'Safe Israel and Peaceful Democratic Palestine'

Discourses and Policies of Dutch Post-Oslo Development Aid in Palestine

A Research Paper presented by:

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Palestine

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Major:

Human Rights, Gender and Conflict:
Social Justice Perspectives

1 Source: ‘Terms of Reference: The Evaluation of Dutch Development Cooperation in the Palestinian Territories 2008-2014’ (p4). Reference to ‘Safe Israel and democratic and peaceful Palestine’ is regularly made in Dutch foreign and development policy documents.
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The Hague, the Netherlands
November 2015
Disclaimer:

This document represents part of the author’s study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies. The views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

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# Contents

**Acronyms**

**Acknowledgments**

**Abstract**

Keywords

## 1 Introduction

1.1 Research Goals and Core Questions

1.2 Relevance

1.3 Scope and Limitations

1.4 The Researcher: Ethical and Political Choices & Personal Involvement

1.5 Structure of this Study

## 2 Theoretical Perspectives and Methodological Strategies

2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings of this Research

2.2 Methodological Strategies

2.2.1 Data Collection and Generation

2.2.2 Data Analysis

2.2.3 Reflections on Fieldwork

## 3 Situating Current Dutch Development Aid in Palestine

3.1 Development and Aid in Palestine: Historical and Political Context

3.2 The Geopolitics of the Oslo Process

3.3 The Oslo Process and its Aid Regime

3.4 Dutch Development Cooperation: Background and Dynamics

3.5 Dutch-Israeli Relations

3.6 Dutch Development Aid to Palestine: Terms of Engagement

## 4 Dutch Development Aid to Palestine: Deconstructing Discourses

4.1 Framing Dutch Development Cooperation: Self-Representation in Dutch Foreign Policy

4.2 Palestinian Identity Representations in Dutch Official Discourses

4.3 Framing Occupation: “Conflict” and “Peace”
4.4  Dutch Role in Development Aid for Palestine: Acting for “Peace” and “Stability” in “the Region”  25
4.5  Dutch Security Discourses and Policies in Palestine  28

5  Conclusions  31

References  33

Appendices  35
Appendix 1. List of Dutch policy Documents used in the analysis  35
Appendix 2. Communique from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  37
Appendix 3. Dutch Ministers since 1982  39
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHLC</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Liaison Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDS</td>
<td>Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>ChristenDemocratisch Appel (Dutch Christian Democratic Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>EU Border Assistance Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICHR</td>
<td>Independent Commission for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLC</td>
<td>Joint Liaison Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOB</td>
<td>Inspectie Ontwikkelings samenwerking en Beleids- en Evaluatie (Policy and Operations Evaluation Department)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LACC</td>
<td>Local Aid Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>MASP</td>
<td>Multi-Annual Strategic Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NRO</td>
<td>Netherlands Representative Office to the PNA</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASF</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCLD</td>
<td>People-Centred Liberationist Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Palestinian Civil Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>Palestinian National Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNF</td>
<td>Palestinian National Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Partij van de Arbeid (Dutch Labour Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief Works Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Dutch Conservative Liberal Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEOG</td>
<td>Western European and Others Group</td>
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Acknowledgments

I extend my deep gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Dubravka Zarkov for her support and guidance through the entire research process. Her input and critical feedback were essential contributions to my research. I am also grateful to my second reader Dr. Nahda Shehada for her critical questions and feedback, and for sharing her insights, which I appreciate immensely.

I also gratefully acknowledge my friend Rose-Marie Barbeau for copy-editing and proofreading the manuscript, and Jenny Baboun, who transcribed all interviews and translated two of them from Arabic to English.

Special thanks for all those who were interviewed for this research in the Netherlands and in Palestine. I would also like to thank Anna Christina Dinglasan for being my discussant during the design and research seminars. Her input is highly appreciated. And many thanks to the ISS, SJP lecturers and the 2014-2015 MA cohort for a great learning experience.

I wouldn't have been able to accomplish this work without the love, caring and support of my partner Gert and our children Emiel, Miral and Rona. I am grateful to my children for bearing with me throughout my Masters study and during the writing process, and for Gert for reviewing and commenting on everything I produced during this year, for our debates and critical discussions on every aspect of my research, and for his assistance and understanding.

This work is dedicated to my parents: my father for his support and pride in his children, and my mother, who is no longer with us but without whom I would not be the person I am.
Abstract

This research seeks to contribute to the academic debate on the politics of development aid in the context of violent conflict. It focuses on the Netherlands as a political and development actor in the post-Oslo context in Palestine, and attempts to understand and situate Dutch bilateral development aid policies in that specific context. It examines the convergence of Dutch foreign and development aid policies and investigates the historical and geopolitical dynamics underlying the specific policy choices. An in-depth examination of interrelated policy discourses illuminates the politics of identity representations in constructing and legitimizing the policies of and discourses around Dutch development aid to Palestine. Analysing these discourses and Dutch framing of the concepts of "conflict", "peace", and “security”- and the interrelation between them in the Palestinian context- allows for an understanding of Dutch framing of Palestinian development needs and how that informs the specific policy choices. The study concludes that Dutch development policies in Palestine and policy discourses are specific political choices. It argues that this approach -- acting for "peace" and "stability"-- fails to address the individual and collective injustices of the Israeli occupation, and the resulting violence and insecurities confronting Palestinian men and women. Consequently, it poses the question whether and to what extent such policy choices meet Palestinian development needs, or serve Palestinian security and social justice agendas under Israeli colonial occupation.

Keywords
Dutch development cooperation, aid, Oslo Accords, conflict, development, peace, security, occupation, Palestine, Israel, discourse, identity representations, framing.
1 Introduction

My fieldwork for this research coincided with an official visit of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders (PvdA) to Israel and Palestine, including Gaza. During his visit, Minister Koenders donated a container security scanner to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The scanner is the second to be donated for use on the Karm Salem border between Gaza and Israel and paid for through a special Stability Fund of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The equipment was donated to the PNA at the request of the Israeli authorities and will be operated by Israeli security forces. According to Minister Koenders, the scanner will help increase Gaza’s export capacity while guaranteeing Israel’s "security requirements". An August 2015 investigation by Dutch TV programme Zembla found that only 4 trucks of goods cross the Karm Salem border each day. Examples of these paradoxical relationships between conflict, development aid and security are common, and they lie at the heart of my research on Dutch development aid policies and discourses in Palestine.

1.1 Research Goals and Core Questions

The politics of conflict analysis is central to the choice of response mechanisms (O’Gorman 2011). Many conflict theories link violence to poverty and underdevelopment. Proponents of these theories suggest employment of development policies as a way to counter violence and create stability. Development aid is also used as an instrument for conflict management and containment, and to create a “peace dividend”. The risk of this approach lies in ‘relocating power from the protagonists to those seeking to effect an intervention’ (Jacoby 2007 p: 181), serving thereby the vested geopolitical interests of the powerful actors in the process. While in theory ‘conflict sensitivity’ is an imperative for aid provision in conflict situations to ensure neutrality and avoid harm, experience shows that practice depends on ‘donors’ own subjective, even ideologically shaped, understandings and assumptions as to the causes and dynamics’ of the specific conflict (Nadarajah 2013:59).

My research seeks to contribute to the academic debate on the politics of development policies in the context of violent conflict. It focuses on the Netherlands as a political actor and donor in Palestine, and examines the Dutch post-Oslo development policies; analyses the framing of these policies; and examines the historical and geopolitical dynamics that underpin the policies. The 1993 Oslo Accord between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) – was an interim step in a peace process which addressed, among other things, governance responsibilities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs). The Accord opened the door to a massive flow of international development aid to Palestine.

