presented in the previous chapter will be applied to these methods. Lastly this chapter will give a brief account of the strengths and limitations of the methodology. Chapter 4 will present the two EU policies under investigation: Policy Coherence for Development embedded in the European Consensus on Development (2005) and the Code of Conduct for the Division of Labour (2007). Chapters 5 and 6 will present the main findings from the data collection and discuss them in light of the theoretical framework, answering the research sub-questions. Chapters 5 and 6 will conclude with a critical discussion of the Netherlands' implementation and internalization of PCD and The Code. Chapter 7 will conclude the analysis by discussing the implications of the findings for the Netherlands as a progressive EU MS and the EU as a normative power in development cooperation policy.

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5 The EU documentation relevant to PCD and The Code will be discussed in Chapter 4.


2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter will present the theoretical approach used to answer the research questions. First, a brief overview of Social Constructivism - the conceptual umbrella of the paper - will be provided. Second, Europeanization will be discussed in a development context, using a sociological institutionalist approach. Third, the theory used to measure the impact of European norms on the Netherlands will be discussed: the role of political discourse and conceptualizing the degree of norm internalization. Lastly, the implications and limitations of the applied theoretical framework for determining the causality of norm internalization in the Netherlands will be discussed.

2.1 Constructivism and International Relations

Adler (1997) describes constructivism as “the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world” (Adler, 1997: 323). It is not “a fully-fledged general theory,” but a “philosophically and theoretically informed perspective on and approach to the empirical study of international relations” (Ruggie, 1998: 856). The major concern of a constructivist analysis is in understanding how social facts are formed (socially constructed) and the ways social facts influence politics (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 393). Constructivism is therefore a social theory which offers a socio-cognitive synthesis between “material, subjective, and intersubjective dimensions of the world” in the study of international relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (Adler, 1997: 232).

Wendt’s renowned article “Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics” laid the theoretical groundwork for the constructivist approach in IR by focusing on ideational and intersubjective meanings. In his Social Theory of International Politics (1999) Wendt asks “What difference do ideas make?” and goes on to discuss how “ideas have constitutive effects on power and interests” (Wendt, 1999: 92, 114). Wendt contested that realist concepts such as “power politics” are socially constructed and thus capable of being transformed. Wendt stresses that constructivism is not merely about adding the role of ideas to existing theories of IR but that material power and state interests are fundamentally formed by ideas and social interaction. Finnemore built upon Wendt’s notions by focusing on the role of international organizations in disseminating international norms and models of political organization (Finnemore, 1996: 5). Her focus has been on the norms of international society and the way in which they have affected state identities and interests. Another major route for constructivist explorations of the impact of causal beliefs has been through the roles played by transnational networks of knowledge-based experts (Ruggie, 1998: 868).

Constructivists all emphasize the interactive manner in which an actor’s identity and interests are formed from intersubjective meanings. Constructivists characterize this interactive relationship between what people do and how societies shape their actions as the “mutual constitution” of structures and agents. The main goal of constructivism is to provide theoretical and empirical explanations of social institutions and social change, using the combined effect of agents and structures (Adler, 1997: 325). Moreover, structures lead actors to redefine their interests and identity in the process of interacting or socialization (Copeland, 2006: 3). According to Giddens’ structuration theory, “properties of agents and of structures are both relevant to explanations of social behavior (...) structures enter simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and ‘exists’ in the generating moments of this constitution” (qtd. in Adler, 1997: 325). In this view, structural properties are both constraining and enabling and therefore allow for change. Furthermore, the term structure encompasses almost all types of social order such as global social systems, issue-specific international regimes, and formal organizations (Klotz & Lynch, 2007: 25). The European Union is the

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6 Structures constitute actors in terms of their interests and identities, but structures are also produced, reproduced and altered by the discursive practices of agents. Constructivists do not consider structures to be reified objects that actors cannot affect. Rather, structures exist through the reciprocal interaction of actors and that agents can change structures (Copeland, 2006: 3).

11
ideational structure investigated in the context of this investigation, whereas the Netherlands (an individual MS of the EU) is the agent.

The main reasons for using social constructivism as the conceptual umbrella for the case study are:

- Development aid is normative as international development is a form of “soft power.” It consists of norms and principles. The impact of norms on the construction of identities, interests and behavior is readily explained by constructivist notions based on the premise that power and state interests are fundamentally formed by norms and social interaction.
- There have been changes in the Netherlands’ development policy between 2005 and 2012 and constructivism provides theoretical and empirical explanations of social institutions and social change, using the combined effect of agents and structures.

2.2 Europeanization of development cooperation: Sociological Institutionalism

Europeanization is not a theory but a conceptual framework that draws on a range of theoretical and explanatory schemes that emphasize different mechanisms that produce change at the domestic and EU levels. The existing literature predominantly uses the concept to refer to the institutional effects of the norms, rules, practices and acquis of the EU on the processes, politics and policies of the MS. Scholars and political scientists argue that “a certain degree of Europeanization” may be found in almost every area (Radaelli, 2000: 5). This section will place Europeanization within a European development policy context. A multifaceted definition of Europeanization is one provided by Radaelli:

“Europeanization consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub national) discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2003: 30).

This overarching definition follows a social constructivist premise since it targets the cognitive components of policy-making. Furthermore, Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization will be applied to the data collection. As such, a distinction will be made between changes in policy discourse, political & institutional structures and the implementation of policies in order to assess the internalization of EU development norms.

International development cooperation has been a shared competence between the MS and the EC since the Maastricht Treaty. The MS remain, however, the ultimate drivers of their bilateral policies. The EU norms under investigation (PCD and The Code) are voluntary as EU decisions related to development policy are comprised of soft law instruments that are not binding. Furthermore, MS do not consider development policy as an autonomous policy, but as an integral part of their foreign policy. The European agents of foreign policy are thus positioned at the intersection of transnational processes and domestic structures.

Sociological Institutionalism will be discussed below to shed light on the processes of institutional change and connect the different mechanisms by which Europeanization is brought about. There are three strands of new institutionalist theories: Historical Institutionalism, Rational Choice Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism (SI). SI is the approach most suitable for the purpose of this paper because of the voluntary nature of EU development policy. Without “hard law” measures to enforce EU development policy, the EU must rely on social influence to bring about change in its MS.

**Sociological Institutionalism**

From the perspective of SI, Europeanization is understood as “the emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning to which member states are exposed and which they have to

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7 The accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which constitute the body of European Union law.
incorporate into their domestic practices and structures” (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 66). Sociological institutionalists emphasize how EU institutions “constitute” actors by providing them with new understandings (Carbone, 2007: 17). Institutions are viewed as constitutive forces that shape and change the interests and identities of its members. This stems from the constructivist premise that states are actors whose preferences are influenced by a cultural and normative environment. For this reason, SI is sometimes referred to as “normative institutionalism” where agent interests and identities are shaped through interaction. Accordingly, institutions “provide agents with understandings of their interests and identities” through an interaction between agents and structures (Checkel, 1999: 547). This viewpoint therefore captures the essence of mutual constitution as it incorporates “the constitutive dynamics of social learning, socialization, routinization, and normative diffusion, all of which address fundamental issues of agent identity and interests” (ibid., 545).

This mutual constitution under SI is determined by a “logic of appropriateness,” which suggests that MS act not (only) as utility maximizers (as observed by Rational Choice Institutionalism, following “a logic of consequence”) but in accordance with what is deemed as appropriate and expected behavior from other actors. The “logic of appropriateness” is a perspective that sees human action “as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior [where] rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate” (March and Olsen, 2004: 1). Hence, the rationality of political actors is socially bounded, and institutions project a “logic of appropriateness” which functions as the guiding force for political behavior. According to March and Olsen: “institutions allocate resources and empower and constrain actors differently and make them more or less capable of acting according to prescribed rules” (ibid, 2004: 5). Sociological institutionalists are regarded as “thick institutionalists” claiming institutions constitute actors and their interests. Institutions therefore “affect the most basic preferences and very identity” of political actors (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 948). The EU can affect national policy by “creating policy forums and socialization processes that lead to cognitive convergence” (Featherstone, 2003: 16). The EU as an institution is thus seen as an organizational arrangement that links roles/identities, resources and prescriptive rules and practices.

Studying Europeanization from an SI perspective can be used to recognize and understand how certain norms, values and practices are spread to EU MS through a process of socialization and learning. This results in norm internalization and the development of new identities as MS acquire new interests and preferences. This sociological understanding of institutions captures identity and interest forming roles (Checkel, 1999: 545): SI upholds that states incorporate new rules, norms, and practices into their domestic structures through socialization. Socialization is defined as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (qtd in Checkel, 2005: 804). As such it is the process through which agents and structures influence each other. Social learning is a process of interaction, and the dense institutional environment of the EU is particularly well suited to socializing agents from within. EU institutions can be viewed as promoters and sites of socialization (Checkel, 2005: 806). As such, the EU serves as an arena for the exchange of ideas and policy transfer between MS.

Börzel and Risse have generated a model to explain the domestic impact of Europe as a process of “socialization” under a Sociological Institutionalist approach, following a “logic of appropriateness.” Europeanization leads to domestic change through “a socialization and collective learning process resulting in norm internalization and the development of new identities” (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 67). Central to the understanding of Europeanization is the “goodness-of-fit” argument. Börzel and Risse use the term “misfit” to describe “a mismatch between European and domestic policies, processes and institutions” (ibid., 61). This draws on an earlier study by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso which explains the “goodness-of-fit” (or congruence) between the European and the domestic level. According to these scholars, “the goodness-of-fit” determines the degree of pressure for adaptation generated by Europeanization on the MS (Cowles & Caporaso, 2001: 6). Börzel and Risse sum up the goodness-of-fit as follows: The lower the compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies, and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 61). The impact of norms is
explained by “the goodness-of-fit between European and national policies, institutions, and processes, on the one hand, and the existence of intervening factors or intervening variables that filter the domestic impact of Europe, on the other hand” (Ibid, 2003: 67).

This socialization model stresses the importance of “intervening variables that mediate between European pressures for adaptation and MS responses” (Ibid, 2003: 68). Two of these intervening factors by which actors internalize new European norms and develop new identities are: norm entrepreneurs and a conducive political culture.8 This paper prioritizes these two intervening factors over informal institutions that might exist at the domestic level. Norm entrepreneurs “mobilize and persuade to redefine their interests and identities in light of the new norms and rules by engaging them in processes of social learning” (Ibid, 2003: 67). A political culture conducive to consensus-building and cost-sharing also facilitates domestic change in response to Europeanization. These interplays can be viewed in the adapted model below:

**Figure 1:** Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact through Socialization

![Diagram showing the domestic impact through socialization](source: Adapted from Börzel & Risse, 2003: 69 & Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization (Radaelli, 2003: 30)).

This paper will focus on changes in the Netherlands' development cooperation policy as a result of these socialization processes: the degree of norm internalization. As such, the analysis of the case study will focus on the effect of Europeanization rather than the process itself. However, the process of socialization was discussed above as the main mechanism of norm diffusion and social learning (inherent in constructivism) to unravel the mediating variables involved in the internalization of new norms. The mediating factors identified were: the presence of norm entrepreneurs as well as a conducive political culture.

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8 Börzel and Risse also discuss several other mediating variables, such as informal institutions, epistemic communities and advocacy networks. These relate to a micro level of investigation and this paper focuses on a macro level, where political elites (in the Dutch government) make decisions regarding the operational implementation of both PCD and the Code.
2.3 The impact of EU development norms

Constructivism includes the impact of norms and ideas on the construction of identities and behavior (Christiansen, Jorgensen & Wiener, 1999: 532). Finnemore describes norms as “a set of intersubjective understandings readily apparent to actors that makes behavioral claims on those actors” (qtd. in Florini, 1996: 364). IR theorists have developed different ways of assessing the impact of norms. Some constructivists have shown the impact of national norms on international politics while others stress the impact of international as well as European norms on changes in domestic politics. In the constructivist literature, norms are often conceptualized either as constitutive systems of meaning to be deciphered through discourse analysis or as causal variables to be tested in a deductive framework (Jenson & Mérand, 2010: 79). This paper follows Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization and as such makes a distinction between three different types of domestic change from which the degree of norm internalization can be deduced: changes in domestic discourse, changes in institutional structures, and changes in the implementation of policies. The implementation of PCD and The Code and institutional changes to facilitate these policies can be determined readily from the systematic review and interviews, but the role of discourse in the analysis requires further discussion.

2.3.1 Discourse

Discourse is an important factor in the explanation of policy change. Discursive Institutionalism (DI) is a framework developed by Schmidt (2008) as a “fourth new institutionalist theory” which assigns causal weight to ideational factors (Schmidt, 2008: 303). DI focuses on the power of discourse to influence ideas and norms in the policy-making process and in the dynamics of policy change. Schmidt defines discourse as “whatever policy actors say to one another and to the public in their efforts to generate and legitimize a policy program (…) discourse encompasses both a set of policy ideas and an interactive process of policy construction” (Schmidt, 2002: 210). Therefore, discourse involves two dimensions: an ideational dimension and an interactive procedural dimension.

The ideational dimension refers to “the ideas and values that represent the cognitive and normative aspects of meaning creation” (Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004: 197). This follows the argument that the appropriateness of rules includes both cognitive and normative components (March & Olsen’s, 2004: 3). The normative function of discourse is used to legitimate the political goals of a policy program by appealing to values. On the other hand, the cognitive function provides solutions and serves to define efficient policy instruments. It shows the problem-solving capacity of a policy program by demonstrating how relevant, applicable and coherent it is. Essentially, discourse “must be persuasive in normative terms (appropriate and/or legitimate) and convincing in cognitive terms (effective/justifiable) (Schmidt, 2008: 313).

The interactive processes of policy formulation and communication serve to generate and disseminate policy ideas. Policy discourse contains two interactive dimensions: coordinative and communicative. In the policy sphere, coordinative discourse instructs actors at the center of policy construction who are “involved in the creation, elaboration, and justification of policy and programmatic ideas” (ibid., 310). Moreover, “entrepreneurs” or “mediators” may also be present in processes of coordinative discourse serving as catalysts for change. The communicative discourse occurs in the political sphere and consists of the individuals and groups involved in the presentation, deliberation, and legitimating of political ideas (ibid.). Its function is to communicate the policy program agreed upon at the coordinative stage to the general public by means of persuasion. These common elements are used to assess the impact of norms on interests and identities by using different frameworks of social interaction. Discourse is but one factor to analyze domestic policy change (alongside institutional changes and policy implementation).

2.3.2 Assessing the degree of norm internalization

Börzel and Risse differentiate between three degrees of norm internalization: absorption, accommodation and transformation (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 69-70). Absorption means that MS
incorporate European policies (or ideas) into their programs and domestic structures, but without substantially modifying existing processes, policies, and institutions. Absorption is exemplified by changes in the political discourse without significant changes in the implementation of policies or in the institutional structures. Accommodation is where MS accommodate European norms by adapting existing processes, policies and institutions without changing their essential features or the underlying collective understandings attached to them. Accommodation is often in the form of adding policies and institutions to existing ones, without making any fundamental changes to the institutions and policies already in place (Ibid, 2003: 70). Finally, transformation is where MS replace existing policies, processes, and institutions by new, substantially different ones; or by altering existing ones to the extent that their essential features and/or the underlying collective understandings are fundamentally changed.

Lastly, applying a sociological model of Europeanization, the degree of norm internalization cannot go beyond accommodation without the presence of intervening variables. Similarly, if the adaptational pressure is too high, there will be too much institutional inertia preventing domestic change. “Actors are more open to learning and persuasion, if new norms and ideas are compatible with collectively shared understandings and meaning structures” (Ibid, 2003: 70). Following this logic, an “old” member state such as the Netherlands should entail a low to medium adaptational pressure, allowing for a gradual transformation of norms as long as intervening variables are present and institutional structures are adapted to account for change. Based on this model, the Netherlands' norm internalization (of EU development policy) is expected to reflect an accommodation or gradual transformation in response to the EU norms.

2.3.3 Causality
Scholars generally employ two approaches to conceptualize Europeanization: bottom-up, which explores the role of the MS in the European institution-building process; and top-down, which analyzes the effect of the evolving European system of governance on the MS. Furthermore, the bottom-up dimension refers to projection of national ideas, preferences and models from the national to the supranational level. The top-down dimension denotes the processes by which national politics and/or policy processes are increasingly dominated by EU agendas (Delanty & Rumford, 2005:6). This paper will not attempt to determine if the Netherlands is adopting EU standards because the EU is prescribing them; nor does it establish causality since current Dutch development policy is not necessarily a direct result of only (top-down) Europeanization. As a member of the OECD, the Nordic Plus countries, and a participant in global aid forums, the Netherlands has been interacting on many levels regarding effective development cooperation practices. Rather, this study acknowledges the multitudes of processes involved (international, EU as well as the domestic level) but will not attempt to distinguish between the different modalities in the analysis. Instead, this paper takes a constructivist perspective where agents (MS) and structures (the EU) are mutually constituted (a product of cross-loading) and causality takes a back seat in favor of norm convergence. A Sociological Institutionalist perspective can be used to recognize and understand how certain norms, values and practices are spread to EU member states without establishing top-down causality. A more comprehensive discussion of Causality is provided in Appendix A: Causality & the Europeanization of Dutch Development Policy.
3. Methodology

3.1 Research design and unit of analysis
The author opted for a retrospective, descriptive, single-case study design. The unit of analysis is the Netherlands, exploring specifically the Dutch political discourse, institutional changes, and policy implementation pertaining to PCD and The Code. The author decided on a single-case study design because it excels at mapping complex issues through a detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships (Soy, 1997: 1). Furthermore, “a growing number of analysts agree that there are multiple perspectives on policy issues, all of which potentially have some validity and need to be taken into account. They also agree that analytic techniques contain their own implicit biases that need to be acknowledged” (White, 1994: 509). The best way to deal with these problems is to consider multiple data sources and methods (Cook, 1985: 21-22). A second key strength of the case study design is thus that it allows for multiple methods and data sources to describe or explain a single case (Soy, 1997: 4). The author therefore utilized a mixed-method, mixed-data design, a technique sometimes called triangulation to prevent bias and to increase the amount of relevant data considered (Olsen, 2004: 3).

3.2 Policy discourse analysis
This method is based on the premise that “it is through various communicative modalities such as through speech, writing, practices, and actions that meanings are relayed and become evident” (White, 2004: 9). However, as Smith points out: “No single formula exists on how a discourse analysis should be carried out” (Smith, 2007: 60). It is therefore important to clearly describe the “meanings” under investigation, the specific linguistic analysis applied to reveal those meanings, and the sources of discourse considered, to allow for scrutiny and reproduction. The “meanings under investigation” were outlined in the previous chapter. The relevant policy documents (both communicative and coordinative) will be searched for normative and cognitive discourse pertaining to PCD and The Code. Furthermore, as previously stated, norm internalization cannot go beyond accommodation without the presence of intervening variables such as norm entrepreneurs or a facilitating political culture. The presence of these two intervening variables will be determined by considering both the ideational dimension and the interactive dimension of Dutch development policy discourse. The Dutch political speeches and letters as well as (yearly) statements of intent have been retrieved from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, as well as from the official government online repository for political and policy documents. A complete overview of the policy documents can be found in the bibliography.

3.3 Systematic review
A systematic review will be conducted to evaluate the Netherlands’ institutional changes and implementation of development policy. A systematic review typically has clear inclusion and exclusion criteria, an explicit search strategy, and an analysis of the included studies. The systematic review favoured inclusion: the documents were required to a) be published post-1999, b) be authored by an accountable institute or organisation, and c) contain information relevant to the research questions. Older documents from sources which could not be validated were thus excluded. The search criteria were similarly broad: the websites and databases of the Netherlands government, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Operations Evaluation Department of the MFA (IOB), United Nations (UN), EU, OECD, and the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM11). Lastly, the resulting documents were evaluated on their relevance and validity prior to making it to the final list of documents to be reviewed. A complete overview of the documents included in the systematic review can be found in the bibliography.

