

# Success in the eyes of the beholder?

---

A comparative analysis of evaluation  
frameworks for UN peacekeeping operations:  
The case of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire

*“C’est ensemble, main dans la main que nous arriverons à une paix certaine et durable”\**



**M.R.J.A. Darius, BBA (268084)**  
Erasmus University Rotterdam  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
International Public Management and Policy

First reader      Dr. M.A. Beukenholdt-ter Mors  
Second reader    Dr. J.L.M. Hakvoort  
25 July 2014

---

\*UNOCI local website: <http://www.onuci.org/en.php3>

## **Acknowledgement**

The process of my master thesis has been intense with many ups and downs. I herewith would like to acknowledge the academic guidance of my previous thesis supervisors Frederik Voûte and Ko Colijn. Thank you for your advice, comments and suggestions at the very beginning of this research. I would also like to acknowledge the input, help and guidance of dr. Tilly Beukenholdt-ter Mors. Thank you for helping me cross that finish line.

But above all I would like to express my gratitude to those close to me, my friends and family, and in particular my girlfriend for her endless support and motivation. Thank you for always believing in me. I could not have done this without you.

## Table of contents

<b>Acknowledgement</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>List of acronyms</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>2 United Nations</b>	<b>10</b>
2.1 The UN as an organization.....	10
2.2 Types of peace operations .....	11
2.3 Core business of peace operations.....	13
2.4 Reasons to deploy peace operations.....	15
<b>3 Literature review</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>4 Theoretical Framework</b>	<b>24</b>
4.1 Duane Bratt's evaluation framework.....	24
4.2 Applying Bratt's framework .....	26
4.3 Jair Van Der Lijn's evaluation framework .....	26
4.4 Applying Van der Lijn's framework.....	31
<b>5 Research design and methodology</b>	<b>32</b>
5.1 Design and time dimension .....	32
5.2 Definitions and conceptual model.....	32
<b>6 History of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>7 Case analysis of UNOCI</b>	<b>40</b>
7.1 2004: Establishment of the mission.....	40
7.2 2005: The Pretoria Agreement.....	42
7.3 2006: The Yamoussoukro high-level meeting .....	44
7.4 2007: The Ouagadougou Political Agreement .....	46
7.5 2008: The Fourth Supplement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement.....	48
7.6 2009: Working towards elections .....	49
7.7 2010: The Presidential Elections.....	51
<b>8 Analysis of the frameworks</b>	<b>56</b>
8.1 The issue of mandate fulfilment .....	56
8.2 Analysing UNOCI using Bratt's framework.....	58
8.3 Analysing UNOCI using Van der Lijn's framework .....	60
8.4 Results of the analyses.....	64
8.5 Strengths & weaknesses of the evaluation frameworks.....	64

<b>Conclusions and recommendations</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>Appendices</b>	<b>81</b>
<b>Appendix 1: Van der Lijn's clusters of causes of conflict</b>	<b>82</b>
<b>Appendix 2: Standard inventory of policy tools</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>Appendix 3: Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement</b>	<b>88</b>
<b>Appendix 4: Security Council Resolution 1528</b>	<b>101</b>

## List of acronyms

<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
<b>ECOSOC</b>	Economic & Social Council
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>FANCI</b>	Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire
<b>FN</b>	Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire
<b>FPI</b>	Front Populaire Ivoirien
<b>GA</b>	General Assembly
<b>GNR</b>	Government of National Reconciliation
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDP</b>	Internally displaced person
<b>IEC</b>	Independent Electoral Commission
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>IWG</b>	International Working Group
<b>MINUCI</b>	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
<b>MJP</b>	Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix
<b>MPCI</b>	Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire
<b>MPIGO</b>	Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest
<b>NGO</b>	Nongovernmental Organization
<b>OHCHR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
<b>OPA IV</b>	4th supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement
<b>OPA</b>	Ouagadougou Political Agreement

<b>PDCI</b>	Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire
<b>PKO</b>	peacekeeping operation
<b>RDR</b>	Rassemblement de Républicains
<b>RTI</b>	Radio Télévision Ivoirienne
<b>SC</b>	Security Council
<b>UCDP</b>	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNAMIR</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
<b>UNMIL</b>	United Nations Mission in Liberia
<b>UNOCI</b>	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
<b>UNOMOZ</b>	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
<b>UNPKO</b>	United Nations peacekeeping operation
<b>YP</b>	Young Patriots
<b>ZoC</b>	Zone of Confidence

## 1 Introduction

As the Cold War was coming to an end in 1988 the United Nations had undertaken 15 peace operations in a period of forty years, since 1948. Between 1989 and 1999, **only ten year time**, this number jumped to 31 missions.<sup>1</sup> With the increasing number of UN peace operations the question of whether these operations were actually successful was also more frequently asked. Some operations are considered a clear success, such as UNOMOZ in Mozambique, where after sixteen years of war fresh elections were held in 1994 and the country has been at peace ever since. Others are viewed as outright failures, for instance UNAMIR in Rwanda, that could not prevent the genocide of over 800.000 people in 1994. Persuaded by his personal interest the author of this study explored some of the recent literature on evaluating peace operations and found that in most cases however, it is not that easy to judge the success of a peace operation. MacQueen<sup>2</sup> for example identifies three political perspectives on UN operations that could each yield different conclusions. There is the 'peacekeeping process perspective', which focuses on the legal and operational setting of operations. There is the 'peace studies tradition', which sees peacekeeping as part of a larger process of peacebuilding. And there is the 'world politics school, which is mainly concerned with peacekeeping as part of the management of the international system over significant periods. In his article MacQueen analyses several UN missions from all three perspectives, among which UNDOF, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, deployed in 1974 on the Israel-Syrian border in the Golan Heights. All three perspectives yield a different conclusion on UNDOF. The 'peacekeeping process perspective' would judge the mission as a success. The 'peace studies tradition' would judge the mission as a failure and the 'world politics school' would judge this same mission as a limited success. Inspired by MacQueen's article the author of this thesis began his search in the world of evaluating peace operations which led to the research goal and question formulated in this chapter.

### *Research goal*

The goal of this research is to test whether one type of evaluation framework for peace operations yields a different result than another type of evaluation framework when exactly the same operation is evaluated.

### *Research question*

In order to reach afore mentioned goal the author of this thesis has been asking himself certain questions. How does one come to the conclusion of a peace operation being a success or failure? By what standards are operations evaluated in order to determine this? And what exactly constitutes success? Does the ideology of whoever is judging the operation influence the outcome of it? Motivated by these questions this thesis explores the possibilities to evaluate UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and aims at answering the following main research question:

### ***Does the type of evaluation framework affect the outcome of the assessment of a UN peacekeeping operation?***

Several sub-questions will have to be answered in order to be able to answer the main research question. These sub-questions are:

- **What is the United Nations?**
- **What types of peace operations are there and what is their business?**
- **Why are peace operations being deployed?**
- **What types of evaluation frameworks are there?**
- **What are similarities and differences between frameworks?**
- **What are strengths and weaknesses of the evaluation frameworks?**

The main question asked and answered in this thesis is relevant in both societal and theoretical sense. Peacekeeping operations have become the most common response to post-conflict situations. It is important that these operations are as successful as possible because they contribute to peace and security worldwide, save human lives and improve people's living conditions. This is of great importance to both post-conflict societies as the international community. PKOs that are considered failures harm the reputation and credibility of the United Nations as the leading organization that conducts the majority of these missions. It also makes troops contributing countries reluctant to participate in future operations. To be as successful as possible there has to be understanding about what success in peacekeeping operations actually is.

The theoretical relevance of the main research question lies in its contribution to the body of knowledge of evaluation frameworks for UN peacekeeping operations. If the outcome of PKO assessments indeed depends on the evaluation framework used it shows that these evaluations are not objective. This information offers the opportunity to look for the strengths within the different frameworks and combine these strengths to arrive at a new, more generalizable and more objective evaluation framework for UN peacekeeping operations. Having a clear and more objective evaluation framework helps to show the actual accomplishments of UN peacekeeping operations.

This study begins by answering the first three sub-questions in the second chapter, which provides the background information on United Nations peacekeeping operations. Chapter 3 contains the literature review and explores some existing peacekeeping evaluation frameworks and with it provides the answer to the fourth sub-question. After reviewing some frameworks a distinction can be made between two types of frameworks and one model of each type is further developed in the theoretical framework in Chapter 4. Chapter 5, containing the research design and methodology, describes how the two evaluation frameworks are applied to one UN peacekeeping operation that will be the test case of this study, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). The methods of research will be extensive literature research and content analysis of notes, reports, newspaper articles and journal articles. A brief history concerning the test case can be found in Chapter 6 followed by the empirical findings in Chapter 7. The discussion of the evaluation frameworks can be found in Chapter 8, that also holds an alternative evaluation framework for UN peacekeeping operations. Finally, the conclusions of this study can be found in Chapter 9.

---

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> MacQueen, 2008

## 2 United Nations

This chapter holds a brief description of the organization responsible for the majority of peace-keeping operations, the United Nations. Furthermore this chapter will explore the different types of operations, the reasons for their deployment and their core business.

### 2.1 The UN as an organization

After World War II 51 countries founded a new international organization on 24 October 1945 to pursue worldwide peace and economic and social progress, the United Nations. The 4 aims of the organization are 1) to keep peace throughout the world, 2) to develop friendly relations between nations, 3) to work together to help people live better lives, to eliminate poverty, disease and illiteracy in the world, to stop environmental destruction and to encourage respect for each other's rights and freedoms, and 4) to be a centre for helping nations achieve these aims.<sup>3</sup>

Currently there are 193 members of the United Nations who meet every year in the UN General Assembly (GA), which is the closest thing to a world parliament, in which the affairs of the world are debated. Besides the GA there are five other main bodies in the United Nations system. The Economic & Social Council (ECOSOC) concerns itself with the world's economic, social and environmental challenges. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the UN that settles legal disputes between states and is an advisory body to the UN and its specialised agencies. The Trusteeship Council suspended its operation on 1 November 1994, with the independence of Palau, the last remaining United Nations trust territory. Before that date it had the task of supervising the administration of Trust Territories placed under the Trusteeship System, such as for example British Togoland, which later became Ghana. The Secretariat is an international staff carrying out the diverse day-to-day work of the Organization, such as administering peacekeeping operations, surveying economic and social trends and preparing studies on human rights and sustainable development.<sup>4</sup>

The Security Council (SC) is the main body responsible for keeping the peace. It consists of five permanent members with veto power, (USA, UK, France, China and Russian Federation) and 10 non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. Chapter VI of the UN Charter sets out a series of procedures the SC may use to try and achieve 'peaceful settlement of disputes'. When a dispute is not resolved and turns into a 'threat to the peace', a 'breach of the peace' or an 'act of aggression', the SC's primary concern is to stop them as soon as possible. The Security Council has to 'determine the existence' of such a situation and decide what recommendations to make. It can decide to call for certain 'provisional measures' by the parties, such as a ceasefire or mutual withdrawal of forces. The SC also has enforcement measures at its disposal, such as economic sanctions, arms embargoes, and financial penalties. Other measures are a severance of diplomatic relations, a blockade or even collective military action, for instance dispatching military observers or a peacekeeping force. If the Security Council determines that deploying a peacekeeping operation is the most appropriate step to take, this will be formally authorized by the adoption of a resolution. The resolution outlines the operation's mandate and size and contains details of the tasks it will be responsible for.<sup>5</sup>

### 2.2 Types of peace operations

The terminology of peace operations can be confusing. 'Peacekeeping' is used while 'peacebuilding' is meant and vice versa. In essence one should speak in terms of peace activities and not operations, but since that phrase has become so common, this thesis will refer to the whole of activities as peace operations. The United Nations peace operations entail five principal activities and it is important to understand how they interrelate and differ from each other, since they are different activities.

Conflict prevention involves the usage of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state disputes from escalating into violent conflict. This activity should ideally build on early warning, information gathering and careful analysis of the underlying factors of the dispute. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary-General's 'good offices', the dispatch of preventive missions or confidence-building measures<sup>6</sup>.

*Peace-making* in general entails measures to address conflicts already in progress and usually involves diplomatic action and mediation to try and bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. The Secretary-General may exercise his 'good offices' to facilitate the resolution of a conflict, either upon the request of the Security Council or General Assembly or at his own initiative. Peace-making can also be undertaken by special envoys, governments and groups of states or NGOs or regional organizations.

*Peacekeeping* is a technique to preserve the peace, where the fighting has been stopped, and to assist in implementing the usually still fragile peace agreements achieved by peacemakers. It entails the deployment of lightly armed, multinational military personnel for non-enforcement purposes. This enterprise has evolved since 1948 from a traditional, primarily military model of observing cease-fires and force separations after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military, police and civilian, working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.

*Peace-enforcement* involves the threat or the use of coercive measures, including non-defensive military force, with the authorization of the Security Council, to impose, maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. The Security Council may use regional actors for enforcement action under its authority.

*Peacebuilding* is a term that entails a variety of activities to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and reassemble the foundations of peace and development. Peacebuilding is the complex, long-term process of creating the conditions necessary for sustainable peace. It addresses deep-rooted, structural causes of conflict in a comprehensive matter. Peacebuilding measures focus on the functioning of society and the State and include, but are not limited to, reintegrating former combatants, strengthening the rule of law, improving respect for human rights, providing assistance for democratic development and support free and fair elections.

<sup>3</sup> The United Nations: An Introduction for Students. 2000. United Nations Publications. Accessed on 7-4-13.

<sup>4</sup> <http://cyberschoolbus.un.org/unintro/unintro.asp>

<sup>5</sup> MacQueen, 2008

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/>

<sup>6</sup> Definitions retrieved from: UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2008, p. 17-19

The generic phrases *peace operation* and *peace mission* refer to any international peacekeeping, peace-making, peace-enforcement, peacebuilding or conflict prevention operation that includes a multinational military force aimed at restoring or preserving the peace.


As can be seen in figure 1, the boundaries between the different types of peace operations have become increasingly blurred and operations are rarely limited to one type of activity, whether conducted by the UN or other organizations. They do not occur in a sequential way, but are mutually reinforcing and there is almost always some sort of overlap. While UN peacekeeping operations were originally intended to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace-agreement, they often also are involved in peace-making and early peacebuilding activities. Peacekeeping operations may use force at the tactical level to protect themselves and the mandate, with the authorization of the Security Council, and the consent of the host government and main parties to the conflict. This use of force, however, differs from peace-enforcement, even though at times the line between them may appear blurred. The difference is that peace-enforcement involves the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally forbidden for all Member States under Article 2 (4) of the Charter unless it has been authorized by the SC.<sup>7</sup>

### 2.3 Core business of peace operations

Due to the political differences during the Cold War years, traditional UN peacekeeping operations have been limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground. They are a temporary, essentially military measure to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which, at a political level, negotiations of a lasting settlement can continue. Typical tasks involve observation, monitoring and reporting (by means of military posts, patrols and over-flights), supervision of a ceasefire and forming a buffer between parties. Their presence reassures actors that the other party will not exploit the ceasefire for strategic military advantage.<sup>8</sup>


After the Cold War had ended the focus of UN peacekeeping operations shifted and became much more versatile, since there was a decline in inter-state conflicts and an increase in regional, internal armed conflicts and civil wars. This asked for a different strategic approach. In their 2003 'Handbook on UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations'<sup>9</sup> the United Nations speak of 'multi-dimensional' peacekeeping operations, typically deployed in the direct aftermath of civil conflict, which entail a mixture of military, police and civilian components to support the implementation of a new peace agreement. These operations have had more profound tasks such as supporting the transition to legitimate governments, temporarily carrying out legislative and administrative functions of a state, or the establishment of administrative structures. Also preventing the outbreak or spill-over of conflict to neighbouring countries and providing a secure environment for people to return to normal civilian life may be one of the jobs. Multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations operate in a complicated environment as part of a much broader international effort to help countries emerging from civil conflict move towards sustainable peace. This effort is made up of multiple phases carried out by various actors with different, and sometimes overlapping, mandates and areas of expertise, including NGOs, international financial institutions and civil society organizations (figure 2).

**Figure 1** Linkages and Grey Areas



Source: UN Peacekeeping operations - Principles & Guidelines, 2008, p.19

**Figure 2** The Core Business of Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations



Source: UN Peacekeeping operations - Principles & Guidelines, 2008, p.23

<sup>7</sup> UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2008, p. 17-19

<sup>8</sup> The Ibid., 2008, p. 20-30

<sup>9</sup> Handbook on UN Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations, 2003, p. 1

According to the UN<sup>10</sup>, the core tasks of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are to:

- a. Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- b. Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
- c. Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

These core tasks are reflected by the operational support for national law enforcement organizations, the protection of vital government installations like power plants, ports and infrastructure and efforts to allow for free movement of people, goods and humanitarian assistance. Civilians have increasingly become the victims of internal armed conflicts and account for the vast majority of casualties. Forced displacement makes them vulnerable and so more and more multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations have been charged with the responsibility to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, and are mandated by the Security Council to do so. With all these integrated activities multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations go beyond the scope of traditional peacekeeping operations, and usually play a direct role in political efforts to resolve a conflict. They represent the collective will of the international community and therefore enjoy a high degree of legitimacy, making it possible to apply a considerable amount of pressure on the parties involved.<sup>11</sup> On short-term, multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations may help to halt violence, but it is unlikely to lead to sustainable peace without additional programmes focussed on preventing the recurrence of violence. This is the focus of peacebuilding. To obtain sustainable peace there is a need for progress in at least four critical areas<sup>12</sup>:

- a. Restoring the State's ability to provide security and maintain public order;
- b. Strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights;
- c. Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes;
- d. Promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return or resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees uprooted by conflict.

Peacebuilding is a political process and primarily a national challenge. The process may begin even before the arrival of a peacekeeping mission and always continues after its departure. Activities may include a variety of things: mine action; the removal of landmines and other unexploded material, DDR; the disarmament, demobilization & reintegration of ex-combatants and destruction of weapons and ammunition, Security Sector Reform; the restructuring, reforming and training of national police/armed forces, electoral assistance; organize, monitor and carry out free and fair elections,

<sup>10</sup> UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2008, p. 23

<sup>11</sup> UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2008, p.23-24

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 25

and support to the restoration and extension of State Authority; developing political participation and support immediate activities of state institutions, to name but a few.<sup>13</sup>

## 2.4 Reasons to deploy peace operations

The majority of peace operations are deployed in developing countries in response to intra-state violent conflicts. The international community carries the costs for these operations which sometimes include the lives of personnel. However, doing nothing, for whatever reason, would allow intra-state conflicts with all its affiliated side effects to affect the entire world.

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a growing number of intra-state wars. An intra-state war is a war between or among two or more groups within the internationally recognized territory of a state.<sup>14</sup> Meredith Reid Sarkees and Phil Schafer distinguish in their study *The Correlates of War data on War: an Update to 1997* between inter-communal wars, fought between two or more non-state entities, and civil wars, fought against the regime of a state. An intra-state war is classified as a civil war if (a) military action was involved, (b) the central government at the time was actively involved, (c) effective resistance (as measured by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) occurred on both sides, and (d) at least 1000 battle deaths resulted during the civil war.<sup>15</sup>

Of all armed conflicts that were fought in the nineties, 94 per cent were civil wars.<sup>16</sup> Although many of these wars were waged in low-income countries far away from 'Western civilization' the international community realized that internal conflicts posed threats of both humanitarian and strategic nature, not only within the borders of one state but also in neighbouring countries and beyond. Collier et. al. argue that civil wars create devastating adverse effects in, what they named, three rings of suffering: the first ring is the displacement, mortality, and poverty inflicted on non-combatants within the country. The second ring of suffering affects neighbouring countries, and the third ring of suffering is global.<sup>17</sup>

Within the first ring of suffering, Collier et. al.<sup>18</sup> distinguish between economic and social costs of conflict. The economic costs of conflict come from the fact that a society uses some of its resources for the war rather than for productive activities. The loss is twofold; diverted resources not only no longer contribute to economic growth of a country (as governments increase their military expenditure), but they also inflict damage (diverted resources are being used to destroy physical infrastructure, housing, schools and health facilities by both government and rebel forces). The most direct social costs of civil war are fatalities and population displacements. By the 1990s nearly 90 per cent of the casualties resulting from armed conflict were civilian.<sup>19</sup> On the one hand coercive rebel recruitment strategies cause people to flee and on the other hand, the military sometimes deliberately target civilians to create forced migration. Reasons for this could be that soldiers need to collect resources, but also because the displacement of large parts of the civilian population reduces the fighting efficiency of the enemy.

The international community would be affected too when combatants of civil conflicts are left to fight it out among themselves. Apart from the damage and suffering caused within a war-shattered

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p.26-30

<sup>14</sup> Sarkees & Schafer 2000, p. 129

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 129

<sup>16</sup> Wallenstein & Sollenberg 2001, p. 632

<sup>17</sup> Collier et. al. 2003, p. 1-2

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 13-18

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 17

state, civil wars also have, as mentioned before, a second ring of suffering that affects neighbouring countries. Peaceful countries that are adjacent to countries engaged in civil war suffer from direct and long term effects caused by the civil wars of their neighbours.<sup>20</sup> One economic spill over effect is that refugees that flee to neighbouring countries to escape the violence need to be harboured and fed. Besides that, civil wars tend to unleash a regional arms race, making adjacent governments increase their military expenditure, instead of using resources for other necessary means such as healthcare, and thereby slow down economic growth in the entire region. The thousands of refugees tend to stay in asylum countries long after a civil war ends, clustered together in camps with limited access to clean water and food, making the camps a perfect environment for the spread of infectious diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS.<sup>21</sup>

Finally, the third ring of suffering is global, inflicted by narcotics production and distribution, such as coca and opium, and international terrorism.<sup>22</sup> What is typically required to be able to produce and distribute hard drugs is a territory outside the control of any recognized government. A by-product of civil war is that large rural areas cease to be under the control of a government, creating opportunities for criminal organizations to take advantage of the lawlessness civil war generates, and produce and distribute hard drugs at will. About 95% of the global production of opium is in civil war countries.<sup>23</sup> Terrorist organizations, for example Al Qaeda, also thrive well in large uncontrolled areas in civil war countries.<sup>24</sup> Often terrorist organizations are linked in turn with drugs production and distribution and the trafficking in (West African) conflict diamonds.<sup>25</sup>

As a response to the adverse effects of civil wars the international community and for a larger part the United Nations took on the task of launching major operations in countries taunted by internal violence. Most of these missions were deployed in the immediate aftermath of civil wars with the goal of preventing a recurrence of violence. These post-conflict missions became known as peacebuilding operations.<sup>26</sup> Former Secretary-General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali described the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding as “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”<sup>27</sup>. His successor Kofi Annan similarly defined the purpose of peacebuilding as not only to prevent the resurgence of conflict, but also “to create the conditions necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies”<sup>28</sup>. But creating the conditions for a stable and lasting peace in the immediate aftermath of a civil war is a difficult task, because there is more to it than just monitoring a ceasefire. As both Annan and Boutros-Ghali pointed out, peacebuilding involves identifying and alleviating the underlying sources of conflict within a war-torn state, which requires a sound understanding of local conditions.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 33

<sup>21</sup> Collier et. al., 2003, p. 34-39

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 41-47

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p.41

<sup>24</sup> Takeyh, Gvosdev, 2002, p.98-101

<sup>25</sup> Farah, D., The Washington Post 2-11-2001; Takeyh, Gvosdev, 2002, p.98-101

<sup>26</sup> Paris 2004, p. 2

<sup>27</sup> Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 21

<sup>28</sup> Annan, 1999: para. 101

<sup>29</sup> Annan, 1998: para. 63; Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 15

### 3 Literature review

This chapter reviews the most important literature concerning the evaluation of peacekeeping operations. Two types of evaluation models are identified and each model under discussion is classified as one of the two types.

