EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY THROUGH CO-LOCATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATE MISSIONS AND EU DELEGATIONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES

MOVE TOWARDS ONE EUROPEAN VOICE OR PRAGMATIC DECISION-MAKING?

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ABSTRACT

The demand for European diplomacy has risen from various sides – be it from inside the European Union (EU) or outside. The practice of European diplomacy is often associated with the ideas of the EU being a single actor on the global stage or speaking with one European voice. Even though the Treaty of the European Union entitles the EU to implement a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the power to initiate legal action in this field still lies within the responsibilities of the member states. Their willingness to cooperate on foreign affairs is a key prerequisite to strengthen European diplomacy. The establishment of a European External Action Service (EEAS) under the Lisbon Treaty should enhance the cooperation between the diplomatic services of member states and the EU in third countries. One form of cooperation on a logistical basis is called co-locating. The phenomenon of sharing resources among bilateral member state missions and EU delegations of the EEAS is, for some, one step towards a more coherent European voice; others argue that it is a simple matter of expenses. Since co-locations have hitherto been rather unexplored in the prevailing literature, this thesis attempts to shed light on this new area of study and find factors that might increase the probability of a member state cooperating with the EU through co-location. This is done through a sequential explanatory design, which combines a quantitative study including all 28 EU member states with a follow-up case study on the Netherlands.

In the first part, three main independent variables are tested with the help of bivariate measures of association: the size of the diplomatic network, the public opinion on European foreign policy, and budgetary constraints. While the results for the last two factors did not show a correlation with the creation of co-locations, the size of diplomatic services demonstrated to be strongly related to the probability of sharing premises with the EU. According to the study, countries with a larger diplomatic network in place are more likely to have co-locations.

The second part investigates co-locations from the Dutch perspective. Through means of interviews with the Dutch Foreign Ministry, four influential factors could be identified that augmented the findings of the quantitative study: the Dutch interest in the third country, the structure of cost reduction, the type of diplomatic partner mission and the degree of like-mindedness between the co-locating countries.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Rounding off my Master’s course with a research project on a topic that I am truly fascinated by is a privilege that I am very grateful for. My sheer curiosity to explore the cooperation of EU delegations and EU member state missions has doubtlessly helped in staying focused. But interest and dedication alone would not have been enough to finish this Master thesis. I was lucky to find the much-needed support from my friends and family as well as the academic staff and fellow students.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... II

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ............................................................................................................. III

LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... VI

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................... VI

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................... VII

1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Societal relevance ................................................................................................................ 2

1.2 Theoretical relevance ......................................................................................................... 2

1.3 Reading guide .................................................................................................................... 2

2 BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................... 4

2.1 The growing need for European diplomacy ...................................................................... 4

2.2 The Lisbon Treaty ............................................................................................................. 6

3 THE CENTRAL CONCEPTS ................................................................................................ 10

3.1 Bilateral diplomatic missions ............................................................................................ 10

3.2 EU delegations of the EEAS ............................................................................................ 11

3.3 The concept of cooperation .............................................................................................. 12

3.4 The concept of co-location ............................................................................................... 12

4 LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................................................... 14

4.1 The cooperation on EU foreign and security policy ......................................................... 14

4.2 The cooperation between the diplomatic missions of member states and EU delegations in third countries ................................................................................................. 14

4.3 Analysis of gap in literature and research aim .................................................................. 17

5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................... 19

5.1 Relative capabilities .......................................................................................................... 19

5.2 Europeanized identity .................................................................................................... 21

5.3 Financial resources .......................................................................................................... 22
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Co-locations by Diplomatic Network (Embassies) ..................................................38
Table 2: Co-locations by Diplomatic Network (all Types) ...................................................40
Table 3: Co-locations by Public Opinion (Creation before Lisbon Treaty) ..........................45
Table 4: Co-locations by Public Opinion (Creation after Lisbon Treaty) ............................45
Table 5: Co-locations by Public Debt (2009-2014) ..............................................................49
Table 6: Co-locations by Public Debt and Budget Deficit (2009-2014) ..............................50

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Number of Co-locations per Member State (in total) ............................................32
Figure 2: Increase in Co-locations after the Lisbon Treaty ....................................................33
Figure 3: Third Countries with Co-locations per Continent ..................................................34
Figure 4: Size of Diplomatic Network per Member State (only Embassies) and EU in Third Countries ................................................................................................................35
Figure 5: Size of Diplomatic Network per Member State (all Types) and EU in Third Countries .........................................................................................................................36
Figure 6: Number of Co-locations by Number of Embassies ....................................................39
Figure 7: Number of Co-locations by Number of Third Countries with any Type of Diplomatic Mission ...................................................................................................................40
Figure 8: Public Opinion on European Foreign Policy per Country, EB 2004 ......................43
Figure 9: Public Opinion on European Foreign Policy per Country, EB 2008 ......................44
Figure 10: Number of Co-locations by Public in Favor of Common Foreign Policy (2008) ....46
Figure 11: Public Debt and Budget Deficit per Member State (Average 2009-2014) ........48
Figure 12: Factors influencing the Dutch Decision-Making on Co-locations .........................61
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>BE</td>
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<td>BG</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>COREU</td>
<td>Correspondence Européenne</td>
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<td>Com</td>
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<td>European Centre for Development Policy Management</td>
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<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EL</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>the Netherlands</td>
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<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
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<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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vii
1 INTRODUCTION

*European diplomacy* is a widely used term these days. The growing demand for it cannot only be reasoned by the incremental institutionalization of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but emerges also due to global challenges outside the European Union (EU). Political instability, terrorist threats, and consequential migration are some examples that challenge Europe’s foreign policy to become stronger and more coherent. A valid question at this point is: What exactly is European diplomacy and how can it be put into practice?

The study argues that there is more to European diplomacy than the exclusive actions of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Europe’s foreign policy is increasingly challenged to show strength through unity and to speak with one voice. This asks for strong foreign policy cooperation between member states and the EU – not only at ministerial level, but also at diplomatic level in third countries. Federica Mogherini, the current High Representative (HR), states during several of her speeches that one of her goals is to clearly define a common policy and position the EEAS¹.

A concept that shall enhance the cooperation between member states and the EU in third countries is *co-location*. The idea of co-location refers to the sharing of resources among diplomatic missions of EU member states and EU delegations. The EEAS actively searches for possibilities to build so-called EU compounds, which house several member state missions. It can be seen as a chance for countries to position themselves on the global stage, but in parallel, facilitate the symbolic cohesion of European countries abroad. Sharing the same premises among diplomatic missions is – at least from the supranational side – seen as a step in exactly this direction. However, not all countries make use of this possibility. Yet, one might ask why some states do? In the course of this paper the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of co-locations will be analyzed.

Even though EU delegations and bilateral diplomatic missions of member states have already been cooperating to some degree before the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, it seems that with the new legal institution the dimension of cooperation has started to change. Concluded co-location projects have tripled since then. This points to a growing trend among European diplomacy, which is worth taking a closer look at.

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¹ For instance in HR/VP Federica Mogherini’s speech about the first six months in office (European External Action Service (EEAS), 2015b).
1.1 Societal relevance

The relevance of the intended research has its origin within the prominent controversies concerning the establishment of the HR and the EEAS and their contribution to Europe’s diplomacy. Existing and emerging challenges on the global stage, like political instability, terrorism, migration or environmental issues – to name only a few – urge the EU to act more effectively and united in the international arena. The protection of Europeans should be one of the main goals of the European diplomatic service and thus the work of the EEAS affects society as a whole. If co-location was a steppingstone towards more cooperation between member state missions and EU delegations in third countries, which in the long run led to the EU being a single global actor, the security and well being of Europeans might benefit.

On a more technical note, the research might also be useful for policy-makers in the field of diplomatic presence. The problem falls under a very salient area of policy-making, namely foreign policy, and decision-making is still to a large extent nationally driven. Especially during times of budget cuts or reordering of national diplomatic interests, this study might provide some food for thought.

1.2 Theoretical relevance

Since the phenomenon is of a recent nature and the number of co-locations compared to the overall international presence of the EU and its member states is still rather small, it might be too early to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the projects. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to see what factors influence the decision of member states to share their resources with the EU – or when it comes to EU compounds, also with other member states – in the first place.

So far, the topic has been rather unexplored in the pertinent literature, which means that this work aims to approach this new study area and systematically explore reasons for the phenomenon. In general this means to familiarize the reader with the issue and find relevant empirical and theoretical grounds in order to, at best, trigger further research on similar or related matters.

1.3 Reading guide

The current chapter provides a short overview of the research project and its contribution to the academic world and society as a whole. Chapter two continues with a more profound introduction into the topic containing background information on the Lisbon changes and how the EEAS came about. Furthermore, the aim of the research and the research question are discussed. Chapter three then defines the central concepts of the study.
Chapter four focuses on the existing literature on the cooperation in foreign affairs specifically between member state missions and EU delegations. This is to help find the gap in literature and to position the thesis.

In chapter five preliminary answers to the research question will be derived from theories in the realm of international relations (IR) and public management concepts. Hypotheses will be formulated and tested in the ensuing chapters.

Chapter six outlines the structure of the research design and the choice of methodology and operationalization.

In chapter seven the hypotheses will be tested in a quantitative manner, including all 28 EU member states. Bivariate measures of association will be the major tool to do so.

The second empirical part intends to augment the quantitative findings. Chapter eight examines the research topic from the Dutch perspective. With the help of a single case study, relevant factors can be taken into account, which were not considered in the large-N study.

In the last chapter the findings of both analyses will be drawn together and discussed under the light of the theoretical framework presented in chapter five. The implications of the findings and limitations to the conducted research will be announced in chapter nine as well. Finally, food for thought for future research will round off the work.
2 BACKGROUND

2.1 The growing need for European diplomacy

The European foreign policy has not always been shaped the way it is today, but was rather an incremental process of institutionalization. Over the years, the EU has been entitled to define and implement a CFSP, but the European Commission does not have the power to initiate legal acts in the field of foreign affairs (European Commission (Com), 2015b, para.1). This means that it is so far not as integrated as other policies of the EU, such as the regulation of the single market. The first attempts to cooperate in foreign policy matters can be traced back to the 1970s, when the heads of state and government decided on European Political Cooperation (EPC). The main aim back then was consultation among member states on foreign policy issues. Since then a rather complex system of several institutional forms, be it of intergovernmental or supranational nature, has evolved (Smith, 2004).

In accordance to that, over the past 50 years, European and national level diplomacy have witnessed a gradual process of redefinition (Duke, 2009). Especially after the end of the Cold War, and more precisely with the Maastricht Treaty in the beginning of the 1990s – which transformed the EPC into a CFSP – considerable progress has started off (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). The creation of the CFSP should “[…]significantly increase the level of cooperation and coordination of foreign policy among Member States[…]” (Anderson 2001, as cited in Duke, 2002, p. 851). In the light of that, the EU's tasks in external relations increased over time. Member states started recognizing that "politics of scale outweigh unilateral action in external relations" (Duke, 2002, p. 849) and at some point the existing structures were inappropriate to address the rapidly establishing international challenges. Hence, the need for institutional change became clearer (Duke, 2009). The growing number of issues tackled on the European or shared level, including, e.g. conflict prevention, crisis management or civil protection, led to severe coordination problems (Duke, 2002).

Even though the development of the CFSP enhanced a ‘European voice’ on the global stage (Duke, 2009) it is a contested institution (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004).

One of the big issues with European external relations before – and some might argue even after – the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, was the confusion about responsibilities evoked by the high number of actors involved in the external representation of the EU. Broadly speaking, the Commission with at least four of its Commissioners had a say, as well as the HR, delegations of the European Parliament, the European Council and special diplomats. Before the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council decided on a general strategy for the CFSP, whereas the Council of the European Union specified the guidelines and
implemented them. As there were no diplomatic institutions in place to implement the CFSP in third countries, the member state holding the Presidency took over the agenda setting and thus its respective embassy implemented and coordinated the CFSP. Especially for small countries, lacking a broad network of diplomatic representation, this used to be a huge burden (Duke, 2002). EU member states have different levels of diplomatic presence outside the EU. Their number of embassies can vary between 40 and 200 around the globe (Duke, 2009). Only the bigger countries France, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Italy and Spain have a larger number of missions abroad than the EU\(^2\) (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2013, p. 14). Furthermore, the report of the European Parliament states that only in countries of obvious interest, at least 25 member states have an embassy in place. Those are China, Egypt, India, Israel, Japan, Russia and the US (ibid).

Following the increase of foreign issues tackled on a European level, the national foreign ministries have witnessed a growing workload. Their tasks have broadened – for instance environment and trade have become increasingly European matters. This means that the respective ministries seconded work to the foreign ministries for better international coordination, but the resources of the foreign ministries have not been adapted accordingly. Thus not only small member states are facing financial and personnel strains and some countries are not able to keep their size of diplomatic services (Duke, 2002).

For third countries the situation was also confusing, as they would not know whom to approach in terms of foreign matters. The rotation of the Presidency every six months contributed to the complexity of whom to approach (Duke, 2002). So, the missing continuity and somewhat blurred division of competences caused inefficiency in coordinating European foreign policy among member states and EU institutions. As a consequence, the EU feared to lose political and economic leverage on the global stage (Duke, 2009).

In the beginning of the new millennium a working group on external action within the Convention on the Future of Europe discussed solutions for the unsustainable coordination situation between the numerous actors involved in the external representation of the EU. A Constitutional Treaty for Europe was drafted, which also addressed this exact coordination problem. Yet, in 2005 France and the Netherlands voted the treaty down (ibid). The call for a reform treaty was still given though, and hence negotiations continued and resulted in a draft

\(^2\) Please note that in chapter seven the size of diplomatic networks of member states is analyzed and compared to the number of EU delegations. The numbers provided in chapter seven are not coherent to the information given here, because of the difference in counting diplomatic missions. The current sources (Duke, 2009 & Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2013) include all missions, inside and outside the EU, while the analysis in chapter seven only considers diplomatic missions in third countries.
of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, which in general revised the way the actors of the EU should work together (European Union, 2014, para. 2/3).

### 2.2 The Lisbon Treaty

#### 2.2.1 An overview of the major changes in European foreign policy

In the previous section the growing demand for reforms in European external relations has been briefly discussed. A new treaty was aimed to realize the required structures for a more coherent and efficient external action through creating a ‘new actor’ – the EEAS. After long negotiations and a rejection of the draft treaty in 2008 by the Irish population, the Lisbon Treaty finally came into force in 2009 (Duke, 2009).

The two major changes in the treaty for EU’s foreign policy are: (1) the institutionalization of the post of the HR with his/her dual role in representing the Council on CFSP matters and being a Commissioner on external relations, as well as (2) the transformation of Commission delegations in third countries into the EEAS, whose task it is to assist the HR in his/her diplomatic work on the global stage (Hix & Høyland, 2011, p. 318). Even though the President of the European Commission still plays a role in representing the EU in international settings, the HR is the main actor when it comes to representing the EU on a ministerial level or at international organizations concerning CFSP matters (Duke, 2009).

The new service unit was intentionally called ‘external action’ in order to combine the two realms of low politics of trade and development or ‘external relations’ and the one of high politics regarding foreign and security policies (Smith, 2013). Rather than being an independent EU institution, the EEAS is a coordination unit, where all major institutions have a stake (Duke, 2009).