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9 http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/bz.
10 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/zoeken/parlementaire_documenten.
11 ECDPM is a “think tank” and an independent, non-partisan foundation based in Maastricht. It participates in South-North networks and carries out policy-oriented research regarding development.
3.4 Interviews
All of the sub-questions were assessed at least in part by conducting 4 interviews with civil servants within the MFA. The interviews were of particular importance in establishing the Netherlands’ implementation of PCD and The Code, as these recent efforts are not yet fully documented. Information on the interviewed respondents can be found in Appendix B.

The interviews were in-depth and semi-structured. Semi-structured interviews have both structured and unstructured elements. The interviews conducted for this paper consisted of multiple set open-ended questions in a flexible order. The advantage of this type of interview is that the pre-determined questions allows for accurate replication and consistency between interviews. The open ended nature of the questions and their flexible order allows for the respondent to answer the questions in a manner and order most appropriate to his/her knowledge position. Open ended questions in a flexible order also allows a respondent to answer questions regardless of any expectations and bias introduced by the interviewer. As such, this interview design is particularly suited for complex topics which are not yet extensively documented. A total of 19 interview questions have been formulated which combined with the systematic review and discourse analysis offer an in-depth description of the Netherlands’ institutional changes, policy implementation, and to some extent the Netherlands’ political discourse pertaining to PCD and The Code. The interview questions can be found in Appendix C: Interview Questions.

3.5 Synthesis of the research methods and theory
The Netherlands’ political discourse, institutional structure, and development policy implementation will be investigated to determine the degree of norm internalization. Data on the Netherlands’ political discourse, institutional structure and development policy implementation will be collected by combining three methods: a policy discourse analysis, a systematic review, and interviews with informants within the Dutch MFA. Furthermore, a distinction will be made between three degrees of norm internalization: absorption, accommodation and transformation. Absorption is exemplified by changes in the policy discourse without significant changes in the implementation of policies or in the institutional structures. Accommodation is often in the form of adding policies and institutions to existing ones, without making any changes to existing ones (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 70). Finally, transformation is where MS replace existing policies, processes, and institutions by new, substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their essential features and/or the underlying collective understandings are fundamentally changed. A degree of norm implementation beyond absorption requires the presence of intervening variables such as a conducive political culture or a domestic norm entrepreneur. Table 1 illustrates how the degree of norm internalization can be determined from the three levels of analysis.
Table 1: Degree of norm internalization based on domestic change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Potential Domestic Changes</th>
<th>Degree of norm internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>1. No discourse pertaining to PCD or The Code present</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Normative and/or cognitive advocacy for PCD and The Code are present in the communicative and/or coordinative discourse</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>1. No institutional changes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes</td>
<td>2. Institutional structures are added, existing ones remain (relatively) unchanged</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Existing institutional structures are replaced by new substantially different ones; existing institutional structures are substantially altered</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy changes</td>
<td>1. No new policies are enacted, previously existing policies remain unchanged</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>2. New policies are implemented; existing policies remain (relatively) unchanged</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Existing policies are replaced by substantially different ones; existing policies are substantially altered</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.6 Strengths and limitations
The author opted for a mixed-method, mixed-data research design to prevent introducing biases inherent in using any one method or data source. Triangulation using a large number of reliable sources and multiple clearly defined methods greatly improves the internal validity of a study. As such, the main strength of this study is the very strong conclusions it draws regarding the implementation and internalization of PCD and The Code by the Netherlands. However, the external validity is limited as only one case, the Netherlands, is under investigation. The Netherlands is a Nordic+ country, but not representative of all the other EU MS. A similar study would have to be repeated using other EU MS in order to draw general conclusions regarding the Europeanization of development cooperation.

This chapter presents the contemporary trends in EU development policy (2005-2012). Specifically, the main content of the two policies under investigation: Policy Coherence for Development (embedded in The Consensus from 2005) and The Code (2007) will be discussed. This chapter will outline the main principles embedded in PCD and The Code as these are the elements the EU MS are expected to incorporate in their national discourse, institutional structure and policy implementation. For additional background information on the EU, an overview of the legal basis and institutional structure of the EU regarding development cooperation are provided in Appendix D and E respectively.

EU development policy exists within a broader framework of international development initiatives. “Development” occupies a more central place in the mandates of multilateral development bodies (the norm-makers) such as: UN agencies, financial institutions (the World Bank and IMF), and the OECD/DAC than it does in the EU. As a result, the EU’s priorities for implementing development policy have changed since 2005 through the Commission’s efforts to create a more integrated approach to development in the context of global aid effectiveness. Table 2 sets out the recent frameworks/policies and commitments conceived at the EU level for development cooperation.

Table 2: The Evolution of European Development Cooperation (2005-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy/Instrument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>European Consensus on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Endows the EU and MS with a common vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- In pursuit of the MDGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Embedded Policy Coherence for Development (PCD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>EU Strategy for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>The Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI) is launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Replacing a wide range of geographic and thematic instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Joint EU-Africa Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2013</td>
<td>Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>The EC’s Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (EuropeAid) is formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Merged DG RELEX and AIDCO into one institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Allows the EC to speak with one voice on development and cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Gavas, 2009: 9.

The concept of “aid effectiveness” in the global governance of aid first entered the EU development discourse, as a package of specific ideas and measures, following the 2005 Paris Declaration (Hayman, 2009: 583). The Paris High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness was organized by the OECD and it rests on the five core dimensions known as the Paris Principles: ownership by partner countries; alignment with countries’ strategies, systems and procedures; harmonization of donor actions; managing for results; and mutual accountability (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005). The Paris Declaration has been described as a “significant juncture in the history of development assistance and co-operation” (Hyden, 2008: 259). With the Paris Declaration, the MS of the EU and the international community stated their intent to increase efforts in harmonization, alignment and managing of development. Moreover, the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) reaffirmed the Paris commitments. Both of these international forums advocate reducing the costly fragmentation of aid “by improving the complementarity of donors’ efforts and the division of labour among donors, including through improved allocation of resources within sectors, within countries, and across countries” (Paris Declaration 2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action 2008).

The EU has taken steps to include the Paris principles and Accra proposals as the foundation in its recent development policies. The following sections will discuss the two EU policies examined in the

4.1 The European Consensus on Development and PCD

The European Consensus on Development is a policy statement which lays down (for the first in EU history) a “common vision that guides the actions of the EU, both at its MS and Community levels, in development co-operation.” It originated as a Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions in July 2005. With this Communication, entitled: Proposal for a Joint Declaration by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on the European Union Development Policy: The European Consensus, the Commission sought to upgrade the 2000 EC development policy statement into an EU development strategy (Carbone, 2007: 55). After a series of consultations and revisions, The Consensus was jointly signed by the EU institutions (EC, Council and Parliament) in December 2005.

The first part of The Consensus sets out the objectives and principles on the basis of which the MS commit to a shared vision. Moreover, its contents reflects global initiatives in particular those of the UN, the OECD and global forums on aid effectiveness. The Consensus defines the framework of common principles or norms which the MS should include in their respective development cooperation policies. Particularly, EU MS are expected to incorporate five aspects in their development policy discourse and implementation: (1) poverty eradication, (2) common values, (3) common principles, (4) delivering more and better aid and (5) policy coherence for development. This paper will focus on PCD as it is the main guiding principle in all EU external policies, particularly in development cooperation.

The “EU Vision on Development” according to The Consensus (European Commission, 2006):

1. Identifies the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development - including pursuit of the MDGs - as the primary and overarching objective of EU development cooperation.
2. Re-affirms the common values which EU partnership and dialogue with third countries shall be based on: respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice and multilateralism.
3. Promotes a number of development-related principles: ownership and partnership, political dialogue, participation of civil society in development policy, including a range of non-state actors such as economic and social groups, gender equality, the inclusion of a “strong gender component” in relations with developing countries, and addressing state fragility.
4. Calls for MS to increase their respective ODA to 0.56% of their gross national income (GNI) by 2010 on their way to achieving the UN target of 0.7% by 2015.
5. Identifies PCD as the main guiding principle in all EU external policies. It calls for MS to take into account non-development policies that are likely to affect developing nations by “minimizing contradictions and building synergies between policies other than development cooperation that have an impact on developing countries, for the benefit of overseas development.”

Policy Coherence for Development

PCD, though enacted as part of The Consensus in 2005, can be traced back to the 2002 annual OECD Ministerial meeting where OECD members were asked to “enhance understanding of the development

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13 As the agenda-setter that proposes legislation on development policy to the other EU institutions, mainly the Council and the Parliament.
14 The first part is titled “the EU Vision on Development.” The second part of the European Consensus on Development will not be discussed as it deals with the implementation of development policy exclusively at the Community level, namely the Community’s role and added value worldwide.
dimensions of member country policies and their impacts on developing countries” (OECD, 200216). The OECD explicitly recommended that development policy makers consider “trade-offs and potential synergies across such areas as trade, investment, agriculture, health, education, the environment and development co-operation, to encourage greater policy coherence in support of the internationally agreed development goals” (Ibid.). PCD also constitutes a central part of the UN MDGs framework. In particular, the eighth goal calls upon donors to “develop a global partnership for development” which should cover actions to achieve greater coherence between the purposes of ODA and other public policies.

The European Consensus on Development originally identified 12 priority policy areas for PCD in order to accelerate progress toward the MDGs: trade, environment, climate change, security, agriculture, fisheries, social dimension of globalization, employment and decent work, migration, research and innovation, Information society, Transport and Energy. These areas were condensed to five priority areas in 2009: trade and finance, climate change, Food Security, migration and security, in order to make the PCD agenda more operational.17

Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid18 (DG DevCo - Europe Aid) under the Development Commissioner relies on EU forums (as socialization mechanisms) to promote PCD at the EU level: the PCD inter-service group, inter-service consultation, and the Informal Member States PCD Network. The first two are composed of participants from the Directorate-Generals (DGs), responsible for the various policy areas related to PCD. The Informal MS PCD Network is more relevant to this paper, as it deals with MS interacting on PCD issues. The informal network convenes on average twice a year to discuss PCD experiences, share information, and provide feedback on important PCD issues (European Commission, 2011: 14). It is supposed to monitor EU action on PCD between the EU and the MS at the national level, and provide details and information for the aforementioned PCD reports. The DG for Development and Cooperation - Europe Aid thus plays a prominent role in promoting and monitoring PCD at the MS level. DG DevCo - Europe Aid leads in the preparation and monitoring of three features: the PCD Work Program, Biennial PCD Reports and accompanying staff working documents.

The PCD Work program is an operational framework which covers the 2010-2013 period. It sets concrete targets and indicators to track progress in the five priority areas set forth by the EU on PCD. The PCD work program is perceived by the Commission “as a tool for all EU institutions and Member States, to guide their reflection and decision-making across the broad range of decisions that affect developing countries’ opportunities” (European Commission, 2010: 4). The Biennial PCD reports assess progress towards promoting a higher degree of coherence in PCD’s main areas. The Commission has been drafting these reports every two years since 2007. As such, there have been three reports to date that focus on PCD in 2007, 2009 and 2011. The goal of these reports has been to generate awareness and lesson-learning among MS regarding PCD. The 2009 report was furthermore accompanied by a staff working document which outlined several suggestions for MS to improve their performance on PCD. Similarly, the third biennial report on PC prepared by the Commission in 2011 aimed to report: a) on progress made by the EU and its Member States in making their policies more coherent with development cooperation objectives, focusing on those sectors identified as priority challenges for PCD b) on the recent activities to ensure better monitoring and implementation of the PCD process, and c) on the main lessons learned and challenges facing MS (European Commission, 2011: 9). As such the biennial PCD reports and the accompanying staff working documents not only evaluate the MS progress in promoting PCD, but they also identify challenges and make recommendations for MS to improve their performance.

18 Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid is the Directorate-General (DG) responsible for designing EU development policies and delivering aid through programmes and projects across the world and operates under the Development Commissioner. See Appendix D and E for more information regarding the EU’s legal basis and institutional structure for development.
The following table presents the most important challenges, building blocks and recommendations for MS to internalize and implement PCD. It will be used as a framework to evaluate the Netherlands' efforts towards PCD in the case study, and was formulated by the author using the three Biennial reports on PCD by the European Commission.

Table 3: Challenges and Recommendations in Implementing PCD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified challenges to the internalization and implementation of PCD*</th>
<th>Building blocks and recommendations for MS for the internalization and implementation of PCD**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Weak political commitment by the relevant Minister, ministries, Members of Parliament, Parliamentary committees in the MS.</td>
<td>To succeed in &quot;bringing about greater coherence between policies and development objectives&quot; the Commission discusses three key building blocks for MS to pursue:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A lack of institutional capacity and knowledge on PCD and development issues.</td>
<td>1. A (preferably legal) commitment to PCD &amp; a political framework outlining the approach to PCD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A lack of (early) involvement of development cooperation staff in PCD policy processes.</td>
<td>2. Institutionalization of mechanisms, with a specific mandate to promote PCD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The belief that achieving coherence in some areas is too difficult.</td>
<td>3. An obligation to report on national progress toward PCD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The belief that there is always an 'either/or' choice that must be made between a development approach and a non-development policy approach.</td>
<td>Secondary to the three key building blocks, the Commission recommends MS also:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Political expediency, which may lead to a less coherent approach even where a PCD approach is possible.</td>
<td>1. Make better use of impact assessments and reporting on PCD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. A lack of political will to pursue, and the limited priority given to, the reduction of world poverty.</td>
<td>2. Perform research to increase the knowledge and information on the impact of policy coherence and synergies to inform policy screening, negotiations and decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The difficulty of providing evidence of the ultimate impact of non-development policies on poverty in developing countries.</td>
<td>3. Better coordinate their PCD efforts with other EU MS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


** Sources: Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the EU 2009 Report on PCD: 4, 9, 22; EU 2011 Report on PCD: 14

The discourse analysis, systematic review and interviews will reveal to what extent the Netherlands is countering the above challenges and taking steps to build on the building blocks and recommendations. The table has also been added to Appendix F as it will be referred to often for the analysis in chapter 5.

4.2. The European Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour

The Code is the EU’s common thematic framework and action plan for donor harmonization and aid effectiveness. It states that “the EU should act as a driving force for complementarity and division of labour within the international harmonization and alignment process” (Council of the European Union, 2007: 2). It was adopted by the European Community in May 2007, following a proposal by the EC. The Code is also a legacy of the German EU-Presidency (January-June 2007). During its EU-Presidency, Germany pushed for the division of labour in development policy as one of its political priorities in development cooperation.

The Code is comprised of operational principles aimed at improving overall development results and reducing the transaction costs in development cooperation (ECDPM & ActionAid, 2009: 5). Moreover, it assumes a gradual and pragmatic approach as it is to be “periodically revised on the basis of lessons learned” from its implementation (Carbone, 2007: 57). Moreover, it is “voluntary, flexible and self-policing” as is the case with most soft law policies (DSW, 2008: 2). Nevertheless, The Code states that it
should be applied immediately and progressively by the MS and the Commission, building on existing systems (Council of the European Union: 2007, 4, 10).

Progress made by MS in implementing The Code is currently evaluated annually through a revised EU Donor Atlas and the annual EC Development Report. Furthermore, its implementation is also monitored based on a sample of relevant country cases. The final document for the Code adopted by the Council of the European Union on May 15, 2007 lays out eleven guiding principles for EU donors to implement and follow laid down below:

**Table 4: The 11 Guiding Principles of the EU Code of Conduct for EU Donors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In-Country:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Concentrate on a limited number of sectors in-country, effectively a maximum of three sectors per donor per country;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Redeploy out of other sectors on the basis of negotiations with partner country authorities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. In each priority sector, work towards and support the establishment of a &quot;lead donor arrangement&quot; in charge of all donor coordination in the sector thereby reducing the transaction costs;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Encourages &quot;delegated cooperation,&quot; whereby a donor delegates authority to administer its funding in a given sector to another donor;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Adequate donor support, limiting the number of donors in any sector to a maximum of 3-5;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cross-Country and regional:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Principles 1-5 also to be applied at regional levels;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. EU donors should establish “priority countries” to avoid spreading resources too thinly;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Addressing &quot;the orphans gap,&quot; redeployment of resources in the favor of so-called neglected countries, identified by taking into account all financial flows from ODA and other aid flows;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cross-sectoral:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. EU donors should analyze and expand areas of strength, by performing self-assessments of their &quot;comparative advantages&quot; regarding sectors and modalities and playing on those; also taking into account the views of the partner countries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Pursue progress on other dimensions of complementarity; and vertical complementarity in the context of relevant international forums and cross-modalities and instruments;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Deepen the reforms, by providing the right incentives and sufficient decentralized staffing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy (Council of the European Union, 2007).

As seen in Table 4, there are three dimensions to The Code: “in-country” (principles 1-5), “cross-country” (principles 6-8), and “cross-sectoral” complementarity (principles 9-10). The EU’s efforts as a “community” have been mainly directed at the in-country dimension, with the launching of the EU’s Fast Track Initiative (FTI) on Division of Labour in December 2007. The EU’s FTI involves the EC and 14 Member States (including the Netherlands) acting as facilitators in 30 developing partner countries with the aim of implementing the in-country dimension of The Code.

Many of these principles are embedded in the 2005 Paris Declaration. For instance, Paragraph 35 of the Declaration states that donors will “make full use of their respective comparative advantage at sector or country level by delegating, where appropriate, authority to lead donors for the execution of programs, activities and tasks” (OECD, 2008: 6). Also, reducing the number of sectors in which donors are involved in, and addressing the issue of countries that receive insufficient aid (donor orphans) are part of the Accra Agenda (2008). Despite the fact that the Code is still in an embryonic stage, it represents a common framework for MS to put into action in their respective bilateral development policies in order to enhance donor complementarity.
The Code faces both operational and political challenges because development cooperation is also part of a MS' foreign policy. Some of the general challenges MS face for PCD therefore also apply to The Code. Specifically, a weak political commitment to poverty reduction, a lack of institutional capacity and knowledge, political expediency, and the belief that there is always an either/or choice to be made between development and non-development objectives. Moreover, some partner countries perceive the principles embedded in The Code as a top-down imposed EU agenda (ECDPM-ActionAid International, 2009:5). MS may be reluctant to leave a certain country or a certain sector if it contradicts their strategic interests or their development aid philosophy (Carbone, 2007: 59). It is also likely that MS will try to maintain their development cooperation efforts with former colonies, which they employ to exert significant, indirect economic and political influence (Stetter, 2007: 4). Progress may thus be compromised by the MS’ existing historic ties, strategic interests or institutional inertia. The implementation of The Code thus depends on the political will of the MS to overcome domestic pressures. Table 5 presents the five most prominent challenges to The Code.

**Table 5: Challenges to implementing and internalizing The Code faced by MS**

| 1. Weak political commitment by the relevant Minister, ministries, Members of Parliament, Parliamentary committees in the MS. |
| 2. A lack of institutional capacity and knowledge on development issues. |
| 3. Political expediency, which may lead to a less coherent approach even where cooperation is possible. |
| 4. A lack of political will to pursue, and the limited priority given to, the reduction of world poverty. |
| 5. The belief that there is always an ‘either/or’ choice that must be made between a development approach and a non-development policy approach. |

Source: Adapted by the author from general challenges towards PCD that also apply to The Code

The way in which the Netherlands is coordinating and implementing The Code will be examined in chapter 6. Particular attention will be given to the implementation of the three dimensions of The Code and to how the Netherlands is countering the identified challenges.
Case Study of the Netherlands' Implementation and Internalization of PCD and The Code

The next three chapters will present the Netherlands' implementation of PCD and The Code and evaluate to what extent this implementation reflects the internalization of EU norms. Chapters 5 and 6 will present the findings from the political discourse analysis, the systematic review and the interviews and answer the research sub-questions for PCD and The Code respectively. Both chapters will first discuss the relevant discourse and its implications for the EU norm internalization before determining to what extent the Netherlands has institutionalized and implemented PCD and The Code. Chapter 7 will conclude the analysis by answering the main research questions.

