Shifting Tides: Understanding China’s Foreign Policy during the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis

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曰仁義，
禮智信，
此五常，
不容紊。

We speak of charity of heart and
of duty towards one's neighbour,
of propriety, of wisdom, and of truth.
These five virtues
admit of no compromise.

Yinglin Wang, from *San Zi Jing* (Source: 'Chinese Text Project')
Abstract

This thesis researches the rationale behind China’s decision in 2013 to co-draft United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094 with the UN right after North Korea performed its third nuclear test, here known as the Third Nuclear Crisis. The cooperation between the US and China was remarkable, because such conjunction between the two countries on resolution-drafting on the North Korean nuclear issue was unprecedented. To answer this question, I analysed China’s position within the global sphere from a constructivist perspective, adding the elements ‘normativity’ and ‘ethics’ by applying constitutive theory. I analysed China’s interests, the effect of the Six Party Talks, and the role of Chinese President Xi Jinping. Lastly, I determined whether China’s foreign policy can be considered as ‘normative’. I established that China’s interests have not altered much since the Second Nuclear Crisis, making ‘interests’ a weak indicator for explaining China’s decision-making. The failure of the Six Party Talks is most probably not the direct reason for China’s decision to co-draft, as the last Talk took place in 2009. However, the failure itself did give the Chinese food for thought on new strategies on how to cope with North Korea. A notable change before and after North Korea’s nuclear test is the change of leadership. A new president alone does not present enough evidence to conclude that Xi Jinping is responsible for China’s cooperation with the US. However, the fact that he has enabled sole decision making via reforms, making it possible for Xi to make decisions on ‘deadlock’ issues such as the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, is indeed of interest. In theory, this means that Xi Jinping could have made the deliberate decision to co-draft Resolution 2094. In addition, China’s foreign policy is not normative pur sang, but rather positioned between ‘imperialist’ and ‘status quo’. I conclude that China’s decision to co-draft United Nations Security Council Resolution 2094 was driven by a combination of China’s need to establish itself as a bigger and responsible player in order to achieve continued economic growth and more importantly, a new ‘reform-hungry’ leader who managed to ‘simplify’ decision making on pressing issues, making himself truly paramount among ‘equals’.

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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Commission</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Constitutive Theory</td>
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<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Discourse Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>GCS</td>
<td>Global Civil Society</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>LSG</td>
<td>Leading Small Group</td>
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<td>LWR</td>
<td>Light-Water Reactor</td>
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<td>NNWS</td>
<td>Non-Nuclear-Weapon State</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National People’s Congress</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWS</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapon State</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Politburo Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>State Council</td>
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<td>SOSS</td>
<td>Society of Sovereign States</td>
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<td>SPT</td>
<td>Six Party Talks</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCHR</td>
<td>United Nations Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

The world has seen its share of potential wars of ‘nuclear’ proportions. The Cold War with its ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ (1962) as apex has made the world aware of how easily situations can escalate, even, or especially when nuclear weapons are involved. Luckily, both Russia and the United States realized the gravity of the situation, and averted a nuclear war. Since then, efforts have been made to prevent another fall-out between states. A Treaty on Non-Proliferation (NPT) was drawn up (1968), a watchdog was needed which resulted in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1957), and the International Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (1963) incorporated to prohibit nuclear tests. All of these mechanisms were aimed to prevent recurrence.

However, recurrence did not take long, as the entire East Asian region has been preoccupied for several decades already by the lingering danger and potential catastrophe of a nuclear war. Referring to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), i.e. North Korea 1, the rogue state has systematically developed a nuclear program, while disclaiming international treaties such as the NPT. North Korea consistently threatens its neighbours, particularly focusing on South Korea, as reunification with its southern counterpart is North Korea’s main goal. North Korea has shown in the past that it does not shun violence and the threat of a nuclear war to accomplish this goal. The severity of the situation led the international community to adopt the situation to the ‘North Korean Nuclear Crisis’.

With North Korea’s most recent nuclear test (2013), the ‘crises’ counter has been put on three. Being a direct neighbour to North Korea, China has had front row seats for each of these crises. However, it was only during the Second Nuclear Crisis (2002-4) that China decided to get involved. During the First Nuclear Crisis (1993-4) China kept itself from interfering. During the Hu Jintao era (2002-13), China’s foreign policy changed from passive to proactive. This active involvement resulted in the Six Party Talks (SPT), which China hosted up to 2009. During this Second Nuclear Crisis, China refrained from heavy condemnation, but did consent to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1718. The emphasis on its foreign policy during the Second Nuclear Crisis relied on talks and mediation.

However, with the current North Korean Nuclear Crisis (2013) China has responded hard-and-fast on North Korea’s underground nuclear test, performed in February 2013. Right after the detonation the UNSC held an emergency session, asking for stricter sanctions. Not only were these sanctions unanimously accepted by the UNSC, but United Nations (UN) Resolution 2094 carrying these

1 The terms ‘DPRK’ and ‘North Korea’ are alternately used within this dissertation. Both terms refer to the same state.
sanctions were drafted by the United States (US) and China. The fact that China served as co-sponsor to Resolution 2094 is notable. Is this China saying: enough is enough?

This thesis takes a look at the rationale behind China’s firm actions and talk during the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis (2013). What is the reason China decided to joined forces with the US, and co-draft UN Resolution 2094? To answer this question, I will take on a dual approach, by performing a discourse analysis (DA) and theoretical analysis. Firstly, I will analyse two speeches of current Chinese president Xi Jinping, held after the first meeting of the Communist Party of China (CPC) 18th National Congress, where he was appointment as General Secretary. The second speech was given during his presidential inauguration. Speeches are never merely words: they contain hidden messages that can illuminate a certain situation. By setting up a DA on two speeches, given by President Xi Jinping, I attempt to identify whether these texts give any sort of explanation on China’s foreign policy behaviour. Secondly, the situation will be approached from a theoretical approach, by looking at the issue from constructivism and constitutive theory (CT). Constructivism has the unique element of incorporating and linking the importance of identity and human action to interests. Even though constructivism contains a normative element, the ethical element is quite scarce. CT is therefore also applied, as it looks at the ethical dimensions of the relations between actors. The thesis captures a specific timeframe, namely China’s history starting from the inception of the ‘People’s Republic of China’ (PRC) in 1945, up to the end of 2014.
1.1. Research Questions

This research takes a look at the rationale China’s firm actions and talk during the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis (2013). A special look will be taken at the role of internal dynamics in decision-making in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) foreign policy and the effect this might have had on the current status of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis. This dissertation’s main research question is as follows:

Why did China decide to co-draft UN Security Council Resolution 2094 with the US in the aftermath of the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis in 2013?

To answer this main research question I have set up several sub-questions. Each sub-question represents a different component within the North Korean Nuclear Crisis:

1. Viewed from the constructivist theory, what are the backgrounds of the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis, in terms of different participants, i.e. state entities, ‘self’ and ‘other’?
2. Which political, social and economic factors affect the PRC’s foreign policy towards North Korea?
3. Did the Six Party Talks have an effect on China’s North Korea discourse during the Third Nuclear Crisis?
4. What role has President Xi Jinping played in the Sino-DPRK relation during the Third Nuclear Crisis?
5. Can China’s actions and foreign policy towards North Korea during the last Nuclear Crisis be considered as ‘normative’?
1.2. Literature Review

This chapter reviews previous research on China’s involvement in the DPRK nuclear crises. A range of authors and academics have written on China’s foreign policy behaviour towards North Korea during the nuclear crises. Most of this literature focuses on China’s ambiguous foreign policy towards North Korea. However, recent developments, such as UNSC Resolution 2094, show that China deviates from its role as patron. In order to conduct proper research on the rationale of this change, a literature review on what has been discussed previously is necessary.

The North Korean nuclear issue is a global issue security issue, which takes place in an increasingly multipolar world. With China further developing, the question rises what its role in global politics and the nuclear issue will be. According to Kahler, an emerging economy such as China, that aims for a larger regional and global role, is unlikely to support revolutionary changes as its economic success is “based on cautious integration with the international economy, and they have been major stakeholders in the existing international economic order” (2013: 726). Any type of change could result in a greater risk of conflict and disorder. Kahler states that the reason for China to participate in the non-proliferation regime “was driven in part by the logic of nuclear incumbency, ensuring their own security by preventing the spread of weapons-of-mass-destruction to non-state actors in particular” (2013: 71).

Whereas most researchers take China’s rise as evident, given and assured, Shambaugh argues that China “has a very long way to go before it becomes – if it ever becomes – a true global power” and will surely “never rule the world” (2013: 6). In his book, Shambaugh attempts to answer the question how China will influence global affairs in the future. He answers the questions negative, in the sense that China is a global actor, but not (yet) a true global power. Not being a global power, Shambaugh states, equals not being able to influence other nations and events. According to Shambaugh, China has already shown this during the SPT glory days, where it has been quite passive in its role, and not able to produce a positive outcome. China, Shambaugh states, is an international actor, and not an international diplomatic power (2013: 46).

Moore states that the thought of North Korea itself being a threat to China’s security interests grows among Chinese. Yan (2004) endorses this by saying that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons “has provoked the most recent North Korean nuclear crisis, not the United States” (as cited in Moore, 2008: 3). In his article Inside Multilateralism: the Six-Party Talks Park presents an alternative perspective towards China’s concept of ‘North Korean security threat’. He states that, when it comes to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the threat is “more symbolic than actual” (Park, 2005: 82). According to Park, we can only speak of a threat when the North Korean regime collapses.
In his article *Set of Stability – Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia* (2000), Berger also takes it from a realist angle, stating that “a direct military confrontation with the United States and its allies would appear suicidal, […] and will be eschewed by a rational North Korean regime”. The status quo of North Korea using military potential as a bargaining mechanism actually gives the pariah state “structural good reasons […] to remain a smouldering source of instability in the region” (Berger, 2000: 414). However, some remarks have to be made: First of all, one might ask whether the North Korean regime can be seen as ‘rational’. Secondly, context is of the essence as Berger’s article was written prior to the second nuclear crisis.

Remarkable is that most authors take on the ‘interest-based’ position when trying to explain China’s foreign policy behaviour toward North Korea. I only came across one exception on this where Hochul Lee offers an ‘identity-based’ explanation. Within these interest-based explanations, the following interests in China are usually summed up by scholars: Preservation of North Korea as a buffer zone to China; maintaining stability in Northeast Asia and the *status quo* on the Korean peninsula; keeping the Korean peninsula denuclearized; preventing nuclear domino effect into Japan and South Korea; and sustaining a cooperative relationship with the US (Lee, 2012: 324).

For example, in *How North Korea Threatens China’s Interests: Understanding Chinese ‘duplicity on the North Korean nuclear issue* (2008) Moore takes an interest-based position. Within the title he puts the term ‘duplicity’ in between quotation marks, which indicates a certain degree of dubiety in China’s foreign policy. Moore aims to establish the rationale of this paradox of China’s aid towards North Korea, while condemning its ‘ally’. His answer is that China’s behaviour is “a careful calculation of national interests,” and “not at all duplicitous or contradictory” (Moore, 2008: 2). Resembling Moore in this sense, Fitzpatrick states that China claims to look after its national interests and puts priority on stability, but contradicts itself by allowing North Korea to destabilize the entire region (2009: 10).

The matter of ‘duplicity’ itself (and not the doubt of the concept itself) is omnipresent within literature. Fitzpatrick states that “the Chinese know that North Korea has become more of a liability than an ally,” but that the Chinese “just don’t know what to do about it” (2009: 10). Shen concedes on this matter by stating that even though China supports the non-proliferation regimes, embargoes imposed by China could create bilateral problems between China and targeted states (2008: 643). Lee (2012) also adduces the ‘ambiguity’ element within his writing. However, he addresses the interest-based approach for the sole purpose to criticize it. According to Breslin, China indeed would like to change its role, but it is unclear “how this should be expressed and to what ends and outcomes” (2013: 615). The first stage of participation should be to learn the rules of the game one is part of, however, the issue is that China presents itself (and its objectives) in different ways to different audiences (Breslin, 2013: 633).
Lee’s study (2012) researches the rationale between China’s inactiveness during the First Nuclear Crisis (1993-4) and its pro-activeness during the Second Nuclear Crisis (2002-4). He believes that the interest-based explanation was not adequate for explaining the difference in foreign policy as China’s security and strategy interests and -concerns during the first and the second crisis were virtually the same. Lee’s argument on the interest-based approach is quite static and on a meta-level, as he talks about the absence of changes of interest between the first and second crisis. Lee concludes by presenting the identity-based explanation as the answer to “explaining China’s pro-active diplomacy in the second nuclear crisis” (2012: 325). He discovered that China’s state identity had undergone some significant changes in the late 1990s.

Lee drew the conclusion that China’s ‘state identity’ is governed by the CPC. Three decades of economic success and stable leadership transition gave China a self-sense of being a ‘responsible great power’ (Lee, 2012: 327). This new idea of ‘responsibility’ and ‘ability’ supposedly marked China’s proactive attitude towards the second nuclear crisis. Lee’s approach, in which he pushes China’s newly acquired identity forward as main factor, certainly offers variety within the focus on ‘interests.’ However, Lee fully dismisses ‘interests’ as factor for change of policy in China’s changing attitude. In addition, his identity-based approach lacks depth.

To find analysts that research China purely from a constructivist perspective seemed quite the task. To find one that deals specifically with the nuclear issue turned out to be even harder. The one that came closest to it was Alastair Johnston and his research on China’s behaviour in international institutions from 1980 to 2000. In his book he tends to explain whether the central concept of socialization “helps explain China’s cooperation in major security institutions in the 90s that had a potentially constraining effect on its relative power”. To do so, Johnston uses three micro processes: mimicking (copying behavioural norms of the group), persuasion (novices convinced via process of cognition that particular norms, values and casual understanding are correct and ought to be operative in their own behaviour), and social influence (novice’s behaviour judged by the in-group and rewarded) (Johnston, 2008: 23-25). Johnston argues that behaviour of agents within institutions take place in the form of counter-Realpolitik socialization. This form of socialization takes place due to the fact that institutions often have their own normative cores and discourses that are perpendicular to realpolitik-behaviour. Johnston concludes that “Chinese leaders adopted more cooperative and potentially self-constraining commitments to security institutions between 1980 and 2000”, however, “much of this took place in an era of unipolarity” (2008: 197). Although his research focused on an era where a multipolar world was yet absent, his findings give great insights on why China choose to interact with international institutions at that time.
1.3. Research Objective

Research on the North Korean Nuclear Crises and China’s role seems to have stagnated. When going through written works, researchers seem to parrot that stated prior. In addition, there is a remarkable lack of depth as the focus is mainly placed on ‘power’ and ‘interests,’ originated from the predominantly realist view, where state’s interests are taken as given. With this paper, I tend to add a new dimension to the discussion by taking a constructivist turn, adding history, identity and relations. In addition, research on China’s role in the North Korean Nuclear Crises and the dynamics in China’s foreign policy has both societal and theoretical relevance.

1.3.1. Societal Relevance

The world seems to become more and more unethical. Self-interest and profit are paramount to morality and solidarity. Issues like nuclear proliferation and nuclear warfare are not regional, but global challenges. Nuclear non-proliferation should be tackled from an ethical perspective, not the narrow perspective of self-interest which creates the need for nuclear deterrence and, ultimately, expansion of the global nuclear arsenal. It is therefore important that alternative perspectives are represented within research.

1.3.2. Theoretical Relevance

Let me start by saying that this research does not present new, ground-breaking theories. It is based on the existing (meta-) theories, constructivism and CT. My motivation for using these theories lies in their nature and the current overkill in usage of self-interest and power-theories such as realism. I believe that ‘grand’- theories like realism disclaim and ignore the element of ‘identity’, ‘norms’, and ‘ethics’, which are elements that influence decision-making more than anything else. Although constructivism is also considered to be a ‘grand theory’, it is remarkably underutilized in the analysis of case studies that carry the size and complexity of the North Korean nuclear crisis. While I am no psychologist, I believe that, to a great extent, identity, self-image and norms do consciously or unconsciously influence decision-making. For these reasons alone, theories such as constructivism and CT deserve more credit. I do not dismiss theories such as realism; however I do believe normative theories like constructivism and CT complement the current of body of theories.
1.4. Chapter Overview

My research has been split into two distinctive parts. The first part contains background information that is necessary for the reader’s understanding. The second part will contain the research findings. Chapter two contains the theoretical framework that will be used to analyse the case study. It contains two theories of International Relations (IR), namely constructivism and CT presenting one single ‘hypothesis’ that might answer the main research question. Chapter three sets out the research design and method used to answer the main research question. I will be applying a qualitative method, which is the case study analysis. Chapter four contains background information on the substance of the non-proliferation regime, the history of the DPRK Nuclear Crises, and the Sino-DPRK relation. This chapter also answers part of the first sub-questions. This information is necessary for the second part and its analysis is relatively in-depth.

The second part answers the sub-questions and the main research question. Chapter five contains the discursive analysis of several texts, including Xi Jinping’s speech at the Communist Party Committee 18th National Congress (November 2012), his inaugural speech (March 2013) and several statements made by Chinese representatives during an NPT Review Conference. In addition, a quick look will be taken to President Xi Jinping himself. The factors influencing China’s foreign policy and the effect of the (failure of the) SPT on the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis will subsequently be discussed. Constructivism is used to perform the analysis. Within the entire analysis I shall present the world as a ‘constructivist’ world. The latter part contains an analysis of China’s foreign policy on the North Korean nuclear crises, establishing whether this is ‘normative’ and ‘ethical’. Finally, I answer the sub-questions within the conclusion and ultimately my main-research question. In addition, I will mention the challenges that I came across during the research.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter presents the theoretical framework belonging to this research. I will deviate from traditional grand narratives, such as realism, by using the constructivist paradigm\(^2\). Constructivism, which is more of a meta-story than a theory, incorporates and links the importance of identity and human action to structures in the social world. The basic assumptions of constructivism will form the ontological and epistemological foundation of the theoretical framework. However, due to the lack of the ‘ethical’ element within constructivism, I am also applying CT. CT looks at the ethical dimensions of the relations between actors. Both constructivism and CT have an emphasis on ‘norms’, but are still unique in their own way. With both theory discussed, I will present a preliminary answer to the main research question.

2.1. A Better Grand Narrative: Constructivism

Constructivism challenges the positivist label that rationalists put upon the social world and knowledge. This means that constructivism challenges the nature of social science and the discipline of traditional epistemology of IR itself (Adler, 1997: 321). Rationalists believe that social phenomena must be inquired on the same manner as the natural world via empirical validation or falsification. Facts and values must be separated, and actors and concepts are exogenously given (Zehfuss, 2002: 3). For constructivists, concepts like ‘institutions’, ‘regimes’, ‘norms’, and ‘changes in identity’ are better explanations than rationalist concepts as ‘power politics’, ‘anarchy’, and ‘military force’ (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2009: 94). Constructivism differs from the scientific explanation, as it uses interpretive, discursive and historical modes of analysis for their body of empirical work (Reus-Smit, 2009: 219; Guzzini, 2000: 162). On an epistemological level, constructivism involves the social construction of reality, i.e. knowledge. On an ontological level, it concerns the (social) construction of the world.

Due to lack of agreement, the exact definition of constructivism is not easily demonstrated. For some, everything that is non-mainstream can be regarded as ‘constructivist’. For others, Wendt’s widely known approach in which he applies identity and interest formation, equals constructivism (Zehfuss, 2002: 7; Wendt, 1992: 393). Adler describes constructivism as a ‘middle ground approach’ in IR, as it lies between rationalist and interpretive approaches, such as critical theory\(^3\)(1997: 321). Despite the different strands within constructivism, there are core assumptions on the ontological level, which are encompassed in the following chapters (Reus-Smit, 2009: 220-1):

1. Agents and structures are mutually constituted;

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\(^2\) A paradigm is a cycle of “accumulating knowledge based on a set of shared assumptions and commonly accepted theories about the way the world works.” (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2009: 5).

\(^3\) Constructivism is corollary to ‘critical theory’. Critical theorists rejected rational ontology of humans “as atomistic egoists and society as a strategic domain”, and pose instead that “humans are socially imbedded, communicatively constituted and culturally empowered” (Reus-Smit, 2009: 219). According to Wendt, critical theorists view all observation as ‘theory-laden’, making it impossible to fully distinct the subject from the object (2005:75).
2. Identities are the basis of interests; and
3. Normative or ideational structures are just as important as material structures.

2.1.1. Production of Knowledge and Social Structures

The production of knowledge within constructivism lies within its intersubjective, i.e. social relations. Retrieved from Kuhn’s visions, Guzzini states that the production of knowledge “requires an analysis of the social realm in which it takes place” (2000: 199). Human action within this social realm cannot be understood without interpretation, which is “the meaning that is given to it” (Ibid: 160-161). ‘Knowledge’ is considered to be part of meaningful action conducted by agent and observer.

Constructivism takes the social world as a world where human beings are social beings, made and constructed by social relations that make sense, and to use our physical senses. At the same time, we ourselves create the world “from the raw materials that nature provides us […]” (Onuf, 2013: 3-4). In other words, people make society and society makes people. Constructivism does not deny the world of brute, natural facts, but puts emphasis on the notion that knowledge of reality is socially constructed, as interpretations “are based on a shared system of codes and symbols, of languages, life-worlds, social practices” (Guzzini, 2000: 159). According to Wendt, social structures, i.e. sociality, is about ‘shared knowledge’. Structures consist of social relationships, which are simultaneously dependent on ‘ideas’. These ideas are social because of the intersubjective element. Sharing of ideas means sharing knowledge (1995: 73).

2.1.2. The International System

Constructivism is also based on the idea that international society can be regarded as a structure: ‘Self-contained’ countries constitute a world, which is a society in itself, formed via relations among countries, which people try to keep intact (Onuf, 2013: 3-4). Contrary to neorealist claims, international politics are social rather than material. In addition, these structures don’t just shape actors’ behaviour, but also their identities and interests. The analysing process of the construction of international politics equals the analysing of how processes of interaction “produces and reproduces the social structures, cooperative or conflictual, that shape actors’ identities and interest and the significance of their material contexts” (Wendt, 1995: 18).

Wendt puts the state central in his structural theory, in which structure does not exist apart from the practices of actors (Zehfuss, 2002: 14). The distribution of power may always affect states’ calculations, but how it does depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, and on the “distribution of knowledge” which constitute their conceptions of self and other (Wendt, 1992: 397). For example, a security dilemma is a situation in which states are so alarmed that they make
worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions. It is a social structure, consisted of intersubjective understandings and interests defined in self-help terms (Wendt, 1995: 73). Neo-realists believe that institutions have little influence on state behaviour, and that institutional cooperation between states supposedly depends on the distribution of power and configuration of interests. Moreover, hegemonic powers are given a significant role within institutional cooperation, as dominant states can “create and enforce the rules of the international system, and dominant states tend to create and maintain institutions that further their interests and maximize their power” (Reus-Smith, 2009: 559).

