

ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM

MASTER THESIS

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# Economic Inequality and Political Representation in the European Parliament

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## **Abstract:**

This paper examines the relationship between the preferences of party voters and voting behaviour of Members of European Parliament between 1989 and 2009. With microdata from the European Election Survey (Eurobarometer), we are able to disentangle the effects that party voters from different income groups have on the roll call votes in the European Parliament. It appears that on the ideological left-right dimension the middle class has significant influence on the voting behaviour. On the unification/ anti-pro EU dimension, such findings are much less robust. As the political influence of the European Parliament has increased over successive treaty reforms, these findings are a relevant addition to political economy literature.

# 1 Introduction

This paper looks at the congruence of preferences of different income groups with voting behaviour of political parties in the European Parliament (EP). This relationship is examined on two dimensions; the ideological left-right dimension and the unification, anti-pro EU dimension. On both these dimensions, the position of national parties in the EP are then empirically linked with the position of voters of those parties, who are divided into three income groups; lower class, middle class, and upper class. This approach is novel in the sense that the empirical undertaking is based on self-reported preferences. While this approach is not flawless (the limitations are discussed in the end of this paper), it does allow for grouping the surveyed individuals into three income groups for each national party in four EP elections between 1989 and 2004.

Many scholars have documented the effects of economic and social inequality on democratic institutions and political equality. Both from a political science (Dahl, 2006) and economics (Stiglitz, 2012) perspective, this relationship is relatively well documented in theory. In an empirical undertaking, Solt (2008; 2010) tests these claims and finds that inequality negatively affects political interest, political discussion and electoral participation in a large number of western countries.

There are three links through which the relationship between economic inequality and political representation works (Rosset et al., 2013). The first is that policy makers tend to get rewards that places them closer to the affluent constituencies on the income ladder, and that even if they aim to represent the poor, it may become increasingly difficult for them to understand the latter's position. Secondly, wealth is a political resources that can easily and readily buy influence in the political arena. Lastly, political participation may be lower for the poor, while they also have a weaker financial position to engage in the time-consuming aspects of politics in general and preference formation in particular.

All of this may contribute towards an unequal congruence of preferences of certain segments of society with the behaviour of EP parties. The distinct approach of this paper is therefore an interesting undertaking, as it seems all the more relevant that the only supranational directly elected parliament in the world is based on the principles of equality if it is to serve as an ideal for other supranational bodies.

The next section is a literature review of the existing studies. First, the institutional position and drawbacks of the EP are discussed, after which related studies are introduced. The third section deals with the theoretical framework and the empirical model. A brief overview of the data can be found in the fourth section. Results of the empirical analysis are introduced in the fifth section from which several limitations follow in the next section. The seventh section then concludes.

## **2 Literature Review**

### **2.1 European Parliament**

The EU legislature is composed of two different institutions. The EP represents the European people and the Council of the European Union represents the member states. What started in the 1950s as a gathering of 78 parliamentarians with a dual mandate (both in Brussels and in their national parliament) and without much power grew over time to the institution that most directly represents the people of the EU. The first direct EU-wide elections for the EP were in 1979, when the citizens of the 9 member states of the then European Communities could directly vote for MEPs. After the elections in May 2014, the EP is now in its eight session. With the ratification of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, most of the legislature falls under the ‘co-decision’ as ordinary legislative procedure. This procedure entails that the EP and the Council decide as equals, though separately from each other, on proposals of the European Commission (see Article 294 TFEU). This gives the EP an extraordinarily large degree of influence for a supranational parliamentary body.

#### **Democratic Deficit**

The political institutions of the European Union are often said to suffer from democratic deficit. Since the mid-1980s, this debate has really taken shape in academia. There are five characteristics (discussed in Follesdal & Hix (2006)) of this deficit that are often mentioned: the EU institutions tend to give more power to the executive (through the power vested in the Council and the Commission), as opposed to parliamentary control. Secondly, the EP may be too weak to make up for the loss of parliamentary control at the national level. Thirdly, EP elections are between national parties, where national issues as opposed to EU platforms often hijack the

elections. The fourth issue deals with the perceived distance between the citizens of the EU and its institutions. The last issue is that of policy drift, where the EU decides on policies that are not supported by any majority.

These claims are not entirely uncontested. Majone (1998; 2000) argues that because the EU is predominantly a regulatory state, where most decisions produce Pareto-efficient outcomes that do not necessarily require standard democratic legitimation. This seems all the more relevant for the time period of this study, during which the single market was completed, and the euro was adopted. In more recent years, of course, the EU has unconsciously moved more towards a redistributive state. Instead of suffering from a democratic deficit, the EU lacks credibility according to Majone (2000). Moravcsik (2008) opposes the democratic deficit thesis from another point of view. He argues that the power of national parliaments (as the agent with the most direct accountability to the people of Europe) has multiple channels through which it can influence EU politics. First, they nominate the European Commissioner. Secondly, they provide a mandate for the national government to follow in the Council. Thirdly, national parties are the same as parties in the EP.

### **Institutionalized Inequality**

The approach taken in this paper is radically different from other studies that aim to discuss inequality in the EP. While it may run counter to the ideals of the principle of political equality, the institutional composition of the EP is not based on equality of citizens in the distribution of seats. Rather, this distribution is based on a principle of degressive proportionality. In short, this means that those states with a larger population have fewer seats per citizen than the smaller states. Germany, for instance, currently holds 96 seats in the EP, whereas the smallest Member State of the European Union (EUMS), Malta, has 6. This roughly translates in a situation where the Members of European Parliament (MEPs) from Germany represent twelve times more citizens than do MEPs from Malta. Indeed, the five largest member states are underrepresented in number of MEPs; Romania and the Netherlands are around the optimal point of citizens per MEP, whereas citizens of the smaller EUMS are overrepresented.

While other parliaments have similar institutionalized inequalities where each district, province or state is awarded a non-proportional number of representatives (e.g. the Bundestag in Germany and the United States Sen-

ate), these are part of a bicameral system. In the other chamber of the bicameral system then, the principle of proportionality is much closer followed in these cases (Rose, 2013, pp. 99-106). It is possible to regard the Council as the other chamber in a bicameral setting, but the Council is also subjected to votes weighted by size (and requires a qualified majority in the ordinary legislative procedure). Therefore, this institutionalized inequality remains a remarkable feature of the EP.

### **One Agent, Two Principals**

According to Hix & Hoyland (2011, pp. 54-55), the MEPs have two principals. Within the EP, MEPs remain member of their national party. There are no multinational parties from which the voters can choose in the elections. National parties can, however, decide to become member of EU-wide party groups, of which membership is voluntary and yield several benefits such as additional speaking time during session and key positions within the EP. The first principal is this EU-wide party group. If the MEP wants to make a career during his or her tenure in the EP, in positions such as committee chair and delegation leaders, it is important to pursue the line of this party group. On the other hand, the obvious second principal is the national party, and thus indirectly the voter. In most cases, national parties decide on the list of MEPs before the elections, such that following the party line is important. Moreover, the interests and ideological views of their voters should, in theory at least, also be a major role in the voting behaviour of MEPs.

This tension between the two principals are often decided in favour of the latter, national party lines are more often followed than EP party groups. Lo (2013) confirms this by exploiting the Irish rejection of the Nice treaty. 13 of the 15 Irish MEPs made a significant move towards more conservatism on the left-right dimension after the referendum. Likewise, when the adjusted Nice treaty was again subjected to the Irish people who subsequently accepted it, these MEPs returned to their original position. Therefore, there was an updated connection between voter preferences and MEPs due to the referendum, which proves that MEPs are responsive to voters.