In the peacekeeping literature one particular area has remained relatively under-explored: the criteria for success and failure<sup>30</sup>. There are plenty of studies that examine the effect of peacekeeping operations on the duration of post-conflict peace. Examples are the works of Doyle & Sambanis (2000), Fortna (2004) and Gilligan & Sergenti (2006). The shared conclusion is that peacekeeping operations do prolong the period of peace after a conflict and in that sense PKOs are effective policy instruments in general. But these studies perceive peacekeeping operations as successful based on only few criteria. Fortna, in her 2004 work, examines only whether peacekeeping contributes to more durable peace, where she defines peace merely as the absence of war, also known as *negative peace*.<sup>31</sup> Gilligan & Sergenti use one evaluation criterion in the form of the question “Does UN intervention increase the likelihood that a country will transition to a state peace?”<sup>32</sup> And Doyle & Sambanis find that multi-dimensional PKOs “are extremely significant and positively associated with” peacebuilding success.<sup>33</sup> While they do mention several elements that, according to them, are required to uphold peace, they do not develop this into an evaluation framework, because it was not their intention to do so. Surely maintaining peace cannot be the only criterion to determine success or failure of a peacekeeping operation. Nevertheless, general evaluation frameworks to determine whether a PKO has been a success or failure are scarce in the peacekeeping literature. This is not surprising though. The reason for this is because there is no consensus on determinants of success.<sup>34</sup> Different political and scholarly perspectives find different indicators of success or failure important. What seems like effective peacekeeping in one’s opinion might be a total failure from the perspective of another.<sup>35</sup>

In a 1997 article Druckman & Stern invited 5 writers on peacekeeping, Paul Diehl, William Durch, A. Betts Fetherston, Robert Johansen and Steven Ratner, to contribute to a debate about the subject, revealing some of the differences in perspective amongst them and dividing them roughly into two groups. On the one hand, Diehl, Durch and Ratner emphasized evaluation criteria related to the operation’s mandate and its contribution to containing conflict in the host state or region, while on the other hand Fetherston and Johansen stressed the need for qualitative criteria and the contribution of peacekeeping to larger values such as world peace, justice and the reduction of human suffering.<sup>36</sup> Diehl argues that mandate fulfilment is one standard to evaluate success, but since mandates are often political documents, subject to negotiation, they can be vague. There can be disagreement on how to define and operationalize the purposes set forth in a mandate.<sup>37</sup> At the most general level, Durch writes, one can ask whether PKOs contribute to conflict containment and the elimination of its underlying causes. He too considers mandate fulfilment as an option to evaluate operations, but notes that the information from such an evaluation is most likely of interest to those states and leaders who have voted for, paid for, or contributed troops to the operation. A mission that fulfils its mandate may further the interests and political careers of those states and leaders.<sup>38</sup> A shortcoming

of this sort of evaluation, according to Ratner, is that it ignores exogenous factors that may have influenced a mission’s capability to accomplish its goals. What he thinks is a more useful method of mission assessment would be focussing on its impact on the states concerned.<sup>39</sup> Fetherston argues that criteria for success/failure are linked to particular interests of national governments and military organizations rather than to the needs and interests of conflict societies.<sup>40</sup> And because there is disagreement on the terms ‘success’ and ‘failure’, says Johansen, both proponents and opponents of UN peacekeeping can easily manipulate the terms for political purposes, as to either discredit the United Nations or to show that a particular operation has succeeded.<sup>41</sup>

What then are the criteria that need to be fulfilled to call a peacekeeping operation a success? As Durch writes, ‘...there are sufficient variations in context and objective that no single set of criteria may be applicable to all [peace operations]’.<sup>42</sup> It seems that the evaluation criteria depend on the perspective of the evaluator. Although there are no clear borders, roughly two kinds of criteria can be identified: those related to the operation and those related to ‘larger values’. Over the years several authors have produced evaluation models and lists of criteria for peacekeeping success, rooted in their own perspective on success. Amongst these authors are, for instance, Evans (1993), Diehl (1994), Bratt (1996), Van der Lijn, (2006), Pushkina (2006) and Koko & Essis (2012).

In 1993, then Foreign Minister of Australia Gareth Evans published a book, *Cooperating for Peace*, discussing the role of the United Nations and other global actors in securing peace and suggesting improvements to accomplish it. In the chapter on peacekeeping Evans lists what he believes are the seven basic conditions for ensuring an effective peace keeping operation: *clear and achievable mandate, adequate resources, close coordination of peacekeeping with peacemaking, impartiality, local support, external support, and signposted exit*.<sup>43</sup> All these conditions are strongly focussed on the operation itself and there is no mentioning of higher values as meant by Fetherston and Johansen. Evans does not develop these conditions into an evaluation model nor does he explain which criteria should be met in order to classify an operation as successful. He simply listed the conditions he thinks are required for effective peacekeeping.

A year later Paul Diehl was one of the first to attempt to develop a general evaluation model in his 1994 book *International Peacekeeping*. This is the same scholar who later contributed to the Druckman & Stern article on peacekeeping in 1997. Before his study analysts generally used mandate fulfilment to determine peacekeeping success and assumed that successful operations are obvious: one could just see if a PKO was successful or not.<sup>44</sup> In his book Diehl suggests two criteria for peacekeeping success, that are very much focussed on the operation itself: 1) limitation of armed conflict and 2) conflict resolution.<sup>45</sup> According to Diehl ‘...all peacekeeping operations are charged with limiting hostile actions...’ ‘...thus the first criterion for judging the success of peacekeeping operations is their ability to deter or prevent violent conflict...’.<sup>46</sup> To Diehl it seems logical that a strategy called ‘peacekeeping’ should be judged on its ability to keep the peace. The second criterion to judge a PKO on is its ability to facilitate the resolution of the disagreements underlying the conflict, because peacekeeping is designed to assist in the process of reconciliation, Diehl argues.<sup>47</sup> It was Robert Johansen who

<sup>30</sup> Diehl, 1993, p.33; MacQueen, 2008, p.1

<sup>31</sup> Fortna, 2004, p.270; Galtung, 1996, p.9

<sup>32</sup> Gilligan & Sergenti, 2006, p.4

<sup>33</sup> Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, p.791

<sup>34</sup> Druckman & Stern, 1997, p.152; MacQueen, 2008, p.1

<sup>35</sup> MacQueen, 2008, p.1

<sup>36</sup> Druckman & Stern, 1997, p.152

<sup>37</sup> Diehl in Druckman & Stern, 1997, p.152

<sup>38</sup> Durch in Druckman & Stern, 1997, p.154

<sup>39</sup> Ratner in Druckman & Stern, 1997, p.154

<sup>40</sup> Fetherston in Druckman & Stern, 1997, p.153

<sup>41</sup> Johansen in Druckman & Stern, 1997, p.153

<sup>42</sup> Durch in Druckman & Stern, 1997, p.154

<sup>43</sup> Evans, 1993, p.109

<sup>44</sup> Diehl, 1994, p.33

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p.34

<sup>46</sup> Diehl, 1994, p.34

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 37

took issue with Diehl's two criteria, saying that these criteria "ask more of peacekeeping forces than reasonably can be expected because they are not designed for the purpose of resolving underlying conflicts" and "cannot be held responsible for preventing war in general between belligerents".<sup>48</sup> Johansen himself suggested two additional criteria being 1) assess the effect of peacekeeping forces on local people affected by their work and 2) compare the degree of misunderstanding, tension or violence that occurs in the presence of UN peacekeepers to the estimated results of balance of power activity without peacekeeping.<sup>49</sup> This disagreement actually provided the impetus for the Druckman & Stern debate to search for evaluation criteria for peacekeeping operation success.

Duane Bratt wrote an article in 1996 *Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations* identifying four ways to measure operational success: mandate performance, facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment and limitation of casualties.<sup>50</sup> He arrived at these four ways by combining the criteria suggested by Paul Diehl in his 1993 work with the criteria mentioned in Marjorie Brown's 1993 Report for Congress. Brown suggested mandate fulfilment, resolution of underlying disputes, and reducing or eliminating conflict.<sup>51</sup> Bratt rejected the indicators earlier suggested by Johansen, because the first, he argues, is conceptually unclear; it is not specified which variables to use to measure the operations effect on the local people.<sup>52</sup> And Johansen's second variable would have relied on speculation of what would have happened in case peacekeepers had not been deployed. Bratt does not support this criterion of estimating the result of an unchosen option.<sup>53</sup> These four criteria suggested by Duane Bratt are focussed on the operation itself and do not represent any 'larger values'.

Another researcher, J  r Van Der Lijn, aimed at answering the question in the title of his 2006 study *Walking the tightrope: do UN peacekeeping operations actually contribute to durable peace?* In his work Van der Lijn argues that the goal of UN peacekeeping operations is twofold: fulfilment of the mandate as well as a meta-level goal. What he describes as a meta-level goal is "...a contribution to the end of violence, the prevention of its recurrence and attaining and preserving peace and make it lasting."<sup>54</sup> Lasting or durable peace, he explains, consists of two parameters: 'peace' and the adjective 'durable'. The kind of 'peace' that peace operations aim for is very much comparable with 'negative peace'.<sup>55</sup> 'Durability' is determined by Van der Lijn through the extent to which 'causes of conflict' are addressed. He divides these causes of conflict into 7 clusters. Together with mandate fulfilment and negative peace these are actually the 9 criteria Van der Lijn proposes that must be met in order to be able to determine the success of a PKO. The 7 clusters of causes of conflict to be addressed are:<sup>56</sup>

- **Inter-group relations**
- **Group demography**
- **State weakness**

<sup>48</sup> Johansen, 1994, p.308  
<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p.309-310  
<sup>50</sup> Bratt, 1996, p.64  
<sup>51</sup> Brown, 1993 in Bratt, 1996, p.65  
<sup>52</sup> Bratt, 1996, p.66-67  
<sup>53</sup> Ibid. p.66-67,  
<sup>54</sup> Van der Lijn, 2006, p.3  
<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p.5  
<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p.6-7

- **State unwillingness and good governance**
- **State / government legitimacy**
- **Economic causes**
- **External relations**

The extent to which causes of conflict are addressed can be measured through policy tools: these are the intervention techniques that are used in a PKO. Van der Lijn produces a list of standard policy tools of which he found 10 have the greatest chance of delivering a positive contribution in general to durable peace.<sup>57</sup> These 10 indicators can be viewed as his 'evaluation framework' that can be used to assess UN peacekeeping operations. Van der Lijn's criteria have a strong focus on 'larger values'. Political, social and economic justice are represented through the criteria of, for instance, state unwillingness and good governance, inter-group relations and economic causes respectively.<sup>58</sup>

Pushkina sought to determine why the United Nations has been more successful in managing some internal conflicts than others in her 2006 article '*A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission*'.<sup>59</sup> Based on the peacekeeping literature she identified 12 domestic and international factors for the success of peacekeeping operations. These factors were translated into 12 hypotheses that were tested in a qualitative analysis of 17 peacekeeping missions deployed between 1945 and 1998. But before testing the hypotheses Pushkina determined the success of the PKOs based on what she calls multiple broad criteria. Motivated by the Druckman & Stern debate she used mandate fulfilled complemented by 'larger values' criteria. Agreeing with a 1999 article by Duane Bratt<sup>60</sup>, she recognized that '*peace is not only the cessation of conflict but is also closely related to the number of lives that have been saved from likely death and the improvement of political, economic and social justice by defending human rights, establishing the rule of law, and fostering economic and social cooperation*'.<sup>61</sup> Peacekeeping operations are classified successful, partially successful or entirely unsuccessful based on the extent to which the mandate was fulfilled and the broad criteria are met. Although including the criterion of reduction of human suffering Pushkina's model leans more towards an operation focussed one because the majority of criteria focus on operational aspects. The criteria she mentions are:<sup>62</sup>

- **Mandate fulfilment**
- **Limitation of violent conflict**
- **Reduction of human suffering (reduction in human rights abuses and the mission's success in resettling refugees)**

<sup>57</sup> Van der Lijn, 2006, p.25-28, 57, 62  
<sup>58</sup> A detailed explanation of the clusters can be found in appendix 1  
<sup>59</sup> Pushkina, 2006  
<sup>60</sup> Bratt, 1999, p.64-65  
<sup>61</sup> Pushkina, 2006, p.134  
<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p.134-135

- **Prevention of conflict spill over**

- **Promotion of conflict resolution**

In their 2012 book *Determinants of success in UN peacekeeping operations* Koko & Essis identified 14 independent variables, regrouped into 4 major sets of factors that determine success in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs). The dependent variable is the outcome variable (success or failure).<sup>63</sup> Through a large quantitative assessment of 46 UNPKOs deployed between 1956 and 2006 Koko & Essis aimed at developing empirically rooted generalizations<sup>64</sup> and an original and useful model for evaluating UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>65</sup> Their model however is not just generalizable, because of their determination of the outcome variable. While Koko & Essis acknowledge that success or failure is perceived differently by UN policymakers, researchers, outside observers, agencies representing the international community and so on, they decided to use the UN's determination of success in order to avoid 'evaluators' bias'. By UN standards a peacekeeping operation is considered successful when it has fulfilled its initial mandate as stated by the United Nations.<sup>66</sup> The Druckman & Stern debate on peacekeeping however revealed that using mandate fulfilment as a criterion for success already represents the perspective of the evaluator. By using that criterion for success the model of Koko & Essis is typically operation focussed and in the end still biased, even though it was not their intention.

---

<sup>63</sup> Koko & Essis, 2012, p.5, 20, 69-72

<sup>64</sup> Koko & Essis, 2012, p.4, 6 endnote 3

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p.73

<sup>66</sup> Koko & Essis, 2012, p.31, 54 endnote 3

## 4 Theoretical Framework

After briefly touching upon some of the evaluation models and lists of criteria for effective peacekeeping two types of evaluation frameworks were identified in the previous chapter: operation focussed frameworks and those with a focus on 'larger values', such as justice and the reduction of human suffering. Diehl's criteria are somewhat dated and have been disputed by other authors, like Robert Johansen. They are simply too limited to determine the success of a peacekeeping operation. While Bratt involves more criteria, his too are rather outdated. Nevertheless, his argument that mandate fulfilment is the only unique measurement of an operation's objective may still be valid, though the singular use of it would be inadequate.<sup>67</sup> Van der Lijn focusses strongly on 'larger values' with his criteria, but mentioned in his study that an operation's goal is bigger than that and twofold, namely carry out its mandate and contribute to reaching durable peace.<sup>68</sup> Pushkina's 2006 model represents both mandate fulfilment and one 'larger value', the reduction of human suffering, but the focus lies more on operational aspects. Koko & Essis' large quantitative study proved to be not as unbiased as they proclaimed due to their sole criterion of PKO success of mandate fulfilment.

The identification of the two kinds of evaluation frameworks, operation focussed or 'larger values' focussed, gave impetus to the main research question of this thesis, that is whether the different evaluation frameworks yield different results when assessing one and the same peacekeeping operation. In order to examine this, in this chapter one model of each of the kinds of frameworks will be explored in greater detail. In the category of operation focussed frameworks the choice falls on that of Duane Bratt. Although slightly dated, his framework is nicely demarcated into four criteria and best applicable to a case compared to other operation focussed models. In the category of larger values frameworks the choice has fallen on Jaïr Van der Lijn, because his framework too is nicely demarcated, this time into 10 policy tools. Moreover, both frameworks fully represent their category, more than the other options do.

### 4.1 Duane Bratt's evaluation framework

The first framework that will be used in this thesis is the operation focussed model of Duane Bratt. As briefly described in the literature review Bratt was one of the scholars who attempted to develop a general evaluation framework for peacekeeping operations in the nineties. Inspired by the works of Paul Diehl and Marjorie Brown he concluded in his 1996 article *Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations* that there are four ways to measure the success of a peacekeeping operation: mandate performance, facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment and limitation of casualties.<sup>69</sup>

Mandate performance, Bratt argues, is the only unique measurement of an operation's objective, though the singular use of it would be inadequate, because a mandate can be deliberately vague and thus difficult to assess, and even unrealistic only to satisfy the Security Council member's domestic political interests.<sup>70</sup> Therefor Bratt complements this criterion with the other three. Conflict resolution should be a criterion, he continues, because PKOs have the ability to either facilitate or hinder conflict resolution. By halting the fighting a PKO can allow peace negotiations to take place and thus

the resolution of the underlying causes of the conflict.<sup>71</sup> Conflict containment means preventing major powers or neighbouring states from intervening in the conflict. This should be a criterion because sometimes the sole reason to deploy a PKO is to prevent a conflict from escalating.<sup>72</sup> And casualty limitation is a useful criterion, because PKOs make a significant contribution to reducing the impact of armed conflict if it limits the number of deaths.<sup>73</sup>

#### *Mandate performance*

The first criterion Bratt uses to assess the success of a peacekeeping operation is mandate performance. He argues that determining whether the peacekeeping operation successfully completed its mandate is a relatively straightforward procedure. One simply examines the mandate as stated in the Security Council's resolution and then judges to what extent the listed tasks have been completed.<sup>74</sup>

#### *Facilitating conflict resolution*

The second criterion Bratt uses to assess the success of a peacekeeping operation is facilitation of conflict resolution. By this he means whether the operation was able to facilitate the resolution of the underlying causes of a conflict. According to Bratt, this should be the ultimate aim of all UN efforts. To resolve a conflict, he writes, some formal agreement is needed, such as a peace treaty or a power-sharing arrangement. Even when conflict resolution is not explicitly mentioned in an operation's mandate, it's presence may help prevent further fighting and thus allow peace negotiations to occur.<sup>75</sup>

#### *Conflict containment*

The third criterion Bratt uses to assess the success of a peacekeeping operation is conflict containment, which is determined by whether the operation was able to prevent major powers (the Soviet Union and the United States) or neighbouring states from intervening in the conflict. Bratt argues that this is an important criterion because sometimes the only reason to launch a UN peacekeeping operation is to prevent a conflict from escalating. Successfully containing the conflict, he writes, is just as important as mandate performance.<sup>76</sup>

#### *Limiting casualties*

The final criterion Bratt uses to assess the success of a peacekeeping operation is limiting casualties. The success in limiting casualties can be determined by comparing the number of both military and civilian casualties prior to, and after the deployment of the peacekeeping operation. Bratt distinguishes success, moderate success and failure of an operation. Complete success would mean a significant reduction in casualties from the start of the mission, whereas a moderate success would be when the operation, after some periodic flare-ups, is eventually able to limit casualties. If an operation has had very little or no effect on the rate of casualties it would be considered to have failed in limiting casualties.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Bratt, 1996, p.67, Diehl in Druckman & Stern, 1997, p.152;

<sup>68</sup> Van der Lijn, 2006, p.3

<sup>69</sup> Bratt, 1996, p.64

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p.67

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p.68

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p.69

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p.70

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p.67

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p.68

<sup>76</sup> Bratt, 1996, p.69

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p.69-70

The four ways Bratt uses to measure the success of a random peacekeeping operation can be re-phrased into questions to serve as a checklist:

**Did the PKO fulfil its mandate?**

**Did the PKO facilitate the resolution of the conflict?**

**Did the PKO contain the conflict?**

**Did the PKO limit casualties?**

Asking the question whether each of the criteria have been met by a random peacekeeping operation provides information to determine to what extent the operation has been a success.

#### 4.2 Applying Bratt's framework

The four criteria in the previous paragraph together form the framework by Duane Bratt that can be used to assess any UN peacekeeping operation. Based on empirical findings each of the four criteria is judged as either a complete success, a moderate success or a failure. To determine an operation's overall success the same classification of success is used. Bratt explains that a complete success occurs when there has been a resolution to the conflict. When there has been no resolution to the conflict but one of the other remaining three objectives have been substantially fulfilled the peacekeeping operation is called moderately successful. And finally a failed operation is one where all four criteria are classified as failure or the operation has only had partial success in one of the criteria.<sup>78</sup> Schematically Bratt's evaluation framework for determining the success of peacekeeping operations would look like the flowchart in figure 3.


#### 4.3 Jaïr Van Der Lijn's evaluation framework

The second framework that will be used in this thesis is the larger values focussed one by Jaïr van der Lijn, because his model incorporates both mandate fulfilment and larger values. In his 2006 study *Walking the tightrope: do UN peacekeeping operations actually contribute to durable peace?* Van der Lijn aims to answer the question in the title. To answer this question he made a comparison of 4 selected operations. In order to be able to compare operations the same criteria for judging an operation have to be used. Van der Lijn uses criteria based on conflict indicators to assess the contribution of peacekeeping operations with peacebuilding aspects to 'durable peace'. What Van der Lijn means by peacekeeping operations with peacebuilding aspects is very similar to what the United Nations call multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, as described in paragraph 2.3 of this thesis. In his research Van der Lijn views a peacekeeping operation as a collection of 'policy tools' that may be used in UN peacekeeping operations to contribute to durable peace. A policy tool is the means used or the intervention technique that is used.<sup>79</sup> There is a wide range of intervention techniques and Van der Lijn has drawn up a standard inventory of these policy tools.<sup>80</sup> Durable peace consists of two parameters: 'peace' and the adjective 'durable'. The kind of 'peace' that peace operations aim for is very much comparable with 'negative peace', the absence of violence. 'Durability' is determined by Van der Lijn through the extent to which 'causes of conflict' are addressed. Based on the existing body of scholarly literature on intrastate conflict Van der Lijn develops 7 clusters of

<sup>78</sup> Bratt, 1996, p.78

<sup>79</sup> Van der Lijn, 2006, p.8, 9, 25

<sup>80</sup> See appendix 2 for standard inventory of policy tools



causes of conflict. Together with mandate fulfilment and 'negative peace' these are the 9 variables used to assess the contribution of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations to durable peace. These 9 variables are the following<sup>81</sup>:

1. Mandate fulfilment
2. Negative peace
3. Inter-group relations
4. Group demography
5. State weakness
6. State unwillingness and good governance

<sup>81</sup> Van der Lijn, 2006, p.5, 6, 57, 62; See appendix 1

7. State / government legitimacy

8. Economic causes

9. External relations

Of all the policy tools on the standard inventory Van der Lijn concluded that the tools that have the greatest chance of delivering a positive contribution in general to durable peace are the following ten.<sup>82</sup>

1. Reintegration of ex-combatants

2. Institution building

3. Verification of foreign forces withdrawal

4. Winning the hearts and minds of the local population

5. Providing pay to the newly formed national army

6. Human rights verification

7. Human rights education

8. Truth commissions

9. Organisation of elections

10. Election monitoring

Policy tools are the intervention techniques used by UN peacekeeping operations to contribute to durable peace and contributing to durable peace is defined as addressing causes of conflict. Therefore, policy tools address causes of conflict and are in fact the indicators of the variables in this evaluation framework. The explanations of the policy tools that follow are derived from Van der Lijn (2006, pages 26-28) and show what he means by each of the tools and what cause of conflict it aims to address.

#### *Reintegration of ex-combatants*

Activities within this policy tool can range from the monitoring of the reintegration of ex-combatants to the actual organisation of the reintegration of ex-combatants, including income generation for demobilised military personnel, and reintegration and vocational training. It aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace.

#### *Institution building*

This policy tool can consist of activities to strengthen the state within a variety of fields. Activities within this policy tool in the military field also intend to contribute to negative peace and can range from the monitoring of to the actual restructuring or integration of military forces; professionalization or reform of armed forces; military aid; and military-to-military programmes. In the field of internal security and judicial and legal issues, this policy instrument consists of activities that also aim to contribute to good governance and the addressing of state unwillingness, such as civilian police reform; civilian police training and capacity building; judicial/legal reforms; support for legal institutions; support of indigenous dispute resolution and legal institutions; civic society development; and human rights institution-building. In the field of governance this policy tool consists of activities which again may also contribute to good governance and the addressing of state unwillingness, such as political party-building; political institution-building; training of public officials; and government reform and strengthening. In addition, these institutions can be reformed to become more neutral and credible to contribute to the legitimacy of the state.

#### *Verification of foreign forces withdrawal*

This policy tool can consist of monitoring, verification and supervision activities with regard to the withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory of the country where the operation is conducted. As such it aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace and the removal of external causes of conflict.

#### *Winning the hearts and minds of the local population*

Activities within this policy tool can range from the establishment of UN television and radio; the promotion of alternative information and communication sources; the provision of civic and peace education; and broad-based political participation/stimulation of democracy. It may be used to win the population for negative peace, but it can also be targeted at decreasing tension amongst the population and improving inter-group relations.

#### *Providing pay to the newly-formed national army*

This policy tool consists of the funding of the army and/ or civilian police, to enable these institutions to pay their employees. It aims to contribute to the strength of the state.

#### *Human rights verification*

This policy tool consists of the monitoring and the verification of human rights, as well as the investigation and corrections of human rights violations. It aims to contribute to good governance and address state unwillingness.

#### *Human rights education*

This policy tool consists of the educational, training and awareness raising activities with regard to legal, judicial and human rights issues for both government personnel, as well as the public at large. It also consists of activities for the promotion of good governance and transparency. It aims to contribute to good governance and address state unwillingness.

---

<sup>82</sup> Bratt, 1996, p.78

#### *Truth commissions*

This policy tool consists of assistance to, or verification of or the actual organization of a variety of activities ranging from truth commissions to war crimes tribunals. The objective of these activities is both to deal with the past and to improve inter-group relations, as well as to end impunity and state unwillingness, and to contribute to good governance.

#### *Organisation of elections*

Activities within this policy tool can range from providing assistance and support for the organization of elections to their actual organization. It aims to contribute to good governance and address state unwillingness.

#### *Election monitoring*

This policy tool consists of election monitoring activities by the United Nations itself or assistance to monitoring activities by other organizations. It aims to contribute to good governance and address state unwillingness.

When peacekeeping operations apply these 10 policy tools described above, Van der Lijn argues, they will have the greatest chance of delivering a positive contribution to durable peace. In order to apply Van der Lijn's framework the 10 most striking policy tools are translated into questions:


1. Did the PKO apply the policy tool reintegration of ex-combatants?
2. Did the PKO apply the policy tool institution building?
3. Did the PKO apply the policy tool verification of foreign forces withdrawal?
4. Did the PKO apply the policy tool winning the hearts & minds of the local population?
5. Did the PKO apply the policy tool providing pay to the newly-formed national army?
6. Did the PKO apply the policy tool human rights verification?
7. Did the PKO apply the policy tool human rights education?
8. Did the PKO apply the policy tool truth commissions?
9. Did the PKO apply the policy tool organization of elections?
10. Did the PKO apply the policy tool election monitoring?

Asking the question whether each of the policy tools have been applied by a peacekeeping operation provides information on the extent to which the causes of conflict have been addressed or, in other words, to what extent Van der Lijn's criteria for success have been met. By default it can be determined to what extent the operation has been a success.

