Summary

This thesis deals with the question what the effects of the Treaty of Lisbon are on the democratic legitimacy of European Governance. In order to reach conclusions, I have made use of the conceptual framework on input, throughput and output legitimacy by Bekkers, Dijkstra, Edwards, & Fenger (2007), which is an updated version of the framework on input and output legitimacy by Scharpf (1998). Each of the three forms of legitimacy was translated into a Eurobarometer question that best suits the corresponding form of legitimacy, and was subjected to a cross-national comparison between the EU MS of Slovakia, Denmark, Greece and Sweden. Not only did it appear that the Treaty of Lisbon did not affect the way Europeans perceive the democratic legitimacy of European Governance, the research also shows that there are structurally different attitudes towards EU democracy across the Union. This is likely explained by a mix of cultural, economic and political backgrounds at the national level. It was also established that in half of the EU MS, citizens rate EU democracy about as high or low as national democracy. This led to the conclusion that legitimacy is a highly subjective topic, notwithstanding any attempts by the EU and the MS to enhance it by launching new treaties, or by revising them. Instead, much ground can and must be gained at the national level, particularly by politicians, media, schools and companies, to help develop a European public sphere in order to close the distance between Brussels and Europeans.
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Niels Vink
July 2014
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIV</td>
<td>Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs (Dutch: Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken)</td>
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<td>ALDE</td>
<td>Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union (German: Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands)</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>Commission</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<td>Council</td>
<td>Council of the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<td>D66</td>
<td>Democrats 66 (Dutch: Democraten 66)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>European Affairs Committee</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<td>ECI</td>
<td>European Citizens’ Initiative</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EPP</td>
<td>European People’s Party</td>
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<td>ERM II</td>
<td>European Exchange Rate Mechanism II</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<td>MLG</td>
<td>Multi-level Governance</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Member State(s)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NOS</td>
<td>Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation (Dutch: Nederlandse Omroep Stichting)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OMC</td>
<td>Open Method of Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Greek: Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima)</td>
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<td>PPS</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Labour Party (Dutch: Partij van de Arbeid)</td>
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<td>PVV</td>
<td>Party for Freedom (Dutch: Partij Voor de Vrijheid)</td>
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<tr>
<td>QMV</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
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<td>SGP</td>
<td>Stability and Growth Pact</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
<td>Sub-National Authority</td>
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<td>SP</td>
<td>Socialist Party (Dutch: Socialistische Partij)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCE</td>
<td>Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on EU</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UKIP</td>
<td>UK Independence Party</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Dutch: Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie)</td>
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<td>WWI</td>
<td>World War I</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Introduction
Throughout the ages, Europe has been home to a patchwork of warmongering nations, always ready to fly at each other’s throats, whether in the ‘Old’ or in the ‘New’ world, or out at one of the seven seas, for land and wealth, for Empire. Then, in the wake of two terrible World Wars that took the lives of millions, a miracle happened, which we today refer to as the European Union (EU). It is an experiment which the world has never witnessed before. Where it will end, no-one knows. What we do know is that, over time, we have witnessed a development called ‘European integration’, where there is convergence in terms of economic, financial, judicial, political and even cultural aspects that used to fall exclusively under the competences of the nation-state. Today’s EU is a far cry from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that was established in 1952; over the past decades, the national sovereignty of the Member States (MS) was gradually pooled as decision making powers were shared between the Council of the European Union (Council), European Commission (Commission) and European Parliament (EP). The balance of power between these institutions has also gradually shifted, and we have witnessed a departure from unanimity in many policy areas. For decades, the EU was a complex entity relatively few citizens were interested in, as long as they could reap its (chiefly economic) benefits.

However, in the past decade, a time of rapid expansion, institutional reform and crises, citizens became increasingly critical of the democratic legitimacy of the EU. Some Europeans – whether they are voters, politicians or public administrators – have the feeling that their interests are insufficiently represented by their national governments when bargaining in Brussels. Some have problems with the alleged lack of accountability of certain positions within the EU institutions. Then there are some who claim that there is an unstoppable creeping transfer of sovereignty from the national to the European level. In short, there is an alleged democratic deficit. In the meantime, Europeans are faced with false rumours of alleged bans on curved bananas and cucumbers, and are left thinking that the EU has started to overshoot the mark. These stories nevertheless give the EU institutions that are responsible for decision making (typically the Commission, EP and Council under the ordinary legislative procedure) an image problem.

The Treaty of Lisbon, which became effective in December 2009, sought to enhance the democratic legitimacy of EU decision making. The official aim of this treaty was ‘to complete the process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam and by the Treaty of Nice with a view to enhancing the efficiency and
democratic legitimacy of the Union and to improving the coherence of its action’ (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, p. 3). We are soon five years into the Lisbon era, and it is time to establish whether or not citizens across the EU MS have become more satisfied with democracy in the EU.

1.2 Problem analysis

In this section, I will discuss why a democratic deficit poses a problem, whose problem it actually is and who is responsible for solving this problem. The paragraph will be followed by the central research question and related sub-questions.

According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, ‘deficit’ means a deficiency in amount or quality, or a lack or impairment in a functional capacity. When there is a democratic deficit, we could argue that there is a lack of quality in the workings of democracy. Levinson argues that a democratic deficit occurs when ‘ostensibly democratic organisations or institutions in fact fall short of fulfilling what are believed to be the principles of democracy’ (2007, p. 860). A deficit can manifest itself in various ways. For instance, the decision making process could be too complex and/or technocratic. It could be the case that there are insufficient public consultation meetings, or it could be that governments pay little to no heed to the outcomes of such meetings, leaving their constituents frustrated. A deficit can also be caused by a lack of (directly) elected representatives. This creates issues in terms of accountability. Another example can be derived from the rules that are in effect in a certain political arena. For instance, if certain actors are given veto powers, they are able to dominate policy processes, nullifying majorities if necessary. The examples given show how problematic a democratic deficit is, because in such a deficit, voters will eventually feel so marginalised by the political system they are part of that they become alienated from it and eventually start opposing it. In this thesis, I will investigate the phenomenon of the democratic deficit in a EU context. By doing so, I will particularly pay attention to legitimacy as a factor that determines to what extent there is talk of a democratic deficit.

Seeing as there is widespread concern about the democratic legitimacy of EU decision making, it would be hard to believe that through most of the history of European integration, this was never problematic at all. For decades, politicians and citizens were happy to assume the legitimacy of EU institutions and policy processes, despite the fact that these were not akin to the patterns of democratic governments at the national level (Scharpf, 2003, p. 3). European voters were content with the status quo, since output legitimacy, i.e., the capacity of government to produce certain output or outcomes that actually contribute toward solving collective problems, was the only aspect of legitimacy that mattered to them at that time. In other words, as long as the European institutions were effective, European voters had relatively little reason to complain. This situation changed radically when the Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe (TCE), which was rejected in the Dutch and French national referendum, was replaced with the highly similar Treaty of Lisbon, which did not involve a national referendum in any MS, except Ireland (“The Treaty of Lisbon,” 2011). This caused some citizens to believe that they were left out in the decision making process. As a result, input legitimacy, i.e., political equality, active citizenship and popular sovereignty, became much more common in academic and popular discourse. As mentioned in the introduction, one of the stated goals of the Commission through the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon was to ‘enhance the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union’ (“Treaty of Lisbon,” 2007, p. 3). This forms the starting point for my master’s thesis.

If there is indeed a democratic deficit, then trust of European citizens in the EU institutions should be in decline. When looking at the Eurobarometer surveys of the last couple of years, then we can indeed establish a downward development in trust among Europeans.


From Figure 1.1, we learn that satisfaction about the way democracy works in the EU has decreased after August 2009, while dissatisfaction has increased. Also, the percentage of respondents that were not able to answer the question, is declining; more and more citizens have an opinion on EU democracy. Interestingly, the second half of 2009 is also when the Treaty of Lisbon became effective and when the sovereign debt crisis emerged.
In the first results report of the spring 2013 edition of the Eurobarometer, another trend is visible:


Figure 1.2 shows that over two-thirds (67 per cent) of the Europeans now believe that their voice does not count in the EU. This is the highest share of the respondents since the question was first asked in the autumn of 2004. Just as in Figure 1.1, the percentage of respondents that were not able to answer the question, is declining. The results of Figure 1.2 indicate that citizens of the EU increasingly feel that they are left out of the EU decision making process.

A perceived democratic deficit is an issue that concerns every single individual with the EU citizenship that wants to become more involved in the policy process. During the past decades, we witnessed the signing of several treaties that sought to improve the influence of the European citizens in the decision making process. A recent example being TCE. Ironically, it contained various elements that enhanced democracy within the Union. For instance, there would be a right of petition amongst European citizens to make non-binding proposals to the Commission. This became known as the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). The ECI still went through eventually, as part of the Treaty of Lisbon. Nevertheless, a perceived lack of participation in the obscure policy process is frustrating for many Europeans today, although not every European citizen is equally informed. The general belief was (and still is) that most of the decisions are taken by the Council in Brussels, even though in reality they are commonly already taken in the preparation process, by the Committee of Permanent Representatives.
(COREPER) or by the various working groups. Many Europeans nevertheless do not realise how they can affect the decision making process. Even though there is a form of indirect participation taking place, by means of interest groups and lobbying organisations, it begs the question if this suffices to close the gap. At the same time, the constitution that sought to enhance EU democracy was turned down by a referendum – a purely democratic means – nevertheless made it in the form of a treaty that did not undergo a referendum in almost all of the MS. These events altogether did not improve democracy as it is perceived by Europeans.

In this thesis, the phenomenon of democratic legitimacy will return frequently. It is a soft term which needs further explanation. This will be done extensively in the analytical framework. There are also other ways that help to identify whether or not, or to what extent there is a democratic deficit in a political system. However, in my thesis, I will concentrate on the phenomenon of democratic legitimacy.

Central Research Question

*What is the effect of the Treaty of Lisbon on the democratic legitimacy of European Governance?*

**Sub questions**

1. *how did the EU citizens’ satisfaction with EU democracy develop during the past decade?*
2. *to what extent can these developments be attributed to the Treaty of Lisbon?*
3. *how does the development of this satisfaction with EU democracy compare between the MS?*
4. *which historical, economic and political factors at the national level are relevant in measuring satisfaction with EU democracy?*

1.3 Aim

**Academic relevance**

The contribution of this study is set in the discussion on the democratic legitimacy of European Governance in academic literature. It includes topics such as citizen participation, trust in/satisfaction with EU democracy, the EU’s checks and balances, responsiveness, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, accessibility and accountability. Much has been written and said by academics and political commentators in the past decades on the arguable lack of democracy and legitimacy regarding
the workings of the EU and its institutions and procedures. Although not every scientist subscribes to the claim that there is a democratic deficit in the EU, and although those that do agree have differing opinions on the right blueprint for enhancing the democratic nature, it is important to keep the finger on the pulse of democracy in the EU. Continuous research into this issue may lead to a universally accepted toolkit for ‘measuring’ democracy in terms of legitimacy and may raise new questions and yield possible answers in the field of legitimacy of international organisations.

Social relevance

With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has welcomed its eighth version of the Treaty after the Treaty establishing the ECSC, the Treaties of Rome, the Brussels Treaty, the Single European Act and the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice. Amendments are made in order to make the EU more efficient and transparent, to make preparations for new MS and to create new areas of co-operation, as was the case with the single currency (“EU Treaties,” n.d.). However, one may wonder to what extent the average citizen of the EU is able to notice and acknowledge these improvements. There is a general consensus in the Netherlands that ‘Brussels’, though barely a two-hour drive from Amsterdam, is viewed as a remote place. The findings of this master thesis can be of use for both the EU and national institutions that are involved in the EU decision making process, in order to determine which factors need to be taken into account in order to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the bodies of the EU. Also, this work can be of use for European citizens in determining whether or not their feeling of remoteness from Brussels, as well as their concerns regarding the course the ever-growing EU is taking in terms of democracy and legitimacy is justified.
Chapter 2
Analytical Framework

2.1 Introduction
This chapter serves to guide my research by translating the theory that best explains the problem into measurable indicators. These indicators will be applied to the data collection phase later on in my thesis. The analytical framework consists of several parts. First, several key concepts that are relevant to the thesis are discussed by providing the necessary background information regarding governance, democracy and legitimacy. Second, a set of hypotheses is drawn from the concept of legitimacy, resulting in a flowchart that consists of one independent variable, three mechanisms and one dependent variable. At the end of this chapter, a matrix can be found, in which all the concepts are translated into indicators and ways of measurement.

2.2 Theories
Amongst academics, there has been disagreement to this day in regards to the question whether or not there is a democratic deficit in the framework of the EU. There are those, such as Majone and Moravcsik, who have denied that the EU is lacking democratically (Majone, 1993; Moravcsik, 2002, 2003, 2004, as cited in Follesdal, 2006, pp. 537-539). Then there are those, including Follesdal and Sieberson, that did signal a deficit (Follesdal, 2006; Sieberson, 2004, 2007). Official indicators of a democratic deficit simply do not exist. It is up to academics to come up with indicators that they believe are justified for signalling a democratic deficit. In this analytical framework, I will do likewise. The most important indicators that I will use for my research are derived from the work of Bekkers, Dijkstra, Edwards, & Fenger (2007). These indicators, that stem from the concept of legitimacy, will be addressed in further detail throughout this chapter. Before we can find out whether or not the Treaty of Lisbon has affected the democratic legitimacy of European Governance one way or another, it is crucial to get a clear understanding of the meaning of the term ‘legitimacy’ and to make it measurable. In this paragraph, I will discuss the most important theories that are relevant for my research: governance, and in particular Multi-level Governance (MLG) and network governance, understanding that some academics do not consider these to be theories. This will be addressed in the paragraph itself.
Governance

In the 1990s, a shift took place in the dominant ‘steering’ paradigm of the public sector. There was already much criticism on the notion that government is able to effectively intervene in societal developments and solve societal problems from a centralised and hierarchical position, detached from society, and according to the goals that were stipulated in policy programmes. For a long time, it was thought that the government’s position is in the centre of societal developments and issues. Ineffective governments were mainly regarded as errors in the ‘machinery of government’, resulting from a lacking in knowledge on the nature and effects of the problem, and as the result of a mismatch between the policy instruments that were used and the policy goals that were formulated. In the 1990s, a new steering paradigm was born, called the ‘governance paradigm’. It became the successor to the then ‘government paradigm’. Governance implies that:

- government is not an entity but rather a conglomerate of actors;
- government is not the only actor that tries to affect societal developments;
- government interventions are interventions in policy networks, in which power, resource dependency and strategic behaviour are crucial elements (Bekkers et al., 2007, p. 3).

The governance paradigm led to a number of developments. For instance, government organisations were given a position in complex exchange networks, characterised by (inter)dependency and communication relations with relevant stakeholders in their environments, such as other governments, citizens, firms and societal organisations. More attention was given to the processes themselves in which actors with different interests, resources and beliefs co-produce policy practices that they share. Organisations became able to self-organise and self-regulate along with other organisations, sectors and levels of government, from which new forms of coordinated or collective action could arise. The institutions that traditionally formed representative democracy were impacted by governance. In a network setting, it is much less clear which actor is accountable for what tasks than in a traditional hierarchical setting. Also, the thought behind representative democracy has come under pressure due to elected politicians and policy officials engaging in ‘wheeling and dealing’ with societal actors, rather than doing what they are elected for: political decision making. Moreover, the shifts in authority from central government to other public bodies or levels of government are only democratically ‘neutral’ if democratic institutions also respond to this shift in an appropriate fashion. These comments lead up to the claim that governance leads to a democratic deficit. The claim is often suggested, but seldom empirically tested (Bekkers et al., 2007, pp. 3-4).

Bekkers et al. (2007) distinguish five different modes of governance:
- governance at a distance: in this mode of governance, the relationship between the organisations which steer and the organisations that are steered, is still hierarchical. However, the organisations that are steered, are given a (substantial) degree of discretion to develop and implement their own policies, on the basis of the recognition of self-regulation;
- multi-level governance: this mode of governance refers to the upward and downward shifts of problem-solving capacity, responsibilities and competences from the nation-state. The upward shift refers to supranational or intergovernmental authority bodies, while the downward shift implies that regional and local levels increasingly gain importance in policy-making processes as well;
- market governance: this type of governance refers to the use of the market mechanism of supply and demand in governance processes;
- network governance; in this type of governance, steering is aimed at facilitating a shared understanding between the organisations or stakeholders in a policy network so as to create a shared and trustworthy policy practice by means of interaction, communication, negotiation and exchange;
- societal self-governance: this final governance mode is about creating, facilitating and enabling policy initiatives developing within communities (p. 6).

These five modes of governance have in common that the problem-solving capacity is transferred from the traditional state institutions towards other levels or institutions (Bekkers et al., 2007, p. 6). This thesis of course focuses on MLG, since these are inherent to the topic of democracy in the institutional framework of the EU. This particular mode therefore needs to be elaborated on in the upcoming paragraph.

The ‘adoption’ of governance led to the following general shifts:

- from public towards private forms of governance (market governance);
- from public towards forms of governance in which the civic society plays a large role (societal self-governance);
- from central forms to decentralised forms (governance at a distance);
- from national forms to international and supranational forms (MLG);
- from geographical forms to functional forms (governance at a distance);
- from vertical to horizontal forms (network governance) (Bekkers et al., 2007, p. 5).
Multi-level governance

MLG is a conceptual framework or theory (more on this debate later on) that has been in development for the past twenty years (Stephenson, 2013, p. 819). Its aim, according to Stephenson, is to profile the ‘arrangement’ of policy-making activity performed within and across politico-administrative institutions situated at different territorial levels (2013, p. 819). Stephenson argues that MLG has had a multitude of uses since its birth in 1993. Marks and Hooghe, who are ‘arguably the king and queen of MLG’, conceptualised MLG in which they steered away from the ongoing theoretical ping-pong that concentrated on proving the convincingness of intergovernmentalism or neofunctionalism to explain integration over forty years (Stephenson, 2013, p. 819). Although MLG theorists accepted the fact that integration involved intergovernmental bargains, they maintained the neofunctionalist critique of realism that individual governments were not as tightly in control as suggested. Marks, Hooghe & Blank (1996) made three points against intergovernmentalism. First, collective decision making means a loss of control for the governments of individual states. Second, decision making competencies in the EU are shared by actors at different levels, not monopolised by the governments of states. Third, the political systems of MS are not separate from each other, as Moravcsik assumed, but are connected in various ways (Bache, George, & Bulmer, 2011, p. 33).

There are three events that preceded the development of MLG. First, the reform of the Structural Funds in 1988 put greater emphasis on partnership and coordination, therefore stimulating administrative reform and the creation of rules and procedures for the shared management of structural funds. Second, the single market was created with the ‘1992’ programme, which witnessed the mobilisation and proliferation of interest groups within policy networks. Third, the creation of the Treaty on EU (TEU) in February 1992 introduced the concept of subsidiarity, which reflected the desire to act at the lowest possible level. These three events caused Marks to write an article with the title ‘Structural Policy and Multi-Level Governance in the EC’. In it, he mentioned ‘the increasing importance of subnational levels of decision making and their myriad connections with other levels’. He provided the first definition of MLG, being ‘a system of continuous negotiation amongst nested governments at several territorial tiers’ as a result of ‘a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that had pulled some previously centralised functions of the state’ up and down (Marks, 1993, p. 392, as cited in Stephenson, 2013, p. 820). This conceptualisation triggered various responses from other scholars that wanted to build upon it. It was concluded that the state was unravelling, i.e., it was tightly centralised no longer, and not all functions were performed at the highest level any more. It was described as ‘a coat whose thread had got caught, its main body being pulled apart’. International Relations (IR) academics expanded theories of international regimes to account for the ‘diffusion of authority within states’ (Stephenson, 2013, p. 820). At this point, scholars started to assert
that MLG indicated processes that, through the slow accumulation of policy decisions and political
mobilisation, were changing the political structure of the EU, the structures of the individual MS and,
possibly through similar dynamics elsewhere, of the state tout court. This development in turn is a
result of attempts of academics studying changes in the public administration and in the territorial
articulation of nation-states. While doing so, they attempted to explain real-life developments. There
are two notable examples. First, Rhodes (1988, 1996, 1997) analysed the disaggregation of British
aggregation and coordination of various policy preferences in Europe.

Although Rhodes and Scharpf both took concrete territorial entities as their point of departure, MLG
was interpreted as a quintessentially theoretical issue. Therefore, MLG studies became increasingly
abstract. In order to try to define the theoretical space in which the empirical instances of inter-
governmental relations could be inscribed, Marks and Hooghe conceptualised two ideal-types of MLG,
called Type I and Type II (Piattoni, 2009, pp. 9-10). Type I can be classified as general purpose
jurisdictions with non-intersecting (static) memberships at a limited number of levels (often quite rigid
in their terms of institutional architecture). For this reason, Type I is sometimes compared with a
Russian doll set, since there is only one relevant jurisdiction or authority per level. Also, Type I reflects
the simplistic nature of state control and the exertion of authority in a unitary state. Type II is described
as task-specific jurisdictions of intersecting (fluid) membership with unlimited levels and flexible in
design. Whereas Type I is more like a Russian doll set, Type II is actually more of a puzzle consisting of
many functionally specific pieces, each providing services or solving problems. It involves a layered
system of co-existing levels of authority. It is a complex pattern of transnational, public and private
institutional relations with overlapping competences (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, pp. 235-236, as cited in
Stephenson, 2013, pp. 820-821). A brief overview of the differences between Type I and Type II MLG
is shown in Table 2.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type I</th>
<th>Type II</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General-purpose jurisdictions</td>
<td>Task-specific jurisdictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intersecting memberships</td>
<td>Intersecting memberships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdictions organised on a limited number of levels</td>
<td>No limit to the number of jurisdictional levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System-wide architecture</td>
<td>Flexible design</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 2.0.1: Types of MLG (Hooghe & Marks, 2010, p. 18).

Type I and Type II MLG normally coexist in the same overarching polity. According to Hooghe & Marks
(2003, p. 238, as cited in Piattoni, 2009, p. 11), Type II is generally embedded in Type I. This overlap is
also referred to as polycentric governance. The legitimacy of Type I is based on the procedures by
which they are regulated, such as rules, roles and norms, while the legitimacy of Type II depends on its effectiveness and on the ‘navigational skills’ of its management. Although these are seemingly two distinct normative planes, they do coexist in contemporary democracies and characterise especially the European polity (Piattoni, 2009, pp. 11-12). Pierre & Peters (2000, as cited in Piattoni, 2009, p. 12) argue that these two types of MLG coexist in a ‘negotiated order’ typical of situations in which the new institutional level, in our case the EU, is attempting to become institutionalised in a context which is still dominated by existing institutions.

In the era of the original uses of MLG, scholars linked the framework with Europeanisation and regionalisation. E.g., Bache (1998) reconciled MLG with Europeanisation in a study of cohesion policy in the United Kingdom (UK) and the EU. He discovered the rise in flexible Type II arrangements, which he described as ‘loose neocorporatism’ across local governance in the 1990s with the revival of English regions (Stephenson, 2013, p. 822). Since 1993 and the original uses of MLG, there have so far been functional uses (1997 - ), combined uses (2001 - ), normative uses (2003 - ) and comparative uses (2007 - ) of the term. In the functional era, MLG’s problem-solving capacity was investigated by Scharpf (1997b), who concluded that its effectiveness at various governance levels varied from one policy area to the other. In the combined era, new modes of governance arose, such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which was introduced at Lisbon in 2000. It was regarded as the competitor of MLG. OMC perceived the EU as ‘heterarchical’ and ‘decentered’ with OMC ‘radicalising’ the process of subsidiarity (Hodson & Maher, 2001, p. 716, as cited in Stephenson, 2013, p. 823). Blom-Hansen (2005) applied principal-agent theory to assert that while MLG ‘paints a descriptively accurate picture of the cohesion policy’s complex implementation structure, it fails to specify which actors, at which levels, will be causally important’ (Stephenson, 2013, p. 825).

