

# THE BALLOTS AFTER THE BULLETS

MASTER THESIS

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377963

Master International Public Management and Public Policy  
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2015

Word count: 27896

An analysis of the relationship between political institutions and political inclusion in fragile and conflict-affected settings.



# Foreword

At a first glance, it would not seem to be an obvious choice: completing years of education on public administrations and public policies with a research on democracy in ‘fragile and conflict-affected settings’, where public administrations and public policies – if even present – take on forms very different from those I have studied during the years. For me, however, the choice is evident. Democracy and democratization have been important concepts in my academic development during recent years. International democratization efforts in the past decades have shown that, especially in the international arena, there is more to policy than the models and theories we have discussed: there is a need for context specificity, culture specificity and cooperation between actors from various backgrounds. To gain knowledge about these contexts, cultures and backgrounds and to build my views on this broader knowledge, is what drives me – and what has ultimately led to my decision to ‘move’ from the lecture rooms in Tilburg to the international context of master’s programme International Public Management and Public Policy in Rotterdam.

This master thesis is the icing on my cake of knowledge, which has been rising since 2009. I must admit, however, that my personal focus throughout these years has not always been within the walls of educational institutions. Personal development, student life, travelling and international and political positions within various organizations have all been significant parts of the last years for me. With finishing this thesis, I am also finishing the formal part of my education and I am looking forward to further developing myself outside of the university in the future. Through this way, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, professor Haverland, for staying patient and assisting me over the final hill of my academic education. Also, I would like to thank the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, specifically Ralph Sprenkels and Egbert Pos, for providing me with insights, contacts and feedback in the process of writing my thesis. Your contribution has been essential for this result and I am grateful to have had the opportunity to work on this project at NIMD.

Additional thanks go out to all professors and lecturers, both at Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tilburg University, who have made both my bachelor's programme and my master's programme a success and who have handed me the information to develop myself in academic terms. Special thanks to dr. Edwards, who has taken the time to review and co-assess my master thesis. Furthermore, many, many words of thanks and gratitude go out to my loved ones, friends and colleagues from different organizations who have coped with me and who have made life outside of the university a huge success as well.

Best regards,

J.S. (Jelle) van Nuland

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# 1 Overview

Inclusive democracy: an ideal which, regardless of many democratic state-building efforts, is often difficult to establish and consolidate, especially in the complex and deeply divided contexts of fragile and conflict-affected settings. This research will focus on the relationship between political institutions and political inclusion and on other, informal characteristics of political practice that define political inclusion specifically in these fragile and conflict-affected settings. It specifically focuses on Burundi and Mozambique.

In order to set the scene, in the next chapter, the problem analysis will be described. It will do so by sketching the developments in international politics as well as within the academic literature with regard to democracy and democratization efforts, introducing the alleged relationship between the types of institutions and political inclusion will be introduced and shortly focusing on the problems associated with the actual political practice in fragile and conflict-affected settings. The chapter will then question this alleged relationship and will focus on the research question for this research, as well as the theoretical and societal relevance of the research, the research design and the validity and reliability of the research.

To be able to do research on the relationship between types of institutions and political inclusion in fragile and conflict-affected settings, the concept of 'fragile and conflict-affected settings' must first be clarified. Therefore, the third chapter will focus on the elements that define the concept of 'fragile and conflict-affected settings' by describing the concept from its two components: 'fragility' and 'conflict-affectedness'.

After the concept of 'fragile and conflict-affected settings' has been described, the contexts of two actual cases of fragile and conflict-affected settings are introduced in the fourth chapter. With this, the case studies for this research are introduced. This chapter will specifically focus on the political-historical context of these two specific fragile and conflict-affected settings: the cases of Mozambique and Burundi.

The fifth chapter will be the first part of the empirical analysis of Mozambique and Burundi, focusing on the institutions within these countries, particularly the institutions that are relevant for political inclusion. This chapter will identify Lijphart's dimensions and the variables that are relevant for political inclusion within a political system. After these relevant variables have been identified, the political institutions in Mozambique and Burundi will be analysed using these variables. Using the analysis

made, the political systems of Mozambique and Burundi will be placed within Lijphart's majoritarian – consociational framework.

After the institutional analysis has been done in the sixth chapter, chapter six will focus on the analysis of political inclusion in Mozambique and Burundi. To do so, it must first be clear what is meant with 'political inclusion' and which indicators and sub-indicators can deliver data useable to analyse political inclusion in these countries. Afterwards, an analysis of political inclusion in Mozambique and Burundi will be made.

The seventh chapter will focus on the gap between formal political institutions and informal political practice and identify elements specific for fragile and conflict-affected settings which serve as explanations for the observations done. These elements provide insights in specific characteristics of political practices in these settings. The conclusion, finally, will answer the research question and place the research findings done in the context of this research's theoretical and societal relevance, providing insights and ideas for further research as well as for developing future approaches for democratization efforts in fragile and conflict-affected settings.



## 2 Towards a research question

### 2.1 Problem analysis

Establishing and consolidating democracies has, since the end of the Cold War, been a hot topic in international politics over the last decades. In general, it has become an international obligation for states to live up to some democratic standards (d'Aspremont, 2008). But going even further than this international obligation, democracy has actually become a criterion for internationally recognizing and legitimizing governments of states. According to d'Aspremont, "a new government hardly qualifies as the legitimate representative of a state if it has not been democratically elected" (2008, p. 5). Democracy, nowadays, is the international standard of government.

The reason for this lies in the appealing character of democracy as a form of government. Not only does democracy fundamentally let people speak their minds and shape their own futures, democratic systems are also, on average, richer and less corrupt than non-democratic systems (The Economist, 2014). Moreover, democratic governance is seen as a system in which plural and stable societies are protected and the peaceful coexistence of social groups is enhanced (Cogen & De Brabandere, 2007).

#### 2.1.1 Representative democracy and political parties

To understand what is meant when we speak about the efforts to establish and consolidate 'democracy', it is important to have a clear definition of the concept of democracy. Within the academic literature, a wide variety of definitions of democracy can be found, often looking at democracy from different perspectives and contexts. Procedural classifications, such as the tendency to classify systems of government as 'democratic' when there are elections, are contested by Cogen and De Brabandere (2007, p. 671), who state that the concept of democracy should not be narrowed down to simply the organization of general elections. So if democracy is something different from organizing elections, what then is democracy?

One of the most comprehensive definitions of democracy is given by Robert Dahl. In his work *On Democracy*, Robert Dahl (2000) tries to answer this question by stating that democracy, at the very least, should include political equality. According to Dahl, political equality between 'members' of the democracy, which would be citizens on the state-level, can only be guaranteed if a decision-making

process includes five standards: *effective participation of all members; equality in voting; gaining enlightened understanding; control of the agenda; and inclusion of adults* (Dahl, 2000, p. 37-38), which is of specific importance for this research. Taking this last criterium of democracy into account, the inclusion of adults in the democratic process, meaning that all adult citizens should have the full rights of citizens implied by the first four criteria, should be pursued for democracy to be developed and consolidated in fragile and conflict-affected situations. It should be considered, however, that it is unlikely that a criterium such as this can be fully achieved: the usefulness of these criteria lies in the standards they provide to live up to and to measure democratic systems (Dahl, 2000, p. 42).

Dahl's identification of these criteria says nothing about the form in which this democratic process should be established. With regard to democratic forms, the academic literature makes a distinction between direct forms and indirect, representative forms of democratic processes. Different scholars argue that democracy on a state-level is only possible through representation. In his work *Considerations on representative government*, John Stuart Mill already stated in 1861 that "since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be representative" (p. 55). Therefore, for this research, the starting point is taken that if a democratic form of governance should be developed, it must be a *representative* form of democracy.

According to Aldrich (1995), representation between principals and representative politicians can only take place effectively if this is coordinated through 'intermediary vehicles' which help to overcome collective action problems, to facilitate information flows and to simplify the range of electoral options. These necessities, he states, are provided by political parties. Reilly (2013) specifically emphasizes the important role for political parties in societies of transitional democracies. Political parties organize voters, aggregate and articulate interests and craft alternatives for policy, making them contributors to the development of democracy and democratic norms within societies in transitional democracies.

### **2.1.2 Building institutions**

In practice, the international obligation to establish and consolidate representative democracies has been translated into international policy. The United Nations has significantly expanded its assistance to democratization since the last decade of the twentieth century (Cogen & De Brabandere, 2007). 'Traditional' peacekeeping missions have over time evolved into missions which intervene in the

domestic affairs of post-conflict situations and which also include introducing and/or reconstructing institutions of democratic governance in these situations (Strasheim and Fjelde, 2014).

The efforts to introduce and/or reconstruct institutions of democratic governance can be categorized as 'state building' efforts. Fukuyama (2004) looks at these efforts from the perspective of world politics, in which the focus has mainly been on cutting back 'big governments'. According to Fukuyama, however, weak, incompetent or non-existent state institutions can lead to difficulties in developing countries. Therefore, the focus needs to be not on cutting back state institutions, but rather, building strong state institutions in developing countries.

Fukuyama (2004) makes a distinction between the 'strength' and the 'scope' of state institutions. According to Fukuyama, increasing the strength of state institutions is more important than expanding the scope. Fukuyama argues that East Asia has developed more successfully than Latin America, not because of the scopes of these countries' institutions are larger (scopes of state institutions in East Asia, according to Fukuyama, vary from very low to very high), but because these countries have stronger institutions. Fukuyama (2004) therefore calls for strengthening state institutions to facilitate economic development.

### **2.1.3 Political institutions and political inclusion**

As described earlier, the inclusion of adults, or *political inclusion*, is of large importance for democracy. Within any representative democracy, power must be dependent on the consent granted to it by the larger citizenry (Lappin, 2001). Only if all citizens are effectively included in the democratic process, or in other words, if power is divided over the larger citizenry, are they able to grant consent to power. In addition, political inclusion is specifically important because of its negative relation with conflict. According to Reynal-Querol (2001), there is a negative relationship between the inclusiveness of a political system and the probability of civil conflict being ignited. This is specifically important for fragile and conflict-affected settings as these settings have, by definition, experienced years of (political) conflict in the past and often deal with deep societal cleavages. These cleavages and the conflict-affected history can lead to the (re-)ignition of conflict in these settings, undermining democratization efforts. The facilitation of political inclusion and the diffusion of power is, therefore, essential to establish and consolidate democracy and to prevent a relapse into conflict in these settings.

However, particularly in divided societies such as in fragile and conflict-affected settings, political inclusion is often absent. Instead of focusing on a broad picture of the common good for society, ruling

political parties and actors in these settings often tend to focus on “narrow personal, regional or ethnic ties” (Reilly, 2013, p. 89), excluding other groups within society. This ‘political exclusion’ of certain groups undermines democracy in these settings, as a political system which excludes groups within society can hardly be seen as democratic in itself, or as Taylor (1998, p. 144) puts it, “it is not democratic for some citizens to be under control of others”. In addition, political exclusion, according to scholars such as Lijphart (1977), is dangerous for the development of democracy as political exclusion and inequalities between different groups in society often cause conflict and an erosion of democracy. Therefore, attention should be paid to facilitating political inclusion for the development and the consolidation of democracy, especially in fragile and conflict-affected settings. If the international community wishes to effectively establish and consolidate democratic systems through building an institutional framework in these settings, this institutional framework must facilitate political inclusion. The question then rises if there is a ‘best-practice’ institutional design which facilitates political inclusion.

For this, a closer look at forms of democratic institutions and political systems is needed. The main distinction between forms of democratic political systems is made by Lijphart (1999), who makes a distinction between ‘consensus’ or ‘consociational’ democracies, which are democracies with institutions based on negotiation and consensus, and ‘majoritarian democracies’, or democracies with institutions based on the principle of winner-takes-all. The major difference between these two institutional frameworks lies within the way that power is established within the democracy and its institutions. Where majoritarian institutions tend to emphasize differences and concentrate power to a select group, excluding losing groups, consociational institutions are able to get more people participated in governance by diffusing power, not only among various government levels, but also among different political actors and socio-cultural groups and by maximizing majorities (Lawoti, 2007). This means that, within consociational democracies, power is shared among different societal groups instead of one or few majority societal groups dominating others through a majoritarian system.

Political inclusion is therefore, according to theory, greater in democracies with an accommodative, consociational institutional framework than in democracies with majoritarian institutions. Lijphart (1999) also states that consociational democracies tend to score higher in general terms of democratic quality. Lawoti (2007) further states, based on findings done in established democracies, that without the accommodative consociational institutions that are present in established, culturally heterogeneous democracies, different groups within these societies would be excluded and democracy would not have become established in these situations at all. In other words: empirical data shows that consociational institutions are required in order to establish and consolidate

democracy. This logic is extended by the statement that if consociational institutions are adopted in new and developing democracies, this will lead to (a larger degree of) political inclusion and, thus, the establishment and consolidation of democracy in the long run. It can thus be stated that this theory sees consociational institutional frameworks as 'best-practices' for the establishment of democracy.

#### **2.1.4 The practice in fragile and conflict-affected settings**

Summing up: throughout the last decades, efforts have been made to establish representative democracies, mainly through building democratic institutions following the state-building approach. As political exclusion undermines these efforts, it is of vital importance for the establishment and consolidation of democracy to focus these institutions on facilitating political inclusion, specifically in fragile and conflict-affected settings. According to theory, consociational institutions perform better in this regard than majoritarian institutions.

It is interesting to test this theory and the alleged causal relationship between the type of political institutional framework and political inclusion in the context of fragile and conflict-affected settings, as the theory is based on empirical findings from established democracies. The question is whether the theory also holds in fragile and conflict-affected situations. In fact, recent developments in several fragile and conflict-affected settings have shown that the theory possibly does not hold. Political parties and government elite operating within frameworks of consociational institutions in these countries have shown characteristics of political exclusion. Such developments are dangerous within deeply divided societies, not only because political inclusion is a central component of any democratic system (Dahl, 2000), but also because political exclusion is often a cause for conflict and erosion of democracy (Lijphart, 1977), undermining the efforts to establish democracy and peace in these fragile and conflict-affected situations.

The question is, therefore, whether efforts to build formal political institutions really provide for the demand for political inclusion in these settings, or whether factors outside of the institutional framework play (more) important roles. This research will test whether the alleged causal relationship between formal institutional frameworks and political inclusion holds in different fragile and conflict-affected settings and, possibly, what other 'informal' factors play a role with regard to political inclusion or political exclusion in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

## 2.2 Research question

The problem analysis described above leads to the following research question:

What is, in practice, the relationship between political institutions, seen from a majoritarian – consociational framework, and political inclusion in fragile and conflict-affected settings?

## 2.3 Research strategy, validity and reliability

As described above, this research focuses on the relationship between institutional frameworks and political inclusion in the specific cases of fragile and conflict-affected settings. However, a research on all fragile and conflict-affected settings, or settings complying with the criteria discussed later in this research, would imply a research on the political systems and political realities of dozens of countries. As this would be infeasible, two specific cases of fragile and conflict-affected settings are selected: Mozambique and Burundi. With this, this research uses the research strategy of 'case studies', placing the findings from these case studies in a broader context of 'fragile and conflict-affected settings'.

These cases of Mozambique and Burundi are selected because of both their similarities as well as their differences. Mozambique and Burundi are both sub-Saharan African 'fragile and conflict-affected settings', according to the definition described later in this research, both with a turbulent history of conflict during recent decades. However, today's political systems in both countries include important differences in terms of political institutions. Therefore, the two countries share some constant variables in terms of context, fragility and conflict-affectedness, but are different in terms of the independent variables of political institutions.

From these cases, information will be gathered on political systems as well as on political inclusion. For this, three methods of data collection are used jointly: conducting a literature study, conducting a meta-analysis and conducting interviews. By conducting a literature study, the (political) contexts of both Mozambique and Burundi can be sketched and can be placed in the context of fragile and conflict-affected settings in general. The meta-analysis, on the other hand, provides specific insights from earlier research which can be re-used for this research. Examples of these earlier researches are the United Nations Human Development Index, the Democracy Index and the Freedom in the World index, which provide statistics and insights on the political reality in both countries. Together, the literature study and meta-analysis methods provide some generic, distant and more abstract data on the cases studied.

Conducting interviews, on the other hand, provides this research with more first-hand information based on experiences and actual stories from the cases studied. The interviews are conducted personally, based on a topic list. The documentation of these interviews are included in the appendix of this research. In order to ensure that the internal validity of this research is guaranteed, the principle of triangulation is used in selecting respondents for these interviews. For both the case study of Mozambique as well as the case study of Burundi, two respondents are selected: one respondent with a more distant and academic view on politics in the country and one respondent with a more closely

related, active role in the political system in the country. This way, information on the political system and political inclusion in these countries is gathered from both distant and more passive perspectives, as well as from more first-hand involved and active perspectives.

Throughout conducting the research, the research findings are constantly checked with experts familiar with the topic and with the cases studied. This expert consensual validation is mainly done within the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, an institute focussing on political party assistance in transitional democracies and with specific expertise on politics, political systems and inclusive democracies in these settings. The data gathered, the conclusions drawn and the eventual research findings are discussed with experts specifically on fragile and conflict-affected settings within this institute. In addition, some of the respondents are requested to discuss the conclusions drawn. This way, the data and conclusions on which this research is built are validated.

Furthermore, the research question focuses on ‘fragile and conflict-affected settings’, which means that the research findings are to be valid not only for the specific case studies of Mozambique and Burundi, but also for other fragile and conflict-affected settings. Conducting a qualitative research on the broad subject of ‘fragile and conflict-affected settings’ and, specifically, on case studies, poses several challenges in terms of transferability and generalization of the research. Although the defining factors of ‘fragile and conflict-affected settings’ discussed later in this research do provide some constant variables which must be present in a setting for it to be ‘fragile and conflict-affected’, the research findings done in each of these settings are also dependent on the setting’s specific context, history and current political situation which may be very different from those of other fragile and conflict-affected settings. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize the findings done in Mozambique and Burundi to be valid for all fragile and conflict-affected settings. However, the eventual conclusions and characteristics that are specific for these settings are not only based on research findings done in the specific contexts of both Burundi and Mozambique, but are also based on more general academic literature on fragile and conflict-affected settings and are related to the general, shared criteria for fragile and conflict-affected settings. Therefore, the eventual findings done in this research may very well apply to other fragile and conflict-affected settings which fulfil these criteria, although further research may need to prove this to be true.



### 3 Defining fragile and conflict-affected settings

To study cases of fragile and conflict-affected settings, it must first be clear what this term means and what elements distinguish fragile and conflict-affected settings from other developing countries. This chapter therefore focuses on the two-fold definition of ‘fragile and conflict-affected settings’.

Within the academic literature, there is no broadly accepted and comprehensive definition of fragile and conflict-affected situations. We can define, however, at least two aspects of fragile and conflict-affected situations: 1) fragility of the state and 2) a conflict which has affected the setting.

#### 3.1 ‘Fragile’ ...

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has defined states as being ‘fragile’ when they are:

- “unable to meet its population’s expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process”

(OECD/DAC, 2008)

This is a broad definition, as the specific expectations and the specific contexts in which fragility takes place are different in each situation and are dependent on historical, cultural and other factors that determine the relationship between state and society. Also, states cannot simply be categorized as ‘fragile’ or ‘non-fragile’. Instead, fragility must be considered as a matter of degree (Carment e.a., 2013).

In general, however, we can speak of fragile situations when there is a disequilibrium within the social contract between the expectations of society and the state capacity to meet these expectations, as briefly stated in the definition of fragility described above. Examples of these expectations are what Keefer (2007) calls ‘non-targeted goods’, such as universal education, secure property rights and access to information or transparency. Several interacting factors play a role in this social contract: the *expectations* of a state that exist within society, the *state capacity* to provide necessary services and the *elite will* to direct the resources and capacities of the state to live up to the expectations. The relationship between state and society is mediated by an existing *political process*. Finally, *legitimacy*

plays an important role in the dynamics of the social contract, shaping the factors mentioned above and facilitating the political process (OECD/DAC, 2008). These five factors can thus all be important causal factors of fragility.

### 3.2 and 'conflict-affected'

The operational definition described above has only focused on the aspect of fragility within the state, but does not elaborate on conflict. As this research focuses on fragile and conflict-affected settings, however, the selected units of analysis must not only be fragile, but also affected by conflict.

For this, a definition of 'conflict' which can be used to determine whether a country or setting is 'conflict-affected' must be taken into account. Conflict is a broad term, often dealing with different interests, and can be subdivided into different forms. If the requirement for conflict would be the presence of different conflicting interests for situation being 'conflict-affected', this would be too broad and practically any country or political system would qualify, as politics is often about different interests. Therefore, this research defines 'conflict-affected' specifically as being affected by an *armed conflict*.

To be able to distinguish whether a country or setting is affected by an armed conflict, it must first be understood when a conflict is an 'armed conflict'. The Use of Force Committee of the International Law Association has found that there is no widely accepted, general definition of an 'armed conflict' found in treaties or law, but that there are two elements common to all treaties, general principles and judicial decisions of international law, as well as to the writing of scholars, with regard to armed conflicts. These elements are:

- 1) The existence of organized armed groups;
  - 2) engaged in fighting of some intensity
- (International Law Association, 2008, p. 1-2)

It can thus be stated that for a country or setting to be 'conflict-affected', there must have been an armed conflict in the country or setting, existing of organized armed groups engaged in fighting.

Countries, or settings, that deal with a history of conflict are often "incredibly ill-equipped to undertake a democratic transition" (Lappin, 2001, p. 181). According to Lappin, these settings are characterized by a lack of experienced individuals in terms of democratic practices, but also by collapsed infrastructure and institutions, as well as a collapse of law and order. In other words: conflict-affectedness and state fragility are strongly correlated to one another, leading to settings which are 'fragile and conflict-affected'.

### 3.3 Peace agreements

In order to select cases for this research, the variables described above form two selection criteria. However, as introduced in the second chapter, this research will study fragile and conflict-affected settings which have some kind of democratic institutional framework set up. Often, these institutional arrangements are negotiated after conflict and are established through a democratic constitution based on a peace agreement.

In many settings, armed conflicts are ended by peace agreements. These peace agreements often include institutional arrangements, providing the basis for the institutional framework and the political system dominant in the country and, therefore, determinant for the countries' organization of politics after the conflict. Since these institutional arrangements are a result of post-conflict negotiations, the reasons for conflict and the dynamics of the conflict can be of large influence on the post-conflict institutions and political system. Therefore, the presence of a peace agreement in which institutional arrangements are included (and on which the formal constitutional arrangements are based) makes politics and the political system specifically 'conflict-affected'.

With this, the requirements for a country to be 'fragile and conflict-affected' have been sketched. The next parts will take a look at the political contexts and history of Mozambique and Burundi, which will show that these countries can, indeed, be classified as 'fragile and conflict-affected settings'.

<b>Constant variables for selected fragile and conflict-affected settings:</b>	
Z <sub>1</sub>	Fragility
Z <sub>2</sub>	Conflict-affected: armed conflict
Z <sub>3</sub>	Presence of a peace agreement

## 4 Contexts of conflict: the cases of Mozambique and Burundi

This chapter will take a closer look at the contexts of the research objects for this research: Mozambique and Burundi. These countries are selected because of both their similarities and their differences. Both countries are sub-Saharan African countries and both can be categorized as 'fragile and conflict-affected settings' using the definition described in the former chapter. However, the countries have very different political institutional frameworks, making it interesting to compare these countries to one another.

The chapter will sketch the contexts of conflict, peace and democracy in both Mozambique and Burundi by taking a closer look at the political history of both countries.

### 4.1 Conflict, peace and democracy in Mozambique

In its 40 years of independent history, Mozambique, a country along Africa's Indian Ocean coastal line, has been struck by both internal and external conflicts. The history of conflict has had a serious impact on the everyday life of the more than 24 million inhabitants of the country and on the eventual development of the current political system. From 1951 until its independence in 1975, Mozambique was one of Portugal's overseas provinces. During this time, it was mostly poor people from Portugal who settled these lands. Everyday life for Mozambicans took place under a regime similar to the 'apartheid' regime: the white Portuguese took lands, jobs, health care and education, while the 'original' black Mozambicans were excluded from all these opportunities and services (Van den Bergh, 2009).

The feeling of exclusion among Mozambicans led to the rising of a liberation movement, called '*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*', in short Frelimo. The new liberation movement was a union of several earlier smaller liberation movements, united by Eduardo Mondlane in 1962 (Rupiya, 2008) and making Frelimo the sole liberation movement in Mozambique (Van den Bergh, 2009). The rising of this movement mirrored similar developments in other Portuguese colonies on the African continent, namely Guinea-Bissau and Angola (Van den Bergh, 2009). It was Frelimo's goal to achieve independence for Mozambique, from the belief that justice and equality could be achieved not only for the white Portuguese, but for the whole population (Van den Bergh, 2009).

The rising of Frelimo and the struggle for independence of Mozambique eventually led to a long and intense colonial war between Portugal and independence fighters in Mozambique, launched in 1964 with the aid of African, Arab, Eastern European and Chinese aid (Rupiya, 2008). Portugal, on the other hand, was supported by the United States and European nations. The position of West European nations and the United States towards this conflict changed in the 1970's towards supporting Mozambican independence, mainly due to solidarity movements (Van den Bergh, 2009). In 1974, after Carnation Revolution in Portugal, the colonizing country became a democracy and its colonies became independent. Mozambique formally gained its *de jure* independence on 7 September 1974, when the Lusaka Accord was signed, ending colonial rule and handing over the authority in Mozambique to a transitional government led by Frelimo (Rupiya, 2008). The *de facto* independence for Mozambique came in 1975, when Mozambique's first president, Samora Machel, took office. At this point, however, the country was extremely fragile: physical infrastructure was lacking, 90 per cent of the country's population was illiterate and with the fleeing of the Portuguese professional class, Mozambique was in the hands of inexperienced Frelimo rulers (Rupiya, 2008).

During the colonial war with Portugal, Frelimo had received aid from the independent government in Tanzania. As Frelimo now formed the government of Mozambique, it was looking to help other struggles in the region as well. Due to this, the Mozambican government decided to support the liberation movements in South Africa (ANC) and Rhodesia (ZANU). The white governments of these countries saw this as a threat and Mozambique's first external conflict was born (Van den Bergh, 2009). After Mozambique had applied United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia by cutting traffic through the Mozambican port of Beira, Rhodesia attacked Mozambique in its border province.