My objective is to understand the politics of Dutch development aid policies in Palestine through an examination of a specific set of interrelated discourses: on Palestinian development needs and the role of Dutch aid; on the nature of the violence in Palestine; and on Dutch, Palestinian and Israeli identities.

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The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (2011) ranks Palestine second-highest recipient of international humanitarian aid, totalling US$7.2bn between 2000 and 2009. Since the Oslo Accord, Palestinians have received the highest per capita level of development aid despite the fact that Palestine is not characterized with extreme poverty. Twenty years of unprecedented levels of aid and investment by donor countries has failed to meet the stated objectives of security and peace for the Palestinians, enhancing the socio-economic situation, and building transparent, accountable public institutions (Tartir 2012). Instead, what exists is a state of aid dependency and economic subjugation to the occupation and de-development on one hand; a lack of security, and political and social vulnerability on the other. Consequently, Palestinians have failed to create and maintain independent, viable development models that are socially embedded and responsive to the need for resistance and steadfastness in facing continued Israeli occupation.

While it is important to highlight the impact of foreign aid on socio-economic development in Palestine, understanding the historical and geopolitical processes and premises underpinning development aid policies is fundamental for situating, analysing and contextualizing policy discourses. Jacoby maintains that ‘...it is in focusing on outcome and consequences, rather than paying attention to intentions and processes through which decisions are made in the first place, that much of the cause of humanitarianism’s lack of reflectivity lies.’ (2015:48)

Looking at development as ‘a historically produced discourse’ and ‘a regime of representation’ (Escobar 1995: 6), I will situate Dutch policy discourse on Palestine within the context of the emerging socio-political and peace-building dynamics since and as a result of the Oslo process, and in relation to regional and global geopolitical dynamics. My research seeks to answer the following question:

How is post-Oslo Dutch development aid to Palestine framed, constructed and legitimized and how do these frames inform Dutch aid policies?

In order to answer this I will specifically ask:

- How are Dutch and Palestinian identities represented in Dutch policy discourses?
- How are Palestinian development needs and the Netherlands’ role as a development aid donor represented?
- How is the Israeli occupation characterized in Dutch policy discourses?
- What are the geo-political histories, relations and dynamics informing Dutch development aid policies in Palestine?

1.2 Relevance

While much critical work has been done on aid, development and dependency in Palestine in general and in the post-Oslo era in particular, research so far has focused on aid effectiveness and the political economy of the post-Oslo aid regime, and its relation to the peace process. My research will contribute to the current debates on development aid in Palestine, and in general, in several distinctive ways:

- The focus on the Netherlands as an actor in the post-Oslo aid regime allows for an in-depth investigation of the geopolitical (global, regional and domestic) dynamics underlying Dutch government policy choices.

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3 Sara Roy (1995) coined the concept of de-development to describe the effect of the Israeli occupation on Palestinian (economic) development.
• Examination of the relationship between political and development discourses allows for an understanding of the assumptions underlying specific representations of political and development actors in the Netherlands and Palestine. This includes the central role of identity representations in constructing and legitimizing foreign and development aid policies.

• Beyond the focus on the Netherlands and Palestine, the relevance of my research lies in its theorizing of the convergence of foreign policy and development cooperation policy, and in analysing the discourses around geopolitical dynamics underlying aid, security and development.

As such my research contributes to the debates both on aid and development in Palestine, and on the relevance and underlying principles of Dutch development aid generally, as well as to wider theoretical and political debates on humanitarianism, securitization and the relationships between development aid, violent conflict, peace and security.

1.3 Scope and Limitations

The scope of the research includes discourses framing post-Oslo Dutch bilateral aid in Palestine. Thus it does not cover Dutch aid provided through multilateral channels and UN agencies such as United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the World Bank, or aid provided through Dutch and/or international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to Palestinian civil society organizations. Reference will be made to those where relevant. Finally, it is not my intention to assess the efficiency of the Dutch bilateral development program with Palestine nor to monitor the progress of ongoing projects.

Reflecting on the role of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in relation to Dutch development aid policies in Palestine is also outside the framework of this research. This is not to deny Palestinian agency or responsibility relating to development discourses, policies and practices in Palestine, but is due to the limitations on access to specific projects on the ground through which I could have analysed development practice (more on this in methodology section).

1.4 The Researcher: Ethical and Political Choices & Personal Involvement

Producing knowledge is embedded in political and social histories. As a feminist and advocate for social justice and Palestinian right to self-determination, I experience the way in which hegemonic discourse, geopolitics, social relations of power and multiple levels of oppression reinforce dominance and (re)produce and justify injustice, exclusion and marginalization.

The motivation behind this research lies in my critical stance towards development aid in general and in Palestine in particular. I belong to a generation of politically motivated, socially-rooted Palestinian activists who were part of a grassroots movement in the 1980s mobilizing for liberation, justice and equality. I witnessed the contribution of geopolitics and development aid practices to the destruction of Palestinian society and the dependency and co-option of the Palestinian leadership, playing into the hands of the Israeli colonial regime.

I approach this research as a participant-observer, having been professionally involved in Dutch development cooperation in Palestine over the past 26 years. I worked in development in Palestine for 13 years, both on the “recipient” end and in the capacity of advisor on policy and program development, management and evaluation to donors including international development
agencies and Dutch and Spanish governments. Since moving to the Netherlands 14 years ago, as an advocate for Palestinian rights I follow Dutch and EU foreign and aid policies in Palestine and Israel closely and critically. My knowledge of the field and the historical and political context, my deep personal involvement, and my professional background are the source of my ‘strong objectivity’ (Harding 2005).

Transformative research is about understanding the process of domination, hegemony and marginalization. In this sense, I will use my ‘epistemic privilege’ and my ‘situated knowledge’ to unpack Dutch development policy discourses in Palestine in an attempt to understand its underlying assumptions and reflect on its representational strategies.

1.5 Structure of this Study

To address my research question, Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical underpinnings and methodological strategies of the research and reflects on my fieldwork. Chapter 3 situates current Dutch development aid in Palestine and provides an analysis of the historical, contextual and geopolitical dynamics shaping Dutch foreign and development aid policies and their discourses. This includes a general account of the historical and political context of development aid in Palestine, an analysis of the geopolitics and aid regime of the Oslo process, followed by an analysis of the dynamics and underpinnings of Dutch development aid in general, a reflection on Dutch-Israel relations, and a brief presentation of the terms of engagement of Dutch aid in Palestine. Chapter 4 illuminates the central role of identity representations in constructing, (re)producing, and legitimizing the policies of, and discourse around Dutch development aid to Palestine; deconstructs Dutch development discourses; explores Dutch framing of "conflict", "peace", and development needs in Palestine and how those inform policy choices; and examines Dutch security discourses and policies in Palestine. Chapter 5 offers the main conclusions of the research.
2 Theoretical Perspectives and Methodological Strategies

2.1 Theoretical Underpinnings of this Research

'Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. .... My contention is that without examining Orientalism as a discourse we cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period.' (Said 2003:3)

This research is inspired by Said's critique of Orientalism. It draws on Escobar's conceptual framework of development as a Eurocentric, Universalist, modernization and power tool for domination and oppression, and Foucault's theorization of discourse and power/knowledge regimes for understanding the legitimization and normalization of power. My starting point is that development is as a process embedded in social relations of power, and I build on critical feminist concepts of identity and boundary underlying security and development and (re)producing inequalities (Steans 2006). My theoretical framework for examining Dutch development aid policies draws partially on the poststructuralist notion of combinability of identity and policy as theorized by Hansen (2006) and the discursive nature of this linkage in formulating development discourse and practice. According to Escobar (1995), approaching the Development project as a discourse and as a practice gives it 'the status of a certainty in the social imaginary' (Escobar 1995:5), and a sense of imminence both among practitioners and scholars. The dominance of the Western 'imagined reality' in representations of themselves and the other is seen in the dynamics of the Foucauldian power/knowledge nexus. The paradigm of linear history is inherent in modernity thought linking development to rationality, enlightenment and positivism, and imposing Western norms and values in a pervasive manner.