Then, in the normative era, following the White Paper on European Governance, issued by the Commission in 2001, Olsson noted that the discussion on democracy renewal was ‘often unproblematised’, and that discussions on democracy should be more about power and policy-making processes, instead of the basic character of the EU (Olsson, 2003, p. 284, as cited in Stephenson, 2013, p. 826). Identity politics also became more important, after Hooghe & Marks (2008, p. 2, as cited in Stephenson, 2013, p. 827) argued that ‘doing’ European integration means mobilising identity, especially where existing regional political structures of authority are inappropriate, be it inefficient, unconvincing or conflicting. In the comparative era, MLG is much different from 1993. It started by analysing arrangements for implementing the structural funds, yet today, most major recipients are flailing in the wake of the global financial and euro crises. The EU’s fate is intrinsically connected to international politics and economics. MLG no longer operates in splendid isolation as a three-layered,
Eurocentric, isolated image of policy-making. Instead, it acknowledges external actors in global governance.

There are seven main criticisms of MLG. They were summed up by Jordan (2001, as cited in Bache et al., 2011, p. 34):

- MLG was nothing new, only an amalgam of existing theories;
- it provided a description of the EU, but not a theory;
- it overstated the autonomy of Sub-National Authorities (SNAs);
- it adopted a ‘top-down’ view of SNAs;
- it focused on SNAs to the exclusion of other sub-national actors;
- it mistook evidence of SNA mobilisation at European level as evidence of SNA influence;
- it ignored the international level of interaction.

These criticisms triggered a response by George, who believed that Jordan’s critique was of ‘variable validity’ (2004, p. 125, as cited in Bache et al., 2001, p. 34). Although he agreed with the first criticism, he suggested that it was ‘scarcely a criticism’. George argued that MLG went further than description in order to provide a theory of what kind of organisation the EU is. ‘It is hypothesised to be an organisation in which the central executives of states do not do all the governing but share and contest responsibility and authority with other actors, but supranational and subnational.’ Although the validity of this theory was contested, MLG offered counterhypotheses to those of (liberal) intergovernmentalism. Although George agreed with Jordan on his assertion that work adopting the MLG perspective was inclined to focus on SNAs instead of other actors, the work had not sufficiently...
Network governance

Kohler-Koch & Eising (1999) use the term ‘network governance’ regarding governance when talking about the EU. It refers to the idea that political actors regard problem-solving the essence of politics and that the setting of policy-making is characterised by the existence of highly organised social sub-systems. In such a setting, efficient and effective governing has to pay tribute to the specific rationalities of these sub-systems. The state is vertically and horizontally segmented and its role has changed from authoritative allocation ‘from above’ to the role of an activator (p. 5). Network governance is linked with MLG in the sense that networks are regarded as a potential solution to the co-ordination challenges posed by the increased complexity of public policy-making. Various actors can be mobilised that bring different resources to the table in seeking to meet such challenges. EU officials have embraced the notions of network governance and MLG. For example, in 2009, the EU Committee of the Regions released a White Paper on MLG. Besides praise, there is also criticism of network governance. In the area of environmental policy, Jordan & Schout (2006) argued that networked forms of governance ‘while in vogue, are by no means a panacea’ (p. 274, as cited in Bache et al., 2011, p. 31). Although network governance connects the relevant actors that can bring different skills and resources to a specific policy challenge, it can also cause responsibility for policy co-ordination to become dispersed, meaning that no one takes overall responsibility (Bache et al., 2011, p. 31). While this is an understandable argument, this threat can be avoided if one actor assumes a directing role at the very start of the policy process. This does not necessarily have to be the government; actors from the business community or civil society may be equipped with the necessary
expertise to fulfil such a role. Bogason & Musso argue that virtually any actor may be willing to take on a leadership role: public managers, street-level bureaucrats, or private political entrepreneurs (2006, p. 7). This argument is often found in articles by scholars that write on the idea of metagovernance: ‘a way of enhancing coordinated governance in a fragmented political system based on a high degree of autonomy for a plurality of self-governing networks and institutions’. It is an indirect way of governing that is exercised by influencing various processes of self-governance. Governance theorists generally agree that metagovernance is exercised not only by state actors, but also by various networks of public and private actors and a large range of supranational, regional and local levels in the formal political system. In fact, it is possible that metagovernance can be exercised by any resourceful actor, whether public or private. The only requirement is resources, as well as a desire to influence activities performed by self-governing actors. ‘Although the legitimate right to exercise sovereign rule was monopolised by politicians, metagovernance can legitimately be exercised by anybody’ (Sørensen, 2006, pp. 100, 102-103).

2.3 Theoretical concepts

Legitimacy

There are various concepts of legitimacy. In this thesis, the term is only used in a political and democratic context. Benhabib (1994) describes democratic legitimacy as ‘the belief on the part of the citizens that the major institutions of a society and the decisions reached by them on behalf of the public are worthy of being obeyed’ (p. 27). The online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains that legitimacy can be defined in both a descriptive and a normative fashion. If understood normatively, legitimacy can be seen as ‘the people’s beliefs about political authority and, sometimes, political obligations.’ The normative concept of political legitimacy refers to ‘a certain benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power or authority and – possibly – obligation’ (Peter, 2010). Up until now, legitimacy is often regarded as ‘the invisible hand’ in a political system; a black box. It is nevertheless an important concept, since it helps us to determine how political decisions can be justified in governance practices (Fenger & Bekkers, 2007, p. 31). In this section, we will come to a clear definition of legitimacy. Bekkers & Edwards (2007) decomposed the concept of legitimacy by distinguishing between input-, throughput and output-oriented legitimacy. These forms of legitimacy can be used as norms or criteria for assessing the democratic legitimacy of governance practices (p. 43). This concept of legitimacy will be used for this thesis.
Scharpf’s input- and output-oriented democratic legitimacy

Before the concept of legitimacy according to Bekkers et al. (2007) is explained, it is important to make mention of the academic that they chiefly based their writings on: Fritz W. Scharpf. He laid the basis for the explanation of legitimacy that is used for this thesis. Scharpf observes two forms of democratic legitimacy: input- and output-oriented legitimacy. The input dimension refers to the idea of ‘government by the people’. It implies that ‘collectively binding decisions should originate from the authentic expression of the preferences of the constituency in question’. Thus, government is intended to be self-government, and compliance is to be expected because the laws are self-determined, instead of imposed by an exogenous will. The output dimension refers to the idea of ‘government for the people’. It implies that ‘collectively binding decisions should serve the common interest of the constituency’. Obedience is justified, because collective fate control is enhanced when the powers of government can be used to deal with those issues that the members of the collectivity cannot solve either individually, or through market interactions, or through voluntary co-operation (1998, p. 3).

Input legitimacy

As was written in the previous paragraph, input-oriented democratic thought refers to the idea of ‘government by the people’. It includes a number of norms that are related to the values of political equality, active citizenship and popular sovereignty. The most important norms are as follows:

- what are the opportunities for citizen participation? The most basic opportunity in a democracy is the right to vote in elections. However, in a governance context, input legitimacy should be enhanced in other ways as well. For example, there should be room for citizens to express their wishes and interests in political decision making, and it should be possible for them to engage themselves in public debate and policy-making. There should be equal opportunities for citizens to have influence on political decision making;
- in case citizen involvement is only indirect or when citizens do not participate, how high is the quality of the representation of interests and preferences by political intermediaries? It needs to be determined whether or not elected representatives and interest groups actually stand for the interests of their constituents and whether or not all of the relevant interests are included;
- how open is the agenda setting process for demands and concerns of citizens? How easy it to get issues on the political agenda for those that are not a politician or influential stakeholder? This norm is a reference to the openness of governance practices to respond to specific needs in society (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007, pp. 43-44).
**Throughput legitimacy**

Throughput legitimacy is a term that was not described by Scharpf, but was added to the concept by Bekkers & Edwards. This form of legitimacy is defined in terms of certain qualities of the rules and procedures by which binding decisions are made. If problems that confront a community are to be solved, collective action is required. After all, societal problems could not be solved through individual action, through market exchange or through voluntary co-operation in civil society (Stone, 2002; Scharpf, 1998, p. 11, as cited in Bekkers & Edwards, 2007, p. 44). The norms that belong to throughput legitimacy are related in particular to the values of majority rule, checks and balances and free deliberation.

- how is collective decision making realised? One can make a distinction between decision making on the basis of the aggregation of individual preferences through voting, or on the basis of integrating mechanisms such as deliberation and debate (March & Olsen, 1995, as cited in Bekkers & Edwards, 2007, p. 44). Democracy assumes that interests and preferences are weighed on an equal footing. A political system should include a combination of aggregative and integrative mechanisms;
- how high is the quality of participation in the decision making process? In a representative democracy, the legitimacy of the decision making process is based on the participation of politicians and their election by the voters. A variety of perspectives may help in improving the collective learning process, since competing insights are brought into the decision making process. Also, it is of import to pay heed to ‘weak interests’; those with specific interests who do not have the resources to organise themselves as a group. The quality of participation is also determined by information provision on the content and procedures of the decision making process;
- how high is the quality of the checks and balances that are embedded in the decision making process? An example of such checks and balances is any institutional device that constrains the use of power by politicians, bureaucracies and private stakeholders. Such devices prevent the specific interests of minority groups or the aforementioned weak interests from being swept aside by majority rule or by powerful public and private stakeholders (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007, pp. 44-45).

**Output (outcome/feedback) legitimacy**

The output-oriented perspective on democratic legitimacy concentrates on the idea of ‘government for the people’ (Scharpf, 1998, p. 11, as cited in Bekkers & Edwards, 2007, p. 45). It is about the capacity of government to produce certain output or outcomes that actually contribute
toward solving collective problems. Not the capacity itself is judged, but the intended and unintended effects which have been realised.

- how is the performance of government in terms of (1) the effectiveness and efficiency of the outputs, produced as the result of the political decisions made and (2) the responsiveness of these decisions to the expressed wishes of the people? Governments are expected to tackle collective problems, such as crime and traffic jams. Have the policy goals that were originally formulated been realised? What are the effects of the measures that were taken to fulfil these goals and what kinds of costs were incurred to accomplish them? There is a distinction between the output of government programmes and the actual outcomes, while at the same time, the actual performance of government is also affected by the relationship between output and outcome. For example, an increasing number of traffic fines (as the output of government actions) does not necessarily mean that the traffic safety (as outcome of government actions) has been improved;

- how is accountability organised? This refers to a communicative process between an actor and a forum about the actor’s performance in decision making and implementation (Meijer & Bovens, 2005, as cited in Bekkers & Edwards, 2007, p. 46). The authority to make decisions also presupposes that one is accountable for these decisions and for the produced results. This in turn implies that information should be given on the decisions and their effects (transparency). In regards to the institutional nature of the forum (for example, electorate and courts), one can make a distinction between political, legal and public accountability. Also, it is important to investigate how the feedback mechanisms are organised and how relevant stakeholders can participate in these mechanisms (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007, pp. 45-46).

The authors assume that responsiveness affects effectiveness, yet it may also be the case that it works the other way around, meaning that there is an interaction between several variables. This is also known as the interaction effect. In order to come to reliable conclusions, one must control for these variables.

**Accountability in European Governance**

As written before, MLG concentrates on the co-operation between multiple layers of government. Some problems in regards to input and throughput legitimacy are expected when it comes to this mode of governance. Usually, MLG is based on borrowing the legitimacy of other democratic institutions, such as a parliament or a municipal council. There is thus talk of indirect representation and
participation of interests. Also, problems are to be expected regarding the output norm of accountability. Usually, citizens are not able to hold the governors of such MLG bodies accountable. Accountability is arranged on the level of the participating public organisations. It also depends on the nature of the mandate given to the representatives of, for example, a municipality, which participates in a regional development body. At the same time, co-operation between multiple layers of government could contribute to output legitimacy, since many societal issues cross the jurisdictions of the traditional layers of government and their representative bodies. Co-operation is regarded as a strategy to develop and implement effective plans that deal with these boundary issues (Bekkers & Edwards, 2007, p. 47).

Bovens (2007) argues that the legitimacy of the European policy is being compromised by growing accountability deficits. That is, the trend toward European policy-making is not being matched by an equally forceful creation of appropriate accountability regimes (p. 447). The term ‘accountability’ is yet another fuzzy topic which needs to be explained further. It is a golden concept that no one can oppose. The word is found increasingly in political discourse and policy documents, because it conveys an image of transparency and trustworthiness. At the same time, it is a most elusive concept, since it can have various meanings to different people (p. 448). The terms ‘accountability’ and ‘accountable’ hold strong promises of fair and equitable governance. Also, the accounting relationship has almost completely reversed. No longer does it refer to sovereigns holding their subjects to account, but the exact opposite: the authorities themselves are being held accountable by their citizens. What started as a tool to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public governance, has gradually turned into a goal in itself. Accountability has become an icon for good governance, first in the United States of America (USA), but increasingly in the EU as well. The term is an evocative political word that is used to patch up a rambling argument, to create an image of trustworthiness, fidelity and justice, or to hold critics at bay. However, as an icon, the concept is nowadays less useful for analytical purposes. Bovens thinks of it as ‘a dustbin filled with good intentions, loosely defined concepts and vague images of good governance’ (p. 449). Bovens’s definition of accountability as a social relation is as follows:

A relationship qualifies as a case of accountability when:

1. there is a relationship between an actor and a forum,
2. in which the actor is obliged,
3. to explain and justify,
4. his conduct;
5. the forum can pose questions,
6. pass judgement,
and the actor may face consequences (2007, p. 452).

The actor is an individual, such as an official or civil servant, or an organisation, such as a public institution or an agency. The accountability forum can be a certain person, such as a superior, a minister or a journalist, but can also be an agency, such as parliament, a court or the audit office. The relationship between the actor and the forum can have the nature of a principal-agent relation, where the forum is the principal, such as parliament, which has delegated authority to a minister, the agent, who is held to account himself regularly concerning his performance in office. The obligation of an actor can be either formal or informal. Public officials will usually be under a formal obligation to render account regularly to certain forums, such as supervisory agencies, courts or auditors. In case of administrative deviance, policy failures or disasters, public officials may be forced to appear in administrative or penal courts or to testify before parliamentary committees. Examples of informal obligations are press conferences, informal briefings and voluntary audits. The forum may pass judgement on the conduct of the actor. It can approve of an annual account, denounce a policy or publicly condemn the behaviour of an official or agency. In case the judgement is a negative one, the forum frequently imposes sanctions on the actor. The consequences can vary from fines, disciplinary measures, civil remedies to penal sanctions, but can also be based on unwritten rules, which can be the case of the political accountability of a minister to parliament, where the consequence can imply calling for the minister’s resignation (pp. 450-452).

Van Nispen & Posseth (2007) underscore the importance of the system of public, often limited to parliamentary, accountability in case effectiveness does not compensate for the lack of participation in the European context (p. 225). Public accountability can be parliamentary or non-parliamentary. Parliamentary accountability, in turn, can be either direct or indirect. Currently, there are many policy areas where there is no talk of direct parliamentary accountability. For instance, accountability for, and therefore legitimacy of the fiscal policy of the EU MS is at best parliamentary, albeit indirect. When it comes to the common monetary policy, accountability is non-parliamentary, since it is consciously left in the hands of professionals, i.e., bankers. However, Van Nispen & Posseth conclude that this does
not imply that there is a legitimacy gap, since the gap may be filled again (i.e., compensated) by other factors, such as the problem solving capacity of the same bankers (p. 226).

Figure 2.3: A classification of public accountability (Van Nispen & Posseth, 2007, p. 226).

**Uploading and downloading in European Governance**

Marshall (2004) has created a working definition of Europeanisation at the urban level which he considers applicable to any European city engaging with political initiatives and pressures from the European level. He distinguishes between download and upload Europeanisation. The former is about ‘changes in policies, practices, preferences or participants within local systems of governance, arising from the negotiation and implementation of EU programmes’. The latter describes ‘the transfer of innovative urban practices to the supranational arena, resulting in the incorporation of local initiatives in pan-European policies or programmes’ (p. 7). Marshall used this definition in an urban governance context, although it can also be applied to the way in which MS governments both shape European policy outcomes and adapt to them. It is asserted that national executives aim to minimise the costs which the implementation of European norms and rules may impose on their home constituencies. For this reason, they have a general incentive to upload their domestic policies to the European level, arguing that the implementation costs at the national level will be lower if the fit between European and domestic policies is better (Börzel, 2002, p. 194).

**Treaty of Lisbon**

In December 2007, the then EU MS signed the so-called Treaty of Lisbon, which was also known for a time as the European Reform Treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 2009. Two of the primary goals of ‘Lisbon’ were to make the EU ‘more democratic’ and ‘more manageable’. After the accession of twelve new MS to the EU between 2004 and 2007, the 2001 Treaty of Nice was no longer sufficient for the EU to operate effectively. As a result, TCE was drafted. One year after TCE stranded in referenda in France and in the Netherlands in 2005, negotiations started on its successor.
Seeing as the Treaty of Lisbon sought to improve democracy at the EU level, six relevant features of this treaty that impact European Governance will be mentioned in this section.

First, all decision making procedures have received different names and in some cases, they are changed. The codecision procedure was renamed to ordinary legislative procedure. All other procedures have become so-called special legislative procedures which are specified further on an article to article basis.

Second, in a number of policy areas, such as asylum, agricultural expenditure, structural funds, trade, transport, and a part of the police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, the EP has become co-legislator, together with the Council. The EP has also received codecision powers on the appointment of the President of the Commission.

Third, the European Council has become an official body of the EU. The European Council receives a fixed chairperson, separated from the rotating Council presidency. The fixed chairperson leads meetings and prepares the agenda. They also represent the European Council vis-à-vis heads of state and government.

Fourth, the application of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) within the Council was expanded to almost all policy areas, replacing unanimity. The Council will make use of an adjusted QMV per November 2014. It will be a combination of (1) the total number of MS that votes in favour and (2) the share of the population the MS that vote in favour represent relative to the total EU population. By default, a qualified majority equals 55 per cent of the MS and 65 per cent of the population. Proposals that are not made by the Commission or High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) require a qualified majority of 72 per cent of the MS and 65 per cent of the population.

Fifth, national parliaments have received the ability to pull a yellow or orange card when they are of the opinion that it is more appropriate to handle certain EU legislation at the national level, rather than at the EU level (the principle of subsidiarity). If one third of the national parliaments think that the legislation should not be arranged at the EU level, the Council and EP may decide to discard the Commission proposal. In order to cancel the proposal, a 55 per cent majority is needed in the Council, while a simple majority suffices in the EP (“Verdrag van Lissabon,” n.d.).

Sixth, the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon paved the way for the ECI, through which citizens are able to request the Commission to put a particular issue on the agenda, as long as the issue is related to a policy area where the EU is authorised to legislate. If the initiative is supported by at least one million signatures from at least seven different MS within one year, then it is up to the Commission to come up with an official response, or not (“Europees Burgerinitiatief (EBI),” n.d.).
The point of departure of my research is the claim that the aforementioned main features of the Treaty of Lisbon have increased the input, throughput and output legitimacy of European Governance. That is, the ECI has opened up the possibility for citizens to impact the EU decision making process at the earliest stage. The EP’s codecision powers in additional policy areas and the introduction of the ordinary legislative procedure have also indirectly strengthened the role of European voters in EU decision making (input). The introduction of QMV to additional policy areas within the Council, at the cost of unanimity, has made decision making within this body more democratic, since MS population is taken into account, and single MS will no longer be able to block proposals in this voting procedure (throughput). The yellow and orange card procedure can be regarded as a means to secure EU policy-making efficiency and effectiveness (output).

2.4 Hypotheses
From the section on the key concepts and indicators above, a set of hypotheses was created. They will undergo verification in later chapters. First, there is the null hypothesis. Then, there are three hypotheses that are directly based on the writings of Bekkers & Edwards (2007).

\[ H_0 \text{ there is no relationship between the Treaty of Lisbon and an increased legitimacy of European Governance;} \]
\[ H_1 \text{ the Treaty of Lisbon has increased the input legitimacy of European Governance;} \]
\[ H_2 \text{ the Treaty of Lisbon has increased the throughput legitimacy of European Governance;} \]
\[ H_3 \text{ the Treaty of Lisbon has increased the output legitimacy of European Governance.} \]

2.5 Flowchart model
The flowchart as shown in Figure 2.4 on the next page reflects the three hypotheses formulated in the previous section. It shows that there is an interaction between the perceived democratic nature of the EU according to the Treaty of Lisbon (the independent variable) on the one hand, and input legitimacy, throughput legitimacy and outcome legitimacy (the mechanisms) on the other. These three forms of legitimacy are not equal, and interaction takes places between them. The degree of input, throughput and output legitimacy in turn affect the degree to which there is a democratic deficit in European Governance (the dependent variable). The flowchart makes the claim that the Treaty of Lisbon enhances the input, throughput and output legitimacy of EU decision making. These three forms of legitimacy in turn decrease the democratic deficit in European Governance. Thus, the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon will eventually lead to a shrinking of the democratic deficit. Intervening variables
were not included in the figure, to avoid extreme complexity. Instead, the intervening variables will be discussed below.

Figure 2.4: Flowchart model consisting of the independent variable, mechanisms and dependent variable.

2.6 Intervening variables

There are both conditions and potential barriers when it comes to establishing a relationship between the independent and dependent variable. The conditions are that:

- input, throughput and output legitimacy are the prime mechanisms that link the Treaty of Lisbon with the democratic deficit in European Governance;
- EU citizens are aware of the existence and workings of the bodies of the EU;
- the bodies of the EU act in accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon.

There may be other variables that influence the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. These may lead to a bias in the effect that is being researched (Van Thiel, 2010, p. 193). Possible barriers are:

- controversies of particular EU or national policies. For instance, respondents may be pessimistic about the way democracy works in the EU due to the poor financial circumstances in their home country as a result of the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, the EU is not the only actor here; there are other organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that may have an impact on the financial situation of the MS. Another controversy is the improper collection of daily allowances by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The fact that MEPs come to collect their daily allowances and then leave again, is perfectly legitimate. However, it is frowned upon by some Europeans, and has triggered negative attitudes towards the EU in general (Bremner, 2013);
• (a lack of) knowledge on the institutional framework of the EU. Respondents may not be informed, or even misinformed on their rights as citizens to affect the policy process in Brussels. Today, there are many unsubstantiated clichés on how undemocratic the EU is, and the man in the street may be prone to take over this clichéd way of thinking. Then perhaps we could speak of a knowledge deficit, rather than a democratic deficit;

• the bodies of the EU. When looking at the criteria that Bekkers & Edwards (2007, pp. 43-45) created, it begs the question whether output legitimacy is addressed by the Treaty of Lisbon alone. Effectiveness and responsiveness boosts may also be realised under the status quo.

