

Erasmus University Rotterdam
Master's Thesis Early Modern Intellectual History - CH5050

Power, Politics and Propaganda

The Mystification of the Revolt of Naples

Nicole S.D. Linkels, 303682

03-12-2014

Preliminary Chapter: Introduction	3
Contemporary Historiography	4
General Agreements and Differences	8
Thesis Outline	13
Chapter I – Spanish Political History and Thought	17
I.I Spain: an Agglomeration of Political Entities	18
I.II Identity within the Spanish Monarchy	25
I.III Philip IV upon the <i>Theatrum Mundi</i>	31
I.IV Political Theory and Debate	35
I.V Conclusion	39
Chapter II - Agitation in Spanish Naples	41
II.I The Cost of Warfare	42
II.II Legal and Social Structures of Naples	46
II.III Feudal Jurisdiction in Neapolitan Society	54
II.IV Conclusion	58
Chapter III – Giovanni Battista de Thoro on Justice and Monarchy	60
III.I <i>Aureum compendium omnium decisionum</i>	61
III.II Essential Virtues of the King	65
III.III Ideals of State versus Neapolitan Reality	70
III.IV Conclusion	74
Chapter IV – Protagonists in the Revolt of Naples	77
IV.I Masaniello and Don Juan	79
IV.II The Personification of People and Government	82
IV.III Conclusion	87
Chapter V – The Neapolitan Rebels against the Spanish Army	90
V.I The Hardship of War	90
V.II News as Propaganda	94
V.III Conclusion	101
Chapter VI – The Revolt of Naples in Literary Art	104
VI.I The Castilian Poem and the Dutch Play	104
VI.II History as propaganda	107
VI.III Conclusion	110
Chapter VII – Conclusion	112
Bibliography	123
Primary literature	123
Secondary literature	124

Preliminary Chapter: Introduction

For nearly nine months, the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Naples rebelled against the government of their Spanish viceroy, the Duke of Arcos. The Revolt of Naples erupted on the 17th of July 1647, when over fifty thousand people¹ were said to have taken to the streets of the city, led by the now famous common fisherman: Masaniello. The Revolt could not be quieted until the 6th of April 1648, when Don Juan of Austria led the Spanish Armada to finally crush the rebellious Neapolitans.

While this much historical fact can be recognized, the Revolt of Naples has long been a debated topic in modern historiography. To date, the Revolt has most often been characterized by the ten days in which Masaniello rose and fell as the hero of the aggrieved Neapolitan people. The Kingdom of Naples had suffered the demands of the Thirty Years War by means of unbearable taxes and subsequent hunger. This hardship fell upon the least fortunate of Neapolitan society, whose already burdened shoulders could bear no more. These people, driven to madness by the deprivation of their most basic necessity, ravished the city until the recently imposed fruit taxes were lifted.

This interpretation fits quite rightly in the historical context of the Revolt. The general misery of the Neapolitan population could be said to have been in line with the general crisis of the seventeenth century² as well as the decline of Spain³ of which the Kingdom of Naples was part. Naples had not been unique in its reaction to the increasing demands of the Spanish crown. The Thirty Years War was taking its toll on the Monarchy, and Spanish provinces were rising in rebellion throughout the 1640's.⁴ The people of Naples, additionally, were subjected to the abusive power of feudal barons. In such circumstances, it would be acceptable to suggest that the Revolt of Naples was a passionate reaction to the unfavorable conditions of the mid seventeenth century.

Just as plausible, however, would be the interpretation of the Neapolitan Revolt as a political movement. Prior to the Revolt, the Spanish crown had been promoting plans of centralization of the Monarchy.⁵ This process may have been the cause of the tightening grip of the Neapolitan fiefs, which Rosario Villari coined the 'refeudalization' of Naples. The nobility became increasingly insistent on the maintenance of their inherited feudal powers.⁶ Feudal power of the nobility rose at the cost of the royal power of the crown in the government of the Neapolitan Kingdom.⁷ Royal justice was waning, as local jurisdiction was granted to the nobility. Working class Neapolitans suffered the consequences of the overly powerful nobility and harbored ideas of reform. The Revolt of Naples, in this scenario, was not a spontaneous eruption of passions. Through careful consideration, the

¹ Pietro Giannone, *The civil history of the Kingdom of Naples*, trans. by James Oglivie (London 1723) 762.

² Geoffrey Parker & Lesley Smith, *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century* (Routledge 1997).

³ J.H. Elliott, *The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain (1598-1640)*; Elliot, *The Count-Duke of Olivares, The Statesman in an Age of Decline*.

⁴ Elliot, 'Revolts in the Spanish Monarchy', in R. Forster & J. P. Greene (eds), *Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore 1970) 109.

⁵ Geoffrey Parker, *Europe in Crisis* (Sussex 1980) 234.

⁶ Rosario Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, trans. by James Newell (Cambridge 1993) 150.

⁷ Tommaso Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power. The Caracciolo Di Brienza in Spanish Naples* (2004) 104-105.

Neapolitan *popolo* rose towards nine months of systematic and – most significantly – justified rebellion against the Spanish government in Naples.

The contemporary conflict around the interpretation of the Revolt, is therefore mostly the debate on whether it had been a rebellion of passion or politics. As both these interpretations find support in the historical framework of Naples, the aim of my thesis is to trace these contemporary controversies on the Revolt of Naples back to their original sources. By studying texts disseminated by parties that viewed the Revolt from standing at opposite political interests – Castile and the Dutch Republic – a significant difference will come to light in how printed texts portrayed different accounts of the Revolt, and created different perceptions of the Revolt's cause and manifestation.

This chapter will first consider the historiography in which the different studies of contemporary historians clash in their interpretations of the Revolt. I will then summarize the most significant points of the Revolt and compare their differences. These points will then be judged by the extent to which they agree with one another. I will also inspect the origins of these points, by looking into the primary sources on which they have been based. Hereafter I will introduce my own primary sources, and in which roles these will play my thesis.

Contemporary Historiography

In contemporary secondary literature, the controversy around the Revolt of Naples has already been called out by Rosario Villari with his article 'Masaniello: Contemporary and Recent Interpretations'.⁸ As the title indicated, Villari reviewed and criticized contemporary views of the Neapolitan Revolt. He asserted that the conventional view of the Revolt of Naples obscured the true history of the event. In this article Villari directly responded to the article written by Peter Burke, author of 'The Virgin of the Carmine and the Revolt of Masaniello', written two years prior. Works such as that of Burke, Villari claimed, were exactly what stood in the way of the proper understanding of the Revolt. This debate brought to the attention the significance of Masaniello in the historiography of the Revolt. The question of whether Masaniello truly had an influence on the Neapolitan Revolt, would speak volumes regarding the debate of political versus popular rebellion. For this reason, the argumentation of these two historians lay at the foundation of my thesis.

The debate between Villari and Burke took the form of the publications of a number of articles, which were full of accusations of misinterpreting the Revolt's original sources. In this debate, Burke chose to defend the viewpoint of Masaniello as a possibly national hero. Villari, in his extensive book on *The Revolt of Naples*, had only mentioned Masaniello once, as the book mostly discussed the decades preceding the Revolt in terms of a culmination of economic and political problems. Burke therefore took the study of the Revolt of Naples upon himself, with the aim of contributing to the historiography of the Revolt of Naples where prominent historians Rosario Villari and Michelangelo Schipa⁹ had fallen short.

The Passionate Revolt of Naples

⁸ Villari, "Masaniello: Contemporary and Recent Interpretations", *Past and Present* 108 (1985).

⁹ M.A. Schipa, 'La Mente di Masaniello', *Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane*, ix (1913); M.A. Schipa, 'La così detta rivoluzione di Masaniello', *Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane*, new seri., ii-iii (1916-17).

In 'The Virgin of the Carmine', Burke took more of a behavioral approach in studying those who he saw to have been the protagonists of the revolt. Burke asserted that popular violence – such as in the case of the Neapolitan Revolt – was most commonly seen as a most natural reaction to hunger or the expression of a people's urge towards disorder. However, a new trending sociological view is that popular violence was indeed often organized with particular aims in mind, and also ritualized and occurred at certain times, such as during major festivals. Burke aimed to create a synthesis between these two views, and believed that a study of the Revolt of Naples would prove to be useful here. Burke proceeded to give a rather visual and heroic account of the role of Masaniello and stressed that by no means was the Revolt of Masaniello a revolt of the elite. Burke claimed not have denied Elliot's prior study of triggers of the Revolt of Naples: dearth and taxes during the final stage of the Spanish partition in the Thirty Years War.¹⁰ Social and economic grievances were the result of the increasing demands of Neapolitan landlords, after which peasants fled to the overcrowded city of Naples. This theory based on triggers and preconditions of the Revolt however, to Burke, was inhuman and deterministic. Furthermore, they did not explain the success of the charismatic Masaniello. For this reason, Burke believed his behavioral approach necessary.

Furthermore, Burke claimed that the popular narratives on the Revolt of Naples were written by aristocrats only, and history was considered a high end literary genre at the time. History was therefore to be told in keeping with certain style and dignity, and was to omit vulgar and plebeian acts as well. For this reason, the role of the common people, as well as that of Masaniello, has not been recorded properly. Burke nevertheless saw a way to come to know the emotions and thoughts behind the collective acts of the Neapolitan people: alternative interpretation of traditional sources. Some accounts of the revolt were so detailed in their description of 'popular action', as Burke called it, that careful reading between the lines allowed for an interpretation that actually went against the message of the text.¹¹

Burke claimed to have tried to take the 'emotional context' of seventeenth century Naples into account. He highlighted the city's population density, its disorder and its piety, and how 1647 had been a 'long hot summer of tension'. Burke claimed that beside this context, three elements had caused the Revolt of Naples. First was the inspiring Revolt of Palermo that had happened shortly before; then came the imposition of a new tax on fruit; then the latter coincided with the occurrence of a festival – always a fertile ground for trouble – on the 7th of July.¹² It was because of these conditions that the Revolt of Naples erupted. Burke asserted that a significant reason for the crowd's steadfastness had been their belief that God was on their side.¹³ The actions of the mass were mostly symbolical for the messages they wanted to convey: the taxes on fruit were unjust, and their revolt against them was legitimate.¹⁴

That Burke presented the taxes on fruit as the main instigator of the Revolt, brings us back to the main debate in the historiography of the Revolt: people could not afford their food, so they could either go hungry or protest. Their passions apparently chose for the latter. Furthermore, Burke

¹⁰ Elliott, 'Revolts in the Spanish Monarchy', 126.

¹¹ Burke, 'Virgin of the Carmine', *Past & Present* 99 (1983) 7.

¹² Burke, 'Virgin of the Carmine', 10.

¹³ Burke, 'Virgin of the Carmine', 12.

¹⁴ Burke, 'Virgin of the Carmine', 15-16.

restricted the Revolt of Naples to the Revolt of Masaniello. He claimed that the Revolt crumbled into fragmented and mediocre riots after the death of Masaniello. Taxes on bread had been restored and the upset Neapolitans were pacified. This coincided with Masaniello's death, after which he was revered to be the icon of the Neapolitan Revolt.

To Rosario Villari, this reduction – the Revolt of Naples to the Revolt of Masaniello – does the significance of the Revolt in European history great injustice. Villari therefore challenged Burke's interpretation of the Revolt. While abandoning every effort of an anthropological understanding of the seventeenth century Neapolitan, Villari wished to demonstrate that the Revolt of Naples was genuinely seen as a political movement by contemporaries, as he had already asserted in *The Revolt of Naples*. With 'Contemporary and recent interpretations', Villari aimed to show that Masaniello's popularity and mythicization did not rule out the political interpretation by his contemporaries.¹⁵

The Political Revolt of Naples

The first important point that Villari would disagree with, was Burke's idea of a ten-day Revolt. Villari maintained that the Revolt of Naples was a revolution that lasted for nine months. Villari asserted that the seventeenth century witnesses of the Revolt saw it in the same way. In a correspondence between the Duke of Arcos and his king, Villari found that Arcos had first been optimistic after the assassination of Masaniello, but was then confronted with the state of an ongoing Revolt of an undeniable political nature. It was after this realization, that the gravity of the Revolt of Naples had truly set in. The fragmented riots by selected groups – which Burke referred to as the evidence of the fragmentation of the Revolt – Villari called the revolutionary drive that had taken hold of the people of Naples.¹⁶

Villari further criticized Burke's anthropological approach to the Revolt. This approach ignored the significant details of the Revolt that should be seen as the evidence of its political nature. The crowd's refusal to be subdued by the Cardinal's pleas was not as simple as their conviction of God being on their side. The organization of the Revolt, its carefully organized militia, its unity and discipline that lasted for months – all the complexity and endurance of the Revolt was greatly reduced by the gross exaggeration of the city's resolution through piety. Villari insisted that it would have been impossible to understand these major factors without a critical understanding of the social and political history of the city and kingdom of Naples during Spanish reign.

Villari did not entirely marginalize the role of Masaniello, or rather; the role of the myth of Masaniello. Investigating the importance of Masaniello might help explain why his leadership of the Revolt was superimposed on historical reality. The sentiment that Masaniello has wrongfully been identified with the Revolt of Naples, Villari found to date back to Michelangelo Schipa. Schipa, a Neapolitan historian who published on the history of Naples and the Revolt in the early twentieth century, identified the historical distortion of the Revolt of Naples. Unfortunately, the attractive figure of Masaniello left Schipa's political observations severely undervalued. Historiography continued to fade out the truth of the Neapolitan Revolt and portrayed it instead as the Revolt of Masaniello.

¹⁵ Villari, 'Masaniello', 117-118.

¹⁶ Villari, 'Masaniello', 119.

In response to Villari's article and its accusations of demeaning the Revolt's political significance, Burke published 'Masaniello: A response'.¹⁷ Burke claimed that Villari misread his article and misinterpreted his objectives. It should have been clear to Villari that their works stand in perfect harmony. Burke's anthropological view of the Revolt only complemented its political significance. While Villari has not responded to this article to date, and Burke maintains that his anthropologic understanding was indeed political; it would seem that these historians cannot be reconciled on the subject. Their greatest disagreement rests on the passionate identification of the Revolt of Naples. Whereas Burke delved deeper into the sentiments of the Neapolitan people; Villari meant to lift the iconic passion of the Neapolitans and expose their political and deliberate intelligence.

For Villari, this battle wages on. It is not only in the face of publications by Peter Burke that Villari defends his political perspective. John Elliott, among others, stated that in the Spanish provinces where hunger and poverty were prevalent, 'only a sudden tax increase or a rise in the price of bread was needed to precipitate a tumult. Events in Sicily, and to a lesser degree in the city of Naples, hardly extended beyond this classical category of hunger riots.'¹⁸ The Revolt of Naples, in this context, was predictable and irrelevant. Only the extraordinary occurrence of Masaniello attracted attention to this particular revolt. Otherwise, it was a popular movement born out of hunger and misery. Nothing comparable to the political Revolt of the Catalans, Elliott would claim, which had been a combination of elite and popular participants.¹⁹ While the increase of prices or taxes definitely added fuel to the fire, Christopher Marshall, art historian, claimed that the direct trigger of the Neapolitan Revolt was the abolition of taxes following an inspirational uprising in Palermo in May 20 earlier that year.²⁰ It would seem that the conventional understanding of the Revolt is more likely to support the view of Burke, rather than that of Villari.

The Giulio Genoino Revolt of Naples

In this debate, there is also the possibility of a non-elite yet political movement. In a popular assumption, Masaniello has been said to have been a protégé of Giulio Genoino, one of the malcontents of the Neapolitan government. For much of his life, Genoino tried to get the Spanish authorities to involve the Third Estate in the Neapolitan council that governed the kingdom. The significance of the reform-minded Genoino was mentioned by Villari, as well as by Richard Cavendish²¹, Girolamo Arnaldi²² and Henry Kamen²³. If Genoino had indeed been the mind behind Masaniello, there would have been the possibility of the Revolt to have been seen both as a popular and political movement.

Arnaldi explained that from early on, Masaniello had Giulio Genoino at his side. Genoino was eighty years old at the time of the Revolt, and had spent 1622-1640 imprisoned. He had been part of the

¹⁷ Peter Burke, 'Masaniello: A response', *Past & Present* 114 (1987) 197-199.

¹⁸ Elliott, 'Revolts in the Spanish Monarchy', 110.

¹⁹ Elliott, 'Revolts in the Spanish Monarchy', 111.

²⁰ Christopher R. Marshall, 'Order and Anarchy in Domenico Gargiulo's *The Revolt of Masaniello*' in *The Art Bulletin* Vol. 80, No. 3 (Sep, 1998), 478.

²¹ Richard Cavendish, 'Masaniello's Naples Revolt Against Spain', in *History Today* 47 (1997).

²² Girolamo Arnaldi, *Italy and Its Invaders*, trans. by Anthony Shugaar (Harvard 2005) 162.

²³ Henry Kamen, *The Iron Century: Social Change in Europe 1550-1660* (London 1971) 362-363.

Elletto del Popolo in 1620, when the viceroy had tried to strengthen the populace against the nobility within the city government. At the start of the Revolt, Genoino still harbored the hope of giving the third estate of Naples a position of power in the government.

Arnaldi saw the start of the Revolt as a number of mild attacks in the richer areas of the city, as was common during uprisings against hunger. On July 10th, however, a few bandits were hired by a number of nobles to assassinate Masaniello. The attempt failed, but the effects were explosive. The masses retaliated violently against the nobility. Noblemen were sought out and killed. Many aristocrats fled the city, as the masses turned toward the city's palaces to attack. As the rebels' violence was ever increasing, Genoino was encouraged to set up an agreement to banish the gabelles and grant the populace more power in the government. Arnaldi believed Genoino, despite his old age, to have been the very protagonist and mind behind the first phase of the Revolt of Masaniello.²⁴

Somewhat similar to this theory is the view of Kamen. While he did recognize Masaniello as the popular leader of the Revolt; Kamen claimed that the illiterate fisherman's son had no real sense of direction. Genoino essentially formed a coherent policy for the massive movement, but now his main aim was to lift the heaviness of the taxes and to limit the extravagance of the nobility. He was also concerned with strengthening the royal power, in order to limit that of the feudal nobility. This provided a basis for alliance between Genoino and the Duke of Arcos, but this basis held no steady ground: the Spanish crown would never have negotiated with a rebel, and the masses of the mob would not have trusted such associations.²⁵

Agreements and Disputes

From the above, we can gather that the variety in the historiography of Revolt of Naples is considerable, and there have been very few agreements between authors that would suggest that there is a conventional understanding of the Revolt. The very date on which the Revolt is said to have truly erupted is even debated. Burke saw the perfect synthesis between the festival of the Virgin of the Carmine on 7th of July 1647, when Masaniello had reached out to the civic guard, as the undeniable start of the Revolt. While it is quite undeniable that peace in the city was disrupted on this day, not all agree that a true eruption had yet taken place. Arnaldi saw minor attacks on this day and those that followed, but the explosion had not been ignited until Masaniello's attempted assassination of the 10th of July. Villari did agree that the 7th of July was the first ignition of the Neapolitan Revolt, but the true gravity did not fall until Masaniello was killed and the Revolt was recognized as undeniably political. It was not until this point that the Revolt caused alarm.

Who took the role of protagonist in the Revolt, is altogether undecided. The most popular candidate of these, Masaniello, is both challenged and defended. Burke, faithful to his sources, sees Masaniello at the head of the Neapolitan people. Arnaldi, Cavendish and Camen promote Genoino as the true mind behind the Revolt, propelling his wishes through the popular leader of Masaniello. Villari rejects Masaniello of having any significant influence altogether. If there should be any attention paid to Masaniello, it should be to research how and why he has been superimposed on the historical reality of the Revolt of Naples. The insistence of Masaniello as the national hero, leader of the Revolt and

²⁴ Arnaldi, *Italy and Its Invaders*, 162.

²⁵ Kamen, *The Iron Century*, 362-363.

the people, greatly diminished the opportunity of the Revolt being thought of anything other than popular. All that can be agreed on here is that Masaniello remains forever the icon of the Revolt of Naples.

The further progress of the Revolt is just as debated. Especially the reason for its success has a number of theories. First, and most straightforward, is the idea of Burke: the people of Naples stood fast by their belief that God supported their rebellion. This to the frustration of Villari, who insisted on the Revolt's complexity, and the careful considerations that were needed to keep the defenses of the Revolt in place. A possible explanation could be the brilliance of Genoino, as Kamen and Arnldi claimed. Villari, however, insisted that additional study was needed here. The complex nature of the Revolt could not be stressed enough. Exaggeration of the role of the city's piety once again stood in the way of proper study of the Revolt.

Also in the way of proper study of the Revolt, to Villari, is the general acceptance of the Revolt as an almost natural reaction to hunger. Studies on the years preceding the Revolt would reveal decline, poverty and hunger as a general trend for the lower classes in Naples. Burke defied Elliot's preconditions of Revolt by calling them inhuman and deterministic. Instead, Burke summed up the occurrence of the Revolt of Palermo, the imposition of fruit taxes and the occurrence of the festival of the Virgin of the Carmine. Apparently not as deterministic; these three occurrences combined, Burke claims to have triggered the Revolt of Naples.

Villari was less clear on the topic of the Revolt's trigger. Instead, he diverted the attention from the conventional ten days of madness and turned towards the politically charged atmosphere that had already been present long before the Revolt. What caused the initial outburst was not explained, but Villari rather looked at how the Revolt turned into a movement of reform. That the Revolt was essentially seen as such a movement by contemporaries was another essential point within debate in the Revolt of Naples. It also raised the question on whether the Revolt had been spontaneous, or had been planned.

In the assumption of an emotional Revolt, as Elliott and Burke asserted, the specific conditions that made out the context of the Revolt would suggest that the Revolt was entirely spontaneous. Had there been a political motivation behind the Revolt, the movement would have more potential to be planned; by Genoino, for instance. Historians in favor of the Genoino theory claimed that Masaniello and his actions on the 7th of July could have possibly been staged. Henry Kamen even asserted that the entire movement had been orchestrated by Genoino from the start. This question of a planned or spontaneous Revolt remains an essential argument in the question of whether it had been of a political or emotional nature.

The passionate aspect of the Revolt has been studied by Peter Burke, and this unconventional approach has been praised by John Elliott. While extremely appreciative towards Villari's work, Elliott welcomed the innovative insights of history with an anthropological view such as Burke's. Symbolic representations of power and popular rituals played significant parts in early modern society, and in this sense, Villari's strict political approach could be seen as traditional. This brings me to consider the methods by which both these authors, Villari and Burke, came to their interpretations.

Primary sources in question

Burke relied on a number of contemporary narratives of the Revolt. Most useful he found the narratives of three diplomats – the representatives of Florence, Venice and Genoa – who wrote home while the Revolt was in progress, before they could have been aware of how the incidents would turn out.²⁶ The same went for the letters from the archbishop of Naples, Ascanio Filomarino, to the pope.²⁷ Burke also used the famous narrative of Alessandro Giraffi, first published in 1647 and translated to English three years later.²⁸ Three pro-Spanish narratives were by De Sanctis, Nicolai and Tontoli.²⁹ Two anti-Spanish accounts by Donzelli and Della Porta; the first of which were published in 1647 but censored by authorities, and the second had not been published at all.³⁰ Lastly, a more neutral account was given by Liponari.³¹

Burke considered that these sources were written by aristocrats and told the tale of the Revolt from their perspective. As Burke was interested in the thoughts of the populace and understanding the emotions of the participants of the Revolt, he did make use of the narratives mentioned above, but tried to read them while creating another perspective. Their detailed descriptions of the collective actions of the lower classes allowed for an alternative interpretation, based on ‘social drama’³². This way, Burke was able to draw interpretations from texts that were different from the messages that biased authors were trying to convey. In other words, Burke is reading between the lines.

While Burke recycled the conventional sources of the Revolt, Villari delved deeper into lesser known sources of information, and tackled the traps into which many historians frequently fell. As an afterword to *The Revolt of Naples* he wrote: ‘An uncritical reading of the narratives and reports sent from Naples to all parts of Europe, the lack of a detailed examination of Spanish sources, the facile acceptance of commonplaces and accounts that are intentionally mystificatory, and the failure to make use of what remains of the manuscript political texts are all factors that have limited and

²⁶ Vincenzo de' Medici, "Documenti sulla storia economica e civile del regno [di Napoli]", edited by F. Palermo, in *Archivio storico italiano*, ix (1846), 348-53; Ottaviano Sauli, "Relazione dei tumulti napoletani del 1647", edited by L. Correr, *Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane*, xv (1890), 355-87; Andrea Rosso, "La rivoluzione di Masaniello visto dal residente veneto a Napoli", edited by A. Capograssi, *Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane*, new ser., xxxiii (1952), 167-235.

²⁷ Archbishop Ascanio Filomarino's letters to Pope Innocent X are in "Sette lettere del Cardinal Filomarino al papa", ed. F. Palermo, *ibid.*, pp. 379-93.

²⁸ Alessandro Giraffi, *Le rivoluzioni di Napoli* (Venice, 1647), trans. by James Howell as *An Exact History of the Late Revolution in Naples*, 2 volumes (London, 1650-2).

²⁹ Tommaso De Santis, *Storia del tumulto di Napoli* (Leiden, 1652; reprinted Trieste, 1858); Agostino Nicolai, *Historia, o vero narrazione giornale dell'ultime rivoluzioni della cittac e regno di Napoli* (Amsterdam, 1648), Gabriele Tontoli, *Il Masaniello* (Naples, 1648).

³⁰ Giuseppe Donzelli, *Partenope liberata* (Naples, 1647); Angelo Della Porta, "Giornale istorico di quanto piu memorabile e accaduto nelle rivoluzioni di Napoli", *Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, fonds italien*, no. 299.

³¹ Liponari, *Relatione delle rivoluzioni popolari di Napoli* (Padua, 1648).

³² The term social drama was coined by anthropologist Victor Turner in 'Social Dramas and Stories about Them' *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 7, No. 1, On Narrative. (Autumn, 1980), 141-168: "a spontaneous unit of social process and a fact of everyone's experience in every human society" 145.

distorted historical judgment of the Neapolitan revolution and of the attitude of Italian political thinkers towards the contemporaneous revolutionary movement.’³³

True to his word, Villari’s critical approach became clear in his use of for instance Giraffi. Villari was very critical towards Giraffi’s narrative, and particularly towards the translation published by Howell which Burke found so useful. Villari found that Howell went much further in justifying the rebellion than Giraffi originally did. Howell did not only relate the Revolt to the high taxes, but also to the involuntary and harmful services demanded from subjects in the country, and of Spanish exploitation of its Italian provinces. Howell went well beyond the events Revolt itself, and considered the entire framework surrounding the Revolt of Naples. Howell also related the Revolt to the rebellions of the Netherlands, Catalonia and Portugal. The only reason that the Kingdom of Naples did not break ties with the Spanish Monarchy, was because of its lack of will and consistency. Villari held Howell’s publication as a major example that the Revolt had been perceived as a major political movement throughout Europe. For this argument, Villari also studied the letters from the Duke of Arcos to the Spanish King³⁴, and to the Duke of Montalvo³⁵.

Also considering the international sphere, Villari studied the publication and distribution of documents at the orders of the Count of Oñate, the viceroy of Naples at the time. This document announced that Spain had overcome the Revolt, yet stressed the danger that had threatened the Monarchy and Europe when the Neapolitans disrupted its peace. Oñate had copies of these texts delivered to foreign embassies.³⁶ Villari therefore not only critically studied the content of his sources; he also critically examined the backgrounds of these sources.

Villari continued to search for underground manuscripts that circulated in Naples at the time of the Revolt. The anonymous publication *Discorso fatto al popolo napoletano per eccitarlo alla libertà*, for example, was published by Schipa in 1912. The *Discorso* had been falsely attributed to Genoino, and even Masaniello, and this had not come to light until Schipa had been able to negate it.³⁷ The text called upon the Neapolitan people to stand armed against the Spanish government, and to reconsider where their loyalty was supposed to lie. Another text in Villari’s study, also challenging the assumption of loyalty, was *Il cittadino fedele*.³⁸ Villari pointed out the use of the term citizen, rather

³³ Villari, ‘Naples and the Contemporaneous Revolutions. Some Points of Convergence’, in *The Revolt of Naples*, trans. by James Newell (Cambridge 1993) 178.

³⁴ Duke of Arcos to king, 16 July 1647; 23 July 1647: Archivo General de Simancas, Secretarias Provinciales, leg. 218.

³⁵ Duke of Arcos to duke of Montalvo, governor of Sardinia, 3 September 1647: Archivo General de Simancas, Secretarias Provinciales, leg. 218.

³⁶ *A true Relation of the reducing of the City of Naples to the obedience of the King of Spaine, which happened on the 5 of April 1648. Being Palm-Sunday. Together with the Imprisonment of the Duke of Guise and liberty of the Duke of Tursis. With the Resolution and Declaration of the Spanish Generall, concerning the French Fleet, and their proceedings thereupon*, (London, 1648).

³⁷ Michelangelo Schipa, ‘Un grido di libertà nel Seicento’ in *Studi dedicati a Francesco Torraca nel XXIV anniversario della sua laurea*, (Naples, 1912).

³⁸ *Il cittadino fedele. Discorso breve sulla giusta, generosa e prudente risoluzione del valoroso e fedelissimo popolo di Napli per liberarsi dall’insopportabili gravetze impostegli da’ Spagnoli* (BV, MSS 11734 fos 178-99).

than subject, as one of the main novel ideas disseminated during this time. Texts like these would bring to light the conventional thoughts of Neapolitan witnesses of the Revolt.

Burke and Villari have thus taken a different approach to understanding the minds of seventeenth century Neapolitans. There was a considerable difference between the choice of sources between them. While Burke asserted to have taken a novel approach to conventional sources, Villari sought new sources altogether. Burke's sources were all but one published to the public, while Villari turned to hushed up manuscripts. Villari nevertheless also critically researched the backgrounds of the more conventional narratives. That these different approaches towards primary sources have led to such different interpretations, calls for a questioning of those sources that were disseminated to the public at the time of the Revolt.

In this debate, Villari accused Burke of not taking into consideration the overarching political circumstance of the Revolt. Burke, instead, seemed to have more appreciation of the circumstances of the lower class, which had just as much reason to revolt against the government. Both historians made valid points in their defenses of their interpretations of the Revolt, and these interpretations did not have to be mutually exclusive. Mostly, however, I believe that they based their defenses on the sources that they have directly applied to their understanding on the Revolt, which – while original – are of little help in creating an unbiased representation of the Revolt of Naples.

While has been Villari is very convincing in this debate because of his more extensive research; a closer look at the original sources around the Revolt of Naples has led me to believe that the differences in the historiography of the Revolt has more to do with the seventeenth century accounts of the event, than with the quality of the historians' work. I would therefore like to prove that in the case of understanding the Revolt of Naples, the more subjective standpoints have heavily been influenced by the source's background and perspective. The original sources of the Revolt of Naples gave varying accounts of its motivations and progress, and even if one makes sure to read them all; facts will have been left out, emphasized or even slightly bent in order to tell the story that the author wished for the event to be received. The question of which source spoke the truth would always remain. This, I believe, lies at the heart of contemporary disagreements on the Revolt of Naples. Rosario Villari is known for his formidable study on the Revolt of Naples, but that is not to say that Burke did not do his research before publishing his own work. This disagreement between experts suggests that Burke relied on facts which might have come from sources that were precisely written to undermine the messages that Villari received from his.

The subjectivity of these sources used for their argumentation play a leading role in this debate, and my research. From the above, we have seen that Burke has worked solely with subjective sources and relied on his personal interpretation to create new insights. Even Villari, who has ample experience in the use of objective sources when portraying the economic malaise of the Neapolitan Kingdom³⁹, resorted to subjective sources in his arguments against Burke. However critical Villari might have been of his primary sources, most of the sources that he used as evidence for his statements were not objective, and can therefore not be taken as fact. This could suggest that objective sources on the incentives for the Revolt of Naples are scarce and historians must rely on subjective sources instead. This, to me, would seem unlikely. Especially considering Elliott's *The*

³⁹ Villari, 'The Neapolitan Financial Crisis', 240.

Revolt of The Catalans, which has largely been grounded on abundant objective sources.⁴⁰ Such sources would surely be available for the Revolt of Naples as well. Even Elliott, however, has remarked on the uncertainty of interpreting numerical sources⁴¹, and this brings us back to the difficulty of the studying the Revolt objectively. Because my aim is to trace the foundations of the different views to their original sources, I have chosen to work with subjective primary sources as well.

To study the discrepancy between perspectives of the Revolt of Naples, I have chosen Spanish and Dutch pamphlets for their very different political content. My study of Spanish and Dutch sources show significantly different accounts of the same event, and these accounts highly depended on their political contexts. While the Spanish Monarchy was battling with its image of decline; the Eighty Years' War had been drawing to a close. While Dutch pamphlets insisted that the Revolt of Naples was the justified result of a complex state of political conflict, in which the Revolt was a justified means of restoring the kingdom's right and privileges; Spanish prints presented the Revolt of Naples as a much simpler matter, which occurred through very little fault of their own, and mostly concerned hunger and angry peasants. The latter emphasized the passionate side of the Revolt, while the former; the complex and political side of the Revolt. Both these representations are defended again by Peter Burke and respectively Rosario Villari. This suggests that the strength of these portrayals have survived the wear of nearly four centuries.

Thesis Outline

My plan to approach this study of different perspectives therefore involves studying the context of the Revolt of Naples, before continuing to my own research on seventeenth century prints. Important to bear in mind when considering these points of debate, are whether they were in agreement with the contextual factors at the time.

Contextual framework

The first chapter of this thesis will focus on the history of the Spanish Monarchy. This chapter will offer a framework in which the Neapolitan Kingdom was to be found under Spanish dominion. Particularly, I will focus on the Monarchy's political history, as this will give the most useful insight to the relationship between Neapolitan Kingdom and its Spanish government. The key players in my thesis – the Dutch, the Castilians, the Neapolitans – all took part in the Spanish Monarchy at the time of the Revolt, and were therefore related through a mutual history. Therefore, I will pay special attention to the Monarchy's relationships with its states. An important factor here was the criticism that the Spanish monarch himself had been subject to, and the propaganda that had been used to counter any negative ideas disseminated through political thought.

⁴⁰ For instance prices and wages of laborers year by year in the late sixteenth century: J.H. Elliott, *The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain (1598-1640)* (Cambridge 1963) 59-60.

⁴¹ Elliott, *The Revolt of the Catalans*, 563.

The second chapter will then focus on the factors that might have contributed to the prelude to Revolt itself. Again, a parallel consideration of the Spanish Monarchy in 1647 and 1648 will be necessary here. Most conventional explanations for the alleged decline of Spain consider that Olivares had fallen and the Spanish most prized states seemed to be breaking off left and right. The Spanish viceroy in office at the time of the Revolt, the Duke of Arcos, had been forced to uphold policies imposed by the Crown. Close attention will be paid to the conventional triggers of the Revolt; most important of which were said to have been the taxes imposed where they could not be borne. These factors are essential in order to understand the context of the Revolt, and to come to judge the effects of economic decline, the social dynamics, and the relationships between baron and vassal in Kingdom of Naples.

An interesting insight into the seventeenth century perspective on the relationship between the Neapolitan Kingdom and the Spanish crown will be given in Chapter III, which will study a work of a contemporary Neapolitan jurist, Giovanni Battista de Thoro. Through his perspective, this chapter in my thesis will consider his perceptions of ideal kingship, as well as his description of the state that the Neapolitan Kingdom was in. His perspective will also shed light onto the importance of representation at this time, which remains highly relevant to the question of the different perceptions of the Revolt.

Dutch and Castilian sources

With a solid basis in the historical context of the Revolt, I will turn to my own study of primary sources on the Revolt of Naples. The two different versions of the Revolt of Naples can be well found in the accounts of Castilian and Dutch pamphlets. For my comparison of these prints, I will create three separate chapters in which certain themes will come forward. These three chapters will each take one Spanish and one Dutch pamphlet that had significant similarities and differences, and set them out against each other. In the first of these chapters, Chapter IV, I will study the Dutch account of the initial phase of the revolt by looking at the pamphlet *Autentijck, bescheyt en seker verhael van de restitutie der privilegien aen het volck van Napels, door den Hertogh van Arcos*, in which the Neapolitan privileges were restored – thanks to the heroic action of Masaniello and his followers. While Dutch pamphlets fell silent after the success of the Neapolitan rebellions, Spanish sources emphasized their failure. The chapter will therefore compare the Dutch source to *Relacion del feliz successo, que en 6 Abril tuvo el Serenissimo Senor Don Juan de Austria, con la Reducion de la Ciudad, y Reyno de Napoles*, written in May 1648. It will show the Revolt of Naples as a story with an entirely different protagonist; a Spanish hero in the form of Don Juan.

These two pamphlets provided a name and face to go with the Revolt of Naples. Both accounts made for compelling stories in which two very different heroes took the leading part. The first, and perhaps most popular, was Masaniello. The Dutch pamphlet solemnly listed the privileges restored to the people of the Kingdom of Naples. In it, the figure of Masaniello was to thank for the story's success, and to be considered the hero of the Neapolitan people. Being an account of only the first days of the Revolt, the Dutch pamphlet was obviously open ended. From the Spanish pamphlet, we can learn that the Neapolitan Revolt was not quite finished with a fisherman's son holding the winning hand. Instead, the Spanish pamphlet spoke of the successful defeat of the Revolt, by Philip IV's own kin:

Don Juan of Austria. Here, the Revolt of Naples was not a success story of a righteous man, but of the victory of royal power.

The second chapter of my comparison, Chapter V, will show the different accounts given on the events of October 1647 in the city of Naples. As it seemed that the Revolt would not resolve itself without military interference, Philip IV sent Don Juan, his illegitimate son and general of the Spanish Armada, to crush the revolt by force. The stories presented in these Dutch and Spanish sources gave the most striking dissimilarities of this study. While the Dutch pamphlet spoke of terrible abuses of the Spanish army; the Spanish prints spoke of bare necessity and hardship.

The Dutch *Manifest Ofte Redenen Waerom de Ghemeynte van Napels Genootsaecht is gheworden om haer te ontslaen van het Jock van Spangien*, gave an account that was so gruesome and embarrassing to the Spanish Crown, that barely anything of its story reoccured in the Spanish account given in *Ordenes y otros documentos publicados con motivo de la actuación del Barón de Vatteville en Nápoles*, as captain general of the artillery of the Spanish royal army, led by Don Juan. In this comparison, again, it will seem that the texts provided conflicting information on who in the Neapolitan society had been responsible for the rebellion. This comparison is particularly interesting to this essay because it signifies the portrayal of the actions of the Spanish government in the face of rebellion. How the government handled revolts had great repercussions,⁴² as it showed the rest of the Spanish Monarchy how fairly they could expect to be treated by their government.

The final comparison of these three is the influence of the Neapolitan Revolt in Dutch and Castilian literary art. The Revolt of Naples was still in the memories of European minds, and a powerful way to influence these is through the projections of art. Chapter VI will therefore compare two artistic expressions of Spanish-Neapolitan relations in the form of an epic poem, and of a dramatic play.

First is the Dutch play, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello, of Napelse beroerte* that was published over twenty years after the Revolt, but still portrayed the same heroics represented in in *de restitutie der privilegien*. The Dutch writer based the play on the Neapolitan hero: Masaniello. The subject, a rebellion, was a rare theme on the stages of the seventeenth century. Asselijn took a unique stance in defending a revolt, and presenting the people of Naples as subjects to unbearable tyranny, whose rebellion is understandable – if not entirely justified.⁴³ Asselijn also showed another side of the revolt, however, in which the rebellion itself was a horror, and Masaniello showed tyrannical behavior in his final days of madness.⁴⁴

This play will be set out against the Castilian poem, *Napoles recuperada por el rey don Alonso*, written just a year after the Neapolitan Revolt, telling the tale of the heroic conquer of the Kingdom of Naples back in 1442. Masaniello had become quite a popular figure in literature; his remarkable rise to power occurred in more novels and playwright throughout Europe for centuries after the Neapolitan Revolt. The popularity of Masaniello was not so prevalent in Spanish art – but the

⁴² J.H. Elliot, *Imperial Spain: 1469-1716* (London 2002) 329.

⁴³ Marijke Meijer Drees, 'Inleiding', in Thomas Asselijn, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello, of Napelse beroerte*, 1.

⁴⁴ Meijer Drees 'Inleiding', 3.

Castilians did manage to bring a positive and account of Spanish-Neapolitan relations in the form of an epic poem. In 1649, de Borja composed *Napoles recuperada por el rey don Alonso*. This poem did not speak of the Revolt, but of king Alfonso I's heroic defeat of the French and recuperation of Naples. It was portrayed as one of the greatest achievements in Spanish history. The poem exalted Spanish military achievements, and many letters of praise preceding the poem commended this achievement, as well as Spanish superiority and Castilian culture.

Research questions

The seventh and final chapter of my thesis will hopefully give insight to the debate of the Revolt of Naples as a political or popular rebellion. My main questions based on contemporary historiography should be answered by an analysis of my primary sources. Firstly, I shall hope to answer the question of why presentation of the Revolt would be as skewed as it was. Secondly, I will focus on how the perceptions of the Revolt have been created. Especially the portrayals of protagonists and motivations were important here. Thirdly, I hope to assess how the presentations of these sources have survived in the variety of interpretations in contemporary historiography of the Revolt of Naples. All together, I hope to show that the contextual backgrounds of seventeenth century narrators have contributed to an undecipherable history of the Revolt of Naples.

Chapter I – Spanish Political History and Thought

If we are to assume that the Revolt of Naples was a complex matter of the gradual infringement of constitutional privileges; or a much simpler, natural reaction of a hungry populace to newly imposed taxes, it would be vital to understand the entire scenario of Naples under Spanish rule in 1647. A study of the Spanish-Neapolitan relationship is crucial here, and will therefore play a leading role throughout this thesis. The first step towards understanding this relationship is by knowing its wider context. The framework in which the Revolt took place, must be seen in the grander scheme of seventeenth century Europe. This chapter will therefore draw the context of the Kingdom of Naples under Spanish dominion in seventeenth century Europe, focusing on the decades prelude to the Revolt.

While shifting our focus to the Spanish Monarchy as a whole, it is important to consider each entity within the Monarchy together formed what had often been considered the greatest power in Europe. In a matter of decades, the Spanish Monarchy took on its awe-inspiring shape as it expanded through the marital unification of the Crown of Aragon and Castile, the discovery of America and the formation of new alliances throughout Europe. The Spanish Monarchy consisted out of an agglomeration of independent, unrelated states – not imperially related at all.⁴⁵ No effort was made to create unity in neither government nor trade, and each state lived pursuing its own interests. All that linked the provinces together was their inheritance to the same monarch.⁴⁶

Studying the role of the Spanish Monarch will give useful insight to the relationship between the Neapolitan Kingdom and its Castilian King. Intrinsicly linked to this topic was also the role of the sovereign in the whole of his Spanish Monarchy, which will receive most attention in this chapter. This will also offer insight into the relationships between the Dutch Republic, Castile, and Naples – with each other as well as with their king. Having all taken part in the Spanish Monarchy at the time of the Revolt, and are therefore related through a common history, as well as perhaps a common identity. How the king was received throughout his entire monarchy was essential to his authority. This calls for the consideration of the importance of representation at the time of Philip IV; a theme that will be highly relevant to the question of the different perceptions of the Revolt, later in this thesis.