What differentiates constructivism from mainstream IR theories is its view on ‘change’, which especially applies to the discussion of the (social) world being in an anarchic state. Anarchy is characterized by absence as well as presence. The latter refers to the decision-making subjects in the global scene: the ‘states’. Absence lies in the absence of a single centre of universal authority (Ashley, 1988). Constructivists have a different interpretation of anarchy’s causal powers, as they believe that “anarchy is not an unavoidable feature of international reality” (Zehfuss, 2002: 4). According to Wendt, “self-help and power politics are socially constructed in a condition of hierarchy” (Ibid: 14). Wendt states that “if today we find ourselves in a self-help world; this is due to process, not structure” (1992: 395). In addition, ‘structure’ cannot be seen as separate from ‘process’. For realists, self-help systems lack central authority and collective security (Wendt, 1992: 395). Wendt disagrees with the realist assumption that self-help is a necessary condition of anarchy, but rather “an institution developed and sustained through process” (as cited by Zehfuss, 2002: 14). In other words, it is a dynamic and constant changing process. Anarchy is what states make of it. Constructivism holds the idea that ‘anarchy’ is meaningless within the mainstream IR theories, as these theories lack intersubjective sets of norms and practices, making the term structure ‘hollow’. Without structures and norms, relations cannot be formed. In other words, according to constructivists, anarchy is structured (Wendt, 1992: 395).

2.1.3. Normative Structures: Agents, Identities & Interests

One of constructivism’s ontological propositions is that normative or ideational structures are just as important (or even exceed in importance) as material structures. They have the ability to shape the behaviour of social and political actors and exert powerful influence on social and political action (Wendt, 1995: 73). On the other hand, without the practices of actors we would not have ‘normative’ or ‘ideational’ structures. Their actions transform and keep structures alive. In other words, agents and structures are mutually constituted (Reus-Smith, 2009: 221). Onuf states that the existence of agents is only possible through ‘rule’, which can be defined as “a statement that tells people what [they] should do” (as cited by Zehfuss, 2002: 20). Rules provide guidance, and therefore make shared meaning
possible. The identities of these actors are “constituted by the institutionalized norms, values and ideas of the social environment in which they act” (Price & Reus-Smith, 1998: 223). And ultimately, the interests of actors are defined endogenously by identity. Realists and liberalists take the identity and interests of actors as exogenous and given: States and the system of states simply are, “with the ontological status being, not becoming […]” (Ruggie, 1998: 863). Contrary to the previous, constructivists believe that “the identity of the […] state can change and pull its interests along” (Ibid).

Wendt labelled ‘identities’ as the foundation of interests. To understand the interest formation of a state, one should focus on the social identities of states (1992: 398). Reus Smith defines ‘social identity’ as “sets of meaning that an actor attributes to itself while taking into account the perspective of others, that is, as a social object” (2009: 564-5). According to Hopf, identities have three functions within society. First, it tells you and others who you are. Second, it tells you who ‘they’ are. The notions of ‘self’ and environment have the possibility to reshape the international system as ‘self’ and its environment shape interactions and are shaped by interactions (Zehfuss, 2002: 12). Third, with the affirmation of ‘I’ and ‘They’ comes the implication of interests or preferences (Hopf, 1998: 174). In other words, the identity of a state reflects its preferences and actions.

To ensure stability and a certain level of expectations and predictability, states need intersubjective identities that are stable enough to produce predictable patterns of behaviour (Hopf, 1998: 174). According to neo-realisists, units in global politics all have one identity, namely self-interested states. For constructivists, identity is an empirical entity, which can be variable and contextual (Ibid). Constructivists go so far as to say that state identities are also produced by the specific identity of other states, via international interaction (Ruggie, 1998: 864). Constructivists do not fully dismiss the ‘self-interest’ character of states, but do state that “it tells us nothing unless we understand how actors define their ‘selves’ and how this informs their ‘interests’” (Price & Reus Smith, 1998: 221).

2.1.4. The Role of Language

Within constructivism, ‘world’ and ‘words’ do not exist independently from one another; they are mutually constitutive. According to Onuf, constructivism begins with ‘deeds’. Deeds can be present in speech act or physical actions. Speaking a language means participating in a rule governed form of behaviour therefore making language not only to be descriptive, but also performative (Onuf, 1989: 82). This applies especially in case of a ‘speech act’, which is the “act of speaking in a form that gets someone else to act”. ‘Rules’ depend on them, as “a rule is always a statement and the normativity of a speech act developed through repetition” (Zehfuss, 2002: 20).
Just like the social world, deeds and speaking also work in a two-way process. Deeds construct reality, but need to have meaning in order to do this. Whether a deed has meaning or not depends on the existence of rules. Onuf attempts to create a link between the social and natural world by using ‘deeds’ to transport meaning. ‘Speech’ or ‘languages’, which are considered to have the same ability and therefore seen as deeds, are able to influence state of affairs (Zehfuss, 2002: 152). The intersubjective character of the social world can best be understood via the concept of ‘language’, as it “does not exist independently from its use and its rules cannot be reduced to individual choices” (Guzzini, 2000: 164).

2.2. A New Normative Theory: Constitutive Theory

Within the (growing) family of IR theories, normative IR theory is considered to be a newcomer, only to have made its entry three decades ago. During the 1960s and 1970s, challenging events such as the Cold War raised questions of morality: Is it justified to use violence? When is it permissible for one country to interfere in the affairs of another? Dominant theories, like realism, do not acknowledge the explanatory power of norms, or norms “as rationalizations for self-interest” (Klotz, 1995: 13). Normative IR theory advocates that moral judgements matter as it “addresses the ethical dimension of the relations between a whole range of actors in the global realm” (Dunne et al., 2013: 38).

Central to normative theory are its three assumptions. The first assumption is that norms matter in world politics. ‘Norms’ can be seen as “shared […] understandings of standards for behaviour” (Klotz, 1995: 14). As they have a prescriptive character, norms contain ‘rules’ which guide actors in their actions in certain situations. Simultaneously, this generates certain moral expectations (Dunne et al., 2013: 46). The element of ‘shared understandings’ within the international spectrum, which is characterized by division, is more difficult to grasp. Frost tackles this dilemma with his ‘settled norms’ (see sub-chapter 2.2.2. ‘Mervin Frost’s Constitutive Theory’). The second assumption involves ‘sites of value’ affecting ‘moral inclusion’. By determining who participates within international politics, one basically states who is granted equal moral standing. Our moral starting point, i.e. ‘sites of our values’, has an impact on the actors given this equal moral standing. Not being given these same moral

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4 The body of ‘normative’ work is not always referred to ‘normative IR theory’, or also called ‘International Ethics’ (Dunne, Kurki & Smith, 2013: 38). All of these alternative names refer to the same area of study. However, for the sake of clarification, I will use the label ‘normative IR theory’.

5 The term ‘normative’ can refer to ‘standard setting’, encompassing a prescriptive role, or mean standards of behaviour, norms or values. According to Brown (1992: 3), normative IR theory should refer to moral norms. Therefore, for this study, the latter option would be more appropriate, making it a study of how and why standards are set, and who sets these standards.

6 Moral inclusion presents the difference between ethical particularism and ethical universalism, with the first being an example of ‘communitarianism’, and the latter ‘cosmopolitanism’ The absence of ethics within the sphere of IR has to do with the debate on communitarianism and cosmopolitanism We tend to think within ethical communities consisting of ‘us’ and ‘they’, which automatically produces ethical differences in commitment. Communitarians advocate the limits of political community, and shut out outsiders when it comes to moral conversations. However, according to cosmopolitans, “the state can no longer mediate effectively or exclusively among the many loyalties, identities and interests that exist in a globalizing world” (Burchill et al., 2005: 155), asking for a wider community of dialogue and a more cosmopolitan form of political organization. Without there being an umbrella cosmopolitan entity, there is no common framework to foster ethical discussion between ‘us’ and ‘they’ (Frost, 2009: 12).
standings means getting excluded from being a party or having certain rights, ultimately becoming an ‘outsider’. The final assumption focuses on the role of and the crucial link between moral agents and their corresponding responsibilities within a global realm, which is considered to be ethical. The question of moral responsibilities and accountability is important, as moral norms set our principles and practices, which in their turn have greatly influenced international politics (Dunne et al., 2013: 47-49). Frost adds that “being a participant in a social practice necessarily involves making evaluations about what, from an ethical point of view, [it] would be appropriate to do next” (2009: 20).

2.2.1. Normative Foreign Policy

Within the dynamic international system, states may claim that their foreign policy is driven by a normative agenda. However, a state can say one thing, and may decide to do another. What does it mean to be a ‘normative’ foreign policy actor? For a state to have a ‘normative’ foreign policy there needs to be consistency in the goals, means and results. By analysing foreign policy goals, means and results, we can identify four paradigms of foreign policy behaviour: The normative, the realpolitik, the imperial and the status quo actor.

On the ethical interpretation of the term ‘normative’, Tocci states that the term is non-neutral, as “all major international actors would have ‘normative’ foreign policies by definition, in that they all contribute to determining and shaping the ‘norm’ in international affairs” (2008: 4). The definition of ‘normative’ foreign policy can be measured through three dimensions, namely through what an actor wants (normative goals), how it acts (normative policy means), and what it achieves (normative impacts). These three variables in normative foreign policy represent four foreign policy types: the normative, the realpolitik, the imperial- and the status quo actor. Firstly, the normative foreign policy type satisfies both internal variables of goals and means. Justification for its actions is derived by referring to its milieu goals, which “aim to strengthen international law and institutions and promote rights and duties enshrined and specified in international law” (Tocci, 1998: 12), while simultaneously respecting its legal obligations. Secondly, within the Realpolitik foreign policy type international actors pursue ‘possession goals’ with all available means. Own interests are pursued, regardless of its internal and international legal obligations. Thirdly, the imperial foreign policy type claims to pursue normative foreign policy goals; however, it re-shapes the milieu by imposing new norms. It does so by “abrogating existing rules, promoting or preventing the adoption of others, and playing a dominant role in creating others” by using all means at its disposal (Ibid.). Lastly, an actor with a status quo foreign policy type does not wish to further develop international law and institutions, but does respect the existing rules when operating within the international system.

7 SEE APPENDIX I whether an international actor will pursue a normative or non-normative foreign policy depends on the three principle conditioning factors (Tucci, 1998: 17-20).
2.2.2. Mervin Frost’s Constitutive Theory

‘Thin’ is the word Mervin Frost uses in his ‘Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations (2009)’ to describe the current ethical dimension of international politics. According to Frost, “understanding what is deemed ethically appropriate conduct is a prerequisite for participation in social practices, including international ones” (2009: 26). With his CT, Frost tries to construct a normative theory of IR that is able to tackle new and increasingly complicated ethical problems in world politics (1996: 75).

The theory focuses on interaction among key actors in specific global practices, where each actor has its own internal ethical structure (which enables an actor to make sense of what they do within the practice) (Frost, 2009: 19; 23). Mutual recognition between these actors is given in terms of a standard set of ‘rules of the international game’. This reciprocal recognition forms criteria “that determine who is to count as a participant in good standing and what would count as adequate reason to expel a participant from a practice”, as the ethic within a certain practice “makes possible a range of actions and sets the limits of that range”. Along with laws, rules and principles, the ethic also creates an area of freedom for actors (Frost, 2009: 28-27). The goal of a participant to maintain its status as a participant within this social practice, is an ethical goal in itself as it “involves the participants inter-subjectively valuing one another as actors of a certain kind through adherence to rule-governed patterns of reciprocal recognition” (Ibid: 32).

In his ‘Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory (1996)’ Frost presented the necessary components for his encompassing normative theory of IR. A body of ‘settled norms’ and background justification for these settled norms are given a central position within the construction of this background theory. A norm is settled, according to Frost, when “it is generally recognized that any argument denying the norm (or which appears to override the norm) requires special justification” (1996: 104-5). According to Frost, the body of settled norms consists of sovereignty norms, international law norms, modernization norms and domestic norms. The norms ‘sovereignty’ and ‘international law’ are the primary ones as they make the “preservation of the system of sovereign states the primary good” (Ibid: 112). This means that this ethical theory needs to justify this settled norm ‘sovereignty’. Frost ultimately presents his CT as the theory that is able to justify ‘sovereignty’, and thereby an alternative to the ‘contractarian approach’.  

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8 The ‘contractarian approach’ is a rights-based justification, which is a theory of individual human rights. Within CT, individuals are constituted as rights holders within the context of a specific social relationship, and do not possess rights outside of or prior to entering this social context. The ‘contractarian approach’ attempts to combine “the principle of state sovereignty with the principles referring to individual rights by making use of such notions as contract, consent and tacit consent” (Frost, 1996: 128). According to Frost, the grand error of this approach is the need to show that “the sovereign state is a device which protects certain pre-existing rights” (Ibid: 138).
As stated by Frost, “the state depends on there being citizens and citizens exist only within a state” (Frost, 1996: 139). Citizenship and its accompanying rights do not exist out of the state. The practices of Global Civil Society (GCS) and Society of Sovereign States (SOSS) are linked, making citizens participants in both. This also means that participants will have to adhere to the general rule, which is that “as citizens in the system of sovereign states they have to respect the civilian rights that they and others enjoy in GCS”. This makes participants always vulnerable to ethical appraisals from co-participants. The SOSS contains citizenship rights and “builds on the ethical identities made possible within global civil society in which actors are established as civilians – as individual rights holders” (Ibid: 110-111). The claiming of a right simultaneously articulates “a certain kind of reason justifying an action and constraining the actions of others” (Ibid: 139). Within CT, being a rights holder not only implicates having a restrained relationship with another group, it also constrains the actions of others and presents a certain justification for an action.

When applying an ethics-centred approach such as CT to analyse international affairs, it is of the essence to identify the global practices with individual actors and actions. Frost provides a construction mode of the global practice by analysing a single set of practices. The analysis presents ethical interpretations of specific actions taking place in global politics. These actions include an actor’s “analysis of a situation, the explanation of how it came about, the choice of policy options, the justification of the chosen option and the execution of that option” (Frost, 2009: 32-33). To determine what actors themselves say they are doing, it is important to combine these ethical elements into a single narrative. By doing so we can compose a “comprehensive account of the global arrangements within which […] disputes take place” (Ibid: 43-44).
2.3. Preliminary Answer

As stated before, my research has a post-positivist and interpretative character. I do not aim to test the ‘hypothesis’ used in this research. The word ‘hypothesis’ has been placed between brackets, because it is a positivist charged term. My research aims to build further on existing theory and not theory testing; however, I can present that what I expect to see come out of the research, and the answer to the main research question:

**Why did China decide to co-sponsor the draft to UN Resolution 2094 with the US in the aftermath of the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis (2013)?**

The main body of my research question was established mid 2013, when it was made known that China had decided to partner up with the US to draft UN Resolution 2094. During that time Xi Jinping had just been installed as General Secretary of CPC, meaning that very little was known about his policy course. Luckily, time has passed since, meaning we are now able to derive conclusions from his policies and decision made so far.

My hypothesis would be that China’s motivation to co-sponsor the draft to UNSC Resolution 2094 probably lies for a large part in self-interest, but this self-interest has to do with its ‘identity’. China’s relation with North Korea has taken another turn. In addition, I do believe that the change of leadership in the Chinese government and CPC is a factor. However, one person is not capable of changing China’s entire foreign policy discourse. This change must be preconceived, and the right person needs to be selected to execute this. In addition, China’s DPRK discourse tends to a ‘normative’ foreign policy. Its public statements on condemning North Korea’s latest nuclear test and co-sponsorship could not come merely from self interest, but also as an ethical response. China’s growing responsibility as a global power compels it to act and respond in a way that is expected. In addition, China’s state identity, based on normative concepts as ‘harmony’ and ‘peace’, has an ethical charge that can be seen in their foreign policy.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

Chapter 3 discusses the research design of the thesis. I shall start off with the design and method: The Case-Study Design. In this research design, the connection between the empirical data and the initial research question, as well as its conclusion, will be shown. I shall therefore use a dual method which is also an interpretative method, to answer my research question: A theoretical analysis and DA. My method for this research is to fully utilize ‘triangulation’.

3.1. Research Method: A Case Study

As stated by Yin, a research design is there to form a logical plan that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial questions and its conclusions (2009: 26). Within the current ‘sociological’ paradigm, an array of research designs is presented that ostensibly seem suitable for this specific study; however, as pointed out by George and Bennet, “the various fields in the social sciences have addressed the […] “turns” by focussing on norms, institutions, and actors’ identities and preferences, and doing so through largely neo-positivist means” (2004: 5). The survey and measurement of social phenomena and additional theories within the (neo) positivist empirical methodology in sociology are conducted in such a manner that leaves space merely for objectivity without ambiguity. The language of variables and empirical validation of a theory through falsification are considered to be the cornerstones of scientific methodology (Corbetta, 2003: 18).

Critique on this epistemology derives from the thought that our perception of reality is not objective but dependable on “the researcher’s frame of mind and on social and cultural conditioning”. The absence of a clear distinction between theoretical concepts and observed data forms this theory-laden nature of empirical observations, where the “act of understanding remains conditioned by the social circumstances and theoretical framework in which it takes place” (Corbetta, 2003: 19). The need of social circumstances as an essential condition and theoretical framework presented as the answer to the problem of vague borders between theoretical concepts and observed data lead me to use the ‘Case-Study method’ as research design for my thesis. Yin defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (2009: 18).

The case-study method offers the possibility to conduct research on a single or multiple cases. Applied to this topic would be a single case referring to the ‘DPRK Nuclear Crisis’. This research is offered to give a descriptive and explanatory analysis of the ‘DPRK Nuclear Crisis’ event. The ‘DPRK Nuclear Crisis’ case is not only an historical event, but due to its most recent developments a contemporary event. Suitable for complex events where relevant behaviour cannot be controlled or manipulated, a case-study design makes an in-depth investigation of the stated phenomenon within its real-life
context possible. With social circumstances being a core element, phenomenon and context are not separated within a case-study, but entangled (Yin, 2009: 18).

3.2. Data Collection: Triangulation

As stated before, this research involves the analysis of a single case, giving readers a descriptive and explanatory analysis of the stated event. To maximize construct validity I will be applying ‘data triangulation’ (Yin, 2009: 174). Triangulation is considered to be one of the strengths of the case-study design as it gives the opportunity to use different sources of evidence and support the facts of the case study. I shall collect data from multiple sources that are “aimed at corroborating the same fact or phenomenon” (Ibid). Written primary sources include official documents and reports. Secondary sources include journal articles, books, statistical data from official publications by authorities and international organizations.

Due to the nature of the researched subject, the majority of sources and material used within my research shall consist of qualitative material. This is comprised of history-based documents and a discourse analysis. Historical-based documents take a grand part within my research. They are used to provide the descriptive element within the research, including the necessary background information. Describing history and relations of China with other key actors is essential to understand the profundness of the long-lasting DPRK nuclear crisis and complex institutions and regimes underlying the course of events. In order to determine whether change of power has been of influence on China’s DPRK discourse, a DA on two inaugural speeches of China’s current president Xi Jinping and statements made during NPT Review Conference will be performed.

3.3. Research Methods of Analysis

To determine which discourse China has been taking throughout the course of the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis I will be performing a DA on two speeches of China’s current president Xi Jinping during the first gathering of the 12th NPC. By doing a DA and ‘read between the lines’ I hope to find the then new President Xi Jinping’s intention and whether he has played a major factor in the determination of China’s foreign policy toward North Korea. In addition to a DA, I will also use two theories of IR, which I have illustrated in chapter two.

3.3.1. Qualitative Method of Analysis: Discourse Analysis

Within sociology, which is involved with the social organization of individual and collective human action, communication and our ability to talk are considered but two of the defining features of humans. Discourse analyses suggest that “the way we use language can be studied in its own right, but
for different reasons” (Wooffitt, 2005: 18). However, discourse is a term with a range of definitions. For example, Gilbert and Mulkay define ‘discourse’ broadly by stating that it consists of “all forms of talk and writing” (as cited by Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 6). Potter and Wetherell adopt this notion and define DA as “analysis of […] all forms of spoken interactions, formal and informal, and written texts of all kinds” (1987: 7). As an abstract noun, linguist Fairclough defines ‘discourse’ as “language use conceived as social practice,” and ‘discourse practice’ as “the production, distribution and consumption of a text” (1993: 138). A ‘common sense’ definition is given by Jorgenson and Phillips who present discourse as the “general idea that language is structured according to different patterns that people’s utterances follow when they take part in different domains of social life […] Discourse analysis is the analysis of these patterns” (2002: 1). For the purpose of this paper I will apply the broadly defined definition of Potter and Wetherell, in which they include the written text.

All these definitions can be led back to Michel Foucault, who has played a central role in the development of DA. In his Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) Foucault refers to discourse as “a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation […]” that are “made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of existence can be defined” (1972: 112). According to Foucault, there are different regimes of knowledge that discursively construct ‘truth’. As there are many ways to formulate statements, Foucault interested himself in researching those rules that “determine which statements are accepted as meaningful and true in a particular historical epoch” (as cited by Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 12-3).

3.3.1.1. Critical Discourse Analysis
Most discourse analysts built their ideas and corresponding DA approaches on those of Foucault. One of these DA theories is ‘Critical Discourse Analysis,’ which I will be using in my thesis to analyse the two distinctive speeches of China’s current president Xi Jinping and statements made during a NPT Conference. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is an “analysis of the dialectical relationships between semiosis” and other elements of social practices”, dealing with radical changes that take place in contemporary social life (Wodak & Meyer, 2001: 123). It is quite a young approach, emerging only in the 1980s. The approach adds social-theoretical insights into DA.

According to Fairclough, other approaches that differ theoretically, methodologically and in type of research issues from CDA have been merged within CDA. From a methodological perspective, CDA works ‘trans-disciplinary’. It contains a dual purpose, trying to expose how and how far social

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9 The definition of ‘semiosis’ is all forms of meaning making – visual images, body language as well as language (Wodak & Meyer, 2001: 122).

10 ‘Trans-disciplinary’ implies that the “theoretical and methodological development […] of CDA and the discipline/theories it is in dialogue with is informed through that dialogue, a matter of working with […] the ‘logic’ and categories of the other in developing one’s own theory and methodology” (Fairclough, 2012: 452).
changes represent changes in discourse. It tends to reveal the “relations between changes in discourse and non-discoursal elements or moments in social life” (Fairclough, 2012: 452). Additionally, by analysing ‘texts’, the CDA aims to expose which parts of that text are part of processes of social change.

Theoretically, social reality is, according to CDA, consisted of abstract social structures and concrete social events (which Foucault formulates as ‘realist social ontology’), and looks dialectically at the relationship between structure and agency. The relationship between social structures and events depend on ‘social practices’. Social practices consist of different levels (fields, organizations, and institutions), that each has its own semiotic dimension. Languages are considered to be a semiotic system and type of social structure (Fairclough, 2012: 453).