There are a number of context variables that influence the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable:

• political setting: the ratification process of the Treaty of Lisbon was different from the similar Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Unlike in the ratification process of the Constitution, no referenda were held in any MS but Ireland. This decision faced much criticism from Europeans. It is ironic that the Treaty of Lisbon, which aims to improve the democracy of the EU altogether, was introduced in a less democratic fashion than its failed predecessor. This may have consequences for the way Europeans feel about democracy in the EU;

• economic setting: the Eurozone is currently recovering from the financial crisis it was struck by from 2009 on. Much has been said and written on the effectiveness of the EU in combatting the crisis in the past years. There are advanced plans for the creation of an EU banking union that aims to increase the financial stability of the Eurozone, yet they are merely a response to the damage that was already inflicted upon the economies of the MS. The economy variable might play a role in this research, for it is possible that citizens from high debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) MS (e.g., Greece) may find the EU to be undemocratic due to imposed austerity measures by the Troika, consisting of the Commission, European Central Bank (ECB) and IMF. This potentially negates positive effects in terms of the closing of the democratic deficit that the Treaty of Lisbon may cause;

• institutional setting: the unique character of the EU, that consists of both an intergovernmental and a supranational dimension, makes it a challenge to compare it with the traditional nation-state. Although the EU could be regarded as a confederation of some sort, where its MS have to implement policies agreed on in Brussels, there are some fields where the MS are in control of their own policies, such as those that used to fall under the former second and third pillar of the EU (foreign policy, security policy and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters).
If it turns out at the end of my research that additional explanations are required, I will determine whether the above context variables may explain that which my research is unable to grasp.
Chapter 3
Research Design

3.1 Introduction
This purpose of this chapter is to give a justification of the methods that I have used for my research. The two approaches that I am applying to reach conclusions will be explained in detail, as well as the corresponding potential pitfalls, and my methods of countering them. Research designs are not always a given; one needs to mix and match different approaches that meet the objective of the study. There are roughly two different kinds of designs that can be applied to research in the social sciences: quantitative and qualitative designs. This distinction of designs rather refers to the kind of data that is collected (numerical or not) than to the specific methods and techniques with which these data are gathered or analysed. A questionnaire, for instance, can lead to both qualitative data (e.g., opinions and views) and numerical information (e.g., information on the budget of an organisation, or the age of a person) (Van Thiel, 2010, pp. 70). Qualitative data are not suitable for statistical analyses; they require an approach where encoding and interpretation play a large role. Quantitative data are more suitable for statistical analyses (p. 194). Knowing that there is disagreement amongst scholars which research technique is the most suitable in the social sciences, I will not pick a side and will use both quantitative as well as qualitative approaches.

3.2 Methods of inquiry
In the following subparagraphs, I will provide more detailed information on my methods of inquiry for this research: a Eurobarometer survey and a series of interviews with both experts as well as non-experts. Together, they have provided insight into the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the democratic legitimacy of European Governance. I will also further explain why I have chosen these two methods to reach firm conclusions.

3.2.1 Cross-national comparison selection procedure
In Chapter 2, I referred to a number of norms on input, throughput and output legitimacy, as designed by Bekkers & Edwards (2007, pp. 43-46). The framework with its listed norms serves as a set of indicators for my research. As my first step, I have carefully selected four EU MS by means of the work of Kopecký & Mudde (2002). They had designed a two-dimensional conceptualisation of party positions on European integration in general, and of Euroscepticism in particular (p. 297). For the first
dimension, they draw on David Easton’s seminal distinction between different forms of support for political regimes by distinguishing between ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support for European integration. By diffuse support, they refer to support for the general ideas of European integration that underlie the EU. By specific support, they refer to support of the general practice of European integration; meaning the EU as it is and as it is developing. When it comes to support, there are Europhiles and Europhobes. The former believe in the key ideas of European integration underlying the EU: institutionalised co-operation on the basis of pooled sovereignty (the political element) and an integrated liberal market economy (the economic element). Europhobes, on the other hand, do not support (indeed, they often oppose) the general ideas of European integration underlying the EU. This may be because they are nationalists, socialists, or isolationists, or simply because they believe the idea of European integration is a folly in the face of the diversity existing amongst European states. The second dimension of their typology distinguishes between EU-optimists and EU-pessimists. EU-optimists believe in the EU as it is and as it is developing, while EU-pessimists do not support the EU as it currently is, or are pessimistic about the direction the development is taking (pp. 300-302). The two dimensions result in four ideal-type categories of party positions on Europe, as can be seen in Table 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for EU</th>
<th>Support for European integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europhile</td>
<td>Europhobe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-optimist</td>
<td>Euroenthusiasts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-pessimist</td>
<td>Eurosceptics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europragmatists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eurejects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3.1: Typology of party positions on Europe (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002, p. 303).*

Kopecký & Mudde describe the four ideal-type categories as follows:

- Euroenthusiasts support the general ideas of European integration and believe that the EU is or will soon become the institutionalisation of these ideas;
- Eurosceptics support the general ideas of European integration, but are pessimistic about the EU’s current and/or future reflection of these ideas;
- Eurejects subscribe neither to the ideas underlying the process of European integration nor to the EU;
- Europragmatists do not support the general ideas of European integration underlying the EU, nor do they necessarily oppose them, yet they do support the EU (pp. 302-303).
Using the typology, I have selected one Euroenthusiast, one Eurosceptic, one Euroreject and one Europragmatist MS. In order to identify one optimal MS from each ‘archetype’, I have made use of Eurobarometer items that were included in the three most recent Eurobarometer waves: the autumn of 2012, the spring of 2013 and the autumn of 2013. These items served to measure the position of all MS per dimension. The entire selection procedure can be found in Appendix I. To sum up the selection procedure for the country study, the following countries were selected: Slovakia (Euroenthusiast), Denmark (Europragmatist), Greece (Eurosceptic) and Sweden (Euroreject). We thus have four small to mid-range MS, of which two are eurozone members (Slovakia and Greece). The other two (Denmark and Sweden) were members of the economically rivalling European Free Trade Association (EFTA) prior to joining the EU. There is also variety in ‘seniority’; Denmark is the oldest member of the four (1973), with Greece (1981), Sweden (1995) and Slovakia (2004) joining in the following decades. The standards of living also greatly vary: Denmark’s GDP (according to Purchasing Power Standards, PPS) per capita was 126% of the EU average, the 5th highest of all MS. Sweden displays equal figures (126 per cent, ranked 6th), while Slovakia (76 per cent, ranked 18th) and Greece (75 per cent, ranked 20th) produce much lower figures (“GDP per capita in PPS,” 2012). This is therefore arguably a balanced and varied set of MS to include in a country study.

3.2.2 Eurobarometer items for measuring national reactions to legitimacy

Now that the four MS were selected, the next step was to allocate Eurobarometer items that are translations of the norms set by Bekkers & Edwards (2007, pp. 43-46). One Eurobarometer item was assigned to each form of legitimacy.

- for input legitimacy, the following item was chosen: ‘My voice counts in the EU’. The answer options are ‘Agree’, ‘Disagree’ and ‘Don’t know’;
- for throughput legitimacy, the following item was chosen: ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU?’ The answer options are ‘Very satisfied’, ‘Fairly satisfied’, ‘Not very satisfied’ and ‘Don’t know’;
- for output legitimacy, the following item was chosen: ‘The interests of our country are well taken into account in the European Union’. The answer options are ‘Agree’, ‘Disagree’ and ‘Don’t know’.

In the next five chapters, the national reactions from the four selected MS to these three Eurobarometer items from the past decade are displayed and analysed. The goal is to determine if/how the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon affected the way the respondents from Slovakia,
Denmark, Greece and Sweden perceive the democratic legitimacy of the EU. Since these four MS come from the four different archetypes as identified by Kopecký & Mudde (2002), the national responses should be representative for the citizens of the EU as a whole. The three items that are displayed behind the bullet points, in my opinion, reflect my research topic best. The first question is much related to input legitimacy, since it involves the notion that collectively binding decisions should originate from the authentic expression of the preferences of the constituency in question. The second question is linked to throughput legitimacy, due to the idea that binding decisions should adhere to certain qualities of the rules and procedures. I am aware of the fact that this survey item has a degree of overlap with the other two forms of legitimacy. The third question is related to output legitimacy in the sense that governments should produce policies that are responsive to the expressed wishes of the people. The other questions that can be found in the Eurobarometer surveys are not sufficiently related to what I aimed to measure. E.g., there are also questions on the perceived image of the EU, awareness of the European institutions, support for EU membership, feasibility of Europe 2020 goals, and so on. Including such questions in my Eurobarometer research would only steer my research in the wrong direction. The Eurobarometer is a relatively quick and easy way to obtain reliable and valid data on the status quo in the EU when it comes to public opinion. I cannot think of a better quantitative approach for this cross-national study than the Eurobarometer, being the finger on the pulse of European society. I acknowledge that I am dependent on opinions in order to come to conclusions. There is a distinction between stated behaviour and revealed behaviour, whereby stated behaviour shows only opinions and revealed behaviour relates to facts. From the data of the surveys and interviews, I will mainly work with stated behaviour. In other words, we are not actually measuring the EU’s democratic legitimacy; we are measuring public satisfaction with the EU’s democratic legitimacy.

3.2.3 Interviews

Lastly, I have interviewed eight respondents on their opinion on the three forms of legitimacy in European Governance, and on their insights regarding the structurally different national reactions to the three forms of legitimacy. These interviews took place in a semi structured fashion, meaning that there was a topic list which is based on the framework by Bekkers & Edwards (2007), as well as the outcomes from my cross-national comparison. The advantage of having a degree of structure in the interviews is that I could prevent situations in which the interviewee would bring up various topics that are not interesting for my research. I would also be able to steer the conversation better when upholding a structure than I would in a fully open interview. There are various potential pitfalls that I needed to take into account. First, I avoided losing my neutral and independent stance towards the topic and the interviewee. This involved, for instance, not revealing my opinion in the questions that I
asked. This decreased the likelihood that the social desirability bias would occur. Also, any responses from me to the interviewee’s answers had to be positive and constructive, both verbally and non-verbally. Second, I prevented myself from misinterpreting the answers of the interviewee. I did so by summarising their answers so as to identify any possible misinterpretations. Third, I did not ask for peripheral issues unless absolutely necessary. Otherwise, the actual topic would disappear from the scope, and the conversation would go into all kinds of directions. Fourth, I avoided asking vague or difficult questions. Otherwise, the interviewee might misinterpret the questions, or would not even be able to answer them. Fifth, I kept paying close attention to what was said, so as to prevent myself from asking questions that were already covered by the interviewee previously. As a general remark, it was important that the conversation was held in an as much natural way as possible. This way, I would receive the most optimal amount of information. This is known as routing. During the conversation, I asked the interviewee to elaborate, in case the answer of the interviewee required me to (Van Thiel, 2010, p. 110). The actual list with questions can be found in Appendix II.

3.3 Reliability and validity

In any scientific research, reliability and validity are important conditions for reaching thorough conclusions. Reliability refers to the accuracy and consistency of measurements. A measuring instrument is reliable if it shows the same results under the same circumstances. Validity refers to the (1) validity of results (internal validity), as in, did one measure what they wanted to measure; (2) the generalisability of conclusions (external validity), as in, do these conclusions also apply to other times, situations, locations, organisations (Van Thiel, 2010, pp. 189, 200-201)? In the realm of social sciences, it is a good use for academics and students to apply triangulation when conducting research. This means that at least two methods of data collection are used so as to come to firmer conclusions. It is a tested way to counter degradation of the reliability and validity of a particular research. By including information from multiple sources in a study, or by analysing the information in multiple ways, it becomes clear how reliable and valid the collected data actually is. If research findings on the same topic are contradictory, further investigation is required before reliable and valid conclusions can be made. Triangulation is also known as *mixed methods* and is usually applied in qualitative research (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 267; Hakvoort, 1996, p. 131; ‘t Hart et al., 1998, pp. 270-271; Maso & Smaling, 1998, pp. 69, 72, as cited in Van Thiel, 2010, pp. 61-62). Conversely, if different methods lead to the same result, the research method may be deemed as reliable and valid. For this reason, I have also applied triangulation to my research methods by means of (1) performing a cross-national comparison between the four carefully selected MS of the EU on their national reactions to input, throughput and output legitimacy, as well as (2) arranging a series of interviews with both experts and
ordinary citizens, who will comment on the status quo of the three forms of legitimacy and the structurally different attitudes between MS regarding democracy in the EU. By involving a quantitative as well as a qualitative method, I aim to provide results that are both reliable and valid.

3.4 Matrix
On the next page, a matrix comprising the most important theoretical concepts for empirical research, its norms, indicators and ways of measurement can be found. It serves as the linkage between Chapters 2 and 3: the concepts and norms were discussed in the previous chapter, while the indicators and ways of measurement were mentioned in the previous paragraphs of this chapter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical concept</th>
<th>Norm</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Way of measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Input legitimacy</td>
<td>Opportunities for citizen participation</td>
<td>Percentage of respondents that feel that their voice counts in the EU</td>
<td>Eurobarometer Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality of the representation of interests and preferences by political intermediaries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agenda setting process for demands and concerns of citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throughput legitimacy</td>
<td>Realisation of collective decision making</td>
<td>Percentage of respondents that are satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU</td>
<td>Eurobarometer Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality of participation in the decision making process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality of the checks and balances that are embedded in the decision making process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output legitimacy</td>
<td>Performance of government in terms of (1) the effectiveness and efficiency of the outputs, produced as the result of the political decisions made and...</td>
<td>Percentage of respondents that feel that the interests of their country are well taken into account in the EU</td>
<td>Eurobarometer Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...(2) the responsiveness of these decisions to the expressed wishes of the people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organisation of accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3.2: Theoretical concepts, norms, indicators and way of measurement.*
3.5 Prelude to cross-national comparison

In the coming five chapters, the four EU MS that were selected in this chapter – Slovakia, Denmark, Greece and the Sweden – will be part of a cross-national comparison. The objectives of these chapters chapter are threefold. First and foremost, the relationship between the arrangements of the Treaty of Lisbon and the national reactions to the three forms of legitimacy will be measured. This will be done by means of a series of graphs and tables. In order to best compare the national reactions *ex ante* and *ex post* Treaty of Lisbon, Eurobarometer data from the past decade were consulted. Every displayed year typically consists of a spring (S) and an autumn (A) wave. The tables and graphs will sometimes show blanks. This is due to the fact that the items in question were unfortunately not always included in every Eurobarometer survey. Second, it will be measured to what extent the national reactions of the four MS correspond to their archetypes. This means that respondents from Slovakia will ideally show mostly positive responses to the selected Eurobarometer items, while their Danish and Greek counterparts show more scepticism. The Swedish reactions should then be the most negative of the four MS. If this is the case, the typology of Kopecký & Mudde (2002) can be integrated with the norms of Bekkers & Edwards (2007) into a new framework capable of predicting national reactions by means of the currently available Eurobarometer items. Third, some of the most widely discussed elements of European Governance in the Netherlands will be discussed, including both experts’ criticism as well as suggestions to improve the democratic legitimacy of European Governance.
Chapter 4
Reactions to legitimacy: Slovakia

With around 5.5 million inhabitants in 2013, the Slovak Republic is one of the smaller EU MS in terms of population. Slovakia is the first of the four selected MS for this research, and was classified as the ‘Euroenthusiast’. Following the typology of Kopecký & Mudde (2002, p. 303), this implies two things. First, this country is expected to support the general ideas of European integration. Second, it is expected that in Slovakia, there is a strong belief that the EU is or will soon become the institutionalisation of these ideas. It is therefore expected that, from the four MS, Slovakia will show the most positive public responses to the three forms of legitimacy.

4.1.1 Historical development
Throughout history, Slovakia has chiefly not been an independent state, but part of another entity. For a thousand years, the country was a part of the Hungarian Kingdom. After the dual Austro-Hungarian Monarchy formed in 1867, the Magyarisation, which involved language and education policies favouring the use of Hungarian, led to a strengthening of Slovak nationalism and a cultivation of cultural bonds with the highly similar Czechs, who were under Austrian rule at that time. After the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I (WWI), the Slovaks and Czechs founded the state of Czechoslovakia. However, during the interbellum, Slovak nationalist leaders were already advocating autonomy within Czechoslovakia. In 1939, Slovakia became an independent state and entered into an alliance with Nazi Germany. When World War II (WWII) was over, Czechoslovakia joined the United Nations (UN). In that same year, the country was reconstituted and came under communist rule within Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. In February 1991, Czechoslovakia entered into an alliance called the Visegrád Group, with Hungary and Poland. This co-operation still exists today. On the official website of the alliance, it reads that it is ‘a co-operation in a number of fields of common interest within the all-European integration’. The Visegrád Group claims not to be an alternative to the ‘all-European integration efforts’. Their activities are ‘in no way aimed at isolation or the weakening of ties with the other countries’. Contrarily, their stated goal is to encourage optimal co-operation with ‘all countries’, particularly their neighbours. Their ultimate interest is ‘the democratic development in all parts of Europe’ (“About the Visegrád Group,” n.d.). On 1 January 1993, Czechoslovakia peacefully split up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The two fresh countries entered into a customs union together, so that there would be free movement of goods and services between them (“Agreement establishing the Customs Union between the Czech Republic and the

In a government manifesto on the website of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, it can be read that the Slovak government’s priorities are to make Slovakia ‘trusted and respected in Europe’, to develop bilateral relations with EU MS, and especially its neighbours. In the document, it also reads that the Slovak government has a ‘clear pro-European attitude’. The government announces to actively communicate the current themes of the EU to the Slovak public in order to ‘bring the Union closer to the citizens for a better understanding of [the] deepening of [the] integration processes’. Moreover, the government wants to ensure greater involvement of citizens in the EU decision making process (“Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the Period of 2012 – 2016,” n.d.). In the second half of 2016, Slovakia will have the Presidency of the EU. It can be expected that the Slovak government will use its term to elevate the voices of small states with limited influence on the so-called ‘big players’ in the EU (Weiss, 2012).

4.1.2 Economic circumstances

The Slovak economy consisted of services for 47 per cent of the GDP, followed by industry (thirty per cent) and agriculture (3.1 per cent) in 2013. Before it joined the EU in 2004, Slovakia reformed its taxation, healthcare, pension and social welfare systems. The country adopted the euro in 2009. Major privatisations are near completion, while the banking system is already almost entirely in foreign hands. The Slovak government has also caused a foreign investment boom with business friendly policies. Cheap, skilled labour, low taxes, the lack of dividend taxes, a relatively liberal labour code and a favourable geographical location are the country’s greatest assets for foreign direct investment. These investments caused significant growth until 2008. After a contraction in 2009, growth returned, although it has remained slow chiefly because of continued weakness in external demand. In 2012, the government cancelled some of its pro-growth reforms so as to strengthen public finances. Today, corruption and slow dispute resolution are mentioned as key factors constraining Slovakia’s economic growth (“Slovakia,” 2014). In January 2014, the country had an unemployment rate of 13.6 per cent, which is higher than the EU and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) average, 10.8 and 12 per cent, respectively. Unemployment is nevertheless dropping slowly but surely (“Harmonised unemployment rate by sex,” 2014). In the third quarter of 2013, Slovakia had a public debt that equalled 57.2 per cent of the GDP, down from 58.1 per cent in the previous quarter (“Euro area government debt down to
92.7% of GDP, EU28 up to 86.8% of GDP,” 2014). In the third quarter of 2013, Slovakia was the Eurozone’s fastest-growing economy: 0.7 per cent of the GDP year-on-year (Vilikovská, 2013).

4.1.3 Political setting
Slovakia, as its official name suggests, is a republic. It is also a unitary state and it has a parliamentary democracy. Its executive branch consists of the President – who is also the chief of state – as well as the Prime Minister and their cabinet. The President, who is elected by direct popular vote for a five-year term and is eligible for a second term, has only limited powers (“Slovakia,” n.d.). The President represents the country both inwardly and outwardly. Through their decisions, they are to ensure the proper functioning of constitutional authorities. They are responsible for appointing and recalling the Prime Minister. Upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister, the President also appoints and recalls other members of the government, i.e., the Ministers (“Political System of the Slovak Republic,” n.d.; “Slovakia country profile,” 2012). The legislative branch consists of a unicameral parliament, known as the National Council, which has 150 seats. Its members are elected on the basis of proportional representation to serve four-year terms (“Slovakia,” 2014). The most recent general election occurred in March 2012, which was won by the leftist Smer party. For the first time since Slovakia’s independence, a political party gained an absolute majority in the Slovak parliament. Two of the main plans for Smer’s 2012 election campaign were defending the eurozone and enhancing social welfare. During the 2006 election campaign, Smer projected itself as a pro-European party, but after it had formed a coalition with several ultra-nationalist and populist parties, this pro-European image was difficult to maintain. The same government was also responsible for deteriorating relations with the Hungarian minority present in the country, which tarnished its reputation in the eyes of the EU (“Slovakia country profile,” 2012). According to the Treaty of Nice voting procedures, which will be replaced with the Treaty of Lisbon procedures on 1 November 2014, Slovakia holds seven of the 352 votes in the Council and European Council. (“The Council of the European Union,” n.d.).

4.2.1 Popular reactions to input legitimacy
Figure 4.1 on the next page displays the degree to which Slovaks agreed on the Eurobarometer statement ‘My voice counts in the EU’ between 2004 and 2013. The statement serves as the indicator for measuring input legitimacy. Responses that are in agreement on the statement are advantageous to input legitimacy, while those that are in disagreement are disadvantageous.
Figure 4.1 indicates that there has never been an absolute majority amongst Slovaks that believe that their voice is heard in Brussels. The situation was at its worst in the autumn of 2007. After that, there was some recovery, but this was undone after the spring of 2010. The share of respondents that did not know which answer to provide, generally shrank over the years. The gap between those in agreement with the statement and those in disagreement is increasing. The figures show that the Treaty of Lisbon became effective in a time when input legitimacy was rising, yet Slovaks did not have the feeling that this made their voice in Brussels more powerful. Soon enough, there was about as much disagreement on the statement as was the case in the period prior to the start of the Lisbon era. All in all, the figures show that the situation is dire in terms of the input legitimacy of the EU amongst Slovaks. It is unlikely that this form of legitimacy will be perceived in a positive fashion in the next few Eurobarometer waves.

4.2.2 Popular reactions to throughput legitimacy

Figure 4.2 on the next page displays whether or not Slovaks considered themselves to be satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU between the autumns of 2003 and 2013. This satisfaction serves as the indicator for measuring throughput legitimacy. Satisfied responses are advantageous to throughput legitimacy, while unsatisfied responses are disadvantageous.
Figure 4.2 shows that the topic of the workings of democracy in the EU is nowadays a controversial one for Slovaks. Although a relative majority – and in the most recent Eurobarometer wave an absolute one – is not satisfied, there are also relatively many respondents that are in fact content. Prior to the autumn of 2011, an absolute majority was satisfied, preceded by a relative majority. The arrangements in the Treaty of Lisbon did not cause Slovaks to become more satisfied with EU democracy than they had previously been; the exact opposite happened. The share of respondents that do not know whether they are satisfied or not, is generally higher when compared to the previous item. To conclude this subparagraph: although the throughput legitimacy of the EU is perceived by Slovaks as better than input legitimacy, these results can hardly be called positive. Especially the results from the last Eurobarometer wave show that throughput legitimacy leaves much to be desired in Slovakia.

4.2.3 Popular reactions to output legitimacy

Figure 4.3 on the next page displays the degree to which Slovaks agreed on the Eurobarometer statement ‘The interests of our country are well taken into account in the European Union’ between 2005 and 2013. The statement serves as the indicator for measuring output legitimacy. Responses that are in agreement on the statement are advantageous to output legitimacy, while those that are in disagreement are disadvantageous.

The data from Figure 4.3 show that, after a period of increased agreement on the statement between the autumns of 2007 and 2009, to the point where an absolute majority concurred, a period of decline arrived, which is still somewhat ongoing. Since the autumn of 2010, scepticism towards this statement is once again dominant in Slovakia. The Treaty of Lisbon was introduced in a time when this scepticism was on the rise in Slovakia. It therefore seems that the Treaty did not make Slovaks change their minds on the output legitimacy of the EU. The share of respondents that did not know whether to agree or disagree did lower with the entry into force of the Treaty. The bottom line is that output legitimacy is problematic amongst Slovaks, and increasingly so, albeit slightly.