Next to the increasing importance of EP party groups, party coherence also varies among the groups and among issue areas. Rose (2013, p. 121) shows that, for example, ALDE (Liberals) within party group coherence is relatively low for welfare and environmental issues; whereas the ALDE is

completely united on EU integration related roll call votes. There is one more dimension through which the coherence is affected, which is the electoral cycle. From the installation date of a new session towards the middle, within EP party group coherence increases. In the last part of the session (e.g. as we move towards new EP election), we see that national party lines become much more important (Lindstadt et al., 2009).

### **Parties as Representatives**

There are two mainstream explanations for the positioning of political parties on the two dimensions. The first is the partisan constituency model, which depends on the assumption that parties follow the positions and preferences of their voters in the determination of their political stance (Dalton, 1985). The second explanation is based on the general electorate model, which is derived from Downs' (1957) classic work on the median voter theorem (Gerber & Lewis, 2004). Ezrow et al. (2010) concludes that the former is predominantly correct for niche parties (e.g. communists or greens) whereas the mainstream parties tend to be responsive to the median voter, as most votes are to be gained there. Economic inequality, then, affects the positioning of the political parties through the hollowing out of the middle class and the subsequent change in preferences. In this paper, however, we look at aggregated single party voting records as opposed to policy outcomes of the entire political spectrum.

### **Ideological Dimension and Unification Dimension**

While popular press often claims that the EP is an aggregation of pro-integrationists whose only aim is to enlarge their power, Hix (2005) argued that this is not the case. There is no unitary policy preference towards a further European integration process, although the power of the EP has significantly increased over the successive treaty reforms. The political positions of MEPs are as diverse as are European voters, Commission officials and national parliamentarians. A second finding is that the outcome of EP decision-making is more pro-integration than the Council, but Hix argues that this is solely due to the institutional setup and not due to outlying preferences (e.g. majority voting in the EP, versus the status-quo enhancing QMV/unanimity procedures in the Council).

Hix & Noury (2009) find that the pattern along these dimensions did not change after the 2004 enlargement of the EU. The ideological left-right di-

mention remains the most important policy space, and there is a significant element of party politics in the EP, as opposed to voting behaviour along national lines. They do find that the MEPs from the newer member states significantly more often follow national lines than do MEPs from the EU-15. However, EU-wide party groups cohesion remains high.

The ideological dimension of the policy space is said to be more important in the determination of public policy in some issue areas than in others. For example, in the debate about welfare spending, Kang & Bingham-Powell (2010) find that in 17 western democracies the preferences of the median voter on this dimension determine the chosen policies. Costello et al. (2012) find that there is a larger degree of preference congruence between all voters and MEPs on the left-right dimension. On the unification/ anti-pro dimension, however, the MEPs are a lot more tilted towards the pro-EU side than their constituents.

## 2.2 Subconstituency Representation

The main focus of this paper is on the representation of the preferences of different groups of constituents. To the best of the author's knowledge, this has not been done before for the EP in a rigorous manner. For the US, however, it has been established that there is an imbalance in the representation of certain subconstituencies. Bartels (2008, p. 259) shows that US Senators tend to respond to the preferences of the middle- and high-income constituencies only. On salient ideological votes, he finds that the Republican Senators do not even pay heed to the preferences of the middle-class. Only the opinion of the upper class on issues such as minimum wages and civil rights has a statistically significant effect on the voting behaviour of the Republican Senators (Bartels, 2008, p. 271). With an analysis of the US States' political ideology, Flavin (2012) finds that these results at the national level can also be found at the decentralized level. Only the middle and upper classes have a significant effect on the ideology of US State legislatures.

For a similar group of issues, Claassen & Highton (2009) find that only those with a significant degree of political knowledge are able to form coherent preferences and choose a side in the debate. Therefore, the politicians do not take those citizens without the motivation and/or opportunity to formulate and voice their preferences into consideration. Similarly, research by Griffin & Newman (2005) showed that voters are much better represented

than non-voters. While this may be obvious, this has biased effects on politics if economic and social inequality leads to skewed electoral participation figures. Should the rich, old or urban segment of society be more likely to turn out at voting booths, their finding predicts policy outcomes that favour exactly those groups. In an interesting article, Hayes & Bishin (2012) conclude that issue visibility may not necessarily lead to better representation of the preferences of voters. Rather, it increases the unequal weight attached to certain segments of their constituents. For example, interest groups tend to have larger influence over issues that are very much visible in the news. Highly politicized issues may therefore not lead to better responsiveness.

Griffin (2006) finds that there is a stronger connection between the preferences of all voters and the voting behaviour of their elected officials if party competition is fierce. While he finds this based on a 30-year analysis of the US Congress, in the EP this may especially be the case for parties with fewer seats. If they do not vote according to the preferences of their voters, these voters may simply shift to another party in the next election.

More recently, Gilens & Page (2014) tested four traditional explanations of American politics. They conclude that the median voter theorem, or any other theory based on majoritarian preferences, did not have a significant impact on roughly 1800 policy outcomes. The preference of the economic elite, on the other hand, had a significant influence on the outcome. They argue that this is not to say that the average citizen never gets his way, but that this will only be the case if the preference of the upper class is aligned with that of the median voter. Interest groups, be it mass-based or business, have a significant influence on the policy outcomes as well. If we transfer these findings across the Atlantic, the European Commission often invites civil society to participate in the drafting of the proposals. Therefore, mass-based interest groups could be a proper channel through which the preferences of the average citizen are heard. However, the authors seem to disagree with this explanation and argue that, as a whole, interest groups cannot replace the channels of the median voter to directly voice his preferences (Gilens & Page, 2014, p. 576).

In an international analysis, Giger et al. (2012) look at the effect of income inequality on policy representation in 21 countries. Their results show that the preferences of the poor are much weaker represented in political parties and government ideology. Moreover, for a group of 12 West European democracies, Adams & Ezrow (2009) find that politicians are more likely



to react to ideological shifts of opinion leaders than they are to any other type of voter. Opinion leaders are those members of society who actively participate in discussions and analyses of political issues and are, of course, not necessarily member of the upper class. What they do find is that these opinion leaders tend to have a system of beliefs and preferences that is more on the left than that of the average voter. This then results in the adoption of policies that are more to the left than would be implemented without such imbalance in responsiveness. Furthermore, they find that parties tend to shift their policy strategies based on ideological shifts of opinion leaders in the past. They prove that reverse causality is therefore not a problem in their findings.

The paper that comes closest to our present one is Walczak & van der Brug (2012). They identify inequality in representation between different income groups in the EP. The segment of society that is better educated, part of the middle-class and has a sufficient degree political knowledge find themselves much better represented in the EP. Although their analysis is limited in that they only focus on the seventh session of the EP and they rely on survey data for the position of MEPs (as opposed to actual voting data in the present paper for 4 EP sessions), they provide empirical evidence that things are not as unequal as is found in US literature. EP parties on the left tend to much better represent the poor on the left-right dimension, whereas EP parties on the right do so on the anti-pro EU dimension. Regardless, inequalities in representation exist in the EP, with all its consequences.

### 3 Theoretical Framework and Model

In a proper democratic system where equal weights are attached to the preferences of all voters for a single party, the voting behaviour of representatives on a certain policy issue will be a function that takes the following form:

$$\text{Policy Voting Record}^{Party} = f(\text{Opinion}^{All})$$

However, as this paper looks at the differential effect of the opinion of sub-groups in society (based on income class), the theoretical starting point is:

$$\text{Policy Voting Record}^{Party} = f(\text{Opinion}^L, \text{Opinion}^M, \text{Opinion}^U)$$

Where  $L$ ,  $M$  and  $U$  represent the upper class, middle class and lower class respectively.