The dynamics by which development discourses are constructed and (re)produced create social relations of power through a system of knowledge and discursive practice whereby it becomes 'impossible to conceptualize social reality in other terms' (Escobar 1995:5). Consequently, hegemonic Western development discourses and discursive practices constructed the Third World as backward, traditional and under-developed (Mohanty 1991). Mohanty reflects on the underlying assumptions of the binary Western liberal development theorizing arguing that the West conceives the 'third World difference' as 'stable and abistorical' (Mohanty 1991:53). Arguably, the Western liberal feminist Universalist discourse 'discursively colonized the material and historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in the Third world' (Mohanty 1991: 56). Connell (2000) highlights the role of colonialism in creating gendered institutions that 'disrupted indigenous gender orders, and installed violent, often militarized, masculinities in the hegemonic position'. (p37)

Conflict, peace, security and development are key concepts in international relations in today's globalized world. The inter-relation between these concepts remains a subject of contestation among scholars. 'While development as a practice was seen, and theorized, as the opposite of war and violence', and while peace was seen as a prerequisite for development in the early post-World War II decades, more complex theoretical models have emerged since the mid-1990s, challenging the linear relations between development and security in the context of conflict and peace (Zarkov and Hintjens 2014:8). Conceptually, security paradigms range between the realist theorization of state-centred militarized security, and the notion of human security introduced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 Human Development Report to counterbalance the narrow realist paradigm based on masculinist militaristic constructions of security and defence. Critical
security studies portray the current approach to human security in development policies with scepticism. Newman (2010) frames human security as a ‘hegemonic discourse co-opted by the state’ (p 77). Critical feminist scholars frame security outside the boundaries of militaristic threats and state protection, linking it to ‘economic, political, social and personal circumstances of individuals’ (Steans 2006:63), illuminating the politicized aspects of intersectionality in the conception of human security.

The current approach of the (neo) realist global governance order towards security is characterized by state-centrism and interdependence between individual, state and global security (Steans 2006). This notion of interdependence feeds into the development-security nexus and underlines the link between military power and security. This view of the security-development nexus hides the gendered nature of the global and national power structures and related institutions, and the hegemonic masculine values underpinning security policies (Steans 2006:64). Critical feminist theorists problematize the current security definitions that inform foreign and development aid policies. Bilgin (2004: 499), maintains that these definitions are both ‘gendered and statist’. They reproduce gendered relations of power and undermine the need to understand the ‘global social dynamics that create and/or enhance women insecurities’ that inform policies. Winkle and Degele (2011) stress the intersectionality between multiple relations of power, including gender, ethnicity, race and class, in producing inequalities; an aspect that conventional development and security paradigms fail to capture.

To understand the underlying principles of any development policy choices and objectives we need to analyse the way in which foreign and development aid policies are constructed, (re)produced and legitimized. The poststructuralist approach towards foreign policy derives from the assumption that representation of identity and formulation of foreign policy are mutually constitutive, stressing the political nature of identity as opposed to articulation in terms of culture (Hansen 2006:6). Hansen also argues that ‘knowledge is historically and politically situated’ (p10). This establishes the contextual basis for her argument that ‘representations of identity and policy are linked through discourse’ (ibid).

Hansen defines ‘the construction of identity in discourse ...as a political practice’ (2006:21) and policies as ‘particular directions for action’ (ibid). Policies are situated in a ‘larger political and public sphere’ (Hansen 2006: 7). Hence ‘the conceptualization of identity as discursive, political, relational, and social implies that foreign policy discourse always articulates a self and a series of others’ (ibid). In other words, identity representation is a discursive basis for framing and legitimizing of foreign policy as well as a product of it.

Geography, history and moral responsibility constitute the boundaries within which policies and policy discourses are constructed, acted and legitimized (Hansen 2006). Policymakers seek legitimacy through knowledge and institutional authority (Hansen 2006:8). Contextual and external constraints, geopolitical limitations and competing discourses pose major challenges to specific policy articulations, underscoring the need for ‘specificity and flexibility of the policy-identity linkage’ (Hansen 2006:31). Those views will be central to my analysis of Dutch development aid policy discourses regarding Palestine.

Another important conceptual paradigm relating to foreign and development policy is framing. While poststructuralists focus on the constitutive and discursive nature of identity representation in relation to foreign policy, the importance of the instrumentalist approach lies in its ‘ability to capture the strategic calculations that motivate actors’ (Desrosiers 2012:1). Desrosiers maintains that ‘instrumentalist and social-psychological perspectives should be seen as complementary’ (2012:2) and that analysis based on a combined premise is better situated to capture the complex dynamics of policy discourses, because ‘most social phenomena are the result of purposeful behaviour deployed amidst constraining and constitutive social structures’ (Desrosiers 2012:2). Desrosiers concludes that ‘framing is a theoretical perspective that bridges the instrumental-interpretive divide’ (2012:3). Framing is also an analytical tool that I will use to examine Dutch development policy documents, other relevant textual material, as well as the interview transcripts (see methodology section).
2.2 Methodological Strategies

My theoretical perspectives and attention to discourses required a research strategy that allowed a combination of different methods of data generation and analysis: classical interviewing and archive work in data collection and generation, and thematic framing as an interpretive text analysis tool.

2.2.1 Data Collection and Generation

As the Oslo Accord constitutes a watershed for bilateral Dutch development aid in Palestine, 1993 was the starting point for my research. In reviewing Dutch policy documents, I chose to cover the period 1993-2015 to ensure a selection of documents that allow an examination of continuity and shifts in discourses over time and under the various government coalitions and development actors. Search for policy documents included research online and in parliamentary archives. Information was also requested from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Right to Information Act (WOB)⁴. This included project files and specific information and guidelines relating to Dutch foreign and development policies in general, and the Dutch bilateral aid portfolio in Palestine. In the process, dozens of policy documents were reviewed including ministerial parliamentary letters, parliamentary documents and development cooperation policy documents and guidelines, as well as transcripts of relevant ministerial policy addresses. Many of these documents are cited in the research, and a number of them were selected for thematic frame analysis, including: Two policy addresses and one parliamentary letter addressing underlying principles and spearheads of Dutch foreign and development cooperation policy in general; five policy addresses specific to Israel and Palestine covering various Dutch coalitions and policy actors, two Multi-Annual Strategic Plans of the Netherlands Representative Office in Palestine covering the period 2012-2017; two parliamentary letters, and the Terms of Reference for an internal evaluation of the Dutch development cooperation programme in Palestine to be conducted in 2015 (see Appendix 1). These documents cover not only the researched period, but also successive government coalitions and Dutch political spectrum, representing foreign and development policies in Palestine since Oslo.

Empirical primary data was generated through purposeful sampling of 14 interviewees. Six interviews were conducted with Dutch development actors directly involved in development cooperation policy and practice in Palestine, including one former minister and diplomats and civil servants at both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Netherlands Representative Office (NRO) in Palestine. Interviewees were selected to best cover the researched period and different levels of involvement in the formulation of Dutch development policy in Palestine. I opted for semi-structured interviews, inviting the interviewee to share his/her experience as a Dutch development aid actor in Palestine. Six interviews were also conducted in Palestine with Palestinian politicians, scholars, activists, development practitioners, and security officials. Palestinian respondents were selected to represent different levels of interaction with Dutch development policies in Palestine. These interviews were also semi-structured, with interviewees invited to reflect on their experience of Dutch development aid in Palestine. In addition, two interviews were conducted with representatives of the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) to gather information about Dutch involvement in the security sector, including Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) training, criminal justice and rule of law.