#### 2.2.2 Criticism of the European diplomatic service

Today, the EEAS and its HR are increasingly subject to criticism and their existence is often publicly questioned. *Der Spiegel* (Schmitz & Schult, 2014) for instance reported that one of the big weaknesses of the EEAS was the lack of a specific strategy and the formulation of explicit tasks also in contrast to the national diplomatic services. *The Telegraph* (Mendick & Malnick, 2013) moreover made the potential duplication of bilateral embassies by the delegations of the EEAS a subject of discussion. British opponents of the newly created institution further claimed that the diplomatic network of the UK is well established on the global stage and that the EEAS might be wasteful (ibid).
Within the academic world, a number of scholars, e.g. Michael E. Smith (2013), critically claim that the institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty failed in clarifying the responsibilities of representation in third countries. According to him, more actors have a say than before, i.e. the President of the European Council and the Commission, the holder of the rotating Presidency, and the HR. His criticism implies that Europe still struggles to speak with ‘one voice’ and have ‘one representative face’. Furthermore, Smith’s research on the functioning of the EEAS revealed that even insiders harshly criticize the service. He conducted several interviews with senior EEAS staff during the first term in office after the Lisbon Treaty. Back then Catherine Ashton was the HR and had been accused of lacking experience in foreign and security matters, having an unsatisfactory decision-making style and appointing a weak cabinet. Also, the interview answers showed that the position of the HR is easily undermined by powerful member states. Smaller countries worry that the closer cooperation on European foreign policy issues would open doors for assertive member states to gain agenda setting power. However, in theory no EU institution should have the privilege of controlling Europe’s agenda on foreign policy. Proposals or initiatives can be submitted by each member state, the HR alone or the HR with the support of the Commission equally (Smith, 2013).

Vanhoonacker and Pomorska (2013) analyzed, in more depth, the actual effects of the new institutional settings on the agenda setting. They acknowledged that the Lisbon Treaty theoretically gave the HR the necessary instruments to act as a policy entrepreneur and thus could be able to influence the agenda. Nevertheless, this does not come automatically and would need more strategic development of the HR and the EEAS. At the time of the research in 2013, the HR seemed to concentrate rather on capacity-building strategies to establish the new service. By contrast, the scholars concluded that Ashton faced difficulties in claiming authority and gaining attention (ibid).

In his article on the effectiveness of the EEAS, Smith (2013) figured that there are three major political conflicts caused by the creation of the EEAS. The first one is a matter of staffing, meaning that the overall structure and the senior leadership are controversial. Second, he found out that there is ongoing competition between the Commission and the EEAS behind-the-scenes. Third, and prevailing, is the problem of enhancing coordination between the different areas of foreign policy, such as development and security.

Despite all the criticism, the EEAS is in office with 139 delegations around the world (EEAS, 2015c). The perception that the new institution duplicates or challenges the bilateral embassies of the member countries has been taken up as a thought-provoking impulse to further investigate the relationship between those ‘two’ actors.
In the next section the main treaty provisions concerning the cooperation between EU delegations and member state missions will be presented.

2.2.3 Treaty provisions on the cooperation between bilateral diplomatic missions and EU delegations

Taking a closer look at the amendments the Lisbon Treaty entailed, a relationship between bilateral embassies and EU delegations of the EEAS is explicitly foreseen. For example, the insertion of Article 27 into the Treaty on European Union (TEU) encourages collaboration:

“3. In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. **This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States** […]” (European Union, 2012, TEU Art. 27) [emphasis added]

Further, Article 35 (ex Article 20 TEU) of the treaty provides as follows:

“The diplomatic and consular **missions of the Member States and the Union delegations in third countries** […] **shall cooperate** in ensuring that decisions defining Union positions and actions adopted […] are complied with and implemented. **They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information and carrying out joint assessments.**” (European Union, 2012, TEU Art. 35) [emphasis added]

The above-cited legal basis implies that the EU desires cooperation on this matter. Through ratifying the Lisbon Treaty, member states agreed upon an intensified relationship. So, it can be said that there is some sort of move from strictly bilateral to multilateral diplomacy observable. Nowadays the EU already has several foreign policy instruments at its disposal to take united actions on the global stage, such as joint action, common position and strategies (Hix & Høyland, 2011). Not all issues show the same level of integration though. Due to shared competences on some issues and national sovereignty on a large part of other foreign issues, the willingness of a member state to cooperate remains essential. It will therefore be argued in this work that there are differences in the way countries cooperate with EU delegations and the aim is to find the reasons why.
Correspondingly, the goal of this paper is to find out more about the way in which member countries decide upon the degree of cooperation with EU delegations. Co-location will be considered, within the subsequent study, as a higher form of cooperation than separate premises, as it implies a certain level of ‘sharing’, which is not given in the conventional way. The underlying research question can therefore be formulated as follows:

| Which factor(s) increase the probability of EU member states cooperating with EU delegations in third countries through co-location? |

Besides the main research question on the influential factors, the paper will also try to provide an insight into the decision-making process on co-locations of one of the member states. This will be done by zooming into the case of the Netherlands.

The cooperation between bilateral diplomatic missions of EU member states and EU delegations in third countries represents the centerpiece of this research. Before getting deeper into the matter, it is therefore important to shortly define, what exactly should be understood under the main concepts.
3 THE CENTRAL CONCEPTS

The term ‘EU delegation’ as well as its counterpart on the unilateral level, the member state mission, will be described in the following. Moreover, the treaty provisions explicitly ask for cooperation between the national and European units. Hence, the concept of cooperation and the breaking down of that concept to co-locations will be briefly discussed within this chapter too.

3.1 Bilateral diplomatic missions

Between the sixteenth and eighteenth century absolutist states increasingly started to develop a network of permanent representations, namely embassies, in other countries (State in Kurian, 2011). In the early sixteenth century, starting in Italy, the establishment of resident ambassadors spread over Western Europe. Around that time European states began to engage resident ambassadors “[a]s weapons in the struggle for power [...]” (Mattingly, 1955/1964, p.55). The most important task for ambassadors back then was to gather relevant information about the ruler of the state they were sent to, and to report the outlooks to the home government. This was generally carried out in secrecy. Therefore ambassadors were also known as ‘licensed spies’, which often led to reluctance among receiving rulers. Besides acting as messengers of military and political information to advance the balance of power, ambassadors were also used to transmit knowledge and culture in times when newspapers did not exist (Anderson, 1993/2013).

The role of embassies and ambassadors has changed over time as the balance of power diplomacy broke down after World War II (Swift, 1998, p. 10). The Irish Ambassador Swift mentioned issues such as the strengthening of multilateralism and the relative weakening of the nation-state as crucial for the changes in diplomacy (ibid). A good example for that is the construction of the EU and its evolving common foreign policy.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations from the year 1961 defines all concepts and terms regarding diplomatic relations between two countries. Bilateral diplomatic missions have the purpose of representing the home country in the host country and further protecting the interests of the sending state and its citizens in the host country. By doing so, they hold negotiations with the host government, monitor and report to the home government, tackle passport or visa issues and generally try to promote and maintain friendly relations between the two states (United Nations, 2005b).
When talking about bilateral missions of EU member states in this thesis, only those permanent representations of the 28 EU states in countries outside the EU are meant. In the course of the work, various terms of diplomatic missions will be used. The differences between them might not always be straightforward and therefore clarification of the most common entities will be provided.

**Different types of diplomatic missions**

An *embassy* is the national representation situated in the capital city of the host country and typically offers the broadest range of services. This means not only the establishment of diplomatic relationships but consular services too (Types of Diplomatic Missions in eDiplomat, 2014). An embassy is acknowledged to be the most important type of diplomatic representation. It is a permanent entity and the head is usually an ambassador. He/she is the highest official and functions as a representative of the home government (Briney, 2015).

When a country has a diplomatic representation to an international organization it is not called an embassy but a *permanent representation* or *mission* (ibid). Those types are excluded from this study though.

A *Consulate-General* features the same characteristics as an embassy, except that it is not located in the capital but a major city other than the latter (Types of Diplomatic Missions in eDiplomat, 2014). A leaner version of that would then be the *Consulate*. It is often based in larger touristic cities of the host country as it is specialized in assisting national citizens abroad. The chief diplomat of a consulate is called consul and takes care of minor diplomatic issues (Briney, 2015).

In addition, a number of other variants of diplomatic missions exist, such as honorary consulates, diplomatic offices or bureaus, representation offices, special diplomatic missions, liaison offices or cooperation offices.

### 3.2 EU delegations of the EEAS

EU delegations are more or less the equivalent to member state embassies, but on a European level. However, they show differences on various issues, as they for instance do not represent one country, but an alliance of 28 European countries – alias the EU – and the host country can also be a group of countries or regions. In principle, the EU has permanent

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3 An honorary consul is in many cases a local person of the host country and does not enjoy the same status as a diplomat like an ambassador or career consul (United Nations, 2005a). To set up honorary consulates is an optional decision taken by each country individually (ibid) and is often seen as a chance for countries with limited resources to enlarge their diplomatic presence (Stringer, 2011).

4 Further on in the research, the diplomatic network of EU member states will be analyzed, where all diplomatic missions find consideration.
representations at international organizations too, but those are not essential for this specific research and will hence be excluded. There are nowadays some 139 offices in place, which find their legal basis in the Lisbon Treaty from 2009. The aggregate of all delegations is also called EEAS and its overall mandate is to represent the EU and its citizens on the global stage. Moreover, the delegations are key players in explaining, presenting and implementing Europe’s foreign policy. The workforce within the EU delegations is of diverse origin; e.g. delegates from the European Commission, local professionals, diplomats and experts from the member states and EEAS employees are engaged (EEAS, 2015c).

After having described the ‘two’ main actors involved in the phenomenon under exploration, the concept under which light their relationship is analyzed – cooperation through co-location – will be defined hereafter.

### 3.3 The concept of cooperation

“[T]he process of working together to the same end” is one of the general definitions that can be found in the dictionary (Cooperation in Oxford University Press, 2015). Keohane (1984) explains cooperation by differentiating it from the term ‘harmony’. According to him, harmony is a condition that does not require any kind of interference by states. A natural facilitation of each other’s goals on the international stage is given and communication is for the time being not a required means. In contrast to that, “[c]ooperation requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations –which are not in pre-existent harmony– be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as “policy coordination.”” (p. 51). Therefore, cooperation can be seen as a highly political process and it usually is the response to (potential) conflicts (ibid).

Taking the idea of cooperation and elaborating on it, co-locations can be seen as a branch of this and will be defined in the following subchapter.

### 3.4 The concept of co-location

Closer partnerships with national diplomatic missions enhanced the idea of increasingly sharing resources between the EEAS and member state delegations in third countries. In principle, co-locations are cases where one delegation signs a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with another delegation, in which they agree upon sharing premises. An MoU is, simply put, the binding document of agreement between the two parties without being a substantive contract (Memorandum of Understanding in Harper Collins, 2015). It is worth mentioning that such accords are not only possible between EU delegations and member state missions, but also among states. Strictly speaking the creation of EU
compounds, where a number of member state missions move in with the EU delegation, can also be seen as some kind of co-location among states. Further on in this thesis, when the issue of co-locations is analyzed from the Dutch perspective, it will be explained that the Dutch Foreign Ministry does not differentiate when processing a co-location request from another member state or the EU. However, for the main study – the quantitative part – the term co-location shall be understood as the sharing of premises between the EU party and at least one member state party (unless otherwise stated).

From a European point of view, it emerges from the 2014 report that the EEAS tries to boost such arrangements in order to strengthen the economy, as well as efficiency of the service (EEAS, 2015a, pp. 6/7). The service first and foremost frames the possibility of sharing premises as a 'spending-efficiency measure' (EEAS, 2014, p. 9). A further benefit expected on the EEAS side can be traced back to the proximity of diplomatic staff that comes along with co-locating premises. Such an environment is supposed to facilitate mutual cooperation among member states and the EU in third countries. From a long-term perspective, co-locations shall also promote the EU’s image as a single international actor and create a more coherent European voice (EEAS, SG1 Corporate Board Secretariat, personal communication, June 16, 2015).

Nevertheless it is important to keep in mind that the above said represents the European (supranational) opinion on the idea of co-locations. Member states might have other reasons to establish co-locations, yet this issue will be part of the underlying study and discussed at a later stage. Before that, the existing literature on the cooperation in foreign affairs, as well as between bilateral member state missions and EU delegations, will be summarized in the next chapter.
4 LITERATURE REVIEW

Even though the cooperation through co-locating EU delegations and bilateral missions has not yet been subject to a lot of research, the subsequent review will provide an insight in the existent work done on related matters. In this way, gaps in the prevailing literature can be identified and the significance of further research on the topic becomes clearer.

4.1 The cooperation on EU foreign and security policy

To start in a more general manner, Koenig-Archibugi (2004) studied how governments’ preferences for institutional change in EU foreign and security policy can be explained. He investigated the question “why [...] some European governments [are] more willing to pool and delegate sovereignty than others” (p. 142). Even though on another level, this is more or less also the underlying question to this research. Koenig-Archibugi finds proof for four causal factors having an effect on governments’ preferences towards a supranational foreign and security policy. The four tested variables are: regional governance, material capabilities, the Europeanization of identities and policy conformity. Even though none of the factors are essential for a supranational attitude, strong regional governance and a high degree of European identity among the public show features of facilitation. On the contrary, high material capabilities lower the willingness to give up sovereignty, according to Koenig-Archibugi’s research. Lastly, policy conformity does not seem to have significant influence (ibid).

From those empirical findings on the general willingness of member states to give up (parts of) sovereignty in order to cooperate on foreign and security matters, the following section goes more into detail. This means that existing literature on the cooperation between member state missions and EU delegations will be scrutinized.

4.2 The cooperation between the diplomatic missions of member states and EU delegations in third countries

Rijks and Whitman (2007) discuss the emergence of joint representation in third countries as a response to changing circumstances within a paper published by the European Policy Center. Diplomatic cooperation can, according to them, occur in two ways: (1) sharing diplomatic facilities and (2) sharing diplomatic capabilities. The first possibility involves inter alia common security measures or pooling of information as well as sharing the same premises. The majority of observed cooperation initiatives build on the potential of sharing facilities rather than capabilities. This could be explained by concerns among member states to commit themselves to a common representation with other member states or together with
the EU. In general, the reasons for such a lack of commitment stem from the fear of loss in sovereignty and sharing sensitive information, to trivial obstacles such as different administrative procedures in foreign services, hierarchy or culture. Eastern member states are still in the process of establishing their diplomatic systems and therefore might not be ready yet for such a close cooperation. Nevertheless, Rijks and Whitman see potential in a joint representation. Especially for smaller countries it could be an advantage if e.g. EU ambassadors carry out bilateral talks with third countries. According to their study, the access to the government is usually larger for the EU and some small countries do not even have a national representation. In order to maximize the diplomatic capabilities of EU countries and avoid diplomatic duplication, EU delegations should focus on specific areas. On the one hand, in third countries, where member states have relatively little national interest, the EEAS could play an increasing role, as member states’ and EU’s positions are more likely to coincide. On the other hand, in areas, where member states perceive a deviance between their national foreign policy interests and the common one of the EU and in addition have strong bilateral relations with the respective third country, the EEAS is less likely to be entrusted with diplomatic action (ibid).