### **Dependent Variable**

As a dependent variable, this paper will use the ideal point of the national party on two dimensions in the policy space. The first dimension is the classic left-right scale. The second dimension is the anti-pro EU standpoint of the party. Both are determined on an aggregated analysis of roll-call votes and are drawn from the database of Hix, Noury & Roland (2006). They have scaled these roll-call votes of all individual MEPs following the ‘NOMINATE’ method of Poole & Rosenthal (1997). Through this method, the roll-call voting record of individual MEPs is collapsed into the two dimensions. These individual MEPs are then aggregated to form national party scores.

### **Problem with Roll Call Votes**

Some researchers have argued that there may be a problem attached to the use of roll-call data for the analysis of legislative behaviour. Carrubba et al. (2006) argue that we have to be careful in interpreting roll-call votes, as they may not be a representative sample of all votes cast. MEPs may request a roll-call vote on a certain subsample of total legislative behaviour. We may expect to see that predominantly the important and politically sensitive issues are subject to this procedure, so as to enhance transparency and openness. Hoyland (2006) looked at different voting behaviour between ‘important and sensitive’ co-decision votes in the second reading phase (which is necessary if the EP and the Council cannot agree on a certain issue) and all other votes in EP5, but found no significant difference in voting behaviour. Taking the aggregated sum of all roll-call votes of each EP session effectively deals with the criticism of Soroka & Wlezien (2008), who argue that there are certain issue areas in which preferences between the income groups do not diverge that much. This would then make it more difficult to disentangle the degree of success that each income group has on the voting behaviour of EP parties.

### **Variable of Interest**

The variable of interest is the position of voters for a specific party along the two policy space dimensions discussed before. Self-placement on the two dimensions of voters is aggregated for all voters for a single national

party. All individual who have indicated to have voted for a party are divided into three income groups; lower class, middle class, and upper class. These groups are based on self-reported scores; lower class and lower middle class are classified as ‘lower class’. Upper middle class and upper class are classified as ‘upper class’. This leads to a 30/50/20 share of the said groups. For each of these three groups, we then took the average self-placement score on the two dimensions per national party.

### Independent/Control Variables

There may be confounding effects that need to be accounted for. Party politics within the EP may lead to worse responsiveness to the position of their voters for the three/four large EP party groups. An illustrative example: if the ALDE (Liberals) support either of the two big groups (EPP or PES) on one occasion, they may count on the support of either of these groups in a second vote. Party politics, much like a government coalition at the national level, then reduces the congruence between voter preferences and voting behaviour. Following Levitt (1996), the average position on either dimension of the inhabitants of each EUMS is included to allow for political changes within and between EUMS over time. Moreover, the coefficients will be weighted according to the number of MEPs that each party has in each session. Through this, the German Christian Democrats have a much larger influence on the coefficients than do the Dutch socialists. Lastly, economic performance may play a role too. If the economy is growing, one may expect to see better congruence across the board, as there is supposedly more money to be spent on political promises. While this seems unlikely at the EP level, three variables are individually included that serve as a proxy for economic performance. The first is the per capita GDP growth in the year before the election. As a second proxy, we included a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if in the 4 quarters prior to the EP election there was negative year-on-year growth. Thirdly, a measure in the change of government expenditures as percentage of GDP is included in the model.

### Model

For the estimation of the differences in congruence between voters’ preferences and voting behaviour, we follow Bartels’ (2008) model:

$$Y_p = \alpha + \frac{\sum_{i \in pL} \beta_L X_i}{N_{pL}} + \frac{\sum_{i \in pM} \beta_M X_i}{N_{pM}} + \frac{\sum_{i \in pU} \beta_U X_i}{N_{pU}} + \gamma Z_p + \epsilon_p$$

Here,  $Y_p$  is the NOMINATE score per party  $p$ .  $X_i$  is the self-placement on both dimensions of each individual  $i$ , which is summed over all individuals who voted for party  $p$  and belong to one of the three social classes and then divided by the total number of voters from that social class on party  $p$ .  $Z_p$  denotes a set of control variables, such as a centrist dummy variable that indicates whether the party belongs to one of the three large EP groups (PES - social democrats, EPP - Christian democrats and conservatives, and the ALDE - liberals). Another control variable that is included in some models is the average preference of the relevant member state of all voters, not just those who voted for said party. As a robustness check, three variables are added that depict the state of the economy.  $\epsilon_p$  is a stochastic and robust error term clustered at the EP session level. This way, heteroskedasticity is accounted for. This is very similar to the AER Levitt (1996) model.

## 4 Data

NOMINATE scores for the third (1989-1994), fourth (1994-1999) and fifth (1999-2004) EP sessions come from Hix, Noury & Roland (2006), whereas these scores for the sixth session of the EP (2004-2009) were requested by the author and subsequently provided by professor Hix through email. NOMINATE scores are only available at the MEP level, so they were aggregated to find the party position on both dimensions as well as the number of MEPs of each party.

Voter preferences are drawn from the European Election Survey (EES) in 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004. The EES surveys around 1000 individuals in each member state on a large number of questions. These range from their preferences for newspapers and policy preferences to voting behaviour and social and demographic indicators. Among these questions is the self-placement on the left-right dimension, a question regarding the integration of the EU (anti-pro dimension) and self-placement in a social class. All individuals are then collapsed into groups based on the party they voted for in the last election and the self-placement in one of the three social classes. The data used to compile the proxies of economic performance introduced before come from the OECD database (Eurostat quarterly data is incomplete).

As can be seen in Table 1, the dataset contains 349 parties with complete information. This is 71% of all national parties elected into any of the EP sessions between 1989 and 2009. A complete coverage of 100% is infeasible,

Table 1: Data Coverage


	All Data	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6
Number of EU member states	-	12	12	15	25
Number of national parties in EP	495	103	97	127	168
Number of national parties in data	349	70	73	91	115
Share of national parties covered	0.71	0.68	0.75	0.72	0.68

*Notes:* Source of number of national parties in EP: <http://epthinktank.eu/2014/11/26/european-parliament-facts-and-figures/ep-facts-and-figures-fig-6/>.

as there are a significant number of break-aways from parties during the 5-year session of each EP. Individual MEPs may decide that they no longer support the national party line and may become an independent MEP. It is then impossible to link the voting behaviour of these MEPs to the voters of the old party, as it may be assumed that most of these breakaways occur on the extreme sides of the party spectrum. This occurrence is also reflected in the number of MEPs covered in the database. Of the total number of MEPs in the four EP sessions covered by this paper, more than 80% of them are included in the calculations of the party positions. This percentage is much higher than for share of national parties covered and it can therefore be deduced that the missing national parties (e.g. individuals MEPs) are smaller than the average national party.

The position of all parties included in the dataset is depicted in Figure 1 for all EP sessions. The horizontal dimension is the traditional left-right, where -1 depicts the most left winged voting record and 1 the most right winged. The vertical dimension is the anti-pro dimension, where the higher a party positions itself, the more pro-EU it is. If we look at the three largest EP groups, the social democrats (PES), Christian democrats & conservatives (EPP) and liberals (ALDE) along the two dimensions, a few trends are observable at this stage. The PES became less pro-EU (lower scores on the vertical dimension) between the 3rd, 4th and 5th session. They resumed their EP3 position after the 2004 elections. The EPP moved in the opposite direction but ended up in their original position in EP6 as well. For the liberals we can clearly identify a move towards a more pro-EU stance. All of these figures correspond to similar undertakings of for example Hix & Hoyland (2011).