Social events are formed by two causal powers, namely social practices and social agents. Both these powers are interdependent. Texts, which can be seen as a form of ‘language,’ are semiotic elements of social events (Fairclough, 2012: 453). Any analysis of texts which aims to be significant in social scientific terms has to connect with theoretical questions about discourse. Text analysis is therefore an essential part of DA (Fairclough, 2003: 3).

As stated before, I will conduct a DA on the textual inaugural speeches of China’s current president Xi Jinping 习近平 and three statements made by Chinese representatives during the 2013 UN NPT Review Conference, based on Fairclough’s approach. Although other theorists are engaged in DA, I made the choice to apply Fairclough as he outlines all three levels of discourse analysis: text, discursive practices, and social practices. My analysis will take on a dual approach: A textual and critical approach. The textual analysis will comprise of various aspects. Firstly, the ‘social events’ and its corresponding social practices within the texts will be determined. Afterwards, we will see if these texts have a degree of ‘difference’: Is there any sign of resolving, overcome, accept or recognize ‘difference’? ‘Inter-textuality’, thirdly, will show us the presence of other ‘voices,’ and how these voices are related to one another. Lastly, ‘assumptions’ will reveal possible underlying premises, and to which extent they are ‘ideological’.

3.4. Research Limitations

Although I assembled my research design with utmost care, yet I am aware of its limitations. First of all, a complex subject as a nuclear crisis and the numerous actors and factors within it automatically requires for the defining of borders. What should be added, and more importantly, what should I omit? Although time is of essence, my limitation in space is yet a bigger obstacle which I tackle by setting clear boundaries and narrowing down the scope of the subject matter to the centrality of China.
Secondly, my research design is a ‘case study design,’ in which I wish to present reality that minds social and cultural conditioning, and not merely takes the ‘objective’ approach as ‘true’ science. Frequent criticism on applying a case study design and the case study itself is that it supposedly “provides little basis for scientific generalization” (Yin, 2009: 15). In this case, the critics have a point as I believe this case is too unique to serve as a base for generalization. Moreover, generalization is not my objective here.

Another limitation is the subject itself. Research on matters of security and defence always pose a challenge as most of the associated resources and documentation are confidential. Usage of primary sources from CPC Party Assembly meetings is simply impossible as these are not made public. Secondary sources are therefore, for the lack of primary sources, frequently used. In addition to the availability of data, the reliability of data is a matter of concern as censure and control of information within the PRC is normality. Researchers should therefore be aware of the possible ‘contamination’ of information.

And lastly, within my DA I have analysed speeches and statements, belonging to its own timeframe and therefore treated as such. The goal of the analysis is to see whether I can conclude which part China’s leader Xi Jinping plays in the course of the most recent DPRK nuclear crisis. In order to draw a valid conclusion, I planned to analyze speeches and comments given by China during UNSC resolution sessions and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sessions. Unfortunately, official documents on this specific subject have not been made available by the UN or the IAEA, which resulted in me excluding the analysis of these texts from my thesis.
4. SETTING THE CONTEXT

In this chapter, background information on the North Korean nuclear crises, nuclear non-proliferation, and relations of the stakeholders is given. This information is necessary to understand the research findings, which are relatively in-depth.

4.1. The International Non-Proliferation Regime

The arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War left behind not only a huge nuclear arsenal, but also renders the question: What to do with it? The growing concern of proliferation, that is, the distribution of nuclear material or weapons, resulted in the establishment of the layered nuclear non-proliferation regime. The main principle of this nuclear non-proliferation regime is to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons.

Central to the non-proliferation regime are legally binding non-proliferation agreements. The most important of which is the multilateral ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)’, which came into force in 1970 and has since been indefinitely extended in 1995 according to the UN’s “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation”. The NPT holds the rights and obligations of both the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), setting out goals on ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation’, ‘Nuclear Disarmament’ and ‘Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy’.12

In order to ensure compliance among all the countries involved within the non-proliferation regime, the IAEA was established in 1957 (Fisher, 1997: 49). The Agency’s work revolves around its main programs, which are ‘nuclear power’, ‘nuclear safety’ and ‘nuclear safeguards’. The IAEA safeguards system was established to check whether a State adheres to international commitments not to misuse nuclear technology (IAEA, 2014: para. 1). In addition to the IAEA, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996. Simply stated, this treaty bans all nuclear tests.13

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11 January 1967 is presented as the 'cut-off date'. This date determines the status of a country as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) or a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS). Those countries, which tested on or before January 1, 1967, namely China, the US, France, Russia, and the UK, are NWS (Nayan, 2012: 2; IAEA, “The Treaty of the Non-Proliferation”, 2014).

12 Article I of the NPT bans any NWS to transfer nuclear weapons or explosive devices to NNWS. Article II forbids NNWS to manufacture or attain nuclear weapons from another country. Article VI asks of all parties to continue to cooperate in the complete disarmament of nuclear weapons “under strict and effective international control” (UN, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation”, n.d.). Article IV of the NPT gives all Parties of the Treaty, if in accordance with Article I and II, the right to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination” (Ibid).

13 The CTBT has not yet entered into force as, in accordance with Article XIV, it necessary for all 44 states listed under article Annex 2 to ratify it. Currently, 36 countries have ratified the treaty. In addition to not having ratified the treaty, India, North Korea and Pakistan have never signed the treaty (United Nations, “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): paragraph 4).
4.2. **History of the North Korean Nuclear Crises**

This subchapter will go deeper into the origins of the North Korean Nuclear crisis by providing a brief historical overview of the First, Second and Third North Korean nuclear crisis.

4.2.1. **Pre-2013 Period: The First and Second Nuclear Crises**

The nuclear crises-issue started after 1992. The period prior to it was just as turbulent, with the Korean War (1950-3) and the subsequent division of the Korean peninsula. By the early 80s, North Korea was able to produce uranium and plutonium, means to create a nuclear bomb (Akl Kairouz, 2004: 25). In 1985, the DPRK did sign the NPT after the US got wind of its nuclear weapons program. North Korea had already joined the IAEA back in 1974 (Harnisch & Roesch, 2011: 5).

In 1992 the IAEA reported that the DPRK had extracted about 24 kg of plutonium, sufficient to built six nuclear warheads (*Ibid*.). The failure of the pariah state to comply with IAEA regulation and its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993 ushered the First North Korean nuclear crisis (1993-1994). This first nuclear crisis was eventually settled by US-DPRK negotiations which resulted into the US-DPRK Agreed Framework\(^\text{14}\), signed on 21 October 1994 (Harnisch & Roesch, 2011: 8). However, this same Agreed Framework would be the catalyst for the Second Nuclear Crisis (2002/3-2004). In October 2002 North Korea confessed engaging in a covert program to enrich uranium, after the US had accused it of infringing the agreement. On 10 January 2003 North Korea withdrew itself from the NPT (Akl Kairoys, 2004: 28). As the UNSC was unable to reach common ground, the DPRK policy was ‘outsourced’ to China.

China and North Korea have a long-standing relationship. The Sino-Korean relation was established in pre-modern history when China tried to occupy the Korean Peninsula. In modern history China had intervened in the Korean War, supporting North Korea against allied forces (1950-53). The relation between China and North-Korea was further consolidated by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (1961), which states that both countries would come to each other’s aid should the other be under attack (Scobell, 2004: 2). For these reasons, the dynamics between China and North Korea are considered ambiguous. Currently, China is North Korea’s only treaty ally, biggest trading partner and the main source of aid. Beijing supplies between 30,000 to 50,000 tonnes of crude oil to North Korea every month (Reuters, 2013: para. 7). China’s call for direct talks with North Korea, which resulted in the SPT, can be considered as another form of aid to North Korea.

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\(^{14}\) The US-DPRK Agreed Framework contains obligations on both sides: (1) the dismantling and replacement of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants, with the IAEA monitoring the freeze of the reactors. The spent fuel from the 5 MW(E) experimental reactor will be stored safely. A method to facilitate this is in order; (2) full normalization of political and economic relations (reduce barriers to trade and investment, upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorsial level); (3) cooperation on peace and security on a nuclear –free Korean peninsula, through dialogue; (4) strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime (Harnisch & Roesch, 2011: 8).
The long term goal of the SPT, comprised of the US, Russia, South Korea, Japan, North Korea and China, was complete denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. China hosted six multilateral dialogues from 2003 to 2007 (Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart, 2013: 6). On 1 August 2003, North Korea agreed to participate in the SPTs, upon which the first Round of Talks were held on 27-9 August 2003 in Beijing (Ibrahim et al., 2013: 80). In September 2005 Pyongyang agreed to dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for food and energy assistance. During the Sixth Round in 2007 the DPRK agreed to shut down its nuclear plant at Yŏngbyŏn (Zhang & Han, 2013: 193). On 14 April 2009 the DPRK announced that “it would no longer be bound to any agreements under the Six-Party Talks” after the DPRK failed to agree to a verification protocol for its nuclear program (Fitzpatrick, 2009: 7). No SPT session or multilateral negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear program have been held since.

The post-SPT period started off catastrophically, when the DPRK performed a nuclear test on 25 May 2009. The international community responds to the provocations via UNSC Resolution 1874, which included an arms embargo and cargo inspections (International Crisis Group, 2013: 2). When Kim Jong-il died near the end of 2011, the world hoped for his successor, Kim Jong-un, to be less fixed on nuclear proliferation and usher change. Unfortunately, nothing was less true; North Korea has continued to develop its nuclear programs under this new leadership.

4.2.2. The Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis

On 12 February of the same year, the DPRK performed its third nuclear test, depicted as the ‘Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis’. This underground test, which was based on seismic monitoring, was labelled as ‘successful’. Shortly after, the country reiterated their unwillingness to make concessions on nuclear weapons (Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart, 2013: 26). On 5 March the UNSC performed a vote on a resolution responding to the nuclear test, which resulted in the unanimous adoption of Resolution 2094 on 7 March 2013. China had cooperated closely with Washington in the drafting of UNSC Resolution 2094. With this Resolution, the already existing list of prohibited items for export to North Korea got further expanded. In addition, it authorized states to “seize cargoes brokered by the DPRK or its citizens even if not destined for the North” (International Crisis Group, 2013: 3).

The Kaesong Industrial complex, the only remaining symbol of economic cooperation between the North and South, became a stand-off display in April 2013 when both sides pulled their workers from the complex, but reopened after three months (International Crisis Group, 2013: 4). In May 2013 North Korea launched six short-range projectiles. The year 2014 was a moderate continuation of the preceding year. According to a South Korean newspaper, the DPRK has performed at least five ballistic missile tests, including one ending in the East Sea near the Chinese border on 1 September 2014 (Korea Joongang Daily, “North Korea Missile”, 2014).
5. RESEARCH FINDINGS

This chapter contains the ‘meat’ of the thesis and answers the posed sub-questions (chapter 1.1.) by using CT and the worldview of constructivism as underlying framework. The chapter opens with an outline of the current social structures constituting the North Korean nuclear crisis, i.e. the relevant relations among states with China as focus. The second subchapter focuses on the factors that drive China to make the choices it does, which then ultimately takes us to China’s ‘interests’. For the third sub-chapter we go back to the initiative of the SPT and the effect of its (preliminary) failure. In the penultimate sub-chapter we talk about the role of China’s new leader President Xi Jinping: To what extent has he been a factor in China’s DPRK-discourse? By applying a DA on two inaugural speeches and several UN NPT Conference statements, I aim to answer this question. Taking ‘norms’ and ‘ethics’ as the starting point, I finally determine whether China’s foreign policy and actions derive from values attached to international laws and institutions as well as legal obligations.

5.1. A Nuclear Construction? – Social Structures Constituting the DPRK Nuclear Crisis

Based on the idea of constructivism, the (social) world, i.e. the reality, is to be explained and understood through different social structures, each containing its own set of elements (e.g. institutions, regimes, norms). By analysing social practices and social relations, we may come to understand a world event such as the DPRK Nuclear Crisis. In this chapter, I will analyse the two social practices: The SOSS and the International Non-Proliferation Regime. As reality flows out of social relations, key state actors, including China, will be analysed within their social practices as well as their international interactions. Because identities (co-) determine state interests and ultimately a state’s foreign policy, both China and North Korea’s (current) state identity will be addressed later in the chapter.

5.1.1. The SOSS & China’s Position

The SOSS is considered to be an anarchical, yet non-static society containing states that are entitled to sovereignty. The system, largely formed with the establishment of the 1945 UN Charter, holds certain norms such as national autonomy and world order\textsuperscript{16}, which are guarded by its participants, the members of the SOSS. There is wide support amongst members of the SOSS on the norm against intervention in the internal affairs of another sovereign state (Frost, 2009: 55). We will discuss China’s position within this international society, i.e. the SOSS, which can be described as “selective commitment to cooperation” and “tactical flexible” (Heilman & Schmidt, 2014: 121).

Although China (as one of the drafters) had signed the UN Charter already in 1945 (UN, History of the United Nations, n.d.), China mostly upheld bilateral relations with the rest of the world well into the 90s. Its (bilateral) foreign policy has been based on the Maoist doctrine of the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’\(^\text{17}\). Today, this has been complemented by the ‘Four No’s’ of ‘no hegemony,’ ‘no power politics,’ ‘no military alliances,’ and ‘no arms racing’ (Lanteigne, 2013: 7). Since 1945, China has evolved from a rebel outcast into an actor that has been increasingly taking responsibility and engaging with other actors on a multilateral level. This was partly due to the great number of economic reforms and shifts implemented from 1989, in which the Chinese leadership “confronted limitations to its national economic sovereignty”. By joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China set aside its conventional Chinese notions of sovereignty “to become more integrated into transnational markets governed by set rules and discipline of the international organization” (Heilman & Schmidt, 2014: 23-24). However, this choice was also enforced by increasing global economic interdependence. China currently is the US’ second-largest trading partner, its third-largest export market, and biggest source of imports. In 2013, China had received US$ 7.2 billion in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the US, and the US received $2.4 billion of investment from China (Morrison, 2014: 15).

The relation between the US and China saw moments of strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Heilman & Schmidt, 2014: 60). Today the Sino-American relation is marked by superpower rivalry, caused by “domestic policy dynamics […], economic advances in China and associated shifts in perception, and bilateral political and military tensions in specific areas” (Ibid: 159). The US and China have the common goal of preserving a stable global financial system, while both countries also strive to protect the interest of their own (citizens). China would like to have access to advanced US technologies and less political restrictions. The US, in its turn, would like to see its trade deficit with China reduced and revalue the Chinese Yuan (Ibid: 170).

Sovereign states protect the interests of their citizens via national security. China has increasingly participated in security-related multilateral cooperation as it recognizes that it cannot base its national security solely on military and economic power. This reflects in China’s participation in peacekeeping missions which the country’s leadership has long regarded as “incompatible with its demand for unconditional respect of its territorial integrity and state sovereignty”. A total of 1,922 Chinese soldiers, police offers and other security forces participated in twelve UN missions in September 2012 alone, exceeding the amount of troops provided by the other permanent members of the UNSC (Heilman & Schmidt, 2014: 25). Within the SOSS, each sovereign state may pursue the policy they

\(^{17}\) The ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’ *heping gongchu wuxiang yuanze* call for “mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence” (Langteigne, 2013: 7).
wish, with the condition of respecting the sovereign rights and freedoms of other states (Frost, 2009: 82). The prolonged territorial (maritime) disputes in which China takes a central position, breaches the principle of sovereignty on several points, namely the norms of ‘anti-imperialism’ and ‘patriotism’. For China, (re-)claiming Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and the South- and East China Sea means reuniting these territories with the motherland. It is both a central political mission and a boost in national self-esteem, simultaneously ending the imperialistic “century of humiliation” (Heilman & Schmidt, 2014: 130).

As the SOSS and GCS are interlinked, governments of sovereign states have the ability to mend issues that may occur in GCS. Governments can do this within the territories of their own state, but they can also jointly take action (Frost, 2009: 106). In both instances, China still largely fails to deliver when it comes to human rights. China became a member of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in 1982, with which it vowed to respect human rights. The country has published a second human rights action plan, set for 2012-2015, and holds a number of bilateral and multilateral human rights dialogues. However, up to this day China has yet to sign the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (Heilman & Schmidt, 2014: 121). Even though China participates in UN missions, it has failed to take responsibility in its own region regarding its policy on forced repatriation of North Korean refugees, which China classifies as ‘economic migrants’.\(^\text{18}\) China claims that the forced repatriation are essential in maintaining national security, and that illegal North Koreans “not only violates Chinese law, but also undermines China’s border control” (UN Commission of Inquiry, 2014: 132).

As anarchy is what states make of it, the current system of sovereign states has been established by the states themselves, with “legal equality of all states [that] is accepted as the basis for conducting international relations”. However, there are such large equality differences between states on the size and material capabilities, that one can indeed speak of ‘organized hypocrisy’\(^\text{19}\). China heckles the unilateral world with the dominant role of the US in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. To counterbalance US dominance, it calls for a multipolar world order with other powers, such as Russia, the EU, India and China itself, supported by an upgraded UN (Heilman & Schmidt, 2014: 169). China’s desire to counterbalance the US can clearly be seen in the establishment of the New Development Bank, alias ‘BRICS Bank’. This multilateral Bank was announced in 2013 and operated since July 2014 by the five BRICS members Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Ministry of External Relations, “Agreement on the New”, 2014).

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\(^{18}\) In 1986 North Korea and China signed the ‘Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and Social Order and the Border Areas’ (revised in 1998). With this protocol, China and North Korea agreed to prevent “illegal border crossings of residents.” Article 5 of the Protocol states that those crossing into the other’s territory without permission are viewed as ‘criminals’ (NK Freedom, “Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work […]”, n.d.).

\(^{19}\) The notion of ‘organized hypocrisy’ is a neorealist term, however part of Krasner’s ideas of sovereignty is also grounded in Frost’s constitutive theory.
challenge to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which are believed to be US-centred institutions.

5.1.2. International Non-Proliferation Regime & China’s Position

Like the SOSS, the international non-proliferation regime is a social structure that contains its own set of rules, ‘the rules of the game’, its own set of norms, and its own group of players. The international non-proliferation regime is built on the ethicality of prevention of (further) spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology with the ethical starting point being the nuclear standoff between the US and Russia during the Cold War and its aftermath. It was clear that, if in the wrong hands and without clear regulations, nuclear arms were a danger to global security. This shared ethical understanding resulted in the adoption of the NPT. The NPT itself is an indication of ethical appropriate conduct within the non-proliferation regime. Hermit state North Korea and its nuclear program, which form the basis of the recurring North Korean nuclear crises, is very much playing on the minds of both the Asian region as the West, who share the understanding that North Korea should drop its ambition of expanding its nuclear arsenal.

The SOSS and the international non-proliferation regime are highly interlinked, as most of the SOSS members are also players of the international non-proliferation regime. From the context chapter (Chapter 4), I pointed out that signees of the NPT are either a NWS or NNWS, which can be considered as the ‘insiders’ who share an equal ethical understanding and pledged to take responsibility in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and its technology. China officially became a NWS when it acceded to the NPT on 9 March 1992. China had performed a nuclear test earlier in 1964, making it subject to the NWS condition of performing a nuclear test before the cut-off date of 1 January 1967 (IAEA, “The Treaty of the Non-Proliferation”, 2014). China was successful in its nuclear weapons program, even after the Soviets came back on their promises made in 1957 to assist China in developing nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union worried that assisting China in nuclear technology would harm their negotiations with the US on a limited test ban treaty (Nathan & Scobell, 2012: 74). This decision to not aid China in its nuclear program further soured the Sino-Soviet relation.

The establishment of the NPT in 1968 coincided with Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution (1966-76). During this period, China rejected the idea of nuclear non-proliferation being a real security threat. In addition, China (and other developing countries) deemed the NPT as ‘discriminatory’ “because it had a created two levels of membership –the declared nuclear powers and the rest of the world; and the NPT had different standards for each” (Friedman, 2004: 13). After receiving the NWS status, China falls in a period of NPT violations from the 1970s through the 1990s. One of these violations included selling missiles to its neighbour North Korea to consolidate their long-term friendship. During this
entire period, the US pressured China to halt its proliferation of nuclear and missile technology (Nathan & Scowbell, 2012: 310). Although it still criticized the NPT, China signed it in 1991. By doing so, China became a NWS and therefore a member of the ‘insiders’ group of arms control and non-proliferation community. Although the NPT speaks of two groups of actors, namely the NWS and NNWS that function as moral agents which comply with the rules constituting the NPT, there is a third group of actors: The small group of hermit states that have obtained nuclear weapons and technology. North Korea became a member of this group of ‘outsiders’, when it pulled out of the NPT in 2003, after it accused the US of aggression, and plotting to invade North Korea. The DPRK stated that it can “no longer remain bound to the NPT, allowing the country’s security and the dignity of [the] nation to be infringed upon”. North Korea had performed its ‘first’ successful missile test in 1993. North Korea refers to itself as a NWS, and states that it has the right to develop weapons for its self-defence (UNSC Report of Panel of Experts, 2014: 13).

By taking itself out of the NPT, North Korea basically stated that it no longer had the same moral standing and no longer wished to be part of this group of ‘insiders’. Theoretically, by taking oneself out of the NPT, it would meant that it no longer has to abide to its moral norm of non-proliferation, which in turn implies that the rules constituting the NPT no longer apply to North Korea. If one is not a player in that specific game, the rules constituting that game do not apply. With the absence of the game and rules, there are no moral expectations and no responsibilities. However, in practice, North Korea is still a participant in the international non-proliferation regime, only to be placed in the ‘outsiders’ group along with four other NPT non-signatories Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan. As an ‘outsider’ within the non-proliferation regime, the non-proliferation community has made (multiple) attempts to re-instate North Korea’s moral inclusion by convincing it to re-sign the NPT and (re)join SPT dialogues. Today, the moral starting point on the North Korean nuclear Crisis among most signees of the NPT is complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Although verbally supporting complete denuclearization, China’s position remains ambivalent.

Even though China, due to its NWS status, is largely positioned in the ‘insiders’ group, its historical ties with the DPRK and its practices and behaviour towards North Korea cause China to linger in the ‘outsiders’ pool. It seems that China has rather accepted North Korea’s ‘nuclear’ status and the fact that the pariah state has these weapons. What China however does not accept, is when North Korea’s actions pose a direct threat to the stability of the Korean peninsula, which can spill-over to the rest of the region. For instance, revering to North Korea’s third nuclear test in February 2013, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated in March 2014 that the only road to peace was denuclearization of the Peninsula, and that “China would not permit war or instability on its doorstep”. China had warned North Korea not to perform a fourth test, but the question whether China would become severe in consequences towards North Korea remains, especially after the third nuclear test, to which China
failed to properly impose the sanctions of UN Resolution 2094 posed on North Korea which it co-signed (International Crisis Group, 2014: 8). Despite the sanctions imposed\(^{20}\), the DPRK “remains actively engaged in trade in arms and related material in violation of the resolutions”. For example, in July 2013 Panamanian authorities stopped and inspected a North Korean cargo vessel in the Panama Canal, in which reportedly arms (related material) were concealed under more than 200,000 bags of sugar. The volume of these arms has been the largest amount discovered since the adoption of Resolution 1718 in 2006 (UNSC Report of Panel of Experts, 2014: 26).