#### **4.4 Applying Van der Lijn's framework**

Van der Lijn does not mention how peacekeeping operations are classified, nor does he mention how many criteria must be met in order to call an operation successful. To be consistent, this thesis will distinguish in Van der Lijn's framework the same 3 classifications of a peacekeeping operation as is the case in Bratt's framework, being, complete success, moderate success and failure. Since there are 9 criteria in Van der Lijn's evaluation framework, and there is no mentioning of an order of importance among them, this thesis will regard a peacekeeping operation: as a complete success when 7 to all 9 criteria are met, as a moderate success when 4 to 6 criteria are met and as a failure when 3 or fewer criteria are met. Graphically Van der Lijn's evaluation framework would look like figure 4.

**Figure 4** Graphic of Van der Lijn's evaluation framework



## 5 Research design and methodology

### 5.1 Design and time dimension

To be able to answer the research question the research design of this thesis will be a single case study. By studying one and the same test case through two different lenses that are the two different evaluation frameworks all circumstances are maintained identical and possible divergences in the outcome of the assessments of the peacekeeping operation will be due to the difference in evaluation frameworks.

The case under scrutiny in this study is the **United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire** or UNOCI. This is one of the more recent UN peacekeeping operations, deployed on 4 April 2004, and is, at the time of writing, still ongoing. To get more acquainted with this particular case the next chapter holds a brief history of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire. The starting date of the researched time-frame will be the same as the deployment date of UNOCI. The end date will be 28 November 2010. The reason for this end date is that UNOCI's primary objective was to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed by them on 23 January 2003.<sup>83</sup> This Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement<sup>84</sup> demanded the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation that was to prepare and plan the holding of credible and transparent elections. These national elections were held in two rounds, the first on 31 October 2010 and, the final round, on 28 November 2010. Therefore the date on which the goal of holding elections was completed will be the end date of the researched time-frame in this study, 28 November 2010. The necessary information for this case study will be retrieved through careful documentary analysis of the progress reports of the UN Secretary-General on UNOCI. These are periodic reports on the operation itself and related events.

### 5.2 Definitions and conceptual model

The research question in this study contains certain concepts that need to be defined in order to determine what is being studied. To recall, the research question of this thesis is:

#### *Does the type of evaluation framework affect the outcome of the assessment of a UN peacekeeping operation?*

The first concept to be defined is evaluation framework. To understand this concept the following definitions, as found in the Sage Encyclopaedia of Qualitative Research, should be read in conjunction with each other:<sup>85</sup>

*"Evaluation research is carried out in the social sciences to appraise human activities in a formal systematic way." "...the aim is to produce knowledge that will contribute to greater understanding of the effect of a defined activity. This activity may be referred to in a number of ways such as intervention, initiative, and policy."*

*"An evaluation framework is a type of research design. The evaluation framework describes the focus and aim of the research at different stages and how the intervention will be assessed."*

<sup>83</sup> Website UN, 2012, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/>


<sup>84</sup> Appendix 3, Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement

<sup>85</sup> Given, 2008, p.303-304

*"Intervention – a specified, but not necessarily specific, activity"*

The second concept that needs defining is UN peacekeeping operation. The most likely source for finding the definition of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is United Nations documentation. The UN Department of Public Information describes a UN peacekeeping operation as follows:

*"Peacekeeping operations and their deployment are authorized by the Security Council, with the consent of the host government and usually of the other parties involved. They may include military and police personnel, together with civilian staff. Operations may involve military observer missions, peacekeeping forces or a combination of both. Military observers mission are made up of unarmed officers, typically to monitor an agreement or ceasefire. The soldiers of the peacekeeping forces have weapons, but in most situations can use them only in self-defence".<sup>86</sup>*



In order to visualize what is being researched a conceptual model has been developed that holds the variables of the main research question. On the left side there is the independent variable, the evaluation framework. The dependent variable, the UN peacekeeping operation is positioned on the right. The peacekeeping operation will be evaluated in two ways: by Bratt's operation focussed evaluation framework and by Van der Lijn's larger values focussed evaluation framework. Each of the frameworks consist of certain criteria that must be met in order to determine the success of the operation, as shown in figure 3. The top center hexagon holds the criteria that belong to Duane Bratt's evaluation framework and the bottom center hexagon holds the criteria that belong to Van Der Lijn's evaluation framework.

<sup>86</sup> United Nations Department of Public Information (2000), Basic facts about the United Nations, p.73

## 6 History of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire

From 1893 until 1960 Côte d'Ivoire has been a colony of France. The French made economic development possible by building railways, exploitation of the forests and developing agriculture for export purposes, such as palm oil, rubber, cocoa and coffee plantations. As a result there was a growing need for human resources. This was fulfilled by a mixture of voluntary workers and those compulsorily recruited in neighbouring territories<sup>87</sup>, who settled in the agricultural northern part of the colony. To manage the growth the French used indigenous leaders whose tribes became the newly established Ivorian elites enjoying French education and privileges. Since business was concentrated in the southern part of the colony near the capital and ports, and agriculture in the north and west, there slowly developed social inequalities between the workers in the north and west and the elites in the south.<sup>88</sup>

After becoming independent in 1960 the country was ruled by president Félix Houphouët-Boigny, of the Baoulé tribe, and his political party PDCI (Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire). He remained in power for 33 years, until he died in 1993. Houphouët-Boigny ruled the country through a system of patronage and nepotism, appointing loyal colleagues to important high ranking positions. Politically there was not much room for opposition. Economically Houphouët-Boigny pursued a liberalized capital-driven market system. Immigrants were welcomed to contribute to and profit from Côte d'Ivoire's prosperity and they enjoyed citizenship rights. Through this system Houphouët-Boigny managed to hold a heterogeneous country of over sixty ethnic groups together for 30 years.<sup>89</sup>

Ignited by foreign investments from the West and especially France, Côte d'Ivoire experienced great industrial expansion and high agricultural growth, resulting in spectacular growth figures. The country's revenue really rocketed during the 1975-77 boom in agricultural prices of cocoa, coffee and timber. While the economies of other African nations were on the verge of collapse, Côte d'Ivoire flourished, attracting more immigrants from West African countries.<sup>90</sup> As the city of Abidjan developed as the commercial and administrative centre of the country, more people moved towards the city. But the rapid urbanization led to massive urban unemployment and the jobless Ivorians blamed the government and foreign workers for not having jobs. Ultimately the competition between Ivorian and foreign workers led to violent encounters.<sup>91</sup>

Until the late 1970s Côte d'Ivoire kept expanding. But the country spent more money than it made and soon indebted itself to international financial institutions.<sup>92</sup> The economic recession at the beginning of the 1980s caused prices of cocoa and coffee to drop and steep interest rates led to economic slowdown, exacerbating tensions in the labour market among the unemployed. There was economic discontent and the people started to question the president and his one-party system.<sup>93</sup> A young socialist university professor, Laurent Gbagbo, pleaded for a multi-party system and founded the party Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI). Pressured by foreign governments Houphouët-Boigny held multiparty-elections for the first time in 30 years in 1990. The FPI and Gbagbo lost, causing unrest among the people. To counter the discontent, Houphouët-Boigny appointed Alassane Dramane

Ouattara, a senior IMF official of foreign descent, as prime minister, in order to have him resolve the country's economic crisis. None of this, however, put an end to the turmoil that had gripped Côte d'Ivoire. In response to Laurent Gbagbo's call in February 1992, the opposition went out onto the streets of Abidjan. The demonstration ended in violence and Gbagbo was jailed for 6 months. Houphouët-Boigny, who had been ill for some time, eventually died on 7 December 1993 of prostate cancer.<sup>94</sup>

After Houphouët-Boigny's death two men wanted to succeed him: Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara and president of the National Assembly Henri Konan Bédié. The latter was to become the next president, as constitutionally arranged. As Bédié opposed democratic reform he lost support of the PDCI's reformist wing, which broke away from the party to start its own, the *Rassemblement de Républicains* (RDR) with Ouattara as its alternative leader.<sup>95</sup> Bédié, who sensed potential defeat at the next elections scheduled for October 1995, had the National Assembly adopt a new electoral code, stipulating that Presidential candidates must be born in Côte d'Ivoire to parents who were themselves born in the country. The sole purpose of this code was to exclude Ouattara, the biggest rival of Bédié, from the elections. Ouattara is from Dioula descent from the north of the country and his father is said to have come from Burkina Faso. Laurent Gbagbo, who also wished to participate in the 1995 elections, angrily described the electoral code at the time as 'racist, xenophobic and dangerous'.<sup>96</sup> Both Ouattara (RDR) and Gbagbo (FPI) boycotted the 1995 presidential polls leaving Bédié (PDCI) to win.<sup>97</sup> Bédié's use of the national armed forces of Côte d'Ivoire, called FANCI (*Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire*), to suppress popular protests by RDR and FPI supporters, resulted in serious tensions among the army's officers and led to the sacking of one of the force commanders, General Robert Gueï.<sup>98</sup>

Bédié introduced a policy of exclusion which has come to be known as *Ivoirité*, a doctrine to determine who is a true Ivorian, and its corollary, who is not. The major reasons for Bédié to promote this ideology were political and economic. In the political domain, Bédié wished to continue his tribe's (the Baoulé) hegemony of state power, which was threatened by the introduction of a multi-party system. Bédié did not want democratic reform to jeopardize the long lasting aristocratic tradition and found a new strategy of exclusion in *Ivoirité*.<sup>99</sup> *Ivoirité* redefined citizenship and through this doctrine Bédié successfully revoked the right to vote of the immigrants and barred them from political contestation.<sup>100</sup> In the economic domain *Ivoirité* widened the gap between Ivorians and foreigners even more. Since the late 1980s Côte d'Ivoire was going through a recession. Before, foreigners had the low-paid jobs and Ivorians inclined towards high-paid white collar jobs. But as unemployment was rising, Ivorians started to compete for low-level jobs only to be left with the feeling that the 'foreigners took the jobs'. The ideology of *Ivoirité* was becoming more and more dangerous. People from the north came to be depicted as foreigners, as strangers and were being harassed at police roadblocks. Northerners were said to be unreliable, promiscuous and uneducated and incapable businessmen. This perception spread among the other ethnic groups across the country and northerners suffered state-engineered marginalisation, discrimination, exclusion and xenophobia. *Ivoirité* developed into a dichotomy between indigenous Ivorians and 'the foreigners'.<sup>101</sup>

<sup>87</sup> Akindès, 2004, p.8

<sup>88</sup> Kimou, 2013, p. 4-5

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p.24; Akokpari, 2008, p.97

<sup>90</sup> Akokpari, 2008, p. 98

<sup>91</sup> Handloff & Roberts, 1991, p.26 <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.319510030885510>

<sup>92</sup> Hofnung, 2005, p. 21

<sup>93</sup> Handloff & Roberts, 1991, p.30 <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.319510030885510>

<sup>94</sup> Hofnung, 2005, p. 25-26

<sup>95</sup> Bellamy & Williams, 2012, p. 256

<sup>96</sup> Gberie & Addo, 2004, p. 17-18

<sup>97</sup> Akokpari, 2004, p. 100-101

<sup>98</sup> Gberie & Addo, 2004, p.15, 19

<sup>99</sup> Akokpari, p.97, 99-100; Cutolo, 2010, p.538

<sup>100</sup> Hofnung, 2005, p.33

<sup>101</sup> Akokpari, 2004, p.99-100, Cutolo, 2010, p.530, 546; Akindès, 2004, p.21

But on 24 December 1999, General Robert Gueï, supported by army officers from the north, launched a military coup d'état against Henri Konan Bédié, who was forced into exile. Gueï planned and participated in new elections on 22 October 2000. Because he could not secure enough political support he decided to make use of the Bédié electoral code. He changed the constitution to set that only true Ivoirians could become President and, in early October 2000, had the Supreme Court disqualify Ouattara from contesting. With him and Bédié out of the way, there were no real rivals left, except Laurent Gbagbo. When General Gueï suspected defeat by Gbagbo in the polls, he ordered the Interior Ministry to manufacture figures to show he had won. Laurent Gbagbo and his FPI organized massive demonstrations forcing Gueï to exit the stage, where after Gbagbo claimed an electoral victory. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the Organization of African Unity and other western states urged Gbagbo to hold fresh elections in which Ouattara and others could compete, but instead he continued the exclusionist citizenship policy and declared that the Supreme Court had excluded Ouattara based on the criteria in the constitution and that there was nothing he could do about that. From that moment on there have been continuous lethal clashes between Gbagbo and Ouattara supporters, which climaxed on 19 September 2002, when some 800 soldiers from the north who were about to be decommissioned formed the *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI). They took over the northern part of the country which was the start of the First Ivorian Civil War.<sup>102</sup> Through mediation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) a ceasefire agreement was signed by the MPCI and accepted by President Laurent Gbagbo on 17 October 2002. French forces already on the ground, named Operation Licorne, agreed to monitor the ceasefire line until ECOWAS could deploy troops. Despite the ceasefire and peace negotiations taking place in Lomé (Togo) the fighting continued.<sup>103</sup>

The *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI) consisted of a group of junior army officers, recruited by General Gueï. They distanced themselves from Gueï as he became increasingly extreme and xenophobic. The mainly northerners had clear wishes; undo the military reform, new elections and the removal of Laurent Gbagbo.<sup>104</sup> Two more rebel movements emerged by November 2002; the *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (MPIGO) and the *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (MJP), demanding recognition of their Ivorian citizenship, an end to Ivoirité and transparent elections.

The rebels later united in a political coalition in December 2002 named the *Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire* (FN) under command of Guillaume Soro.<sup>105</sup> The two rebel groups captured almost every town in the western region from November 2002 on, and delivered battles with the French forces of Operation Licorne. The MPCI, which had just signed a ceasefire, initially denied links with the two groups, but benefitted from their military efforts nevertheless.<sup>106</sup>

The ceasefire offered opportunities to negotiate a political agreement. But the Lomé Talks reached a stalemate after a few days, because the MPCI insisted on the resignation of President Gbagbo, a review of the Constitution and the holding of fresh elections, while the government demanded that the rebels disarmed and honoured their commitment to preserve the territorial integrity of the country. Since neither side would return to the negotiation table ECOWAS decided to deploy a peace force and requested UN Security Council involvement.<sup>107</sup>

France organized a round-table meeting in Linas-Marcoussis (Paris) with all Ivorian political groups which resulted in the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement on 23 January 2003. This agreement included the founding of a new Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in which Laurent Gbagbo could remain President and would delegate powers to a new Prime Minister appointed in consensus, with a mandate to head the Government until the elections, which were scheduled for October 2005. The GNR had important tasks in overcoming the crisis, listed in a work programme. It would prepare credible and transparent elections, create a national human rights commission, restructure defence and security forces and regroup and disarm all armed groups, as well as reform the Independent Electoral Commission to achieve better representation of all signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis accord. But more importantly the GNR would work towards adopting legislative reforms that lie at the heart of the Ivorian conflict. These were the law on land tenure, the law on eligibility to the Presidency of the Republic (the electoral code; art. 35 of the Constitution) and the laws on Ivorian citizenship and identification, determining people's nationality and subsequently their right to vote.<sup>108</sup>

After the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement had been signed there were days of unrest and massive violent demonstrations in Abidjan by young FPI supporters, the Young Patriots (YP), who protested against the verbal arrangement to allocate the Ministries of Defence and the Interior to the rebel movements. Some leaders of the defence forces did not want the rebels to participate in the new Government at all. Moreover, upon return President Gbagbo referred to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement as just 'proposals'. Meanwhile, fighting continued in the west of Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>109</sup>

In early February 2003 President Gbagbo appointed Seydou Diarra as Prime Minister, who had briefly been Prime Minister before under Robert Gueï, to head the GNR, but in contradiction to the Agreement he did not make this appointment irrevocable. He also rejected the disarmament of FANCI and the assignment of the Defence and Interior Ministries to the rebel movements, while he had agreed to this earlier. Ambivalent as his signals were, it did calm the situation in the country and mainly the Young Patriots so that the street demonstrations stopped.<sup>110</sup> Around the same time the UN Security Council gave Chapter VII authorization to the French Operation Licorne and ECOWAS forces, allowing them to use all necessary means to implement the mandate and for the protection of civilians. It took another Round Table meeting arranged by ECOWAS in Accra, Ghana to settle the differences over the Defence and Interior portfolios. This Accra II Agreement set up a National Security Council to oversee the portfolios and design a procedure for the eventual appointment of the ministers.<sup>112</sup> After some delay members of the Government of National Reconciliation finally took their seats for the first time on 3 May. Also a comprehensive ceasefire agreement was signed between FANCI and all rebel groups for the entire territory of Côte d'Ivoire, including the rebel groups MPIGO and MJP who were not part of the earlier ceasefire and had continued fighting in the west until then. And the Security Council adopted resolution 1479 on 13 May 2003 establishing the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), a political mission with a small military component, meant to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.<sup>113</sup> By 24 May the ECOWAS and Licorne forces created together with FANCI and the Forces Nouvelles a Zone of Confidence (ZoC), a 1200-km long strip of land between the rebel-held north and government-held south and bordering Liberia in the west and Ghana in the east. As a result the security situation in

<sup>102</sup> Gberie & Addo, 2004, p.18-19; Akokpari, 2004, p. 101-103; Bellamy & Williams, 2012, p. 256; Akindès, 2004, p.21

<sup>103</sup> S/2003/374, para.8-9; Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.9-11; Gberie & Addo, 2004, p. 16

<sup>104</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.9-10

<sup>105</sup> Akokpari, 2004, p.102; Bellamy & Williams, 2012, p.256

<sup>106</sup> S/2003/374, para.8,10; Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.11

<sup>107</sup> S/2003/374, para.14-15

<sup>108</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.11; Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, 2003; S/2003/374, para. 16-19;

<sup>109</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.11-12; S/2003/374, para. 22-23

<sup>110</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.12; S/2003/374, para. 24-25

<sup>111</sup> S/RES/1464, para. 9

<sup>112</sup> Gberie & Addo, 2004, p.46

<sup>113</sup> S/RES/1479, para. 2

the western region of Côte d'Ivoire improved and displaced villagers began to return.<sup>114</sup> In July 2003 a joint declaration of FANCI and the Forces Nouvelles was issued proclaiming the end of the war, but in the following months there were still reports of both parties re-arming and regrouping.<sup>115</sup> While the Government worked on a programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants there were still FPI members in the National Assembly who viewed the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement as unworkable.<sup>116</sup> The peace process reached a stalemate when the Forces Nouvelles boycotted the Government of National Reconciliation from September until December 2003, because they did not agree with the appointment of the ministers of Defence and the Interior, because they feared the safety of their ministers and were concerned about the non-delegation of sufficient authority to the Prime Minister by President Gbagbo. Concerned about the progress of the implementation of the Agreement, the Security Council extended the MINUCI mandate for another six months.<sup>117</sup> President Laurent Gbagbo himself suggested the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force and in response an UN assessment mission visited Côte d'Ivoire to collect necessary information on the ground. Based on their findings, the assessment mission recommended a strengthening of MINUCI in the form of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation with military, judicial, electoral, DDR and more components.<sup>118</sup> On 27 February 2004 the Security Council, on recommendation of the Secretary-General, adopted resolution 1528 (2004)<sup>119</sup>, establishing the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) for an initial period of 12 months, starting on 4 April 2004. The original mandate, as lay down in Security Council resolution 1528 contained 8 primary tasks:

- **Monitoring of the ceasefire (3 May 2003) and movements of armed groups**
- **Assist the Government of National Reconciliation with the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement of members of armed groups**
- **Protect United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians**
- **Support for humanitarian assistance**
- **Support for the implementation of the peace process**
- **Contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights**
- **Promote understanding of the peace process through public information**
- **Assist the Government of National Reconciliation in the field of the rule of law, including re-establishing a civilian police and judiciary**

---

<sup>114</sup> S/2003/801, para. 2

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., para. 4,6

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., para. 15

<sup>117</sup> S/2003/1069, para. 7,9; S/2004/3, para. 11; S/RES/1514

<sup>118</sup> S/2004/3, para. 2,3, 60-89

<sup>119</sup> Appendix 4 Security Council resolution 1528 (2004) – establishment UNOCI

## 7 Case analysis of UNOCI

This chapter describes the development of the Ivorian conflict, UNOCI and related events from year to year from the moment of UNOCI's establishment on 4 April 2004 until the Ivorian national elections of 28 November 2010 based on the reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It might include earlier events for explanatory purposes. The purpose is to locate the criteria and policy tools from the theories of Duane Bratt and Jaïr van der Lijn in order to determine to what extent UNOCI has been a success from their perspective in the researched timeframe.

### 7.1 2004: Establishment of the mission

The UNOCI staff officers were well prepared which resulted in a smooth transfer of authority from ECOWAS and MINUCI forces to UNOCI in April. By the end of May the troop strength had been increased to 3000, of which former ECOWAS troops made up half. Despite good planning and preparation there were some limitations on the operational level, because the logistical system could not keep up with the pace of the troop growth. This was partly due to the budget being received late, only ten days before deployment.<sup>120</sup>

The implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement had started off slowly in 2003 and only a few draft laws had been considered by the National Assembly. By January 2004 a joint plan on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was set up by FANCI, Forces Nouvelles, ECOWAS and the French forces, allowing Prime Minister Diarra to announce 8 March as the starting date of the DDR programme. However, by late February Guillaume Soro declared that the Forces Nouvelles would not disarm before the October 2005 elections, unless all key issues of the Linas-Marcoussis accord were addressed and so the DDR programme did not begin on 8 March.<sup>121</sup> It took until end July for the National Assembly to adopt a reform of the law on land tenure, but the laws on citizenship, the electoral code and membership of the Independent Electoral Commission, which was responsible for organizing the elections, still awaited legislative assent.<sup>122</sup>

During the year the situation on the streets deteriorated when over a hundred people were killed during violent clashes between Ivorian security forces and opposition demonstrators who were protesting against the political impasse on 25 and 26 March. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) established an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate these and other human rights related events since 19 September 2002.<sup>123</sup> On 25 April there were demonstrations in Abidjan again, this time from 20.000 Young Patriots demanding from the UN and France the immediate disarmament of the rebels.<sup>124</sup> Meanwhile the situation was being further destabilized by Ivorian media spreading hate propaganda. Most media lacked objectivity and were, especially in Abidjan, under direct control of political parties. To partly counter these developments UNOCI staff organised visits to local media headquarters to explain the peace process and the UNOCI mandate, launched a public information strategy countering hate speech, and a United Nations radio broadcasting service, UNOCI FM, was established in August.<sup>125</sup>

The Accra III Agreement was signed on 30 July. This accord was needed because there was made no significant progress on the implementation of the previous Accra II and Linas-Marcoussis agreements. Prime Minister Diarra experienced hindrances and difficulties in setting up the Government of National Reconciliation and there were constant recriminations of the political parties back and forth. The Accra III urged Laurent Gbagbo to delegate power to the Prime Minister, use his constitutional power to reform the electoral code and all belligerents agreed to start disarming by 15 October 2004.<sup>126</sup> However, because the legislative reforms concerning the electoral code had not been implemented as 15 October arrived, Guillaume Soro of the Forces Nouvelles declared they would not disarm. President Gbagbo on his turn announced that amendment of the electoral code would only be done once the FN had started to disarm.<sup>127</sup>

Since March a civilian police component had been set up to assist in training, mentoring of and facilitating cooperation between the Gendarmerie, Ivorian national police and FN elements. Specific training courses in the field of human rights were also developed for the Ivorian internal security services in cooperation with the mission's human rights section.<sup>128</sup> Meanwhile UNOCI assisted the National Commission of DDR in establishing a planning committee to make the necessary plans to disarm some 26000 FN combatants and 4000 FANCI soldiers when the moment would come.<sup>129</sup> An electoral assessment mission reviewed the tasks concerning the organization of elections and explored options to speed up the electoral process. The delay of the electoral code amendment and legislative reform concerning Citizenship and Identification however, were blocking the electoral process.<sup>130</sup>

When the FN refused to disarm in October, UNOCI was not able to prevent Gbagbo's forces from attacking them.<sup>131</sup> In early November 2004, tensions between France and pro-Gbagbo forces escalated when nine French peacekeepers were killed and twenty-three injured by bomb attacks by FANCI. France took reprisals with air strikes and then seized the Yamoussoukro airport.<sup>132</sup> The Ivorian authorities claimed that the air strike by FANCI on the Licorne force base was a mistake. Fights were also being reported between rival factions within the FN and the 3 thereafter discovered mass graves with over 99 bodies were object of UNOCI-led investigations.<sup>133</sup>

While all this was going on the Security Council adopted resolution 1572 on 15 November 2004 which imposed an arms embargo to the territory of Côte d'Ivoire, and demanded a termination of incitement of hatred, intolerance and violence through State and privately operated radio and television stations.<sup>134</sup>

Meanwhile the crisis affected the humanitarian situation in the country. Health services and education were unavailable in the Northern and Western parts of the country, the Forces Nouvelles controlled areas, throughout 2004. By August an estimated 800.000 internally displaced persons had yet be resettled and some 400.000 people had fled the country. In order to support health services UNOCI supplied fuel to hospitals in Korhogo to ensure their functioning.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>120</sup> Gberie & Addo, 2004, p.37-38; S/2004/443, para. 25, 26