A number of ethical considerations were relevant for the research. To ensure accuracy, consent was secured prior to the recording and transcription of all interviews. Two respondents

⁴ Dutch Acronym for Openbaarheid van Bestuur.
requested and were given the opportunity to review their quotes prior to citation. As some respondents requested anonymity, I chose to keep all interviewees anonymous. Names are included only in cases of publicly available information (speeches and policy documents). Interviewees were assigned a unique identifying number preceded by NL (Dutch), PAL (Palestinian), and EUPOL (EUPOL COPPS).

My research also included an extensive review of available literature on development in Palestine, the Oslo process, and Dutch development cooperation.

### 2.2.2 Data Analysis

Deconstruction is essential for a critical examination of policies, for understanding of the underlying premises and constitutive dynamics, and for unpacking the frames through which these policies inform practice and are normalized and legitimized. For this purpose, a set of methodological tools was used to interrogate the discursive nature of the relation between policy representations and geopolitical dynamics framing Dutch foreign and development cooperation policy discourses on Palestine. Thematic frame analysis is a central method for examining the relationships between conflict, security, development and aid, and the stated and unstated assumptions informing Dutch actors and development aid policies in Palestine. Entman defines framing as 'selecting some aspects of a perceived reality to make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.' (1993: p 52). Gasper and Apthorpe stress the importance of framing in policy discourses and practice, ‘specifically what and who is actually included and what and who is ignored and excluded’ (1996:6). According to Pappacharissi and Oliveira, framing lies in ‘the ability of any entity - media, individual or organizations- to delineate other people's reality, highlighting one interpretation while de-emphasizing a less favoured one.’ (2008:54). Desrosiers (2012) stresses that framing is when 'actors purposefully develop interpretations of an issue...to achieve specific goals'. In this sense, framing is a deliberate process involving selection, prioritization, interpretation and selective comprehension and communication; in a foreign policy context it entails (and promotes) a particular line of action. Thematic frame analysis is used to unpack the narratives of the Dutch development aid actors interviewed in the process of this research, and as part of the policy documents analysis. Identity, development needs and roles, and conflict, peace and security are the themes selected for analysis because those are the dominant themes in the policy documents.

My analysis of development policy documents and interview transcripts borrows from Hansen's framework for foreign policy discourse analysis, built on the premise that text is an essential medium to construct and articulate policy discourse. To identify policy discourse as an 'analytical construction' Hansen proposes an identification of identity representations using 'linking and differentiation' in texts that construct 'sameness' and 'otherness' (2006: 42). She also stresses the need to examine the history of identity representations.

### 2.2.3 Reflections on Fieldwork

I used the Right to Information Act (WOB in Dutch) in data collection, to request information from Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The process was slow and required communication with various Ministry staff followed by a meeting with the officer responsible for the Middle East peace process and a senior Ministry jurist to discuss the nature and purpose of my request. Four months following my first communication with the Ministry I received the requested information and a communiqué (Appendix 2) noting that:
When selecting documents for analysis, I was surprised at the lack of policy statements addressed directly to Palestinian audiences. I found only one policy address by Prime Minister Mark Rutte (VVD) at the opening of the Bilateral Cooperation Forum in Bethlehem in December 2013. This is in sharp contrast to policy statements by almost every successive Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs addressing Israeli and Jewish audiences in Israel and the Netherlands. In itself this reflects the contrast between Dutch-Palestinian and Dutch-Israeli relations. To bridge this gap I include in my analysis other policy documents directed to the Palestinians, such as the two Multi-Annual Strategic Plans (MASPs). Data generated during interviews also helped address this imbalance.

I had planned to conduct a participant observation of one Dutch development programme - training of the Palestinian police force - as part of my examination of the link between Dutch policy and practice in the field of security. Planned observation of training activities did not take place due to Muslim feast holidays during my fieldwork. I also did not gain access to training materials or trainees, despite my visit to the Palestinian Police Academy in Jericho. While this part of the research was not conducted, I address security issues through interviews and the examination of policy documents.

Translated by the author from the communiqué of 14 August 2015 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding requested information.

A list of all Dutch ministers cited in this research, their positions and service years are provided in Appendix 3.
3 Situating Current Dutch Development Aid in Palestine

This chapter aims to contextualize Dutch development cooperation policies in Palestine. It approaches development as a process embedded in social relations of power, and analyses the context, history, geopolitics and (economic) interests in shaping Dutch policy representations and discourses. To start with, the historical and political context of development and aid in Palestine is addressed, followed by an analysis of the geopolitical context of the Oslo process and its aid regime in relation to major geopolitical actors, which underpins Dutch development aid policies in Palestine. A brief historical account of the dynamics shaping Dutch development cooperation in general are followed by reflections on Dutch-Israeli relations and their significance in shaping Dutch development policies in Palestine. The chapter concludes with a presentation of the terms of engagement of Dutch aid in Palestine.

3.1 Development and Aid in Palestine: Historical and Political Context

To understand foreign aid and development issues in Palestine, both must be placed in their political and historical context. Before the Nakba7 and the creation of Israel in 1948, Palestine's central location on the Mediterranean Sea with its three port cities Haifa, Jaffa and Gaza, its arable land and varied topography, and its holy cities, allowed diverse economic activities including agriculture, tourism and trade, and a level of prosperity especially in the main cities and among elite (Smith 1984). The majority of Palestinians, however, were peasants depending on small-scale arid agriculture for their livelihood or providing agricultural labour for landed families (ibid). In her book ‘The Palestinians from Peasants to Revolutionaries’, Rosemary Sayigh describes the ‘peasant past’ of Palestinian society where ‘rather than markets, the primary aim of peasant agriculture was subsistence’ (2008:23).

The establishment of the State of Israel on 87% of the historic land of Palestine brought the Palestinian way of life to an abrupt end (Smith 1984:77). Massacres, displacement, dispossession and expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians by Zionist militias mark the first Zionist attempt to ethnically cleanse the Palestinian people (Pappe 2007). The influx of dispossessed refugees into the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem and surrounding Arab countries created new realities of poverty, lack of security, aid dependency and the need for humanitarianism, leading to the creation of UNRWA by the United Nations General Assembly. UNRWA’s mission was to ‘provide assistance and protection’8 to Palestine refugees. The period from 1957 to 1986 witnessed the emergence of a collective Palestinian political identity which came about as a result of ‘the ambivalent position of the Arab regimes regarding the Palestinian cause; the rise of the Palestinian resistance in the 1960s; the founding and growing authority of the Palestinian Liberation Organization; and the special circumstances of life under Israeli rule in the Occupied Territories’ (Taraki 1991:53).

In 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, immediately annexing East Jerusalem and placing the entire population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under a repressive military regime. Military law governed every aspect of Palestinian life. Israeli domination

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7 Arabic word for catastrophe. The term is used to describe the expulsion and displacement of Palestinians by Zionist militias in 1948.
8 http://www.unrwa.org/who-we-are
was consolidated through 'four major processes of hegemonic subjugation [...]': political suppression, economic exploitation, institutional destruction, and ideological and cultural repression' (Farsoun and Landis 1991:19). This complex regime manifests itself in coercion and structural violence, and governability through exclusion and isolation: a control matrix of movement restrictions, checkpoints and separation; racism and institutional discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel; the wall, and the siege and continuous aggression on Gaza. This led to under-development, aid dependency and social and political fragmentation (Whittal, 2009), exacerbated by land expropriation, settlement-building and economic annexation by using Palestinians as cheap labour force and the OPTs as a dump market for Israeli products. Roy (1995) argues that Israeli policies structurally and deliberately restricted Palestinian development potential, creating a state of de-development and dependence.