This chapter will first look at the formation of the Monarchy from the time of the Union of the Crowns of Castile and of Aragon, which had set the foundation of how the Monarchy would be governed. This foundation included the constitutions agreed upon in the initial stages of Spanish dominion; the legal structures applied over those that were already present; as well as the position the nobility took in the government of newly annexed territories, such as the Kingdom of Naples. Then we will observe the role of such kingdoms within the Spanish Monarchy and the crown's behavior towards these states. The insistence of the individual political entities on their own constitutional laws and privileges, calls for a reflection on their thoughts on their identities and their relationship with their monarch. Here the role of representation of royal power will come to light,

⁴⁵J.H. Elliott, *The Revolt of the Catalans*, 8.

⁴⁶ Leopold Ranke, *The Ottoman and Spanish Empires in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New York 1975) 28.

which will play an important part in understanding the significance of portrayals of the Neapolitan Revolt.

I.I – Spain: an Agglomeration of Political Entities

The seventeenth century has often been portrayed as Spain's epoch of decline: the crown was failing to integrate its viceroyalties into the framework of Castile; winds of revolt were blowing throughout the monarchy; and in 1640, Catalonia and Portugal had slipped out of Spanish dominion. Nevertheless – the Spanish Monarchy was an unquestionable and intimidating world power even after these adversities. Jonathan Israel asserted that the weakening of Spanish power was not truly recognized before the end of the Thirty Years War in 1659 at the Peace of the Pyrenees, and Spain's failure to reconquer Portugal in 1660.⁴⁷ This chapter will therefore not focus on Spain's decline, but on its development and mechanisms that were in working order during the in the seventeenth century.

To start, we shall look at the first circumstances under which Spain was governed as an agglomeration of autonomous states. With the marriage of Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon, their territories became no more united than before. These territories now shared common rulers, but these rulers were to govern them according to their own laws and policies. This was the Spanish kings' approach to government over the course of the sixteenth century. Still, some degree of integration was necessary for the monarchs to effectively control their realm. The question was how to achieve this over such a large territory where conformity of government was absent. On this scale, coercion was no option. This would arouse hostility towards the new crown; not to mention the expense of keeping up an army to enforce such a policy at the time. Instead, new institutional organs were created within newly annexed states. With these new organizations, new positions opened up that could be given to the old elite, who gladly accepted the offers of positions of power. As a result, the loyalty of influential locals was won through patronage of the crown.⁴⁸

It was through this network of local authorities that the king was able to represent his own power in his many states and thus in his entire monarchy. When speaking of seventeenth century Spain, it is therefore necessary to consider the differentiation between the crown and the political units that constituted the Spanish Monarchy. Such political entities in Europe have been classified as composite monarchies, as dynastic agglomerates, or as polycentric monarchies. The first implies that sixteenth century Europe revolved around large composite states, coexisting in a multitude of smaller sovereign units. This system is referred to as one of composite monarchies.⁴⁹ Another term that would apply to this organization would be dynastic agglomerates. Like composite monarchies, dynastic agglomerates imply that a collection of sovereign political units exist in composite states. The difference between the two is that a system of composite monarchies present Europe as rather static and organized, while dynastic agglomerates poses the idea that Europe was an ever-changing myriad of dynamic and diverse states. Finally, polycentric monarchies imply that the former two underestimate the unity that existed among the members of a composite monarchy. The entities within a monarchy were part of a fluid and dynamic whole – a unity that was not to be trivialized.

⁴⁷ J. Israel, *The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy and the Jews* (London and Ronceverte 1990) xi.

⁴⁸ J. H. Elliot, *The Count-Duke of Olivares, The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven and London 1986) 55.

⁴⁹ J. H. Elliott, 'A Europe of Composite Monarchies', *Past & Present* 137 (1992) 50.

The significance of classifying the Spanish Monarchy is that it helps in establishing the position of the Kingdom of Naples within the Spanish Monarchy, and understanding the relationship it had with its monarch. This subchapter will consider the history and behavior of the government and entities in the Spanish monarchy, and which term would be best applied to the overarching structure in which the Revolt of Naples took place.

The Union of the Crowns

The Union of the Crowns has oftentimes been seen as the birth of 'Spain'. This Union, however, was not the formation of the united nation we imagine it to be today. Instead, the Union of 1469 was a marriage through which Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon became rulers over the autonomous regions of Castile, Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia. Together, their territories took up most of the physical territory of the Iberian peninsula, and was therefore often referred to as Spain. This idea of Spain was more of a conversational convenience than a political reality. Each region presented its own hub of politics, culture, and economy.

In 1474 Isabella was recognized as the queen of Castile and later that year, Ferdinand succeeded to the Aragonese throne. At this point, the success of their union was yet to come. The newly shaped Spanish Monarchy had limited economic resources, as the Spanish peninsula was challenged by extremes of climate and a scarcity of raw materials. Its main industry was wool trade, while products of basic necessity were often imported. In addition to internal tensions; French, Portuguese and Muslim threats loomed in the background. The countryside of the Spanish states was in the hands of the nobility, which was in control of the local economy and had thousands of vassals owing allegiance to their lords. In order to develop alliances in these already highly developed systems, the young monarchs started to create institutions that would allow them to collaborate with nobles, cities, the church and commercial sectors. As civil conflicts died down, violence was organized rather than eliminated. Vigilantes were encouraged to keep order internally, and in southern Castilian cities were encouraged to keep arms as a means of defense, as well as the onset of a new offense towards Al-Andalus. All the while, the Catholic Kings traveled about their provinces as a way of strengthening their royal authority with their physical presence.⁵⁰ While Spain remained an informal collective term for the autonomous states, this network was soon to be somewhat united by a sense of Spain by their rulers' expansive ambitions.

Ferdinand and Isabella had set out to conquer the Muslim cities south of their borders. On the 2nd of January 1492, the royal couple made their famous entrance into the city of Granada, seized from Muslim hands and integrated into the Christian crown of Castile. No three months later were the Jews within the Spanish Monarchy expelled from their lands. Only a few days later, Christopher Columbus set sail to the western seas, who would return a year later with the exciting news of his alleged new route to Asia. On top of all this, Ferdinand and Isabella were awarded with the title of Catholic Kings by pope Alexander VI in 1494.

The glittering achievements of the Catholic Kings attracted the support that their ambitions would not have been able to have done without. Castile had not been able to conquer Granada, had it not been for the money, men and weapons provided by their supporters from all around Christian

⁵⁰ Henry Kamen, *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power 1492-1763* (2004) 35.

Europe. Castile's venture into Al-Andalus was seen as the new European crusade, in which Spain was battling against the enemies of the Catholic faith. Entire campaigns were being funded by the Church and by rich financiers from Italy. Soldiers from different parts of the continent volunteered to fight for the battles of Spain, which now stood united in a religious war that was theoretically Castilian. This alliance between Spaniards – in which the cause and, significantly, the spoken language were Castilian – set a major foundation of Spanish policies in which Castile would take the leading role.⁵¹

When all of Al-Andalus had been wiped off of the Iberian peninsula, Spanish imperial interests turned to Italy. The Crown of Aragon had dynastic ties with Naples, since King Alfonso the Magnanimous of Aragon had conquered Naples in 1442. At his death in 1458, he divided his territories in two: the Aragonese crown went to his heir, Juan; and the Kingdom of Naples went to Alfonso's illegitimate son, Ferrante. In 1476 Ferrante married Juan's daughter, Juana, bringing together these branches of family. Through this union between Ferrante and his niece, Ferdinand was often involved in Italian affairs through familial bonds.⁵²

Between 1494 and 1504, and especially during the latter two years, the French sought to take possession of Naples. At first, Ferdinand supported Ferrante II in fending off the French invaders. Later, it turned out to have been a French-Spanish contest for the Neapolitan Kingdom. In January 1504, at the end two years of substantial battles, the French surrendered and Ferdinand was formally recognized as the sovereign of Naples. The Kingdom of Naples hereafter became the dynastic possession of Ferdinand, its king. Naples fell under his direct rule as an autonomous kingdom, although it was immediately ruled by the king's viceroy. While Naples had now been united with the Crown of Aragon, Ferdinand gave credit to the Castilian troops that attained it. This winning battle for Naples, the first war Castile had fought outside the Iberian peninsula, established a legend of Castilian military superiority.⁵³

The next major step in expansion was in 1496 when Juana, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, married Philip of Habsburg. In 1516, upon Ferdinand's death, his sixteen year old grandson Charles inherited the thrones to Castile and Aragon. In 1520, he was crowned Holy Roman emperor. Charles considered his inherited possessions to be independent entities, which were governed by their own traditional laws. The entities remained unaffected by the fact that they were now one of the very many territories ruled by a single sovereign. The entities considered themselves unchanged, and held on to their own particular rights and liberties. Any attempt to alter their traditional laws in hopes of creating a more homogenous realm, would have been considered the violation of the constitution that their ruler was obliged to respect. Charles was to rule over each territory with disregard to the technicality that he had many more.⁵⁴

A major drawback of the size of Charles' empire was his amount of territories – and thus individual governments – in relation to his single physical body. The physical presence during the rule of the Catholic Kings was one of the most revered virtues for which they were to be reminisced as the rulers of the Spanish golden age. This strategy only lasted for a few decades, however, and Ferdinand the

⁵¹ Kamen, *Empire*, 15-17.

⁵² Kamen, *Empire*, 24.

⁵³ Kamen, *Empire*, 26-29.

⁵⁴ Elliot, *Imperial Spain*, 150-165.

Catholic himself had outlived this practice. When Isabella died in 1504, and their daughter Juana was deemed not fit to rule, Ferdinand was forced to work through a network of alliances in order to rule over the numerous territories. As there was no common Spanish government, each of these provinces required separate rule. This web of relationships that would rule Spanish territories individually gave rise to the characteristic network of Spanish authority, in which each state was individually, but often indirectly, ruled by a single sovereign.

Each territory only acted in favor of its own interests, and sooner considered it a liability that their king - emperor of a great realm – had responsibilities elsewhere. Especially the Spanish territories saw their king as undeniably foreign. Charles had been born and raised in Ghent, and upon his arrival in Castile he was surrounded by his Dutch advisors. Charles made significant efforts to conform to Spanish culture and successfully became fluent in the Castilian language. Nevertheless, his many territories demanded that he was present elsewhere. He left his Castilian responsibilities with his wife Isabella, who assumed his tasks of government in his absence.⁵⁵ This was one of his many solutions to governing an empire without a common government. While respecting the individuality of each state; when Charles saw many of his territories endangered by Ottoman threat, he was able to rally resources from his many territories and defend his empire as a whole. Charles' territories therefore found security in their king's empire. Nevertheless, that their resources were used to fund battles seemed remote and unnecessary in their eyes. The only common identity that was formed in this period was the ideological goal of Christian Spaniard resisting the Turk.⁵⁶

Charles's enormous empire only lasted throughout his own lifetime, for by the time his son ascended to the throne, the empire had been divided in two. The Charles' failing expedition in the German lands of the Empire placed his Habsburg inheritance into the hands of his brother, Ferdinand, who had been determined to keep it in his own branch of the family. Charles then abdicated in favor of his heir, Philip II, and while Flanders had long been his home base, he sought his last days of retirement in a monastery on Spanish soil. Unlike Charles, his successor Philip II, had been born and raised in Castile. He was only ever entirely fluent in Castilian, and he preferred to surround himself with Spanish advisors.⁵⁷ Philip's reign was to bring the Iberian Peninsula once more to the focus of the Spanish Crown.⁵⁸

Viceroyalties

During the reign of Philip II, he established institutions in the hope of preserving his authority in his autonomous territories. The Spanish monarchy consisted out of nine viceroyalties: Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Navarre, Sardinia, Sicily, Naples and two viceroyalties in the New World: New Spain and Peru.⁵⁹ Each viceroyalty was highly centralized, and each viceroy was closely tied to the central government of Spain. In each viceroyalty, a Counsel, consisting out of local natives, would closely watch the actions of the viceroy to make sure that their local rights and liberties would be respected. The Counsel would meet regularly, and their discussions and recommendations would be

⁵⁵ Kamen, *Empire*, 52.

⁵⁶ Elliot, *Imperial Spain*, 169-170.

⁵⁷ Henry Kamen, *Spain 1469-1714: A Society of Conflict* (Routledge 2005) 122.

⁵⁸ Elliot, *Imperial Spain*, 210-211.

⁵⁹ Elliot, *Imperial Spain*, 175

summarized in what was called a *consulta*. From these *consultas*, the king would stay well-informed of the matters in his viceroyalties. In his own hand, he would draft appropriate orders to be sent back to the viceroy of the concerning state. This chain of communication ensured that no matter remained uncovered in the king's government of his monarchy. This allowed a highly centralized control over each state, albeit through a thick bureaucratic administration.⁶⁰

In 1561, the Spanish Court, which until then had been peripatetic, moved from Toledo to Madrid. In time, it was recognized as the capital of the Monarchy. It conveniently lay in the geographical center of Spain, but while it was central; it was also very remote to many territories of the monarchy. The latter contradicted the fundamental assumptions on which the Spanish Monarchy stood, in that each territory was of equal importance. The setting of a permanent capital, however, was the end of peripatetic kingship, which until then had given the many territories of the monarchy the visual reassurance by the occasional physical appearance of their king.⁶¹ In time, the Spanish monarchy became increasingly Castilian of character. The king's residence in a Castilian environment, often made Castile his primary concern. Being surrounded by Castilians, offices often went to them, and viceroyalties were hence often governed by Castilians.

Generally, the Spanish kingdoms in Italy remained loyal to the now obviously Castilian king. As long as their local laws and privileges against foreigners were respected, Italians had no issue with accepting a foreign monarch.⁶² Spain was careful not to impose imperialist tactics on a society such as Italy's, as was done in America, knowing it would only call for opposition. Besides; the Italian provinces were much easier to govern as they had similar class and legal structures, and there was no real need for the monarchy to come up with a consistent theory of empire. It was not until the problems that arose mid seventeenth century when Spain gradually came up with an imperial theory.⁶³ Still, when problems arose in the monarchy's kingdoms, its government had to act tactfully. The problems in the Netherlands, for instance, had more than one repercussion. The outcome of the Dutch revolt in 1566 would be decisive in the opinions of the non-Castilian territories of the Monarchy. The treatment that Madrid would decide upon for the Dutch that rebelled against the government, would exemplify the treatment the rest of the monarchy could expect from their sovereign.

The Spanish Monarchy became much more dependent on the decisions made in Madrid. When the famous Olivares established his position as the *valido*, or favorite, of Philip IV, he had a much more ambitious agenda than that of his predecessors. One of the problems he saw in the Spanish monarchy was the great diversity between its kingdoms. Olivares wished to create a more homogenous realm, and wished for this realm to conform to the standards maintained in Castile. If the Spanish monarchy were to be less fragmented, as it was at the time, it would facilitate the mobilization of resources the king needed for the many aspirations to restrengthen what he considered the most powerful empire of the world – if not so crippled by its lack of cohesion. This idea is often credited to ambitions of Olivares, who had set out to fix the waning authority of the

⁶⁰ Elliot, *Imperial Spain*, 176-180.

⁶¹ Elliot, *Imperial Spain*, 258.

⁶² Helmut Georg Koenigsberger, *The Government of Sicily under Philip II of Spain: a Study in the Practice of Empire* (California 1951)47.

⁶³ Koenigsberger, *The Government of Sicily*, 53.

Crown, and of Castile's lone burden in enduring the financial stress of maintaining the Monarchy. His ideal of unity has remained characteristic of his office. However, homogenization had already been a heavily discussed topic among the crown's political thinkers in the early decades of the seventeenth century that the Monarchy could not survive if it had to depend on the resources of Castile alone.⁶⁴ When Olivares finally proposed dividing the monarchy's fiscal burdens throughout the monarchy, the non-Castilian states were immediately opposed to this idea as they were already reluctant to pay taxes that they believed were mainly for the benefit of Castile and its aspiration of maintaining an empire.⁶⁵

Olivares' response to the protests of the kingdoms was a proposition that he believed would benefit all parties. The empire's kingdoms would gradually conform to Castilian law, and in return, these kingdoms would see a more unified empire in which they could participate politically just as much as the Castilians did. What was to happen, was in practice the reversion of the acts of Kings Charles V and Philip II, who had effectively brought all devotion to Castile. Spain, he believed, was an entity. Differentiating between its states only weakened the whole. Soon followed the famous 'Union of Arms', in 1624. With it, Olivares planned to create a reserve of 140,000 men, proportionately divided to be maintained by the kingdoms of the empire. If one of the kingdoms was endangered, one seventh of the reserve would be sent to their aid.⁶⁶

Particularly Aragon, Valencia and Catalonia were more opposed to the Union than Olivares had already feared. It had been decades since the Spanish government had shown any interest in them, and during this time, their troubles had accumulated without any notice from their king. The kingdoms were therefore unobliging to provide anything for foreign needs, and were not to be tempted by the possibilities of aid in return. Yet Olivares pressed on. In this process, Catalonia was of particular interest to him. It was one of the few kingdoms from which he believed that the crown could still extract some wealth. The Catalonians soon reacted with their protests that they were an alienated state of the Spanish government, whose only concern was to squeeze money from them.⁶⁷ By 1640, Olivares saw the Union of Arms as the very last hope in the salvation of the Spanish monarchy. Meanwhile, his ambitious plan was about to backfire. Stradling stated that the rebellions of the 1640's all had in common that they had been a reaction to the policies of centralization that were coming from Madrid.⁶⁸ The Revolt of the Catalans was inspired with contempt for the Spanish, or rather, Castilian government. When Olivares tried to pacify their hatred by undoing the recently imposed practices, the Catalonians pointedly refused to accept his efforts. Before the Catalans had even broken with the Spanish Crown, Portugal had seized its independence. Philip IV could no longer accept the repeatedly failing expeditions of Olivares. The King's favorite was sent into exile, and was to be replaced by his nephew. Don Luis de Haro showed little likeness to his uncle, as his tactics showed favor towards constancy rather than ambition. The Monarchy needed peace, and he set out to realize it. The Dutch, who had been the cause of a persisting Castilian headache for over seventy years, were about to see their independence realized. In 1647, the Italian kingdoms of Naples and

⁶⁴Stradling, *Philip IV and the Government of Spain, 1621-1665* (Cambridge 2002) 174-175.

⁶⁵ Elliot, *Imperial Spain*, 329.

⁶⁶ Elliot, *Imperial Spain*, 300.

⁶⁷ Elliot, *Imperial Spain*, 330, 340.

⁶⁸ Stradling, *Philip IV*, 173.

Sicily rose up against the viceroys that had been sapping them dry for the past decades. The Monarchy faced a series of events that pushed it dangerously close to the brink of disintegration.⁶⁹

Conclusion

From the above, a number of significant points can be determined about the formation of the Spanish Monarchy. The first significant decision regarding the rule of the Monarchy was Ferdinand and Isabella's agreement to call themselves the king and queen of Castile, Catalonia, Valencia, and so forth. While they might have been conversationally called the monarchs of Spain, their territories remained entirely autonomous. The most convenient way to rule these states was to respect its constitutions and to create local alliances that facilitated government from afar. By working with local powers, the monarchs maintained their own authority. This presented the Spanish Monarchy with the model with which it would be governed for the generations that would inherit their territories. If there had been any effective unity during their reign, it was not of a political nature, but a sentiment that was mostly based on the ideological vision of Spaniards defending the Catholic faith.

The conquest of Al-Andalus was one of the most significant actions of the Catholic Kings. It earned them their respect from their subjects and their reputation from the rest of the European continent. The conquest was a Castilian effort, but it could not have been achieved without Christian support. Aid came from all over the continent, as well as from the rest of the Monarchy. Spaniards increasingly joined in on the mission, and took their orders from Castile and spoke Castilian amongst each other. Thus Castile became of huge military importance and was responsible for the greatness of the newly arisen Spanish Monarchy. The Catholic Kings had made Spain grand, and their military ambitions rallied internal support for the superiority of Castile. It was the first step towards the superior status of Castile among the other states of the Spanish Monarchy.

As it was physically impossible to govern each unit of the Spanish Monarchy individually, royal authority worked through a network of viceroalties that also became increasingly Castilian of character. This Castilianization of the Spanish Monarchy was unapologetically supported by the policies under Philip IV, whose favorite minister saw the conformity to Castilian government the ideal way to unite the fragmented Monarchy. When attempts at conformity failed, the Spanish Monarchy seemed to find its solace in the original Union of the Crowns, in which each state was confident that their laws and privileges would be upheld.

It appeared that the world power did not find its strength as one, but as a collection of various entities within it. The actions of Charles V have made it clear that when bundled, the monarchy was impregnable. The failures of Olivares have shown that when they so wished, the entities of the monarchy could resist, and dramatically weaken the whole. This went to show that the entities had their own interests and opinions, and protected these when they felt the need. These entities saw themselves as autonomous nations that had their own identities, and these nations together formed the monarchy on their own terms. That the concepts of nation and identity were alive at this time, is important to know in understanding the Revolt of Naples, as well as in understanding the discussion around the Revolt by contemporaries in other parts of the Monarchy. These notions will be further discussed below.

⁶⁹ Elliot, *Imperial Spain*, 348-352.

I.II – Identity within the Spanish Monarchy

As shown in the previous chapter, each political entity within the Spanish Monarchy was its own hub of laws and administration. That these entities were so particular in maintaining their autonomy and stood fast against the pressure of conformity to centralizing policies – and that these central policies were Castilian when the Monarchy consisted out of so more states in the Spanish Monarchy – brings up the question of identity. Nationalism in the seventeenth century is a somewhat questionable topic, but the occurrences of certain terms around the Revolt of Naples are so significant that they require accurate interpretations of their definitions at the time.

Firstly, there was a frequent use of the word nation. This is relevant to understanding the Revolt of Naples, or at least the representation of the Revolt of Naples, as Spanish sources site that the Neapolitan rebels had no qualms with their nation. In surviving accounts of the Revolt of Naples, the thoughts of the Neapolitan mob can be revealed to us through the records of their chanting while they rampaged through the streets of the city. In the most popular of these chants, the Neapolitan people exclaimed their loyalty to their king, but demanded the removal of the taxes. More detailed exclamations included their loyalty was not only to their king, but also their viceroy. Further explanation was given on why they revolted nonetheless: the high taxes were unbearable, and that their anger was geared towards ‘los cavalleros, gente, ricos, y no contre la Nacion.’⁷⁰

After a quick consideration for the demography that was here alleged to have participated in the Revolt, the easy use of the word nation demands attention here. It is significant that a seventeenth century kingdom would speak of a nation when it had not been properly defined at the time; and somewhat incomprehensible to us because it held a different meaning from our modern definition of the word. Another noticeable allegation here, was the insistence of loyalty. The question of what loyalty implied to a seventeenth century Neapolitan can be posed here, as well as what the value of this claim would have been. It would seem ironic that a revolt by a people which claimed to be loyal to the royal authority would lead to a short-lived independence. The Neapolitans’ claim of loyalty towards their king and nation begs the question of what these terms implied, and how they fit in the context of seventeenth century Naples and its Spanish government.

A second term that came up around the Revolt of Naples, was *patria*. Masaniello had been called the *liberator patriae*⁷¹ by his contemporaries. This raises the question of the extent in which patriotism existed in Naples in the seventeenth century. Certain care must be taken not to venture off into the anachronism of accepting the term as it is defined today, and to specifically study what the word *patria* implied when it was used in the days of the Revolt. Even more interesting will it then be to consider what *liberator* in this title of Masaniello meant.

This subchapter will delve into the definitions of the terms above as they were used in the middle of the seventeenth century. Understanding the Neapolitans view and use of nation, loyalty and *patria* is indispensable to assessing the surrounding the protagonists and aims of the Revolt. In these

⁷⁰ ‘Relacion del tumulto de Napoles ocasionado por la gevela de la fruta.’ in *Relación de los tumultos ocurridos en Nápoles siendo Virrey don Rodrigo Ponce de León, Duque de Arcos*, BNE MSS/2662, 1647.

⁷¹ Mentioned by Elliott in, ‘Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe’, who found this in Giraffi, *An Exact Historie of the late Revolution in Naples* (London 1650) 160.

definitions I am aware of the distinction between the words nation and *patria*. Conal Condren has demonstrated that this question has not been settled among historians,⁷² but this thesis will not venture into this debate. I will assess these words as I have encountered them in primary sources: the 'nacion' in the political sense of the word; and *patria* with regard to the passion that was associated with Masaniello.

Birthplace and identity

The seventeenth century nation was not as much based on territorial space, as on the laws and privileges held by inhabitants of a state. In Spain, the term nation was most commonly used in the early seventeenth century to refer to an individual kingdom or principality.⁷³ From the difficulties that Madrid met when attempting to centralize Spanish government, it could be determined that the monarchy existed as a group of entities – each with their own goals and interests. When their interests were marginalized, they stood firm for their recognition. To understand the views of one of these political entities within the monarchy that rose up in revolt, it is necessary to consider the identities they had taken on for themselves. Xavier Gil spoke of the occurrence of the word *patria* to indicate one's place of descent in the Early Modern world. He found that in similar terms, the word nation was used to describe the same importance. 'Nation' had not yet been strictly defined, yet was already commonly used in contemporary terminology.

Gil looked at the significance of the *patria* in the formation of one's identity. He saw that Tacitus asserted that any man at any time or space is just as any other man, but he is formed according to the affections environment he lives in. Tacitus then named the birthplace as the most important factor in the personal affection of an individual. The *patria*, whatever state it was in, would bind a man to its soil and form his identity for the rest of his existence. He would be similar to – and always have love for – those who shared his *patria*.⁷⁴ The Spanish identity of the Iberian Peninsula was to be derived from the existence of *Hispania* from Roman times. Yet it was often on a smaller scale on which people considered their *patria* and towards which they exhibited their sense of attachment. It would be the place where a person would find his friends and family, and would hold sentiments of affection and loyalty.⁷⁵

A birthplace was more than the physical space it took up. It was formed by its laws and liberties, and again this was a factor in forming a mutual *patria*. Thus, a birthplace, *patria*, or nation, was a territory defined by its jurisdiction. A legal Castilian, for example, was a *naturaleza*. The term *natura* only implied the place of birth in a strict sense, but *naturaleza* implied the juridical components that came with nativity in that certain kingdom. *Naturaleza* came with rights and privileges, as well as obligations. First and foremost, stood loyalty towards the ruler of the *patria*. Furthermore, there were military and financial obligations, but in return there were many privileges and possibilities that would not have been granted to foreigners. The Union of the Crowns did nothing to change these

⁷² Conal Condren, 'Historical Epistemology and the Pragmatics of Patriotism in Early-Modern England', in R. von Friedeburg (ed.), *Patria und Patrioten vor dem Patriotismus* (2005) 67-90.

⁷³ Stanley G. Payne, *Spain: A Unique History* (Wisconsin 2011) 107.

⁷⁴ Xavier Gil, 'One King, One Faith, Many Nations: *Patria* and Nation in Spain 16th-17th Centuries', in Robert von Friedeburg, *"Patria" und "Patrioten" vor dem Patriotismus: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europäischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden 2005) 115

⁷⁵ Gil, 'One King', 107-109.

individual laws and privileges in the nations brought under the same rulers. Gil therefore called the Spanish monarchy a 'plurinational monarchy.'⁷⁶

The fictional body of the king allowed him to have two bodies. This enabled his public body to have as many *naturaleza's* as he had kingdoms. As the king of multiple kingdoms, he had multiple representations as king. This way, the kingdoms were able to remain separate under one ruler, just as they had been before. With the development of Madrid as the governing center and residence of the King, it could be said that because all the king's territories shared a single ruler, his entire realm was to be considered *patria* to all of them. This did not supersede the general sentiments regarding the safeguarding of a kingdom's rights and privileges, and the refusal to let foreigners from other kingdoms within the monarchy to enjoy them as well.⁷⁷

Spanishness

Out of all the Monarchy's kingdoms, there was mostly a degree of hegemony between Castile and Aragon since the late fifteenth century. Imperial expansion and mutual strife against the Islam contributed to an idea of a community that was Spain. There was an increased awareness of Spanishness, and that this Spanishness was centered on the Iberian lands. It was also referred to as the Spanish nation by a Castilian and Aragonese community in Rome, who did not differentiate amongst themselves. They included all inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula in their definition of the Spaniard. In the sixteenth century, there were already history books being written about Spain, although it was still debated what exactly Spanish history was.⁷⁸

Olivares, too, spoke of Spain. Although his commitment extended to all of the king's territories, he differentiated between Spain and the Spanish monarchy. Spain would include Castile and the Crown of Aragon, while the Spanish monarchy would include Italian territories as well. He rejected the idea of the separate nations, when the monarchy should be viewed as a whole.⁷⁹ Yet the nations in this 'Spain' seemed to have an equally adamant defensive stance in the maintenance of their identity as the state outside of it. Even Castile had a strong local sentiment that was opposed to too much royal interference. While Castile was often seen as the center of Spanish government, and was generally for the integration of the Monarchy, it was not any less willing compromise its privileges or identity. In comparison, the nations outside of the Iberian peninsula had an easier acceptance of the legitimacy of – and sense of loyalty to – their Spanish sovereign.⁸⁰

Questions surrounding autonomy, integration and identity in the Spanish Monarchy brings us to the debate of the classification of seventeenth century monarchies. Most popular candidates for the classification of the Spanish Monarchy are the composite monarchy, the dynastic agglomerate and the polycentric monarchy. The latter is the most novel and less conventional of the three, but the authors in favor of this term have published insightful information on the identities of the nations within the Spanish Monarchy.

⁷⁶ Gil, 'One King', 118.

⁷⁷ Gil, 'One King', 119.

⁷⁸ Gil, 'One King', 126-127.

⁷⁹ Gil, 'One King', 132.

⁸⁰ Payne, *Spain*, 104.

The authors of the bundle *Polycentric Monarchies* conventionally spoke of the Spanish monarchy as a collection of separate entities, but asserted that these were polycentric: interlinked centers that did not only communicate with their king, but also with each other. Together, their interaction forged the entity of the monarchy, and the entities within it could be said to have been multi-territorial. This included a constant flow of negotiation and competition between the units, shifting the political weight from one entity to another. The internal structure was therefore highly mobile, despite the permanence of Madrid. Furthermore, the interactions between these entities were not solely political. They also interacted economically, culturally and socially. The collection of entities within the monarchy offered individuals, families and corporations opportunities that reached beyond their own regions.⁸¹

Another significant assumption in *Polycentric Monarchies*, was that the Spanish territories that reached all over the globe could not be classified as center or periphery, colonial or non-colonial, or European or otherwise. These assumptions would only be an anachronistic attempt of studying the history of what modern man would like to see as nation-states. The same was done when studying the history of Spain without consideration of what this term implied at the time.⁸²

Despite the borders that separated the entities within the monarchy, they were caught in a polycentric network in which people traveled, and in which goods were traded and thoughts were disseminated.⁸³ People were highly mobile, and travel through the monarchy was perfectly common. There was a mutual interest throughout the monarchy, and inhabitants of the different entities were well aware of each other.⁸⁴ A certain homogenization took place throughout the monarchy, and the construction of shared practices encouraged the view of the monarchy as a whole.⁸⁵

One of the contributors of the idea of Spain as a whole, was the racial issue that had been brought up in America. Tamar Herzog saw that an obvious way to define 'us' is to define the 'other'.⁸⁶ In this case, however, it had more to do with the sense of superiority rather than the sense of nationality. Out of the native Americans, imported Africans and settling Europeans; the latter benefited from the establishment of the differentiation between these groups by identifying the Spanish as a superiorly civilized people – a trait begotten by birth on Iberian soil. In some sense, the civilization and Christianization of the American inhabitants would have granted them the identification of 'Spanish'; while the settlers who made themselves too comfortable with Indian customs, were labeled 'Indian'.⁸⁷ These identities were in this sense fluid. A more rigid classification of identity was one that was based on race and appearance. Genealogy often determined one's class, and in terms of slavery – even one's worth. Knowledge of such classifications had spread throughout the entire Spanish empire, as yet another indication of the high mobility among the Spanish entities. In this field of

⁸¹ Cardin, Herzog, Ibáñez, Sabatini, 'Introduction', in *Polycentric Monarchies* (Cornwall 2012) 3-5.

⁸² Cardin, 'Introduction', 4.

⁸³ Cardin, 'Introduction', 7.

⁸⁴ Jean-Paul Zúñiga, 'Visible Signs of Belonging: The Spanish Empire and the Rise of Racial Logic in the Early Modern Period' in *Polycentric Monarchies* (Cornwall 2012), 125-126.

⁸⁵ Cardin, 'Introduction', 7.

⁸⁶ Tamar Herzog, 'Can You Tell a Spaniard When You See One? "Us and "Them" in the Early Modern Iberian Atlantic' in *Polycentric Monarchies* (Cornwall 2012) 147-148.

⁸⁷ Herzog, 'Can You Tell a Spaniard When You See One, 148-152.

classification, a full-blood Spanish American was superior to a non-Spanish or mixed-blood American. The Spaniards in America identified themselves as such without reference to a particular kingdom within the monarchy. What was of importance was the Iberian homeland they had in common.⁸⁸

This Spanish identity, however, did not extend to those back on the continent. Rather, they identified themselves according to their kingdoms. Herzog would have to agree that Spain was no less divided by a differentiation in laws and liberties.⁸⁹ Furthermore, the Castilians had long been the sole 'Spaniards' in America. The monopoly they had in transatlantic trade further emphasized the distinctions between the kingdoms of the Spanish empire. The strong distinctions between the Spanish nations' jurisdictions, cultures, languages, would – in my opinion – undermine the argument of the polycentric monarchies. As much interaction as there was between the kingdoms, true integration in the monarchy itself would not entirely have occurred. Spain, it would seem, was mainly the dynastic inheritance of an agglomeration of political entities.

Religion

What the political entities within Spanish Monarchy did have in common aside from the person of the Spanish king, was their devotion to the Catholic faith. Religion also played a significant role in the identity of a community. It was generally assumed that one common religion was a prerequisite in order to live among one another. The expulsions and – somewhat forceful – conversions of Jews and Muslims were therefore high on the Spanish political agendas of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Muslim converts, or *Moriscos*, remained a thorn in the eye of the old Christian Spaniards, for their dress and traditions did not conform to the local standard. They formed a very visible community apart from the rest of society. The quality of the faith of Jewish converts, or *conversos*, remained in question. Though entirely invisible, this questionability tainted entire generations, and genealogy often determined the quality of their faith and therefore became an essential factor in Spanish society.

Religion was such an important factor to identity that the idea of a common religion designated one's *patria* was spreading throughout Europe. Popular writers such as Lope de Vega and Desiderius Erasmus spoke of a *patria* that had no earthly borders. It was therefore a disappointment that enmity and selfishness occurred between states such as Castile, Aragon or Catalonia, when amity would be much more sensible.⁹⁰

The extent of the division between these kingdoms, however, would be subjective. It was not to be forgotten that while union of the sixteenth century power couple only brought the states under the same dynastic possession without altering their autonomy; it were their conveniently ideological military achievements that had earned the Spanish Monarchs the honorary title of Catholic Kings. This essentially bound their identities, as well as their form and aim of government, to that of the Catholic faith. Moreover, the Reconquista had stirred a binding effect that inspired respect and awe for Castilian superiority, which had taken the lead in fulfilling a Catholic mission to which the rest of the Monarchy could relate and support. The great achievement of a Christianized Iberian peninsula

⁸⁸ Zúñiga, 'Visible Signs of Belonging, 125-132.

⁸⁹ Herzog, 'Can You Tell a Spaniard When You See One, 152.

⁹⁰ Gil, 'One King', 110.

was admired throughout Europe, and Spaniards would share this admiration for their monarchs just the same.

Conclusion

From the above, we can conclude that there was a myriad of identities to be found in the Spanish Monarchy. There was a degree of hegemony on the Iberian Peninsula, but as the Monarchy stretched much further than that, and there had been communities that were excluded from Spanish society even within the peninsula, it could again be confirmed that there was hardly a way to speak of Spain when speaking of the Spanish Monarchy. In relation to the revolts that had arisen in the 1640's, it would seem that they manifested themselves in the form of national rebellions, and their nations were formed by their sense of identity.

The inhabitants of the entities felt themselves tied to kingdom, community or *patria* through a variety of factors. From the soil they were born on to the privileges that they enjoyed, the people of a nation shared a common identity that bound them to one another. The separation that was an obvious consequence of these ranges of identity, brought me to reject the theory of Spain as a polycentric monarchy. First and foremost here was the unity that it would imply of a monarchy in which separation and competition was what Olivares had claimed to be one of its greatest drawbacks. The mobility of people, products and knowledge within the monarchy did not imply a fluidity of identity or a willingness to conform to a hegemonic government.

The fact that the Monarchy had been able to endure the turbulence of the mid 1640's, according to Elliot, possibly lied in their recommitment to the old monarchical structure on which the empire was built. The kingdoms under the Spanish crown greatly valued the consideration of their constitutions, as had been the case in the Union of the Crowns. This explanation agrees perfectly in his assumption of Spain as a composite monarchy. The Spanish monarchy found its strength in a system in which each kingdom was governed by one king who left their constitutions intact.

The makeup of the monarchy as a collection of entities would agree with the nomination of Spain as a composite monarchy, were it not for its inclination of a static whole in which each member was of equal significance. The formation of the Spanish monarchy, especially in the times of Philip III and Philip IV, have shown Castile as the leading member in a collection of highly divergent nations. A term most suitable for the Spanish Monarchy would therefore seem to be a dynastic agglomeration. A cluster of widely ranging entities, fallen under the sovereignty of the Spanish king under different terms and conditions. Additionally, the circumstance in which this rule took place was subject constant change through space and time.

Thus, the identity of the kingdom of Naples did not change when it crept from the rule of the Crown of Aragon to the domination of Castile. Philip IV of Castile was king of the Neapolitan nation, but the kingdom demanded the consideration of their laws and privileges just the same. Regardless of Spain oftentimes only being referred to as the Iberian Peninsula, there was more than a geographical determination to be considered. The Neapolitans experienced little influence of 'Spanishness' over their identities despite the common factor of a single ruler over the Spanish Monarchy. The kingdom of Naples had its own culture and jurisdiction, among the primary factors that determine the identity of a nation. When the Neapolitans of 1647 therefore declared their loyalty of the Spanish king and

their own nation, it was consistent with the characteristics that have been sketched throughout this chapter to show what had been prevalent throughout the dynastic agglomeration of the Spanish monarchy.

In this sense we can understand the Neapolitan nation as it would have been defined in 1647. It is now also clear what relationship the Kingdom had with its king, which had a single body but also had many public body's; one of which had *naturaleza* that made him king of the Neapolitan nation. The relationship that Neapolitans were deemed to have with the sovereign was bound in the *naturaleza* as well, as a birthplace came with rights as well as obligations, and the latter included loyalty to the sovereign. The Neapolitan claim of loyalty to the king is therefore connected to the nation, or in this sense better related to the *patria*, which implied the sentimental association of the birthplace. While it could thus be said that a Neapolitan would be loyal to Philip IV out of sentimental love for the *patria*, it should also be kept in mind that any allegations of treason would have severe consequences for the accused. *Crimen laesae majestatis* was not a crime that was taken lightly in the seventeenth century, apparently not even by a rebellious mob. Clarifying that their rebellion was not aimed towards their king, the Neapolitans may have tried to exempt themselves from this grave sin. This raises the question of whether Neapolitan loyalty to the king was only a legal formality, or whether it was truly entrenched in the minds of seventeenth century Neapolitans.

There are two arguments that would support the latter. Firstly, the sources claiming Neapolitan loyalty were usually Castilian, and would be likely to reflect the positive mindset of Neapolitans towards the king, rather than confirm that their rebellion was legally sound. Secondly, a closer study of ethics in societies within the Spanish Monarchy indicates that morality plays a huge part in public opinion, and was therefore heavily invested in by the Spanish crown. The importance of Catholicism along side of – or even above – the sovereign to Spanish society was to such an extent that this subchapter will close with a suggestion of the recognition of a dynastic and confessional agglomerate as the most fitting classification of the Spanish Monarchy. That Christian morality played a leading role in society as well as government will be further discussed throughout the rest of this chapter.

I.III – Philip IV upon the *Theatrum Mundi*

At his ascent, Philip IV could rest assured that he was the unquestioned sovereign of all the nations in his monarchy. Even so – the nature of kingship was a much debated topic, and ranged from the nature of power to the rights and responsibilities of a ruler and his subjects.⁹¹ The king himself was just as well aware of the importance of the image of his power and authority, and cultivated this image through the representation of his actions in the media. Reputation had been a crucial element in the social order of the early modern Spanish monarchy, in which everyone was to know the role and obligation of his position in society – and everyone protected the image of this position. All of society stood upon a metaphorical *theatrum mundi*, on which each actor's actions and bearings was witnessed by his peers, and the judgment of this audience determined his identity.⁹²

⁹¹ Jodi Campbell, *Monarchy, Political Culture, and Drama in Seventeenth-century Madrid: Theater of Negotiation* (Hampshire 2006) 65.

⁹² Campbell, *Monarchy*, 65-66.

Reputation and support

Spanish policies were deeply committed to the maintenance of the Monarchy's reputation in the eyes of the world. Expansive ambitions were now low on the political agenda, while the preservation of the supremacy of the Spanish Monarchy in seventeenth century Europe became an increasingly important matter. During the 1620's, the Count-Duke of Olivares was much concerned with projecting the image of Spanish reputation, while restoring the virtues of Castile to those of the Catholic Kings. The latter called for internal reform. This was necessary to assure the Monarchy's prosperity which, as the Dutch had shown, would equate to power. Thus reform and reputation went hand in hand in the Spanish government under Philip IV.⁹³

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Western European monarchs sought to centralize their authority. As they did so, royal figures had themselves represented as central and essential characters of a successful state. Through media and art, rulers were portrayed as strong and magnificent figures, corresponding with the similarly represented ideals of an exemplary monarch. Likewise, the members of his court were represented as the essential figures at the king's side. Philip IV specifically concentrated on projecting an image of absolute authority at the tide of a significant governmental reform.⁹⁴

The Spanish monarchy had already reached past its peak at the dusk of the sixteenth century. When Philip IV inherited the throne, he was faced with mounting fiscal challenges and increasingly strong enemies. The process of centralization had already been at work in the sixteenth century, but had not met much resistance, despite the increasing taxes and authority of the Spanish crown. The destructive religious wars of the Reformation might have made a strong government more appealing in the sixteenth century, as well as influential political theorists such as Jean Bodin who supported absolute governments. Sixteenth century Spain enjoyed a good reputation, and subjects of the Spanish crown were both willing and proud to pay their taxes and invest in a monarchy from which they wear reaping the benefits. When the fruits of the Spanish monarchy began to falter, its government not only faced resistance to its decline, but had to struggle to maintain its reputation as well. Without its good reputation, the Spanish government risked losing its authority.⁹⁵

The 1640's dealt an especially heavy blow to the Spanish reputation. While the Atlantic trade grew stagnant, inflation and increasing military costs made covering the empire's expenses unattainable. The Castilian nobility and ruling class were becoming reluctant to support the newly proposed policies, whereby the state's authority faltered. Questions arose regarding the right to rebel against a sovereign. Along with the devastating revolts within the empire, in which the suppressed lower classes rebelled and harassed the nobility, 1640 marks the turning point of Castile's status as a grand world power.⁹⁶ The Spanish government flushed with embarrassment as its façade of control fell. Philip IV not only failed to centralize his rule over the Spanish kingdoms, but was faced with open

⁹³ Elliott, 'Foreign Policy and Domestic Crisis', in *Spain and its World 1500-1700: Selected Essays* (London 1990) 123-125.