4.2.4 Conclusion

After consulting the data from the Eurobarometer, the argument can be made that the input legitimacy of the EU is increasingly becoming more problematic amongst Slovaks. Throughput legitimacy is controversial, to say the least. Output legitimacy is an issue as well. In other words: in Slovakia, there is the belief that European citizens should have much more influence in the EU decision making process. There is much disagreement amongst Slovaks on the matter of the workings of democracy in the EU. Slovaks also increasingly believe that their national preferences are not sufficiently taken into account in the EU.
Chapter 5
Reactions to legitimacy: Denmark

The Kingdom of Denmark has around 5.6 million inhabitants and is therefore one of the smaller EU MS in terms of population. Denmark is the second of the four selected MS for this research, and was classified as the ‘Europragmatist’. Following the typology of Kopecký & Mudde (2002, p. 303), this implies two things. First, Denmark is expected to not support the general ideas of European integration underlying the EU, nor to necessarily oppose them. Second, it is expected that Denmark does support the EU. It is also expected that Danes will generally respond less enthusiastically to the Eurobarometer statements and question than the Slovaks did.

5.1.1 Historical development

Denmark has evolved from a major North European power into a modern and prosperous nation that participates in the general political and economic integration of Europe. The country was one of the founding members of the UN in 1945, NATO in 1949 and the EFTA in 1960, along with Austria, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. EFTA started as an equivalent to the European Economic Community (EEC) in that it was – and still is – a trade bloc. In 1961 and 1967, Denmark applied for membership of the EEC along with the UK, Norway and Ireland. However, the then President of France, Charles de Gaulle, vetoed British membership. Since Denmark did not wish to enter the EEC without the UK, the country renounced its application. Denmark eventually joined the EEC together with Ireland and the UK in 1973. The accession was preceded by a national referendum, in which 63.3 per cent of the Danish population voted in favour of EEC membership, whereas 36.7 per cent voted against it (“Denmark & EU,” n.d.). By joining the EEC, Denmark gave up its EFTA membership. Denmark did not integrate as deeply as the majority of the other MS; the country has opted out of certain elements of the Maastricht Treaty, including the EMU, European defence co-operation, as well as issues regarding certain justice and home affairs (“Denmark,” 2014). The opt-outs cannot be changed without Danish consent and will be in place for as long as Denmark desires. In 2007, the ambition to organise a referendum on these opt-outs was announced by the then Danish government, yet it never took place. Even though the opt-outs are maintained in the Treaty of Lisbon, the Treaty allows Denmark to change its opt-out regarding the co-operation on justice and home affairs in the EU by means of a national referendum, so that the country can cooperate in this area on a case-by-case basis (“Danish opt-outs,” n.d.).
On the website of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it can be read that ‘Denmark has worked for an efficient and well-functioning internal market, transparent decision making, and clear and visible results for the individual citizens’ (“Denmark in the EU,” n.d.). During the first half of 2012, Denmark held the EU Presidency. Its priorities were ‘a responsible Europe’ (ensuring healthy European economies), ‘a dynamic Europe’ (focussing on growth and employment), ‘a green Europe’ (promoting green transition and green growth) and ‘a safe Europe’ (strengthening the safety of European citizens). The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserts that the 250 delivered results under the Danish Presidency have shown that the EU can deliver concrete results, when all MS work together and have the will and determination to enter into compromises and collaboration. Denmark considers this ‘a good premise for the EU co-operation to continue on’. (“Danish EU priorities,” 2013; “Results of the Danish EU presidency,” n.d.). The BBC describes the relationship between Denmark and the EU as one that is ‘often difficult’. This is due to the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, as well as the rejection of the euro in a national referendum in 2000. Also, Denmark’s progressive tightening of its immigration laws has resulted in charges that its strict rules violate European norms (“Denmark country profile,” 2011).

5.1.2 Economic circumstances

Today, Denmark is known for its modern economy and extensive welfare system. As written in the previous paragraph, the country did not adopt the euro. The feared loss of political independence and national sovereignty outweighed the economic arguments about the benefits of joining the EMU (“Denmark country profile,” 2011). Instead, the Danish krone is pegged to the euro. The Danish economy consisted for the most part of services (76.8 per cent) in 2013, while industry (21.7 per cent) and agriculture (1.5 per cent) were the lesser sectors. The national economy is highly dependent on foreign trade. It is therefore not surprising that the country is one of the strongest supporters of trade liberalisation within the EU. In 2007, the Danish economy started to slow after a housing boom had ended. In part thanks to increased government spending, Denmark recovered modestly in 2010. This was again followed by a recession in late 2010 and early 2011. Today, in spite of a deficit in the budget balance, the fiscal position of Denmark remains amongst the strongest in the EU (“Denmark,” 2014). In January 2014, the country had an unemployment rate of 7 per cent, which is lower than the EU and EMU average, 10.8 and 12 per cent, respectively (“Harmonised unemployment rate by sex,” 2014). Denmark has the lowest unemployment rate of the four selected MS. In the third quarter of 2013, Denmark had a public debt that equals 46.3 per cent of the GDP, up from 45.7 per cent in the previous quarter (“Euro area government debt down to 92.7% of GDP, EU28 up to 86.8% of GDP,” 2014).
5.1.3 Political setting

Denmark is a unitary state. It has a parliamentary form of government, under a constitutional monarchy. Its executive branch consists of the Monarch – who is also the chief of state – as well as the Prime Minister and their cabinet. The Monarch fulfils a largely ceremonial role. Although the Monarch signs all Acts of Parliament, they cannot come into force when they are not countersigned by a Cabinet Minister. The Monarch formally appoints new governments. They are also regularly informed by the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs on the latest political developments. The everyday tasks of the Monarch are to represent Denmark abroad and to be a figurehead at home (“The Monarchy today,” n.d.). The legislative branch consists of a unicameral parliament, known in English as the People’s Assembly, or in Danish as the Folketing. The Folketing has 179 seats, including two from Greenland and two from the Faroe Islands. Its members are elected by popular vote based on proportional representation to serve a four-year term, unless the Folketing is dissolved earlier. The most recent general election took place in September 2011, from which emerged a minority coalition consisting of the Social Democrats, Social Liberal Party and Socialist People’s Party. This coalition made an end to a decade of liberal-conservative government under the Rasmussen cabinets. Although the current Prime Minister, Ms Thorning-Schmidt, campaigned to relax immigration rules and oppose tax cuts, these two promises remain controversial topics amongst the parties of the coalition. In January 2014, the Socialist People’s Party left the coalition, due to a conflict over the proposed sale of energy shares to Goldman Sachs. The party will nevertheless continue to support the coalition (Wenande, 2014). According to the Treaty of Nice voting procedures, which will be replaced with the Treaty of Lisbon procedures on 1 November 2014, Denmark holds seven of the 352 votes in the Council and European Council (“The Council of the European Union,” n.d.).

5.2.1 Popular reactions to input legitimacy

Figure 5.1 on the next page displays the degree to which Danes agreed on the Eurobarometer statement ‘My voice counts in the EU’ between 2004 and 2013. The statement ‘My voice counts in the EU’ serves as the indicator for measuring input legitimacy. Responses that are in agreement on the statement are advantageous to input legitimacy, while those that are in disagreement are disadvantageous.
5.1 Danish popular reactions to the statement 'My voice counts in the EU' between 2004 and 2013.


What Figure 5.1 above shows is that there has always been a relative and almost always an absolute majority amongst Danes that believe that their voice counts in the EU. That said, the share of people that disagree has also been significant. The percentage of respondents that did not know whether to agree or disagree has remained generally low over the years. The proportions of the responses throughout the years have remained relatively stable. All in all, the conclusion can be drawn that the input legitimacy of the EU is generally approved of in Denmark, though it is not entirely without controversy. Given the stable outcomes since 2010, it is expected that the current trend will continue in the next Eurobarometer waves.

5.2.2 Popular reactions to throughput legitimacy

Figure 5.2 on the next page displays whether or not Danes consider themselves to be satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU between the autumns of 2003 and 2013. This satisfaction serves as the indicator for measuring throughput legitimacy. Satisfied responses are advantageous to throughput legitimacy, while unsatisfied responses are disadvantageous.
Figure 5.2: Danish popular reactions to the question ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU?’ between the autumns of 2003 and 2013. From European Commission. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm.

Figure 5.2 shows that there has almost always been a rather large absolute majority amongst Danes that are satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU. As was the case for input legitimacy, the responses here are stable as well. Dissatisfaction has been generally low, although it has nevertheless risen since the autumn of 2011. Meanwhile, satisfaction has only slightly dropped. The same can be argued about the share of respondents that did not know whether or not they were satisfied, although it seems that there is more uncertainty amongst Danes about the EU’s throughput legitimacy than was the case for input legitimacy. Although some data are missing from the years prior to the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as those following its introduction, it seems that the Treaty did not cause many Danes to think more positively about throughput legitimacy. All in all, from the results can be concluded that the throughput legitimacy of the EU is generally sufficient in Denmark. Whether this remains the case in the long term depends on the trend concerning the increasing share of dissatisfied respondents.

5.2.3 Popular reactions to output legitimacy

Figure 5.3 on the next page displays the degree to which Danes agreed on the Eurobarometer statement ‘The interests of our country are well taken into account in the European Union’ between 2005 and 2013. The statement serves as the indicator for measuring output legitimacy. Responses that
are in agreement on the statement are advantageous to output legitimacy, while those that are in disagreement are disadvantageous.

Figure 5.3: Danish popular reactions to the statement 'The interests of our country are well taken into account in the European Union' between 2005 and 2013. From European Commission. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm.

Figure 5.3 shows that there has always been a relative majority amongst Danes that believe that the Danish interests are well taken into account in the EU. Nevertheless, a significant share of the respondents has always been sceptical towards this statement. Although there was a drop in those in agreement with the statement following the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the situation gradually restored in the years after. Looking at the figures, it is unlikely that the Treaty has made a positive impact on the stance of Danes towards the EU’s output legitimacy. The share of respondents that did not know whether to agree or disagree has dropped over the years. All in all, the EU’s output legitimacy, like its input legitimacy, is quite controversial in Denmark, although it has always had a majority that was content with it.

5.2.4 Conclusion

The data from Denmark show that input and output legitimacy might be the most problematic of the three forms of legitimacy, although a majority still is satisfied. Throughput legitimacy show a brighter story, where those that are not satisfied are clearly a minority. These conclusions would imply the following: in Denmark, there is the general acknowledgement that European citizens are influential in
the EU decision making process, yet there is room for improvement. It is quite clear amongst Danes that EU democracy currently works well. Most Danes also think that the Danish interests are taken seriously in the EU, although this opinion is not shared by everyone.
Chapter 6
Reactions to legitimacy: Greece

The Hellenic Republic, better known as Greece, has a population of circa 10.8 million. It can therefore be considered a mid-sized EU MS. Greece is the third of the four selected MS for this research, and was classified as the ‘Eurosceptic’. Following the typology of Kopecký & Mudde (2002, p. 303), this implies two things. First, Greece is expected to support the general ideas of European integration. Second, Greece is expected to be pessimistic about the EU’s current and/or future reflection of these ideas. It is also expected that Greeks will generally respond less enthusiastically to the Eurobarometer statements and question than the Slovaks did.

6.1.1 Historical development

Greece’s Association Agreement with the EEC in 1961 was supposed to be a first step towards the country’s integration into the EEC. The agreement froze, however, when a military junta was established in Greece in April 1967. When the junta collapsed in July 1974, democracy was restored, and negotiations with the EEC were re-activated. The then Greek cabinet, led by Prime Minister Constantinos Caramanlis, applied for full accession in July 1975. Greece had several reasons for becoming a MS of the EEC. Not only did it want to become more powerful vis-à-vis rival state Turkey, especially after the invasion and occupation of Cyprus in July 1974; it also considered the Community to be the institutional framework within which stability could be brought into the Greek democratic political system and institutions. Greece also wanted, as a European country, to be present in, and to have an impact on, the process towards European integration and the European model. It would take until 1981 before Greece’s admission into the EEC took place, due to the Council initially rejecting the Commission’s proposal to let the country join. Between 1981 and 1985, Greece had strong doubts about certain serious aspects of the European integration, especially to the efforts and plans aimed at further integration in the departments of institutions, politics and defence. Between 1985 and 1995, Greece gradually adopted stronger pro-integration positions. For instance, it supported the strengthening of supranational institutions such as the Commission and EP, as well as the development of a joint foreign and security policy in the EU. Since 1995, the country has generally supported the idea and process of European integration even further.

On the website of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it can be read that ‘[t]oday, Greece still strongly supports EU deepening and enlargement’ (“Greece’s course in the EU,” 2011). Greece held the Presidency over the Council from 1 January 2014 until 1 July of the same year. In a nutshell, the priority
framework of the Greek Presidency was formulated by the promotion of policies and actions for achieving growth, combatting unemployment, promoting economic and social cohesion and structural reforms, deepening integration and completion of the EMU, as well as addressing external challenges, including EU enlargement (“Programme & Priorities,” n.d.). Besides its EU membership, Greece is also a founding member of the UN and the Council of Europe. The country joined NATO in 1952, together with Turkey (“Greece in International Organizations,” n.d.).

6.1.2 Economic circumstances

Greece has a relatively large public sector, which represents circa forty per cent of the GDP. The country’s economy also depends on tourism, which is estimated at fifteen per cent of the GDP. Greece’s economy is dominated by the services sector (80.5 per cent), while the industrial (16 per cent) and agricultural (3.5 per cent) sectors play a minor role. Greece is a major beneficiary of EU aid, which is about 3.3 per cent of the annual GDP. In 2010 and 2011, Eurozone member Greece received bailout packages of 107 and 123 billion euros respectively from the IMF and other Eurozone MS. The present situation is much different from the circumstances of the previous decade. Due to the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, which required infrastructural spending, the Greek economy grew by almost four per cent per year between 2003 and 2007. An increased availability of credit also contributed to economic growth, which caused record levels of consumer spending. In 2009, the Greek economy went into recession, following the world financial crisis. The Greek government failed to address a growing budget deficit. The economy shrank by 2.3 per cent in 2009, 3.5 per cent in 2010, 6.9 per cent in 2011 and 6.0 per cent in 2012. Between 2001 and 2006, the country violated the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) budget deficit criterion of no more than three per cent of the GDP. As a result of deteriorating public finances, inaccurate and misreported statistics and consistent underperformances on reforms, the major credit rating agencies decided to downgrade Greece’s international debt rating in late 2009, which led the country into a financial crisis.

Many investors doubt that Greece can sustain fiscal efforts in the face of a bleak economic prospect, public discontent and political instability. Austerity measures caused the deficit to reduce to circa eight per cent in 2012. The austerity programme was more or less imposed by the EU and international market participants. The Greek government was instructed to cut government spending, decrease tax evasion, overhaul the healthcare and pension systems and reform the labour and product markets. Still, Athens faces long-term challenges to push through unpopular reforms amidst widespread unrest from the country’s powerful labour unions as well as the general public. The continued massive austerity measures force Greece to remain in an economic recession, with depressing tax revenues
In November 2013, the most recent month from which Eurostat collected data on Greece, the country had an unemployment rate of 28 per cent, which is well above the EU and EMU average, 10.8 and 12 per cent, respectively. Unemployment had still been on the rise in the last months (“Harmonised unemployment rate by sex,” 2014). In the third quarter of 2013, Greece had a public debt that equals 171.8 per cent of the GDP, up from 168.8 per cent in the previous quarter (“Euro area government debt down to 92.7% of GDP, EU28 up to 86.8% of GDP,” 2014).

6.1.3 Political setting

Greece is a unitary state and has a parliamentary form of government, under a constitutional republic. The head of state is the President (currently Karolos Papoulias), who appoints the cabinet on the recommendation of the Prime Minister (currently Antonis Samaras). The President, who is elected for a five-year term, shares legislative power with parliament, and shares executive power with the cabinet. Other than that, most power lies with the cabinet, of which the Prime Minister is the head. The President represents the state in its relation to other states. He also proclaims referendums (“Government and Politics,” n.d.). Although the President obviously has a largely ceremonial role, the country’s debt crisis has thrust Mr Papoulias into the political foreground, as he attempts to maintain a stable government in the face of public outrage, as well as a divided political class (“Greece profile,” 2013). The legislative branch also includes the unicameral Hellenic Parliament, which consists of three hundred Members of Parliament (MPs), who are elected by popular vote for a four-year term (“Greece,” 2014). In the past eighteen cabinets – since 1980 – Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), the largest Social Democrat party, took part eleven times. Runners-up are the Liberal Conservative party New Democracy: nine times.

After the most recently held elections, in June 2012, the cabinet of Greece was initially a three-party coalition of New Democracy, PASOK and the Democratic Left. In June 2013, the latter party left the coalition due to their disagreement with Prime Minister Samaras on imposing deeply unpopular measures (“Greece profile,” 2013). Politics in Greece are relatively unstable, as far as the length of terms of the cabinets is concerned. Another factor that contributes to this instability is the rise of the Golden Dawn political party in the Hellenic Parliament. In the most recent elections, this ultranationalist party entered parliament with eighteen seats. Six of the eighteen MPs were jailed, however, since the murder of an anti-fascist musician in September 2013. Golden Dawn is described as ‘Europe’s most violent political force’. Golden Dawn founder Nikos Michaloliakos, who is one of the incarcerated MPs, is known for admiring the military junta that was in power for seven years (Smith, 2014). Golden Dawn is under heavy fire in Greece; if the court rules that the party is a criminal

6.2.1 Popular reactions to input legitimacy

Figure 6.1 below displays the degree to which Greeks agreed on the Eurobarometer statement ‘My voice counts in the EU’ between 2004 and 2013. The statement ‘My voice counts in the EU’ serves as the indicator for measuring input legitimacy. Responses that are in agreement on the statement are advantageous to input legitimacy, while those that are in disagreement are disadvantageous.

![Figure 6.1: Greek popular reactions to the statement 'My voice counts in the EU' between 2004 and 2013. From European Commission. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm.](image)

Figure 6.1 indicates that there has been an almost constantly vast absolute majority that believe that their voice does not count in the EU. The Greeks are therefore much, much more pessimistic than the Slovaks and Danes are, when it comes to this statement. As Greece was dragged deeper into the financial crisis, arguably in part due to the imposed austerity packages, the sense of European democracy amongst its inhabitants waned accordingly. The absolute low point thus far was between
the autumn of 2012 and spring of 2013. In the most recent Eurobarometer, the situation improved only ever so slightly, which is no cause for celebration. What is striking is the minimal share of respondents that did not know whether or not to agree on the statement. This shows that Greeks are very outspoken, even frustrated, on this issue. Even though the financial crisis led to an alarmingly high disagreement amongst Greeks on this Eurobarometer statement, the notion warrants attention that even in the financially successful years following the Olympics in Athens, there was already a considerable amount of negativity towards the EU’s input legitimacy. It is clear that the Treaty of Lisbon did not change the attitude of Greeks towards this form of legitimacy in a positive fashion. The conclusion can therefore be made that the input legitimacy of the EU is a huge problem amongst Greeks. The prospect remains incredibly worrisome.

6.2.2  Popular reactions to throughput legitimacy

Figure 6.2 below displays whether or not Greeks consider themselves to be satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU between the autumns of 2003 and 2013. This satisfaction serves as the indicator for measuring throughput legitimacy. Satisfied responses are advantageous to throughput legitimacy, while unsatisfied responses are disadvantageous.

Figure 6.2: Greek popular reactions to the question ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU?’ between the autumns of 2003 and 2013. From European Commission. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm.
As can be derived from the data shown in Figure 6.2, a worrisomely large share of the Greeks is to some degree not satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU. Greece has not always been negative towards throughput legitimacy: in the ‘early years’, a majority was satisfied. Although it is not possible to pinpoint it due to a lack of data from some Eurobarometer waves, the spring of 2010 may have been the turning point. Again, in recent years, only a small share of the respondents did not know which answer to give. The results show that, just as was the case with input legitimacy, the EU’s throughput legitimacy is alarmingly problematic in Greece. There is also little reason to expect any drastic changes in the responses for the next Eurobarometer waves.

6.2.3 **Popular reactions to output legitimacy**

Figure 6.3 below displays the degree to which Greeks agreed on the Eurobarometer statement ‘The interests of our country are well taken into account in the European Union’ between 2005 and 2013. The statement serves as the indicator for measuring output legitimacy. Responses that are in agreement on the statement are advantageous to output legitimacy, while those that are in disagreement are disadvantageous.

The data from Figure 6.3 reveal that there has always been a majority that do not agree on the notion that the Greek interests are well taken into account in the EU. The scepticism constantly rose between the autumns of 2009 and 2012. In the two most recent Eurobarometer waves, some very slight
recovery can be observed, although this cannot hide the fact that the EU’s output legitimacy is alarmingly low, much like its input and throughput counterparts. Once again, the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon did not cause any effect on the perception of output legitimacy by the Greek public. The share of respondents that did not know whether to agree or disagree has generally been relatively low, as was the case in the previous two items. All in all, the EU’s output legitimacy amongst Greeks is a huge issue, and it is expected that it will continue to be in the next Eurobarometer waves, the hints of slight recovery notwithstanding.

6.2.4 Conclusion
The results shown for input, throughput and output legitimacy for Greeks show a highly similar result. For all three forms of legitimacy, there is an alarmingly high degree of outspoken negativity. This could imply the following: in Greece, there is the belief that European citizens barely are able to have an impact on the EU decision making process. Greeks also (or therefore) believe that the decision making process is highly undemocratic. There is a lacking trust amongst Greeks in the responsiveness of the EU to Greek national preferences. Following the reasoning of Kopecký & Mudde (2002, p. 303), it is expected that the results for Sweden, the next and final MS in this research, will be more negative than for the other three MS.
Chapter 7
Reactions to legitimacy: Sweden

The Kingdom of Sweden, with a population of about 9.6 million, can be regarded as a mid-sized EU MS. The country is the last of the four selected MS for this research, and was classified as the ‘Euroreject’. Following the typology of Kopecký & Mudde (2002, p. 303), this implies that Swedish respondents are expected to neither subscribe to the ideas underlying the process of European integration, nor to the EU itself. It is also expected that the Swedes will generally respond in a more negative fashion than the respondents from the previous three MS did.

7.1.1 Historical development

After Sweden had fought many wars throughout the past millennium in its ambition to become a European superpower, the country has not been part of any battle since 1814, when it was involved in a short armed conflict against Norway in conjunction with the creation of a union between these two countries. Since WWI, Sweden has followed a policy of non-alignment in peacetime and neutrality in wartime, basing its security on a strong national defence. Notwithstanding this somewhat isolated stance in international relations, Sweden did become a member of the League of Nations in 1920 and the UN in 1946. In 1952, the country agreed on the proposal of the then Danish Prime Minister, Hans Hedtoft, to create a consultative inter-parliamentary body between Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden: the Nordic Council was born. In 1971, a Nordic Council of Ministers was added, which has intergovernmental characteristics (“The Nordic Council,” n.d.). Agreements were made between these countries in the fields of culture, industry and trade, defence affairs, labour market, education and research, taxation affairs, social and health care, language and more (“Agreements sorted by subject,” n.d.). These two bodies still exist today. Although Sweden is not a member of NATO, it has co-operated with this organisation under the Partnership for Peace programme since 1994.

The country joined the EU on 1 January 1995, together with Austria and Finland (“History of Sweden,” 2013.). Before Sweden’s admission to the EU, however, it had already signed a Free Trade Agreement with the European Community in 1972, as well as the Treaty establishing a European Economic Area in 1992. Sweden’s membership to the EU was preceded by a national referendum in 1994. Given the high turnout of 83 per cent, many Swedes realised that the referendum would determine the future of their country. Ultimately, 52.3 per cent of the electors voted in favour of joining the EU, while 46.8 per cent voted against membership. This indicates that the Swedish bid for EU membership was not without controversy. Between 1 July and 31 December 2009, Sweden had its most recent Presidency
of the EU. The Swedish Presidency particularly focused on the climate change challenge, as well as the financial and economic crisis. Another ambition was to get the Treaty of Lisbon in place, which proved a great deal of hard work, according to the then Swedish government. The said government had the ambition to make Sweden an active and driving force in the EU (“The Swedish Presidency of the EU in autumn 2009,” 2013). Sweden’s policy of neutrality has led to a number of Swedish politicians assuming international roles, often mediating between conflicting groups or ideologies (“Sweden country profile,” 2012).