As previously stated, a degree of norm internalization beyond absorption requires the presence of a conducive political culture and a domestic norm entrepreneur. It is therefore important to outline the Netherlands' position regarding the EU as a framework for development cooperation at the inception of these two policies, before going into the Netherlands' implementation of PCD and The Code.

The Netherlands' position regarding the EU as a framework for international development cooperation at the inception of The Consensus and The Code

Minister for Development Cooperation Koenders (2007-2010) asked the Advisory Council on International Affairs19 (AIV) to produce an advisory report on the implications of recent developments in EU development policy for the Netherlands on June 11th 2007 (Koenders, 2007). Prior to this, the Netherlands had largely refrained from taking a stance regarding development cooperation within a European framework. The following quote is from his request letter:

“(…) until a few years ago there was widespread skepticism, including in the Netherlands, about EU development policy. The Commission was seen as a fairly ineffective 16th donor without particular added value. The developments of the last few years have led to a rethink regarding collaboration on development issues in the context of the EU. There is now more recognition of the potential value of the EU context for Dutch efforts in the field of development cooperation. The Netherlands has also actively contributed to the above-mentioned developments at EU level, for example through its presidency in 2004. In political terms, there is generally widespread support for this agenda, as reflected in the at times intense discussions about it in both houses of parliament. At the same time, there are questions about the consequences of these developments” (Koenders, 2007: 2).

The Minister's request marks a significant change in the Netherlands' position regarding development cooperation. It revealed that the Netherlands considered the EC an ineffective donor up to 2007 and that the increase in the EU budget and the establishment of The Consensus, PCD and The Code had increased national and international support for the EU as a partner for development. It also revealed that the Netherlands had already been pushing for an improved EU development agenda prior to 2007 and that there was considerable support for it at the Dutch national-political level. The quote thus illustrates that the Netherlands had a conducive political culture regarding using the EU as a framework for development from 2007.

The requested synthesis report was published by the AIV in 2008 and it re-affirmed the legitimacy of the EU as a development framework for the Netherlands (AIV, 2008). As Minister Koenders stated in his response to the synthesis report: “The EU has become an important framework for development cooperation for the Netherlands for the coordination and cooperation with other donors in light of the Paris Agenda” (T.K. 21501-04-100, 2008: 4). Furthermore, the Minister concluded his response by stating that the Netherlands is “particularly keen to strengthen political dialogue with partner

19 The Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) of the Netherlands is an independent body which advises government and parliament on foreign policy, particularly on issues relating to human rights, peace and security, development cooperation and European integration (www.aiv-advies.nl).
countries,” that “the Netherlands aims to further strengthen EU development policy”, and finally that though the EU’s potential will depend on the commitment of other member states, “The Netherlands will nevertheless continue to lead the way” (Koenders, 2008b: 2-3). Where the Minister’s request letter to the AIV illustrated the presence of a conducive political culture regarding development through an EU development framework; his response to the resulting AIV synthesis report revealed that the Netherlands also began framing itself as an international norm entrepreneur for EU development. The Operations Evaluation Department of the MFA (IOB) furthermore noted that: “the Netherlands’ staff in development cooperation regards the new aid agenda as a boon to the visibility of the Netherlands in the partner countries and that the role of the Netherlands as a front-runner in the EU development policy agenda is a strong incentive to engage in implementing development measures” (IOB, 2008: 106).

The Netherlands’ support for the EU as a development framework appears to be based predominantly on cognitive reasoning. Ultimately, the discourse from 2007 and 2008 illustrated that the Netherlands had a conducive political culture and thus began framing itself as an international norm entrepreneur regarding the EU as a development framework. The predominantly cognitive ideational discourse furthermore illustrated that the Netherlands could be willing to implement PCD and The Code particularly if it considers these policies to be effective and beneficial to the Netherlands.
5. Implementation and Internalization of PCD

This chapter will answer the research sub-questions pertaining to PCD. As such, this chapter will determine to what extent PCD is present in the Netherlands’ discourse and the extent to which the Netherlands has institutionalized and implemented PCD over the past decade. The Netherlands’ efforts to overcome the EU’s identified challenges to the implementation of PCD will also be taken into account. The policy discourse pertaining to PCD (research question 1A) will be discussed first, and then the institutionalization (research question 1B) and implementation (research questions 1C, D and E) will be evaluated.

5.1 Research question 1A: PCD in Dutch political discourse

Policy coherence for development featured very prominently in the Netherlands’ political discourse over the past decade. For instance, Minister of Development Cooperation Van Ardenne-van der Hoeven stated in 2003: “The Netherlands wishes to set an example with other like minded countries” regarding development coherence and coordination (T.K. 29234-1, 2003: 10). Furthermore, Genee noted during the interview that Minister Van Ardenne-van der Hoeven wanted to be known as “Mrs. Coherence” (Interview with Genee, 2013). As such, Minister van Ardenne-van der Hoeven sought to be regarded as a norm entrepreneur for PCD both domestically and in the EU development context. By 2006, the Netherlands' MFA “had established policy coherence as one of the main priorities of Dutch foreign and development policy” (OECD, 2011: 34). The Netherlands thus framed itself internationally not only as a leader in development cooperation, but also as a norm entrepreneur for PCD as early as 2003 (a year after the 2002 OECD ministerial meeting on PCD).

As previously stated, the IOB noted that the Netherlands’ position as a front-runner in the EU development policy agenda is a strong incentive to engage in implementing development measures (IOB, 2008: 106). Considering that the Netherlands framed itself as a norm entrepreneur for PCD in 2003, it is unsurprising that the Netherlands’ political discourse from the past decade contains a considerable amount of normative and cognitive advocacy for PCD. For example, Minister for Development Cooperation van Ardenne-van der Hoeven noted that “Development cooperation coherence is about the realization that wealthy countries, not only in the area of aid, but also in many other foreign policy areas (...) can and must contribute to achieving the MDGs” (T.K. 29234-46, 2006: 1). According to the Minister, wealthy countries thus have a responsibility (normative) to pursue PCD as it is needed to achieve the MDGs (cognitive).

The policy discourse during this period also echoed several of the challenges to PCD identified by the EC (Appendix F). Minister Koenders noted for example “a tendency to work on relatively easy coherence themes,” “a limited capacity to tackle complex processes from a PCD perspective,” and a lack of “political commitment to progress” (T.K. 21501-04-100, 2008: 4). The Dutch political discourse from 2012 expanded on these challenges, noting that: “Measurement instruments developed by the EU to embed PCD remain unused in some cases, and many MS lack sufficient motivation, knowledge and capacity to consider potential development effects in their policy making” (T.K. 32605-102, 2012: 2-3). It will therefore be important to determine to what extent these challenges have affected the Netherlands’ implementation and internalization of PCD, and if the Netherlands has taken measures to counter them.

The political discourse also contains several coordinative documents with statements of intent as well as specific instructions to counter the last challenge to PCD identified by the EU: the difficulty of providing evidence of the ultimate impact of non-development policies on poverty in developing

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20 See appendix F for the EU’s building blocks, recommendations, and identified challenges for PCD.
countries. Particularly, the Minister for Development Cooperation authorized a “Pilot coherence-report in Ghana, Mali and Bangladesh, to set an example on a small scale to research the methodologies needed to measure the consequences of PCD” (ibid., 3). This indicates that the Netherlands is following the EU’s recommendation to increase the knowledge and information on the impact of policy coherence (the second EU recommendation for PCD, refer to Appendix F). The political discourse therefore contains both ideational elements supporting PCD as well as coordinative documentation.

5.2 Measures taken to implement PCD
This section will evaluate the institutionalization (section 5.2.1: research question 1B) and implementation (sections 5.2.2 through 5.2.4: research questions 1C through 1E) of PCD in the Netherlands. The following sections will thus discuss how PCD is institutionalized (currently, and how it came about), to what extent the Netherlands' thematic priorities are consistent with PCD, the methodologies the Netherlands employs to evaluate PCD, and the channels through which the Netherlands interacts with other MS on PCD issues. Some of the measures taken to implement PCD are very technical and therefore not directly relevant to assess the degree of norm internalization. Furthermore: “the specifics of the implementation of PCD usually do not leave the ministry ‘on paper’” (Interview with De Nooijer, 2013). This discussion therefore offers a rare insight into the implementation of PCD from the perspective of the Netherlands' leading PCD experts.

5.2.1 Research question 1B: Orchestrating coherent development policy in an EU context and the institutionalization of PCD
This section will address research question 1B: How is PCD institutionalized to ensure coherence and how has this changed over the past decade? The analysis will reveal to what extent the Netherlands is taking measures to address the first two building blocks for PCD identified by the European Commission. The building blocks and recommendations by the European Commission for implementing PCD can be viewed in Appendix F. This section will first discuss the Netherlands' institutional structure to ensure PCD, and then outline the institutionalization process over the past decade.

The whole-of-government approach and the MFA
The Netherlands has employed a whole-of-government approach to development cooperation since 1965 (Führer, 1996: 16 ; Van Beurden & Gewald, 2004: 17). The whole-of-government approach to development entails that development cooperation is a shared responsibility between the ministerial departments and their political representation in the Dutch Cabinet. Development cooperation is thus represented at the highest political level. It allows for the Minister of Development Cooperation to promote and intervene in matters related to development cooperation and PCD. As the OECD notes: “this is an important asset for promoting policy coherence for development as it provides a permanent platform for advocating development co-operation and development issues both in the highest political sphere and publicly” (OECD, 2011: 35). By employing a whole-of-government approach, where the Minister for Development Cooperation has a mandate to promote and ensure PCD at the national level, the Netherlands has institutionalized a legal commitment as well as a political framework to PCD. As such, the Netherlands has institutionalized the first building block for PCD as recommended by the Commission. According to the OECD DAC peer review: “Other donors can learn from the Netherlands' experiences with whole-of-government approaches” (Ibid., 14).

The MFA is the hub for Dutch development co-operation, responsible for almost 90% of Dutch development assistance (Ibid., 51). Its departments are divided over five Directorates-General (DG): DG for European Cooperation (DGES), DG for International Cooperation (DGIS), DG for Political Affairs

22 Particularly measuring the impact of PCD in developing countries is a very new and highly technical endeavor.
23 1) To institutionalize a (preferably legal) commitment to PCD & a political framework outlining the approach to PCD. 2) Institutionalization of mechanisms, with a specific mandate to promote PCD.
The DGIS is responsible for coordinating, implementing and financing the Netherlands’ development cooperation policy (MFA, 2010b: 15). As such, this DG has a leading role in the analysis, formulation and implementation of coherent development policy by the MFA. The Effectiveness and Coherence Department (DEC) under DGIS furthermore advises the Minister regarding effective and coherent development, development aid, and the reduction of extreme poverty (Ibid., 16-17). DGIS alongside the DEC thus advises the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, coordinates bilaterally with EU MS and aid-recipient countries and multilaterally with the UN, World Bank, NGO’s and the EU. DGIS and DEC are therefore the institutional structures responsible for the Netherlands’ efforts regarding PCD. As such, the Netherlands has not only institutionalized a legal commitment and a political framework to PCD, but also institutional structures for development and PCD (the second EC building block as seen in Appendix F).

### The “Interdepartmental Working Group Evaluation of New Commission Proposals” (BNC)

The Netherlands’ development coordination with the EU is often considered a reactive process as it is initiated by a proposal from the European Commission (Korsten, 2004: 41). Such proposals can be a statement, policy, or a law relating to the European Union and its Member States. Proposals concerning development are put forth (proposed) by the Development Commissioner. The first stage in the Netherlands' coordination process is the evaluation of such a proposal by the Interdepartmental Working Group Evaluation of New Commission Proposals24 (BNC) (Expertisecentrum Europees Recht, 2011: 2). The BNC is chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and supported institutionally by DGES. The BNC assembles every two weeks and its primary task is to determine which Ministry is best suited for the coordination and formulation of a response to every EU proposal, and to determine which other Ministries should be involved in the formulation process (EuropaNu, n/d.c: 1). The MFA tends to be leading when a proposal concerns matters on development, as it houses both DGIS and DGES. Once the BNC decides upon an arrangement of ministries, the leading Ministry appoints a leading department. The MFA generally appoints the DEC under DGIS for proposals regarding PCD or the quality of aid. The leading Ministry also assembles an inter-departmental working group for the formulation of a preliminary response to the EC proposal. In the case of international development the working group relies heavily on the departments within DGIS. The Netherlands’ institutional structure is therefore highly flexible and conducive to change, as the selection of departments depends on the policy being considered.

The preliminary response to an EC proposal by the BNC is called a “concept BNC-fiche.” It consists of a summary of the history, consequences and desirability of the proposal and it considers the financial consequences, the subsidiarity principle, proportionality, the legal basis, and development cooperation-coherence consequences (EuropaNu, n/d.a: 1; Korsten, 2004: 19). As such, every EU proposal is systematically screened for PCD issues. The BNC-fiche is concluded with the Netherlands’ preliminary position regarding the proposal, and once it is approved by the BNC, it is considered the foundation of the Netherlands’ position (Expertisecentrum Europees Recht, 2011: 2). The BNC-fiche is the leading

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24 “Interdepartementale Werkgroep Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen."
document for both the Netherlands’ national-political representatives (in the Council of Ministers) and the Netherlands’ supporting civil servants (Council Working Groups and Coreper).

When the proposal concerns development cooperation, the MFA’s department for International/European Affairs is responsible for assembling a “PV-instructions Working Group.” This interdepartmental working group formulates the instructions for the Dutch permanent representatives in Brussels, based on the previously approved BNC-fiche (Korsten, 2004: 22; Expertisecentrum Europese Recht, 2011: 3). Once the instructions have been written, DGES briefs the permanent representatives in Brussels. The Netherlands’ permanent representatives in the Council Working Groups and in Coreper base their position and negotiations on these instructions.

**The Coordination Commission for European Integration- and Association Problems**
The approved BNC-fiches are also offered to the Coordination Commission for European Integration- and Association Problems (CoCo). Coco has been responsible for formulating the Dutch National Position within the European Council since 1958. It convenes every week to review new BNC-fiches and to formulate the final conclusions and positions for the Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation (Korsten, 2004: 20, 22; EuropaNu, n/d.a: 1; Expertisecentrum Europese Recht, 2011: 2; Interview with Genee, February 2013). When CoCo reviews the BNC-fiches, it is also responsible for evaluating the coherence test for foreign policy within these BNC-fiches: “The Dutch effort in an EU-framework involves the systematic evaluation of the interests of the developing countries. This is done through a specialized coherence test for all new European Policy. CoCo, the organ that prepares the Dutch position regarding European policy, (...) makes the first judgement. After CoCo, the final call is made by the Council of Ministers” (T.K. 32605-4: 21). As such, CoCo is the final mechanism at the civil servant level before the conclusions and positions prepared by the MFA and the Minister of Foreign Affairs reach the Ministers. Chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, CoCo includes representatives from DGES and DGCB, DGIS, and the department heads involved in the formulation of the BNC-fiche (MFA, 2010b: 31). Lastly, the Dutch Council of Ministers shares and fine tunes the conclusions and national positions formulated by CoCo with the Dutch Parliament preceding an EC assembly (Korsten, 2004: 23). Accordingly, this is where the Minister for Development Cooperation can fulfill his mandate to promote PCD, and act as a norm entrepreneur to the Dutch national government, the Ministry’s civil servants, and to the EC.

The Netherlands screens EU policy for PCD issues and formulates its formal position through the BNC and CoCo. The Netherlands has therefore institutionalized PCD at the EU level both politically and institutionally, with a clear mandate to promote PCD both domestically and in Brussels (EC building block 2 for PCD). The coordination process with the EU through the BNC and CoCo can be seen in the figure 2.
The Netherlands moved away from an ad-hoc approach to PCD in favor of an institutional structure dedicated to PCD with the creation of the Policy Coherence Unit (CU) in 2002:

“There was an ad hoc working group when the new Minister Herfkens was called to higher office and became the Minister for Development Cooperation in 1998. At the end of her first period she wanted to give a real push for PCD with the creation of a unit. We were given a mandate and staff of 6 people in total including myself and a secretary to set it up in 2002. Then we started working on PCD” (Interview with Genee, 2013).

This quote illustrates that the appointment of Minister Herfkens in 1998 addressed two of the challenges to PCD identified by the EU: a weak political commitment to PCD and a lack of institutional capacity and knowledge on PCD issues. Though Minister Van Ardenne-van der Hoeven (2002-2007) wanted to be known as “Mrs. Coherence” internationally, it was Minister Herfkens before her (1998-2002) who was a domestic norm entrepreneur for PCD and institutionalized a unit for PCD. This also illustrates the importance of a domestic entrepreneur to achieve a degree of norm internalization beyond absorption. Accordingly, the Netherlands not only had a conducive political culture (since 2007), but also a domestic entrepreneur enabling institutional changes and thus a higher degree of norm internalization (since 1998).

The CU originally strived for PCD as follows:

“I had 4 people with experience who could deal with different topics and we made project teams with sector divisions inside the Ministry and on certain issues we made interdepartmental project teams with

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25 Original Dutch name: Coherentie Eenheid (CE). One of the departments that used to be under DGIS.
for example the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Trade. The first priority we attacked was the coherence between trade, agriculture and development and we started to develop government policy papers on the coherence of those policies” (Interview with Genee, 2013).

The CU thus first attempted to promote PCD by writing up policy papers on PCD of bilateral development policy with other Ministries. However, the other Ministries gradually lost interest in writing up these policy papers, and the CU began promoting PCD through the EU: “At the beginning we wanted to put this in the form of government policy papers. That worked until other ministries were becoming more reluctant to flesh out policy papers that went to parliament. After that we focused on instructions for meetings in Brussels” (Interview with Genee, 2013). The CU therefore focused its efforts on PCD through an EU framework in part because the Ministries were becoming reluctant to work on PCD of bilateral foreign policy. There was therefore still a lack of commitment and capacity for PCD in the other ministries (EU challenges to PCD 1 & 2, see Appendix F).

By 2006, the CU had adopted a three-pronged strategy for policy coherence: Promoting coherence in Brussels through the BNC fiches; proactive targeting of specific coherence dossiers; and building partnerships and promoting awareness of the importance of coherence (OECD, 2011: 34). The OECD noted that with the creation of the CU the Netherlands had put in place a “winning combination of political commitment, a clear policy framework and the capacity to deliver through a dedicated Policy Coherence Unit located within the ministry” (OECD, 2006: 15, 45). The Netherlands’ institutionalization of PCD up to 2006 was therefore in line with the EU building block to institutionalize a framework for PCD and addressed the first two challenges (refer to Appendix F).

Another way the CU worked towards PCD was through the institutionalization of the coherence test within the BNC-fiche: “One of the first things we managed to establish was a coherence test, which was developed into the BNC-fiche” (Interview with Genee, 2013). Since May 2004, the BNC-fiche contains a paragraph that brings to light the possible effects on developing countries (Interview with Genee, 2013). With it, the CU institutionalized an ex-ante mechanism to test the coherence of EU policies. According to the OECD, this coherence test is “a key strength of the Dutch approach to promoting coherence at the European Level” (OECD, 2006: 15). However, the effectiveness of the coherence test in the BNC-fiche was limited by the available institutional capacity. As Genee notes: “the ministry responsible for the piece of legislation under consideration can simply say ‘not applicable.’” As a consequence, “there have been many proposals undermining development.” It is thus important to have “a countervailing power in the decision-making process” (Interview with Genee, 2013). Unfortunately, having a countervailing power requires a considerable amount of capacity. Though the CU institutionalized the coherence test in the BNC-fiche, it did not have sufficient institutional capacity to monitor the performance of the other ministries. The institutionalization of a coherence check in the BNC-fiche was therefore a step in the right direction but its effectiveness was limited by the capacity of the CU and the capacity and political commitment to PCD of the other ministries.