<sup>121</sup> S/2004/443, para. 3, 5-7

<sup>122</sup> S/2004/443, para. 41, 42; S/2004/697, para. 13

<sup>123</sup> S/2004/443, para. 8, 10, 12, 13

<sup>124</sup> S/2004/443, para.17

<sup>125</sup> S/2004/443, para.38, 49, 50; S/2004/697, para. 44

<sup>126</sup> Bah, 2010, p.608, S/2004/697, para. 15-17, 19

<sup>127</sup> S/2004/962, para. 8

<sup>128</sup> S/2004/697, para. 25-26

<sup>129</sup> S/2004/962, para. 39

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., para. 49, 50

<sup>131</sup> Bellamy & Williams, 2012, p.258

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., p.259; S/2004/962, para. 17, 18

<sup>133</sup> S/2004/697, para. 28, 38

<sup>134</sup> S/RES/1572 (2004)

<sup>135</sup> S/2004/443, para. 54; S/2004/697, para. 46

## 7.2 2005: The Pretoria Agreement

With UNOCI FM up and running since 13 August 2004 the operation was supporting efforts to counter incitement of hatred, efforts to sensitize militias to disarm and efforts to prevent violent activities and demonstrations of Young Patriots. UNOCI also provided support for committees responsible for redeploying civil servants to FN controlled areas in order to re-establish state administration.<sup>136</sup> However, the political impasse had prevented UNOCI from carrying out core elements of its mandate, namely to assist in restoring a nationwide police presence and to advise on the restructuring of the internal security services. Joint patrols of UNOCI, FANCI, the Gendarmerie and the Ivorian national police did contribute to decreasing insecurity in several cities including Abidjan, but the absence of a plan of the GNR prevented the restructuring of the Ivorian national police.<sup>137</sup> Meanwhile, there was no functioning judicial system in the north and especially in the Zone of Confidence. Though protected by UNOCI and Licorne forces, but without rule of law institutions or police presence, there was a climate of instability, insecurity and impunity in the Zone of Confidence.<sup>138</sup> The UNOCI Rule of Law Unit focussed on developing measures to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, while UNOCI civilian police continued with mixed patrols and the Public Information and Outreach Section had strengthened its capacity to monitor the media and conduct public information campaigns.<sup>139</sup> UNOCI also continued, as much as it could, to conduct investigations into most human rights violations brought to its attention. A programme was designed aimed at the general population, civil society organizations as well as governmental authorities to create awareness and effectively promote and protect human rights.<sup>140</sup>

An African Union mediation mission had been focussing since November on creating a climate of peace. Main priority was to restore the functioning of the Government of National Reconciliation, because the Forces Nouvelles ministers had not been participating since the November clashes. The National Assembly did, however, adopt the amendment of the electoral code in December. The laws on nationality and the Independent Electoral Commission, although not yet adopted, were perceived not in line with the Linas-Marcoussis agreement by the opposition, where after some parties expressed their wish for the UN to organize the elections.<sup>141</sup> The AU mediation mission resulted in April in the signing of the Pretoria Agreement after a meeting brokered by the president of South Africa. This accord contained a joint declaration of the end of the war and a strong focus on urgent military and electoral issues, especially the disarmament of militias. It also underscored the need for presidential elections in October 2005, followed by legislative elections. To this end the Pretoria Agreement envisaged a modification of the Independent Electoral Commission and agreed to invite the UN to participate in the organization of the elections.<sup>142</sup> Other laws that were considered not in line with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, such as laws on land tenure (though adopted earlier), identification and citizenship still had to be revised. Agreement was however reached to start the DDR programme on 27 June, expected to benefit some 48000 combatants in total.<sup>143</sup>

Political progress and the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement unfortunately stagnated again in May since there was still radical disagreement about the meaning of Ivorian citizenship, which blocked any efforts of holding elections and building confidence between the parties. The Forces

Nouvelles announced that they would not disarm until the militias were disarmed first and the laws on identification, citizenship and the modification of the Independent Electoral Commission were formally adopted by the National Assembly.<sup>144</sup>

The Security Council adopted resolution 1603 on 3 June, enabling the appointment of a High Representative for the elections to verify that the presidential and legislative elections were going to be free, fair and transparent. Although autonomous from UNOCI, they would work closely together to this end.<sup>145</sup> Subsequently the UNOCI mandate was expanded (and extended for 7 months) in resolution 1609 of 24 June 2005 to include assisting in the disarming and dismantling of militias, offering support for the organization of free and fair elections and, with ECOWAS, assisting the Government of National Reconciliation in re-establishing its authority across the whole country, as well as an iteration to monitor the arms embargo of the year before. To have UNOCI fulfil its new duties the SC authorized an extra 850 soldiers and 750 civilian police officers.<sup>146</sup>

Until September limited progress had been made in the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. The parties agreed in yet another meeting end of June that the dismantling and disarmament of militias should have been completed by 20 August and DDR of ex-combatants should have begun by end of July, but neither processes had commenced when experts from UNOCI, the AU, ECOWAS, the Licorne forces and other agencies draw up a new schedule for the implementation of the DDR programme by late November 2005.<sup>147</sup>

Due to disagreement on revised laws on the Independent Electoral Commission, nationality and identification that were perceived still not in line with the previous accords, the timeframe to hold elections on 30 October 2005 had become void. The FN declared elections could not be held since essential conditions were still not in place by end of August.<sup>148</sup> The Peace and Security Council of the African Union stipulated that the provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement should be continued to be implemented after the 31 October deadline, not exceeding 12 months. It also provided for the appointment of a new Prime Minister during this 12 months transition period, Charles Konan Banny, who would be sworn into office on 7 December. The AU further established an International Working Group (IWG) that would assist the GNR in implementing the peace process.<sup>149</sup> The IWG drafted a roadmap with new timelines for the overall peace process including an electoral schedule made with assistance of the UN's High Commissioner for the Elections. To help prepare for the elections scheduled in October 2006, UNOCI deployed 4 electoral coordinators and 83 electoral advisers to 14 regional offices in the country.<sup>150</sup>

During the year UNOCI had continued to conduct gender-awareness training for military personnel and Forces Nouvelles recruits. The mission supported national human rights groups in raising human rights awareness among the population and came to an agreement with the FN to end the use of child soldiers.<sup>151</sup> But the combatants who were still not disarmed, ethnic and urban militias and extremist groups such as the Young Patriots continued to form a threat to security and stability throughout the country and ethnic killings, mainly perpetrated by militias, continued to be reported

<sup>136</sup> S/2004/697, para. 44; S/2005/186, para. 5, 14, 15

<sup>137</sup> S/2005/186, para. 34, 35, 37

<sup>138</sup> S/2005/186, para. 42, 43

<sup>139</sup> S/2005/398, para. 39, 40, 48

<sup>140</sup> S/2005/186, para. 48, 49

<sup>141</sup> S/2005/186, para. 4, 7-9, 19

<sup>142</sup> Bah, 2010, p.609; S/2005/398, para. 4, 5

<sup>143</sup> S/2005/398, para. 9, 10

<sup>144</sup> Bellamy & Williams, 2012, 259; S/2005/398, para.12

<sup>145</sup> S/RES/1603 (2005); S/2005/398, para. 19, 20

<sup>146</sup> Bellamy & Williams, 2012, 259

<sup>147</sup> S/2005/604, para. 2,3; S/2006/2, para. 18

<sup>148</sup> S/2005/604, para. 36, 38

<sup>149</sup> S/2006/2, para. 3, 4, 10, 11; Bah, 2010, p. 609

<sup>150</sup> S/2006/2, para. 14, 19, 22

<sup>151</sup> S/2005/604, para. 49; S/2006/2, para. 62, 66

in the west of Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>152</sup>

The already fragile humanitarian situation, meanwhile, deepened, especially in the education, health, water and sanitation sectors. UNOCI launched some 62 quick-impact projects in areas of rehabilitation of education and health facilities in early 2005 and collaborated with UN agencies on projects to repair water pumps, establish water purification and distribution. An estimated 500.000 people however remained internally displaced and extra vulnerable.<sup>153</sup>

### 7.3 2006: The Yamoussoukro high-level meeting

Prime Minister Banny appointed his new cabinet end 2005 and immediately started to work on the road map for peace from the IWG. A meeting of the 5 main political leaders, President Gbagbo, Prime Minister Banny, Bédié (PDCI), Ouattara (RDR) and Soro (Force Nouvelles) on 28 February resulted in the reiteration of their readiness to engage in constructive dialogue and the issue of representation of the political forces within the Independent Electoral Commission was finally resolved. The leaders also agreed that the processes of identification of the population and pre-cantonment of armed forces (the preparation of the DDR programme) should start simultaneously.<sup>154</sup> However, violent demonstrations by Young Patriots in early January deteriorated the security situation once again. Anti-United Nations propaganda through Radio Télévision Ivoirienne and local networks led to attacks on UNOCI and humanitarian agencies' offices and property forcing the mission to relocate their staff to safe havens.<sup>155</sup> April and May brought political tensions by Young Patriots and prominent members of the FPI opposing the simultaneous start of the key processes of identification and DDR, leading to threats and attacks on UN personnel. Nevertheless a pilot project was launched end May to test the identification process, but due to disagreements between FANCI and FN on the modalities of the process the project did not include a pre-cantonment of armed forces. The project was still considered successful, with 7 mobile courts deployed to conduct public hearings, determine people's eligibility for citizenship and issue new birth certificates when needed.<sup>156</sup>

A high level meeting in Yamoussoukro on 5 July of several African politicians and the 5 main Ivorian leaders agreed to continue with the simultaneous implementation of the key processes and set up a monitoring group to overlook the pre-cantonment process and the disarmament and dismantling of militias, which were to be completed by 31 July. Both FANCI and the FN announced to have pre-cantonment around 12.000 troops each, but UNOCI was denied access to the pre-cantonment sites, so numbers could not be verified. Disarmament of militias was postponed twice to allow militia leaders to sensitize their members.<sup>157</sup>

The Yamoussoukro meeting also decided that 150 mobile courts would be deployed by mid-July to identify and issue national identity cards to approximately 3.5 million people, while at the same time a voter register would be produced of those eligible to vote. But no more than 25 mobile courts were deployed, because they were immediately hindered by Young Patriots and FPI supporters claiming that the mobile courts were inconsistent with the law and susceptible to fraud by those who were not eligible to receive Ivorian citizenship. As violent disruptions continued, Prime Minister Banny

changed the guidelines so that only a few courts could issue nationality cards, which in turn aggravated the opposition parties. By September the operations of the mobile courts had come to a complete stop.<sup>158</sup> In response to the Prime Ministers modification, the Force Nouvelles withdrew from the military dialogue and many combatants returned to their former posts and stations. Meanwhile the disarmament and dismantling of militias had been disappointing, since not even 1000 members were registered and only 110, mostly unusable weapons were surrendered.<sup>159</sup>

Côte d'Ivoire found itself yet at another political impasse and the International Working Group concluded that the holding of elections by 31 October 2006 would be impossible. The Group recommended that the Security Council adopted a new resolution to resolve the procedural ambiguities and grant more power to the Prime Minister. Another high level meeting was held in which President Gbagbo did not participate, because he stated the time for negotiations was over and he intended to present his own proposals on the peace process at an upcoming African Union meeting.<sup>160</sup>

The Security Council adopted resolution 1721 on 31 October 2006, extending the transition period and the mandates of President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny with an additional 12 months, with elections to be held on 31 October 2007. Mr Banny was determined to implement the resolution, which repeated the need to continue with the key processes mentioned in the road map of the International Working Group and the previous peace agreements. He also requested UNOCI and others to assist in developing a plan for the implementation of the new transition process. The International Working Group drafted new timelines to continue with the DDR and identification processes and reform the security sector.<sup>161</sup>

Meanwhile the restoration of State administration had proceeded slowly in 2006. Only half of 24.000 civil servants were redeployed to the north and west of the country, even though incentives and installation grants were offered.<sup>162</sup> The monitoring of the functioning, effectiveness and independence of the judiciary by UNOCI continued, as did the implementation of the human rights promotion programme. Through human rights training for 250 representatives of Government departments, judicial services and civil society organizations and the establishment of regional human rights offices throughout the country UNOCI worked on raising more human rights awareness.<sup>163</sup>

With support from UNOCI the humanitarian community was able to facilitate the voluntary return of some 2000 IDPs to their homes in the northern part of the country. Together with humanitarian organizations joint efforts were initiated to rebuild social cohesion and support community development in this area. In the west the spontaneous return of some refugees indicated a slight improvement of the security situation.<sup>164</sup> However, an upsurge of crime and inter-ethnic violence forced over 4000 people to flee their villages again in May 2006. UNOCI troops took care of the distribution of more the 650.000 litre of clean water for these vulnerable groups and UN personnel.<sup>165</sup>

<sup>152</sup> S/2006/2, para. 25, 28

<sup>153</sup> S/2005/186, para. 57, 65; S/2005/398, para. 54, 57

<sup>154</sup> S/2006/222, para. 2, 9, 11, 12, 35

<sup>155</sup> S/2006/222, para. 4, 5, 18

<sup>156</sup> S/2006/532, para. 3, 4, 10, 12, 13

<sup>157</sup> S/2006/532, para. 8, 9, 15, 17

<sup>158</sup> S/2006/821, para. 5-7

<sup>159</sup> S/2006/821, para. 8, 9, 10

<sup>160</sup> S/2006/821, para. 22, 24

<sup>161</sup> S/RES/1721 (2006); S/2006/939, para. 8, 14

<sup>162</sup> S/2006/532, para. 19; S/2006/821, para. 18

<sup>163</sup> S/2006/222, para. 47, 57

<sup>164</sup> S/2006/2, para. 54, 55

<sup>165</sup> S/2006/532, para. 35

#### 7.4 2007: The Ouagadougou Political Agreement

President Gbagbo's proposals to spur the peace process entailed the search for a home grown solution to the crisis, since none of the solutions proposed by the international community had brought peace to Côte d'Ivoire. In December 2006 Gbagbo proposed direct dialogue with Guillaume Soro of the Forces Nouvelles who responded positively, but upheld that such dialogue would have to lead to the implementation of resolution 1721 (2006). The other opposition parties too welcomed Gbagbo's initiative.<sup>166</sup> The Security Council extended the mandates of UNOCI and Operation Licorne in resolution 1739 and Prime Minister Banny meanwhile continued to implement the new road map of the IWG and established a working group on Security Sector reform and a working group on Identification. The public hearings for the identification process slowly resumed and mobile courts began to be deployed again.<sup>167</sup>

On 4 March 2007 Gbagbo and Soro signed the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) facilitated by the president of Burkina Faso, President Compaoré. The Agreement built on the forgoing peace agreements and SC resolution 1721 (2006) and included the key issues that had previously blocked implementation. Important measures to be taken were:<sup>168</sup>

- **Merging the Forces Nouvelles and the national defence and security forces by creating an Integrated Command Centre**
- **Replacing the Zone of Confidence with a green line with UNOCI and Licorne observation points that would be dismantled gradually**
- **Deploying mixed Forces Nouvelles and national police units to maintain law and order in the former Zone of Confidence**
- **Re-establishing State administration throughout the country**
- **Dismantling the militias**
- **Disarming combatants and enrolling them in a civic service programme**
- **Granting amnesty for all crimes relating to national security since September 2000 until the signing date of the agreement (exempting economic and war crimes and crimes against humanity)**
- **Simplifying and accelerating the identification of the population and the registration of voters**
- **Organizing free, fair, open and transparent elections, in accordance with the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra and Pretoria agreements**
- **Creating an new transitional Government**

In a supplementary agreement President Gbagbo and Mr. Soro agreed that he, Guillaume Soro, would become Prime Minister until the presidential election. Most of the deadlines set out for the key processes were met and the establishment of the Integrated Command Centre, the amnesty for crimes relating to national security, the removal of the Zone of Confidence and the deployment of mixed police units started on time. The dismantling of militias, the cantonment of combatants, the redeployment of State officials and the launching of mobile court hearings were more complex and were not able to meet the deadlines of commencement.<sup>169</sup>

The Agreement mentioned specific tasks for the UN like the overall supervision of the DDR programme, cantonment of combatants and storage of their weapons, and maintaining observation posts along the green line. Other key tasks were left out, but President Compaoré stated that the UN, UNOCI and Licorne were expected to assist in security matters and the electoral process. To review their new tasks the UN sent a technical assessment mission to Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso to consult with President Compaoré and the parties and UNOCI's mandate was extended in SC resolution 1765 (2007) until January 2008.<sup>170</sup>

All the involved parties reaffirmed the continued need of UN assistance for the peace process, but President Gbagbo stipulated that the UN and other international partners should advise and assist and not impose decisions on the Ivorian institutions, even though it was acknowledged that many institutions suffered capacity constraints. UNOCI would establish 17 observation posts along the green line in cooperation with the Integrated Command Centre and assist them in defining their organizational structure and functions. The mixed police units would include UNOCI staff members for training and mentoring purposes while in the west UNOCI would reinforce its military and police deployments to conduct border patrols at the Liberian border in coordination with the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Furthermore the operation would assist the national institutions in the planning and implementation of the DDR programme and help construct additional cantonment sites. Through UNOCI FM the redeployment of the remaining 12.000 civil servants to the west and the north of the country would be stimulated. Concerning the identification process UNOCI would conduct observations of the hearings of the 208 mobile courts and provide security for the courts during their operations and for the regional staff of the Independent Electoral Commission before, during and after the elections. All parties confirmed the need for the UN to maintain responsibility for international certification of the election process to ensure transparent and credible elections.<sup>171</sup>

In the following months the Ivorian parties continued to work together to implement the Ouagadougou Agreement and the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire remained relatively calm, until an attack on the aircraft of Guillaume Soro, who remained unharmed, created renewed tensions. Good news fortunately came shortly after from the Independent Electoral Commission carefully estimating that if all mobile court operations continued in this pace elections would be feasible by October 2008. However, due to inadequate funding the redeployment of civil servants stagnated, therewith delaying the re-establishment of State administration nationwide. In fact, the limited capacity of national institutions slowed down the entire implementation process halfway through the year. The restructuring of the defence and security forces, the disarming & dismantling of militias and the voter registration processes all experienced difficulties.<sup>172</sup>

<sup>166</sup> S/2006/2, para. 25, 28

<sup>167</sup> S/2006/2, para. 25, 28

<sup>168</sup> S/2006/2, para. 25, 28

<sup>169</sup> S/2007/275, para. 5, 6, 10, 11

<sup>170</sup> S/2007/275, para. 13, 17; S/RES/1765 (2007)

<sup>171</sup> S/2007/275, para. 21, 23, 24, 42, 43, 46-48, 51, 52, 54, 60, 66, 67, 71, 73

<sup>172</sup> S/2007/593, para. 2, 8, 10, 19, 20, 23, 25, 30

Nevertheless cooperation between Gbagbo and Soro continued in good spirit as they visited each other's home towns announcing that the war was over and the country had been reunited.<sup>173</sup> Since the green line had been established on 15 September 2007 no ceasefire violations in the area had been reported prompting UNOCI in early December to remove 8 of the 17 observation posts along the line, pursuant to the OPA. By late December it had been decided how many FN elements would be integrated into the new army, the police and the gendarmerie and who would benefit from the civic service and reintegration programmes.<sup>174</sup>

During the year serious human rights violations had been decreasing and a National Human Rights Commission had been set up in January by then-Prime Minister Banny, collaborating closely with UNOCI to promote and protect human rights.<sup>175</sup> Joint patrols of UNOCI, Licorne and the mixed police units continued, as did patrols and arms embargo inspections together with UNMIL in the Liberian border area.<sup>176</sup> With regard to the media, UNOCI continued its efforts to promote an improved media environment, monitor print and broadcast activities, provide information on the peace process and enhance participation of civil society actors in the process.<sup>177</sup>

The humanitarian situation improved slightly during this year. Together with other UN agencies, the World Bank and the European Union UNOCI assisted the Ivorian government in developing reintegration programmes for internally displaced persons, former militia members and other vulnerable groups.<sup>178</sup>

### 7.5 2008: The Fourth Supplement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement

The overall security situation in Côte d'Ivoire remained stable, although the delay in the DDR programme of Forces Nouvelles elements and the militias still posed a threat to the situation. Some unsatisfied demobilized FN combatants held demonstrations to protest the delay of their monthly payments, but the situation soon was brought under control by Licorne and UNOCI forces. The beginning of the year saw the careful start of political campaigning by the FPI and RDR and in April President Gbagbo announced 30 November as the date set for the elections. The previous envisaged date for elections in June proved technically not feasible, because election-related processes had funding gaps. With UNOCI assistance the Integrated Command Centre continued to build up its capacity, mixed police patrols were patrolling the former Zone of Confidence and UNOCI removed all but one observation post in the area. While the DDR programme had cantoned 12.000 FANCI elements, the disarmament of the Forces Nouvelles stalled as they were plagued by financial constraints and awaited a clearly defined reintegration programme. The dismantling of militias too stagnated, pending their request to be equally reimbursed for disarmament as the FANCI and FN combatants.<sup>179</sup>

No significant progress was made in the redeployment of the judiciary and law enforcement personnel to the north, since approximately 50 per cent of the country's judges were occupied in the operations of the mobile courts. Their activities proceeded significantly well though, as did the redeployment of civil servants of whom three-quarters had returned to their posts throughout the country by July.<sup>180</sup> The UN Special Representative for the elections established benchmarks in consultation with all national and international partners to certify all stages of the electoral process and

assure its credibility. The Independent Electoral Commission announced a timetable in conformity of the Ivorian constitution and the revised electoral code and UNOCI assisted the IEC in planning, mapping of polling stations, purchasing electoral materials and registration of candidates.<sup>181</sup>

As the year progressed and preparations for the elections intensified, political campaigning increased too. All parties were travelling the country throughout August to gain support from the population in the upcoming polls. The green line no longer existed as UNOCI had dismantled the last observation post and the mixed police units had completely taken over patrolling the area. Out of 34000 Forces Nouvelles members about one third had been cantoned while at the same time the voter registration process was launched successfully.<sup>182</sup>

The process however experienced more technical and logistical problems than anticipated, causing problems for the electoral timeline to such a degree that in a 10 November meeting the four political leaders, President Gbagbo, Prime Minister Soro, Mr Konan Bédié (PDCI) and Mr Ouattara (RDR) decided that it was no longer feasible to hold elections on 30 November 2008. In order not to lose momentum in the peace process a fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (OPA IV) was signed on 22 December 2008 which outlined the plan to, before holding elections, disarm former combatants, dismantle militias, reunite defence and security forces and complete redeployment of State administration. There would be time to do this now elections had been postponed again.