A 2014 UNSC report on the findings and recommendations on Resolution 1874 (2009) showed that Japan had seized forbidden items in March 2013, which were shipped by North Korea via Dalian, China. In May 2013, the US identified an individual from Taiwan to be actively involved in the procurement of dual-use machinery for the DPRK. The report claimed involvement of Russia and China (local branches of the concerning DPRK shipping operator Ocean Maritime Management Company, Ltd. OMM) among the role players that worked together in a network in support of the ship. The UN Panel requested those involved, including China, for information regarding the OMM branch, in China’s case: Dalian. Where Russia did respond on 18 February 2014, China has not done so (yet) (UNSC Report of Panel of Experts, 2014: 32). Although making progress in strengthening its system of export controls, China still seems to permit North Korean ballistic missile shipments to other countries via Chinese territory. This makes China’s role in North Korean proliferation ambiguous (Nathan & Scobell, 2012: 312). Such reports show that China falls short on its obligation as moral agent within the system of non-proliferation and agreed upon sanctions to properly inspect for forbidden (hidden) cargo.

5.1.3. **China & North Korea: Identity and Relations**

*China’s Identity*

China’s national identity has been formed and, is still driven by several ideologies. The foundation of Chinese society is strongly based on the dynastic concept of 天命 tiānmìng ‘Mandate of Heaven’. This concept states that Chinese political leaders get their legitimacy to rule China, or 天下 tiānxià ‘All-Under-Heaven’, by having a ‘just’ or righteous personality. Coercion is not sufficient to hold onto power, and your mandate could be taken from you in case of incompetence and tyranny (Collins & Cottee, 2012: 9). Secondly, *Confucianism* has strong roots within Chinese culture and politics. The core of Confucian philosophy is that civil and political freedoms have to give priority to stability and social order. Stability equals harmony. China’s strong attitude towards sovereignty is linked to the Confucian concept of ‘harmonious society’, which is reflected in China’s contemporary society that is

comprised of different ethnicities. A harmonious society enables and embraces differences (Collins & Cottey, 2012: 10; Jacques, 2012: 378). Thirdly, China’s imperial *tributary-system* has exercised hegemonic influence to its immediate proximity. Fourthly, within modern history *Maoism*, which came to life in 1949 during a time of national crisis and imperialism, and had ‘communism’, ‘Marxism’ and ‘Leninism’ at its core, formed the foundation for ‘Chinese Socialism’ (Teiwes, 2001: 8). Fifthly, *Dengism* centralised around ‘peace and development’, with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the late 70s as its flagship. China’s foreign interaction with the rest of the world was labelled as passive, based on ideas of 韬光养晦 tāoguāngyǎnhuì ‘hiding one’s capacity while biding one’s time’ or ‘keeping a low profile’, and 不当头 bù dāngtóu ‘not seeking to lead’. From a constructivist point of view, Deng’s reforms fostered a shift in China’s identity. The same applied to Jiang Zemin’s seemingly liberal policy of opening up to the world ‘developing China as a comprehensive power’, and ‘building a new international order’. China’s foreign policy during Hu Jintao built forth on Jiang’s policy and infused this with Confucian elements, which resulted into his ‘harmonious society (or world)’ (Zheng & Tok, 2007: para. 1.3). China’s contemporary internal ethical structure is largely founded on its priority of stability, social order and being master of its own house, which can be extended into ‘sovereignty’ and the principle of ‘non-interference’. All of these elements have shaped and are still part of China’s political and national identity. They consciously and subconsciously influence Chinese decision-making towards surrounding states in the region.

**North Korean Identity**

As stated before (chapter 4.2.1.) China has quite the history with North Korea, which intensified during the Korean War when both fought side by side against the allied forces (mainly the US). Both countries embraced Communism as their state ideology, which was seen by the US as a threat to the Asian region and the rest of the world. Today, the relationship between China and North Korea has cooled somewhat. China’s rise and economic prosperity elevated China’s global position. China’s well-intentioned advice to North Korea is being ignored by the pariah state, putting China in an awkward position. The source of North Korea’s dismissive behaviour can be found in its history, where the Korean peninsula was “threatened, plundered, subjugated, attacked and exploited by its neighbours who are all much bigger and stronger in almost every respect” (Park, 2010: 20). In addition, North Korea has politically returned to the orthodoxy of the 50s and 60s, with an emphasis on “classical socialism with a strong nationalist component, values such as collectivism and self-sacrifice, militarism, political repression, xenophobia, and the prospect of a rosy future in exchange for enduring the temporary hardships of leading a front-line life” (*Ibid*: 36). Most importantly is the semi religious ideology *juche* that has its roots in Stalinism. This ideology was developed by Kim Il-sung

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21 Kim Il-sung was driven by *Juche* i.e. self-reliance (Ramberg, 2009: 14) and *Marxist Doctrine*: ‘Juche’ is North Korea’s semi-religious adaption of communism to the Korean situation. It was adopted by Kim Il-sung. One might see it as ‘Korean Socialism’ (Oh & Hassig, 2000: 5).
to declare “North Korea’s ideological independence from both Beijing and Moscow” (*Ibid:* 8). From a constructivist perspective, North Korea’s ‘irrational’ domestic and international behaviour has its foundation in its cultural history. Its current ideology is most probably a product of a history full of bullying by its neighbours, and it currently feels the need for ‘rehabilitation’.

5.1.4. China & North Korea: How the ‘Other’ Sees the ‘Other’

The relation between China and North Korea used to be an absolute allegiance, however today it is no longer characterized by ‘unconditional loyalty.’ The relation between the two neighbours has been formed not only by geographical proximity and pre-modern cultural exchange, but also by having alliances in fending off shared common enemy, the US, and to a lesser extent, Russia. Both China and Korea share the traumatic experience of occupation by Japanese occupation and Western powers. In October 1949, North Korea was one of the first nations to establish diplomatic relations with the newly formed PRC, an alliance that was describe to have been “sealed in blood” by the Korean War (1950-1953) (*Heilman & Schmidt,* 2014: 152).

China has more than once supported the North Korean government diplomatically, economically and militarily. However, today this support increasingly comes with conditions and criticism on North Korea’s provocative behaviour towards its direct neighbours South Korea and Japan. After North Korea sunk a South Korean warship and fired rounds at the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, China openly expressed its sympathy for South Korea and subsequently asked for reopening of the SPT. China considers North Korea to be a stubborn little brother, that refuses to take anything China gives them, except when it’s in terms of money.

Since the 1990s, China has repeatedly attempted to introduce economic reforms in North Korea, but in vain. China has long considered non-coercive methods to influence North Korea, using both micro processes ‘social influence’ and ‘persuasion, to have North Korea change its mind on its nuclear discourse. Persuasion would ultimately mean that North Korea accepts the norms and values attached to the non-proliferation regime. Social influence has already taken place during the SPT era. North Korea has received (social) rewards in the shape of financial aid, but also a vote in its own course. As Johnston stated, whether social influence takes ground also depends on prior identity construction. North Korea has a high level of nation insecurity, distrusts even its closest ally, and holds fast to its ideology of self-help. Its refusal to cooperate makes it the end receiver of punishments in the form of shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning (*Johnston,* 2008: 24-25).

One notable trend from the last few years is a decrease in high-level visits and return visits between Chinese and North Korean leaders. China even broke a longstanding tradition this year, when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited South Korean President Park Geun-hye on 3 July 2014 in Seoul, which
was the first time a Chinese leader has ever visited Seoul before Pyongyang (BBC, “China and South Korea”, 2014). North Korea played the same trick by inviting South Korean representatives over Chinese officials (who ended up sending one Politburo Standing Committee member) for a commemoration ceremony on 16 December 2014 of the late leader Kim Jong-il, who died in 2011 (South China Morning Post, “North Korea’s Snub”, 2014).

North Korea’s refusal to accept China’s assistance on economic reforms already speaks volume. As much China is annoyed by North Korea’s antics, there is also growing discontentment at the North Korean side over China’s attempts to ‘control’ North Korea. According to Chosun Ilbo, a conservative South Korean newspaper, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un ordered the posting of a banner in the prominent Kang Kon Military Academy, which stated:

“China is a turncoat and our enemy”

The slogan is a quote from North Korea’s eternal president Kim Il-sung, who pronounced it after China had established diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992. The timing of the placement of the banner is no coincidence, as the report came out shortly after the news of China joining in on UNSC Resolution 2094 in 2013 (The Diplomat, “North Korea: China”, 2014). The accuracy of this report needs to be questioned, as the report comes from a South Korean newspaper. However, the banners had been used before respectively in 1992 and 2009 at the exact same institution during similar events.

North Korea’s current position is to use China in its advantage, but not to trust it. The fall (and public ‘execution’) of DPRK leader Kim Jong-un’s uncle Jang Song-thaek, the de facto number two leader of North Korea, reportedly resulted from him confiding in and communicating with China to perform some sort of coup. North Korea’s news Agency KCNA reported that Jang plotted to “overthrow the state” by staging a coup (KCNA, “Traitor Jang Song”, 2013: para. 41-42). Unofficial sources claim that Jang dispatched a letter to the Chinese leadership early 2013, which stated that he wished to “instigate changes to the North Korean system such that its pivot power would move away from the Korean Workers’ Party and towards the DPRK government, as overseen by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet” (New Focus International, “Exclusive: Jang Song”, 2014). In addition, China’s supposedly contingency plans for the collapse of the North Korean government which were leaked by Japanese media in May 2014 right after China warned North Korea not to perform a fourth nuclear test, did not improve the already strained relation between the two. The document, which was drawn up by China’s PLA, includes proposals for detaining key DPRK leaders, the creation of refugee camps on the Chinese side of the border, and even contains a suggestion to involve “foreign forces” (Telegraph, “China Plans for”, 2014). Such a document can generate the idea that China lost faith in the DPRK-
cause. It is therefore not surprising if North Korea’s image of China is negative, and North Korea now views China as one of ‘them’, instead of one of ‘us’.

Not only is there a cooling relationship between China and the DPRK. It even appears that China is being replaced as ‘principal patron’. Since recently, the ties between Russia and North Korea have become closer. Russia adopted a pro-active strategy in Asia, ‘Putin’s Pivot’, which began years ago with tightening its relations with China. However, this pivot gained a new dimension now Russia has bolstered its ties with North Korea. In November 2014 Russian President Putin called for deeper ties with North Korea to “improve regional security” (Reuters, “Putin Backs Deeper”, 2014). In December 2014, President Putin invited North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un to Moscow in May 2015 to mark the 70th anniversary of Soviet Union’s World War Second victory (Reuters, “Russia Visits North”, 2014). These incidents are no coincidence as Russia’s relations with the West have soured after Russia’s involvement in and handling of the Ukraine Crimean incident and the MH17 crash, and it seems Russia is now looking for new allies. But Russia’s strategy is also for economical reasons, as “Moscow needs North Korean cooperation in boosting natural gas exports to South Korean as Gazprom wants to build a gas pipeline through North Korea to reach its southern neighbour” (Reuters., “Russia Invites North”, 2014).

5.1.5. International Non-Proliferation Regime vs. SOSS: China’s Dilemma

Both China and North Korea are part of the interlinked non-proliferation regime and the SOSS. How they face their positions within these two social structures has changed over time. The relation between China and North Korea used to be based on the shared idea that the West (read: US) is the enemy, which derived largely from a shared history of aggression. Due to economic prosperity, China’s national identity has changed from victim to victor in the course of the new millennium. Growing global interdependence has forced China to built relationships and cooperate with states that it previously considered as foes. For example, South Korea’s and China relation, which turned south because of the Korean War, continues to improve after announcing regional economic cooperation, new maritime boundary negotiations and even a direct currency exchange (Xinhua, “Won-Yuan direct”, 2014). Although the Sino-American relation is still characterized by rivalry, it is nonetheless a huge improvement from the Korean War period.

The change in one’s identity can cause a ripple effect as one identity shapes the other. China became a global power almost in the likeness of the US. North Korea is forced to watch one of its few remaining allies grow into a strong global player, a goal the pariah state most probably has set for itself as well. In addition, the newfound ‘friendship’ China has created with the US means that, from a North Korean point of view, the DPRK is now surrounded by US-allies. The result is that North Korea’s identity also changes for the worse: Where the North Korean national identity is already based on the semi-
religious juche, this ideology constituting its national identity only gets further reinforced. Naturally, changes within the pariah state also affect North Korean identity. Kim Jong-un, who assumed leadership in 2011 might have felt the need to display his authority, hence the 2013 nuclear test. Kim Jong-un’s harsh rule was further underscored when he decided for the first time in four decades to make footage of his purged uncle and official Jang Song-thaek (Klinger, 2014: 170).

China’s stake in the SOSS is increasing on different levels, especially on the economic and political level. Because of growing interdependence, its ties and interaction with other nations have intensified. There is a change in ideas and norms which underlie a nation’s identity: China moved from the idea that nuclear arms and its proliferation do not pose a national security threat to signing the NPT and co-drafting UN Resolutions with its competitor the US. China also changed from unconditionally supporting North Korea, to criticize the hermit state and peacefully foster change via diplomatic talks to basically warning North Korea and support UN Resolutions. Although China largely fails in changing regional dynamics and the status quo, we can only state that a change in China’s interests or identity, or both, must have occurred if there is a change in behaviour. China’s identity has not changed much since the second nuclear crisis. China continues to grow and remains a major player in the global sphere. Rather, to speak of change in identity or it being static, I would rather state that China is having an ‘identity-crisis’. For a long time they had to ask themselves ‘who do we want to be?’ China is in a dilemma while balancing on the edge of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’: Should we show allegiance to the world (SOSS) or to our long-time friend North Korea? Although it is safe to say that China is rather a member of the ‘insiders’ than of the ‘outsiders’, the lifeline China threw out decades ago still lays in the water, which North Korea eagerly uses when in need.

5.2. Proximity, Regional Stability & the US: What Are China’s Interests?

This sub-chapter aims to identify which factors influence China’s behaviour within the most recent North Korean nuclear crisis (2013), which has changed from being non-judgemental and understanding in 2012, to condemning and stern in 2013. The other stakeholders the US, Japan, South Korea and Russia will also be mentioned as they are still closely linked to, or part of China’s history and present.

5.2.1. Proximity: War in China’s Backyard

The first factor refers to ‘proximity’. China and North Korea are direct neighbours and have a long history of interaction. The entire eastern region was ‘dominated’ by China through the so-called ‘tributary-system’, which “exercised an extraordinary hegemonic influence on the entire surrounding region” (Jacques, 2012: 304). The tributary-system was part of Pax Sinica, the Imperial Chinese world order, a system of thought and institutions regulating Imperial China’s international relations (Zhang,
Korea had been one of the closest to China for many centuries, but lost the peninsula eventually to Japan (Jacques, 2012: 102).

The border between China and North Korea is 870 mile long. The border works as a life line for North Korea, as this is where the bulk of Sino-North Korean trade takes place (Moore, 2008: 8). China is considered to be North Korea’s biggest trading partner. When Kim Jong-un took office in 2011, the relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang soured even further, but this hardly has had any direct economic consequences for China. This is not true for North Korea, because its trade with China counts for roughly sixty percent of North Korea’s trade (Chanlett-Avery & Rinehart, 2014: 10).

Another issue is the border itself, which serves besides its obvious purpose as an instrument for North Koreans to keep its people inside North Korean territory. China’s north eastern region has approximately 2.3 million peoples of Korean origin. So far, about 100,000 North Koreans have crossed the Sino-North Korean border, but human rights groups estimate the number to be as high as 300,000 (Hill, 2013: 14). This entire situation of North Koreans crossing the border into China puts the Chinese into an awkward and difficult situation. China and North Korea signed a Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and Social Order and the Border Areas in 1986 which obliges China to track down North Korean refugees in China and execute forced repatriations to North Korea (North Korea Freedom, “Mutual Cooperation Protocol”, n.d.). If indeed the status quo should change for the worse in the future, then China could see a flood of North Korean refugees coming her way. This may turn into a domestic and demographic disaster for China.

Figure 1. Map of border China-North Korea

Source: cass-ro.org
Realism can only partly explain the reason why China is so ambiguous in its attitude towards North Korea. The location most certainly explains why China is involved: it is directly affected by whatever North Korea does. China is North Korea’s biggest donor and trade partner, but hardly profits from its economic relation with the pariah state. China could use this hermit state as a control mechanism. However, from the perspective of a ‘power’-driven theory such as realism China would be handing in its power, instead of gaining it, if it keeps siding and patronizing North Korea. Realism takes China’s position as given, ignoring why China has taken up this ambiguous role, which has very much to do with history and culture. What is then the reason why China is (currently in lesser degree) siding with North Korea? I believe this question can be answered by taking a constructivist approach, which emphasizes the role of identity, actors and structures. Factors which exceed the importance of proximity are historical interaction and identity-formation. The latter factor influences China’s relation with North Korea, and therefore relates to the East Asian region; the interaction among different states within the region and the motives and concerns on stability.

5.2.2. A Rattling Region: the Stability Issue

China is surrounded by “twenty immediately adjacent countries arrayed in a circle from Japan in the East to Vietnam in the south to India in the southwest to Russia in the north” (Nathan & Scobell, 2012: 4). Five of these countries, Russia, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam and India, have been at war with China at some point in the past seventy years. In addition, at least nine countries have unstable regimes. North Korea is one of them. From this perspective ‘proximity’ is a variable that affects the relations between nations, but is only valid when placed in the historical and cultural context.

For a large part, the countries that surround China used to be American allies and still enjoy the advantages of that former status. China is mostly concerned with continuing economic development and political stability. This can only be done if the East Asian region is stable and secure and the status quo on the Korean peninsula is sustained (Lee, 2012: 324). Being North Korea’s immediate neighbour and frequent target of threats, South Korea has been in conflict with North Korea since their separation after the Korean War. There is a double strain on the relationship between the DPRK and South Korea. One, the main goal for North Korea is unification with this other half of the peninsula. Two, as the outside world sees South Korea as the ‘better’ Korea; its growing welfare causes even more irritation with the DPRK (Park, 2010: 20-21). South Korea’s economic success and democratization of its political system right after the Korean War is ascribed to the patron-client relation that it had with the US. During the Bush administration, South Korea grew more towards China, as it was more inclined to agree with China’s restraint approach to the North Korean nuclear crisis than the more aggressive American approach. The relationship intensified also economically as China is now South Korea’s largest trading partner (Jacques, 2010: 365). South Korea’s shift seems a rationalist action, to bandwagon with those that could benefit its interests. But this shift seems illogical as the US already has military troops stationed in the region, making its military still superior to China. However, it
seems South Korea identifies itself rather with China’s more delicate approach. This is no coincidence, as South Korea’s identity has very much been under the influence of China during imperial times.

Japan however does not lie well with most of the stakeholders that are involved in this nuclear crisis. Japan’s colonial occupation of China formed the Sino-Japanese relation into one of considerable enmity. In its defeat, China lost Taiwan during the Sino-Japanese war in 1894-1895 (Nathan & Scobell, 2012: 115). From a realist perspective, Taiwan is of strategic interests to Japan due to its location, and therefore will not insist the US on “peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue” (Ibid: 117). With the help of Russia, Japan colonized Korea in 1910, and two decades later large parts of China. China’s resentment towards Japan can also be found in Japan’s rapid development pace. Where it took the US forty-seven years, in 1839 to double their per capita GDP after the start of industrial modernization, it took Japan thirty-four years starting in 1885. China, however, has been doubling its per capita GDP every ten years (Schoppa, 2000: 130).

Japan genuinely feels threatened by North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile-delivery system, a concern which Japan also shares with South Korea. The anti-Japan rhetoric is an important tool for the North Korean government to maintain its legitimacy (Park, 2010: 27). Japan put itself under American protection, which gave Japan space to prioritize on economic development. This deal consisted of mutual exchange as Japan served as the main base for American power in Asia (Nathan & Scobell, 2010: 118). However, the alliance between Japan and the US seems somewhat unequal. Japan feels ignored by the US when it comes to its own interest (Ibid). In July 2014, Japan talked about its right of ‘collective self-defence’ which entails that it may (militarily) aid an ally that is under attack. Officially, this it is not allowed because Japan’s constitution prohibits ‘collective self-defence’ (Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, “Cabinet Decision on Development”, 2014: chapter 3). China responded to the news by stating that Japan should not “undermine China’s sovereignty and security interests, nor shall it harm regional peace and stability” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson”, 2014: para. 4).

5.2.3. Dance of the Giants: China-US Relations

China and the US are strategically, politically and economically interlinked to one another. The Asian region can be placed within six regional systems (Northeast Asia, Oceania, Continental Southeast Asia, Maritime Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia), of which “each system contains a set of states whose foreign policy interests are interconnected” (Nathan & Scobell, 2012: 6). If one looks

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These six different systems are: 1) **Northeast Asia**: Russia, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, and the US; 2) **Oceania**: Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, twelve Pacific island microstates, China, and the US; 3) **Continental Southeast Asia**: Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, China, and the US; 4) **Maritime Southeast Asia**: Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, China, and the US; 5) **South Asia**: Burma, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Russia, China, and the US; 6) **Central Asia**: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, China, and the US (Nathan & Scobell, 6: 1)
carefully, it becomes evident that both China and the US appear in each of the six systems. However, Sino-American relations are still in limbo, and China’s future attitude towards North Korea might be a decisive factor. The straining relation between China and the US started during the Cold War when China became a communist ally to Russia, and the US shaped its foreign policy towards China “based on its status as an ally of Moscow and strove to split the two apart” (Ibid: 89). From a constructivist perspective, the Cold War was a war that concerned ideology, namely capitalism vs. communism. US’ interest today is somewhat a Cold War inheritance, along with new interests, mostly economic interests.