Important about this conflict was the rising of an opposition movement. The Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) of Rhodesia, under the head of Ken Flowers, founded the Mozambican Resistance Movement (MNR) in 1977 (Rupiya, 2008). This movement, later renamed to '*Resistencia Nacional de Mocambique*' or, in short, Renamo, formed the main opposition group towards the Mozambican Frelimo government. Renamo consisted of black Mozambican soldiers who had formerly been part of the Portuguese military under colonial rule, and who had fled after Mozambique became independent (Van den Bergh, 2009). After Rhodesia became the independent country of Zimbabwe, Rhodesian support for Renamo stopped. However, after one year of quietness, Renamo was relocated to South Africa. The South African government supported this movement because Mozambique, as an independent country under the rule of a 'black' government, simply had to fail in the eyes of this regime (Morier-Genoud, 2009). In addition, South Africa found itself supported by the United States' Reagan administration, which promoted the Cold War fight against socialist states such as

Mozambique. The country of Mozambique was particularly strategic in this anti-socialist struggle, because it was an example of a country which had actually achieved internationally recognized successes during its first years of independence (Van den Bergh, 2009). The move from Rhodesia to South Africa severely changed the nature of Renamo: the Rhodesian CIO had used Renamo as an intelligence unit to gain information on Rhodesian liberation movement, but while based in South Africa, Renamo became a Mozambican organization used for terrorism, disruption and destruction of the Mozambican government. This transformation created the basis for years of intense internal civil conflict (Van den Bergh, 2009).

After Frelimo came to power in Mozambique in 1974, it transformed from a liberation movement to a political party. Frelimo focused on national unity in Mozambique and did so by consolidating one-party rule and limiting opposition. In fact, opposition leaders and Frelimo dissidents were sent to 're-education' camps in the north of Mozambique (Rupiya, 2008). This way, Frelimo established single-party control over Mozambique, creating a state structure in which it could implement its own ideas and ideology, mainly a Marxist-Leninist ideology. In ruling over Mozambique, Frelimo followed a moderate African version of the socialist model inspired by the East Bloc on the European continent, in which it tried to provide access to services and food for every Mozambican citizen (Van den Bergh, 2009, p. 15). The mission of Frelimo was 'to lead, organize, orientate, and educate the masses, thus transforming the popular mass movement into a powerful instrument for the destruction of capitalism and the construction of socialism' (Rupiya, 2008).

The socialist rule of Frelimo found resistance, however, on three fronts. First, in an international Cold War context, Western and Arab countries opposed the socialist Mozambican government. On a regional scale, Rhodesia initiated a war, as explained earlier, to destabilize Mozambique, which was later supported by the government of South Africa. On a national scale, the socialist ideas of the Frelimo government found resistance internally. Particularly within certain social groups, such as religious organizations, traders and traditional leaders, as well within regions of Mozambique which had been oppressed by the Frelimo regime, opposition against the government's rule and Renamo's support raised. By the mid 1980's, all these fronts coalesced to turn acts of aggression into a civil war (Morier-Genoud, 2009).

The leader of the Renamo opposition movement, Afonso Dhlakama, used strategies of launching attacks not only on government targets, but also on civilian targets such as villages, schools and hospitals (Van den Bergh, 2009). These targets were seen as legitimate targets by the opposition movement because of its strategy to force people to withdraw support from the Frelimo government. Choosing to travel in government-facilitated *coluna's*, as well as choosing to lie in government hospitals

and being educated in government schools, was seen as 'choosing sides' by the Renamo movement. The purpose of these attacks was to stop travel, bring the economy to a stop and preventing the use of services provided by the Frelimo government in order to raise opposition towards the ruling government. However, towards the end of the conflict, these strategic aims were no longer part of the Renamo attacks: it basically came down to 'Mozambicans killing Mozambicans' (Van den Bergh, 2009, p. 18).

In 1984, the presidents of Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord (Rupiya, 2008) with the aim of stopping support for each other's internal foes and ending the conflict between Mozambique's Frelimo government and the Renamo opposition. According to this accord, Mozambique would end its logistic support for the South African liberation movement ANC, while South Africa would end its support for Renamo. While Mozambique ended its logistic support for the ANC, South Africa only reduced, but did not end its support for Renamo (Van den Bergh, 2009). In fact, immediately after signing the accord, the South African government provided Renamo bases in Mozambique with airlifted supplies (Rupiya, 2008). South African support did decrease, however, which meant that Renamo needed a strategic re-orientation: instead of focusing on South African supplies, it needed to focus on supplies from the domestic population. The conflict continued and the Mozambican Armed Forces often had no chance: by 1986, Renamo had gained effective control over large parts of the country (Rupiya, 2008).

During the mid-1980s, Renamo established a political wing, although it did not consolidate its political structures until its first party congress in 1989. The Renamo political wing was characterized by politicians who were well-trained, working together with Renamo-leader Afonso Dhlakama. Also, the Renamo leadership during these years became ethnically heterogenous, which put aside claims that Renamo was an ethnic movement (Ostheimer, 1999).

The Frelimo regime in Mozambique became aware that its support in the country had been eroding (Van den Bergh, 2009). From 1981, the regime had therefore been trying to reform some of the elements of its regime that caused resistance, such as negotiating the peace treaty with South Africa as discussed earlier, but also abandoning the regime's attacks on religion and authorizing the operation of traders within Mozambique (Morier-Genoud, 2009). The reforms went even further during the mid-1980's, when president Samora Machel started making a shift in the regime's ideology: he moved it away from the socialist regimes and moved towards Western countries (Morier-Genoud, 2009). While returning from a conference in Zambia, president Machel was killed in a plane crash. His successor, Joaquim Chissano, took the office of presidency in Mozambique and continued the reforms and re-orientation that his predecessor had started. In 1986, Chissano signed an agreement with the IMF and

the World Bank. The hope was that, if these reforms would be implemented, peace would be restored and the economy would be revitalized (Morier-Genoud, 2009).

This did not succeed, however, as the internal conflict between Renamo and Frelimo went on. In fact, according to Morier-Genoud (2009), the social and political crisis deepened due to the measures taken. Eventually, the crisis was so deep that the Frelimo regime decided in the late-1980's that a shift towards political and economic liberalism was needed, turning its back towards its original socialistic ideology. The decision was made "to embrace what it could no longer oppose" (Morier-Genoud, 2009, p. 155). Embracing liberal democratic and free-market ideas was the only way for Frelimo to stay in power, called the strategy of 'preservation through transformation' (Pitcher, 2002). It was at its fifth party congress in 1989 where the Frelimo regime decided to definitely abandon socialism and move towards a liberal-democratic political and economic system (Morier-Genoud, 2009, p. 153). At this congress, the principle of negotiations with Renamo was also accepted (Rupiya, 2009, p. 14). These reforms not only paved the way for peace in Mozambique, but also for a liberal-democratic system as opposed to the socialist system Frelimo had set up during the late-1970's.

The planned reforms by the Frelimo regime were translated into a constitutional reform between 1989 and 1990. Elements such as a separation of powers, freedom of association and an opening of the way for multiparty democracy were included in a constitution (Hall & Young, 1991) that formerly contained centralized power and socialist principles. This was also a strategic move: by creating a liberal constitution, Frelimo could disprove all the Renamo claims that Renamo was the party fighting for democracy (Morier-Genoud, 2009, p. 155). At the same time, outside of these internal transitions, the Cold War was coming to an end and South Africa was in its own process of democratization (Van den Bergh, 2009), both of which had severe impact on the support for Renamo.

By 1992, more than one million people had died and more than five million had sought refuge due to the conflict between Frelimo and Renamo (Van den Bergh, 2009), but finally, the conflict was de-escalating, Frelimo had made moves towards negotiation, Renamo was losing ground and while doing so, the country was making a shift towards peace and democracy.

In July 1990, Frelimo and Renamo both participated in negotiations in Rome, Italy. The negotiation talks were facilitated by the Sant Egidio Catholic community, a community which both conflicting parties trusted (Rupiya, 2008). The negotiations between both conflicting parties were far from simple. However, although there was a sense of deep distrust and abiding between both parties, there was a will to negotiate and a strong commitment to dialogue within both parties. This was shown by



the fact that neither of the two negotiating sides replaced any of its members during the 2 years it took to reach an agreement (Van den Bergh, 2009).

For a long time during the negotiation process, Frelimo and Renamo seemed to be stuck in a deadlock. Mutual distrust and attempts to win exclusive political legitimacy by both parties caused serious problems for the negotiation process. Even on the last day, Renamo-leader Dhlakama threatened not to sign the final accord (Gentili, 2013). However, eventually on October 4<sup>th</sup>, 1992, after ten rounds of negotiations, the Rome General Peace Accords were signed. The signing of these Rome General Peace Accords not only restored peace in a country torn apart by severe internal conflict, but also initiated a period of peace and the development of liberalism in social, economic and political contexts. According to Morier-Genoud (2009, p. 153), “almost everything changed in Mozambique in the 1990s”. Although the country was in ruins, the economy grew at a pace of about 7 to 8 per cent per year and the country became an interesting destination for foreign investment. The IMF and the World Bank saw the country as an African success story (BBC, 25 March 2013). The peace process in Mozambique was in fact highly unusual, as there were no trials and there was no truth commission installed. The mentality within the country was to “forgive, not forget” (Van den Bergh, 2009, p. 9).

A strictly presidential system was implemented in Mozambique, in which a popularly elected president obtained legislative powers as well as the power to nominate his cabinet, the heads of judiciary, universities and provinces, as well as (Cahen, 1990; Lala & Ostheimer, 2003). The unicameral Parliament of Mozambique would be chosen in multiparty elections by proportional representation, with a 5% threshold. This, in combination with the strictly presidential system, created a political environment which would be dominated by the party winning the elections. In the years to come, Frelimo would win every subsequent election until today, therefore dominating the Mozambican political scene.

The year 1994 was marked by the first multiparty elections in Mozambique. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, head of Frelimo, was elected president over the contesting Afonso Dhlakama of Renamo. The first Mozambican elections produced a high turnout (88 per cent of the registered voters) and were relatively peaceful. By winning the elections, the Frelimo elite managed to hold on to power in Mozambique and the party retained parts of the party structure and ideology. The party abandoned socialism, but kept its ideology of democratic centralism, nationalism and the idea that Frelimo represents the entire nation (Morier-Genoud, 2009). This upholding of parts of Frelimo’s traditional ideology caused resistance in Mozambique. Many opposition parties tried to influence Mozambican politics, but only a few were able to pass the threshold of 5 per cent (Morier-Genoud, 2009). Because of the conflict, Frelimo and Renamo were familiar names in Mozambique, but the small parties were

unknown and lacked experience and a support base (Van den Bergh, 2009). Therefore, small opposition parties have not been able to break the Frelimo rule over the country.

The 1998 local elections were boycotted by opposition parties. These elections had a turnout of only 14.58 per cent, although the elections were still recognized as valid by the European Union (Braathen & Orre, 2001). Although this was a major setback for democratic development of Mozambique, the Rome General Peace Accords are generally seen as successful because it has accomplished what is was meant for: to end war and stabilize the country (Gentili, 2013). In addition, elections are being held regularly in Mozambique.

Recently, however, peace and stability in Mozambique has come under pressure. Renamo-leader Dhlakama left for 'the bush' in 2013, claiming that the power over the Mozambican state was being occupied by Frelimo and that the Rome General Peace Accords should be renegotiated. Dhlakama threatened to resume war (Gentili, 2013) and, indeed, launched some attacks against government targets in recent years. Eventually, Renamo and the ruling party Frelimo negotiated and signed an agreement before the 2014 elections, in which Renamo promised not to return to the bush again. Instead, Renamo is now using strategies of civil disobedience to oppose the Frelimo government. The party refuses to recognize the results of the 2014 elections, which were won by Frelimo (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2014). The mixed signals of growing distrust between Frelimo and Renamo and the Renamo preference for power-sharing methods outside of Parliament (Siteo, Matsimbe & Pereira, 2005) are causes for serious concern for the future of democracy in Mozambique.

## 4.2 Conflict, peace and democracy in Burundi

The country of Burundi has a troubled recent history of conflict. Burundi, similar to its neighbouring country Rwanda, is infamous for years of severe ethnic struggle during the past decades between the Hutu ethnicity, forming the majority of Burundi's population, and the traditionally ruling Tutsi minority. The conflicts and deep ethnic cleavages between these groups still shape the political system of Burundi today.

In 1962, Burundi attained its independence from Belgium. In the years after independence, since 1966, Burundi was ruled by military Tutsi rulers originating from the south of the country. Under the flag of the 'L'Union pour le Progrès National' (Uprona), these rulers initially had an agenda based on nationalism, but eventually developed into promoting mainly Tutsi interests. Ethnic tensions led to a

alleged Hutu coup in 1972, which was reprised by a 'partial genocide' by the army of the ruling Tutsi elite, resulting in the killing of 200.000 Burundians and 300.00 refugees (Vorrath, 2009).

Ethnic tensions continued in Burundi and in September 1987, Pierre Buyoya came into power after overthrowing the military regime under Jean-Baptiste Bagaza in a coup d'état. As Buyoya was a Hutu from the south of Burundi, like his predecessors, the grasping of power by Buyoya gave reason to believe that the political power in Burundi would stay in the hand of Tutsi elite, leading to struggles to obtain or maintain power in the country based on ethnic and regional cleavages (Vandenginste, 2009). Indeed, Buyoya's army ruthlessly suppressed a Hutu uprising in 1988. However, this time, the massacre was condemned by the government's international partners, forcing president Buyoya to liberalize politics in Burundi and to share power with different groups within society. Political reconciliation and inclusiveness of all groups were part of Buyoya's new liberalization policies, although it would take some more years for democracy to be established in the country (Vandenginste, 2009).

In 1988 a focus on national unity led to Buyoya installing a National Commission on this topic, including an equal number of Hutus and Tutsis. In addition, Buyoya installed power-sharing mechanisms in the government by including an equal number of Hutus and Tutsis, led by a Hutu prime minister, into government: efforts to resolve injustices from the past and to build lasting peace in the country (Vandenginste, 2009).

The year 1993 was marked by the first multiparty elections, replacing the "gun" of the monarchy and the "drum" of the military regime by the "ballot box" of democracy (Vandenginste, 2009). The winner of these elections was the Frodebu party, originated by Hutus in exile and registered as a political party in 1992. Melchior Ndadaye, leader of Frodebu, replaced Buyoya and his Tutsi-dominated Uprona party as president of Burundi, after an overwhelming victory in the country's elections: he attained 65 per cent of the votes in the presidential election and his party, Frodebu, attained 80% of the seats in Parliament, reflecting the social composition of the country (Vorrath, 2009). Under the new president, the first consociational arrangements were applied in Burundi, with the introduction of representation of both dominant ethnic groups in Burundi at the highest level of the country's government and the introduction of measures to compensate the Tutsi minority (Vorrath, 2009).

Ndadaye would not be in power for long, however, as he was assassinated in October of 1993 in a failed attempt to overthrow Ndadaye's government (Vandenginste, 2009). The scene was set for year of ethnic struggle in Burundi, from 1994 onwards. The immediate aftermath of the coup, many thousands of civilians were killed and even hundreds of thousands displaced or being forced into exile (Vandenginste, 2009). The new Hutu president of Burundi was killed in a plane crash when his plane,

along with the president and prime minister of Rwanda, was shot down in 1994. In Rwanda, this led to the infamous massacre, killing over hundreds of thousands Rwandan citizens.

The violence of ethnic conflict in Buundo led to the negotiation of a new agreement in the 1994 Convention of Government. In this new agreement, 55 per cent of the government positions was guaranteed for Frodebu versus 45% for opposition parties. In addition, Sylvestre Ntibantungaya (Frodebu) was elected as the next president. The new agreement, however, did not deal with reforms of the military, which was still dominated by the Tutsi minority (Vorrath, 2009). Violence therefore continued and in 1996, Pierre Buyoya retained power over Burundi's government after a coup (Vorrath, 2009).

Peace negotiations started again between September 1997 and June 1998, when the government of president Buyoya negotiated in a 'political partnership' with Frodebu. These negotiations moved to Arusha, Tanzania, in 1998, where larger peace negotiations were held (Vorrath, 2009). Some ten negotiation rounds were organized in Arusha in some two years' time, facilitated by South African president Nelson Mandela from 1999 onward, who has had a large impact on the consociational outcome of the negotiations. The negotiation led to the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000 by 17 political parties, divided into a predominantly Hutu and a predominantly Tutsi group (Vandenginste, 2009). However, two of the larger rebel groups, CNDD FDD (created in exile) and Palipehutu-FNL did not lay down their arms until 2003 and 2006 respectively (Vorrath, 2009), and were therefore not included in the negotiation process of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

The Arusha Peace Agreement had a strongly consociational character with many power-sharing arrangements included. According to the agreement, the president of Burundi was to be assisted by two Vice-presidents, each belonging to different ethnicities and political parties. Political parties, however, were not to be established on the basis of ethnic or regional differences and, additionally, each of the political parties' lists were to reflect the diversity of Burundian society in terms of ethnicity and gender. The Arusha Peace Agreement also included ethnicity and gender rules and quota for the composition of government, the appointment of different minister posts and the composition of the Senate, combined with the requirement of a 2/3 qualified majority in Parliament in order to pass legislation, forcing the majority of Hutu members of Parliament to seek alliances with members of Parliament with other ethnic backgrounds (Vandenginste, 2009).

The consociational agreements of the Arusha Peace Agreement formed the basis of the current Constitution of the Republic of Burundi, which was signed in 2005. Many of the consociational features that make up the Burundian political system today have their roots in the peace process towards the

signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement. The constitution, however, also features some additional power-sharing arrangements, such as ethnic and gender quota for the composition of the National Assembly (Parliament), which were not included in the Arusha Peace Agreement (Vandenginste, 2009). With this, the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi includes instruments, such as quota and the over-representation of minorities, in order to combine majority rule with minority protection and create a formal institutional framework with a power-sharing character. As compared to the elections in 1993 and the aftermath of these elections, the political landscape under the new constitution of Burundi is much more multipolar, includes a much more constructive and less radical approach by the political class and civil society and a more distant stance of the military from politics (Reyntjes, 2005). Today, Burundi is more peaceful than it has been during recent decades and has implemented Lijphart's 'consociational formula' of power-sharing mechanisms into its political system. Because of this, political competition in Burundi no longer evolves around ethnic conflicts and cleavages and both ethnicities are included within the ruling CNDD FDD party, within the Parliament as well as within the government (Vandenginste, 2009). However, the country has recently been experiencing quite some problems in terms of political inclusion. Mainly due to an electoral boycott by almost all opposition parties, the mechanisms of the Arusha Agreement have been replaced by a de facto one-party system (International Crisis Group, 2012) in which the ruling party, CNDD FDD, exercises control over the Parliament as well as over the executive government. Because of this control, the power-sharing mechanisms provided by the constitution have become largely irrelevant. In addition, there has been a lack of dialogue between the governing party and the opposition parties since the 2010 electoral boycott, as well as a lack of respect for political minorities and for the rule of law that are included in the country's constitution (International Crisis Group, 2012). A look at the 2012 Democracy Index (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012) and the 2015 Freedom in the World index (Freedom House, 2015) shows a significant drop in terms of the quality of democracy and the establishment of political rights and civil liberties in the country during recent years, which has even led to Burundi being classified as an 'authoritarian regime' (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012). In addition, there have been reports of opposition forces renouncing violence and regrouping, as well as attacks on towns and villages in the country (Economist, 2012).

The history of Burundi shows significant progress from a country being strongly divided and being struck by severe ethnic conflict, to the implementation of power-sharing arrangements and the introduction of consociational democracy. However, even though power-sharing, consociational institutions are in place, the recent developments and political practice in the country is alarming for the future of democracy in Burundi.

## 5 Analysing institutions: majoritarian and consociational institutions in Mozambique and Burundi

After the former chapters have introduced and clarified the theory and concepts of this research, as well as introduced the fragile and conflict-affected contexts of Mozambique and Burundi, this chapter will focus on analysing the formal institutions in Mozambique and Burundi from a majoritarian – consociational framework. For this, first of all, the majoritarian – consociational framework will be described and the variables of this framework which are relevant for political inclusion will be identified and elaborated on. Afterwards, an analysis of these variables will be made in both Mozambique and Burundi, after which the formal institutions examined in these countries will be placed in the majoritarian-consensus framework.

### 5.1 Lijphart's majoritarian – consociational framework

In his work *Patterns of Democracy*, Arend Lijphart (1999) makes a distinction between two forms of political institutions found within established democracies: consociational forms and majoritarian forms. He distinguishes two different dimensions in which the forms of political institutions in consociational democracies and in majoritarian democracies differ from each other: the executive-parties dimension and the federal-unitary dimension.

The executive-parties dimension that Lijphart (1999) distinguishes focuses mainly on structures that determine how easy it is for a single party to grasp power and control the government and the extent to which other parties are included. It thus focuses on institutions such as the way power is concentrated and the number of competing parties present within a democracy. Within the executive-parties dimension, Lijphart distinguishes five variables through which a democracy can be characterized as majoritarian or consociational:

Variables	Majoritarian institutions	Consociational institutions
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Party system	Two-party system	Multiparty system
Cabinets and grand coalitions	Concentration of executive power in single-party majority (minimum winning coalition) cabinets	Executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions
Executive – legislative balance	Presidentialism: the executive is dominant over the legislature	Parliamentarism: a legislative-executive balance of power
Electoral system	Pluralistic first-past-the-post electoral rules	Proportional representation
Interest groups	Pluralistic interest group system	Corporatist interest group system

The second dimension distinguished by Lijphart (1999) is the federal-unitary dimension. This dimension focuses mainly on the extent to which governing parties and actors, once they have grasped power, are able to change policy and structures that protect (or do not protect) minority rights. As within the executive-parties dimension, Lijphart also distinguished 5 variables within the federal-unitary dimension through which democracies can be classified as majoritarian or consociational:

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Majoritarian institutions</b>	<b>Consociational institutions</b>
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Unitary or federal system	Centralization of power through a unitary system	(Guaranteed) division of power through a federal system
Unicameral or bicameral legislative	Unicameral	Bicameral
Constitution	Flexible, easily-amended (or non-existent) constitution	Rigid, supermajority-amended constitution
Constitutional review	Legislative determines constitutionality of its own legislation	Judicial constitutional review of legislation by an independent court
Central Bank	Executive control of Central Bank	Independence of Central Bank

## 5.2 Variables relevant for political inclusion

Lijphart uses the variables listed above to analyse the political institutions of thirty-six established democracies and to place these democracies on the scale from majoritarian to consociational. For this research, a similar analysis will be made, examining several fragile- and conflict-affected institutions on the basis of the dimensions and institutions sketched above and will be classified as '(mostly) majoritarian' or '(mostly) consociational' institutions. However, this research does not aim to classify political systems in general, but aims to specifically focus on institutions which are relevant and dependent for political inclusion. Therefore, specifically the institutions which deal with 'political inclusion' must be taken into account.

For this, it must first be clear what is meant with 'political inclusion'. Earlier in this research, political inclusion has been introduced as an important criterium for democracy. The next chapter will



elaborate further on the definition of political inclusion. For now, it is important to realize that political inclusion, or 'inclusion of adults' as Dahl (2000) describes it, is about the diffusion of power and about the rights and opportunities for all citizens to exercise power and influence over the government. Variables and formal institutions specifically dealing with the participation of citizens and power-sharing between different groups are therefore relevant variables for this concept.

This fits well within Lijphart's 'executive-parties dimension', described above, which specifically deals with ways to control the government and the extent to which all parties are included. Since the variables within Lijphart's executive-parties dimension are relevant for political inclusion, it is these variables that will be examined for this research in the fragile and conflict-affected settings of Mozambique and Burundi: *party systems; cabinets and coalitions; executive-legislative relationship* and *electoral systems*. The fifth variable Lijphart mentions within this dimension, *interest groups*, will not be analysed, since there is hardly any established system of interest groups in countries such as Burundi and Mozambique. Therefore, there is little to no empiric data available on the type of interest group system in these country, making the variable irrelevant for studying political inclusion in these settings.

In order to research the four variables relevant for political inclusion in fragile and conflict-affected settings, it must be understood what Lijphart (1999) specifically means with each of these variables. After this clarification, the practical working of each variable can be examined in actual fragile and conflict-affected settings. The next parts of this chapter will therefore describe each variable and analyse each in the cases of Mozambique and Burundi.

### 5.3 Party systems

The first variable that Lijphart (1999) describes is the party system in democracies. Party systems, as described by Lijphart, can be distinguished from one another by the number of parties present in the democracy. The main distinction in the number of parties is made by two-party systems on one hand, which characterized majoritarian models of democracies, and multiparty systems on the other, which characterizes consociational democracies (Lijphart, 1999).

Looking at Lijphart's first variable of party systems, it can be said that the dominant party system in a democracy is dependent both on behaviour and on rules. Constitutions provide some basic rules that influence the outcome of elections and the presence of political parties, such as an electoral threshold or established criteria for political parties. Also, the electoral system, as provided by the Constitution

and electoral laws, are of large influence for the number of parties effective within a political system. However, the eventual type of party system – two-party or multiparty – is also an outcome of the electoral behaviour within a democracy. Therefore, the party system is seen as determined by both political behaviour as well as political rules.

The simplest form to determine the number of parties in a democracy is by taking the average of the number of participating parties during past elections. This would, however, give us the absolute number of parties – not the effective number of parties. If this criterium were to be used, a party which gains no seat would have the same weight as a party which gains an absolute majority. To determine whether a democracy has a two-party system, in the sense that two parties are dominant within the party system, or multiparty in the sense that dominance within the party system is divided between more than two parties, the dominance of the participating parties must be taken into account.