2005 saw the creation of another department under DGIS; the Effectiveness and Quality Department (DEK). The creation of the DEK was a direct response to The Consensus that same year and it became the hub which fostered the promotion of the Paris Declaration. The DEK was institutionalized with a mandate to support and offer advice on policy implementation and to stimulate discussions on aid effectiveness issues (IOB, 2008: 105). As such, it was responsible for offering advice and support to overcome the EC’s identified challenges to PCD (Appendix F) and The Code (Table 5 in section 4.2).

The DEK was therefore both a normative and cognitive agent for effective development cooperation within the MFA, with a broader mandate than the CU as it pertained to both PCD and The Code. According to the DAC: “DEK has a broad mandate to oversee effectiveness and quality within the MFA
and collects and records data, makes policy recommendations, and develops and maintains instruments for implementing policy on cross-theme and cross-country issues” (OECD, 2006: 51).

Prior to 2009, the CU had been promoting PCD in Brussels through the BNC-fiches, drafting PCD policy papers on the most important development dossiers, and had a mandate to promote awareness for the importance of policy coherence. However, as previously stated, it lacked the institutional capacity to enforce the coherence test in the BNC-fiche, and other ministries were proving reluctant to work on the PCD policy papers (Interview with Genee, 2013). Accordingly, a 2009 evaluation of the CU concluded that the CU would be more effective if it limited itself to a role as instigator and coordinator, and delegated the coherence-sensitive dossiers to the relevant directorates and departments (Engel, Keijzer, Van Seters & Spierings, 2009: 62). The CU was subsequently merged with the DEK that same year to form the Effectiveness and Coherence Department (DEC) under DGIS. According to the OECD, the merger “resulted in a more integrated institutional base for policy coherence for development within the MFA” (OECD, 2011: 79). The OECD also noted that the DEC continued the three pronged approach to PCD initiated by the CU in 2002 (Ibid., 34). It was a further institutional change, which freed up institutional capacity originally dedicated to writing up policy reports for the coherence report and it integrated the departments for PCD and The Code. The Netherlands has therefore taken several steps over the past decade to institutionalize PCD.

However, the MFA is currently planning a profound re-organization due to budget cuts. One of the intended institutional changes is the dissolving of the DEC. Though no formal documents have been published confirming the reorganization, interview respondent Sunita Verlinde added that the DEC will be merged with the Bureau of International Cooperation (interview with Verlinde, 2013). The coherence unit in DEC will most likely be reduced to a staff bureau which instigates and coordinates between the divisions dealing with coherence-sensitive dossiers (Interview with Genee, 2013). As a result, the future institutionalization of PCD is uncertain.

5.2.2 Research question 1C: Policy areas prioritized for PCD
This section will address research question 1C: Are the Netherlands’ thematic priorities for achieving PCD consistent with those advocated by the EU? Both The Consensus (2005) and the original PCD communication9 (2005) identified twelve priority areas “where the challenge of attaining synergies with development policy objectives is considered particularly relevant” (European Commission, 2006: 4). The twelve priority areas for PCD established at the EU level in 2005 were: Trade, Environment, Climate Change, Security, Agriculture, Fisheries, Social Dimension, Migration, Research and Innovation, Information Society, Transport and Energy (European Commission, 2009: 5). When asked how these twelve priorities came about, Genee responded: “What happened in Brussels and in other MS as well, all the DGs in Brussels threw in their priorities” (Interview with Genee, 2013). Fundamentally, because the other MS and the DGs in Brussels could add and negotiate priorities, the result was that too many of them were agreed upon. As such, as Genee puts it, “by having 12 we had none.” The Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010-2013 narrowed the priorities down to five: trade and finance, climate change, global Food Security, migration, and security (European Commission, 2010: 4). However, these five priorities were not the ones the Netherlands was pushing for. In fact, Minister van Ardenne-van der Hoeven stated that “the greatest challenge regarding the Dutch effort for PCD is without a doubt at the EU level: how do we get the EU to accept the ‘coherent’ Dutch positions?” (T.K. 29234-1, 2006: 17). Rather than internalizing the EU’s priority areas, the Netherlands was pushing for the EU to adopt the Netherlands.’ According to Genee the Netherlands pushed for trade, finance, agriculture, intellectual property rights and fisheries, because those were “where the real incoherencies

26 The Netherlands therefore already had an institutional structure which would oversee the implementation of the in-country and cross-country dimensions of The Code two years before The Code was signed by the Netherlands.
27 The latest institutional changes are not reflected in the recent organograms published by the MFA.
28 Bureau Internationale Samenwerking, under DGIS.
were staring us in the face” (Interview with Genee, 2013). He describes the process of getting from 12 priorities to 5 at the EU level as “a sort of political horse trading game” (Ibid.). Illustrating this process, he describes the inclusion of immigration as a priority as “purely political,” and the merger of trade and finance at “the insistence of the Netherlands” as a middle ground as the Netherlands wanted them both as separate priorities, but other MS wished to drop financial flows entirely (Interview with Genee, 2013). As such, though the Netherlands had some influence on the creation of these five priorities for PCD, the Netherlands' priority areas did not “fit” with the EU's priority areas for PCD, exerting a pressure for adaption. As the OECD noted in 2011: “the Netherlands has not yet internalised these five EU priority areas in its own work programmes” (OECD, 2011: 14).

5.2.3 Research question 1D: Reporting on - and measuring PCD
This section will address research question 1D: What methodologies does the Netherlands' MFA employ to evaluate PCD and what indicators (if any) are in place to measure PCD performance? Accordingly, this section will discuss how the Netherlands has pursued the EC's 3rd key building block to PCD as well as the EC's first two recommendations: reporting on PCD, making better use of impact assessments and reporting on PCD, and performing research to increase the knowledge on the impact of PCD and PCD synergies.

Very little is known about the methodologies to measure PCD, as measuring the impact on development of non-development policies is a very new and technical endeavor: “Methodologies to evaluate PCD, that is really the big thing because it doesn't really exist. The person you want to talk to is Otto Genee” (Interview with De Nooijer, 2013). According to Otto Genee, there are three requirements for any methodology to evaluate PCD: “Independent evaluations are absolutely necessary to remain credible. The second thing is to start to develop real indicators. Third is to look more at the whole policy cycle and really look at the impact in developing countries” (Interview with Genee, 2013).

Reporting on PCD
The Netherlands' first priority toward the evaluation of PCD was to establish a reporting system for the PCD of national policies and policies at the EU level: “We pushed first for a reporting system on what MS are doing on PCD” (Interview with Genee, 2013). The reason for this was to make countries accountable for their progress on PCD. The CU reported on national progress every year: “We reported annually to Parliament in national progress reports to get a foothold and force other departments to give input, to have a method to engage with them” (Ibid.) As this quote illustrates, there was an ulterior motive behind reporting progress: it was a means to engage other departments and ministries with PCD issues and keep PCD on the agenda. It was also a means to engage the parliament and the national political level with PCD issues as the parliament would receive the reports and they would be publicized. As such, it is a method to counter a lack of political will both at the ministry level and at the national-parliamentary level (EU challenge 1, see appendix F). The DAC commented on the Netherlands' monitoring and reporting system, stating that: “The ministry had started to manage for results in its work on coherence by ensuring a strong focus on results delivery and clear reporting on progress to parliament, including the regular MDG 8 report.” (OECD, 2011: 35). Furthermore, the CU started reporting the Netherlands' national progress on PCD issues to the EU in 2007. There have been three progress reports to the EU so far: 2007, 2009 and 2011 (as discussed in section 4.1). By participating in the biennial EC progress reports, the Netherlands has implemented the third key building block to PCD: an obligation to report on national progress toward PCD (see appendix F).

Moreover, the Netherlands has been pushing for a greater validity of the biennial EC reports. The Dutch contribution to all three reports have been based on a self-assessment of the Netherlands, written by the same person; the interview respondent Otto Genee. Their credibility has thus been limited. As

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30 Refer to Appendix F.
31 Otto Genee’s three requirements to evaluate PCD correspond with building block 3, recommendations 1 and 2, and the 8th challenge identified by the European Commission as seen in Appendix F.
Genee states: “Three rounds of self assessment, there is a limit to the credibility of that. You can imagine what the outcome is” (Interview with Genee, 2013). Genee has voiced the issue in the instructions to the permanent representatives in Brussels:32 “What the Netherlands wants is an independent evaluator added to the progress reports” (Ibid.). The EC proved receptive to the Netherlands' criticism to the current reporting system but no concrete measures have yet been taken. The Netherlands is therefore improving upon the EU's key building block 3. The DAC noticed the Netherlands' efforts, stating that: “the DEC is working towards a systematic approach to performance assessment” (OECD, 2011: 35).

Creating indicators for PCD and measuring the impact

This second requirement to measure PCD is also a response to the EU's 8th identified challenge to PCD: “The difficulty of providing evidence of the ultimate impact of non-development policies on poverty in developing countries” by pursuing the EU’s second recommendation: “perform research to increase the knowledge and information on the impact of policy coherence” (see appendix F). As such, this section outlines the Netherlands' efforts in pursuit of these PCD principles.

The Netherlands' approach to creating indicators for PCD and measuring the impact of PCD is based on the available documentation. As Genee notes: “I borrowed from impact assessments in the area of aid” (Interview with Genee, 2013). It is therefore necessary to outline the international state-of-the-art as a frame of reference. The ECDPM conducted a study to determine the feasibility and potential design of a policy coherence index for non-aid donor policies affecting developing countries (King, Keijzer, et al., 2012). It is one of the most recent and comprehensive methodological studies on developing PCD indicators. As such, it offers a framework to assess the Netherlands' efforts to develop indicators and measure PCD.

The ECDPM and the European Commission both argue that there is one particular requirement which must be met before the development of PCD indicators can be successful: there must be sufficient political will to take concrete steps toward the institutionalization of PCD indicators (the first challenge to PCD, see appendix F and King, Keijzer, et al., 2012: 47-48). When asked why political will is so important for the creation of PCD indicators, Genee replied: “As long as we stay very general and abstract, everything seems fine” (Interview with Genee, 2013). The existence of PCD indicators would make actors accountable for their PCD performance. As Genee states: “Start developing targets, goals, define them. What is it you actually want, and then make it measurable. That is already a revolution in policy coherence because you make yourself vulnerable if you set a real goal” (Ibid). The development of indicators is therefore a prerequisite to make states accountable and make better use of the impact assessments and reporting on PCD (EC recommendation 1, see appendix F). When asked about the political will to pursue PCD indicators in the Netherlands, Genee replied: “That's where it becomes tricky because if you read the progress reports you will find a description of good intentions.” The ECDPM came to the same conclusion stating that “Member States prefer such discussions to stay very general”, and “it would be incorrect to state that it [PCD] is a high priority” (Keijzer, Spierings, et al., 2012: 26). The ECDPM also notes that both interest and investment in the development of performance indicators in the field of development cooperation have grown considerably since 2005 (Ibid., 6).

The Netherlands reached a critical mass of political will to strive for impact indicators in 2011: “Mrs. Ferrier33 began pushing through the pipeline of international public goods. The ministers wanted to know the impact on developing countries in-country. We first advised the ministers that this is too difficult, but the parliament kept insisting. A first attempt was committed to parliament in April 2011” (Interview with Genee, 2013). This quote illustrates two important details regarding the Netherlands' effort to pursue indicators for PCD. First, it required a domestic norm entrepreneur (Mrs. Ferrier) to get the pilot started. Second, illustrating the importance of political will and the whole-of-government

32 See section 5.2.1 for the procedure to instruct the permanent representatives in Brussels.
33 2002-2012 member of the Second Chamber.
approach, the Dutch parliament insisted and the Minister of Development Cooperation committed to a pilot project to create indicators for PCD in Ghana, Mali34 and Bangladesh.

One of the challenges to PCD identified by the European Commission is the difficulty of providing evidence of the ultimate impact of non-development policies on poverty (challenge 8, see appendix F). To deal with the complexity of PCD, the ECDPM suggested that research efforts toward establishing indicators and measuring PCD use the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) (King, Keijzer, et al., 2012: 42). The LFA is a long established intervention design methodology used by many major multilateral and bilateral donors which can be adapted to structure the many variables involved in PCD and develop indicators. It involves the creation of linear causal chains to represent sequential assumptions with accompanying indicators between the objectives of developing countries and the indicators to represent PCD impact in the developing countries. It requires the researcher to develop indicators for every step, or “link” in the causal chain. A complete chain with corresponding indicators would reveal at a glance not only the exact relation between objectives and impacts (PCD of the various policies), but also which “links” promote or reduce coherence with the country’s development (Ibid., 2012: 36).

The Netherlands’ pilot borrows heavily from the LFA. As Genee stated: “In evaluating the impact of aid interventions at developing country level, it has become more or less standard practice to construct so-called result chains,” and “the result chains in this pilot are being built up as a logical framework while taking into account the local situation” (Interview with Genee, 2013).

The Netherlands’s intervention logic is illustrated in the figure above. From left to right, from the EU/NL PCD objectives and underlying assumptions to the policies of the developing country and lastly the impacts in the developing country priorities (Interview with Genee, 2013).

The ECDPM also identifies several technical challenges to developing indicators for PCD: The complexity of the result chains; trade-offs between development objectives; and accounting for the impact of (failing) developing country institutions (EU challenges to PCD 5 and 8, see appendix F) (King, Keijzer, et al., 2012: 8, 36). Genee recognizes the above challenges, stating that “estimating the PCD sensitivity of EU aid and non-aid policies from a partner country’s angle is a complicated exercise fraught by methodological difficulties and data availability problems” (Interview with Genee, 2013). However, the

34 Mali was removed from the pilot in 2013 due to instability in the region.
exercise of measuring PCD “is one that needs to be started” (Ibid.). Though a correlation may be found between certain policies and impacts in the developing country (Ghana and Bangladesh for this pilot), there is no methodological foundation to establish pure causality. The Netherlands will likely have to settle, at best, for plausible linkages. Nevertheless, the Netherlands is following most of the ECDPM’s recommended methods in pursuit of the EC’s recommendations to perform research and overcome several of the challenges to PCD. The pilot should provide new insights regarding both the methodology to measure, and the impact of, PCD policy, for the Netherlands and the international community to build on.

5.2.4 Research question 1E: Sharing and coordinating with the EU: the Informal MS Network

This section will discuss research question 1E Through which EU channels does the Netherlands interact with other MS to share its national implementation experiences regarding PCD? This will illustrate to what extent the Netherlands is following the EU’s recommendation to “better coordinate PCD efforts with other EU MS” (see appendix F). The primary channel for communicating and coordinating for PCD with other MS is the Informal MS Network. The Netherlands has been instrumental in setting up the informal working groups on PCD at the EU level: “It builds on previous notions that go back to Minister Herfkens (2001). It was then picked up in 2003 by Minister Van Ardenne-van der Hoeven” (Interview with De Nooijer, 2013). The “idea” behind the informal MS PCD Network is illustrated by the following quote:

“We gave the push to this informal PCD network because it usually takes a lot of time to develop coherent positions in different capitals in EU MS. When you have developed the position it’s almost too late in the decision-making process in Brussels so we wanted to be more proactive. We wanted to keep it informal because when you make something formal in Brussels it’s institutionalized and bureaucratized and that doesn’t work” (Interview with Genee, 2013).

This quote illustrates that the Netherlands pushed for the informal MS network primarily to counter one of the challenges to PCD identified by the EU: Political expediency, which may lead to a less coherent approach even where a PCD approach is possible. The informal MS network was intended to pro-actively develop coherent positions in different EU MS where this would have been too slow in the regular EU decision making process. Another interesting objective of the Informal MS network is that it was intended to promote a division of labor for PCD amongst EU MS: “We wanted to get to a division of labor because if you focus on national policies of non-aid sectors, they are usually very complicated topics and the responsible ministry involved has real experts” (Interview with Genee, 2013). The informal MS network was therefore also a means to overcome “A Lack of institutional capacity and knowledge on PCD and development issues” (EU challenge 2, see appendix F). The informal MS Network currently meets twice per year and it includes a number of EU countries, not just the Nordic + (Ibid.). It has expanded over the years to include some of the new EU MS (Interview with De Nooijer, 2013).

Organizing these meetings as an informal MS network does have a drawback. By keeping it informal there are no rules regarding policy output. It is therefore a soft socialization mechanism between EU MS. Second, avoiding the bureaucracy of the EU also means that anything that may come out of the meetings is not necessarily shared with other EU MS. Relatively little is known about the results of the Informal MS network. As De Nooijer states: “I have no clue how often they meet, if they ever meet,” and “I’ve never seen anything come out of it specifically” (Interview with De Nooijer, 2013). The Informal MS network is therefore a weak socialization mechanism, impeded by the weak political commitment present in EU MS.

5.3 Dutch internalization of PCD

This chapter - by answering the research questions pertaining to PCD - illustrated to what extent the Netherlands has been implementing the three EU buildings blocks -, the EU’s recommendations -, and to what extent the Netherlands has been addressing the EU’s identified challenges for PCD (see
appendix F). This section will briefly summarize these findings and discuss the implications for the Netherlands’ internalization of PCD. A distinction will be made between the Netherlands’ discourse (research question 1A), institutionalization (research question 1B) and implementation of PCD (research questions 1C, 1D, 1E).

1A: To what extent is PCD present in the Netherlands’ political discourse?
The policy discourse regarding PCD mostly reiterated the acceptance of the EU as a development framework (legitimacy, normative reasoning), the importance of PCD for the development aid effectiveness agenda (efficiency, cognitive reasoning), and the position of the Netherlands as a norm entrepreneur for the EU as a development framework. The Netherlands has therefore accepted the EU as a legitimate framework for development, and PCD on the basis of effectiveness. The discourse also illustrated that the Netherlands recognizes several of the challenges to PCD listed by the EU (namely a weak political commitment to PCD, a lack of institutional capacity and knowledge and the difficulty of providing evidence of the impact of non-development policies), and several coordinative documents illustrated concrete actions to counter these challenges. The Netherlands is therefore incorporating the importance of PCD in its political discourse. The presence of both normative and cognitive ideational discourse as well as coordinative discourse regarding PCD seems to indicate that the Netherlands has transformed its foreign policy in response to the EU’s PCD principles. However, accommodation or transformation also requires institutional changes and changes to the policies implemented.

Table 6: The degree of internalization of PCD principles indicated by the political discourse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Potential Domestic Changes</th>
<th>Degree of norm internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>1. No discourse pertaining to PCD present</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Normative and/or cognitive advocacy for PCD are present in the communicative and/or coordinative discourse</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transformation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1B: How is PCD institutionalized to ensure coherence and how has this changed over the past decade?
The Netherlands has employed a whole-of-government approach to development cooperation since 1965. The CU started promoting PCD since its inception in 2002 and proposals by the EC and EU member states have been systematically screened for PCD issues through BNC-fiches in CoCo since 2004. It is through the BNC and CoCo that the Netherlands screens EU policy for PCD and formulates its formal institutional and political position. The Netherlands has therefore institutionalized both a legal commitment to PCD as well as a political framework to PCD (EU building block 1). It has also institutionalized mechanisms with a mandate to promote and ensure PCD (EU building block 2). Since the appointment of Minister Herfkens in 2002 and through the institutionalization of pro-active and ex-ante PCD mandates the Netherlands has also taken steps to overcome several of the challenges to PCD. Minister Herfkens created institutional capacity dedicated to PCD with the creation of the CU in 2002 (EU challenge 2) and increased political commitment to PCD (EU challenge 1). However, political commitment in the ministries other than foreign affairs remains limited. Because the DEC does not have the capacity to monitor all the activities of the other ministries, the bilateral policy papers are not always sufficiently “fleshed out” and the coherence test for EU development policies can be glossed over. Thus, even though the Ministry took steps to counter these challenges, a lack of commitment and capacity continue to undermine PCD efforts.