A thorn in the flesh for China is the everlasting military presence of the US around China’s periphery. The US intervened during the Korean War, and prevented North Korea to overtake the South. It is not just about US interest in North Korea, but also US’ own forces that are still stationed in the region that need to be protected (Gompert, 2013: 21). However, with “more than 230 of the 800 US overseas military installations [that] are located in Japan and South Korea” (Nathan & Scobell, 2012: 94), US presence in the region gives it the capabilities to invade the North. China still considers North Korea to be a buffer state that is strategically and perfectly positioned between China, South Korea and Japan. Besides military intervention, US presence in Asia also gives it political capabilities, as the US becomes part of that country’s defence and security system. However, this is a narrative that would quite fit the realist camp. When looking from a constructivist perspective, it is quite difficult to find a valid argument for the US to still have such a large amount of troops stationed in the East. It merely comes across as hegemonic behaviour: We are there because we can. Or could this be a sense of responsibility derived from historical ties and the fear that leaving the region would give countries like China or North Korea free range to wreak havoc? While I believe realists are not wrong in this aspect, the constructivist explanation of the US’ patron role creates a deeper understanding.

It is no secret that the US wants the Korean peninsula denuclearized. However, the US is not even close to getting the North Koreans to give up their nuclear program. The US realizes more and more that help from the Chinese is key in solving the issue, or to at least maintain the status quo. The non-proliferation regime, a UN-born system, is in essence a US-invention. It is therefore not surprising that the US feels somewhat responsible for putting a stop to North Korea’s hostile tactics. But to get China where it would like to see it is very much dependent on the relationship with China. The US and China lack a common enemy, and even though China’s stance toward North Korea is changing slowly, Beijing has stated numerous times in the past that it would not turn its back on its old friend. However, if there would be a nuclear standoff between North Korea and the US, it will severely disturb regional stability (Lee, 2012: 324).

With China trying to develop itself into ‘Chinese Socialism’, a nuclear standoff would spell disaster. China is believed to become the world’s largest economy before 2030, and with that surpassing the US
(Park, 2010: 8). The (global) economy itself is a crucial variable within the Sino-American relation. Both countries see each other’s economic importance, but will take counter measures to protect their own interests. Washington has occasionally accused Beijing of disrupting the market. In 2012 the US imposed anti-dumping and countervailing measures on China, which the WTO ruled as “inconsistent with WTO rules (Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, “Regular Press Conference […] November 20, 2012: para. 47). Beijing is aware of the fact that the US economy could hurt China, as the dollar is still the single major reserve currency trade. In addition, maintaining economic stability is of the essence for continuation and legitimacy of the Party. The idea of Mandate of Heaven is still very much alive in Chinese society. Disruption of the Chinese market means disruption of its society, which will in turn endanger the Party’s prominent position within China.

China’s relation with the US seems to be marked by competition as China’s growth continues. However, the ongoing battle between the US and China might also be linked to the concept of ‘intersubjectivity’, or the lack of it. Both countries make efforts to understand each other, but have an image of one another that only feeds the relative negative image they have of each other. Chinese believe that “American actions almost anywhere in the world are secretly directed against China”, and see Western strategic culture as “militaristic, offensive minded and expansionist, and growing out of the experience of maritime powers that are mobile and mercantilist”. This is not surprising as China’s most influential body of IR theory is ‘offensive realism’ implying that “a country will try to control its security environment to the full extent that its capabilities permit” (Nathan & Scobell, 2012: 91). The real problem therefore could be a lack of mutual understanding from both sides.

5.3. Six Parties, Zero Effect?

The SPT initiative was set up in 2003, but is today entitled as dead. Until 2009, China had hosted three rounds of SPT. The SPT were the first multinational talks that China ever hosted (Zhang & Han, 2013: 192). The SPT aimed to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. This goal was never achieved; however, the Talks itself brought together parties with turbulent histories and emotionally charged relations. Surely, it must have had a certain effect on this ‘nuclear’ situation? Within this section we will look at this assumption, as well as to determine whether and how the SPT have had an effect on the North Korean nuclear crisis. The matter will be again approached through the constructivist lens.

For China, the SPT was a way to guide the crisis diplomatically and in a civilized manner while maintaining the status quo (Nanto & Manyin, 2010: 7). Beijing had tried to form the SPT on the basis of “reconciliation, an incremental process, and reciprocity”, which is a softer and more suitable approach than “Pyongyang’s hard-nosed style or Washington’s hard-line tactics” (Wu, 2005: 40). Four days prior to the first round of Talks, beginning on 27 March 2003, the US, North Korea and China hold trilateral talks, where North Korea admitted to having nuclear weapons. Now that the cat was out
of the bag, the end goal seemed closer. However, the US and North Korea clashed, and accused one another of ethical deficit. This has eventually led to the expansion of talks into the SPT, adding South Korea, Russia and Japan.

Based the idea of constructivism, interaction does not only produce but it can also reproduce social structures. The dilemma of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis has led China to establish the SPT most probably based on its own interests, thus forming a new process within an existing one. However, setting up the SPT also creates a situation of re-production where North Korea is given the chance to maintain the status quo of provocations and remunerations. The SPT gives North Korea the space to keep executing its strategy, which contains a ‘provocations phase’ followed by a ‘diplomatic offensive.’ This diplomatic offensive is all about negotiations, which North Korea uses to buy time “to further refine its offensive nuclear capabilities while ostensibly seeking cooperation and a warming of relations.” The diplomatic offensive usually results in economic and humanitarian assistance. The SPT have been part of such an offensive multiple times, for example, in 2009 when North Korea stated that it would return to the Talks after dropping out (Nanto & Manyin, 2010: 2). It made direct bilateral talks with the US a pre-condition to the multilateral talks of the SPT. The US refused direct talks, but North Korea’s behaviour shows that it has the space to demand such (Zhang & Han, 2013: 198-9).

Constructivists talk of a world that is socially constructed, which in turn affects the behaviour of the actors. The SPT can be seen as an effect, a product that came to, now that China is an integral part of the socially constructed international realm. For China to participate with the greats, it is expected to abide by international norms, and exchange ‘hard power’ for ‘soft power’ (Zhang & Han, 2013: 202). The world was and still is structured in such a way that, if China wanted to pursue its interests, it had to act as a responsible stakeholder and enhance its soft power. This process started prior to the SPT, as the SPT became part of China’s rhetoric on the gradual road of peaceful rise. One could therefore say that the SPT as an institution was the product of the classification of social structures during that time. By establishing and hosting the SPT, China showed the world that China’s principal priority is resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis.

The overall SPT included six rounds, and on occasions, progress seemed to have been made. In 2007, the six parties agreed on a denuclearization plan, which gave North Korea sixty days to freeze its program. In that same year, North Korea shut down its nuclear plant at Yŏngbyŏn, but resumed reconstruction of the complex in 2008 after accusing the US of breaching the disarmament agreement (Cha, 2007: 105). North Korea’s repeated cooperation within the SPT make the Talks seem successful. However, compensations in the form of aid and assistance from the other five parties are given to North Korea in exchange for its cooperation. In 2005, $25 million in frozen accounts were released to the DPRK, under the condition that it disabled its nuclear facilities and allow IAEA inspectors into the
country (Ibid: 107). Realists claim that institutions have little influence on state behaviour. However, within the North Korea nuclear crisis, it was the institutional arrangement of the non-proliferation regime itself and accompanying ‘discriminatory’ rules which caused the North Korean government to not pursue the common goal of non-proliferation and nuclear security with other states. North Korea perceives the regime to be nothing but straining and sees no benefits in joining. The country finds itself in a security dilemma, where its intersubjective understanding of the US consists of worst-case scenarios of an imperialist that is still out to get North Korea. North Korea’s interests, which are driven by self-help, push the state to make illogical decisions and further into seclusion.

However, it seems North Korea wishes to re-join disarmament talks. In May 2013, not so long after its last nuclear test, North Korea reached out to China. During a meeting in Moscow between senior officials from North Korea and Russia in November 2014, both parties agreed to increase efforts to resume the SPT (Xinhua, “Resumption of Six-Party”, 2014). In October 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated during a meeting with the chairman of South Korean leading Party Kim Moo-sung that the Talks should resume, as “the Korean Peninsula issue cannot be resolved alone” (North Korea News, “Chinese Step Up”, 2014). US Secretary of State John Kerry even stated that, after active diplomacy with Russia, China and the other parties, the dynamics can develop “in the next weeks, months perhaps, where we could get back to talks” (The Diplomat, “Kerry: Return to Six”, 2014).

Although China continues to call for continuation of the suspended Talks, but failure forced China to look for other ways to deal with the constant threat of war in its backyard. The initiative of the SPT itself was a break in China’s typically passive foreign policy. Even though the SPT itself do not present a permanent solution to the nuclear crisis or even change the status quo, the let-down of the Talks forced China to reflect its own role within the issue. Apparently, China considered the UNSC to be a more suitable platform to resolve the long-term nuclear crises. However, the failure of the SPT only partly answers the question of: Why now? It took China four years, from the last Talks in 2009 to the Third Nuclear Crisis, to make the decision of taking on a greater role in preparing sanctions imposed on North Korea. China’s change in response is very likely related to equal change in leadership, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

### 5.4. A Test Too Many? – China’s New Leadership

On the 12th of December 2012 North Korea fired a long-range missile. In April of that same year a similar test was done, which exploded right after its launch (International Crisis Group, 2013: 3). The December 2012 launch was performed only a month after Xi Jinping’s installation as General Secretary of the CPC and the Central Military Committee (CMC). All eyes were on China, awaiting its response. China responded traditionally in a softer line, stating that it was regrettable that the DPRK did so regardless of international concern” and hoped that “all parties will bear in mind peace and

On 12 February 2013, North Korea performed its third nuclear test. During the UNSC emergency meeting on that same day, China not only strongly condemned the test, but also agreed to work appropriate measures in response. The sanctions were unanimously approved by all of the UNSC members. China unprecedentedly contributed largely on these sanctions, as it functioned as a co-sponsor, co-drafting the resolutions with the US. Washington had “very intensive and productive discussions in consultations, particularly with China” before presenting the draft to UNSC. When Washington did introduce the draft, it did so introducing it with the phrase: “US-China agreed”. On 7 March, the UNSC ordered these new (mainly economic and export) sanctions (Resolution 2094) against North Korea (SinoNK, “China and UN Security”, 2013: para. 3; International Crisis Group, 2013: 7).

On 14 March 2013, Xi Jinping was elected as China’s State President. Xi Jinping’s inaugural speech of 17 March 2013 followed only ten days after the approved sanctions by the UNSC on 7 March 2013. Xi Jinping started his term as President of China with provocations from North Korea. Just several months after Xi’s installation, China reacted pointedly towards these provocations by cooperating with the US. If speeches are to be performative, than Xi Jinping’s speech can be seen as his first presidential response to North Korea’s last nuclear tests. In this chapter, I will be performing textual analyses on two distinct speeches. The first speech (DA1) was given on 15 November 2012 to (inter)national press by Xi Jinping after the 18th CPC National Congress, in which Xi Jinping was elected as General Secretary to the CPC Central Committee. The second speech (DA2) was given by Xi Jinping on 17 March 2013 during the first gathering of the 12th National People’s Congress, where he was inaugurated as President of the PRC. In addition, I briefly analyse the statements (DA3) made by Chinese representation during the April 2013 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of NPT Parties. By analysing these texts, I determine whether China’s new leadership has been a major factor in China’s decision to act as co-sponsor in the drafting of UNSC Resolution 2094.

5.4.1. Speeches with Character? - Discourse Analysis Press & Inaugural Speech Xi Jinping

DA 1: Speech to Press after election CPC Politburo Standing Committee (15 November 2012)

Discourse, or ‘language in use’, is considered to be ‘part of action’, as languages are part of the social world, which consists of social structures, social practices and social events (Fairclough, 2009: 24). Speaking and writing is a way of (inter)acting. Xi Jinping’s first official speech was given on 15 November 2012 where he introduced himself to the (inter)national press as the CPC’s new General Secretary. Texts are considered to be part of social events. In this case, the speech came directly after the disclosed social event of the quinquennial CPC National Congress, in which the actual election of
new CPC Politburo Standing Committee members took place. This Central Committee National Congress is part of a bigger event, namely the completion of the transition of power, which takes place every ten years as each newly elected leader is appointed to two five-year terms (Lanteigne, 2013: 25).

According to Fairclough, genres link together social events in different social practices, countries and even times (2009: 31). A genre might be considered as the ‘identity’ of the text, a conventionalized form. In the case of both speeches, there is a mix of genres, namely those of ‘speech’ and ‘narrative’. In addition, the speeches are part of a genre chain, where genres link together social events. The CPC National Congress press conference on 15 November 2015 is the first public speech within one of the first political events, ushering the Xi era. The speech is a formality, performed by every newly elected General Secretary (which is equivalent to paramount leader of China). Xi Jinping’s first speech might therefore be considered to be part of a chain. The genres within this speech are quite ‘local’ in scale, as the content is primarily aimed at China’s people, even though the speech was given to foreign press.

The element of ‘difference’ is not ignored but rather highlighted. There is both recognition and bracketing of difference, but also an attempt made to resolve differences, rather focussing on commonality and solidarity. This is reflected in the comment made by Xi on China and the rest of the world:

(21) “China needs to learn more about the world and the world needs to learn more about China.”

There is also a big focus on commonality, although more on a local scale. In his speech, Xi talks about the endgame for China: both the people and the Party have the same goal, which is ‘better lives for all’. The term 民族 mínzú, which loosely translated means ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’, in its essence means ‘all people of different ethnicities’. The Party takes it as its task to make sure that not just the Han population, but all Chinese benefit from China’s development. Thus, the focus is not only on ‘commonality’, but also on acceptance of difference.

We may distinguish the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ relations of texts. ‘External’ would refer to the relation of the text with other elements of social events, social practices and social structures. However, there also may be a relation between a specific text and other (‘external’) texts. In this case, elements of other texts may be ‘intertextually’ incorporated in the shape of ‘voices of others’ (Fairclough, 2009: 36). In his speech, Xi Jinping refers to China’s harmonious society:

(11) “In the long course of history, the Chinese people have created a beautiful home of national peaceful coexistence by relying on hard work, courage and wisdom, cultivating

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23 The numbers between brackets preceding the quotes refer to the positions of the paragraphs in the original speech texts in Appendix II and III.
By appointing ‘peaceful coexistence’ in his speech, Xi Jinping makes a clear reference to the grand narrative of his predecessor, President Hu Jintao, and Hu’s grand narrative of ‘Harmonious Society’. In addition, Xi Jinping repeatedly mentions the goal of ‘revival of the Chinese nation’. This is a narrative that can be ascribed to former president Jiang Zemin (1993-2003). The Jiang and Hu eras are considered as periods of “omnidirectional diplomacy” in which “China […] truly went global” (Shambaugh, 2013: 51). It is possible that Xi intentionally makes references to Jiang and Hu to indicate that he plans to continue their active practices, and therefore omitting any (in)direct reference to Deng Xiaoping and his passive strategy of 韬光养晦 tāoguāngyǎnhuì “maintaining a low profile” (Ibid: 9).

In addition to former authoritative figures, Xi Jinping gives a grand role to the masses: he praises the people, thanks the people for their trust and acknowledges the hardship they had to go through to reach this stage of development.

(11) “This great responsibility is a responsibility to the people. Our people are a great people. In the long course of history, by relying on their own hard work, courage and wisdom, the Chinese people have created a beautiful home of national peaceful coexistence, cultivating a timeless and outstanding culture.”

Xi Jinping exclaims the masses as responsible for the current new and prosperous state of the nation. Now the time has come for the CPC to take over the baton and give the masses the life they want and deserve.

Although the speech seems to conclude on a positive note as China invites the rest of the world to get to know one another better, which might even indicate an invitation to tighter cooperation, China still seems to hold onto a global identity of realism and self-help. Xi Jinping talks of the responsibility of the Party to unite and lead […], to which he states the following:

(10) “[…] to make the Chinese nation stronger and more powerful, so it can stand on its own among the nations of the world, making a new and even greater contribution to mankind.”

The phrase 自立于世界民族之林 loosely translated means ‘to be independent/self-reliant/stand on its own among nations of the world’. Literally translated 世界民族之林 means ‘a forest of global nations’. 林 can mean so much as ‘numerous’, ‘a collection of’ or simply ‘forest’. We may conclude that the common denominator in all these definitions is ‘density’. The fact that Xi Jinping wishes for China to be able to stand on its own in a ‘jungle’ of other nations comes across as a purely self-
interested state in a self-help system. Here, Xi Jinping makes an assumption which is ideological as it also provides legitimacy to the CPC: In this world of chaos we need to develop China so we may survive all other nations, through revival and Chinese socialism.

In addition to this assumption, numerous other statements are made in the speech. They are a mix of evaluations, predictions and facts. Xi Jinping evaluates the past and by referring to China’s course of over five-thousand years of civilization and develop (“the Chinese nation has made an indelible contribution to the civilization and progress of mankind”). Besides evaluations, predictions are made (“so that our Party will always be the strong leading core for advancement of the socialist cause with Chinese characteristics”). Lastly, facts are to be found through the entire speech (“people wanting better lives, is our goal”).

In addition to genres, discourses are also elements of social practices. Different discourses represent the world in different ways and are often ideational (Fairclough, 2009: 26-27). This speech contains a mix of discourses. Xi Jinping speaks in high volume of ‘unity of the people and the Party’, ‘responsibility’, and ‘rejuvenation/revival’. Xi Jinping refers only once to ‘the socialist cause with Chinese characteristics’, which is remarkable as this is known to be one of the cornerstones driving the CPC. ‘Chinese Socialism’ is a reformulation of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’. This ‘ideal’ form of socialism entails material wealth for the whole society; eliminate exploitation, oppression and polarization, social equality and justice, a unity of free people, and free development of all. It should be a form of Socialism that is “suited to China’s actual conditions”, and connects to China’s disbelief in “a universal model that was applicable to all times and places” (Wang, 2010: 40).

**DA 2: Inaugural Speech Presidency – 1st Session of 12th NPC (17 March 2013)**

Xi Jinping’s second speech took place on 17 March 2013 during the first gathering of the 12th NPC, where he was inaugurated as President of the PRC. The inauguration of the new President is also an integral part of the power transition. Where the CPC National Congress speech was placed on Party level, this speech applied to state-level, and can be considered as the seal of the ceremonial power transition.

Just as the previous speech (DA1), the Presidential speech is both a speech and narrative. This hybridity of genres give the text an intimate touch and connectedness with the masses. As stated before, genres can vary in scale, from local to global. In this speech, the genre is both local and global. Xi Jinping addresses the Chinese people and the goals all people share. The genre has a global element at first place because of the fact that it refers to Xi’s inaugural as President of the PRC, which makes

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24 The term ‘discourses’ is not used here as the abstract ‘language in use’, but rather as a way of representing the world, a type of ‘-ism’ (Fairclough, 2009: 26).
him China’s representative to the rest of the world. However, the speech also indicates how China plans to present itself globally. This inaugural speech is connected to the CPC speech and therefore belongs to the same genre chain that the CPC speech is part of, as it completes the transition of power.

The Presidential speech also contains a mix of discourses: ‘Chinese Spirit’, ‘Chinese Dream’, ‘Chinese Socialism’, ‘CPC’, and the ‘People’. However, in this speech Xi introduces a new discourse: ‘the Chinese Dream’. This main theme has remained Xi’s grand narrative up to this day, and basically accumulates all the other discourses into one single concept.

(10) “To achieve the Chinese dream you have to enhance the Chinese Spirit. This patriotism is the core of our national spirit. These reforms and innovations are our ‘Zeitgeist’, the spirit of our time. This type of spirit is an invigorating soul that sets cohesion, a body that strengthens the nation.”

Xi’s key policy concept, his grand narrative of the ‘Chinese Dream’, is very prominent within his speech. The realization of this dream is dependent on the people, the Chinese spirit, which in its turn is dependent on the extent of patriotism. Even with this knowledge, it is difficult to set what this ‘Chinese dream’ is. The speech only indicates on the steps to be taken to get there, and not its meaning. The ‘Chinese Dream’ could simply mean the completion of the perfect form of Socialism suitable to China. However, it could also refer to a wish for atonement for the ‘Century of Humiliation’ which China suffered by the hands of imperialists with the Treaty of Nanjing (1842); for China now to become once again the world’s dominant power. Another interpretation is that the slogan is propaganda for the Party to win over the masses. Democratization is not a part of Xi’s ‘China Dream’, as “Xi has so far shown little interest in democratizing the country.” However, according to Zhang & Gore, Xi’s ‘Dream’-concept could encompass China replacing the US as the world’s dominant superpower, an idea possibly taken from Liu Mingfu, who published the 2010 book The China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-America Era (Zhang & Gore, 2014: 3).

Xi Jinping is unquestionably clear on the path he wishes for China to take:

(9) “This [Chinese path] is also the path of ‘Chinese Socialism’”

Although the goal of ‘Chinese Socialism’ is present within Xi’s CPC speech, it is only mentioned once, while the ideal is omnipresent within Xi’s Presidential speech. Nevertheless, there is a clear connection between both speeches.

(9) “We are also capable of continuously expanding and take the peaceful road on the suitable path of development of China”
Notable within this statement are the terms ‘expanding’ and ‘suitable’; both can be interpreted in different ways. With China’s history of annexation this comes across as an unfortunate choice of character (or not). The character 拓展 tàzhǎn means ‘to expand (and develop)’ or ‘to realize’. The character 拓 itself means ‘to push with the hands’, which could also be interpreted as ‘coercive’. In the modern context and the current international system it would most probably mean ‘to develop economically’. The exact meaning of the term ‘suitable’ is vague, as it is not clear what is ‘suitable’ for China. That what is suitable for China may be a disadvantage to a neighbouring country, the region, or the world. Thus, the ambiguity within this choice of characters gives room for concern; even as it states that this suitable road will be a peaceful one.

Absent in his CPC speech, but present in his inaugural speech, is Xi’s reference to Deng Xiaoping:

(24) “We need to fully implement the eighteen spirits of the CPC, and take Deng Xiaoping’s theory of the significant ideology of ‘Three Represent’, and the Scientific Outlook on Development’ as guidance.”

Without literally saying it, Xi refers to the paramount position of the CPC, functioning as “the only guarantor of the safety and prosperity of the Chinese state” (Lanteigne, 2013:34). Xi thanks all his predecessors in the speech, which falls in line with the Chinese tradition of respecting your elders and honouring your forefathers. However, he gives special attention to Hu Jintao. He does this directly by referring to his development of Chinese socialism, and indirectly by referring to Hu’s ideas on foreign policy of ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘harmonious world’ (Lanteigne, 2013: 31):

(22) “We peacefully walk the path of development, and go for a win-win and mutual benefit strategy of opening-up. We will commit ourselves to work together in developing friendships with countries around the world, fulfil our international responsibility and obligations.”

Although the element of difference is present, the focus is rather on ‘commonality’. Xi speaks frequently of ‘the people’ and ‘the dream’ which ‘all people of all ethnicities’ have in common. Xi not only includes the voices of mainland China, but also involves the citizens of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan:

(21) “The Taiwanese and mainland compatriots have to join hands, support, uphold, push for peaceful evolution of cross-strait relations, and enhance the welfare of our brothers and sisters from Taiwan and the mainland to create a new future for the Chinese people.”