The 1967 Arab defeat constituted a watershed for Palestinian armed resistance, which emerged almost immediately from Jordan, gained momentum and mobilized Palestinian refugees in neighbouring countries. Within the OPTs, the Palestinian National Front (PNF) formed in 1973 and with that an organized political resistance and grassroots mass movement in the OPTs emerged. (Taraki 1991).

Israel also restricted social, health, educational and other services to the Palestinians – obligations of the occupier under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Palestinian resistance was shaped by creating a web of "popular sovereignties" - institutions, social relations, and ideology in response to Israeli colonial oppression. The Palestinian natives wore an opposing "fabric of hegemony" through which collective action could be mobilized and sustained and Palestinian society could be reconstructed and preserved in the face of Israeli colonialism' (Farsoun and Landis 1991:18). Parallel to armed resistance, a solid indigenous model of non-violent resistance emerged, deeply rooted in the political and social structures. During this period local alternative development models emerged which were responsive to the needs for liberation and self-determination and as a coping mechanism against the oppression of the Israeli regime, and an organized infrastructure of resistance and steadfastness gradually took shape (Barghouti and Giacaman 1991). These included promoting self-reliance and household economy, local cooperative initiatives, and non-profit basic service delivery by grassroots movements. The first Intifada, which erupted in 1987, consolidated grassroots-based development and strengthened social cohesion and solidarity. Slogans such as 'resilience is resistance' and 'household economy is a viable economy', neighbourhood schools and alternative theatre gained resonance among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories (Nassar and Heacock 1991).

The 1980s saw development aid finding its way to Palestine, much of it provided through international social and political movements, solidarity groups, and NGOs working directly with Palestinian grassroots movements. Although modest in scale, such aid was appreciated because it facilitated much-needed community services and aligned with the local socio-economic and liberation agenda. The conditions and impact of aid during this period must be differentiated however. Aid provided by international alternative social movements and solidarity groups was unconditional but smaller in scale, while aid from larger NGOs was conditional on “professional” terms of implementation and accountability, leading to increasing 'NGOsation' (Jad 2007) of many grassroots organizations, paving the way for a new era in Palestinian development. Civil society organizations replaced grassroots activism based on the mobilization of the masses (Jad 2007). This process of “professionalization" and "institutionalization" of development intensified in the aftermath of Oslo.

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9 Annexation wall being built by Israel in OPTs since 2002. In 2004 the International Court of Justice ruled construction of the wall on Palestinian land contrary to international law
3.2 The Geopolitics of the Oslo Process

With the Cold War ending in the late 1980s, a new global governance order emerged, manifested in the convergence between development, security and humanitarianism (Duffield 2007). These global processes, reinforced by geopolitics and post-Gulf war power shifts in the Middle East and dominated by the US realist approach to conflict resolution, form the backdrop of the Oslo process, and have shaped both the political and aid dynamics in Palestine (Said 2007). The Oslo process, mediated by global geopolitical actors and brokered mainly by the US, led to the Declaration of Principles in 1993. This was followed by the Jericho-Gaza Agreement which created the Palestinian National Authority with limited powers of self-rule in part of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) for an interim period of five years to culminate in a comprehensive solution to the "conflict". According to a Palestinian interviewee who is a legislator and a member of the PLO Executive Committee, 'the PNA, which was supposed to be a temporary, transitional functional institution, […] became more powerful than the mother institution the PLO. This led to a real weakening of all the Palestinian body politic, and left Palestinians in exile deprived of genuine representation' (PAL1). The Oslo process was characterized by power imbalances, lack of neutrality on the part of the peace brokers, and the geopolitical vested interests of the key political actors.

The asymmetries of power are particularly visible in the field of security. International engagement with security issues in Palestine since Oslo has been geared towards regional stability, Israeli security, and counterterrorism, rather than the security of the Palestinian population under occupation. This is evident not only in the position of the US but the EU as well (Collantes-Celador et al 2008). In 2002 President Bush linked the engagement of international political actors with the Oslo process to reform in the Palestinian security sector (Y. Sayigh 2009). As a result, the US led the "restructuring and reform" of the PNA Security Forces (PASF), including training, coordinating assistance, and Palestinian-Israeli security coordination (Y. Sayigh 2009). The EU complemented the work of the US in security assistance to the Palestinians (Collantes-Celador et al 2008, Y. Sayigh 2009). Since 2005 the European Union 'has framed its effort within an explicit reform discourse based on the rule of law' (Y. Sayigh 2009:6) linking security and development to enhanced stability through promoting good governance, focussing development aid on the "soft" security aspects, including rule of law, criminal justice and the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP). The EU (and the Netherlands therein) took charge first of the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah border (EUBAM) in 2005 to monitor the Palestinian-Israeli Agreement on Movement and Access, and then the EUPOL COPPS, charged with supporting the establishment, training and maintenance of the PCP (Collandes-Celador et al 2008).

When the Islamic movement Hamas came to power following the 2006 Palestinian elections, the US administration decided to take sides in support of the Palestinian National Authority Presidency (Fatah) by providing training to the National Security Forces and Presidential Guard (Y. Sayigh 2009). The EU joined the blanket boycott of the Hamas government and froze EUPOL COPPS involvement with Gaza. In doing so they 'adopted the US/Israeli policy of ostracizing Hamas and supporting the PA presidency' (Collantes-Celador et al 2008). A 2008 evaluation report of EU Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Palestine concluded that: 'Not only have other EU civil police missions been sidelined, but the EU is now perceived by the Palestinians as an implementing instrument for US foreign policy.' (Collantes-Celador et al 2008).

Such decisions, with the asymmetry of geopolitical power relations, led to a situation whereby development and humanitarian aid became tools for power diplomacy to impose political concessions and generate Palestinian public support for the Oslo process.

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10 The use of the word conflict to describe the Israeli colonial occupation in Palestine is inaccurate and misleading, therefore it is placed in semicolon throughout the document whenever it is used to refer to the situation in Palestine. This applies also to the words peace and security.
3.3 The Oslo Process and its Aid Regime

Khalil Nakhleh (2012) argues that the attempt of all Oslo proponents to legitimize the Oslo process— with all the effects of its power imbalances- and engender support to it, undermined any prospect of what he calls a ‘People-Centered Liberational Development’ (PCLD) (p131)

The international aid regime following Oslo has been informed by a (neo) liberal peace agenda manifested in a focus on stability, democratization and governability, and promoting economic growth and liberalization (Tartir 2012). According to Nadarajah, liberal peace aims at ‘the transformation of state and society into a new mesh of internal and external relations in which the re-emergence of violent conflict is actively precluded’ (Nadarajah 2013: 61). The Oslo regime imposed new agendas that served what the donors saw as the emerging peace and security paradigms rather than promoting sustainable development priorities responsive to Palestinian needs for steadfastness, resistance and (social) justice (Kuttab 2008). Preconceived politicized concepts such as state-building and reconstruction, security sector reform (SSR), good governance, peace-building and reconciliation, and democratization figured high on donor agendas and were promoted, prioritized and financed (le More 2008). In her study of the mechanisms and effect of international aid in Palestine post-Oslo, le More (2008) critically examines the role of the international community concluding that aid was not driven by, or responsive to Palestinian needs, but was employed to cover up the failure of international political actors to meaningfully and decisively address the Israeli occupation and bring about a just peace.

Indeed, the Oslo process was supplemented by a huge flow of donor aid to Palestine dubbed a “peace dividend”. On the eve of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, bilateral and multilateral funding mechanisms were devised, ostensibly to meet Palestinian humanitarian and development needs, and to facilitate state-building through support for the PNA apparatus as envisioned by the key political actors in the Oslo process (le More 2008). Following the Washington conference in 1993, a donor planning and control structure emerged, starting with the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), which functions as the main donor policy coordinating point; the Joint Liaison Committee (JLC), the World Bank Consultative Group (with membership for all donors) - all of which were donor-only mechanisms; and the Local Aid Coordinating Committee (LACC), which created 12 sector working groups with membership for PNA line ministries (Sanders 1999).