⁹⁴ Campbell, *Monarchy*, 67.

⁹⁵ Campbell, *Monarchy*, 68.

⁹⁶ Kamen, *The Iron Century*, 318-321.

rebellions in them as well. Despite the unwavering attempts of promoting the Spanish rule, the gap between the presented illusions and reality had become so wide that the façade of the no longer supreme monarchy lost its credibility and fell. Spaniards faced the *desengaño*, or disillusion, of the images that the government had fed to the public.⁹⁷

Divine rule

Like all European courts at the time, the Spanish court played three major roles in the monarchy. Firstly, the court created and maintained a sacred character of kingship. Second – it served as a center of political and administrative power. Thirdly, the royal Spanish court was seen as the exemplary role in the civilization of the monarchy. Court etiquette and hierarchy created expectations for similar conduct from the rest of society. The Spanish court was especially characterized by its religious zeal in public manifestations.⁹⁸

The latter not only implied the piety of the monarch, but also emphasized the relationship between God and king. Commentators also discussed the king's piety, and this was obviously an important prerequisite of the monarch. The Spanish king was not said to be endowed with divine healing powers, however, unlike for example the king of France. For the Spanish king, this called for public displays of devotion instead. These displays could be witnessed during the rare occasions on which the king would actually be seen. Philip IV was very rarely seen in person, even by the members of his own court. The king was separated from his subjects by a thick layer of classes and functions, and even an accumulation of rooms and doors within his own palace. Very few of his household could serve the king directly.⁹⁹ Thus the image was created of an inaccessible and sacred monarch.

The link between king and God was extremely important considering the ideology that stood since the sixteenth century that the Spanish Monarchy was the guardian of the Christian faith. The dominance of the Spanish Monarchy, as well as the enormous size and amount of the territories the Spanish monarch had been blessed with, were considered reasons why Habsburg rule and Spanish supremacy were gifts of God. This gift came with a mission as well, which was to guard and extend the Catholic faith alongside of the Church. This mission would lead to a *pax hispanica*, in which the world would enjoy the blessings of order and peace.¹⁰⁰ This divine providentialism, then, was Spain's reason of state. This again strengthens my observation that the Spanish Monarchy was not only an agglomeration of states united by a common ruler, but also by a common faith. Catholicism was the overarching consolidator of the Monarchy in which units had their own laws, policies, cultures and languages by which they could find a common identity.

Implementation of propaganda

⁹⁷ Campbell, *Monarchy, Political Culture, and Drama in Seventeenth-century Madrid*, 74.

⁹⁸ Elliott, 'The court of the Spanish Habsburgs', in *Spain and Its World, 1500-1700: Selected Essays* (London 1990) 147

⁹⁹ Elliott, 'The court', 147-149.

¹⁰⁰ Elliott, 'Power and Propaganda', 148-154.

Olivares and his ambitious plans of reform sparked a political debate throughout the Spanish Monarchy in the 1620's and 1630's.¹⁰¹ The opposition to the Union of Arms highlights the problem of disobedience that Olivares faced during his time in power. When Olivares tried to mobilize the provinces of the Spanish Monarchy for war, he was obstructed by stubborn generals, aristocrats and ministers. It must be noted that while Olivares was highly ambitious, he believed in the divine right and duty of the king's rule.¹⁰² Philip IV, despite this right, was not being obeyed. Enforcement of obedience was thus one of the major components of Olivares' program of reviving the Spanish Monarchy, as well as a hot topic of debate. The program included a coercive system to deal with resistance to the execution of royal orders. Coercion on its own, however, could only play a limited part in the dealing with the problem of disobedience in the early modern state. Thus, an additional effort was made by concentrating on social discipline as well. The court strived to issue norms of virtue, stemming from ancient Roman philosophers, and imprinting them on society.¹⁰³ Additionally, Olivares focused on propaganda in self-projection of himself and his king by commissioning works of arts and literature.¹⁰⁴

Outside of government supported propaganda, were the appearances of published opinions among the public. In larger cities such as London and Paris, it was thought that the public did not consist out of passive recipients of information from the government, but were also producers of opinions themselves. Their voices were disseminated in the form of pamphlets and had influence on the policies of their rulers. In seventeenth century Madrid, a similar situation had been created by the *arbitristas*. They wrote opinionated pieces, often in the form of memoranda addressed to the monarch, intended to influence royal policy. From the 1620's, these pieces also found their way into the public through the publications of pamphlets and *relaciones* in the shape of manuscripts or print. Many of these were especially critical of the person and policies of Olivares. To stem these prints, such publications were prohibited in 1627 to be printed without the approval of a member of the Royal Council of Castile. Many political authors were imprisoned because of this decree, but many authors found ways to work around these laws and most of these opinions were still able to circulate in manuscript.¹⁰⁵

The decree was reissued several times, and there was an increasing recognition of the importance of the public opinion on governmental policies. The pamphlet war that started in 1620 – when Vienna printed a pamphlet that suggested that the new king of Bohemia was about to sign away most of eastern Europe to the Ottomans, after which a flow of contestant pamphlets followed – encouraged the leaders of the rest of Europe to embrace this tactic of misinformation. Rulers sponsored the publication of propaganda that defended their own interests and attacked those of their enemies.¹⁰⁶ Royal participation in the publication of pamphlets, goes to show that public opinion in the

¹⁰¹ Elliott, 'Power and Propaganda', 172.

¹⁰² J.H. Elliot, *Richelieu and Olivares* (Cambridge 1984) 39-45.

¹⁰³ Elliott, 'Power and Propaganda', 180.

¹⁰⁴ Elliott, 'Power and Propaganda', 187.

¹⁰⁵ Richard L. Kagan, *Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (Balitmore 2010) 205.

¹⁰⁶ Kagan, *Clio and the Crown*, 206.

seventeenth century was significant and even influential. The following subchapter will therefore look at the opinions held and spread by the public on its government in the Spanish Monarchy.

Conclusion

Reputation of the Monarchy seemed to have been vital to the Spanish government. This reputation of Spanish supremacy was projected into the world, as well as to the members of the Spanish Monarchy. The upkeep of the reputation of a powerful and successful government was essential to maintaining the support of Spanish subjects. This balance was especially sensitive in times of change, and Philip IV was in the tricky position of facing new challenges and wanting to implement policies of reform. Royal authority had already been an unwelcome challenge to noble power, but when the Spanish Monarchy was no longer deemed the invincible world power, the authority of the king would be undermined.

The promotion of the grandness of the Spanish monarch was therefore high on the agenda of the Spanish government. One of the strategies that were used was the insistence of the king's divine right to rule. Here, again, we can observe the significance of religion in the Spanish Monarchy, and how this could have been used to the government's convenience. Philip IV was portrayed as the epitome of piety. He was the personal defender of the Catholic faith which was interlaced with the Spanish identity. The Christian duty of the Spanish king represented the Spanish reason of state. Spanish propaganda used this idea as one of the ways to implement virtues in society to counter the increasing signs of disobedience.

The public seems to have been well informed of royal policies, and public opinion was very much alive and influential in the Monarchy. Propaganda was becoming essential, and even misinformation had become an implemented tool. This essential detail should be remembered when studying the representations of the Revolt of Naples later in this thesis. For now, this chapter will continue to look at the specifics of the trending public opinions in the Spanish Monarchy.

I.IV – Political Theory and Debate

Despite the Spanish government's best efforts to maintain a reputation of unfaltering power and progress, Spanish political theorists took their own views regarding the developments in Spanish policies. The Union of Arms program was an undeniable strategy to centralize the state's political power.¹⁰⁷ It was, however, also required to do so within the system of traditional institutions. This attempt to centralize power to the reign of Castile was felt especially in the farthest dominions of Spain, where the political equilibrium between monarch and nobility rested on the traditional rights to autonomy of the local ruling class. From 1620 leading up to the Revolt the viceroys of Naples were nevertheless encouraged to act in a more absolute fashion and to centralize their powers – even to ignore the local regulations. The latter sparked indignation and debate. One of the leading issues in question of centralizing royal power, was the matter of morality versus expediency.

¹⁰⁷ Parker, *Europe in Crisis*, 234.

Ethicists versus *políticos*

An exemplary demonstration of this dominance of morality was the disdain of Spanish and Italian political theorists expressed towards Machiavellian practicalities. They absolutely rejected Machiavelli, though spent much time discussing and discrediting him. Instead, they placed particular value on a virtuous king. They referred to Machiavelli, and other absolutists such as Bodin, as *políticos*, who subordinated Christian values under practical politics. Theorists in the Spanish monarchy reached back to the classical theories of Aristotle, Plato and Seneca, who all argued that a king who put personal over public interest was a tyrant. At this point, lack of virtue was easily equated with tyranny.¹⁰⁸ Olivares himself was often criticized for his vices, and his persistent influence over Philip IV made an argument that a king should not be said to be *legibus solutus*. The sovereign ought to be bound to the law instead, rather than act unrestrainedly on his own devices.¹⁰⁹

The opposing group of the *políticos* were the political theorists known as *ethicists*, who believed in the subordination of politics to morality. The writers thought it necessary that a king possessed certain virtues and had the ability to control his passions. This kind of thought was not only present in political theories, but was also to be found in the opinions of the general public. A just and prudent king was often idealized in folklores and plays. Theater, especially, focused on the proper conduct of kings. The theater had become a medium of political propaganda.¹¹⁰ This stands in relation to the *theatrum mundi* discussed in the previous subchapter, on which the king sought to influence his subjects' opinion on him through displaying his most favorable virtues.

While the king was the sole sovereign, it was a generally agreed upon assumption during Philip III's reign that a monarch was physically unable to govern all by himself. The king of Spain was therefore deemed only to tend to the most significant matters concerning the monarchy, while delegating less significant tasks to his ministers. This – mostly Castilian – opinion allowed for the substantial rise of Spanish ministers to power throughout the monarchy, acting as though their authority rested on their duty to unburden the king from the unpleasant demands of rule. This was still the traditionally accepted environment in which Philip IV commenced his rule. In the 1620's, however, new opinions turned to that the ideal king would rule personally, as he alone had been appointed by God.¹¹¹

Historian Fernández-Santamaria has studied the development of the trends in political thought in the Spanish monarch in 'Reason of State and Statecraft in Spain', and identified three phases which the ethicists could thus be said to have gone through. First, they were confronted with Machiavellianism: the goal of preserving the state through the means of religion and deceit. They also saw that there was a difference between Machiavelli and his followers. Whereas Machiavelli wished to turn religion into a political instrument; *políticos* tried to free the state from all ethical bonds by advocating religious toleration. The second phase of the ethicists was that they showed that Machiavelli's doctrine was false. His theory violated a basic political truth that had long been demonstrated by history: the state could not survive without religion. The ethicists criticized the works Machiavelli and

¹⁰⁸ Campbell, *Monarchy*, 102-103.

¹⁰⁹ Melveena McKendrick, *Playing the King: Lope de Vega and the Limits of Conformity*, 149.

¹¹⁰ Paul Monod, *The Power of Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe 1589-1715*, 82.

¹¹¹ Stradling, *Philip IV*, 14.

políticos until Spanish political thought entered the third phase, in which theorists started to offer a more constructive view. The ethicists formulated their own reason of state, in which political means were reconciled with divine law. This idea of compromise between reason of state and political prudence continued on into the seventeenth century.¹¹²

In 1591, Pedro Rivadeneira wrote *Virtues of the Christian Prince*¹¹³, dedicated to the future Philip III and reflected on the popular opinions of his contemporaries' political debates. Rivadeneira argued that while kings had indeed been appointed by God, they were only His vicegerents and were not given any divine attributes. Just as any man, he was not only subject to divine law, but answered to human law as well. Therefore, a king was to respect customs and constitutions as established by his subjects. From the concept of divine appointment also followed that a king was not morally absolute. His subjects could therefore judge him for acting immorally. God would withdraw his patronage from a tyrant, and the latter could justly be overthrown. Considering this, government was intrinsically linked to the moral dogma of Catholicism. Furthermore, the Spanish king was strongly bound by existing constitutions.¹¹⁴

The work of Rivadeneira reflected the Spanish moralist tradition. Other influential contemporaries took more extremist stances against the *políticos* of the preceding century. One of these writers was Benedictine Juan de Salazar, who equated the reason of state as the reason of religion. Jerónimo Gracián would reject reason of state entirely, and argue that there was either a reason of state or a true Christian reason. Francisco de Quevedo went even further by stating that the reason of state was the invention of the Devil; introduced to the world to challenge the position of God above humanity. Tyrannous rulers who broke divine or human law would do so on behalf of reason of state. Quevedo would offer the example of Pontius Pilate, who had sentenced Christ to death, as the epitome of those who choose to serve reason of state rather than God.¹¹⁵

The general view of reason of state was more akin to that of Rivadeneira, however, who spoke of a good versus bad reason of state. Many other writers copied this notion in believing that a prince who was led by his love and fear for God, would naturally decide on the means of achieving the best results for his realms, as long as these were within divine law and natural reason. The *politico* doctrines would inevitably lead to tyranny. To the ethicists, the opinions of *políticos* were impious, ignorant and simply false. Their bad reason of state was the unfortunate outcome of the reading of Machiavelli's doctrine and observing the French wars of religion.¹¹⁶

Arbitristas

The ethicists stopped short here. Realists emerged with more rigorous approaches to reason of state. They – just as the ethicists – wished to form a compromise between the extremes of practical and ethical idealists. The difference between the ethicists and the realists lied in the increasing demand

¹¹² José A. Fernández-Santamaria, 'Reason of State and Statecraft in Spain (1595-1640)' in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 41 (1980) 359-361.

¹¹³ Pedro de Rivadeneira, *Tratado del príncipe Cristiano* (Madrid 1595).

¹¹⁴ Stradling, *Philip IV*, 14.

¹¹⁵ Fernández-Santamaria, 'Reason of State', 355-359.

¹¹⁶ Fernández-Santamaria, 'Reason of State', 359-360.

of a more thorough reason of state in the seventeenth century. The Spanish monarchy dealt with an increasing amount of internal and external pressures, or frankly; a decline. The realists, or specifically the *arbitristas*, studied the ails of the Spanish Monarchy and theorized over possible remedies. To them, *razón de Estado* ranged from demographic, to social, foreign, and economic policies. To the *arbitristas*, reason of state was related more closely to statecraft. Further, more extreme realists were not concerned with convincing the reader that a king could be both a Christian as well as a competent ruler. Spanish realism formulated politics in terms of historical reason, and Tacitus enjoyed great popularity. More moderate realists did formulate their ideal ruler, however, as the *principe politico-cristiano*, which had already been embodied by Ferdinand the Catholic.¹¹⁷

Most *arbitristas* were concerned with the health of the Spanish economy, and often criticized the decay of industry and agriculture. They also observed the unwillingness to work and to embark on enterprises and investments. The corruption and cost of the government was scrutinized as well. In addition to these complaints on the economy, the *arbitristas* were also vocal about the policies of the government. They disagreed with the expulsion of Jews and Moors in the Monarchy, and the wealth distribution in society. The *arbitristas* were also against the incessant war waged to maintain the Dutch Provinces, as they believed that Spain should only consist out of their territories in the Mediterranean.¹¹⁸

An interesting observation that the *arbitristas* made was that the church had been responsible for the crisis of the Monarchy. The clerical estate had grown disproportionately to the working population, and severely reduced the size of the potential labor force. The clergy promoted idleness and had no interest in engaging in economically productive activities. The *arbitristas* claimed that the church was exempted from obligations and enjoyed privileges, which further burdened the rest of society that was already carrying the burden of tribute. This wealth, the *arbitristas* asserted, were better to be invested in more productive areas instead. While Catholicism was held in great esteem both politically and ideologically, many Spaniards agreed with this perception of the clergy. The Castilian Cortes tried to stem the flow of wealth towards the clergy in 1607, 1621 and again in 1633. Despite their argumentation based on facts and numbers that the church was further hurting an already wounded economy – the piety of the majority of the Spanish population, and its concern to secure a place in heaven, justified the church's wealth and over-recruitment with its spiritual role.¹¹⁹

Conclusion

Two very significant points can be derived from the observation of the main political theorists in the Spanish Monarchy. First was that the Spanish public had a strong voice in Spanish politics. The circulation of pamphlets in the Monarchy was a successful way of reaching the public, as well as an influential one. The Spanish government engaged in the dissemination of pamphlets itself, and fought against the publication of those who spoke against its policies. Censored texts made it to the

¹¹⁷ Fernández-Santamaria, 'Reason of State', 365, 379.

¹¹⁸ Colin Pendrill, *Spain 1474-1700: The Triumphs and Tribulations of Empire* (New Hampshire 2002) 128.

¹¹⁹ Helen Rawlings, 'Arbitrismo and the Early Seventeenth Century Spanish Church: The Theory and Practice of Anti-Clericalist Philosophy' in *Rhetoric and Reality in Early Modern Spain* (London 2006) 25-40.

public anyway, and the government's concern with this, showed how dangerous these pamphlets were thought to have been.

The second significant point here, is the moral and religious ground on which Spanish politics stood. Whereas most of Europe was exploring the reason of state of the *politicos*, the Spanish drew back from any immoral theories and looked for the power in virtue instead. The church was costing the state an enormous amount of money, but the religious character of the Monarchy was to be upheld no matter what cost. If a king was to follow the way of God, his grace would naturally follow. His subjects recognized his divine right to rule, but consequently also saw the human possibility of his failure. If a king acted like a tyrant, he would forgo this gift and could be justly overthrown. The ethicists therefore did not merely subject themselves to the authority set above them by God; they also saw their own rights as subjects of a mortal Christian king.

That the public was well educated on the topic of the divine right to rule, is also evident in their argumentation that only the king had been appointed by God. Viceroys, it was increasingly said since the 1620's, were to remember this blessing was extended to the king alone. They were only appointed to their office by the king, and were therefore as subject to the law as any man. The ideal king would govern his kingdom personally, but it was recognized that this was practically impossible when the king had a monarchy of autonomous agglomerates the size of Spain.

I.V – Conclusion

The Kingdom of Naples was placed under the Crown of Aragon when the Catholic Kings were the rulers of the Spanish Monarchy. Their rule has oftentimes been seen as the Golden Age of Spain, and their marriage as the brilliant political move that brought together two territories destined for greatness. As the Spanish Monarchy assumed its great proportions, and there was no common Spanish government, each state needed its own administration to be looked after separately by appointing a viceroy to manage these states in the place of the king.

The political entities within the Spanish Monarchy were very particular in their persistence that each had to be respected as the individual states of culture, jurisdiction and economy that they were. While the term 'nation' was strictly undefined in the seventeenth century, there was a common use of this word, as well as of *patria*. Especially the latter indicated a sense of identity that extended to all native-born inhabitants of Naples. Masaniello as the *liberator patriae* therefore portrayed a national hero that had acted out of the virtues that surround the term *patria* that would characterize the Revolt as one of passion. The political implications of nation and identity, however, are equally important in the debate of a political or passionate Revolt. Technically, each political entity was after all defined by its laws and privileges rather than its territorial space. When the constitution of a nation was infringed, a revolt would have been constitutionally justified. The relationship between the crown and the nations of the Monarchy rested on a delicate balance between local and royal authority. Any attempts towards centralization had to be presented with utmost care, and required the public to believe that their monarch was acting according to their best individual interests.

The reputation of a king was therefore of great importance during his rule. His policies depended on the favor of his taxpaying subjects, who were much less impressed under Philip IV than they had

been under Ferdinand and Isabella. While military greatness was no longer on Philip's side, he still had the benefit of his Christian reputation in a Monarchy that was profoundly Catholic. The opinions of political thinkers were sooner skewed to favor a virtuous king than one that ruled with practical aims alone. Even the reason of state was morally grounded. The Spanish public even continued to support the clergy when *arbitristas* had pointed out that they were irresponsibly spending the state's ever diminishing wealth. That the majority supported the extravagance of the Spanish clergy in times of crisis, further illustrates the importance of Catholicism to the inhabitants of the Spanish Monarchy. As much as the political entities of the Monarchy varied, religion was one factor that they had in common.

The propaganda to project the king and his rule was entrenched by his Christian virtue and was a powerful tool of legitimizing the rule of the Spanish King among political thinkers. The effort made to portray the image of the Spanish sovereign illustrates the importance of public opinion. Furthermore, that misinformation in propaganda was not uncommon reaffirms the caution that must be taken when assessing sources on the Revolt of Naples. Its Spanish portrayal represents another important message that the royal government disseminated among its subjects, which was that their king was still responsible for the powerful and successful Spanish Monarchy – as it had been since the late sixteenth century. Acceptance and consequent authority of the Spanish government seems to have depended on the perception of its king.

Having now studied the theoretical organization of the Spanish Monarchy; identified its general trends of political thought; and the lengths to which the government would have to influence the public – the following chapter will assess the circumstances of the Kingdom of Naples in as Spanish government was put in practice.

II – Agitation in Spanish Naples

In the previous chapter we have been able to make out the position of the Kingdom of Naples in the Spanish Monarchy as an autonomous political entity. This chapter will continue to consider the incentives for the Neapolitan people to have revolted against their Spanish government by focusing on the Kingdom in particular. The themes that will receive most attention here are the circumstances which have been said to have been the preconditions of the Revolt: hunger, taxes, feudal abuse and centralization of the Spanish government. The first two were a reflection of the economic strain that was affecting the whole of the monarchy. A closer study will show that these were also linked to the social structure in Naples, as well to the feudal abuse that was prevalent. The latter also calls for an insight into the legal system of the Kingdom, as well as the political arrangements that had been made between kingdom and crown that might have favored a powerful feudal nobility. That Spanish political goals had repercussions in the Kingdom was also evident in the reactions to the centralization of the Spanish crown.

This myriad of possible incentives calls for the study of each of these fields, and this chapter will therefore try to cover as much of these topics as needed to portray the framework in which the Revolt of Naples took place. This way, all factors can be considered when analyzing the different portrayals of the Revolt and its alleged reasons. It will also offer perspective to the question of the Revolt having been motivated by passion or political reasons. The economic malaise of the Kingdom offered the scenario of a hunger ridden populace that was overcome to make a decision between revolt and starvation. The sad state of the Neapolitan economy could be seen in line of that of the entire Spanish Monarchy, which could have been associated with the so called decline of Spain, at this time running on empty in the arms race of the Thirty Years War. The crown was turning over each and every resource that could hold it over in its war against the French for a bit longer. These resources included the reserves of the people of Naples.

That any part of society would have been left to starve, calls for the questioning of the social structure of the Kingdom. Important issues would have been the relationship between the upper and lower classes, and the division of wealth in society. The city of Naples was densely populated, so a high poverty rate equated to a large number of impoverished Neapolitans. A large enough number perhaps, to have taken over the city during a revolt. Equally important was the legal structure of Naples. It is questionable what laws were held in place to protect the weaker members of society, for such a gap in welfare to be present. Looking at the Revolt as a reaction to feudal abuses makes for an interesting interpretation, as it would imply that the Revolt of Naples was indeed an act of passion, as well as an act against the nobility – not the Spanish government.

Aside from the economic burden that the Spanish crown was placing on its subjects, its policies unsettled the nations of the Monarchy as well. That centralization was on the Spanish political agenda has already been touched upon in the previous chapter, and will be discussed in further detail in relation to the royal and feudal powers at stake in the Kingdom of Naples. As the relationship between crown and state rested on a delicate balance between royal authority and the maintenance of constitutional privilege, any shift in power that would jeopardize the terms on which the Neapolitans had accepted Spanish rule could lead to an accusation of tyranny, and thus justify rebellion.

The image of a tyrannous, oppressive, Castilian ruler raises a number of interesting questions. First, is the question of who accused the king of Spain of tyranny. During the revolt of July 1647, the masses chanted their devotion to the king. If any group found their constitutions infringed, it would seem one that had been granted with privileges in the first place: the nobility. Throughout the history of Spanish Naples, feudal authority had been tipping the scales of royal power. When the crown saw the need to fortify that power, it was at the cost of noble privileges. These privileges bring me to second matter of this image of a tyrannous king.

All things considered, this chapter should provide an overview of the possible agitated groups of society that would have had reason to revolt.

II.I – The Cost of Warfare

While the term ‘decline of Spain’ is much contested – and arguably so¹²⁰ – there is no doubt that the warfare in which the Spanish Crown was entangled, put much strain on its finances. All of Europe was somehow at war in the seventeenth century, and had to cope with the subsequent crises and revolts. Poverty, famine and plague threatened Europeans, who were now regularly confronted with seeing death on the streets.¹²¹ A chain of conflicts had snowballed into the Thirty Years’ War, which brought an evolution in warfare with it. Armies were getting stronger, bigger and more destructive throughout Europe and every state hastened to keep up with each other until none could seem to afford it anymore. By 1635, with onset of the Franco-Spanish war, military policies dominated all of Spain’s political life. The competitive European state system left no room to back out of the arms race, so instead governments sought to cover war expenses by digging deeper into public finance. Spain was no exception to this behavior and plummeted its monarchy into great public debts. Stradling referred to this period as an epoch of total war, in which all aspects of life were permeated by military policies.¹²²

This subchapter will review a number of aspects of the Spanish economies, and of the Castilian and Neapolitan economies in particular. The Castilian economy has been said to have been greatly impacted by its discovery of gold and silver mines in the West-Indies. To such an extent, even, that Castilian culture was reputed to have been entrenched with the love for decadence and disdain for labor.¹²³ The fluctuation of wealth made the fruit of a man’s toil unpredictable, and heavy labor has been said not to have been promoted in Castilian work ethic. It was a topic popular among the *arbitristas* in their criticism of the Spanish shortcomings.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, the riches from the New World did not exempt the Spanish Monarchy from the economic strain of warfare, and this was well exemplified by the demands the crown made from the Kingdom of Naples. The severity of the public debt, and how the Neapolitan government dealt with this, is fundamental to this chapter. In its despair, the government had basically been selling its authority to private individuals. This will prove to have been one of the leading problems of the relationship between the crown and the Kingdom.

¹²⁰ Kamen, ‘The Decline of Spain: a Historical Myth?’ in *Crisis and Change in Early Modern Spain* (1993) 24-26.

¹²¹ Parker, *Europe in Crisis*, 30.

¹²² Stradling, *Philip IV*, 129.

¹²³ Henry Kamen, ‘The Decline of Spain’, 26.

¹²⁴ Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, 299.

Castile's world economy

From the 1530's until 1680, Castile enjoyed a monopoly over Spanish Atlantic trade. The West Indies offered luxurious goods, and most importantly silver and gold. Traditionally, any mines discovered within the king's territory were considered as part of the royal heritage. Venturing to the New World to exploit its mines, however, posed such high a risk that the crown renounced this right and instead rented out the mines and in return demanded one fifth of its yield. The precious metals imported from the New World were most often used to buy Spanish luxury goods that were missed by the colonists that had settled in the Indies. On the goods imported from Europe to America a tax was levied as well. Seville, particularly, enjoyed enormous prosperity as it attracted merchants from all across Europe with its influx of silver.

The rest of the Spanish Monarchy could only benefit from Castile's newfound wealth indirectly. Even Aragon had been unable to establish any privileges to American trade, and only benefited indirectly by selling their cloth to Castile, so that it could be bought up to ship to the New World. Seville also turned to the Basques for their shipbuilding skills, which were gladly sold in return for Castilian silver. By the mid fifteen hundreds, Castile found itself confronted with an economic crisis. Local industries were plummeting, as importing goods from abroad had become much more affordable. Castilian labor and goods had to compete with cheaper foreign alternatives. In the 1550's, it was recognized that the high influx of silver and gold had been responsible for the high prices of Castilian goods. At the university of Salamanca, it was observed that where money was scarce and goods were abundant, prices were lower than where goods were scarce and money was abundant. All the while, colonial industries were free to develop where Spanish export could not keep up. It would seem that neither the Spanish Monarchy nor Castile itself had been able to exploit the riches of the New World fully.¹²⁵

Nevertheless, Spain had one of the strongest – if not the strongest – economies in the world at the end of the sixteenth, and first half of the seventeenth century. Castile had secured the bulk of the world's silver supply. With the addition of Portugal to the rule of the Spanish crown, it came with its overseas empire as well. Now the leading market of fine spices was added to the tropical products of the Spanish Caribbean and America. Seeing the Spanish position in international trade, ministers gave thought to mobilizing Spain's economic power against its enemies. Embargoes were placed on trade as a state instrument. The significance of Spain's engagement in economic warfare against its European rivals has been contested, as it has often been implied that the cutoff from Spanish trade was ineffective in cases such as the Dutch or English, who found ways to foreign products by going around the Spanish trade. Jonathan Israel, however, found significant evidence that the Dutch suffered considerably from the inconveniences and increased expenses caused by Spanish embargoes. Access to the Spanish trade network, including its Italian and American possessions, proved to have been a major advantage for European economies.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, 181-199.

¹²⁶ Jonathan Israel, 'Spain, the Spanish Embargoes, and the Struggle for Mastery of World Trade, 1585-1660.' In Jonathan Israel (ed.) *Empires and Entrepreneurs: Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy and the Jews, 1585-1713* (London and Ronceverte 1990) 190.

Royal demands of the Neapolitan economy

The membership of the Spanish trade market had been profitable for the Neapolitan economy as well. Naples had been able to sell its products for high prices to Iberian states of the Monarchy, where inflation had struck hardest. Spanish warfare also stimulated production in Naples to fulfill its demand in military needs. Thus Naples enjoyed the profits of export throughout the sixteenth century. In the early seventeenth century, however, the membership of the Spanish Monarchy became less beneficial to the Neapolitans, as fiscal pressure increased. Tax rates increased and new forms of taxation were introduced to meet the demands of the Spanish crown. The pressure placed on state creditors was an important reason why the Neapolitan government left its currency overvalued, so as to meet Spanish taxes. Most Italian states, even Spanish Sicily, devalued their currencies to stimulate exports. Neapolitan products were therefore at a disadvantage compared to other Italian states, which further hurt the Neapolitan economy.¹²⁷

In 1612, the Kingdom of Naples faced a severe financial crisis. The public debt had reached over 10 million ducats, with an annual interest payment of 800,000 ducats and an annual deficit of 262,337 ducats. The situation was grave, but the Neapolitan viceroy in office at the time, the Count of Lemos, had been able to remedy the financial crisis with administrative reorganizations. In 1636, however, another crisis hit and seemed far beyond repair. The public debt had reached 40 million ducats. The annual interest on this debt now stood at 2,648,037. The state's total expenditure was twice its income at 8,450,120 ducats, most of which went to war expenditure and interest on public debt.¹²⁸ The basic expenses of 1636 were:

Until this point, the state's expenditure had been covered by a number of measures. Feudal lands, public offices and public revenues were sold; special taxes were being imposed; credit was loaned and interest was being withheld. By 1636, these measures had reached such a scale that these tactics became exhausted, as the authority of the state declined with these discrediting methods to meet its financial needs. The table below shows the amounts that were brought up in an attempt to meet the state's expenditure in 1636:

Sale of state securities	851,683.89 ducats
Sale of offices	55,484.84
Sale of fiefs	63,769.00
Loans	1,370,602.04
Suspension of public debt payments	224,082.66
Extraordinary imposts (parliamentary aids)	1,451,372.53
Total	4,016,994.86 ¹²⁹

By 1636, a large part of the revenues from both direct and indirect taxes had also been mortgaged to creditors. All that what had previously been able to fund the Kingdom, had now been compromised. Unfortunately for the Neapolitan Kingdom; the Spanish Crown would offer no help. Instead, Naples

¹²⁷ Gaetano Sabatini, 'Economy and Finance in Early Modern Naples', in *A Companion to Early Modern Naples*, 93.

¹²⁸ Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, 74.

¹²⁹ Villari, 'The Neapolitan Financial Crisis of the 1630s and 1640s' in *Good Government in Spanish Naples*, 239.

was expected to continue to fund Spanish warfare. According to Villari, the Kingdom of Naples had gone from being a critical link in a Mediterranean political and military system, to being a reserve for money and supplies for the wars that Spain was waging in Europe. Orders to sell state offices, lands and revenues seemed to be all that came from the king. By 1638, creditors were increasingly hard to come by, as they themselves were lacking in funds, and also because they were becoming reluctant to do business with a court that had little to offer them in return. By 1639, the yearly interest on public debt had reached more than 3,500,000 ducats.¹³⁰

In addition to financial aid, the Kingdom was also expected to contribute troops to be dispatched abroad. The able-bodied men of the Neapolitan Kingdom were recruited as soldiers, though not entirely with their consent. Many were taken by force when they resisted conscription. Soldiers were in some cases even chained and guarded until they were dispatched to prevent their escape.¹³¹ Riots and violence broke out throughout Naples in reaction to the raids of thousands of its indispensable men.

Hostility grew in the Kingdom of Naples for providing incessant war funds. In 1638, Naples was ordered to bring up 2,500,000 ducats, along with six thousand infantrymen. In 1639 another two million ducats were sent along with soldiers and arms. In 1640, a monthly 200,000 ducats were requested, along with another 6,000 infantrymen. The Kingdom of Naples was now also on the radar of Muslim invaders, as well as French attacks. The Neapolitan defense system, however, had been drained to exhaustion. The viceroy of Naples resorted to popular militia in order to defend the Kingdom. Naples seemed to have absolutely nothing left, yet in 1641 new aid requests came from the Spanish crown: 9 million ducats and 12 thousand soldiers were needed to defend the Monarchy.¹³²

While the viceroy declared these requests entirely impossible to fulfill, the Duke of Medina managed to answer to the king's orders every time.¹³³ Inevitable to mention here is the notorious figure of Bartolomeo d'Aquino. He started his career as a merchant, but turned to the state's finance at a time when creditors were no longer interested in doing business with the court. D'Aquino soon found himself with a monopoly on the state's financial relationships with private creditors. In 1636, he was able to contract a number of wealthy creditors and raise 2,400,000 ducats, of which an ample amount went to D'Aquino himself in interest. D'Aquino grew extremely wealthy in this business, much to the revulsion of the rest of Neapolitan society. He would later be held responsible for the financial crisis of the Kingdom, but not before he had raised millions for the government.¹³⁴

Conclusion

It is now apparent that the financial demands from the Spanish crown to support its warfare was partly being paid by the selling of Neapolitan state properties. Public finance was set into a downward spiral in which loans were taken out to pay off the interest expenses on existing debts.

¹³⁰ Villari, 'The Neapolitan Financial Crisis', 240.

¹³¹ Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, 78.

¹³² Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, 77-84.

¹³³ Villari, 'The Neapolitan Financial Crisis,' 241.

¹³⁴ Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, 85-86, 97.

The desperate willingness to sell state offices and revenues discredited the government's authority. This erosion of power was amplified as this method of selling state property led to its power falling into private hands. In the decade preceding the Revolt of Naples, these hands were those of a small circle surrounding d'Aquino, upon which the Neapolitan government depended to meet the crown's demands. The following subchapter will explore the situation of the Kingdom in which the nobility was endowed with power that would ideally have resided with the king.

II.II Legal and Social Structures of Naples

The Kingdom of Naples was initially placed under the Aragonese crown after conquest of the kingdom in 1442. During his reign, Alfonso V reduced the repressive privileges that nobles had over their vassals, and became known as the champion of the peasantry. In Naples, however, Alfonso was faced with a land and people that were deeply entrenched by a feudal tradition. The aristocracy dominated all power and took little consideration of royal authority. There was nothing to particularly limit the constitutional right of the crown, but the administration of the kingdom proved very difficult. The Spanish crown, when adding the Kingdom of Naples to its Monarchy, saw that its long standing system of government was best left intact, and chose to work with it rather than against it. While this strategy initially earned the Spanish sovereign the trust of the local nobility; the aristocracy's unyielding demand for autonomy undermined royal authority. Jurisdiction was in the hands of the feudal lords, and their vassals had no way of going around this system. Well aware of this dilemma, the crown tried – and failed – to regain its authority. The attempt begrudged the nobility, and its failure filled the peasantry with contempt.¹³⁵

This friction between royal and noble power in the Kingdom of Naples was therefore already an issue before the practice of selling offices and lands. The selling of state property started under the rule of Charles V. In the latter years of his rule, taxes in Naples – which had remained the same since Alfonso V after 1444 – were increased. While the fiscal pressure on the kingdom had now been increased; its economic growth remained stagnant. To compensate for the growing needs of his empire, Charles started selling public offices and lands. This was not yet a matter of great concern, yet piled onto the existing issues of royal authority. The Kingdom of Naples was said to have been an exemplary model of politics and administration in the twelfth and thirteenth century; under Spanish rule it became notorious for its disorder and weak constitution and administration.¹³⁶ Under the reign of Charles V, the first major problems of government started to occur. The viceroy and the officials of the kingdom deviated from the king's orders regarding finance. Personal ambitions motivated their actions, and soon the juridical system was affected as well. Justice was increasingly disobeyed. Ministers were assaulted, and these acts were left unpunished.¹³⁷ This subchapter will focus on the balance between royal and noble power in the Kingdom of Naples, and what issues were brought with it.

¹³⁵ Alan Ryder, *The Kingdom of Naples Under Alfonso the Magnanimous – The Making of a Modern State* (Oxford 1976) 12-17.

¹³⁶ Antonio Calabria, John A. Marino, 'Introduction: Good Government in Spanish Naples?', in *Good Government in Spanish Naples* edited and translated by Antonio Calabria and John Marino (New York 1990) 2.

¹³⁷ Giuseppe Galasso, 'Trends and Problems in Neapolitan History in the Age of Charles V, in *Good Government in Spanish Naples*, 26.

This subchapter will first consider the traditional structure of the Kingdom, and then observe how the Spanish crown embedded its rule into this system. The feudal structure of Naples can be traced to the twelfth century, when it fell under Norman administration. Here, a competition between royal and feudal power could already be seen. A significant change that did take place was that during the Middle Ages, the authority of the church had been a counterweight to that of the king. The Reformation, however, separated a large part of Europe from the church of Rome and gave sovereignty a theocratic root. This view of sovereignty was also adopted by Catholic rulers. In this way, an extreme absolutism was born. Absolute monarchs no longer needed to recognize the people as their source of sovereignty or justify their power by reference to laws. Instead, the king was bound by no law and his subjects no longer had claim to rights, but both were bound to, and respectively protected by privileges that the king had granted his subjects.¹³⁸ Below, we will see in which way the development of absolutism affected the administration of Naples, in which a long history of government already stood; as well as its effect on noble-royal relations, and why the onset of absolutism did not necessarily improve royal power in the Kingdom of Naples.

Naples before Spanish dominion

Before Naples was introduced to Spanish rule, it had already known membership of a large realm ruled by a single monarch by means of a feudal administration. The Norman Kingdom, consisting out of Sicily, Apulia, Capua, and Naples, was formed in 1130 at the coronation of Roger II. From there on, the kingdom expanded and grew to considerable power. It stood on the grounds of theocratic kingship, and introduced to southern Italy the precepts of Norman feudal administration. Together it formed a competing system of autocratic and feudal government, but an oath of loyalty to the crown overrode the will of the feudal nobility. The farther off provinces did necessarily enjoy a degree of autonomy. They were governed in the name of the king by counts, who delegated further administration of the province. Counts were even free to act as royal judges within their domains. Financial matters, however, were handled by direct servants of the king. The result was a very thorough exploitation of the kingdom's wealth, more so than anywhere else in Western Europe. This would last until the end of the Norman period, when feudal ambitions invaded the financial system – and ultimately, royal authority.¹³⁹

Frederick II succeeded to the throne in 1220 and retightened the royal grip over the kingdom. He established the practice of canon law throughout the entire kingdom, and replaced the counts with royal servants as head of the provinces, who were controlled by professional judges. These judges were still recruited from the ranks of the nobility, but they were never allowed to judge in their native provinces, and only held their office for a single year at a time. This organization would be maintained for centuries.¹⁴⁰

To support the professionals in service of the royal jurisdiction, the University of Naples was founded in 1224 as an institution of the state. This new university attracted marvels for its individual and independent character. Most important themes taught at the university were: the centralization of justice, Naples' own national legislation, important judicial traditions and a greater understanding of

¹³⁸ Carlo Calisse, *A History of Italian Law*, 133-134.

¹³⁹ Ryder, *The Kingdom of Naples*, 3-4.

¹⁴⁰ Ryder, *The Kingdom of Naples*, 7-9.

Lombard law – which was practiced in nearly all Italian states. At the University of Naples, the professors of civil law worked on a fusion of local and Roman law; a practice which was quite unique at the time, and would not occur in the rest of Western Europe for centuries.¹⁴¹

The professors of the University of Naples were often magistrates or lawyers as well. Soon they not only quoted Roman Law in their studies, but also in courts.¹⁴² As a result, Neapolitan jurists were highly educated in Roman Law, to the point that they did not accept a sovereign that would overstep his bounds. Charles I of Anjou, now on the throne, was not able to carry on the absolutist policy of his predecessor, and instead had to make many concessions that would greatly diminish the authority of the crown. Throughout the fourteenth century, the nobility regained its wealth and military power. Another concession gave the nobility full juridical power. The feudal lords gained increasingly more power over the peasantry, and Naples became the very center of feudal jurisprudence. The feudal monarchy was reasonably effective, until the early fifteenth century showed an accumulation of problems that flowed from the poverty and repression of the Neapolitan people. It was under these conditions that Naples entered the Spanish Monarchy with the Aragonese conquest of the kingdom in 1442.¹⁴³

The feudal system

Because the Neapolitan feudal system was so defining for its government and society, it is essential to know this mechanism through which the Spanish monarch was to implement his rule. In Italy, the word *feudo*, or fief, had several meanings. In Naples, however, it specifically referred to land endowed with specific legal characteristics. Civil and criminal jurisdiction over the inhabitants of a fief was not wielded by the royal government, but by a private individual, invested with that royal power. This individual also received any amount of personal rights and privileges, and ownership of as much land as he pleased within that territory. Aside from jurisdiction, a baron also had other exercises of royal power, such as the enforcement of laws. He also had right to specific feudal economic activities and monopolies. The general population had to pay fees to their lord to use his domain, and a baron had a right to his vassal's services. Prosperous families often aimed to acquire multiple fiefs, which would together form a *stato*. The fiefs of the kingdom had evolved since the Norman conquest of the eleventh century, into complex networks and systems of right. During the Spanish reign in Naples, there were over 1,500 of such lands, which was over ninety-five percent of the kingdom's villages and towns and included three quarters of the population.¹⁴⁴

Earlier in this chapter we have seen that state property was being sold to private owners as a finite solution to the Kingdom's dwindling economy. This had a major impact on the Neapolitan feudal system. The selling of state lands dramatically increased the number of feudal properties by the end of the sixteenth century, as the state only held on to the lands that were deemed most important

¹⁴¹ E.M. Meijers, *Etudes d'Histoire du Droit*, 'L'università di Napoli nel Secollo XIII' 149-166. This chapter is the introduction to *Iuris interpretes saeculi XIII (Septingentesimo Anno Studii Neapolitani)*, *curantibus scholaribus Leidensibus duce E.M. Meijers* (Naples 1924), p XVII-XXXIX.

¹⁴² Giannone, *The Civil History of the Kingdom of Naples*, 437.

¹⁴³ Ryder, *The Kingdom of Naples*, 12-17.