7.1.2 Economic circumstances

According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, Sweden’s stance of peace and neutrality throughout the past century allowed the country to achieve an enviable standard of living under a mixed system of high-tech capitalism and extensive welfare benefits. The Swedish labour force consists mainly of services (70.7 per cent in 2008), and to a lesser extent industry (28.2 per cent) and agriculture (1.1 per cent). Until 2008, Sweden went through a sustained economic upswing, enhanced by increased domestic demand and strong exports. Together with robust finances, this upswing allowed the then centre-right government to implement its reform programme aimed at increasing employment, reducing welfare dependence and streamlining the state’s role in the economy. In spite of strong finances and underlying fundamentals, the Swedish economy entered a recession in the third quarter of 2008. The contraction went on in 2009, due to deteriorating global conditions, which reduced export demand and consumption. In 2010 and 2011, there was a strong rebound, thanks to strong exports of commodities and a return to profitability by Sweden’s banking sector. Growth slipped to 1.2 per cent again in 2012. In that same year, the Swedish government proposed stimulus measures in order to curb the effects of a global economic slowdown and to boost employment and growth (“Sweden,” 2014).

In a national referendum in 2003, a majority of the Swedish voters was against Sweden joining the Eurozone, due to concerns about the impact on the economy and sovereignty (“History of Sweden,” 2013; “Sweden,” 2014). Although Sweden currently still does not use the euro, the Treaty of Maastricht obliges the country to adopt the euro in the future (“Economic and Monetary Union and the Euro,” n.d.). To add some complexity, the Swedish government believes that joining the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) – which is required for adopting the euro – is voluntary, which the country uses as a de facto opt-out (“What is ERM II?,” 2013) from the Eurozone. In January 2014, the country had an unemployment rate of 8.2 per cent, which is lower than the EU and EMU average, 10.8 and 12 per cent, respectively. Unemployment is rising slowly but surely, however (“Harmonised
unemployment rate by sex,” 2014). In the third quarter of 2013, Sweden had a public debt that equals 40.7 per cent of the GDP, down from 40.8 per cent in the previous quarter (“Euro area government debt down to 92.7% of GDP, EU28 up to 86.8% of GDP,” 2014). It has therefore the relatively lowest debt of the four MS.

7.1.3 Political setting

Sweden is a unitary state and has a parliamentary form of government, under a constitutional monarchy (“Sweden,” 2014). The Monarch also serves as the chief of state. They are known as the nation’s supreme representative. However, they do not enjoy any political powers; they are ceremonial only. Still, they are regularly informed of the affairs and concerns of the realm. They also chair the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs (“The Head of State,” 2011). Unlike their Danish counterpart, the Swedish Monarch does not appoint the cabinet; this is done by the Prime Minister, who leads the executive branch. Legislative powers are shared between the executive and legislative branch. The legislative branch consists of a unicameral parliament, for which 349 MPs are elected for a four-year term (“Sweden,” 2014). During the twelve years preceding the installation of the current centre-right Prime Minister of Sweden, Fredrik Reinfeldt, in 2006, the country was ruled by the centre-left Social Democrat Party. The Social Democrats used to govern Sweden for much of the period since WWII, making the Reinfeldt cabinet, known as the Alliance for Sweden, a striking change in Swedish politics. Thanks to Sweden’s rapid economic recovery since 2008, it was expected that the Alliance for Sweden would gain a second term in 2010, making Reinfeldt the first Swedish centre-right Prime Minister to be re-elected since WWII. However, after the 2010 general election, it turned out that the Alliance lacked an overall majority by two seats. This led to the installation of a minority coalition government. The election also resulted in the first far right party to win seats in parliament: the anti-immigration Swedish Democrats. At the same time, the Social Democrats suffered a painful slump in support (“Sweden country profile,” 2012). The current Swedish cabinet, which was installed in October 2006, is a four-party centre-right coalition consisting of liberal conservative, social liberal and Christian democrat parties (“Reinfeldt unveils reshuffled cabinet,” 2010). According to the Treaty of Nice voting procedures, which will be replaced with the Treaty of Lisbon procedures on 1 November 2014, Sweden holds ten of the 352 votes in the Council and European Council (“The Council of the European Union,” n.d.).
7.2.1 Popular reactions to input legitimacy

Figure 7.1 on the next page displays the degree to which Swedes agreed on the Eurobarometer statement ‘My voice counts in the EU’ between 2004 and 2013. The statement ‘My voice counts in the EU’ serves as the indicator for measuring input legitimacy. Responses that are in agreement on the statement are advantageous to input legitimacy, while those that are in disagreement are disadvantageous.


Figure 7.1 shows that only once there has been an absolute majority of Swedes that thought that their voice counts in the EU: the spring of 2009. One year later, in the spring of 2010, there was still a relative majority that subscribed to this opinion. Ever since, there has been a relative majority that disagrees with the statement, except in the spring of 2011. It seems that the Treaty of Lisbon did not create a trend of more positive answers to this item. Even though the situation improved in the most recent wave, it is not likely that the next waves will show more favourable figures for input legitimacy. The results are too fluctuant to make any fair predictions. The share of those that did not know which answer to give has generally waned over time. The results indicate that input legitimacy is (still) perceived as insufficient by Swedes. In fact, the second-last wave shows the most negative results measured since the spring of 2008.
7.2.2 Popular reactions to throughput legitimacy

Figure 7.2 on the next page displays whether or not Swedes consider themselves to be satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU between the autumns of 2003 and 2013. This satisfaction serves as the indicator for measuring throughput legitimacy. Satisfied responses are advantageous to throughput legitimacy, while unsatisfied responses are disadvantageous.

"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU?"

Figure 7.2 displays the controversy of EU democracy in Sweden. After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, satisfaction did increase to the point where it was often shared by a majority. That said, the share of those unsatisfied also rose, at the cost of those not knowing whether or not to be satisfied. These developments are caused by a drop in the share of respondents that do not know which answer to give; it has significantly lowered over the years. The results indicate that Swedes are not very enthusiastic about the democratic framework of the EU. As was the case with input legitimacy, throughput legitimacy is not without controversy amongst Swedes. Seeing as there is no big gulf between the shares of respondents that replied positively and negatively as was the case for Denmark, it is unlikely that there will be drastic changes in the responses for the next Eurobarometer waves.
7.2.3 Popular reactions to output legitimacy

Figure 7.3 on the next page displays the degree to which Swedes agreed on the Eurobarometer statement ‘The interests of our country are well taken into account in the European Union’ between 2005 and 2013. The statement serves as the indicator for measuring output legitimacy. Responses that are in agreement on the statement are advantageous to input legitimacy, while those that are in disagreement are disadvantageous.


The results from Figure 7.3 show that, prior to the Lisbon era, relatively many Swedes agreed on the notion that their national interests are well taken into account in the EU. Since the spring of 2008 and the autumn of 2011, however, a negative trend can be identified. In the past few years, the statement remained controversial. The share of respondents that did not know whether to agree or disagree on the statement declined over the years. The conclusion is that the EU’s output legitimacy is controversial in Sweden, just like its input and throughput counterparts.

7.2.4 Conclusion

The data for Sweden clearly show that the three forms of legitimacy are controversial in this particular MS. This could imply the following: in Sweden, there is the belief that European citizens should have more influence in the EU decision making process. Swedes are highly divided on the question whether or not EU democracy is to their liking. They generally believe that the EU decision making process
leaves much to be desired. Swedes are also highly divided on the question whether the EU is sufficiently responsive to the Swedish national preferences.
Chapter 8

Reactions to legitimacy: cross-national comparison

8.1 Development of reactions to legitimacy in the four MS and the EU

Now that the four selected MS have each been identified in terms of their reactions to the EU’s three forms of legitimacy, it is time to show the development of the shares of positive reactions (i.e., ‘Agreed’ and ‘Very/Fairly satisfied’) of these MS as well as those of the EU average. On the next few pages, three graphs are displayed, one per form of legitimacy.

8.1.1 Input legitimacy

Figure 8.1 above shows that input legitimacy has been relatively high amongst Danes and Swedes, when compared to Slovaks, Greeks and the EU average, approximately since the autumn of 2008. It is striking that, during the spring of that year, the four MS jointly show a sudden increase in support for EU input legitimacy, particularly Denmark and Sweden. Although none of the four MS continued to hold on to the increased support, the two Scandinavian MS continue to value the EU’s input legitimacy higher in the Lisbon era than Slovakia and Greece do. Greece’s support for input legitimacy has been far below the EU average since the spring of 2010. When comparing the EU averages pre- and post-
Lisbon, it turns out that support for the EU’s input legitimacy has generally declined. My interviews with eight respondents led to an interesting observation: those that were more professionally involved in the EU tended to be more content with the input legitimacy of the EU than those that were not involved as much. An increased public awareness of the possibilities for citizens to influence EU decision making could perhaps lead to higher satisfaction with input legitimacy. Not only are the possibilities there; they are more numerous than the available instruments at most national levels.

8.1.2 Throughput legitimacy

"I am satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU"

Figure 8.2: Development of the four MS’ positive reactions to throughput legitimacy compared to EU average between the autumns of 2003 and 2013. From European Commission. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm.

Figure 8.2 is similar to Figure 8.1, in that Denmark and Sweden are once again generally performing above the EU average when it comes to support for the EU’s throughput legitimacy. The difference between Sweden and Slovakia and the EU average is not as significant as it is for input legitimacy, however. Greece shows very little support for throughput legitimacy since the autumn of 2011, when compared to the other MS. Although it is more difficult to detect any differing trends pre- and post-Lisbon in Figure 8.2 due to the blank data, the observation can be made that, after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009, the average EU support for the EU’s throughput legitimacy dropped. Almost all the respondents that I interviewed were of the opinion that the checks and balances between the institutions of the EU are in order, and that the Treaty of Lisbon has rightly
strengthened the role of the EP in the ordinary legislative procedure. There was also a high amount of satisfaction amongst the respondents concerning information provision by the EU on its workings. In other words, the EU’s throughput legitimacy scored quite high overall amongst the interviewees, in contrast to the cross-national results.

8.1.3 Output legitimacy

As far as the output legitimacy of the EU is concerned, the gap between Slovakia, Denmark and Sweden is much closer. Although Denmark and Sweden currently once again show the most relative support, this has not always been the case. On the eve of the Lisbon era, in the autumn of 2009, Slovakia showed the highest relative support of the four MS. Slovakian support quickly fell again in the following Eurobarometer wave, however, and has since been in decline. There has also been a period in which some of the Swedes dropped their support for output legitimacy, although a very slight majority favours it again today. Once more, there is a huge gap between Greece and the other three MS and the EU average. When comparing the EU averages pre- and post-Lisbon, support did not structurally fall, nor did it increase. The eight individuals I interviewed have different opinions on the effectiveness of the EU, depending on the policy area. The majority of the respondents, however, were negative on the efficiency of EU decision making, often referring to the twenty-eight national bureaucracies, plus
the one in Brussels, as well as the size of the College of Commissioners. On the responsiveness of the EU, there are varying opinions. Again, the respondents that are more involved with the EU professionally tended to be more positive in this respect. The same holds true for the accountability of the EU to citizens, for the most part. A few respondents made a case for making Commissioners individually accountable to the EP. Some respondents instead wondered whether the Council, i.e., the MS’ governments altogether, is truly accountable when misleadingly reporting back to their national parliaments.

8.1.4 Conclusion
After studying Graphs 8.1 through 8.3, the conclusion can be made that the perception of input and throughput legitimacy across the EU MS became slightly more negative after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. This is not to say that Lisbon is the source of this increased negativity. Other variables, such as the Eurozone crisis, might be responsible for this trend. This is something that we cannot pinpoint by means of these Eurobarometer items. In the next chapter, I will elaborate on this matter. As far as the four selected MS are concerned, the two Scandinavian countries consistently show greater appreciation for the three forms of legitimacy than the other two MS do. The Slovakian respondents seem to serve as a proper yardstick for determining the EU trends, since Slovakian and the average EU reactions have often been highly similar since the Lisbon era. The Greek popular appreciation for the three forms of legitimacy has constantly dropped after the autumn of 2009 and is now showing the first signs of recovery, albeit modestly.

8.2 Scores of MS’ reactions to legitimacy
Now that the reactions of the four selected MS to input, throughput and output legitimacy have been identified, it is time to compare the average ‘scores’ of the four countries in regards to the three forms of legitimacy. The score is determined by the average of the positive responses from the last three Eurobarometer waves. The reason for this is that the same three waves were used for the selection procedure of the four MS. It is therefore necessary to score the four countries using the same three Eurobarometer waves from which they were selected. The procedure goes as follows: for input legitimacy, only the ‘I agree’ answers between the autumns of 2012 and 2013 will be compared. For throughput legitimacy, only the ‘Satisfied’ answers between the autumns of 2012 and 2013 will be compared. For output legitimacy, only the ‘I agree’ answers between the autumns of 2012 and 2013 will be compared. Finally, the scores for the three forms of legitimacy will be given an average score. The results are shown in Table 8.1 below. The consequences of these scores for the integration of
Kopecký & Mudde’s (2002) typology with the norms of Bekkers & Edwards (2007) into a new framework will be discussed in paragraph 9.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGITIMACY</th>
<th>SLOVAKIA (EUROPHILE)</th>
<th>DENMARK (EUROPRAGMATIST)</th>
<th>GREECE (EUROSCEPTIC)</th>
<th>SWEDEN (EUROREJECT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INPUT</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THROUGHPUT</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTPUT</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1: The four MS’ scores regarding input, throughput and output legitimacy.

8.3 Relationship between the Treaty of Lisbon and the national reactions to input, throughput and output legitimacy

Although it is unfortunate that some of the pre-Lisbon data are missing, some careful conclusions, or at least observations can yet be made on the relationship between the Treaty of Lisbon and the national reactions to the three forms of legitimacy. The most important observation is that the Treaty of Lisbon did not provide a positive impulse to the way the nations from the four archetypes react to the three forms of legitimacy. In the majority of the tables and graphs, it appears that the perceptions on input, throughput and output legitimacy have roughly remained the same, or have in fact worsened. There are only a few cases, in which the perceptions improved after the autumn of 2009. This implies that there is no direct (neither positive, nor negative) relationship between the arrangements of the Treaty of Lisbon and national reactions to the EU’s three forms of legitimacy.

Structurally different reactions to input, throughput and output legitimacy

Another observation that warrants mentioning is that the reactions to the used Eurobarometer items vary strongly between the four selected MS. For instance, in Denmark, there has always been a majority that believe that their voice counts in the EU. In the other three MS, particularly in Greece and in Slovakia, the mind-sets of the population have been entirely different on this matter. This is remarkable, since every EU citizen has the same possibilities for contributing input to the EU decision making process. We now know for a fact that this is apparently not perceived that way across Europe, given the highly different mind-sets between the nationals of the four selected MS. Intrigued by this conclusion, I asked individuals with differing degrees of EU knowledge on possible explanations for this. The most common explanation was that a mix of cultural, economic and political backgrounds are the cause of these structurally different attitudes towards EU democracy. Denmark and Sweden, for
instance, are two countries that have a strong tradition when it comes to transparency and citizen participation. Scandinavians also tend to react less emotionally to politics, in contrast to Southern Europeans. In Greece, there is a deeply-rooted public distrust in politics, also at the national level. This particular issue will be addressed later in this section. The general distrust is likely caused by the tradition of clientelism and corruption in this particular country. The Greek military junta of 1967 – 1974 may have also left some scars. Slovakia is a country that was under communist rule throughout the Cold War, during which there was little room for democratic principles. Slovaks might still be highly sceptical towards democracy because of this, whether it is at the national or at the EU level.

Possible correlation between satisfaction with national and EU democracy

The explanations provided by the respondents lead to the following theory: if national factors are indeed relevant, then that means that citizens have a tendency to expect that EU democracy works the same as national democracy, and therefore, tend to be similarly positive or negative towards EU democracy as they are to national democracy. Eurobarometer data from the 2013 autumn wave may support this claim; in fourteen of the 28 MS, there was a percentage difference of fifteen or less between satisfaction with national and EU democracy ("Standard Eurobarometer 80," 2013). This implies that many Europeans consciously or unconsciously link EU democratic legitimacy with national democratic legitimacy. This could be explained by the ‘second-order election’ conceptual framework by Reif & Schmitt (1980), and by Hix & Marsh (2007, p. 495) who revisited the framework by arguing that elections to the EP ‘are secondary to the main (national) electoral contest, and [that] they are national contests rather than European contests.’ In other words, citizens are said to find elections to the EP of less importance than national general elections. These second order elections serve as a means to react to national elections. As Reif & Schmitt (1980, p. 9) put it: ‘Many voters cast their votes in these elections not only as a result of conditions obtaining within the specific context of the second-order area, but also on the basis of factors in the main political arena of the nation.’ My take on this is that many citizens base their judgement of EU democracy on their judgment of national democracy, just like EP elections are said to be treated as a reflection of national elections. Table 8.2 on the next page compares the four MS’ satisfaction between both national and EU democracy in the three most recent Eurobarometer waves. The table indicates, for instance, that in 2012, 29 per cent of the Slovaks were satisfied with national democracy, while 41 per cent of the Slovaks were satisfied with EU democracy.

The figures also show that in Greece and Slovakia (overall the two most negative MS on input, throughput and output legitimacy), there is even more dismay over the workings of national democracy than of those of the EU. When taking all the other current EU MS into the equation, it appears that in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia, there was a higher appreciation for EU democracy than for national democracy in the autumn of 2013 (“Standard Eurobarometer 80,” 2013). In other words, in every Eastern and Southern European MS of the EU, except for Malta, the throughput legitimacy of the national government is currently even worse off, in some cases much worse in several Eastern European countries. In support of the theory that many Europeans link EU democratic legitimacy with national democratic legitimacy: in Denmark, there is a high degree of satisfaction with national democracy, and to a lesser extent, the same can be argued about EU democracy. The Swedish case, however, shows that this theory is not rock solid. In this country, there is considerably less satisfaction with EU democracy compared to national democracy.

Notwithstanding the Swedish case, my observations lead to an intriguing conclusion: the actual democratic legitimacy of European Governance may not be as deficient in real life as it tends to be perceived by the public. There are roughly two solutions at hand: (1) the cure to a (perceived) low EU democratic legitimacy could be to enhance the legitimacy of the national government first. If there is indeed a correlation between satisfaction with national and EU democracy, citizens will be inclined to think more positively of EU democracy if their appreciation for national democracy increases first. Again, Sweden shows that this may not suffice. Nevertheless, the fact that, in half of the MS, the appreciation for national and EU democracy is similar to each other, leads to the presumption that the EU and its institutional framework might suffer from a misplaced image problem in many of its MS. This takes us to the second conclusion: (2) a potentially contributing factor is a lack of information on, and/or interest in the workings of EU democracy in a number of MS. Enhanced information provision
on the EU could improve the image of the EU. This conclusion is supported by the head of the Representation of the European Commission in the Netherlands, Andy Klom, with whom I had an interview. He argued that information provision on the EU has turned the northern MS more favourable towards the EU in the past twenty years.

8.4 Enhancing democratic legitimacy of EU decision making

In April 2014, the Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) published a report named “Towards A Supported European Co-operation: Building Trust,” at the request of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Frans Timmermans. The report aimed to answer three questions:

1. where lies the key to reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of the EU (national parliament, EP, a combination, or otherwise?);
2. how can a balance be found between the effectiveness and legitimacy of the checks on European administration at different levels?
3. what are the boundaries of the intergovernmental and Community methods (and hybrid forms)?

The report specifically mentions the following causes of a declined trust of (Dutch) citizens in the democratic legitimacy of the EU:

- the financial-economic crisis, in which the saving of governments and banks in Southern Europe and Ireland took a central position;
- oppression of the labour market as the result of the free movement of persons;
- the 2005 European Constitution referendum;
- the meddlesomeness of the EU in the daily lives of citizens regarding work, income and welfare;
- the EP’s travelling circus between Brussels and Strasbourg;
- the lacking influence on, and accountability of EU decision making;
- the inscrutable procedures and institutional arrangements of the EU, that seem like a European maze;
- the (allegedly creeping) transfer of national competencies that limits the discretion of national governments;
- the lack of effectiveness of the EU, especially in times of economic crisis;
- the accession of countries to the EU that were not ready for it, as well as talks with candidate MS such as Turkey, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Serbia and
potential candidate MS such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (AIV, 2014, pp. 8; 10).

In general, European integration happened too swiftly, and too many decisions were taken with unforeseen side effects, such as the adoption of the euro and the twelve MS expansion in a short period of time. The expanded competencies of the EP that were introduced with the Treaty of Lisbon, did not bring the EU closer to the public (AIV, 2014, p. 8). Surveys across Dutch respondents indicate that 52 per cent of the Dutch are not interested in the EU, while 24 per cent are indifferent towards it. However, the aversion of citizens to politics and administration is not limited to the EU and its institutions alone; only 39 per cent of the Dutch respondents trusts Dutch politics. The low faith in the representative democracy is reflected by a declining turnout in national, provincial and local elections (2014, p. 9).

The AIV report, like this thesis, makes a distinction between input and output legitimacy – though it disregards throughput legitimacy – and, not surprisingly, it concludes early on that both forms of legitimacy are lacking in the EU (2014, p. 12). The report also mentions that democratic legitimacy depends on the question whether citizens within a political system feel connected with each other. If so, then there is talk of a political community. Democratic legitimacy requires bonds of solidarity and a base of joint values. An overarching political identity is needed, since the transfer of resources from group of citizens A to group of citizens B will only be accepted if group A feels obliged to group B. In reality, to a majority of the citizens, the nation-state is still the natural political home. The weak development of the EU as a political community is often attributed to the lack of a European public sphere (2014, pp. 12-13). During his annual speech in 2013, Commission President José Manuel Barroso argued that the EU needs a new vision. Not because the old values – peace through co-operation – are no longer valid, but because the new generations are less acquainted with the founding of the EU. Barroso’s spokesman, Cezary Lewanowicz, added that the newer features of the EU, such as common borders, studying abroad and a common currency do not appeal to many citizens. ‘These are no longer ambitions, but achievements.’ In response to this, Barroso launched a project by means of a co-operation with European intellectuals, artists and politicians, who are supposed to lead the discussion on Europe’s shared story. The declaration that they signed defines Europe as a state of mind: a moral and political responsibility that is shared across the entire continent. This so-called ‘new European Narrative’ is supposed to make clear the new overarching European thought and ambition. The European story will have to explain why Europe matters and why nationalism and populism need to be fought, said Lewanowicz. Claes de Vreese, professor of political communication at the University of Amsterdam, thinks this critical note to euroscepticism is hardly surprising, since the Commission is expected to represent the interests of the EU. On the bright side, De Vreese adds, conflict and clear
differences between parties result in the fact that citizens know that they can make a clear choice during the EP election. De Vreese adds, however, that the EU has become so large, with so many differences, that a pan-Narrative European story is impossible to conceive. Instead, he argues, Europe needs to realise that there are many differences. However, there are certainly European themes that can connect Europe at certain moments, such as economic crises. De Vreese concludes that there is space for a European identity beside the national identity, though the former will not replace the latter. Europeans will continue to particularly feel Dutch, Danish or Italian (Moerman, 2014).