To determine the number of parties taken into account the dominance of parties – in terms of their relative sizes in the national Parliament – Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera (1979) developed an index to measure the effective number of parties within a party system. This index is based on the number of parties that gained seats in Parliament and their relative sizes. The formula for this index is:

$$N = 1/(\sum s_i^2)$$

N is the effective number of parties measured for each election;  
s<sub>i</sub> is the proportion of seats of the 'i-th party'

(Lijphart, 1999, p. 68)

To determine if the cases of Mozambique and Burundi can be classified as two-party party systems or multiparty party systems, the effective number of parties for these countries are to be measured. This is done using the index described above. In order to measure only the 'modern-day', post-conflict democracy, only data from elections after the signing of peace agreements in Mozambique and Burundi is used.

### 5.3.1 Party system in Mozambique

Since Mozambique's peace agreement was signed in 1992, there have been five elections of the country's unicameral, 250-seat National Assembly: in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. For each of these elections, data is used to determine the amount of parties which gained seats in the National Assembly, the relative size ( $s_i$ ) of each party, the denominator ( $\sum s_i^2$ ) and, eventually, the effective number of parties (N) for each election.

<b>Effective number of parties in Mozambique (1994 elections)</b>			
Number of parties voted on: 11			
Turnout: 77,44%			
<b>Party</b>	<b>Seats</b>	<b>% (si)</b>	<b>(si)^2</b>
FRELIMO	129	0,516	0,266256
RENAMO	112	0,448	0,200704
UDEMOMO		9	0,036
			0,001296
$\sum s_i^2 = 0,468256$			
<b>N = 2,14</b>			

<b>Effective number of parties in Mozambique (1999 elections)</b>			
Number of parties receiving votes: 12			
Turnout: 67,92%			
<b>Party</b>	<b>Seats</b>	<b>% (si)</b>	<b>(si)^2</b>
FRELIMO	133	0,532	0,283024
RENAMO	117	0,468	0,219024
$\sum s_i^2 = 0,502048$			
<b>N = 1,9</b>			

### Effective number of parties in Mozambique (2004 elections)

Number of parties receiving votes: 20

Turnout: 36,34%

Party	Seats	(si)	(si)^2
FRELIMO	160	0,64	0,4096
RENAMO Electoral Union	90	0,36	0,1296
11 smaller parties			
$\sum si^2 =$		0,5392	
<b>N =</b>		<b>1,85</b>	

An important note on these elections must be made, as the winning party FRELIMO has been accused of fraud in 2004 by the losing party, RENAMO. Indeed, the National Electoral Commission detected fraud as 1,400 sheets favouring RENAMO were stolen. To compensate this fraud, one seat was transferred from FRELIMO to RENAMO.

Another note on the 2004 General Elections in Mozambique concerns the Electoral Union, which the main opposition party to the ruling FRELIMO party, RENAMO, formed with 11 other smaller political parties. In his description of measuring the total effective number of political parties, Lijphart (1999) states that closely allied parties should be taken into account when measuring the effective number of parties by measuring N with two parties and measuring N with both parties as one party, and taking the average of those two N's. However, as the RENAMO Electoral Union was registered as one party and the number of votes all went to the one union, the RENAMO Electoral Union can be seen as one party, even though it actually was a cooperation between many smaller parties.

### Effective number of parties in Mozambique (2009 elections)

Number of parties receiving votes: 19

Turnout: 44,44%

Party	Seats	%	% ^2
FRELIMO	191	0,764	0,583696
RENAMO	51	0,204	0,041616
MDM	8	0,032	0,001024
$\sum si^2 =$		0,626336	
<b>N =</b>		<b>1,60</b>	

<b>Effective number of parties in Mozambique (2014 elections)</b>			
Number of parties receiving votes: 29			
Turnout: 48,49%			
<b>Party</b>	<b>Seats</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>% ^2</b>
FRELIMO	144	0,576	0,331776
RENAMO	89	0,356	0,126736
MDM	17	0,068	0,004624
$\sum si^2 = 0,463136$			
<b>N = 2,16</b>			

The data above shows that the effective number of political parties in Mozambique is low, with  $N = 2,16$  being the highest effective number of parties and  $N=1,60$  being the lowest. The mean of the four measured effective numbers of political parties is  $N = 1,93$ . If this measurement would have been part of Lijphart's 1999 study in thirty-six different democracies, Mozambique would have been ranked as the second lowest scoring country in terms of the effective number of parties.

As the mean effective number of political parties turns out to be lower than two, strictly taken, Mozambique cannot even be qualified as a two-party system. However, since there have been two parties distinctly dominating politics since 1994 – FRELIMO and RENAMO – and since the mean effective number of political parties turns out to be close to two, Mozambique will be qualified as a two-party system. It is interesting to notice, however, that many more parties have received votes in Mozambique, up to 29 parties in 2014. Therefore, the political system in Mozambique is dominated by only a few parties not because of institutional, electoral limitations for other parties, but because other parties fail to receive votes in practice.

### **5.3.2 Party system in Burundi**

As described in chapter 4, Burundi's peace agreement was signed in 1998 in Arusha, Tanzania. The signing of this peace agreement led to political reforms and, finally, to the approval per referendum of the new constitution of Burundi in 2005. After this constitution was adopted, Burundi has had two elections of its 100-seat National Assembly: in 2005 and in 2010. For both of these elections, the amount of parties which gained seats in Burundi's National Assembly, the relative size ( $si$ ) of each

party, the denominator ( $\sum si^2$ ) and, eventually, the effective number of parties (N) for each election are determined.

<b>Effective number of Burundi (2005 elections)</b>			
Number of parties receiving votes: 26			
Turnout: 77,23%			
Party	Seats	%	% ^2
CNDD-FDD	59	0,59	0,3481
FRODEBU	25	0,25	0,0625
UPRONA	10	0,1	0,01
CNDD	4	0,04	0,0016
MRC-Rurenzangamero	2	0,02	0,0004
$\sum si^2 = 0,4226$			
<b>N = 2,37</b>			

<b>Effective number of parties in Burundi (2010 elections)</b>			
Number of receiving: 3			
Turnout: 66,68 %			
Party	Seats	%	% ^2
CNDD-FDD	78	0,78	0,6084
UPRONA	17	0,17	0,0289
FRODEBU Nyakuri	5	0,05	0,0025
$\sum si^2 = 0,6398$			
<b>N = 1,56</b>			

The 2010 boycott of the elections is a disturbing factor in determining the effective number of parties, and thus the party system, in Burundi. Although the party system started off in 2005 as a quite moderate two-party system which would have ranked 26th in Lijphart's 1999 study of thirty-six party systems – just under the United States and tied with Canada – it ranks very low on the scale in the 2010 elections. The question is whether the data gathered from the 2010 election can be seen as representative for the party system. However, because even Burundi's highest scored number of effective political parties ranks among typical majoritarian, two-party systems such as the United States and Canada, based on this index, Burundi can be classified as a two-party system. However, it

must also be taken into account that as many as 42 parties are active in the country (Nsengimana, 2015). As in Mozambique, Burundi does possess institutional limitations for multiparty democracy, but parties other than the dominant parties fail to achieve results. Taking this into account, Burundi has a two-party system in terms of election results, but can be classified as a much more multiparty system looking at the number of parties active and the institutional arrangements.

Based on the research done in thirty-six democracies for his work *Patterns of Democracy*, Lijphart (1999) states that there have been several countries which, over the years, have shown a trend towards greater multipartism. Interestingly, looking at the data analysed above, it can be said that both Mozambique and Burundi show contrary trends: away from multipartism and closer towards the dominance of a very small number of political parties.

## 5.4 Cabinets and coalitions

The second variable within the executive-parties dimension that Lijphart (1999) describes is the type of cabinets that form the executive government within a country. This variable depends a great deal on the way that political parties operate and the effective number of parties within a party system: a party system in which only two parties are dominant will most likely lead to one party gaining the absolute majority (while the other party forms the opposition), forming executive cabinets in which this one party has the power. A party system with a high effective number of parties, in contrary, means that the legislative seats are divided over more parties and that, for an executive cabinet to be supported by a majority within Parliament, there is a higher probability that parties will need to form broader coalitions.

Lijphart (1999) broadly describes three types of cabinets:

1. *Minimal winning coalition cabinets*, in which one party or more parties control a minimal majority in Parliament;
2. *Oversized cabinets*, which include parties that are 'unnecessary' to control a majority in Parliament;
3. *Minority or undersized cabinets*, which do not control a majority of Parliament.

These three types of cabinets distinguish majoritarian democracies from consociational democracies. According to Lijphart (1999, p. 97), minimal winning coalitions typically belong to majoritarian democracies and conflict with the often oversized coalition cabinets and minority cabinets found in consociational democracies. In fact, a study shows that of 196 cabinets in situations where no one party has a majority in Parliament, only 77 were formed by a minimal winning coalition – the other 119 were either oversized coalition cabinets or undersized minority cabinets (Lijphart, 1999, p. 97).

As will be shown later in this chapter, both Mozambique and Burundi can be classified as – at least mostly – presidential systems. Within presidential systems, power is much more concentrated with the President and less power is handed over to Parliament. The President, for example, often appoints his own cabinet members within presidential systems: no parliamentary majority is needed. Since Presidents within a presidential system are popularly elected and do not need this majority in Parliament, presidential cabinets are minimal winning by definition in terms of the President staying in power – unless the Constitution provided other measure, such as quota. However, if the President's cabinet wishes to pass legislation in Parliament, it can form coalitions in Parliament that are either minimal winning, oversized or minority (Lijphart, 1999, p. 104).

There can be substantial differences among presidential systems in terms of who gets appointed and what parties are represented within the president's cabinet (Lijphart, 1999, p. 104-106). In some cases, such as will be shown for Burundi, it is even established by law that a President must appoint cabinet members from different parties. Therefore, while the type of cabinet seems to be mostly determined by the behaviour of political actors, formal rules can also influence this variable.

#### **5.4.1 Cabinets and coalitions in Mozambique**

Mozambique is – under its current constitution – a presidential system, meaning that the President of Mozambique is elected by popular vote and exercises dominant power within the executive cabinet. The executive cabinet in Mozambique consists of the Council of Ministers, which consists of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Ministers (Article 201 Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique).

As described above, cabinets in presidential systems are regularly minimal winning coalitions and one-party cabinets, especially when it comes to staying in power. In Mozambique, the President is the head of government and has the power to appoint, exonerate and dismiss his Prime Minister and his Ministers (Article 160 Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique). Therefore, the members of the



Council of Ministers are accountable towards the democratically elected President and are not dependent on coalitions in Parliament to stay in power, meaning that they are able to survive with only one party in power. In practice, we have seen that the President of Mozambique has successively come from the FRELIMO party, as well as his Prime Minister and his ministers. FRELIMO has dominated the executive cabinets in Mozambique, making it in practice a minimal winning, one-party coalition. There has been no need to include other parties in the executive power.

One of the main tasks of the Council of Ministers is to pass laws through Parliament. For this, a Parliamentary majority is needed. Therefore, the Council of Ministers in Mozambique – in theory - may be dependent on coalitions within Parliament to be able to pass laws. In practice, however, the FRELIMO party has been dominant in Mozambican politics, delivering the President besides gaining an absolute majority in Parliament in every election since peace has been obtained in Mozambique. Therefore, the members of the Council of Ministers only need the support from their own FRELIMO party in Parliament. In short, we can say that there have been no broad coalitions in Mozambican politics; in fact, it has been one party dominating the lot through minimal winning coalitions.

#### **5.4.2 Cabinets and coalitions in Burundi**

As in Mozambique, Burundi has a presidential system in which the President is democratically elected. There are, however, some major differences between the presidential system in Mozambique and in Burundi in terms of the representation of political parties within the executive cabinet.

The democratically elected President of Burundi is the head of government and presides over the Council of Ministers (Article 109 Constitution of the Republic of Burundi), which forms the main executive body in Burundi's political system. The Council of Ministers consists of the President, the two Vice-Presidents and the ministers. Especially the two Vice-Presidents within this Council of Ministers are able to co-share power with the President: the first Vice President presides over the Council of Ministers and the second Vice-President does so in absence of the first Vice-President (Article 125 Constitution of the Republic of Burundi). Both Vice-Presidents take by order all the measures of execution of the presidential decrees (Article 126 Constitution of the Republic of Burundi) and the President appoints the ministers within the Council of Ministers only after consultation with the Vice-Presidents (Article 108 Constitution of the Republic of Burundi). In short, the executive power within Burundi's Council of Ministers is – at least to some extent – shared between the President and his two Vice-Presidents.

This does not say anything about which of Lijphart's type of cabinets Burundi possesses. If both Vice-Presidents are member of the same party as the President, there would still be a minimal winning coalition with the dominance of one party. The Constitution of the Republic of Burundi, however, includes measures to prevent one part from taking all the executive power. Besides the fact that Parliament needs to approve the candidatures for the positions of Vice-Presidents before they are appointed by the President (Article 123 Constitution of the Republic of Burundi), the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi actually prescribes rules to include more than one party in the executive cabinet. According to Article 124 of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi, the Vice-Presidents of Burundi are to belong to different ethnic groups and political parties. This means that at least two parties are to be represented by the executive: more than strictly needed for the executive to be legitimate.

The ministers within the Council of Ministers are required to come from different political parties which have obtained at least one-twentieth of the votes for the National Assembly, and these parties have the right to deliver a percentage of ministers to the Council of Ministers that is at least equal to the percentage of seats they have in the National Assembly (Article 129 Constitution of the Republic of Burundi). Because of this constitutional ruling, there is always a coalition of political parties within the Council of Ministers, even though the President formally appoints the ministers. In addition, the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi prescribes quota for the executive cabinet: at most 60% of the ministers and vice-ministers may be of the Hutu ethnicity, at most 40% of them may be of the Tutsi ethnicity, and at least 30% must be women (Article 129 Constitution of the Republic of Burundi).

With the constitutional arrangements described above, Burundi forms a unique case of a presidential system with a very consociational executive cabinet. In both the 2005 and the 2009 elections, as shown in the first part of this chapter, one party (CNDD – FDD) gained the absolute majority in Parliament. Therefore, in any regular presidential system, Burundi's President would be able to stay in power as well as pass laws quite easily and, because of this, the CNDD – FDD would be able to exercise dominant power over the executive cabinet alone without the need for coalitions, like FRELIMO is able to do in Mozambique. However, because of the constitutional arrangements described above, the President of Burundi is forced to include more parties in the executive cabinet than would be strictly necessary to control a majority. Therefore, Burundi always has oversized cabinets, typical for a consociational democracy.

## 5.5 Executive – legislative relationship

The relationship between the executive and the legislative forms the third variable that Lijphart (1999) describes in his executive-parties dimension. The main distinction within this variable is the distinction between *parliamentary* and *presidential* systems. According to Lijphart, parliamentary systems differ from presidential systems in three ways:

1. In a parliamentary system, the head of government – which is often a Prime Minister – is directly responsible to the legislative, whereas in a presidential system, the head of government – always a President – cannot be forced to resign by Parliament as he is elected for a constitutionally prescribed period;
2. In a parliamentary system, the Prime Minister is selected by legislatures, whereas Presidents in presidential systems are popularly elected;
3. In a parliamentary system, the executive is collective or collegial, whereas in presidential system, the executive is dominated by one person (the President) and the members of executive cabinets are mere advisors and subordinates of the President.

(Lijphart, 1999, p. 117 – 118)

According to Lijphart (1999, p. 116), the balanced executive – legislative relationship of the parliamentary system belongs to consensus democracies, whereas the executive dominance of the presidential system belongs to majoritarian democracies. Also, Lijphart (1999) describes various types of hybrid models, which are in between majoritarian and consociational models.

Looking at the three main elements that describe parliamentary systems and presidential systems, it can be seen that all three of these elements are defined by formal rules. Therefore, the executive – legislative relationship is defined by formal rules instead of behaviour. In the section below, these formal rules will be described for Mozambique and Burundi in order to see whether both countries have a parliamentary or a presidential (or hybrid) system.

### 5.5.1 Executive – legislative relationship in Mozambique

In Mozambique, the political system is based on a separation of powers, as is defined by Article 134 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique. The executive power lies with the Council of Ministers, which is – as described above – dominated by the democratically elected President, and legislative powers lie with the unicameral National Assembly. It is the relationship between these two powers that defines the type of political system in Mozambique.

Looking at the first element that distinguishes parliamentary systems from presidential systems, the President of Mozambique cannot be forced to resign by the National Assembly. As defined by Article 179 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, the National Assembly has the power to pass laws and decide on the government's decisions, as well as to ratify the appointment of public officials such as the President of the Supreme Court and the President of the Constitutional Council. The National Assembly does not, however, ratify the appointment of the Prime Minister and the ministers or force the President, the Prime Minister or the ministers to resign from their function. In fact, it is the other way around: the President, according to Article 166 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, can pronounce itself on the dissolution of the National Assembly.

Members of the Council of Ministers are answerable to the National Assembly as well as the President in terms of their policies (Article 207 Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique), but are politically accountable only to the President of Mozambique (Article 208 Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique) who can 'sack' the members of the Council of Ministers, as was done to the Prime Minister in 2012 by President Guebuza (Reuters, October 8<sup>th</sup> 2012). With this, the power of the legislative in relationship to the executive is limited, making Mozambique a presidential system. The same goes for the way that the head of state is appointed, as the President of Mozambique is elected by popular vote, according Article 147 and Article 148 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique.

There are some small consociational elements to be found within the formal relationship between the executive and the legislative in Mozambique. According to Article 209 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, for example, the members of the Council of Ministers are collectively responsible for their policy and are bound by the Government Programme, coinciding with the collective executive that belongs to a parliamentary system. However, in general, the political system of Mozambique can be seen as strongly presidential: a system in which the executive exercised dominant powers over the legislative.

### 5.5.2 Executive – legislative relationship in Burundi

As in Mozambique, the political system in Burundi is based on a separation of powers. The President of Burundi is elected by popular vote according to Article 96 of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi. The Parliament of Burundi – consisting of the National Assembly and the Congress – therefore does not appoint the head of state of Burundi, which would indicate that Burundi has a presidential system.

Earlier in this chapter, it has already been described that the executive cabinet in Burundi consists of the President and Vice-Presidents and ministers from different parties. This automatically accounts for a much more collective and collegial executive cabinet, as the Vice-Presidents and ministers are much more than mere advisors to the President: they must represent their own parties' interests, not only the President's interests. This shows some – at least slightly – parliamentary elements in Burundi's political system. It is Articles 116 and 117 of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi, however, that give the political system of Burundi the strongest parliamentary elements. Article 116 states that "The President of the Republic may be declared relieved of his functions for grave fault, grave abuse or corruption, by a resolution taken by two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly and of the Senate meeting together". In other words, if there are serious reasons to do so, the National Assembly and the Senate together have the power to force the President to resign by a two-third majority. Article 117 of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi, in addition, states that the President of Burundi can be impeached of high treason by a two-thirds majority of the National Assembly and Senate meeting together. In other words, the President of Burundi is subject to the legislative power in order to stay in office, providing a much more balanced executive-legislative relationship that characterizes parliamentary systems.

Because of the strong presidential element of a popularly elected head of state and the strong parliamentary element of political accountability of the President towards Parliament, Burundi can be seen as a hybrid form (Lijphart, 1999, p. 119 – 124). One of these hybrid forms is a system in which the executive is selected by voters, but is dependent on legislative confidence. Lijphart states that when his study was done in 1999, there were no empirical examples of a political system such as this one and that these systems would be problematic because "a legislative vote of no confidence in a popularly elected executive would be seen as a defiance of the popular will and of democratic legitimacy" (Lijphart, 1999, p. 120). However, the current political system in Burundi is exactly this type of system: a hybrid form between a presidential and parliamentary system, in which the executive is elected by popular will but the executive is also subject to the confidence of the Parliament, perhaps providing the first empirical example of this type of system.

## 5.6 Electoral system

The fourth variable that Lijphart (1999) describes is quite easy to determine and depends strongly on constitutional arrangements, thus *formal rules* instead of behaviour: the electoral system. Within this variable, Lijphart makes a distinction between majority and plurality methods and proportional representation.

Majoritarian democracies typically include majority or plurality methods. Both methods follow the winner-take-all rule: the candidate with the highest amount of votes gets the position, all other voters remain unrepresented, and the winning party is overrepresented in the representational body. According to Lijphart (1999), this is a perfect representation of the majoritarian model. Examples of these methods are single-member district methods, in which one person gets elected per district and all votes for other candidates are ignored.

In contrast to these majoritarian methods, proportional representation methods seek to represent both majorities and minorities and to translate votes into a proportionality of seats (Lijphart, 1999). Lijphart describes three types of proportional representation:

1. *List proportional representation*, in which parties nominate lists of candidates in multimember districts and in which voters cast ballots for party lists;
2. *Mixed-member proportional representation*, in which part of the Parliamentary seats is elected by plurality in single-member districts and part of the seats is elected by proportional representation, and in which the proportional representation seats compensate for any disproportionality produced by the district seats;
3. *Single transferable votes*, in which voters cast their ballots for individuals instead of party lists.

(Lijphart, 1999, p. 147 – 148)

In the next paragraphs, the electoral systems of Mozambique and Burundi will be described using these characteristics of both type of systems.

### 5.6.1 Electoral system in Mozambique

Looking at Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, stating that the democratic state of Mozambique is based on a “plurality of expressions”, one would say methods as proportional representation are used in Mozambique for its democratic elections. This is partly the case. Article 169 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique states that National Assembly of Mozambique is elected through direct, universal, equal and periodic suffrage. Candidates for the elections must be political parties who nominate lists, although these lists may include citizens who are not member of the party.

In Law 7 of 2007, which governs the election of the President and the National Assembly, it is established that there are 13 constituencies, each with their own lists: ten for the provinces, one for the city of Maputo, one for expatriates in Africa and one for expatriates in Europe. According to Article 168 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique , elected deputies are obliged to represent the entire country, not only the province they represent.

The seats elected by the separate lists in the provinces and the city of Maputo make up 248 of the 250 total seats, divided according to the number of registered voters for each region, and there is one seat for expatriates in Africa and one for expatriates in Europe. With this, this system is a system of list proportional representation. Therefore, if we take into account Lijphart’s description of methods seeking to represent both majorities and minorities and to translate votes into a proportionality of seats, the Mozambican system can be classified as a plurality system. The Mozambican system of list proportional representation, after all, does not allow Mozambican citizens to vote for individual candidates coming from their own social groups, but instead allows Mozambicans only to vote on political parties, based on political preferences.

In contrast to the proportional representation system which elects Mozambique’s National Assembly, the President of Mozambique is elected by majority vote. Article 148 of the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique states that the candidate who gains the absolute majority (more than half of the votes) shall be elected as President, and that if no candidate gains an absolute majority, a second electoral round between the two candidates receiving the most votes in the first round will determine the elected President.

The fact that the President of Mozambique is elected by majority vote is a matter of course, as the President cannot be ‘proportionally represented’: he is one person and represents only one group of voters. Although Lijphart does not take electoral rules for presidents into account for this reason, it is important to include this in the analysis of institutions relevant for political inclusion in this research

because of the significant powers that the presidents both Mozambique and Burundi have. These powers are exercised by one person representing one group of voters, which has implications for the political inclusion of all groups in both countries: it somewhat balances the Mozambican system of proportional representation for the election of the legislative power with a very strong majoritarian system for the election of the executive power.

Taking into account both the closed list system for the parliamentary elections and the majority vote for the presidential elections, the Mozambican electoral system can be seen as a hybrid system, consisting of a mix of majoritarian and consociational elements.

### **5.6.2 Electoral system in Burundi**

Burundi's electoral system is, in fact, quite distinct from many other electoral systems. Although, as in Mozambique, the election of the National Assembly is based on proportional representation, the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi provides some specific arrangements. Article 168 of the Constitution states that the elections of deputies for the National Assembly takes place through nationwide bloc lists and proportional representation, and provides the obligation for lists to be multi-ethnic of character and to take into account the equilibrium between men and women. Also, political parties are obliged to represent national interests, to be open to all Burundians, to be democratic in their organization and to promote free expression in suffrage and participation in political life (Article 75 – 59 Constitution of the Republic of Burundi). Voters cast their ballots on these parties through the nominated lists, indicating a system of list proportional representation, and parties are represented in the National Assembly when they have gained a threshold of 2 % of all votes.

Article 164 of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi provides the specific arrangement, however, that the 100 elected members of the National Assembly must be 60% of the Hutu ethnicity, 40% of the Tutsi ethnicity and including a minimum of 30% women. If the election results do not match these requirements, co-optation is used to make sure that all seats in Parliament are divided on the basis of these requirements. These special requirements make the electoral system in Burundi different from any type that Lijphart (1999) describes, but it is most close to the system of mixed-member proportional representation: although Burundi's system does not include single-member districts, such as described by Lijphart, it does involve correcting the results of the elections by co-opting members so that the composition of the National Assembly matches the constitutional requirements.



Although it would seem that Burundi has quite a consociational, proportional representation-type electoral system, this is not the case for the election of the Senate. Article 180 states that the Senate is composed of two delegates from each province, elected by a council composed of members of communal councils, three persons originating from the Twa ethnicity, and all former Heads of State. There is thus no direct election of Senate members in Burundi. In addition, the President of Burundi, as in Mozambique, is elected through majoritarian methods: Article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi states that the President is elected by an absolute majority of the suffrage expressed, and that if this is not achieved in the first round, a second round will be initiated. As has already been stated earlier in this chapter, the majority system of electing comes naturally, as one elected President cannot be 'proportionally representative' to all social groups, but rather, represents its own group of voters. It is, however, important to take this into account in this institutional analysis, because the system allows the President to possess significant executive powers based on the voting support of a relatively small part of society.

Although Burundi does have a threshold of 2 per cent and a President chosen through a majoritarian system, consociational arrangements – such as quota and a system close to mixed member proportional representation – play a large role in Burundi's electoral system. With these arrangements, the electoral system seeks to represent both majorities and minorities – at least in the National Assembly. The Burundian electoral system, in other words, is focused to a large extent on producing inclusive electoral results. Therefore, this hybrid system is seen as mostly consociational.

## 5.7 Majoritarian or consensus?

In this chapter, the relevant variables for political inclusion within the institutional frameworks of Mozambique and Burundi have been analysed. Using this analysis, we can classify the formalized institutional frameworks of these countries as 'majoritarian' or 'consociational'.