¹⁴⁴ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, 37-38.

administrative centers.¹⁴⁵ The old feudal aristocracy, remained an elite society. Tied to one another by familial bonds, the powerful baronage of the provinces and members of the city patriciate bundled their powers. Throughout the sixteenth century they united as a single dominating group over Neapolitan economy, society and jurisdiction: a system that would last into the late eighteenth century.¹⁴⁶

Feudal powers in the kingdom of Naples were therefore very extensive and diverse. Because of the strength of feudal civil and criminal jurisdiction, Neapolitan barons had very strong local control. Feudal power in the kingdom of Naples was therefore stronger than anywhere else in Western Europe.¹⁴⁷ When Naples entered the Spanish empire, its nobles were given the opportunity for even further advancement. The Spanish monarch worked closely with the Neapolitan aristocracy, employing them in prominent positions throughout the empire.

The economic decline of the kingdom of Naples, starting in the 1590's, was soon seen in a decline of feudal revenues a few years later. This process could have been the cause of the tightening grip of the Neapolitan fiefs, which could have been seen in the decades preceding the Revolt of Naples. Rosario Villari specifically argued that this trend further eroded the royal power over the Neapolitan Kingdom. The nobility was increasingly insistent on the maintenance of their inherited feudal powers.¹⁴⁸ This refeudalization entailed that the feudal aristocracy increased the burden of the Neapolitan population, and with the decline of royal power to control the nobility, this could very well be the reason of the social conflict in the kingdom.¹⁴⁹

Organization of the *università*

An elemental term in the government of the Kingdom of Naples, was the *università*. In Naples, specific legal terms were used to define groups of people. These were mainly named according to its size. A *città*, or city, was larger than a *terra*, or village, which was larger than a *casale*, or hamlet. The term *città* was also used for larger villages, as there was no juridical term for conglomerations that fell between *terra* or *città*. Most hamlets were not autonomous, but depended on neighboring cities or villages. Still, hamlets, as well as villages and cities, constituted what was called *università*. The *università* consisted of all citizens of these centers, but not all inhabitants. Citizens were those who had the right to participate in local administration. Residents were described in relation to their lord, whether he was their king or baron, as *vasalli*, or vassals. Lords, titled or untitled, were called *baroni*: barons.¹⁵⁰

During the Spanish reign, most *università* had developed an oligarchic character, especially in the wealthier regions. In most smaller and poorer villages, the *università* still had a medieval character, and most heads of household had a say in the council. They could elect the local administrators, who controlled the taxes and jurisdiction. Most *università* were feudal. All residents of a feudal *università*

¹⁴⁵ Giuseppe Galasso, 'Trends and Problems, 48-52.

¹⁴⁶ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, 20.

¹⁴⁷ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, 40.

¹⁴⁸ Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, 150.

¹⁴⁹ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, 104-105.

¹⁵⁰ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, 109-110.

fell under baronial jurisdiction. They could appeal to royal jurisdiction, but as most barons had first and second, sometimes even third degree justice since the Aragonese period, vassals might have to go through as many as three trials to get there. To be free of baronial jurisdiction, and only being vassal to the king, was almost a precondition to be part of the nobility. Generally, this was therefore only possible for citizens of the royal *università*. This system was held in place until the turn of the nineteenth century.¹⁵¹

Representatives of the Neapolitan People

Since the reign of Alfonso, the *università* paid its taxes as a whole to the king as well as their feudal lord, and could decide by themselves how they would be gathered.¹⁵² Before this, however, a *università* was already a corporation that had the same elements of a political entity. A *università* therefore needed its own representative. The feudal overlord was the representative of the sovereign before the people, and the magistrates were the representatives of the people.¹⁵³ Before the thirteenth century, the latter was first embodied by the consul, which was chosen by the people. Though not specified by law, the consul was usually chosen from the class that was most dominant in the government at the time. The election was to be confirmed by the bishop or the crown, but this formality was often disregarded. The elected consul was to fill his office for a year. The consul swore to obey the constitutions of the people, who in turn swore their obedience to him. The whole administration of executive power was entrusted to the consul, including justice, finance, police and foreign relations. This concentration of power was the result of the consuls taking over the places of magistrates, and settling themselves at the heads of separate departments of the public service. Because the consuls were now in possession of significant powers, the constitutions of the people were well protected.¹⁵⁴

After the late twelfth centuries, the consuls were replaced by the *podestà* as magistrates of most Italian cities.¹⁵⁵ The *podestà* was to be a stranger of the city, not be from feudal nobility, and would not be allowed to establish any personal relationships during his time in office. His tenure could be as short as six months, though usually lasting a year. The elections and powers of the *podestà* did not differ from those of the consul. The anticipated improvement from transitioning from consul to *podestà* did not follow, however, as a scramble for power remained.¹⁵⁶

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, there was also an election of leaders by the plebeian population. They, too, wished for representation and some political control. The people's association was shaped according to the model of the city's government, with a captain at the head. This captain of the *popolo* would correspond to the *podestà*. Both the communes of the people and the communes of the *podestà* worked independently for their own interests. This system proved to be problematic, however, when these interests overlapped. When there were matters at hand that

¹⁵¹ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, 110-111.

¹⁵² Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, 109-110.

¹⁵³ Calisse, *A History of Italian Law*, 141.

¹⁵⁴ Calisse, *A History of Italian Law*, 142.

¹⁵⁵ Killinger, *The History of Italy*, 61.

¹⁵⁶ Calisse, *A History of Italian Law*, 144

concerned both communes, it was settled by the most dominant party; on most unfavorable terms for their counterparts.¹⁵⁷

The fundamental principle of electing magistrates was that the sovereignty remained with the people. The elected magistrates exercised power that was delegated to them by the people. This way, the communes remained participants of the government. There was a general assembly of the people, which initially included everyone who had political capacity. This assembly was called the parliament, or *colloquio*. Major affairs – laws, taxes, wars, elections – were announced and transacted here. The many opinions of the numerous participants of the parliament created unrest, and to remedy this, access to the parliament became limited. First, participation was limited to the heads of families, but was later further restricted by limiting the occurrences of assemblies to matters of gravest importance, and transferred all others to a Great Council.¹⁵⁸

Representatives of the King

Around the dawn of the early modern period, the power of these types magistrates waned, and their officeholders were slowly replaced by confidants of the sovereign. This magistrate owed not his authority to the people, but to his king. The latter was the source of law, but his ministers administered the government through their begotten offices of state. In the early Middle Ages, the powers of the sovereign were considered his personal attributes, in which his court participated. Now, the state and the sovereign became to be considered as one. All was now done in his name and by his will. His magistrates were the instruments of his power, and represented him in usual matters of government. The state officials composed his Collateral Council. In some large Italian states, the councils were divided up into councils of politics, justice and war. As monarchies progressed throughout, these bodies formed to be a Council of State. This, however, would not be the case for Naples, where there would only be a Collateral Council until 1735.

The functions of the councils were limitless; their powers were delegated by the king. The viceroy had similar councils, to which he delegated power. Thus the viceroy of Naples had the Collateral Council of Naples, or *Consiglio Collaterale*. The Italian provinces of a foreign monarchy – as Sicily and Naples possessed by the Spanish monarchy – were represented by a chief magistrate: the viceroy. The latter was appointed by the king, and was in office for three years, with a possible renewal of office thereafter. To prevent abuse of power, the king sent inspectors to visit and check up on the viceroy, to make sure his government held the public interest above his own pleasure. In Naples, Charles V had already established a permanent office of such a *visitatori*.¹⁵⁹

The rise of absolute governments did not completely exclude all representation of the local authorities from political life. Especially in the farthest dominions of Spain, the political equilibrium between monarch and nobility rested on the traditional rights to autonomy of the local ruling class. This was the result of the commonplace practice of concession making and obligations to respect the local autonomy. These concessions were often made to ensure the loyalty of those who regulated

¹⁵⁷ Calisse, *A History of Italian Law*, 144-145.

¹⁵⁸ Calisse, *A History of Italian Law*, 146.

¹⁵⁹ Calisse, *A History of Italian Law*, 152.

and approved of the taxes demanded of the kingdom.¹⁶⁰ Feudal lords thus maintained their ruling power in the face of absolutism. To counterweight this feudal power, the formation of parliaments was supported by the state. Temporal and clerical formed the two estates of the parliaments. The 'third estate' was added lastly, and represented the people of the state. The peasantry was excluded from this, as their rights were completely absorbed by their feudal lords.¹⁶¹

The third estate was comprised of citizens that were not members of the clergy or nobility. This class formed its separate chamber in parliaments. The citizens had their own classes amongst themselves, and the wealthiest merchants and manufacturers even merged with the nobility. These rich citizens, known as the *popolo grasso*, tended to dominate Italian cities during the Middle Ages. Their economic importance provided leverage in the political sphere, as they had made themselves indispensable by providing for the costs significant social matters and warfare. In time, however, the power of the third estate came to wane. Monarchy demanded a more uniform society, and many of the rich citizens were made noble. The rest was stripped from their political power, and made subjects like all other common people.¹⁶²

Traditionally, the city Naples was divided into administrative districts, called *Seggi*. These *Seggi* referred to the territorial divisions in the city, as well as the governing powers residing there. Through annual election, a representative was appointed among the members of the *Seggi*. Together, directed by an elected aristocrat by the viceroy, they formed the city tribunal. They controlled the administration of the city's infrastructure and safeguarded its privileges, and even had a limited hold over the city's police. After 1642, they also served as the kingdom's representative institution. The *Seggi* were therefore able to vote taxes and grants to the king in the name of the entire kingdom, and were alone in their right to plead to the king. The *Seggi* dominated the kingdom with their powers until they were abolished in 1800.¹⁶³ The *Seggio del Popolo* was the noble *Seggi's* counterpart. This represented the non-noble citizens of Naples. The privileges established in 1505 were much in favor of the *Popolo* and their influence in the city's politics. The nobility and populace thus shared the city's government, though the nobility always had the upper hand. The noble *Seggi* and the *Seggio del Popolo* never gathered together, but met separately. The city emphasized faithfulness to the king as the leading characteristic of their relationship with the Spanish monarch.¹⁶⁴

The *Magna Curia* was composed of the seven highest officials of the kingdom. It had authority in all important matters, including the administration of justice. The latter became its most important function. Alongside of it, was also the Viceregal Court, which stood in place of the king. These were soon fused together, as the Grand Viceregal Court. Alfonso V of Aragon created the Holy Royal Council, also known as the Council of Santa Clara. This court was superior to the *Magna Curia*.

The Italian states under Spanish rule had their own fully developed and functional systems of administration and government. Naples, along with Sicily and Milan were placed under the Council of

¹⁶⁰ Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, 4-6.

¹⁶¹ Calisse, *A History of Italian Law*, 153.

¹⁶² Calisse, *A History of Italian Law*, 162.

¹⁶³ Astarita, *The continuity of feudal power*, 24-25.

¹⁶⁴ Giulio Sodano, 'Governing the City' in Tommaso Astarita (ed.), *A Companion to Early Modern Naples* (Leiden 2013) 111, 144.

Italy, which had been created halfway through the sixteenth century. While Spanish government did not destroy the institutional structures of the Italian states, the new rulers were warranted to create additional institutions. These were for example the Collateral Council and the presence of viceroys in Naples by Ferdinand of Aragon. Sicily had voluntarily chosen the Spanish sovereign as their ruler in 1282, and the Duchy of Milan had come under Spanish possession in 1545. The Kingdom of Naples, however, had been conquered by military defeat of the Angevins. The very different means by which the Italian states had come under Spanish rule dictated the terms by which the states could be governed, and it would be unwise to cram them into a common framework.¹⁶⁵

Conclusion

An interesting political development that could be seen in the government of Naples from the eleventh to seventeenth century, was that the issue of proper representation turned from selecting proper representatives of the people to selecting proper representatives of the king. The government first existed to represent the people. Ideally, all with political capacity were allowed to participate in government, but as too many people were participating in professing their opinions, their participation had to be slimmed down by electing representatives. Magistrates were elected for this convenience, but the goal remained to represent the people. This changed when the sovereignty was believed to reside with the king. Whereas the sovereignty first resided with the people, who then appointed a leader; the sovereignty now resided with the king, who had been appointed by none other than God. His subjects had no rights to which they could bind their king, but they were able to call upon privileges granted to them. Upon entering the Spanish Monarchy, the nobility was able to maintain these privileges by making annexation of the Kingdom a smooth transition. Leaving the existing form of government standing, was a successful way of maintaining the friendliness with the local elite, who could manage the administration.

In the case of Naples, taking over the existing administration proved to be fairly problematic. Considering the history of the Kingdom, its feudal system allowed the local nobility much autonomy. The realm was divided into *universitàs* which were responsible for their own administration, and were free to collect and pay taxes to the central government as they saw fit. The *università* was a significant part of Neapolitan administration, and it showed the degree in which local nobility enjoyed autonomy. In addition to having to pay fees to the feudal lords, owing him their services, and falling under his jurisdiction – his vassals were not able to enjoy the protection of royal authority. Reports of feudal abuses would go unheard, as the collection of taxes was indispensable to the central government. As was the privilege of the *università*, they themselves could collect their taxes as they saw fit. As long as they met their demands, the government would not interfere in a system that worked in their benefit in the end.

The already present strength and autonomy of the feudal system in Naples was further aggravated by the Monarchy's demand for funds. The Neapolitan government selling offices further aggravated a problem that was already there. The number of powerful feudal lords was only expanding in this way, and by the end of the sixteenth century, feudal power in Naples had grown stronger than anywhere else in Western Europe. This in combination with the economic decline starting in the

¹⁶⁵ Mireille Peytavin 'Government/Administration: The Italian Kingdoms within the Spanish Monarchy',

1590's, which was soon seen in a decline of feudal revenues, could be seen as the cause of the tightening grip of the Neapolitan fiefs, or what Villari called the refeudalization of Naples. This refeudalization further burdened the Neapolitan population, while royal power to control the nobility seemed to grow ever more distant. Both these trends cumulated towards the Revolt of Naples, and could have given a good indication of the wellbeing of the Neapolitan populace.

Another interesting point that can be gathered from the information in this subchapter is that the third estate had known ample political representation in the Kingdom of Naples. Traditionally, there had been a system in place by which the third estate also had a place in politics, and somewhat restricted the advancement of feudal power. The thirteenth century election of the *podestà*, for example, required that the candidate did not come from feudal nobility. Also under the Spanish dominion there was some room for popular political influence, through the means of the third estate. Their power was limited, but the *Seggio del Popolo* was left standing. The *Seggio del Popolo* had privileges established in their favor in 1505, but after decades of ever increasing feudal power, there would have been good reason for the third estate to have been in favor of a Revolt by 1647.

II.III – Feudal Jurisdiction in Neapolitan Society

So far, the possible political motivations of the Revolt have received most attention. Equally important to assess, however, is the possibility of the Revolt having been an act of passion. In the Elliot-Burke debate, Burke represented the team which portrayed the Revolt of Naples as a revolt of the people. With his research he tried to reveal the popular mindset of the Neapolitans in July 1647, by 'reading between the lines'¹⁶⁶ of the documentation of the Revolt by aristocratic witnesses. With a number of narratives and the analysis of symbols and traditions, Burke tried to uncover the untold story of the Neapolitan commoner that bore witness to or participated in the Revolt. While Burke's unorthodox approach can be applauded for its creative resourcefulness; a more conventional approach will prove to be able to bring the historian much closer to the illiterate Neapolitan who has been said to have left no legacy of popular thought.

Judicial sources

By the study of judicial sources, Tommaso Astarita, expert in Neapolitan history, was able to get in touch with the generally anonymous Neapolitan populace of the seventeenth century.¹⁶⁷ The study of judicial sources gave an insight into the lives and ideas of the populace that had little means of providing a legacy of paper themselves. Court records are often able to tell specific stories of common people who led ordinary lives. Their statements were recorded, often verbatim, and therefore provide a straightforward documentation of popular thoughts without having to yield to reading between the lines.

Unfortunately, records of trials held in feudal courts were rare in the Kingdom of Naples before the restriction of feudal criminal jurisdiction at the end of the eighteenth century. Neapolitan jurisdiction was unique compared to the rest of Europe because of the extent of the nobility's judicial power.

¹⁶⁶ Burke, 'Virgin of the Carmine', 7.

¹⁶⁷ Tommaso Astarita, *Village Justice. Community, Family, and Popular Culture in Early Modern Italy* (Baltimore-London, 1999).

Over three quarters of the Neapolitan population fell under feudal jurisdiction, and had little to no access to royal justice. Royal jurisdiction was usually limited to large and strategically important towns. The rural population of Naples largely depended on feudal justice. Luckily, there are sufficient court records to assess how common Neapolitans fared in this juridical system.

The few records that do exist should be able to provide us with insightful information on a number of matters that are otherwise difficult to assess by studying historical context alone. The Kingdom of Naples was an important center of legal studies in Early Modern Europe, and there has been ample attention given to this in modern historiography.¹⁶⁸ However, studying how this was actually applied in practice as well gives an insight in popular culture, in addition to social relationships and power structures. It could also help illustrate the relationship between authorities and the values of their subjects. Trial records also give a more practical understanding of how the feudal courts worked, and what they handled. This is why the study of Tommaso Astarita is so valuable in assessing the standards of living of the Neapolitan populace.

Astarita made a case study of court records found in the village of Pentidattilo in the Kingdom of Naples, in the region of Calabria. Pentidattilo was an average village within the Kingdom, and much of the trends that occurred there were applicable to similar villages throughout the Kingdom. Pentidattilo witnessed rebellions of the villagers against their lords in 1647-1648. That Pentidattilo is a substantial five hundred kilometers away from the city of Naples – where the ten day Revolt allegedly took place – illustrates the scale of the Neapolitan Revolt. Firstly, it indicated that the Revolt was not contained within the city of Naples; secondly, that it lasted long enough to reach and inspire a far off village in Calabria; and third, that the rebels throughout the kingdom were vassals rebelling against their feudal lords, and not nobility rebelling against the King of Spain.

Feudal power in practice

The term vassals was used for all subjects that were under their lord's jurisdiction. This was so until the abolition of the feudal system in 1806. Just as many noble landowners throughout Europe; Neapolitan lords enjoyed the right to jurisdiction over the inhabitants of their fiefs. Neapolitan feudal lords, or barons, were different in the extent of their jurisdiction, as well as the portion of the Neapolitan population that fell under their jurisdiction. Three quarters of the Neapolitan kingdom fell under feudal jurisdiction. Most barons enjoyed full civil and criminal jurisdiction through the first appeal, and many also enjoyed right to the second appeal. This meant that to reach royal justice, it was so difficult and expensive that most could not afford it. Centralization and absolutism has often been thought to have been characteristic of the early modern period. Especially historians studying Italian states have been insisting, however, that powers of the elite and local institutions were just as persistent as ever. The aristocracy lost much political power under Spanish dominions, but their economic, social and local power remained the same.¹⁶⁹

Feudal jurisdiction had become even more extensive with the concessions made by Alfonso the Magnanimous to the barons of Naples when it had been integrated into the rule of the Aragonese crown. Still, their power was also limited and regulated often, and between the fifteenth and

¹⁶⁸ Meijers, *Etudes d'Histoire du Droit*, 'L'università di Napoli nel Secollo XIII', 149-166.

¹⁶⁹ Astarita, *Village Justice*, 48.

eighteenth century, many edicts on this matter were published. There were many treatises published that discussed the rights and obligations of lords and their vassals, often focusing on feudal jurisdiction. Feudal criminal jurisdiction was therefore not unlimited. There were, for example, certain crimes that could not be prosecuted by a baron. This included crimes toward the state such as false coinage or treason; as well as moral crimes such as blasphemy or sodomy, which were considered even more offensive than murder because they were crimes against God and nature. Also, appeals to royal courts were also theoretically possible. Nevertheless, reality proved otherwise.¹⁷⁰

There was also the church court, which had jurisdiction in cases of heresy and certain moral crimes. It sometimes clashed with secular jurisdiction, in cases of supposed mixed crimes, such as blasphemy or adultery. In rural areas, however, clerics were usually poorly educated sons of local families. Again, feudal jurisdiction was practically unchallenged in its influence on the baron's vassals.

Feudal jurisdiction deeply influenced life in the community. The baron was, for instance, in charge of managing and funding the local prison. Methods of punishment were usually corporal punishment, exile, service in the galleys, fines and capital punishment. Imprisonment increased as a method of punishment in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. In the seventeenth century, still, prisons were seen less as punishment than as a means to detain defendants during their trials. It was thus viewed as unacceptable for prisons to have bad conditions, but in the Kingdom of Naples this was often the case. Neapolitan barons were notorious taking such bad care of their prisons that they were deemed abusive and repressive to his vassals that faced criminal jurisdiction. The quality of feudal prisons were therefore often a source of conflict between lord and vassals. Additionally, the baron had jurisdiction even in cases where the penalty could be capital punishment. This meant that he had power over life and death in the eyes of his vassals.

There were certain restrictions that a baron faced in his exercise of jurisdiction. The baron could not, for instance, directly exercise jurisdiction himself. He appointed a governor instead, who had to meet a number of requirements that would make him as impartial to the community as possible. The governor, in turn, would appoint jurists to the court. This system limited abuses, and limited possible tensions and conflicts as a result of the personal nature of the baron directly interfering in the lives of his vassals. While feudal abuses could and did occur, feudal jurisdiction was undoubtedly restricted by royal laws and tribunals, which were largely obeyed. The aim of this was to make sure that feudal courts resembled royal courts in their function. The royal court, however, should not be held as the ideal, as it was not unsusceptible to corruption and abuses either.¹⁷¹

Altogether, a baron's feudal court made him to be the community's judge, the enforces of moral values, and even the one to decide over his vassals' life and death.

Torture

Aside from capital punishment, another fear-instilling ability of the seventeenth century jurisdiction was its implementation of torture. This method was a regular part of the criminal procedure. The use

¹⁷⁰ Astarita, *Village Justice*, 50.

¹⁷¹ Astarita, *Village Justice*, 54-57.

of torture is difficult to rationalize or understand modern society, but should be judged with consideration to its historical and cultural context. At the time, the use of torture was justified as a means of the repression of crime, of creating absolute proof, and of avoiding the subjective decision of the judge. Nevertheless, for the understanding of the extent of feudal power and the vassal's relationship with his baron. It should not be marginalized and deserves to be assessed with some criticism.

The exercise of torture went according to procedure. When a defendant was unable to convince the court of his innocence, and the crime was punishable by a corporal penalty or worse, the judge could order the torture of the defendant to extract a confession from him. It was carefully regulated by law, in which the methods and duration of a torture session was determined. The defendant could therefore not simply be tortured until he confessed. To assure the session would not be too painful, the defendant would not eat anything in the hours in advance. To make sure that the torture would not actually harm the defendant, he would also undergo a medical examination, and the physician would attend the torture as well. If the case concerned multiple defendants, the one most likely to confess the soonest, would be tortured first. This limited the total amount of pain that would have to be inflicted, but also that the ones deemed the weakest – old, young, female – would be first in line to be torture. Some groups were exempted from this procedure, such as the elderly, young children, pregnant women; as well as privileged groups such as priests, judges and some jurists. Furthermore, a confession under torture had no validity unless the defendant confirmed it the following day. If he refused to confirm, however, the torture would be repeated the next day.¹⁷²

While torture was undeniably regulated by law in its procedure, questions of fairness, humanity and necessity remained. The effectiveness of torture was debatable, and varied throughout Europe. The aim of torture was to extract a confession, but even when a confession was already given, torture still ensued. In the particular case of Naples, the procedure was much more susceptible to abuse. The central royal court of the Vicaria in Naples differed from all other European courts in that it had the privilege of being allowed to torture defendants before their trials. There were certain requirements here, that would suggest that the defendant was certainly guilty of his alleged crime, but these were so vague that the court could – and did – abuse this privilege in many cases.¹⁷³

Conclusion

The seventeenth century populace of Naples has not faded from historical memory, and there are many insights to be found from the remaining court records. That these records were so scarce, was the result of the high juridical power that was in the hands of the Neapolitan barons. Three quarters of the Neapolitan population fell under feudal jurisdiction, and the study of feudal jurisdiction is therefore vital to the understanding of the Neapolitan populace.

A case study as small as that of Astarita is still valuable because the society of a typical Neapolitan village reflected upon the rest of the Kingdom. While each was its own *università*, Neapolitan villages were far from secluded, and the members of their communities held strong opinions that were influential even in the exercise of local jurisdiction. The inhabitants of the communities themselves

¹⁷² Astarita, *Village Justice*, 62.

¹⁷³ Astarita, *Village Justice*, 63.

had to report crimes, and because criminal investigations could not be aided by the modern scientific advancements we know today, most proof came in the form of statements of witnesses. While the witnesses were under oath, their statements were influenced by their own opinion of the defendant, and the reputation of the latter. On some level, this reflected the way opinion and reputation were entrenched in every level of society, just like the Spanish government was concerned with as shown in Chapter I.

The final form of proof in the Neapolitan court was the confession of the defendant. The way this confession was extracted from the commoners, reflected upon the relationship between lord and vassal. It would be anachronistic to call their practices inhumane, but it would be an accurate observation that the use of torture and harsh punishments were not always fair. While regulated by the law, there were sufficient loopholes through which courts could abuse their powers. Furthermore, certain privileged groups were exempted from this practice. In a strongly hierarchical society some inequality before the law was to be expected, but the exemption of an undeniably cruel practice that was thus reserved for commoners, does illustrate the power the nobility had over its vassals.

Feudal jurisdiction was regulated in such a way that it would mirror the royal juridical system, but royal justice was practically unreachable for the vassals that fell under feudal jurisdiction. Despite the general assumption of seventeenth century centralization; study of juridical sources suggest that local feudal power indeed remained the same in most Neapolitan communities.

II.IV – Conclusion

By the mid seventeenth century, warfare – and funding warfare – had entrenched the Spanish political agenda. The cost of war itself had increased as armies grew bigger and stronger, and all Spain could do was dig deeper into its public finance lest it succumb to the European arms race. The Kingdom of Naples bore the financial burden of Spanish warfare through devastating crises, and funds were sought at the expense of government. While the economy suffered and debts were built upon debts, there was the hopeless addition of the sale of royal power. Fiefs, public offices and public revenues were being sold to private buyers. This way, royal authority was being sold to the local elite. The desperation with which the government sought funds was not doing much for royal authority either.

The effects of the financial raid of the Kingdom was immediately felt through new taxes that were being imposed and existing that taxes were being increased. The cost of war was not only being paid in cash, as soldiers were being recruited from among the Neapolitan population. The Kingdom suffered, but Neapolitan creditors and tax collectors enjoyed their position of being valuable assets to the royal government. The bitterness that was born out of these extremes of fate at the cost of Spanish warfare, was apparent in the retaliating abuse of tax collectors during the Revolt.

Before this, Naples had already been entrenched in a hierarchical society. When added to the Aragonese crown by Alfonso the Magnanimous, this feudal system was practically taken over in its entirety. The alliance with local authorities facilitated the annexation of the Kingdom initially, but made it difficult for royal authority to find steady ground. Feudal powers remained a counterweight to the effective royal control in the majority of the Kingdom. The nobility under the house of Anjou

had been able to win full juridical power, giving it an additional authority over its vassals. While the power of the nobility grew more extensive, it was also growing in quantity and range as the Neapolitan government sold public offices and feudal lands. The power struggle between royal and feudal authority left little room for the consideration of the third estate, which had previously known a considerable position. The *Seggio del Popolo* had been recognized under Spanish rule as well, but its political influence had to yield to feudal power.

The extent of feudal power in Neapolitan society has been illustrated by its juridical power. Three quarters of the population fell under feudal jurisdiction, and deeply influenced community life. The severity and fairness and of penalties were regulated by the crown, but royal justice was practically unreachable for regular Neapolitans. Another supposed counterweight of feudal jurisdiction was the church court, but in practice these had little say in the smaller villages of the Kingdom. The feudal court was therefore practically unchallenged in the community of most Neapolitan people. It would therefore have been questionable whether it had been the nobility that had seen reason to revolt because of infringed privileges. Centralization and absolutism did not seem to have greatly affected the Neapolitan nobility. If there was any group that saw its privileges disregarded, it would seem to have been the shrunken third estate. Little of the privileges of 1504 survived the towering feudal aristocracy.

If there had been any power left in the non-privileged members of society, it would have resided with the popular community. In criminal jurisdiction especially, convictions revolved around the statements witnesses and the confession of the defendant. Moral virtues were judged here, as was a person's identity based on his family and native land. Because witnesses were so important in the juridical system, public opinion and reputation were vital to a defendant, and therefore also in society. How important the eye of society was to the early modern rule of Naples, and in which way the government tried to influence its subjects' perception of their state and ruler, should become evident in the following chapters.

Chapter III – Giovanni Battista de Thoro on Justice and Monarchy

The previous two chapters have provided the necessary framework for an understanding of seventeenth century Neapolitan politics, jurisdiction and society under Spanish dominion. So far, we have considered the organization of the Spanish Monarchy, the individual nations within it, their economic and political problems faced on different scales, and the criticism expressed by the subjects of the king. This chapter will offer some tangibility to this framework, by recollecting the views of an opinionated Neapolitan who would bear witness to the Revolt of Naples in the same year that he published *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni Neapolitani*¹⁷⁴. This publication was a collection of juridical decrees, but Giovanni Battista de Thoro¹⁷⁵ also managed to add a political element to his work by writing a preface in which he stated his purpose. De Thoro's *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum* was thus published with more than the practical intention of guiding jurists in the employment of law. His preface, though formal and unobtrusive, contained significant political thoughts and opinions on the Neapolitan Kingdom and its Spanish King.

The purpose of the study of this work is to consider the more specific and individual memories of a Neapolitan contemporary with the Revolt, and to compare them to the more general information provided up until now. De Thoro's commentary on the reason of state, the ideals of kingship, and the significance of proper jurisdiction, offers a Neapolitan view on these topics that until now have been considered in relation to the whole of the Monarchy, and will thus aid in understanding the more specific expectations and frustrations of the inhabitants of the Kingdom, as well as ultimately assessing the question of who and what had been responsible for the Revolt of Naples.

The preface to *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum* could be divided into four points that de Thoro wished the reader to know before continuing to his work. First, de Thoro spoke of the qualities a monarchy – or rather, the monarch himself – was deemed to have in order to manage the ideal state. With a careful harmony of piety, power and wisdom, the ideal monarch would be able to create a community in which mankind can safely prosper. From the latter he continued to the importance of the law, and the proper employment of the law. De Thoro paid special attention to the works of Justinian and biblical scriptures concerning government. To further support the proper employment of the law, de Thoro created this collection of legal decrees. De Thoro then continued to explain the organization of the Neapolitan state and most specifically, its courts.

As the text was originally written in Latin, this chapter will begin with a translation of the preface. This will reveal a number of interesting statements, and these are best appreciated when considering their context: mid seventeenth century Spanish Naples. The framework drawn in this chapters up until now has shown the position of a viceroyalty within the Spanish Monarchy, as well as the position of the monarch towards his subjects. With this translation, I would like to show how de Thoro's ideal relates to the contemporary political thought of the seventeenth century, as well as the

¹⁷⁴Giovanni Battista de Thoro, *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*, edited by Giovanni Domenico Bove, published by Iacobi Gaffari, third edition (Naples 1647). This edition was the last after the publications in 1628, 1637, 1640 and 1642.

¹⁷⁵ De Thoro was active between 1621 and 1655; also author of *Vota decisiva civilia criminalia et mista* (Naples, 1634) and of *Codex Casuum selectorum rerum iudicatarum criminalium, civilium et mixtorum* (Naples, 1655).

political reality. It should also offer valuable insight into the political thought of a Neapolitan in particular, and how his views will relate to the presentations of the Revolt of Naples that will be studied in the remaining chapters of my thesis.

III.1 – *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni Neapolitani*

The Neapolitan jurist, Giovanni Battista de Thoro, began his preface with the reflections on the knowledge of wise men, ripened with life experience, who believed that a true monarchy necessarily possessed three qualities that were good for the state. These were: piety, power and wisdom. They believed that piety, or Worship of God, came in the first place, since this lied at the very foundation of all that was good.¹⁷⁶ De Thoro quoted 1 Corinthians 3, verse 11 and 12: “For no one can lay any foundation other than the one already laid, which is Jesus Christ.”¹⁷⁷ For every other foundation that had been laid, which was not Christ, was not a good foundation. This thought reflected the well-known words of Apostle James, who stated that all good things spring from Christ. Thus – as all gifts come down from the heavenly Father, the world’s leading empire had been a blessing from God. Its government had been appointed by God, and its government had been imposed by God, so that it concurs with the true laws of nature. These laws had been gathered by Justinian. He too stated that kings ruled by the grace of God.¹⁷⁸

Roman Emperors – as did all kings of the world – ruled by divine clemency. Rulers were either set to govern as an unity, as a well-oiled machine; or individually. Ruling as a unity, should be noted, was a particularly wonderful form of government.¹⁷⁹ Justinian’s view was supported by the proverbs of Solomon that said: “It is by Me that kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.”¹⁸⁰ Justinian observed that once this has been established by God, man shall marvel and wonder if the leaders of a successful state are being sustained by heavenly favor. They would reap the benefits of worshipping God above all others, and receive His guidance.¹⁸¹

With Christianity established at the top of a government’s policy, the two remaining necessary characteristics of a successful leader were: power and wisdom. Without them, the administration of the public was nearly impossible. The administration of human affairs was prone to evil,

¹⁷⁶ ‘Prisci illi Sapientes veram monarchiam eam esse existimarunt, quae tria potissimum necessaria, ac Reipublicae utilia obrinebat, nempe divinum cultum, potentiam, et Sapientes, non ab re cernitur, divinum cultum in Monarchiae gubernaculo primum locum vindicare, cum sit totius boni aidsicii peculiare fundamentum,’ de Thoro, *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*, 4.

¹⁷⁷ ‘Fundamentum aliud nemo potest ponere praeter id, quod positum est, quod est Christus Iesus, et consequenter verificatur, quia uni Christus non est, fundamentum nullius boni operis est super aedificium.’

¹⁷⁸ “Omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum desersum est descendens a Patre luminum”, de Thoro, *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*, 4.

¹⁷⁹ hinc et Romani Imperatores in cunctis eorum sanctionibus exordiuntur verba illa: "Divina favente clementia" et pariter cuncti Reges Mundi, "Dei gratia Reges", verum etiam arbitrati sunt, et si mudialis Machina iunctim, vel segregatim per Principes gubernetur. Univeria tamen a Summo Opifice Principum Principe, ac Domino Dominantium miro ordine, ac ineffabili providentia gubernari, de Thoro, *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*, 4.

¹⁸⁰ ‘Per me Reges regnant, et legu conditores iusta decernunt’, Proverbs 8:15.

¹⁸¹ ‘Cumque; hoc deo propitio peractum est’, ubi optima glosella subaudit, idest ‘deo coadiuvante’, et non mirum si principes ipsi coelesti favore suffulti, acceptique; beneficii memores excogitaverunt, pre ceteris divinum cultum esse praefendum; ut cuncta, ipso duce, bono initio, optimo medio, ac foelici exitu terminentur,’ 4.

unpredictable, and could change in an instant. From these faults flowed wars, quarrels, lawsuits, impudence and misery.¹⁸² For these human shortcomings, law was introduced. With this establishment of law, the wickedness of man could be calmed. The community could then be maintained in peace, and the people could be protected. Now, beauty and honesty had room to flourish. For this reason, a leader had to be powerful – so that he was able to execute the law. He held the power of righteousness over his subjects; he rewarded good and punished evil.¹⁸³

The king's power was essential to the presence of justice in a state. For, one could hate sin out of virtue; or hate sin out of fear for punishment. Only when the latter was achieved, was the work of justice complete. Furthermore, everyone begot his right through just distribution, ordered by the imperial majesty. This was achieved, not only by the force of arms, but also by the force of the law. Both coexisted: at times of war and at times of peace. Justinian ascribed the power of warfare, wisdom, human laws and religious laws to a single king. An emperor could first be found among soldiers, and later among senators. This was why wisdom and power were both necessary in governing a state.¹⁸⁴

When a government would be governed without laws, the system would therefore suffer the loss of the state, and the people would suffer the loss of their principles and would destroy its peace. They would fall into evil and depression. People would no longer be able to speak freely, while it was their opinions that were of great importance for the law. The authorities who executed the law would not be able to consider the people's thoughts, or the decrees of the senate in certain cases.¹⁸⁵ For this, the emperors pled for the right to a general revision of cases they saw as important. This way, discussions and disputes would not be possible, and future cases would be judged by the purest decisions that had already been made. Thoro quoted Justinian once more: "legibus, neque leges

¹⁸² '...potentiam, hoc est, et sapientes, si recte perpendantur, proculdubio affirmare cogimur, rei publica administrationem absque illis corrumpere, impossibilis fere, aut difficilis administratio reddi videtur, itaque praeposita humans rerum conditione ad malum proclivi, volubilitatis, atque mutabilitatis capace, unde bella captiuitates lites, iurgia, insolentiae, iniuriae, atque delicta processerunt,' 4.

¹⁸³ ex iurisdictionum prava seracitatem introductae; quare ad sedandam duram hominum malitiam populorumque perversam duritiam, hostium seracitatem, nec non ad rei publice tutelam, subiectorum tranquillitatem tuendam, pacifque; custodiam, et confervationem personarum, bonorum, et decoris, honestatisque; potentiam ipsam principi necessariam esse recte digoscimus, ita pariter et sapientes, ut legibus, et consiliis eorum respublica gubernetur, ac iustitiae virtus in subditos exerceatur, bonis premia elargiendo, malos poenis afficiendo, 4.

¹⁸⁴ Oderunt peccare boni, virtutis, amore: oderunt peccare mali formidine poena, et sic iustitiae opus completur, ius suum unicuique; distribuendo, unde decer Imperatoriae Maiestati non solum armis decorari, sed legibus pariter armari, ut utroque; tempore bellorum, et pacis recte gubernare possit, exordiebatur "Diuus Iustinianus" Imperatorum lumen in citato "proemio Institutionum", potentiam videlicet militiae ascribendo, sapientiam vero legibus, sive religioni in legibus, providentia vero in armis, juxta, "providentissimus, ubi in textu dicitur, et "idem Princeps providentissimus", et non mirum si idem Imperator, nunc inter milites, nunc autem inter Senatores se comuneraverat teste glos an Const, Si damna", super "verbo in quorumcunque territorii, vers et ipse Imperator", quasi quod potentia et sapientia in eo residere videantur ad Reipublicae gubernaculum necessariae.4.

¹⁸⁵ 'Cum itaque mundialis machina olim quasi sub umbra sine legibus gubernaretur, in maximum Reipublicae detrimentum, populorum damnum, bonorumque; iacturam, prudentes illi Principes subditorum pacem insectantes, bonorum exaltationes; malorumque depressiones, vitis prudentibus, legis condendae, de iure respondendi, iuraque; publice interpretandi facultatem concesserunt; quorum opiniones pro legibus habitae tantam vim,' 5.

neque Senatus consulta ita scribi possunt, ut omnes casus, qui quandoque, acciderint, comprehendantur sed sufficitae, quae plerunq ; accidunt, contineri.”¹⁸⁶

Not each and every one of the articles, laws or decrees ever made can be found in the *Aureum compendium*, so if a judge was to find an exceptional case, he was to declare to proceed in the same manner: according to the law. In such a case, the Senate or councils would have to have been present, as well as a compilation of decisions issued in the past. Many authors had made such compilations and Thoro listed them and their work. Some of these authors have been taken up in the catalogue of our latest Archiepiscopal Court of Naples and of the ecclesiastical Canon. If just decisions had been made, they might have been mentioned here. Things that were said to be part of the Canon, also had a place in the counsel of the kingdom. This had been a most ancient custom, and the counsel of the king had always flourished this way. In de Thoro’s time, councilors observed that despite of the law, syndicates were not bound to truth and royal authority. This perverted the course of justice in a proceeding.¹⁸⁷

The preface of the compilation continued to discuss certain subjects of the royal tribunals of the kingdom that were relevant to this work. Important Neapolitan figures attended the assembly of the kingdom, or, ‘Collaterale Consilium’ which was the highest tribunal set up with a certain number of regents, in which all things were decided by the highest number of votes. The regents were divided between those who were concerned with war, and those who were concerned with justice. This corresponds with the theory mentioned above, about a leader that needed to possess both power and wisdom in order to rule in both powerfully in war and wisely in peace. The regents concerned with war, were the soldiers of the counselor. The regents concerned with righteousness, were called ministers of justice.¹⁸⁸

This last Collaterale Consilium on matters concerning justice, had complete jurisdiction, above any of the other many things brought on by the Heads of State. There were usually three regents, although Thoro observed that it might sometimes have been four or five. These royal regents of the chancery were appointed by the Catholic king, and it was laid upon them to rule over the Collaterale Consilium. Second there was the Sacrum Regale Concilium Sanctae Clarae, an establishment based on the ancient *Manga Curia*. The Grand Chancellor could take his appeal to the Concilium Sanctae Clarae, which could make use of the instruments of the king: common law.¹⁸⁹ The Concilium Sanctae Clarae had jurisdiction over all matters and persons, except in matters that concerned the heritage of the royal treasury. This pertained to the Great Chamberlain, or *Magnus Camerarius*.¹⁹⁰

King Alfonso I founded a form of council in which a president was assisted by a number of councilors. The city of Naples was instituted as the chief part of the kingdom, and the Concilium Sanctae Clarae

¹⁸⁶ Justinianus, Dig.1.3.10.

¹⁸⁷ ‘praetermisso ordine iuris, et secundum veritatem auctoritate Regia non tenebantur in syndicato, tanquam pervertentes ordinem iuris in procedendo’, 5.

¹⁸⁸ ‘SC iurisdictionem habet in omnes causas, et in omnes personas, praeterquam in concernentibus patrimonium Regii Fiscii’, 6.

¹⁸⁹ Giovanni Battista de Thoro, *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*, 6.

¹⁹⁰ Battista de Thoro, *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*, 7.

was made to reside there.¹⁹¹ It would serve as a leading example for other towns and cities. The number of Councilors in most of the courts was six. After the innovations of a number of emperors, Philip III finally instituted a system that people were happy about. There were twenty advisors in the four courts assigned to them. The laws of decrees were constituted in the kingdom of Naples. Each region of the Kingdom and all the lower parts of the tribunals had been considered, so that the first sacred royal decisions in our kingdom, Thoro said, were obtained after the royal parallel decisions.¹⁹²

It was custom for the kings of Naples to assign a viceroy to the kingdom, who was set up in the City of Naples.¹⁹³ (Although, it were the regents of the kingdom who actually managed the courts.) The power of the king was absent when he himself was absent from the kingdom. A viceroy was therefore sent in his place. This had been so since viceroys had first been assigned by the king of Aragon. It was not entirely the same, however, as when a king was actually present in his kingdom.¹⁹⁴ In case the king of Naples should decease, his office would not cease. In his place, the Magna Curia held the jurisdiction over certain offences. The Magna Curia represented the Magistrum Maiestatis. The latter did not have as many prerogatives, and was to inform the Magna Curia in cases of crimes of heresy, rebellion or treason. These acts were a sign of ownership, and therefore offended the person of the king.¹⁹⁵

Thoro stated that in his day, feudal power was waning, and resembled the time when King Alfonso seized power, and took care that the absolute power of barons was destroyed. However, it could not be said that the Magna Curia had power in whole of the kingdom. In Batista's opinion, the Magna Curia Vicaria was the largest turning wheel and the greatest tribunal in Italy. The Magna Curia remained the same as long as the royal tribunal would be called the mirror of justice, the greater light, and had universal jurisdiction over barons, earls, dukes, princes and any once else of any kind. These persons were not to proceed without consulting their leader first, which would be against 'Constitutiones et Ritus'. The whole kingdom was to observe the Magna Curia.¹⁹⁶

Before continuing to the collection of decrees, Thoro concluded his preface by stating his motivation and intentions. While there were many books being published in his day, Thoro defended his reason to publish by pointing out that knowledge is infinite, and this infinite knowledge comes from God, or

¹⁹¹ 'et potissimum in hac Urbe Neap institutum, cum sit caput Regni, propterea SC in Metropoli residere debet, in qua Magnates etiam resident, ut iustitiae ministratae exemplum tanquam tivoli a Homine suscipiant caeterae Urbes, et Civitates', 7.