Figure 1: EP party positions along two dimensions



The descriptive statistics of the dataset can be found in Table 2. The number of MEPs per national party is relatively diverse; there are 171 observations with parties that only have 1 MEP in Brussels and Strasbourg. The maximum value is attained by the UK Labour Party, which had 64 MEPs in the fourth session of the EP. The national party positions for both dimensions are between -1 and 1, as discussed above. For both dimensions, the average is small but positive, indicating that the average position is slightly pro-EU and slightly right-winged. The left-right dimension (on a scale from 1 to 10) shows that there is a large degree of similarity between the voter preferences of all three income groups and the national average. Similarly, for the pro-anti EU dimension (on a scale from 1 to 3), we find that the average voter income group and national positions are very much alike. Remarkable is the low minimum score on the pro-anti EU score; the average voter in Luxembourg in 1994 and 1999 was very pro-European, whereas the average voter in 2004 in the UK was the least enthusiastic.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Scale	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
D1 Nat. party position	-1 to 1	349	0.078	0.493	-0.895	0.860
D1 National average	1 to 10	349	5.3	0.6	3.6	6.7
D1 Voter lower class	1 to 10	349	5.2	1.6	1.6	10
D1 Voter middle class	1 to 10	349	5.3	1.6	1.5	9
D1 Voter upper class	1 to 10	349	5.3	1.7	1.5	10
D2 Nat. party position	-1 to 1	349	0.056	0.461	-0.927	0.853
D2 National average	1 to 3	349	1.5	0.2	1.2	2.2
D2 Voter lower class	1 to 3	349	1.7	0.4	1	3
D2 Voter middle class	1 to 3	349	1.5	0.3	1	3
D2 Voter upper class	1 to 3	349	1.5	0.4	1	3
Number of MEPs	#	349	6.4	8.5	1	64
Voters lower class	#	349	83	122.3	1	867
Voters middle class	#	349	90	115.7	1	583
Voters upper class	#	349	33	40.5	1	221
Total party voters	#	349	206	258.5	2	1631


Notes: D1 is the ideological dimension, D2 is the unification dimension.

### Voter – MEP Congruence

For comparative reasons, this section will introduce a preliminary analysis of the data based on nation-wide congruence rather than party representation. While the data used in this paper allows for deeper testing than most previous literature, it may be worthwhile to discuss some methods that were applied in earlier literature as well. Following Golder & Stramski (2010) and Andeweg (2011), comparing the distribution of voters and parliamentarians on the ideological dimension allows for a measurement of the congruence between these two groups. At this point, it is important to note that for this endeavour we focus on the distribution of individual voters (regardless of party preference) and individual MEPs (regardless of party). This allows for a more heterogeneous distribution along the ideological dimension. An example of distributions along this dimension can be found in Figure 2. Both the distribution of all Dutch voters and all Dutch MEPs are depicted. Congruence is then measured as:  $\text{Congruence} = \sum_{i=1}^{10} [\min(s_{v,i}, s_{p,i})]$ , where  $s_v$  is the share of voters with position  $i$  and  $s_p$  is the share of MEPs with

position  $i^1$ . In the figure below, this is the area that is below both lines. This leads to a theoretical range from no congruence between voters and parliamentarians with a score of 0 to complete congruence with a score of 100 (Werner, 2014).

Figure 2: Distribution of Dutch voters & MEPs along ideological dimension



While Figure 2 displays the distribution of all voters, the last three columns of Table 3 show the congruence of the three different income groups. The overlap between the distribution of the ideological preferences of the upper class and the MEPs are highest for 15 of the 23 EUMS included in this paper. For 7 EUMS, the middle class shows the highest congruence and only in Portugal does the ideological preference distribution of the lower class fit the MEP distribution best. Due to the data limitations of the unification dimension (e.g. only 3 scores possible; in favour of unification, no opinion on unification and against unification), this undertaking could only be completed for the ideological dimension.

<sup>1</sup>The MEP positions are rescaled from a -1 to 1 scale to a 1 to 10 scale by adding 1 and multiplying by 5.



Table 3: Voter and MEP congruence per EUMS on the ideological dimension

Country	Voters incl.	MEPs incl.	EP sessions incl.	Congr. lower class	Congr. middle class	Congr. upper class
Austria	1 401	39	2	0.553	0.588	<b>0.608</b>
Belgium	6 507	113	4	0.710	<b>0.721</b>	0.681
Cyprus	481	6	1	0.235	0.280	<b>0.314</b>
Czech Republic	821	23	1	0.283	0.339	<b>0.509</b>
Denmark	8 290	69	4	0.705	<b>0.828</b>	0.748
Estonia	1 214	7	1	0.433	0.476	<b>0.615</b>
Finland	1 280	30	2	0.274	0.415	<b>0.558</b>
France	8 054	393	4	0.628	<b>0.714</b>	0.588
Germany	10 769	396	4	0.646	0.665	<b>0.688</b>
Greece	6 390	109	4	0.476	0.498	<b>0.507</b>
Hungary	1 065	25	1	0.539	<b>0.545</b>	0.483
Ireland	6 861	62	4	0.289	0.322	<b>0.487</b>
Italy	9 504	387	4	0.547	<b>0.556</b>	0.531
Latvia	820	10	1	0.585	0.622	<b>0.647</b>
Luxembourg	3 693	26	4	0.211	0.232	<b>0.233</b>
Netherlands	8 416	126	4	0.204	0.262	<b>0.437</b>
Poland	719	61	1	0.112	0.152	<b>0.447</b>
Portugal	6 077	115	4	<b>0.749</b>	0.742	0.647
Slovakia	877	14	1	0.183	0.347	<b>0.423</b>
Slovenia	831	8	1	0.413	<b>0.457</b>	0.432
Spain	6 800	275	4	0.228	0.267	<b>0.453</b>
Sweden	1 691	41	2	0.173	0.312	<b>0.543</b>
United Kingdom	8 234	326	4	0.337	0.418	<b>0.543</b>

*Notes:* Congr. = congruence, which is the overlap of voter preferences per income group and positions of the MEPs per EUMS. Graphically, this is equal to the area below both lines in Figure 2. Bold values indicate the largest congruence of the three income classes for each EUMS.

## 5 Results

The results chapter is split up in three sections, the first will analyse the findings of the analysis on the first dimension (left-right), whereas the second section of this chapter will focus on the second dimension (anti-pro). In the final section, some robustness checks will be discussed.

### 5.1 Ideological Dimension

Table 4: Ideological dimension - pooled results

	(1) Naive	(2) Controls	(3) EP Dummies	(4) Weighted	(5) ≥ 15voters
Lower class pos.	0.072* (0.041)	0.077* (0.042)	0.089** (0.039)	0.011 (0.064)	0.038 (0.043)
Middle class pos.	0.115* (0.057)	0.100* (0.053)	0.092* (0.048)	0.174** (0.063)	0.158*** (0.046)
Upper class pos.	0.047 (0.032)	0.042 (0.028)	0.038 (0.025)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.044 (0.040)
Nat. average pos.		-0.055 (0.039)	-0.053 (0.033)	-0.105*** (0.031)	-0.112*** (0.032)
Centrist Dummy		0.325*** (0.039)	0.319*** (0.040)	0.240*** (0.060)	0.211*** (0.053)
Constant	-1.150*** (0.084)	-0.976*** (0.199)	-0.963*** (0.173)	-0.705*** (0.196)	-0.681*** (0.204)
EP dummy	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	349	349	349	349	321
R-squared	0.556	0.661	0.685	0.717	0.748
VIF	5.90	3.99	3.16	5.24	7.01

*Notes:* This table shows the results of the pooled regression model. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIF values are an indication of multicollinearity.