The following table provides an overview of the analysed formal political institutions relevant for political inclusion in Mozambique:

**Variable** **Model of Democracy**

<b>Party System</b>	Multiparty in terms of parties participating, two-party in terms of effective parties	Hybrid
<b>Cabinets</b>	Minimal Winning Coalition	Majoritarian
<b>Executive-Legislative Relation</b>	Presidential	Majoritarian
<b>Electoral System</b>	List Proportional Representation for National Assembly, Majority for President	Hybrid

Although Mozambique has an electoral system based on proportional representation, all other institutions in Mozambique point towards the direction of a majoritarian system. The bipartisan party system, minimal winning coalition cabinets and presidential system characterize Mozambique as a majoritarian system. Taking into account the consociational electoral system of proportional representation, Mozambique is characterized as a ‘mostly majoritarian’ system.

In comparison to Mozambique, the analysis of formal political institutions relevant for political inclusion in Burundi shows more consociational institutions:

**Variable** **Model of Democracy**

<b>Party System</b>	Multiparty institutions in terms of parties participating, but only few effective parties	Hybrid
<b>Cabinets</b>	Oversized cabinets	Consociational
<b>Executive-Legislative Relation</b>	President popularly elected but subject to parliamentary confidence	Hybrid
<b>Electoral System</b>	Mixed member proportional representation with quota for National Assembly, majority for President	Hybrid, mostly consociational

The system of oversized cabinets in Burundi, through the inclusion of different ethnicities in Parliament, typically belongs to a consociational democracy. In addition, Burundi has as much as 43 active parties in the country (Nsengimana, 2015), even though the effective number of parties in Burundi, based on election results, lies around 2. Although the president is elected by popular vote, an institution typically belonging to majoritarian systems, the country’s president is subject to Parliamentary confidence, creating a hybrid executive-legislative relationship with consociational elements.

Although it would be too superficial to categorize Burundi as a pure consociational democracy, it can at least be concluded that Burundi has a hybrid system with several strong consociational elements – and is, at the least, more a consociational democracy than the majoritarian system of Mozambique.

## 6 Analyzing political inclusion in Mozambique and Burundi

In the former chapter, the political institutions in Mozambique and Burundi, mostly formalized in constitutional, legal frameworks, with regard to political inclusion have been analysed. To test the alleged relationship between institutions and political inclusion, however, the practice of political inclusion must be examined. For this, a broad understanding of political inclusion is needed.

Dahl (2000) describes the inclusion of adults as one of his criteria for democracy, stating that adults are included if they possess the full rights implied by Dahl's other four criteria for democracy: effective participation of all members; equality in voting; gaining enlightened understanding and control of the agenda (Dahl, 2000). With this definition, Dahl focuses on the formalized democratic rights of citizens in order to participate in the entire democratic process. The practice of political inclusion is, according to Lawoti (2014), determined by an interaction between formal institutions, such as these rights and the institutions analysed in the chapter before, and informal institutions. Political inclusion, in other words, is not just defined by democratic rights and opportunities, but is co-defined by inclusive practices.

Often, political inclusion is operationalized too narrowly and is reduced to the 'breadth of suffrage' (Coppedge, Alvarez & Maldonado, 2008). Suffrage, however, only refers to the formal access to voting, but says nothing about informal practices and only covers a relatively narrow aspect of inclusion. Inclusive democratic processes can manifest itself in more stages than just the electoral process. Lawoti's (2014) definition, according to which political inclusion is defined by "political participation in the process and public policies that address the needs and aspirations of different groups" (p. 63), includes two of these stages: inclusive political participation in the democratic process and inclusive results of this process, which represent all people. However, it does not cover the first stage: after all, political participation in any democratic process is only possible when political resources are present and when there is inclusive access to these resources. Political resources, in this sense, are means which can be used by citizens to influence the behaviour of the government and the political elite. Examples of these resources are political rights, organized elections, but also access to information.

For this research, a three-stage description of political inclusion is proposed:

- Political inclusion can manifest itself in three ‘stages’:**
1. Equal access to political resources
  2. Inclusive political participation in the democratic process
  3. Inclusive results of this process, representing all people

This chapter will focus on this broad understanding of political inclusion in Mozambique and Burundi in all the stages listed above. For this, it must first be clear what indicators and sub-indicators can be used in order to measure this concept of political inclusion in these different settings. The indicators identified in order to analyse political inclusion in this research are ‘general democratic quality’, ‘political equality’, ‘electoral participation’ and ‘inclusive representation’. The figure below shows which of these indicators relates to which stage of political inclusion:

**‘Stages’ in which political inclusion can manifest itself**

	<b>Equal access to political resources</b>	<b>Inclusive political participation in the democratic process</b>	<b>Inclusive results of this process, representing all people</b>
<b>Indicators</b>	<i>General democratic quality</i>	<i>General democratic quality</i>	<i>General democratic quality</i>
	<i>Political equality</i>		
		<i>Electoral participation</i>	
			<i>Inclusive representation</i>

As can be seen from the figure above, the indicator *general democratic quality* concerns all three stages in which political inclusion can manifest itself: as political inclusion is a central element to any democracy (Dahl, 2000), it can be expected that the countries that score high in terms of general quality of democracy are also more inclusive in their practice of democracy throughout all stages. The indicator *political equality* specifically focuses on the first stage: equal access to political resources. In countries where political equality is high, all people have similarly equal access to political resources. The second stage, inclusive political participation, can be measured with the indicator of *electoral participation*, through which information to determine to what extent people effectively participate in

the democratic process of free and fair elections. The third indicator, *inclusive representation*, focuses on the results of this process: to what extent do democratic processes lead to the inclusive representation of all people.

In the remaining part of this chapter, the specific definitions of each indicator and the way to measure each indicator through sub-indicators will be described, followed by an analysis of each indicator (and sub-indicators) in the specific cases of Mozambique and Burundi. These analyses are built on information gathered through analysing literature and reports and by conducting interviews on the specific cases of Mozambique and Burundi. At the end of this chapter, the information gathered from each of the indicators will be grasped together in order to draw conclusions on political inclusion in both countries.

## 6.1 Overall: General democratic quality in Mozambique and Burundi

As described above, political inclusion requires access to political resources, participation in democratic processes and inclusive results of these processes. However, before identifying indicators for these different elements, a general picture is useful in order to generally analyse political inclusion: as 'inclusion' is one of Dahl's (2000) central elements to democracy, it can be argued that the democracies that score high in terms of general quality of democracy also are more inclusive in their practice of democracy in each of the stages described above.

In order to measure this indicator, general sub-indicators on the quality of democracy can be used. In describing this indicator, Lijphart (1999) uses Dahl's rating of democratic quality, which Dahl (1971) describes in his work 'Polyarchy', and the rating of democratization by Vanhanen (1990) as ways to measure the general quality of democracy. Since the indicators Lijphart mentions are based on studies which have been conducted once (one in 1971 and one in 1990), the data from these sub-indicators would be outdated for a research done today. Therefore, for this research, the data from The Economist's most recent *Democracy Index* (2012) will be used in order to see whether there is a correlation between the general quality of democracy in Mozambique and Burundi and the type of political system these countries possess.

Another way to indicate the quality of democracy, Lijphart (1999) argues, is by measuring the satisfaction with democracy of the citizens within a country. Part of determining the extent to which people are satisfied with democracy is, after all, determining the extent to which people feel

themselves effectively included in the decision-making process. Because of this, Anderson and Guillory (1997) hypothesize that overall, consociational democracies produce more satisfaction with democracy than majoritarian democracies. To measure this, the Afrobarometer (2012) can be used: a source which measures the extent to which respondents from different countries are satisfied with democracy, and which also includes a measurement of the extent to which people feel themselves represented. While using this sub-indicator, however, it is important to bear in mind that supporters of the governing parties in power are more likely to be satisfied with democracy (Anderson & Guillory, 1997).

<b>Sub-indicators</b>	
-	Scores on democracy indexes
-	Satisfaction with democracy

**6.1.1 General democratic quality in Mozambique**

One of rankings used to analyse the general democratic quality in Mozambique is the *Democracy Index* by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The most recent of these rankings has been published in 2012. In this index, Mozambique scored 4.88 on a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being the most authoritarian regimes and 10 being the most full democracies. With this, Mozambique is ranked as the 102<sup>nd</sup> country in the world and falls under the category of ‘flawed democracies’ (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012). The country does, however, score significantly higher on the democracy index than the average Sub-Saharan African country: the average for these countries in 2012 was 3.73, well below Mozambique’s score. (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012).

<b>Mozambique on the 2012 Democracy Index</b>	
Score	4.88
Sub-Sahara Africa avg.	3.73
Rank	102
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012)	

During the 1990's, Mozambique has been classified as a political 'success story'. Improvements in Mozambique had been quickly implemented and peace was installed relatively fast (Corinna Jentsch, 19 December 2014). However, ever since the establishment of democracy, one ruling party has been in power: Frelimo has attained a majority over main opposition parties Renamo and MDM in every subsequent election since the first multiparty elections in 2004. While theoretically having a multiparty democratic system, in practice, Mozambique has oscillated between a dominant-party and a bipartisan system (Siteo, Matsime & Pereira, 2006). Under some definitions, Mozambique would actually not even be categorized as a democratic country, because democracy calls for at least one change of regime in history (Corinna Jentsch, 19 December 2014).

Looking at the general quality of democracy in Mozambique today, the formal arrangements have been put in place, but there is a struggle to consolidate these arrangements and to cultivate a democratic spirit (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015). While elections are being organized, for example, the actual quality of these elections is still low. Using the distinction that Lawoti (2007) makes between formal and informal institutions, for the most part, it is the informal institutions in Mozambique that make the country a 'flawed democracy'.

Although democracy in Mozambique is not flawless, the introduction of democracy in the country has seriously improved the conditions in the country. Where Mozambique has a score of 0.216 on the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index in 1990, some years before the introduction of democracy, the country scored a 0.393 on the same index in 2013 (UNDP, 2013). These significant improvements, however, have not led to the people of Mozambique being satisfied with their democratic system. The Afrobarometer of 2012 shows that only 23% of the Mozambicans is very satisfied with democracy, while 12% is fairly satisfied, 37% is not very satisfied and even 17% is not at all satisfied (Afrobarometer, 2012). This survey corrects for the bias of supporters of governing parties being more satisfied with democracy than supporters of opposition parties (Anderson & Guillory, 1997) by including respondents from different political backgrounds, as well as from different regions, religions and ethnicity. UNDP's 2014 Human Development Report does show, however, that 63% of the Mozambicans expresses trust in their national government (UNDP, 2014). Therefore, we can conclude that while Mozambicans are not satisfied with their democratic system, a certain degree of trust in their government is present among the Mozambican people.



**6.1.2 General democratic quality in Burundi**

Where the Economist Intelligence Unit classified Mozambique as a ‘flawed democracy’ in the 2012 *Democracy Index*, Burundi was downgraded in the same index as an ‘authoritarian regime’. With a score on of 3.6, Burundi scored below the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 3.73 and ranked as the 125<sup>th</sup> country in the world (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012). Burundi’s score has significantly dropped since the signing of the Arusha Accord, showing that democracy is regressing in the country. The International Crisis Group (2012) states that democratic institutions in Burundi are in place and functioning, but that it is largely due to the electoral boycott of 2010 that Burundi now has a de facto one-party system characterized by a lack of dialogue, although the formal, de jure institutions say otherwise.

<b>Burundi on the 2012 Democracy Index</b>	
Score	3.60
Sub-Sahara Africa avg.	3.73
Rank	125 <sup>th</sup>
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012)	

As described in chapter 5, Burundi has established inclusive, consociational formal arrangements within its constitutional framework. Within this framework, Burundi currently had 42 actual political parties operating in the country, forming a multiparty democratic system which has been in place since 1993 (Nsengimana, 2015). However, as we saw in chapter 6, the effective number of political parties in Burundi is very low. Democracy in Burundi, therefore, can be seen as a developing democracy which is on-track in terms of its institutional development (Nsengimana, 2015), but is experiencing difficulties in terms of inclusion in practice, most notably after the electoral boycott in 2010 and the following political impasse.

Remarkably, although the country scores very low on the Democracy Index, the majority of Burundians seem to be relatively satisfied with their government and the democratic system. The 2014 Human Development Report shows that 85% of Burundians has trust in their national government (UNDP, 2014). One possible explanation for these trends is that the ending of the long-lasting conflict, the signing of the peace accord and the establishment of democratic institutions in Burundi has largely improved the country’s score on the UNDP Human Development Index. According to the 2014 Human

Development Report (UNDP, 2014), Burundi scores 0.389 on the Human Development Index, where it only scored 0.290 in 2000. In addition, the 2012 Afrobarometer on satisfaction with democracy in Burundi shows that 34% of the respondents is 'fairly satisfied' and 31% is even 'very satisfied' with the way democracy works in Burundi.

The question, however, is whether these figures actually show the satisfaction with democracy in general or whether they rely on satisfaction and ties with the ruling regime. The rural population in Burundi, making up a large majority of the total population, are mostly concerned about basic needs issues, such as security, land access and education, and are less concerned with governance and democratic issues. As the ruling president Nkurunziza has travelled to these rural areas to help develop these basic needs, a significant part of the rural population feels closely tied to the president and the ruling party CNDD FDD (International Crisis Group, 2011). These rural political ties to the ruling party reflect in the figures showing the differences between urban and rural Burundians in terms of satisfaction with the democratic system. Rural Burundians tend to be more satisfied with the democratic system than urban Burundians: the Afrobarometer (2012) shows that 10% of the rural respondents is 'not at all' satisfied with democracy as compared to 22% of the urban respondents, and 35% of the rural respondents responds to be 'very satisfied' with democracy as compared to only 15% of urban respondents. Anderson and Guillory (1997) would seek the explanation for these figures in the fact that, according to them, supporters of governing parties are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than supporters of opposition parties. In situation such as these, where satisfaction with democracy is closely related with ties to the party in power, the usefulness of this sub-indicator to measure the quality of the democratic system in general can be questioned.

## 6.2 Equal access to political resources: political equality in Mozambique and Burundi

As stated above, the access to political resources is of importance for political inclusion. According to Dahl (1971), every society allocates resources with which the behaviour of other actors can, at least in certain circumstances, be influenced. Equal access to these political resources, or political equality, is a basic need for any inclusive democracy: only when there is – at least to some extent – political equality in a country, its citizens are able to effectively participate in the decision-making process and to engage in developing inclusive public policies. Therefore, political equality forms the second indicator for political inclusion.

In order to have access to political resources, these resources must be guaranteed. The existence of political rights and civil liberties therefore provide the basis for access to political resources. The scores of countries on the Freedom House’s 2015 Freedom in the World index on political rights and civil liberties therefore serve as sub-indicators, as ways to measure the presence of these political resources.

However, simply examining the existence of these resources is not enough: we must also take into account to what extent the access to these resources is evenly divided. Lijphart (1999) argues that this is difficult to measure. However, he argues that political equality “is more likely to prevail in the absence of great economic equalities” (1999, p. 282), and therefore, that measuring economic equality can serve as a proxy for the indicator of political equality. Dahl (1996) backs this argument by stating that “many resources that flow directly or indirectly from one’s position in the economic order can be converted into political resources” , implying that political equality is positively correlated to economic equality. In comparison to political equality, economic equality is much easier to measure and determine. Several international researches done by different institutes focus on economic equality within different countries. One of these researches is done by the United Nations Development Programme and included in the 2014 Human Development Report by the Gini-coefficient. This coefficient represents the income distribution of a country’s residents, with a full equality of income at 0. In other words: the higher the Gini-coefficient, the lower economic equality – and thus political equality – is.

<b>Sub-indicators</b>
- Political rights and civil liberties
- Proxy: Economic equality

**6.2.1 Political equality in Mozambique**

Political equality, as described earlier, is about equal access to political resources. These basic resources include political rights and civil liberties that enable citizens to effectively be included in the political process. In Mozambique, these political rights are provided by the constitution, guaranteeing a free political process through the respect of freedoms of association, movement and expression (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2009, p. 4). On the Freedom House Freedom in the World 2015 index, published in January 2015, Mozambique scores a 4 on the establishment of political rights and a 3 on civil liberties, both on a scale from 1 to 7.

Although these rights are formally provided by the constitution, in practice, recent developments are reason for concern in Mozambique. The dominant party in Mozambique, Frelimo, has shown some authoritarian tendencies, especially under president Guebuza. During recent years, criticism has been cracked down and journalists have been investigated for expressing critique (Corinna Jentsch, 19 December 2014). In addition, the main opposition party, Renamo, is still not being seen as a legitimate political party by the ruling party Frelimo. Frelimo has a tradition of presenting itself as the one and only legitimate political party in Mozambique and does not show tolerance towards opposing parties (Virtanen, 2003).

Within this context, opposition parties such as Renamo have relatively little political space to operate in. Renamo is not given equal space to influence Mozambicans and to point out differences (Corinna Jentsch, 19 December 2014). In addition, the ruling party Frelimo is taking advantages over opposition parties by using state resources for political mobilization (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015). Therefore, although equal political rights and

*“You have the coal mining companies in Mozambique, that displace people and don’t reimburse the people for the land they take. They build bad new houses and displace people to land they can’t work on. There are a lot of problems all over the country that are linked to the economic boom and companies coming into Mozambique, taking the land and using resources for big-scale projects. This is creating a larger difference between elite and regulars”*

- Corrina Jentsch, 19 December 2014

civil liberties are relatively well-established in Mozambique, the practice is that one party, Frelimo, has more access to political resources than other players on the Mozambican political field.

Besides inequality on the political playing field, economic and social inequalities also play a large role in Mozambique. Not only political inequalities, but also economic inequalities are rising as the differences between regulars and the elite class are rising in the country (Corinna Jentsch, 19 December 2014). In the 2014 Human Development Report, the Gini-coefficient for Mozambique, showing the level of income inequality in the country, is determined at 45.7 on a scale from 0 (equal income distribution) to 100 (unequal income distribution). This shows that income inequalities in Mozambique are relatively high. According to Corinna Jentsch (19 December 2014) as well as Hermenegildo Mulhovo (17 January 2015), this is a result of the ‘regular’ Mozambican people not benefiting from the economic boom and the energy boom in the country. The Frelimo elite are benefitting from these developments, but the regular people are staying behind. The discontent with these inequalities is a base for support for opposition parties such as Renamo (Corinna Jentsch, 19 December 2014; De Rosario, 2014). Opposition leaders use the discourse of economic inequality and plays this discourse to their hands (Corinna Jentsch, 19 December 2014). Inequalities are therefore

used for political strategies, although the rising inequality is not necessarily linked to ideological ideas or political choices', but more to a general lack of capacity within the ruling party to create policies of high quality (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015).

Often, differences in access to political resources are not only defined by social-economic inequalities, but also by inequalities between urban and rural areas. The 31.7% of Mozambicans living in urban areas (UNDP, 2014) have much more exposure to information and are generally more literate than Mozambicans living in rural areas (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015), creating somewhat of an 'urban bias' with regard to political equality in Mozambique. Because of this, we can say that the access to political resources is greater in urban areas than in rural areas in Mozambique. Interestingly, citizens in rural Mozambique tend to be more satisfied with democracy than urban citizens. In the Afrobarometer 2012, 27% of the rural respondents answered to be 'very satisfied with democracy' compared to only 16% of the urban respondents.

### **6.2.2 Political equality in Burundi**

Looking at the political resources in place in Burundi, the country scores a 5 on both political rights as well as civil liberties in Freedom House's 2015 Freedom in the World index. With this, Burundi has fallen back to a level even lower than it was on before the signing of the constitution in terms of political rights and civil liberties: in 2005, the year the democratic constitution was signed, Burundi scored a 5,5 overall score (Freedom House, 2015).

The CNDD FDD, Burundi's ruling party, enjoys a majority in both Parliament as well as the executive government after the electoral boycott by major opposition parties in 2010. In the Burundian Parliament today, only the ruling CNDD FDD and two other smaller parties (Uprona and Frodebu Nyakuri) are represented in Parliament. This has created a tendency in the ruling party to monopolize power and to work as if it is working in a one-party system, causing frustration among opposition parties, who feel excluded from the management of the country (Nsengimana, 2015). The political space in Burundi is not open to every party and, in fact, the recent adoption of a new media law and discussions in Parliament over the possible banning of political demonstrations is causing serious concerns regarding the freedom of press and the democratic governance in Burundi (ISS Today, 24 July 2013). The International Crisis Group (2012) even states that the power-sharing system defined by the Arusha agreement has become irrelevant. Clearly, the space of political resources necessary for an inclusive democracy is becoming smaller in Burundi.

As in Mozambique, the access to political resources in Burundi is also unequally divided. Burundi's ruling party – CNDD FDD – is closing the political space and grabs more privileges and uses public means for campaigning and party matters (Nsengimana, 2015). In addition, competence is not always prevailing in the appointment of officials by the CNDD FDD government, as favoritism plays a large role in these appointments (Nsengimana, 2015). Although freedom of expression is formally guaranteed in the Burundian constitution, the political practice shows that there is a lack of tolerance towards different ideas, within society, but especially within the Burundian political parties (Nsengimana, 2015). With this, the Burundian political system is not evenly distributing its political resources over all Burundians with different political preferences.

In terms of economic equality, Burundi has a Gini-coefficient of 0,33 (UNDP, 2014) and, therefore, has a higher degree of income equality than Mozambique. According to theory, this means that political equality in Burundi is also higher, as economic equality serves as a proxy for political equality (Lijphart, 1999). However, although the overall income equality may be higher in Burundi, the differences between the political class and 'regular' citizens is also high. Members of the ruling party, who are more represented in Burundi's formal institutions, have much more access to resources than others (Nsengimana, 2015). Participating in the government is seen as a problem of overcoming problems of existence in the generally poor history of Burundi. The colonial history of the country has marginalized certain groups and has created a system in which participation in the government guarantees a good life. This mentality has been institutionalized in Burundi and is still strong today (Nsengimana, 2015). These large inequalities between the political class and the much poorer 'regular' citizens of Burundi constitutes a threat to security and has negative impacts on the political stability in the country (Nsengimana, 2015).

In addition to economic inequality, the access to resources in Burundi also differs between urban citizens and rural citizens. Although participation of rural citizens in government is improving, there is a certain 'urban bias' under because the 11.5% of Burundians living in urban areas (UNDP, 2014) receive more information and are generally more aware of political issues than rural citizens (Nsengimana, 2015). As was shown earlier in this chapter, however, the rural Burundians' view on politics relies much more on ties with the ruling regime providing their 'basic needs' within their own environment, much different from urban citizens' views based on more access to information and awareness of political issues.

### 6.3 Inclusive political participation in the democratic process: electoral participation in Mozambique and Burundi

Another indicator for political inclusion, specifically the extent to which inclusive participation in the decision-making process takes place, is by examining the extent to which citizens actually do participate in one of the most important aspects of the democratic process: general elections. Therefore, measuring electoral participation serves as an indicator for political inclusion.

To measure electoral participation, a relatively easy sub-indicator may be used: voter turnout data, which is published for each election by International IDEA. According to Lijphart (1999, p. 283), voter turnout is “an excellent indicator of democratic quality” for two reasons: first, it says something about the extent to which citizens are interested in being represented or able to be represented, and second, it says something about political equality, because a high turnout usually means more equal participation and more equal access to political resources. In order to measure electoral participation through voter turnout, Lijphart (1999, p. 284) proposes to use the number of voters as percentage of the voting-age population at the elections with the highest turnouts, which are usually the presidential elections and/or the elections for national Parliaments. Therefore, International IDEA’s voter turnout data for these elections will be examined.

High voter turnouts, and therefore high participation, only leads to political inclusion when the elections themselves can be deemed as ‘free and fair’. If electoral participation is enforced, turnouts may be high, but the citizens’ ideas may still not be effectively included in the decision-making process. In addition, the ‘free and fair’ character of elections can serve as an explanation for the turnout numbers: if elections are never ‘free and fair’, this may lead to apathy among voters and the ‘resigning’ of voters from the process. Therefore, the extent to which elections are ‘free and fair’ must also be taken into account. This is not only about the access to secret ballot free of external interference, but also about equal opportunities for campaigning and such (Ostheimer , 1999). Therefore, to determine whether elections in Mozambique and Burundi are free and fair, the election observation reports by the European Union, covering a broad range of electoral topics, will be used.

<b>Sub-indicators</b>	
-	Voter turnout
-	‘Free and fair’ character of elections

**6.3.1 Participation in free and fair elections in Mozambique**

A look at the voter turnout data (International IDEA, 2014) shows that the turnout of voters during the 2014 parliamentary as well as presidential elections has been low, well below 50%. This number has severely decreased since the first multiparty elections in 1994. During these elections, there were voter turnouts of almost 90%. The low turnout in 2014, however, is significant in a country where voter turnouts have been traditionally high (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015).

<b>2014 Parliamentary elections Mozambique</b>	
Voter turnout (% of registered voters)	48.84%
Voter turnout (% of voting age population)	44.87%
<b>2014 Presidential elections Mozambique</b>	
Voter turnout (% of registered voters)	48.64%
Voter turnout (% of voting age population)	45.01%
(International IDEA Voter Turnout Data, 2014)	

However, as described earlier in this chapter, focusing only on voter turnout is not sufficient. To analyse electoral participation as an element of political inclusion, the participation of citizens in the electoral process has to be effective . Therefore, it must be analysed whether the elections were ‘free and fair’. Free and fair elections, according to Ostheimer (1999), not only include access to secret ballot free of external interference, but include about equal opportunities for, for example, campaigning. Mozambique has experienced problems to this regard. During the 2014 Parliamentary and Presidential elections in the country, the political playing field was not level as Frelimo, the ruling party, was able to use state resources for the party’s purposes (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015). The European Union Election Observation Mission (2009) came to the same conclusion for the elections in 2009. In their final report, they state that there was a vast gap between the campaigning capabilities of Frelimo and the limited reach of Renamo, MDM and other opposition parties, partly due to a late release of public funds by the Frelimo-ruled government. As can be seen in the chart below, this resulted in significantly more media-time for the ruling party Frelimo compared to the opposition parties.