All through the year UNOCI provided logistical support for the electoral processes, monitored Liberian ex-combatants in the border area, continued gender awareness and child rights training for a variety of partners in Côte d'Ivoire and kept on monitoring the media and sensitize the population about the identification and voter registration processes. Security conditions improved to such an extent that the Secretary-General recommended reducing UNOCI's troop level by one battalion.<sup>183</sup>

The year 2008 saw the spontaneous voluntary return of approximately 50.000 internally displaced persons, in the west and north of Côte d'Ivoire. Humanitarian agencies developed strategies together with local authorities and relevant ministries to provide mid- to long-term assistance to returnees.<sup>184</sup> As time passed the focus of United Nations agencies and its local partners shifted from humanitarian response to recovery and development interventions, indicating that humanitarian relief became less necessary and time had come to develop an exit strategy by April 2008.<sup>185</sup>

### 7.6 2009: Working towards elections

While some Forces Nouvelles elements and militias still had not been disarmed and dismantled by April 2009 and were still posing a potential threat to the peace process, the overall security situation remained relatively stable. There remained 2 last critical processes that had to be completed in order to restore normalcy in Côte d'Ivoire: the reunification of the defence and security forces and holding elections. The fourth supplementary agreement outlined a plan and timeline for these processes: a) disarmament of FN combatants and dismantling of militias two months before the elections, b) reunification of the defence and security forces, c) effective redeployment of State administration, including the *corps préfectoral* (local authorities), the judiciary and fiscal and customs administra-

<sup>175</sup> S/2007/133, para. 47; S/2007/593, para. 39, 42

<sup>176</sup> S/2007/133, para. 25, 27, 33; S/2007/593, para. 5, 7

<sup>177</sup> S/2007/133, para. 50; S/2007/593, para. 53; S/2008/1, para. 55

<sup>178</sup> S/2007/275, para. 57

<sup>179</sup> S/2008/250, para. 2, 6, 7, 13-17, 21; S/2008/451, para. 3, 7, 14, 16, 17, 21

<sup>180</sup> Bah, 2010, p.614; S/2008/250, para. 24, 25, 27; S/2008/451, para. 24, 26

<sup>181</sup> S/2008/250, para. 32; S/2008/451, para. 29, 31

<sup>182</sup> Bah, 2010, p.614; S/2008/645, para. 2, 3, 16, 19, 29

<sup>183</sup> S/2009/21, para. 5, 6, 11, 14, 22, 23, 27, 61

<sup>184</sup> S/2008/1, para. 50

<sup>185</sup> S/2008/250, para. 57

tion, and d) centralization of the treasury.<sup>186</sup>

By end of May the Forces Nouvelles zone commanders in the north of the country handed over authority to the corps préfectoral, but progress on the other 3 key processes remained limited.<sup>187</sup> The DDR programme progressed slowly because, besides financial and capacity constraints, there was still disagreement on the exact number of FN soldiers to be absorbed in the new national army and what military rank they would have. While the supplementary agreement resolved a long lasting issue of the reimbursement of militias, who would now receive the same demobilization payment as other combatants of \$ 1,000 dollars, the unavailability of funds hampered progress in this field. The institutions responsible for the reintegration programme too lacked funding and UNOCI provided short-term reinsertion assistance for already demobilized combatants through micro-projects, so that they could provide themselves with income. The micro-projects helped reduce tensions while searching for additional financing for governmental reintegration programmes.<sup>188</sup>

Meanwhile the process of identification and voter registration went well and although it took more time than anticipated the processes were completed by 30 June. The Ivorian government announced on 14 May that the elections would be scheduled for 29 November 2009 and subsequently the Independent Electoral Commission published the associated timeline for the remaining key tasks, such as publication of the electoral list on 29 August. UNOCI on its turn helped with procurement and transport of electoral materials and started preparations for coordinating and facilitating international election observation activities.<sup>189</sup>

By early November the Independent Electoral Commission announced that elections would have to be postponed once again since the deadline for publishing the provisional voters list three months prior to elections was missed, due to technical challenges and strike actions by unpaid workers. The provisional list ('white' list) was finally published by 23 November where after UNOCI assisted in the distribution of the list to all local electoral commissions, followed by an appeal period to verify some 1 million names that still had to be confirmed ('grey' list). Meanwhile the Constitutional Council of Côte d'Ivoire validated 14 out of 20 presidential candidates and campaigning activities of the political parties continued. The Ivorian leaders prepared a new timeline on 3 December including the publication of the final voters list and the distribution of identity and voter cards and predicted that elections could be held in early March 2010.<sup>190</sup>

As the parties remained positive and committed to the peace process it was unlikely for some of the provisions in OPA IV to be adhered to. It was agreed that FANCI and FN combatants would be disarmed and the militias dismantled no later than two months prior to the date set for presidential elections, but by early January 2010 only 16.000 out of 28.000 FN elements had been demobilized and virtually no progress was made in dismantling the pro-Government militias. The Forces Nouvelles would deliver 4000 troops to temporarily support the Ivorian police and gendarmerie (who would deliver the same troops) during and after the election period, but according to an assessment of the Ivorian military only 2000 out of 8000 would be deployed, two weeks prior to the elections. Despite the transfer of authority by the zone commanders in the north, the corps préfectoral still experienced difficulties in exercising their authority and no progress was made to redeploy tax and

customs officials. And although all 11 courts were reopened in the north, they lacked the required personnel to operate efficiently.<sup>191</sup>

In the meantime UNOCI continued with its efforts to support the peace process. UNOCI police offered training and advice to the national police and gendarmerie and helped the Integrated Command Centre planning the intended deployment of the 8000 elements during the elections. Financial and technical support for women associations proceeded as did training for journalists on investigative journalism and conflict-sensitive reporting. Grave Human Rights violations continued to happen on a daily basis and the need to conduct awareness raising trainings at grassroots levels remained. UNOCI also facilitated the establishment of a Human Rights platform through which 30 local human rights organizations would monitor and promote human rights during the electoral process.<sup>192</sup>

Many IDPs had returned to their villages of origin in 2009, but an estimated 50.000 people still remained displaced and required assistance. UNOCI, humanitarian agencies and the Ivorian authorities continued to work closely to support the return and reintegration of the latter vulnerable group.<sup>193</sup>

### 7.7 2010: The Presidential Elections

In the beginning of the year new problems had arisen. It came to light that the president of the Independent Electoral Commission, Robert Beugré Mambé (PDCI) had produced a parallel list of 429.000 names without following the established procedures. While Mambé insisted he had developed the parallel list only for 'internal use' of the IEC the ruling party (Gbagbo's FPI) maintained that Mambé had committed fraud and that the provisional electoral list had been compromised. After Mambé refused to resign, as demanded by the FPI and advised by the facilitator of the peace process President Compaoré of Burkina Faso, President Laurent Gbagbo dissolved the Independent Electoral Commission and the government and requested Prime Minister Guillaume Soro to form a new government. Meanwhile reports surfaced that the FPI had requested several courts in the country to remove ineligible individuals from the provisional voters list ('white' list). These reports triggered violent demonstrations that cost the lives of several people. Angry protesters demolished the offices of the local authorities in Bouaké, destroyed civic records and attacked the residences of FPI party members. As a result President Gbagbo and the FPI maintained that the security situation in the north would not allow free campaigning and fair elections in the Forces Nouvelles controlled area and demanded disarmament and the reunification of the country prior to holding elections, as actually agreed upon in OPA IV. An angry opposition claimed this was just a technique to postpone elections indefinitely and called for the resumption of the appeals process in order to produce a final voters list. The FPI however demanded that the provisional list would be audited to remove the names of those who were included on the list fraudulently.<sup>194</sup>

Following these events a UN technical assessment mission visited Côte d'Ivoire to consult with the parties involved in the peace process. President Laurent Gbagbo and the FPI maintained that massive fraud had occurred: the alleged manipulation of the provisional voters list by Mambé and 'non-political' fraud of foreigners who wanted to become Ivorians. Gbagbo showed evidence to the

<sup>186</sup> S/2009/196, para. 2, 6; S/2009/344, para. 6

<sup>187</sup> S/2009/344, para. 7

<sup>188</sup> S/2009/21, para. 9; S/2009/495, para. 7-9, 14, 15

<sup>189</sup> Bah, 2010, p.614; S/2009/196, para. 13; S/2009/344, para. 4; S/2009/495, para. 5, 19, 24, 25

<sup>190</sup> S/2009/495, para. 20; S/2010/15, para. 6-8, 10-12

<sup>191</sup> S/2010/15, para. 14, 16, 18, 20-22; Ouagadougou Political Agreement IV (2008), art. 3, 5, 8, 9

<sup>192</sup> S/2009/196, para. 27, 33; S/2009/344, para. 35; S/2009/495, para. 30, 46, 35-38; S/2010/15, para. 29, 31, 33

<sup>193</sup> S/2009/21, para. 18

<sup>194</sup> Bah, 2010, p. 614; S/2010/245, para. 3-7

assessment mission of pre-signed and pre-stamped but blank birth and nationality certificates that were supposedly being sold to foreigners, and electoral lists from several districts containing names of people who were not Ivorian nationals. Therefor Gbagbo stressed the necessity to verify the voters list while the FPI called for a complete audit. But the opposition parties claimed Mr Mambé had not committed fraud because he had informed all Ivorian leaders about the existence of the parallel list during the 3 December 2009 meeting thus proving he was acting in good faith. The 'white list', at least, had been prepared in a broadly accepted and credible manner, strictly following the procedures agreed upon by the parties.<sup>195</sup> Subsequently Prime Minister Soro and the new Independent Electoral Commission announced on 2 May that individuals on the 'grey' list would be given the opportunity to confirm their eligibility to vote and be registered on the 'white' list (the provisional voters list).

The violent demonstrations in the north in February were reason for the FPI to demand full implementation of the OPA IV (disarmament and reunification) before holding elections. Prime Minister Soro stressed that if the Forces Nouvelles were expected to complete the disarmament process they needed to be assured that they would receive national identity cards, since that was the reason they took up arms in the first place. OPA IV also entailed the disarming and dismantling of the militias. Together with the FN elements this meant a total of demobilizing 75.318 personnel (32777 FN and 42451 militias), which would be a considerable challenge considering the lack of capacity of the integrated command centre.<sup>196</sup>

With regard to the reunification of the country difficulties still remained. Although the Zone of Confidence and the green line had both been suspended, Côte d'Ivoire was still a divided country, with the Forces Nouvelles operating a parallel administration, economy, treasury and judicial system in the north. By May 2010, in the FN controlled north, the corps préfectoral still had no real authority, tax agents were non-operational, the mixed police brigades lacked adequate manpower to effectively protect the population and the newly installed state institutions and many courts in the north and west were either non-operational or closed. The FPI and Laurent Gbagbo demanded that the FN zone commander structure and parallel administration be dismantled prior to elections, since the FN were part of the government since 2007 and it was unacceptable for them to continue running a separate administration. Reunification had not been possible so far because of a lack of political will and because the division benefitted the Forces Nouvelles in the north enormously. The FN mentioned that reasons were the need to resolve the identification issue first, the lack of funding from the government for the demobilization and cantonment of ex-combatants and the need for the FN to fund itself to maintain as an organization. The UN Secretary-General noted in May 2010 that until then the role of UNOCI had focussed on monitoring and supporting the redeployment of civil servants and enhancing conflict management and conflict resolution capacities of local authorities. He recommended that UNOCI and the United Nations system played a more active role in support of the effective restoration of State authority throughout the territory of Côte d'Ivoire.<sup>197</sup>

The security situation rapidly deteriorated in the beginning of the year following the violent demonstrations over the voters list dispute and left the political landscape as well as the population once again severely polarized. It was said the protesters that sought the streets in February were not demonstrating against the dissolution of the government but against the attempts of the FPI to

purge large numbers of people from the provisional voters list, therewith depriving them of Ivorian citizenship. As more refugees returned to their villages in the west violent inter-communal clashes became more frequent there, particularly over land disputes. Unemployed youth nationwide and the presence of armed criminal groups and militias still formed a serious threat to security during the political stalemate. The media did not help simmer things down either and was in fact publishing messages that fuelled tensions. Opposition parties were granted no access to state owned media which brought the situation further off balance.<sup>198</sup>

Prime Minister Soro managed to find agreement with all parties end of April to proceed with the appeals process of the grey list. Almost half a million names were checked and moved to the white list and simultaneously a verification process had started of 1.8 million names on the white list. Both processes were finished in August where after the Prime Minister announced that elections would be held on 31 October 2010 and a possible second round on 28 November 2010. The provisional results of the first round would be published by the Independent Electoral Commission on 3 November, followed by a confirmation of the final results by the Constitutional Council on 10 November. All 5.725.720 Ivorians on the final voters list would be issued voters and national identity cards, starting from 7 October.<sup>199</sup>

As Election Day approached the parties continued to work on the implementation of OPA IV and some progress was made in this regard. The cantonment process of 5000 FN elements that were to be absorbed in the new army had started, payments to demobilized ex-combatants had commenced and a joint deployment of customs officers in border towns was arranged. By 31 October 17.601 out of 32.777 Forces Nouvelles ex-combatants had been demobilized, but disarmament and dismantling of militias had stalled unfortunately and some 20.000 militia members remained active. Even though the command zones in the north were reduced from 11 to 4 the FN zone commanders continued to illegally collect taxes, obstructing a proper centralization of the State treasury. The eleven courts in the north had reopened after the February turmoil, but were not able to deal with criminal matters due to a lack of properly functioning judicial police force.<sup>200</sup>

In the lead up to the elections there was a generally peaceful campaigning period although ethnic and social tensions did resurface and politically motivated targeting of certain ethnic groups had been reported. Logistical challenges of the Independent Electoral Commission were overcome with UNOCI support and preparations for polling day were completed on time. Then the moment of truth arrived: after having been postponed six times the first presidential elections in ten years were finally held in Côte d'Ivoire. The elections were conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner under observation of thousands of national and international observers. With a voter turnout of 83.73 per cent the first round was considered a success with only minor disturbances reported, owing to the effectively provided security by the Ivorian forces, which were able to deploy 6600 out of the planned 8000 elements. After some reported minor irregularities that had not affected the results in any significant way the Independent Electoral Commission announced the provisional results in the early hours of 4 November 2010: President Gbagbo obtained 38,04 per cent, followed by Mr Ouattara with 32,07 per cent and Mr Bédié with 25,24 per cent of votes. The 11 other candidates had a combined total of 4 per cent of the vote. The UN Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire certified the electoral process based on 5 criteria and concluded it had been free and fair. The results were

<sup>195</sup> S/2010/245, para. 9, 13-16

<sup>196</sup> S/2010/245, para. 19-22

<sup>197</sup> S/2010/245, para. 24-27, 67, 68, 93

<sup>198</sup> S/2010/245, para. 8, 30, 31, 36, 38, 44

<sup>199</sup> S/2010/537, para. 3, 4, 8, 11, 21

<sup>200</sup> S/2010/600, para. 28, 31-33, 35, 36

validated by the Constitutional Council on 6 November and because none of the candidates had a constitutionally required absolute majority, the two candidates with the highest percentage would contest in a run-off presidential election on 28 November 2010.<sup>201</sup>

Again UNOCI supported the Independent Electoral Commission with major logistical operations to distribute the electoral material for the second round of elections. The defence and security forces assisted the Integrated Command Centre in providing security during the second polling day, leading up to a total number of 11,390 elements, both military and police.<sup>202</sup> Despite several incidents of violence the second round of elections was conducted satisfactorily. However, multiple allies of President Gbagbo appeared on television and gave press conferences claiming that the second round of elections had not been transparent in the north and that the Forces Nouvelles had committed violence against supporters of Laurent Gbagbo and the FPI in the centre, northern and western regions. Prime Minister Soro called these statements premature, incomplete and dangerously partisan. At the same time the IEC announced that the partial results would be released one day later than initially planned, on 29 November. Meanwhile one of Gbagbo's allies requested the IEC to nullify the results from three northern districts, who had mainly voted for Alassane Ouattara, because elections had not been transparent there. Moreover, national television kept repeating the broadcast of the press conference in which the Force Nouvelles were accused of acts of violence, which was referred to by the opposition as continuous manipulation of the spectators.<sup>203</sup>

When the spokesperson of the Independent Electoral Commission on 30 November finally attempted to announce the partial results of the second electoral round he was physically prevented from doing so by Commissioners representing President Gbagbo's alliance. Journalists witnessed the struggle. The IEC had to wait until the next day before they could submit the results to the Constitutional Council, in accordance with electoral law. On 2 December then the IEC announced from the Golf Hotel in Abidjan, where Ouattara had been based, that Alassane Ouattara had obtained 54,10 per cent of the votes and Laurent Gbagbo had obtained 45,90 per cent with a voter turnout of 81 per cent. But the President of the Constitutional Council, Mr Paul Yao N'Dré, declared that those results were 'null and void' since the IEC had missed the deadline for announcing the provisional results. The next day he came with different numbers: 51,45 per cent for Laurent Gbagbo and 48,55 per cent for Ouattara with a voter turnout of 71,28 per cent. The Constitutional Council arrived at these numbers after cancelling the results of 7 northern regions, who had voted overwhelmingly for Ouattara, based on the alleged acts of violence by the Forces Nouvelles there and the absence of the signatures of Gbagbo's representatives on the tally sheets.<sup>204</sup>

Earlier, on 29 and 30 November respectively, both the ECOWAS observer mission as the African Union observer mission had concluded that the polling had been conducted in a generally free, transparent and satisfactory manner. The UNOCI police component deployed at polling stations all over the country too declared that despite a couple of incidents the elections had been conducted in a free and fair atmosphere. The UN Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire held a press conference on 3 December to explicitly certify the outcome of the electoral run-off as announced by the Independent Electoral Commission with Alassane Ouattara as the rightful winner of the elections. The certification was based on the same five criteria as used in the first round and three methods were used by the Special Representative. He had investigated the voting trend on polling day, he had

collected election results from the 19 regional electoral commissions where 19 UNOCI observers had been present and the tally sheets had been analysed in UNOCI headquarters. There were indeed a few tally sheets that lacked the signatures of the representatives of Laurent Gbagbo, but these were so few that the irregularities would not have altered the outcome. Therefore Alassane Dramane Ouattara had won the presidential elections of Côte d'Ivoire of 28 November 2010.<sup>205</sup>

The media have played an important role in the time leading up to the elections. At the beginning of the year opposition parties had complained about unequal access to State media. Many of the newspapers, especially in Abidjan had close ties with political parties. But during the official campaigning period however the candidates' access to State media significantly improved. UNOCI, together with the Ministry of Communication, had been training Ivorian media practitioners, journalists and radio station employees on the role of the media and media coverage modalities during the electoral period. Through UNOCI FM the mission continued sensitizing the population on the overall peace process, especially on the upcoming elections. UNOCI also pursued its outreach activities to reinforce social cohesion within and among communities. When the situation worsened after the elections the State broadcasting corporation RTI was misused by Gbagbo's allies to spread hate messages and incite violence against particular Ivorian ethnic groups and UNOCI. The National Press Council, appointed by Gbagbo, banned the publication of multiple pro-Ouattara newspapers.<sup>206</sup>

Throughout the country the human rights situation remained bad, particularly in the West and former Zone of Confidence. Grave violations such as executions, rape, and sexual violence against children, theft, extortion and torture were committed by unidentified armed groups as well as uniformed elements from the national defence and security forces and the Forces Nouvelles. UNOCI continued to monitor and investigate human rights violations, raise awareness and strengthen the capacities of national human rights institutions.<sup>207</sup> Local authorities, community leaders, women's groups and military and police were being trained on human rights norms and principles, gender issues and child protection.

<sup>201</sup> S/2010/600, para. 4, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 20, 23

<sup>202</sup> S/2011/211, para. 3, 4

<sup>203</sup> S/2011/211, para. 11, 12, 73

<sup>204</sup> S/2011/211, para. 13-15

<sup>205</sup> S/2011/211, para. 16-20

<sup>206</sup> S/2010/245, para. 36; S/2010/600, para. 11, 57; S/2011/211, para. 60

<sup>207</sup> S/2010/245, para. 69; S/2010/600, para. 44, 47, 48, 50

## 8 Analysis of the frameworks

### 8.1 The issue of mandate fulfilment

The purpose of the previous chapter was to determine whether UNOCI undertook any action (and if so what kind of action) to meet the criteria in the frameworks of Duane Bratt and Jaïr Van Der Lijn. In Bratt's case the search was for his four criteria. In Van Der Lijn's case this can be determined by checking whether policy tools have been applied by UNOCI. For the purpose of this study it will be sufficient when UNOCI has offered support for or was responsible for the actual application of the policy tool. The two frameworks share a criterion to determine the success of a peacekeeping operation and that is mandate fulfilment. Therefore this paragraph about mandate fulfilment concerns both frameworks.

The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire was established by the adoption of Security Council resolution 1528 (2004). It was this resolution that held the original mandate of the operation. UNOCI started out with 8 primary tasks:

- **Monitoring of the ceasefire (3 May 2003) and movements of armed groups**
- **Assist the Government of National Reconciliation with the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement of members of armed groups**
- **Protect United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians**
- **Support for humanitarian assistance**
- **Support for the implementation of the peace process**
- **Contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights**
- **Promote understanding of the peace process through public information**
- **Assist the Government of National Reconciliation in the field of the rule of law, including re-establishing a civilian police and judiciary**

One of UNOCI's primary tasks was the monitoring of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003, between FANCI and all rebel groups for the entire territory of Côte d'Ivoire. During the first year of deployment UNOCI was unable to prevent fighting between Ivorian national forces and combatants of the Forces Nouvelles after the latter refused to disarm in October 2004. Several mass graves were discovered indicating that the ceasefire agreement had been severely violated. From 2005 on however the presence of joint military and police patrols of UNOCI, FANCI, the Gendarmerie and Ivorian national police in the city of Abidjan and especially in the Zone of Confidence seemed to have had a preventive effect. The Zone of Confidence functioned as a buffer between the government forces and the Forces Nouvelles elements, limiting the chance of armed confrontation between

the belligerents. By 2007 the Zone of Confidence had become a 'green line' and UNOCI was able to remove almost all observation posts by 2008 because the ceasefire was being adhered to by all signatories. In cooperation with UNMIL UNOCI conducted border patrols at the Liberian-Ivorian border monitoring the movement of troops and mercenaries and potential arms trafficking. Even though there was a rough start, from the case analysis it can be concluded that UNOCI did perform this task.

Another task of UNOCI was to Assist the Government of National Reconciliation with the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement of members of armed groups. The case analysis shows that UNOCI did everything in its power to perform this task. There were many stagnations in the process, but they were mainly due to political impasses beyond the control of UNOCI. An interesting effort of UNOCI concerning DDR were the micro-projects of May 2009, that provided ex-combatants, militias, young people at risk and women with income and continued to provide income beyond the project life.

Another task was to protect United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians. From the case analysis it can be concluded that this task too was performed by UNOCI, eventually. The first year of deployment was full of unrest and violent clashes during demonstrations that cost the lives of hundreds of civilians in March and April 2004. In November nine French peacekeepers were killed by bomb-attacks by FANCI. During 2005 and 2006 there were violent demonstrations by Gbagbo supporters, who repeatedly threatened and attacked UNOCI personnel, that eventually needed to be relocated to safe havens in Abidjan. From end 2007 on however, the presence of joint patrols throughout the country by UNOCI, FANCI and Gendarmerie personnel seemed to have had a preventive effect on large scale violence and human rights violations. The security situation remained relatively stable until election year 2010, when despite best efforts some violent demonstrations recurred due to political frictions.

Offering support for humanitarian assistance was also a task in the mandate. This task was mainly performed during the first few years of deployment, because as the humanitarian situation improved the focus shifted from emergency relief to recovery and development activities. UNOCI, together with other humanitarian agencies, supplied fuel to hospitals, repaired pumps and distributed clean drinking water and facilitated the safe return of internally displaced persons and refugees. Therefore it can be said that the performance of this task was completed successfully.

Support for the implementation of the peace process is a task that has indeed been performed by UNOCI. In any way it could UNOCI tried to further the reconciliation of the opposing parties and support the achievement of the goals set out in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Efforts include advising on DDR tasks, restructuring the defence and security forces and the organization of elections.

Another task that has been performed by UNOCI was contributing to the promotion and protection of human rights. Right after deployment UNOCI started investigations in human rights violations and launched education programmes for both military and police personnel as civilians. Through the use of UNOCI FM the mission created awareness and understanding of human rights.

UNOCI FM was also the main tool to perform another task, promoting understanding of the peace process through public information. The radio station became very popular very quickly and was an ideal way to reach a large number of people and inform them about the purpose of the mission and the peace process. Monitoring the media to try and prevent the incitement of hatred too contributed to this task of informing the population.

Finally, assisting the GNR in the field of the rule of law was also performed by UNOCI. By training and educating civilian police and Gendarmerie in, among other things, police work and human rights issues and the monitoring of the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary UNOCI contributed to re-establishing the rule of law in Côte d'Ivoire. The protection of the mobile courts since 2006 too supported the rule of law in the country. Based on the case analysis it can be concluded that the criterion of mandate fulfilment was indeed met by UNOCI. The mission has had more difficulties with some tasks than others, but overall each and every one of the 8 mandated tasks were somehow performed or given considerable attention with to purpose of completing it. This means that for both Bratt's as Van der Lijn's evaluation frameworks the first criterion was met and can be regarded a complete success.

## 8.2 Analysing UNOCI using Bratt's framework

As can be concluded from the former paragraph the first of Bratt's four criteria, mandate fulfilment, has been met by UNOCI and can be regarded successfully. The analysis of UNOCI continues by reviewing the remaining three criteria of Bratt's evaluation framework.

By his second criterion, facilitation of conflict resolution, Bratt means whether the operation was able to facilitate the resolution of the underlying causes of a conflict. He argues that some sort of power-sharing arrangement or peace treaty is needed to resolve a conflict. In the case of UNOCI such a peace treaty, the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, already existed long before the mission was deployed. UNOCI, as a peacekeeping operation, did not contribute to the development of the treaty. But Bratt also understands facilitation of conflict resolution as simply being present in order to prevent further fighting and thus allowing for (further) peace negotiations to take place, even when conflict resolution is not explicitly mentioned in an operation's mandate. Indeed, from the case analysis can be concluded that UNOCI's presence did seem to have a preventive effect on fighting. But it cannot be said that UNOCI resolved the underlying causes of the conflict. Therefore UNOCI partially met the second criterion in Bratt's evaluation framework, and it should be judged a moderate success.

Conflict containment, the third criterion in Bratt's framework, was also met by UNOCI. A conflict is contained when the operation was able to prevent major powers or neighbouring states from intervening in the conflict. In Côte d'Ivoire there was no involvement in the conflict by major powers or neighbouring states other than facilitating negotiations between the different Ivorian parties. The involvement of France took place long before UNOCI was established and was not a matter of worsening the conflict, but rather of trying to contain it. The case analysis also shows that UNOCI made efforts to monitor the borders together with UNMIL forces in order to prevent arms-trafficking and involvement of Liberian mercenaries. The conflict did not spread beyond Ivorian borders and there was no interference from other surrounding nation states and so it can be said that the criterion of

conflict containment was indeed met by UNOCI and can be judged a complete success.

Finally, the fourth criterion of Bratt's evaluation framework, the limitation of casualties has been a challenge to research. Bratt suggests to compare the number of both military and civilian casualties prior to, and after the deployment of the peacekeeping operation to determine the success in limiting casualties. In this case, pre-deployment would be between 19 September 2002, since the outbreak of the war, until 4 April 2004, UNOCI's starting date. Unfortunately clear data on fatalities in this conflict are difficult to come by. An estimate of battle deaths for 2002 until 2004 however can be found in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP) Battle Related Deaths Dataset.<sup>208</sup> The best estimate of the number of casualties in this period according to the UCDP is 809 dead. This particular dataset however does not contain information on the years 2005 until 2010. An estimate of fatalities from unofficial sources is that 'over 4,000 people have been killed in the conflict since 2002'.<sup>209</sup> This website article has been updated last in January 2009. Logically this would mean that at least 3,191 people have been killed in the period between 2005 and 2009 (4,000 – 809). This information cannot be verified unfortunately, but it is somewhat of an indication of the number of fatalities during this conflict. And based on this information it can be said, preliminary, that the criterion of limitation of casualties has not been met and should be judged a failure.