The first dimension, the ideological left-right dimension, will be introduced here. Table 4 shows the estimation results of the model introduced above. The first column shows the naïve regression output, where the only variables included are the average voter preference of each income group. It appears that only the preferences of the low and middle-income groups have a significant impact on the voting behaviour of the national party in the EP. The same can be concluded if two control variables, the average national

preference and the centrist dummy, are included in the regression (column 2). Similarly, we find the same results once EP session dummies are added (column 3). The significant and positive effect of the centrist dummy indicates that parties that belong to the big three EP groups (PES/EPP/ALDE) find themselves more on the right winged side of the dimension compared to non-centrist parties. This confirms the graphical depiction in Figure 1.

The outcome of the preferred model, however, is shown column 4. The coefficients are here weighted for the number of MEPs, so that we allow for a heterogeneous influence between small and large parties. Remarkably, results change quite substantially once this is accounted for. The preferences of the lower class are no longer significant, while the preferences of the upper class are. The largest point estimate remains with the middle class, so that we can preliminarily conclude that national parties in the EP are responsive to the preferences of middle class citizens on the ideological dimension, as well as to upper class preferences. If we limit the dataset to cases where we have more than 15 voter preferences, only the middle class' preferences remain significant. The national average variable is significant at the 10% level, where the negative coefficient indicates that a shift in average national preferences lead to an opposite shift in the party voting behaviour. An explanation could be that the party assumes that other parties will accommodate this shift and that they should focus on their own sub-segment of the population.

Table 5 displays the results if we have a look at the individual EP sessions. For the first three EP sessions covered in this analysis, we see that the middle class preferences have a significant impact on the voting behaviour of national parties in the EP. The preferences of the lower class and upper class are insignificant in all cases. This may be because of multi-collinearity problems, as the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores are well above the (arbitrary) threshold of 10 for the first two columns. For the fifth EP session, column 3, this is no longer the case. In the last EP session covered in the dataset, we see that none of the income groups have a significant influence on the voting behaviour. The political landscape in the EP was heavily disrupted after increased powers of the EP were provided for in the Nice Treaty of 2001, while the addition of 10 new member states (and another 2 halfway through the session; Bulgaria and Romania) may also play their part.

Table 5: Ideological dimension - single EP session results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	EP 3	EP 4	EP 5	EP 6
Lower class position	-0.065 (0.091)	-0.161 (0.102)	0.053 (0.075)	0.046 (0.040)
Middle class position	0.241** (0.107)	0.365*** (0.113)	0.166** (0.075)	0.074 (0.051)
Upper class position	0.022 (0.071)	0.067 (0.090)	0.026 (0.045)	0.075 (0.049)
National average position	-0.075* (0.040)	-0.310** (0.150)	-0.133* (0.080)	-0.051 (0.040)
Centrist dummy	0.178** (0.084)	0.100 (0.075)	0.483*** (0.105)	0.269*** (0.083)
Constant	-0.645** (0.268)	0.189 (0.747)	-0.860** (0.404)	-0.767*** (0.210)
Observations	70	73	91	115
R-squared	0.768	0.831	0.717	0.722
VIF	28.72	25.19	3.38	8.23

*Notes:* This table shows the results of the regression model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIF values are an indication of multicollinearity.

For the final breakdown of this dimension, we will now look at the results of the four largest EP groups as reported in Table 6. In the first column, only parties that belong to the Christian democratic/ conservative EPP are included. It appears that only middle class preferences have a significant effect. For the social democratic PES, none of the three groups seem to matter. The finding for the PES may make sense, as it was the largest EP group after the 1989 and 1994 elections and therefore was in a position to negotiate and trade favours in ad-hoc coalitions with the other EP groups. In 1999 and 2004, it came second and remained part of the grand coalition. Interestingly, for the liberal ALDE group, we find that lower class preferences have a negative effect on the national party's voting behaviour. If the preferences of the lower class voters shift to the left, national parties that belong to ALDE become more right-winged. Middle class voters have the expected positive influence. For the Greens, only lower class preferences are significant.

Table 6: Ideological dimension - EP group results

	(1) EPP	(2) PES	(3) ALDE	(4) Greens
Lower class position	-0.020 (0.029)	-0.016 (0.054)	-0.048* (0.027)	0.103** (0.041)
Middle class position	0.060** (0.028)	0.018 (0.049)	0.066* (0.035)	-0.028 (0.034)
Upper class position	-0.030 (0.023)	0.023 (0.034)	0.008 (0.028)	-0.041 (0.039)
National average position	0.016 (0.021)	-0.063* (0.032)	-0.001 (0.025)	-0.099** (0.040)
Constant	0.435*** (0.135)	0.066 (0.127)	0.089 (0.091)	-0.325 (0.243)
Observations	85	68	61	41
R-squared	0.066	0.076	0.216	0.240
VIF	2.81	2.72	5.30	1.67

*Notes:* This table shows the results of the pooled regression model. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIF values are an indication of multicollinearity.

## 5.2 Unification Dimension

The second, unification dimension, shows slightly different results compared to the ideological dimension of the previous section in Table 7. The naïve model, column 1, shows that all three income groups are able to significantly impact voting behaviour in the EP. However, once we add control variables and allow different EP sessions to have different coefficients, only the middle class retains its significant influence. In columns 2 and 3, it becomes clear that EP parties are much more pro-EU than are the average citizens. This, too, is reflected in Figure 1. The three party groups that belong to the centrist variable (PES/EPP/ALDE) all tend to be positioned higher than the other non-centrist parties. Column 4 reflects the preferred model again, where the coefficients are weighted according to the number of MEPs that the party delivers. It appears that once we correct for these size differences, the middle class voters no longer have a significant influence on voting behaviour. Upper class voters, on the other hand, can significantly influence the pro-anti voting behaviour in the EP. In the last column we see that once we restrict the dataset to observations with more than 15 voters, the preferences of the middle class become significant again.

Table 7: Unification dimension - pooled results

	(1) Naive	(2) Controls	(3) EP dummy	(4) Weighted	(5) $i$ , 15 voters
Lower class pos.	0.106* (0.057)	0.046 (0.047)	0.045 (0.048)	0.062 (0.100)	0.010 (0.120)
Middle class pos.	0.176** (0.075)	0.122** (0.050)	0.122** (0.048)	0.162 (0.098)	0.229* (0.130)
Upper class pos.	0.121** (0.053)	0.017 (0.047)	0.020 (0.047)	0.164* (0.091)	0.182* (0.103)
Nat. average pos.		-0.118 (0.098)	-0.130 (0.096)	-0.398 (0.332)	-0.393 (0.358)
Centrist dummy		0.623*** (0.040)	0.625*** (0.040)	0.665*** (0.088)	0.663*** (0.091)
Constant	-0.565** (0.120)	0.333 (0.178)	0.365 (0.180)	0.264 (0.530)	0.217 (0.563)
EP dummy	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	349	349	349	349	321
R-squared	0.063	0.481	0.484	0.459	0.447
VIF	1.55	1.60	1.74	1.89	2.04

*Notes:* This table shows the results of the pooled regression model. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIF values are an indication of multicollinearity.