**Total distribution of airtime and space allocated to political parties around the 2009 elections in Mozambique, in percentages:**

FRELIMO	Radio 43.4%	TV 43.9%	Newspapers 40.6%
RENAMO	Radio 22.2%	TV 21.7%	Newspapers 25.1%
MDM	Radio 12.6%	TV 18.8%	Newspapers 19.6%

(European Union Election Observation Mission, 2009, p. 24)

In addition, the European Union Election Observation Mission (2009) reported cases of voter intimidation, biased behaviour by independent officials and violent disruptions of the electoral process. The practice of elections in Mozambique can, therefore, not be considered as completely 'free and fair', even with the formal constitutional, legislative arrangements calling for the protection of political rights and guaranteeing genuine elections.

### **6.3.2 Participation in free and fair elections in Burundi**

Since the signing of the Arusha Accords and the implementation of the constitution, there have been two national elections organized in Mozambique: in 2005 and in 2010. The following national elections will be organized in 2015. As can be seen in the figure, the 2010 voter turnout numbers shows that the turnout during these elections was relatively high in Burundi: around 50% of Burundi's voting age population took part in the Parliamentary elections, while well over 50% of these people voted for a new president (International IDEA, 2010). These figures need some further explanation: because of the electoral boycott in 2010 by major opposition parties, it can be expected that the turnout during the 2005 elections was much higher. A look at the 2005 voter turnout figures indeed shows that in 2005, more than 70% of the Burundian voting age population participated in the Parliamentary elections (International IDEA, 2010). It can therefore be concluded that the 2010 electoral boycott has had a negative impact on the turnout of voters in Burundi.

**2010 Parliamentary elections Burundi**

Voter turnout (% of registered voters) 66.68%

Voter turnout (% of voting age population) 50.81%

**2010 Presidential elections Burundi**

Voter turnout (% of registered voters) 76.98%

Voter turnout (% of voting age population) 58.69%

(International IDEA Voter Turnout Data, 2010)

Earlier in this chapter, the differences in access to political resources between socio-economic classes in Burundi has been described. These differences are also relevant for electoral participation. Extreme poverty among a part of Burundi's society, as well as a high level of illiteracy, limits groups of citizens from participating in the electoral process (Nsengimana, 2015). In addition, there have been problems with regard to registering voters in Burundi. This is illustrated by the fact that the voter turnouts as percentages of registered voters during the 2010 elections are significantly higher than the turnouts as percentages of the voting age population, showing that a significant part of the voting age population in Burundi has not been registered. However, there is, at least to a certain degree, a political will in Burundi to hand people the opportunity to participate in elections, shown for example by recent efforts by political parties, civil society organizations and the electoral management body to solve problems of registration for the upcoming 2015 elections (Nsengimana, 2015).

As described earlier, electoral participation is only effective when the elections are 'free and fair'. After last general elections in Burundi, in 2010, and the announcement of the victory of the CNDD FDD, the opposition parties denounced "massive electoral fraud" (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 1). Although national as well as international observers have recognized these elections as "free and fair, despite some irregularities", the playing field in Burundi has not been equal. As described earlier, for elections to be free and fair, there must be equal opportunities for all parties during the elections as well as in the run-up to elections (Ostheimer, 1999). However, the ruling party CNDD FDD has more access to political resources than other parties and, similar to Frelimo in Mozambique, uses state resources for the party's purpose (Nsengimana, 2015). In addition, CNDD has had much more airtime in national media than the contesting parties, as shown in the figure below.

**Total distribution of media airtime and space allocated to political parties around the 2010 elections in Burundi, in seconds:**

CNDD FDD	425000 seconds
FNL	little over 24000
UPRONA	around 12500
FRODEBU	little over 10000

(Union Europeene Mission d'Observation Electorale, 2010, p. 41)

Therefore, although the electoral process itself may be recognized as 'free and fair', the allocation of political resources in the run-up to elections has not been fair: not all parties have been equally included in opportunities to effectively engage in the political process.

#### 6.4 Inclusive results of the democratic process: inclusive representation in Mozambique and Burundi

In order to consolidate inclusive democracies, adopting political institutions that guarantee political rights and periodic elections may not be enough: effective participation and the representation of different groups within the government is essential (Lawoti, 2007). In other words: equal access to political resources and participation in democratic processes must lead to inclusive representation for any inclusive democracy. 'Effective participation' and 'engagement in developing inclusive policies', the central elements to political inclusion described earlier, are after all only possible when all groups – including minorities – are effectively represented within any country's political system. Therefore, minority representation serves as a sub-indicator for political inclusion.

Lijphart (1999, p. 280) uses women's representation as a proxy to see how well – in general – minorities are represented within the country. Since the multiplicity of ethnic and religious minorities in different countries make it very difficult to compare the inclusion of minorities, Lijphart (1999, p. 280) argues that, for him, it "makes sense to focus on the 'minority of women' – a political rather than numerical minority – that is found everywhere and that can be compared systematically across countries". Lijphart's study covers 36 democracies, which makes him unable to identify all 'minorities' and measure the extent to which they are represented in all the countries he covers.

However, as this study covers only two countries, Mozambique and Burundi, identifying minorities and measuring their representation is possible. For this, a focus on different relevant ethnicities, minorities and cleavages in the contexts of the country studied is needed. Simonsen (2004) argues that the concept of ‘ethnicity’ has been challenged, and that there are many ways ethnic groups can be defined: by religion, by language, by descent, but also by other identities and ‘dichotomies’ which may play an important role. Therefore, the identification of ‘relevant’ social groups and cleavages is different in each country and each context. Having said this, it is always relevant to measure women’s representation as well, as women form a political minority in every country. Since there is no quantitative data available for the representation of minorities – with the exception of representation of women – this sub-indicator will be measured in a more qualitative way. The representation of women will be measured by using the share of women in Parliament for each country, found in UNDP’s 2014 Human Development Report.

- |   |
|---|
| <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Sub-indicators</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Proxy: women’s representation</li><li>- Representation of relevant social groups</li></ul> |
|---|

**6.4.1 Inclusive representation in Mozambique**

Earlier in this chapter, it has been described that in an inclusive democracy, all relevant groups within society are represented within the government. To identify which groups and which differences within society are ‘relevant’ in Mozambique, it is important to analyse the societal context of the country.

In contrast to many other civil conflicts revolving around ethnic, regional or religious cleavages, the conflict in Mozambique has been – to a large extent – a political conflict. Mozambique does not have a strong history of ethnic conflict and minority issues are not sharply drawn in the country (Minority Rights Group International, 2014). The socialist Frelimo-regime has created a society in which national unity of the state has a prominent place (Virtanen, 2003; Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015)

Mozambique has, however, a history of a strong political cleavage between the ruling Frelimo party and opposition parties, most notably Renamo. At the start of the conflict in Mozambique, Renamo was framed as an ‘external threat’ to Mozambican unity as the movement existed mostly because of support by the South African and Rhodesian governments (Corinna Jentsch, 19 December 2014).

However, Renamo transformed into a local, Mozambican player which was strongly embraced by part of the Mozambican population (Corinna Jentsch, 19 December 2014), dividing the country in two in terms of political ideology. In fact, traditionally, support for Renamo has traditionally been based on discontent with the sitting Frelimo regime. Initially, support for Renamo was, to a large extent, built on frustration with the Frelimo regime for taking away authority from traditional, local leaders, fuelling dispute within rural areas in Mozambique (Braathen & Orre, 2001, p. 217). Local political divides such as these have been the underlying basis for conflict in Mozambique: in contrast to other former colonized countries in Africa, such as Angola, the conflict in Mozambique was never a 'proxy war' between external superpowers (Ostheimer, 1999). Within this politically divided country, one party – Frelimo – has dominated the political scene, winning every multiparty election since 1994 and exercising power over the country's executive government since independence. Renamo, to date, has never been included in these governments. In terms of inclusion, therefore, a significant part of the Mozambican population has been excluded from government in terms of political preferences. However, the new president, installed in January 2015, has expressed his intentions to be a president of all Mozambicans and has promised more inclusion in Mozambique's executive government (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015). It remains to be seen if he will take steps towards more inclusion in terms of political preferences being represented in the executive government.

As described above, the conflict in Mozambique was based on a political divide instead of an ethnic, religious or regional cleavage. This political divide has, to a certain extent, been translated into a regional cleavage. Uneven colonial development as well as post-colonial policies created resentment among northern Mozambicans towards the southern-dominated political class (Minority Rights Group International, 2014). This resentment has led to strong Renamo-support in the north of the country, while Frelimo had its base mostly in the south of the country. However, these regional differences never led to an actual cleavage between the north and the south of Mozambique, is not so much an issue in Mozambican politics today and will not translate into a regional conflict (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015). Frelimo has strong supporters everywhere and dominates local administrations in the north as well as in the south of the country (Corinna Jentsch, 19 December 2014). It is therefore too superficial to speak of a regional cleavage. Michel Cahen (1990) actually argues that the regional differences in Mozambique are nothing more than expressions of socio-economic class differences within the country. The regional differences are therefore not a large issue in terms of government representation. In addition, the new president of Mozambique is from the north himself (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015).

Generally speaking, societal cleavages, other than the political differences between Frelimo and opposition parties, have not caused problems of representation in Mozambique. All relevant ethnic groups are represented in the Parliament (Minority Rights Group International, 2014), which is elected through a system of proportional representation. In addition, women are also relatively well represented. According to the UNDP Human Development Report 2014, Mozambique has a share of women seats in Parliament of 39.2%. Although Mozambique does not have gender quota in its electoral legislation, the constitution does guarantee equal right for both genders (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2009). In addition, political parties in Mozambique themselves, most notably the ruling party Frelimo, have taken the responsibility of introducing quota for different societal groups – including women, but also youth and veterans, for example – in their internal party regulations; a fashion which other political parties have tried to follow (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015). For the 2009 elections, Frelimo’s closed lists consisted for 30% of women, while 20% of Renamo’s candidates and a targeted 45% of MDM’s candidates were women (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2009).

Interestingly, although there are no significant cleavages within Mozambique that create problems of underrepresentation within Parliament and government, societal differences have played – and still play - a significant role in Mozambican politics. Societal differences within the country have been instigated and exploited by political elite in Mozambique. During the conflict, leaders of opposition movements and local militia such as the Naparama have appealed to local traditions, religions and cultures in order to mobilize people for their movement (Corinna Jentsch, 19 December 2014). Today, political leaders, most notably from the opposition party Renamo, still try to instigate cleavages in the past and have threatened to break up the country. These threats, however, are posed by political leaders as a political strategy, but are not backed by strong cleavages among the Mozambican people themselves (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015): the ‘cleavages’ stay within the parameters of rhetoric and political strategies.

#### **6.4.2 Inclusive representation in Burundi**

Ethnic differences have played a significant role in the history of Burundi, put in place by the colonial system. The Belgian colonization powers made differences between different ethnic groups in Burundi, touching the core of society in a very fundamental way and, eventually, leading to years of ethnic conflict in the country (Antony Otieno Ong’ayo, 12 January 2015). These ethnic differences still play a large role in Burundi today, as people are still considered to be part of an ethnic group (Fabien

Nsengimana, 13 January 2015). Taking this into account, it makes sense to look at the political representation of different ethnicities in Burundi.

As described in chapter 6, ethnic representation of the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic group is constitutionally guaranteed by quota for both the Parliament as well as the executive government, while representatives from the Twa minority are co-opted into Parliament, although this minority is not represented within the executive government. With this, although ethnicity still plays a large role in society, politics is no longer dominated by ethnic differences. Today, all major parties in Burundi include

*“Yesterday, conflict in Burundi was basically ethnical with political signs and implications. Today, the conflict is more political”*

Fabien Nsengimana, 13 January 2015

both Hutus and Tutsis (Fabien Nsengimana, 13 January 2015). The elections campaigns between major parties overshadow the ethnic divide in the country (Minority Rights Group International, 2014).

With this, Burundi has undergone an evolution from clearly ethnical cleavages in the country to a much more political divide (Fabien Nsengimana, 13 January 2015). Therefore, focusing only on the representation of ethnicities does not give a fulfilling picture of political inclusion in Burundi: although ethnicities are well represented, opposition parties feel excluded based on political preferences, as described earlier in this chapter. Basically, the CNDD FDD exercises power in Burundi on its own. The power-sharing system defined by the Arusha agreement has become irrelevant (International Crisis Group, 2012). As the CNDD FDD, since the electoral boycott in 2010, controls both the Parliament as well as the executive government with strong majorities, there is a lack of effective Parliamentary control on the executive government in Burundi (Fabien Nsengimana, 13 January 2015). In addition, there has been no dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition parties (International Crisis Group, 2012). Political exclusion in Burundi is thus no longer based on ethnic grounds, but takes place by the ruling party not including their opposition in the process of ruling the country.

Burundi has, however, taken large steps in terms of the representation of women in Parliament. The Burundian constitution of 2005 guarantees 30% of the Parliament seats for women, fitting within the international increase in the implementation of quota for women after the Beijing 95 conference (Fallon, Swiss & Viterna, 2012). In practice, 34.9% of the Parliament’s seats is allocated to women (UNDP, 2014). Burundian women also participate in the electoral process: during the 2010 general elections, more women (51.4%) were actually registered to vote than men (Union Europeene Mission d’Observation Electorale, 2010).

## 6.5 Political inclusion in both systems

In chapter 6, the conclusion was drawn that Mozambique had a system of mostly majoritarian institutions, while the Burundian system was much more consensus-oriented. According to theory, this would mean that the political system in Burundi provides for more political inclusion than the political system in Mozambique. After all: according to theory, consociational institutions are able to get more people participated in governance (Lawoti, 2007), leading to more political inclusion.

However, a thorough look at the different indicators for political inclusion in the political systems of Mozambique and Burundi, as described above, learns that consensus-oriented Burundi does not score significantly better in terms of political inclusion than majoritarian Mozambique. In fact, in terms of general democratic quality, political rights, civil liberties and access to political resources, Mozambique actually scores significantly better than Burundi. Burundi, on the other hand, scores better than Mozambique in terms of electoral participation, meaning that a greater share of society is included in the electoral process in Burundi. This does not lead to significant differences in terms of inclusive representation, however, since both countries score similarly well in terms of the representation of relevant minorities and women in Parliament. Therefore, it can be stated that although there are differences to be found between both countries on several indicators of political inclusion, neither of the countries scores significantly better than the other on the overall picture of political inclusion.

In fact, similar problems with regard to political inclusion can be identified in both the majoritarian system in Mozambique and the more consociational system in Burundi. Although the formal institutions and constitutional arrangements in both countries differ from each other, in practice, both countries deal with a government dominated by one party, monopolizing power, excluding opposition parties, using state resources for their own purposes and not being effectively controlled by Parliament. In addition, the electoral processes in both countries show similar problems, with the very small political space for opposition parties to operate in both countries. The gathered information also shows that the access to both political as well as economic resources is unevenly distributed in both countries. These findings show that, regardless of the political system effective in these countries, similarities in terms of problems with regard to political inclusion occur. We can therefore conclude that the formalized consociational institutions in Burundi do not necessarily lead to a practice of political inclusion, while the formalized majoritarian institutions in Mozambique are not necessarily the reason for political exclusion, in contrast to claims made by various scholars. Institutional frameworks, in other words, do not provide the explanation for problems with regard to political inclusion in these fragile and conflict-affected settings.



This raises the question what factors do provide an explanation for these problems. The research findings done in both cases show that several similar characteristics of politics in both majoritarian Mozambique and consensus-oriented Burundi lead to similar phenomena in both these fragile and conflict-affected settings. The next chapter will conclude the research by focusing on several of these characteristics, specific for fragile and conflict-affected settings.

## 7 The gap between formal institutions and informal practice: specific characteristics of political practice fragile and conflict-affected settings

In his article *Democracy in Divided Societies*, Horowitz (1993) states that democratic institutions can lead to undemocratic results in divided societies. Clearly, the former chapters have shown that this statement is true in the divided, fragile and conflict-affected settings of both Mozambique and Burundi. Problems of political inclusion occur in both these settings.

The theory introduced in the first chapters of this research states that consociational institutions lead to inclusive democracies. Although empirical findings from the countries studies in Lijphart's (1999) research may prove this to be true for established democracies, this research shows that in fragile and conflict-affected settings, neither consociational institutions nor majoritarian institutions provide for political inclusion. Regardless of where the institutional system of these countries can be placed in the spectrum of Lijphart's majoritarian – consociational framework, similar problems of political inclusion occur. There seems to be a gap between the formal way in which institutions have been organized and the practice of political inclusion, meaning that factors other than the formal institutions must play important roles in the way democracy is practiced.

The institutional framework used for this research, provided by Lijphart's *Patterns of Democracy*, is influential and renowned within political science and comparative politics for its comprehensive approach towards classifying democracies and democratic institutions. Within academic literature, the framework is regularly used for analysing democratic systems, as Lawoti (2009) has done in Nepal. The reason of its usability in different contexts of democracy is at the same time, however, the framework's weakness: the framework classifies democracies based on formal arrangements, which are comparable, but does not take into account the informal practices and characteristics that co-define political systems. These informal practices are reasons for a lack of political inclusion in the fragile and conflict-affected settings studied earlier in this research, therefore undermining democratization efforts which focus on establishing democratic institutions.

This research shows that, regardless of the formal institutional arrangements, informal aspects influence political inclusion in fragile and conflict-affected settings. A few of these informal characteristics, specific for fragile and conflict-affected settings, are described below. The descriptions

of these specific characteristics of fragile and conflict-affected settings are built on information gathered through analysing literature and conducting interviews on the cases of Mozambique and Burundi.

### 7.1 The 'ethnic security dilemma' and the downward spiral of distrust

Political distrust plays a key role within fragile and conflict-affected settings, having dealt with years of civil conflict and hostility towards fellow citizens. Even when this civil conflict has ended, the causes of these conflicts, such as conflicting attitudes, behaviours and issues, may still be present in society (Lappin, 2001). In addition, the acts of war which occurred during the civil war may be new sources for distrust in post-conflict settings.

The political distrust towards one another provides the central basis for the ethnic security dilemma. According to the ethnic security dilemma, described by Saideman, Lanoue and Campenni (2002), the government of any divided state is, potentially, the greatest threat to any group within this state. The fact that the state controls resources and exercises power, causes fear among groups that other groups within society will control the government and use its resources and power against them. Because of this, groups within the society seek control over the state themselves, in order to prevent other groups from exercising control over the state, or may secede if the state's neutrality is at risk. These efforts may lead to the attempts of one group reinforcing the fear of others, bringing society in a downward spiral of distrust.

In each the case studies studied for this research, Mozambique and Burundi, the control over the state is basically being exercised by one dominant party. This strong domination of single political parties excludes significant parts of society in both Mozambique as well as Burundi. In the case of Mozambique, Frelimo has been able to dominate the power over the state since the first elections in 1994 and as the party held on to power, the same elite kept control over the party, which maintained several aspects of its organization and ideology it already exercised during the 80's, when Frelimo had the power in a one-party system (Morier-Genoud, 2009). The same can be seen in Burundi, where the *de jure* consociational institutions are in place, but where the Hutu-dominated CNDD FDD has controlled power over the state and moved towards one-party system, characterized by a lack of inclusive dialogue with opposition parties, since the election boycott in 2010 (International Crisis Group, 2012), even plunging Burundi on the 2012 Democracy Index into the category of 'authoritarian regimes' (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012). Supporters of opposition parties, or more generally,

people who are not supporting the ideology of the single dominant party in these countries have been consequently left out of government control.

Although these forms of exclusion are based on political divisions rather than ethnicity, the consequent exclusion of a large part of the Mozambican citizenry enhances distrust between the parties: there is evidence of growing distrust between Frelimo and Renamo (Siteo, Matsimbe & Pereira, 2005). This distrust has its source in the years of intense conflict between the two parties, but is consolidated and even growing today. Renamo has called the domination of Frelimo an “occupation of power” (Gentili, 2013, p. 14) and feels it has no power to achieve its interests within the formal, constitutional framework of electoral politics and parliamentary democracy, and therefore shows a preference for mechanisms of power-sharing outside of this framework, such as by threatening to reignite conflict, by not recognizing election results and by forms of civil disobedience (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015; Siteo, Matsimbe & Pereira, 2005). Similarly, Burundi has recently seen attacks on civilian targets for which rebel groups were blamed by the government, while others involved say the attacks were committed by the regime’s own agents in order to ‘hammer’ opposition towards the regime (The Economist, 2012). Clearly, because of the domination of politics by a single party and the strong distrust of opposition parties towards the regime, opposition parties in these countries seem to be seeking control over the state and its resources outside of the institutional framework, reinforcing distrust between political parties and bringing the relationship between these parties in a downwards spiral – much like the ethnic security dilemma sketched above.

To break this downwards spiral of distrust, a strong emphasis on building on political trust, dialogue and consensus between parties is needed, specifically in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

## 7.2 'Big-man' democracy and clientelism

Democracy, most notably in African countries, is characterized by patrimonial logic and clientelist relationships. According to Van de Walle (2001), in these countries, “democratizations have had little impact on economic decision-making because the new regimes remain governed by neo-patrimonial logic” (p. 18). In other words: personal relationships and mutual promises towards certain people prevail over the general picture of ‘the greater good’, even when democracy is in place.

The reason for this is that within young democracies, there is a certain absence of political credibility among political leaders. Political leaders choose to make unreasonable promises to certain voters, but are unable to make credible commitments to a broader group of voters. There is a lack of *elite will*, in other words, to direct the resources and capacities of the state to live up to the expectations, which forms one of the factors for fragility described earlier (OECD/DAC, 2008). In these situations, the provision of non-targeted goods by the state is lower and the provision of targeted goods, meaning goods targeted at certain people, is greater (Keefer, 2007). In these settings, political leaders appeal to clientelist relations within a clientelist network. Examples of targeted goods include jobs and public work projects, whereas non-targeted goods include universal education, secure property rights and access to information (Keefer, 2007).

The reason why the provision of targeted goods prevails over non-targeted groups in these countries, is because political leaders in these settings appeal to members of their clientelist networks. Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) characterize these networks as networks defined by members who are able to make mutual, credible commitments. Political leaders in these networks are seen as ‘big men’ and clients within their networks are primarily members of the same ethnic or political group. Country studies done by Stroh (2009) and Erdmann (2007) show that clientelist relationships play a large role within political parties in these settings, as political parties typically look for candidates who control local clientelist network, which are often ethnically or politically homogenous.

These patrimonial, clientelist relations are very clear in the situation of Burundi. In Burundi, engaging in politics is seen as a way to solve problems of existing. In a setting with relatively few resources and high levels of poverty, participating in the government and exercising control over the administration is seen as a possibility to live a good life (Fabien Nsengimana, 13 January 2015). This has large impact on the interests that political leaders have. Although political leaders in Burundi try to stand for the greater good, the starting point is their own personal interest of solving problems of existence, for

themselves and for their direct networks. Power, in these settings, is used to attain access over basic resources (Antony Otieno Ong'ayo, 12 January 2015). In the appointment of officials in Burundi, for example, competence is not always prevailing over personal ties and relationships (Fabien Nsengimana, 13 January 2015). Because of this, people within clientelist networks around 'big men' are included in the government and attain access to resources, while others are excluded, creating economic as well as political inequalities within the country. However, these excluded and marginalized people may accept the state of affairs as it is because they are tired of war and conflict. Therefore, these clientelist relationships can continue to dominate political systems in these settings (Antony Otieno Ong'ayo, 12 January 2015).

Mozambique shows similar trends of clientelism and patrimonial hierarchies. Especially the main opposition party, Renamo, is very much focused on their political leader, Dhlakama, fitting within the idea of 'big man' democracies in Africa. Dhlakama has mostly prevented youth and other groups within the party to influence the party's policies (Corinna Jentsch, 19 December 2014). In addition, Renamo under Dhlakama seems to have little interest in sharing power with Frelimo. Although there have been attempts to create coalitions between the two main parties, these coalitions with Renamo under leadership of Dhlakama have failed (Ostheimer, 2010), showing that patrimonial relationships and 'big man' tendencies can be an obstacle for inclusive democracies in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

As can be seen, building and relying on clientelist networks plays a key role in politics and democracy within the studied fragile and conflict-affected settings. There is a lack of a general 'social contract', according to which political leaders have an obligation to apply rights to every citizen in return for them submitting to the authority of the government, in these settings. Instead, the focus of political leaders in these settings is on satisfying the 'right' people in return for support.

### 7.3 Exploitation of cleavages, war rhetoric and veteran politics

In chapter 7 of this research, several cases of political leaders 'exploiting' cleavages and identities as a political strategy have been described. The usage of identities as strategy is very clearly visible in the history of Mozambique. While initially Renamo was seen as an external threat by the Frelimo regime, the conflict eventually transformed into a local and fragmented conflict involving local militia. One of these militia was Nampara, which operated in the northern provinces of Zambezia and Nampula, protecting towns from Renamo attacks. As the militia was based in these specific regions, the initiator and leader of this militia appealed to the region's local traditions and religions in order to mobilize people (Jentsch, 2014), forming an example of how identity can be used to group people in a fragmented country.

This strategy of using identities and exploiting cleavages is still used by political leaders today. Just recently, Renamo leader Dhlakama threatened to split the northern part of Mozambique, where most Renamo supporters are traditionally based, from the southern part of the country (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015). In 2013, Dhlakama retreated to Gorongosa, a former guerrilla stronghold, where he called for a renegotiation of the Rome General Peace Accord and threatened to end the peace and restart the war (Gentili, 2013, p. 14). Similar tendencies to use war rhetoric has been seen in Burundi, where opposition parties have renounced violence in 2012 and where the ruling CNDD FDD and opposition movements have blamed each other for attacks on Burundian towns and villages (The Economist, 2012). By using this kind of rhetoric, political leaders deliberately choose to focus on identity and polarize the country, using the deep divisions present after conflict, instead of focusing on including all parties.

The usage of polarizing war rhetoric by political leaders in severely divided countries can be seen as a political strategy. In a country such as Mozambique, this rhetoric comes from political leaders only rather than from citizens themselves (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 2015). One of the reasons for this is the inclusion of war veterans into political parties, often within leading positions. These war veterans deal with a process of healing from trauma, even 20 years after the settlement of conflict. As veterans are often placed in front of their party, they bring experiences and rhetoric of war and trauma into the public space of politics (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015), influencing the rhetoric in this political space and enhancing and facilitating war rhetoric within political parties.