**Figure 6** Judging Bratt's four criteria

<b>Mandate fulfilment</b>	<b>Complete success</b>
<b>Facilitation of conflict resolution</b>	<b>Moderate success, but no resolution to the conflict</b>
<b>Conflict containment</b>	<b>Complete success</b>
<b>Limitation of casualties</b>	<b>Failure</b>

Figure 6 lists the results of the analysis in this paragraph. Now that each of the four criteria of Bratt's evaluation framework are judged it is possible to determine the overall success of the peacekeeping operation. Mandate fulfilment and conflict containment are substantially fulfilled criteria and can be regarded complete successes. But there has not been a full resolution to the conflict nor has the operation been able to significantly limit casualties from the start. Revisiting the flowchart of Bratt's evaluation framework for peacekeeping operations in paragraph 4.2 leads to the conclusion that from his point of view UNOCI has been a moderate success, since its date of deployment on 4 April 2004 until the national elections of 28 November 2010.

<sup>208</sup> [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp\\_battle-related\\_deaths\\_dataset/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_battle-related_deaths_dataset/)

<sup>209</sup> [http://ploughshares.ca/pl\\_armedconflict/cote-divoire-2002-2008/#Summary](http://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/cote-divoire-2002-2008/#Summary)

### 8.3 Analysing UNOCI using Van der Lijn's framework

Paragraph 8.1 explained that of Van der Lijn's framework too it can be said that the first out of his nine criteria, mandate fulfilment, has been met. Whether the other eight criteria have been met can be determined by asking to what extent the 10 most striking policy tools have been applied. The 10 questions formulated in paragraph 4.3 that are applicable to any peacekeeping operation will now be applied to the specific test case, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, UNOCI. In addition some of the mandated tasks that have been performed by UNOCI are policy tools that occur on Van der Lijn's standard inventory, but are not in the top 10. Nevertheless these tools will have to be reviewed too, because they have been applied through means of the mandate. For this research it will suffice when UNOCI has applied the policy tool itself or offered its support for it. This paragraph reviews each of the 10 questions one by one and at the end the policy tools that were embodied in the missions mandate.

The first question to be answered is '*Did UNOCI apply the policy tool reintegration of ex-combatants?*'. The Government of National Reconciliation was initially responsible for the DDR programme and UNOCI was only to assist with its efforts. The reintegration of ex-combatants was part of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement programme. Political impasses have stalled this process frequently and for long periods of time. As early as 2004 UNOCI assisted the National Commission of DDR in establishing a planning committee to make the necessary plans to disarm ex-combatants. From 2007 on UNOCI assisted in the construction of cantonment sites where demobilized combatants were to be stationed to await the further procedure. Throughout 2008 the DDR programme experienced financial constraints which also affected the reintegration programme. Moreover, there still did not exist a clearly defined reintegration programme. Around May 2009 UNOCI provided short-term reinsertion assistance to some of the FANCI and FN combatants that had already been demobilized and were waiting for the reintegration possibilities from the government. Through micro-projects the ex-combatants were able to provide themselves with income. These micro-projects helped reduce tensions created by the endless waiting on both the disarmament fee of \$ 1000 dollars and the governmental reintegration programmes to commence. This question can be answered positively since UNOCI did apply this policy tool. It aimed to contribute to the establishment of negative peace.

The next question is '*Did UNOCI apply the policy tool institution building?*'. UNOCI has made a lot of efforts to assist the Government of National Reconciliation in rebuilding state institutions. The UNOCI civilian police component has assisted in training, mentoring, and facilitating cooperation between the gendarmerie, the Ivorian national police and the Forces Nouvelles elements. Besides that UNOCI has assisted the internal security services and later, from 2007 on, the Integrated Command Centre in their attempts to unify and restructure the national armed forces and the Forces Nouvelles armed forces. Mixed police forces were set up to conduct joint patrols in the Zone of Confidence and later along the green line. UNOCI supported the redeployment of government officials and the judiciary in order to re-establish State administration and authority in the north of the country. Through UNOCI FM civil servants were sensitized to resume their duties in the north. The functioning, effectiveness and independence of the judiciary has been monitored by UNOCI's Rule of Law Unit and strategies were developed to further these processes. While most of these processes experienced much stagnation due to financial constraints and political blockades, UNOCI has done

its very best to support and assist the government in rebuilding effective state institutions and with it aimed at the establishment of negative peace, contributed to good governance/addressed state unwillingness and improved the legitimacy of the state. This question can be answered positively. The next question to be answered is '*Did UNOCI apply the policy tool verification of foreign forces withdrawal?*'. While there were foreign nationals fighting on the territory of Côte d'Ivoire it cannot be said that foreign forces were a participant in this conflict. Some of the militia members for instance were of Liberian or Sierra Leonean descent. Some Forces Nouvelles elements were of Burkinabe or Malian descent but there has not been a major external force of which the withdrawal could be verified. This thesis however does not take that in consideration and will therefore have to answer this question negatively.

The question '*Did UNOCI apply the policy tool winning the hearts and minds of the local population?*' is the next to be answered. Ever since the commencement of the operation UNOCI has made efforts to sensitize the population about the peace process, the operation and its mandate, human rights and reconciliation. The violent pro-Gbagbo Young Patriots were the ones to become impatient about the slow progression of the disarmament of the Forces Nouvelles only two months after launch. While this indicates that there had not been given sufficient public information about the process it does not mean that UNOCI did not attempt to win the hearts and minds of the people. The conduct of joint patrols in the Zone of Confidence also contributed to winning of the hearts and minds of the people for there were no functioning police and judiciary in this area. Providing protection to the population, by presence and action, and attempting to end impunity by policing activities and support for the re-establishment of the rule of law must have contributed to this policy tool. The fact that UNOCI FM grew more and more popular as time passed indicates that the population appreciated the mission's presence and supported it. This question can be answered affirmatively. With this policy tool UNOCI contributed to the establishment of negative peace and contributed to group demography and improving inter-group relations.

The next question is '*Did UNOCI apply the policy tool providing pay to the newly-formed national army?*'. This too was a task for the Government of National Reconciliation. While some police officers, mainly former national policemen, in the mixed brigades did receive pay, the former Forces Nouvelles officers did not for a long time. UNOCI and Licorne forces swiftly controlled the demonstrations motivated by this issue by former FN combatants in 2007. This however says nothing about the newly-formed national army. That is because in the researched time frame there was still no new army. The restructuring of the national defence and security forces had not been completed before the holding of the elections as actually set out in all the peace agreements. For this reason this question will have to be answered negatively.

The next question is '*Did UNOCI apply the policy tool human rights verification?*'. From start-up human rights violations were brought to UNOCI's attention and the mission conducted investigations into these violations, such as investigations into the 3 mass graves in 2004. The mission supported local human rights groups too in promoting human rights with the general population and civil society organizations. In 2005 UNOCI came to an agreement with the Forces Nouvelles, a significant breakthrough in the field of children's rights, to end the use of child soldiers. Human rights promotion programmes were designed from the beginning and implemented all through the mission's dura-

tion and UNOCI assisted in the establishment of regional human rights offices in the country. In 2007 a National Human Rights Commission was set up which collaborated closely with UNOCI for the promotion and protection of human rights. In addition a Human Rights platform was created in 2009 through which some 30 local human rights organizations would monitor and promote human rights during the forthcoming elections. The answer to this question is therefore positive. By applying this policy tool UNOCI contributed to good governance and addressed state unwillingness.

*'Did UNOCI apply the policy tool human rights education?'* is the next question and affiliated to the previous one. From the start on UNOCI has been providing training to government officials, military, police and community leaders in the field of human rights. The internal security services received training already in 2004 and UNOCI continued training other officials in the following years to create awareness and effectively promote and protect human rights. In 2006 a human rights training was provided to 250 government officials consisting of representatives of various departments, judicial services and civil society organizations. Specific gender awareness and children's rights training was also developed and provided. For these reasons this question can be answered affirmatively. With the application of this policy tool UNOCI contributed to good governance and addressed state unwillingness.

The next question to be answered is *'Did UNOCI apply the policy tool truth commissions?'*. Truth commissions or war crime tribunals were not established in the period between April 2004 and November 2010. Many violent events over the years however, triggered the establishment of investigatory bodies. This thesis will regard these bodies as covered by the policy tool human rights verification, since the initial purpose of these bodies has been the investigation of the grave human rights violations perpetrated during specific days and events. This is the reason that this question is answered negatively.

The next question is *'Did UNOCI apply the policy tool organization of elections?'*. While UNOCI did not actually organize the elections by itself, it did provide massive support and assistance to the government in doing so. An electoral assessment mission was set up in 2004 to help plan the elections. Each new peace agreement yielded new efforts for the organization of elections and each time UNOCI assisted in developing time tables and strategies for the actual conduct of the polling. As elections had been postponed six times these strategies and plans had to be revised each time to meet the new demands and deadlines. In 2005 the UN was formally invited by the signatories to the Pretoria Agreement to help organize the polls. UNOCI provided important technical and logistic support during the process of voter registration, preparing polling stations, distributing and collecting sensitive and non-sensitive electoral material and actually sent an UN aircraft to France to collect polling equipment in order for it to be available on time. This question can be answered positively. UNOCI herewith contributed to good governance and addressing state unwillingness.

The last question to be answered is *'Did UNOCI apply the policy tool election monitoring?'*. This last question too can be answered affirmatively. Throughout the country over 600 UN staff visited polling sites to monitor the process and help with problems that occurred at the voting sites. UNOCI was assisted by thousands of other people, both national and international observers. Monitoring the elections contributed to good governance and addressing state unwillingness.

Out of 10 questions 7 can be answered in the affirmative, meaning that UNOCI has applied or offered support for the application of 7 out of 10 policy tools that in turn positively contributed to 5 criteria of the framework. As explained in the beginning of this paragraph, some of the mandated tasks that were performed or supported by UNOCI, are in fact policy tools that can be found on Van der Lijn's standard inventory in appendix 2 of this thesis. Some of these tasks contributed to meeting some of the criteria and are therefore included in this review. The 8 mandated tasks of UNOCI were:

- **Monitoring of the ceasefire (3 May 2003) and movements of armed groups**
- **Assist the Government of National Reconciliation with the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement of members of armed groups**
- **Protect United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians**
- **Support for humanitarian assistance**
- **Support for the implementation of the peace process**
- **Contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights**
- **Promote understanding of the peace process through public information**
- **Assist the Government of National Reconciliation in the field of the rule of law, including re-establishing a civilian police and judiciary**

Task 1 contributed to the establishment of negative peace. Task 2 consists of multiple policy tools that have been applied. This task contributed to the establishment of negative peace (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration), addressed demographic pressures (repatriation and resettlement) and addressed state weakness (disarmament increases the strength of the state with regard to its monopoly on violence). Supporting humanitarian assistance addressed demographic pressures, while promoting and protecting human rights contributed to good governance and addressed state unwillingness. Assisting in the field of the rule of law addressed demographic pressures, state weakness, and state unwillingness and stimulated good governance. All the policy tools including the mandated tasks have together contributed to the following of Van der Lijn's criteria:

1. Mandate performance
2. Negative peace
3. Inter-group relations
4. Group demography

5. State weakness
6. State unwillingness / good governance
7. State legitimacy

Revisiting the graphic of Van der Lijn's evaluation framework for peacekeeping operations leads to the conclusion that from Van der Lijn's perspective UNOCI can be regarded as a complete success, since its date of deployment on 4 April 2004 until the national elections of 28 November 2010, because the operation has met 7 out of his 9 criteria.

#### 8.4 Results of the analyses

The former paragraphs show that UNOCI, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, can be regarded as a moderate success when Bratt's evaluation framework for peacekeeping operations is used. They also show that UNOCI can be regarded as a 'complete success' when Van der Lijn's evaluation framework for peacekeeping operations is used. These results confirm the main research question of this thesis:

#### ***Does the type of evaluation framework affect the outcome of the assessment of a UN peacekeeping operation?***

Yes, in this research, the type of evaluation framework that is being used to assess a UN peacekeeping operation does indeed affect the outcome of the assessment. One and the same peacekeeping operation can be classified differently when assessed with different frameworks, leading to it that a UN mission could, for example, be both a moderate success and a complete success at the same time. This confirms that scholars do not agree on the criteria for success and failure of peacekeeping operations and that there is no general evaluation method. Although extremely important, the evaluation of the performance of UN peacekeeping operations is not an objective affair but depends on the type of evaluation method that is being used.

#### 8.5 Strengths & weaknesses of the evaluation frameworks

Both evaluation frameworks that have been used in this research have their strengths and weaknesses. A strength in Bratt's framework is the application of the criterion mandate performance. Even though mandates are political documents and often deliberately vague and difficult to assess, it is the only unique measurement of an operation's objective and should thus be used as a criterion to determine operational success. Conflict containment is also a strong criterion. While major power involvement as meant by Bratt (Soviet Union and the United States) has become less relevant since the end of the Cold War, the prevention of the spread of a conflict or interference by neighbouring states is a solid criterion, because sometimes the main reason to deploy a mission is to prevent escalation.

However, the criteria of *limitation of casualties* and *facilitation of conflict resolution* have some weaknesses to them. The first weakness is that *limitation of casualties* lacks a specification of a time dimension in Bratt's framework. Bratt suggests measuring casualties before and after deployment of

the operation, but does not account for the possibility that the period before deployment, the actual fighting, could be rather short, as such is the case in Côte d'Ivoire, compared to the time span after deployment. Should the criterion *limitation of casualties* be regarded as failed when in a few months of heavy fighting 2,000 people die, and in 10 years of deployment there are 2,500 battle deaths? Bratt does not consider this in his criterion.

Another weakness is that *facilitation of conflict resolution* is a rather vaguely described criterion. Bratt assumes that there is no peace treaty or power sharing arrangement at the time of deployment of the peacekeeping operation. This criterion however does not consider the possibility that a mission is deployed after a peace treaty is already negotiated and signed. Moreover, it is not realistic to assume that the signing of a peace treaty or power sharing arrangement alone is sufficient for resolving deep-rooted, underlying causes of a conflict. It might form the basis of future resolution, but signing such a document does not erase the sources of civil strife. Besides, it will always be the responsibility of the warring parties themselves to eventually come to a resolution of the conflict. It begs the question why Bratt only connects complete success of a PKO to the criterion that is for the larger part being influenced by parties other than the mission itself.

What is also strange and a considerable weakness is that when there is a resolution to the conflict Bratt calls a mission a success. But this is not in line with his criterion, because *facilitating* the resolution of underlying causes is different from the actual resolution of the conflict. Facilitating could mean stopping the fighting to create an atmosphere in which negotiations can take place or setting up a meeting between parties. It does not mean resolving the conflict. Theoretically, a conflict can be resolved by outside mediators and the parties involved without any interference of the PKO whatsoever. But that would not make the mission successful since it did not even contribute to resolving the conflict.

Van der Lijn's evaluation framework is strong because of its use of 9 criteria. Measuring the performance of a peacekeeping operation over a wider spectrum of criteria gives a more accurate measurement of the actual performance than only evaluating, for example, two criteria. The use of mandate performance as a criterion is a strength, because it is, as said before, the only unique measurement of an operation's objective. A weakness however is that the framework considers a contribution to the elimination of the causes of conflict. It does not specify how much contribution is needed. If an operation only marginally contributes to all of the criteria, should it be considered successful? The framework does not clarify this.

## 9 Conclusions and recommendations

The knowledge this research has produced offers the opportunity to attempt to construct an alternative evaluation framework for peacekeeping operations made up out of the strong elements of the frameworks that have been under review. This alternative framework is by no means complete or exhaustive; it is merely a suggestion of the author to use those elements that seem to complement each other.

Paragraph 2.3 described the core tasks of multidimensional peacekeeping operations according to the United Nations:<sup>210</sup>

- a. Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- b. Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
- c. Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

It seems plausible to determine the success of a PKO by analysing whether it has been able to perform these core tasks. It also seems plausible that PKOs attempt to keep the peace by contributing to the elimination of the causes of conflict (see appendix 1 for Van der Lijn's causes of conflict). With these things in mind this thesis suggests the following criteria in random order to judge a peacekeeping operation:

Criterion	Goal
Negative peace	Create secure and stable environment
State weakness	Help state to provide security
State unwillingness and good governance	Help state to promote rule of law and human rights
State legitimacy	State weakness
External relations and conflict containment	State weakness

<sup>210</sup> UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2008, p. 23

Mandate performance	Justify the operations existence to the target country and international community
Group demography	Lower tensions caused by refugees and IDPs
Facilitate dialogue and reconciliation	Stimulate political process

The criterion of negative peace is evident. To keep the peace it is important there is an absence of fighting. Addressing state weakness is important to help a state regain the power to provide for (internal) security for all its citizens. Addressing state unwillingness and promoting good governance is important to help a state become more democratic and promote the rule of law and adhere to international human rights. Addressing state legitimacy is connected to state weakness and good governance. People should feel represented and protected by the government of their country. Conflict containment and controlling for external relations are important because they are related to negative peace. Peace will be difficult to keep when it is being challenged by the interests of foreign parties. Mandate performance is an important criterion, because it is the only unique measurement of an operations objective. Group demography is a criterion because this cause of conflict can have great impact on negative peace. The pressures caused by refugees and IDPs on local inhabitants could easily lead to renewed fighting. And facilitating dialogue is an important criterion because the political process has to be stimulated until formerly warring parties can maintain this process by themselves.

These suggested criteria for an alternative evaluation framework seem to address all of the core tasks of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations as described by the United Nations. This suggestion is by no means exhaustive and much research is still to be done. For example, it is also important to consider whether a peacekeeping operation actually intends to meet a criterion. Can a mission be judged on something that was not even a goal? And what if after 5 years of peace a civil conflict reappears again? Should an operation formerly judged a success be called a failure? How much time is acceptable to pass after termination of a mission before the operation no longer holds responsibility for the situation in a country? Many questions still are left unanswered in this field of research which keeps this area of peacekeeping very interesting for future students and scholars.

The purpose of this thesis was to gain knowledge about the evaluation of United Nations peacekeeping operations; more specific this thesis aimed at answering the main research question whether the type of evaluation would affect the outcome of the assessment of a UN peacekeeping operation. By answering several sub-questions this thesis arrived at an answer to this research question.

The first sub-question aimed at explaining what the UN is. The United Nations is an international organization of 193 countries that pursues worldwide peace and economic and social progress. One of the ways to achieve this is through peace operations. The second sub-question focussed

on identifying the different types of peace operations. There is conflict prevention which means trying to prevent a dispute from escalating into a conflict through diplomatic measures. There is peace-making, which involves diplomatic action and mediation to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement when a conflict is already in progress. Then there is peacekeeping, a technique to preserve the peace, after the fighting has been stopped, and to assist in implementing a usually still fragile peace agreement. The operation, typically deployed in the direct aftermath of civil conflict, entails the deployment of lightly armed, multinational military personnel and usually also police and civilian components to support the implementation of a new peace agreement. There is also peace-enforcement, meaning imposing, maintaining or restoring international peace by coercive measures or even military action. And there is peacebuilding, a complex, long-term process made up of a variety of activities to reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict. These activities focus on the functioning of society and the State.

Most of the peace operations are deployed in developing countries in response to intra-state violent conflicts and sub-question three found those reasons. Intra-state conflicts have adverse effects on the state itself, the neighbouring states and the rest of the world. In the state itself there are civilian casualties, human rights violations, displacements and poverty. Neighbouring states are confronted with refugees, infectious diseases and maybe conflict spill over. Conflicts usually lead to regional arms races and money spent on weapons instead of healthcare for instance. And without state control in large areas intrastate conflicts create perfect conditions for international crime, such as the production of narcotics, blood diamonds, human trafficking, arms dealing and terrorism.

This study came to be because the author wondered how peacekeeping operations are evaluated. Sub-questions four and five found an answer to what types of evaluation frameworks there are and what their similarities and differences are. Through literature research it came to light that there are roughly two schools of thought when it comes to evaluation methods for peacekeeping operations. There are evaluation methods with a strong focus on the operation itself and there are evaluation methods with a strong focus on larger values, such as justice and the reduction of human suffering. It seems that a similarity of these frameworks is that they both use mandate fulfilment as a criterion for success. But there are also differences. An operation focussed evaluation framework would consider a PKO a success when for example the mandate has been fulfilled and casualties are limited. A larger values focussed evaluation framework takes into account the contribution an operation has had on for instance group relations or the promotion of human rights to determine its success.

With this knowledge in mind two evaluation frameworks, one of each type, were selected and used on one and the same test case, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) in order to find out whether the type of evaluation framework that is being used affects the outcome of the assessment of a peacekeeping operation.

The evaluation framework by Duane Bratt is categorized as the operation focused one and the evaluation framework by Jair van der Lijn represents the larger values focussed methods. Bratt uses 4 criteria to determine the success of a peacekeeping operation whereas Van der Lijn uses 9:

Bratt's criteria	Van der Lijn's criteria
Mandate performance	Mandate performance
Facilitating conflict resolution	Negative peace
Conflict containment	Inter-group relations
Limiting casualties	Group demography
	State unwillingness and good governance
	State / government legitimacy
	Economic causes
	External relations

After a thorough description of the history of Côte d'Ivoire and the events and developments during the years of deployment of the operation this thesis looked for empirical evidence derived from literature, UN reports and newspaper articles about Côte d'Ivoire and UNOCI to be able to determine to what extent UNOCI has met the evaluation criteria of the two frameworks and how the operation would be classified; success, failure, or somewhere in-between. UNOCI has been evaluated between its deployment on 4 April 2004 until the holding of national elections on 20 November 2010. The reason for this time frame is that UNOCI's primary objective was to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed in 2003 and the main goal of this peace agreement was to hold fresh elections.

Each of Bratt's criteria could be judged a complete success, a moderate success or a failure. It turns out that UNOCI has met two out of the four criteria completely (complete successes), one was moderately met and one criterion was not met (failure). This leads to the conclusion, using Bratt's decision flowchart of paragraph 4.2, that UNOCI has been a moderate success in the research time frame.

Van der Lijn's evaluation framework has a somewhat different method of determining the success of an operation. He uses indicators to see whether his criteria have been met. These indicators are policy tools, intervention techniques that are used by the operation. When policy tools have been applied one can say it contributed to meeting one or more of the criteria. Disarming ex-combatants for example contributes to negative peace and addresses state weakness. This thesis has reviewed

Van der Lijn's top 10 policy tools and some tools that were incorporated in the mission's mandate. It was concluded that the operation fulfilled its mandate so it automatically successfully applied the policy tools that were in the mandate. Analysis shows that out of Van der Lijn's nine criteria UNOCI has met seven by means of the policy tools that have been applied. This means that with this evaluation framework UNOCI can be regarded as a complete success.

Sub-question six was aimed at finding strengths and weaknesses of the frameworks. Bratt's framework is strong in the use of mandate fulfilment and conflict prevention as criteria. It is not so strong however in the use of limitation of casualties and facilitation of conflict resolution as criteria. Limitation of casualties lacks a specification of a time dimension and facilitation of conflict resolution is too vaguely described. Van der Lijn's framework is strong in the use of nine instead of four criteria, like Bratt. A weakness however is that the framework does not clarify how much contribution to the elimination of the causes of conflict is needed to be able to call an operation successful.

Together the answers to the sub-questions confirm the main research question of this thesis:

***Does the type of evaluation framework affect the outcome of the assessment of a UN peacekeeping operation?***

Yes, in this research, the type of evaluation framework that is being used to assess a UN peacekeeping operation does indeed affect the outcome of the assessment. This means that whether an operation is deemed a complete success, moderate success or failure strongly depends on whoever is doing the evaluation and makes it an subjective matter. The author believes that peacekeeping operations are of such importance that the academic world and peacekeeping practitioners should work on the development of an evaluation framework for peacekeeping operations that is unbiased. A suggestion has been made in paragraph 8.6 but this alternative framework is by no means exhaustive. There is a need for further study in this field to come to a comprehensive evaluation framework that is generalizable and unbiased. Only then can peacekeeping operations be evaluated truly objective and produce information to help make future peacekeeping efforts more successful.

## 10 Bibliography

Akindès, F.A. (2004). *The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Cote d'Ivoire*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika Institutet.

Akokpari, J. (2008). Chapter three "You don't belong here": Citizenship, the State and Africa's Conflicts: Reflections on Ivory Coast. from *The Roots of African Conflicts*. Nhema, A., & Zeleza, P.T. (eds). Oxford: James Currey.

Annan, K. (1998). 'The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa'. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, UN document no. S/1998/318 (April 13)

Annan, K. (1999). 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization'. UN document no. A/54/1 (August 31)

Bah, A.B. (2010). *Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Côte d'Ivoire*. African Affairs. Vol. 109, No. 437, (19 August 2010), pp. 597-615. Oxford University Press.