¹⁹² Battista de Thoro, *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*, 7.

¹⁹³ 'Curia, inquam, Vicariae erat Curia Vicarii Regis, et personam Vicarii Regis representabat. Mos erat apud Reges nostros, degentes in hac Civitate Neap eorum Vicarios constituere in Regno, et hoc potissimum apud Reges Gallos receptum fuerat, sicuti Carolus Secundus, Caroli Primi Regis Vicarius extitit', 8.

¹⁹⁴ 'Et si dicatur, unionem ipsam eo tempore non fuisse peractam, cum etiam tempore Regum Aragoniae Vicarii fuerunt constituti, id facilius corruiere videtur, cum ob absentiam Regum perneesse Vicarios constituere compellebantur, diversiam tamen potestatem, absente Rege habebant, quam Rege praesente, adeo quod Vicarius Regis absente Rege in Regno consensium praestare poterat alienationibus feodorum, "50" tamen quando Rex in Regno erat, secus erat, nisi sibi specialiter esset demandatum, ut etiam notat "...", et maxime procedit in assensibus solitis, et consuetis a Rege praestari, ut non possit etia Vicarius hoc idem facere' 9.

¹⁹⁵ 'et sunt crimina haeresis, rebellionis, seu laese Maiestatis, que sunt reseruata in signum domini, ex quibus videtur offenda persona Regis, item de cirimine falsaei monetae, et de laesai Maiestatis crimine fatetur.' 9.

¹⁹⁶ Battista de Thoro, *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*, 10.

better still – Christ himself is knowledge. Hence knowledge is sacred. Just as God is infinite, there would be no end to making books. Due to the flaws of human nature, man saw ambiguities in laws when they were examined at different times and by different people. With so many observing laws, many opinions were given on them by common people. Batista felt obliged to do the good deed, as God created man as good doers who help their neighbors, and did not want to be ungrateful to his Creator who had blessed him with his talent.¹⁹⁷

III.II – Essential Virtues of the King

The first points that receive immediate attention in the *Aureum Compendium* are the virtues of the ideal king. Backed by typical early modern fusion of biblical and ancient based argumentation, Giovanni Battista de Thoro listed piety, power and wisdom as the essential virtues a ruler needed to efficiently govern a state. Their order of appearance in the text reflects their order of importance to the author, which is visible in the amount of attention and argumentation that is given to each virtue. The first requirement was that of a pious king, as religion laid at the foundation of all that is right. Without it, no good would come from his rule. De Thoro stressed that sovereignty was a gift, and with this, he apparently agreed with the contemporary consensus that kings ruled by divine right.

When the virtue of piety laid out the morally correct tone of the text, de Thoro continued to the more practical requirements of the sovereign: power and wisdom. Both of these virtues were necessary for the proper administration of the public. The subjects of the sovereign were prone to all human flaws and evils. For this, law was introduced. To execute the law, force was sometimes needed, so the leader had to be powerful. The king's power was therefore essential for justice. Force alone, however, was not enough to govern a state, as the administration of jurisdiction and government required its ruler's wisdom.

In the *Aureum Compendium*, De Thoro seemed to make the law the most powerful tool of the state. Without it, all peace and humanity would be lost. His preference is not surprising considering his profession, but his views are interesting to this thesis considering the question of royal versus feudal jurisdiction in Naples, as well as de Thoro's insistence of the need of the king's presence to enforce the law when all of non-Castilian Spain bemoaned his absence. It will therefore be interesting to compare de Thoro's statements to his contemporary's views; and his political views to political the Kingdom's reality. This subchapter will first assess the theoretically ideal virtues of the king according to de Thoro, and how they related to the ideal virtues of his time.

De Thoro's ideal king versus Philip IV

De Thoro's representation of the ideal king was part of an import trend in the seventeenth century. In Chapter I, we have observed the ethical standards by which a monarch was judged. His partaking in the *theatrum mundi* was observed by his subjects, who then judged him for his act. During the rule of Philip IV and his political reform, the king's reputation was invaluable to his authority. The king's actions and his propaganda made Philip out to be a pious and near-sacred figure, whose unwavering good competence to rule would dismiss any doubt that his sovereignty was not in the best interest of

¹⁹⁷ Battista de Thoro, *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*, 10.

his subjects. The king's reputation was therefore crucial to his authority. The preface to *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum* started with the requirements of a competent monarch, and these demands were noteworthy considering the importance of representation and reputation of seventeenth century monarchs. To the modern reader, the ideal king presented in the *Aureum compendium* might seem like a romanticized description of a single person. Yet – the monarchy itself was also seen as an ideal of governance, and the king was seen as the personification of this ideal.¹⁹⁸ This realization presents us with the importance of promoting the person of the king, in order to maintain support of his government.

The required virtues of the ideal king presented by De Thoro largely corresponded with the reputation that the Spanish king projected to the public. Philip IV's reputation was crucial to his authority, as he required the support of his subjects to sustain his policies and finance his government. This was a lot more difficult for him than it had been for his predecessors, now that his monarchy was lacking the luster it had enjoyed before. Faced with the disillusion of his subjects, Philip was challenged with maintaining a falling façade of the never ending prosperity of the Spanish Monarchy. Nevertheless, de Thoro's argumentation of essential virtues insinuated that the ideal monarch, as long as he was instilled with the proper virtues, would be the best possible king a kingdom could wish for. Having even witnessed the turbulence of the 1640's, there would still be no better option than to have a sovereign whose virtues made him to be the most competent candidate to govern a state in which peace and fortune could prosper.

The first of these virtues, before power and wisdom, was piety. De Thoro's argumentation of this virtue worked twofold. First, it justified the king's divine right to rule. The king's piety required him to recognize that his power came from above, but his subjects were then to recognize this heavenly endowment just the same. It was by law of nature that kings begot their right to rule in this way. The king's recognition of this gift, and his according worship of God above all others, would allow his kingdom to prosper. With the blessing of God as the absolute prerequisite of a successful state, the Spanish King – with his reputation of defender of Catholicism – would surely be the best option. It appears very fitting to de Thoro's argumentation that it was for this reason that Philip IV was presented as the pious Christian that he was. The king's relationship with God was one that an outsider could never attain for himself, and even the highest nobility was to respect. This could be said about the devotion shown to the king by Olivares, who has been said to have puppeteered the king for his own rise to power,¹⁹⁹ but has also been said to have believed in the king's divine right and duty to rule.²⁰⁰

In relation to the impact that religion had on political thought – the piety of both the king and his subjects could be questioned. The *arbitristas*, for example, openly criticized the exuberance of the clergy. In Naples there was criticism as well, where the clergy had many privileges, and membership of the church was starting to become profitable. The clergy's financial benefits and political influence was substantial. An anticlerical sentiment arose for their extravagant behavior, and this sentiment

¹⁹⁸ Paul Monod, *The Power of Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe 1589-1715* (New Haven and London 1999) 9.

¹⁹⁹ Martin Hume, 'Spain and Spanish Italy under Philip III And IV' in *The Cambridge Modern History vol. 5*, 626-652.

²⁰⁰ Elliot, *Richelieu and Olivares*, 39-45.

was only strengthened after the Revolt.²⁰¹ Nevertheless, the many churches and convents of the characterized the city of Naples, which was marked with the air of the religious institutions throughout the entire bustling city. In regards to the rest of Spain, the *arbitristas* assertions of the clergy's abuse of the state's finances was hushed for fear of the loss of a safe seat in heaven in the afterlife.²⁰²

The king himself supported the majority of the Spanish Christians in their devotion to the church despite financial hardship, and this strengthened his reputation of the defender of Catholicism. The king himself, however, cannot be said to have only acted out of care for his reputation. To illustrate: for twenty two years of his rule, Philip IV maintained an intimate correspondence with the Franciscan nun, María Jesús de Agreda.²⁰³ Between 1643 and 1665, Philip consulted María Jesús not only for religious counsel, but asked for political advice as well. Philip requested her help in pleading with God to help him withstand the military challenges he was being faced with in the 1640's, and she obliged. When her prayers went unanswered and Philip suffered losses in war, María Jesús insisted that he was personally being punished by God for his lack of morality. That he took these accusations to heart was apparent in the consequent sumptuary laws he imposed to reform public morals.²⁰⁴ This kind of evidence pointed to the genuinely religious disposition of the Spanish king and his subjects. The theory of divine right to rule would therefore be accepted as a legitimate component of political thought.

Another reason why the virtue of piety was valued in a ruler, was because the state was expected to bear the duty of civilizing Spanish society through example.²⁰⁵ As the king himself was not seen as a sacred person himself, his devotion to God was valued most. If this devotion was mirrored by society, it would be in accordance with de Thoro's idea of a peaceful state thanks to a virtuous monarch. Even if his subjects did not mirror his behavior themselves, the king could impose his Christian morals onto society. Philip IV had a particularly puritanical agenda. He for example closed legal prostitution houses in Spain in 1623²⁰⁶, reversing the legalization of brothels by his grandfather.²⁰⁷ The adverse reaction to prostitution has often been linked to the introduction syphilis that had been spreading in Europe, but as Kathryn Norberg put it, 'early modern men did not fear for their bodies; they feared for their souls.'²⁰⁸

Altogether, de Thoro's insistence on the king's piety seemed like an accurate reflection of society's expectations of a king. The other two virtues were probably appreciated by the public as well, but they also had a place in political thought. The virtues of power and wisdom were required for the sake of maintaining military strength and proper jurisdiction, which corresponded with the

²⁰¹ Helen Hills, *Invisible City: The Architecture of Devotion in Seventeenth-Century Neapolitan Convents*, 20.

²⁰² Rawlings, 'Arbitrismo', 25-40.

²⁰³ Stephen Haliczzer, *Between Exaltation and Infamy: Female Mystics in the Golden Age of Spain* (Oxford 2002) 7.

²⁰⁴ Haliczzer, *Between Exaltation and Infamy*, 243.

²⁰⁵ Elliott, 'The Court of the Spanish Habsburgs', in *Spain and its World*, 147.

²⁰⁶ Haliczzer, *Between Exaltation and Infamy*, 18.

²⁰⁷ Merry Wiesner-Hanks, *Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern World: Regulating Desire, Reforming Practice* (Routledge 2014) 159.

²⁰⁸ Kathryn Norberg, 'Prostitutes' in G. Duby, M. Perrot, N. Zemon Davis, A. Farge, P. Schmitt Pantel, *A History of Women in the West: Renaissance and Enlightenment paradoxes* (Harvard 1993) 461.

conventional two main responsibilities of a European monarch: justice and warfare. The proper administration of both were considered essential to a well ordered state. Although a king most often did not administer justice himself; the justice administered by his courts was taken as a measure of his own fairness. Similarly, the success of the monarchy's warfare was taken as a measure of his own accomplishment. For this judgment, European monarchs strove to make themselves the sole sources of justice and the leaders of war. This meant centralization. Monarchs took to centralizing their power by laying claim on justice, war and religion.²⁰⁹ This is an interesting consistency with de Thoro's description of the king's personal virtues – piety, power, wisdom; representatives of his claim to religion, war, justice – at a time when the Spanish government had great difficulty centralizing its power.

Virtuous versus Practical Reason of State

This issue of centralizing public administration brought on a new wave in the political debate throughout the Spanish monarchy, and the public questioning of the reason of state. From the movements of political thinkers summed up in Chapter I, it seemed that political theorists of the seventeenth century Spanish Monarchy did have Machiavelli as the starting point of their thoughts. Foremost, however, stood their rejection of Machiavelli's reason of state. The popularity of *políticos* who had similar views of a practical reason of state, ignited a group of political theorists that could not turn away from the ideals of Spanish and Catholic virtue. Thus, the ethicists emerged: rejecting the *políticos* and insisting that without moral belief, a government would fail.

The practicality of Machiavellianism and his followers in the shape of *políticos*, could not be suppressed altogether. During the rule of Philip IV, the rise of realists was more prevalent than the moral insistence of the ethicists. While still holding on to the most basic Spanish and religious virtues, the realists also insisted on the usefulness of a practical government. This, in combination with de Thoro's preface's description of the ideal king, leads me to believe that he had been one of these realists.

While de Thoro set God above all else; he also spoke of reason of state. Aside from the requirement of a king's piety, a sovereign was also required to be wise and powerful, so that he might rule over a peaceful state. There is an interesting similarity that can be drawn here. The king had to be powerful, so that he would have the ability to enforce the law. This thought was akin to Hobbesian ideal of an all-powerful king, for the good of the people. Hobbes asserted that without civil authority, man would always be at war. There would be no notion of justice or crime, as there was no law to be broken. The truly novel Hobbesian thought was that there would also be no distinction between good and evil. The human mind would not grasp justice or injustice by itself, and would not even sin on his own accord.²¹⁰ It would be very unlikely that a pious Neapolitan would call himself a follower of Hobbes – not to mention that the *Leviathan* was not published until four years after the *Aueum compendium* – but there seems to have been an early modern stream of political thought in which de Thoro would find very common ground. If there was no king to enforce the law, the alternative would be that people would obey the law out of virtue – if they possessed it. If they lacked this virtue

²⁰⁹ Monod, *The Power of Kings*, 28.

²¹⁰ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 100-101.

and had no fear of repercussions for their actions, society would be reduced to a state of nature. De Thoro does not mention the latter directly, but does portray the result of having a powerful king: a peaceful state as a result of a law-enforcing king. If mankind could not live safely by the guidance of his own virtue; fear of a sovereign would enforce a peaceful lifestyle upon him for his own good.

The third virtue, wisdom, is another interesting one when compared to early modern political thought. De Thoro seemed to have been part of a political tradition that insisted on virtue and abhorred Machiavellian theories. Nevertheless, quite a few similarities can be found between de Thoro's requirements of the virtues of power and especially wisdom, and Machiavelli's *The Prince*.²¹¹ As mentioned before, it seemed that political theorists of the seventeenth century Spanish Monarchy had Machiavelli as the starting point of their political thoughts, even if it was only to criticize him.

For a good while, Machiavelli became the icon of evil government because he stated that a ruler can deceive in order to attain power. He also stated that in order to conquer a principality, a ruler would have to harm his subjects. On top of that, a ruler created enemies because those that helped him attain his rule, expect certain things in return that the ruler could not give them. Yet the government could not achieve anything from his subjects by force, because it still remained of utmost importance to attain the goodwill of subjects. They needed to feel that their new government was beneficial to them, or they would overthrow the ruler.²¹² Even if the ruler was evil to the bone, his subjects would accept him if they believed him to be good to them.

This is quite reflective of the course of events we have studied in the first and second chapters. The Kingdom of Naples had been subjected to Aragonese rule by conquest, as well as by the support of Neapolitan barons. He recognized their juridical and political authorities in their own lands, thus keeping the feudal tradition in place. Once Alfonso had established his rule, he promised local barons the strengthening of their powers and increased their privileges. The nobility thus saw no reason not to accept his rule.²¹³ Naples would have been the kind of state that had already known monarchy, and would therefore be easy to rule in that form of government. The basis of noble-royal relations between the Kingdom of Naples and the Spanish crown could be accurately described by this Machiavellian theory.

For the annexation of a state, military strength and cleverness to establish convenient relationships proved to have been essential to the security of a king's rule. While this concurs with only two of de Thoro's virtues; even Machiavelli presented the need to exude morals. Startlingly similar to de Thoro's ideal, Machiavelli believed that the most import of these virtues that a ruler should project to his subjects, was the virtue of religion. In Chapter XVIII of *The Prince* called 'Concerning The Way In Which Princes Should Keep Faith', Machiavelli explained how it was very important for a ruler to appear virtuous, but that it was not necessary for him to actually be virtuous:

'...a prince ought to take care that he [...] may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand, because it

²¹¹ Nicolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, translated by W. K. Marriott for <http://constitution.org/>.

²¹² Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 6-7.

²¹³ Jerry H. Bentley, *Politics and Culture in Renaissance Naples* (Princeton 2014) 12-18.

belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.²¹⁴

This excerpt from *The Prince* made a strong case for the necessity of representation, and the power of propaganda once it influenced the masses. As we have observed of the initial years of the Spanish Monarchy, the Catholic Kings had marked their rule by their military strength and strategy, and suggested that their success was thanks to their piety. This combination of virtues marked the Spanish monarchs as defenders of Catholicism for generations to come, which was even exalted to the Spanish reason of state. Purging the Iberian peninsula of Muslim natives might have been achieved by evil acts that resulted in the deaths of thousands, but as Machiavelli said, they were judged by the result: a Christian Spain.

Conclusion

De Thoro pointed out three necessary virtues of a king to rule over a state. Piety, strength and wisdom all played their roles in achieving the ideal state. First, piety assured the blessing of God. Without it, the state would stand no chance of prosperity; with it, the state would be blessed and prosperity would come effortlessly. Nonetheless, De Thoro continued to mention the importance of two more practical virtues: power to enforce the law, and wisdom to be capable of the administration of government and jurisdiction. For this practical side of de Thoro alongside of his ethical insistence, de Thoro seemed to have been a realist within the early modern Spanish tradition of political thought. His insistence of religion fits in accordance to the Spanish culture in which piety seems to have been a genuine component.

That Machiavellianism was therefore strictly rejected from Spanish political thought was therefore little surprising – yet what was surprising was that de Thoro’s insistence of the three kingly virtues do not stray very far from the ideas of the *políticos*. Most surprising of all, would be the similarities between the ideals of de Thoro and the practicalities of Machiavelli, who advised the prince to be strong, cunning and outwardly pious. What might have mattered most, was representation of these virtues. In the face of centralization, Philip IV would have had to made the impression on the public that his rule would be the most competent of all. In his hands, war, jurisdiction and religion were the safest they could be.

III.III – Ideals of State versus Neapolitan Reality

De Thoro was very insistent on the value, quality and proper employment of the law. This, to him, would ensure the peacefulness and prosperity of a state, and was best overseen by the virtuous king himself. The subjects of the king were prone to all kinds of evil that would disrupt peace would live in misery if left to their own devices. To quench this human tendency to sin, law was established. The law required a leader who was powerful enough to execute it. He rewarded good and punished evil. A state in which justice thrived, resulted was a people who hated sin – whether out of their own virtue or out of fear of the law.

²¹⁴ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 68.

The law, de Thoro seemed to say, was the most important tool of the state. This was an interesting statement to have made in a kingdom where was said to have been a power struggle between feudal and royal power. Barons had full jurisdiction in their lands, and royal justice was practically unreachable to three quarters of the Neapolitan population. De Thoro believed that if justice was lacking that, in a matter of speaking, a state of nature of ensue.

From the literature studied in Chapter II, it would seem that the nobility in the Kingdom of Naples was so powerful that it had little reason to claim that their privileges were being infringed. If we were to believe de Thoro, the nobility did have reason to believe that feudal power was being endangered. This would suggest that the nobility did have reason to 'refeudalize'; but it would also suggest that this refeudalization had not taken place prior to the Revolt, while Villari asserted this refeudalization have been an antagonist of the Neapolitan people and a reason to revolt.²¹⁵ This inconsistency between de Thoro's text and secondary literature, leads me to question the validity of his claims, as well as the background and motivation of this his work.

Political reality

After his queen's death, Ferdinand the Catholic had already begun to rely on a network of local authorities to represent his power throughout the Spanish Monarchy. While the Catholic Kings were revered for their devotion to physically be among their subjects, this quality had only been short-lived in practice. Without a common Spanish government, each Spanish political entity required a separate administration. Through this web of relationships that would characterize Spanish authority, each state was individually, but often indirectly, ruled by a single sovereign. This issue has often been presented as a leading problem in the states of the Spanish Monarchy, in which Castile was getting most of their king's consideration. Rather than take pride in being part of a monarchy as large as Spain, nation lamented the lack of personal attention they craved from their king.²¹⁶ Why the king's subjects demanded his presence has been illustrated by the high expectations de Thoro set for his king. He presented the virtues and subsequent abilities of a king, which have now been discussed at length throughout this chapter, and how much good it could do a kingdom. It could be suggested here, that this idealization had been another plea for a more involved king – especially since de Thoro remarked that 'the power of the king was absent when he himself was absent from the kingdom.'²¹⁷

The king instead sent a viceroy in his place, to execute this power on his behalf. In his description of the office of a viceroy, however, de Thoro even noted on the inadequacy of a viceroy fulfilling the tasks of a king completely. While historian Calisse described the office of the viceroy of as that of a chief magistrate,²¹⁸ de Thoro described him as an insufficient replacement of the king. De Thoro especially emphasized the king's special position of power by which he could enforce the law. The work of justice was to create a society in which man hates sin, even if he did not possess this virtue on his own. This created the ideal society, in which humanity could flourish. As discussed earlier, an important strategy in centralizing the government was by laying claim on the identity of the state's

²¹⁵ Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, 150.

²¹⁶ Graham Darby, *Spain in the Seventeenth Century* (Routledge 2014) 6.

²¹⁷ Battista de Thoro, *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*, 9.

²¹⁸ Calisse, *A History of Italian Law*, 152.

source of power, justice and religion. Similiar to this tactic, de Thoro referred to Justinian's attribution of the power of warfare, wisdom, human and religious law to a single ruler.²¹⁹ Furthermore, de Thoro stated what would happen if the government had no laws: it would fall into depression and distruction. It would seem that the king, and the king alone, had the power – and wisdom and piety – to rule. This may have been a contemporary view in favor of centralization. What it could also suggest, was that de Thoro might also have meant to say that the current division of the king's attention of his monarchy was inadequate.

Prior to Spanish rule, the Italian states each had their own fully developed and functional systems of administration and government. Naples, along with Sicily and Milan were placed under the Council of Italy, which had been created halfway through the sixteenth century. The Kingdom of Naples, however, had been conquered by military defeat of the Angevins. The very different means by which the Italian states had come under Spanish rule dictated the terms by which the states could be governed, and it would have been unwise to cram them into a common framework.²²⁰ Perhaps it was for this reason that de Thoro did not mention this Council in his preface, despite his detailed descriptions of the other councils of Naples. Even more notable is that de Thoro made no mention of this popular rule at all. Detailed as his work was, he did not create any insinuations towards the rights of the *popolo* to political power. In *Aureum compendium*, the sovereignty of the kingdom was reduced to the central figure of the king. Through him worked the apparatuses his government, and it was all his subjects could do to properly realize the tasks delegated to them. As long as this king was righteous, his rule would be just.²²¹ In Chapter II we have been able to observe that there had been a shift from the need from representatives of the people to representatives of their king. Power was delegated from above, and distributed in a way that would best accommodate the king's rule.

Very notable was the extent to which the people of Naples had political power in their own government, prior to the Spanish conquest. While the aristocracy now had the undeniable upper hand, the *popolo* had known their share of political influence. During the Middle Ages, rich citizens tended to dominate Italian cities. The *popolo grasso* had made themselves indispensable by providing for the costs significant social matters and warfare, and therefore had significant political leverage. The Monarchical government, however, demanded a more uniform society. Many of the rich citizens were given noble titles and thereby got their political power from their status. The remaining members of the third estate were largely stripped from their political power, and made subjects like all other common people.²²² While their power was not very limited, the *Seggio del Popolo* remained a legitimate institution. The privileges that had been established in their favor in 1505 were succumbing to feudal power, and as has been detected in the previous chapter, there would have been reason for the third estate to entertain the idea of turning against the government for the restitution of its privileges.

This is particularly interesting to note considering the year the *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum* was published: 1647. The most popular recital of the Revolt of Naples is that it was led by

²¹⁹ Battista de Thoro, *Aureum compendium*, 4.

²²⁰ Peytavin, 'Government/Administration: The Italian Kingdoms within the Spanish Monarchy', translated by Lydia Cochrane, in *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society and Religion 1500-1700*, 57.

²²¹ Battista de Thoro, *Aureum compendium*, 8.

²²² Calisse, *A History of Italian Law*, 162.

a common Neapolitan: Masaniello. Yet – another theory exists, as gathered in the Preliminary Chapter, saying that Masaniello had been a protégé of Giulio Genoino. For much of his life, Genoino had tried to get the Spanish authorities to involve the third estate in the Neapolitan council that governed the kingdom.²²³ Genoino had been eighty years old in 1647, yet was said to have been the very protagonist and mind behind the first phase of the Revolt of Masaniello of July 1647.²²⁴ This would suggest that Neapolitans longed for popular rule, as had been their tradition dating back to the twelfth century.²²⁵ Whether it been the nobility of the *popolo* at the head of the Revolt; the Duke of Arcos, viceroy of Naples at the time, had restored privileges that had been infringed by Spanish government.²²⁶ What is most interesting here in relation to the *Aureum compendium*, however, is that de Thoro made no mention of the Neapolitan third estate in his description of the Kingdoms government, but gave the nobility no significance either.

Juridical reality

On one of the more interesting statements to be found in the *Aureum compendium* was that de Thoro found feudal power to have been diminishing. This would go against the studies of Villari and Astarita, who – as experts in Neapolitan history – both claimed that feudal power had been stronger than it ever had been, and stronger than anywhere else in Europe. De Thoro, however, said that this limited feudal power resembled the time when King Alfonso seized power in Naples, and had destroyed the absolute power of Neapolitan barons. This is also contrary to conventional literature, which states that the annexation of Naples was accomplished with the making of concessions with local nobility. The third inconsistency with contemporary literature is that de Thoro claimed, albeit formulated in a matter of opinion – that the *Magna Curia Vicaria*, the viceregal court, was greatest tribunal in the Kingdom and had jurisdiction over all the elite Neapolitans, thus including barons who had absolute jurisdiction in their fiefs. *Magna Curia Vicaria* was to be informed in cases of crimes of heresy, rebellion or treason as these acts offended the person of the king. This we have also observed in the previous chapter, that feudal courts were to deliver certain cases to the royal court. Nevertheless, de Thoro also admitted that the Magna Curia did not have power in the whole of the kingdom. If by this he meant the seventy-five percent of the kingdom that fell under feudal rather than royal power, this would have been quite an understatement.

From the inconsistencies with secondary literature, the *Aureum compendium* seemed particularly skewed towards the power of royal rather than feudal authority, and never even mentioned the third estate. In light of the questioning the aims of projecting representations by primary sources around the Revolt of Naples in this thesis, it would be a reasonable to question with what aims de Thoro had been praising and idealizing royal power in Naples. Why would de Thoro claim that even though he was not ideal, the viceroy of Naples had the greatest power in the Kingdom, when most conventional secondary literature emphasizes how royal authority in Naples had buried itself under concessions with local feudal authorities?

²²³ Cavendish, 'Masaniello's Naples Revolt Against Spain'.

²²⁴ Arnaldi, *Italy and Its Invaders*, 162.

²²⁵ Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, 66-68.

²²⁶ *Autentijck, bescheyt en seker verhael van de restitutie der privilegien aen het volck van Napels*, printed in 1648 (Knuttel, nr 05645).

Conclusion

De Thoro's ideal state was one in which the law provided the community with peace and inspired adversity to sin. The law provided justice that was ideally administered by the king. The problem in Spanish Naples was, despite this ideal, that the king himself did not administer justice. Nor did he govern the Kingdom directly. The entire administration of Naples was delegated to the viceroy in office who, while inadequate, de Thoro said to have been the greatest power in the Kingdom as it presented royal justice. This insistence of royal superiority, and the ideals and capabilities of the king, was very much in line with what is said to have been the ideals disseminated by the royal government trying to gain support for centralization.

In light of centralization, de Thoro made it seem like the feudal powers in the Kingdom had been diminishing. This raises questions regarding the theories of refeudalization, and whether had been an antagonist for the Revolt of Naples. Instead, it would seem like centralization had been the reason why Neapolitans found their constitutions infringed. The counterpart of feudal power, however, had not only been the crown, but had also been a barely surviving third estate. It could now be suggested that the Revolt of Naples had rolled out of a triangular power struggle of royal, feudal and popular authority.

What should be considered, however, was that de Thoro published his work in a city which was in fact governed by the viceregal court. His book was edited by Giovanni Domenico Bove, a Neapolitan editor that specialized in juridical publications. For the publication of such a large, formal, and especially authorized work; De Thoro would have had to comply with certain conventional standards that praised the authority of the crown, whether he did or did not believe it himself.

III.IV – Conclusion

De Thoro used a typical fusion of biblical and Roman law to legitimize his theory of how the virtues of piety, power and wisdom in a ruler would help attain the ideal state. The first, he argued, ensured the blessing of God, which a king should be concerned with in the very first place. Though de Thoro did not say this directly; his attribution to the relationship between God and king as a reason why a state would prosper, also favored the legitimization of divine rule. This was a popular political thought among Spanish political theorists. Religion seems to have been a genuine part of Spanish political culture, and a legitimate argument in political theories.

Nevertheless, de Thoro also had his practical reasons of state. In reaction to the very practical *politicos* that had emerged in the stage of political thought, the *ethicos* emerged especially in the Spanish Monarchy. Their claim, similar to de Thoro's, was that government without morals and piety was impossible. When a more practical, though still moral group flowed from this trend – the realists gained popularity in Spanish political thought. The enemy of Spanish ethics, Machiavelli, was still rejected here. Nevertheless, de Thoro's two remaining virtues, power and wisdom, were surprisingly similar to the qualities Machiavelli expected from a prince. Even more startling, was that Machiavellian political theory also claimed the importance of seeming a pious Christian. In Spanish political thought, it seems, representation of these virtues were also a tool to secure rule.

This is especially interesting in light of the process of centralization. The three virtues – piety, power and wisdom – also had their usefulness for the wellbeing of the state’s religion, warfare and justice, had also been a tool in the argumentation of centralization. The king would lay claim on these affairs by presenting himself as the sole source of religion, warfare and justice. De Thoro’s corresponding argument of the king’s virtues making him the ideal ruler of the Neapolitan Kingdom, could very well have been part of the camp in favor of centralization; or, a tool in royal propaganda.

That this preface was a piece of propaganda would explain the inconsistency between some of its statements and conventional literature on seventeenth century Naples. The inconsistencies mainly concern the division of power in Naples, as the viceregal court was portrayed by de Thoro as the most competent and powerful in the Kingdom. The discussion around centralization in Spanish Italy seemed to have come to a consensus that feudal power had proved impenetrable. Especially in Naples, feudal power had only grown in the face of the financial strain that the crown had placed upon the Kingdom. Yet, if royal power had been reestablishing itself in the Kingdom, this would have made the members of the nobility the ideal candidate to instigate the Revolt of Naples. This would skew the political-versus-passion debate in favor of the Dutch sources on the Revolt, which portray it as the restitution of Neapolitan privileges that had been infringed by the Spanish monarch.

A factor that must be considered here, however, is the difference between urban and provincial nobility, and the different privileges that were granted to them. Provincial barons were usually endowed with absolute jurisdiction, while urban nobility – at least in the city of Naples – did not enjoy such extensive power. What we might conclude here is that the situation of the city of Naples, where this work was published – and the rest of the Kingdom had been very different, and that it would be unwise to retrospectively assign an instigator of the Revolt of Naples. Yet, the Revolt had reached throughout the Kingdom, not just the city. If the Revolt had started in the city of Naples, and had spread to remote villages as far as Pentidattilo, this would suggest that there might have been different interests at stake. This would inherently change the notion of right or wrong argumentation in the debate of a political or passionate Revolt. It seems that it would mostly depend on the presentation of information for the good of a theory. If the Revolt of Naples had been one of passion, there economic malaise, feudal abuse of jurisdiction and their remaining extensive powers, and the lack of royal jurisdiction that was supposed to keep their lords in check. If the Revolt had been a conflict of political interests, it has been well represented by the *Aureum compendium*.

The most obvious of these political complaints in the *Aureum compendium* was the absence of the king. The viceroy had to represent the king’s power, which seems to have been openly criticized, yet his court was recognized as the greatest power. It could be questioned to what extent this outright criticism of the Neapolitan government, or whether his presence was still the next best thing as he was still a representative of royal power; the counterpart of feudal power. If we recall the alleged chanting of the Neapolitan rebels studied in chapter I, in which they proclaimed their loyalty to king, govern and viceroy; and their animosity to the noble and rich – this aversion towards feudal power seems rightly placed. Bearing in mind the possibility of the *Aureum compendium* having been a piece of propaganda, its arguments could be seen in opposition of the powerful Neapolitan nobility and by advocating for a powerful monarchy. From De Thoro’s juridical ideal, it would seem that the very reason of monarchy was that it stand above all of society, in which each member would answer to justice.

The question that now remains, is whether centralization had truly been effective and offensive enough for the nobility to have been in favor of revolt. If we consider that contemporary historians have formed opposing teams in regards of centralization in the seventeenth century versus the unaffected feudal power, the question would be where they have gotten their opposing information from. If we consider the skewed presentation of de Thoro, it might here as well be possible that this has been the effect of biased primary sources, just like I assert the pamphlets around the Revolt to have been.

Whether de Thoro had been a firm believer of the statements he made in his preface, the true intention of his labor was to publish his *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni Neapolitani*. Here, executors of the king's law would find guidance to fulfill the crucial task of properly executing justice, and bring peace and prosperity to humanity.

Chapter IV – Protagonists in the Revolt of Naples

The critical reading of the preface to *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani* by Giovanni Battista de Thoro has shown us how informative, and at the same time misleading, seventeenth century publications could be. In Chapter I we have considered the significance of reputation, and the consequent importance and effort made in representation. Spanish policies were very much geared towards maintaining the support of the king's subjects, especially when the controversial subject of centralization was on his agenda. In the 1640's, the Spanish Monarchy was confronted with a series of revolts, and the reputation of the Spanish central government must have been of particular concern. For this reason, the pamphlets disseminated to inform the public on the Revolt of Naples should be read with consideration of their purpose.

From hereon, my thesis will study a number of pamphlets that claimed to tell the course of events of the Revolt of Naples. Until the seventeenth century, the only medium of mass communication was the pamphlet. The improvements of postal services and the invention of printing made mass dissemination of news possible. A pamphlet was usually printed on a single sheet of paper and then folded once or twice, creating the characteristic chapbooks that typically created one news item or 'relation'. The *relaciones de sucesos* that will be studied in the following chapters were therefore a typical form of printed news that reached the public of Spain.²²⁷

The government oversaw the printing of news, and kings of Spain made sure to filter out all bad news in these *relaciones* for which they would be held responsible. For Philip III this was not as big an effort as it was for his successor, as Spain under Philip IV was for the most part at war at a number of fronts. It is not surprisingly then, that the *relaciones* all spoke of Spanish victories, and the troubles of the early seventeenth century was nowhere to be found in Spanish news. The *relaciones* were a significant counterweight to the works of the *arbitristas*, as they portrayed the current government as actively successful. The *relaciones* were often written with patriotic rhetoric, boasting of the success of their warfare, and the gains that were made in defeating the enemy. The news was just as significant – if not more – in shaping the reader's world as political writers were.²²⁸

This trend will be well illustrated in the current chapter, which will be the first of three in this thesis comparing Castilian and Dutch accounts of the Neapolitan Revolt. The choice behind this comparison lies in the in the opposing political circumstances of Castile and the Spanish Netherlands, and later Dutch Republic, at the time of the Revolt. While the Spanish government was fighting the rebellious spirit that had taken hold of the Monarchy for the past decade, the Dutch were eager to exploit the ills of Spanish rule and the victories of rebellion. Furthermore, both these parties have contributed to the debate of whether the Revolt of Naples had been motivated by political or passionate reasons.

The reasons that motivated the Revolt would immediately point the finger to the party to blame for whatever unhappiness had gripped the Kingdom to rise in rebellion. A political Revolt would imply that there was something amiss with the rule of the Spanish nations. A passionate Revolt would reduce the complexity of the troubles of the Kingdom of Naples. This approach to the misery of the

²²⁷ Henry Ettinghausen, 'The News in Spain: Relaciones de sucesos in the Reigns of Philip III and IV' in *European History Quarterly* (1984) 14: 1.

²²⁸ Ettinghausen, 'The News in Spain, 15-16.

Neapolitan people marginalized the Revolt to the part of society that had been less fortunate to begin with, and was sensitive to the least aggravation that did not have to be the direct fault of the Spanish government. It was therefore fitting that Spanish sources pointed to the taxes levied on fruit as the leading – and perhaps only – cause of the Revolt of Naples. All the while, Dutch sources seem to have portrayed the Neapolitan Revolt as the noble cause of the restoration of privileges that the Spanish had infringed. These opposing incitements were portrayed with different, often inconsistent, portrayals of the Revolt of Naples.

My thesis will reflect on a number of different approaches that the Dutch and Spanish took in creating their portrayals of the Revolt. In this first comparing chapter, one of the approaches that will become evident is emphasis on either the initial or final phase of the Revolt of Naples, and the complete neglect of the other. The Dutch emphasized the initial days of the Revolt, which led to the popular reference to the Revolt of Masaniello. While the Dutch limited their interest to the heroic rise of Masaniello and the passionate resistance of the Neapolitans against their government, the Spanish sources showed little concern for the popular fisherman. Instead, theirs showed the emphasis on the settlement of the uprising, in which Philip IV sent his son Don Juan of Austria, to settle the Revolt with the royal Spanish armada.

Masaniello and Don Juan of Austria seemed to have fulfilled the role of protagonist in the Neapolitan Revolt in the Dutch and respectively Spanish sources. Don Juan, Philip IV's illegitimate son, was able to bring the Revolt of Naples to an end and restore peace and order. In Castilian accounts of the Revolt in this study, there was little mention of Masaniello as a significant player in the Revolt of Naples. Masaniello was said to have been a simple man – a boy even – who had caught the attention of the plebeians in Naples. Dutch pamphlets revealed that Masaniello was a commoner as well, yet portrayed him as a figure that is noble of spirit and significant to the Revolt. The Dutch seem to have perceived the Neapolitan Revolt as one of the elite, and its dissatisfaction with the Spanish government. In this uprising, Masaniello was an important, honorable actor with a prominent role in the noble cause. He was a leader of the people; not a leader of troublemakers. The people's revolt was against a government that the Dutch knew all too well. Their own uprisings had come to span almost eighty years by 1647, and there was obvious sympathy and justification for their fellow rebels. The Dutch sources also hinted towards a justification of their own rebellions: the Castilian government obviously did not govern with a fair hand, and Naples was a prime example of such malgovernment.

In a similar way, Spanish sources showed a justification for Spanish policies. Especially in retrospect, when the revolt was over and done with, and the Kingdom of Naples was again united with the Spanish Crown. Despite the rebels' earlier convictions, they would come to see that their place was in the Spanish Monarchy. Additionally, the sources spoke of the Spanish ails in their dealings with the Revolt. The reader of Spanish sources was persuaded to sympathize with Spanish conditions, and admire the perseverance with which the Spanish crown and army were able to stabilize the situation and brought peace to the confused Neapolitan Kingdom once more. This was especially evident in the Spanish account of the battle fought by Don Juan to reclaim the Kingdom of Naples.

IV.I – Masaniello and Don Juan

The Revolt of Naples has been reported in a number of different narratives that have taken on a variety of versions that would make them seem like each proposed a different story altogether. Nevertheless, the most consistent factor within these narratives point to the raise in taxes as the very first instigator of the Revolt of Naples. When the Duke of Arcos was being threatened by the invading French, and his finances were down to a minimum, he was forced to apply taxes on the only remaining good: fruit. The inhabitants of Naples had rebelled against their lords time and again, often on the basis of the repressive nobles and growing taxes. The newly imposed taxes, however, proved too hard to swallow. Fruit was the principle food in the poorer Neapolitan's diet, and the threat of starvation sent the populace into a well-reasoned panic. With the successful Revolt of Palermo fresh in their memories, and the nobility giving no ear to their pleas, the people of Naples could only be stimulated to act likewise.²²⁹

On this day emerged the now iconic figure of Masaniello, who rose to the occasion when he heard unrest on the marketplace. Here, possibly staged,²³⁰ a poor peasant broke into an emotional fury when he could not afford the taxes for the newly levied fruit; he knocked over a crate of figs and trampled them. The surrounding people were swept away by his passion and grabbed at the figs as well, all in pity of the poor countryman. Masaniello encouraged the mob to direct their fury at the tax collector's office. The people obliged and continued to ravage until there was nothing left, after which they proceeded to the viceroy's palace to confront him for his bad governance. As in Sicily, the viceroy of Naples quickly granted all of their requests, but this mob could not be quieted. The Duke of Arcos fled, for fear of his life, and only just escaped death at the hands of the mob.²³¹

Nevertheless, aside from his initial fright, the viceroy was not too concerned with the situation at first. He had expected to reverse the requests once the tumult would simmer down, but the hatred of the commonality towards the noblemen ran very deep. Vengeance reared its head and the mob, now 150.000 men,²³² ravaged the streets and killed several of these noblemen and continued to burn their houses. Still, the people maintained that they were loyal to the king and only opposed the local government and their mistreatment by the nobility and ministers. Indeed, their aggression was only aimed towards the Spanish abusers of office, but the anger of unrestrained mob took on a life of its own. Their brutality was answered with the solemn ratification of their requests, and even after the death of Masaniello ten days into the Revolt, the masses stood united for months to come, and Spain had not been able to soothe the unrest until April 1648.

This much could be gathered from consistent accounts of the Revolt in contemporary literature. This chapter will present two pamphlets that illustrate the inconsistencies of contemporary literature by assessing Dutch and Castilian narratives that provided a name and face to go with the Revolt of Naples. The first, and perhaps most popular face, was that of Masaniello. The Dutch pamphlet, *Autentijck, bescheyt en seker verhael van de restitutie der privilegien aen het volck van Napels, door*

²²⁹ Hume, 'Spain and Spanish Italy under Philip III And IV', 655.

²³⁰ Cavendish, 'Masaniello's Naples Revolt Against Spain'.

²³¹ Giannone, *The civil history of the Kingdom of Naples*, 763.

²³² Giannone, *The civil history of the Kingdom of Naples*, 762.

den Hertogh van Arcos,²³³ solemnly listed the privileges restored to the people of the Kingdom of Naples. In it, the figure of Masaniello was to thank for the story's success, and was to be considered the hero of the Neapolitan people. Being an account of only the first days of the Revolt, the Dutch pamphlet was obviously open ended. From the Spanish pamphlet, *Relacion del feliz successo, que en 6 Abril tuvo el Serenissimo Senor Don Juan de Austria, con la Reducion de la Ciudad, y Reyno de Napoles*, we can learn that the Neapolitan Revolt was not quite finished with a fisherman holding the winning hand. Instead, the Spanish pamphlet spoke of the successful defeat of the Revolt, by Philip IV's own son: Don Juan of Austria. Here, the Revolt of Naples was not a success story of a righteous man, but of the victory of royal power. Nevertheless, both accounts make for compelling stories in which two very different heroes took the leading part.