In addition, political parties themselves are often 'veterans', or remnants of insurgent forces during conflict, such as opposition movements and rebel groups. Renamo in Mozambique, but also the CNDD FDD in Burundi, are parties which have converted from insurgent forces to civil political parties. This

process of post-insurgent reconversion is of vital importance for political inclusion in fragile and conflict-affected settings. A lack of full reconversion can lead to the refuelling of conflict in these deeply divided societies. In Mozambique, for example, Renamo has not fully been demilitarized and still has an active military wing (Hermenegildo Mulhovo, 17 January 2015), which is able to threaten to restart the war, as it did in 2013 and 2014. Similarly, opposition forces in Burundi have been able to renounce violence in Burundi (The Economist, 2012). Therefore, in fragile and conflict-affected settings, a strong emphasis on supporting parties in the transition from insurgent force to civil political party is needed, focusing on both the organizational capacities as well as the programmatic capacities of these parties.



## 8 Conclusion

The problem analysis of this research has introduced democratization efforts during recent decades, which have mainly focused on state-building and setting up democratic institutions in developing democracies, and the importance of political inclusion for this establishment and the consolidation of democracy, specifically in divided societies and conflict-affected settings. Lijphart's theory states that to facilitate political inclusion, so-called consociational democracies must be set up. This theory, however, is based on findings from established democracies, raising the question whether the alleged relationship between consociational institutions and political inclusion also holds for the specific contexts of fragile and conflict-affected settings, where political inclusion is of such importance.

The analysis of political institutions in Mozambique and Burundi, both of which are fragile and conflict-affected settings, shows an overall picture of Mozambique as a more majoritarian system and of Burundi as a more consociational system. Therefore, testing the relationship and examining the differences in political inclusion in these countries can prove the theory described above to be true or false. Although there are some differences on certain aspects of political inclusion found, the analysis of political inclusion in both fragile and conflict-affected settings shows no significant differences in terms of political inclusion between majoritarian Mozambique and consociational Burundi. In fact, similar problems in terms of the government being dominated by one party, monopolizing power, excluding opposition parties, using state resources for their own purposes and not being effectively controlled by Parliament. Regardless of the type of political system, political inclusion faces problems in both countries.

As described in the former chapter, a closer look at the findings done from both case studies learns that it is some specific characteristics of political practice in fragile and conflict-affected settings, instead of institutional factors, that explain the problems of political inclusion in both majoritarian Mozambique and the more consociational system of Burundi. In other words, this research shows that there is a gap between formal democratic institutions and informal political practice, and introduces some informal characteristics of fragile and conflict-affected settings that create this gap.

The answer to the research question is, therefore:

*What is, in practice, the relationship between political institutions, seen from a majoritarian – consociational framework, and political inclusion in fragile and conflict-affected settings?*

Democratic political institutions, whether majoritarian or consociational, are not able to solely facilitate political inclusion in the specific contexts of fragile and conflict-affected settings. The theory that consociational institutions lead to inclusive democracies, therefore, does not hold in these settings. Instead, fragile and conflict-affected settings face challenges with regard to political inclusion which are not based on institutional frameworks, but rather, on political practice specific for these settings.

Although the characteristics of political practice in fragile and conflict-affected settings which have been described in this research concern elements of ‘fragility’ and ‘conflict-affectedness’, which are aspects in definition relevant to all fragile and conflict-affected settings, they are based on findings in two specific case studies of fragile and conflict-affected settings: Mozambique and Burundi. Other cases of fragile and conflict-affected settings may show similar characteristics, but may also be different and show additional characteristics. In addition, surely, the scale of this research makes it impossible to include all the informal institutions, patterns and practices to be found in the specific cases of Mozambique and Burundi. Field work in either of these countries may provide other important informal aspects which have not been described in this research, and may therefore be useful to provide a more comprehensive sketch of these fragile and conflict-affected settings.

Although there should be no illusion that the specific characteristics of political practice in these settings described in this research provide all the answers towards inclusive democracies, this research does give some overall insights, showing that the state-building approach, focusing on institution-building, is not sufficient in the contexts of fragile and conflict-affected settings. This argument is backed by the work of Nixon and Ponzio (2007), who state that attention should be paid to micro-level sources of legitimization, instead of altering state institutions on a macro-level (Nixon & Ponzio, 2007).

In developing future approaches for establishing and consolidating democracy in fragile and conflict-affected settings, it is important for the actors engaged to acknowledge and pay attention to the fact that specific characteristics of these settings may facilitate a gap between the formal democratic institutions and the informal political practice on the field. In addition, actors engaged must thoroughly sketch these characteristics in the specific setting by studying its context, its history, its conflict dynamics and the composition of its society. The history of conflict, the deep divisions within society and the relatively large risk of reigniting conflict make this extremely important for fragile and conflict-

affected settings. By acknowledging and sketching the context, a specific 'tailor-made' approach can be developed, addressing both the institutional as well as the informal aspects of the specific settings influencing, or even undermining, the efforts to establish and consolidate inclusive democracies and democratic institutions in these settings.

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## Appendix I – Interview Corinna Jentsch

*Leiden University*  
*19 December 2014*

J Thank you very much for your time for this interview. What I understand, is that you have quite some experience on the ground in Mozambique. You have worked there and have done research for several months.

C Yes, I did research in two provinces, Nampula and Zambezia. In the provincial capitals, so in Quelimane and in Nampula.

J Ok. And you focussed mainly on the conflict dynamics, right? The civil war dynamics?

C Yes. So I looked at civilian mobilization during the war. There was a militia, basically a self-defence militia, that emerged in the late 1980's in the border region between Nampula and Zambezia and spread across Zambezia and Nampula. It influenced the war very much because people... Well, people were tired of the war, the government army was very weak in its response to Renamo. So people looked for alternative ways to protect themselves, to end the violence that was a major motivation to do something about ending the violence. So they formed these militias. Basically, it was one traditional healer who created this militia initially, and it spread from one area to another. So I studied the initial formation of the group and how it spread across these two provinces. Nampula and Zambezia were Renamo strongholds so they were very much affected by the war. Violence was very high. This militia actually achieved, succeeded in retaking towns. In '86-'87, Renamo succeeded in occupying a lot of the district towns across these two provinces and Naparama, that's the name of this militia, they succeeded in re-occupying and liberating these towns in the late 1980's. So they were very successful in driving back Renamo.

J So what was the support base for this militia?

C It was peasants. Yes, it was a movement.. the traditional healer, Manuel Antonio recruited many peasants who were fed up with this suffering. Some of the... the government had state militias, kind of in the set-up of the socialist state. So everybody was organized in some organizations. Especially in the connection with the communal villages. So every communal village had a militia to protect the local population against enemies of the state and internal enemies. So Zambezia and Nampula, especially Zambezia, was an area with a lot of tea factories. All these big factories also had militia, so the workers were organized in militias. So there was already a system set up for an armed civilian force to protect the state and this was then redesigned into a force that would also fight the civil war. It wasn't set up to fight a civil war, but all the state institutions were redesigned once it was clear that Renamo was a real threat to the stability of the country. All the state institutions were redesigned to respond to this enemy. So they were all set up to protect from an internal enemy once Mozambique was independent because it was a socialist state, so from the beginning, it was clear that the state would face all these internal enemies that were against the socialist ideas of the government. But the Renamo threat was constructed as an external enemy, as an external threat...

J Because it was supported by Rhodesia and South Africa...

C Exactly, because of the South African and Rhodesian support base. So there was a response by the state to use these militias against Renamo. But they weren't very effective, they weren't trained very well, they weren't equipped very well. These militias had the same problems as the state military: they didn't have enough resources, they didn't even have enough food to survive, so most of the soldiers and the militia just lived off the population and.. And so they were very ineffective. So there was a space for this third force to emerge.



J That's basically what it was then, right? You had the government force, you had the Renamo rebel force, which was seen as an external force, and you had all these different kinds of internal forces. Do I understand that right?

C Yes, well, they did belong to one.. I mean, there were, this Naparama militia was one bigger movement. So there was one leader in Zambezia, there was one leader who was basically controlling most of the forces in Nampula. So it was decentralized, but it had a common source. And they did.. Well it's true, there is evidence of smaller forces that kind of.. I mean, this was a war that was very local. There was very little communication between the districts and, well, basically between the periphery and the centre. There was very little communication. So it was a very fragmented war where local elites also used the opportunity to settle their own local disputes. So there were other forces as well, but they didn't become as prominent as the Naparama militia.

J Ok. Would you say that these militias were more pragmatic, that they were against violence and making use of the conflict situation? Or were they more ethnically based, regionally based, religiously based? Were they based on cultural cleavages or were they more a response to violence?

C Well, there was... So, the initiator of this militia was a traditional healer. So one of the ways in which this militia mobilized the population is by appeal to traditional religion, to this cultural resource of traditional practices. So what he did is he came into a town or a village and he would perform this ceremony in which he demonstrated his extraordinary, supernatural powers. So he would dig a grave and be buried and then he resurrected from the grave. So there was a mix of traditional elements and Christian elements.

J Wow...

C Yes. It was kind of the resurrection of Jesus Christ that he would act. So the goal of this was to demonstrate how powerful he was, so that people would believe in his powers and would join his group because they thought they would be in good support. So one of the ways in which he mobilized peasants was by providing a vaccine to make them invulnerable to Renamo's bullets. So they would all be cut in the skin and they would get a medicine, scars over the body, which would make the invincible. Part of the ceremony was also to test the new recruits, so he would shoot at them or cut with a machete across their bodies. It was a very powerful demonstration of his powers in order to mobilize the people to believe in themselves, believe in their powers and basically give them courage to confront Renamo.

J Right.

C The other thing was that, at least initially, they wouldn't be allowed... So the thing is that, according to traditional religions, in order for medicine to work, you have to comply with a bunch of rules. So you can't eat certain things, you can't... In this case, you couldn't use firearms. So the only weapons they were allowed to use were spears, knives, traditional weapons. Otherwise, the medicine wouldn't work. The other taboos were, they were not allowed to withdraw. So all the taboos, all the laws, made them a really fierce force, because they had to confront the enemy. Frelimo and Renamo, the two armies, would fight from a distance, unless Renamo planned ambushed. But there were rarely direct confrontations between the two armies. So what the Naparama did was they confronted Renamo head-on. They would advance. They all spoke of how they took down the Renamo soldiers with their bare hand. Because that's what they had to do. That explains why they were so successful. Renamo feared them. They weren't used to people running at them and overrunning them. And so, that's why they were very successful. So in that sense, it was a peasant movement, the leader spoke to peasant values and practices that were very common in the area. So he mobilized on the basis of... Well, you could argue there's a reason why this militia was only in these areas and didn't spread much wider.

J Yes, what are these reasons?

C Well the first reason is that the war stopped. But another reason is that these traditions and rituals were based in a certain linguistic group. There was sort of a cultural boundary to this group. But they weren't.. There was no ethnic mobilization. Or religious. The mobilization didn't take place on ethnic or religious grounds or anything like that. It wasn't a creation of a new cleavage. The main thing, I would say, is that it mobilized peasants.

J So it's basically more using traditions of the regions they were operating in than these traditions or religions being the reason to operate?

C Right. Yes, exactly.

J But if you look at the conflict in general, over all the country. Renamo was of course supported by more rurals. Frelimo more by urban citizens. Would you say this is a cleavage in itself in Mozambique and a reason for the conflict? The large difference between rurals and urbans?

C During the conflict or today?

J Well, during the conflict, but also translating into today.

C Not sure. Part of the reason why Renamo was so strong in the rural areas and Frelimo in the urban areas was that this was just a consequence of guerrilla warfare. The strategy that Renamo had, attacking the state infrastructure and so on... Like in the south, they weren't even interested in occupying territory. They attacked and withdrew. It's part of the consequence of guerrilla warfare strategy that Renamo controlled the countryside but didn't come close to taking over major cities. In Nampula it was different because they did occupy the countryside, they did occupy vast areas. Frelimo only controlled the district towns. At some point, Renamo even occupied the district towns before they were retaken. There is a difference between the conflict dynamics in the south and in the north and centre. Many people link that to... there is a big discussion... I'm sure you've heard of Geffray's work *La cause des armes*.

J Yes

C Well... His argument is that the communal villages, there were many many communal villages in the Nampula province where he did his research. His claim was that the creation of communal villages created grievance among the communal population. That's why they were more receptive to Renamo.

J More anti-government, basically policy-based? This was a result of the socialist policies?

C Right, but there was kind of a movement against the socialist powers of Frelimo, and that's why Renamo had a real support base. So the big discussion about the war in Mozambique is whether Renamo really had an internal, genuine support base among the Mozambican population, or whether it was just a puppet for Rhodesia and South Africa to pursue their own interests in Mozambique. And so this issue is linked to this broader debate.

J What do you think about this?

C Haha. It's a really difficult discussion. I think it is true that the war was different in Zambezia and Nampula. I think it's true that Renamo could mobilize genuine support among the peasants. But mainly by promising impossible things. What they did, how they mobilized people in Zambezia and Nampula, is by promising cars, jobs, all the good things when the war was over. And so they got a lot of support from workers within local governments. That actually enabled them to set up their own local administrations in the occupied areas. So.. And then, if you say that, you kind of suggest that

people were already inclined to support them. There was a tendency to support them. There is a historical reluctance to support the state in these two provinces. Although...

J Why is that?

C Well one argument is that in Zambezia and Nampula never really fought during the liberation war. And... So they never really fought for the support of the people. They never really mobilized people to support the movement. And so also, later, the people were much more reluctant to Frelimo. I think it is true that Renamo could mobilize a significant amount of support, real support, among the people. They weren't just a puppet. It still influences local politics today. I think the argument that Renamo was just an external force, just a puppet, is just too superficial. You have to look at how the wars were fought in different areas of the country. The country is too big to say that this was the main thing. I think what's true is... The different question is why the war started in the first place. I think it makes sense to say that there wouldn't necessarily have been a war had there not been a Renamo. But once Renamo was there, people embraced it and used it as a vehicle for their own outward mobilization.

J So basically what you say is that it was initiated by external forces, because Renamo was set up by the South African and Rhodesian governments, but once it was there, it established into a local conflict as well?

C Yes.

J Ok. And once the conflict was established, you said that the conflict dynamics were much different in the north than in the south. Could we say that it was a north against south war? Or is that just too blunt?

C Uhm... No, that would be too blunt. There is... Frelimo and politics have been dominated by southerners. And Nampula and Zambezia are kind of the marginalized provinces, they don't really influence what is happening in Maputo. And I think, in terms of cleavages, that is probably the most important cleavage in Mozambique, that you have a north-south cleavage. But it's... Well, but then it also... It's more... *Michel Cahen*, he has argued that it's more... it's not so much a regional cleavage, but more what people do and their social status. It's more a countryside versus urban cleavage, where you have the employed workers versus the more merchant peasants. Kind of like more a class issue than a regional issue. The regional context is more an expression of class. I think that makes sense. The interesting thing now is to see whether the new president, who is from the north, will change something or whether he is only a puppet of Guebuza. Or whether he will change the dynamics very much.

J Right. Because if we look at politics now, it is still the case that Renamo is very much supported in the north and Frelimo in the south.

C Well with the exception of Capo Delgado. That's a Frelimo stronghold.

J Ok. But how would you say that uhm.. Is this still a big issue within the north of Mozambique? Do the people in the north of Mozambique feel excluded in the Mozambican government?

C Well the thing is that there is no.. There are strong supporters of Frelimo everywhere. When I talk to people in towns or cities everywhere, Frelimo... Well Frelimo is well organized, they have people everywhere. And there was always a certain bias. So I am kind of hesitant to say that they are all really sceptical of Frelimo. At least in the towns, they'd rather look.. Like, Renamo is marginalized, they don't really want anything to do... Well at least the local elites, they are very much Frelimo interested. The local administrations, they are all Frelimo. The peasants may think differently, but the local elite are very pro-Frelimo.

J Ok. And the fact that Frelimo is still able to maintain control over the government, ever since the peace accord... Would you say this also has to do with Renamo supporters not having access to political resources?

C Renamo... Well Renamo always had problems with resources and mobilizing media.. Debate, basically. Partly because it was so focussed on Dhlakama. The party structure, the party itself, just has a problem. Dhlakama marginalized everyone who didn't agree with him. He prevented the younger generations from influencing party politics, from influencing where the party is going. He alienated many people. That's also why the new party, MDM, emerged. And so I think many decisions Dhlakama made.. Well it's not only resources, it's also the decisions Dhlakama made that led to a really weak base structure base of the party. Of course, he claims that it's because of resources, he doesn't have enough resources to mobilize people. But it's also a very narrow understanding of what you need to organize debate. Because he kind of continued what he did during the war. He promises people positions and money to support him. So it's a very patron-agent relationship. A very patronage type of relationship.

J Yes.

C But Renamo does have little space, that's definitely true. They are not... it kind of depends from district to district, but they are not given equal space to influence people and to point out their views.

J If we look at the Renamo supporters, traditional Renamo supporters. Are they able to vote and participate? Are they literate? Or do they have to be mobilized... How do you say this... Are they able to participate themselves?

C I don't know. I haven't really witnessed elections in that way. So you mean... So you think that the social base of Renamo is, for example, more illiterate and that Renamo has more problems to vote.

J Well, it's one of my hypotheses that, because Renamo is based in rural areas, and mostly supported by peasants, it might be the case that they are less literate in general. I haven't found many numbers on this.

C But you also need to remember that Mozambique is a country where 95% of the people are peasants, is rural. So there are also... I think it is true that there may be an urban bias. But Renamo... You see that with the MDM, there are people who vote alternative parties, also in urban areas. In the recent municipal elections, MDM got a lot of towns. I would look at the results of the municipal elections. Many of the towns that MDM won are kind of in the central and northern regions.

J Ok...

C The aspect of illiteracy is a general problem. I would not necessarily relate that to Renamo's votes. And then I would look at the recent elections.. Renamo did mobilize people.

J In the most recent elections, conflict was re-initiated by Renamo, right. They went back to the bush. It ended up giving them large gains in the polls and in the results compared to what they had before. What I've read in some articles is that the military strategy was just a really smart political move. Looking at conflict dynamics, and the support base of Renamo, how do you think this worked? Were supporters motivated? Or afraid?

C Well, I would like to know that too...

J Yes because it's very strange...

C Indeed, it's very strange. I also read a comment that said that people were just... It was a smart move, right? Dhlakama was in the bush for some time and suddenly reappeared. And people were just curious. Who is this guy? What is he doing? And then they had a huge amount of people that came out for the parades and the speeches, the rallies. There was a huge mobilization of people who were... I think just curious, to see what he was doing. But then on the other hand, I had an interview with Domingos de Rosario on the blog, *Africa is a Country*, and... In his opinion it is demonstrating something larger. That the support base for Renamo doesn't necessarily represent a genuine support for Renamo but an expression of discontent with what's currently happening in Mozambique. So you have the energy boom, the economic boom, but the normal people don't really benefit from anything. Especially the Frelimo elite is benefiting from it. They sell out the resources and the local peasants doesn't really.. I mean there is...

J There is inequality...

C Yes, and there is a lot of reason to give up these kind of grievances everywhere in Mozambique. You have the coal mining companies that displace people and don't really reimburse the people for the land they take. They build really bad new houses. They displace people to land where they can't work because it's not... nothing grows there. There are a lot of grievances all over the country that are linked to the economic boom and to companies coming into Mozambique and taking the land and using it for their big-scale projects. And using the resources. So there are political inequalities as well as economic inequalities definitely rising. There is a larger difference between elite and regulars. You also see this... there were a couple of protests in recent years as a response to the rise of bread prices and transport prices. And that's mostly among the youth in the cities. It's not that discontent is widespread among peasants, but it's also widespread among the youth in urban areas. They don't have a job. So if you ask the regular person in Mozambique what the biggest problem is, their answer is: we don't have employment and income. And there's no way I will get it. Even if they're well educated, there's very little employment. So I think that the support for Renamo is an expression of this discontent with regard to the economic inequalities.

J That is interesting, because that was the support for Renamo in the first place, during the war: discontent with the government. And then after the signing of the peace agreement, I mean it's been 25 years, and obviously, Renamo still has not been able to establish itself into a programmatic party. It's still all about discontent with the government.

C Well, they... Yes. But it has changed. During the war, they propagated mostly what Frelimo was not. They were against socialism, against state influences to everything, they were basically the negative version of Frelimo. And then they got into trouble, because before the peace accord, Frelimo changed the constitution. Renamo didn't have a platform anymore, on which to mobilize. Because Frelimo already changed things. So Renamo had to rethink and reorganize. And now, I think Dhlakama just makes use of what he refers to as one of the critical issues of the time. He's very smart. He just uses the current discourse of economic inequality and he plays it to his hand. Before the recent years, the discourse was about powers. 'We actually won, but Frelimo didn't let us win'. This discourse was mainly about fraud, there was no programmatic issue where he mobilized on. Now, I think it's different. He uses this new issue...

J But basically, this happened because Dhlakama had the opportunity to do so because there was an economic crisis and...

C Yes, exactly.

J If we look at the development of Mozambique since the conflict, it's been called a success story, by the World Bank and by the IMF. But especially if we look at the political development of Mozambique, is it really a success story? Why or why not?

C That depends on how you would define the success story.

J Well, what I've read on Mozambique's success is basically on economic development. It has developed very fast since 1992.

C Well if you look at the numbers. It has one of the highest growth rates across the world. So if you look at that number, you could call it a success story. But I mean it has the typical problem of any developing country that growth is not translating into better opportunities for the people. And into better... There's a huge, there was a lot of attention given to the peace process, there was a huge UN mission, there was huge involvement from NGO's and development organizations towards the peace process. And beyond. One of... Mozambique is one of the countries with the highest presence of international agencies. So... donors love Mozambique. But there's an abundance of agencies and people in Mozambican projects. And if you compare the attention to the actual outcomes, you get disappointed very soon. This is not necessarily a problem of Mozambique, but a problem of development aid in general that the kind of projects and the way project are conducted, they just don't lead anywhere. But this point to a more general problem. So... I think the success story... It's also been said on the political side, not only on the economic side, that Mozambique is a success story, because the peace could relatively fast be installed. It didn't really relapse into civil war, like Angola did. Angola is always kind of the comparison case.

J Yes, I've seen that a lot.

C Yes, well, it's basically because of the similar history, the Portuguese colonialism and also because of the language and because there are so few countries in Africa that speak Portuguese. Mozambicans themselves therefore compare themselves to Angola. During the war, one of the concerns was that a second rebel force would emerge as it did in Angola. So Mozambicans themselves and the government itself compares itself to Angola. So the success story was not only in the economic sphere, but also in the political sphere. But I don't know what the initial question was..

J Well based on that, what I'm trying to find out is... Ok, so it's a success story because the conflict wasn't reinitiated except for September this year. But not on a large scale, at least. However, has it become a democracy?

C Oh, but that's another thing. Some people define democracy only a democracy when there has been a change of government. Mozambique has been dominated by Frelimo ever since it became a democracy. It's not really an established democracy. Many authoritarian developments have become visible in the past years. So.. A crackdown on criticism in the past, the editor of a newspaper was fired, there's an investigation against a journalist... So especially Guebuza, when Guebuza came, a much more authoritarian figure came in power. So in that sense there might have been a success story through the 1990's, because the improvements were so quick, but I would say that during the last years, there's definitely a lot of negative development that might question how long this success story might last. Democracy is not really establishing itself, Renamo is too weak, Frelimo is too dominant, the new party MDM kind of generated hope for changes for democracy but it is really unclear whether MDM can fulfil all these expectations. I mean, MDM didn't really fulfil the expectations in the recent elections. And especially with the inequality issue...

J The economic inequality...

C Yes, there is really a problem.. That demonstrates it. It's not the country that people imagined it to be.

J Exactly, that's what I really found out reading about Mozambique. When I started researching, I didn't know very much about Mozambique, basically what NIMD did there. I started reading about the country and read about success story, peace, democracy and so on. I figured it

might be an interesting case to compare to Burundi also because Burundi is not so much a success story, it has conflicts. But it's not really that simple. Mozambique has not been that much of a success...

C No, however, it hasn't seen the level of ethnic violence that Burundi has. They have a really troubled history over the last century. But it has different problems. The conflict was also different, it was contained and didn't really spread, there weren't as many attacks on civilians. So.. it has a very different.. In that sense, it hasn't seen the problems of Burundi. But it has different problems.

J Right. Well I think we have already talked about how the conflict still is established in Mozambican society today, also in Mozambican politics right? Well maybe just one question to close it off.. Just in general, your general opinion: how do you think the conflict still plays its role in Mozambican politics today? Like when there is an election, the conflict dynamics you were talking about, do they still take a place among the citizens and society?

C I think more among the elite. Frelimo still doesn't really find Renamo a legitimate political party. Many of the local elite... they don't really take them seriously. You see this in the negotiations that took place between Renamo and Frelimo in the past year and a half. Frelimo still doesn't take Renamo seriously. But on the other hand, Dhlakama doesn't really contribute anything to be taken seriously. He has huge demands and wants to break off, and again, over the last year he is always threatening big revolutions, has big demonstrations, he says he's going to overrule the country. So the talk about war has not really stopped. Partly because Dhlakama uses this rhetoric every time. He want to... force concessions from the government. And people are afraid of the re-emergence of conflict. That's what I definitely found when I talked to people in the district I was working in. They are deeply concerned about the recurrence of conflict. They don't want conflict. Especially the older people who have observed the conflict. They are deeply concerned about the recurrence of war. They are concerned also because there is a new generation of young people who haven't really experienced the war and don't really know what war means. They could buy into the rhetoric against the government. So I think the conflict still influences local politics and national politics in a sense that the rhetoric still refers to this. And the main cleavage between Frelimo and Renamo still dominates politics because they are the main parties that are out there. MDM has not even come close to replacing... I mean that was actually the hope, that MDM could replace Renamo as an opposition party and be a real alternative. So 20 year after the war, it's still very much in the heads of the people. But more in the older generation.

J Ok.