In coherence with Rijks and Whitman’s findings, Helly et al. (2014) established the argument that smaller countries benefit most from the EU delegations’ services. They conducted an independent study on EU’s external action frontline within the framework of the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), a think-tank on international cooperation. Amongst other things, they took a closer look at the cooperation between EU delegations and member states and recognized that the EU delegations are valuable ‘information hubs’. Especially for smaller member states, the EEAS represents a clear added value by granting them access to important information and analysis, they might otherwise not get (p. 8). The possibility of report sharing between member state embassies and the EU gives the former a chance to focus on other bilateral topics. Also, member states that have problems providing financial and personnel resources can benefit from the services of EU delegations. Even though Helly et al. explain the advantages of a working information exchange system, they also suggest further examining the influence of EU delegations on the diplomatic work of member state embassies on a case-to-case basis. There have been cases, where countries are not willing to hand over tasks to the EU delegations and by doing so, undermine the latter’s reputation vis-à-vis third countries.

Bicchi and Carta (2012) analyzed the role of the prevailing communication network in EU’s foreign policy collaboration, the so-called COREU (Correspondence Européenne) system, under the light of the recently established EEAS. With the help of this network, important
information regarding issues on CFSP and EPC can be distributed among member states and EU institutions in order to facilitate common action. As stated previously, the Lisbon Treaty entailed an increasing obligation for consultation and information exchange between member states. The EU delegations of the EEAS play an important role in the communication process, as they are the center of information accumulation and a pivotal actor for coordination. Even though the EEAS is, according to Bicchi and Carta’s study, responsible for the majority of the sent messages via the COREU system, they could also find variations in activity among the member states. An analysis of data provided by the General Secretariat of the Council, including all COREU messages during the period of 2004 until 2009, led the two scholars to the following conclusion: “[...] some states are more active than others. Both size and duration of EU membership seem to account for the different levels of activity of the member states, but do not give the whole story for medium-sized countries.” (p. 472). In general, they identified three different groups of senders. First, the three big member states, France, Germany and the UK, showed most activity. The second group contains medium-sized, ‘old’ member states, as e.g. Portugal, Spain, Italy or Finland. Those countries feature underachievement in relation to their size due to various reasons. On the opposite side, the Netherlands, Sweden and Belgium performed above average in regard of their size, since they were involved in the system from an early time on. The third group of COREU users includes 15 small and all ‘new’ countries (from the 2004 enlargement). They evidently sent the least amount of messages and hence shared the least information. Having said this, the authors argue that the communication system in EU’s foreign policy is one that is dominated by the EEAS, the General Secretariat of the Council and the three big member states France, Germany and the UK (ibid).

Dermendzhiev (2014) touches, like Rijks and Whitman (2007), upon the subject of joint representation in the form of co-location between national missions and EU delegations and its hidden potential. Even before the reform treaty, member states realized co-location projects, but after 2009 the number of co-locations has more than doubled. Some might assume that smaller countries would be more inclined to enter into such agreements, but it is worth noticing that there are also cases of big countries like e.g. Germany and the UK, with strong global interests, sharing their premises with EU delegations. Dermendzhiev raises the question whether the decisions are taken on a simple cost-benefit calculation or whether other factors play a role as well. Without explicitly testing any factors, he mentions some of his assumptions, like e.g. the level of direct strategic interest of the member state in the third country or the advantage of sharing security bills in riskier areas and burden sharing through joint reporting. Although he does not elaborate much further on the topic, the author shortly

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5 By 2015 the numbers have even tripled, as will be shown later on in this study.
analyzes the situation from a socialization point of view. In that case, member states would choose to work together with the EEAS because of the level of trust they share with the delegation (ibid).

4.3 Analysis of gap in literature and research aim

Having said this, especially Rijks and Whitman's (2007) as well as Dermendzhiev's (2014) studies trigger the interest in elaborating more on the topic of co-locations as an advanced version of cooperation between EU delegations and bilateral diplomatic missions. Why would countries choose to make such a commitment in foreign policy towards the EU? So far, the reviewed literature has focused on the possible advantages and opportunities for member states when cooperating with the EEAS in third countries. There is consensus that especially smaller countries with less diplomatic representations and resources could benefit from the European service (e.g. Helly et al., 2014; Rijks and Whitman, 2007). Regarding information sharing, Bicchi and Carta (2012) found out that bigger countries are more willing or able to cooperate. To sum up, the main argument or influential factor discussed in the pertinent literature concerns the size of a country. This might also be a starting point for analyzing the decision-making on co-locations. Does the size of a member state matter? And most important, how can the factor size be translated to suit the phenomenon under examination?

With this in mind, Koenig-Archibugi's (2004) findings on how governments' preferences for institutional change in EU foreign and security policy can be explained might also be applicable for the case of embassy cooperation.

Sharing diplomatic resources clearly does not show the same degree of giving up sovereignty to the supranational level as allowing European institutions to initiate and decide upon a common foreign policy. Nevertheless, common spatial representation in third countries could be – and from the view of several parties already is – seen as a steppingstone towards joint representation. To justify the choice of Koenig-Archibugi's article to develop theoretical arguments, it can be further said that the willingness to give up small parts of sovereignty play a role in the co-location cases as well. The decision to engage into a cooperative relationship of whatever kind with the EU delegation leaves the bilateral embassy ceteris paribus in a less independent situation than before.
Concluding, the reviewed literature touched upon the possibility of sharing resources and raised questions for further research, without gaining a deeper understanding of the topic. Yet, it is a phenomenon, which might be worth studying due to its growing trend, which could in the future also be an option for other member states. Therefore, the underlying study will also use the existing findings and ideas to set up a theoretical framework that shall help to find answers to the research question.
5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Nowadays the EU is composed of 28 European countries. The original peace project, which started off after the end of World War II, has witnessed great approval over the past half century, which led to a fast growing Union (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011, chap. 1). Despite the ongoing integration process on several levels, one thing still remains: it is the member states that play a major role in creating and forming the EU and its trajectory. EU member states are actors who make efforts to work together towards common goals, yet they can feature fundamental diversities (Hix & Høyland, 2011, chap. 1). This leads to the underlying assumption that different characteristics on the national level might also result in diverging interests and decisions taken on the European or international level. This study examines, whether certain characteristics might influence the decision of member states to cooperate closer with EU delegations in third countries. Engaging into co-locations is an opportunity that has not been taken up by all member states. What is more, the countries having a co-location in place do not count the same number. The diversity among member states in this exact foreign policy decision triggers the subsequent research.

Within this section a number of tentative answers to the posed research question will be derived from existing IR theories, public management concepts and empirical research findings on relating matters. The goal is to filter plausible factors that could explain why some member states are more inclined to take the cooperation of their embassies with the EEAS to a higher level through co-location. By doing so, the basis for the empirical analysis in chapter seven will be established.

As explained in the previous chapter, Koenig-Archibugi’s (2004) findings concerning factors that facilitate cooperation in foreign and security matters, will be taken up for building a theoretical groundwork for the analysis. The concepts behind relative material capabilities and Europeanized identities will in the following be discussed more in detail. It will be shown that both of them are appropriate to advance the current discussion and find independent variables that might increase the possibility of co-locations. In addition to that, a third concept, rooted in the reform waves of the public sectors, will be used.

5.1 Relative capabilities

One of the explanatory factors in Koenig-Archibugi’s section of consequential approaches is relative capabilities of a member state. Relative capabilities are rooted in the logic of consequence since the theory behind them allows for a calculation of a country’s attitude on EU institution-building in foreign affairs (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). This power-related concept has its origin in the realist theory of IR.
According to the neo-realist Kenneth N. Waltz (1979), domestic political structure can be defined by three factors: the ordering principle, the character of the units and the distribution of capabilities. The theory further says that the order in an international system is constantly anarchic and the states acting in this international arena are individual units with undifferentiated functions, all striving for self-help. Consequently, the remaining factor defining political structures is the distribution of capabilities. Following this argument, Waltz claims that “[t]he structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units. And changes in structure change expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the outcomes their interactions will produce.” (1979, p. 97). So, realism does not consider any attribute of a state to determine its actions, but its sheer power. Power, in turn, equips a state with being able to maintain its autonomy when it comes to international affairs (ibid).

When states are aware of their relative power within the framework they are acting in, they use their resources in a way to pursue their own goals. Roughly speaking, actions of member states can, according to this theory, be explained by studying their relative positions in the EU. A critical note that could be made at this stage is that the EU cannot be directly compared to the anarchic international stage, because of its several supranational institutions and treaties. Yet, foreign policy is still an issue where member states make most decisions at the national level and are sovereign in their actions. Therefore, the realist idea will be pursued as Koenig-Archibugi did in his article.

In practice, realism would expect governments with powerful resources that allow them to achieve their goals in foreign policy independently – yet also effectively – not to give up their autonomy. On the contrary, this would suggest that relatively weaker member states are more willing to engage in supranational agreements in foreign and security policy, as they would count on a growing influence on the international stage, when combining resources (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004).

Power capabilities within the realist theory are often reduced to military power, which is said to be the key to ensure the state’s security and power position. Yet, elaborating on this assumption and linking it to the issue at hand, diplomatic missions also aim to secure the home countries. The executive nature of military and diplomatic power might be diverse, yet the goals are similar. Having a large diplomatic network in place and establishing good bilateral relations raises the power capability. Therefore relative capabilities of EU member states in third countries can in regard to this research’s topic be interpreted as the size of diplomatic networks. When a member state already has a relatively large diplomatic network in place and is well-positioned in third countries, it can be assumed that this country is able to pursue its interests abroad independently. It has the privilege to work autonomously, without having to rely on European allies. The country would only choose to cooperate with other
countries, when cooperation betters their own position. A reversed strategy is then hypothesized for those member states, which are relatively underrepresented in third countries. Their capability in achieving diplomatic goals is believed to be minor; so is their autonomous power. In order to bring their interests across it might sometimes be helpful or even necessary to engage in cooperation.

Koenig-Archibugi’s thesis that “Governments with higher power capabilities will be less supportive of supranational integration in foreign and security matters than governments with lower capabilities” (2004, p. 145), can thus also be used as a groundwork for the first hypothesis and adapted to the specific matter.

H1: The smaller the network of national diplomatic representations in third countries is, the higher the possibility that it shares resources on the EU level.

Following the realist argument, which suggests that the dispersion of one country’s diplomatic representations has to be taken into account when analyzing its willingness to engage in co-locations with EU delegations, the next argument is rooted in the constructivist IR theory.

5.2 Europeanized identity

Another possibly relevant factor Koenig-Archibugi tested positive for affecting a country’s attitude towards supranational integration in foreign policy originates from the constructivist theory of IR. Constructivism is a rather young theory in the study of IR, yet it might explain governments’ actions, where other theories fail to do so. It implies that decisions on the international stage are driven by the formation of identities, cultures and norms. In this specific regard it means that the level of Europeanization among the public matters. (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004).

Looking at the evolution of the EU over time, it is obvious that a growing number of competences have been transferred to the supranational level. Joint-decision making with more and more involvement of supranational institutions marks the contemporary European polity. Thomas Risse writes, “[…] we should expect that this emerging European polity impacts upon the way individuals and social groups view themselves and the nation-state.” (2001, p. 200). From a constructivist point of view, national identities are the essence of creating imaginary communities of nation-states that are then usually defined by territorial properties. A ‘collective’ identity can in turn be seen as “intersubjective, shared understandings of identity that have become consensual among social groups.” (Risse, 2001, p. 201). Following those arguments, it would be true that European integration is as much a result of Europeanized identities as it is a cause.
In democratic states like European countries, where the people elect the national governments, the previously obtained train of thought can be pursued to arrive at a hypothesis about political decision-making in international settings. Constructivists believe that populations to some extent form the governments’ attitude on European integration (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). Even though the idea may be normative, governments should represent the majority of citizens’ opinions, hence if that part of the population was in favor of certain policies, the government ideally should be as well. To sum up, the theory traces government’s behavior back to the domestic level and the way identities are formed within it. Koenig-Archibugi found that more Europeanized identities are positively correlated to “the possibility that governments prefer a supranational foreign and security policy [...]” (p. 164). Masses consist of individuals though and the constructivist theory says that those individuals can be – in regard to the context – part of multiple social identities. So, the underlying policy area matters (Risse, 2001) and should therefore be incorporated in the study. Making use of those findings and linking them to the policy field under examination, a second hypothesis can be formulated:

H2: The more a country’s population is in favor of a European common foreign policy, the higher the possibility that it shares resources on the EU level.

Through a more cost-efficient lens, the argument why countries would choose co-locations looks differently and will be reproduced hereafter.

5.3 Financial resources

It is commonly known that European countries have not been spared by the financial and subsequent economic crisis breaking out around the years of 2008/2009. Some EU member states are more affected than others though; e.g. Greece, Spain or Ireland to name only a few. Unbearable public debts forced countries to cut back on their budgets, which per definition should lead to smaller spending.

‘Do more with less’, or in other words ‘increasing efficiency in the public sector’, was also one of the founding principles of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991, pp. 15/16). NPM was a reform wave that started off in several OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries in the 1980s and 1990s using elements of managerialism and economic rationalism and implementing them in public administrations (Hood, 1994). Hood (1991) outlines seven doctrines that explain the NPM style: it includes (1) more ‘hands-on professional management’, (2) performance standards and subsequent measurement, (3) greater emphasis on output controls, (4) decentralization of public sector units, (5) stimulation of competition among public units, (6) a shift towards private-sector
management styles and (7) emphasis on more discipline and parsimony in resource management (pp. 4/5). Especially the last doctrine regarding public resources is one that still applies to a lot of European countries, given their financial situation. Many countries are facing financial constraints and international financial obligations, which pressure them to evaluate their goals carefully and find a way to allocate the minimum input needed to achieve the maximum output. Putting it differently, governments have to assume responsibility in maximizing efficiency in the public sector. Diplomatic missions are no exception to this. They are part of a country’s foreign ministry and hence consume a significant part of the public budget assigned to the ministry.

Applying the approach to the subject at hand, this would suggest that countries try to achieve their goals in diplomatic representation with the most cost-efficient engagement of the budget. Sharing resources generally implies a reduction of individual costs. This would hence be a preferable option for countries confronted with budget cuts, as it reduces their fixed costs on rental expenses and offers a more flexible and less expensive way of public spending. Following the previous arguments, a third hypothesis can be made:

\[ H3: \text{The more budgetary constraints a member state faces, the higher the possibility that it chooses to share resources on the EU level.} \]

The theoretical framework provides three potential factors that might have an influence on the probability that a member state co-locates with an EU delegation. The aspects of the established diplomatic network, the level of Europeanization among the people regarding a common foreign policy and budgetary constraints constitute the basis for the up-coming analysis. In a next step, the choice of research design and methodology as well as the operationalization of the identified factors will be explained.
6 RESEARCH DESIGN

So far, the phenomenon under examination has been defined and the theoretical framework that will be used to find answers to the research question has been outlined. In this part various tools will be discussed and assessed for their appropriateness to build a linkage between the theories and the collected empirical data or as Gschwend and Schimmelfennig put it “[creating a] dialogue between theory and data” (2007, p. 2).