35 The other research questions determined to what extent the actions described in the coordinative discourse were actually implemented, and to what extent these actions addressed the EU’s building blocks, recommendations and challenges.
The analysis of the Netherlands’ institutional changes illustrated that the combination of a conducive political culture (acceptance of the EU and a willingness to change) and a domestic norm entrepreneur (Minister Herfkens) allowed the Netherlands to institutionalize a legal and political framework to PCD. In particular, the creation of the CU in 2002, DEK in 2005, their merger to form DEC in 2009, and the institutionalization of the coherence test in the BNC-fiche in 2004 illustrate that the institutional changes are characterized as a gradual transformation in response to PCD. It is not a complete transformation however, as several challenges to PCD remain (a lack of capacity to monitor the activities of the ministries regarding PCD, a lack of political commitment to PCD of the other ministries).

Table 7: The degree of internalization of PCD as indicated by institutional changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Potential Domestic Changes</th>
<th>Degree of norm internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes</td>
<td>1. No institutional changes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Institutional structures are added, existing ones remain (relatively) unchanged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Existing institutional structures are replaced by new substantially different ones;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>existing institutional structures are substantially altered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the MFA is currently planning a profound re-organization. The institutionalization of PCD over the past decade indicates that the Netherlands has been gradually “transforming” for PCD, but the future of the institutional structure for PCD is unclear.

1C: Are the Netherlands’ thematic priorities for achieving PCD consistent with those advocated by the EU?

The EU’s thematic priority areas for PCD are trade and finance, climate change, food security, migration and security. However, the Netherlands’ priorities include trade, finance, agriculture, intellectual property rights and fisheries. According to the interviews, the priorities established at the EU level were a result of politics, rather than the most glaring incoherencies. As such, though the Netherlands' implemented priority areas include several elements of the EU's priorities (such as trade and finance, the overlap between food security and agriculture); the Netherlands has not internalized the EU’s priorities for PCD.

Table 8: The degree of internalization of the EU’s priority areas for PCD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Potential Domestic Changes</th>
<th>Degree of norm internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy changes:</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCD</td>
<td>1. No new policies are enacted, previously existing policies remain unchanged</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. New policies are implemented, existing policies remain unchanged.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Existing policies are replaced by substantially different ones; existing policies are</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>substantially altered.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that though the Netherlands has not internalized the EU’s priority areas for PCD, the Netherlands has not done so because it considers its own priorities a better reflection of the most
glaring incoherencies. As such, the fact that the Netherlands has not internalized the EU’s priority areas for PCD is consistent with its role as an EU entrepreneur for PCD, where the Netherlands is attempting to promote PCD at the EU level.36

1D: What methodologies does the Netherlands’ MFA employ to evaluate PCD and what indicators are in place to measure PCD performance?

Research question 1D: What methodologies does the Netherlands’ MFA employ to evaluate PCD and what indicators (if any) are in place to measure PCD performance? unraveled to what extent the Netherlands has pursued the EU’s 3rd key building block to PCD as well as the EU’s first two recommendations: reporting on PCD, making better use of impact assessments and reporting on PCD, and performing research to increase the knowledge on the impact of PCD and PCD synergies. The research question also illustrated how the Netherlands has approached several of the challenges to PCD, particularly a weak political commitment to PCD, the belief that achieving coherence in some areas is too difficult, and the difficulty of providing evidence of the ultimate impact of non-development policies on poverty.

The Netherlands is not only reporting on national progress toward PCD regularly, but also pushing for an improved validity of the EU reporting obligation. The Netherlands is thus building upon the EU’s key building block “An obligation to report on national progress toward PCD” and the recommendation to “make better use of impact assessments and reporting on PCD.” Furthermore, the Netherlands’ pilot to create indicators for PCD follows the EU’s recommendation to “perform research to increase the knowledge and information on the impact of policy coherence.” The Netherlands’ pilot to create indicators and measure PCD is also an effort to overcome several of the challenges identified by the EU: “a weak political commitment” by making countries accountable and “the difficulty of providing evidence of the ultimate impact of non-development policies” by developing a methodology to measure PCD. The Netherlands is furthermore using the ECDPM’s recommended methodology as the basis for its pilot. Unfortunately, the Netherlands’ pilot to create indicator for PCD is a solitary effort without the involvement of other MS and therefore limited in scope. As such, though the Netherlands is building upon the state-of-the-art literature for both reporting on and measuring PCD, it isn’t taking advantage of the expertise or capacity present in other EU MS. Nevertheless, the Netherlands’ current practices on reporting on and measuring PCD indicate a thorough internalization of PCD. As new reporting mechanisms are promoted and the creation of indicators for the impact of PCD is underway, the Netherlands is gradually transforming its implementation to report on- and measure PCD in response to PCD.

Table 9: The degree of internalization of PCD as indicated by the Netherlands’ efforts to report on - and measure PCD.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Potential Domestic Changes</th>
<th>Degree of norm internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy changes: Implementation of PCD</td>
<td>1. No new policies are enacted, previously existing policies remain unchanged</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. New policies are implemented, existing policies remain unchanged.</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Existing policies are replaced by substantially different ones; existing policies are altered substantially.</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transformation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36 This view is consistent with the theoretical framework, as norm convergence, rather than a strictly top-down perspective to Europeanization is upheld for the analysis.
1E: Through which EU channels does the Netherlands interact with other MS to share its national implementation experiences regarding PCD?

The research question Through which EU channels does the Netherlands interact with other MS to share its national implementation experiences regarding PCD was included to illustrate to what extent the Netherlands is following the EU recommendation to “better coordinate PCD efforts with other EU MS.” The primary channel for communicating and coordinating regarding PCD with other MS is the Informal MS Network. The Netherlands pushed for the informal MS network primarily to counter two of the challenges to PCD identified by the EU: “Political expediency” and “A lack of institutional capacity and knowledge on PCD and development issues.” However, the informal MS network is a soft socialization mechanism without any hard rules or regulations to ensure agreements are made and communicated. The Informal MS network is therefore a weak socialization mechanism, greatly impeded by the weak political commitment present in EU MS. Nevertheless, the informal MS network is a new mechanism, implemented to coordinate with other MS regarding PCD. Though there is considerable room for improvement, the implementation of the informal MS network indicates an accommodation of these PCD principles according to the established criteria.

Table 10: The degree of internalization of PCD as indicated by the Netherlands’ coordination of PCD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Potential Domestic Changes</th>
<th>Degree of norm internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy changes: Implementation of PCD</td>
<td>1. No new policies are enacted, previously existing policies remain unchanged &lt;br&gt; 2. New policies are implemented, existing policies remain unchanged &lt;br&gt; 3. Existing policies are replaced by substantially different ones; existing policies are altered substantially</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6. Implementation and Internalization of The Code

This chapter will answer the research sub-questions pertaining to The Code. As such, this chapter will determine to what extent The Code is present in the Netherlands’ discourse and the extent to which the Netherlands has been putting the three dimensions of The Code into practice. The Netherlands’ efforts to overcome the EU’s identified challenges to the implementation of The Code will also be taken into account. The policy discourse pertaining to The Code (research question 2A) will be discussed first, and then the implementation of the in-country, cross-country, and cross-sectoral dimensions will be evaluated (research questions 2B, C and D respectively).

6.1 Research question 2A: The Code in the Dutch political discourse

OECD figures revealed that development aid budgets started dropping in 2010 - for the first time in 15 years - as a result of the economic crisis. As the OECD noted: “governments are under pressure to reduce aid spending in line with other cuts” (Love, 2012: 1). The Netherlands is no exception, and the Netherlands’ development policy discourse changed considerably in response to the more challenging economic climate: “The government is seeking a fundamental revision of Dutch development policy. (...) The unavoidable need to cut spending provides us with a unique opportunity to make very clear choices” (MFA, 2010: 1-2). The economic crisis thus instigated a political culture which was very conducive to change, as it forced the Netherlands to reconsider its foreign spending. Furthermore, as previously stated, the Minister for Development Cooperation has a mandate to promote effective development policy. This was evidenced by the Minister’s role as a domestic norm entrepreneur for PCD, but it also applies to The Code. In-line with his mandate to promote The Code, Minister Knapen stated that “the Netherlands cannot act alone; the division of labour is an important objective” (ibid., 6, 9-10). This statement holds particularly true in light of the economic crisis as an improved coordination of donor efforts may alleviate the consequences for achieving development objectives of the reduced development aid budget. The discourse pertaining to The Code from 2007 onward therefore illustrated the presence of both intervening variables; a conducive political culture (the economic crisis) and a domestic norm entrepreneur (the Minister with mandate to promote The Code).

Research question 2A asked: To what extent is The Code present in the Netherlands’ political discourse? The discourse contained both normative and cognitive ideational elements supporting The Code. The Minister for Development Cooperation stated for example that he considers The Code to be “born from a need and necessity to reduce transaction costs of aid to developing partner countries” and “the most concrete expression of growing EU-cooperation in the field of development” (T.K. 21501-04-100, 2008: 3). The Netherlands therefore considers The Code both a necessity to maintain development objectives in the face of budget cuts (cognitive reasoning) and a legitimate culmination of EU development cooperation practices (normative reasoning). Furthermore, Minister Koenders stated that “the final Code of Conduct contains very practical suggestions” (ibid.). Unlike PCD, The Code is therefore considered a very practical, coordinative set of EU principles. As a result, the Netherlands’ political discourse not only contains general communicative reiterations stemming from the Netherlands’ role as a norm entrepreneur, such as “The Netherlands plays a leading role in implementing the EU Code of Conduct” and “The Netherlands is prepared to actively lend its support” (T.K. 21501-04-102-b1, 2008: 3), but also more concrete coordinative documents.

The Netherlands’ discourse also illustrated an awareness of several of the challenges to The Code highlighted in the EU documentation (see table 6 in Chapter 4). The Minister stated for example that “many MS are only prepared to change their priorities by cooperation through a European framework

37 See tables 5 and 6 in chapter 4 for the principles and dimensions of The Code and the challenges identified by the EU.
39 These have been included in the systematic review, see section 6.2.
to a limited extent” (T.K. 32605-4, 2011: 21) and “much like in the Netherlands, the process of reducing partner countries is a political topic in other like-minded countries. This complicates attempts to come to agreements on a division of labour in terms of countries and sectors prior to political decisions” (ibid., 7). The Netherlands therefore noted a lack of political commitment to The Code both domestically and abroad, as EU MS are unwilling to change their domestic political priorities in favor of coordination attempts. It will therefore be important to note not only to what extent the Netherlands is implementing the “very practical suggestions” of The Code, but also to what extent the EU’s identified challenges are interfering with the implementation of the three dimensions, and how the Netherlands is addressing these challenges.

6.2 Measures taken to implement The Code
This section will evaluate the Netherlands' implementation of the in-country (principles 1-5), cross-country (principles 6-8), and cross-sector (principles 9-11) dimensions of The Code. Section 6.2.1 will answer research question 2B, pertaining to the in-country dimension. Section 6.2.2 will answer research question 2C, pertaining to the cross-country dimension and section 6.2.3 will answer research question 2D, pertaining to the cross-sectoral dimension. It should be noted however that not every principle from The Code will be discussed equally. The analysis of the in-country dimension will focus on the Netherlands' efforts to coordinate with other EU MS, as this is where the EC is focusing its attention. For the cross-country dimension the analysis will focus on the Netherlands' country selection process, and to what extent this reflects development policy goals or the Netherlands' own interest, as this is the main challenge for the cross-country dimension. The analysis of the cross-sectoral dimension will focus on how the Netherlands analyses and expands on its areas of strength and comparative advantage.

6.2.1 Research question 2B, In-country dimension: participation in the EU Joint-Programming Efforts
Research question 2B asked: What progress has the Netherlands made in in-country complementarity of The Code with other MS in the context of European joint-programming efforts? As stated previously however, the first principle will only be discussed briefly as the EU’s focus is on the coordination with other EU MS; the remaining four principles of the in-country dimension.

The Netherlands uses four criteria to select priority sectors and modalities: Selectivity, Coherence, Added Value and Effectiveness. (T.K. 32605-2, 2011: 4). Though Coherence and Effectiveness are two of the most well known criteria in development cooperation since Paris and Accra, they are not directly relevant to the implementation of The Code. Furthermore, Added Value will be discussed in section 6.2.3 as it pertains to the cross-sectoral dimension of The Code. Selectivity does pertain to the first principle of the in-country dimension: focusing on fewer sectors. As previously stated, the economic crisis instilled a political culture where EU MS were forced to cut their foreign spending budgets. Naturally, a selection of priority countries and sectors would have to take place in order to determine where the foreign spending could be cut. As a result more and more EU MS, including the Netherlands, have limited themselves to a maximum of 3 priority sectors per partner country (T.K. 32605-4, 2011: 7). The first principle has therefore been one of the most successful principles of The Code.

The remaining four principles of the in-country dimension are more challenging however as they require considerable coordination between EU MS. The EU’s efforts as a “community” (the EC) to promote The Code have therefore mainly been directed at supporting the coordination aspect. The EC is supporting the coordination of donor efforts mainly through the EU’s Fast Track Initiative on the Division of Labour (FTI DoL), launched in December 2007. The FTI DoL aims to support a selected group of partner countries with the implementation of the in-country principles of The Code. The partner countries were selected on the basis of a set of criteria that included significant EU presence as well as evidence of congestion and fragmentation40 (European Commission, 2011: 74). The EU’s FTI DoL

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40 Congestion is where particular sectors receive too much donor attention, whereas fragmentation describes a situation where several sectors are underfunded.
involves the EC and 14 MS who volunteered to act as either facilitating or supporting donors in each of the 30 developing partner countries. The Netherlands was one of the donor countries to volunteer. As such, the EU's FTI offers a framework to assess the Netherlands' coordination of the in-country principles.

The Netherlands has been acting as “lead facilitator” in three developing partner countries since December 2010: Bangladesh (co-lead with the EC), Mali (co-lead with France) and Mozambique. The role of a “lead facilitator” is to:

- Explain the purpose and modality of the FTI to in-country facilitators;
- Provide support to in-country facilitators and supporting donors in the form of web-based knowledge management, and provide human and financial resources to effectively take on in-country facilitating roles;
- Analyze developments on the ground;
- Liaise with other donors' HQs, particularly those of facilitating and supporting donors, in order to share information, ensure coordinated and coherent action and to facilitate problem-solving and decision making (on sector involvement, co-financing, etc);
- Share the EU Toolkit for the DoL; 41
- Report regularly on progress, discuss lessons learnt from country cases and discuss further actions to be taken;
- Share lessons learned with in-country facilitators.


The Netherlands has also taken on a role as a “supporting donor” in 9 developing partner countries: Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. As a supporting donor, the Netherlands provides additional support for the DoL in coordination with the facilitator at the headquarters as well as country level. The complete list of FTI DoL donor and partner countries can be found in table 11.

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41 This EU Toolkit is based on experiences and feedback from the ground used to further strengthen local processes. However, this analysis is limited to in-country complementarity and the division of labour.
Of particular note is that EU MS have to synchronize their joint-programming with the development cycle for each partner country (Interview with Van Dijk, 2013). This entails not only that the Netherlands must adjust its own policy cycle to that of the partner countries, but also that the other countries involved in the same partner country do the same. Seeing as the discourse already indicated that EU MS are unwilling to change their domestic political priorities in favor of coordination attempts, the challenges of “weak political commitment” and “political expediency” also apply to the coordination for the FTI. Furthermore, interview respondent Van Dijk acknowledged that the MS and the Commission have been using existing coordination mechanisms in the field to implement The Code (Interview with Van Dijk, 2013). This indicates that the Netherlands has not changed its institutional structure or policy implementation processes to pursue the FTI and counter the challenges previously identified by the EU.

The most recent evaluation of the Netherlands' implementation of the FTI is the Joint Multi-annual Programming Final Report: A Study on European Union donor capacity to synchronize country programming (and joint programming) at the country level (O’Riordan, Benfield, & De Witte, 2011). The report assessed the progress made by MS and discussed which practical steps would be needed for further advancement in joint-programming. The report exposed that institutionally, most MS were using headquarter agencies based in their respective MFAs or development agencies as the prime decision-makers. The Netherlands on the other hand was one of only four MS (including Austria, Ireland and Italy) where the primary decision-making on country programming was being handled at the country level (O’Riordan, Benfield, & De Witte, 2011: 24). As previously stated, the Netherlands employs a decentralized approach to development policy, where the MFA orchestrates the activities of the Netherlands’ posts abroad. Moreover, the report noted that: “while country level joint multi-annual programming can be supported from headquarters, lack of authority at the country level is often both an impediment to coordinated activities and to meaningful dialogue with partner country governments’
on priorities” (ibid.). According to the O’Riordan, Benfield & De Witte, decentralized decision-making is important for joint programming because “when donor country representatives are empowered to take funding and strategy decisions they are better positioned to participate in strategy negotiations with the partner country (ibid., 26). As such, the Netherlands’ decentralized institutional structure is considered an example to other EU MS, and a boon to the Netherlands’ FTI efforts in the partner countries. The Netherlands has therefore institutionalized both a political mandate to promote The Code as well as a structure which allows for more efficient coordination with partner countries.

The report also assessed the performance of each MS donor in their as lead facilitator or supporter in the partner countries on the basis of four aspects: having no bilateral strategy, having a change cycle, having a rolling strategy, and joint-programming capacity (O’Riordan, Benfield, & De Witte, 2011: 76). These four aspects reflect an independence from the challenges to The Code identified by the EU (see table 6). The Netherlands earned two out of four possible points for its role as a lead facilitator in Bangladesh; one for “no bilateral strategy” and one for “joint programming capacity.” The Netherlands was therefore able to fund substantial country-level programs without a country specific programming document in place, and its institutional structure and mechanisms for The Code were sufficient to formulate programming documents and coordinate the development effort. The Netherlands therefore has the prerequisites to overcome two of the challenges identified by the EU in Bangladesh: funding programs without a programming document allows for avoiding an either/or decision between development and non-development objectives (challenge 5), and the Netherlands had sufficient capacity to coordinate and implement country-specific programs (challenge 2). The Netherlands also scored a 2 out of 4 points as the lead facilitator in both Mali and Mozambique. However, a potential for joint-programming does not guarantee actual coordination and programming, only the potential based on the institutional structure and mechanisms in place for The Code. Joint-programming for the in-country principles of The Code is still largely impeded by a lack of political will, particularly to adapt the policy cycles to those of the partner country and other MS.

6.2.2 Research question 2C, Cross-country dimension: Establishing priority countries
Research question 2C asked How has the Netherlands established its priority partner countries and how does the Netherlands address the orphan gap? As previously stated, the need to establish priority countries became particularly clear in 2010 when the economic crisis forced the Netherlands to reconsider its development policy. The Netherlands had to focus on fewer partner countries (15 from 33 in 2009); a political necessity very conducive to implementing the 7th and 8th principles of the cross-country dimension: establishing priority countries and addressing the orphan gap.

The Netherlands’ partner country - and priority country selection takes as its basis the 33 partner countries already invested in (T.K. 32605-2, 2011: 14). Therefore, the country selection is limited to 15 of the 33 partner countries where no new bilateral partners may be added: “there was no zero point analysis involved” (T.K. 32605-4, 2011: 4). Rather than doing a zero point analysis to select the partner countries most suitable according to The Code and development objectives, the Netherlands remained in 15 of its previous 33 partner countries based on six criteria (Knapen, 2012: 17: T.K. 32605-2, 2011: 13-14: T.K. 32605-4, 2011: 4, 5: T.K. 33448-2, 2012: 8):

42 “No bilateral strategy” refers to a MS being able to fund substantial country-level programs without a country specific programming document in place, sidestepping any potential either/or choices to be made between development and non-development approaches (challenge 5). A “change cycle” refers to the possibility to adjust a MS programming cycle for a particular country to match the timing of the country’s national strategy or that of other donors working in the country. It therefore denotes a willingness to adjust to the policy cycles of the partner country and other MS donors, and independence from the challenge of “political commitment” (challenge 1) and “political expediency” (challenge 3). A “rolling strategy” refers to a donor’s ability to revise and extend a strategy set for a particular term. It therefore refers to a flexibility to adjust development policy for particular partner countries during a policy cycle. Finally, “joint programming capacity” refers to the possibility to procedurally provide support on the basis of a of a joint programming document signed with other EU donors that sets out shared analysis and objectives and then divides implementation activities among donors. It therefore refers to having the institutional capacity and knowledge (challenge 2) to formulate programming documents and coordinate the development effort (O’Riordan, Benfield, & De Witte, 2011: 76).
1. There has to be sufficient potential to achieve results in development, in part through the Netherlands' comparative advantage in the partner country, and in part through the Netherlands' own best interests;
2. The income- and poverty level;
3. Opportunities for, and interests of, the most involved departments;
4. The current investment in the partner country in financial terms;
5. The level of good governance, including democratization, adhering to human rights laws and combating corruption;
6. Lastly, “the extent to which an exit or downsize of the development program in a country would contribute to the intended budget cuts.”