Xi Jinping avoids the sensitivity of the ‘One Policy, Two Systems’ policy between China and Taiwan by only mentioning the need for communication to secure ‘their’ future. He puts both mainland Chinese and Taiwanese on the same level. Within his career, Xi has worked on Hong Kong, Macau
and Taiwan. In his time in Fujian he immersed himself in China’s relationship with Taiwan and helped attract Taiwanese investment to Fujian Province (Xinhua, “Profile: Xi Jinping”, n.d.).

In his earlier career, Xi showed a strong sense of responsibility towards the future of the nation; he did so by presenting several development models for several cities, such as Xiamen and Zhengding. Up to this day, he still remotely visits these cities and its provinces (Xinhua, “Profile: Xi Jinping”, n.d.). With his foreign visits and meetings with foreign visitors, he shows great attachment and importance to international exchange as well as maintaining these relations. In 2012, Xi stated that “not all countries seek hegemony”, and “China will stick to the path of peaceful development; a win-win strategy of opening up and the pledge of never seeking hegemony, now or in any future generation” (Ibid). This is, partly, reflected in his speech, where he states:

(22) “We peacefully walk the path of development, and go for win-win and mutual benefit strategy of opening-up”

With this paragraph, Xi wants to emphasize that China is not looking to deal with the rest of the world in an unpeaceful manner.

**DA 3: Chinese statements during Second Session of Preparatory Committee for 2015 NPT Review Conference (22-26 April 2013)**

Within this DA, three distinctive statements will be analysed. The statements were given during the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in Geneva, between 22 and 26 April 2013. Different from DA1 and DA2 is that these statements were not given by Xi Jinping himself, but by Chinese representatives. Although the statements had been made after the North Korea had performed the third test, taking a short look at these statements might give us a better understanding of China’s DPRK policy regarding the nuclear crisis.

All three speeches are part of a social event chain, namely the NPT Review Conference which takes place every five years. The first speech statement was given by the Chinese Delegation during the general debate on 22 April 2013. The text is besides a speech also a narrative on the NPT and China’s involvement. With the exception of one, the statements literally address the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Within the 22 April statement, China states that:

“China persists in solving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and consultations. We remain committed to achieving the denuclearization of the Peninsula, as well as maintaining peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. We will continue our efforts to promote all parties to seek a balanced solution to each others’ concerns through the Six-Party Talks and other dialogues, and to de-escalate the current tension.”
The statement made on 26 April on non-proliferation reiterates this, but is complemented with the statement that China “will continue to make unremitting efforts in this regard” (paragraph 10). China also clearly states its desire to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully, and that nuclear non-proliferation:

“[…] must be addressed in an integrated manner by tackling both the symptoms and the root causes of the problem, and through political and diplomatic means. Double standards must be forsaken”.

The statement could be a reference to the sanctions imposed to North Korea, which might not be the best approach. Rather, the source of the nuclear issue should be addressed. China has long considered itself able to develop North Korea out of its poverty-stricken domestic situation through (economic) reforms. This attempt has failed, which leaves the question: how should the root causes of the nuclear issue be tackled? China acknowledges the difficulty in this:

“[…] it should be pointed out that nuclear disarmament is sensitive and complicated, which cannot be achieved overnight”.

Both in its statement during the general debate and on nuclear disarmament, China brings forward its own ‘institution’ on nuclear disarmament in the shape of the no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons policy (NFU):

“Nuclear-weapon states should abandon the nuclear deterrence doctrine based on the first use of nuclear weapons […] the development of missile defence systems which undermine global strategic stability should be abandoned […]”

The NFU is a pledge China took since it has been establishing nuclear weapons. The pledge implies that China will not be the first to use a nuclear weapon during a conflict. In addition, China would maintain an arsenal sufficient to deter an attack, but not overwhelm its enemy (Lanteigne, 2013: 84). It is very possible that, with this unilateral pledge, China attempts to defuse the nuclear situation on the Korean Peninsula through the very system that is supposed to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, the international non-proliferation regime, and its NWS and NNWS. If NWS not only vow to not use their disproportionate arsenal, but also reduce their amount of nuclear weapons, pariah states like North Korea could be persuaded to renounce their nuclear ambition. However, chances of this happening are slim as any nuclear arsenal, no matter how small, is a reason for North Korea to continue their program for nuclear deterrence.

5.4.2. Xi Jinping: First-Among-‘Equals’

As a ‘princeling’ (a descendant of prominent Party official) and seemingly loyal to the Party, Xi’s views concerning China’s political reforms appear to be remarkably conservative and in line with Marxist doctrines (Brookings Institute, “Xi Jinping”, n.d.). He aspired toward a career with the CPC,
even though this same Party imprisoned his father, leaving him and his family in hardship. Whether this shows character, or he joined the Party out of desperation is debatable; nevertheless, compared to other ‘princelings,’ Xi Jinping seems more approachable and easy-going. He is seen as a pragmatic leader, someone who is a problem solver and who has “expressed his deep feelings for the people [...]” (Xinhua, “Profile: Xi Jinping”, n.d.). This is reflected in his speeches which contain a personal touch as well as a charismatic element. His grand narrative of the ‘Chinese Dream’ is meant as a bridge to reach the common folk and is so far well received. The absence of its meaning invites one to think along.

Although decisions that might change the status quo on the North Korean nuclear crisis have not been taken yet, Xi Jinping is surely capable of making them since the Third Plenum of November 2013. Xi was very much aware that holding the three positions of State President, General Secretary of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and CPC does not give one full power to enforce meaningful reforms. Xi drew lessons from Hu’s leadership, which failed to implement what was planned (Zheng & Gore, 2014: 7). He therefore presented a package of sixty socioeconomic reforms during the Third Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee in November 2013 (Ibid: 5), among which the establishment of the new National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Leading Small Group (LSG) on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms. These two bodies may be considered to be China’s main foreign policy actors and highest-level decision makers when it comes to external relations and security issues. Both bodies are subordinate to the CPC.

The main responsibilities of the NSC are “to formulate and implement national security strategy, promote national security legislation, design principles and policies for national security work, and discuss and resolve key issues concerning national security” (China.org.cn, “Decision of the Central Committee”: para. 57). China’s State President functions as the head of this new Council (Xinhua, “Xi Jinping to lead”, 2014). The LSG on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms is in charge of designing reform on an overall basis, “arranging and coordinating reforms of different sectors, pushing forward reforms as a whole and supervising the implementation of reform plans” (China.org.cn, “Decision of the Central Committee”: para. 58).

With the old bodies, the CPC LSG on Foreign Affairs and CMC, leaders had been constantly thwarted by “horizontal conflicts with formidable institutional players in other systems” (Zheng & Gore, 2014: 8). This was (partially) the reason of Hu Jintao’s weak state leadership, as “much of his power was shared and restrained by his Political Bureau colleagues, [and] his reform initiatives constantly

25 See APPENDIX IV for Xi Jinping’s Biography
26 The CPC Constitution does speak of the LSGs (as it does not fall under State Law), although indirectly, namely under Chapter IX ‘Leading Party Member’s Groups’ (Article 46–48). The purpose of the LSG is to issue guiding principles, not to formulate concrete policies. However, in practice, their detailed policy recommendations are often accepted by Party leaders, with little or no modifications. There are in fact LSGs that are run by the SC and PLA, but these LSG remain CPC inventions and are (vice-) chaired by Party-members. (Xinhua, “Full Text of Constitution”, Para. 1).
blocked by interest groups”. These new institutional changes have centralized unparalleled power in Xi’s hands, giving him “omnipotent power over the socioeconomic policy, military forces, domestic security, propaganda and foreign affairs” (*Ibid*: 1-2). It has brought Xi’s position of first-among-equals in the Political Bureau Standing Committee to an “all-powerful leader that has absolute authority in handling domestic and external affairs”. This power concentration could “facilitate bold reforms and forestall policy deadlocks” (*Ibid*: 7-8).

**Conclusion**

Xi Jinping does not literally address the issue in his own speeches, but they might unlock the direction he and his Party will take China within the North Korea nuclear crisis. Xi Jinping talks about the ‘Chinese Spirit’ which is a ‘harmonious’ spirit. Based on the Confucian background of the term ‘harmonious’, it could take a long time before China will forcefully tackle North Korea. ‘Harmony’ and the acceptance of ‘diversity’ are part of China’s identity. To punish North Korea for having different aspirations would go against China’s own principles. China has its own dream, which in my view is to achieve a prosperous and full form of ‘Chinese Socialism’. If it was up to other countries in the international realm (read: Western countries), China would be a prosperous and full-fledged democracy. Xi Jinping stated that China has no plans to deviate from its harmonious and peaceful path. However, the concept of intersubjectivity and language fail in this context, as basically the entire East Asian region and the US do not take China for its words. Language, to them, is *not* action.

Xi Jinping is considered to have a strong sense of responsibility. Since he came to power, he has consolidated CPC power to foster the implementation of meaningful (mostly economic) reforms. In addition, he has been on a fierce hunt on those who are corrupt in the government or military, making “vows of fighting both ‘tigers’ and ‘flies’, referring to both powerful leaders and lowly bureaucrats (Zhang & Gore, 2014: 4). But will Xi try to extend his trend of reform to China’s foreign policy and relation with North Korea? Will China take on the responsibility of a great power, as is expected of it?

The first speech focuses on the ‘local’, but does ask of the world to learn more about China. This CPC speech is a clear prelude of the inaugural speech. There are clear conventions that return in the inaugural speech, such as Chinese Socialism, the role of the people, and the hefty responsibility of the Party to develop the nation. He makes indirect reference to Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, and their active foreign policies, which could indicate that Xi Jinping plans to continue this trend. However, the phrase of China needing to ‘stand on its own among nations of the world’ comes across quite realist. It could mean that China chooses to stay loyal to its neighbour North Korea, and disregard its responsibilities. Or it could mean that China chooses to go for its own interests (economic development and Chinese Socialism), which would mean it should abide by the rules and act as a responsible player to maintain its position in the insiders group. This ultimately means it must take a tougher stance against North
Korea. The second speech is more aimed at the global public. It has a clear narrative, ‘the Chinese Dream’; however it is unclear what this dream exactly is. I believe the Dream entails further economic development for China, so that it can regain the position it once had: a dominant position which equals rehabilitation and revalidation. The third set of statements literally addresses the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, which makes sense as the setting has been designed for such. China does frequently mention the NFU, which shows that China consciously attempts to introduce new multilateral mechanisms.

His pragmatism might cause China to further drift from North Korea. As seen in the manner in which he approached the Taiwan-issue, he does not sweep problems under the carpet. However, Xi Jinping is still an ideologist who firstly serves the CPC. He is ‘affiliated’ with Deng Xiaoping, who has left China a great legacy. But Deng maintained a foreign policy of passivity and inaction. Xi seems to be eager to develop extensive relations with the outside world. He has been assertive on domestic and international politics, and has tried to insert meaningful reforms by bringing back strong-man politics. Whether Xi will take China on a road towards ‘hegemon’-status only time will tell, but it is remarkable that shortly after his entrance in the Chinese government such strong signals were sent out to North Korea as well as to the rest of the world. It is therefore possible that Xi is planning to take firm action against North Korea, simply because he has enabled himself through reforms to be able to take firm action.

5.5. Is China a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?

China’s emergence (or from a Chinese perspective - ‘re-emergence’) provided the country with the opportunity to become a great power. Key actors within this North Korean nuclear crisis have high expectations of China’s capability to change the status quo. Its tight co-operation with the US in the draft of UNSC Resolution 2094 seems to be a sign in the right direction of solving the decades-long nuclear situation. As part of answering the question of why China decided to co-draft UNSC Resolution 2094, it is important to determine what kind of foreign policy China has when it comes to North Korea and the nuclear crisis. Can it be considered as normative, where values attached to international law, institutions and legal obligations are adhered and even re-produced? To answer the question I will analyse three principle conditioning factors: China’s interests, means and the impact of its foreign policy.27

Prior to the North Korea’s third nuclear test, China repeatedly stated that regional stability in the East Asian region should be maintained at all costs. After the third test, China stated that complete denuclearization was the only way to peace. However, these two statements are official responses made by the Chinese government in times that a correct response is expected, as befits a global power

27 Note that the analysis only focuses on China’s foreign policy within the frame of North Korean nuclear crisis, and not China’s foreign policy as a whole.
like China. Although it can be deducted from these statements, it does not say everything about China’s interests. China keeps emphasizing that denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is the primary goal, which is very much in line with the norms of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime that China is a member of.

However, ‘complete denuclearization’ is most probably not China’s end goal. Like every (sovereign) state actor, China may pursue its own concept of the ‘good’. Economic development is top-priority for the CPC. Within its 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15), China had set *inter alia* a target of seven percent annually GDP growth (on average), and to keep prices stable (Xinhua, “Key Targets of China’s”, para. 1). Targets for China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) have not been published yet, although research on it has started. However, we may expect that priority will again be given to economic growth and reforms. If war would break out on the Korean Peninsula, the entire East Asian region risks destabilization. This would ultimately have a negative effect on China’s economy and growth, halting the realization of the ‘Chinese Dream’. Keeping the masses content is a thought that goes all the way back to pre-modern times. Order was maintained by providing the masses with all the basics and to keep the economy thriving. Good, moral rule by the emperor and the state of the economy was interlinked to internal social order. Rulers lose their legitimacy once social unrest occurred. This thought remains valid up to this day. China’s current ruler, the CPC, has been losing its fight over ideology and legitimacy. The difference between then and now is that, today, China’s internal order is prone to external influences from other states. In addition to fears of a crashing economy, China regards North Korea as a buffer zone. If North Korea were to fall, the current North Korean regime could be replaced by allied forces. US or UN troops could be stationed in the area, even up to the Chinese border, which could further strain the already troubled relation with the US. Then there is the potential North Korean refugee-issue. In other words, China has many interests, and therefore a lot to worry about.

According to Frost, keeping oneself in the non-proliferation regime is an ethical goal in itself. As a NWS, China has rights and obligations which work internally and externally. China is allowed to hold nuclear material, but is refrained from exporting its technology or material to non NPT-signatories. China itself is prone to criticism by other participants, but also has the moral duty to value on other actors within the regime. However, if merely being a participant within the non-proliferation regime makes an actor rationale ‘ethical’, then this would mean that all NPT signees, by definition, are regarded as ‘ethical’, with the exception of non-signatories. The picture of the situation is however not as monochrome.

China’s main interest is economic stability. During the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC on 12 November 2013, the Committee adopted deepening reforms, with economic system reforms being the focus. The Committee stated that “development is still the key to solving all
problems in China” (China.org.cn, “Decisions of the Central”, 2014). If economic stability can be maintained through complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, than this is the way to go as far as China is concerned. If it can maintain economic stability by having dialogues with North Korea, so be it. China does not wish for denuclearization, because it is a NWS and permanent member of the UNSC. These normative goals are inferior to its strategic goal to maintain internal stability, via economic prosperity.

We might even rephrase the latter by saying that China has been pursuing normative goals to achieve underlying strategic goals. The normative goal consists of ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ based on the value of non-proliferation via a strong message such as co-drafting UN Resolution 2094 with the US. With this unprecedented co-sponsorship, China openly states that it wishes to put an end to North Korea’s recurring nuclear tests and provocations. However, the collaboration between the US and China was not done for the sake of the collaboration. Because China’s previous attempts to restrain the North Korean regime, with the SPT being its greatest effort, China had to find another way to avoid North Korea’s antics to influence China’s internal (economic) stability. It was most probably frustration and impotence from the Chinese side that drove it to participate in the draft of the UN resolution. This co-sponsorship ultimately means that China became more ‘normative’ in its foreign policy towards North Korea on the surface. China’s actual goal lies underneath the surface of normative behaviour, namely to continue its strategic goal of economic prosperity which could even be extended to become a superpower that surpasses the US.

China has both hard and soft power capabilities to share in the solution of this North Korean nuclear crisis. With a nuclear arsenal of sixty to seventy long-range missiles, and an annual military budget of 670 billion Yuan (109 billion dollar), China is physically capable of demonstrating a strong piece of ‘hard power’ (Lanteigne, 2013: 4). However, today ‘soft power’ is ‘hard power’. Coercive tactics are not desirable, even if the situation demands for it and the majority of the international community agrees. It would be a huge risk for a country that is trying to continue in its development. At the moment, China has no other options than to continue to use soft power tactics. The issue within China’s soft power-approach is its ambiguous method. It both supports and condemns North Korea, by advocating UNSC sanctions. It seems that, since Xi Jinping’s accession, there is a push for milieu goals. Since its last nuclear test in July 1996, China began to adhere more towards international non-proliferation and testing protocols (Lanteigne, 2013: 84). Although China has not diminished its nuclear arsenal (which is a long term goal for NWS stated within the NPT) (Lanteigne, 2013: 80), yet taking on the co-sponsorship with the US does show that China attempts to change its ‘operation environment’ with usage of the tools given to it by an influential body such as the UNSC. However, under this upsurge of international cooperation and usage of international regimes and organisations lies most probably the goal to increase China’s presence on the international stage. It is to show its
people that China is indeed a key player among all other players, including the US. This as a CPC strategy to show the masses that China is the relevant and legitimate ‘rightful’ ruler.

According to Johnston, international institutions such as the UNSC are often agents of counter-realpolitik socialization. This makes perfect sense as international institutions carry normative structures which are often mimicked and incorporated by the agents, i.e. norms entrepreneurs, at unit level (2008: 29-30). When China became a member of the UN and subsequently of the UNSC, there was already conformity on its norms. Social interaction within the UN does not always have to be considered as strategic behaviour. During a time of unipolarity this seems like the ‘logical’ thing to do. However, within a multipolar world, states are expected to act in the benefit of all. International institutions are often a reflection of this multipolar world. Constructivists therefore consider actors within institutions such as the UN as ‘agents of counter-realpolitik socialization’. China supporting UNSC Resolution 2094 comes across as an act of mimicking other UNSC members like the US, after having received years of “mediated normative influence” from being a UNSC member (Ibid: 25).

UNSC sanctions are not the only method China uses to change, or at least maintain, the status quo. China also supports North Korea by providing the country aid and assistance. China is also North Korea’s largest foreign direct investor, with $18.4 million of a total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of $67 million in 2007, and $41.2 million of a total FDI of $44 million in 2008 (Nanto & Manyin, 2010: 17). In 2011 China’s FDI flows to North Korea even reached the amount of $55.95 million (Reilly, 2014: 925). The sly of money is without a doubt a strategy of China to prevent the hermit state from collapsing, which is disastrous for China and the entire region. However, the rationale behind China’s policy also has to do with its historical relation with North Korea. China remembers the tributary link that it once had with the Korean peninsula, and feels that it can rehabilitate and denuclearize North Korea via money injections. China has always exclaimed that the dealing with North Korea should always be based on ‘dialogue’, and the crisis should be handled in a peaceful manner. This certainly has been the case during the SPT era; however there was no direct dialogue with North Korea in the period between North Korea’s third nuclear test and the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2094. China’s approach remains soft and on a multilateral level, but shifted from the voluntarily environment of the SPT towards the UNSC which issues binding elements for both North Korea and China.

China’s firmer action in its overall ambiguous foreign policy toward North Korea is somewhat in line with internal policy intensification. President Xi Jinping has been implementing new policies on a high pace that range from anti-corruption, economic liberalization initiatives, but also severely limiting internet and press freedom (The Diplomat, “Is Xi Jinping”, 2014). Although the relation between China and North Korea has soured over time, it remains ambiguous. In March 2014 China officially rejected a UN-Commissioned report on human rights violations in North Korea. However,
China’s Foreign Ministry stated clearly during a press conference on 20 November 2014 that China holds “a clear and firm position on the Korean nuclear issue, that is, [we] should stay committed to realizing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula […])(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson”, 2014). However, the trend of North Korea slowly replacing China with Russia indicates the change in dynamics between China and North Korea.

The US aims for a forceful tactic, hitting the DPRK where it hurts most, namely financially. Although China’s money injections give an opposite message, China’s recent co-operation with the US to draft the UN Resolution 2094 issued a strong message, stating that China is ready to give North Korea though love. US Secretary of State Kerry expressed in October 2014 his contentment for China’s efforts of “ additional measures taken in the last year to try to send a very clear message to the North Koreans that [the continued development of a nuclear program] is unacceptable to the Chinese” (The Diplomat, “Kerry: Return to Six”, 2014).

However, China’s policy toward North Korea leaves something to be desired, as China has been accused of exporting small arms ammunition to North Korea between 2012 and 2014. Although the export is not a violation of UNSC Resolution 2094, UNSC Resolution 1874 does require a Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) application, with the condition of at least five days prior to selling, supplying or transferring small arms or light weapons to the DPRK. If proven, this (lack of) action could be quite embarrassing to China (North Korea News, “China Exports Shotgun”, 2014). Due to this, China’s repeatedly pledged commitment to adhere to international regulation on non-proliferation and its policy toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula becomes implausible. China states one thing, but then does the complete opposite. However, despite its flaws, China is regarded as a key actor within the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis, because of its proximity and shared history with imperialists. The six parties within the SPT have also recently booked progress on the rehabilitation of the SPT, which could be a matter of months.

**Conclusion**

After analysing the three determinants ‘China’s interests’, ‘means’ and the ‘impact’ of its foreign policy, it is safe to say that China is not a normative foreign policy actor *pur sang*. As stated before, China’s milieu goals are a superficial justification for its actions toward the Third Nuclear Crisis. Its actual goals are strategic, aimed to maintain stability in the region so that China may continue its development. The ultimate goal is to “continuously strengthen every confidence in taking the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics […] so as to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects” (China.org.cn, “Decision of the Central”, 2014). By *officially* stating that it fully supports complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, China claims to pursue normative foreign policy goals, but does not actually do so. We might even state that China’s support in complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is a means to achieving its goal of economic development. This places China’s foreign policy in the ‘imperialist’ box.

However, when it comes to China’s role on reshaping environment and the development of international law and institutions, the distinction is not so clear. China’s SPT initiative and continued attempts to revive the Talks is a direct result of China aversion of and lack of agreement in ‘Western’ resolution mechanisms. China is a strong advocate of peaceful means and non-coercive methods, such as dialogue and consultation between all parties. The SPT initiative provided China with the opportunity to promote its ethical identity and the Chinese norm of ‘harmonious’ dialogue to resolve conflict. In addition, China attempts to play a more dominant role, which is evident from its role as co-drafter of UNSC Resolution 2094. China’s pro-active attitude again puts it in the ‘imperialist’ corner, but we can also place China within the ‘status-quo’ corner as it, in its attempts respects the existing rules when operating within the international system. In general, the idea of China flouting international regulation prevails. This mostly derives from the country’s human rights situation, as well as Sino-US and Sino-EU trade relations and the ongoing reciprocal dumping accusations; whereas within the international non-proliferation regime, China seems to make great attempts to respect its legal obligations. There are certainly areas of improvement, especially on compliance of export restrictions and limitations towards the DPRK.