Throughout the report, the AIV provides a number of conclusions and recommendations to the cabinet of the Netherlands and to the Dutch House of Representatives, and refutes popular criticism on various aspects of EU decision making. The most important conclusion of the report is that the EU meets all the requirements for democratic checks and balances, at every administrative level. However, this cannot conceal that citizens feel that they are not involved in EU decision making (2014, p. 42). Therefore, a multi-track approach is needed in order to gain a broader strengthening of the democratic legitimacy of the EU, which in turn can contribute to the citizens’ trust in the EU. According to the AIV, not only does the role of the MS and national institutions, such as the national parliaments, need to be strengthened in EU decision making; a further politicisation of the debate, in which politicians take the lead and propagate a clear vision on the core tasks of the EU, and in which citizens, civil society, trade unions, companies, et cetera, participate actively, is necessary as well (AIV, 2014, p. 6). Thus far, politicians have failed to make the increased interrelation between European and national administration clear to citizens. Also, they have failed to provide vistas regarding the future of the EU (2014, p. 10).

This failure was voiced by several experts and stakeholders during a TV broadcast by the Dutch state broadcaster Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation (NOS) in May 2014, prior to the EP election. Historian and writer Rutger Bregman argued that it was most difficult for Dutch politicians to find disagreements during TV debates, which led to confusion amongst viewers. He described the election campaigns in the Netherlands as indolent, notwithstanding the fact that the EU faced a significant reconstruction during the past five years. Shipbuilder Thecla Bodewes notes that the TV debates between party leaders and top candidates attract too few viewers. She believes that these debates can be made more interesting if party leaders communicate their message bluntly. Chris Ostendorf, NOS correspondent in Brussels, argued that politicians have completely neglected the EU. Even though Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the Netherlands actively contributed to the reconstruction of the EU in the past five years, this was not explained in the election campaign. Instead, the campaign was rather about ‘little rules people supposedly suffer from’. Another reason why politicians often still fail to take EU politics seriously is that national political parties tend to put up MEP candidates that ‘need to learn
the trade’. Ostendorf warned that the EP has acquired such power that it begs the question whether the position of MEP should still be regarded as an internship. During the broadcast, it was also argued that MEP candidates still do not generate sufficient publicity during elections, which results in an ongoing gap between voters and the EP. NOS correspondent Wouter Meijer argued that, in Germany, the campaign of the political party Christian Democratic Union (CDU) relied heavily on the popular Chancellor, Angela Merkel. This strategy had the effect that ‘nobody knew who was the CDU’s leading candidate for the EP’. It was suggested that, perhaps, more famous and accomplished national politicians should stand as a MEP candidate, as was the case in Belgium with Mr Guy Verhofstadt, ex-Prime Minister of Belgium, now a MEP and Spitzenkandidat on behalf of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group (ALDE) for the position of President of the Commission. Ostendorf thinks that the Belgian example will likely not work out, since EP legislation is often highly detailed, which is impossible to explain in short slogans (“Nederland kiest: Het stemmen,” 2014).

To address the recommendation by the AIV to strengthen the role of national institutions, such as national parliaments: this is something that can be realised by the MS themselves; neither the EU, nor any of its institutions is required in order for this to happen. In Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden, for instance, there exists a scrutiny model called the mandating or procedural system, which seeks to ensure control over what the ministers agree to in Council meetings. In this system, national parliaments issue direct mandates to the ministers which may set the bargaining range or even stipulate explicit voting instructions. The minister in question is required to present their negotiation positions before the European Affairs Committee (EAC), which may force the government to review its position (Jans & Piedrafita, 2009, pp. 21-22). National parliaments therefore have a significantly higher amount of control over their government under the mandating or procedural system than under the document-based system, which focuses on examining legislative proposals and other documents emanating from the EU institutions. The latter system does not in general focus on proceedings at individual Council meetings, nor does it systematically seek to mandate ministers formally or informally (“Models of scrutiny of EU matters in National Parliaments,” n.d.). A mandating or procedural system in every MS could potentially enhance the input and output legitimacy of the Council, since national parliaments will be able to influence the agenda of their national governments to a greater extent, and national governments in turn have an extra incentive to be responsive to the wishes of the national parliaments for accountability reasons. In recent years, national parliaments seem to converge towards mixed systems, where parliaments combine elements of both models. Parliaments that originally focussed on document scrutiny have started to set up hearings with ministers so as to monitor the government’s position more carefully. Many parliaments with mandating systems have reacted to the Barroso initiative of 2006 to transmit Commission
documents directly to national parliaments with an open invitation to comment on the documents, by intensifying the document scrutiny and by formulating opinions directly to the Commission (Jans & Piedrafita, 2009, p. 22).

The AIV report contains dozens of specific recommendations in order to improve the democratic legitimacy of the EU in detail. It would go too far, however, to discuss them all in this thesis. Instead, a few notable recommendations are briefly discussed in this section. First, the AIV is content how the European Council currently needs to take the EP election results into account, since this leads to a more intensive political debate within the political families due to the EP candidatures for the position of President of the Commission. The AIV is of the opinion that this is conducive to the bond and identification of the citizen with the EU (2014, p. 46). Although this may be so, the current system with national electoral lists still has its shortcomings and limitations. In the past period, there was a number of so-called ‘European presidential debates’ between Commission candidates Martin Schulz (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), Jean-Claude Juncker (European People’s Party, EPP), Guy Verhofstadt (ALDE), Ska Keller (The Greens-European Free Alliance) and Alexis Tsipras (European United Left-Nordic Green Left) that were broadcast live on TV. However, most of the Europeans would not be able to vote for any of these Spitzenkandidaten come election day. All they could do is to vote for a national candidate from a party that belongs to the same political family as one of the presidential candidates. These European presidential debates may therefore only cause more confusion amongst Europeans.

National electoral lists have another shortcoming, as was argued by NOS correspondent Meijer. In Germany, when voters were asked whether they would rather see the Luxembourger Juncker or German Schulz as President of the Commission, the majority responded that they preferred to see the latter. However, most Germans also indicated that they would vote for the party that they also vote for in national politics: Chancellor Merkel’s CDU (“Nederland kiest: Het stemmen,” 2014). This is consistent with the aforementioned second-order election framework by Reif & Schmitt (1980), and by Hix & Marsh (2007, p. 495). Ironically, a vote for CDU is ultimately a vote for Schulz’s rival Juncker, since CDU and Juncker’s political party are both in the same pan-European political party: EPP. The AIV report in turn argues that it is too early for transnational electoral lists, however, since a European public sphere for debate and opinion forming is (still) underdeveloped (2014, p. 46). Therefore, it is unlikely that we will soon see a change to the current Commission appointment procedure, in which every MS puts up one countryman as Commissioner for one of the (currently) 28 Directorates-General (DGs). The AIV argues that this system only paves the way for more legislation, as history has shown that an increase in the number of Commissioners has led to an increase in the number of DGs. The AIV is of the opinion that this harms both input and output legitimacy, and it makes a case for a reduction
in the number of Commissioners in 2018. This is also something that was often plead by respondents I interviewed. We already know that the Commissioners will again be handpicked by the MS and heard by the EP, before they are installed. The AIV report does not discuss the prospect of creating a more political Commission that reflects the EP election outcome the same way a cabinet is formed in a representative democracy. This way, the EP would have a much bigger impact on the composition of the Commission, rather than just supporting or dismissing a total package that was hoisted into the saddle by the MS. For now, this will have to remain another pie in the sky, since such a system would have to be paired with transnational electoral lists to make it work the way it does in a national representative democracy.

The AIV indicates that it is not in favour of referenda on EU affairs, since it does not lead to a structural solution to the democratic deficit of the EU; there will be no space for a nuanced judgement on the content and shape of a proposed decision, and neither will there be for the assessment of alternatives (2014, p. 46). This advice is remarkable, since there are various (mainly progressive) political parties in the Dutch House of Representatives that support the idea of a referendum in general, such as the Greens (GroenLinks), Democrats 66 (D66, social liberals), the Socialist Party (SP, socialists) and the Labour Party (PvdA, social democrats). They have been joined recently by the Party for Freedom (PVV, radical right) and to some degree by the Christian left (ChristenUnie) (“Hoe denken de partijen over invoering van het referendum?,” n.d.). Together, these political parties currently occupy 86 of the 150 seats in the Dutch House of Representatives. The political parties that are more favourable towards European integration (GroenLinks, D66 and PvdA) face a paradox, since they support referenda, yet a negative outcome of a referendum on the Dutch membership of the EU is not in their interest.

Some of the AIV’s recommendations are highly similar to the various answers that were given by the respondents in the series of interviews. For instance, national ministers and politicians need to be consequent and persuasive when propagating their vision on the tasks of the EU. Increased transparency on decision making procedures is also mentioned, especially regarding the Commission and Council. Furthermore, he AIV advises the Dutch government to do more to enable the EP to dismiss individual Commissioners.

The AIV stresses that, not only from a financial-economic perspective, but also from a good functioning of the internal market, strong MS are required. ‘Europe has to be based on the power of the MS, and the EU must contribute to the strengthening of the economies of the MS. Only then can the EU succeed in its mission in the long term’ (2014, p. 48).

The recommendations made by the AIV are not necessarily a panacea. As the Head of the Representation of the Commission in the Netherlands, Andy Klom noted: the desire for, e.g., a smaller
Commission is purely a Dutch one, and it is unlikely that it will gain sufficient support by the other 27 MS. It would therefore be unrealistic to expect that all of the remarks and recommendations by the AIV are shared across the entire EU. It is more feasible instead to focus on increasing the democratic legitimacy of the decision making process at the national level, since this is a purely sovereign structure at which national governments can boost their legitimacy vis-à-vis the rest of the Council.

In May 2014, Dutch MP René Leegte (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, VVD) presented a report on the role of the Dutch House of Representatives and national parliaments in the EU, titled “Ahead in Europe”. In this report, he reaches some noteworthy conclusions. Leegte recommends increasing the House’s involvement in the EU decision making process and improving co-operation with national parliaments of other MS in order to contribute to better representation of European voters. He argues that, together with the use of stronger accountability mechanisms, this can enhance the legitimacy of EU policy-making. Leegte contends that in the input phase, national parliaments should follow the example of interest groups and companies and contribute ideas early on in the decision making process. In the output phase, the House should make more use of existing instruments and available information in order to exercise its supervisory tasks. E.g., there should be discussions with invited MEPS, Commission experts and parliamentary delegations. The House’s own documentation should also be put in order, so that more insight into the way dossiers are dealt with at the national and EU level is given (p. 33).
Chapter 9

Final conclusion and evaluation

9.1 Introduction

In this final chapter, the final conclusion and evaluation of this research are written. The final conclusion is based on the findings from the Eurobarometer report and the series of interviews with the eight respondents, as well as the 2014 AIV report on the democratic legitimacy of the EU. Particular attention is given to answering the central research question and sub questions, as well as the hypotheses. The evaluation specifically addresses the attempt to integrate the typology on European integration by Kopecký & Mudde (2002) with the norms of legitimacy by Bekkers & Edwards (2007) into a new framework.

9.2 Final conclusion

At the end of Chapter 1, the central research question and four sub questions were posited. Now, each of these questions will be addressed.

The central research question was: ‘What is the effect of the Treaty of Lisbon on the democratic legitimacy of European Governance?’ Over the past decades, EU decision making has increasingly required the consent of the EP, which is directly elected by the citizens. This is taken to a higher level by the Treaty of Lisbon. The effect that these institutional (re)arrangements had on the perceived democratic legitimacy of European Governance, however, is negligible, as my Eurobarometer research has pointed out.

The first sub question was: ‘How did the EU citizens’ satisfaction with EU democracy develop during the past decade?’ This question was answered using the three Eurobarometer items that most accurately describe the three forms of legitimacy according to Bekkers & Edwards (2007). The answer to this question is that, between 2004 and 2013, there were some small fluctuations in terms of EU satisfaction with the three forms of legitimacy, yet satisfaction has remained quite static overall, with only minor differences when comparing the 2004 and 2013 scores. Thus, one decade later, as if time stood still, EU citizens generally do not think any more positive or negative on the three forms of legitimacy. It is worrying that there still is no majority in the EU that is satisfied with input, throughput or output legitimacy. Especially input legitimacy is generally perceived as insufficient.

The second sub question was: ‘To what extent can these developments be attributed to the Treaty of Lisbon?’ Since there were no structural changes to the way EU citizens perceive the three forms of
legitimacy during the past decade, notwithstanding the commencement of the Treaty of Lisbon, it can be ruled out that Lisbon made EU citizens look at the three forms of legitimacy differently. Even though Lisbon strengthened the role of the EP and national parliaments in the ordinary legislative procedure, paved the way for the introduction of the ECI, and introduced QMV to policy areas in the Council that were subject to unanimity under the Treaty of Nice, these arrangements did not clearly resonate with the reactions of the Eurobarometer respondents in the four MS, as well as the EU average.

The third sub question was: ‘How does the development of this satisfaction with EU democracy compare between the MS?’ This question was again answered by using the three Eurobarometer items that most accurately describe the three forms of legitimacy according to Bekkers & Edwards (2007). The answer to this question is that there are structural differences in the way citizens from Slovakia, Denmark, Greece and Sweden perceive the EU’s three forms of legitimacy. Slovaks generally looked much more negatively at the three Eurobarometer items than I had expected, while Danes and Swedes turned out to be relatively positive towards the items, more so than I had imagined.

The fourth sub question was: ‘Which factors at the national level are relevant in measuring satisfaction with EU democracy?’ From the series of interviews with eight respondents, the conclusion can be made that a mix of cultural, historical and political factors play an important part in the way citizens of MS look at EU democracy. MS that have a tradition of democracy and transparency tend to be more positive towards EU democracy, while MS that have or had a tradition of nepotism and/or clientelism tend to be more negative towards EU democracy. Another conclusion that was drawn in this thesis is that in half of the EU MS, citizens look nearly as positive or negative at national politics as they do at EU politics. Indeed, in every Southern European MS, except Malta, citizens are more negative towards national politics than towards EU politics. This is both good and bad news to advocates of European integration. The good news is that many Europeans are perhaps simply not aware of the possibilities to become involved in the decision making process and instead base their assumptions for EU democracy on their experiences with national democracy. The bad news is, as was already argued, that these experiences with national democracy are the product of a mix of cultural, historical and political factors, which are most difficult to change. Even if administrative reforms at the national level of Southern European MS are successfully implemented, it could still take decades and generations to win the trust of the citizens up to the Nordic levels.

The answer to the fourth sub question leads to the suggestion that the EU does not suffer from a democratic deficit, or a lack of democratic legitimacy; it has an unwarranted image problem. From the series of interviews and the AIV report, it became clear that there is simply not enough awareness amongst citizens of the possibilities of influencing EU decision making. National politicians are in part
responsible for this, as they tend to shun the topic of European integration, or tend to be inconsistent in their vision on the matter. These politicians, as well as the media, schools and companies, should do more to bring the EU on the agenda, also when there are no elections.

So is the democratic legitimacy of the EU actually in a good shape, and are we making a mountain out of a molehill? Not exactly. There is discontent amongst a part of the European population across the three forms of legitimacy, although there is also disagreement amidst these people on the issues, their causes and solutions. To give an example of my own empirical data, several interview respondents mentioned that EU decision making is inefficient, due to the 29 bureaucracies – Brussels and the MS – each with their own agenda. The fact that there are 28 DGs, since there are 28 MS, is also described by some as an inefficiency. Some of the criticism heard in the interviews is resonated in the 2014 AIV report on the democratic legitimacy of the EU, for instance that a smaller and individually accountable Commission is highly desirable. However, will a smaller Commission increase its legitimacy if it means that most MS will not be able to put up a countryman anymore? This is one of the various topics that is up for debate.

Regardless, an enhanced democratic legitimacy of the EU is not something that will appear just by making arrangements in the institutional framework of the EU and/or its MS; a full-fledged European public sphere is needed as well. This public sphere, in turn, requires a further politicisation of the debate, especially at the national and local level. This is something that most national politicians have been negligent in, even though the EU was subject to significant institutional reconstruction in the past five years. The previous chapter pointed out that it will be challenging for national politicians across the entire EU to create a public sphere, since in various countries, especially in Southern Europe, citizens tend to highly distrust their government and politics in general. This is not something of yesteryear; the distrust is often deeply rooted in the mentality of citizens in these countries. This is contrasted by the Northern European MS, where trust in the national government as well as the EU is generally higher. Institutional reform within the EU takes years to accomplish, whereas winning over the hearts and minds of the majority of all Europeans may require decades. If the sovereign debt crisis taught us anything about solidarity, it is that some Northern Europeans do not always feel obliged towards Southern Europeans. This hampers the development of a European public sphere. A ‘European narrative’ is required in order to develop such a public sphere, although this idea is still in its infancy; it remains to be seen whether it is conceivable. Although there is still room for some institutional improvement in the institutions of the EU as well as those in its MS – more changes will indubitably follow in the coming treaties – they might be a distraction from, or even an denial of reality. Democracy is not just a document containing rules and procedures; it is ultimately something that has to be experienced and widely accepted. This is the true challenge that we face.
Lastly, in Chapter 2, a null hypothesis and three hypotheses were formulated:

$H_0$: There is no relationship between the Treaty of Lisbon and an increased legitimacy of European Governance.

$H_1$: The Treaty of Lisbon has increased the input legitimacy of European Governance;

$H_2$: The Treaty of Lisbon has increased the throughput legitimacy of European Governance;

$H_3$: The Treaty of Lisbon has increased the output legitimacy of European Governance.

Seeing as no direct relationship between the Treaty of Lisbon and the three forms of legitimacy was established, the three hypotheses could not be verified.

9.3 Evaluation of the integration of typology on European integration and norms of legitimacy into a new framework

As noted earlier, one of the goals of this chapter was to attempt to combine the work of Kopecký & Mudde (2002) with that of Bekkers & Edwards (2007) and the Eurobarometer items that would best reflect their work. This would mean that ideally, the Euroenthusiast MS displays high appreciation for the EU’s input, throughput and output legitimacy, while the Europragmatist and Eurosceptic show mediocre enthusiasm, and the Euroreject produces little appreciation. This would create a framework that is equipped to predict how respondents from the MS will react to the three forms of legitimacy.

The figures in Table 8.1 lead to an interesting observation. It has turned out that Slovakia, the Euroenthusiast, has obtained a lower score than Europragmatist Denmark and Euroreject Sweden. Meanwhile, Greece, the country that was selected as the Eurosceptic, turned out to obtain the lowest score by far. This is not in line with the hypotheses that Slovakia would gain the highest score overall, with Denmark and Greece gaining lower, similar scores, and Sweden gaining the lowest score overall.

The verdict is therefore that the framework by Kopecký & Mudde is not compatible with the accumulated theories of Scharpf (1998) and Bekkers & Edwards using the existing Eurobarometer items. There must be one or multiple factors that are responsible for this mismatch. A number of these potential factors will be discussed in the coming subparagraphs, in which I will reflect on my used methods in order to attempt to explain why the results did not meet the expectations. First, I will discuss the external validity of Kopecký & Mudde’s typology. Second, I will look back at the used criteria for the selection procedure of the four MS. Third, I will do the same for the used criteria for the popular reactions to the three forms of legitimacy. Along the way, some suggestions will be made to enhance the internal validity of this kind of research.
9.3.1 Typology on European integration

First of all, it must be emphasised that Kopecký & Mudde (2002) created their framework for the allocation of political parties, whereas I used their framework for the allocation of states. This is relevant, since political parties are generally based on a particular ideology and because of that, they are most unlikely to change their attitude on topics, while states, or to be more accurate, nations consist of individuals, each with their own opinion on a plethora of topics, that may change over time, for various reasons. This is why, for instance, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has since its founding campaigned against the EU and the British membership, and also why the British Liberal Democrats have always made a case for British EU membership, while the ratification process of the European Constitution stranded after a referendum in the Netherlands, a founding nation that is traditionally seen as a strong supporter of European integration. In this respect, political parties are rigid, while nations are dynamic. In my case, I had to use average values of three Eurobarometer waves, which fluctuated more in some countries than in others. Another thing to consider when applying this framework to states instead of parties is that there will always be a Euroreject MS. The idea that the EU has a member which not only refuses to subscribe to the ideas underlying the process of European integration nor to the EU itself, is irrational. However, it is not entirely unthinkable: in January 2013, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, promised that, should his Conservative Party gain a majority following the next general election, he will hold a referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the EU. There has generally been a majority of the British voters that support a ‘Brexit’ – a blend of the words ‘British’ and ‘exit’ – since 2010 (Boffey & Helm, 2012). Seeing as the Treaty of Lisbon, by means of TEU Article 50, provides the possibility for a MS to voluntarily give up its EU membership, it is not inconceivable that the UK may withdraw from the Union after the 2015 general election.

9.3.2 Eurobarometer Selection procedure

Since I attempted to apply the typology on nations instead of political parties, I chose to link the conditions Kopecký & Mudde (2002) mentioned with Eurobarometer items that in my eyes best reflected these conditions. In retrospect, I find the Eurobarometer items that I used reasonably accurate, but not perfect. Where Kopecký & Mudde described support for European integration (the first dimension) as the degree to which there is a belief in institutionalised co-operation on the basis of pooled sovereignty (the political element) and an integrated liberal market economy (the economic element), I chose the Eurobarometer item on the desire for a federation of nation-states (the political element) and support for the EMU and euro (the economic element). I am fully aware of the fact that pooled sovereignty and federalism are two different things – the former is a step towards the latter.
Similarly, support for an integrated liberal market economy is not the same thing as support for the EMU and euro. For instance, the UK and Denmark are both major proponents of the EU’s internal market, while both nations continue their refusal to adopt the euro as the national currency. Where Kopecký & Mudde described support for the EU (the second dimension) as the degree to which there is a belief in the EU as it is and as it is developing, I chose the Eurobarometer item on the belief whether or not things were going in the right direction in the EU. Although this Eurobarometer item is still not a literal translation of the condition Kopecký & Mudde created, it is nevertheless fairly accurate. All in all, the existing Eurobarometer items do not sufficiently ‘catch’ the required data that fully meet the created conditions for the framework, and respondents might also interpret the items differently than I do.

Another potentially hindering factor is the combination of the dimensions. For instance, according to Kopecký & Mudde, a Europhile supports both European integration as well as the EU itself. The optimum of these two dimensions was found in Slovakia, even though the Slovakian nation ended on the third place regarding support for the political element of European integration, which was eight points behind the number one nation, Poland. As for the economic element, the country finished on the third position as well, less than four points behind the number one, Slovenia. By taking the average value of these two elements, Slovakia ended first in the Europhile score by over three points. However, as far as the EU-optimist score is concerned, Slovakia is suddenly much less convincing: it finished over fifteen points lower than winner Bulgaria. While Slovakia had the highest average score of the Europhile vs. Europhobe and EU-optimist vs. EU-pessimist continuums, and was therefore the rightful winner, this demonstrates that there is no true archetype MS that convincingly fits one of the four archetypes; it is only the result of a trade-off. This naturally goes for all four selected MS. That does not mean, however, that the four MS each came like a bolt from the blue. For instance, the fact that Denmark came out as the Europragmatist would probably not surprise Kopecký & Mudde, since Denmark’s relations with the EU are characterised by a dilemma between, on the one hand, a desire to seek the preservation of national autonomy and, on the other hand, the pursuance of economic and political interests through participation in the EU. This has led Danish EU policy to utilise different forms of dualistic policies and pragmatic adaptation when and where necessary (Kelstrup, 2013, p. 14). Kopecký & Mudde regard the Europragmatist as a party that, through pragmatic (often utilitarian) considerations decide to assess the EU positively, because they deem it profitable for their own country or constituency (2002, p. 303). Similarly, Greece seems to fit the Eurosceptic archetype too, in that it does support the idea of European integration: in the selection procedure, it turned out that 62.3 per cent of the Greek respondents between 2012 and 2013 supported their country’s membership of the EMU. Yet, in that same selection, it turned out that no less than 72.3 per cent of
the Greek respondents between 2012 and 2013 stated that things were going in the wrong direction in the EU. Therefore, the main reason why the typology and the norms on input, throughput and output legitimacy are not compatible is not entirely because of the selection procedure, but also due to the linkage of the three forms of legitimacy with the selected Eurobarometer items for measuring the popular reactions.