The Oslo aid regime had far-reaching consequences for Palestinian society and helped transform its political, developmental and social agendas (Kuttab 2008). Tartir (2012) sums up the aid and development link in Palestine as being ‘particularly problematic’, raising many dilemmas ranging from aid being ‘highly politicized and aiming to sustain a trapped peace process’ to the problems arising from aid ‘administered by an authority that lacks both the de jure and de facto sovereignty’, highlighting the ‘limited successes, harmful effects, limitations, and failure’ (2012:1).

In light of the failure of Oslo to engender justice and peace for the Palestinians, the associated aid became at best ‘the humanitarian plaster for the political wounds of the occupation’ (Whittall 2009: 41). In his book ‘Globalized Palestine: The National Sell-Out of a Homeland’, Nakhleh maintains that the Oslo premise of combinability between economic development and colonial occupation is produced and normalized through ‘a tripartite coalition; namely, (1) Palestinian capitalists and Oslo political-economic elite, (2) the newly emerging Palestinian "developmental" NGOs, and (3) the transnational aid agencies’ (Nakhleh 2012:xxi). Tartir also contests the ability of post-Oslo international aid investment to bring about peace or development in Palestine:

‘the failure of aid can be attributed to a number of reasons, including: the economic framework dictated by the Oslo Peace Accords; the World Bank’s “Investment in Peace” paradigm for economic development; the “peace dividends” and “economic peace” approaches; the post-Washington Consensus neoliberal economic agenda adopted by all actors
Development cooperation in the Netherlands can be traced back to the end of the Dutch colonial regime in Indonesia in 1949. Dutch development cooperation sector was born out of the need to create jobs for around a quarter of a million civil servants returning to the Netherlands after the decolonization of Indonesia with experience not easily utilized in the Netherlands itself but relevant for countries with conditions similar to Indonesia (Reingoud, 2009).

According to Reingoud (2009) Dutch development aid is meant to generate not only goodwill but profit for Dutch businesses. This has been a major driver of Dutch development cooperation since the start, even under the Minister of Development Cooperation Jan Pronk (PvdA) from 1973 to 1979, when development cooperation policy was framed in terms of poverty alleviation and human rights and Dutch economic interests 'remained in the background' (NL1). The latest policy shift in 2012 combining foreign trade and development cooperation in one Ministry, illustrates the convergence of economic interest and development cooperation. In her development policy document, ‘A World to Gain: A New Agenda for Aid, Trade, and Investment’, the Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation Lilianne Ploumen (PvdA), indicates that Dutch economic interests underpin development policies, with the slogan 'from aid to trade' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013a). Dutch interests are not limited to economic profit, but include geopolitical power relations and global political and diplomatic influence.

Dutch interests are not limited to economic profit, but it includes geopolitical power relations and global political and diplomatic influence. The Netherlands was one of the first countries to contribute to a special UN Development Fund created in 1949, donating 1.5 million Dutch Guilders at the request of the US and in accordance with the Truman Doctrine, which called for the provision of aid to poor countries as a means to exert political influence, and counterbalance the influence of the Soviet Union (Spitz et al 2013:8). This marked the beginning of Dutch development cooperation.

Although historically Dutch policymakers place international cooperation and development aid policies within the parameters of both national interest and international ‘moral obligation’ (Spitz et al 2013:10), emphasis has shifted between these two pillars depending on domestic politics, socio-economic context, geopolitics and ideological convictions of successive government coalitions. After the initial attention to poverty alleviation, especially under the centre-left government of 1973-1977, with Jan Pronk (PvdA) as Minister of Development Cooperation, the end of the Cold War and the new global governance order shifted the discourse around Dutch foreign and development aid policies towards a new humanitarianism.

According to one of the Dutch interviewees:

'In light of the increasing violent conflicts following the end of the Cold War, Holland began rearranging its military set-up, and introduced reform in defence expenditure in order to have the possibility to participate in multiple peacekeeping operations simultaneously' (NL1)

And although the Dutch participated in peacekeeping missions prior to the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War marked a new stage in Dutch involvement in "humanitarian operations" and the advent of the 3D paradigm linking development to defence and diplomacy. The Netherlands’ participation in the US-led post-9/11 “war on terror” coalition consolidated the 3D approach and the commitment of Dutch foreign policy and development actors across the political spectrum. This is clearly and regularly articulated in policy addresses. In Maastricht May 2007, Minister of
Foreign Affairs Maxime Verhagen (CDA) sought to establish authority for this discourse by adopting Barnett’s development frame connecting violence and economic growth:

‘In Barnett’s words I recognise the three Ds that form the cornerstone of the Dutch approach to conflict zones: diplomacy, defence, and development. In other words, working together to safeguard stability and improve economic and social prospects for the local population.’ 12

Current Dutch foreign and development cooperation policy discourse is affected by two simultaneous developments: diminishing political and public support for development aid in an environment of growing islamophobia, anti-migration feelings and Euroscepticism, and diminishing financial resources due to the economic crisis and governmental cuts in development budget (Spitz et al 2013).

3.5 Dutch- Israeli Relations

‘The destiny of Europe can never be disentangled from the destiny of Israel’ 13

Understanding the nature of Dutch-Israeli relations is fundamental to understanding Dutch foreign and development cooperation policy discourses in Palestine. As the subsequent chapters will prove, Israeli identities and securities figure prominently in Dutch discourses on Palestine and the Palestinians. To situate those discourses, I offer here a brief investigation of the historical, political and economic dimensions of Dutch-Israeli relations.

The Netherlands did not formally recognize the State of Israel immediately after its establishment in 1948 due to geopolitical and diplomatic considerations, particularly Dutch relations with a newly independent Indonesia with a majority Muslim population14. Nonetheless, the Netherlands has maintained extremely close ties with the State of Israel since the 1950s, including diplomatic, military and economic relations, scientific and cultural cooperation, and political support both bilateral and within the EU framework. Dutch Protestant Church contributes to Dutch public support through its doctrine of an “unbreakable bond”15 with Israel. Despite criticism of some aspects of Israeli policies (especially Jewish settlements in the OPTs), Dutch relations with Israel have been portrayed consistently as a warm friendship by Dutch and Israeli policymakers alike.16 One Dutch interviewee explains this as an expression of Dutch Holocaust-related ‘ongoing feeling of responsibility and guilt and shame’ (NL1), which translated to the forging of exceptional relations and unwavering, unconditional support to Israel during the 1950s and the 1960s.

At the beginning of the 1970s, ‘a joint Dutch-Israeli development program was initiated and coordinated by Mashav, Israel’s Centre for International Cooperation. Mashav consists of various projects, courses to train

11 Thomas Barnett is security advisor to US Administrations since the end of the Cold War.
12 Speech Verhagen (Foreign Affairs) on Globalisations and Dutch foreign policy, University of Maastricht on 31-05-2007 (appendix 1)
13 Speech Timmermans (Foreign Affairs) at University of Tel Aviv December 2013 (Appendix 1)
14 Speech Verhagen (Foreign Affairs) about the Middle East at the Hirsch Institute on 29-11-2007 (Appendix 1)
16 http://embassies.gov.il/hague-en/aboutisrael/Relations/Pages/Relations.aspx, [Accessed 02-11-2015]. Also see Speeches of successive Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Appendix 1)
specialists and provide support in developing countries”\(^{17}\). This special joint development program continued into the late 1980s\(^{18}\) (NL1). Cross-border projects involving Israel remain an essential element in the Netherlands’ development cooperation policies in the Middle East, especially within the framework of and in the aftermath of the Oslo process (NL1). Facilitating Israeli political, economic and diplomatic interests has been a formal Dutch policy throughout the last decades. Between 1967 and 1992 the Netherlands represented Israel diplomatically in the former Soviet Union through its Moscow embassy, when the Soviet Union severed direct diplomatic relations after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. During this period, the Dutch also provided thousands of Russian Jews with visas enabling them to immigrate to Israel, represented Israel on the Board of the IMF and supported Israeli membership in the West European and Other Groups (WEOG) at the UN (Source: Israeli Embassy website)\(^{19}\).