The research question, “Which factor(s) increase the probability of EU member states cooperating with EU delegations in third countries through co-location?”, implies an outcome-centric research. The focus lies on finding an explanation of the specific phenomenon: the cooperation through co-location. Here, the view of causality is probabilistic as the factor(s) looked for are those, which increase the probability of co-location. Moreover, outcome-centric research designs are particularly often applied in realms, where the theoretical development is less advanced (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig, 2007), as is the case here.

The research will be split into two empirical parts combining two types of research approaches: large-N and a case study. This mixed option allows for an augmentation of the results of the quantitative research with insights on the topic provided through a case study (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). In the first step, a quantitative research design taking all EU member states into account will be chosen to analyze whether any of the selected independent variables is significantly related to the co-location decision. A more in-depth view on the issue will then in a second step be provided through a more detailed analysis of one specific member state, namely the Netherlands. The decision to collect additional empirical data and analyze them in a qualitative manner, after statistically testing the hypotheses, can be reasoned by the probability of not finding any clear patterns through quantitative analysis. Having a look at the member states, which have co-locations, it is conspicuous that no preliminary assumptions about country-related patterns can be made at first glance. This could be the case due to the limited number of cases studied. On that score, a more thorough analysis would enrich the academic contribution of this thesis on the respective matter.

The following subchapters will explain the choice for the quantitative empirical part and discuss the measurement as well as the operationalization of the variables.

6.1 Selection of quantitative research approach

One characteristic that facilitates the selection of a research design is the number of cases (N) to be studied. The so-called large-N or quantitative approach pays more attention to
creating generality among its findings at the expense of lacking special investigation of individual results, like for instance deviant cases (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig, 2007). For this empirical study the sample will include all 28 EU member states. Hence, the small-N approach or qualitative research method can for the time being be put aside. The analysis will be conducted with the objective to find a pattern among all cases, which in return raises the external validity of the results.

According to Kellstedt & Whitten (2013) two types of quantitative research are most frequently used in political science: experiments and observational studies. While experiments score well in controlling the independent variable by randomly assigning values of interest to the participant groups (ibid), it is not suitable for this specific research. The research aim is more to find member state-related factors. Thus, a better approach to do that would be to conduct an observational study.

Observational approaches are appropriate to draw a picture of reality as they work with existing data, that the researcher is not able to influence. One can differentiate between time-series and cross-sectional observational studies. The second one, the cross-sectional design, is of particular relevance as it allows for comparison of individual units (ibid), which will within this investigation be the EU member states and their bilateral missions in third countries.

6.1.1 Internal validity

According to Kellstedt & Whitten (2013) four hurdles have to be overcome in order for the study to be of high internal validity. First, a causal mechanism is according to the scholars, who did research on the institutionalization of European foreign affairs, plausible (e.g. Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; or Rijks & Whitman, 2007). Second, the cause has to precede the effect, which is in this case the establishment of co-locations. This hurdle will be tackled by splitting the data (where necessary) into two periods: co-locations established before and after the creation of the Lisbon Treaty. This leads to the Lisbon Treaty being an additional independent variable. Third, a co-variation between factors X and Y is presumed and explained in the theoretical framework, but yet has to be tested through the study. In general, the elimination of the fourth hurdle is the most difficult one within observational studies (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013). For an assertion of a causal relationship between X and Y, not only the identified variables should be tested, but also all other factors (Z) that might have an impact on the decision. This is due to bounded rationality and time constraints almost impossible to put into practice. Nonetheless, crossing three hurdles accompanied by an appropriate and sound research design makes the verification of potential causal relationships feasible.
6.2 Bivariate measures of association

The quantitative analysis will be done with the help of bivariate measures of association. Measures of association are in general a very important tool in social research because they assist the researcher in tracing causal relationships between two variables. However, one of the limitations is that the statistics produced through measures of association cannot be seen as an explicit proof that the independent variable causes the variation in or existence of the dependent variable. If the results show some degree of association (also referred to as correlation), they should rather be interpreted as evidence for a potential cause-and-effect relationship. Bivariate measures of association usually follow a three-step plan, answering three essential questions: “1. Does an association exist? […] 2. If an association does exist, how strong is it? [and] 3. What is the pattern and/or the direction of the association?” (Healey, 2007, p. 255). In the following, the operationalization of this three-step plan will be briefly explained.

6.2.1 Bivariate table

In the first step, the variables are categorized into dichotomies (for detailed choice of measurement see 6.3 Operationalization). Categorical variables, also referred to as nominal variables, are characterized by being different or equal in value, yet a ranking between the categories cannot be made (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013). Having categorical variables on both ends, i.e. for the independent as well as the dependent variable, calls according to Kellstedt and Whitten for a tabular analysis. Tabular analysis is widely used in political science research. The table displays the independent variable and its two categories in the columns and the dependent variable in the rows (ibid). The number of cases is amounting to 28 (EU member states), which is fairly small. For that reason the utilization of a special statistical computer program is not necessary and Microsoft Excel will be the main software for measuring the association.

6.2.2 Measure of significance: chi square test

After the creation of a bivariate table, containing all the observed frequencies \( f_o \) for each relation, a chi square \( \chi^2 \) test will be carried out. Chi square is a significance test that evaluates the independence of the relationship between the two variables. In order to do that, a null hypothesis has to be formulated, saying that the two variables are independent. Under this assumption, the values in the bivariate table have to be transformed into expected frequencies \( f_e \). The observed and the expected results can then be compared with each other through means of the following formula (Healey, 2007, p. 231):

\[
\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(f_o - f_e)^2}{f_e}
\]
The above is also called $\chi^2$ (obtained). Its value can only be interpreted, when compared to $\chi^2$ (critical), which indicates the critical region. The degree of freedom, which has the value of 1 in a 2x2 table and alpha, which sets the level of significance at 0.05, determine $\chi^2$ (critical). In this case it will be 3.841. If $\chi^2$ (obtained) exceeds the critical region, it is likely that the variables are dependent and consequently the null hypothesis can be rejected and further analyses can be carried out. The detection of a significant association or independence answers the first question of the three-step plan and connotes that the hypotheses may deliver a valid answer to the research question.

6.2.3 Measure of association: phi test

If a relationship between the two variables is proven, then the second step is to measure the strength of association. By calculating phi ($\varphi$), which is based on the chi square test, a value can be obtained that helps making claims on the strength. The choice of computing phi can be reasoned in its suitability for 2x2 tables at a nominal level. The formula\(^6\) divides $\chi^2$ (obtained) by the number of cases and takes the square root of the result. In the case of 2x2 tables the scores will range between 0 (no association) and 1.00 (perfect association). It is further possible to read the basic grade of association: weak (less than 0.10), moderate (0.11 to 0.30) and strong (greater than 0.30) (Healey, 2007).

6.2.4 Analysis of pattern and direction of association

Besides reading the column percentages provided in the bivariate tables, which put the frequencies into relation to the number of cases per category, scattergrams will help visualizing patterns of association.

**Scattergram**

The construction of a scattergram that makes the features of a correlation between two variables in a graphical way visible is an additional helpful tool. The plot illustrates two dimensions; the dependent variable on the y-axis (vertical) and the independent variable on the x-axis (horizontal). Every member state is represented by a dot and all together they build the pattern of association. An advantage of the scatterplot is that it allows for an illustration of the association on an interval-ratio level, i.e. the data are not categorized, but the individual values are shown.

With the help of a regression line, the pattern and direction of the relationship can be clarified. If the line lies at an angle to the x-axis, this indicates that a relationship is existent. Besides that, the angle of regression also implies the direction of the relationship. An

\[ \varphi = \frac{\chi^2}{\sqrt{N}} \]

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\(^6\)Formula for phi (Healey, 2007, p. 261): $\varphi = \frac{\chi^2}{\sqrt{N}}$
ascending line suggests a positive direction and a descending line a negative one. In that manner the third question of the three-step plan can be answered.

Further, the distance of the dots to the regression line also provides information on the strength of correlation. As a general rule, the closer the dots are to the line, the stronger the relationship is (Healey, 2007). However, a scattergram will only be inserted in cases where the prior tests show a strong association between the variables. In that way the detected correlation can be analyzed more in-depth.

6.3 Operationalization

In chapter five the underlying hypotheses for the investigation were put forward. In order to test them with the help of statistical tools, the independent variables as well as the dependent one have to be identified and transformed into measureable units.

Concepts of social and political science are often difficult to measure. Yet, a transition from the theoretical-conceptual stage to the empirical-measured one has to be made. This will be done in three steps for each variable. First, the concept of the variable has to be defined. Second, the level of measurement will be chosen and last, the reliability and validity of the measures have to be checked (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013). An operational measure can basically be regarded as reliable, when the same measurement rules could be repeatedly applied to the same cases and the results would stay equal. In addition to that, the validity check ensures that the selected measures actually represent the originally intended concepts (ibid).

In the following two subchapters, the measurement of each relevant variable will be announced briefly. A more elaborate explanation on the data sources and choices made when transforming the obtained information into categorical units will be provided in chapter seven. In this way the link between the descriptive and explanatory analyses of each independent variable becomes clearer to the reader.

6.3.1 Measurement of dependent variable

Co-location

The research question points out that the investigation attempts to find out which factor(s) have an influence on the likeliness that EU member states establish a co-location with an EU delegation. Hence, the dependent variable is in principle the existence or absence of co-locations.

The Annual Activity Report 2013 of the EEAS (EEAS, 2014) included a list of co-location cases with bilateral missions in third countries. Even though this was the most current published information on that matter it had to be regarded as outdated, because the report of
the year 2014 stated that more co-locations had been created (EEAS, 2015a, pp. 6/7). Since there was no list enclosed in the most recent report, the EEAS was contacted and asked for an updated one. The institution reacted to the request and sent an updated list of co-locations between EU delegations and member state missions (to be found in appendix A). The new version proves that apparently there have been numerous projects concluded throughout 2014. The updated table will be used as the main source for the quantitative analysis, as it was directly created for this research and contains the most recent data available.

Nevertheless, it is very difficult to control for the validity of the list. Overall, it is not evident from the websites of the EU delegations and/or bilateral missions, whether a co-location exists or not. Sometimes the foreign ministries do not even mention the representations, which allegedly share premises with the EEAS, in their official list of diplomatic missions abroad. As a consequence, contact details could not be found for each co-location case. This fact makes the verification of the list received from the EEAS more difficult. The lack in transparency unquestionably adds to the limitations of this work. Being aware of this fact though, there is still enough proof that the phenomenon exists and is growing. Some MoUs, for instance between the EEAS and Spain in Myanmar, Azerbaijan and Yemen, can be found under the press releases of the EEAS.

According to the updated list of the EEAS, 16 member states have hitherto decided to share premises with the EU. The dependent variable will be measured regarding the existence or absence of co-locations per member state. Consequently, the 16 countries make up the first category ‘having at least one co-location with the EU’. The remaining 12 countries have so far no co-location arrangement. The content of the list will be presented and discussed more in detail in chapter seven, when descriptively analyzing the data.

### 6.3.2 Measurement of independent variables

**Relative capabilities**

The first hypothesis was phrased as follows:

**H1**: The smaller the network of national diplomatic representations in third countries is, the higher the possibility that it shares resources on the EU level.

The independent variable here is the size of the diplomatic network of a member state. In the analysis, the definition of the size of a diplomatic network counts the number of third countries a member state is diplomatically represented in. This implies, that diplomatic

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7 Those countries are: Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain and the UK.
representations within the EU are excluded from the count (e.g. the Dutch Embassy in Germany).

There are two ways the network will be depicted. Firstly, only third countries with an embassy (being the most important and powerful form of bilateral diplomatic missions) of every EU member state are considered. Secondly, all third countries with any kind of diplomatic representation from the respective EU member state are included in the count (i.e. embassies, consulate-generals, honorary consulates and representative offices). The sums provide an overview of the geographical dispersion of diplomatic missions of a country. The total numbers make a categorization of diplomatic capabilities of each member state into 'small' and 'large diplomatic networks' possible. Data collection is done by browsing through the websites of all foreign ministries of EU countries and figuring out where and in what form the member states are represented in third countries.

**Europeanized identity**
The second argument focused on the public identity and suggests that:

**H2: The more a country’s population is in favor of a European common foreign policy, the higher the possibility that it shares resources on the EU level.**

In this case the independent variable is the attitude of one country’s population towards European common foreign policy. Roughly speaking, the population of a country can be for, against, or neutral towards the matter. Masses consist of individuals though and the constructivist theory says that those individuals can be – in regard to the context – part of multiple social identities. So, the underlying policy area does make a difference and should therefore be examined separately. Thus, it is more realistic to work with percentages of the population that is in favor of a common foreign policy. Eurobarometer is the umbrella term under which survey data is collected and evaluated on behalf of the European Commission. Since 1973 the public opinion of European citizens on various European topics has been monitored (Com, 2015c). It will serve as the main source for measuring the independent variable of Europeanized identity.

**Financial resources**
The third hypothesis contains an argument about the financial situation of a state.

**H3: The more budgetary constraints a member state faces, the higher the possibility that it chooses to share resources on the EU level.**

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8 Please note that there is a possibility that websites of foreign ministries have not been updated recently and therefore the size of diplomatic missions might be slightly different in reality. However, the potential deviation presumably would not change the research results significantly.
According to this statement, the independent variable is the *budgetary constraint of a member state*. It can be measured in various ways. As this study investigates an EU matter, it seems legitimate to assess the financial situation of a country according to EU rules. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) contains rules regarding economic and financial affairs of EU member states with the aim of ensuring sound public finances and fiscal policies at the national level. The European pact will be seen as a guide for financial stability. The limit set for an excessive budget deficit is greater than 3% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and for an excessive public debt it is 60% of the GDP (Com, 2015a).

### 6.4 Qualitative research approach

In addition to the observational study, where existing data are brought together to find possible statistical linkages between the independent and dependent variables, the second empirical part will be of a qualitative nature.

Case studies are a convenient method for examining recent and complex phenomena. Due to the fact that only one or a few cases are studied, more time and effort can be spent on analyzing and reflecting the empirical findings (Blatter & Haverland, 2012).

In the course of the second empirical part, data will be collected through interviews and obtaining thorough knowledge of the case through document-based research. The additional information allows for a more detailed testing of the theories and might reveal the (non-)applicability of the three potential factors, where the quantitative approach could not do so. Furthermore, other factors may also have an impact on the decision-making, which can be considered in a case study as well. More detailed information on the design of the case study will be provided after the first empirical part.
7 EMPIRICAL PART I: QUANTITATIVE STUDY

The previous two chapters gave an overview of the selected theories that allowed for formulating preliminary answers to the research question and after that exemplified the methods of testing the hypotheses. In this section the empirical data will be described more in detail and analyzed individually as well as in association with the dependent variable. As outlined before, for the explanatory analysis the statistical tools of bivariate tables, chi square and phi value as well as percentage columns and scattergrams will be used. In that way the significance, strength and direction of association can be detected.