Masaniello – guardian of privileges

The first pamphlet of this study, *Autentijck, bescheyt en seker verhael van de restitutie der privilegien aen het volck van Napels, door den Hertogh van Arcos*, was written in the name of God; the Holy Virgin of the Camine; a number of patrons and saints of the city; and in honor of the Catholic King; Cardinal Filomarino, their Archbishop and loved shepherd; his excellence the Duke of Arcos, viceroy of the Kingdom of Naples and dear father of the people; and of Tomaso Aniello d'Amalfi, or Masaniello, head of the loyal people, whose actions led to Arcos' decision to give back to the people of Naples – in the name of the king – their privileges, as will be shown below.

This pamphlet was allegedly written by Roderico Ponze de Leon, Duke of Arcos and viceroy of Naples, in the name of the king, that he has been requested by the loyal people of Naples, to reinstate the privileges instated by Ferdinand, king of Aragon. The restitution of these privileges had been promised by Ferdinand the Catholic in 1505, so that the whole city and kingdom may enjoy these privileges forever.²³⁴ These privileges were now being presented again by the people of Naples.

The first of these privileges was that half of the votes and seats in the government of Naples should be represented by people that were actually Neapolitans. The second was that the city would enjoy a general pardon from the *crimen laesae Majestatis* for so far its people might have committed this, although the people of Naples say that this has not been the case in any way, as they people have always called out 'leve den Koningh van Spanjen': long live the king of Spain. The people stated that the upheaval had only been of lowly people and unruly youths as a reaction to the taxes. Those who had been freed from prison during the upheaval were to receive no benefit from this situation. Thirdly, there should be a Bishopric consisting out of eight heads, as advised by Saint Augustine, and granted by Charles V. If the people of Naples do not approve of those assigned to these positions, they should have the right to depose of them. The bishopric was to have as many and as substantial votes as the nobility does.

The list of demands went on, many of which dismissed the policies of past viceroys that infringed the privileges set when the Kingdom joined the Spanish Monarchy. It further demanded that the viceroy promised that he would get a ratification and confirmation of these prerogatives from the king within

²³³ *Autentijck, bescheyt en seker verhael van de restitutie der privilegien aen het volck van Napels*, printed in 1648 (Knuttel, nr 05645).

²³⁴ *Autentijck, bescheyt en seker verhael van de restitutie der privilegien aen het volck van Napels*, 'de gansche Stad en het Rijck, 't voorscheven privilegie eeuwelijke soude genieten,'

three months, and that this confirmation would literally be set in stone at the market where the Revolt started on 7 July, so that all the people of Naples could see and be reminded of their privileges. It also demanded that no tax would be set for the time coming – unless the king was in dire need: ‘Maer als sijne Majesteyt des van noden heeft, wil het volck hem te hulpe komen, met haer leven, goed en alles wat sij hebben.’ Then, the people of Naples would provide and come to his aid, and offer him with all that they had – even their lives.

Any crimes committed during the revolt were to be pardoned, assuming that their loyalty had always been with their king. Further, the weapons were not to be taken away from the people – as had already been a privilege in the past; all taxes were to be reduced to what they had been at the time of Charles V; food was to be allowed to be sold in all public places; criminals that were imprisoned in galleys, and had already served their time, were to be released immediately. In the general pardon, it would be written that the Neapolitan Tomas Aniello d’Amalfi and his companions were to be forgiven for the crimes that they committed during the revolt. What they had done, was only in the cause of the restitution of the Neapolitan privileges. If these articles were not upheld, the people would take up their arms once more. If they did, it would not be a rebellion, but ‘een rechtvaardighe defensie’; a justified and necessary defense of their privileges as Neapolitans. It was signed in July 1647, but the exact date has been left blank.

Don Juan – guardian of peace

Relacion del feliz successo, que en 6 Abril tuvo el Serenissimo Senor D Juan de Austria, con la Reducion de la Ciudad, y Reyno de Napoles was written in May 1648, and presented the Revolt of Naples in retrospect. While the Revolt was full of hardships, the Spanish Monarchy may be pleased with how it came to a close, and even how it progressed. While the Spanish were dealing with the Neapolitan rebellion, the monarchy’s subjects showed great loyalty at all levels of society.

First and foremost, was the nobility of the Kingdom. The nobility showed great loyalty to the Monarchy, even when it meant competing with more powerful enemies.²³⁵ ‘La Nobleza Napolitana sin haber menester nuevas pruebas de su fineza, ha admirado con ella al mundo, y ha empeñado mucho la grandeza, y generosidad de su Monarca. El Pueblo ha conservado intacto el glorioso titulo de fidelissimo porque la gente civil ha tenido siempre a su Rey en el corazón, aviendose comunicado la contagion de estas inquietudes a sola la Plebe mas disculpada en su ignorancia y multitud.’²³⁶ The nobility thus seemed just as taken aback by the Revolt, which had been a tumult of the populace. The Spanish Crown and the Neapolitan nobility were facing the same battle.

In addition to the nobility, certain praise must be reserved for the soldiers that served during the dealings with the Revolt, as the pamphlet states their due admiration. They patiently and quietly suffered through the horrors of the war. During the battles, the soldiers had to persevere without food, without clothes and all other comforts of life. It is quite obvious that all accounts happened according to the Divine Providence with which God takes care of the Spanish Monarchy, which, someone who would not know any better – would call miraculous.

²³⁵ *Relacion del feliz successo*, 7: ‘la nobleza napolitana que compitiendo con las naciones mas valientes a ninguna cede en el valor, haviendo sido asi en esta ocasion como en todas las de mas exemplo firme de fidelidad’.

²³⁶ *Relacion del feliz successo*, 14.

During the course of the Revolt, multitude of rebels did not stumble. Yet, their hate for the nobility abated in due time. Bit by bit, they were persuaded by speeches vouching for peace. Pamphlets penetrated the rebellious quarters in Naples, which pardoned their crimes and relieved the taxes. The manifest intended to relieve the people of their 'vanos pretextos' of the revolt, and clear their perceptions which persuaded them to rebel.

Eventually, the people calmed down, and themselves wished for the Naples as it was before the bloodstained events that had ruined the kingdom. Furthermore, 'como los favores de Dios son siempre muy cumplidos', the Duque of Guise was caught and imprisoned. It was with great pride that the king could announce to the world that his son, during his very first actions, had been able to draw the world's praise and admiration. Philip IV wrote a letter and sent it to numerous cities, recounting how Don Juan had managed to settle the Revolt of Naples and defeat the Duke of Guise. It recounted how Don Juan had been able to breach the defenses of the Neapolitan people in a very short time, and reduced the people to the obedience of their king. Finally, he was also able to defeat the Duke of Guise. He did all this as a devout and pious Christian, for it had to be recognized that the final thanks should be given to God's grace.²³⁷ This letter was signed in Madrid, 2 May 1648.

IV.II The Personification of People and Government

The Dutch account of the beginning of the Revolt; and the Spanish account of the end of it, both portrayed a very different story of the key players in the Revolt of Naples. From the Dutch perspective, we have Masaniello. The protagonist presented here, fought for the rights of the Neapolitan people. These rights had been granted to the Kingdom of Naples by the kings of Spain, but were taken away by abusive Spanish ministers. From the Spanish perspective, Don Juan was the savior of public order. The city of Naples had been reduced to a warzone by its own populace, in which its people were miserable and now sought for a way out. They had been persuaded by their passions and encouraged by the French. The Duke of Guise had not been a savior to the Neapolitan people, despite what he may have seemed.

Heroes of the Revolt

Instead, the true friends of the Neapolitan Kingdom were the nobility, Don Juan, and the army he led. The people of Naples had acted wrongly, but in their ignorance they did not know any better. They had been the source of their own misfortune, but thanks to the perseverance of their superiors, they had mercifully been persuaded to see the consequences of their actions. Once they had acknowledged that they found themselves in a much worse situation than before, the populace subjected itself to the nobility once more. In the end, it would seem, Naples under Spanish government would be preferred over all.

On this note, Philip IV was proud to report the outcome of the Revolt of Naples to the world. The Spanish pamphlet showed an air of self-satisfaction that the Spanish Monarchy was not to be meddled with – not by its subjects and not by its enemies. The pamphlet preceding this enclosed letter further established the fruits of siding with the Spanish Monarchy. The nobility, who had

²³⁷ *Relacion del feliz successo*, 16.

shown loyalty to the Crown when it could easily have been tempted to go another way, now stood alongside of the winning party, and could claim their stakes with pride. The rebellious Neapolitans came to regret the Revolt, and had to count their losses before subjecting themselves to Spanish authority once more.

If we were to accept the *relaciones de sucesos* of the Spanish pamphlet, it would seem like the Revolt had been an unfortunate act of passion, in which troublemakers had disrupted the peace in the Kingdom. This portrayal of the leaders and supporters of the Revolt was very different from what they would seem from the Dutch pamphlet, which spoke of the great success achieved by brave defenders of justice. Indeed, much had happened in the populace's fury, but this would duly have to be pardoned. Regrettable deeds may have taken place, but their motivations were honorable. The final article of the pamphlet rang with pride and power, as the Neapolitans threatened that the rebels would take up their arms against the government if it failed to recognize the law. The pamphlet repeatedly emphasized that their rebellion was justified, as would any future rebellions be if their requests would not be taken seriously.

Instead of having been the miserable people filled with regret for their reckless acts that the Spanish made them out to be; the Dutch insisted that the leaders of the Revolt were heroes, and their supporters were winners. Interesting here, though, was the distinction that the Dutch source made between the honorable players of the Revolt, and the rioters that had disrupted the peace. The rebels that had taken to the street did not represent the cause of the Revolt, as they consisted out of the subordinate and adolescent members of society. Additionally, the people who had been freed from prison in the midst of the chaos of the rioters, were not to benefit from the Revolt in any way. The source made it very clear that the Revolt of Naples had not been a matter of simple disobedience or reckless passion that had been initiated by delinquents; quite the contrary. The Revolt was a deliberate political movement to restore the privileges. The lawbreaking involved in this restitution was presented as an almost noble risk that Masaniello and his followers had been willing to take for the good of the people. If their king was no longer protecting the wellbeing of his people; the people had no choice but to take their wellbeing into their own hands.

Thus far, these two pamphlets have sharply distinguished between the parties that acted for the good of the people. For the Dutch, it were the Neapolitans themselves that chose the recognition of their privileges over conventional submission to a government that had violated the kingdom's constitutions. To the Spanish, the heroes of the Revolt were those that established peace to a community that had acted passionately on a matter of which they had no comprehension. Through the mercy of the royal representative and army, and the local nobility, their mistakes were forgiven and the people of Naples were saved from the grave they had dug for themselves.

Loyalty

A problem that arose in both pamphlets was the defense of the Neapolitan's loyalty to the Spanish monarch. Both pamphlets seem to have recognized the general inconsistency of loyalty to the sitting government and the occurrence of a revolt. Nevertheless, both sources pleaded for the forgiveness of the rebels, though by very different approaches in their defense: knowledge versus political awareness.

The latter was particularly well represented in Dutch sources, which will also be seen later in this thesis. A peculiar detail in *de restitutie der privilegien's* defense against any allegations of *Crimen laesae Majestatis* was that they claim to have chanted 'leve den Koningh van Spanjen', or 'Long live the King of Spain', as they marched. This very technical method of abiding by the law indicated some insincerity in their actual loyalty to the Crown. If these words were only chanted to avoid the charges of treason, feigning loyalty towards the Spanish King was their only option. This is especially interesting when compared to the Spanish pamphlets, which repeatedly claimed that the loyalty of the Monarchy's subjects had been on a personal level. This was even more interesting when compared to the pamphlets that will be presented in Chapter V, which will present a turn of events. Loyalty seemed to have been a recurring theme, which will prove to have been useful as a justification for both government as well as rebellion.

What was also interesting in the Dutch pamphlet, was that the attitude of the Neapolitans seemed much more geared towards their *patria*. Masaniello was described as "Hooft van 't selve getrouwe Volck".²³⁸ In these terms, as with the title of *liberator patriae*, the Revolt was one in defense of the *patria* as described by Xavier Gil: a common affection for the soil and people of their birthplace, as well as an awareness of the formal constitution that legally defined their nation. Loyalty to the king was part of their constitution, and the person of the king held this office because his public body inherited the *naturaleza* that gave him his Neapolitan identity.²³⁹ In this sense, the Neapolitan people should indeed have been loyal to their king, 'Koningh van Spanjen,' and not differentiate between him and themselves, even if his rule had become excessively Castilian. Nonetheless, the pamphlet did show the demand of the reduction of Castilian officeholders in their government, and the restoration of the privilege that native Neapolitans held the majority of public offices. This hinted towards an opposition to centralization.

The restoration of these privileges were demanded by the Neapolitan 'volck' that was remarkably aware of the political and legal ails and their solutions of the Neapolitan Kingdom. The statement that they denied their guilt of *crimen laesae majestatis* by calling 'long live the king,' indicated that the people of Naples were well aware of the severity of rebellion in the face of the law, and made sure to reject any accusations by preparing a provisional defense. As we will see in more detail in Chapter VI, the Dutch pamphlets portrayed the people of Naples as very well aware of political and juridical matters, and of where they rightly stood in their actions and demands.

In *la Reducion de la Ciudad, y Reyno de Napoles*, there was also an emphasis on loyalty to the king during the Revolt. This seemed to have been a particularly well employed tool in maintaining loyalty of those were indispensable for the king's rule. There was a significant degree of homage paid to the soldiers that fought for the Spanish during the Revolt. The conditions under which they were forced to fight had been harsher than any man would have to face, and their predicaments seemed hopeless. Nonetheless they persevered without complaint, until the near-miracle of their victory finally relieved them from their duty. Their victory was not entirely a miracle, however, as those who know the blessing of the Spanish would recognize the turn of events as the divine providence through which God cared for the fare of the Monarchy. This insistence of honor in the army, and

²³⁸ "Bescheyt en Seker verhael van de Restitutie der Privilegien aen het Volck van Napels", 2.

²³⁹ Gil, 'One King', 119.

divine providence is interesting when related to the trouble that the government came across when recruiting troops from the Kingdom of Naples.

As seen in Chapter II, the Spanish crown requested soldiers from the Neapolitan Kingdom, in addition to finances and arms. This request was met with popular opposition and riots, and many conscripted soldiers downright resisted deployment. From the resistance the Neapolitan people showed, as well as the praise they received in *la Reducion de la Ciudad, y Reyno de Napoles*, it would seem that the Monarchy's reputation that the Spanish government was concerned with, applied to the reception of Spain in the eyes of the army as well. With the importance of warfare at this point, it was essential to have the soldiers of the Spanish royal army believe in their king and in cause. With the reports of Neapolitan resistance to conscription in literature versus the glorification of service in the Spanish army this pamphlet, we here find another attempt at saving face even through misinformation in propaganda.

The other essential group in the Spanish pamphlet – and government – was the nobility. That there had been possible friction between the Neapolitan nobility and the Spanish crown seems like a debatable issue in contemporary literature. In any case, a strong network of local authorities was essential in the government of the Spanish Monarchy with its myriad of administrations and constitutions – and dealing with local uprisings. Most literature indicated that most of the nobility remained loyal to their monarch during the Revolt of Naples. Barons sent their own troops to suppress the revolt, often effectively so.²⁴⁰ As will be observed from a pamphlet in the following chapter, Don Francesco Toraldo was among those who risked their lives in service of the Spanish king, by acting as a spy right underneath the Neapolitan people.²⁴¹ Additionally, Villari found that separatist tendencies among the aristocracy were only marginal, as most nobles drew closer to the monarch when their feudal security was shaken.²⁴² As has been an important theme throughout this thesis – the monarch had been very careful to secure the nobility's allegiance through patronage and the maintenance of their privileges. In return, the Neapolitan nobility was loyal to the Spanish sovereign. Only a few small and short-lived conspiracies took hold of the aristocracy throughout the first half of the seventeenth century. One of them discussed the possibility of appealing to French aid to loosen the grip of the Spanish authority. The conspiracy theorists decided against it, for the risk that the French might actually invade and take over Naples was too great.²⁴³

Nonetheless, the loyalty of the Neapolitan nobility presented in this pamphlet was still a useful way of maintaining the Neapolitan-Spanish bond, and to exemplify the goodness of loyalty to the Spanish king to the rest of the Monarchy. *La Reducion de la Ciudad, y Reyno de Napoles* was entrenched with the insistence that despite of the occurrence of a revolt, loyalty in the Neapolitan Kingdom had always been present, and held especially secure in the hearts of the nobility. How strong their loyalty was to their king, was illustrated by the hardship they faced, and the temptation they resisted instead seeking an easier way out. Two significant implications were also made here. Firstly, during the Revolt it might have seemed that circumstances were unpromising, as had been a general trend

²⁴⁰ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, 149.

²⁴¹ *Manifest Ofte Redenen Waerom de Ghemeynte van Napels Gehootsaect is gheworden om haer te ontslaen van het Jock van Spangien*, printed in 1648 (Knuttel, nr 05645).

²⁴² Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, 150.

²⁴³ Villari, *The Revolt of Naples*, 127-128.

of loss of faith throughout the Spanish Monarchy according to Jodi Campbell.²⁴⁴ The alleged disillusion of the invincibility of the Spanish Monarchy would have posed a threat to the support of Spanish subjects, and the collapse of the king's support system would have enormous repercussions. This pamphlet showcased how the royal government would always be the victor in every battle. With God on their side, there would be no exceptions to this rule.

The second implication has been suggested in this pamphlet, was that the loyalty of the barons worked out in their own favor. The nobility itself was deemed to fight the rebels of the Revolt because they had been the first to be confronted by them. The anger of the Revolt was actually geared toward them. In other Spanish relations of the Revolt, it was claimed that the rebels chanted their loyalty to the king, viceroy and government, but that their anger was geared towards the rich and noble.²⁴⁵ If anything, the Revolt had been caused by Neapolitan noblemen, and the royal army had come to their rescue. The nobility's loyalty was therefore the only appropriate sentiment regarding the Spanish king; there was nothing Philip IV had remotely done to have caused the Revolt of Naples.

Rebellion

Both pamphlets stated the occurrence of a mindless rebellion during the Revolt of Naples. Even *de restitutie der privilegien* admitted to the riots that disrupted the public peace happened at the time of the Revolt of Naples, but insisted that these were not part of the movement that constituted the Revolt. It declared the Revolt to have been a honorable political movement, of which the plebs of society took no part and deserved no benefit. Masaniello, however, was revered as the leader of the Neapolitan people, even though his social status was only that of a commoner. The pamphlet therefore seemed to have differentiated between the alleged riffraff that rioted out of whatever passion it had been gripped with as reaction to the taxes that had imposed earlier on; and the common people of Naples that were now standing up for the constitutional privileges that had been infringed, and were demanding their restitution for the common good of the Kingdom.

In *la Reducion de la Ciudad, y Reyno de Napoles*, the same rioters that had reacted to the tax raise had been responsible for the disruption of public peace, but contrary to the Dutch portrayal of the Revolt; the popular rioters were here the sole players of the Revolt of Naples. There was no noble cause, or even an intelligent organization. It was 'sola la Plebe' that revolted, and even that had only been in their ignorance. They had been swept away by their passions and by each other, and unlike the Dutch would suggested – there was nothing heroic about their actions. While the Spanish pamphlet claimed to have been a true recount of the Revolt, the famous Masaniello did not appear at all. This while the Duke of Arcos had given a handwritten portrayal of him early on in the Revolt: 'un mozo de 20 años natural de Napoles llamando Thomas Anielo de Amalfi, y diminutivamente Masaniello, hombre tan ordinario quese cubria solo con una camisa, y calzoncillos desnudo en los restante del cuerpo, cuyo oficio unas veces era vendez peces.'²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ Campbell, *Monarchy*, 74.

²⁴⁵ 'Relacion del tumulto de Napoles ocasionado por la gevela de la fruta.' in *Relación de los tumultos ocurridos en Nápoles siendo Virrey don Rodrigo Ponce de León, Duque de Arcos*, BNE MSS/2662, 1647.

²⁴⁶ Idem.

The removal of the person who was seen as the leader of the Revolt was an addition to the portrayal of a mindless machinery, angered by the loss of a basic necessity. The Revolt of Naples was therefore entirely reduced to a problem of finance. This shallow motivation completely eradicated any honorability implied by the Dutch perception of the Revolt. The only credit given to the Neapolitan populace was when they came to their senses and sought submission to their lords once more. This submission took quite some time and persuasion, as the Neapolitan people had been filled with so much hatred for the nobility. The latter also indicated a fault on the nobility's part, as the relationship between baron and vassal was supposed to stand on a foundation of mutual respect. With the fiscal strain on the Neapolitan Kingdom, Henry Kamen surprisingly claimed it was the nobility that was struck hardest. To meet their monarch's demands, barons were forced to place increasing pressure their vassals. Barons could no longer count on the support of their vassals, for they had grown tired of their lords' abuses. As a result, the nobility was terrorized by the populace and were often the targets during popular revolts.²⁴⁷ From this perspective, the Revolt of Naples had indeed not been a Revolt against government, but against the nobility.

Thus the Dutch and Spanish pamphlets gave very different characters to the Revolt of Naples. The former portrayed the picture of a righteous, intelligent and brave people against an unjust and tyrannous government; while the latter told the story of the Spanish Monarchy, faced with a passionate and ignorant populace, reacting to inevitable circumstance like a furious child in the face of reality. In both stories, there were appropriate heroes that were capable of remedying the crises at hand – and both of them symbolized the goodness of the people they represented.

IV.III Conclusion

News reports were an effective early modern government's way of reaching the public mind. They were a competent counterpart of political works in creating a representation of government policies and actions, and were all the more valuable because the readers could have been given the feeling that they were creating their own opinions based on facts. Yet, news reports were not at all unbiased statements of facts. Rather – they were skewed representations of reality, emphasizing details or leaving out significant factors that would have contributed to an entirely different story. The two pamphlets studied in this chapter are suiting examples of the propaganda projected through official publications of current affairs in the Spanish Monarchy.

One of the most significant messages projected through the Spanish and Dutch reports of the Revolt, was that both were boasting about who came out as winners after the Revolt of Naples. In the Dutch portrayal of the Revolt, the Neapolitan people took the risk of revolt and possible consequent accusations of treason, and came out as victorious. In the Spanish account, the Neapolitan people only harmed themselves with their ignorant actions to upset the government. Instead, the Spanish crown and the local nobility came out as the invincible champions in the face of resistance. These portrayals of winners and losers in the occurrence of a revolt, also seemed to have been a projection of the benefits versus disadvantages of rebellion against a king.

²⁴⁷ Kamen, *The Iron Century*, 327-329.

That the Neapolitan population had not considered its disadvantages, seemed to have been the case presented in the Castilian pamphlet. Its representation of the Neapolitan populace as innocently ignorant and inconsiderate of the consequence of their actions, gave the impression of a juvenile people; throwing a tantrum when upset, but then allowing itself to be pacified at the sight of its blunder. Swept away by its own ignorance and unable to clean up their own mess, royal intervention in the form of Don Juan of Austria restored the Kingdom of Naples to peace. The same went for the Neapolitan nobility and its inability to maintain a stable relationship with its vassals. The latter's dissatisfaction with the local authority created a chaos in the Kingdom of Naples, and the king was forced to act to restore order – a responsibility the crown had given the local nobility in exchange for their privileges.

While the Castilian pamphlet portrayed the Revolt as an embarrassing mistake on behalf of the Neapolitan population, including the nobility; *de restitutie der privilegien* showed predetermined action and consequent success. It recognized the occurrence of riots after the imposition of taxes, but distinguished the political Revolt of Naples from the street riots, which had nothing to do with the cause the people of Naples were representing: the restitution of privileges that had been constitutionally granted to them, but were infringed by modern ministers. There was no fault in their defense of what was rightfully theirs, and they were willing to repeat their offences if their demands were not honored. The people of Naples were not in any way guilty of anything, least of all treason, and any acts that were deemed unlawful were to be forgiven, considering the honorability of the circumstances these had been committed. Because their cause was so just, the people of Naples triumphed over the abuse that Spanish ministers had inflicted on them.

Thus the Dutch portrayed justice as the decisive factor in the battle between rebellion and authority; but the Castilian source left out any consideration to a threat of royal authority. The Spanish monarch had the blessing of God, and was thereby invincible. This source made good use of the conventional acceptance of the king's divine right to rule by emphasizing what this blessing meant in practice. At times, able to defeat the Revolt seemed near impossible. Yet, this victory proved the investment of God into Spain's fate, and would convince anyone to put their faith in the Spanish government. If there had been any trace of disillusionment of Spanish subjects after witnessing crises and revolts, this pamphlet presented the invincibility of the Spanish crown even in the most unpromising circumstances.

Faith in the Spanish king and monarchy would reinforce the loyalty that Spanish subjects were willing to display. Alliance with the Spanish king, the Castilian pamphlet insisted, would ensure the membership of the winning team. This would have been a powerful message in the representation of Philip IV in Spanish propaganda. The Dutch pamphlet, on the other hand, conveniently steered the perception of the Revolt in a direction where people who were faithful enough to the king to give up their lives, were best off deciding for themselves what was just. The Neapolitan people showed loyalty with *patria* and this virtue was both honorable and beneficial. Broadcasting a message was particularly convenient for the Dutch shortly before the close of the Eighty Years' War. This particular pamphlet just so happened to have been a success story of how a nation had risen up against the tyranny of Spain and would do well to inspire those who found themselves in a similar predicament.

The *Autentijck, bescheyt en seker verhael van de restitutie der privilegien aen het volck van Napels, door den Hertogh van Arcos* and *Relacion del feliz successo, que en 6 Abril tuvo el Serenissimo Senor Don Juan de Austria, con la Reducion de la Ciudad, y Reyno de Napoles* have portrayed the Revolt of Naples as an exemplary event that begged for a deciding factor between rebellion and authority. Heroes of the Revolt rose to the occasion in the shapes of Masaniello and Don Juan of Austria, proving that justice and respectively divine providence should earn the trust and loyalty of the government's subjects. Both these pamphlets seemed to have taken on ideal stories of propaganda geared towards Dutch and Castilian readers. Furthermore, representations of the constitutionally aware people of Naples versus the passionate commoners that stumbled over their own ignorance, made these two pamphlets alone provide evidence for contemporary historians to judge that Revolt of Naples had been seen as passionate or political.

Chapter V - The Rebels against the Army

The second comparison of this study is the assessment of the Dutch and Spanish presentations of the events of October 1647 in the city of Naples. As it seemed that the Revolt that started in July would not resolve itself without military interference; we once again read that Philip IV sent Don Juan of Austria, his illegitimate son and general of the Spanish Armada, to crush the revolt by force. While the Dutch pamphlet spoke of terrible abuses of the Spanish army; the Spanish prints spoke of bare necessity and hardship.

The Spanish account used in this study was a set of recollections of Baron de Vatteville, Conde de Corvieres. The Baron had been named Captain General of the Artillery of the Royal army, and was in service Don Juan of Austria. This print gave a significantly different account than the Dutch of the arrival of Don Juan in October 1647, who had been sent by his father, Philip IV, to settle the revolt. Apart from the dissimilarities between the Dutch and Spanish accounts of the arrival of the Spanish Armada, this comparison is particularly interesting to this essay because it signified the portrayal of the actions of the Spanish government in the face of rebellion. How the government handled revolts had great repercussions,²⁴⁸ as it showed the rest of the monarchy what they could expect from their government. The *Manifest Ofte Redenen Waerom de Ghemeynte van Napels Genootsaecht is gheworden om haer te ontslaen van het Jock van Spangien* gave a shockingly unjust account of how the Spanish Monarchy dealt with rebellious subjects.

V.I – The hardship of War

Military hardship

The *Ordenes y otros documentos publicados* published by Vatteville opened with a copy of a letter of Philip IV that announced Don Juan of Austria as the General Governor of all his maritime armies on 27 April 1647. It explained that the Baron of Vatteville would be in his son's service and in charge of the royal artillery.²⁴⁹ The accounts began by recounting the day that Don Juan arrived in Naples on 1 October 1647, with the Spanish Armada all set off the coast. He was then welcomed by the Duke of Arcos, viceroy of Naples, who informed Don Juan on the state of affairs. The people of Naples, it turned out, were hostile and armed. This led Don Juan to decide to disembark the royal army on the shores of Naples on 5 October.²⁵⁰

The Baron orders the army to take over all the posts in the city. The army managed to stand at the turn of every street and corner, making sure that the people of the city could not pass. The people of Naples, however, were not about to allow the army to take over city. The Neapolitans put up a substantial fight: 'con todo esfuerzo procuraba rechazar la gente Regia [...] atacándola con infinita mucho dure.' They tried to keep the army from overtaking their posts in Naples, until all they could fortify were their own homes. The Baron tried to secure the army's positions at the posts in the city 'sin hacer mas hostilidad,' and tried to keep a friendly relationship with the local people.

²⁴⁸ Elliot, *Imperial Spain*, 329.

²⁴⁹ Vatteville, *Ordenes y otros documentos publicados con motivo de la actuación del Barón de Vatteville en Nápoles en el puesto de Capitán General de Artillería del ejército de la Armada Real y al servicio de Don Juan de Austria, desde mayo de 1647 hasta abril de 1648*, 1.

²⁵⁰ Vatteville, *Ordenes y otros documentos publicados*, 2.

Nevertheless, the Baron was required to create a structure strong enough to defend the line that went around the city, as well as all the lines required to keep a network of communication. Despite these efforts, a few men of the Duke of Guise did manage to infiltrate a number of the barracks. Consequently, over four thousand of his soldiers went down to the Church of Santa Ana and swarmed to Via de Toledo, to break the lines of defense and communication, and which ensured the safe evacuation Don Juan of Austria from the Palace. At this moment the Baron of Vatteville charged from the other side with only a handful of Spaniards and, 'algunos reformados Napolitanos,' managed to secure the posts once again. At this occasion, the city lost about 500 men to being wounded, imprisoned or killed.²⁵¹

The Spanish army ran into ever more problems when the French navy disembarked onto Neapolitan shores. The Baron had no choice but to rely on his by now worn out army: 'continuado la defensa de los puestos con tan corto número de soldados descalzos, desnudos, y aunque valientes, cansados de la hambre, y del continuo trabaja.' Still, they did not waver nor question their orders. This very army had to be embarked on the royal navy and in this way, the Spanish were able to defeat the French invasion.²⁵²

During this time, the Baron was also concerned with establishing a good relationship with the Neapolitan people. He was known for his gentle hand, agreeability and reliability. He showed kindness and perseverance; even when provisions ran low and the circumstances were as difficult as they were. In due time, the Baron was able to win their affection. The Neapolitans saw the goodness and love with which he handled his soldiers, and how he stood with them day and night to support them. Finally, he was also able to secure the nobility's good opinion. The Baron was able to reconcile the conflicted parties, even though they were different by nature, and while they were hardly compatible – they formed the body of the state. This conserved the kingdom, and reduced all to the obedience of the king.

At the end of this account, there were a few copies enclosed of the different publications that the Baron of Vatteville had printed on different occasions during this time. These pamphlets were published in Italian and spread on the streets, so that the locals would understand the situation to full extent. The pamphlets speak of the good that was happening in the kingdom, and how pleased the king was with the work of Don Juan and the Baron. It also countered the negative rumors that were being spread about the Spaniards and their dealings with the locals.²⁵³

²⁵¹ Vatteville, *Ordenes y otros documentos publicados*, 'ya apoderarse de los barrios altos para consecutivamente desalojar al señor don Juan de Palacio, y por consecuencia reducir el ejército a los Castillos sin comunicación, cuando el Barón acudiendo al mismo instante con la gente de reten apeándose del caballo supuso delante della, y con bien poco número de Españoles, y algunos reformados Napolitanos fue rechazando los sediciosos hasta recuperar todos los puestos referidos, en cuya ocasión perdió el pueblo entre muertos, heridos, y prisioneros al pie de 500 hombres,

²⁵² Vatteville, *Ordenes y otros documentos publicados*, 'Dejase también de decir por menor lo que hizo cuando llego la Armada Francia a Nápoles, continuado la defensa de los puestos con tan corto número de soldados descalzos, desnudos, y aunque valientes, cansados de la hambre, y del continuo trabaja, pues nunca se mudaron las guardias dando sin replica, ni dificultad toda la gente que le pidieron así en cantidad como en calidad para guarnecer la Armada Real, de modo que pudiese salir apalea con la de Francia.'

²⁵³ Vatteville, *Ordenes y otros documentos publicados*, 3: 'Y derramandose entre el pueblo de los quarteles fue les rumores, y voces falsas de que los Espanoles querian saquear dichos quarteles, y luego retirar se en sus

Manifest Ofte Redenen Waerom de Ghemeynte van Napels Genootsaecht is gheworden om haer te ontslaen van het Jock van Spangien.

The following pamphlet was a compilation of three texts, each indicating the situation in Naples at various times. The first was a proclamation preceding the Revolt. The second was an extract from the *Manifest van 't seer ghetrouwe Volck van Napels*.²⁵⁴ The third was a letter written from Naples, pleading for help. Together, these texts listed the misdeeds done by the Spanish towards the people of Naples – including rape, destruction, capture and murder. It also included the reason why the kingdom had rejected the Spanish crown, and the occasion on which this had been demonstrated.²⁵⁵ The most grievous misdeeds of the Spanish army allegedly took place in October 1647. The pamphlet was anonymously published by a devotee in 1648 and claimed to have been translated from the French text that had earlier been published in 1647.

The first text stated to have been written in service of the king and of the good government of the kingdom: 'voor den dienst van sijne Catholijcke Majesteyt, ende het goed Gouvernement van dat alder-ghetrouste volck.' It deemed it necessary that no nobleman, of any rank or status, for any thinkable reason, had any right to take up arms against the people of the city. Should a nobleman take up arms nonetheless, the people of Naples would have the right to kill him without fear of punishment.²⁵⁶ It continued to list violators of this law, and called upon the people of Naples to take justice into their own hands when coming across them. Sums of money rested on their heads, and rewards were promised to those who executed them. Pardons would be given from local law and would be forgiven heaven for the crime that the murder might have been.²⁵⁷ The assassin would receive a quarter of the offending nobleman's belongings; the people of Naples would receive the rest.

It continued to forbid the nobility to engage in trade, or 'Coopmanschap te doen in dit Koninkrijk'. Surplus from their lands was to be sold to the people of Naples for the current price. Violation of this law would have all of the offending nobleman's supplies confiscated or even death: 'op straffe van het leven'. These supplies would, for one fourth, be given to the person who discovered and declared the crime, and for the remaining three quarters, be given to the people of Naples. This fine would be in addition to any other physical punishment that might be given to the violator.²⁵⁸ The text was

fortificaciones, mando su Alteza remediar estos discursos encuya execucion hizo el Baron publicar el siguiente bando, y poner en las esquinas de las calles en lengua Italiana para que todos los ciudadanos lo entendiesen.'

²⁵⁴ *Manifest van 't seer ghetrouwe Volck van Napels*, 1647.

²⁵⁵ *Manifest Ofte Redenen*, 'Mitsgaders, van de groote en wreede moordeyen, vrouwenschendingen, branden, vangen, doodt-slaen, ende nog veel onmenshelijckke moetwhillen meer aldaer gepleegt.'

²⁵⁶ *Manifest Ofte Redenen*, '..alle Baronnen, ghequalificieerde Heeren, ende allen anderen van wat staet [...] wapenen aennemen teghen dit alder-ghetrouste Volck: eenen yegelijcken toelatende te dooden, sonder daer over ghestraft te werden.'

²⁵⁷ *Manifest Ofte Redenen*, 'met pardon van de misdaden des gheenen die den slach sal ghegeven hebben [...] voor de welcken hij van gelijcken sal verkrijghen Pardan van wat misdaet het soude moghen zijn.'

²⁵⁸ *Manifest Ofte Redenen*, 'Alle de geene, van wat staet ende conditie sijs ouden moghen zijn, die sullen hebben meeder Granen en Meel, als sij van doen hebben tot het ghebruyck van haer Huys ende Familie, en om te bezaeyen hare Landen na proportie van 't geene sij van nooden sullen hebben, moetende dit gebruik verstaen zijn van een sekere maet voor yeder Persoon ter Maendt, tot den Maent van September aenstraende, sullen gheouden zijn daer van deurich open Winckel te houden, ende te doen weten datse te koop zijn voor den prijs courant, op straffe van verliet harer Goederen [...] boven de andere lichamelijcke straffen die tegen haer souden mogen ingestelt worden.'

signed on 16 October 1646 by Don Fransesco Toraldo d'Aragona, a military man who will recur in the pamphlet in less fortunate circumstances.

The second text was an extract from the *Manifest van 't seer ghetrouwe Volck van Napels*²⁵⁹, titled 'Extract van het Manifest van die van Napels, tegens het Gouvernement van Spangien.' It claimed to have been the most important part of the manifesto, and will be also the most significant in this chapter. This extract was no been signed by name, but the date was given: 17 October 1647. It told the story of how the trust of the kingdom had been betrayed by the Spanish Crown and how and why the Neapolitans went about in their resistance; 'de Redenen diese ghehadt hebben om toevlucht te nemen tot de natuerelijcke defensie teghen de onderdruckinghen van de Dienaers van Spangien.' The populace had to take refuge in their natural right to defend themselves against the servants of Spain – with the Duke of Arcos in particular; the viceroy of Naples, who had failed to maintain the privileges of the Neapolitans. The rumor had been going around that to restore the privileges, Don Juan of Austria would come to Naples with the royal Armada. The people of the city rejoiced at this prospect, but Don Juan refused to set foot in the kingdom if the people were armed as they were during the Revolt. Obediently, the people laid down their arms and devotedly awaited to see the prince. Once unarmed, the city was invaded by Spanish soldiers. They took the city with armed force. Soldiers barged into holy convents, violated its women, and committed various awful crimes towards the most innocent of people. The city was attacked from all fronts and ruined throughout.²⁶⁰

Seeing that they could no longer trust the promises of the Spanish, the people of the city were forced to turn to their only natural remedy of self-defense.²⁶¹ First, the people of Naples would have to resort to prayer, so that they might stand a chance in defending themselves. In addition to divine help, they would hope for the aid of the pope, and other members of the church, including the king, nobility, and all other fellow Christians, in prayers as well as other means of support they could spare.

Finally, the third text in this pamphlet was a copy of a letter from Naples, written 24 October. The year was not specified, but presumably it was also written in 1647, shortly after the *Manifest van 't seer ghetrouwe Volck*. It summarized the events that had happened until then.²⁶²

²⁵⁹ *Manifest van 't seer ghetrouwe Volck van Napels*, 1647.

²⁶⁰ *Manifest Ofte Redenen*, 'Al het Volck seer verblijft, liep daer toe met een ghemeyn ghejuygh, seer begeerich om te zien dien Heer, ghesproten uyt het bloet van haren wel-beminden Koninck: Maer ter wijle dat men van dach tot dacht dit gheluck verhoopte, haer zijnde verthoont, dat hij gheen voet op 't Land wilde setten voor ende al-eer dat het Alder-ghetrouwste Volck hare Wapenen neder leyde: en yeder heeft soo heeft zijne Wapenen in 't Huys nedergheluyt, hoe-wel men het niet en behoorde te doen, acht hebbende op de geseyde Privilegien [...] maer alles was in stilte en een genereale gerustheyt. Dewelcke duerende ende terwijle het volck verlangde te sien dien Prince van welcken het verhoopte nieuwe gunste, ende faveur, de Spaensche Soldaten sich op het onversienste gheworpen hebbende in verscheyden boecken vande Stadt diese met gewelt van Wapenen ingenomen hadden.'

²⁶¹ *Manifest Ofte Redenen*, 'Dit ist dat dit Alder-getrouste Volck genootsaecht heeft toevlucht te nemen tot de natuerlicke remedie van hare bescherminghe, ende sich door de zelve te mainteneeren, verhopende niet meer van elders andere ruste ofte verseekeringe van hare personen, ende goederen, dewelcke geresolveert zijn door dit middel te behouden, gheen plaetse meer hebbende om te vertrouwen op de beloften van de gheseyde Spaensche Dienaers.'

²⁶² *Manifest Ofte Redenen*, 'Coye. Uyt eenen Brief van Napels, van den 24 October, geschreven uyt het quartier, ingenomen va de Spangiaerts, inhoudende 't ghene daer ghepasseert is tot op den gheseyden dach.'

The first ail that was addressed in this letter, was that instead of ceasing, the battle was causing increasingly more casualties on both the side of the Spanish as well as of the Neapolitan people. The city was constantly covered in smoke from the incessant canon fire: already 60.000 shots have been counted in total. Apart from the canon fire, the city had grown quiet. Holy masses were silenced; church bells had ceased to ring. People were hungry and troops were running low. The Neapolitan people had now come to despise the Spanish reign: 'De Inwooners selfs, hebben ghebruykt sulck een verachtinghe van de Spaensche Heerschappye.' The people removed the Spanish weaponry from the city, and even exposed a large portrait of the Spanish king on the market – where it was fired at with over a thousand shots. The inhabitants of the city, first fighting only in defense, had now turned to offence. The Spanish army, however, could easily take their attacks, and continued to send troops to the city.

The author of the first letter mentioned above, Don Francesco Toraldo, named lieutenant general of the people, and who had been given absolute commandment of the Neapolitan troops by its people, had now been accused of conspiring with the Duke of Arcos. He was consequently decapitated and hanged from his feet as a traitor of the fatherland. The manifest explained: 'na dat hy overtuigt was van collusie met den Hertoch d'Arcos, Viceroy van Naples, wiert het Hooft afgehouden ende daer na gehangen aen een voet, als een Verrader van sijn Vaderlant.' His heart was torn from his body, and then sent to his heavily pregnant wife. Before the execution, the Neapolitans started to mistrust him when he had refused to allow them to attack the city gates that had been taken by the Spanish, and had allowed the enemy to walk right into the city. Further suspicion arose that he had been telling the Spanish about the Neapolitan plans of attack. They were certain of his guilt when they found he had been replacing the Neapolitan troops' gunpowder with sand. Similarly, a number of people found their deaths at the hands of the Neapolitan people for treason.

The pamphlet closed with a conclusion, in which the reader was invited to judge the atrocities of the Spanish army against the city of Naples. Hopefully – with the aid and mercy of the Virgin of the Carmine – a protector, from anywhere from France to Rome, would take pity on the suppressed city and come to their aid. It pointed out that the Neapolitan nobility no longer had any reason to obey or support their king, nor his viceroys or kin. It pleads the French king to have compassion and come to the aid of the Neapolitan people.

V.II – News as Propaganda

The comparison of the pamphlets above has taken the concept of representation of the Revolt of Naples out of the realm of portrayal, and into the sway of persuasion. Especially the last text of the Dutch pamphlet, in which the reader was invited to judge the actions of the Spanish, confirmed the intention of this pamphlet to sway the reader into siding with the Neapolitan victims of tyranny. Once again, this Dutch text emphasized the justification of the Neapolitan rebellion. Even more so than the *Autentijck, bescheyt en seker verhael van de restitutie der privilegien aen het volck van Napels* of Chapter IV, this pamphlet pointed out the pure necessity of rebellion under the Spanish government. Interesting here was that the blame has shifted from the Neapolitan government to the Spanish crown.