Bellamy, A.J., & P.D. Williams. (2012). *Local Politics and International Partnerships: The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)*. Journal of International Peacekeeping, 16 (2012), pp. 252-281. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-keeping*. New York: United Nations.

Bratt, D. (1996). Assessing the success of UN peacekeeping operations. *International Peacekeeping*, 3(4), 64-81. doi:10.1080/13533319608413640

Collier, P.; Elliott, V. L.; Hegre, H.; Hoeffler, A.; Reynal-Querol, M.; Sambanis, N. (2003). *Breaking the conflict trap : civil war and development policy*. A World Bank policy research report. Washington, D.C. : The World Bank.

Cutolo, A. (2010). *Modernity, Autochthony and the Ivorian Nation: the End of a Century in Côte d'Ivoire*. The Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 527-552. Cambridge University Press.

Department Of Peacekeeping Operations. (2003). *Handbook on United Nations Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations*. New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Department Of Peacekeeping Operations. (2008). *UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Diehl, P. (1993). *International Peacekeeping*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Doyle, M.W., & Sambanis, N. (2000). *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Dec., 2000). Pp.779-801. American Political Science Association.

Druckman, D., Stern, P.C., Diehl, P., Betts Fetherston, A., Johansen, R., Durch, W., Ratner, S. (1997). *Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions*. Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, (ay, 1997), pp. 151-165. Blackwell Publishing.

Evans, G. (1993). *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.

Farah, D. (2002). "Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade." *Washington Post*, 1 November. Available on: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27281-2001Nov1.html><http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A27281-2001Nov1&not-Found=true>

Fortna, V. P. (2004). Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war. *International Studies Quarterly*, 48(2), pp.269-292.

Galtung, J., (1996). *Peace by Peacefull Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*. Volume 14 International Peace Research Institute Oslo. Sage Publications

Gberie, L., & Addo P. (2004). *Challenges of Peace Implementation in Côte d'Ivoire*. Report of an international experts workshop held the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre from 31 May to 1 June 2004.

Gilligan, M.J., & Sergenti, E.J. (2006). *Evaluating UN Peacekeeping with Matching to Improve Causal Inference*. New York University.

Given, L.M. (ed.) (2008). *The Sage encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

Handloff, R.E., & T.D., Roberts. (1991). *Cote d'Ivoire: a country study*. Washington D.C.: The Division.

Hoffnung, T. (2005). *La crise ivoirienne*. Paris: La Découverte.

Kimou, S.A.(2013). *The Politics of "Othering": Will Ethnic Polarization destroy Côte d'Ivoire?*. Georgetown University. Publication Number 1535841. Thesis available via: <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1351414521>

Koko, J.L., & Essis, E.J.M.G. (2012). *Determinants of success in UN peacekeeping operations*. Lanham: University Press of America.

Lijn, J. van der, (2006). *Walking the tightrope: do UN peacekeeping operations actually contribute to durable peace?*. Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers.

MacQueen, N. (2008). *Judging Peacekeeping Outcomes: Three Perspectives on UN Operations*. From : Langholtz, H., Kondoch, B., & Wells, A., (eds). *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations*, Volume 12, 2007, pp.00-00. Koninklijke Brill.

Paris, R. (2004). *At War's End; Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pushkina, D. (2006). *A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission*. *International Peacekeeping*, 13:2, 133-149. Doi: 10.1080.13533310500436508

Sarkees, M.R., & Schafer, P. (2000). The correlates of war data on war: an update to 1997. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 18 (1), 123-144. Doi:10.1177/073889420001800105

Takeyh, R., & Gvosdev, N. (2002). *Do terrorist networks need a home?*, *The Washington Quarterly*, 25:3, 97-108.

United Nations Department of Public Information. (2000). *Basic facts about the United Nations*. United Nations Publications.

Wallensteen, P., & Sollenberg, M. (2001). Armed conflict, 1989-2000. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(5), 629-644. Doi:10.1177/0022343301038005008

## Other documents

Human Rights Watch. (2003). *Trapped between two wars: violence against civilians in western Côte d'Ivoire*. Vol. 15. No. 14 (A).

## United Nations documents

### Agreements

Security Council. *Linah-Marcoussis Peace Agreement*. Letter and Annex I to the letter dated 27 January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2003/99

Security Council. *Ouagadougou Political Agreement*. Letter dated 13 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2007/144

Security Council. *Fourth Supplementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement*. Letter and Annex I to the letter dated 30 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Burkina Faso to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2008/834

### Reports

Security Council. (26 March 2003). *Report of the Secretary-General on Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2003/374

Security Council. (8 August 2003). *First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2003/801

Security Council. (4 November 2003). *Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2003/1069

Security Council. (6 January 2004). *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1514 (2003) of 13 November 2003*. S/2004/3

### Progress reports on UNOCI

Security Council. (2 June 2004). *First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2004/443

Security Council. (27 August 2004). *Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2004/697

Security Council. (9 December 2004). *Third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2004/962

Security Council. (18 March 2005). *Fourth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2005/186

Security Council. (17 June 2005). *Fifth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2005/398

Security Council. (26 September 2005). *Sixth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2005/604

Security Council. (3 January 2006). *Seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2006/2

Security Council. (11 April 2006). *Eighth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2006/222

Security Council. (17 July 2006). *Ninth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2006/532

Security Council. (17 October 2006). *Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2006/821

Security Council. (4 December 2006). *Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2006/939

Security Council. (8 March 2007). *Twelfth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2007/133

Security Council. (14 May 2007). *Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2007/275

Security Council. (1 October 2007). *Fourteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2007/593

Security Council. (2 January 2008). *Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2008/1

Security Council. (15 April 2008). *Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2008/250

Security Council. (10 July 2008). *Seventeenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2008/451

Security Council. (13 October 2008). *Eighteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2008/645

Security Council. (8 January 2009). *Nineteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2009/21

Security Council. (13 April 2009). *Twentieth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2009/196

Security Council. (7 July 2009). *Twenty-first progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2009/344

Security Council. (29 September 2009). *Twenty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2009/495

Security Council. (7 January 2010). *Twenty-third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2010/15

Security Council. (20 May 2010). *Twenty-fourth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2010/245

Security Council. (18 October 2010). *Progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2010/537

Security Council. (23 November 2010). *Twenty-sixth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2010/600

Security Council. (11 March 2011). *Twenty-seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/2011/211

### **Security Council Resolutions**

Security Council. (4 February 2003). *Resolution 1464 (2003)*. S/RES/1464

Security Council. (13 May 2003). *Resolution 1479 (2003)*. S/RES/1479

Security Council. (13 November 2003). *Resolution 1514 (2003)*. S/RES/1514

Security Council. (27 February 2004). *Resolution 1528 (2004)*. S/RES/1528

Security Council. (15 November 2004). *Resolution 1572 (2004)*. S/RES/1572

Security Council. (3 June 2005). *Resolution 1603 (2005)*. S/RES/1603

Security Council. (31 October 2006). *Resolution 1720 (2006)*. S/RES/1720

Security Council. (10 January 2007). *Resolution 1739 (2007)*. S/RES/1739

Security Council. (16 July 2007). *Resolution 1765 (2007)*. S/RES/1765

### **Internet sources (websites)**

UNOCI mission local website

<http://www.onuci.org/en.php3> (last accessed on 15 march 2014)

UNOCI mission website

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/>

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf> (last accessed on 7 April 2013)

The United Nations: An Introduction for Students. 2000. United Nations Publications

<http://cyberschoolbus.un.org/unintro/unintro.asp> (last accessed on 7 April 2013)

United Nations Secretariat

<http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/secretariat/> (last accessed on 10 April 2013)

United Nations Security Council

<http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/> (last accessed on 3 May 2013)

Uppsala Conflict Data Program Database

[http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp\\_battle-related\\_deaths\\_dataset/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_battle-related_deaths_dataset/) (last accessed on 25 May 2014)

Ploughshares website

[http://ploughshares.ca/pl\\_armedconflict/cote-divoire-2002-2008/#Summary](http://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/cote-divoire-2002-2008/#Summary) (last accessed on 25 May 2014)

## Appendices

---

1. Van der Lijn's causes of conflict
2. Standard inventory of policy tools
3. Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement
4. Security Council Resolution 1528 (2004) – establishment of UNOCI

## Appendix 1: Van der Lijn's clusters of causes of conflict

Source: Van der Lijn, 2006, p.64-85

*Inter-group relations* can be a cause of conflict when there are bad relations between groups. A group consists of individuals that share the same identity, being religion, age, gender, ethnicity, ideology etcetera. If a group has an identity then it can perceive differences, ones that already existed or are deliberately created. If the different interests of groups clash then conflict may develop along the identity lines. There are three factors within the cluster of inter-group relations. The first is *objective and subjective inequality*. Objective inequality is the systematic exclusion of certain groups from political and economic decision-making processes and the denial of opportunities. Subjective inequality is the perception of a group that it does not have access to the wealth, prosperity and power it feels it is entitled to. The second factor is *communal hegemonism* or the desire of groups for hegemony over other groups. The third factor in the cluster is *government-group relations*. If governments do not give minority groups the opportunity to express their interests and participate in leadership selection, this could give rise to conflict.<sup>211</sup>

*Group demography* is a cluster that includes demographic pressures. Demographic pressures do not directly cause conflict but the demographic shifts they bring about possibly can, especially in an already tense environment. These demographic shifts consist of two factors. The first factor is *population composition* which entails the characteristics of a population in terms of parameters (such as size, age distribution, geographical distribution, ethnic, religious or tribal configuration). For example, states with multiple ethnicities within a population would supposedly run a greater risk of conflict, because the ethnic groups would be more interested in protecting their own identity than the state they live in. As a result multi-ethnic states would have more problems with defining their people than homogeneous states and would therefore have more legitimacy problems. The second factor is *population dynamics* which is made up of the two subdivisions *population growth* and *population movement*. Population growth could spark conflict when a faster-growing group deems itself powerful enough to win a quick and decisive victory over a slower-growing group (in order to obtain more land, resources or political privileges for instance). Or a slower-growing group may feel threatened by the faster-growing group (and the decreasing availability of land, resources or political privileges) and launch a preventive strike. Population movement entails migration, refugees and urbanisation. A large number of refugees may change the ethnic balance in a country and a population may see its identity threatened. Urbanisation in itself does not cause conflict but the concentration of problems such as unemployment, lack of food, currency devaluation, could lead to massive violent urban protests.<sup>212</sup>

*State weakness* is the third cluster of causes of conflict. A weak state is unable to meet the economic needs of its population, has a weak identity, lacks social cohesion and cannot provide the internal security, because it has lost its monopoly on the use of force. State weakness consists of three factors. The first factor is *socio-economic weakness*. Low-income countries cannot or will not meet all the demands of its population, resulting in discontent and conflict. A loss in revenue of a state, for example through the loss of foreign aid or a domestic source of income, decreases the available expenditure on social welfare, education, health and development which in the end could lead to social and political unrest. The second factor is *socio-political weakness*. Politically stable countries

have a smaller chance of civil conflict than those that have a history of civil conflict. As violence is part of a country's history or tradition even, the threshold to resort to violence once again is much lower than in politically stable countries. Political instability could easily lead to rebellion or military coups in order to re-establish economy and law and order, especially when the military is insufficiently paid. The third factor is *weakness to provide security*. If groups are discriminated against and there are no mechanisms of pacific dispute settlement they may take up arms to settle the dispute and to provide their own security, since the state is not able to. The availability of arms makes this easier and hampers the state's monopoly on violence.<sup>213</sup>

*State unwillingness and good governance* is made up of four factors. Good governance is governance that is effective, participatory, transparent, accountable, and equitable and promotes the rule of law. Countries that lack good governance often have a winner-takes-all attitude in politics, from which conflict may arise. The first factor is *bad leadership and the spoiler problem*. Conflicts can be seen as the consequence of bad leadership. Somehow, bad leaders manage to make a conflict erupt into violence, whether unintended or deliberately. Spoilers are leaders and parties that feel their power or interests are threatened by newly found peace and resort to violence to try and stop peace from happening. Factor two is the polity of the state that could be a cause of conflict. A democracy offers room to peaceful opposition while an autocracy would repress any attempt to resolve grievances. A state polity somewhere in between, such as the semi-democracy does not offer peaceful opposition but does not entirely suppress it either. This is a situation in which there is an opportunity to rebel and thus conflicts may break out. The third factor in this cluster is a lack of human rights or the use of coercive methods to suppress the activities of dissident groups. Human rights violations are more common in autocracies than in democracies. If there are no means for peaceful protest, violent conflict might be the only way to express dissatisfaction. And the fourth factor finally is the *fight for resources*. Many conflicts are greed-driven and rebels and their leaders benefit economically from them. They have an interest in the continuation of conflict because it's their source of income, while society as a whole suffers from it.<sup>214</sup>

*State/ government legitimacy* is the fifth cluster of causes of conflicts consisting of the factors *government legitimacy* and *state legitimacy*. Conflicts can come from a legitimacy crisis that has its roots in both a lack of government and state legitimacy. The lack of government legitimacy is a regime that has lost its right to rule in the eyes of the public because it has failed to provide for the common good. A government that relies on coercive methods to suppress groups is actually a weak government. When a government loses legitimacy it could come from four causes: Political exclusion by repressive means of groups that want access to the government, corrupt or incompetent policies that only favour the ones in power and their allies, stagnating or declining economies, and the collapse of similar regimes that discredit one's own system. The legitimacy crisis that follows can lead to violence when a government tries to regain legitimacy or suppress dissent. A lack of state legitimacy is a when citizens no longer consider themselves to be citizens of a state and no longer feel represented by the central government. Political exclusion could cause that feeling. When citizens feel this way they might pursue autonomy and separatism.<sup>215</sup>

*Unemployment and economic decline* are another cluster. Economic factors play a huge role in ethnic conflicts but are by themselves not sufficient causes of conflict. They need an existing tribal, ethnic

<sup>211</sup> Van der Lijn, 2006, p.64-66

<sup>212</sup> Ibid., p.67-70

<sup>213</sup> Ibid., p.70-76

<sup>214</sup> Van der Lijn, 2006, p.76-79

<sup>215</sup> Ibid., p.79-81

or religious enmity to be able to spark ethnic conflicts. There are two factors, *absolute* and *relative deprivation*. Absolute deprivation (or poverty) does not directly cause violent conflict but it helps make it possible, because in poor countries the incentives for conflict for rebel groups are higher than in rich countries. The cost of rebellion is low compared to rich countries while the expected gains/incomes from conflict are the same. Relative deprivation or the perception of being poor is aggravated as income inequalities along ethnic lines increase in times of economic decline and inflation reduces purchasing power. The frustration that comes from the perceived poverty could give rise to conflict.<sup>216</sup>

The last cluster of causes of conflict comprises *external relations*. External factors alone are not sufficient reason for conflict. Internal causes need to be in place for a conflict to erupt. But since most conflicts in recent history have had external involvement this is an important cluster, especially because they seem to make resolution of the conflict more difficult. There are three factors to be distinguished regarding external factors. The first factor is *outside interventions and bad foreign relations*, consisting of for instance funding of rebels, arms trading, military trainers, political advisors, financiers or direct military invasion. These activities could have serious destabilizing effects. Also external support for groups by kin-groups can contribute to violence. The second factor is *regional instability*, because instability in neighbouring countries can have significant impact on a conflict. A high level of democracy in the region has a moderating effect on the likelihood of ethnic conflict in a country, because 'good neighbours' can help resolve a conflict while 'bad neighbours' do nothing or might even worsen the situation in a country. Moreover in an instable region the availability of and easy access to weapons is a strong destabilizing factor. The third factor finally is *past foreign occupation or colonialism*. Colonialism and hegemonic contestation (Cold War) both come up in the literature as cause of conflict. After the colonial era many African countries were left behind in a weak condition, with a European style administration, judiciary and political structure uncommon to their cultures. The elites were not prepared to govern their countries and often lacked the education to do so. It was also common for colonizers to privilege a specific group, ethnicity or tribe with education and power to be their local asset, but after independence unequal inter-group relations became visible. Besides that, the artificial borders drawn up by European powers cut straight through living areas of ethnic groups and communities who all of a sudden were living in another country. The superpowers of the Cold War fought their battles in some of today's third world countries that were their client states at the time. In doing so they exacerbated existing conflict and in some cases the hegemons are the cause of conflict. But also the end of the Cold War could be regarded a cause of conflict, since the hegemons lost interest in their client states, no longer politically, military and economically supported them and left them behind as weak states.<sup>217</sup>

<sup>216</sup> Van der Lijn, 2006, p.81-83

<sup>217</sup> Van der Lijn, 2006, p.83-85

## Appendix 2: Standard inventory of policy tools

Source: Van der Lijn, 2006, p.26-28

- **Cease-fire monitoring:** This policy tool can consist of activities such as truce supervision, military observation, demilitarisation, and confidence-building and security measures. It aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace.
- **Cantonment and demobilization:** Activities covered by this policy tool can range from the monitoring of to the actual organization of the cantonment and demobilization of armed forces. It aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace.
- **Disarmament:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the monitoring of to the actual organization of disarmament processes and arms control. It aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace and to increase the strength of the state with regard to its monopoly on violence.
- **Reintegration of ex-combatants:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the monitoring of to the actual organization of the reintegration of ex-combatants, including income generation for demobilized military personnel, and reintegration and vocational training. It aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace.
- **Institution building:** This policy tool can consist of activities to strengthen the state within a variety of fields. Activities within this policy tool in the military field also intend to contribute to negative peace and can range from the monitoring of to the actual restructuring or integration of military forces; professionalization or reform of armed forces; military aid; and military-to-military programs. In the field of internal security and judicial and legal issues, this policy instrument consists of activities that also aim to contribute to good governance and the addressing of state unwillingness, such as civilian police reform; civilian police training and capacity building. In the field of governance this policy instrument consists of activities which again may also contribute to good governance and the addressing of state unwillingness, such as political party building; political institution-building; training of public officials; and government reform and strengthening. In addition, these institutions can be reformed to become more neutral and credible to contribute to the legitimacy of the state.
- **Verification of foreign forces withdrawal:** This policy tool can consist of monitoring, verification and supervision activities with regard to the withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory of the country where the operation is conducted. As such it aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace and the removal of external causes of conflict.
- **Winning the hearts and minds of the local population:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the establishment of UN television and radio; the promotion of alternative information and communication sources; the provision of civic and peace education; and broad-based political participation/stimulation of democracy. It may be used to win the population for negative peace, but it can also be targeted at decreasing tension amongst the population and improving inter-group relations.

- **Diplomacy:** This policy tool can consist of a wide variety of activities, including mediation; negotiations; conciliation; good offices; informal consultations; peace conferences; dialogue facilitation; high level consultation and diplomacy; fact-finding missions; special envoys; “friends” groups; and statements by the Security Council and Secretary-General of appeal or condemnation. It is aimed to contribute to the establishment of negative peace and in the case of international diplomacy also to address the external causes of conflict.
- **Sanctions verification:** This policy tool can consist of diplomatic, cultural and economic sanctions or moratoria. An example is also market closure for warlords. It aims to contribute to negative peace.
- **Civil administration controlling:** This policy tool can consist of the monitoring, supervision, verification and controlling of the civil administration at all levels of government. It aims to contribute to the establishment of negative peace and good governance, and to the addressing of state unwillingness.
- **Civilian police monitoring:** This policy tool can consist of the monitoring and verification of the civilian police, as well as the investigation of complaints and their possible correction. It aims to contribute to the establishment of good governance, and to the addressing of state unwillingness.
- **Border monitoring:** This policy tool consists of border monitoring in order to verify or enforce, amongst other things, arms embargoes or blockades; to prevent illicit arms trade; and to control arms proliferation. It may be aimed to contribute to negative peace and/or the addressing of external causes of conflict.
- **Providing pay to the newly-formed national army:** This policy tool consists of the funding of the army and/or civilian police, to enable these institutions to pay their employees. It aims to contribute to the strength of the state.
- **Repatriation:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the monitoring of to the actual organization of the repatriation process for refugees and the resettlement of IDPs. It aims to address demographic pressures.
- **Reintegration of refugees:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the monitoring of to the actual organization of the reintegration of refugees and IDPs, including income-generation projects and vocational training. It aims to address demographic pressures.
- **Mine clearance:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the supervision of to the actual clearing of mines, both in the short term, emergency demining, and in the medium to long term. It aims to address demographic pressures and economic decline.
- **Humanitarian aid:** Activities within this policy tool can range from the monitoring of to the actual provision of humanitarian assistance, relief and food aid to refugees, IDPs and others in need. It aims to address demographic pressures.

- **Providing law and order:** This policy tool consists of activities to secure the presence of law and order. These activities can range from limited military intervention to safeguarding the provision of humanitarian aid to the restoration or maintenance of public law and order, and securing the safety of important political leaders and politicians. Depending on these goals, the aim of this policy instrument is to address demographic pressures, state weakness, or state unwillingness and to stimulate good governance respectively.
- **Society building:** This policy tool consists of activities aimed to address state weakness and strengthen the cohesion and integration of society. These activities may range from minor development programs and aid to civil society in an attempt to restructure the organization of society.
- **Rehabilitation:** This policy tool consists of reconstruction and rehabilitation activities, such as, amongst other things, healthcare improvement, and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. It aims to address state weakness and in some cases also unemployment and economic decline.
- **Human rights verification:** This policy tool consists of the monitoring and verification of human rights, as well as the investigation and correction of human rights violations. It aims to contribute to good governance and address state unwillingness.
- **Human rights education:** This policy tool consists of the educational, training and awareness raising activities with regard to legal, judicial and human rights issues for both government personnel, as well as the public at large. It also consists of activities for the promotion of good governance and transparency. It aims to contribute to good governance and address state unwillingness.
- **Truth commissions:** This policy tool consists of assistance to, or verification of or the actual organization of a variety of activities ranging from truth commissions to war crimes tribunals. The objective of these activities is both to deal with the past and to improve inter-group relations, as well as to end impunity and state unwillingness, and to contribute to good governance.
- **Organization of elections:** Activities within this policy tool can range from providing assistance and support for the organization of elections to their actual organization. It aims to contribute to good governance and address state unwillingness.
- **Election monitoring:** This policy tool consists of election monitoring activities by the United Nations itself or assistance to monitoring activities by other organizations. It aims to contribute to good governance and address state unwillingness.

**Security Council**

Distr.: General  
27 January 2003  
English  
Original: French

---

**Appendix 3: Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement**

---

---

**Letter dated 27 January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**

At the invitation of the President of the French Republic, a round table of Ivoirian political forces met at Linas-Marcoussis from 15 to 23 January 2003. The round table adopted a reconciliation agreement, of which I have the honour to transmit to you a copy herewith (see annex I).

A Conference of Heads of State on Côte d'Ivoire then met at Paris on 25 and 26 January 2003, under the co-chairmanship of the President of the French Republic, the Chairman of the African Union and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Conference adopted Conclusions, a copy of which is attached herewith (see annex II).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annexes circulated as a Security Council document.

*(Signed)* Jean-Marc de La Sablière  
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations

03-22621 (E) 280103 280103



**Annex I to the letter dated 27 January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: English and French]

**Linas-Marcoussis Agreement**

1) At the invitation of the President of the French Republic, a Round Table of the Ivorian political forces met in Linas-Marcoussis from 15 to 23 January 2003. It brought together the following parties: FPI, MFA, MJP, MPCI, MPIGO, PDCI-RDA, PIT, RDR, UDCY and UDPCI. The conference was chaired by Mr. Pierre MAZEAUD, assisted by Judge Keba Mbaye, former Prime Minister Seydou Diarra and facilitators appointed by the UN, the African Union and ECOWAS.

Each delegation gave its analysis of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and made proposals aimed at restoring confidence and overcoming the crisis. The vision shown by delegations enabled the Round Table to bring the positions together and arrive at the consensus described below, in which all elements – principles and annexes – have the same status:

2) The Round Table welcomes the cease-fire made possible and guaranteed by the deployment of ECOWAS forces supported by French forces, and demands strict compliance with it. The Round Table calls on all parties immediately to put a stop to all exactions and consecrate the peace. It calls for the immediate release of all political prisoners.

3) The Round Table reiterates the need to maintain the territorial integrity of Côte d'Ivoire and respect for its institutions and to restore the authority of the State. It recalls its commitment to the principle of democratic accession to and exercise of power. To this end it agrees as follows:

a- A Government of National Reconciliation will be set up immediately after the conclusion of the Paris Conference to ensure a return to peace and stability. It will be charged with strengthening the independence of the justice system, restoring the administration and public services and rebuilding the country. It will implement the appended Round Table program which includes, in particular, provisions in the constitutional, legislative and regulatory spheres.

b- It will prepare an electoral timetable with a view to holding credible and transparent elections and set dates for them.

c- The Government of National Reconciliation will be led by a consensus Prime Minister who will remain in office until the next Presidential election, in which he will not be able to stand as a candidate.

d- This government will be made up of representatives appointed by each of the Ivorian delegations taking part in the Round Table. In assigning Ministries a balance will be struck among the parties throughout the term of office of the government.

e- To discharge its duties the government will have executive powers in accordance with the delegation of authority provided for in the Constitution. The political parties represented in the National Assembly which took part in the Round Table undertake to guarantee the support of their Members of Parliament for the implementation of the government's programme.

f- The Government of National Reconciliation will, immediately upon taking office, attend to rebuilding an army committed to the values of integrity and republican morality. The government will restructure the defence and security forces and may, for this purpose, receive the counsel of outside advisers and in particular the assistance offered by France.

g- In order to contribute to restoring security of persons and property throughout the national territory, the Government of National Reconciliation will organise the regrouping and subsequent disarming of all forces. It will ensure that no mercenaries remain within the country's borders.

h- The Government of National Reconciliation will seek the help of ECOWAS, France and the United Nations to arrange for their forces to guarantee these operations.

i- The Government of National Reconciliation will take the necessary steps to ensure release and amnesty for all military personnel being held on charges of threatening State security and will extend this measure to soldiers living in exile.