7.1 Co-locations

7.1.1 Descriptive analysis

As stated in the operationalization part, there are currently according to the updated list received from the EEAS (see appendix A) 16 member states having at least one co-location between one of their diplomatic representations and an EU delegation outside the EU in place. Figure 1 lists all of those 16 countries in regard to the number of co-locations they had established by 2015\(^9\). France counts five co-locations, which is the highest number among them. Yet, Spain, the UK and Germany follow France with only one less and Finland has signed three MoUs on that matter. States like the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Austria and Slovakia chose to share premises in two countries and Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Croatia, Greece and Portugal have one co-location.

![Figure 1 Number of Co-locations per Member State (in total)](image)

The amount of co-locations indicated in Figure 1 show no distinction of the type of diplomatic mission on the member state side. It is not evident from the EEAS list what kind of member state representation shares the premises. However, the description of the different types of diplomatic missions in chapter three makes an assumption possible. EU delegations are usually situated in capital cities, thus the bilateral missions are supposed to be embassies,

\(^9\) Updated list as per June 16, 2015 (EEAS)
honorary consulates or cooperation offices. Since consulate-generals and consulates are generally not located in the capital cities, they can be excluded. Sometimes it is possible though to trace the cases back and determine the nature of the member state mission. For example the Austrian case in Belarus, which is an honorary consulate, yet most cases are unclear. On the EU side it is clear, since there is only one type, the EU delegation. The difficulty of finding contact details of the representations and comparing them to the locations of the EU delegations has already been acknowledged in the operationalization part. Diplomacy is after all a very delicate issue for member states and they may have legitimate reasons of not disclosing certain information.

Chapter two briefly dealt with the call for more European diplomacy and the implications of the latest treaty revision. One of the changes of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 was the implementation of EU delegations. Their task is to support and enhance European diplomacy around the globe. Having one official European institution in a majority of third countries also encouraged the creation of more co-location projects. Figure 2 exhibits the increase in co-locations after the Lisbon Treaty. It demonstrates that the number has more than tripled over the period of 2010 to 2015. The rising numbers, to be precise from 11 to 36 cases, imply an increase of almost 230%. This trend, once more proves the existence of an emerging phenomenon in this area.

Another way of presenting the data is to look at the frequencies of third countries per continent, where premises are shared. Figure 3 depicts the dispersion of arrangements, indicating that most cases are to be found in Asian and African countries. The nine Asian countries are Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, East Timor, Georgia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Turkey (Gaziantep) as well as the two Middle Eastern states Yemen and Iraq. In Africa there have been projects concluded in the following five countries: Ethiopia, Mauritania, Nigeria, South Sudan and Tanzania. Colombia is until now the only Southern American example and Honduras the single case in Central America. A co-location in a European country outside the EU was created in Belarus.
Currently, there are discussions going on between the EEAS and EU member states on co-location projects in 20 third countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Hong Kong, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Mali, Paraguay, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Turkey and Uganda (EEAS, SG1 Corporate Board Secretariat, personal communication, June 16, 2015).

The presented data on co-locations will in the following be analyzed by three factors – starting with the size of the diplomatic network – that potentially raise the probability of a country to co-locate.

7.2 The diplomatic network of EU member states in third countries

The diplomatic presence of member states in third countries is the first factor to be crossed with co-locations in this study. The theoretical framework outlined in chapter five, explained that countries with a smaller diplomatic network are expected to be more likely to share their premises with the EU. The worldwide dispersion of diplomatic missions serves as an indicator for relative power capabilities, which is a factor rooted in the realist theory of IR.

7.2.1 Descriptive analysis

During a process of systematically browsing through the foreign ministries’ websites of the 28 member states as well as the website of the EEAS, an extensive data collection on diplomatic missions in third countries could be carried out. In the following, the results will be first presented in a descriptive way and then the measurement of the variable will be explained more in detail before testing the first hypothesis.

Figure 4 gives an overview of the number of current diplomatic missions of all 28 member states in countries outside the EU and further includes the number of EU delegations of the EEAS across the world. For a better comparison on the member state side, only those representations with the status of an embassy have been considered in this graph. Thus, the

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10 For the sources of data collection (websites of foreign ministries) please see appendix C.
A comparison of diplomatic missions happens in a way, where third countries with a respective embassy are counted. This is important, to get an idea about the number of countries around the world, where EU member states are officially represented in the highest form.

The figures show that there is a considerable difference in diplomatic presence between the member states. While the ‘big three’ France, Germany and the UK take the leading position with 138, 126 and 121 embassies respectively, the smaller countries Malta and Luxembourg have a rather scarce network of embassies in only 11 third countries. Also, the Baltic states have still a comparatively small diplomatic mission in place. The EEAS counts the same amount of delegations as the UK, having the third highest number of embassies abroad. However, this does not mean that countries lacking an embassy in a specific country, did not establish bilateral relations with the latter. There is also the possibility of setting up other forms of diplomatic missions.

**Figure 4 Size of Diplomatic Network per Member State (only Embassies) and EU in Third Countries**

In contrast to Figure 4, Figure 5 shows the total amount of countries outside the EU, where member states have any kind of diplomatic representation. Hence, it includes embassies, but also representative offices, liaison offices, consulate-generals, consulates and honorary consulates. As in the preceding figure, only the third countries have been counted, meaning...
that even if e.g. Portugal had an embassy, a consulate-general and four consulates in Brazil it was only counted once; namely as ‘being diplomatically represented in that third country’. The second, more comprehensive point of view on diplomatic missions abroad stirs up the ranking order of Figure 4. Germany, for instance, takes the lead with being present in 152 third countries, followed by France in 140 countries. Moreover, Italy (131), the UK (131), Belgium (130), the Netherlands (129) and Sweden (128) are broader represented than the EEAS (124). Spain, who was on the fifth place when it comes to embassies only, drops down to place 15. On the other hand, Austria being a rather small country in size has a quite extensive presence in third countries, falling only shortly behind the EEAS. Other member states, like for example Slovenia, that simply do not have a widespread network, often rely on the services of other member states in third countries.

![Figure 5: Size of Diplomatic Network per Member State (all Types) and EU in Third Countries](image)

In order to be able to produce a bivariate table, the EU countries will be divided into two categories: large diplomatic missions and small diplomatic missions. The threshold value for the first test will be at 70 embassies. The average (rounded value 55) is not suitable for separation, because the ‘big three’ countries (France, Germany, UK) deviate considerably from this number. This means consequently, that six countries have large diplomatic networks (70 or above) and 22 countries have smaller networks (69 or below).
For the second test, where every type of diplomatic mission counts, the cutting point needs to be raised since the absolute number is higher as well. Here, the EU average lies at approximately 96, which seems to be an adequate cutting point. Having a representation in 96 or more countries qualifies a member state to be labeled with ‘large diplomatic network’. Within the EU, 16 countries fulfill this criterion. The remaining 12 states have a smaller dispersion of diplomatic missions and thus fall under the second category ‘small diplomatic network’.

Before going ahead with the explanatory analysis, the measurement of the dependent variable ‘co-location’ will be shortly repeated. The dependent variable will be divided into two simple categories: ‘co-location’ and ‘no co-location’. Countries that have at least one co-location in place fall under the first category; the rest is part of the second one.

### 7.2.2 Explanatory analysis

Having specified the measurement for both, the independent and dependent variable of the first hypothesis, the statistical tests of bivariate measures of association can be carried out. Following the claim made about the correlation between the size of the diplomatic network and co-locations, it is expected that countries with smaller diplomatic networks are more inclined to share premises with EU delegations in third countries. In order to check whether this is the case, bivariate tables were created for both scenarios, (1) taking only embassies into account and (2) considering all types of diplomatic representation. As already described in the research design section, a chi square test will be done to see whether a significant (0.05 significance) dependence between the two variables can be identified. If the result is above the critical value of 3.841, it can be assumed that the variables are not independent, if it is under the critical point, the variables can be seen as independent from each other. Independence – according to the chi square test – means that, if one case was classified in one category of the independent variable, it wouldn’t make any difference to the probability that the exact same case would also be categorized into a specific (correlating) category of the dependent variable (Healey, 2007). Phi will then reveal the strength of the relationship and column percentages, just like scattergrams will be presented to be able to determine the direction of the detected pattern.

In Table 1 the correlation between the size of the diplomatic network defined by embassies and having a co-location or none is tested. Six member states have more than 70 embassies and therefore hold a large diplomatic network according to the set rules\(^\text{11}\). The other 22

\(^{11}\) France, Germany, UK, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands
countries\textsuperscript{12} are regarded as having smaller networks. The chi square value (5.727) exceeds the critical region, which means that independence between the two variables can be excluded. Hence, a statistically significant association is existent and with a phi value of 0.452 even a strong relationship could be detected\textsuperscript{13}. Putting it differently, it can be assumed that the size of diplomatic networks is to some extent related to the creation of co-locations. However, the column percentages in Table 1 indicate that the empirics do not manifest the same direction of association as expected from the theory. The entire group of countries with a large diplomatic network has a co-location arrangement, while the majority (54.55\%) of the countries with fewer embassies in third countries have no such accords. This means that the tests do not support the hypothesis when it comes to the predicted pattern. Rather, the results imply that states with large diplomatic networks are more likely to have a co-location with the EU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of diplomatic network in third countries (by embassies)</th>
<th>Large (%)</th>
<th>Small (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-location</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>45.45</td>
<td>57.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No co-location</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>54.55</td>
<td>42.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Note: chi square 5.727 (3.841), phi 0.452 (strong relationship)}

The direction of association becomes even more visible in a scattergram (Figure 6). The data for this analysis is at the interval-ratio level. Every country is represented by a dot combining two dimensions: the number of co-locations on the y-axis and the number of embassies in third countries on the x-axis. The country-scores on those two axes determine the position and also the scatter of the dots. The received pattern summarizes the relationship and direction of the association, which is in this case a positive relationship between the dependent and the independent variable. The more embassies a state has, the more co-locations it has established. The diagonally ascending regression line illustrates this positive relationship. The strength of the bivariate association can also be interpreted by looking at the spread of the dots around the regression line. Since not all the cases are located directly

\textsuperscript{12}Sweden, Romania, Czech Republic, Poland, Belgium, Greece, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Slovakia, Ireland, Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, Luxembourg and Malta

\textsuperscript{13} General guidelines of the textbook ‘the essentials of statistics – a tool for social research’ (Healey, 2007, p. 263) find application here for interpreting phi: less than 0.10 – weak relationship, between 0.11 and 0.30 – moderate relationship, greater than 0.30 – strong relationship.

38
on the line, the association is not perfect. A certain degree of correlation is provided though, as proven by the phi test as well as the angle of the regression line.

The second way of testing hypothesis 1 is to consider every type of diplomatic mission. In Table 2 the frequencies of co-locations among member states with large diplomatic networks are contrasted with those having a smaller diplomatic service. Similar to the previous results, the chi square test delivers evidence that the two variables are to a significant extent not independent. Continuing with the testing, phi value accounts for 0.473, which can be interpreted as a strong relationship between the comprehensive size of diplomatic networks and co-locations. Even though bivariate measures of association are not able to confirm a causal mechanism (Healey, 2007), the results can still be seen as evidence for the independent variable to influence the dependent one. So, it can be said that – just like the network of embassies – also the size of the total diplomatic service is associated to the decision of co-locating with EU delegations. Examining the pattern of correlation, Table 2 shows an obvious direction of association. 75.00% of the member states with an extensive representation are engaged in an agreement on sharing resources with the EU. On the other side, roughly the same percentage (72.73%) of countries with smaller networks does not share premises. Hence, the pattern implies that large diplomatic networks increase the chance that states create a co-location.
### TABLE 2 Co-locations by Diplomatic Network (all Types)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of diplomatic network in third countries (all types)</th>
<th>Large (%)</th>
<th>Small (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-location</td>
<td>75.00</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>53.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No co-location</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>72.73</td>
<td>42.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: chi square 6.272 (3.841), phi 0.473 (strong relationship)*

Additional to Table 2, Figure 7 gives a visual impression of the direction of association. The regression line is again diagonally ascending, which indicates a positive relationship. The plot suggests that ‘the bigger a country’s diplomatic network is, the more co-locations it has’. Nevertheless, the spread of the dots in the scattergram does not point to a perfect association and neither does the phi value. It is noticeable that there are countries like e.g. Sweden and Belgium with an extensive representation, but no co-location with the EU whatsoever. Thus, predictions are only to be made with caution.

![Figure 7](image)

To sum up, the first hypothesis could not be supported by the conducted analysis. According to the test results it is not the case that countries with relatively smaller capabilities, or as it is defined here smaller diplomatic networks, are more likely to create co-locations with EU.
delegations. Interestingly enough, a strong association between the two variables could be detected, yet in the opposing direction. The majority of member states with a larger presence abroad co-locate.

7.3 Public opinion on common foreign policy

According to the constructivist theory discussed in chapter five, countries with a more Europeanized society are rather willing to give up sovereignty in foreign policy-making (Koenig-Archipugi, 2004). The argument was further elaborated by applying it to co-locations. Thomas Risse (2001) finds that policy areas matter when it comes to the Europeanization of peoples, since individuals can be part of numerous social identities. Keeping that in mind, it was hypothesized that the more positive a population’s attitude towards European foreign policy is, the more likely it is that this country shares resources with the EU.

7.3.1 Descriptive analysis

Eurobarometer (EB), the umbrella term for public opinion analyses on behalf of the European Commission, has been monitoring and evaluating survey data concerning various European topics since 1973 (Com, 2015c). In order to test the second hypothesis, EB is an eligible source. In the course of each standard survey, people could inter alia indicate whether they are in favor of, against or neutral in regard to common foreign policy. The validity of the dataset is quite straightforward as it shows exactly the concept intended by the independent variable.

Nevertheless, for measurability reasons a decision had to be made when it comes to the year of the survey. Since not all co-locations have been created after the Lisbon Treaty, two different years will be used. For all the projects realized before the Lisbon Treaty, the opinion of the year 2004 (Com, 2004 (EB 61); 2005 (EB 62)) will be taken. The public opinion of the year 2008 (Com, 2008 (EB 69); 2010 (EB 70)), which is the year before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, will serve as an indicator for the co-locations established after the creation of the EEAS (Lisbon Treaty)14. EB conducts the standard survey twice a year. To grasp the public opinion of the whole year, the average of the spring and autumn polls in the respective years will be used for the analysis.

In order to create a table out of the collected data, the member states will be divided into two categories: (1) above-average in favor (greater than 67.4% (2004)/ 69.1% (2008)), (2) below-average in favor (lesser than 67.4% (2004)/ 69.1% (2008)).

More limitations appear in regard to the youngest EU members. Croatia joined the EU in 2013 and can hence not be considered in the test before the Lisbon Treaty. Since its

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14 The awareness of the simplification of the independent variable is certainly given. Yet, for measurement reasons a decision had to be made and country patterns regarding EU foreign policy issues are mostly persistent (e.g. UK and Scandinavian countries are less in favor).
accession it has, according to the list of co-locations, already concluded one project in Azerbaijan. This is why it should be taken into consideration in the 2008 round.

The year of 2004 also presents some particularities, which will be overcome as explained in the following. In May 2004, 10 new countries acceded to the EU (European Union, 2007, para. 1). The EB results of spring 2004 do not take those states into account. The autumn edition on the contrary does and additionally discloses numbers from earlier that year. These data will be used for the analysis ‘before Lisbon’. The two – back then – pending countries Bulgaria and Romania, which became members in 2007, will also be considered. This is reasonable, when one keeps in mind that both had the possibility to create a co-location between their accession and the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Data for the last two countries are also provided by the same survey of EB.