China stepped off its usage of hard power, not only because it is trying to convey a peaceful and harmonious attitude, which it claims to have on the rest of the world, but also because using hard power is no longer accepted. No actor in the international sphere will use all the means that it has at its disposal in the pursuit of its own concept of the good. Doing so is equal to (state) ethical deficit and states will risk getting shunned by fellow states, which can result in complete isolation; the same predicament North Korea is currently in. China understands the necessity of international cooperation to reach its strategic goal of (economic) development.

After having looked at China’s interests, means and impact of its foreign policy, we can say that China is positioned between an ‘imperial’ and ‘status quo’ type of foreign policy. China, along with other actors like the US, would like to see the North Korean nuclear crisis resolved, but fears the possible negative consequences of a de-stabilized region. However, the latest developments within the North Korean nuclear crisis have forced China to play a more dominant role. With the possibility of war in its backyard, China decided to promote itself more as a responsible player and increased its cooperation with not only the US but also South Korea, Russia and even Japan. In the process, China makes increasingly use of its soft power means, but remains principled and stays close to its ideology and identity in its choice of means. China can therefore be regarded as an imperial foreign policy actor with a moderate status quo character.
6. CONCLUSION

This thesis explains why China decided to co-draft a UNSC Resolution (2094) with the US shortly after North Korea performed its Third Nuclear Test on 12 February 2013. The global community within this thesis has been presented as a constructivist world, meaning the global structures and the actors contained have been described from a constructivist perspective. In addition, because of a deficiency of ‘norms’ and ‘ethics’ within IR, the constructivist approach has been complemented with CT. This chapter features the conclusion and therefore finalizes the research. First, the sub-questions and main research question are answered, to which the difficulties experienced in this research are explained.

6.1. Answer to the sub-questions

In order to draw a conclusion on the reason for China’s decision to co-draft UNSC Resolution 2094 right after the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis (2013), five sub-questions are used to break down the different components necessary to ultimately answer the main research question, which is answered in the next sub-chapter. The sub-questions are stated and answered below.

1. What are the backgrounds of the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis (2013), when viewing the world from a constructivist perspective?

Within the SOSS, China has managed to grow from an isolated state to a world actor that has increasingly been taking responsibility, (increasingly) using soft power methods and engaged in multilateral cooperation. Although China’s relation with the US is still marked by rivalry, both strive to preserve the global financial system to maintain national development. The SOSS and the international non-proliferation regime are two social structures that are interlinked and interact with one another. As one of the few NWS, China has the responsibility of adhering to the NPT’s ethical foundation, i.e. the stated goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. By detaching itself from the NPT, North Korea took itself out of this group of moral agents. Although North Korea is now part of the group of outsiders, it remains a participant of the international non-proliferation regime.

Whereas the relation between China and North Korea used to be an absolute allegiance, today the two states have rather drifted apart, which has become noticeable in a decrease in Sino-DPRK diplomacy. North Korea distrusts China, but was forced to cope with China as the pariah state is financially dependent on China. However, latest trends show that China’s role of patron is slowly being taken over by Russia. Just like North Korea, Russia’s position within the SOSS has been dwindling due to the MH17 and Crimea incidents. China’s ambiguous position toward North Korea may be founded in China’s identity, which I earlier referred to as being a dilemmatic. It is not so much a matter of change in China’s identity. Rather China is in a crisis, balancing on the edge of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.
2. Which political, social and economic factors affect the PRC’s foreign policy towards North Korea?

There are several factors that influence China’s DPRK discourse, which can be extended to China’s interests. Firstly, China is a direct neighbour to North Korea, which means it will immediately feel the aftermath of a potential (nuclear) war or collapse of the North Korea regime. China fears that North Korea’s erratic behaviour could thwart China’s short-and long term goal of economic development. Secondly, if the regime were to fall by the hand of UN or US troops, China would be (almost entirely) surrounded by US allies. Lastly, the relation between the US and China is still based on ‘rivalry’, which is based on US’ hegemonic status which China feels the US is abusing. However, these elements were all present during the Second DPRK Nuclear Crisis, and have not really changed within their essence. These factors therefore do not present a sufficient explanation to why China decided to co-draft UNSC Resolution 2094.

3. Did the Six Party Talks have an effect on the ‘nuclear’ situation during the Third Nuclear Crisis (2013)?

China had initiated the SPT itself in 2003 after other multilateral efforts failed to resolve the DPRK Nuclear Crisis. The SPT itself did not resolve the crisis; however it did present another mean for North Korea to continue the cycle of provocation and extortion, merely by using its presence and participation as leverage. One could therefore even state that the SPT became a part of the problem: the fact that the status quo remained as the SPT fostered no form of change. For China, the SPT also became a part of China’s rhetoric of peaceful rise and its embrace of soft power. Although China, and the other SPT participants, up to this day call for continuation of the Talks, the failure of the SPT most probably forced China to review its part within resolving the crisis, which resulted in a stronger participation within the UNSC. However, as the SPT had already collapsed in 2009, this does not fully explain why China decided to take such notable action in 2013.

4. What role has President Xi Jinping played in the Sino-DPRK relation during the Third Nuclear Crisis?

China’s new leader, President Xi Jinping, became General Secretary of the CPC in December 2012 and was inaugurated in March 2013, just over a month after North Korea’s third nuclear test. Xi Jinping seems to be a leader with a mission. Xi Jinping’s inaugural speech, given on 17 March 2013, contains one single thread: ‘the Chinese Dream’. Xi’s CPC speech to the press lacks such a distinct narrative. It does however clearly connect with his 2013 inaugural speech. The exact meaning of this ‘Chinese Dream’ is still unknown; however it could refer to China’s goal of ‘Chinese socialism’ or China replacing the US as hegemon. This would mean that China has to continue developing, and therefore does not need any disturbance of the stability within the region. The statements made during
the NPT Review Conference state that China will continue with attempts to resolve the nuclear issue. These attempts will be in line with Chinese norms and values of harmony and peace.

Xi Jinping pace of reform is quite high (possibly in the memory of Deng Xiaoping?). In a short amount of time he was able to implement reforms on corruption, the economy, but also within decision-making. Xi Jinping, however, makes no direct reference in the speeches. He rather focuses on Jiang and Hu’s policies of active foreign policy. With the establishment of the NSC and Central Leading Small Group (LSG) on Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, Xi has truly become first among ‘equals’, as he is now capable of making important decisions on his own, including on North Korea matters, which remained in deadlock numerous with previous leaders times due to blockage by institutional players. In addition, Xi Jinping makes conscious decisions to distance China somewhat from North Korea by China breaking a longstanding tradition by surpassing North Korea in its presidential visits, choosing South Korea over the hermit state. The decision for China to co-draft UNSC Resolution 2094 suspiciously coincides with Xi Jinping’s arrival in China’s highest level of politics. I therefore consider Xi Jinping to be a great factor within China’s swift change of DPRK discourse.

5. *Can China’s actions and foreign policy towards North Korea during the last Nuclear Crisis be considered as ‘normative’?*

After analysing China’s interests, means and the impact of its foreign policy, I can conclude that China’s foreign policy is not ‘normative’, but rather positioned between ‘imperial’ and ‘status quo’. China takes on a more dominant and pro-active role in the resolution of the DPRK nuclear crisis by taking on the role of co-drafter of UNSC resolutions. China has made the deliberate decision to present itself more as a responsible player by engaging in multilateral cooperation. Although China still needs to improve its export control-system regarding North Korea, it does attempt to respect the existing rules within the international non-proliferation regime. Its increased multilateral cooperation clearly indicates that China increasingly embraces the fact that the SOSS is a social structure that is founded on acceptance of responsibility and sovereign actors that are strongly interconnected. These are all characteristics of a ‘status quo’ actor. Although China is not a normative actor, its foreign policy behaviour has become more ‘normative’, in the sense that China has been acting less on its own interests, but rather keeping the greater good of non-proliferation in mind. China is slowly diverting from unconditionally supporting North Korea to using the multilateral and soft power means that the UNSC offers it, and attempting to keep up the values underlying the NPT.
6.2. Answer to the main research questions

After having answered the sub-questions, the main research question can be answered. The main research question reads:

**Why did China decide to co-draft UNSC Resolution 2094 with the US in the aftermath of the Third North Korean Nuclear Crisis (2013)?**

Although interest-factors such as proximity and (economic) stability have indeed played on China’s decision to co-draft UNSC Resolution 2094 with the US right after the Third Nuclear Crisis in 2013, they are not decisive factors. North Korea’s provocations are a constant threat to China, although not so much on the nuclear field, as China does not consider North Korea to be a nuclear threat to China itself. Rather, North Korea’s antics are a threat to China’s growth and development. In addition, China is not happy with US’ overwhelming military presence in the region. However, this situation was already present before the third nuclear test and even during Hu Jintao’s Presidency, and does not explain China’s decision in 2013 to work closely with the US on sanctions.

I have shown that the failure of the SPT worked as a catalyst which contributed to China’s decision to take on the role as co-sponsor. With the talks suspended for an indefinite period China had to find other means to pressure North Korea into cooperating. Although China calls for return of the SPT, it will not wait for it and found different means to contain the situation. The one element that differs from that was not present during the SPT and the second nuclear test was China’s new President Xi Jinping. I have shown that Xi Jinping has the agenda to change China for the better. Not only did he present a new grand narrative, the Chinese dream, but he also implemented reforms which give him the ability to make important decision on his own. This means that Xi Jinping could ultimately be responsible for China’s more vigorous DPRK-discourse.

6.3. Difficulties experienced in research

Taking on a large project like the North Korean Nuclear Crisis does not come without tussles. It is a crisis of decades and has many actors involved. I attempted to incorporate all relevant actors, however, due to the word count limit, I merely dealt with the (state) actors directly involved. Writing on China always poses the known challenge of (reliable) data availability on China’s decision-making process (or the lack of). The Chinese government (i.e. the CPC) only gives information on its decision makers and process up to a certain extent. It is therefore possible that the chapters on decision making lack dept.

In addition, because of the lack of depth the reliability of available data and sources must be viewed with a dose of scepticism. I tried to bypass this problem by using as much public data sources and my own interpretation of original Chinese texts. In addition, the DA itself posed challenges. I made a principal decision to focus mainly on speeches given in the Xi-era, as I do not render comparing two
distinct eras with their own unique elements as logical. Therefore, I attempted to use multiple sources derived from different institutions, resulting in the usage of state-level and multi-nation level texts. Notably missing are statements made by China during UNSC session. These were unfortunately not made public by the UN.
7. REFERENCES


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8. **APPENDIX I: ANALYSIS NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY**

Foreign policy goals can be subdivided in various goals. Firstly, goals can be normative or non-normative, i.e. values and interest. However, certain values, such as ‘democracy’ or ‘order’ can be interpreted differently over time and space (Tocci, 2008: 6). Secondly, goals can either be ‘normative’ or ‘strategic’. It should be noted that it is quite difficult to keep a clear distinction between the two types of goals, as pursuing strategic goals does not automatically mean being un-normative. Thirdly, a state may have ‘possession goals’ or ‘milieu goals’. Unlike ‘possession goals’, which focus on national resources, ‘milieu goals’ are intended to shape the nation’s (international) operation environment, with usage of international regimes, organisations and law (Ibid: 7).

Normative goals can be pursued via ‘normative means’. ‘Normative foreign policy means’ are “instruments (regardless of their nature) that are deployed within the confines of the law” (Tocci, 1998: 10). It is important to know how policy instruments are used, instead of which policy instruments are used. These means can range from soft power and co-optation towards hard power and coercion. The problem within this sense is that there is consensus on the method of usage, but not on “what constitutes ‘normativity’ in the deployment of these means” (Ibid). Just as relevant as the goals and means is the external impact of policy, i.e. normative impact. There is talk of ‘normative impact’ when a “traceable path can be drawn between an international player’s direct or indirect actions and inactions (or series of action) on the one hand and the effective building and entrenchment of an international rule-bound environment on the other” (Tocci, 1998: 11).

Whether an international actor will pursue a normative or non-normative foreign policy depends on the three principle conditioning factors (Tucci, 1998: 17-20):

i. **WHAT INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE? (INTERNAL POLITICAL CONTEXT)**
   - Are there internal constituencies pushing for adoption of particular milieu goals?
   - Do internal political and institutional forces push for the adoption of milieu and/or possession goals?
   - Is the articulation of milieu goals presented as competing or complementary to the fulfilment of possession goals?

ii. **WHAT FOREIGN POLICY MEANS ARE AVAILABLE? (INTERNAL CAPABILITY)**
   - Does a foreign policy actor have the capability to pursue non-normative means?
   - Does it have the foreign policy instruments to pursue particular objectives by breaking international law and operating outside international organisations?
   - What is the relational context in which a foreign policy actor deploys its means?

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28 Some authors have labelled soft methods as more ‘normative’ than hard methods, but firm agreements on the definition of ‘normative’ methods are yet to be made.
iii. HOW DOES A FOREIGN POLICY UNFOLD IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM?
(EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT)

- How does a foreign policy interact with the domestic dynamics within the targeted third state?
- How does a foreign policy interact with the policies of other international actors within a third state or in a specific issue area?
- How does a foreign policy interact with the wider international context shaping the developments within a third state or issue area?
- What is the role played by a foreign policy actor within international organisations and how do these organisations affect the foreign policy impact of an international player?

APPENDIX II: PRESS SPEECH XI JINPING – Original Speech & English Translation
(15 November 2012)

Source: (Xinhua, 2012)

现场直播: 新一届中央政治局常委同中外记者见面 2012.11.15 北京人民大会堂
Live Broadcast: New Central Politburo Standing Committee members meet with Chinese and foreign press 15 November 2012 Great Hall of the People Beijing

Date of publication: 15 November 2012 Source: Xinhua Net

1. 女士们，先生们，朋友们：大家好！让大家久等了，很高兴同各位记者朋友见面。

Ladies, gentlemen, friends: Hello to you all! Sorry to have kept you waiting. I am very happy to meet all of you, friends of the press.

2. 昨天，中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会胜利闭幕了。这些天来，各位记者朋友们对这次大会作了大量报道，向世界各国传递了许多“中国声音”。大家很敬业、很专业、很辛苦，在此，我代表十八大大会秘书处，向你们表示衷心的感谢。

Yesterday, the 18th CPC National Congress came to an end. For the last couple of days, (all of you) the press have made lots of coverage on this Congress, delivering “the voice of China” in abundance to the rest of world. You have all been very dedicated, professional, inexhaustible, and for this, on behalf of the Secretariat of the 18th National Congress I express you my deepest gratitude.

3. 刚才，我们召开了中国共产党第十八届中央委员会第一次全体会议，会议上选举产生了新一届中央领导机构。全会选举产生了七位中央政治局常委，选举我担任中共中央总书记。接下来，我把其他6位常委同事向大家介绍一下。

Earlier on, we held the first plenary meeting of the 18th CPC Central Committee, electing the new Central leadership organisation. The plenary session brought seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, and
elected me [to serve] as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. Next, let me introduce you to my colleagues, the six other members of the Standing Committee.

4. 他们是：李克强同志、张德江同志、俞正声同志、刘云山同志、王岐山同志、张高丽同志。

They are: Comrade Li Keqiang, Comrade Zhang Dejiang, Comrade Yu Zhengsheng, Comrade Liu Yunshan, Comrade Wang Qishang, and Comrade Zhang Gaoli.

5. 李克强同志是十七届中央政治局常委，其他同志都是十七届中央政治局委员，大家对他们都比较了解。

For you to get to know them better: Comrade Li Keqiang served as a Standing Committee member of the Politburo of the 17th CPC Central Committee. The other comrades were all committee members of the 17th CPC Central Committee Politburo.

6. 在这里，我代表新一届中央领导机构成员，衷心感谢全党同志对我们的信任，我们一定不负重托，不辱使命！

Here, on behalf of the members of the new CPC leading organisation, I sincerely thank our Party Comrades for their trust in us. We will live up to this great trust placed on, and fulfil this mission assigned to us!

7. 全党同志的重托，全国各族人民的期望，这是对我们做好工作的巨大鼓舞，也是我们肩上沉沉的担子。

The great trust of all members of the Party, the hopes of all ethnic groups in the country, these are not only great encouragements for us to do a good job, but also a heavy responsibility for us to carry.

8. 这个重大的责任，是对民族的责任。我们的民族是伟大的民族。在五千多年的文明发展历程中，中华民族为人类的文明进步作出了不可磨灭的贡献。近代以后，我们的民族历经磨难，中华民族到了最危险的时候。自那时以来，为了实现中华民族伟大复兴，无数仁人志士奋起抗争，但一次又一次地失败了。

This great responsibility is the responsibility towards our nation. Our nation is a great nation. In the course of over 5000 years of civilization and development, the Chinese nation has made an indelible contribution to the civilization and progress of mankind. In the modern era, our nation has gone through constant hardship, when the Chinese nation came to its most dangerous times. Since then, to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, numerous people with lofty ideas vigorously made a stand and fought, but failed one time after another.

9. 中国共产党成立后，团结带领人民前赴后继、顽强奋斗，把贫穷落后的旧中国变成日益走向繁荣富强的新中国，中华民族伟大复兴展现出前所未有的光明前景。

Since the founding of the CPC, we have united and lead the people one after another to advance, and struggle tenaciously, changing impoverished and backward Old China into a New China that is becoming more and more prosperous, rich and powerful. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has demonstrated unprecedented bright prospects.

10. 我们的责任，就是要团结带领全党全国各族人民，接过历史的接力棒，继续为实现中华民族伟大复兴而努力奋斗，使中华民族更加坚强有力地自立于世界民族之林，为人类作出新的更大的贡献。

Our responsibility is that we have to unite and lead the Party and all the people, take over the baton of history, continue to strive for the achievement of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, in order to make the Chinese nation stronger and more powerful so it can stand on its own among the nations of the world, making a new and even greater contribution to mankind.
11. This great responsibility is a responsibility to the people. Our people are a great people. In the long course of history, by relying on their own hard work, courage and wisdom, the Chinese people had created a beautiful home of national peaceful coexistence, cultivating a timeless and outstanding culture.

12. Our people love life, and hope for better education, more steady jobs, better income, more reliable social security, better health services, more comfortable living conditions, better environment. They hope that their children can have a better youth, better jobs, and a better life. Peoples wanting better lives, is our goal.

13. All the happiness in the world comes from hard work. Our responsibility is to unite and lead the Party and the people, continue to emancipate our way of thinking, stick to reform and opening up, further unleash and develop social productive capability, work hard to resolve the difficulties faced by the masses in both the production and life, and steadfastly take the road of common prosperity.

14. This great responsibility is the responsibility of the Party. Our Party is a political party that wholeheartedly serves the people. The Party has led the people to have made remarkable achievements of world interest. We have every reason to be proud of this, but we are proud, not complacent, and simply cannot rest on our laurels.

15. Under the new situation, our Party is faced with many severe challenges. There are many pressing problems to be solved within the Party, especially issues such as corruption and bribe-taking that occurs among some Party members, being out of touch with the people, placing undue emphasis on formality and bureaucracy. We must make great efforts to solve this. The entire Party must wake up.

16. The metal itself must be hard to be turned into iron. Our responsibility is to work together with all the Party members, to make sure that the Party handles and administrates itself strictly; settle prominent issues effectively; practically improve our work style; get more in touch with the masses, so that our Party will always be the strong leading core for advancing of the socialist cause with Chinese characteristics.

17. The people are the creators of history; the masses are the true heroes. The people and the masses are our source of power. We very well know: everyone's power is limited, but as long as we all unite, a unity of will is an
impregnable stronghold; there is no difficulty that we cannot overcome. Everyone’s working hours are limited, but to serve the people with heart and soul is unlimited.

18. 责任重于泰山 (2849), 事业任重道远。我们一定要始终与人民心心相印、与人民同甘共苦、与人民团结奋斗, 夙夜在公, 勤勉工作, 努力向历史、向人民交一份合格的答卷。

Our responsibility is heavier than Mount Tai and the cause is a heavy load and a long road. We must always be one kindred spirit with the people, share life’s joys and sorrows with the people, unite and strive with the people, always stay amongst the public, work diligently, and with great effort give our history and the people a satisfactory answer.

19. 人民是历史的创造者, 群众是真正的英雄。人民群众是我们力量的源泉。我们深深知道: 每个人的力量是有限的, 但只要我们万众一心, 众志成城, 就没有克服不了的困难; 每个人的工作时间是有限的, 但全心全意为人民服务是无限的。

The people are the creators of history; the masses are the true heroes. The people and the masses are our source of power. We very well know: everyone’s power is limited, but as long as we all unite, a unity of will is an impregnable stronghold, there is no difficulty that we cannot overcome. Everyone’s working hours are limited, but to serve the people with heart and soul is unlimited.

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21. 记者朋友们，中国需要更多地了解世界，世界也需要更多地了解中国。希望你们今后要继续为增进中国与世界各国的相互了解作出努力和贡献。

Friends from the press, China needs to learn more about the world and the world needs to learn more about China. I hope you all from now on will continue and contribute to promote mutual understanding between China and the rest of the world.

22. 谢谢大家！

Thank you all.

APPENDIX III: INAUGURAL SPEECH XI JINPING – Original Speech & English Translation (17 March 2013)

Source: (Xinhua, 2013)
1. 各位代表，这次大会选举我担任中华人民共和国主席，我对各位代表和全国各族人民的信任，表示衷心的感谢！

Dear representatives and comrades, this congress chose me as President of the People’s Republic of China. I express my sincere gratitude for the trust given by you all and given by the people!

2. 我深知，担任国家主席这一崇高职务，使命光荣，责任重大。我将忠实履行宪法赋予的职责，忠于祖国，忠于人民，恪尽职守，夙夜在公，为民服务，为国尽力，自觉接受人民监督，决不辜负各位代表和全国各族人民的信任和重托。

I am well aware that a president’s task is a noble task, a glorious mission, and a heavy responsibility. I will faithfully perform my duty, as entrusted to me by the constitution, and will be loyal to the motherland, and the people. I will fulfil my duties faithfully, carefully and prudently, and work day and night. To serve the people and the country, I wilfully embrace the people’s supervision, and will under no circumstances let you [the delegates] and the people down.

3. 各位代表！中华人民共和国走过了光辉的历程。在以毛泽东同志为核心的党的第一代中央领导集体、以邓小平同志为核心的党的第二代中央领导集体、以江泽民同志为核心的党的第三代中央领导集体、以胡锦涛同志为总书记的党中央领导下，全国各族人民戮力同心、接力奋斗，战胜前进道路上的各种艰难险阻，取得了举世瞩目的辉煌成就。

Ladies and Gentleman! The People’s Republic of China has a glorious history. With comrade Mao Zedong as the core of the Party’s first generation of [central] collective leadership, comrade Deng Xiaoping as the core of the Party’s second generation of [central] collective leadership, comrade Jiang Zemin as the core of the Party’s third generation of [central] collective leadership, and comrade Hu Jintao as General Secretary of the Party’s [central] collective leadership, all the people were united and worked together, subjected to hardship [as heritage], overcame all difficulties and obstacles on the road ahead, and attained glorious achievements that are looked upon by the world.