4) The Round Table decides to set up a committee to monitor implementation of the Paris Agreements on Côte d'Ivoire in charge of ensuring compliance with commitments made. This committee will report to national, regional and international authorities all cases of obstruction of the Agreements and failure to apply them, to ensure that appropriate remedies are implemented.

The Round Table recommends to the Conference of Heads of State that the monitoring committee be set up in Abidjan and made up of representatives of the countries and organizations called on to guarantee implementation of the Paris Agreements, and in particular:

- . the representative of the European Union,
- . the representative of the Commission of the African Union,
- . the representative of the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS,
- . the Special Representative of the Secretary-General who will co-ordinate UN bodies,
- . the representative of the International Francophone Organization,
- . the representatives of the IMF and the World Bank,
- . a representative of the G8 countries,
- . the representative of France.

5) The Round Table calls on the French government, ECOWAS and the international community to provide for the security of the persons who took part in it and if need be for that of the members of the Government of National Reconciliation until such time as the latter is in a position to fully perform this task.

6) The Round Table pays tribute to the mediation provided by ECOWAS and to the endeavours of the African Union and the UN, and thanks France for its role in organizing this meeting and achieving this consensus.

Done at Linas-Marcoussis, 23 January 2003

FOR THE FPI  
Pascal AFFI N'GUESSAN

FOR THE MFA  
Innocent KOBENA ANAKY

FOR THE MJP  
Gaspard DELI

FOR THE MPCJ  
Guillaume SORO

FOR THE MPIGO  
Félix DOH

FOR THE PDCI-RDA  
Henri KONAN BEDIE

FOR THE PIT  
Francis WODIE

FOR THE RDR  
Alassane Dramane OUATTARA

FOR THE UDCY  
Théodore MEL EG

FOR THE UDPCI  
Paul AKOTO YAO

THE CHAIRMAN  
Pierre MAZEAUD

**Annex**  
**Programme of the Government of National Reconciliation**

I- Citizenship, identity, status of foreign nationals

1) The Round Table considers that Law 61-415 of 14 December 1961 on Ivorian citizenship, as amended by Law 72-852 of 21 December 1972, which is based on complementarity between jus sanguinis and jus soli and makes broad provision for naturalization by certificate issued by the public authorities, is a generous and well-drafted text.

The Round Table considers on the other hand that there are many difficulties in implementing the law, as a result either of lack of awareness among populations or of administration and police and security force practices which disregard the law and human rights.

The Round Table has observed a degree of legal difficulty in applying Articles 6 and 7 of the Citizenship Code. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that in practice the certificate of citizenship is valid for three months only and that the person holding it must prove his citizenship each time it is renewed by producing a number of documents. However, the Code has heretofore been applied.

Therefore the Government of National Reconciliation will:

a. immediately promote increased recourse to existing naturalization procedures, based on better information and possibly co-operation projects implemented with the support of international development partners;

b. submit, on an exceptional basis and within six months, a naturalization bill aimed at settling in a simple and accessible manner the cases of those persons deemed ineligible and considered to be in the country illegally (in particular cases concerning persons formerly covered by Articles 17 to 23 of Law 61-415 as repealed by Law 72-852 and persons residing in Côte d'Ivoire prior to 7 August 1960 who did not exercise their option within the prescribed deadline), and supplement the existing text by including in new Article 12 foreign men married to Ivorian women.

2) To cope with the uncertainty and slow pace of the identification process and with the mistakes and abuses to which security checks can give rise, the Government of National Reconciliation will take further action with respect to registration and identification of individuals, in particular:

a. Suspension of the current identification process pending decrees implementing the Law and timely establishment of a National Identification Commission, headed by a judge and made up of representatives of the political parties, to be charged with supervising and overseeing the National Identification Office.

b. Ensuring strict consistency of the Law on Identification with the Citizenship Code regarding proof of citizenship.

3) The Round Table finds that the foreign nationals residing in large numbers in Côte d'Ivoire have made a major contribution to national wealth and helped confer on Côte d'Ivoire its special position and responsibility within the sub-region, which has also benefited the countries of origin of these foreign nationals, and considers that the petty annoyances perpetrated by the administration and the police and security forces, which often disregard the law and human rights and which often affect foreign nationals, can be caused by wilful misapplication of identification provisions.

a. The Government of National Reconciliation will therefore immediately eliminate the residence permit requirement under Article 8 paragraph 2 of Law 2002-03 of 3 January 2002 for nationals of ECOWAS countries and will carry out the immigration inspection needed by using means of identification not subject to fraudulent misuse.

b. Moreover the Government of National Reconciliation will consider introducing legislative and regulatory provisions to improve the status of foreign nationals and protect their property and persons.

c. The Round Table also calls on all ECOWAS Member States to ratify, in a timely manner, the existing protocols concerning free circulation of persons and goods, to practice strengthened co-operation in controlling migratory flows, to respect the fundamental rights of immigrants and to diversify areas of development. These actions can be implemented with the support of international development partners.

II- Electoral system

1) The Round Table considers that Law 2000-514 of 1 August 2000 on the Election Code raises no difficulties and reflects efforts to improve the text of the laws and that Law 2001-634 of 9 January 2001 creating the Independent Electoral Commission constitutes significant progress in ensuring the organization of transparent elections.

2) The Government of National Reconciliation:

- a. will ensure impartiality of the measures taken to identify voters and draw up voter lists;
- b. will submit several amendments to Law 2001-634 aimed at achieving better representation of the parties taking part in the Round Table within the central committee of the Independent Electoral Commission, including its Officers;
- c. will submit, within 6 months, a bill relating to the status of the opposition and to the public funding of political parties and election campaigns;
- d. will submit within one year a bill on illicit personal enrichment and will organize effective inspection of the personal asset disclosures filed by those elected;
- e. take all appropriate measures to ensure the independence of the justice system and the impartiality of the media with respect to both election disputes and election propaganda.

III- Eligibility to the Presidency of the Republic

1) The Round Table considers that Article 35 of the Constitution on the Election of the President of the Republic must avoid referring to concepts without legal content or deriving from legislation. The Government of National Reconciliation will therefore propose that the conditions governing eligibility to the Presidency of the Republic be laid down as follows:

"The President of the Republic is elected by universal suffrage to a five year term of office. He can be re-elected only once.  
The candidate must be in possession of his civil and political rights and be at least thirty-five years of age. He must have only Ivorian citizenship and have a father or a mother born Ivorian."

2) The Citizenship Code will be amended by adding to the conditions under which Ivorian citizenship can be revoked, under Article 53, the following words: "holding elective office abroad or serving as a member of a foreign government".

3) The President of the Republic shall publish a report on his state of health once a year.

IV- Land tenure regime

1) The Round Table considers that Law 98-750 of 23 December 1998 on Rural Land Tenure, adopted unanimously by the National Assembly, constitutes a reference in a field that is legally difficult and economically crucial.

2) Nevertheless the Government of National Reconciliation:

- a. will support the progressive implementation of this regime by carrying out a campaign to explain it to rural populations in such a way as to work toward true security of tenure.

- b. will submit an amendment to better protect acquired rights under Article 26 of the law on heirs of landowners holding rights predating the enactment of the law but not fulfilling the conditions of ownership set out in Article 1.

V- Media

- 1) The Round Table condemns the incitement to hatred and xenophobia propagated by certain media.
- 2) The Government of National Reconciliation will within one year overhaul the general regime governing the press so as to strengthen the role of the regulatory authorities, guarantee neutrality and impartiality of the State broadcasters and foster the financial independence of the media. These measures may receive the support of international development partners.
- 3) The Government of National Reconciliation will immediately restore free broadcasting of the international radio and television media.

VI- Rights and freedoms of the individual

- 1) The Government of National Reconciliation will immediately set up a National Human Rights Commission to ensure protection of rights and freedoms in Côte d'Ivoire. The Commission will be made up of delegates of all Round Table parties and be chaired by a person accepted by all.
- 2) The Government of National Reconciliation will call for the establishment of an international board of enquiry to investigate and establish the facts throughout the national territory in order to identify cases of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law since 19 September 2002.
- 3) Based on the report by the international board of enquiry, the Government of National Reconciliation will determine which cases should be brought to justice in order to put an end to impunity. The Round Table particularly condemns the actions of the "death squads" and those giving them orders as well as those carrying out summary executions throughout the country, and considers that those guilty of and those aiding and abetting these acts must be brought to justice before an international criminal jurisdiction.
- 4) The Government of National Reconciliation will endeavour to facilitate humanitarian operations to aid the victims of the conflict throughout the country. Based on the report of the National Human Rights Commission, it will take steps to compensate and rehabilitate victims.

VII Regrouping, disarming and demobilizing

- 1) Immediately after assuming office, the Government of National Reconciliation will undertake the process of concomitant regrouping of the forces on the ground, under the supervision of ECOWAS and French forces.
- 2) In a second phase it will set out the measures to be taken with respect to disarming and demobilizing these forces, also under ECOWAS and French force supervision.

- 3) All recruits enlisted after 19 September will be immediately demobilized.
- 4) The Government of National Reconciliation shall ensure the social reintegration of military personnel of every origin with the help of Disarmament - Demobilization - Repatriation - Resettlement - Reintegration (DDRRR) type programmes which can be implemented with the support of international development partners.
- 5) The Government of National Reconciliation will take the necessary steps to ensure the release and amnesty of all military personnel detained on charges of threatening State security and will extend the benefit of these measures to soldiers living in exile. The amnesty law will under no circumstances mean that those having committed serious economic violations and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law will go unpunished.
- 6) The Government of National Reconciliation will carry out an audit of its armed forces and determine, in a difficult economic context, the level of sacrifice which it can accept in order to meet its obligations with respect to national defence. It will on that basis restructure the armed forces and request, for this purpose, outside assistance.

#### VIII- Economic recovery and the need for social cohesion

- 1) The Government of National Reconciliation will restore free circulation of persons and goods throughout the national territory and facilitate the resumption of educational, administrative, economic and social activity.
- 2) It will prepare, in a timely fashion, a plan for infrastructure reconstruction and development, national economic recovery and strengthening of social cohesion.
- 3) The Round Table recommends to international institutions and international development partners that they provide support for the process of rebuilding Côte d'Ivoire.

#### IX- Implementation

The Government of National Reconciliation will ensure that the constitutional, legislative and regulatory reforms arising from the decisions it is required to make are introduced without delay.

### **Annex II to the letter dated 27 January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council**

[Original: French]

#### **Conclusions of the Conference of Heads of State on Côte d'Ivoire (Paris, 25 and 26 January 2003)**

1. At the invitation of the President of the French Republic, Mr. Jacques Chirac, the heads of State of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, and South Africa, representatives of the heads of State of Angola, the Gambia, Guinea, the Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, representatives of the States members of the European Union, the President of the European Commission, Mr. Romano Prodi, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Mr. Javier Solana, and the President of the International Organization of la Francophonie, Mr. Abdou Diouf, and representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the African Development Bank (ADB), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Community of Sant'Egidio met at Paris on 25 and 26 January 2003 to consider and adopt the reconciliation agreement concluded by the political forces of Côte d'Ivoire at Linas-Marcoussis and to offer their support for its proper implementation.
2. The Conference was chaired jointly by the President of the French Republic, Mr. Jacques Chirac, the Chairman of the African Union and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The Conference heard statements by President Mbeki, in his capacity as current Chairman of the African Union, President Wade, in his capacity as Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), President Gbagbo, President of Côte d'Ivoire, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
4. The Conference took note of the Agreement signed at Linas-Marcoussis on 24 January 2003 by the round table of Ivorian political forces, which was submitted to it by Mr. Pierre Mazeaud. It commended the participants for the loftiness of their vision and for their sense of responsibility.
5. The Conference pays a tribute to the efforts and initiatives of ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations, which paved the way for the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. It commends the personal efforts of President Wade and President Eyadéma, which laid the groundwork for a peace agreement. It welcomes the constant support shown for these undertakings by the Chairman of the African Union and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
6. The Conference endorses the Agreement concluded at Linas-Marcoussis by the round table, which establishes national reconciliation and paves the way for a return to peace in Côte d'Ivoire with respect for the constitutional order.
7. The Conference welcomed the announcement by President Gbagbo of the establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation, as called for in the

Linac-Marcoussis Agreement. It took note of the fact that, after consultation with the Ivorian political forces, the Government is to be headed by Mr. Seydou Diarra, Prime Minister-designate, and constituted in accordance with the criteria recommended in the Linac-Marcoussis Agreement for ensuring a balance.

8. The Conference stresses the need to implement the provisions of the Agreement promptly. In particular, it calls upon the Government of National Reconciliation, once constituted, to begin to put the programme of implementation for the Agreement into effect immediately.

9. The Conference decides to support the establishment of a committee to monitor the Agreement, to be constituted immediately at Abidjan. It confirms that this Monitoring Committee shall be entrusted with monitoring the implementation of the provisions of the Agreement and shall be empowered to invoke any national, regional or international authority in the event of obstruction or failure so that appropriate steps can be taken. The Monitoring Committee shall be specifically empowered to bring any instances of failure to implement the Agreement to the attention of the United Nations Security Council through the appropriate channels so that the Council may draw the appropriate conclusions and take the necessary decisions.

10. The Conference decides that the Monitoring Committee shall consist of the following members:

- The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Abidjan, who shall coordinate the representation of the bodies of the United Nations system;
- The representative of the ECOWAS secretariat;
- The representative of the Commission of the African Union;
- The representative of the country occupying the Presidency of the European Union;
- The representative of the European Commission;
- The representative of IMF;
- The representative of the World Bank;
- A representative of the Group of 8;
- The representative of the International Organization of la Francophonie;
- The Ambassador of France to Côte d'Ivoire;
- A military adviser representing the countries involved in bringing the crisis to an end.

11. The Conference expresses the hope that the Chairman of the Monitoring Committee will be the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It requests that the Committee meet regularly and report to the bodies it represents on the implementation of the Agreement.

12. The Conference calls upon the Government of National Reconciliation to give high priority to respect for civil liberties and personal security; it calls upon the

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide all possible support to the Ivorian Government in this area through appropriate means.

13. The Conference affirms the importance of support from the States members of ECOWAS and the United Nations in restoring peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire. It expresses its gratitude to ECOWAS and France for having committed troops to participate in the military and security effort, and welcomes the adoption of the statement issued by the President of the United Nations Security Council on 20 December 2002, which endorsed that deployment.

14. The heads of State invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the participating States that are also members of the United Nations Security Council to arrange to have the conclusions of the Conference endorsed by the Council. The Conference expresses the hope that the Security Council will affirm, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the right of the ECOWAS forces and the forces supporting them to take the necessary steps to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel and to ensure, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Government of National Reconciliation, the protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical violence within their zones of operation, using the means available to them. The Conference also invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to submit to the Security Council proposals for strengthening the presence of the United Nations system, particularly in the area of security, humanitarian assistance and human rights.

15. The Conference recommends that the Secretary-General of the United Nations submit to the Security Council recommendations for the deployment of civilian and military observers who will help to supervise the implementation of the Agreement throughout Côte d'Ivoire.

16. The Conference requests that the Government of National Reconciliation facilitate the deployment of ECOWAS forces and French support forces throughout Côte d'Ivoire with a view to promoting the implementation of the military regrouping and disarmament measures provided for in the Agreement.

17. The Conference wishes to recall the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation. Accordingly, it calls upon all States that are neighbours of Côte d'Ivoire to support the peace process by preventing any action that might undermine the security of Côte d'Ivoire.

18. The Conference expresses its concern at the deterioration in the humanitarian situation; it requests that greater resources be mobilized to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches its intended recipients and that refugees and displaced persons are afforded protection. It expects that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and ICRC will continue to work to this end.

19. The Conference deplors the extent of the damage occasioned by the duration of the crisis, not only to the economy of Côte d'Ivoire but to the economies of the countries of the region. It encourages the Government of National Reconciliation to prepare an economic and social recovery programme, as called for in the Agreement. It urges IMF, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Union and bilateral donors to contribute to this recovery by making their expertise and financial resources available to the Government of National Reconciliation. The Monitoring Committee shall transmit all useful

recommendations to donors so that their contributions may be effectively utilized in the effort to restore peace and stability.

20. In concluding its work, the Conference expresses its conviction that the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement will lead to national reconciliation and a return to stability. It believes that only mutual trust among all the parties will allow the Government of National Reconciliation to accomplish its task. For their part, the Conference participants intend to do all they can to help Ivorians uphold the commitments they have undertaken to bring peace and prosperity to Côte d'Ivoire.

---

## **Appendix 4: Security Council Resolution 1528**

---



## Resolution 1528 (2004)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4918th meeting, on 27 February 2004**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 1464 (2003) of 4 February 2003, 1479 (2003) of 13 May 2003, 1498 (2003) of 4 August 2003, 1514 (2003) of 13 November 2003, 1527 (2004) of 4 February 2004, and the statements by its President on Côte d'Ivoire,

*Reaffirming* its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d'Ivoire, and *recalling* the importance of the principles of good neighbourliness, non-interference and regional cooperation,

*Recalling* that it endorsed the agreement signed by the Ivorian political forces in Linas-Marcoussis on 24 January 2003 (S/2003/99) (the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement) approved by the Conference of Heads of States on Côte d'Ivoire, held in Paris on 25 and 26 January 2003,

*Taking note* with satisfaction of the recent progress, in particular the return of the Forces Nouvelles to the Government, the agreement reached on the implementation of the programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the talks between the President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire and the Forces nouvelles,

*Considering* that the Ivorian parties have made the progress called for by the Secretary-General towards the steps mentioned in paragraph 86 of his report on Côte d'Ivoire of 6 January 2004 (S/2004/3), as confirmed to the Council on 4 February 2004, and *encouraging* the Ivorian parties to continue their efforts in that direction,

*Calling* on the parties and the Government of National Reconciliation to take all necessary steps to prevent further violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and to put an end to impunity,

*Reaffirming also* its resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, 1379 (2001) and 1460 (2003) on children in armed conflicts as well as its resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts,

*Welcoming* and *encouraging* efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

*Deeply concerned* by the deteriorating economic situation in Côte d'Ivoire and its serious impact on the subregion as a whole,

*Welcoming* the commitment of the African Union in supporting the process of national reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire,

*Recalling* its full support for the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and France to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and *welcoming*, in particular, the effective action taken by the ECOWAS forces in order to stabilize the country,

*Taking note* of the message addressed to the Security Council on 10 November 2003 by the President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, in which he requested the transformation of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) into a peacekeeping operation,

*Taking note* of the request made by ECOWAS to the Security Council on 24 November 2003 to establish a peace keeping operation in Côte d'Ivoire,

*Noting* that lasting stability in Côte d'Ivoire will depend on peace in the subregion, especially in Liberia, and *emphasizing* the importance of cooperation among the countries of the subregion to this end, as well as the need for co-ordination of the efforts of the United Nations Missions in the subregion to contribute to the consolidation of peace and security,

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on Côte d'Ivoire of 6 January 2004 (S/2004/3 and addenda 1 and 2),

*Taking note* of the letter of the President of the General Assembly of 8 January 2004 (S/2004/100) addressed to the President of the Security Council,

*Aware* of the persistent challenges to the stability of Côte d'Ivoire and *determining* that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to establish the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) for an initial period of 12 months as from 4 April 2004, and *requests* the Secretary-General to transfer authority from MINUCI and the ECOWAS forces to UNOCI on that date, and *decides* therefore to renew the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) until 4 April 2004;

2. *Decides* that UNOCI will comprise, in addition to the appropriate civilian, judiciary and corrections component, a military strength of a maximum of 6,240 United Nations personnel, including 200 military observers and 120 staff officers, and up to 350 civilian police officers, as required to perform the mandated tasks described in the following paragraph 6;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to encourage the United Nations missions in West Africa to share logistic and administrative support, to the extent possible, without prejudicing their operational capabilities with respect to their mandates, in order to maximize effectiveness and minimize the cost of the missions;

4. *Requests* UNOCI to carry out its mandate in close liaison with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia, including especially in the

prevention of movements of arms and combatants across shared borders and the implementation of disarmament and demobilization programmes;

5. *Reaffirms* its strong support for the Secretary-General's Special Representative and *approves* his full authority for the coordination and conduct of all the activities of the United Nations system in Côte d'Ivoire;

6. *Decides* that the mandate of UNOCI, in coordination with the French forces authorized in paragraph 16 below, shall be the following:

*Monitoring of the ceasefire and movements of armed groups*

(a) To observe and monitor the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003, and investigate violations of the ceasefire,

(b) To liaise with the National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) and the military elements of the Forces Nouvelles in order to promote, in coordination with the French forces, the re-establishment of trust between all the Ivorian forces involved, as stated in its resolution 1479 (2003),

(c) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in monitoring the borders, with particular attention to the situation of Liberian refugees and to the movement of combatants,

*Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement*

(d) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in undertaking the regrouping of all the Ivorian forces involved and to ensure the security of their cantonment sites,

(e) To help the Government of National Reconciliation implement the national programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the combatants (DDR), with special attention to the specific needs of women and children,

(f) To coordinate closely with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia in the implementation of a voluntary repatriation and resettlement programme for foreign ex-combatants, with special attention to the specific needs of women and children, in support of the efforts of the Government of National Reconciliation and in cooperation with the Governments concerned, relevant international financial institutions, international development organizations and donor nations,

(g) To ensure that the programmes mentioned in paragraphs (e) and (f) take into account the need for a regional approach,

(h) To guard weapons, ammunition and other military materiel handed over by the former combatants and to secure, neutralize or destroy such materiel,

*Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians*

(i) To protect United Nations personnel, installations and equipment, provide the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of National Reconciliation, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment,

(j) To support, in coordination with the Ivorian authorities, the provision of security for the ministers of the Government of National Reconciliation,

*Support for humanitarian assistance*

(k) To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions,

*Support for the implementation of the peace process*

(l) To facilitate, in cooperation with ECOWAS and other international partners, the re-establishment by the Government of National Reconciliation of the authority of the State throughout Côte d'Ivoire,

(m) To provide oversight, guidance and technical assistance to the Government of National Reconciliation, with the assistance of ECOWAS and other international partners, to prepare for and assist in the conduct of free, fair and transparent electoral processes linked to the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, in particular the presidential election,

*Assistance in the field of human rights*

(n) To contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire with special attention to violence committed against women and girls, and to help investigate human rights violations with a view to help ending impunity,

*Public information*

(o) To promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNOCI among local communities and the parties, through an effective public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of a United Nations radio broadcasting capability,

*Law and order*

(p) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organizations in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d'Ivoire, and to advise the Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of the internal security services,

(q) To assist the Government of National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organizations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Côte d'Ivoire,

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to give special attention to the gender and child-protection components within the staff of UNOCI;

8. *Authorizes* UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General and the Government of National Reconciliation to conclude a status-of-force agreement within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the safety of United Nations and

associated personnel, and *notes* that, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;

10. *Stresses* the importance of the complete and unconditional implementation of the measures provided for under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, and *demand*s that the parties fulfil their obligations under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement so that, in particular, the forthcoming Presidential election can be held in 2005 in accordance with the constitutional deadlines;

11. *Calls upon* all parties to cooperate fully in the deployment and operations of UNOCI, in particular by guaranteeing the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel as well as associated personnel throughout the territory of Côte d'Ivoire;

12. *Reaffirms*, in particular, the need for the Government of National Reconciliation to undertake the complete and immediate implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, including the disbanding of all armed groups, in particular the militias, the curbing of all kinds of disruptive street protests, especially of the various youth groups, and the restructuring of the armed forces and the internal security services;

13. *Urges* the international community to continue considering how it might help further economic development in Côte d'Ivoire with a view to achieving long-term stability in Côte d'Ivoire and the whole subregion;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the implementation of the mandate of UNOCI, and to report to it in this regard every three months, including a review of the troop level with a view to a phasing down in light of the progress achieved on the ground and the remaining tasks to be fulfilled;

15. *Decides* to renew until 4 April 2004 the authorization given to the French forces and ECOWAS forces through its resolution 1527 (2004);

16. *Authorizes* for a period of 12 months from 4 April 2004 the French forces to use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI in accordance with the agreement to be reached between UNOCI and the French authorities, and in particular to:

- Contribute to the general security of the area of activity of the international forces,
- Intervene at the request of UNOCI in support of its elements whose security may be threatened,
- Intervene against belligerent actions, if the security conditions so require, outside the areas directly controlled by UNOCI,
- Help to protect civilians, in the deployment areas of their units;

17. *Requests* France to continue to report to it periodically on all aspects of its mandate in Côte d'Ivoire;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