Similarly to the previous section, for dimension 2 the results of the individual EP sessions are reported in Table 8. While the problem of multicollinearity does not seem to play a large role in these estimations (as opposed to dimension 1), the results tend to be largely insignificant. Only in the fifth EP does the middle class succeed in affecting the party voting behaviour. All other variables are insignificant, with the exception of the centrist dummy. Again, for all 4 sessions do we see that those parties that belong to the three EP groups in the centre of the political spectrum are much more in favour of the EU integration than the other parties. If we proceed to the four largest EP groups, Table 9 shows that the preferences of the upper class are negatively related to the PES voting behaviour. While this may be proof of social democrats catering for the poor more than for the rich, this is a surprising finding nonetheless.

Table 8: Unification dimension - single EP session results

	(1) EP 3	(2) EP 4	(3) EP 5	(4) EP 6
Lower class position	0.397 (0.508)	0.117 (0.142)	0.132 (0.128)	-0.036 (0.169)
Middle class position	-0.269 (0.497)	0.430 (0.270)	0.264** (0.127)	0.222 (0.208)
Upper class position	0.154 (0.407)	0.043 (0.160)	0.238 (0.154)	0.086 (0.121)
National average position	-1217 (0.736)	-0.860** (0.366)	-0.284 (0.235)	0.296 (0.246)
Centrist dummy	0.607** (0.232)	0.949*** (0.078)	0.470*** (0.087)	0.596*** (0.100)
Constant	1.519* (0.837)	0.884** (0.434)	-0.201 (0.368)	-0.557 (0.355)
Observations	70	73	91	115
R-squared	0.341	0.749	0.537	0.472
VIF	2.58	2.34	1.80	1.84

*Notes:* Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.

Table 9: Unification dimension - EP group results

	(1) EPP	(2) PES	(3) ALDE	(4) Greens
Lower class position	0.182 (0.164)	0.127 (0.197)	0.026 (0.122)	0.209 (0.126)
Middle class position	-0.170 (0.250)	-0.149 (0.230)	0.173 (0.176)	-0.168 (0.177)
Upper class position	0.230* (0.132)	-0.361** (0.157)	0.054 (0.160)	0.155 (0.119)
National average position	-0.042 (0.233)	0.474* (0.273)	-0.283 (0.226)	-0.387* (0.204)
Constant	-0.452** (0.224)	-0.876*** (0.212)	0.166 (0.232)	0.692*** (0.241)
Observations	85	68	61	41
R-squared	0.076	0.110	0.034	0.140
VIF	2.53	2.84	2.04	1.93

*Notes:* Clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.

### 5.3 Further Robustness Checks

Electoral results may be influenced by economic performance. In case the economy is growing at an above average speed, there is more room for spending programs according to the wishes of the constituents. However, this paper deals with the European Parliament, where a single party is never so powerful to be in a position to decide on specific programs (while it should be noted that the EP has the annual obligation to accept or refute the EU budget proposal from the Commission). In an attempt to prove the hypothesis that economic performance plays no role in voter-party congruence at the EP level, three variables were created and separately included in the model. The results of this endeavour can be found in Table 10.

Table 10: Positive economic performance results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	D1	D1	D1	D2	D2	D2
	GDP	GovExp	Rec	GDP	GovExp	Rec
Lower class pos.	0.041 (0.043)	-0.084 (0.102)	-0.030 (0.067)	0.018 (0.122)	0.155 (0.110)	0.007 (0.139)
Middle class pos.	0.165*** (0.047)	0.289** (0.102)	0.220*** (0.066)	0.081 (0.140)	0.182 (0.169)	0.188 (0.166)
Upper class pos.	0.026 (0.023)	0.030 (0.030)	0.036 (0.023)	0.207 (0.127)	0.254* (0.140)	0.215* (0.113)
Nat. average pos.	-0.119*** (0.025)	-0.201*** (0.040)	-0.076** (0.033)	-0.062 (0.224)	-0.153 (0.278)	-0.474 (0.393)
Centrist dummy	0.228*** (0.056)	0.476*** (0.113)	0.247*** (0.060)	0.650*** (0.072)	0.552*** (0.140)	0.580*** (0.100)
Constant	-0.624*** (0.162)	-0.587*** (0.158)	-0.823*** (0.187)	0.018 (0.306)	-0.472 (0.320)	0.297 (0.289)
Observations	231	87	263	231	87	263
R-squared	0.769	0.751	0.722	0.446	0.529	0.383

*Notes:* This table shows the results of the pooled regression model. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. D1 is the ideological dimension, D2 is the unification dimension. GDP, GovExp, Rec indicate the inclusion of observations where the country had a real GDP growth rate above 3%, growing government expenditures (as share of GDP) and no quarterly recession in the year prior to the elections respectively.

Here, we restrict ourselves to positive economic performances. This means that only those observations where; the country experienced growth



above 3%, had positive government spending change as percentage of GDP, or no recession in any of the 4 quarters prior to the EP elections are taken into account. For the ideological dimension, in all three cases, the middle class position has a significant effect. In the latter two cases on the unification dimension, the upper class has a significant influence on the voting behaviour of the national party.

This last section briefly splits the dataset into three groups; the founding member states of the EU (EU6), the newly admitted Central and Eastern European member states (EU10) and the ‘old-EU’ member states (that is, all member states that joined before the large expansion in 2004 – EU15).

Table 11: title of table

	(1) D1 EU6	(2) D1 EU10	(3) D1 EU15	(4) D2 EU6	(5) D2 EU10	(6) D2 EU15
Lower class pos.	0.009 (0.033)	0.143 (0.000)	0.006 (0.031)	0.116** (0.036)	0.120 (0.000)	0.087 (0.069)
Middle class pos.	0.179** (0.049)	0.049 (0.000)	0.174** (0.033)	0.172 (0.157)	-0.166 (0.000)	0.220 (0.139)
Upper class pos.	0.048* (0.018)	0.008 (0.000)	0.057* (0.018)	0.101* (0.039)	-0.072 (0.000)	0.187*** (0.029)
Nat. average pos.	-0.268** (0.075)	-0.067 (0.000)	-0.140** (0.034)	-0.400* (0.154)	-0.005 (0.000)	-0.562 (0.273)
Centrist dummy	0.387** (0.098)	0.138 (0.000)	0.254* (0.096)	0.754*** (0.089)	0.644 (0.000)	0.658** (0.121)
Constant	0.041 (0.263)	-0.459 (0.000)	-0.545** (0.094)	0.458* (0.168)	0.683 (0.000)	0.346 (0.526)
Observations	154	42	307	154	42	307
R-squared	0.718	0.797	0.721	0.591	0.417	0.471
VIF	4.97	9.18	5.26	1.72	2.05	1.86

*Notes:* This table shows the results of the pooled regression model. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. VIF values are an indication of multicollinearity. D1 is the ideological dimension, D2 is the unification dimension.

For the former, Table 10 columns 1 and 4 show that the upper class has a significant impact on parties originating from the original six member states on both dimensions. For the ideological dimension, so does the middle class,

whereas for the unification dimension, the lower class has a significantly positive impact. For the second group (EU10), it may be important to mention that this group only has 42 observations. None of the variables are significant, which may be caused by the low statistical power due to the small sample size. In the EU15, it is again the upper class that has a significant impact on voting behaviour in EP on both dimensions. Similar to Table 4 for the entire database, the middle class is the largest determinant of voting behaviour on dimension 1.

## 6 Limitations

This paper has a few limitations that are worth mentioning. As this paper is original in the sense that it is the first time this is tested with this data and in this political institution, the findings of the report should be seen as preliminary and subject to the limitations addressed in this section. The first of these limitations is the limited number of observations. Only four sessions of the EP are examined, as the first two sessions (from 1979 – 1989) do not provide the data used in this paper and NOMINATE data on the seventh session (2009-2014) has not yet been published. Moreover, it is impossible to match all parties between datasets. It is not only made much more difficult due to abbreviations and name changes; but splits away from the main party also increase the number of parties that cannot be matched with voter preferences. The average share covered in this paper, 71%, can be regarded as sufficient, but improvements can always be made.