Having clarified the measurement of the bivariate analysis, the collected data will be presented hereafter. Figure 8 lists the 25 EU member states by 2004 plus Romania and Bulgaria (EU 27) that joined in 2007. The respondents of the spring and autumn polls 2004 were asked to issue their opinion (for, against, neutral) on the following matter: “One common foreign policy among the member states of the EU, towards other countries”. The comparison in Figure 8 is based on the ‘in favor’ level, meaning that the percentages at the end of each bar depict the amount of survey participants, who said that they are for a common foreign policy. The survey results range between 43% and 79.5%. An aversion on more integration in foreign matters is most visible in the UK as well as all Scandinavian countries. The remarkably low amount answering ‘in favor’ in the UK corresponds to the relatively high percentage of around 40% being against it. Comparing this to e.g. Malta, where also only half of the respondents were in favor of common foreign policy-making, 25% claimed their indifference on the topic. On the other end, above EU average, are countries like Cyprus, Greece, Slovenia and Germany. However, in almost all EU countries back then the majority was in favor of tackling foreign policy collectively.
For the second identified period of creating co-locations, after the Lisbon Treaty, Figure 9 displays the collected data of the year 2008. All present 28 EU member states are included in the visualization. Overall, the rates of people being in favor of a common foreign policy are slightly higher compared to the data from the 2004 survey. According to the theory, this would imply that societies have become more Europeanized on the specific matter. On the one hand, the population least in favor still remains British with 49%, followed by Portugal (51%). On the other hand, there are four states exceeding 80%: Cyprus, Germany, Slovakia and Slovenia. The cases of Italy and the two Baltic States Estonia and Lithuania seemingly witnessed the most striking switch in opinion. Italy lost around 12 percentage points over the four years, while Estonia and Lithuania gained in approval of 7.5 and 9 percentage points respectively. The European average lies at 69.1%, which demonstrates that the majority of Europeans wishes to see more common action in foreign policy.
For the explanatory analysis the national public opinion just discussed will be linked to co-locations to find a potential association. The two categories for each year (2004 and 2008) are determined by the EU average results. Countries having a lower percentage in favor are lumped together as well as the ones scoring above average. In the case of 2004 this means that 11 countries are below-average and 16 above-average. In 2008 a number of 13 countries is relatively less in favor, whereas 15 states feature a higher approval.

### 7.3.2 Explanatory analysis

Hypothesis 2 expects that countries, where a relatively larger proportion of the population has a positive attitude towards common foreign policy, have more co-locations. In Table 3 and Table 4 the two categories of public opinion ‘above-average in favor’ and ‘below-average in favor’ are crossed with the dependent variable.

For the 11 projects concluded before the treaty revision, Table 3 exhibits the relationship under scrutiny. The chi square test with a value of 0.050 verifies the two variables as being independent. The observed frequencies in the bivariate table are not considerably deviating from the expected frequencies. Further tests of association are not necessary in that case, since both categories of the independent variable feature more or less the same frequencies of co-locations. Having such a low chi square value also implicates that the strength of
association is diminishing. The reason for that is the dependency of phi (strength of association) on chi square.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3 Co-locations by Public Opinion (Creation before Lisbon Treaty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion on European common foreign policy (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above-average in favor (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No co-location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: chi square 0.050 (3.841), phi 0.043 (weak relationship)

The measurement for the period after Lisbon (Table 4) finds some degree of association between the two variables. It has to be noted though, that the significance level for the chi square test is in this case only at 0.10, with a critical region at 2.706. In any case, the computation of phi also reveals a strong relationship (value of 0.358) between the public opinion on foreign policy and the co-location arrangements made after the Lisbon Treaty. Analyzing the percentages obtained for each country on an interval-ratio level is the next step to make general statements on the direction and pattern of correlation. For this reason a scattergram (Figure 10) was produced.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4 Co-locations by Public Opinion (Creation after Lisbon Treaty)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion on European common foreign policy (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above-average in favor (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No co-location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: chi square 3.590 (2.706), phi 0.358 (strong relationship)

Before continuing with the results of the scattergram, the bivariate table suggests that there is a negative relation between the approval of European foreign policy among the public and co-locations. In essence, this means that countries with a population less in favor of common foreign policy-making are more likely to create co-locations (69.23% in contrast to 33.33% for member states scoring above-average).
Figure 10 detects the association between the variables prior to dichotomizing the countries. The regression line does, like Table 4, point to a negative relationship, yet the angle of the line implies a very weak association. This is due to the wide spread of country scores. Reflecting on the impression received from the scattergram, the conclusion can be made that Figure 10 weakens the pattern assumed behind the frequencies. The reason for that can be found in the change from analyzing the data at a nominal level to the interval-ratio level, which shows that country-scores of the independent variable are very close to each other.

**Figure 10 Number of Co-locations by Public in Favor of Common Foreign Policy (2008)**

Concluding, hypothesis 2 did not find support in the preceding empirical findings. For the cases before the Lisbon Treaty there was no significant correlation whatsoever. The second analysis for the period after the Lisbon Treaty showed a higher degree of association, but the direction of the relationship contradicted the assumptions deduced from the constructivist theory. When taking a closer look at the results with the help of a scattergram, the relationship further loses significance and no real pattern can be verified. Concededly, there is a chance that findings would have been different if using other reference years for the public opinion on European foreign policy. Nevertheless, at an interval-ratio level the results might not have changed drastically, since the percentages in favor generally cluster in a quite small range above majority. Following the carried out tests, it can be summarized that the
degree of European identity on common foreign policy issues is – at this point – not noticeably related to the decision-making regarding co-locations.

7.4 Financial resources of member states
Following the concept of NPM, the financial resources of a country are assumed to be an issue during the process of whether or not to co-locate. The third hypothesis expects countries that are challenged through budgetary constraints to rather agree on co-locations with the EU.

7.4.1 Descriptive analysis
In order to prove whether the assumption is applicable for the EU member states, the financial state has to be measured in some way. Fiscal policy-making is an area that is basically handled domestically, yet the EU implemented a fiscal governance system to stabilize budgetary positions and ensure more efficiency in public spending (Com, 2015d, para. 3). The SGP contains rules regarding economic and financial affairs of EU member states with the aim of ensuring sound public finances and fiscal policies at the national level. This is why the SGP will be used as a guideline to differentiate countries facing budgetary constraints from others. The limits set for an excessive budget deficit is greater than 3% of the GDP and for an excessive public debt it is 60% of the GDP (Com, 2015a). These criteria will be used to categorize the member states by their public finances. Or to be clearer, into member states, where cost-efficiency is more likely to be an issue than others. It might seem strange to use such a strict indicator, where even presumably ‘rich’ countries like e.g. Germany cannot comply with it, yet the aim is to identify states where cost savings and cost-efficiency might play a role. And in that sense the SGP appears to be a suitable tool.

For the operationalization of the variable an average percentage for both SGP criteria will be calculated for the period of 2009 to 2014. This is the time when the financial situations of many EU countries became severe. Information on the financial conditions is retrieved from Eurostat, the statistical center of the EU situated in Luxembourg. The institution provides statistical data, which are regularly used to carry out country and region comparisons at the European level (Eurostat, 2015c, para. 2).

For the subsequent analysis two different ratios from the Eurostat database are taken into consideration. The first one is the general government gross debt (Eurostat, 2015b), which is specified as a percentage of the country’s GDP. The second value is the general government deficit or surplus as a percentage of the GDP (Eurostat, 2015a).

According to these calculations, over the indicated time only six countries met both requirements under the terms of the SGP. Those countries are Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden. The other 22 countries exceeded at least one of the
thresholds. Figure 11 lists every member state in terms of its public debt and budget deficit as a percentage of the GDP. As mentioned earlier in this section, the rates are an average calculated using Eurostat data from the years 2009 to 2014. The figures show that above all Greece, but also Italy, Portugal, Ireland and Belgium have on average a public debt crossing the 100%-line. Regarding the budget deficit, Ireland followed by Spain, Greece and the UK feature the highest gaps. Estonia, Bulgaria and Luxembourg on the other side have the lowest public debt and budget deficit according to these numbers.

The categorization for the third independent variable divides the member states into those staying within the limits of the SGP and the ones exceeding them. This allows for taking the next step and analyzing whether the financial state of a country influences the decision of sharing premises.

7.4.2 Explanatory analysis
If hypothesis 3 was proven to be right, countries experiencing budgetary constraints would rather go for co-locating with EU delegations. Hereafter, an investigation of the relationship between financial resources and co-location cases per country will be carried out in two
ways. Firstly, the financial resources are measured solely by the public debt. Secondly, a combination of public debt and budget deficit stipulate the independent variable.

In Table 5 the columns represent two groups of countries, the ones with low public debt (13 countries) and the ones with high public debt (15 countries). In accordance with the SGP rules the separation point lies at 60% of the GDP. Every percentage above 60% is considered as high public debt and consequently the need for more efficiency in public spending is assumed.

The chi square test shows that the two variables are independent. The result of 0.197 does not surpass the critical region and hence no statistical significance is given. Since the test for the strength of association (phi test) is based on the chi square value, it further proves that there is only a very weak relationship between the degree of public debt and the establishment of co-locations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5 Co-locations by Public Debt (2009-2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public debt max. 60% of GDP (SGP rules)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low public debt (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No co-location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: chi square 0.197 (3.841), phi 0.084 (weak relationship)

Table 6 takes the budget deficit also into account. Linking the two criteria of the SGP makes the fulfillment more difficult. This is recognizable in the decrease of countries from 13 to 6 classified as having a low public debt and budget deficit. Likewise, with the previous findings of Table 5, the two variables do not seem to be significantly associated with each other. The chi square (0.159) and phi value (0.075) are both pointing to a very weak correlation. In the case of the member states with low public debt and budget deficit the dependent variable is even equally distributed. Due to those outcomes, further scrutiny with these data is not regarded necessary.
TABLE 6 Co-locations by Public Debt and Budget Deficit (2009-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public debt max. 60% of GDP</th>
<th>Budget deficit max. 3% of GDP (SGP rules)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low public debt + budget deficit (%)</td>
<td>High public debt + budget deficit (%)</td>
<td>Total (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-location</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>59.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No co-location</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>40.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: chi square 0.159 (3.841), phi 0.075 (weak relationship)

In conclusion, the test results could not support hypothesis 3. Other than expected from the doctrines of NPM, the findings showed only a negligible correlation between the financial resources of a country and the arrangement of co-locations. Doubtlessly, there is a chance that the results might have looked differently using other measures of the independent variable, but a trade-off is always included in such a study.

7.5 Conclusion of quantitative study

The observational study was set up to find an empirical pattern to answer to the following research question:

*Which factor(s) increase the probability of EU member states cooperating with EU delegations in third countries through co-location?*

Within the theoretical framework, three factors had been identified that could increase the probability of member states to co-locate with the EU. Those factors are the size of diplomatic networks, the population’s attitude towards a common foreign policy and the need for cost-efficiency due to budgetary constraints. With the help of bivariate measures of association each variable was individually crossed with the independent variable, whether a country has a co-location or not. The outcome of the study demonstrated that only one of the considered factors is strongly related to co-locations, the size of the diplomatic network. Moreover, the statistical tests could not detect a significant correlation between co-locations and the financial state of a country. The case of public opinion has shown that there is an association between the variables after the creation of the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, the results did not surpass the critical value and at an interval-ratio level the relationship lost strength.

To sum up, none of the three hypotheses can be supported by the test results. However, the size of diplomatic presence in third countries is significantly associated with the sharing of premises with EU delegations. The analysis indicates that EU countries with an extensive
diplomatic representation abroad are more likely to have co-locations. So, with regard to the limited choice of only three influential factors, one of them could prove to be at least related to the matter. As stated in the research design section, the tests carried out rather assisted in exploring associations, not causations per se. This is why an explicit causation of a large diplomatic network on the establishment of co-locations cannot be affirmed. Nevertheless, the findings could be used for further research on the subject.

Koenig-Archipugi's (2004) empirics about the influence of relative capabilities and Europeanized identities regarding governments’ preferences on foreign and security policy do not apply to co-locations – at least not when taking all member states into account. Even though the issues of the underlying study and Koenig-Archipugi's work are rooted in the same realm, namely European foreign policy, they do not share the same influential factors.

While co-locations have already been created before the establishment of the EEAS, the increase of concluded projects after the Lisbon Treaty implies that the phenomenon is ever-more emerging. However, comparing the total number of co-locations to the amount of diplomatic representations in third countries, the percentage is still relatively small. This could be one of the reasons why the observational study did not identify clear patterns of association at the interval-ratio level (besides the one mentioned earlier). Another factor that may play a role in the absence of a visible pattern is the relatively small number of cases (28 EU member states) studied. Quantitative analyses generally include a larger amount of cases, where outliers can be levied. Yet the EU has only a limited number of members, which have to be seen as given. The scattergrams especially made the diversity of cases visible, which leads to the conclusion that the decision on co-locating is taken on a more case-to-case based evaluation.

Additionally, the fact that only three factors have been tested should not be neglected. The possibility of other variables having an effect on the co-location decision is certainly given.

In order to provide a more comprehensive answer to the research question and to gain deeper insight and depart from the generalizing approach, a concise single case study will round off the analysis. One of the member states that share premises with EU delegations as well as other countries is the Netherlands. The subsequent case study will focus on the position of the Dutch government on co-locations and how it decides with whom and where to agree on co-locating.
8 EMPIRICAL PART II: CASE STUDY – THE NETHERLANDS

Among the EU member states, the Netherlands belongs to those countries having a relatively large diplomatic presence in third countries (see Figure 4 and 5, pp. 35/36). However, in 2013 the Dutch government started to restructure its diplomatic service as a response to new circumstances and challenges, such as budget cuts and changes in diplomatic interests. A program was set up, which inter alia included to work actively on the creation of more co-locations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2013, p. 1). What this means exactly from a Dutch perspective and what influences the decision-making on that matter, will be discussed within this chapter.

8.1 Research Design

As described in chapter six, the research design of the whole analysis consists of a combination of quantitative and qualitative research, also called ‘sequential explanatory design’ (Creswell, 2009). The previous chapter containing an observational study is regarded as the main empirical examination within this work, while the following case study has the purpose to deepen the statistical findings and augment them with additional case-related information. The quantitative findings informed the data collection and the set-up of the qualitative study. Since the quantitative results could not provide a clear pattern and answer to the research question, concentrating on one particular country might reveal additional valuable information on the matter under discussion.

A single case study might not feature the same level of external validity (transferability to other cases) as a quantitative analysis, but it can still be seen as useful, when it reveals insights into a phenomenon that has not been scrutinized in depth before. Putting it shortly, it can be called a ‘revelatory case’ (Yin, 2009, p. 48). The internal validity of a case study, in contrast to the observational study, is higher though. Due to the focus on one country and the collection of first-hand data through e.g. interviews and government documents, the systematic exploration of co-locations can be continued on a second, more detailed and enriched level.