The first text of the *Manifest ofte Redenen*, that preceded the Revolt, indicated that the people of Naples had already been on bad terms with the nobility. The text was full of threats towards the nobility, and justified the reactions that they would have had to expect when the populace took law into their own hands. We might even say: the nobility had been warned. The second text was the most striking out of the three in this pamphlet. It spoke in a most passionate way of the suffering of the Neapolitan people. While the Spanish account recounted a textbook annexation of a city; the Dutch *Manifest* showed the brutal betrayal and abuse of the Spanish Crown. First, Don Juan entered the city under the pretext of defending Neapolitan privileges, when he intended no such thing. Second, he persuaded the Neapolitans to lay down their arms, after which they were attacked by a ruthless army, taking advantage of their trust in the king. The army then continued to sack the city, inflicting excessive damage to buildings and innocent people.

The army's fury seemed endless, and the city was afire for days. The Neapolitans desperately resorted to prayer and plead for help from abroad. They solemnly renounced their loyalty to the Spanish King, as they awaited a savior to rescue them from this massacre. This account portrayed in *Manifest ofte Redenen* told an entirely different story than the Baron of Vatteville. To start – the Spanish text spoke of no promise to the Neapolitan people about their privileges. He also made no prior refusal to come ashore because of the state the people were in. Don Juan had already come to shore on October 1st, to speak with Arcos about the Neapolitan situation. The text stated that Arcos informed Don Juan that the people of Naples were in fact armed and seditious, and mentioned no negotiations of laying down weapons. Apparently, the Neapolitan populace had been beyond reason. Based on this information, Don Juan decided to disembark his army, and systematically took over the city. The army struggled against the mass of people, but nevertheless prevailed. The result was an orderly situation, though the army lost much of its strength. The texts made no mention of October 17th, which would have made a very memorable day if it had indeed gone as told in *Manifest ofte Redenen*.

The recollections of the Baron also made no mention of the Neapolitan people's renunciation of the Spanish King. This brings us back to the theme of loyalty. The Spanish texts did not fail to report that the battle for the city won with the help of Neapolitans. An interesting similarity between the two texts was the presence of reformed – or treacherous, depending on who was judging – Neapolitans. In the Spanish text, these were the locals who had come to their senses. They then sided with the Spanish, and together they came to victory against the Crown's enemy: the French. From a radically different perspective; the Dutch pamphlet showed how the traitors of the Neapolitan people were mercilessly punished for their collaboration with the Spanish. None of the Spanish texts used in this study, however, show the Neapolitan people exhibiting such power. If anything; the Spanish texts repeatedly emphasized the loyalty of the Neapolitan people, and their wish to serve their king. Whereas the Dutch pamphlets showed a rupture in the Spanish-Neapolitan relationship, the Spanish pamphlets seemed to preserve it.

The only people up in arms in these texts were again the populace of the Kingdom, and suppressing the Neapolitan people was a very technical feat. It included a strong army, and the use of soothing words. Befriending the local people played an important role in the Baron's agenda, and this is once again a far cry from the decent and knowledgeable rebels of Naples portrayed in both *restitutie der privilegien* and *Manifest ofte Redenen*. Instead, Vatteville portrayed the people of Naples just as

having been caught in a flurry of passions, but capable of being mollified by an affectionate Spanish general. It hereby severely marginalized the political motivations of the Revolt of Naples, as it was once again reduced to a shallow consequence of plebeian instincts.

This was a sharp contrast to the Dutch texts, which portrayed the Revolt as a thoroughly premeditated rebellion with the law undeniably on the people's side. This is further confirmed in the conscious plead for help to readers abroad – particularly the French. Such calculative actions were not credited to the populace of Naples in the Castilian account, in which the Duke of Guise merely showed up as an enemy of Spain, arriving in this story as yet another hardship for the Spanish army to bear.

Altogether, three significant elements could be extracted from the dissimilarities in these pamphlets. First was the either over- or understatement of the cruelty in the Spanish invasion of Naples in October by the Dutch and respectively Spanish accounts. The *Manifest ofte Redenen* was obviously pleading for a case of abuse and consequent justification for the rebels, while the accounts of Baron de Vatteville hushed up the more brutal details of military action. Second, was the identification of loyalty to, and renunciation of, the Spanish Crown. Both pamphlets made strong cases for Neapolitans who felt that they did or did not owe their allegiance to their king. Third were the political elements of the Revolt, and the respectability of its rebels. The Dutch pamphlet, once again spoke of a people that was very well aware of its struggle and its rights. The reader would be swayed to agree on both aspects. The first text of the pamphlet even showed the Neapolitan threatening inclination to rebellion a year before the occurrence of the Revolt, indicating the premeditated deliberation of their actions. This was entirely contrary to the account of the Baron, who gave the plebeian uprising no such credit. Once again, there was a child-like element in the presentation of the populace. The local Neapolitans could be charmed by the Baron's kindness, and admired the affection with which he treats his inferiors. Apparently, they would not need any restitution of privileges, fair government or answer to their cry for justice. That would indicate that the Revolt had stood on political grounds, while the reasons portrayed in Vatteville's *Ordenes y otros documentos publicados* were of a much simpler nature.

Having recognized the most striking dissimilarities between the Castilian and Dutch pamphlets that recounted the Spanish reaction to the Neapolitan uprising, some details in particular spoke volumes and require consideration as well. These details portrayed the ideals of loyalty, the political awareness, and the definition of tyranny to the inhabitants of Naples.

Loyalty

In previous chapters, we have been able to define the meaning of loyalty to the people of Naples in the seventeenth century. The major change we have encountered in this chapter, however, was the rupture of the Neapolitans' relationship with the Spanish king. Similar to *de restitutie der privilegien aen het volck van Napels*; the Dutch pamphlet in this chapter seemed to carry on the sentiment of the duty of Neapolitans to their fatherland. Completely absent, however, were the vows of loyalty to the king or even any the fear for allegations of *crimen laesae majestatis*. Instead, treason was now a crime committed by those who were not loyal to their *patria*. The people of Naples had quite obviously renounced their king when they publicly shot at his portrait. When Don Toraldo appeared

to have been collaborating with the Duke of Arcos, the Neapolitan people murdered him publically and brutally, giving him the death of a traitor.

Those who were willing to risk death at the hands of Neapolitan patriots, appear in the Castilian pamphlet as reformed Neapolitans and were welcomed to fight a most challenging battle at the side of the Spanish king. They now found themselves in the same boat as the Baron and the Spanish soldiers, who in this pamphlet again found themselves in a seemingly hopeless predicament. Yet, their loyalty, trust and perseverance made them both honorable and winning players in the recollections of Vatteville. As in the *la Reducion de la Ciudad, y Reyno de Napoles* of the previous chapter, there was again an admirable suffering and subsequent reward for those who remained loyal to the king when circumstances seemed hopeless.

Political awareness

This choice of to whom the Neapolitans owed their loyalty, could be said to have been based on a judgment of who provided them with the duties that a government was deemed to uphold. When the Neapolitan people saw that the representatives of the king had treated them unjustly, they reverted to the government of natural law instead. According to Vatteville, the people of Naples needed to realize that they, the nobility and the populace, together formed the body of the state. While different. This choice of words, 'el cuerpo del estado,' was interesting. The Baron claimed that once order had been restored, all were once again obedient to the king. This recognition of social order was achieved by kind words and display of virtues. Patronizing a group that by the Dutch had been said to have had intelligent political aims, would have been a clever way to reduce the Revolt of Naples to an act of passion, in which the lowliest members of society had forgotten their place.

Vatteville also recounted, however, that part of the Spanish strategy had been to spread pamphlets to these people. Considering how high illiteracy was in Naples, even among respectable people who held influential offices, the question would be towards whom these pamphlets were geared. Were they written for the same passionate Neapolitans who got swept away by their peers and ignorant ideas? Or perhaps there was involvement of an educated group that was neither plebeian or noble: the third estate. Here we must come to consider the theories of Giulio Genoino's involvement in the Revolt of Naples.

As has been discussed in the preliminary chapter of this thesis; the charismatic Masaniello has been said to have been a protégé of Giulio Genoino. The latter was said to have spent most of his life – save for the twenty years Genoino spent in captivity – having tried to involve the third estate in a stronger position of power.²⁶³ Genoino had been part of the *Eletto del Popolo* in 1620, when the viceroy of Naples had tried to strengthen the third estate against the nobility within the city government.²⁶⁴ The Duke of Osuña had promoted Genoino to the people's representative in the city government of Naples in 1619. This appointment had quickly been nullified by the members of the collateral council on the grounds that it had not been consulted with them beforehand. Osuña reappointed Genoino a year later, and nullified this appointment again; but now on the grounds of conflicts of interest. Genoino had high political ambitions, and by now he was demanding that the

²⁶³ Cavendish, 'Masaniello's Naples Revolt Against Spain'.

²⁶⁴ Arnaldi, *Italy and Its Invaders*, 162.

third estate had equal representation, and even that the nobility was to pay taxes. Genoino took his office despite the opposition, and was followed by a crowd of armed friends and supporters. The opposition of the appointment of Genoino argued against Osuña to the king, and they got him recalled.²⁶⁵ Indeed, the Duke of Osuña had been called to Madrid, and was accused of seeking to make himself king of Naples.²⁶⁶

Genoino found himself without royal protection and fled Naples, but was arrested and taken to Madrid. He was accused of sedition, but escaped execution. Instead, he was sentenced for life to be imprisoned in the Spanish fortress on the coast of Morocco in 1622, but was released thirteen years later. It was not until four years after that, that he was allowed to return to Naples, where he was soon briefly imprisoned again for trying to resume his activities. Peter Robb found that Genoino had been spreading his third estate ideals among the professional community and the lower levels of the city administration since his return to Naples in 1639. Since the fruit tax of 1647 he also started conspiring with the people who these taxes would affect the most.²⁶⁷

His history made Genoio the perfect candidate for historians to have called him the very protagonist and mind behind the first phase of the Revolt of Masaniello.²⁶⁸ Masaniello was the leader of the popular revolt, but it seemed unlikely that he, an illiterate son of a fisherman, had himself negotiated the terms in *de restitutie der privilegien* of the previous chapter. Genoino's aims were to lift the most burdensome taxes and to limit the excessiveness of the nobility, and he also had ideals to strengthening the royal power to counterweight that of the feudal nobility. The latter provided a basis for alliance between Genoino and the Duke of Arcos, but this basis held no steady ground. Kamen pointed out that the Spanish crown would never have negotiated with a rebel, and the masses of the mob would not have trusted such associations.²⁶⁹ Interestingly enough, the ideal of strengthening royal authority and limiting feudal power, was consistent with that which de Thoro presented in the *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*. There is no telling whether de Thoro had been influenced by Genoino, a controversial figure that had been accused of and imprisoned for sedition. Yet – it would not have been unthinkable for two jurists that shared a similar political opinion could have crossed paths. In any case, we here find another suggestion that people of Naples had been pleading for more royal interference and less feudal authority in the Kingdom.

Until now, this thesis has given much consideration to the strength of feudal power in the Neapolitan Kingdom. Much contemporary literature has asserted that the Spanish government had a particularly weak grip over Neapolitan administration: most of local authority laid in the hands of feudal lords, and Astarita claimed that the crown was very aware of the tyrannous and severe regimes of some these feudal powers. While the early modern period has long been characterized by the growth of centralized power, the relationship between the Neapolitan feudal nobility and the Spanish crown show otherwise. While absolute power grew, it did so in service of the interests of local nobility and

²⁶⁵ Peter Robb, *Street Fight in Naples: A City's Unseen History* (Bloomsbury 2011) 283.

²⁶⁶ J. P. Cooper, *The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War, 1609-59*, 276.

²⁶⁷ Robb, *Street Fight in Naples*, 284-285.

²⁶⁸ Arnaldi, *Italy and Its Invaders*, 162.

²⁶⁹ Kamen, *The Iron Century*, 362-363.

traditional institutions. Absolutism is therefore only part of a complex system, in which traditional powers continued to thrive.²⁷⁰

We have already considered the state of the economy of mid seventeenth century Naples, but what remains to be emphasized is the strain that the financial demands from the crown meant in practice. To illustrate the cruelty of the Kingdom's financial situation on the Neapolitan populace, we can observe the reluctance with which the newest viceroy of Naples took on his position in May 1644. Pietro Giannone narrated the time in which Juan Alfonso Enríquez de Cabrera y Colonna, Admiral of Castile, took his office as the viceroy of Naples. The Admiral found that the kingdom's resources had been drained and its subjects were utterly miserable. The accumulation of taxes from the past decades had taken their toll. His gravest troubles were not, however, how to remedy the situation at hand, but how to meet his monarch's ever increasing demands. Moreover, his predecessors had never failed in raising the enormous sums, and the Admiral was expected to perform no less.²⁷¹ However, the Admiral could not bear the guilt of further robbing the impoverished people of the Neapolitan Kingdom. He wrote to the king, begging to be relieved from his office. Giannone described the psychological distress that the Admiral suffered from being responsible for the misery of the people under his watch. His request to resign was initially declined, but at his insistence he was replaced by the Duke of Arcos after two years in the office of viceroy of Naples.²⁷²

If Giannone's description of the plundering of the Neapolitan people was accurate, it would have been consistent with the *Manifest ofte Redenen* claiming that the Duke of Arcos was the most hated of all. Here we would find a duality of theories that the feudal as well as royal authorities that have been placed with the blame of the bad state of the Kingdom of Naples and the repression of its population. The crown demanded financial support, and the nobility was responsible for collecting it through taxes. All the while, the nobility itself was privileged to evade these taxes.

Dutch pamphlet has placed the Neapolitan's loyalty to the crown and animosity with the nobility in a new light. That the Kingdom of Naples denounced the sovereignty of the Spanish King, leads us to the question of tyranny.

Separation from the tyranny of Spain

In this thesis we have been able to identify two Spanish definitions of tyranny in the seventeenth century. First, a tyrant would have been a ruler who did not respect the constitutional privileges of his kingdom. In the opinions of ethicist, who believed in the subordination of politics to morality, a tyrant was a ruler who put his own interests before the needs of his subjects. A king who lacked virtue was therefore often equated with a tyrant. In the *Manifest ofte Redenen*, both of these definitions of tyranny were consistent with the government of the Spanish King.

First – the privileges of the Neapolitan people were not upheld, and so this pamphlet justified that they had risen up in rebellion. Nevertheless; at this point, the people of Naples were not yet past the point of reconcilability. The point of no return occurred on the day that the Spanish royal army had taken advantage of their loyalty to their king, when they complied to the demand of Don Juan, who

²⁷⁰ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, 202.

²⁷¹ Giannone, *The Civil History of the Kingdom of Naples*, 751-752 .

²⁷² Giannone, *The Civil History of the Kingdom of Naples*, 753.

refused come ashore if the people of Naples did not lay down their weapons first. As an ultimate act of betrayal to the king's subjects, the royal army attacked the good loyal of Naples who had been tricked into letting down their guard when the army was about to strike. To make matters worse, the royal army did not simply take over the city in a manner of conquest. The Spanish soldiers pillaged the city with unnecessary cruelty. To speak to the imagery of the city of Naples that had been characterized with its many religious buildings,²⁷³ the Spanish soldiers barged into convents and assaulted their women. If the violation of nuns was not the epitome of complete lack of impiety, it was the permission given by the Spanish representatives for the soldiers to continue their massacre until even the church masses had been quieted.

This abuse had been the deciding grounds for the Neapolitans to break with Spanish rule. They expected Don Juan to come to the Kingdom and act as their hero, but he turned out to have been a tyrannous representation of the Spanish king. Conversely, the account of Vatteville displayed a compassion, support and understanding on the Spanish side that earned him the devotion of his suffering soldiers, and the admiration even of Neapolitans. On the other hand, the *Manifest ofte Redenen*, while speaking of the horrors of the Spanish invasion; the Neapolitans demonstrated their own brutality as well. Their murdering of the traitors of the Neapolitan *patria* displayed an aggression that did not advocate their virtuous disposition either. The execution of Don Toraldo was one thing, as treason was deemed a graver crime than murder,²⁷⁴ but in addition to his death, his heart was ripped out and sent to his pregnant widow. This Dutch account would provide as evidence for the Castilian insistence of the aggression of the Neapolitan people, and how harsh this war had been on the Spanish soldiers.

The tyranny of Spanish rule based on the definition of lack virtue was demonstrated by the Dutch pamphlet in this chapter; and was opposed by the Castilian pamphlet with the virtuous characters of Don Juan and especially the Baron. Both these accounts attempted to persuade their readers by invoking their sympathy, and the *Manifest ofte Redenen* even went as far as to beg for help from abroad in the same sentence as they prayed to God for mercy.

The support from abroad came in the form of Spain's enemy: the French. The battle between the Baron of Vatteville and the Duke of Guise was the heroic highlight of the Castilian pamphlet. The Duke appeared out of nowhere. Still, the Baron was able to fend him off with his army of weakened but loyal soldiers, and the help of reformed Neapolitans. This portrayal of an unexpected skirmish with the French, an attack from which the Spanish had to defend themselves like any other, glossed over any political reasons why the Duke might have been there. Yet, the *Manifest ofte Redenen* gave a strong impression that the people of Naples themselves had requested help from the French.

In the third text of the *Manifest*, which ended with a plea for help, the letter claimed that the Neapolitan nobility was no longer loyal to the king. Considering what we have studied on the history of the expansion of the Spanish Monarchy, this opened doors to annexation of the Neapolitan Kingdom to a new ruler. The nobility not owing allegiance to another king would mean that they the local authorities were open to making the crucial alliances needed to establish rule in a kingdom

²⁷³ Hills, *Invisible City*, 20.

²⁷⁴ Astarita, *Village Justice*, 50.

where a longstanding feudal tradition was present. All evidence in this thesis had pointed towards a largely loyal nobility and suggested that the nobility had not been separatist. Previous chapter we have seen that Astarita and Villari found evidence against this, and these pamphlets have shown that the so called traitors of the Neapolitan people remained loyal to their king.

If there should be any consideration of a separatist nobility, it was that because Neapolitan barons did face a development of a bureaucratic monarchical state that sought to eliminate the political power of old aristocratic families. This, Naples did have in common with the rest of European early modern states. The significant difference, however, was that Naples was ruled from afar. There was no court at the center of the government. Viceroys tried to imitate royal allures, but in reality, the viceroy was only a magistrate and his tenure was brief. The absence of a royal court also fragmented the network of patronage. Another consequence of the distant Spanish rule was that Naples was given a specific role in the imperial system: to raise the state funds. From the time that Naples was secure under Spanish rule, the king expected from this region a steady supply of money, resources and men, to support his enterprises elsewhere. The king was therefore very lenient regarding compromises with the local nobility, as long as the kingdom's tasks were fulfilled. Thus, the nobility maintained its privileges in face of the monarch's absolutist ambitions.²⁷⁵ Most evidence therefore maintains that the nobility of Naples had no particular interests of breaking their allegiance with their king.

V.III – Conclusion

October 1647 in Naples has been portrayed as a period of sacrifice, perseverance and loyalty by both the Dutch and Castilian source in this chapter. These characteristics, however, were attributed to the opposing parties in the battle for Naples. The first of these parties consisted out of Don Juan of Austra, the Baron of Vatteville, and the soldiers of the Spanish Armada. The second; the people of Naples.

The Castilian pamphlet, a compilation of the accounts of the Baron of Vatteville witnessing the Revolt of Naples from October 1647 until April 1684, which started on the first day of October, when Don Juan had gone ashore to discuss the state of the Revolt with the Duke of Arcos. As it turned out, the people of Naples were armed and hostile. Don Juan therefore disembarked the army, which had been awaiting orders offshore, four days later. What followed was a systematic occupation of the city. This operation went smoothly enough, but the real challenge was when the French army invaded the city. With only a handful of Spanish soldiers and a few reformed Neapolitans, the Baron had been able to defeat the French invasion. With this attack, however, the city counted 500 casualties, all danger had not yet passed. The French navy soon disembarked, and all the Baron had to defend the Neapolitan coast was his fatigued, hungry and outnumbered army. Yet, his soldiers showed no doubt nor protest. The kindness with which the Baron treated his soldiers, and the loyalty they showed him in return, did not go unnoticed by the Neapolitan people. The Baron won their affection as well, and in time the nobility could not resist his honorable character either. Additionally, the Baron also had pamphlets printed and disseminated throughout the Neapolitan barracks, contradicting negative rumors about Spaniards, and were full of the king's praises for Don Juan and

²⁷⁵ Astarita, *The Continuity of Feudal Power*, 203-205.

the Baron. Having befriended the conflicted parties of the Revolt and negating negative thoughts of the Spanish, the Baron of Vatteville was able to reconcile them and restore peace to the Kingdom of Naples.

The narration of the resolving of the Revolt of Naples would seem like a textbook operation that would have gone entirely to plan had it not been for the French attack. Nevertheless, the Spanish representatives were able to restore peace by restoring the relationship between nobility and the rest of the Neapolitan population. This reduction of the Revolt to a local conflict, completely negated the fault of the Spanish government. If anything, the crown had made sure that the unrest in the Kingdom would be settled by offering his most virtuous representatives. This was entirely contrary to the Dutch representation of the Revolt, in which the Spanish army only further aggravated an already present problem. *Manifest Ofte Redenen Waerom de Ghemeynte van Napels Genootsaeckt is gheworden om haer te ontslaen van het Jock van Spangien*, in its title already indicated the general message of the pamphlet. The people of Naples had no other choice but to release themselves from the tyranny that came with Spanish rule.

From the first text of the pamphlet, the people of Naples had already shown inclination to rebel against the nobility, but showed no sign of separatist ideas. Among its threats, the text claimed that if a nobleman was to take up arms against Neapolitan citizens, they could retaliate without punishment. The word citizen, according to Vittor Ivo Comparato, was one of the terms that had been gaining popularity among the idealists of popular rule and ideals behind the Neapolitan Republic.²⁷⁶ The text was openly threatening nobility, and encouraged the people of Naples to take the law into their own hands. This inspires the question of whether the Neapolitan juridical system had been lacking, or whether this had been the experience of Neapolitans. When three quarters of the Neapolitan population fell under feudal jurisdiction, there was little it could legally do against an unjust nobility. The text therefore encouraged punishing criminal noblemen singlehandedly when they acted unjustly. Furthermore, in addition to their punishment, the Neapolitans were also encouraged to divide their possessions amongst themselves. This indicated that the Neapolitan population may not have been very content with the current division of wealth. This would be in accordance to the division the increasing burden of taxes. This text would also be in accordance with the Castilian portrayal of the Revolt having been a conflict between populace and nobility.

Nevertheless, the *Manifest ofte Redenen* continued with the narration of the backstabbing Spanish ruin of the city of Naples, and the resorting to natural law when their government had now fallen short. The total renunciation of the Spanish king also applied to the Neapolitan nobility, which owed no more allegiance to Philip IV and were therefore open to accepting a new ruler. The only allegiance that was expected from the Neapolitan people, was to their own *patria*. Anyone that acted differently would be charged with treason, and would be punished accordingly. Thus the Revolt had taken entirely different turn, when the Spanish representative Don Juan had refused to settle the Revolt on their terms of justice and the restitution of their privileges.

²⁷⁶ "From the Crisis of Civil Culture to the Neapolitan Republic of 1647: Republicanism in Italy between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in M. van Gelderen & Q. Skinner (eds.), *A Shared European Heritage vol. 1* (Cambridge 2002).

The Dutch account openly ended with pleas for help, but the Castilian publication continued to the very end of the Revolt, at which point the Neapolitan people, nobility and the Spanish authority were once again reconciled. Just like *la Reducion de la Ciudad, y Reyno de Napoles* of the previous chapter, the cause Revolt was again reduced to a chaos that had arisen as a result of the broken relationship between populace and nobility. The Baron had been able to successfully reconcile the nobility and the people of Naples; the body of the state.

Both pamphlets indicate that the Revolt had been caused by a conflict between populace and nobility. The Dutch pamphlet turned at its second text, and seemed rather inconsistent with the first, when the Revolt was geared towards the royal faults alone. Another inconsistency that appears in the *Manifest ofte Redenen*, is when it is compared to *de restitutie der privilegien*. In the latter, the Duke of Arcos had already signed the restitution of the Neapolitan privileges. The *Manifest ofte Redenen* showed no cooperation of the royal representatives at all. The disregard to the restitution of privileges was represented by the account of Vatteville as well, considering that he made no mention of this problem at all. He also failed to mention the collaboration between the Neapolitans and the French, as well as the formation of the Neapolitan Republic.

All Neapolitan political ambitions were reduced to a conflict of passion, that the Baron was able to lull by winning the Neapolitan's trust and affection. That the people fell for his patronizing approach further strengthened the Castilian argument that the Revolt had been one of passion. While the *Manifest ofte Redenen* also laid an emphasis on the passionate aspect of the Revolt, the people of Naples expressed themselves in a political way. They were conscious of their unjust treatment, and knew exactly why and how their loyalty to the Spanish crown would be broken.

Chapter VI – The Revolt of Naples in Literary Art

The final comparison of this study will be on the influence of the Neapolitan Revolt in the artistic field. The Revolt of Naples left a significant trace in the memories of European minds, and a significant way to influence these memories was through the representations of the Revolt in literary art. This chapter will therefore compare two artistic expressions of Spanish-Neapolitan relations in the form of an epic poem, and of a dramatic play.

The latter was the work of a seventeenth century Dutch writer, who was inspired to compose a play based on the Neapolitan hero: Masaniello. *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello, of Napelse beroerte* was published in 1668, a good two decades after the Revolt. The subject, a rebellion, was a rare theme on the stages of the seventeenth century. If there had been any plays that included the subject of rebellion, it had been portrayed as negative. Asselijn took a unique stance in justifying a revolt, and presenting the people of Naples as subjects to unbearable tyranny, whose rebellion was understandable – if not entirely justified.²⁷⁷ Asselijn also showed another side of the revolt, however, in which the rebellion itself was a horror, and Masaniello showed tyrannical behavior in his final days of madness.²⁷⁸

Masaniello became quite a popular figure in European popular literature. His remarkable rise to power occurred in more novels and playwright throughout Europe for centuries after the Neapolitan Revolt. The popularity of Masaniello was not so prevalent in Spanish art – but the Castilians did manage to bring a positive account of Spanish-Neapolitan relations in the form of an epic poem. In 1649, Don Francisco de Borja composed *Napoles recuperada por el rey don Alonso*. This poem did not speak of the Revolt at all, but of king Alfonso I's heroic defeat of the French and recuperation of Naples. It is portrayed as one of the greatest achievements in Spanish history. The poem exalted Spanish military achievements, and many letters preceding the poem praised this achievement, as well as Spanish superiority and Castilian culture.

VI.I – The Poem and the Play

Napoles y España recuperadas

Napoles recuperada por el rey don Alonso was written by Francisco de Borja, Prince of Esquilache, Count of Mayalde, Commander of Azuage of the Order of Santiago, gentleman of the chamber of his Majesty. The epic poem – a book of nearly four-hundred pages – told the story of Alfonso V of Aragon's recapture of Naples in 1442.²⁷⁹ The *Aureum compendium* by de Thoro has shown us the worth of considering all forewords of seventeenth century works, and *Napoles recuperada* was similarly provided with significant texts. The book started with an epilogue written by Father Francisco Mazedo.²⁸⁰ He claimed that despite the true historical content; the poem was a work of art. Its style was a perfect imitation of the works of the ancients and was obviously inspired by the great

²⁷⁷ Marijke Meijer Drees 'Inleiding' in *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello, of Napelse beroerte*, 1.

²⁷⁸ Meijer Drees 'Inleiding', 3.

²⁷⁹ Francisco de Borja, *Napoles recuperada por el rey don Alonso*, 1651.

²⁸⁰ 'Padre Francisco de Mazedo, de la Compañía de Jesus, Catedratico de Retorica y Poesia en los Estudios Reales de su Magestad de Madrid.' lii.

works such as Homer and Virgil. While it was an epic poem, it told its story as elegantly as any poem.²⁸¹ Thus it was with pride that this work of art, written in perfect Castilian, was brought to light: 'que sera de grande honra, no solo para el Autor, sino tambien para toda Espana'.

The publication included a number of censorships as well. First, it was censured and revised by Diego Niseno as ordered and commissioned by Don Alonso de Morales Ballesteros, 'Vicario General desta Villa de Madrid'. The work was censured so as not to overstep any of the dogma's of the Catholic faith, and the poem had fit these Christian requirements perfectly. Niseno was all praise for this work, and believed that it might as well have been called *Napoles y España recuperadas*. Naples, because it honored the kingdom by showing its grand history; and Spain, because the poem showed the Spanish sublime spirit, and recuperated the glory of 'nuestra Nacion'. This work showed the people of the world what a great work of art it had produced. This text was signed at 'el gran Basilio de Madrid' 17 May 1649.²⁸²

Another censorship was employed by Augustin de Castro. He also praised the artistic value of the work; how brilliant the Castilian language was; and what honor it brought to the Spanish monarchy. Signed from the Colegio Imperial de la Compañia de Jesus, 12 June 1649. Finally, this line of censorships ended with the approved of Del Padre Fray Geronimo de San Joseph, from the Carmelita Descalzo, signed 1 June 1651. He could not but agree that the work was a prima example of Spanish poetry. Finally, there was the approval of Padre Maestro Fray Ivan Perez de Munebrega, Difidor General de la Orden de la Merced, Redempcion de Cautivos. He too praised the work that brought to light the great achievements of Spain. The work was already copyrighted for ten years in 1649, was licenced to be printed on 6 June 1651.

De Borja noted that the reason why this work was printed years after it had been finished, was so that it could be approved by the many knowledgeable people listed above. The poem, de Borja ensured the reader, was historically accurate, and contained no exaggerations of what had happened. He made sure of this especially, because hyperboles were only invitations to criticism, and the historical accuracy saved the many of the reviewers the trouble of having to correct it.²⁸³ De Borja obviously felt strongly about not allowing the nature of poetry to affect the historical accuracy of his work, but this gentleman of the king's chamber could apparently not help but romanticize the recuperation of Naples:

Alli el silencio, la ocasion y el arte
(forcosos consejeros de la Guerra)
la furia templan del airado Marte,
que todo estuendo military destierra.
Si el muro rondas sin dormer reparte,
Alfonso rompe su vezina tierra,

²⁸¹ De Mazedo, 'En las descripciones y comparaciones guarda todas las leyes de la buena Retorica y Poesia, y no las entra con violencia, sino que la misma obra las pide; ni es prolijo, ni enfandoso en ellas, antes engendra y causa con ellas gusto y deleite.'

²⁸² Diego Niseno, *Napoles recuperada por el rey don Alonso*, Viii-ix.

²⁸³ De Borja, *Napoles recuperada por el rey don Alonso*, xxiiij.

A todos ocultando, sola y muda
La obscura noche con igual ayuda.²⁸⁴

Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello, of Napelse beroerte²⁸⁵

The opening act of the 'Rise and Fall of Mas Anjello, or the Neapolitan Revolt' presented the circumstances of the people of Naples who were confronted with ever increasing taxes on their most basic necessities. The Neapolitan people could no longer support that the revenues of these extreme taxes would be used to support the incessant Spanish warfare. Greed was the main motivation of those in the court of Naples, where ministers abused the name of their king to fill their own pockets, while the populace starved. In this context, 'Mas Anjello' decided that the time had come to liberate the Neapolitan people from this abuse.

Anjello managed to gain support from various groups within Neapolitan society to actively come to a stance against the government. During the first dialogue of the play, Anjello explained his reasons for planning to free the Neapolitan people from their suffering and from the taxes that contributed to their misery.²⁸⁶ He discussed this plan with Perrone, the chief of a large banditry in Naples. He asked Anjello how he planned on doing this, as he did not have the means or weapons to achieve any such thing. Anjello, however, saw the strength of the Neapolitan people in numbers, and in the power of their bitterness: 'De meenigte is al ree ontelbaar in getal, en ieder is vol wraak en bitterheydt.'²⁸⁷ Perrone was skeptical at first, as he detected thoughtlessness in Anjello's passion. But seeing the latter's determination, Perrone was persuaded and agreed to offer his support.

Anjello then started persuading his friends by telling them that they had seen that who wanted to stir the state, should first stir its people. Furthermore: 'al wie stats recht beschermt, voldoet zijn eed en pligt,' all those who protected the state's rights, fulfilled their duty. Anjello's friends also were skeptical at first, asking if he was approving of open mutiny. Indeed, Masaniello replied, the government forbade rebellion; but this government abused its power, and was therefore tyrannous. The nobility suppressed the people of Naples and did so in the name of the King. Noblemen lacked every virtue and only acted out of greed. They had no regard for the rights of the people they were abusing, but only insisted on their own privileges; fiercely attacking those who threatened them. The government required the very people of Naples to take action, in order to be saved from the nobility that was ruining the state. The nobility was now harming the common good. Here, natural law would have to take over: 'Natuur gebiedt u weer te wreken aan tyrannen.'²⁸⁸ This was what justified the people to resist authority, so now all they needed was to trust in their courage to defend their 'Vaderland'. Strong in their numbers, the people of Naples managed to arm themselves, and took revenge for their abuse by seeking out their repressors: the nobility.

²⁸⁴ De Borja, *Napoles recuperada por el rey don Alonso*, 31.

²⁸⁵ Asselijn, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello*.

²⁸⁶ Asselijn, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello*, 26: 'Het volck van al hun lasten te bevryen, En schattinge, zoo lang gedraagen tot hun leet.'

²⁸⁷ Asselijn, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello*, 27.

²⁸⁸ Asselijn, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello*, 33, translates into 'nature commands you to seek revenge in tyranny.'

In the second act, the astonished Duke of Arcos sought advice from his council: two noblemen, two representatives of the people and the archbishop of Naples. The nobility was all in favor of immediate, aggressive action. The people's representatives and the archbishop suggested a milder approach, and to give ear to the pleas of the Neapolitan people. They referred to the recent events in Palermo, where the entire nation had been turned upside down by its angry populace. The archbishop, Filomarino, observed that the people hated the nobility and the unbearable taxes which were most recently imposed on fruit.²⁸⁹ The viceroy opted for the milder approach of considering the pleas of the Neapolitan people, and asked Filomarino to act as a mediator between government and people. In the city, Filomarino met with Anjello and his companions, and pled with them to stop their violence. However, the rebels stated that they would not let themselves be soothed by comforting words and empty promises. Anjello laid down his demands and Filomarino returned these to the king, and again advised for a policy in which the taxes would be lowered. To the nobility's displeasure; Arcos agreed to agreeing to Anjello's demands. The nobles therefore decided to have Anjello assassinated. They conspired with Anjello's bandit friend, Peronne.²⁹⁰ This plan was discovered, however, and the revolt rose to new heights.

To soothe the revolt, Anjello was invited to the viceroy's court to negotiate terms once again. Anjello, it appeared, had been completely inflated by his position of power. Arcos had offered him gifts and regal jewelry, and exalted him above the people: 'als opperhoofd van staat.'²⁹¹ His followers no longer supported him, and even came to the viceroy to complain about his tyranny. Anjello went to Filomarino to complain of their deceit; 'Myn Heer, 't ont dankbre volk heft my geheel verlaaten.'²⁹² The archbishop could not let him come to his senses, so left him be. Anjello then turned to his friends, but would to them his last words would be spoken. The nobility had taken the loss of his supporters as a sign that the time had ripened for another attempt to assassinate Anjello, who was now called 'tyran en pest van 't Rijk en van den ganschen Staat.'²⁹³

Upon the death of Masaniello, the entire nation rejoiced and seemed reborn.

VI.II – History as propaganda

The literary works of de Borja and Asselijn had more value to them than having been fine samples of historical fiction. Both the poem and the play carried heavy political insinuations – some of them more obvious than others. This subchapter will consider how these narratives of Neapolitan-Spanish relations were appropriate to the political contexts of their authors.

Value of history

Throughout this thesis, there has been much evidence that much value was placed on historical evidence for contemporary thoughts. The feudal system, for instance, was based on its laws and

²⁸⁹ Asselijn, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello*, 44: 'Men vloekt den Adeldom en lasten iop het ooft, Hun onverdraagelijk dus op den hals te laden'.

²⁹⁰ Asselijn, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello*, 77.

²⁹¹ Asselijn, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello*, 103.

²⁹² Asselijn, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello*, 120, continued: 'Ik ben als radeloos. Hoe radeloos? O neen. Ik ben de mondt van 't regt, een voorspraak van 't gemeen.'

²⁹³ Asselijn, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello*, 221.

traditions, and would not tolerate any changes that would change the traditional position of the nobility. Privileges that were granted centuries before, would be defended not only by the nobility; but also by the Neapolitan people, even when they had been infringed for as long as they could personally remember. Historical memory, however, was kept alive by for instance Summonte's *Historia*, which was said to have been the inspiration of the reform movement of popular rule. Lessons learned from rulers throughout history were appreciated by de Thoro – and while not directly related to the Revolt – was taken as evidence for political theory by Machiavelli. History was also an important medium of propaganda, and that seemed to have been the case in the two artistic representations of history here.

Similar to the Neapolitan insistence of the continuation of history and tradition, the publication of *Napoles recuperada* praised the origins of Spanish grandeur. Not only did the work itself praise Spanish achievement; the various reviews this poem had gotten from various Castilian dignitaries, held that this work was a classic demonstration of Spanish greatness. Niseno even linked the great poem to the history of Naples, whose people would take honor in their representation in this story. The writing of *Napoles recuperada por el rey don Alonso* could be seen to have been an attempt to remind the people of Castile, if not the world, that the Spanish Monarchy was to be associated with power and military success. Spain took great pride in its military success and Reconquista culture. Alfonso V of Aragon had been able to heroically conquer Naples in 1442, just as Naples had recently been reconquered, so to speak, with the same incessant superiority by Philip IV in 1648. Alfonso, of course, had been king of Aragon and not Castile, but the reviewers of the poem kept insisting on the grandeur of the whole of Spain. This might have suggested that the people of Spain were to remember their common history, and that their membership of the Spanish Monarchy was to be viewed with a sense of common identity and pride.

The play of *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello* similarly appreciated a common history, and in this case it was not the membership; but the resistance of Spanish government. Israel noted that the Revolt of Naples had become symbolic for the resistance to monarchical tyranny.²⁹⁴ Israel also noted that Masaniello in particular, became to be seen as the evidence that common people, too, had just as much capacity for leadership.²⁹⁵ The latter was an interesting notion when compared to the particular representation of the end of the Revolt by Asselijn.

Justification of revolt

The *Op- en ondergang* demonstrated the alleged defensive necessity of the Revolt of Naples. The people of Naples were well aware of the crime they would commit if they were to take part in an open rebellion, but chose to do so nevertheless out of bare necessity. At this point, there was no use in maintaining public order; order had already been disrupted by the tyrannical government. What the people therefore wanted, was a restitution of this public order, and thereby the restitution of the Kingdom's privileges. Interesting about the play was that the rebels, Anjello included, knew a great deal more about politics and government than one would expect from the general public – which the Spanish sources in this study claimed to have revolted out of passion and ignorance. The Neapolitan

²⁹⁴ Jonathan Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man (1670-1752)*.

²⁹⁵ Jonathan Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity (1650-1750)*.

people in the *Op- en ondergang* were perfectly well aware of the importance that they emphasized that their rebellion was not against the Spanish king, but against the ministers of the Neapolitan Kingdom who had caused this tyranny. At the court, and especially by the viceroy, their demands were met with reasonable understanding. This sympathetic reaction from the representatives of the Duke of Arcos, supported the idea that their rebellion was justified.

On the other hand, the play also showed the aggression with which the rebellion was undertaken. Anjello associated with the lowliest members of Neapolitan society during the revolt. His leadership created circumstances which opened doors to plundering, abuse and even murder. Anjello was also shown to have become excessively cruel once he had been given power, and his death was accepted as the avenger for the blood on his hands. The play was published again in 1669, this time accompanied by a poem by an anonymous writer. The poem praised the play, by explaining the essence of the story: the tyrannous nobility got its well-deserved penance, but the disrupters of public order would not go unpunished either.²⁹⁶ This poem could be taken to have reflected upon the criticism that the play had been exposed to. The compelling monologues of Anjello and the people's representatives and archbishop's sympathy to their cause, could have been taken to have justified and even encouraged open rebellion. An example of this is another poem by Andries Pels, written in 1681.²⁹⁷ It stated that the play was written 'Om het volk tot muitery, en oproer te beweegen': to stir the people consider to mutiny any rebellion.²⁹⁸ The people of the Dutch Republic were not moved in any such a way, and the play was acted out and was published many times since its debut.

In the play's prologue, Asselijn made a comparison between the Neapolitan suffering, and a similar occurrence in Dutch history: when the Duke of Alba had been agitating the Low Countries with a raise in taxes, 'scheen den gantschen Staat gedreyght te warden met een eeuwichduurige slaverny': the whole nation was threatened to condemnation to eternal slavery. Its rights and privileges would have been disregarded, and the country would have been ruined as a result of tyrannical government under Philip II, on which grounds his sovereignty would be rejected.

What would be an interesting observation to make from these two expressions of art, was that the Dutch still had the Neapolitan Revolt in mind – two decades after its occurrence. Asselijn was able to recount the first ten days of the Revolt in great detail, many of which seem historically accurate when compared to secondary literature.²⁹⁹ What was more, Anjello took on the role of the brave and noble-hearted protagonist of the Neapolitan Revolt, just as portrayed in *Autentijck, bescheyt en seker verhael van de restitutie der privilegien aen het volck van Napels*. Throughout the play, the Revolt was brought back to life, and its comparison to the Spanish repression of the Dutch demonstrated that the anti-Spanish sentiment was kept in Dutch culture. The Spanish, on the other hand, seemed to want to push the Revolt back into the farthest places of the public mind within a year after it had ended, and drew happier and prouder memories of the Spanish relations with the Kingdom of Naples.

²⁹⁶ 'Soo heerlijck als het is voor 't Vaderlandt te sterven, Soo schandelijck een doot de Rustverstoorders erven.' ('As honorable it is to die for one's homeland, so shameful it is to die as a disrupter of peace.)

²⁹⁷ Marijke Meijer Drees 'Inleiding' in *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello, of Napelse beroerte*, 10.

²⁹⁸ Andries Pels, *Gebruik én Misbruik des tooneels*, 1681.

²⁹⁹ Facts and names used in the play are in accordance with the details in the narrative of the Revolt by Peter Robb, *Street Fight in Naples*.

VI.III – Conclusion

The reminiscence of the heroic figure of Masaniello in Dutch culture came in the shape of Asselijn's *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello, of Napelse beroerte*. Asselijn's play, however, was subject to criticism for its open justification of popular rebellion. De Borja's epic poem was much less of a controversial topic, as it had already been approved by a number of reviewers that left no chance for a politically incorrect thought to have been embedded in its text.

What was most interesting about *Napoles recuperada por el rey don Alonso*, was that it was accompanied by a number of letters of those who had censored and approved of de Borja's work. The epic poem had dutifully been censored by Castilian clergymen, who ensured that de Borja would not accidentally publish anything that would oppose the dogma's of the Catholic faith. Having conformed this, these reviewers also praised the work of de Borja; the victorious history of the Spanish Monarchy; the honor that the Kingdom of Naples should find in this; and the absolute superiority of Castilian culture and language. De Borja himself provided his work with a prologue, in which he assured the reader that his poem was historically accurate, and did not contain any exaggerations in service of poetic beauty. The reader could question the honesty of the latter statement, but the many notable reviewers of *Napoles recuperada* – as de Borja pointed out – would have detected any errors in his work.