A second limitation is the fact that for both the variable of interest (voter position) and the variable that is used to determine the social class of the voter are self-reported in the Eurobarometer. This means that it was up to the voter to decide where he would place himself on the left-right and anti-pro EU dimensions. Clearly, personal and cultural characteristics influence whether one even considers the extreme boundaries to be viable options to choose from. If one is not very much involved in politics, placing oneself at the boundaries may be less likely than for someone who is actively involved and very angry with the current status-quo. Even if these two people have the same political preferences, one may select a more modest/central position on the dimension scale. Likewise, cultural variables may influence whether one is able to admit that one belongs to the lower class or upper class. There may be a tendency to consider oneself middle class as the default option, even though the economic and social situation clearly disagrees.

Some parties may be more socially acceptable for voters than others, especially once one is asked to publicly disclose the voting behaviour, strategic lying may occur. Some parties at the extreme boundaries of the political spectrum may not be considered as a reasonable option out in the open, while citizens may have voted for them in private. Should this be the case, these voters are then matched to the party they claim to have voted for, while their preferences should obviously be matched with the party they actually voted for. There is no way to account for this.

Lastly, the period covered by this paper is one of increased public awareness within the EU. Within this period, the Single Market was created with all its benefits and drawbacks at the individual level, the euro was introduced and membership grew from 12 to 27 over the years covered. While one may be able to account for this in an econometric sense, and we did, the social and political impact of said developments may have their influence on the findings. A closer look, at the relationship discussed in this paper for for example a number of roll calls within a specific issue area may be worthwhile for further research.

## 7 Conclusion

This paper looked at the relationship between political preferences of different groups of voters and the voting behaviour of political parties in the European Parliament. Voters for a single national party were divided into 3 groups based on their self-placement in society; lower class, middle class and upper class. Their preferences along two dimensions, the ideological left-right dimension and the unification/ anti-pro EU dimension were then linked to the voting behaviour of Members of European Parliament of the party that these voters elected in the last EP election. Data availability limited the analysis to the EP elections of 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004, as more recent data still needs to be processed.

On the ideological dimension, the preferences of the middle class seemed to coincide with the voting behaviour of MEPs in many of the configurations. In three of the four individual sessions, for the EPP and ALDE party groups and for those observations where the economy was performing well, the middle class voters were the only income group with any significant influence. In the preferred specification of the model, the preferences of the

upper class also played a role. These results were only visible for the EU-6 founding member states and the EU-15 pre-enlargement group of countries.

On the unification dimension, a significant relationship between voter preferences and voting behaviour of parliamentarians was more difficult to find. While the upper class preferences seem to be a significant predictor of the voting behaviour for the pooled model, this only applies if we use a 10% significance level. For a split database with the individual EP sessions and EP party groups, the results were largely insignificant. Remarkable was that the lower and upper class showed significant results in the six founding member states. The results for both dimensions can be linked to the only paper that comes remotely close to the present one, where Walczak & van der Brug (2012) find that the middle class has the largest degree of congruence between voters and politicians.

While this paper is the first to provide a preliminary overview of the relationship between voters and politicians at the European level, future research could extend this paper by looking at different effects based on other social indicators. Moreover, as the EP continues to grow in importance and power, more extensively available data would certainly benefit scholars who aim to explain voting behaviour in the EP.

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## 9 Appendix

### Annex A

The list below contains the questions used for analysis in this paper, with the corresponding variable names in the 4 European Election Surveys of respectively 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004.

Trend file Var name	Variable Description	Name EES 89	Name EES 94	Name EES 99	Name EES 04
t_ees	EES Study (89, 94, 99, 04)	-	-	-	-
t_var001	Country Name	VAR003	COUNTRY	VAR002	VAR001
t_var112	Voted which party in EP elections	VAR019	V14	VAR094	VAR111
t_var134	Placement on ideological scale	VAR202	V114	VAR117	VAR134
t_var155	Placement on unification scale	VAR127	V262	VAR136	VAR115
t_var225	Placement in social class	VAR298	V368	VAR165	VAR225



## Annex B

This table presents an overview of all the parties included in the analysis, sorted by EUMS. If the party is part of the four largest EP groups, this is also indicated.

Party Name	EUMS	EP Group	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6
Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative	Austria	Greens	-	-	Yes	Yes
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Austria		-	-	Yes	Yes
Österreichische Volkspartei	Austria	EPP	-	-	Yes	Yes
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	Austria	PES	-	-	Yes	Yes
Anders gaan arbeiden, leven en vrijen	Belgium	Greens	-	Yes	Yes	-
CD&V	Belgium	EPP	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Ecolo	Belgium	Greens	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
FDF / MCC	Belgium	ALDE	-	Yes	-	-
Parti réformateur libéral	Belgium	ALDE	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Parti social-chrétien	Belgium	EPP	Yes	Yes	-	-
Parti socialiste	Belgium	PES	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Socialistische Partij	Belgium		Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Vlaams Blok	Belgium		Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Vlaamse liberalen en democraten	Belgium	ALDE	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Volskunie / België Spirit	Belgium	Greens	-	-	Yes	-
AKEL - Aristera - ND	Cyprus		-	-	-	Yes
Dimokratiko Komma	Cyprus	ALDE	-	-	-	Yes
Dimokratikos Synagermos	Cyprus	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
Gia tin Evropi	Cyprus	EPP	-	-	-	Yes