The case study will be structured as follows: To start off, an introduction to the case and especially the Dutch plan to reform the diplomatic service will be provided. After that, the focus will lie on the Dutch decision-making on co-locations and how this information supports or augments the theories. In addition, the possibility of other influential factors will also be examined. The data collection was carried out, on the one hand, document-based, which means mostly searching through papers and articles published by the Dutch government. On the other hand, an interview was conducted with those responsible for coordinating and
executing co-location requests in the Dutch Foreign Ministry, more precisely with the Operational Management Department and the shared service organization 3W/World Wide Working (Interview 1). In general, those departments are the central contacts in the Dutch government concerning international housing issues. Besides the interview with the Dutch Foreign Ministry in The Hague, another telephone interview with the Dutch Ambassador in South Sudan (Interview 2) was carried out. Those conversations were useful to obtain a broader picture on co-locations from a government’s perspective.

Qualitative interviewing is a tool that helps the researcher to find explanations and build theories through synthesizing and analyzing details, evidence and examples received from the interviewees (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). All interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, which means that the researcher introduced the interviewees to the topic and then took a guiding position throughout the conversation (ibid). In the following analysis, a linkage between the theories and assumptive influential factors on co-locations from the theoretical framework will be drawn to the statements of the Dutch Foreign Ministry. In that manner, the hypotheses can be tested for the individual case as well.

The reliability of qualitative research can be found in the consistency of the research approach. Carefully processing the collected data helps to ensure a reliable case study. The validity on the other hand can be raised when converging multiple sources (Creswell, 2009), which is in this case partly done through interviewing two departments and including various documents in the analysis. However, it has to be acknowledged that the main source of information for the decision-making process was the responsible department within the Dutch Foreign Ministry. Hence, there is a chance of bias in the answers, yet there is also no better source for providing information on the specific matter than the ones directly involved.

8.2 Introduction to Dutch modern diplomacy
The task of Dutch foreign policy is in general the protection of Dutch citizens and businesses in the international arena, but it also manifests itself in the rather normative role of advancing human rights, the international rule of law (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2012, para. 1) and development cooperation (Schaik, 2013). The Netherlands has a long tradition tracing back to the 17th century in promoting its goods and values abroad. Due to the country’s open market economy and its considerable investments in third countries, economic diplomacy plays a big role. This role has even witnessed an increase during the slowdown of Netherlands’ economy (ibid).
The Dutch foreign minister under the Rutte-Verhagen government, Uri Rosenthal, brought the idea of reforming Dutch diplomacy into being. The fundamentals of the reform were budget cuts and consequent staff reduction at both levels, the ministry in The Hague and the Dutch representations abroad (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2015). Back in 2012, the goal was to cut back costs over the upcoming few years concerning employment and accommodation of embassies and consulates of a total amount of 55 million euros. Until 2015, the reforms intended to reach a reduction of around 200 employees in diplomatic missions around the globe and downscaling or closure of various embassies like for instance in Burkina Faso, Bolivia or Ecuador (ibid).

In the year of 2013, the Dutch Rutte-Ascher cabinet continued the former government’s plan and issued a roadmap for diplomatic reforms. “Working together for the Netherlands, worldwide – Moving to the forefront of modern diplomacy” was seen as a response to the emerging challenges the country was (and partly still is) confronted by in regard to foreign and financial affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2013). Within that paper, the government states, amongst others, that the Netherlands wants to keep its extensive diplomatic presence, yet adapting it to new areas of interest (especially emerging markets). One of the doctrines also concerns co-locations. In order to save financial resources on mission buildings, the possibility of creating co-locations with other European and non-European countries was seen as a solution (ibid; Interview 2). Even though some cases of co-locations had already been realized before 2012 (e.g. the projects with the EU mentioned in earlier sections), the new strategy also brought a more advanced version of co-location along. The Belgian government approached the Dutch in regard to creating co-locations, where not only premises are shared, but also political coordination takes place to some extent. Nowadays, the Dutch government understands the term ‘co-location’ as exactly this kind of merger between bilateral diplomatic missions (Interview 2). Comparing this understanding to the one of the EEAS and also the one adopted throughout this study, it is a different option and therefore a distinction needs to be drawn. Since 2012, there have been 17 advanced co-locations concluded with partner countries like Belgium, Denmark, Croatia, Spain, but there are also ongoing talks with non-EU countries e.g. Norway (ibid). Leaving the advanced version of co-location aside and concentrating on the initial understanding, where co-location means sharing premises, the following section will give an overview on the decision-making on co-locations within the Dutch government. It has to be noted though, that the Dutch government does not explicitly distinguish between the process of deciding on a co-location with an EU delegation or with other member states. The decision-making process is roughly the same for either option. After all, creating an EU compound often also implies that other member state missions move in. Therefore, the analysis of the influential factors
mostly apply to both scenarios, bilateral co-locations and co-locations with the EU (unless explicitly stated otherwise). Taking other member state missions into account in the analysis could furthermore reveal an interesting point of view on the decision-making.

8.3 Can the theories explain the Dutch decision-making on co-locations?

In the first empirical part, three factors have been statistically tested for their relation to co-locations between EU delegations and member state missions. Only one of them, the size of the diplomatic network, has proven to be significantly associated with the dependent variable. However, the theoretical assumptions could not be supported through the quantitative approach. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see whether the ideas derived from realism, constructivism and NPM are applicable to the specific case of the Netherlands. So far, the Netherlands has two running co-location projects with EU delegations (Nigeria and Tanzania), one realized before the Lisbon Treaty and one afterwards. Since then, discussions have been going on concerning EU compounds for instance in the Dominican Republic or Hong Kong (Interview 2).

"Due to budget cuts [...] embassies are getting smaller, but the buildings stay the same." (Interview 2). This observation was taken up as an incentive to actively search for solutions in the realm of co-locations with other diplomatic missions abroad. Although this statement points to the financial resources being the major factor to decide on sharing premises, the Dutch case also revealed details coinciding with the other two theories.

The following information on the Dutch approach of co-locations has mainly been obtained through an interview conducted with two professionals of the Dutch Foreign Ministry. Therefore, acknowledgements of potential biased views, meaning only from the Dutch angle, are adequate at this point. Yet, talking to the departments responsible for the decision-making on housing situations, allowed for interesting insights from daily practice that cannot be provided from other sources.

Prior to the changes in the diplomatic approach, a single department in the Dutch Foreign Ministry, the so-called Housing Department, handled housing issues. In December 2013 the department was split into an operational and a policy department. The operational section processes and evaluates the requests for co-locations from other countries or the EU and executes them after the policy department has approved the project (Interview 2).

In the subsequent sections, the information gathered during the interviews and document-based research will be analyzed for its correspondence or possible contradiction with the theoretical approaches. After that, new factors that have not been considered in the
quantitative analysis, but influence the co-location decision in the Netherlands, will be presented.

8.3.1 Relative Capabilities

As explained in the theoretical framework, the idea of relative capabilities influencing the decision-making in foreign affairs comes from realism. The theory, adapted to the issue, expects countries to achieve their diplomatic goals and pursue their national interest autonomously when holding relatively powerful resources. According to that, the hypothesis then claimed that countries with a smaller diplomatic network are more likely to share resources with the EU.

The Netherlands has a relatively vast diplomatic presence on the global stage. In 76 third countries it has an embassy in place and in additional 53 countries outside the EU it has at least one other type of diplomatic mission (see chapter 7.2.1). Even though the country has a large diplomatic network, it counts to those 16 states having co-locations established with EU delegations. Hence, the hypothesis does not hold for the Dutch case. It rather shows that the possibility of sharing premises with the EU is higher for member states with an extensive diplomatic presence. So, taking only the numbers into account, the qualitative findings are consistent with the quantitative ones. However, a logical reason for that could also be that the large extent of the Dutch diplomatic network, led to empty spaces as soon as the downscaling of missions started off. Due to that, other states started approaching the Netherlands to ask whether they could rent parts of their premises. The increasing request on sharing Dutch locations left the Dutch government in a more passive position, rather than actively searching for potential co-location partners themselves. However, there are not only inquiries for renting Dutch premises, but also propositions from e.g. the EU who wants to bring the Netherlands on board for the creation of EU compounds (Interview 2).

From the realist theory it is also possible to derive other assumptions on the behavior of the Dutch government when deciding on co-locating. Self-help and pursuing the national interest are principles that, according to realism, guide actions on the international stage. Such ideas can also be found in the Dutch decision-making.

In the roadmap to modern diplomacy, the Dutch government states that “[o]nly by working with other countries – at European, multilateral and bilateral level – can the Netherlands maintain and increase its security and prosperity [...]” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2013, p. 5). This sentence could be interpreted as the Netherlands seeing diplomacy as a kind of tool to ensure national security and promote national interests.
An important step during the evaluation process is to consult with the regional division of the Dutch Foreign Ministry about their strategy for the third country, where e.g. the EU asks them to move in with. In that manner the Dutch national interest regarding the specific country is taken into account and projects will only pass when the regional division agrees. There are those countries of high interest, like e.g. the US, where co-locations are unimaginable at this stage. Even though the Dutch embassy in Washington might offer more space than necessarily needed the ministry would not sublet these offices (Interview 2). Recalling the remarks made on the descriptive data of co-locations in the quantitative analysis (chapter 7.1.1) between EU delegations and member state embassies, the previous argument goes in line with the findings and assumptions made there. Not a single co-location project has been concluded in third countries, where the interest of EU countries is very high (according to Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2013, p. 14). From the Dutch point of view co-locations are after all a ‘business agreement’, which has to be favorable for the country (Interview 2).

In this connection, the Netherlands wants to pursue its own foreign strategy. Because of its vast diplomatic presence, it can be assumed that the state is in the place to pursue its diplomatic interest in third countries autonomously. So, it could be said that co-locating under the umbrella of the EU is not primarily a decision to promote one European voice, but more one of pragmatism from a domestic point of view.

An interesting observation was made about the areas of foreign interest. On the one hand, it can be noted that in areas of increasing interest, like e.g. business, the foreign ministry is more skeptical of co-locations (Interview 2). On the other hand, in areas where the Netherlands is re-evaluating and reducing its stake, like it is the case in development cooperation, the government welcomes more initiative on the EEAS side (Schaik, 2013). This leads to the conclusion that highly salient issues are rather tackled independently, at a national level and co-locations are less likely.

A last argument that can – to some extent – be explained through a realist lens, is that the Netherlands is aware of its passive, yet powerful position, when other countries ask for renting their premises. Being in the place to decide, whether to grant a request or not and also setting the terms for the co-location project stems from the fact that the country had a large diplomatic network established in the first place.

In conclusion it can be said, that the Netherlands is aware of its diplomatic position and would not engage in a co-location if there were no clear gains for the country itself. After all, diplomacy is, according to the interviewee in the Dutch Foreign Ministry, a very sensitive and
most of all national issue (Interview 2). Therefore, the realist ideas of power capabilities and self-help apply to the Dutch case and support the theory in regard to co-locations.

8.3.2 Europeanized identity
The second theoretical approach originated from constructivism. Even though it might be normative in nature it says that the population forms the government’s attitude on foreign policy-making. The hypothesis emerging from the constructivist arguments expected countries where the population is more in favor of a common foreign policy to be more likely to co-locate.

One advantage of a case study is that it allows for a deeper analysis of the data. Therefore the EB results on common foreign policy of the Dutch population can be reviewed over a longer period. What is striking about the Dutch opinion on common foreign policy is that the percentages in favor drop drastically after the Lisbon Treaty (2009). In 2008 on average 70% were in favor, while in 2010 it was only 55% (Com, 2010b (EB 73); 2011 (EB 74)). If the hypothesis holds true, these numbers may explain why the Netherlands has been quite skeptical towards joining EU compounds (Interview 2), yet they fail in reasoning the MoU between the Dutch mission and the EU delegation in Tanzania, which was created after Lisbon.

Thus far, the Dutch Ministry has not received any complaints from the field, where co-locations had been created. The foreign ministry would even call them a success (Interview 2). The Dutch position on the EEAS and EU delegations in general was relatively endorsing during times of the creation of the service. In particular, the Netherlands saw potential in delegating more consular and visa-related tasks to EU delegations and make use of co-locations, where the Dutch diplomatic entity is rather small. The Dutch government believes though that the European diplomatic service needs more time to become a viable partner in supporting Dutch diplomacy (Schaik, 2013).

It seems that there is currently more faith in bilateral projects rather than the ones initiated under the umbrella of the EU. Particularly when it comes to the advanced version of co-locations, where two embassies literally merge and by doing so, establish a political cooperation. This kind of intensified diplomatic cooperation is in the European context, according to the Operational Management Department, not realizable at this point. The basic version of co-location through sharing premises is in the case of the EU more likely to be increased in the future (Interview 2).

To sum up, there was no conclusive argument to be found that the population’s attitude towards a common foreign policy has an impact on the rather skeptical opinion on the
creation of EU compounds and the delegation of tasks to the EEAS. The numbers of public opinion do not contradict those assumptions though and therefore the hypothesis could only with caution be partly seen as supported.

8.3.3 Financial resources
The third concept tries to explain the emergence of co-locations between member state missions and EU delegations from the NPM doctrine of cost-efficiency. The hypothesis said that countries with higher budgetary constraints are more inclined to co-locate.

Probably one of the most fundamental grounds of the Dutch decision-making on co-locations is the cost-saving aspect. As already stated in the introductory words of the case study, the concept of making use of co-locations found momentum during times of budgetary cutbacks (Interview 2). Compared to other EU countries, the Netherlands does not exceed the marks for public debt and budgetary deficit in an excessive manner (see chapter 7.4.1). On average (2009-2014) it did cross the SGP rules though and hence it can be said that cost-efficiency is an issue. This was also confirmed during the interview (Interview 2). With the help of co-locations, expenditures cannot only be reduced by sharing the rent, but also by employing common maintenance, utility and security staff. All those elements have to find consideration in the calculation to verify or create a win-win-situation that convinces the last instance, the Deputy Secretary-General. The financial aspect can thus be seen as a very essential one for the Dutch government. The whole idea of co-locations emerged from budget cutbacks rather than anything else. In this specific case it is more of a subletting from the Dutch side though, than renting themselves. So, in order to relieve the public spending on housing costs for diplomatic missions, the Netherlands tries to make use of dispensable office space in their entities.

Coming back to co-locations, where the EU asks them to move in with them, the finances certainly matter too. Currently, there are negotiations going on concerning ‘Europe Houses’ in Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic) and Hong Kong. For the Dutch government a win-win-situation is essential in order to agree to such an MoU. If the evaluation does not occur to be favorable for the Netherlands, like it was e.g. the case with the EEAS’ proposal to create an EU compound in Tripoli (Libya), the offer will be declined. In this specific case it was the financial factor that played a crucial role for the refusal of the offer (Interview 2).

Concluding, the third hypothesis is, on the one hand, substantiated by the decision of the Dutch government to use co-locations in order to save costs. On the other hand, the example of Tripoli showed that co-locating under the umbrella of the EU might not always be cheaper than renting premises individually. This leads to the conclusion that the decision is made on a careful case-to-case evaluation basis.
8.4 Additional factors

In addition to the before discussed arguments that could support or elaborate on the theories from the theoretical framework, the subsequent paragraphs will present two elements that have not been taken into account yet. Other than the already mentioned factors, those two are not domestic factors, but rather related to the country that wishes to co-locate.