4. 今天，我们的人民共和国正以昂扬的姿态屹立在世界东方。

Today, our country and its high spirited attitude stand proudly in the East.

5. 胡锦涛同志担任国家主席 10 年间，以丰富的政治智慧、高超的领导才能、勤勉的工作精神，为坚持和发展中国特色社会主义建立了卓越的功勋，赢得了全国各族人民衷心爱戴和国际社会普遍赞誉。我们向胡锦涛同志，表示衷心的感谢和崇高的敬意！

Comrade Hu Jintao has served as president for ten years. With an abundance of political wisdom, superb leadership, diligent work ethic, and adherence to and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, he made remarkable contributions, and not only won the people’s love and respect, but also universal recognition of the international community. To comrade Hu Jintao, we would like to express our sincere gratitude and utmost respect!

6. 各位代表！中华民族具有 5000 多年连绵不断的文明历史，创造了博大精深的中华文化，为人类文明进步作出了不可磨灭的贡献。经过几千年的沧桑岁月，把我国 56 个民族、13 亿多人紧紧凝聚在一起的，是我们共同经历的非凡奋斗，是我们共同创造的美好家园，是我们共同培育的民族精神，而贯穿其中的、最重要的是我们共同坚守的理想信念。

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Dear representatives and comrades! The Chinese people possess 5000 years of continues cultural history. It produced a broad and profound Chinese culture, and has made an indelible contribution to the progress of human civilization. After thousands of years of great changes, China’s sixty-five ethnic groups and over 1.3 billion people are tightly united. It is a shared experience that we all had to go through. It is the beautiful homeland that we built together. It is the national spirit that we all fostered, and runs through us. The most important thing is that we all hold the same dreams and beliefs.

7. 实现全面建成小康社会、建成富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家的奋斗目标，实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦，就是要实现国家富强、民族振兴、人民幸福，既深深体现了今天中国人的理想，也深深反映了我们先人们不懈奋斗追求进步的光荣传统。

To achieve the establishment of a prosperous society [where everyone lives well], to achieve a prosperous, democratic, civilized, and harmonious modern socialist nation, and to realise the great regeneration of the Chinese dream of the Chinese people, means that we have to create a rich and powerful nation, re-energize the people, and make the people happy. It does not only deeply embody the dream of the Chinese people today, but also deeply reflects our forefathers’ persistent efforts to improve of our glorious tradition.

8. 面对浩浩荡荡的时代潮流，面对人民群众过上更好生活的殷切期待，我们不能有丝毫自满，不能有丝毫懈怠，必须再接再厉、一往无前，继续把中国特色社会主义事业推向前进，继续为实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦而努力奋斗。

Facing the mighty tide of time, facing the masses that want to live a better life, gives us no room for complacency, we cannot be lazy. We have to persist, push forward. We have to continue to push the cause for “Chinese Socialism” forward. We have to continue with the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.

9. 实现中国梦必须走中国道路。这就是中国特色社会主义道路。这条道路来之不易，它是在改革开放30多年的伟大实践中走出来的，是在中华民人民共和国成立60多年的持续探索中走出来的，是在对近代以来170多年中华民族发展历程的深刻总结中走出来的，是在对中华民族5000多年悠久文明的传承中走出来的，具有深厚的历史渊源和广泛的现实基础。中华民族是具有非凡创造力的民族，我们创造了伟大的中华文明，我们也能够继续拓展和走好适合中国国情的发展道路。全国各族人民一定要增强对中国特色社会主义的理论自信、道路自信、制度自信，坚定不移沿着正确的中国道路奋勇前进。

China must walk the Chinese path to realize the Chinese dream. This is also the path of “Chinese Socialism”. This road is hard to come by. It started during the great policy of Reform and Opening up [to the world] over thirty years ago. It started during the continuous exploration of the sixty year old People’s Republic of China. It started in the profound summation of the over 170 year development process of the Chinese people since modern times. It started during the 5,000 year long cultural heritage for the Chinese people, and has deep historical roots with a broad fundament in reality. The Chinese people are an exceptional creative people. We built the great Chinese civilization. We are also capable of continuously expanding and take the peaceful road in the suitable path of development for China. All the people must strengthen the theory of self-confident of “Chinese Socialism”, a road to self-confidence, a system of self-confidence, and forges China courageously ahead along the right path.

10. 实现中国梦必须弘扬中国精神。这就是以爱国主义为核心的民族精神，以改革创新为核心的时代精神。这种精神是凝心聚力的兴国之魂、强国之魄。爱国主义始终是把中华民族坚强团结在
一起的精神力量，改革创新始终是鞭策我们在改革开放中与时俱进的精神力量。全国各族人民
一定要弘扬伟大的民族精神和时代精神，不断增强团结一心的精神纽带、自强不息的精神动力，
永远朝气蓬勃迈向未来。

To achieve the Chinese dream you have to enhance the Chinese spirit. This patriotism is the core of our
national spirit. This reform and innovation is our ‘Zeitgeist’, the spirit of our time. This type of spirit is a
rejuvenating soul that sets cohesion, a body that strengthens the nation. Patriotism has always been a mental
force for Chinese people, which holds the Chinese people together. Reform and innovation have been our
mental strength during the Reform and Opening Up that encouraged us to be progressive. All of the people
must promote our great national spirit, continuously strengthen its united spiritual bond, the spiritual power
of self-improvement, and forever vigorously march toward the future.

11. 实现中国梦必须凝聚中国力量。这就是中国各族人民大团结的力量。中国梦是民族的梦，也是
each Chinese man or woman. As long as we unite closely, with millions of people united as one, struggling to realize our
common dream, the power of realizing the dream is an extremely powerful force. The great effort we each
make to realize our dream is a broad space. Living in our great motherland and the great era of the Chinese
people, the opportunity to enjoy together the colours that life bring, the opportunity to enjoy the dreams that
come true together, and the opportunity to enjoy growth and improvement within the same ancestral land
and era. Having dreams, having opportunities, having struggles, all beautiful things can come true. The
people need to keep its task in mind. Our minds as one, our actions as one, the wisdom and strength of 1.3
billion people bundled into a boundless force that is undefeatable.

12. 中国梦归根到底是人民的梦，必须紧紧依靠人民来实现，必须不断为人民造福。

Ultimately, the Chinese dream is the dream of the people. Whether it will keep benefitting the people, really
depends on the people.

13. 我们要坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国有机统一，坚持人民主体地位，扩大人民民主，
推进依法治国，坚持和完善人民代表大会制度的根本政治制度，中国共产党领导的多党合作和
政治协商制度、民族区域自治制度以及基层群众自治制度等基本政治制度，建设服务政府、责
任政府、法治政府、廉洁政府，充分调动人民积极性。

We must adhere to the leaders of the party. The people are masters of their own house. Ruling this organic
unity according to the rule of law, adhere to the dominant position of the people, expand our democracy,
improve the rule of law, adhere and improve the fundamental political system of the National People’s
Congress, the multiparty cooperation of the CPC leadership and the political consultative system. Political
systems like the regional ethnic minority system and the autonomous system of the grassroots masses, build
governments that serve, responsible governments, a government that rules by the law, an honest
government, and that fully deploys the enthusiasm of the people.

14. 我们要坚持发展是硬道理的战略思想，坚持以经济建设为中心，全面推进社会主义经济建设、
政治建设、文化建设、社会建设、生态文明建设，深化改革开放，推动科学发展，不断夯实实现
中国梦的物质文化基础。

The development that we must adhere to is the absolute principle of strategic thinking. We must continue to
take economic development as central, and fully promote Socialistic economic development, political
development, cultural development, social development, development of ecological civilization, deepen the
‘Reforms and Opening-Up’, promote scientific development, and continuously fight to achieve the material
cultural foundation of the Chinese dream.

15. 我们要随时随刻倾听人民呼声、回应人民期待，保证人民平等参与、平等发展权利，维护社会
公平正义，在学有所教、老有所得、病有所医、老有所养、住有所居上持续取得新进展，不断
实现好、维护好、发展好最广大人民根本利益，使发展成果更多更公平惠及全体人民，在经济
社会不断发展的基础上，朝着共同富裕方向稳步前进。

We must at all times listen to the voice of the people, live up to people’s expectations, guarantee equal
participation, and equal right of development for the people. We have to make sure that all the people enjoy
their rights to social fairness and justice, and keep making progress so that all people enjoy their rights to
education, income for the elderly, medical care, social security for the elderly, and housing. We have to keep
realizing, protect, and develop the fundamental interest of the majority. To have all the people benefit from
the fruits of development during continues development of the economic society, we have to move steadily
towards common prosperity.

16. 我们要巩固和发展最广泛的爱国统一战线，加强中国共产党同民主党派和无党派人士团结合作，
巩固和发展平等团结互助和谐的社会主义民族关系，发挥宗教界人士和信教群众在促进经济社会
发展中的积极作用，最大限度团结一切可以团结的力量。

We will strengthen and develop the widespread patriotic United Front, strengthen the CPC’s joint
cooperation with the Democratic Party faction and figures without political affiliation, and consolidate and
develop a national Socialist relation that is equal, united, full of solidarity and harmonious, the active role of
religious figures and groups of practitioners during a time of economic and social development promotion.
We have to maximize the unity of all forces/power that can be united.

17. 各位代表！“功崇惟志，业广惟勤。”我国仍处于并将长期处于社会主义初级阶段，实现中国梦，
创造全体人民更加美好的生活，任重而道远，需要我们每一个人继续付出辛勤劳动和艰苦努力。

Dear representatives and comrades! China has been in its socialist primary stage for a long time. Realizing
the Chinese dream means creating a better living for all the people. We have a long way to go, and it
requires us all to continue to work hard and great effort. The vast numbers of workers, farmers, and
intelligentsia must display their intelligence and wisdom, work hard, and play an active role as the main
force and new force within socio-economic developments. The entire government staff will serve the public
interest wholeheartedly, an honest and government that concern themselves with people’s suffering, and
manages practical work for the people.
18. All workers, peasants, and intellectuals should develop their wisdom and diligence and make active contributions to social and economic development. All government officials should be selfless and upright, care for the people, and work hard. The entire Chinese People’s liberation Army (PLA), the entire Chinese People’s Armed Police Force (CAPF), under party command, have the ability to fight a victorious battle. A first-rate vigorous military goal, improve mission capabilities that need to be executed, firmly defend the country’s sovereignty, security, development interest, and firmly defend the people’s life, assets, and safety.

19. All non public ownership figures and other new social strata have to carry the spirit of labour and entrepreneurship forward. To give back to society and benefit the people, we have to come up with a construction suitable for our “Chinese socialism”.

20. The vast number of the nation’s youth has high aspirations. They are becoming more intelligent, and more determined, which lets the youth during this time of progress glow brightly.

21. Our fellow citizens of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) Hong Kong, and SAR Macau have to put the entire country’s interest as a whole first, jointly protect and develop Hong Kong, and long term prosperity for Macau. The Taiwanese and mainland compatriots have to join hands, support, uphold, push for peaceful evolution of cross-strait relations, and enhance the welfare of our brothers and sisters from Taiwan and the mainland to create a new future for the Chinese people. The vast number of overseas Chinese want to promote the fine tradition of the hard-working and kind-hearted Chinese people, and make great effort to promote the growth of their homeland. They make a contribution to the friendship between Chinese and local people.

22. Chinese people are peaceful (people). We shall hold the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual profit high. Consistently we peacefully walk the path of development, and go for a win-win and mutual benefit strategy of opening-up. We will commit ourselves to work together in developing friendships with countries around the world, fulfil our international responsibility and obligations, and continue to work with people of all countries to promote the noble cause of peace and development.
23. 各位代表！中国共产党是领导和团结全国各族人民建设中国特色社会主义伟大事业的核心力量，肩负着历史重任，经受着时代考验，必须坚持立党为公、执政为民，坚持党要管党、从严治党，全面加强党的建设，不断提高党的领导水平和执政水平、提高拒腐防变和抵御风险能力，全体共产党员特别是党的领导干部，要坚定理想信念，始终把人民放在心中最高的位置，弘扬党的光荣传统和优良作风，坚决反对形式主义、官僚主义，坚决反对享乐主义、奢靡之风，坚决同一切消极腐败现象作斗争，永葆共产党人政治本色，矢志不移为党和人民事业而奋斗。

Dear representatives and comrades! The Chinese Communist Party is the core power that leads and unites people all over the world to build on the great cause of “Chinese Socialism”, carries the historical responsibility, endures the test of time, continues to serve the public, and adhere to the party to take care of itself. We have to manage the party strictly, fully strengthen the party structure, constantly improve the Party leadership and governance, and increase the ability to fight and resist corruption. All Party members, especially the leading Party cadres, must strengthen the Party ideal and faith, and have always put the people first. We must carry the Party’s glorious tradition and fine work forward, strongly oppose Formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, extravagant habits, and firmly battle the negative phenomenon of corruption. To always commit to the distinctive political qualities of Communist Party members, we have committed to the cause of the party and the people in the world.

24. 各位代表！实现伟大目标需要坚韧不拔的努力。全国各党派、各团体、各民族、各阶层、各界人士要更加紧密地团结在中共中央周围，全面贯彻落实中共十八大精神，以邓小平理论、“三个代表”重要思想、科学发展观为指导，始终谦虚谨慎、艰苦奋斗，始终埋头苦干、锐意进取，不断夺取全面建成小康社会、加快推进社会主义现代化新的更大的胜利，不断为人类作出新的更大的贡献！（据新华网直播文字实录）

Dear representatives and comrades! To achieve our great goal, we need to make great efforts. All national parties, all organizations, all ethnic groups, all social classes, and walks of live should unite more closely with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. We need to fully implement the eighteen spirits of the CPC, and take Deng Xiaoping’s theory of the significant ideology of ‘Three Represent’, and the Scientific Outlook on Development’ as guidance. We must always be modest and prudent, work hard, make an all-out effort, and go forward. We have to keep striving for a full middle-class society, accelerate the new and greater victory of socialist modernization, and continuously contribute to new and greater contribution for mankind!
Biography: Xi Jinping

Xi Jinping was born in Fuping, Shaanxi Province on 15 June 1953, and therefore the First Party-leader to be born after the PRC’s inception year 1949 (CCTV, “Profile: Xi Jinping”, 2012). Xi Jinping was born in a time of changes: right after the establishment of the PRC in 1949, and right before the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Xi Jinping, a ‘princeling’ 太子, which is used for senior officials who owe their success to their guānxì ‘connections’ with veteran communist revolutionaries, is the son of Xi Zhongxun, a revolutionary veteran and one of the Party’s founding fathers. His mother’s name was Qi Xin. Xi Zhongxun was one of Mao’s trusted lieutenants and became deputy prime minister after the revolution. In 1962 Xi Zhongxun was imprisoned after fallout with Mao Zedong, and Xi Jinping had to live a life of hardships due to his father’s disgrace (Washington Post, “For Xi Jinping”, 2012). At the age of 15, Xi Jinping was sent to work on the country as part of the anti-rightist movement during the Cultural Revolution, like most other intellectual youth at that time. Before joining the Communist Party in January 1974 Xi studied chemical engineering at the prestigious Tsinghua University in Beijing. After his ninth attempt to become Party member, due to his father’s history, Xi served as a local party secretary in Hebei province from 1982 to 1983. In 1985 he became member of the CPC Standing Committee of Xiamen Municipal Committee. Until 2007 Xi Jinping assumes resembling positions in several different provinces, and served in the army for three years. From 1998 to 2002, he also studied Marxist theory and ideological and political education at Tsinghua University. (News of the Communist Party of China, “Xi Jinping”, 2013). In 2007 he made his way further to the top as he was promoted to the nine-member Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 17th CPC Central Committee. In 2008 he was elected as vice-president. On the 16 November 2012 he was elected as General Secretary of the CCP, new leader of the CCP. On 14 March 2013 he also assumed the position of President of the PRC during the NPC (The New York Times, “Xi Jinping”, n.d.).
## APPENDIX V: TIMELINE NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR CRISES


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>End of the Korean War (1950-1953)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>DPRK signs the NPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Jan 30</td>
<td>North Korea signs agreement to permit inspections of its seven sites at nuclear complex Yongbyon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 Mar 12</td>
<td>DPRK announces its withdrawal from the NPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 Jun</td>
<td>DPRK suspends its withdrawal from the NPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 May</td>
<td>IAEA inspectors accuse that DPRK of destroying evidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 Jun 9</td>
<td>President Kim Il-sung dies. His son, Kim Jong-il, becomes Supreme Leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 Aug 31</td>
<td>DPRK fires a Taepodong-1 missile over Japan into the Pacific Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Oct 16</td>
<td>Collapse of 1994 Agreed Framework after DPRK admitted to conducting a major nuclear program using enriched uranium after US accusation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Jan 10</td>
<td>DPRK withdraws from the NPT, blaming US aggression for its decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Apr</td>
<td>US, China and North Korea resume talks on the nuclear issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Oct 27</td>
<td>DPRK joins the first round of six–nation nuclear talks in Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 Feb</td>
<td>Second Round of SPT</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004 Jun</td>
<td>Third Round of SPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Feb 10</td>
<td>North Korea acknowledges it has nuclear weapons, officially declares itself a de facto nuclear power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Jul 25</td>
<td>Fourth Round of SPT negotiations (lasted 13 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Sep 19</td>
<td>DPRK agrees to abandon nuclear program in return for light-water reactor and US non-aggression pledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Nov 9</td>
<td>Fifth Round of SPT negotiations collapse after three days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 Jul 5</td>
<td>DPRK fires seven missiles over the Sea of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 Oct 8</td>
<td>DPRK announces it has performed its 1st (underground) nuclear test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 Dec 31</td>
<td>The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1695 condemning them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Feb</td>
<td>DPRK agrees to close Yongbyon reactor within sixty days, in return for aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Mar 19</td>
<td>Sixth Round of SPT negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Jul 14</td>
<td>DPRK shuts down its Yongbyon reactor and invited the IAEA to monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Sep</td>
<td>Continuation of Sixth Round of SPT negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Oct 3</td>
<td>SPT demands DPRK to provide a complete declaration of its nuclear programs and disable facilities at its main reactor complex by Dec 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Nov 5</td>
<td>DPRK starts disabling the Yongbyon reactor under the watch of US experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Dec 31</td>
<td>DPRK misses deadline for declaring all its nuclear programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 May 16</td>
<td>US announces to provide DPRK with 500,000 tons of emergency food aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 May 30</td>
<td>DPRK fires three short-range missiles into the Yellow Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Jun</td>
<td>Continuation of Sixth Round SPT negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Jul 26</td>
<td>DPRK submits a declaration of its nuclear activities to China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Jul 27</td>
<td>DPRK demolishes the cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear reactor site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Sep 19</td>
<td>DPRK accuses US of breach on disarmament agreement (remove the DPRK from a list of state sponsors of terrorism, and suspends disablement of nuclear facilities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Sep 24</td>
<td>DPRK starts reconstruction at Yongbyon complex and bans IAEA inspectors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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29 DPRK agrees to freeze and then dismantle the complex in Yongbyon and open up two secret military sites to inspection by international experts. In exchange, DPRK will receive energy aid, including two proliferation-resistant LWR (Arms Control Association, 2012).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 11</td>
<td>US agrees to remove DPRK from list of states sponsoring terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 8</td>
<td>DPRK confirms to resume dismantling nuclear weapons program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 Apr 5</td>
<td>DPRK launches a rocket with the aim of placing a satellite in orbit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 Apr 14</td>
<td>DPRK dismisses IAEA inspectors and distances itself from the SPT, after the UNSC held an emergency session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 25</td>
<td>DPRK performs 2nd nuclear test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 12</td>
<td>UNSC adopts Resolution 1874, condemning the DPRK’s nuclear test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 12</td>
<td>DPRK states that the SPT are dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 12</td>
<td>DPRK tested a number of short-range missiles off its eastern coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 10</td>
<td>DPRK and ROK navy ships exchange fire in disputed waters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 Mar 29</td>
<td>DPRK announced its intention to construct a light water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 Dec 8</td>
<td>Kim Jong-il dies. His son Kim Jong-un becomes “supreme leader”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Feb 29</td>
<td>DPRK agrees with the US to suspend nuclear weapons tests and uranium enrichment and to allow IAEA inspectors, in exchange for food aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 13</td>
<td>DPRK performs unsuccessful rocket launch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 12</td>
<td>UNSC adopts Resolution 2050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 12</td>
<td>DPRK successfully launches a long-range rocket into orbit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 Jan 22</td>
<td>UNCI adopts Resolution 2087, condemning the launch of 12 December 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 12</td>
<td>DPRK confirms a 3rd nuclear test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 7</td>
<td>UNSC adopts resolution 2094, imposing additional economic sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>FM Yang Jiechi states that China will not abandon North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>DPRK cuts off the last remaining military hot lines with ROK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DPRK advises countries to consider evacuating their embassies in Pyongyang,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DPRK pulls its 53,000 workers and temporarily suspends the operations at industrial park Kaesong, which is jointly run with South Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>DPRK rejects ROK’s proposal for talks on the future of industrial park Kaesong. ROK pulls out all of its 175 remaining factory managers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Chinese President Xi Jinping calls on North Korean envoy Vice Marshal Choe to return to SPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>DPRK and ROK restore a cross border hotline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 15</td>
<td>Panama detains DPRK-flagged ship containing weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 14</td>
<td>ROK and DPRK agree to reopen joint industrial complex Kaesong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>China bans export to DPRK of items that could be used to make missiles or nuclear, chemical and biological weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Kim Jong-un’s uncle, Chang Song-thaek, is found guilty of attempting the overthrow the state and is executed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 Feb 13</td>
<td>China states it supports the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula “over the long run”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 18</td>
<td>China warns DPRK against conducting a fourth nuclear test,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>DPRK launches two ballistic missiles, which landed in the sea between the DPRK and Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>UNSC condemned the DPRK’s ballistic missile launch as a violation of UN resolutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 26</td>
<td>China and South Korea agreed that nuclear activity by North Korea posed a serious threat to peace and stability of the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-28</td>
<td>Japan holds high-level government talks with North Korea in Stockholm over a range of issues including Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 29</td>
<td>DPRK fires three short range projectiles off its east coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 3</td>
<td>Chinese President Xi Jinping visits ROK before the DPRK, which is the first time a Chinese leader visits South before North President Xi Jinping called on the SPT to resume negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1</td>
<td>DPRK fires short-range missile near the Chinese border into the East Sea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>