Dutch political relations with Israel are clearly traceable in its foreign policy and declarations both bilaterally and within the EU framework. In the 11th Annual Israeli security conference in Herzliya, referring to growing international criticism of Israeli human rights violations, the then Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Rosenthal (VVD) stated:

"There is indeed a creeping tendency to condone the delegitimisation of Israel. [...] I will keep urging my colleagues in the EU to object vocally to this trend. [...] The Dutch government will not tolerate Israel-bashing."\(^{20}\)

Minister of Foreign Affairs Maxime Verhagen (CDA) regularly used similar terms in his Middle East policy statements, and called for a more balanced EU policy towards Israel. Moreover, the 2012 Palestinian statehood bid was portrayed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Timmermans (PvdA) as 'legitimate but untimely', complicating efforts to resume peace talks.\(^{21}\) The 2010 VVD-CDA government coalition accord\(^{22}\), specifying its foreign policy platform, prioritizes strengthening relations with Israel, which led to the establishment of the Dutch-Israeli Cooperation Council in 2013. The current VVD-PvdA coalition launched an equivalent bilateral Dutch-Palestinian Cooperation Council in 2013.

Economic cooperation is fundamental to Dutch-Israeli relations and Dutch government pursues proactive and vibrant economic and trade relations with Israel irrespective of the occupation of Palestine. The underlying premise of these economic ties is the opportunity, innovation and mutual economic benefit.\(^{23}\) The Netherlands is one of Israel’s largest trade partners, and its second largest export partner in Europe (Israeli embassy website)\(^{24}\). Holland also functions as a middle point for many Israeli export products, which are then sold across Europe (ibid). The Netherlands also benefits, from major Israeli investment in transportation and the growing number of Israeli


\(^{18}\) Significance of this programme is that Dutch development aid budgets were used to facilitate entry points for Israel to establish itself as a meaningful geopolitical and economic actor in postcolonial Africa.

\(^{19}\) Source: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2010/09/30/regeerakkoord-vvd-cda [accessed 02-11-2015].

\(^{20}\) Introductory remarks by Minister Rosenthal (Foreign Affairs) on the panel Is Israel Losing Europe’ Herzliya 08-02-2011. (Appendix 1)


\(^{22}\) ‘Innovation Nations: Promoting Stronger Relations between the Netherlands and Israel in a Changing Middle East’, Minister Verhagen (Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation) 14-06-2011 (Appendix 1)

\(^{23}\) [Accessed on 02-11-2015]
companies that are attracted to the Netherlands by tax benefits (website Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

According to Minister Maxime Verhagen (CDA) ‘cooperation with Israel yields splendid results’ in technology innovation; ICT and scientific research; applied industrial engineering and management; and water and water treatment technologies.

Dutch-Israeli military and security cooperation is also significant and highly relevant for the purpose of this research. Although its true nature and scale remains under the radar, a Dutch government statement in May 2014 on the visit to Israel of Dutch Defence Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert (VVD) reveals that current cooperation includes: Israeli facilities used by the Dutch Commando Corps; cooperation and knowledge exchange in the use of remote controlled aircraft (drone industry) for intelligence purposes; cooperation in ‘cyber-related matters’ and ‘measures against improvised explosives’ (Dutch government website).

3.6 Dutch Development Aid to Palestine: Terms of Engagement

Dutch involvement in development aid to the Palestinians did not materialize till the 1980s, and was mainly provided through NGOs and the Netherlands contribution to humanitarian aid provided by the UNRWA (NL3). Oslo and the subsequent Gaza-Jericho Agreement laid the basis for the official entry of many donor countries –including the Netherlands- to Palestine and the implementation of aid programmes. In 1994, the Netherlands inaugurated its first representative office in the OPTs in Jericho (later moving to Ramallah), marking the first direct bilateral diplomatic relations. A Dutch interviewee involved in the process notes:

‘Our arrival in the area alongside the Germans and the Danes (we were the first to establish representative offices) was clearly circumscribed and limited to the establishment of the representative office charged with the execution and implementation of aid programmes, i.e. development cooperation that was established in 1994’. (NL2)

Thus, Dutch formal presence and bilateral development cooperation policies in Palestine were authorized by and formulated within the Oslo framework. The rationale for the Dutch involvement as a donor and development actor in Palestine following Oslo was articulated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pieter Kooijmans (CDA) in 1994: ‘a sustainable recovery of the confidence in the peace process will mainly be realised through visible improvement of the socio-economic circumstances in the Occupied Territories’.

Currently, the three pillars of Dutch foreign policy in Palestine are economic diplomacy, political dialogue and development cooperation (Sanders 1999). Development aid is bilateral and multilateral. The total bilateral aid budget for 2014-2017 is an estimated €69,410,000, divided between projects in security and rule of law; food security; water and sanitation; and human rights (Source: NRO Multi-Annual Plan 2014-2017). In addition to financial support for the PNA apparatus, the Netherlands contributes to ‘stimulating economic growth, and developing a functioning security service’ (NRO

26 ‘Innovation Nations: Promoting Stronger Relations between the Netherlands and Israel in a Changing Middle East’, Minister Verhagen (Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation) 14-06-2011 (Appendix 1)
28 Letter of Minister Kooijmans (Foreign Affairs) to the Dutch Parliament on 15 August 1994 (Appendix 1)
29 See list of documents (Appendix 1)
Multi-Annual Plan 2012-2015). Dutch also contribute US$15 million annually for humanitarian aid through UNRWA (ToR IOB 2004-2014)\textsuperscript{31}, and a Dutch-Palestinian bilateral Economic Cooperation Forum was launched in Bethlehem in 2013, as a tool for "economic diplomacy" (ibid). What assumptions inform the ways these large amounts of money are spent will be addressed in the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{31} Document listed in Appendix 1
4 Dutch Development Aid to Palestine: Deconstructing Discourses

Deconstructing Dutch development aid discourses in Palestine is essential to understanding how aid policies are produced and legitimized. Analysis here will focus on Dutch official discourses as constructed and articulated by ministers, civil servants and other official development actors and in policy documents. Research tools include interviews with foreign and development policy actors, policy documents, multi-annual strategic plans, speeches and statements of successive foreign and development cooperation ministers and parliamentary documents (Appendix 1). Thematic frame analysis allows for an in-depth examination of Dutch development discourses using Entman’s definition of framing. Intertextuality is applied to examine direct and indirect intertextual and conceptual links over time and by different actors, to establish continuity, authority, and legitimization of the official discourses.