The many reassurances that the reader was about to be presented with a historically accurate piece of literary artwork, was an important element in this Castilian source. The value of history in public minds and governmental propaganda has been emphasized throughout this thesis, and the epic poem portraying the recuperation of Naples by a great Spanish king was an ideal way of presenting the Monarchy's glorious history. Alfonso V was king of Aragon, but was presented here as part of the Spanish legacy that the entire Monarchy would appreciate. Superiority was accredited to Castilian culture, but it was all of Spain, and especially the Kingdom of Naples, that deserved to share this common pride. The Revolt that occurred a year prior to de Borja's writing, seemed to have been swept under the rug entire, making way for memories that did the Spanish Monarchy much more justice.

Very much alive, however, remained Masaniello in the minds of the people of the Dutch Republic. Rebellion, however, was an unconventional theme on the stage. If it was presented, it would often be done with a negative message. The Revolt of Naples had nevertheless been a memorable event that had coincided with the last breath of the Eight Years' War, and might still have been appreciated for the common enemy that was the king of Spain. The Dutch pamphlets that had been disseminated on the Revolt, portrayed the Neapolitan cause in such a way that its rebellion seemed justified. The similarity between the Dutch and Neapolitan cause, aside from an allegedly tyrannous king, was their formation of a republic. Asselijn drew a negative picture of the nobility, which had been responsible for the Revolt and further aggravated it by employing their usual immoral ways.

The reinstatement of the privileges of the third estate seemed to have been an important theme throughout the play, and the common people of Naples were presented as politically conscious members of society. Asselijn seemed to have maintained a delicate balance between the Neapolitan's resistance to the tyrannous ministers of the king of Spain; and resisting present

government. The Dutch Republic had been established since 1648, and while a negative portrayal of monarchical tyranny was in its favor; twenty years later it also needed obedience from the Dutch people, and *crimen laesae* was to be understood to still be a crime. The poem seems to have shifted away from the presentation of the Revolt in the *Manifest ofte Redenen*, in which the Neapolitan people violently rejected their sovereign altogether; to a much more reasonable people, that weighed the risk and crime of rebellion against the unjust treatment of subjects. Here they seemed to have made an informed decision, in which civil law would have to temporarily be subordinated to natural law. In a way, the tyrannous regime of Naples had forced its people to take part in a terrible tragedy that had no possibility of ending well. 'Natuur gebiedt u weer te wreken aan tyrannen,'³⁰⁰ but gave no guarantees for what would follow. The *Op- en ondergang* was a terrible tragedy in which the people of Naples were condemned to an unfortunate outcome from the start. It was their natural duty to defend themselves from tyranny; yet rebellion was never an option. While the nation belonged to everyone, not just everyone – not even the legendary Masaniello – was equipped to handle the ungratifying burden of leadership.

³⁰⁰ Asselijn, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello*, 33: 'nature commands you to wreak vengeance on tyranny.'

VII – Conclusion

The contemporary historiography on the Revolt of Naples has been divided by the debate on whether it had been a rebellion motivated by passionate or political reasons. Both sides of this debate could find evidence in the historical context of the Kingdom of Naples, as well as seventeenth century primary sources on the Revolt. The two most outspoken historians on the Revolt of Naples have been Peter Burke and Rosario Villari. Burke considered the passionate – or in his terms – emotional value of the Revolt, while Villari tried to show that the passionate emphasis on the Revolt negated its political value. Throughout this thesis, I have considered the possibilities of both passionate and the political motivations of the Revolt, based on the findings of modern historians, as well as on seventeenth century Castilian and Dutch accounts of the Revolt of Naples.

Historiography on the Revolt of Naples most often includes a reference to the context of the Kingdom to validate its particular views on the Revolt. Elliot, for example, saw that the classic preconditions of revolt in the seventeenth century were scarcity of food and an increase in taxes. The Kingdom of Naples in 1647 had a scarcity of food, and there was an increase of fruit taxes. Burke found these preconditions inhuman and deterministic. Instead, Burke looked at the causes of the Revolt from an anthropological standpoint. Here he saw occurrence the Revolt of Palermo, the imposition of fruit taxes and the occurrence of the festival of the Virgin of the Carmine, each as instigators of a rebellion. Apparently not as deterministic; these three occurrences combined, Burke claimed to have been the events that triggered the Revolt of Naples.

Villari was less clear on the topic of the triggers of the Neapolitan Revolt. Instead, he diverted the attention from the conventional ten days of passion and towards the politically charged atmosphere that had already been present long before the Revolt. In my thesis, I have tried to take into consideration all of these themes. The scarcity of basic necessities and the possible aggravation of the least fortunate of society; the inspirations and circumstances that might have inspired spontaneous action; and the tensions present in political thought. I have therefore studied the historical context of Spanish Naples, the personal aggravations of the people of Naples, and the most prominent political thoughts in the Spanish Monarchy.

Most of this research has shown similarities with Villari's argumentation in favor of a political Revolt, and the pamphlets I have studied suggest that the Revolt of Naples was much more than a spontaneous act of passion. This political view, which was essentially the outcome of Villari's extensive research as well, leads me to believe that his would have been closer to the objective truth of the Revolt of Naples than that of Burke. To add to this research, however, I have also considered the significance of propaganda in early modern government, and the possibility that this altogether skewed all information around the Revolt of Naples that has been gathered throughout this thesis.

This called for the differentiation between subjective and objective primary sources. While Burke rejected Elliott's supposed inhuman factors, they did come from objective sources. Burke, instead, relied on subjective sources, which I hope to have proven to have been entirely vulnerable to opinion, propaganda and purposeful misinformation. Furthermore, first two chapters of my thesis have demonstrated the importance of the contextual factors of the Revolt when considering the

subjective sources that we are left with today. Burke, while taking objective economic sources into account, also based much of his argumentation on subjective sources.

An interesting insight into Neapolitan political relations by the use of objective sources, has been provided by Astarita. His use of juridical sources for his case study of Pentidattilo, has demonstrated the extent of feudal power, lack of royal power and the influence of jurisdiction on society by studying objective sources that provided names, numbers occupations and verdicts recorded in the courts of Naples. While also subjective to interpretation, such objective sources should be seen as vital to a proper reconstruction of the Revolt of Naples.

The Kingdom of Naples under Philip IV

In the identification of the framework of seventeenth century Naples, Chapter I and II have considered the position of the Kingdom of Naples within the Spanish Monarchy. The formation of the Spanish Monarchy dated back to 1469, in which year Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon became sovereigns over the autonomous political entities of Castile, Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia. The most significant element of this union was that each entity remained unrelated, other than that they shared common sovereigns. Another important element that had developed during the rule of Ferdinand and Isabella, was that they ruled through a network of alliances that held local authority. This network of alliances was to characterize Spanish government throughout the rest of Habsburg rule.

Another significant characteristic imposed on Spain by the Catholic Kings, was its identity of a Catholic monarchy. In the defense of the Christian faith, Castile was accepted as it acted as the military leader of the religious cause. This set the basis of Castilian domination over the Spanish Monarchy, which was further extended when the Spanish Court had permanently moved to Madrid in 1561. The network of alliances through which royal power was maintained throughout the Monarchy, became increasingly Castilian. The Castilianization of the Spanish Monarchy had risen to new heights during the rule of Philip IV, whose policies of centralization – most famous of which was the Union of Arms – demanded conformation to the Castilian government. Kamen found that the centralization of the Spanish government was the leading cause of all revolts in the 1640's. Indeed, after Olivares had left his office, the Spanish government opted for a more conservative approach of handling each political unit as an autonomous entity, which Elliott believed to have been the wisest survival tactic of the Spanish government.

The insistence of the autonomy of the nations within Spain, and the rejection of Castilian influences, brought up the question of seventeenth century identity. The use of the words use of nation, loyalty and *patria*, was not uncommon in Naples at the time of the Revolt. These were significant terms that demand a proper definition befitting their context in order to understand the revolts that had arisen in the 1640's, which seemed to have manifested themselves in the form of national rebellions. The inhabitants of the entities felt themselves tied to kingdom, community or *patria* through a variety of factors. The kingdom of Naples had its own culture and jurisdiction, among the primary factors that determined the identity of a nation. This identity came with a *naturaleza*, which legally determined ones identity. The person of the king had a single body but also had many public body's; one of which had the *naturaleza* that made him king of the Neapolitan nation. The *naturaleza* came with rights as well as obligations, and the latter included loyalty to the sovereign. In this sense, the Neapolitan

rebels' claim of loyalty to the Spanish king, was a legal obligation. While loyalty to the king could be said to have been a sentimental love for the *patria*, it should also be kept in mind that any allegations of treason would have had grave consequences, and even a rebellious mob may have been aware of this. The accompanying chants of 'long live the king' by the Neapolitan rebels during the Revolt may have been an attempt to exempt themselves from this unforgivable criminal act. This raises the question of whether Neapolitan loyalty to the king was only a legal formality, or whether it had truly been a personal sense of loyalty towards all things connected to the *patria*.

The Spanish nations' definition of their identity and their concern with the proper consideration of their autonomy was an important problem for the king's policy of centralization. Technically, the identity of each political entity was defined by its laws and privileges, rather than its territorial space. When the constitution of such an entity was infringed, a revolt would have been constitutionally justified. The government of the Spanish Monarchy rested on a delicate balance between local and royal authority. Any attempts towards centralization had to be presented with utmost care, and required the public to believe that their monarch was acting according to their best individual interests. The reputation of a king was therefore of utmost importance during his rule. The reputation of Spanish grandeur had been waning under Philip IV, but he still had the benefit of his Catholic reputation in a Monarchy in which the Christian faith played a major role in society. The opinions of political thinkers were sooner skewed to favor a virtuous king than one that ruled with practical aims alone. Even their 'reason of state' was grounded on the duty of the Spanish king as the defender of the Catholic faith.³⁰¹ The unquestioned importance of religion to the inhabitants of the Spanish Monarchy was further illustrated by the support of the extravagant clergy even in times of crises.³⁰² All of this suggests that religion was therefore a very effective tool in the propaganda used project the king and his rule. His Christian virtue largely legitimized the rule of the Spanish King among political thinkers. Much effort was made in portraying the virtuous image of the Spanish sovereign, and this again illustrates the importance of public opinion in the seventeenth century.

Possible incentives of the Revolt of Naples

In the face of the problem of centralization as portrayed above, it could be said that the nobility of the Neapolitan Kingdom had seen its privileges infringed, and had been able to call tyranny on the basis of the unconstitutional policies of the Spanish king. However, the Revolt of Naples could retrospectively have been caused by a myriad of incentives, based on the economic, social and juridical tensions within the Kingdom. While the alleged decline of Spain is very much debatable, there is no denying the fiscal strain that the crown was forced to put on its subjects, and what the consequences the priority of financial revenue over proper government were. In the Kingdom of Naples, financial demands had reached such heights that the Neapolitan government started selling state offices, feudal lands and public revenues. The desperate willingness of the court to sell public offices and revenues significantly discredited the government's authority, which was already selling its power to private persons. In addition to an incessant request for finances from the Spanish crown, the distant ruler was also demanding the Kingdom Neapolitan troops to be dispatched abroad.

³⁰¹ Elliott, 'Power and Propaganda', 148-154.

³⁰² Helen Rawlings, '*Arbitrismo* and the Early Seventeenth Century Spanish Church: The Theory and Practice of Anti-Clericalist Philosophy' in *Rhetoric and Reality in Early Modern Spain* (London 2006) 25-40.

Soldiers were physically resisting conscription, and Neapolitan people were rioting in protest against the plunder of their men. From this standpoint, there could have been significant contempt for the Spanish king and his concern with far off warfare instead of proper government.

The power struggle between the crown and nobility, while discreetly fought, had been present since the very annexation of the Kingdom of Naples by the Spanish government. Naples had known a very longstanding feudal tradition, and the Spanish king – as had been tradition since the rule of the Catholic Kings – chose to work through the local institutions of power rather than against them to implement Spanish rule. The feudal tradition allowed the local nobility much autonomy. The degree in which local nobility enjoyed autonomy, was illustrated by the system of the *universitàs*, which played a significant role in Neapolitan administration. The whole of the kingdom was divided into *universitàs*, which enjoyed responsibility for their own administration, and were free to collect and pay taxes to the central government as they saw fit. Most *universitàs* were feudal, and this meant that they were endowed with certain legal characteristics. A baron was endowed with personal privileges, and was invested with juridical power. All inhabitants of a feudal *università* therefore fell under baronial jurisdiction. This entailed that his vassals were not able to enjoy the protection of royal authority. Reports of feudal abuses would often go unheard, as the collection of taxes was indispensable to the central government.

The already present feudal authority in the Kingdom had been able to gain more ground by the sale of state properties, which had already begun under Charles V. By the end of the sixteenth century, feudal power in Naples had grown stronger than anywhere else in Western Europe. This had not always been the case in the Neapolitan Kingdom, as its history has shown that the third estate had known ample political representation. Traditionally, there had been a system in place by which the third estate had significant influence in politics, and somewhat restricted the advancement of feudal power. Its power was limited, but the *Seggio del Popolo* was left standing under Spanish dominion. The third estate had been granted privileges in their favor in 1505, but by 1647, feudal power had risen to such absolute heights that those in favor of popular rule could have seen the complete neglect of the privileges of the third estate as a reason to rise up in revolt.

An increasing number of historians have been saying that the feudal powers of Naples had not at all been impacted by policies of centralization. Also, the theoretical restrictions placed on the extent of the powers of the baronage over its vassals were often disregarded in practice. The nobility's grip over jurisdiction in over three quarters of the Neapolitan Kingdom illustrated the extent of the local power that the baronage enjoyed. Feudal jurisdiction played a significant part in early modern Neapolitan life, as it signified the hierarchy of every day society. Burke's approach of 'reading between the lines' to discover popular thought, could be contested by the study of court records, in which the illiterate Neapolitan had been recorded in historical memory. Proper study of the feudal juridical powers in Naples would also illustrate that the noblemen of Naples had little to gain from rebelling against their Spanish king, as he had been the source of increasingly unrestrained power, while the crown and the third estate stood immobilized before noble privileges.

Ideal king; ideal government

The juridical system of Naples was a vital part of its politics, society and government. The preface to *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*, written by Giovanni Battista de Thoro,

has given an invaluable insight into the views of a seventeenth century Neapolitan jurist. In this preface, de Thoro provided the reader with his observations on the ideals of kingship, the reason of state, and a description of the organization of his contemporary government. Each one of these points were particularly interesting when placed into the context of their author.

De Thoro listed the essential virtues that a king needed to properly rule over a state: piety, power and wisdom. Each of these virtues were accompanied by an argumentation of why these were essential to the king, based on a typical fusion of scripture and Roman law. The first of these virtues, piety, de Thoro claimed to be necessary for the king and his state to attain the blessings of God. Without this blessing, the state would stand no chance of success. Unlike the ethicists, de Thoro did not stop here. The following two virtues, power and wisdom, were of a practical rather than moral nature, but were nevertheless indispensable to the abilities of a king. Power was needed to enforce the law, and wisdom was needed for the proper administration of government and jurisdiction. In relation to the early modern tradition of Spanish political thought, de Thoro seemed to have been a realist: his insistence on religion and morals came first, but there was still room in to consider the practical requirements of ruling a state.

Surprisingly, these same ideals had also been promoted by the heavily rejected Machiavelli, who stated that a prince had to be strong and clever, and was advised to make the impression that he was also a virtuous Christian. Even more interesting was that the Spanish annexation of Naples largely went according to Machiavellian theory. First, the Kingdom had been conquered by military conquest, as was often the most conventional way of annexing a state. What was most important, however, was to have established alliances within the newly annexed state, so that authority could be established through local institutions. In the Kingdom of Naples, Alfonso of Aragon had established relationships with the local nobility who were open to accept him as their ruler. As long as their new king respected their privileges, they would see no reason to overthrow him. The crown's tiptoeing around the constitution of Naples despite its interference with the royal authority, was an excellent illustration this element in Machiavellian theory. The royal exuberance of Catholicism was the final case in point of the Machiavellian theory that a sovereign would be praised and supported when he showed his subjects his virtue of religion.

De Thoro's insistence on the king's three virtues were also conspicuously similar to Justinian's attribution of the power of warfare, wisdom, and human and religious law to a single ruler. That the king was the sole source of religion, justice and warfare was also used in propaganda that promoted of the person of the king in times of policies of centralization. All that was needed for the proper administration of a state, was centralized to the person of the king. This personification of the ideal government to the king was presented in centralization propaganda, as well as in de Thoro's preface. This similarity raises the question of de Thoro's position in the debate of centralization – or in what position he had been put in.

Furthermore, de Thoro's preface contained some inconsistencies with contemporary literature on the Kingdom of Naples. These inconsistencies mainly concerned the division of authority in the Kingdom. Contemporary historiography has largely indicated that feudal power in Naples remained virtually unchallenged in the face of centralization. King Alfonso, as de Thoro claimed, did not destroy any of the Kingdom's baronial power, but used it in his benefit. The feudal administration was taken

over in its entirety when the Kingdom was integrated into Spanish rule, and had challenged royal authority ever since. According to de Thoro, however, the greatest power in the Neapolitan Kingdom was the viceregal court. If there was any downside to this, it was that the king himself was not present in the Kingdom. Other than that, the entire triangular power struggle of royal, feudal and popular authority that might have been going on in the Kingdom, was entirely negated as de Thoro reduced the question of authority to the royal power of the viceregal court triumphing over the overstepping powers of the nobility.

That the king was most fit to govern the state, to de Thoro, seemed to have been the result his divine right to rule. This Christian right to rule and subsequent reason of state was a popular political thought among Spanish political theorists. Alongside of this, de Thoro seemed believe that the law was the most important tool of the state, and execution of this law might have even been de Thoro's foremost belief for the very reason of state. Interesting here, was that one of the primary troubles of the Kingdom of Naples might have been the lack of royal justice. That the king was the prime candidate for the executioner of the law, was also an idealization of the monarchy. The monarchy was seen as an ideal of government, and the king was seen as the personification of this ideal. In order to maintain the support of the subjects of the standing government, it was an essential part of governmental policy that the person of the king was promoted as the ideal ruler. For this reason – along with the inconsistencies with historical facts that portrayed royal authority as the most powerful, and de Thoro's lamenting of the absent king – I am inclined to believe that de Thoro's preface was a tool of propaganda that promoted the centralization of power to the government of Spain.

Protagonists of the Revolt of Naples

In early modern propaganda, it appeared that misinformation was not uncommon. This would explain the inconsistency between modern historiography and de Thoro's description of the division of power in the Kingdom, and reaffirms the caution that must be taken when assessing sources on the Revolt of Naples. The pamphlet was the medium of mass communication at the time, and was the medium through which early modern news was disseminated to the community. The government was in charge of overseeing the printing of news, and made sure that only positive news reached the public. Maintaining the support of subjects was crucial to maintaining authority, so it was of little surprise that in the published news reports of Spain, the Spanish king always portrayed as the victor of every challenge, and the Spanish people were the recipients of his success. This was especially crucial during the rule of Philip IV, whose days in office had not been as rewarding as those of his predecessors. From the *relaciones de sucesos* that presented Spanish news, one would have been able never tell that modern historians would speak of a 'decline of Spain' today. The *relaciones* were therefore a powerful tool to counter the criticism of the *arbitristas*, as they were just as successful in influencing the public mind.

What was most conspicuous in the comparison of narratives on the Revolt, was that the of Dutch and Castilian pamphlets emphasized the initial and respectively final phases of the Neapolitan rebellion, and with these phases, both could take components of the Revolt that could be portrayed in the benefit of their own political agendas. During the first days of the Revolt of Naples; the popular rebels had taken hold of the entire city, and even the Duke of Arcos fled for his life when seeing the

immense power that the people of Naples had in their number. Conversely, the Revolt of Naples ended when the Spanish representatives of Philip IV restored the Kingdom to Spanish rule. The latter represented the forgiving nature of the king, and the mistake of believing in the success of rebellion. In both narratives, there was a heroic character that steered the events of the story, and represented the winning parties of 1647 and 1648.

The one of the Dutch pamphlets in this study, *Autentijck, bescheyt en seker verhael van de restitutie der privilegien aen het volck van Napels, door den Hertogh van Arcos*, was allegedly written by the Duke of Arcos, reinstating the privileges of the Neapolitan Kingdom as were granted by king Ferdinand in 1505. In Chapter II we have observed that the privileges granted to the Kingdom in 1505, were also much in favor of the influence of the third estate in national politics. The Castilian pamphlet, *Relacion del feliz successo, que en 6 Abril tuvo el Serenissimo Senor Don Juan de Austria, con la Reducion de la Ciudad, y Reyno de Napoles*, was written May 1648, the month after the Revolt of Naples had come to an end. Don Juan had been able to restore order to the Kingdom, but the pamphlet also credited the loyalty of the Neapolitan nobility and the Spanish soldiers. The Neapolitan people were forgiven for their ignorance and inclination to subject to their passions.

This merciful understanding conveniently emphasized that the people of Naples themselves had been responsible for the Revolt. The populace had been swept away by their own passions and ignorance, inconsiderate of their actions. All that drove them was the anger they felt towards the nobility, which was at fault as well for not being able to properly exercise its power over its vassals. Royal intervention was necessary in order to relieve both parties from the chaos that had arisen out of this revolt. If anything, the Revolt of Naples had been an embarrassment to the Neapolitan people – nobility included. This pamphlet was the first of the three Castilian sources of my study that insisted that what the Kingdom of Naples needed, was a strong centralized government led by a powerful king.

The Dutch pamphlet, on the other hand, aimed to take all association of passions and ignorance away from the Revolt of Naples. Indeed, there had been rioters that had aimlessly reacted to the harsh imposition of taxes on basic necessities; but the true movement of the Revolt of Naples was entirely separate from that event. This movement was entirely intelligent and politically motivated. The entirely premeditated motivation of the Revolt was to have the reinstatement of the Neapolitan privileges. For this defense of the Neapolitan constitution, rebellion was justified, and would be repeated if necessary. The rebels were not liable for accusations of any crime, least of all treason, as they claimed to have been entirely loyal to king and government. Because their cause was entirely justified, the Neapolitan rebels came out as the victors of righteousness over ministerial abuse in the Revolt of Naples.

While justice was here portrayed as the unshakable force that would rule out all adversity; the Castilian source insisted on the invincible authority of the Spanish crown. Masaniello and Don Juan presented both these powers, and their presentations left out a few significant details that might have proven otherwise.

Rebels and rulers

Turning from the possible causes and key players of the Revolt, my second comparison in this thesis considered its proceedings. Whether intelligent or ignorant, Philip IV sent the Spanish royal army under leadership of Don Juan to settle the Revolt when it became clear that the Kingdom could not resolve the rebellion on its own. Two entirely different accounts were given of the events of October 1647 by *Ordenes y otros documentos publicados* by the Baron of Vatteville, and *The Manifest Ofte Redenen Waerom de Ghemeynte van Napels Genootsaect is gheworden om haer te ontslaen van het Jock van Spangien*. Both these pamphlets tried to invoke the sympathy of the reader by retelling two very different stories based on the same event in time.

The Baron of Vatteville recounted the burdensome days of having to restore peace to the Kingdom of Naples. This was basically achieved by military occupation of the city, followed by the reconciliation of the nobility and the people of Naples. Neither of these tasks had been easy: the soldiers of the Spanish army had been stretched beyond their capacities, and the people of Naples could not easily let go of their deep rooted hatred for the nobility. An unexpected challenge came with a French invasion, which required every bit of mental strength that the Spanish soldiers had in them. Their bodies had been beaten by fatigue and hunger, and they were far outnumbered by the French. Nevertheless, the soldiers showed no sign of protest to the Baron's orders, for he had won their loyalty and affection. The honorable character of the Baron had not gone unnoticed by the Neapolitan people and nobility, and by befriending both parties he was able to reconcile these enemies. In this way, peace was once again restored to the Kingdom of Naples.

This account of the Revolt of Naples, completely reduced it to a local conflict between populace and nobility, and brushed aside any insinuation that the Spanish government had been in any way at fault. All that royal interference had come to do, was to restore order in a Kingdom where the nobility had not been able to maintain it. That the Spanish army had come to do anything good, was entirely contrary to the Dutch presentation in the *Manifest Ofte Redenen*, in which the Armada had only come to aggravate the unjust treatment of the people of Naples. It was the abuse of the Spanish representatives that had led the people of the Kingdom to want release themselves from the tyranny that was the *Jock van Spangien*. The pamphlet showed that the Neapolitan people had already professed their belief in justified resistance against the nobility, a year prior to the Revolt. It seemed as though the people of Naples were required to take the law into their own hands. This would have been consistent with the Castilian insistence that the people and nobility had been at conflict during the Revolt. This changed entirely, however, with the arrival of the Spanish Armada, at which occasion Don Juan had betrayed their trust and set his soldiers to plunder the city.

At this point, the sovereignty of the Spanish King over the Neapolitan subjects was allegedly broken. The inhabitants of the Kingdom now answered to natural law, and were to be loyal to the *patria* alone. Collaboration with Spanish ministers became punishable by death or worse, and the Kingdom was now open to new rule. To assure the reader of the latter, the *Manifest* stated that the nobility was no longer loyal to the Spanish king either. The Dutch account stopped here, again open ended. The Baron continued, however, until the very end of the Revolt. All Neapolitan political ambitions were reduced to a conflict of passion, that the Baron was able to pacify by winning the Neapolitan's trust and affection. That the people fell for his patronizing approach further strengthened the Castilian argument that the Revolt had been one of passion, and the Neapolitan people were

innocently ignorant. While the *Manifest ofte Redenen* also laid an emphasis on the passionate aspect of the Revolt, the people of Naples were also portrayed to have expressed themselves in politically.

History as propaganda

The final comparison in my thesis was that of de Borja's *Napoles recuperada por el rey don Alonso* to Asselijn's *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello, of Napelse beroerte*. Both these works of literary art presented the history of Spanish-Neapolitan relations in a way that suited the Dutch and Castilian current policies. Asselijn made his choice to write a play on the controversial topic of rebellion based on a common tyrannous government: that of Spain. De Borja took no such risk, and instead narrated the recuperation of Naples by Alfonso V of Aragon.

The latter was accompanied by a number of letters that had censored the work and praised it for its beauty and accuracy. They also praised the greatness of Spain, which was illustrated by the poem that did the Spanish Monarchy great honor. The poem was such a work of art, and displayed the history of Naples and the Spanish Monarchy with such a pride-instilling beauty, that it might as well have been called *Napoles y España recuperadas*. The honor of the poem was only just a little more in favor of the Spain, and with this the reviewers probably meant the Castilian Kingdom, in which talent and a superior language and culture was most admirable of all. De Borja himself assured the reader that his work was entirely historically accurate, and did not exaggerate any of the historical facts for the purpose of beautifying his poetry. The many reviewers of de Borja's work assured the reader that this poem was entirely true.

The insistence of the historically correct content of de Borja's work, which praised the history of Spain to high heaven, was an interesting element of *Napoles recuperada*. The presentation of history to the public minds of the king's subjects was a significant tool of propaganda. Credit was given to the Spanish Monarchy in its entirety, as if it had always shared a common identity in the past. The historical achievements of the Monarchy were therefore to be shared by all of Spain, and in the case of this publication, Naples was especially meant to be proud of its membership to the Spanish Monarchy. Written only a year after the close of the Revolt of Naples – which, according to the Baron of Vatteville and Philip IV had been a great success on the side of the Spanish government – the rebellion was not mentioned at all.

Twenty years later, however, Dutch theaters were showing the play in which Masaniello chose justice over tyranny. The Revolt of Naples had coincided with the last year of the Eighty Years' War, and the publication of Dutch pamphlet showed the appreciation and interest that had gone out to the Neapolitan rebels at the time. Now that order had been restored in the Dutch Republic, however, the appreciation of the Neapolitan Revolt seemed to have come with reservations. The play was not received well by all, and was criticized for enticing rebellion. Asselijn therefore had to be very careful in formulating the message that came with the play. This Dutch source no longer spoke of breaking with the standing authority, but of justice for those oppressed by the nobility. An interesting point that was made here, was that although tyranny was unacceptable; not every man could take leadership upon himself, even if he did have well reasoned and honorable ambitions. The *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello* was a tragedy indeed, as a good man was driven to greatness by resisting tyranny, but paid the price of unbecoming leadership with the loss of his sanity – and finally – his life.

Lost in narration

Having traced the origins of the political versus passionate controversies around the Revolt of Naples; the comparison of Dutch and Castilian publications have each proved to have contributed to the reputation of the Revolt as one of politics and respectively passions. Judging from the historical context, there had been just as much reason for the populace to have risen up in revolt out of taxes imposed on already scarce fruit. While this was the most simplistic explanation of the Revolt, there were another number of reasons for why the poorer people of Naples would have rebelled against their government.

First of these, and most emphasized by the Castilian pamphlets, were the feudal abuses of barons who had absolute local power over their vassals. Neapolitan historiography has shown that the feudal power in Naples had been stronger than ever before, and more extensive than anywhere else in Western Europe. Royal justice was practically unreachable to a vassal of a feudal baron, and royal grip had been feeble over the Neapolitan Kingdom because of the extensive privileges that the baronage enjoyed. This included jurisdiction, and the collection of taxes. With the fiscal strain on the Kingdom, and the feudal *universit as* in charge of collecting taxes as they pleased, the burden of the Thirty Years War fell on the shoulders of the Neapolitan vassals. The nobility itself was exempted from paying taxes, but collected it in the name of the king all the same. In addition to funds, Neapolitan soldiers were conscripted beyond the population's capacity, to the point that the people of Naples protested against sending their men off to fight a far off war for which they were already paying with everything they owned. From this perspective, the Neapolitan populace would have been very upset indeed. The Castilian representation of the Revolt of Naples as an outburst of hatred towards nobility that had been treating them unjustly, could therefore very well have been supported by the circumstances of the Kingdom.

The Neapolitan Revolt as an act of passion very well suited the Spanish government. It negated any questions of the crown having been at fault, as the conflict was entirely local. If anything, the royal representatives of the king had come to help to remedy the situation, and bring back peace to one of the king's territories when the nobility had fallen short of their responsibilities of local administration. It had been an exemplary act when the representatives of the king entered the Kingdom with a powerful army, and were able to pacify the angry rebels by a display of Spanish virtue and Christianity. The Spanish action in Naples exemplified the supremacy of the central government, and demanded loyalty of all the king's subjects no matter how impossible the adversity may have seemed. If his subjects could not trust the actions of the king alone, they would have to trust the divine providence that never failed to ensure every Spanish victory.

Both Castilian and Dutch texts came to the theme of loyalty. The Spanish pamphlets emphasized the fruitfulness of remaining loyal to the king – even in hardship. Conversely, the Dutch Republic, having broken with the king, would have sought to justify the instances in which rebellion against a king was warranted. The Dutch pamphlets instead referred to a loyalty that was geared towards the *patria*. When the royal and feudal authorities had failed to execute justice, the people of Naples were to take the law into their own hands. The people of Naples were described as a rational and politically conscious community, that knew exactly when civil law could be made subordinate to natural law. Unlike the Neapolitans portrayed by Castilian accounts, the Neapolitans of the Dutch narratives

would not be hushed by charm and comfort as though they had been badly behaved children; they demanded justice and recognition of their privileges in the Neapolitan government.

The Dutch representation of the restitution of privileges having been the cause of the Revolt of Naples, could also be backed by its historical context. Once more, feudal power seemed to have been the culprit, as it eclipsed the royal maintenance of the privileges that were supposed to be upheld for the third estate as well. The history of Naples, long before Spanish dominion, had known significant political influence of the third estate. King Ferdinand of Aragon had granted privileges to the third estate, which was to remain a power counterweight to the nobility. Knowledge of this history among the Neapolitan people was also evident, and it would not have been impossible that the Neapolitan people of the third estate wanted these privileges restored.

Nevertheless, I believe to have added to the research on the Revolt of Naples, The significance of history, or the portrayal of history was a similarly important tool to governmental propaganda as news had been. That history, as well as news, had been subject to the cause of political representation, reaffirms my statement that the historiography of the Revolt of Naples has been based on a variety of conveniently narrated accounts in service of propaganda. Villari posed the question of why Masaniello had been superimposed onto the history of Naples to reduce it to a Revolt of passions, but apparently Villari had not seen that Masaniello had been portrayed by the Dutch as the political leader of the Neapolitan third estate. Very little therefore can be truly be accepted as historical facts of the Revolt of Naples. All interpretations of the Revolt of Naples can thus far only be based on perception.

Bibliography

Primary literature

Knuttel collection

Autentijck, bescheyt en seker verhael van de restitutie der privilegien aen het volck van Napels, door den hertogh van Arcos, 1647 (Knuttel, nr 05409).

Manifest Ofte Redenen Waerom de Ghemeynte van Napels Gehootsaeckt is gheworden om haer te ontslaen van het Jock van Spangien, printed in 1648 (Knuttel, nr 05645).

Manifest van 't seer ghetrouwe Volck van Napels, 1647 (Knuttel, nr 05411).

De Digitale Bibliotheek voor de Nederlandse Letteren

Thomas Asselijn, *Op- en ondergang van Mas Anjello, of Napelse beroerte, (voorgevallen in 't jaar 1647)*, first published 1668. ed Marijke Meijer Drees (Amsterdam 1994).

Biblioteca Nacional de España

Relación de los tumultos ocurridos en Nápoles siendo Virrey don Rodrigo Ponce de León, Duque de Arcos, BNE MSS/2662.

Relacion de lo sucedido, BNE MSS/12977/20.

Borja, Francisco de, *Napoles recuperada por el rey don Alonso*, 1651, (BNE R/5799).

Casanate, Mattia, *Relacion del feliz successo, que en 6 Abril tuvo el Serenissimo Senor D Juan de Austria, con la Reducion de la Ciudad, y Reyno de Napoles*, 1648 (BNE, MSS 9628).

Vatteville, Charles, Barón de, *Ordenes y otros documentos publicados con motivo de la actuación del Barón de Vatteville en Nápoles en el puesto de Capitán General de Artillería del ejército de la Armada Real y al servicio de Don Juan de Austria, desde mayo de 1647 hasta abril de 1648*, (BNE R/35834).

Miscellaneous

Battista, G. de Thoro, *Aureum compendium omnium decisionum Regni neapolitani*, edited by Giovanni Domenico Bove, published by Iacobi Gaffari, third edition (Naples 1647).

Giraffi, A., *An exact historie of the late revolutions in Naples; and of their monstrous successes, not to be parallel'd by any ancient or modern history* (London, 1650).

Giannone, P., *The civil history of the Kingdom of Naples: In two volumes*, published 1723 in Italian, translated by James Ogilvie (London 1731).

Reumont, Alfred von, *The Carafas of Maddaloni: Naples under Spanish dominion*, translated from German (London 1854).

Secondary literature

Arnaldi, G., *Italy and Its Invaders*, translated by Anthony Shugaar (Harvard 2005).

Astarita, T., *The Continuity of Feudal Power: the Caracciolo di Brienza in Spanish Naples* (Cambridge 1992).

Astarita, T., *Village Justice: Community, Family, and Popular Culture in Early Modern Italy* (Baltimore-London 1999).

Bentley, J.H., *Politics and Culture in Renaissance Naples* (Princeton 2014).

Bercé, Y.M., *Revolt and Revolution in Early Modern Europe: an Essay on the History of Political Violence* (Manchester 1987).

Burke, P., 'Masaniello: A response', *Past & Present* 114 (1987) 197-199.

Burke, P., "The Virgin of the Carmine and the Revolt of Masaniello", *Past and Present* 99 (1983).

Calisse, C., *A History of Italian Law* (Boston 1928).

Campbell, J., *Monarchy, Political Culture, and Drama in Seventeenth-century Madrid: Theater of Negotiation* (Hampshire 2006).

Cardin, P.; Herzog, Tamar; Ibáñez, José Javier Ruiz; Sabatini, Gatano, 'Introduction', in *Policentric Monarchies* (Cornwall 2012) 3-10.

Cavendish, R., 'Masaniello's Naples Revolt Against Spain', in *History Today* 47 (1997).

Comparato, V.I., "Toward the Revolt of 1647", *Good Government in Spanish Naples* (New York 1990).

Comparato, V.I., "From the Crisis of Civil Culture to the Neapolitan Republic of 1647: Republicanism in Italy between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in M. van Gelderen & Q. Skinner (eds.), *A Shared European Heritage vol. 1* (Cambridge 2002).

Condren, C., 'Historical Epistemology and the Pragmatics of Patriotism in Early-Modern England', in Robert von Friedeburg, "*Patria*" und "*Patrioten*" vor dem *Patriotismus: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europäischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden 2005).

Cooper, J.P. 'The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years War, 1609-59' in *The New Cambridge Modern History vol. 4* (London 1979).

Darby, G., *Spain in the Seventeenth Century* (Routledge 2014).

Elliott, J.H., *The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain (1598-1640)*, (Cambridge 1963).

Elliot, J.H., *Richelieu and Olivares* (Cambridge 1984).

Elliot, J. H., *The Count-Duke of Olivares, The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven and London 1986).

Elliott, 'Foreign Policy and Domestic Crisis', in J.H. Elliott, *Spain and Its World, 1500-1700: Selected Essays* (London 1990).

Elliott, J.H., 'The Court of the Spanish Habsburgs', in J.H. Elliott, *Spain and Its World, 1500-1700: Selected Essays* (London 1990), 142-161.

Elliott, J.H., 'Power and Propaganda in the Spain of Philip IV' in J.H. Elliott, *Spain and its World, 1500-1700: Selected Essays* (London 1990) 162-188.

Elliott, J. H., "A Europe of Composite Monarchies", *Past & Present* 137 (1992).

Elliot, J. H., *Imperial Spain: 1469-1716* (London 2002).

Ettinghausen, H., 'The News in Spain: Relaciones de sucesos in the Reigns of Philip III and IV' in *European History Quarterly* (1984).

Fernández-Santamaria, J.A., 'Reason of State and Statecraft in Spain (1595-1640)', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 41 (1980) 355-379.

Galasso, G., 'Trends and Problems in Neapolitan History in the Age of Charles V, in *Good Government in Spanish Naples* (New York 1990) 13-78.

Gil, X., 'One King, One Faith, Many Nations: *Patria* and Nation in Spain 16th-17th Centuries' in Robert von Friedeburg, "*Patria*" und "*Patrioten*" vor dem Patriotismus: Pflichten, Rechte, Glauben und die Rekonfigurierung europäischer Gemeinwesen im 17. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden 2005).

Gutmann, M. P., "The Origins of the Thirty Years' War", *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring, 1988).

Haliczer, S., *Between Exaltation and Infamy: Female Mystics in the Golden Age of Spain* (Oxford 2002).

Herzog, Herzog, 'Can You Tell a Spaniard When You See One? "Us and "Them" in the Early Modern Iberian Atlantic' in *Polycentric Monarchies* (Cornwall 2012), 147-161.

Hills, H., *Invisible City: The Architecture of Devotion in Seventeenth-Century Neapolitan Convents* (Oxford 2003).

Hume, M., 'Spain and Spanish Italy under Philip III and IV' in *The Cambridge modern history, Volume 5*, (2008), 637.

Israel, J., *The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy and the Jews* (London and Ronceverte 1990).

Israel, J. *The Radical Enlightenment, Philosophy and the Making of Modernity* (New York 2001).

Kagan, R.L., *Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore 2010).

- Kamen, H., *Empire: How Spain Became a World Power 1492-1763* (2004)
- Kamen, H., *Spain 1469-1714: A Society of Conflict* (Routledge 2005).
- Kamen, H., 'The Decline of Spain: a Historical Myth?' in *Crisis and Change in Early Modern Spain* (1993).
- Kamen, H., *The Iron Century: Social Change in Europe 1550-1660* (London, 1971).
- Killinger, C. L., *The History of Italy* (London 2002).
- Koenigsberger, H.G., *The Government of Sicily under Philip II of Spain: a Study in the Practice of Empire* (California 1951).
- Norberg, K., 'Prostitutes', in G. Duby, M. Perrot, N. Zemon Davis, A. Farge, P. Schmitt Pantel, *A History of Women in the West: Renaissance and Enlightenment paradoxes* (Harvard 1993).
- Machiavelli, N., *The Prince*, translated by W. K. Marriott, for *Constitutional Society*, <http://constitution.org>.
- Marshall, C.R., 'Order and Anarchy in Domenico Gargiulo's *The Revolt of Masaniello*', *The Art Bulletin* 80 (1998).
- McKendrick, M., *Playing the King: Lope de Vega and the Limits of Conformity* (London 2002).
- Meijers, E.M., *Etudes d'Histoire du Droit*, 'L'università di Napoli nel Secollo XIII' 149-166. Introductory chapter to *Iuris interpretes saeculi XIII (Septingentesimo Anno Studii Neapolitani), curantibus scholaribus Leidensibus duce E.M. Meijers* (Naples 1924), p XVII-XXXIX.
- Monod, P., *The Power of Kings: monarchy and religion in Europe 1589-1715*, (New Haven and London 1999).
- Pendrill, C., *Spain 1474-1700: The Triumphs and Tribulations of Empire* (New Hampshire 2002)
- Payne, S.G., *Spain: A Unique History* (Wisconsin 2011).
- Parker, G., *Europe in Crisis 1598-1648* (Sussex 1980).
- Parker, G., Lesley Smith, *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century* (Routledge 1997).
- Peytavin, M., 'Government/Administration: The Italian Kingdoms within the Spanish Monarchy', translated by Lydia Cochrane, in *Spain in Italy: Politics, Society and Religion 1500-1700* (Leiden 2007) edited by Thomas James Dandelelet and John Marino, 355-382.
- Ranke, L., *The Ottoman and Spanish empires in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*, (New York, 1975).
- Rawlings, H., 'Arbitrismo and the Early Seventeenth Century Spanish Church: The Theory and Practice of Anti-Clericalist Philosophy' in Richard Pym (ed.), *Rhetoric and Reality in Early Modern Spain* (London 2006) 25-40.

Robb, P., *Street Fight in Naples: A City's Unseen History* (Bloomsbury 2011).

Ryder, Alan, *The Kingdom of Naples Under Alfonso the Magnanimous – The Making of a Modern State* (Oxford 1976).

Sodano, Giulio, 'Governing the City' in *A Companion to Early Modern Naples*, edited by Tommaso Astarita (Leiden 2013).

Stradling, R. A., *Philip IV and the Government of Spain, 1621-1665* (Cambridge 2002).

Villari, Rosario, "Masaniello: Contemporary and Recent Interpretations", *Past and Present* 108 (1985).

Villari, 'Naples and the Contemporaneous Revolutions. Some Points of Convergence', in *The Revolt of Naples*, translated by James Newell (Cambridge 1993).

Villari, R., "The Neapolitan Financial Crisis of the 1630s and 1640s", *Good Government in Spanish Naples*, (New York 1990).

Villari, R., *The Revolt of Naples*, translated by James Newell (Cambridge 1993).

Wiesner-Hanks, M., *Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern World: Regulating Desire, Reforming Practice* (Routledge 2014).

Zúñiga, Jean-Paul, 'Visible Signs of Belonging: The Spanish Empire and the Rise of Racial Logic in the Early Modern Period' in *Polycentric Monarchies* (Cornwall 2012), 125-146.