Party Name	EUMS	EP Group	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6
Česká strana sociálně demokratická	Czech Rep.	PES	-	-	-	Yes
Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy	Czech Rep.		-	-	-	Yes
Křesťanská a demokratická unie - Československá strana lidová	Czech Rep.	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
NEZÁVISLÍ	Czech Rep.		-	-	-	Yes
Občanská demokratická strana	Czech Rep.	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
SNK sdružení nezávislých a Evropských demokratů	Czech Rep.	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
Centrum-Democraterne	Denmark	EPP	Yes	-	-	-
Dansk Folkeparti	Denmark		-	-	Yes	Yes
Det Konservative Folkeparti	Denmark		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Det Radikale Venstre	Denmark	ALDE	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ny Alliance	Denmark	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
Socialdemokratiet	Denmark	PES	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socialistisk Folkeparti	Denmark		-	Yes	Yes	Yes
Venstre	Denmark	ALDE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Eesti Keskerakond	Estonia	ALDE	-	-	-	Yes
Eesti Reformierakond	Estonia	ALDE	-	-	-	Yes
Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit	Estonia	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond	Estonia	PES	-	-	-	Yes
Bloco de Esquerda	Portugal		-	-	-	Yes
Coligação Democrática Unitária / Partido Comunista Português	Portugal		Yes	Yes	-	-
Partido do Centro Democrático e Social / PCDS-Partido Popular	Portugal	EPP	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Partido Social Democrata	Portugal	ALDE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Partido Socialista	Portugal	PES	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Party Name	EUMS	EP Group	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6
Vasemmistoliitto	Finland		-	-	-	Yes
Kansallinen Kokoomus	Finland	EPP	-	-	Yes	Yes
Soumen Keskusta	Finland	ALDE	-	-	Yes	Yes
Soumen Kristillinen Liitto	Finland	EPP	-	-	Yes	-
Soumen Sosialidemokraattinen Poulue	Finland	PES	-	-	Yes	Yes
Svenska Folpartiet	Finland	ALDE	-	-	Yes	Yes
Vihreät	Finland	Greens	-	-	Yes	Yes
Centre Démocrates Sociaux	France	EPP	Yes	Yes	-	-
Energie Radicale / MRG / Parti radical de gauche	France	PES	Yes	Yes	-	-
Front national	France		Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Les Verts	France	Greens	Yes	-	Yes	Yes
Parti communiste française / Gauche unitaire / PCR	France		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parti radical	France	ALDE	Yes	-	-	-
Parti républicain / Démocratie libérale	France	EPP	-	Yes	-	-
Parti Socialiste	France	PES	Yes	Yes	-	Yes
Rassemblement pour la République / DIFE	France		Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Union pour la démocratie française	France	EPP	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire	France	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	Germany	Greens	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Christlich Demokratische Union	Germany	EPP	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Die Republikaner	Germany		Yes	-	-	-
Freie Demokratische Partei	Germany	ALDE	Yes	-	-	Yes
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus	Germany		-	-	Yes	Yes
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	Germany	PES	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Party Name	EUMS	EP Group	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6
Dimokratiki Anaossi / Politiki Anixi	Greece		Yes	-	-	-
Kommounistiko Komma Elladas	Greece		-	Yes	Yes	-
Nea Dimokratia	Greece	EPP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Panellinio Socialistiko Kinima	Greece	PES	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Synaspismos tis Aristeras kai tis Proodou / NAR	Greece		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség	Hungary	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
Magyar Szocialista Párt	Hungary	PES	-	-	-	Yes
Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége	Hungary	ALDE	-	-	-	Yes
Fianna Fáil	Ireland		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fine Gael	Ireland	EPP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Green Party	Ireland	Greens	-	Yes	Yes	-
Labour Party	Ireland	PES	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Progressive Democrats	Ireland	ALDE	Yes	-	-	-
Sinn Féin	Ireland		-	-	-	Yes
Workers' Party / Democratic Left	Ireland		Yes	-	-	-
Jaunais laiks	Latvia		-	-	-	Yes
Pilsoniska Savieniba	Latvia		-	-	-	Yes
POS "Par cilvēka tiesībām vienota Latvija"	Latvia	Greens	-	-	-	Yes
Tautas partija	Latvia	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
Déi Gréng	Luxembourg		-	Yes	Yes	-
Parti chrétien social	Luxembourg	EPP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parti démocratique	Luxembourg	ALDE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parti ouvrier socialiste luxembourgeois	Luxembourg	PES	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Party Name	EUMS	EP Group	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6
Centro cristiano democratico	Italy	EPP	-	Yes	Yes	-
Cristiani democratici uniti	Italy	EPP	-	-	Yes	-
Democratico Cristiana / Partito popolare italiano	Italy	EPP	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Democrazia proletaria / PDP / Comunisti unitari	Italy	Greens	Yes	-	-	-
Forza Italia	Italy		-	Yes	Yes	-
I Democratici	Italy	ALDE	-	-	Yes	-
Italia dei Valori	Italy	ALDE	-	-	-	Yes
La Rete movimento democratico	Italy	Greens	-	Yes	-	-
Lega Nord	Italy	ALDE	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
Movimento sociale fiamma tricolore	Italy		-	-	Yes	-
Movimento sociale italiano / Alleanza nazionale	Italy		Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Partito Comunista Italiano / PDS / Democratici di Sinistra	Italy		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani	Italy		-	Yes	Yes	Yes
Partito radicale / PR / Bonino / Lega antiproibizionisti droga	Italy		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Partito repubblicano italiano	Italy	ALDE	Yes	-	-	-
Partito socialista democratico italiano	Italy	PES	Yes	-	-	-
Partito socialista italiano / Socialisti democratici italiani	Italy	PES	-	Yes	-	-
Patto Segni	Italy		-	-	Yes	-
Rinnovamento italiano - Dini	Italy	EPP	-	-	Yes	-
Südtiroler Volkspartei	Italy	EPP	-	-	Yes	-
Verdi Arcobaleno / Federazione dei Verdi / Verdi Europa	Italy	Greens	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Liberalna Demokracija Slovenije	Slovenia	ALDE	-	-	-	Yes
Nova Slovenija	Slovenia	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
Slovenska demokratska stranka	Slovenia	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
Socialni demokrati	Slovenia	PES	-	-	-	Yes

Party Name	EUMS	EP Group	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6
Christen Democratisch Appèl	Netherlands	EPP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ChristenUnie - Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij	Netherlands		-	-	-	Yes
Democraten 66	Netherlands	ALDE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Groen Links / De Groenen	Netherlands	Greens	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij / Communistische Partij Nederland	Netherlands	Greens	Yes	-	-	-
Partij van de Arbeid	Netherlands	PES	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Politieke Partij Radikalen	Netherlands	Greens	Yes	-	-	-
Socialistische Partij	Netherlands		-	-	Yes	Yes
SGP-GPV-RPF	Netherlands		Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie	Netherlands	ALDE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Liga Polskich Rodzin	Poland		-	-	-	Yes
Naprzód Polsko	Poland		-	-	-	Yes
Partia Demokratyczna	Poland	ALDE	-	-	-	Yes
Platforma Obywatelska	Poland	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Poland		-	-	-	Yes
Samobrona RP	Poland		-	-	-	Yes
Socjaldemokracja Polska	Poland	PES	-	-	-	Yes
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej - Unia Pracy	Poland	PES	-	-	-	Yes
Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko	Slovakia		-	-	-	Yes
Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie	Slovakia	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia	Slovakia	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
SMER-Sociálna demokracia	Slovakia	PES	-	-	-	Yes
Strana maďarskej koalície - Magyar Koalíció Pártja	Slovakia	EPP	-	-	-	Yes

Party Name	EUMS	EP Group	EP3	EP4	EP5	EP6
Centro Democrático y Social	Spain	ALDE	Yes	-	-	-
Coalición Canaria	Spain	-	-	Yes	-	-
Convergència Democràtica Catalunya	Spain	ALDE	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Herri Biltasuna / Euskal Herritarrok	Spain	-	Yes	-	-	-
Izquierda de los Pueblos	Spain	Greens	Yes	-	-	-
Izquierda Unida / Izquierda Unida-Iniciativa per Catalunya	Spain	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Los Verdes	Spain	Greens	-	-	-	Yes
Partido Popular / Partido Demócrata Popular	Spain	EPP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Partido Socialista Obrero Español	Spain	PES	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Centerpartiet	Sweden	ALDE	-	-	Yes	Yes
Folkpartiet liberalaerna	Sweden	ALDE	-	-	Yes	Yes
Kristdemokraterna	Sweden	EPP	-	-	Yes	Yes
Miljöpartiet	Sweden	Greens	-	-	Yes	Yes
Moderata samlingspartiet	Sweden	EPP	-	-	Yes	Yes
Socialdemokratiska arbetarepartiet	Sweden	PES	-	-	Yes	Yes
Vänsterpartiet	Sweden	-	-	-	Yes	Yes
Conservative and Unionist Party	UK	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Democratic Unionist Party	UK	-	Yes	Yes	-	-
Green Party	UK	Greens	-	-	Yes	Yes
Labour Party	UK	PES	Yes	Yes	Yes	-
Liberal Democrat Party	UK	ALDE	-	Yes	Yes	-
Official Unionist Party / Ulster Unionist Party	UK	-	-	Yes	-	Yes
Plaid Cymru - Party of Wales	UK	Greens	-	-	Yes	Yes
Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party	UK	EPP	-	-	-	Yes
Scottish National Party	UK	-	-	Yes	Yes	-
Social Democratic and Labour Party	UK	PES	Yes	Yes	-	-