9.3.3 Measuring the popular reactions to the three forms of legitimacy

In Chapter 2, an extensive conceptualisation was given on input, throughput and output legitimacy. In order to operationalise these three forms of legitimacy for my research in this chapter, I translated them to mundane topics. For input legitimacy, the emphasis would have to be on input of the European citizen in general. Throughput legitimacy should be aimed chiefly at the democratic process in EU decision making, typically the ordinary legislative procedure. Lastly, output legitimacy should be all about the EU’s effectiveness and responsiveness. In this section, I will share my experiences with the linkage of these worldly topics with the available Eurobarometer items, starting with input legitimacy. The item that I chose for this form of legitimacy was ‘My voice counts in the EU’. I believe that this item is a fairly valid choice for measuring input legitimacy, although it only partially captures the conditions set by Bekkers & Edwards (2007). The Eurobarometer item does not specifically take into account the possibility to engage in public debate and policy-making. Neither does the Eurobarometer item capture the openness of the agenda setting process.

As for throughput legitimacy, the item I chose was: ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU?’ Again, this Eurobarometer item is only moderately compatible with the conditions set by Bekkers & Edwards in Chapter 2, although these conditions may not be taken into account by the average European respondent when reading the corresponding Eurobarometer item. Does the average European respondent automatically consider the quality of the checks and balances that are embedded in the decision making process? Do they also take the quality of participation in the decision making process into consideration? This we cannot know. For all we know, respondents might consider factors that belong to input and output legitimacy when answering this Eurobarometer item, with all the consequences that will entail.

As far as output legitimacy is concerned, it was much more difficult to find a satisfying Eurobarometer item. There are no items specifically on the effectiveness, responsiveness and accountability of the EU as a whole, not even individual EU bodies. I eventually decided that the best option would be to pick the item ‘The interests of our country are well taken into account in the EU’. In my opinion, this catches
the norm of a responsive government as a step towards being an effective government. This means that effectiveness and accountability were unfortunately not taken into the equation. If these norms were translated to Eurobarometer items, the research would be more internally valid.

9.3.4 Conclusion

The Eurobarometer currently does not accurately measure what is necessary to combine the framework of Kopecký & Mudde (2002) with the writings of Bekkers & Edwards (2007), since the Eurobarometer items are generally not accurate enough; they leave too much space for interpretation if we are to follow the criteria of Bekkers & Edwards. Another attempt to link the typology with the norms should be made when the items are direct translations from both the conditions set by Kopecký & Mudde, and Bekkers & Edwards. For the conditions set by the former, there should be items on the belief in institutionalised co-operation on the basis of pooled sovereignty, as well as the support for the EU’s internal market. For the conditions set by Bekkers & Edwards, there should be items that are a direct translation from the norms of the three forms of legitimacy, as articulated in Chapter 2. What also needs to be taken into account is that the framework by Kopecký & Mudde was originally not intended for catching the dynamics of national opinions, but for catching the static ideologies of political parties. The archetypes that emerge from the typology are always a trade-off between several dimensions, i.e., support for the economic element of European integration, support for the political element of European integration, belief in the EU as it is and as it is developing. The archetype MS may thus not fit as well in every single dimension.

9.4 Recommendations

During my research, I stumbled across several interesting questions that went beyond the scope of my own thesis, but nevertheless warrant further investigation in my opinion. They are as follows:

One of the persons I interviewed for my research was Mr Andy Klom, Head of the Representation of the European Commission in the Netherlands. He argued that information provision on the EU in Nordic countries has made the population of these MS more favourable towards the EU in the past twenty years. Although I believe that information alone does not suffice in boosting the democratic legitimacy of European Governance, what can we learn from the relationship between information provision on the EU on the one hand, and satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU on the other? Is information the key to a more positive image of the EU?
Paragraph 8.3 pointed out that in fourteen of the 28 MS, there was a percentage difference of fifteen or less between satisfaction with national and EU democracy. This implies that many Europeans consciously or unconsciously link EU democratic legitimacy with national democratic legitimacy. Hence, what is the link between national opinions on EU democracy on the one hand, and national opinions on national democracy on the other?

By extension, Hix & Marsh (2007, p. 495) argue that elections to the EP ‘are secondary to the main (national) electoral contest, and they are national contests rather than European contests.’ In other words, citizens are said to find elections to the EP of less importance than national general elections. These second-order elections serve as a means to react to national elections. As Reif & Schmitt (1980, p. 9) put it: ‘Many voters cast their votes in these elections not only as a result of conditions obtaining within the specific context of the second-order area, but also on the basis of factors in the main political arena of the nation’. In line with the two research suggestions, does the ‘second-order election’ conceptual framework by Reif & Schmitt and Hix & Marsh explain the relatively similar opinions in most EU MS on national and EU politics?

In paragraph 8.4 it was explained how the national parliaments with a mandating or procedural scrutiny system have proactively participated in their respective government’s position on EU affairs for the past few decades. Is such a system beneficial to the democratic legitimacy of EU decision making?

Paragraph 8.4 also discussed the lack of a public sphere at the European level. This was also mentioned by Mr Arjo Klamer, one of the persons I interviewed for my research. The paragraph also mentioned that a European narrative could help develop such a European public sphere. This warrants the question, what is required to successfully create a lasting European public sphere, and how feasible or desirable is it to create a European narrative?

Lastly, paragraph 9.3 dealt with the shortcomings of combining the framework of Kopecký & Mudde (2002) with the norms by Bekkers & Edwards (2007) in detail. Will this combination provide a more representative country selection as well as national results if survey questions are used that are direct translations of the dimensions and norms respectively that were designed by these authors?
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Appendices

I Eurobarometer selection procedure

EU-optimist versus EU-pessimist. For this dimension, I have selected the following question: ‘At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction in the European Union?’ The answer options are ‘Things are going in the right direction’, ‘Things are going in the wrong direction’, ‘Neither the one nor the other’ and ‘Don’t know’. I have designated the EU-optimist to the answer option ‘Things are going in the right direction’, whereas I have designated the EU-pessimist to the answer option ‘Things are going in the wrong direction’.

Europhile versus Europhobe. As noted on p. 2, this dimension consists of a political and an economic element. I selected two statements in the Eurobarometer that best reflect these; one statement on the political and one question on the economic element. The statement on the political element is as follows: ‘The EU should develop further into a federation of Nation-States.’ The answer options for this statement are ‘Totally agree’, ‘Tend to agree’, ‘Tend to disagree’, ‘Totally disagree’ and ‘Don’t know’. The question on the economic element is as follows: ‘Please tell me whether you are for or against a European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro.’ The answer options for this question are ‘For’, ‘Against’ and ‘Don’t know’. I have designated the Europhile to the sum of those that answered ‘Totally agree’ and ‘Tend to agree’ to the political statement on the one hand, and those that answered ‘For’ to the economic question on the other. The Europhobe, on the other hand, is the sum of the share that answered ‘Totally disagree’ and ‘Tend to disagree’ to the political element on the one hand, and those that answered ‘Against’ to the economic question on the other. The answers to the political and economic element have the same weighting (1).

In order to determine which MS has the best score within each quadrant, I have calculated the average values between Europhile and EU-optimist percentages, Europhobe and EU-optimist percentages, Europhile and EU-pessimist percentages and Europhobe and EU-pessimist percentages. These four aspects all had the same weighting (1). E.g., when determining which MS is the Euroreject in my country study, I did not consider the Europhobe aspect to be more important than the EU-pessimist aspect, or vice versa. In my selection procedure, I have included every EU MS as of 2014, except Croatia. My reason for this is that Croatia has only recently joined the EU, making it pointless to consider the relationship between the Treaty of Lisbon and Croatian reactions to input, throughput and output legitimacy during the past decade.
Selecting the Euroenthusiast

Table 3.1 taught us that the Euroenthusiast is the MS which is both an Europhile and an EU-optimist. This means that, in order to select the optimal MS for this quadrant, I had to look for the MS that relatively shows the most positive answers to the question on the satisfaction with the way things are going in the EU, as well as the statements on the political and economic elements of European integration. First, I consulted the Eurobarometer results on the political and economic elements of European integration. The results can be seen in Table I.1 below.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for federation of nation states (political element)</th>
<th>Support for EMU and euro (economic element)</th>
<th>Europhile score</th>
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<td>Agree %</td>
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Table I: Europhilic score of EU MS based on the political and economic element of European integration (Eurobarometer, 2012-2013).

Table I above shows that, on average, Slovakia has the highest support for political and economic integration. The next step is to take the satisfaction with the way things are going in the EU into the equation, in order to identify the Euroenthusiast MS.

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Table I.II: EU-optimist score of EU MS based on satisfaction with the way things are going in the EU (Eurobarometer, 2012-2013).

As can be seen from the results in Table I.II, Bulgaria has the highest percentage of respondents that believe that things are going in the right direction in the EU. In order to calculate the score for the Euroenthusiast quadrant, I will take the average score of the MS in Table I.I and the percentages of Table I.II. The MS with the highest average will be used as Euroenthusiast in my country study. The results can be seen in Table I.III below.

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Table I.III: Euroenthusiast score of EU MS based on the average between Europhile and EU-optimist scores.
Table I.III on the previous page shows that Slovakia has the highest Europhile and EU-optimist score on average (47.8), which means that this country was selected as the Euroenthusiast for my country study.

Selecting the Europragmatist

Table 3.1 showed that the Europragmatist is the MS that is both a Europhobe and an EU-optimist. This means that, in order to select the optimal MS for this quadrant, we will need to look for the MS whose inhabitants generally do not agree with the notion that the EU should develop further into a federation of nation-states, yet believe that things are going in the right direction in the EU. First, we need to calculate the Europhobe score the way we did with the Europhile score in Table I.I.

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*Table I.V: Europhobe score of EU MS based on the political and economic element of European integration (Eurobarometer, 2012-2013).*

Now that we know the Europhobe scores of every MS, we can bring the EU-optimist scores from Table I.II into the equation so as to create a new, average Europragmatist score. The results are shown in Table I.V on the next page.
Table I.V shows that Denmark scores the highest average (52.4), which means that this country was selected as the Europragmatist in my cross-national comparison.

Selecting the Eurosceptic

According to Table 3.1, the Eurosceptic is the MS that is both a Europhile and an EU-pessimist. This means that, in order to select the optimal MS for this quadrant, we will need to look for the MS that generally provides the most positive answers to the statements on the political and economic elements of European integration, yet has generally negative feelings on the direction in which things are going in the EU. We already know the Europhile scores from Table I.I, but the EU-pessimist scores are yet to be calculated. We will do this as our next step in Table I.VI below.
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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*Table I.VI: EU-pessimist score of EU MS based on satisfaction with membership of the EC (Eurobarometer, 2012-2013).*

Now that we know the EU-pessimist score of the EU MS, all we need to do now is to include the Europhile scores so as to determine which MS, by average, scores the most points and will be used as the Eurosceptic. Table I.VII on the next page shows the results.
**Euro sceptic score**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table I.VII: Euro sceptic score of EU MS based on the average of their Europhile score and EU-pessimist score (Eurobarometer, 2012-2013).*

As Table I.VII indicates, Greece scores the highest average (63.6). Therefore, this MS was selected as the Euro sceptic for the cross-national comparison.

**Selecting the Euro reject**

Now for the fourth and final quadrant, which is the Euro reject. When looking at Table 3.1, we are told that the Euro reject is the MS that is both a Europhobe and a EU-pessimist. These are two aspects that are already displayed in Tables 8 and 10. By averaging the percentage of Europhobes with the percentage of EU-pessimists, we come to the following insights, as displayed in Table I.VIII on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>67,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>60,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table I.VIII: Euroreject score of EU MS based on the average of their Europhobe score and EU-pessimist score (Eurobarometer, 2012-2013).*

Table I.VIII reveals that Sweden scores the highest average (67,3) and was therefore selected to join the other three MS as the Euroreject.
II Interviews on the democratic legitimacy of European Union Governance

Respondent profiles

In this section, the profiles of the eight respondents I had the pleasure and honour of interviewing are listed, with information on their educational background and career. The list appears in alphabetical order.

Aldrik Gierveld has obtained a master’s degree in Politics and Law, both at the University of Amsterdam. Thus far, he has worked for the Netherlands embassy in Budapest and Rome, as well as the Netherlands Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels. He has also worked at the European Integration Department, where he partook in the Intergovernmental Conference that drafted the Nice Treaty. Between 2010 and 2014, he worked at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague as Deputy Director Multilateral Organisations and Human Rights Department. He is currently the Dutch ambassador to Yemen.

Mendeltje van Keulen has obtained a Ph.D. in European Public Administration at Twente University, as well as a master’s degree in European Politics and Administration at the College of Europe. She has already had various occupations, including at the Netherlands Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, the EP, Clingendael Institute, Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy and the Dutch House of Representatives. Since July 2011, she is clerk and advisor to the Standing Committee on European Affairs in the Dutch House of Representatives.

Arjo Klamer has obtained a bachelor’s degree in Econometrics and a master’s degree in Economics at the University of Amsterdam. He has also obtained a Ph.D. in Economics at Duke University. He has worked as an assistant, visiting and research professor at various universities in the US. Nowadays, he works as a professor in the Economics of Art and Culture at Erasmus University Rotterdam, and as a research professor of Economics at the George Washington University. In April 2014, he was sworn in as wethouder (member of the executive board) of the Dutch municipality of Hilversum, concerned with Social Affairs and Participation, on behalf of the Socialist Party.

Andy Klom has obtained a master’s degree in Political Science and European Studies, both at the University of Amsterdam. He worked at the International Environmental Affairs department of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs before joining the European Commission in 1993, where he worked at the DG for External Relations and Energy. Later, he became the Head of the Representation of the European Commission in Wales. Since March 2012, he is the Head of the Representation of the European Commission in the Netherlands.
Leo Lauwaars has obtained a postdoctoral degree in accountancy at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. After graduation, he pursued a career as a so-called generic accountant in general practice. He chiefly provided advice on mergers and acquisitions. He was a Partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers for 24 years before retiring in 2003.

René Leegte has obtained an academic degree in Development Economics and Environment at Wageningen University. He served as, inter alia, the personal secretary of the then Dutch MP Frits Bolkestein between 1994 and 1998, and worked as a brand manager at Unilever between 1998 and 2002. He has been a member of the Dutch House of Representatives on behalf of the VVD since October 2010. In 2014, he wrote a report on the role of the Dutch House of Representatives and national parliaments in enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the EU.

Tatjana Meijvogel-Volk has obtained a degree in Political Science at the University of Zagreb and a degree in Eastern European Sciences at the Freie Universität Berlin. She has worked for the German embassy in Croatia, for the EU Administration of Mostar in Bosnia Herzegovina and for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the field of humanitarian aid, public relations, protocol and democratisation. She currently works as a project leader at ProDemos, a Dutch foundation in the field of citizenship, rule of law and democracy.

Ruben Peeters has obtained a post-bachelor degree in Business Administration at a faculty shared between the Technical University Delft and the Erasmus University Rotterdam, amongst others. In addition, he has obtained a doctorate of Medicine. He began working as an accountant and later became a controller. Since 2000, he works as a Financial Director at a holding that supplies and distributes fruit and vegetables. In addition, he works as a part-time Financial Director for medium businesses in the horticultural sector since 2011. He also works as an executor.

Interview questions

Below, the list with seven questions that were asked to all respondents, is displayed. The questions are based on the norms as articulated by Bekkers & Edwards (2007) that can be found in Chapter 2. The seventh question is not a part of their norms; it is related to my own findings from the national reactions to the three forms of legitimacy that emerged from my Eurobarometer research.

Input legitimacy

1. What do you think of the current possibilities of citizens to influence the EU decision making process directly and indirectly?
**Throughput legitimacy**

2. At the EU level, decision making usually takes place by means of the ordinary legislative procedure. Do you believe that there are sufficient checks and balances between the Commission, the EP and the Council of Ministers?

3. Do you find the available information on EU decision making sufficiently accessible to citizens?

**Output legitimacy**

4. Do you find the policies of the bodies of the EU efficient and effective?

5. Do you think that the bodies of the EU currently correspond to the expressed wishes of citizens?

6. Do you think that the bodies of the EU are currently sufficiently accountable to each other, and, ultimately, to citizens?

**Eurobarometer study**

7. Graphs 1 through 3 show to what extent citizens from four selected MS agree on various theorems that are related to the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The graphs indicate that opinions between the four MS vary greatly on affairs such as citizen participation, the way democracy works in the EU and the taking into account of MS interests by the EU. What could explain these different attitudes between the four MS?

**Interview data**

In this section, the answers of the respondents to the seven questions are reflected.

**Input legitimacy**

*Possibilities for influencing EU decision making*

Aldrik Gierveld points out that there are indeed many ways for citizens to influence EU decision making, for instance by pressurising MPs. The question that we need to ask ourselves is whether citizens are actually sufficiently involved with that which is decided in Brussels. There is currently a weak link between MEPs and citizens. For some reason, despite the good intentions of the bodies of the EU, there is a gap that we are not able to close. Democracy is not just about rules, institutions and procedures; it is ultimately about the physical experience by people: the perception of democracy (*belevingsdemocratie* in Dutch). In order for material democracy to mature, crises, such as the
Eurozone crisis, ‘aid’ in the development of our political system. The development of a European demos is also necessary in order to enhance belevingsdemocratie.

**Mendeltje van Keulen** believes that the possibilities for citizens to influence EU decision making are definitely present. However, they should become better known. Theoretically, possibilities for impacting decision making at the EU level are the same as at the national level: membership of a political party, being active in such a party, voting, being in touch with your representatives, informing yourself as a critical citizen, participating in consultations. Not only at the national level, but also at the municipal level. These are all instruments that are similar to the instruments at the national level. Mrs Van Keulen supports the idea of transnational electoral lists and similar developments, from a utilitarian perspective. She believes that it is at least worth a try.

**Arjo Klamer** argues that a democracy is about a process in which issues are at stake that are generally shared and are visible in the media. They are shared by people. At the national level, this is the case, but not at the European level, except when the euro was in trouble, or when the European Constitution was a hot topic. It is also difficult to talk about European citizens, because there is no European demos. There are only those that operate in the EU biotope. Everyone else is removed far from it. One can see that from the fact that EU affairs are not shared in the media. We vote for MEPs that disappear into thin air; they are not checked, and no-one is interested in what they do. A public sphere at the EU level is lacking. In short, the EU is a democracy in the formal sense, but not in the substantial sense. Mr Klamer does not believe that there will ever be a demos, partially because the idea of a European unification is outdated. Rather than becoming stronger at the supranational level, it is more important to become stronger at the local and regional level.

**Andy Klom** indicates that, since the autumn of 2012, the Commission has organised a series of 51 so-called citizens’ dialogues across Europe, in which the Commission made proposals directly to citizens. This series was chiefly boycotted by Dutch politics and by the Dutch central government, and was often ignored by the press. Mr Klom understands that the requirements for the ECI seem somewhat harsh, but a million signatures from a quarter of the MS would equal 34 thousand signatures from three of the twelve provinces of the Netherlands. The ECI is also a safeguard against purely national interests; it has to be about an issue that is shared transnationally. Mr Klom notes that the distance between citizens and the EP is as big as the distance between citizens and the national parliaments, because the same political parties are found in both institutions. Participation and decision making at the EU level are probably more neatly arranged than in the Netherlands, since there are various possibilities for citizens to participate in consultations on future EU legislation, for instance. There is no such thing as consultations at the Dutch national level. One has to realise that the competencies and separation of
powers at the EU level are different than in the Netherlands, since the EU is characterised by 29 models of democracy – referring to the 28 MS and the EU institutions. The Dutch model is no panacea.

Leo Lauwaars thinks that the distance between citizens and the EU institutions is so great that he does not feel that he has any impact on EU decision making. The ECI is an instrument that is not relevant until there is a general awareness. A call up for the EP election creates a certain awareness, but then the turnout is woefully low. Instead of creating a degree of European awareness amongst people, there are counter-forces that preach nationalism and oppose what they consider the ‘evil outer world’. In the public sphere, national politics are dominant. The media are potentially an important link between citizens and the EU, whose institutions need to realise that they need to present themselves more, in order to attract the media. There is currently insufficient attention to the positive aspects of European integration, that this bundling determines our relevance in the world.

René Leegte argues that democracy in the EU is based on representative democracy, and that there are essentially possibilities for citizens to influence the democratic process. In fact, there are more possibilities for Dutch citizens to impact EU decision making than national decision making. When asked about the idea of transnational electoral lists for EP elections, Mr Leegte warns that it is already not done in the Netherlands to not have a Frisian or Limburger on the national list, let alone in Europe. With transnational lists, it is not guaranteed that representatives from such regions are elected.

Tatjana Meijvogel-Volk hears a lot of frustration about the ECI. Although its good intentions are clear, it is a very lengthy procedure that also requires a certain level of education in order to be successful. Ordinary citizens are not able to sustain the process, and even the highly educated encounter great difficulties gathering the necessary signatures from so many countries and so many people. It is understandable why the ECI is as it is: it is an instrument that is designed in a way that the sensitivities are taken into account and that no-one will feel left out. However, it makes it incredibly unpractical. Another question would be: how to organise direct democracy differently in a community with twenty-eight bureaucracies and one bureaucracy in Brussels? That question remains unanswered for now.

Ruben Peeters is of the opinion that it is important to create a sense of a European community. He considers the fact that France and Germany are no longer at war the most important aspect of this community. That makes up a lot for the costs and inefficiencies, beside the economic disadvantages of warfare and especially human suffering. Given the fact that we need to have twenty-eight countries in agreement and need to guarantee a reasonable form of democracy, the entire setup is fairly successful. He considers the EP to be more democratic than the Dutch House of Representatives, because he expects MEPs to be less occupied with the issues of the day than MPs. There are
imperfections in the democratic system, but Peeters is at peace with them, because he strongly believes in the value of the existence of the EU and its institutions.

Throughput legitimacy

Checks and balances between Commission, EP and Council

Aldrik Gierveld believes that that the checks and balances between the institutions indeed work sufficiently. Between the European Act and the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, a democratic structure ‘by the book’ was designed, because full codecision rights for the EP were desirable in order to close what was called the democratic deficit. Every effort was made to put in place a full participation and democratic balance between the European institutions. At key moments, the EP should be able to show its teeth and prove that it is a lion and not a lamb. Thanks to the influence of people such as Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, who was the rapporteur on the EP budget, budgetary powers have gradually shifted from the Council to the EP. What we have now is a totally balanced situation, yet the final judgment on the budget is with the EP. It will also be incredibly hard for the European Council to ignore the candidacies of Mr Juncker, Mr Verhofstadt and Mr Schulz for the position of President of the Commission. The Commission should not lose its exclusive right of initiative. Otherwise, it will become a purely administrative organisation that supports the Council and EP. There are already sufficient means for the EP to stimulate the Commission to come up with something.

Mendeltje van Keulen contends that the role and rights of the EP have been strengthened. The Council, however, could do more in terms of transparency and openness to allow for more checks. The Council should handle legislation in a more transparent fashion, so that the national parliaments as well as citizens can exercise their control task. This is also a duty of national politicians. The Commission has acquired new powers in terms of economic governance, yet supervision is still lacking. National parliaments are looking for a way to check on this economic governance. The European Semester involves MS-specific recommendations, but it really is a strong form of peer pressure. National parliaments are still struggling to review this. It is important that they succeed in this, since national parliaments have the budgetary authority.

Arjo Klamer argues that it is visible that the Treaty of Lisbon has improved the checks and balances between the EU institutions and has strengthened the role of the EP. He nevertheless believes that the Council will ultimately remain the most powerful institution. De facto, it is the German Federal Chancellor who has the most power; the role of other MS is only marginal compared to Germany. EU decision making is dominated by the power of experts and lobbies around the Commission. Mr Klamer
believes that it is currently irresponsible to equip the EP with more powers, such as the right of initiative, because democracy is not secured. In a democracy, one must find a balance between expertise and popularity. Right now, this balance is totally inadequate.