First, the type of diplomatic mission wishing to co-locate with the Dutch representation is an influential factor. Even though it is obviously applicable for bilateral co-locations, it would also be important to know the nature of the diplomatic missions housed in an EU compound. The reason for paying attention to the type of mission can be traced back to conflicts of interest. The Dutch missions typically pursue - depending on the third country - a certain economic interest. If the potential partner country also had an economic section within the embassy and even worse, if the two countries had the same kind of business in mind, then they would be competitors. To provide an example, in case a Dutch and a German embassy wanted to co-locate, but are both proficient in e.g. shipping, it would be difficult for them to meet business partners in the office without the other country noticing it. And since they are competitors in the shipping sector, they canvass for the same contacts. Eventually, trade is, according to the interviewee, not seen as a European, but a national issue. In contrast to embassies with economic sections, cases where a consulate or a simple embassy asks for co-location, the project is easier to be realized (Interview 2).

The second factor deals with the mindset of the partner states. Like in most cooperative relationships, a like-minded attitude and sympathy among the states is an element that increases the probability of them to work together through co-location. This argument has also come up during the talk with the Dutch Ambassador in South Sudan (Interview 1). One example of a country, where the Netherlands has already established co-locations including political cooperation is for instance Denmark. It is seen as a like-minded partner within the European countries. In general, the government sees European countries, whether they are members of the EU or not, as their first partners when it comes to co-locating (Interview 2).

Following the analysis of the Dutch decision-making on co-locations, the most important factors will be summarized.
### 8.5 Summary of influential factors

When evaluating a request for co-location several aspects play a role. During the interview four main factors could be identified as influential: (1) the national interest in the third country, which could be explained by the realist theory, (2) the structure of cost reduction, which goes in line with the NPM doctrine, (3) the type of diplomatic partner mission and (4) the degree of like-mindedness between the countries. Figure 12 displays those four factors and their influence on the decision-making. It has to be noted though, that the list is not exhaustive, but summarizes the issues emphasized by the two interviewees (Interview 2), i.e. issues falling under those four categories have been mentioned multiple times and then synthesized by the author.

**Figure 12** Factors influencing the Dutch Decision-Making on Co-locations. Adapted from Interview 2.

Having described the Dutch approach of co-locations and identified various factors that influence the government’s decision-making, it is possible to draw a conclusion from the results of the case study.

### 8.6 Conclusion of case study

Zooming into one case and thus analyzing the issue of co-locations at a country-level, was a useful task to figure out in what way the concept of co-location has been framed in the Netherlands. The boost of subletting spatial units of Dutch representations to other countries or renting themselves from e.g. the EU became popular with the financial and economic crisis. Budgetary cuts and changing diplomatic interests led to a reform of the Dutch diplomatic service, which included the creation of more co-locations. Besides simply sharing premises, the Dutch Foreign Ministry also looks out for more profound diplomatic cooperation with like-minded countries. This can be seen as a kind of ‘co-location 2.0’.
Through means of qualitative interviewing, new data concerning influential factors could be found. A synthesis of the answers revealed that there are four areas that seem especially relevant to the respondents of the Dutch Foreign Ministry: the national interest, the financial factor, the type of partner mission and the mindset of the partner country. Some of those findings could already be found in the theories described in chapter five. Prioritizing the national interest for instance shows elements of the realist assumptions made. The relevance of cost-efficiency was furthermore hypothesized with the help of the doctrines of NPM. Reflecting on the theoretical framework used for the research and comparing it to the findings of the case study it becomes evident that the theories solely focus on factors related to the country choosing to co-locate. Yet, the additionally identified factors both imply that it is also important to carefully examine the countries with whom and also where to co-locate.

Having summarized the findings of the case study on the Netherlands, the last chapter will bring the quantitative and qualitative results together in order to give an answer to the research question.
9 CONCLUSION

The concluding words serve to reflect on the findings, discuss the validity of the theories and give an answer to the underlying research question:

*Which factor(s) increase the probability of EU member states cooperating with EU delegations in third countries through co-location?*

The ever-more emerging phenomenon of co-locations between EU delegations and member state missions has been systematically explored through means of a quantitative and a supplementary qualitative study. Since the topic has thus far been rather unexplored in the academic world the main purpose of this work was to introduce the reader to the subject and shed light on different aspects that might lead to sharing diplomatic premises. By doing so, it is in the following possible to reflect on the findings and provide potential outlooks on the evolution of European diplomacy under the light of co-locations.

The two-step analysis started with an attempt to find out whether there is a visible pattern among all EU member states in regard to the three factors size of diplomatic service, Europeanized identity and financial resources. With the help of bivariate measures of association a strong relationship between the first factor, the diplomatic network, and the creation of co-locations could be detected. According to the statistical results, countries with an extensive diplomatic representation are more likely to co-locate with EU delegations in third countries. This result contradicts the before assumed direction of association and hence the first hypothesis did not find support in the statistics.

Continuing with the findings, Europeanization of the population and budgetary cutbacks did not show a significant correlation with the emergence of co-locations. For hypothesis 2 this means that a positive attitude of a country’s population towards a common foreign policy does not increase the probability of a member state to co-locate with the EU. However, the results for the period after the Lisbon Treaty revealed that a positive relationship between countries less in favor of handling foreign issues at the European level and the establishment of co-locations exists. In a scattergram it becomes then visible though that the relationship is relatively weak. Hypothesis 3, stating that member states with higher budgetary constraints are more likely to co-locate, could not be substantiated by the analysis as the conducted tests showed that financial resources and co-locations are not related.

In addition to the statistical testing of the three factors, the research project studied co-locations from a member state’s perspective too. The Dutch government took up the idea of sharing diplomatic premises with other countries or under the umbrella of the EU as a consequence of budgetary constraints. This information proves that even though there was no observable pattern concerning financial resources at the EU level, when investigating the
matter individually it can still be an influential factor. During interviews with the Dutch Foreign Ministry, four important factors could be identified that raise the probability of the Netherlands to agree on co-location. First, the host country must not be of high national interest. Second, cost reduction is seen as a major aspect. Third, the partner mission must not pursue the same (economic) interest in the third country. Finally, the states moving in with the Dutch representation should be to a certain degree like-minded. On the bottom line the co-location project has to create a win-win-situation for the Netherlands, but also for the partner countries. This counts for bilateral co-locations just as much as for co-locations under the umbrella of the EU.

At this stage the question on the implications of the findings can be posed. Is the rising trend of sharing premises among bilateral diplomatic representations and EU delegations one step towards joint representation and one European voice or is it more likely to be rational decision-making by the member states?

First of all, the figures show that the co-locations between the EU and member states increased over time in particular after the founding of the EEAS. Since the EEAS is – where possible – actively working towards the end of creating EU compounds, this trend might continue in the future. However, the question on implications should be approached from two different sides.

In the course of the research it became clear that the EU is in favor of closer cooperation between their delegations and the member state missions, because it would like to see the EU as a single international actor in third countries, and in that way increase its political power. Even though it is a long shot, the EEAS believes that the creation of co-locations is a move towards that end. But wouldn't that also imply that, in the long-run, member state missions would have to be under the aegis of the EU delegations (rather than exercising equal cooperation among bilateral and multilateral diplomatic entities)?

The implication of the argument that relatively powerful countries are more likely to co-locate with EU delegations should also briefly be reflected. If the establishment of co-locations increased in the future according to this finding and the EEAS wants to develop sharing premises towards political cooperation – then wouldn't the CFSP executed in the field be dominated by ‘bigger’ member states? This would contradict the normative idea of a common European foreign policy.

Seeing the sharing of premises as a steppingstone for one European voice might be a bit too optimistic at this stage. Practicing a stronger and above all coherent CFSP would in general demand EU compounds housing all member states. So far, no co-location project has
included all states. One reason might be that the incentives for members to join co-locations are not sufficient yet. After all, the decision to engage in co-locations depends on the states, and there does not seem to be any kind of pressure mechanism in place that paves the way to such commitments. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, diplomacy was once strongly characterized by secrecy and the struggle for power. It seems that those two matters are – even though in another dimension – still present among member states. Admittedly, this work only studied the Dutch opinion on co-locations with the EU and therefore shouldn’t be generalized, but at least in this one country the intentions to move in with an EU delegation were not of a symbolic nature. Diplomacy is still seen as a national issue that could evoke conflicts of interest among co-locating countries. Hence, the country has to better its position through sharing resources; otherwise it will not approve. This perception makes a complete convergence of national foreign policies in the future cumbersome, not to say infeasible. To the present day, co-locations are – roughly speaking – unstandardized processes of burden sharing, which might need some sort of standardization and incentives for member states to jump on the bandwagon and maybe even step up cooperation on a political level. Nonetheless, it has to be acknowledged that co-locations and the practice of effective European diplomacy cannot be compared easily.

In conclusion, the thesis was a first attempt to approach the rather new area of study, which was able to deliver insights that have so far not been revealed in depth. It may add to the existing literature on the cooperation between the EEAS and member states, but still needs further research and theorization.

9.1 Limitations

During the research process several limitations have been encountered that will be mentioned in this section.

The limitations regarding the quantitative analysis can be found in the rather small number of cases studied. The EU has 28 member states, which is a fairly small number for large-N studies. Therefore, the chance of finding significant associations was lower. The difficulty of checking the existence of co-locations and thus the control of the validity of the EEAS list on co-locations has already been discussed earlier in the thesis. The transparency of diplomatic missions is not always given, which contributed to the limitations of this work. The methods used to test associations can further not be seen as proof for causal mechanisms, but rather as evidence to support assumptions. Moreover, the operationalization of the independent variables happened on a nominal level, which led to a high degree of simplification of the data. There is also the possibility that other measurement units for the variables would have resulted in different findings. Due to limited resources only three factors have been crossed
with the dependent variable, which means that the quantitative study neglects several factors that might have played a role. This was also the reason why the case study was added. Its findings have been revelatory for critically engaging with the statistical findings, yet it also features limitations. Studying the point of view from only one country does not allow for generalization. In addition, the majority of the sources for the case study came from the Dutch government. Using interviews as a tool to collect data must be accompanied with the awareness that this bears a certain risk of bias.

It is worth mentioning that studying a European matter from the supranational as well as national perspective is an endeavor that once more revealed the complexity of the EU. The diverging understandings of various issues, like for instance the word ‘co-location’, might have complicated the research process, but also demonstrated that disagreement between the supranational institutions of the EU and its member states is also visible in the case of co-locations and hence has to be acknowledged. Reflecting on the findings of the (quantitative) research, it has to be noted that they were only in a very limited way suitable for theorization and policy suggestions and thus need further research. Moreover, when the number of co-locations is higher theorization becomes a more feasible task on this matter.

9.2 Suggestions for further research
As already pointed out here and there within the research, there are several issues that would encourage enhanced research. One is for instance rooted in the spectrum of factors that facilitate the creation of co-locations. The case study has indicated that there are more influential factors involved in the decision-making than considered in the quantitative testing. It might be of interest to investigate other aspects and their influence on co-locations, especially related to potential partner countries and third countries. Coming back to a statement made in chapter 2.1 about the six countries of obvious interest to the EU member states, it strikes that a co-location arrangement has not yet been made in any of them. Only for Japan, there are negotiations happening. This could be seen as food for thought for further investigations and it could be hypothesized that the practice of joint representation is more likely in third countries of less national interest of the member states.

Moreover, the study indicated that countries with a large diplomatic network are more likely to co-locate. Since no specific theory had been proven at the large-N basis within this work, this finding needs more elaboration and theorization in the future. Reflecting on the findings, a different realist approach to the matter could still deliver some thought-provoking impulse. The realist author Waltz (1979) wrote that countries are always striving for self-help and that
relative power determines their degree of acting autonomously in international affairs. Now, what if self-help can be translated into a kind of self-serving way of pursuing its own diplomatic goals and those goals might be better achieved through co-location? One possible reason might be for instance that the EU has more or different venues and accesses (incentives) in third countries that are useful for the member state to advance its own diplomatic relations. A second hypothetic motivation could be that those member states are aware of their relative power within the EU and might see a chance in influencing the EEAS’ agenda on international affairs by strengthening cooperation with EU delegations.

As briefly mentioned in the conclusion, the member states would need incentives to engage in co-locations, but probably not the same kind works for all of them. If the establishment of co-locations continues the way it is now, meaning a rather unstandardized sharing of premises, it is hard to imagine that the step from logistical to political cooperation ever happens. However, those are only trains of thought that would need further elaboration and may be taken up for future research.

Finally, the idea of enlarging the knowledge on member state perspectives could be picked up in further research too. It might be worth taking a closer look at other member states and comparing their positions and decision-making on the matter to gain a broader picture on the member state motives and derive ideas for an incentive mechanism on the EEAS side. This would maybe enhance the move towards stronger European diplomacy.

Concluding, the phenomenon of co-locations between member state missions and EU delegations is growing and an increased number of cases improves the possibility of revealing more interesting and concrete conclusions on the subject. Hence, future research is essential to explore the role of co-locations on European diplomacy.
REFERENCES


**Interviews – explanation of in-text citation**

*Interview 1:*


*Interview 2:*

### Appendix A – List of co-locations (from EEAS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DELEGATION</th>
<th>EU MEMBER STATES (<em>projects concluded before the Lisbon Treaty</em>)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFGHANISTAN</td>
<td>LITHUANIA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZERBAIJAN</td>
<td>SPAIN, CROATIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELARUS</td>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLOMBIA</td>
<td>FINLAND, CZECH REPUBLIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST TIMOR</td>
<td>FRANCE*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHIOPIA</td>
<td>LUXEMBURG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEORGIA</td>
<td>SLOVAKIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONDURAS</td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRAQ</td>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAURITANIA</td>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MYANMAR</td>
<td>SPAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>ITALY*, NETHERLANDS*, GREECE*, FRANCE*, GERMANY*, AUSTRIA*, SLOVAKIA, PORTUGAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH SUDAN</td>
<td>DENMARK, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, SPAIN, UNITED KINGDOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA</td>
<td>FINLAND; GERMANY, NETHERLANDS, UNITED KINGDOM (CO-OWNERSHIP)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY (GAZIANTEP)</td>
<td>FRANCE, DENMARK, GERMANY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIETNAM</td>
<td>FINLAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEMEN</td>
<td>SPAIN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EEAS Info Public Back Office, SG1 – Corporate Board Secretariat, Case_ID: 1057622 / 2572691, June 16, 2015
Appendix B – List of contacted institutions

The diplomatic missions have been contacted via mail. Furthermore, the EEAS headquarter has been contacted for further information and an updated list of co-locations on May 31, 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Hosting country</th>
<th>Member state diplomatic mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 29, 2015</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>• British Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Dutch Embassy (telephone interview with Ambassador Robert van den Dool on June 1, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• French Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Danish Embassy (in order to get information about Danish Office in South Sudan; email answer on June 4, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31, 2015</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>• Dutch Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Italian Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• EU Delegation (telephone interview on June 15, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 8, 2015</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>• Luxembourgnian Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>• Czech Embassy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the Dutch Foreign Ministry was contacted and kindly offered its help to advance the research with an interview with the responsible department for co-locations, the Operational Management Department and shared service organization 3W/ World Wide Working (personal communication, June 18, 2015).
Appendix C – Sources of Figure 4 and 5