The Netherlands’ MFA had a quick scan made for the 33 original partner countries to assess their potential based on the above criteria: “Opportunities were identified for pursuing the spearheads of policy. For this purpose a quick scan of each of the 33 current partner countries was carried out, to see where these opportunities presented themselves and where the Netherlands had something to offer (...) Finally, we looked at whether there were any broader Dutch interests and whether synergy between the various spearheads would be possible” (Knapen, 2012: 17). The above selection criteria have thus all been considered in the priority country selection process, but perhaps not equally. The Netherlands’ partner country selection contains a susceptibility to two potentially conflicting goals: the “potential for development” versus “the Netherlands' own best interests.” The main challenges to the cross-country dimension is therefore the 5th identified challenge to The Code; “The belief that there is always an either/or choice that must be made between a development approach and a non-development policy approach.” More specifically, if the Minister for Development Cooperation believes development and non-development goals are mutually exclusive for a particular country, it would require considerable political commitment to pursue poverty reduction in favor of development objectives over self-interest (the 6th identified challenge). It is thus particularly important to determine if the Netherlands and other EU MS believe there is an either/or decision to be made between development and non-development objectives, and if there is sufficient political commitment to pursue development and The Code.

Regarding the coordination with other EU MS donors to address the orphan gap (the 8th principle of The Code), the focus-letter development cooperation of 2011 stated that an effort would be made to avoid creating donor orphans to improve the effectiveness of development cooperation in light of Paris and Accra: “Where possible, we selected our partner countries in coordination with like-minded donor countries and the EU.” (Knapen, 2012: 18: T.K. 32605-2, 2011: 14). However, this is a communicative statement of intent, and the person who decides “where possible” is the Minister of Development Cooperation. As such, though a quick-scan is made to determine the potential of each of the 33 partner countries, the country selection comes down to a political (potentially either/or) decision. That isn't to say that the Netherlands isn't leaving any donor darlings however: “Leaving Zambia and Tanzania, two well recognized donor darlings, was in part due to the presence of a large number of bilateral and multilateral donors” (T.K. 32605-4, 2011: 7).

However, leaving Zambia and Tanzania was a reactive decision rather than an example of pro-active coordination with other EU MS donors. The Netherlands did however organize a meeting with other EU MS in an attempt to come to a pro-active coordination of the DoL: the Netherlands used an informal MS network meeting for PCD to organize an additional meeting with six like minded countries to arrange a division of labor for the cross-country dimension (T.K. 21501-04-122: 1: T.K. 32605-2, 2011:15: T.K. 32605-4, 2011: 7). The meeting was mentioned briefly in the DAC peer review of the Netherlands 2011 as evidence of pro-active coordination for The Code: “We note that the Netherlands had initiated informal consultations with a group of six like-minded countries - members of the

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43 The meeting February 22nd 2011.
44 UK, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium and Spain.
European Union - and other donors regarding division of labour before deciding on the selection of countries” (OECD, 2011: 26).

The participating EU MS echoed the importance of The Code in their discourse, and agreed that it was the right time to attempt to come to a division of labor (T.K. 21501-04-122, 2011: 4; T.K. 32605-4, 2011: 7). However, they also noted that the selection of bilateral partner countries is very much a process that is driven nationally; which is impeding international efforts toward coordination (ibid.). As previously stated, the Minister for Development Cooperation echoed this sentiment, stating that “this process has limitations because countries are only willing to adjust their priorities through cooperation in a European Framework to a limited extent” (T.K. 32605-4, 2011: 7). Though the policy discourse indicated that the Netherlands and other EU MS donors view the EU as a legitimate framework for development cooperation, the actual coordination for the cross-country dimension of The Code indicates that this is not the case for the country selection process. The EC determined that EU MS are unwilling to adjust their policy cycles for the in-country dimension of The Code, and the Informal MS network illustrated this is also the case for the cross-country dimension (O’Riordan, Benfield, & De Witte, 2011: 55). The coordination mechanisms for The Code (the informal MS network) therefore illustrated that there is a lack of political commitment and a lack of political will to pursue the reduction of world poverty, particularly when it jeopardizes the country's national decision to pursue either development or non-development approaches in partner countries (the either/or choice). Furthermore, though the attending countries agreed they would keep each other informed regarding their own country selection and assist if problems arise when retreating from bilateral partner countries, no concrete agreements were made. Though the Netherlands’ Ministry for Foreign Affairs noted that “there was a clear political commitment to implement the division of labor agenda, with a focus on pragmatic cooperation,” there was no actual implementation of the division of labor agenda (pro-active coordination of the cross-country dimension (T.K. 21501-04-122, 2011: 4).

The flipside of focusing on 15 countries is that the remaining 18 countries (of 33) would be abandoned. According to the Focus-letter development cooperation 2011 (T.K. 32605-2, 2011): “The Netherlands will discuss with other donors to what extent the Dutch activities can be transferred.” Regardless of whether or not the Netherlands stops all aid to that donor or just to one sector, the Netherlands is required to make an effort to find a suitable replacement donor through for example an ‘exchange' with other donors (idem., 19). However, the only concrete measure taken to pro-actively coordinate with other donors is the previously mentioned informal meeting, where the like-minded donors agreed that bilateral aid is a nationally driven process, and no concrete decisions were actually made. Though the Netherlands consistently mentions this meeting to show it is “making an effort” to coordinate for the cross-country dimension and find replacement donors to prevent donor orphans, the effort is rather meager with little to show for it in terms of policy outcomes. As was the case with the Informal MS network for PCD, the informal meetings arranged for The Code are a “soft” socialization mechanism and greatly obstructed by the weak political commitment to pursue development objectives over self-interest present in EU MS (the 6th challenge to The Code, see table 6).

The formal process to establish the new priority countries (evaluating the partner countries on the selection criteria using quick-scans, discussing the division of labor with like minded member states and the EU) resulted in a list of 15 partner countries. The partner countries were divided into three “profiles” (T.K. 32605-2, 2011: 15): Profile 1 consists of low income countries, profile 2 of fragile states and profile 3 countries with healthy economic growth, which will be exited in coming years. The Minister of development cooperation selected the following 15 countries in 2011:
The Focus-letter development cooperation 2011 (T.K. 32605-2, 2011) presented the Minister’s formal reasoning behind the selection of the above 15 priority countries. As such, it offers insights into the final political decision, based on the quick-scans and the informal meetings. The letter notes for example that several like minded donors were leaving Benin, which put Benin at risk of becoming a donor orphan if the Netherlands were to leave Benin as well (T.K. 32605-2, 2011: 20). Though the Netherlands hasn’t been able to pro-actively steer other donors to change their respective donor countries, the Netherlands does seem to take into account the risk of a country becoming an orphan in its own country selection. It should be noted however that though Benin remains a partner country, the Netherlands did leave particular sectors. “The Netherlands will have transferred its entire share of aid to the education sector to Denmark by late 2011. Denmark has notified us that it will leave Benin in 2014. It’ll be Denmark’s responsibility to responsibly exit the education sector, and Benin as a partner country” (T.K. 32605-4, 2011: 53). The Netherlands therefore left the education sector without pro-actively arranging a replacement donor, knowing that Denmark would also leave Benin 3 years later. Instead, the responsibility to find a replacement donor was simply transferred to Denmark (as the last donor to leave is held responsible for finding a replacement).

Furthermore, it is not clear what the deciding factor was for the Minister to make Benin a profile 1 priority country: the risk of becoming a donor orphan, the potential for the four spearheads, or the Netherlands’ own best interests. This applies to all the bilateral partner countries; there are so many selection criteria that potentially any of the previous 33 partner countries could qualify one way or another. For example, the Palestinian Territories is a donor darling and a low-middle income country. The Netherlands considers it a priority country however as it is a fragile state, with potential on three of the four spearheads (T.K. 32605-2, 1011: 21). However, considering it is a low-middle income country with many other bilateral donors, one could argue that the Netherlands’ contribution to the Palestinian Territories is based solely on the (potentially modest) contribution to the region’s stability. It raises the question if another fragile state, with a lower income, more potential for the spearheads and fewer bilateral donors would have been a more suitable priority country. Furthermore, one of the criteria for the selection of the 15 partner countries was “The current investment in the partner country in financial terms.” This does not mean however that partner countries with a long history of investment are automatically selected: “Countries like Zambia, we’ve been there for ages and we pulled out. We’ve been in Tanzania for decades, we pulled out” (Interview with De Nooijer, January 2013). The aforementioned selection criteria are therefore inconclusive, and the final decision lies with the Minister.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Ben Knapen clarified his selection of partner countries for the Second Chamber in 2011 by stating:

“The eventual decision for the 15 partner countries is a political consideration. A country selection process, in my eyes, is not a mechanical or technical exercise where criteria are checked off and the country with the most checks will become the partner country. The complete picture, with many considerations, I have considered carefully for each country, where the risk of becoming a donor orphan may weigh heavily for me, such as for Benin, whereas another country may have particular potential for the Dutch spearheads, such as Burundi for safety and stability” (T.K. 32605-4, 2011: 5).
The country selection procedure is therefore very un-transparent, where the quick-scan allowed for any combination of partner countries and the informal MS network efforts to coordinate for the cross-country dimension of The Code failed to bring about pro-active agreements for a DoL. According to De Nooijer the criteria the Netherlands uses to select partner countries, in the end, do not outweigh the Netherlands’ national interests: “Sure they have criteria but in the end it’s a political decision”, and “It’s the Netherlands first and then we’ll see how the rest fits in” (Interview with De Nooijer, 2013).

6.2.3 Research question 2D, Cross-sectoral dimension: comparative advantage in sectors
As previously stated, the Netherlands uses four criteria to select priority sectors and modalities: Selectivity, Coherence, Added Value and Effectiveness (T.K. 32605-2, 2011: 4). The criteria most relevant to research question 2D is Added Value. Added Value “is defined by the Netherlands’ expertise, position regarding other donors and the added value a bilateral development program has for the Netherlands” (ibid.). Assessing and expanding on a comparative advantage in sectors is therefore a central component of the Netherlands’ multiannual country strategies. However, because Added Value is defined by both the Netherlands’ relative expertise and the added value to the Netherlands’ own interests, there is a susceptibility to the either/or choice. The analysis will therefore focus on how the Netherlands analyzes and expands on its areas of strength (the 9th principle of The Code), and to what extent this process is affected by the EU’s identified challenges.

The Netherlands’ development policy is based on four spearheads, which the Netherlands considers to be a combination of pressing global problems and areas where the Netherlands has a comparative advantage. These spearheads are: Security and the Legal Order, Food Security, Water, and Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (T.K. 32605-2, 2011: 2). The selection of these four spearheads already illustrates the importance of the either/or choice as a challenge to The Code as the inclusion of Water and Food Security is a result of “explicitly seeking a link to the Netherlands’ biggest economic sectors and expertise” (Ibid: 3). The most recent self-assessment of the Netherlands’ comparative advantage was the Focus-letter development cooperation 2011, which discussed the four spearheads and their relevance to development cooperation, the Netherlands’ own goals, and the Dutch position regarding its strengths relative to other donors.

Regarding the spearhead Security and the Legal Order, the Minister notes that the Netherlands is internationally recognized for its “3D-cooperation approach” in fragile states such as Afghanistan and Burundi. The reason that the Netherlands is said to have an advantage in this sector is because it employs a whole-of-government approach, involving the ministries of Defense, Safety and Security, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation (T.K. 32605-2, 2011: 5). The Minister also notes that “the Netherlands makes an effort regarding subjects which are neglected internationally, where the Netherlands has a comparative advantage, such as the restructuring of the security sector and the development of a functioning legal system” (ibid., 6). The Netherlands is therefore basing its assessment of its comparative advantage for Security and the Legal Order on the fact that it employs a whole-of-government approach, and makes an effort on internationally neglected themes. The DAC peer review of 2011 agrees that the 3D approach “has resulted in some practical improvements in how these different government departments work together and how resources are mobilized” (OECD, 2011: 27). However, the peer review also states that “it has not necessarily brought greater strategic policy convergence or better results on the ground” (Ibid.). Therefore, though the Netherlands may have an institutional advantage domestically, the peer review concludes this may not translate to a comparative advantage in the partner country. As such, the Netherlands’ self assessment regarding Security and the Legal Order seems to be based on its potential for effective policy implementation based on its institutional structure, rather than on particular experiences with effective implementation in specific partner countries.

45 “Is the Netherlands analyzing and expanding on its comparative advantage regarding sectors and modalities?”
46 Diplomacy, Defense and Development.
As previously stated, Water and Food Security were added explicitly seeking a link to the Netherlands' biggest economic sectors and expertise. The Netherlands is perhaps best known for its second spearhead: Water. According to Minister Knapen: “the Netherlands has very specific knowledge regarding water management and shares this with other countries. Particular our comprehensive, but it will need to

- ons regarding
- regular partner countries
- ven though the Min
- neral, but also in particular those
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- ing the most active players in promoting gender equality and empowerment of women
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- able irrigation
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conclusive answer. It is an illusion that something as complicated as the evaluation of economic, political, human rights- and good governance situations in partner countries, in which many respects is very foreign to our own, can be technically evaluated as if it is a simple addition of factors” (T.K. 33448-2, 2012: 16). Because there is no set methodology to assess a comparative advantage, the Netherlands’ assessment might be faulty, or inconclusive. For example, the Minister refers to the Netherlands’ extensive domestic experience with Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights as a comparative advantage over other donor countries. De Nooijer states that this line of reasoning could be misleading: “Yes we are good at them in the Netherlands but whether we are good at them in developing countries is totally different” (De Nooijer, January 2013). The same applies to the 3D approach in fragile partner states, where the DAC peer review of 2011 concluded that the Netherlands' assessment of its comparative advantage regarding this subject is based on domestic experience, rather than experience in the partner country. Furthermore, the Minister can come to a decision based on national political considerations which contradicts the advice of the embassies and reports (T.K. 33448-2, 2012: 16). As such, the Dutch development agenda may also “run counter to the objectives and priorities of the partner country, thereby frustrating alignment and ownership” (IOB, 2008: 106). The IOB notes that “the four spearheads match the Dutch policy but perhaps not so much the priorities of the partner country. This introduces the risk of obstructing the principles of alignment and ownership” (T.K. 33448-2, 2012: 9). De Nooijer agreed during the interview, stating that “whether in all these countries those 4 spearheads are indeed their main priority remains to be seen” (Interview with De Nooijer, 2013).

Moreover, the Netherlands has a lot to gain financially from investing in particular sectors. The Water and Food Security spearheads stand out in particular as these were added “explicitly seeking a link to the Netherlands’ biggest economic sectors and expertise” (T.K. 32605-2, 2011: 2). The Netherlands is the second largest exporter of agricultural products (hollandtrade.com), which “creates investment- and trade possibilities for Dutch companies and organizations” (T.K. 33448-2, 2012: 9). As such, it is unclear to what extent the Netherlands truly has a comparative advantage in particular sectors, to what extent the four spearheads are also a priority for the partner country, and to what extent the Netherlands simply has a lot to gain from investing in spearheads such as Water and Food Security. As one of the interview respondents noted, it might not be about a comparative advantage as much as “what the Netherlands felt it could export in terms of know-how” (De Nooijer, January 2013). “The belief that there is always an either/or choice that must be made” between development objectives and self-interest might therefore have played a central role in the Netherlands’ assessment of its comparative advantage. The factors discussed above led the DAC peer review of 2011 to note that:

“While we commend the Netherlands for narrowing its thematic focus, this global statement of Dutch comparative advantage will need to be refined at partner country level. In particular, the Netherlands should ensure that its priority focal areas in partner countries are selected following full consultation with the partner country government and other development partners. The rationale for thematic selections in each country should be made explicit in discussions and in Dutch country strategies” (OECD, 2011: 27).

6.3 Dutch internalization of The Code
This chapter illustrated to what extent the Netherlands has been implementing the in-country, cross-country, and cross-sectoral dimension of The Code and to what extent the Netherlands has addressed the identified challenges. This section will briefly summarize these findings and determine the Netherlands' degree of internalization of The Code as an EU norm.

However, unlike the analysis for PCD, this section will not discuss to what extent the Netherlands' institutional changes for The Code reflect norm internalization. 2005 saw the creation of the Effectiveness and Quality Department (DEK). The DEK was institutionalized with a mandate to support and offer advice on policy implementation and to stimulate discussions on issues to do with both PCD and The Code. The Netherlands therefore already had an institutional structure for The Code before this EU policy was formally enacted (whereas this was a process from 2002 onward for PCD). Furthermore, unlike the documentation on PCD, the EU documentation pertaining to The Code
contained no guidelines on institutional changes. Lastly, the Netherlands’ decentralized structure and whole-of-government approach were already considered a boon to donor coordination and an example to other EU MS. There was therefore no “misfit” between the Netherlands’ institutional structure and the EU’s principles for The Code. Chapter 2 illustrated that without a “misfit,” there is no pressure for adaption or norm internalization. The degree of norm internalization will therefore be assessed by evaluating the Netherlands’ discourse pertaining to The Code and the Netherlands’ implementation of the three dimensions, without considering institutional changes.

**2A: To what extent is The Code present in the Netherlands’ political discourse?**

The policy discourse illustrated that the economic crisis triggered a very conducive political culture as it forced the Netherlands to reconsider its foreign spending. Furthermore, the Netherlands has an institutionalized political commitment to both PCD and The Code. Both factors facilitating change where thus present. Furthermore, the communicative discourse indicated that the Netherlands considers The Code both legitimate as the culmination of EU development cooperation to date (normative reasoning), and functional, born from a necessity to reconsider foreign spending (cognitive reasoning). The presence of both normative and cognitive advocacy of The Code in the Netherlands’ political discourse indicates that the Netherlands has transformed its foreign policy in response to the EU’s PCD principles. However, accommodation or transformation in response to The Code also requires actual implementation efforts for the in-country, cross-country and cross-sectoral dimensions of The Code.

*Table 12: The degree of internalization of The Code indicated by the political discourse*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Potential Domestic Changes</th>
<th>Degree of norm internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>No discourse pertaining to The Code present</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Normative and/or cognitive advocacy for The Code are present in the communicative and/or coordinative discourse</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2B: What progress has the Netherlands made regarding in-country complementarity of The Code with other MS in the context of European joint-programming efforts?**

The conducive political culture (the economic crisis) was particularly influential regarding the implementation of the first principle of The Code; concentrating on a limited number of sectors in-country. The first principle is one of the main areas of progress on the DoL, and the Netherlands is limiting itself to a maximum of 3 priority sectors per partner country. Furthermore, the Netherlands has been acting as a lead facilitator in three developing countries and as a supporting donor in 9 developing partner countries since 2010. According to the EC, the Netherlands had the institutional structure, capacity and mechanisms required to formulate programming documents, coordinate the development effort and fund substantial country-level programs without a specific programming document. Though this illustrates the Netherlands’ potential for joint-programming, it does not guarantee actual coordination takes place.