C Although if I say older generation.. Many people were very young when they participated in the war. So they are 45 or 40. For Africans that's already old, for us it's not really old.

J That's interesting. How there is a discrepancy between the people being really afraid for war and the elite using war rhetoric to get things done. That's something I will need to point out.

C Yes. I think.. I mean, I think what would be interesting is to research in why, what kind of genuine support Renamo currently has and why they support them. It's kind of a puzzle.

J Alright, great. Thank you very much. I think I have received a lot of information from you.

C You're welcome. Are you aware of Michel Cahen's work?

J Yes, I am.

C You know, I think it would make sense to look into why there were never any power-sharing institutions in Mozambique. I don't quite understand why... I think Renamo has turned a lot of things down. They demanded things, but then they turned them down. And the constitution become before

the accord so... I'm not really sure, but the constitution was influenced by international demands for democracy. There were certain commissions to agree to cease fire agreements. But there weren't really new institutions created in order to accommodate.. It wasn't a power sharing agreement.

J Right. Well it might also be a question of time spirit in which the respective constitutions of Mozambique and Burundi were written in. Because Mozambique was in the late 80's... early 90's... Burundi's constitution and peace agreement was established in 2005. So that was a lot later.

C So that might be more influenced by consensual ideas...

J Exactly, more focus of the international actors on consensual institutions etcetera. But also in Burundi, it hasn't always worked out well. There's all kinds of quota. But these rhetoric are there as well. It has created a situation that democracy is not really able to develop further than the institutions. So that's basically what my thesis is about.

C Very interesting. Good luck with it.

J Thank you. The best of luck with your research.

C The best of luck with your thesis. I would be interested in reading it actually.

J I will definitely share it with you.



## Appendix II – Interview Antony Otieno Ong’ayo

*Utrecht University*

*12 January 2015*

J Hello Mr. Ong’ayo, good evening. How are you?

A I’m ok. So I don’t know what was the problem with the connection...

J No I don’t know, but I’m glad you have the opportunity to talk with me for an interview. I am doing a master’s degree in Rotterdam and I’m writing my master’s thesis on political inclusion in fragile and conflict-affected settings. I’m using Mozambique and Burundi as two case studies, because Mozambique is a mostly majoritarian political system whereas Burundi is, at least in its constitution, a more consensus-based political system. It has some consensus elements in it. I’m trying to draw a comparison between these two countries and look at the differences and similarities with regard to political inclusion. Now, I’ve read that you are member of the ASC community for Burundi, is that correct?

A Yes, indeed.

J Are you from Burundi yourself?

A No, but I do work with Burundians.

J Ok. I would like to ask you some general questions about democracy in Burundi, about political equality in Burundi and about representation in Burundi. Is that ok?

A Definitely.

J Great. So in general, how would you describe the overall quality of democracy in Burundi today? How has it developed over time?

A Those things, you need to see under what conditions we look at certain democratic principles and ideas. So what conditions are relevant for those kind of things to happen? That is the first question to ask. If you look at all the principles of democracy, or what a state needs to have in order to be considered democratic. There’s a list of elements for democratic systems. But under what conditions a country can achieve those things, you can use that mirror to look at Burundi. Then you see, there is a conflict... a diversity. There are not many more heterogeneous societies. So if you look at democracy... at representation, who is represented and who is not? If you talk about consensus, who is part of that consensus? And those kind of things.

J How do you see that?

A So... In my view, it’s better to problematize that instead of a straightforward answer to that question. If you problematize it, there is more room for discussion. So you look at what is needed for democracy, than you look at that case, and you look at the composition of the country, the kind of institutions in the country, the history of the country, the political and economic conditions, the post-conflict construction and reconciliation... Those things are the kind of institutions we’ve built, or that have been built since the conflict. Elections is one thing, but only elections... Well it’s only one thing. Sometimes the conditions under which elections take place do not create the same playing field. That you can read in Burundi. I don’t really want to make claims, but you can see that in Burundi, some are more prominent than others. But also you must think of other actors, for example the international community. The Dutch government supports reconstruction in Burundi, the Army and

those kind of things. And those things are all part of nation building, post-conflict reconstruction and so on. But yes, you must realize that that empowers some groups, or one group, over the others.

J        Ok

A        So there are a lot of factors that.. if you ask what is the state of democracy, than I would say: Burundi is in a process. There have been developments, they have had elections since the civil war, but those are just small gains. They are symbolic, important.. But the direction to go, that depends on the kind of leadership. So here you need to realize: who are the major actors there? What is the political will on the ground to get things in a certain direction? You can also look at what system is put in place? What is the agenda? And you can see whether people are ok with that or not? Because you cannot get democracy in a vacuum. So you need to out in some institutions, those are very important.

J        Right...

A        So if you ask 'does Burundi have the institutions' I would say: not completely yet, Burundi is still in the phase of putting those in place. There are things happening, but the question to ask is: what institutions are really in place? Yes, there are some steps. You can compare these with countries who have gone through similar things, where they are at this moment, what system has been put in place. Botswana, Namibia, Eritrea, in West-Africa there are a few others. You can see the path they've taken, if they are in the same direction. It's not only about institutions. Botswana for instance has not only built institutions, there is a culture of doing things in a certain way...

J        Yes, a democratic culture.

A        Yes. That culture is not even foreign in the case of Botswana. When you talk about democracy, you must think about what it means, not necessarily how we see it from here. If you look at Botswana, they've done things their way. That has worked very well. So it's not foreign. And those things are part of the buildings. They got independence not so long ago, and they are trying to put things in place, combining different kinds of institutions derived from their own traditions but also combining what is from somewhere else.

J        So how would you say Burundi is doing those things? Because I've analysed the institutions in Burundi, I've analysed the constitution and the political system and all those kinds of things, and it looks like Burundi has a pretty good set of institutions which guarantee democratic practice. But in practice, we see..

A        Yes, exactly. The practice is another question.

J        Right. Because in practice, we see that minorities in Burundi are politically excluded, still today. Am I correct?

A        Yes.

J        Ok, so how would you describe the exclusion of minorities in Burundi? Which minorities do you feel are excluded and why?

A        Well, the point is... the conflict was also about ethnicity. Ethnic politics has been one of the key issues there. Part of the construction, part of nation state building, has been based on that. The colonial system put it in place. Countries who have gone away from that... You can see Malaysia for example, they adopted consociational democracies. You can read that in Arend's work...

J        Yes, Lijphart.

A Exactly. So we can check what systems work. We need a system where everyone feels that they are part of the system. That balance is needed. You know there are different stages of democracy, you also have a so-called consolidation part. But Burundi has not even reached the consolidation part. The consolidation part is the last part. Burundi has not reached that level...

J Why?

A Why? Because of the political dynamics there. The power games there. And also the role of external actors... of different interests. Now the political system is very different from Mozambique. Mozambique was originally more left-oriented. The Burundian case... Well if you do capitalism in a context where there is increased marginalization, then you're going to have a problem. This system is not about others, it's about 'I'. You know what I mean?

J I see what you're saying.

A Well see, as a Dutch person... Where you are living now, in Brabant, there is schools, there is water, there is a highway to The Hague, doesn't matter who is in power in The Hague. In Burundi, that is different. That's what's happening with the use of power. Primitive conditional resources through state power. And that is also part of the problem, why some people would like to exclude others. So there are many other factors with regard to exclusion. And the thing is... war is war, and people can get tired of it. So sometimes, even the ones who are marginalized do not have the strength to battle it. But at some point, these things might rise again.

J So basically, what you're saying is that there is political exclusion because the mentality is more about surviving themselves and their own interests instead of thinking about the general picture. Right?

A Yes, you know, it is a small country. If you have the resources there, you have the power. Why do people need power? You know, there are two types of power: *power to* and *power over*. So if you look at this case, why do they need power? Power to do something is power to make a difference. That is in political philosophy the most important thing. You know, democracy does not develop itself. There is a need for political leadership, there is a need for political weight to put in place the right things.

J Right.

A So if you check the Burundi case, you need to analyse it from that point of view. Politics have impact on policy, whether you like it or not. It starts with politics, than it becomes policy, than it becomes legislation. So in Burundi.. Writing a constitution is one thing. Actually getting things done, getting people aware, is another challenge.

J And that is still lacking?

A That is still lacking.. Well the process of democratization in developing countries.. There are a lot of implications for that. Because people also say what some other people want to hear. When you ask people what they mean with democracy, what they're trying to achieve, you get some very different answers. Civil society plays some roles, but they've also ended up maintaining the status quo. They have also become power brokers in some other way, do you understand that?

J Yes.

A The process... You can set platforms, that's one thing. You get your things done and you can shout in Bujumbura and the government looks your direction. That's power, what I was talking about.

J I understand. Now we've talked about political leadership, about leading politics... If we look at the social composition of Burundi... The conflict in Burundi was to a very large extent an ethnic conflict. It was based on ethnic cleavages in the country. Are those ethnic cleavages still in place today? Because there is basically a prohibition in Burundi for parties to be ethnically based. But with the power of CNDD-FDD, do you think some ethnic minorities are being excluded? Are the cleavages still in place?

A Yes, those cleavages are still there. Remember, parties can have names, but you have to analyse their programmes. Titles can come off a lot of stuff. In some cases, it can also be a class thing. So.. Ethnic cleavages are still there, but it can also turn out to be class. Than people from a class.. No one makes noise. Revolutions are led by middle class. Those people living in certain conditions today, surviving, have no time to go to Bujumbura from a rural area. They cannot even afford the transport. So that means... Well which cleavage is playing a big role at the moment? Class can be one of them. Because... People want to make money. And you can have a political system, but as long as the political system leaves them alone, they do their thing.

J So the current system is basically satisfying the middle class...

A Well that's how I look at it. Because if it is not addressing institution building and building the state, why is it silent? Because either there is a comfort zone for some actors. The most significant actors. Or there is some incremental gain. Because people don't want to have conflict anymore after a long time. That can also pacify people. So they accept their state as it is.

J So what you're saying is that to some extent it's quiet now, not because everybody is included, but because the right people are being satisfied?

A The right people are being satisfied, yes. And that could be a class issue which can sometimes cut across, and divide. So those who could be considered enemies are not enemies anymore. At one moment people can fight, but if they are in the same class, they stop the fighting.

J So would you say there has been a shift...

A Yes there's a shift, now also in Burundi, because women are taking leadership positions. There are some organizations wishing that, and that is a big shift. That was pushed by... Also by diasporas from Burundi, who were pushing these kind of agendas. And playing... these kind of influences. And that's making a difference, in small ways.

J But in general... Because the conflict was really about ethnicity. Would you say....

A Ethnic cleavages are still there. Because when we talk about power-sharing... What is power? What positions are they holding? One thing is to share positions, but which positions are given to which group? When you talk about power... It is about what makes things happen. It's about... Who's drafting the constitution? Who's putting it in place? Who's enforcing it? Who is... Well, what we call power-sharing, who is sharing it? Which actor with which actor?

J So basically what I understand you saying is that, although there are power-sharing agreements which are constitutionally based, written down on paper, formal laws. But in practice, political leaders are undermining these arrangements by assigning the important positions to the Tutsi minority...

A Well, you should check this very well. Who is holding the defence? Who is holding the finance? Who is holding... You know. Find that out.

J So, just as an advise. Because I have checked the government composition in Burundi, but it's very unclear to me. It's not documented who is Hutu and who is Tutsi, for example. How can I find out?

A Well, you need to talk... You need to talk to some people from inside. They know and they can tell you. In many places in Africa, if you say a name, someone can tell you where they come from. That can be one way.

J Ok. And what about electoral participation in Burundi?

A Well.. There are some problems in the literature on elections in Africa. Because elections are somewhat a kind of ritual. But does it really produce results? They've been able to do something. People have been able to participate. But the question is: to what extent is that participation making a difference?

J And, in your opinion, are all people in Burundi able to participate? You were just talking about people living in rural areas...

A Yes, well, you should check what is the voter turnout in the last elections. It is a step, that people are voting. It's a big thing, especially because of the background. Hutus and Tutsis are both voting...

J Definitely, that's true. But the thing is... if only the middle class people in Bujumbura have access to political resources, than you can at least...

A Yes, yes, and also access to information. Information in Burundi is still a problem. So that can also be marginalized. You need to check the actual turnout. What was the turnout last time and what can be the implications for that. Regionally. You can look at... numbers. And you can see... The social diasporas have a big impact on this, so you need to have this discussion. Diasporas play a very big role, also in the opposition, the internet...

J Could you elaborate on this role of diasporas?

A Yes. They have a role in the construction, but also in the politics of today. They support different groups. Some are living here. But the Burundi diaspora is very important for Burundian politics. People can tell their families what to do or what not to do.

J But diasporas also have voting power? Or what do you mean?

A No, they have power over their relatives. Not voting power for the state. They are not allowed to vote, but they support in many other ways the fundraising also of political parties. People need favours.

J That is very interesting. Because most of the diaspora from Burundi are Hutus, right?

A You could say that, but remember, the conflict has manifested itself differently in different times. You can see the patterns of violence shift. So the conflict-induced diasporas are different at different times. You should check online and you can find articles on conflict-induced diasporas. That's a very interesting discussion. Those things also have impact. Because they need those resources to keep things going... remittances are very important for Burundi. Those people who are marginalized, but their families are supporting from a distance... Those things have influence on politics directly or indirectly. Because they try to deal with the position from abroad. But also, they try to influence things from here. So that also has implications for what is being done on the ground. Because those voices are very good... Calling for the state to be accountable and for opposition. That noise makes a difference. And some people still have strong links with their country of origin... That has influence in many different ways.

J That is a very interesting...

A Yes, and it is also very serious one.

J Would you say that diaspora... You are saying that they influence their families on the ground in Burundi. Would you say that the way they influence there, their own opinions on things, is also influenced by the new context they live in.

A Yes, based on the new context they are living in, but also based on their own experiences.

J Are there also diaspora living in Western Europe who are actively promoting their relatives to support democracy, freedoms, that kind of stuff.

A Yes, and supporting the opposition.

J Ok. That's very interesting to... Because than basically...

A There's a lot of Burundi discussions with this regard on the internet. Check this on the internet. Simon Turner has written a lot on this in Burundi. You can see these discussions.

J If you look at this, to some extent, this is another cleavage maybe, right?

A Well... It just plays a big role, diasporas. Even in the representation in Parliament, there could be people advocating thing for them. You can check that. Because there are people coming up for their interests on the ground. That's why they are supporting them. And that is a big power in Burundian politics. They will support them financially, but also say: do your things. They can send money, send cars...

J Ok...

A And they also influence foreign governments by making noise about Burundi. Even here in the Netherlands, when there are meetings on Burundi, some Burundians go to these meetings. They even host some of these at homes. Those kind of mechanisms...

J Very interesting, I will also include your article as well.

A Yes. If your discussing public policy, discuss public policy on politics, talk about the institutions. And the practices are also important. The practices can also shape the outcome on how things are done.

J Exactly. What I basically want to put in picture is the discrepancy between the policy of inclusion which is laid down in the constitution, and the practice of exclusion which is practically happening on the ground. There's some kind of discrepancy between these.

A Yes, because state building has to be all inclusive. All inclusive and actually reaching all parts of the country. And reaching different groups. It's often the political will... It's not that the constitution is weak, but it's about the political will. For policy to be implemented, you need political will. There are arguments about political will. It's very important. If there's no political will, nothing happens.

J Right. Basically, you're saying that the constitution does provide abilities for the people, but..

A Yes, this is a reference point which is very important. Constitutionalism is very important. It becomes a Bible to which you can refer. Those who aspire to achieve certain things can refer to this document. If it is not there, than you have a problem. So it being there, that's a very big step. Although it is only on paper, at least it is something that people can refer to. Especially if it was made by everyone or a majority of the people who contributed to its drafting.

J But, what I understand from you, is that there is some kind of strategic acting... By political actors... Who are strategically acting to undermine rules written down in the constitution. They don't have a political will to get things done.

A Yes, because it depends on how... What kind of... Well, what it is why they are in power. Because if it is rebuilding the country, than you can leave some parts out. Understand it in this way... Because in the Netherlands we are wanting the same things, in Groningen and Limburg, no one is asking to secede from the Netherlands. That's what it is about. It doesn't matter which party is in power in the Netherlands. Water is flowing, electricity is flowing, there are hospitals... No matter which party is in power. You get that..?

J Yes, yes, so there is a correlation between the level of development and the level of inclusion. So political inclusion is harder in places where development is low. Right?

A Yes, people there are not part of the system. They are tired of it. The state works according to a social contract, right. The social contract means... that leaders are responsible for some things. That social contract means they have an obligation to do certain things. People also have a responsibility, and also have rights. That applies to everyone, doesn't matter which part of the country. Those things need to be together in order to start building a nation. Nation-building is a long process. It consists very much of instrumental things... Small little things. But it makes a difference if someone has water or not. But if someone has water and another does not... That is a problem in these countries.

J Yes. I see. The large differences in development and in resources...

A Yes... It's a kind of inequality. It's not only about giving money, it's also about creating opportunities for the people. If some people feel left out, than we have a problem. And if a system enforces that, than the system is not democratic. Democracy is not only about the freedom to vote, but also to eat and to realize your aspirations.

J Yes, it is. So basically the reason for inequality in Burundi is more the socio-economic inequality than ethnic inequality?

A But it has to do with ethnicity. People were marginalized because of their ethnicity.

J Ok, so the ethnic cleavage has caused people to become marginalized, and that has caused a difference in socio-economic...

A Well it has been institutionalized. That's why people could kill in the name of that. That means that resources are being redistributed based on that.

J So is it the case that, for instance, if we talk about water, that the Tutsi minority has water and the Hutu does not, for example?

A Well, those are variables I used to compare it to the Netherlands. Those are the kind of variables you can use to check. Does the current system provide everyone with the same things? If this is not the case, than we have an issue. Do you know a rosary?

J Rosary? Not sure...

A Are you catholic? You know a rosary?

J Oh a rosary, yes.

A Well, they say you cannot pray a rosary on an empty stomach. Democracy is also about eating. And about going to school and realizing your dreams. And doing it in peace. Jesus first hands out bread, and then he starts to preach. Because otherwise, people don't listen. Here, we are

choosing what we eat now, green food. Because the basic things have been met. Then we talk about other things. But if people still need physiological needs, than this is a big challenge.

J Interesting. Because in the case of Burundi, I was very much focusing on the ethnic divide between Tutsi and Hutu. Which is, of course, an important factor. But what you're basically saying is that this ethnic divide has institutionalized itself in certain ways that are now more of a problem for democracy than the ethnic problems themselves?

A Yes, and it was also due to colonialism. Don't leave that out. Because the Belgians... There was a Belgian professor studying Hutus and Tutsis who was saying that the Hutus had a lower capacity. This was also a big issue. Because that's how they set it apart. All of a sudden, people on the same land became different because someone has a cow etcetera. That's how they were divided. And they used things.. Like the way people looked. If someone looked like a Hutu, it meant something was not right. Those things were repeated and repeated and repeated. And those things have implications. Once you do that, it can become very dangerous. That's what happened. So marginalization... The core of people had been touched, in a very fundamental way. So you can discuss the democracy using also... focusing on the fundamental issues. Also look at under what conditions things are to be realized.

J Yes.

A And so, also look at political will. Because things can be on paper, but are sometimes not put in practice. And why are they not put in practice? Because the status quo is also good for some people. There are people who are happy the way things are. That's why they don't want this to change.

J Because the right people are being satisfied?

A Well, the few people who are in power.

J Yes, but the people who are being satisfied are the people who have the power to let hear of themselves?

A Yes. You can also ask yourself why the masses are accepting things. If they are accepting things and why. This could be some kind of apathy. If you've hoped for things to change and they do not change... Than people will resign.

J Yes. Than they just say: "whatever, I'll take care of my own business".

A That, or: "this is my fate". You can see that in voter apathy. People are not interested anymore if the vote doesn't make a difference. Because it's being stolen or... Than someone says "why should I vote".

J Would you say that elections in Burundi are free and fair?

A There are small little steps, but they are not free and fair. Police comes to arrest people, boxes are stolen... Those kind of things.

J Ok. This still happens.

A Yes, those things happen. As long as those things happen, it's not free and fair. Election observers can say: it was ok. Sometimes they say that. They know it wasn't ok, but for the sake of peace, let it go. That's also a problem in Africa. Why do these people accept it? They give people a lot of money to build a road. So why don't they demand a good road? There is something about... Western democracy being promoted in a way that... Well, it's not done from the right perspective.



J Very interesting. I think that due to this interview, there will be somewhat of a shift in my thesis. Because I was very much focusing on ethnic cleavages, but it's also about a lot more.

A Yes. It's also about these other things. Don't focus only on ethnicity. Ethnicity is also created. It is created so that's why it can become very problematic. It's problematic because... In some people, we ask the population of the people. In the Netherlands, we only have 17 million people, but we are not calling each other tribe. Lagos alone has 40 million people. And we still call it a tribe. What makes the nation a nation and what makes a tribe a tribe? If you go to Friesland, you see the names also written in Fries. But why is it not a problem here? It is because of our standards. Then we start talking about one people. Previously, we had different regions. Brabant, Gelderland, Holland. People killed each other because of that. Why was that banned out? Because there was a common thing. That common thing was the need to be able to realize aspirations. This is needed for democracy and then, nation building starts. Nation building starts when everyone feels as a part of it. But as long as some people are left out, it's not nation building and we cannot speak of a nation. That's why many countries in Africa are artificial constructions. And this becomes a problem.

J indeed. Alright, thank you very much for this.

A Ok. I hope to see you some time and let me know what you will write. Success and I hope to hear from you.

## Appendix III – Interview Fabien Nsengimana

*NIMD*

*13 January 2015*

J        Alright. Thank you for your time, Fabien. How have you been?

F        I'm fine. A little bit busy, but that's good.

J        Good to hear that. It's a very important year for Burundi, right?

F        Haha, yes it is.

J        As you know, I am doing research on political inclusion in Burundi. I am trying to figure out the correlation between the political system, the constitution, so the formal side, and the way that political inclusion takes place on the informal side. I believe there is some kind of discrepancy between the formal arrangements, which are fine in Burundi, and the informal political practice which is not so fine. So I'm trying to find the link between those.

F        Ok.

J        And for that, I would like to ask you some general questions about democracy in Burundi, some questions about political equality, some questions about representation and some questions about electoral participation. Is that ok?

F        Yes it is ok, but I would like to make a proposal about how we can proceed. I got your questionnaire, about the different pillars of your research. And as I have not plenty of time, I would like maybe for the moment to discuss with you the general questions about democracy. And then, respond to the other questions and send you written responses.

J        Right. Ok, that's fine. What I am specifically looking for, as a part of the representation pillar, is to try and find uhm... The formal arrangement in Burundi is that 60% of the Parliament is Hutu and 40% is Tutsi, right? And there are also power-sharing arrangements in government. Now what I'm trying to find is whether these formal arrangements actually lead to inclusion of everybody, or maybe that some important positions are handed over to some minorities. I'm trying to find the link between that. Do you understand what I mean?

F        Yes... Yes.

J        So if you could also elaborate on that maybe?

F        Ok. So I will prepare written responses to the questions, and if you have any additional questions, you can put them on the table and I will give you additional answers and indications needed.

J        That sounds excellent. Ok, so generally about the democratic system of Burundi. The country has been in conflict until 2005, when the peace agreement was signed. And in 2008 was the last cease-fire, right?

F        Yes, that is correct.

J        So then the conflict basically ended. How would you describe the overall quality of democracy today and how has it developed since the conflict?

F Yes. I can briefly say that democracy in Burundi is on-track. I am referring to the multiparty system. We have more than 40 parties, which is a lot for a small country like Burundi. It is a sign that there is a tentative of a multiparty system. That multiparty system exists for decades, but especially since 1993. We have separated powers, let's say in theory. I'll come back to this in some limits I see in our democracy. I would like to add that there is a kind of democracy which is in development. Because from time to time, we organize elections that lead to elected institutions. And we experience a kind of freedom to speak, a freedom to organize meetings, even if we sometimes face some problems with the way that freedom is managed. Generally speaking, I must say that there is a representation of the population through the elected representatives. Having said this, there are some limits that I would like to point out.

J What are these?

F Well... The first limit is that we still have to learn a lot, in terms of having a vivid democracy, both within parties as well as between parties. According to, referring to the current situation, we also need to open the political space more. If I observe what is going on, the political space is not enough open to every political party. There is a tendency for the ruling party to work as if it is a one-party system. That's why I am saying that the political space needs to be more open than how it is right now.

J Ok. Do you think this political space has been more closed since the boycott of the elections in 2010?

F Yes, especially, especially. Yes. And there is also another kind of limit, referring to the need of more tolerance. For people that have different ideas from the ruling party's ideas. There is a need for more tolerance to those people. And there is... Internal democracy also needs to be more improved. Because... We don't see, every time, the expected for every member of parties. Internal democracy needs to be more improved, so that people are more at ease to say what they think, speak out, about the way the party is ruled and about the country is governed.

J Ok. With internal democracy, you mean within the parties, right?

F Especially, yes. As a starting point. Because if democracy is not developed within the party, it cannot be developed on the national level, the state level.

J That makes sense, ok. And... well you just said that elections are organized and that the population is represented by the people they vote for. Do you think, in general, political inclusion is ok or are there still people being excluded from certain positions or from participating in general?

F Yes, that's the second question. Because I have some other limits to what I said. There are two problems that I would like to mention to this level. One is the executive interference in the judiciary and even in the management of the party. That expresses a kind of limit to what democracy should be in our country. Second, the Parliament does not regularly control the executive. That is the last limit I would like to indicate to you.

J Why is that? Why does the Parliament not control the executive?

F Because the two institutions are almost the same in terms of the people who are in these institutions. The ruling party... Since there have been parties who boycotted the elections in 2010, at the end of the day, the ruling party had got most seats. So they are the majority in the Parliament and in the executive government. That created problems in terms of being able to control, make an effective control of the government and what the government is doing.

J I understand. And if we talk about the inclusion of minorities, not so much about parties, but about for example ethnic minorities. Do you feel all minorities, the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa for example, are being represented within Parliament? Or do you feel some are left out.