Andy Klom stresses that the ordinary legislative procedure is not about checks and balances. The Commission is the executive power, while the EP and Council are the two legislative chambers. The latter two institutions check the Commission, not the other way around. The EP and Council take the decisions on new legislation, new treaties and any ex post monitoring of budgets. This situation is comparable to decision making at the Dutch national level, where the cabinet depends on the House of Representatives and Senate in order to pass legislation.

Leo Lauwaars believes that the Commission is a sort of an ungraspable institution to outsiders. Unmistakably, there are national interests within the Commission, even though the portfolio allocation is arranged in a way that it rises above the nationalities. For example, Mr Lauwaars has the feeling that, when the Dutch Mrs Neelie Kroes was Commissioner for Competition, Dutch banks were dealt with more rashly than other MS’ banks. The Commission is entirely amorphous, since one will always wonder: ‘Who is that Commissioner and from what country do they come?’. It is simply droll that there are 28 DGs only because there are 28 MS. It would be better to introduce constituencies, as is the case in the UN and IMF, in order to look for coherent policy areas. The EP could use a right of initiative, as long as MEPs will not use this only to profile themselves. It must contribute to the EU. Ultimately, the European Council is dominant in EU decision making. As long as those nationalities are recognisable, this is an indispensable institution. It is a good development that QMV is becoming commonplace, as it shifts the equilibrium toward the commonality.

René Leegte stresses that the EU institutions are not only checked by the EP, but also by the national parliaments. The Dutch House of Representatives plays an active role in forming coalitions with other national parliaments in checking the EU decision making process. Not many citizens or even MPs are aware of this. With the report on the democratic legitimacy of the EU, named ‘Ahead in Europe’ (Dutch: ‘Voorop in Europa’), that Mr Leegte published in May 2014, he wants to send a message that aims to raise awareness in the Dutch House of Representatives that the House is already very much able to influence EU decision making under the current treaties.

Tatjana Meijvogel-Volk argues that, on the one hand, people want a more democratic Europe, where the EP has more power, but on the other hand, people do not want to give away too much power to the EU; some form of power must remain. Mrs Meijvogel-Volk points out that, if the EP gains new powers, this results automatically in less power for the Council and therefore the MS. Also, one does not simply ‘copy and paste’ checks and balances of the national level to the EU level. Ultimately, it is a
matter of finding the lowest common denominator. It will be impossible for the European Council to ignore the results of the upcoming EP election, especially since the EU is in the biggest legitimacy crisis since its establishment.

**Ruben Peeters** calls it an imperfection that the EP does not have the right of initiative. The fact that the Commission, which is essentially the cabinet, and the EP, which is the parliament, are joined by the national ministers (the Council) is ultimately not a good thing. It may take another fifty years before the Council has transferred enough sovereignty so that it is prepared to step aside. It would suffice to limit EU decision making to the EP and Commission. It is important to give the EP elections more weight and introduce a Commission that is comprised of the biggest EP fractions. This Commission needs to be setup carefully; the idea that every MS may send in one Commissioner is unsustainable. The European Council is a redundant institution, but Mr Peeters appreciates the role of Mr Van Rompuy to add some stability and continuity to it, since it is populated by new faces every half a year. Ultimately, the national democratic model should be the model for the EU, but that may take another thirty years. Mr Peeters is content if the progress towards this model is slow but sure.

**Accessibility of information on EU decision making to citizens**

**Aldrik Gierveld** is of the opinion that the information is sufficiently accessible. Everyone who wants to know everything, is able to know everything. In every phase of the policy cycle, citizens are able to know what is going on by using the internet, for instance, so that they are also able to provide input to EU decision making.

**Mendeltje van Keulen** thinks that the Dutch House of Representatives as well as the Representation of the European Commission in the Netherlands has greatly improved information provision in terms of public debates on Europe. High school students are always told about the EU when they visit the Dutch House of Representatives, so that they know that the national parliament is also a place where Europe is discussed; one does not necessarily have to go to Brussels for that. If a student searches on the internet for information on the EU, they will undoubtedly find it. However, schools, media, politicians and political parties can still do more to provide such information. Claims that there is not enough attention to the EU in schools are false. Still, it ought to remain a recurring topic at schools. The establishment of international studies is a very positive development, since it will provide more people with a natural European outlook.

**Arjo Klamer** thinks it is difficult to answer this question, because there is hardly talk of ‘citizens’, or people that feel involved in EU decision making. Mr Klamer also finds it most difficult to find
information on decision making. Even though the websites of the EU on decision making are quite well organized, there are so many processes at play, which makes Mr Klamer reluctant to visit such websites.

Andy Klom points out that the Commission has a representation in every MS that shares an array of information with citizens. In the larger MS, there are multiple representations at the regional level. The Commission boasts a network of over five hundred Europe Direct information centres across the 28 MS. Until 2012, there were only eight Europe Direct centres in the Netherlands; now, there are fourteen, soon fifteen. The EP also has a network of information centres across the MS. In 2008, a joint communication strategy was created by the Council, EP, Commission in which it was agreed that communicating Europe is a joint responsibility, also for the MS. However, the Dutch central government does not participate in this strategy at all. Whenever the Commission discusses this with the Dutch government, the government states that, today, citizens are able to find the information about the EU by themselves. Mr Klom hints that a great responsibility also lies with national politicians to properly inform citizens on EU decision making. If a Dutch political party claims that the EP election is not about Europe, but about the Netherlands, then it is obvious what its intentions are. When looking at the number of ‘European presidential debates’ broadcast on Dutch TV between 28 April and 15 May, it is clear how much Dutch politicians are willing to share with the Dutch public. The press is also insufficiently involved in communicating Europe. The press used to be the fourth branch of government. Yet nowadays, articles are seldom based on facts and figures. Editorials are sold as information, even though they are merely opinions that are rarely based on facts.

Leo Lauwaars believes that much information is available. However, there is little context. There is information on specific topics, but broader vistas are needed, comparable with what is known in the Netherlands as the Algemene Beschouwingen (general reflections). That way, a context will develop in which measures will eventually fit. At the local level, this works well, for instance. It is the responsibility of the systems and those that represent us therein to activate us in order to inform ourselves about EU decision making. Citizens usually do not take action by themselves.

René Leegte argues that, when it comes to the information provision on EU decision making, there is a responsibility both with the information providers as well as the citizens that need to digest the information. Mr Leegte does wonder whether information alone is the key to legitimacy. Provided that citizens request information because they are not satisfied with laws, the quality of the laws resulting from EU decision making ought to be enhanced.

Tatjana Meijvogel-Volk explains that, through the years, the EU has produced expensive piles of paper and has spread them across European citizens, who at some point no longer were able to find easy to
read information. Her organisation, ProDemos, works on providing citizens with information that is more easily digestible. It is better to explain something in four pages and have the citizen read it than to produce a four hundred-page document no-one will ever bother with. Mrs Meijvogel-Volk finds it nonsense that the same information needs to be available for 28 nationalities, since a Pole might have a need for different information than a Dane does. It is also noticeable that debates on Europe attract a smaller audience than other debates, so it seems that only few are interested. Then again, the matter on EU decision making is fairly complicated; as far as the Netherlands is concerned, only people from the Clingendael Institute and universities seem to have a good understanding of it. It is also dangerous how little knowledge national politicians have on EU decision making. Mrs Meijvogel-Volk has noticed how this general uncertainty of knowledge on the EU amongst national politicians gives the EU a bad name. ProDemos offers various school activities on politics, history and the EU. Recently, the organisation decided to remove the EU activity, because it was hardly booked. Instead, the EU activity is now fit into the other activities.

Ruben Peeters argues that one needs to be able to find their way to obtain information on EU decision making, but more importantly, one needs to have the inclination to obtain such information. Mr Peeters himself does not really have the inclination, but when he did perform a search online, he found the information to be easily found, and that is what matters. Many people exclaim that they think that everything should be different or more accessible, but in practice, they make no use of it anyway. People who criticise accessibility of information on the EU should first look in the mirror and wonder if they actually know how things work at the national level. Mr Peeters is quite sure that 98 per cent of the EU citizens has never taken the time to look up such information, since it is a lot more fun to look at a pop star than at the decision making process.

Output legitimacy

Efficiency and effectiveness of the EU institutions

Aldrik Gierveld points out that ‘the policy of the EU’ is a very broad term. There are areas where there have been successful operations. There are also areas where some things still have to prove their worth, simply because they need a certain amount of time in order to mature. Eventually, history will pass judgment on the success of policies. In the course of time, people will look back at the way in which we had to deal with a major economic crisis and the impact it had, not only on the euro, but also on the EU itself. After the European Constitution was dismissed, it was put back into place, and the institutions were able to function as they had always done. One can compare it to a reconstruction of a large airport. You’ll have to take a detour for a while, but eventually, a new hall opens, the scaffolding
and fences are removed and then you see that there is a beautiful shopping mall, or an even more efficient handling, or whatever. EU policies are compromises, and everyone knows how difficult it is to reach an agreement on matters at a certain point. Back in the eighties, there was a lot of skepticism towards the feasibility of creating an internal market. And yet it happened. When looking back at the past eight to ten years, very efficient policies were actually made. It may not have been mother’s most beautiful child *(moeders mooiste* in Dutch), but we do love the child very much.

**Mendeltje van Keulen** was not able to answer this question, because her position as clerk and advisor to the Standing Commission on European Affairs of the Dutch House of Representatives does not allow her the leeway to provide normative answers. When asked about the effect of 28 Commissioners on the efficiency of EU decision making, she replied that reducing the number of Commissioners could actually harm the democratic legitimacy of the EU, since right now, all MS are represented in the Commission.

**Arjo Klamer** notes that certain policy areas are quite successful, such as the labour market and digital policy. They do sometimes result in strange things in terms of safety, such as norms and standards. Nevertheless, as long as we do not notice anything from it, one can say that these policies are efficient and effective. However, the policies that reach the media, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the euro policy, we notice how inefficient and ineffective a co-operation between so many parties is. The answer to the euro took very long and is also inadequate. We have to ask ourselves: do we want extensive federalisation, like Mr Verhofstadt does? That is the only way to secure the euro. At the same time, that way is hopeless, because, again, a European demos is lacking. There is no society behind it.

**Andy Klom**, when asked about reducing the number of Commissioners in the future, argues that this is a purely Dutch narrative which is not shared by other MS, thus it is a dead end. In the summer of 2013, the Dutch government agreed on maintaining the present Commission structure for another number of years. Moreover, the Commission does not take instructions from the MS; it decides alone on such matters. Also, all MS want to have their own Commissioner. As for the Netherlands: do we want to replace Neelie Kroes with no one at all and still have an impact on decision making? Regardless of the discussion on the size of the Commission; it has been highly efficient for years, given the enormous agenda of objectives, assignments, instructions and requirements. The institution is also relatively small compared to most MS when looking at the number of civil servants: there is one European civil servant for every ten thousand Europeans. In the Netherlands, there is one public servant for every hundred and thirty Dutchmen.
Leo Lauwaars mentions the ‘travelling circus’ of the EP between Brussels and Strasbourg as an evident inefficiency that is linked to French nationalism. He also criticises the way the EU dealt with the 2014 Crimean crisis and the appointment of Catherine Ashton as the HR. She is just another face in the crowd and is completely invisible.

René Leegte points out that national parliaments can do much to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of EU decision making. Currently, national parliaments still tend to wrongly argue that only bad news comes from Brussels and that the good news comes from the (political) capitals.

Tatjana Meijvogel-Volk argues that it is extremely difficult to be efficient and effective under the current construct. Again, the Brussels bureaucracy equals 29 bureaucracies. The way things currently are, it is impossible to work more efficiently and effectively. The only way is to choose the direction of more integration, but there is not enough support for that. Mrs Meijvogel-Volk questions the need to have 28 Commissioners, as that also contributes to inefficiency. That said, we can also see much bureaucracy at the national level. It is no different in Brussels.

Ruben Peeters notes that EU decision making is not efficient, but he is good with that. As for effectiveness: in some cases the EU is able to operate effectively, for instance in terms of movement within the Community. The common currency has some snags and unpleasant side effects, yet Mr Peeters is convinced that the euro is a blessing for the Netherlands and other MS that are heavily involved in foreign trade. The EU is definitely making steps. Let them go a little faster, let them cost a little less, but nonetheless, there is progress.

Responsiveness of the EU institutions

Aldrik Gierveld believes that, as far as one can know the wishes of citizens, the institutions of the EU are sufficiently responsive. The concerns and objections from some politicians about the idea that the powers of national parliaments are transferred to the European level are usually not heard from average citizens. What average citizens care for are peaceful, predictable and prosperous developments in the economy and in politics. Most people choose for certainty, tranquillity and a steady growth of income and welfare, and pay particular attention to their long term interests and those of their children. As patronising as that may sound, many people will wonder if the EU meets these desires. Mr Gierveld believes that the EU indeed meets them. The institutions indeed try to come up with fitting solutions with the tools that they are given by the MS.

Mendeltje van Keulen was not able to answer this question, because her position as clerk and advisor to the Standing Commission on European Affairs of the Dutch House of Representatives does not allow her the leeway to provide normative answers.
**Arjo Klamer** thinks that there is still much anger in the Netherlands about the way the Dutch cabinet dealt with the referendum on the European Constitution in 2005, after it appeared that two-thirds of the Dutch voters rejected it. He expected that we would see its effect in the 2014 EP election.

**Andy Klom** argues that, following the sovereign debt crisis, the EU altogether has met the expressed wishes of citizens. The crisis itself had nothing to do with the euro, but with a number of national banking systems that did not have their act together. The MS are so interdependent that Europe had to solve the crisis. In broad terms, the EU has met the expressed wishes of the people in this respect. Whether it is the internal market, the free traffic of persons and trade, the lowered roaming charges or cheaper airline tickets, the EU has been successful in areas that are taken for granted to the extent that they have become perfectly normal. Once these benefits disappear, people will notice how important they were and what the costs are when there are no European policies.

**Leo Lauwaars** argues that there is no visible responsiveness for EU citizens. It ought to be clear to the EU that anti-EU sentiments are growing, but there are no clear signals that the EU is countering such sentiments.

**René Leegte** was not able to answer this question, because his position as vice-president of the Standing Commission on European Affairs of the Dutch House of Representatives does not allow him the leeway to provide normative answers.

**Tatjana Meijvogel-Volk** has learned through her experiences at ProDemos that for policy areas where the EU currently has little impact on, such as social security, pensions and health care, there is a request from citizens from all over the EU for the institutions to become more active in these areas. She has also learned from a two-day workshop with citizens from various EU MS that people from all over the EU actually have the same needs.

**Ruben Peeters** wonders which EU citizens actually express wishes to the EU in general. He argues that it is really the representatives from the MS that express the wishes in Brussels. Mr Peeters himself has never expressed wishes to the EU, as he calls himself a positively minded citizen of the EU. He also notes that it is impossible for the EU to meet all wishes expressed by the people.

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**Accountability of the EU institutions**

**Aldrik Gierveld** thinks that the EU institutions are sufficiently accountable. When asked about the appointments of Catherine Ashton and Herman Van Rompuy, he replies that it is just the way how things go. These people are chosen from the own ranks of the European Council. The President of the
Commission will be a different story, since there is a battle going on between three main candidates. It remains to be seen what will result from that.

**Mendeltje van Keulen** stresses that it is impossible to argue that the institutions are sufficiently accountable, for it is the politicians from the MS that populate them. These individuals, however, are sufficiently accountable, yet there is room for improvement. People often complain about the inability of the EP to dismiss individual Commissioners, but in the past years, it did so twice with a Bulgarian and Italian candidate. There is also a role for national politicians to play when questioning the Prime Minister regarding his voting behaviour in Brussels. The same goes for journalists, who can tell about the translation of reform contracts in the Council conclusions, for instance.

**Arjo Klamer** argues that there is no accountability with respect to citizens, not in a single way. Even though Van Rompuy is not directly accountable to EU citizens, Mr Klamer thinks that he is doing a fairly good job. One could argue that the EP is accountable to national parliaments, but citizens do not notice much of that. Formally, they are accountable to the citizen. Informally, it does not appear to work that well.

**Andy Klom** contends that the Commission is accountable to the EP and the Council, as it should be in a constitutional system. The College of Commissioners is chosen by the EP, there lies the democratic legitimacy. Mr Klom suggests that one should wonder whether the Council is truly accountable to citizens, since the cabinets of some MS tend to misinform their national parliaments when reporting back to their national parliaments after a Council meeting in Brussels.

**Leo Lauwaars** is of the opinion that the institutions of the EU are currently not at all accountable to citizens, although the strengthened role of the EP has led to some accountability paths. The dismissing of an individual Commissioner by the EP is likely to result into side effects that are abused. For instance, dismissing a French Commissioner will result in France seeking redress somewhere. Holding on to the collectivity of the Commission is therefore important.

**René Leegte** argues that the Commission is accountable not only to the EP, but also to national parliaments. The Dutch House of Representatives has already invited the Commissioners Šefčovič (Inter-Institutional Relations and Administration) and De Gucht (Trade) in order to question them.

**Tatjana Meijvogel-Volk** thinks that, due to a lack of transparency, there is no talk of accountability to the citizen. Upon being asked for it, she would welcome the idea of making the EP able to dismiss individual Commissioners. That way, we can prevent the situation that certain persons are freeriding, without citizens noticing how these individuals are performing. Mrs Meijvogel-Volk does not believe
that the President of the European Council should be accountable to citizens, since he is an incarnate European compromise between the MS.

Ruben Peeters is of the opinion that accountability in the EU is arranged sufficiently, although there seem to be some imperfections in the system. On the fact that the Commission cannot be dismissed by the EP as a whole: this is an imperfection, but it is just the way things are. Mr Peeters is good with that.

*Eurobarometer interpretations*

Aldrik Gierveld argues that the different reactions between Slovakia, Denmark, Greece and Sweden to the democratic legitimacy of the EU are explained by the political culture of these MS. This political culture is based on the degree of faith that citizens generally have in the official institutions. Faith in, and appreciation for the behaviour of these institutions is shaped by history, by collective experiences of citizens. Crises may also play a temporary role. For instance, Slovakia’s national reactions are explained by forty years of communism, followed by new ideas that many citizens were skeptical about, such as the privatisation of state enterprises. Besides that, now there is an economic setback. One has to consider this mix of various backgrounds.

Mendeltje van Keulen notes that the sudden peak of the four MS in 2009 on the first graph regarding the citizens’ feeling that their voice counts in the EU may be explained by national or European developments. The fact that satisfaction is generally higher in Denmark and Sweden probably has to do with the positive attitude of these nations vis-à-vis democratic and transparent governance, as well as their good tradition of openness. Slovakia’s decline in satisfaction might have to do with the economic crisis after it joined the EU. The same can be argued about Greece. Shifts in Sweden could be explained by the elections that led to a political landslide. There may also be a direct relationship with the provision of information on the EU.

Arjo Klamer asserts that the way citizens fill out these Eurobarometer questions is affected by cultural patterns. Denmark and Sweden are MS with high trust. Those other countries score low structurally. Mr Klamer points out that it is very strange that Swedes were relatively negative at the start of the graphs. There may have been certain circumstances that had an impact on this.

Andy Klom notes that in the Nordic countries, the distance between citizens and the government is much smaller, and participation is much higher. At the same time, Nordic citizens are critical. Town hall meetings and citizens’ dialogues are perfectly normal in the Nordic countries, while they are much less popular in the Netherlands, for instance. Information provision on the EU has also turned these
northern MS more favourable towards the EU in the past twenty years. As for Greece, this MS is still involved in a crisis, which causes very raw feelings. The negative attitude is also a response to the clientelist way in which the country was governed in the past period. The traditionally powerful political parties, such as PASOK, hardly exist anymore. Slovakia, in turn, is insufficiently involved in the EP election turnout. The country has just seen some twenty turbulent years. In the first decade after its independence, it was chiefly dominated by dictatorial types. In the second decade, democratic reforms were issued.

Leo Lauwaars believes that the national reactions are largely determined by the history of these MS. Slovakia, for instance, has been a part of other countries for a long time. It has no democratic history. Slovaks therefore have little faith in externalities, such as supranational institutions. Greek national reactions are likely explained by their feeling that they were harmed from the outside. At the same time, Greece has a history of corruption and a lack of faith in national democracy. Therefore, one cannot expect Greeks to have faith in European democracy. The crisis in Greece could be a blessing, since it might result in a break from nepotism. In countries such as Denmark and Sweden, on the other hand, democracy is deeply rooted and works well there. Denmark is a good example with its minority governments. The majority dismisses its own interests in order to support a minority plan in the interest of the country.

René Leegte attributes the structurally different reactions to the Eurobarometer questions to cultural differences. In Northwestern Europe, there is a more Calvinist way of thinking, whereas in Southern Europe, people tend to interpret rules more often as guidelines. Slovakia’s national reactions to the Eurobarometer items likely stem from a distrust of the government, which in turn has to do with its past as a country that was under Soviet rule for decades. As for Greece, the adoption of the euro may have led to criticism, since Greeks consequentially had to borrow twice as much money.

Tatjana Meijvogel-Volk believes that the different national reactions are determined by cultural differences. Swedes and Danes are more pragmatic and rational, whereas Greeks and Slovaks are more emotional in different ways. Southerners tend to deal more emotionally with politics. As for Slovakia, its Cold War history probably also plays a part in the reactions to the Eurobarometer questions.

Ruben Peeters thinks that the feeling whether or not one’s voice counts may have to do with the voting power of the MS they inhabit. For instance, Germans may believe that their voice truly matters. Mr Peeters is surprised by Slovakia’s national reactions, because it is a country that profits much from European subsidies. He argues the same about Greece, although the decline of the recent years does not surprise him. Slovakian dissatisfaction might have to do with unemployment and the general economic situation. Mr Peeters would expect a very positive attitude from Danes and Swedes, and also
from the Dutch, and is disappointed in their actual attitude. These attitudes may be related to all kinds of ‘political ballyhoo’ at the national level.

**Interview analysis**

Now that we know the opinions of the respondents on the various topics regarding the democratic legitimacy of the EU, we can draw a number of general conclusions. As for input legitimacy, most respondents have indicated that there are indeed possibilities for citizens to influence the decision making process at the EU level. However, there is still insufficient awareness of these possibilities. Regarding throughput legitimacy, several respondents have indicated that the Treaty of Lisbon has improved checks and balance between the EU institutions. Yet some of the respondents also mention the powerful role of the Commission in the decision making process. Some also point out that the European Council still plays a crucial part in decision making as well. All of the respondents believe that information on EU decision making is plentiful. Andy Klom claims that information provision and acquisition has led to more favourable views on the EU. At the same time, René Leegte wonders if information alone is the key to enhanced legitimacy. Some respondents do indicate that politicians, the media, schools and companies should do more to trigger citizens to gain a better understanding of the EU. As far as output legitimacy is concerned, not every respondent is as satisfied when it comes to the efficiency and effectiveness of EU policies. The CFSP is criticised by some – which is a policy area the MS are responsible for – although there is ultimately a large degree of realism on the efficiency of EU policies, due to the various actors that participate in the decision making process, with all their bureaucracies. The respondents are divided on the responsiveness of EU policies: a few believe that they are indeed responsive, some say that they are not. Most of the respondents are of the opinion that the EU institutions are insufficiently accountable to citizens. Some of those that believe that they are, think that there is still room for improvement. A few also state that the President of the European Council should not necessarily be directly accountable to citizens. When asked to interpret the structurally different reactions between Slovakia, Denmark, Greece and Sweden to the democratic legitimacy of the EU, most of the respondents argue that these differences are related to the historical background of these countries in relationship to democracy. Peaks and lows could be explained by certain events, such as referenda, elections or crises.