Joint-programming for the in-country principles of The Code through the FTI is impeded by a lack of political will to coordinate for The Code and a lack of commitment to poverty reduction (EU challenges 1 and 4, see table 5). In particular, EU MS donors, including the Netherlands, are not willing to adapt their policy cycles to those of the partner country and other MS. Furthermore the mechanism in place to promote coordination with other EU MS donors (the informal MS network) is weak, as it relies on soft power where political will is known to be lacking. The interviews furthermore revealed that the Netherlands has been using existing co-ordination mechanisms in the field to implement The Code, with leadership and ownership lying with the partner country. The Netherlands therefore has not significantly changed its policy implementation processes in pursuit of in-country principles of The
Code. As a result, the Netherlands' coordination with other EU MS is predominantly reactive, where donors decide on their individual foreign policies first, and then see “how the rest fits in” (Interview with De Nooijer, 2013).

Though the Netherlands has considerable potential to coordinate for the in-country dimension of The Code due to its institutional structure, it has not adapted existing policies or mechanisms to counter the EU's identified challenges. Furthermore, EU MS donors, including the Netherlands, are not willing to align their policy cycles with those of the partner country and other MS. Because the Netherlands is not addressing these known challenges, the Netherlands' coordination for the in-country dimension indicates a superficial absorption of EU norms.

Table 13: The degree of internalization of the EU’s in-country dimension of The Code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Potential Domestic Changes</th>
<th>Degree of norm internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy changes: Implementation of The Code</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. No new policies are enacted, previously existing policies remain unchanged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. New policies are implemented, existing policies remain unchanged.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Existing policies are replaced by substantially different ones; existing policies are altered substantially.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2C: How has the Netherlands established its priority partner countries and how does the Netherlands address the “orphan gap”**?

The need to establish priority countries became particularly clear in 2010 when the economic crisis forced the Netherlands to reconsider its development policy. The Netherlands had to focus on fewer partner countries (15 from 33 in 2009); a political necessity very conducive to establishing priority countries and addressing the orphans gap.

The Netherlands left 18 of its previous 33 partner countries, rather than doing a zero-point analysis. As such, the selection of partner countries was limited to the previous bilateral partners. Furthermore, though the Netherlands utilized quick scans to assess the potential of the 33 partners based on 6 criteria, which included the risk of becoming a donor orphan or darling, the quick scans were inconclusive. The final list of eligible partner countries potentially included all the previous partner countries. Furthermore, the country selection process contains a susceptibility to two potentially conflicting goals: the “potential for development” and “the Netherlands' own best interests,” as both are part of the selection criteria. The EU's identified challenge “The belief that there is always an either/or choice that must be made between a development approach and a non-development policy approach” was therefore particularly applicable to the Netherlands' implementation of the cross-country dimension. Furthermore, though the Minister stated an effort would be made to coordinate the decision for bilateral partner countries and prevent donor orphans, the Netherlands and other EU MS consider the final country selection a nationally driven process. As such, establishing priority countries comes down to a political decision where the Minister has to decide between development and non-development objectives. Furthermore, though the Netherlands did leave several donor darlings and stayed in a few countries which were at risk of becoming donor orphans, it isn’t clear to what extent these decisions were made to prevent darlings and orphans, or for other reasons. The country selection was also a reactive process, where the Netherlands decided on its partner countries after several other EU MS donors had already done so. As such it isn't the result of pro-active coordination for cross-country dimension of The Code.
The Netherlands did organize a meeting in an attempt to pro-actively coordinate for a DoL. However, the participating EU MS countries agreed that the selection of bilateral partner countries is very much a process that is driven nationally. Accordingly, no concrete decisions were made. The coordination mechanism for the cross-country dimension therefore illustrates that there is generally a lack of political commitment to coordination for the cross-country dimension of The Code and a lack of political will to pursue the reduction of world poverty, particularly when it jeopardizes a donor country’s (national) political decision to pursue either development or non-development objectives.

Though the policy discourse indicated that the Netherlands and other EU MS donors view the EU as a legitimate framework for development cooperation, the coordination for cross-country dimension of The Code indicates this is not the case for the country selection process. There was a lack of political will to come to a coordinated division of labour, as the EU MS donors were unwilling to align their policy cycles or relinquish the country selection to the EU level. This illustrates that though countries (including the Netherlands) projected a political commitment in their political discourse, very little was done to actually pro-actively coordinate the cross-country dimension even when a meeting was organized to do so. Furthermore, the criteria the Netherlands uses to select partner countries are inconclusive, where the final decision is a political one. It seems that the Netherlands’ commitment to coordinating for the cross-country dimension of The Code against world poverty does not outweigh the Netherlands’ national interests. As such, though the Netherlands' national projection is one of acceptance of The Code on both normative and cognitive grounds, the Netherlands’ internalization of the cross-country dimension indicates an absorption of the EU principles of the cross-country dimension of The Code.

Table 14: The degree of internalization of the EU’s cross-country dimension of The Code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Potential Domestic Changes</th>
<th>Degree of norm internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy changes: Implementation of The Code</td>
<td>1. No new policies are enacted, previously existing policies remain unchanged</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. New policies are implemented, existing policies remain unchanged.</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Existing policies are replaced by substantially different ones; existing policies are altered substantially.</td>
<td>Accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2D: Is the Netherlands analyzing and expanding on its comparative advantage regarding sectors and modalities?

The Netherlands’ development policy is based on four spearheads which are a combination of global problems and areas where the Netherlands deems it has a comparative advantage. These spearheads are: *Security and the Legal Order*, *Food Security*, *Water*, and *Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights* (T.K. 32605-2, 2011: 2). As previously stated, the Netherlands added the criteria “Added Value” to the selection of countries and modalities specifically to apply the cross-sectoral dimension of The Code to the implementation of the in-country and cross-country dimensions. Assessing and expanding on a comparative advantage in sectors is therefore a central component of the Netherlands’ multiannual country strategies. However, because Added Value is defined by both the Netherlands’ relative expertise and the added value to the Netherlands’ own interests, there is a susceptibility to the either/or choice.

The Netherlands’ assessment of its comparative advantage is predominantly based on its whole-of-government approach (*Security and the Legal Order and Water*), domestic experience (*Water and Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights*) and a strong international market position (*Water and Food*).
Security). The analysis illustrated however that there is no clear methodology to assess a comparative advantage and that there are too many economic, political, human rights- and good governance situations in partner countries for domestic experience to be a valid criteria. The fact that the Netherlands is experienced and proficient in an area domestically may thus not necessarily mean it translates to a comparative advantage abroad. Furthermore, though the Netherlands’ whole-of-government approach is considered an advantage, it may not necessarily lead to better implementation in the field. Moreover, though the Netherlands has considerable experience abroad due to its strong international market position, it also indicates that the Netherlands has a lot to gain from investing in particular sectors. The spearheads Water and Food Security were added explicitly seeking a link to the Netherlands’ biggest economic sectors and expertise. As such, the implementation of the cross-sectoral dimension shows the same conflict of interest between development objectives and national interests as the other dimensions of The Code. It is not clear to what extent the Netherlands considers itself to have a comparative advantage in sectors due to its experiences with promoting development, or because it has a lot to gain from investing in those sectors.

The Netherlands has incorporated the cross-sectoral dimension in its political discourse, and the Minister’s communicative discourse discusses the Netherlands’ comparative advantage. However, the Netherlands’ assessment of its comparative advantage is predominantly based on institutional potential, domestic experiences and potential for investment, rather than actual implementation experience abroad and its potential for promoting development compared to other EU MS donors. As such, it is unclear to what extent the Netherlands’ spearheads reflect development objectives or self-interest. Lastly, the Netherlands has not implemented any new policies to counter these identified challenges. The implementation of the cross-sectoral dimension therefore indicates that the Netherlands has absorbed the norms embedded in the cross-sectoral dimension of The Code.

Table 15: The degree of internalization of the EU's cross-sectoral dimension of The Code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Potential Domestic Changes</th>
<th>Degree of norm internalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy changes: Implementation of The Code</td>
<td>1. No new policies are enacted, previously existing policies remain unchanged</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. New policies are implemented, existing policies remain unchanged.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Existing policies are replaced by substantially different ones; existing policies are altered substantially.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Table 15: The degree of internalization of the EU's cross-sectoral dimension of The Code
7. Conclusion

This paper assessed the implementation and internalization of EU norms in the area of development cooperation by using the Netherlands as a single-case study. The EU is the largest aid donor in the world, but a high degree of fragmentation has historically undermined the effectiveness of EU aid. However, EU development policy has undergone substantial changes in recent years with the adoption of The Consensus in 2005 and The Code in 2007. These two policy programs offered a common position and set of practices to guide the development policies and actions of the EU’s MS to reduce the fragmentation of EU development aid. Are MS implementing and internalizing these EU development norms? The EU’s credibility and legitimacy as an agent and structure for development depend on its ability to align the development policies of the individual MS with that of the EU. This paper used the Netherlands as a single-case study to investigate the implementation and internalization of PCD (as the main coordinative aspect of The Consensus) and The Code. By answering the research question, this paper sought to contribute to the knowledge regarding the normative position of the EU in the area of development cooperation and the Netherlands’ implementation of EU development norms as an “old” EU Member State.

The overall question this paper strived to answer was: To what extent has the Netherlands implemented and internalized Policy Coherence for Development and the European Code of Conduct for the Division of Labour in its development policy?

In order to address this overall question, the analysis was divided into two parts: one pertaining to PCD (5 sub-questions) and the other to The Code (4 sub-questions):

1. What measures has the Netherlands taken to adopt PCD?
   A. To what extent is PCD present in the Netherlands’ political discourse?
   B. How is PCD institutionalized to ensure coherence and how has this changed over the past decade?
   C. Are the Netherlands’ thematic priorities for achieving PCD consistent with those advocated by the EU?
   D. What methodologies does the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) employ to evaluate PCD and what indicators (if any) are in place to measure PCD performance?
   E. Through which EU channels does the Netherlands interact with other MS to share its national implementation experiences regarding PCD?

2. What measures has the Netherlands taken to adopt the in-country, cross-country and cross-sectoral dimensions of the Code?
   A. To what extent is The Code present in the Netherlands' political discourse?
   B. What progress has the Netherlands made in in-country complementarity of The Code with other MS in the context of European joint-programming efforts? (in-country dimension)
   C. How has the Netherlands established its priority partner countries and how does the Netherlands address the “orphan gap”? (cross-country dimension)
   D. Is the Netherlands analyzing and expanding on its comparative advantage regarding sectors and modalities? (cross-sectoral dimension)

Chapters 5 and 6 answered these research sub-questions by discussing the Netherlands’ domestic changes (discourse, institutional and policy implementation) and to what extent these reflect an internalization of PCD and The Code. This chapter will tie these results together in order to answer the main research question, and discuss its implications for the Netherlands’ position in the EU development aid agenda and the EU as a normative power for development.
7.1 To what extent has the Netherlands implemented and internalized Policy Coherence for Development?

This paper assumed a social constructivist model of Europeanization, where the degree of norm internalization is dependent on the experienced adaptational pressure and the presence of intervening factors. Based on this model, it was hypothesized that an "old" member state such as the Netherlands would experience a low to medium amount of adaptational pressure, allowing for a gradual transformation of norms as long as intervening variables are present. The acceptance of the EU as a legitimate framework and agent for development in 2007 illustrated that the Netherlands had a conducive political culture in regards to EU norm internalization. Furthermore, the Minister for Development Cooperation had a mandate to promote development aid effectiveness, and the Minister began framing the Netherlands as an international norm entrepreneur for PCD. As such, the Netherlands had both a conducive political culture and a domestic norm entrepreneur to promote PCD.

Table 16: The degree of internalization of PCD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Degree of norm internalization regarding PCD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse and PCD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization of PCD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of the EU’s priority areas for PCD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of systematic reporting and measuring for PCD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of coordinating for PCD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in Table 16, the Netherlands’ discourse transformed in response to PCD, as befitting of a norm entrepreneur. Furthermore, the institutionalization of PCD and the implementation of systematic reporting and measuring for PCD reflect a gradual transformation as hypothesized. Table 16 also illustrates that the Netherlands’ implementation of coordinating for PCD indicates an accommodation of this aspect of PCD, as a new mechanism has been adopted (the informal MS PCD network). The only aspect of PCD that seems to break with the trend of gradually transforming in accordance with the EU’s PCD principles is the implementation of the EU’s priority areas. However the Netherlands hasn’t internalized the EU’s priority areas for PCD because it considers its own priorities a better reflection of the most glaring incoherencies. As such, the lack of internalization of the EU’s priority areas is consistent with the Netherlands’ role as an EU norm entrepreneur for PCD, where the Netherlands is attempting to promote PCD at the EU level.

The Netherlands has therefore taken several steps toward the institutionalization and implementation of the EU’s PCD principles. Though considerable challenges remain to the implementation and internalization of PCD, the Netherlands is currently undergoing a gradual transformation due to the EU’s PCD norms.

7.2 To what extent has the Netherlands implemented and internalized the European Code of Conduct for the Division of Labour?

The economic crisis triggered a political culture which forced the Netherlands to cut back on its foreign spending. Furthermore, as previously stated, the Minister for Development Cooperation has a mandate to promote effective development policy. This was evidenced in the Minister’s role as a domestic norm entrepreneur for PCD, but it also applies to The Code. As such, the Netherlands had both a conducive political culture and a domestic norm entrepreneur to promote The Code, allowing for a gradual transformation.
Table 17: The degree of internalization of The Code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Degree of norm internalization regarding The Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse and The Code</td>
<td>None Absorption Accommodation Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of the in-country dimension of The Code</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of the cross-country dimension of The Code</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of the cross-sectoral dimension of The Code</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in Table 17, the Netherlands’ discourse transformed in response to The Code much like it did for PCD, once again reflecting the Netherlands’ role as a norm entrepreneur. However, as Table 17 also illustrates, the Netherlands’ implementation and internalization of the three dimensions of The Code is very limited. Though the Netherlands has considerable potential for the implementation of The Code due to its participation with the FTI and its institutional structure, very little was done to proactively coordinate. Furthermore, the Netherlands has not adapted existing policies or mechanisms to counter the challenges identified in the EC’s documentation. The Netherlands’ internalization of The Code is thus a shallow absorption of EU norms.

7.3 Implications of the findings for the Netherlands as an EU donor and the EU as a normative agent and framework

Though the Netherlands has taken considerable steps toward institutionalizing, implementing, and internalizing particularly PCD, several challenges are impeding the Netherlands from achieving a full transformation for PCD, or even an accommodation of The Code. The EC’s documentation on PCD and The Code outlined several challenges to implementing these two policy programs. Several of these challenges are greatly impeding the Netherlands’ implementation and internalization of PCD and The Code.

Though the Netherlands had adopted a three pronged approach to PCD by 2006 consisting of promoting coherence in Brussels through the coherence test; proactive targeting of specific coherence dossiers; and building partnerships and promoting awareness of the importance of coherence, all three elements are impeded by several of the identified challenges. The most systemic of the challenges to PCD is a weak political commitment by the relevant ministries. Though the Minister has a mandate to promote PCD and PCD has been institutionalized within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the other Ministries lack political commitment. As a result, the Netherlands’ bilateral policy papers on PCD are not sufficiently detailed, and the institutionalized coherence test for EU policies is not always applied properly. Furthermore, there is a lack of institutional capacity within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to supervise the bilateral policy papers and the coherence test for EU policies. As a result, the effectiveness of the Netherlands’ implementation of PCD is greatly limited despite the institutionalized political commitment, institutional structures and institutional mechanisms. Furthermore, there is a lack of priority given to the reduction of world poverty in both the Netherlands and other EU MS. Though the Netherlands helped set up an informal MS PCD network, this network is a weak socialization mechanism, greatly impeded by the weak political commitment present in EU MS. As a result, nothing concrete has come out of it. The informal MS network failed to improve the coordination of PCD efforts and it hasn’t been utilized to coordinate the Netherlands’ efforts to create indicators for the measurement of PCD.

The implementation of The Code also suffered from a lack of political will and commitment. The implementation of the in-country dimension suffered from political expediency, as the Netherlands and other EU MS are not willing to align their policy cycles for the joint-programming of the in-country principles of The Code. The implementation of the cross-country selection suffered from a lack of
transparency as the final country selection was based on a political decision, not necessarily driven by development objectives, and there was no pro-active coordination because the country selection process is considered a nationally driven process. The implementation of the cross-sectoral dimension was greatly impeded by a lack of transparency, a lack of objective assessment of the Netherlands’ comparative advantage, and a conflict of interest between development and non-development objectives. Though the political discourse fully endorses the EU’s goal of poverty reduction and the EU as the framework for development, there was no pro-active coordination for The Code as. Ultimately, the selection of partner countries and sectors is considered a national political decision, where the MS is free to choose strategic interests over development objectives. Though the economic crisis was considered to have triggered a political culture conducive to change, it seems it made the Netherlands particularly keen to favor strategic interests over development objectives.

The ultimate goal of this paper was to determine the EU’s international credibility and legitimacy as a normative power. The EU became the Netherlands’ preferred framework for development in 2007 particularly through the establishment of The Consensus in 2005 and The Code in 2007. As such, the EC is currently an accepted norm entrepreneur for both PCD and The Code. However, the EU has so far failed to become a legitimate structure for the pro-active coordination of PCD and The Code as its MS consider the cooperation on PCD and the selection of sectors and countries for The Code a nationally driven process. As such, the normative power of the EU as a policy forum is greatly limited by the “soft” nature of EU development policy, particularly considering the lack of political will to pursue development objectives over non-development objectives. This challenge is compounded by the economic crisis which puts additional pressure on national governments to strengthen strategic interests. As these challenges to PCD and The Code are widespread among the EU MS donors and not exclusive to the Netherlands, a MS widely considered a progressive EU donor; these are challenges which the EU has to address as an agent (EC) and framework (EU) for development.

Accordingly, the EU could greatly strengthen its normative power if it is able to counter the belief that there is always an “either/or” choice that must be made between a development- and a non-development policy approach. This would reduce the tendency to pursue strategic interests over development. Alternatively, the EU could strengthen its credibility as a framework for development if it is to establish a formal EU MS network for PCD and The Code, which includes incentives for participants as well as systematic sharing of experiences, knowledge and capacity. Though this may not include a requirement to pro-actively coordinate for PCD and The Code, it would be an improvement over the current informal MS network, where no concrete agreements are made, information isn’t systematically shared, and EU MS are not involved in national efforts for PCD or The Code.

7.4 Implications of the findings for the theoretical framework
The investigation took a constructivist perspective to explain the impact of EU development norms on the construction of identities, interests and behavior. Furthermore, the implementation and internalization of PCD and The Code was conceptualized as a form of Europeanization, where domestic discourse, political structures, and public policies are affected through a process of socialization. As such, social institutional theories were applied to study the changes in the Netherlands’ discourse, institutional structure, and policy implementation due to the principles contained in PCD and The Code. The social constructivist perspective proved to be a very valuable tool to analyze the Netherlands’ internalization of PCD and The Code. Particularly the notion that agents (MS) and structures (the EU) are mutually constituted through a process of norm convergence was very valuable, as it allowed for an evaluation of how PCD and The Code were internalized without establishing top-down causality. This was particularly evident for the internalization of the EU’s priority areas for PCD; where there was a norm convergence for PCD, but no top-down causality for the specific priority areas. Furthermore, applying Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization allowed for a distinction between a nation’s discourse, institutional structure and policy implementation in assessing norm internalization. This proved to be a very valuable distinction as particularly for The Code, though the Netherlands depicted itself as a norm
entrepreneur for The Code, the implementation was very limited. Furthermore, this paper also supported the importance of intervening variables for norm internalization. Particularly for PCD, the presence of both a conducive political culture and a domestic norm entrepreneur allowed for several institutional changes, which improved the implementation of PCD. The political culture also had a significant impact (though not conducive) on the internalization of The Code, as the economic crisis put additional pressure on national governments to strengthen strategic interests, impeding the implementation of The Code.