F Generally speaking, Tutsi and Hutu are represented in the Parliament. The Twa have been co-opted because they were not elected. As it is said in the constitution, some minorities are not represented but have a system of co-optation. So some Twa have been co-opted in the Parliament.

J So generally speaking, all minorities are represented and are obtaining seats within the relevant institutions?

F Yes.

J Parliament as well as executive?

F Well... The Twa are not represented in the government, they are only co-opted in the two chambers of Parliament.

J Ok. And if we talk about power sharing... Do you feel the government, the political elite in the country, is willing to share power with all the minorities in the country? Or are they using the power for themselves?

F I think the power is mostly shared. I have to mention that the lack of a very good sharing of power also results from the boycott of parties in 2010. But generally speaking, power is shared. Because there is in the Arusha Accord, but also in the constitution, there are some mechanisms that help in this regard. Of course, because of that boycott of the elections, very few parties are represented in the government. We have only the ruling party and two other parties with a very low representation.

J What I've read in some articles, is that the conflict in Burundi has created a system in which some people have become marginalized and do not have access to resources. Do you think that is true and needs to improve, or do you feel all people, for example the people in Bujumbura as well as in rural areas, have the same access to the same resources?

F No, there is a real problem of access to resources. Members of the ruling party, since they are more represented in institutions, it is clear that they have more access to resources than others. Especially in a country like Burundi, where the poverty has a high level.

J Is this because of the conflict that took place? Because of ethnic cleavages?

F It has something to do with the conflict, it also has something to do with the history of Burundi. We had the colonization by Belgium. It has been said that that if someone needs to live in a good way, they have to be in the administration, participate in the government. That is something to be changed, because nowadays people realize that they shouldn't need to be in government in order to earn life in a good way. We should have this life without being in the government. But uhm... That is a mentality which is still strong. Because there are not so many resources, and there is connection. So it is important to be in government to earn easily a good life.

J Do you mean to be in the government yourself, or to make sure that your minority or your town or your group is represented? You say that it is important to be in government to have access to resources. Do you mean to be in government yourself, or that your group is represented?

F No, I think more to be in government myself than the group I belong to.

J Ok. Because what I'm trying to find out is whether the political leaders of Burundi are thinking about the general picture and considering the entire population or whether they are

favouring their own constituency, so their ethnic group or their town. Would you say they stand for the greater picture or for their own interests.

F They stand for both of them. They try to stand for the bigger picture, but of course the starting point is to stand for their own interests, personal interests. But that's a problem that many of them are trying to overcome within a given time.

J And if we look at the conflict, between the Hutus and the Tutsis, the minorities, and especially all the things that happened. Does it still impact politics and democracy in Burundi today and in what ways?

F I think it is true that violence.. The conflict, still impacts our democracy. That's true. Conflict in Burundi was very clear ethnical, with political implications. Now there has been a kind of progress, evolution. Because the conflict currently is more political. Political behaviour is still negatively impacted by the war between the governmental army and the armed groups. I would like to illustrate this by three points. First, former rebels involved in politics keep some reflexes of people who were involved in the bush. That's one.

J So they keep track of the people involved in the bush and they provide them positions?

F Exactly. Second, members of the army and the police who have been in the bush are enough independent from the politicians. That is a real challenge, not only in Burundi but in every country where there has been a rebellion.

J So independence from politics, that's the second point, right?

F Yes. The third point is, because of the divisions, people are still considered as belonging to a given ethnic group and not just as a simple individual who have the same rights and duties as any other.

J Ok. Is there still... What I've heard is that inclusive political dialogue is very much needed in Burundi but that it is very difficult, because there is much distrust. Could you reflect on that?

F Well, it's true. I have to say that the distrust is also very much present within the parties. And that's why some parties are very much divided into wings. And even in the ruling party, what I note right now is that the internal cohesion is decreasing. That will impact the general, overall dialogue which can be organized between... amongst parties.

J Yes. Has this always been the case since the end of the conflict or has it been there since the election boycott in 2010?

F Well it has been reinforced after the 2010 elections. It was there, but it has been reinforced. But the... the confidence has never been something granted in advance. It is something to gain, something to build up.

J That's true. And if we talk about the state institutions in Burundi. It has been said that Burundi has quite weak state institutions. What I do not understand is exactly what it means in the context of Burundi. Could you elaborate on that in the context of your country?

F Yes. First of all, I am convinced that Burundi is still a very fragile state. We are still recovering from the war and trying to put in place good institutions, but it is still a real challenge. The weakness of the state institutions is due, from my perspective, to the lack of the representation of broader political tendencies. But also, I may add to that reason, are other reasons: for instance, the corruption. Even at the state level. Another reason which I have to mention is a kind of nepotism in the process of appointing officials. Because my impression, my feeling is that competence is not

always prevailing over militancy. And that's not a problem because of the ruling party, it has always been the same.

J So you are saying that personal ties and friendships, and also history of engagement in militancy, is prevailing over competence in the appointment of officials?

F Yes. And the explanation of that is what I already said, that the fact of seeing the parties functioning in the government as a way to resolve problems of existing.

J The problems of poverty and such.

F Yes exactly.

J So really engaging in politics is, by some, seen as a way to get out of poverty and existence problems.

F Yes, right.

J But I can imagine that's not possible for everybody, right? Because is it difficult for... Well, if you are a farmer in the rural area of Burundi, is it more difficult for those people than if you grow up in the middle class in Bujumbura?

F No.. Well the situation is changing. Even people from the rural areas are really participating in politics.

J Ok. So I can imagine you are busy, and our time is up. So maybe this would be a good point to stop and that you can send your written answers and elaborations to me?

F Ok. Yes that is perfect. I would like to continue to response to the written questions by e-mail. Now I need to speak to Egbert. We have to discuss some things about his upcoming meeting in Burundi. That's why I have been obliged to ask for this arrangement.

J Ok. That is fine.

## Appendix IV – Interview Hermenegildo Mulhovo

*NIMD Mozambique*

*17 January 2015*

J Hi Gil. How are you?

H I'm fine, thank you.

J Good. Thank you so much for finding time in your weekend to talk with me.

H No problem at all. Just one second... Sorry, I was still in a discussion with someone else.

J Oh, that's fine. So how are things over there? I heard your President got installed?

H Yes, we have a new President now. Let's see what is going to happen.

J Indeed. Because he was installed on Thursday, right?

H Yes, on Thursday.

J And was there a big celebration? Or how was it?

H Yes, there was a big celebration. Because of the issue of legitimacy, with this ceremony, they are trying to say: "this is your President, there is no one else". Because, as you know, in countries like Mozambique where most of the people are still not in a democratic spirit... Issues like literacy brings problems in terms of people understanding what is going on. So that's why, whatever we do, we have to do it in a way that... Like a big event, so that people understand what is going on. They are now trying to show to everyone that the new President is coming into office. It was a holiday.. So yeah.

J So, just out of interest, how does an opposition party like Renamo respond to that?

H They didn't show up. Because they are claiming the results. Like always, they feel like they have been cheated. So that's why they have said that they do not recognize the government.

J Ok. So just to start the interview, in general, how would you describe democracy in Mozambique today? How is democracy doing?

H Well.. I would say that, if we compare 1992 or 1994, the first general elections, or if we put a point on 1990 as the date that the first Constitution with democracy in Mozambique, if we compare that with today, I can say that we are having our progress, however, we are also having problems of young democracies. We are still fighting to consolidate democracy. Which I think is a natural process of maturing democracy. I have just told you that we have high literacy, and there is still in so many people a mind-set another type of regime, so we are still in the process of educating. And of course, in this process of educating, some people are taking advantage of other people that really don't understand what are their rights, you know. But if I can summarize, I can say that we are in progress... When I say progress, I mean for example... Some of the things I can point out, is the fact that we have this new democratic constitution. Formally, everything is fine. We have a constitution, we have elections, we have divisions of power, we have rule of law... And we have a market that is open, and people have their own rights. In terms of media, we have freedom of media, everything formally is fine. Now the big challenge is the process.

J Ok.

H It's the culture. The spirit of democracy. We are still cultivating it. People are still learning how to deal with it. We are now in the process of implementation of what we have on our documents. So the problems we are facing now, most of them, are in the implementation. The formal side, there is a consensus among Mozambicans that the system we are having is the best. But the problem is exactly the implementation. So this is how I can say... Let me give you an example: we have regular elections, but the quality of it is still low. So we are having problems in the quality rather than in the quantitative dimension, of putting things in place. On a lot of indicators we are ranking high. But the problem is exactly on the quality, exactly the kind of... The implementation of what we have agreed.

J So basically, the formal side is fine, but more the informal side... The way it works in practice, is still in progress?

H Yes.

J Alright. What I want to talk with you about is especially this informal aspect. I have analysed the formal side already, I have analysed the Constitution of Mozambique, I know about the freedoms and I know the way the system works formally. What I would like to talk with you about is about the informal side of things. Basically about political inclusion, about political equality, and about representation. Is that ok?

H Yes, that is fine.

J Ok. So let's start with representation. If you look at the Parliament in Mozambique.. Do you feel that all people in the country, not looking at their political preference, but more... Well, are women and men both represented? Are Christians and other religions both represented? Are rura; and urban people represented? Do you think all people feel represented in the Parliament?

H Well, first of all, let me tell you that we are having... Let's always bear in mind that what we have here is a PR system, proportional representation system. Which in terms of inclusivity, I think it is the best. It allows us to make sure that we have so many different groups represented. The other thing I would like to bring up before I dive into an analysis is that the fact that we are... Regarding the religions, Mozambique is.. Every religion has freedom. We have declared that our country is not Christian, it's not Muslim, it's a country for everyone. Which, to some extent, makes us feel like there is no need to open quotations for Muslims, and whoever, in the Parliament. That has never been an issue. In the south of the country, we have Christians, and in the north we have Muslims. But to a large extent... Well, I'm talking about majorities. But we also have, in the south, a lot of Muslims and Hindus and in the north we also have Christians. But the majorities are Muslim in the north, Christian in the south. I have to say that we have never had problems of living together. That's not an issue. People can marry together... A lot of ceremonies, like yesterday, every religions had place in order to say prayers. There was space for Muslims, for Christians, for Catholics, there was space for Hindus. There is no big issue regarding that. So when I look at the Parliament in terms of representation, most of the things I will say is not related to that because, for us, we... It's not a big issue. So before I analyse this, let me tell you why it is not an issue.

J Yes, please.

H It's not an issue thanks to the regime that we have had after independence. During the independence, we had a socialist orientation. The biggest challenge was to unify the country. What they have said, is to declare Mozambique as independent and they have said: we are all brothers. People from the north, people from the south, we are all brothers. That's why they have tried to mix up people from different backgrounds in the public sector. Like the police working in Maputo would be police from the north. In the military as well. We didn't have a big university in the country, only



in Maputo. So we had people from the north coming to Maputo. So that's why it has never been a big issue as such.

J There has been unity and people have lived together...

F In the society, yes. However, inside the parties, there is also kind of an underlying issue. Before the President we are having now, most of the Presidents came from the south. So in extent, people were questioning that. But inside, these people that... He was in no problem, no matter if he was from the south or not, what meant is that as long as our party chooses him. Although we have this underlying issue, people trying to instigate, but the ruling party was really good at managing it and it was no longer a big issue. But now we have a President who comes from the north. Looking at the Parliament, in terms of representation: as I said, in the Parliament we don't have a kind of legislation that says how much we can have in terms of the quote of women and stuff like that.

J Right.

H But the political parties themselves, they have this. Because of this closed list system, it allows them to choose how many people are women, how many men, you know. So far, we have been doing very well in the ruling party. Because the ruling party has created a system where they have a quote for veterans, for young people, and a quote for women.

J So Frelimo has this?

H Yes, Frelimo has this. So other political parties, they don't have it. However, they have tried to follow Frelimo's fashion. They have felt pressed in order to create a way of having some quotes. They don't declare quotes as such in their internal regulations, but they showed that they mind these kind of things. So.... Frelimo has more women, Renamo is following them at least. I don't have figures now but I can give them later. So what does this mean? It means that the representation we have in the Parliament... It's kind of a result of.. internal uhm...

J Internal structures..

H Yes, internal structures. So in that sense, we have been doing very well because we have women that, for example, during the last Parliament we had 98 women out of 250 MP's. Now, the number has reduced quite a bit, but it was according to chairs. But this number is dynamic, because some people can die and who comes can be women. In the last Parliament, we added up to having almost 100 women in a place where we have 250 places in Parliament. So in that sense I can say that the representation of groups in the Parliament has never really been an issue. Parties have their internal way of dealing with this. Just some other things: we have two electoral systems as you know. The proportional representation is more political representation as such, it is not constituency based. When it is constituency based, this is exactly the kind of issues that come up. It's not... It's more political representation in a way that we have people voting for a party because of its ideology, not because they represent a group of people or like that. So that's why the Parliament doesn't deal with this as such, but it is dealt with in political parties.

J That makes sense. That also fits within the conflict which has taken place in Mozambique. As you know, I am studying Mozambique and Burundi. Burundi has had a very much ethnic conflict, while Mozambique has had a more political conflict, right? It was basically a conflict between political groups?

H Yes. In terms of ethnic conflict, we have never had a report of a serious ethnic conflict as such. But what happens sometimes is that the opposition threatened to cut the country in half, just because they have the majority of their supporters in the north. However, it doesn't come up more like ethnic, because there is a lot of people who are part of Frelimo in the north. In the past, it was more opposition supporters in the north, but there has also been migration. If we look at the last

elections, you will see that Frelimo has won in places like Cabo Delgado and such. Which are provinces just in the northern corner. They may have lost in the corridor of the centre of the country, but not all in the north. So that's why I can say.. It's not really a big issue, we have never had a lot of.. Of course, during the elections, we had some.. Well where Frelimo had supporters, in some of the provinces of the south, they didn't allow people into... Well we had MDM, and MDM is seen as a more central-based political party. But... So people from the north said: well you people from the north are doing this and that, but it isn't a kind of ethnic... Well there are some people trying to push it towards that side, but it's never been like that. So that is basically what it is like.

J So what you're saying is that it used to be that the political conflict was also some kind of regional conflict, because Renamo had its supporters in the north and Frelimo in the south, but uhm.. It used to be a little more like that, but now it's not like that anymore at all. Right?

H Well... Not exactly like that. It... I can talk about the threats of conflict. It wasn't an open conflict as such.

J Oooh... it was threats.

H Yes, it was more threats. Like: "ok, we're going to divide it up". It was a threat more from the political leaders rather than from the people. So it didn't receive like.. positive answers from the majority of the people. It's a kind of issue that we don't classify as a kind of conflict between people from the north and the south. So...

J Ok. So are these threats still taking place?

H Well, for example now, as I told you, Renamo is not recognizing the results. They are coming up and saying they want to divide the country. And... But it's just coming from the politicians. And the way they say it... also... they are also cautious. They also say: no, we didn't say that. Sometimes, newspapers are trying to sell and they raise this issue. But nobody assumes, it's not like it's declared.

J It's just threats and statements?

H Yes. In terms of deep roots, I don't believe that we will ever have a kind of conflict between north and south.

J Right. So the statements that political leaders make are just statements, never really a real risk of the country being broken up?

H Exactly.

J Now what I've read is that Renamo was, at least in the past, Renamo was very much rural based and Frelimo was very much urban based. Is that still a difference between the two parties?

H Well from the last results in 2014 that we have, of course, Renamo still has some supporters from the rural areas. But what happened is.. We had kind of a progress within Frelimo. In so many rural areas... They had won in so many districts. And we also had MDM, people were saying that MDM was more urban based in terms of the votes. People were thinking they might steal Frelimo supporters. But then, in the end, what happened is that Frelimo had their voters and Renamo as well, and some of them had emigrated to Renamo. If you look at the results of other terms, you would see that Frelimo also won in the rural areas. Now there has been sort of a migration. Of course, the big base of Renamo is still in the rural areas. But although they have strong supporters there, they don't have a monopoly.

J Ok. If we look at political equality... Do you feel that all people in the country, so the people in Maputo, the people from smaller cities and from the towns and from farms... That they all have

the same access to political resources? Are they all able to vote? Are they all included in campaigns? Or is there a difference?

H No. I can say that the... in the urban areas, people are much more exposed to information. The literacy there is high. They are more likely to have access to political resources rather than people in the rural areas. It is still a problem. That's why most of the programmes of governance, of capacity building, look more at the rural area. In fact, this was kind of a tradition. That's why, in the end, in the urban areas, we didn't have a lot of programmes for you know... citizen strengthening. Although this is also needed. But in the rural areas we had these problems.

J Ok. And what about income levels? Is there a difference between people with a high income and with a low income? Also within the city of Maputo, for example?

H Yes. The.. We have this measurement which is the GINI coefficient. Which like... 0.44 rate, which means that the level was growing. Inequalities are now growing, too fast. So... In the last sensor that we had, it showed that people in rural areas... that is exactly where the number of poor people is too high, but we have still in the urban areas, the economy was growing too fast rather than in the rural areas.

J Is this a result of the policy of the Frelimo government, or was it something that happened because of the economy in general?

H No. We don't have cause-effects stats on that. But I can say that I assume that it is also because of the policies that the ruling party has been taken. I'm not exactly saying that they have policies that hold people back. They have never had high quality political policy.

J So it's basically a quality and a capacity problem, not so much a political ideological problem, but more capacity and quality?

H Yes indeed.

J Ok, great. Uhm.. If we look at the elections, especially at the last elections in October, do you think they can be categorized as free and fair? Because you've already said that Renamo is challenging the results. But if we look at it from a general, non-partisan perspective, do you think that the elections were free and fair and that all Mozambicans had the chance to bring out their vote in a free and fair manner?

H Uhm.. We had a lot of problems that make us say that it was not free and fair. They weren't free and fair....

J What were these problems?

H Well, problems like reeking, like... How can I say... In some places there were votes that had been stolen. In some extent there was a kind of manipulation. And... There were kind of... The ruling party took more advantages. So the playing field was not level. Frelimo was using state resources in order to campaign so... Although we cannot point out that because of these problems the number of votes was influenced, we can say that they were not free and fair. Although we don't have a kind of quantitate impact analysis. In terms of numbers and such. I don't know if you have the observation reports?

J Are they out yet?

H Yes. Of the EU, of different organizations. I can send these to you.

J Yes, please. I was looking for them and I only found older ones.

H Ok, well I have them here and I will send them to you.

J That would be fantastic! So that's something that is on the issue of political parties who are manipulating, who are using general resources... But if we look at the level of voters, of citizens, do you feel that all people of Mozambique had the chance to participate? And also, were they willing to participate?

H Well... If we compare it with other years, the turnout has decreased a little bit, but it is still high, somewhere in 50%. This issue of not-recognition of results, conflicts between parties, the lack of trust, you know... It also creates apathy among people. It makes them say: ok, this is their business, we don't.. We have nothing to do with it.

J People become skeptic.

H Yes, yes. Its effecting the numbers of the people voting.

J Ok. What I'm also trying to look for, is... Is it the same, the turnout number, in Maputo as well as in other cities? Is it the same in the north and the south? Is it the same in rural areas and urban areas? Or are there large differences?

H I will try to find the table of results and the turnouts for you. But to answer: there are differences. However, we can also suspect... There are places where there were more voters than people registered... Which means that people suspect that there were votes that have been stolen by the ruling party.

J I understand. But there is no significant difference between the turnout in cities and in rural areas?

H Yes, yes. In the rural area, people have been hired. But where, we are not sure, because organizations were not very good in controlling the rural areas.

J Ok. I understand. So there's more control in the urban areas?

H Exactly. Because the figures in urban areas reflect the turnouts more. So I guess that in urban areas, the turnouts were higher. But I will just check it if I have the results and turnouts for you.

\*CONNECTION LOST\*

\*CONNECTION REINSTALLED\*

J Hi Gil, lost you for one second there.

H Yes Jelle. Let's continue. Just make a list of the promises I am doing now, I will then make sure that I will send the relevant documents to you. I have now sent you a bunch of reports of Carter Centre, SADAC, and some other organizations as well.

J Great, thank you very much for that.

H I will also look for the last report from 2014. It will give you more updated information.

J Fantastic. I am almost through my questions, have a few more questions to ask you and a few more questions to address, is that ok?

H Yes.

J Ok. What I'm still looking for... Of course, Mozambique has had a history of conflict. And of violence, conflict rhetoric and of threats and all those things. How does the conflict between Frelimo and Renamo, which has lasted for many years, how does it still play a role today in Mozambican democracy.

H        Wel yes.. In some point, this conflict still has a kind of influence in the process of democracy here. Because... Sometimes we really feel that... It looks like there are some issues that were not properly solved in the past in the peace agreement. During the implementation, there are now issues coming up... And this is exactly what the opposition parties are claiming. Because what they claim is that what we have now is a fake democracy. According to them, we don't have inclusion. Inclusivity is a big issue for them, they feel they are not being excluded. Second, they feel that the elections are not authentic. They feel that although the agreement has been signed, that we have introduced democracy, this is still not... You know. So... The opposition parties, the main opposition party Renamo, has not, during this process, really been demilitarized for 100%. They have not demilitarized their own party. They still threaten, sometimes, to go back to war. This is what happened last year, when there was an issue of the electoral rules. As they didn't agree on the electoral rules and they knew that in the Parliament they would not be able to do anything, because Frelimo has the majority, they decided to go back into the bush in order to start a new civil war. The government, however, was able to negotiate with them, and then we had elections. Now, they have promised never to go back into the bush again, but they are now starting a new movement. Kind of a movement of civil disobedience. They say that they don't need war, but they also don't recognize the government. So they are going to start their parallel government in a constitutional way. They are not going to fight or something like that. But... If the military attacks them, they will. So people who were active in the civil war are still there. Because if you remember, the window of the healing, of the trauma... You know, it's not like 20 years and then it's gone. It's a process. So we just feel that the costs of civil war are still here, although 20 years has passed and we no longer have... We don't even... Well, we have a new generation of voters that didn't even feel the impact of this civil war. But once the power is with veterans, they still threaten... But I believe that, with time, as our democracy matures, these costs will go whenever these people also die... Or something like that.

J        Ok. So it's basically within the people who have experienced the civil war themselves? It's not so much policy or structure, but basically the ideas of the people who have experienced the war?

H        Yes, but these people are also in front of their parties, to bring it in a public space. The opposition party uses it as kind of a strategy for negotiations. A strategy... Because, in the Parliament, as the ruling party is always winning the majority, they feel it is difficult for them to get any kind of good results there. So what they say is, whenever they really feel fed up, whenever they used all kinds of diplomacy, then they come up with these kind of issues. "You know what, we can get better results if we go back to the bush", you know. So this is an example of what's happening now. Last year, we had an example of... Well this leader of Renamo went back to the bush and started military attacks. Which wasn't seen as a civil war that they started, but it was a strong threat to peace. It was not a second civil war, it was not.

J        It was only a threat.

H        Yes, yes.

J        Right. Does Renamo still have an operating military wing?

H        Yes, well, some of the guys were not properly integrated into the military. The ruling party has done that as a kind of you... Like cheating. But now the consequence is that they were not able to absorb every veteran in Renamo. This group feels excluded. But now because of all this what we had last year, we had a second peace agreement. In this agreement, there was kind of a package of reintegration. There were given small business etcetera to veterans in order to help them integrate into society. So this is an example.

J        Has this helped, the second peace agreement?

H Yes, to some point it has. Thanks to that, we had Renamo accepting to leave the bush and come to the elections. It helped with the elections. No matter the results, if the opposition does not go back to the bush... They are fighting and complaining and contesting the results, but they are still in the public sphere and inside the constitution.

J Right. Now what I've also read was that the decision to go back to the bush by Renamo was also very much a political strategy. Renamo was not doing well in the polls, and after going to the bush, they were doing very well. What is your view on this?

H I can say that... Well it was not like a conscious strategy. Not that going back to the bush would give better results, no. They went back just because of a lot of things. Like the issue of being excluded, and the key was that they didn't agree with the electoral legislation. The reforms that have been done. They knew that in the Parliament they wouldn't get any results. That's why they went back to the bush. It was a surprise to everyone that because of that, they gained again their supporters. They showed that they could challenge the establishment. People believed them again. It's not like it was an electoral strategy, no. Not at all.

J Ok. Alright, one last question: what does, in your view, the political future of Mozambique look like?

H Well... I think if we look at the last results, we have... sort of a ... balance. However, Frelimo still has the majority, but it's sort of balanced. The power. We still don't know exactly what the administration of the new President is going to be like.

J Oh? It's not clear yet?

H No, it's not that clear. The formal side is one thing, but the real side is another thing. So it is still not clear. Because what happens is that some people say: "well this guy is a puppet of the other President". But the other says: "he may really fight to get his independence", which means this can cause some instability within the party and means it can break down and crack down... Because, this new President, if he really wants to have legitimacy, and have a good government, he really has to create distance with the last President. Because otherwise, people will not respect him. So we guess that in the next months, weeks, whatever, we will be sure whether he is going to come... Well, whether this is going to cause sort of a small instability inside the party, which is going to contaminate the government as such. In his speech, of course, as always... He came up with a really nice speech saying that there will be more inclusivity and steps like that. People were very optimistic when they heard his speech. But let's see what's going to happen.

J So he's talking about inclusivity. Does that mean there is a chance that he also might include people from opposition parties in the government?

H Well he was clear, has been saying that he is a President of all Mozambicans, no matter what party you are at. To govern the party, he is taking this into consideration. But also academics and... Well, he mentioned different groups, he says he is establishing a space in government.

J That is interesting, let's see what's going to happen there...

H Yes. If I have the speech, I can send it to you. You could also analyse that.

J That would be great. Because this would be a very big step.

H Yes.

J Great. I think I am through my questions, Gil. They've all been answered very well. So thank you very much again, I really appreciate your time.

H No problem Jelle, and sorry for the inconvenience. This month has been a bit hectic.

J I understand.

H And the internet hasn't helped me so much. But I will also try to see if I can get you some very good documents. I mean documents in a way that... Because we don't have too many stats, but I mean original documents that you can use as evidence.

J That would be fantastic. I'm really glad I got to talk to you.

H No problem, it's a pleasure to discuss these issues with you. Feel free to call if you need it.

J Great, thank you!