7.5 Limitations of the study
The author opted for a mixed-method, mixed-data research design to prevent introducing biases inherent in using any one method or data source. Triangulating the data using the various sources and methods greatly enhanced the internal validity of this study. Furthermore, the constructivist framework allowed for a comprehensive analysis of the impact of PCD and The Code through a process of socialization, taking into account intervening variables and changes at various domestic levels. As such, the conclusions drawn regarding the Netherlands’ position in the EU development agenda are very robust. However, the external validity of this study is potentially limited, as this study pertained to a single-case study; the Netherlands. Though this paper determined how EU development policy has affected the Netherlands as an “old” progressive MS, additional studies with different cases must be completed to draw stronger conclusions regarding the EU’s normative power. The author thus recommends future studies utilize a similar research methodology in which the national political discourse, institutional changes and policy implementation are investigated for other EU MS. A focus on the other Nordic+ countries is recommended, as combining these studies would allow for general conclusions and recommendations (perhaps best practices) for and from the Nordic+ donor group, before expanding to the other European donor countries.
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**Interviews:**


Appendixes

Appendix A: Causality & the Europeanization of Dutch Development Policy

Scholars employ two approaches to conceptualize Europeanization: bottom-up, which explores the role of the Member States in the European institution-building process; and top-down which analyzes the effect of the evolving European system of governance on the Member States. The top-down approach is the most common aspect of Europeanization used by researchers since recent research has focused on "domestic changes caused by European integration" (Ibid: 6). European level processes are "bracketed" to analyze their effects at the member-state level or vice versa using one, rarely both of the two approaches (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 57). However, Europeanization is an "ongoing, interactive and mutually constitutive process of change linking national and European levels (...) the responses of MS to the integration process feed back into EU institutions and policy processes and vice versa" (qtd in Major, 2005: 177). A comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the Member States and the European Union requires the systematic integration of the two dimensions (Börzel & Hisse, 2003: 57). This follows the social constructivist premise that mutual interactive contacts of values and norms lead to a reconstruction of the social reality. Europeanization therefore in its broadest sense describes a process of identity and interest convergence. This is because the uploading-downloading interaction predicts cross-national policy convergence between EU states following a continued period of structural and procedural adaptation. On this basis, there is a third dimension of Europeanization positioned between the top-down and bottom-up frame: cross-loading.

"Cross loading goes beyond the idea of only the EU offering the arena for change and also deals with a 'cross-country,' 'cross-institutions' and 'cross-policy' dimension, where domestic change might not only be generated at the EU level but might come indirectly through the transfer of ideas, norms and ways of doing things that are exchanged from and with European neighbors, domestic entities or policy areas. Put simply: it is not only change due to Europe but also within Europe" (Major, 2005: 186).

This definition is consistent with Radaelli’s elements of Europeanization: a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalization of (formal and informal) institutions, styles, and norms. These three distinct dimensions of the Europeanization process are evident in the relationship between a Member State’s (MS) foreign policy and the EU (Wong & Hill, 2011: 6).

Europeanization of foreign policy has produced "shared norms and rules that are gradually accumulated, rather than being a process where interests have been fixed" (Olsen, 2001: 938). Therefore, the three aspects of Europeanization (top-down, bottom-up and cross-loading) can be used to measure the nature and the extent of policy convergence (as a process of change) in foreign policy. A useful framework for analyzing Europeanization as a process of change in foreign policies is one developed by various scholars: Wong (2007); Tsardanidis and Stavridis (2005); Major and Pomorska (2005). This framework places all three aspects of Europeanization (discussed above) and their expected indicators vis-à-vis the relationship between the MS foreign policy and the EU.

Table A: Three Dimensions of Europeanization in National Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Adaption and Policy Convergence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Increasing salience of European political agenda</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Adherence to common objectives</td>
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<td>c) Common policy obligations taking priority over national domaines réservés.</td>
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<tr>
<td>d) Internalization of EU membership and its integration process ('EU-ization')</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) Organizational and procedural change in national bureaucracies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Harmonization &amp; transformation of a MS to the needs and requirements of EU membership (top-down or &quot;downloading&quot;)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. National Projection</td>
<td>a) State attempts to increase national influence in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The top-down dimension of Europeanization looks at "how the European Union has affected the Member States and to what extent it has changed their domestic institutions, policies and political processes" (Börzel & Risse, 2003: 57). Though the top-down dimension seems readily applicable to the study of EU development cooperation policy, the direct impact of European norms on Dutch interests and identities in development policy (a causal relationship) cannot be assessed. This is because the Netherlands has been interacting on many levels, both European and internationally, regarding development cooperation. Apart from being a MS of the EU, the Netherlands is a member of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, the United Nations, the Nordic Plus countries, and a participant in global aid forums. Furthermore, the Netherlands also influences the EU and other international structures and agents though national projection, further blurring the distinction to what extent the Netherlands' domestic changes are due to top-down Europeanization, or cross-loading. The multiple interactions between Member States (including the Netherlands) and the governance of international development can be viewed below.

2. **Figure A: Europeanization of Development Cooperation Policy and the diffusion of norms: general interaction between international, European and national levels**

   Source: Adapted from Major, 2005: 184.
Appendix B: Information on the interview respondents

Paul De Nooijer: Active in the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB). The IOB is an independent department within the Audit and Evaluation cluster of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that monitors and evaluates all aspects of foreign policy and examines whether resources have been spent properly. It also provides the Ministers with independent advice. Since 2011, Paul de Nooijer has been involved with an evaluation on how the Netherlands has been interacting with the EU for development cooperation. As a policy expert within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, involved with the evaluation of development cooperation in an EU context, he is a key informant for this investigation. The interview was recorded and transcribed within 24 hours. Interviewed January 25th 2013.

Robert van Dijk: Team Leader EU Development Cooperation at the EU External Policies Division (European Integration Department, External Affairs Division), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. The European Integration Department seeks to ensure the consistency of Dutch policy on the European Union (EU). It also consults with the other ministries at official level to coordinate the Dutch contribution to decision-making in the EU. As such, it is responsible for the coherence of the Dutch position, and improving the internal coherence of the various EU policy fields. Robert van Dijk was an informant regarding the Dutch process to achieve PCD at the EU level. This respondent did not allow a recording. Notes were taken and transcribed. Interviewed January 31st 2013.

Sunita Verlinde: Former employee of the Effectives and Coherence Department (DEC) under the Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Currently working at the Bureau for International Cooperation (BIS). BIS is the staff bureau of DGIS, which has taken over several tasks from the previous DEC and also supports the DGIS in writing up the strategic agendas for global public goods and PCD. Though BIS is still being formed, Sunita Verlinde is an informant on the Netherlands’ institutionalization of PCD. This respondent did not allow a recording. Notes were taken and transcribed. Interviewed January 31st 2013.

Otto Genee: Paul de Nooijer, Robert van Dijk and Sunita Verlinde all recommended the author interview Otto Genee. Founder of the Coherence Unit in 2002, and former head of the Effectiveness and Coherence Department (DEC). The DEC ensures that Dutch policy on sustainable development and the reduction of extreme poverty in developing countries is both effective and coherent. Otto Genee is the leading expert regarding the effectiveness of development policy and PCD within the MFA as he has been involved with aid effectiveness and PCD since he started the Coherence Unit in 2002. Otto Genee is also seated in the Coordination Commission for European Integration- and Association Problems, and as such he has been involved with the creation of papers on the Netherlands’ bilateral development coherence and the creation and application of the BNC-fiches and the Coherence Test for PCD. His most recent efforts have been directed at creating a pilot to create indicators and measure PCD in three partner countries. Otto Genee is considered the expert on PCD in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a key informant regarding the institutionalization and implementation of PCD. The interview was recorded and transcribed within 24 hours. Interviewed February 7th 2013.
Appendix C: Interview Questions

Date:  
Name:  
Location:  
Organisation/function:  

1. Thank you for your time,
2. Introducing myself,
3. Introducing the research and the interview questions:
   - How is the Netherlands coordinating with the EU regarding development coordination policy and what measures has the Netherlands taken to implement EU norms on aid effectiveness and donor coordination? Not an evaluation of policy outcomes.
   - Policy Coherence for Development and the Division of Labour among donors according to the European Code of Conduct.
   - Four parts: Institutionalization, coordination, implementation & improvement, concluding questions.
   - First questions fairly broad, then going more in-depth
4. Duration of the interview,
5. Would like to record the interview for later analysis,
6. Any questions for me? If not, I would like to begin the interview.

1. How is development cooperation policy organized institutionally in the Netherlands?

**Policy formulation and implementation:** How is development policy formulated within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? *(policy process)*

**External actors involved in the formulation process:** Do actors outside the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs influence development policy *(think tanks, NGO’s)*? Who are the main ones? How do these Dutch non-state actors influence development policy formulation? *(which channels, forums)*

Now I would like to talk about how the Netherlands coordinates Policy Coherence for Development and the Division of Labour with other Member States at the EU level.

2. How is the Netherlands coordinating with the EU regarding development cooperation policy? *(In particular PCD and the Division of Labour)*

**Sharing Experiences on Policy Coherence for Development in an EU setting:**

Through which EU channels does the Netherlands interact with other Member States to share its national implementation experience regarding policy coherence for development? *(For example:*
Informal Member States PCD Network of the EU, other forums) What is the Netherlands sharing? (Importance of policy coherence? Implementation experiences?)

Coordinating with MS on the European Code of Conduct for the Division of Labour in an EU setting:

How is the Netherlands interacting with other Member States regarding donor coordination in the EU’s fast-track for the Division of Labour initiative? (in-country)

How is the Netherlands coordinating with other EU Member State donors on limiting its involvement in sectors within a partner country?

How is the Netherlands coordinating efforts towards “the lead donor arrangement” and “delegated cooperation/partnership” with other EU fast-track participants?

What challenges exist within the Netherlands that complicate effective donor coordination with other Member States? How might these be overcome?

This third and section deals with the Netherlands’ domestic implementation of policy coherence for development and the division of labour.

3. What measures has the Netherlands taken to implement, and improve the implementation of, PCD and the division of labour?

What measures has the Netherlands taken to improve Policy Coherence for Development?

How is PCD institutionalized and how has this changed over the past decade? (Organogram, DEC, and implementation).
How does the Effectiveness and Quality Department (DEC) – Development Policy and Coherence Division ensure that non development policies that affect development (like trade, food security, security, migration etc) are coherent with Dutch development cooperation policy?

What methodologies does the MFA employ to evaluate PCD and what are the main challenges?

Is the Netherlands developing indicators to measure PCD performance? (to establish a coherence index) How? *If not, why not?*

**How is the Netherlands implementing the European Code of Conduct on the Division of Labour (cross-country aspect) domestically? What measures have been taken?**

How is the Netherlands addressing the “orphan gap”?

How has the Netherlands established its partner countries?

Is the Netherlands analysing and expanding on its comparative advantage regarding sectors and modalities? How?

What challenges does the Netherlands face in implementing these aspects of the European Code of Conduct for the Division of Labour?
What policy options can be identified to overcome these challenges?

4. Concluding questions

Is there anything about Policy Coherence for Development and the Division of Labour among donors according to the European Code of Conduct we haven’t discussed that I should know about? Do you have any comments and suggestions?

Are there any documents on this topic I may not be aware of which I should incorporate?

Do you know of anyone else who I might speak with about this topic?

Thank you for your time! If you wish, I can send you the final report when it is completed.
Appendix D: Legal Basis of the European Union

Although the beginnings of the Community’s development policy date back to the Treaty of Rome (1957), the legal basis for EU development cooperation policy is laid down in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), also known as the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). The TEU is built on three pillars: The first pillar is the European Community, managed by the community of institutions. This entails that decision-making competencies of MS are taken over by the EU institutions, resulting in EU law. The second pillar is concerned with the "Common Foreign and Security Policy" (CFSP) and pillar three refers to the area of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). The second and third pillar represent "intergovernmental pillars" meaning decisions are coordinated by MS and not made at the European level (EU-Platform, 2007: 5). Development cooperation falls under the first pillar, also called the supranational or Community pillar of the European Union. The responsibility for development cooperation is thus shared by the European Commission and the Member states. The creation of the CFSP under the second pillar, however, is also important for development policy, since development cooperation is linked with foreign policy (Frisch, 2008: 22).

The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (Article 177) and the 2009 Lisbon Treaty also emphasize the EU’s competence in carrying out a common policy in the field of development cooperation and make relevant adjustments to the TEU. Specifically, Title XVII of the TEU deals exclusively with development cooperation. In particular, Article 130u sets forth the general objectives regarding development cooperation:

"Community policy in the sphere of development co-operation, which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster: - the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them; - the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy; - the campaign against poverty in the developing countries" (The Maastricht Treaty, 1992: Art. 130u).

Furthermore, in order to define Community responsibilities in development cooperation, the Maastricht (1992) and later Amsterdam Treaties (1997) set out the principles of the four C’s: 1) Coherence between policies that have an impact on third countries and the objectives of development co-operation; 2) Complementarity between member states and Commission activities in development; 3) Co-ordination of actions between member states and the Commission; 4) Consistency between the policies of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and development co-operation (Van Reisen, 2001: 5-6). In particular, the principle of coordination establishes that MS and Community pillar should consult each other and coordinate their development and cooperation policies. This is because EC development cooperation complements the efforts of MS, as such; development cooperation remains essentially bilaterally focused. Article 130 x (paragraph 1) of the TEU states:

"The Community and the Member States shall co-ordinate their policies on development co-operation and shall consult each other on their aid programs, including in international organizations and during international conferences. They may undertake joint action. Member States shall contribute if necessary to the implementation of Community aid programs" (The Maastricht Treaty 1992: Article 130x, paragraph 2).

On this premise, the treaty of Maastricht also formally granted the European Commission the right to take initiatives to promote coordination among MS and the EC by formulating strategies and implementing development programs: "The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote the co-ordination referred to in paragraph One" (The Maastricht Treaty 1992: Article 130x, paragraph 2). The Commission thus ensures the implementation of Development Policy. Overall, the Commission attempts to coordinate and harmonize the 27 national (development) policies and leads negotiations with third countries on behalf of the EU (regarding for example accessions, associations, and international agreements) (EU-Platform, 2007:6, Carbone, 2007: 130).
Appendix E: Institutional Structure of the European Union

The main institutional actors involved in EU development policy-making are the Commission and the Council of the European Union. However, the EU External Action Service (EEAS) also plays a role in development cooperation as it attempts to connect both foreign and development policy. The following figure (which is briefly explained below) shows the current institutional structure for development policy-making in the EU.

**Figure B: EU Development Policy-making and Institutional Structure**

Within the Council, the GAERC has been the main-decision-making body for development cooperation (prior to the 2008 Lisbon Treaty). The Treaty split GAERC into two Council formations: the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), chaired by the High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is also the Vice President of the European Commission, and the General Affairs Council (GAC), chaired by the rotating Council presidencies (Kaczynski & Byrne, 2011: 2). The Foreign Ministers of the MS gather within the FAC once a month; in this configuration, the council deals with the "whole of the Union’s external action" which includes development cooperation (Council of the European Union Website - Council Configurations).

Also within the Council, the Development Working Group (CODEV) plays an important role. It is composed of junior officials from the Permanent Representations of the MS, normally meets once a week (Carbone, 2007: 49) and has a rotating chairmanship (the representative of the country holding the EU Council Presidency). Moreover, the Working Party drafts [and prepares] Council Conclusions pertaining to European Commission documents (communications, reports, action plans) and European Court of Auditors reports, as well as joint EU positions on international events on the development agenda. The working party sessions are also attended by representatives of all MS, the EC, and the EEAS. Moreover, decisions on matters prepared in CODEV are taken by development Ministers within...
the framework of the FAC. Overall within the Council, CODEV prepares and the FAC decides, as can be viewed in Figure B.

The Development Commissioner manages the European Union's commonly defined EU development policy and oversees the EU's overall development policy. However, the Commission has recently embarked on a series of reforms in order to streamline the bureaucracy involved in administering aid (Booth and Herbert, 2011: 7) in the aftermath of the 2008 Lisbon Treaty.

In the past, there were several Directorate-Generals within the European Commission that dealt with development cooperation. For instance, EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO) was founded in January 2001 with "the mission of implementing the EU external aid programs around the world" [EU-Platform, 2007:13]. During that time, the overall planning capacity was held by the Directorate-General for Development (DG DEV), responsible for the relations with the ACP countries, as well as DG External Relations (DG RELEX), responsible for the EU's relations with developing countries in Asia and Latin America.

In 2010, DG RELEX was merged into the European External Action Service, headed by a High Representative which oversees EU delegations and the various other Commission DGs involved in Development Policy. As of January 1st, 2011 DG DEV merged with AIDCO. This resulted in the creation of the Development Cooperation Directorate-General- EuropeAid (DG DevCO-Europeaid), which currently operates under the guidance of the Development Commissioner. DG DevCO-EuropeAid thus designs development policies and is in charge of implementing the EU's external aid instruments.

Consequently, DG DevCO-EuropeAid is the main institution for EU development and it is:

"Now responsible not only for defining EU development policy but also for ensuring the effective programming and implementation of aid... [It] coordinates the actions of the EU institutions, the EU Member States and other EU actors around the Union's core values, objectives and common priorities (...) [It is] also the single interlocutor for the European External Action Service (EEAS), and for all sectoral DGs on development and cooperation" (Europe-Aid Website).

Finally, the EEAS also helps define the aims of development cooperation. EEAS staff comes from the European Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Diplomatic Services of EU Member States (EU Website). It is mainly responsible for the overall strategy towards third countries, in particular "the strategic priorities for development" (Drieksens & van Schaik, 2010: 14). Moreover, it works together with DG DevCo-EuropeAid on Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and National Indicative Programs (Furness, 2012: 78). However, policy development on thematic strategies, Annual Action Programs and policy implementation (mainly aid disbursement) remains the task of DG DevCo-EuropeAid (Drieksens & van Schaik, 2010: 14) under the Development Commissioner. In effect, the EEAS links the Council of the European Union, the Commission, MS and partner countries. Its main task is to "promote coordination among these actors," particularly at the implementation level through the 40 EU delegations around the world (EU Website). As such, the EEAS attempts to synergize both foreign and development policies.

48 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/about/
50 ibid.
### Appendix F: The European Commission's building blocks, recommendations, and identified challenges for PCD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identified challenges to the internalization and implementation of PCD*</th>
<th>Building blocks and recommendations for MS for the internalization and implementation of PCD**</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Weak political commitment by the relevant Minister, ministries, Members of Parliament, Parliamentary committees in the MS.</td>
<td>To succeed in &quot;bringing about greater coherence between policies and development objectives&quot; the Commission discusses three key building blocks for MS to pursue:</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. A lack of institutional capacity and knowledge on PCD and development issues.</td>
<td>1. A (preferably legal) commitment to PCD &amp; a political framework outlining the approach to PCD.</td>
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<td>3. A lack of (early) involvement of development cooperation staff in PCD policy processes.</td>
<td>2. Institutionalization of mechanisms, with a specific mandate to promote PCD.</td>
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<td>4. The belief that achieving coherence in some areas is too difficult.</td>
<td>3. An obligation to report on national progress toward PCD.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. The belief that there is always an 'either/or' choice that must be made between a development approach and a non-development policy approach.</td>
<td>Secondary to the three key building blocks, the commission recommends MS also:</td>
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<td>6. Political expediency, which may lead to a less coherent approach even where a PCD approach is possible.</td>
<td>1. Make better use of impact assessments and reporting on PCD.</td>
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<td>7. A lack of political will to pursue, and the limited priority given to, the reduction of world poverty.</td>
<td>2. Perform research to increase the knowledge and information on the impact of policy coherence and synergies to inform policy screening, negotiations and decisions.</td>
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<td>8. The difficulty of providing evidence of the ultimate impact of non-development policies on poverty in developing countries.</td>
<td>3. Better coordinate their PCD efforts with other EU MS</td>
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