4.1 Framing Dutch Development Cooperation: Self-Representation in Dutch Foreign Policy

'It is our duty to uphold the dividing line between civilization and barbarism.... Our civilization is worth defending. Values of freedom, democracy and human rights, and also solidarity and humanity are fundamental to Dutch foreign policy'

According to Hansen, identity representation is key to foreign policy. Identity is framed in ‘spacial, temporal and ethical’ terms (2006:8). According to Spitz et al, ‘traditionally, the Dutch international approach is often described as a combination of ‘the Merchant and the Clergyman’ (2013:6), combining (economic) interest with what Hansen calls ‘moral responsibility’ (Hansen 2006:47). Dutch policy actors across the political spectrum construct Dutch identity in foreign policy both as traders (read: open; internationally-oriented and pragmatic), and as clergymen (respect for values, moral responsibility, and human rights). In his speech ‘Need for an Active Foreign Policy’, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maxime Verhagen (CDA) argues that combining idealism ‘doing the right thing’ and realism ‘serving our own interest’ through commitment to internationalism and seeking opportunity is the cornerstone of Dutch foreign policy 33

Policy discourse ‘always articulates a self and a series of others’ (Hansen 2006: 6), and ‘identities are often constructed as a mixture of the territorially bounded and the abstract political’ (Hansen 2006:47). In his policy address ‘Over the dikes and into the world: using a moral compass to plot a realistic world’ 34 Minister Maxime Verhagen (Foreign Affairs) sums up the principles of Dutch foreign and development cooperation policy within a specific set of objectives: internationalism and strengthening of global governance; Europe, and the Netherland therein, emerging as a significant geopolitical actor on the world stage; re-enforcing transatlantic relations under the leadership of the US; and linking development cooperation and security policy to serve Dutch security and national interests and to serve the common (Western) values of freedom, free market economy and human rights. Those objectives set the boundaries for Dutch identity in terms of space -EU and transatlantic

32 Minister Verhagen (Foreign Affairs) on globalisation and Dutch foreign policy, 31-05-2007 (Appendix 1)
33 Speech listed in Appendix 1
34 Speech on 31-05-2007 in University of Maastricht is listed in Appendix 1.
partners, i.e. the West—, as well as values representing a liberal understanding of national and international political and economic freedoms. Development cooperation in this discourse is directly linked to national security.

This discourse resonates with the stated objectives of Dutch foreign policy as defined in yet another document, a 2013 letter to the Dutch House of Representatives:

"The three main aims of foreign policy are to improve the Netherlands' economic position in the world, promote global stability and security, and foster human rights and the rule of law. [...] Poverty in developing countries and the Netherlands' aims are closely linked[...]. Development cooperation needs to make a major contribution to this." (p2)

The letter links poverty alleviation to global stability and security, and presents development cooperation as an important tool to serve Dutch economic interests, enhance stability, and promote human rights and the rule of law. This approach to development cooperation reflects a power relationship between the Self and the Other, i.e. the Netherlands as the West and developing countries on the receiving end, portrayed as "part of both the problem and the solution" (p2). Similarly, One of the Dutch interviewees frames development cooperation as a tool to 'coordinate and support the political views with regards to international political order, international peace and international development' (NL1), showing the alignment between foreign and development cooperation policy objectives. Those objectives frame the representations of not only Dutch but also Palestinian identities in Dutch policy documents.

4.2 Palestinian Identity Representations in Dutch Official Discourses

Hansen defines identity representation as 'discursive, political, relational and social' (2006:6) and argues that identity representation in foreign policy discourse 'could be theorized as a dual process of linking and differentiation' (2006:42). This section addresses the construction of Palestinian identity in Dutch policy discourses, focusing first on the representations of Israel and Palestine, and of Dutch-Israeli and Dutch-Palestinian relationships through linking and differentiation, and secondly through strategic omissions and absences in the texts.

Official Dutch documents and state representatives consistently construct Israeli identity through connectedness, in terms of shared history and values such as democracy and the rule of law. For example, in 2011 Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Uri Rosenthal (VVD) stated:

'Israel is a democracy based on the rule of law. It is the only country in the region, I repeat, in the region that can truly say this. The EU was built on these same values. We share these values. And they are not something superficial; they are fundamental values; the bottom line of what the EU stands for. [...] they are the bottom line of what Israel stands for, [...] when you have values in common [...] friendship should come naturally.'

This position was reiterated in 2013 by Minister of Foreign Affairs Frans Timmerman (PvdA) in Tel Aviv: ‘I believe Israelis and Europeans share a common heritage, a common belief, which is one of the greatest of all human achievements: [...] we should cherish that’

35 Letter to the Dutch House of Representatives presenting the Spearheads of Development Cooperation Policy. 16-02-2012 (Document listed in Appendix1)
36 Letter to House of Representatives 16-12-2012, p 2 (Document listed Appendix 1)
37 ‘Introductory Remarks’, Minister Rosenthal (Foreign Affairs) at the Panel ‘Is Israel Losing Europe?’ at the 11th Herzliya Conference in Israel on 08-02-2011 (Appendix 1)
38 Speech Minister Timmerman (Foreign Affairs) at the University of Tel Aviv on 19-12-2013 (Document listed in Appendix 1)
In contrast, Prime Minister Mark Rutte (VVD), in a December 2013 speech at the opening of the Dutch Palestinian bilateral Cooperation Forum in Bethlehem stated:

‘Dutch involvement with the Palestinian people is already extensive. We work together closely in many areas, such as food security, water management, judicial and governance capacity, and humanitarian aid for Palestinian refugees in the region. Last year we spent €54 million on these programmes only.’

Thus, while Israel is constructed in the above statements as an equal, in terms of a shared Western heritage of values and democratic practice, Palestinians are represented in terms of basic development needs (such as food and water) and a lack of judicial and governance capacity. The Dutch-Palestinian relationship is unequal, that of provider and beneficiary. In both cases Palestinians and Israelis are depicted as a homogeneous category.

In an earlier letter to the Dutch Parliament, in 2012, Minister of Foreign Affairs Frans Timmermans (PvdA) uses similar constructs to explain the nature of Dutch relations with Israel and Palestinians:

‘The Netherlands and Israel have longstanding good relations that connect the two countries in different terrains. These [relations] are consolidated through frequent political dialogue, and cooperation in the fields of trade, science and culture. The relations with the PA have been also good for many years and are shaped by the yearly political consultations, and yearly consultations regarding the allocation of Dutch financial assistance and support to the Palestinian state-building. In this framework a substantial assistance programme is directed towards food security, private sector development, security and rule of law, water supply and humanitarian help.’

The relationship with Israel is represented here as long-standing, based on dialogue and mutual interests in science, culture and trade, implying equal standing, collaboration and connectedness. In the case of Palestine, the relationship is with the Palestinian Authority and manifests itself through political consultations on development and humanitarian assistance, reflecting dependency and hierarchy and thus based on difference.

Analysing representation and the dynamics of development discourse, Escobar argues that ‘certain representations become dominant and shape indelibly the ways in which reality is imagined and acted upon’ (1995: 5). Which aspects of a reality are glossed over and which emphasized plays an important role in the construction of representations. My aim is not to comment either the democratic aspects of Israeli society or the assumed development needs of the Palestinians, but rather to analyse how these become reified in the representations. An excellent example is a 2007 policy speech about the Middle East in the Hirsch Institute by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Maxime Verhagen (CDA), in which he praised the state of democracy in Israel:

‘What is beyond question is that Israel [...] has developed into a modern democracy founded on the rule of law [...] Israel has welcomed immigrants from many corners of the globe into its society [...] At the same time we mustn’t forget that Israel also has a sizable Palestinian Arab minority, whose members enjoy Israeli citizenship, speak Hebrew, and are represented in the parliament. The way this group has found a place in Israeli society, [...] demonstrates the strength and maturity of Israeli democracy.’

This representation fails to note a number of realities fundamental to understanding the nature of the Israeli political system: Israel is open only for Jewish immigrants while three generations of descendants of the Palestinian refugees expelled by the Zionists on the foundation of the State of Israel are denied any right of return (Akram and Rempel, 2004). The statement referring to the Palestinian minority in Israel -depicted as a group which enjoys Israeli citizenship, political representation and a place in society- ignores the political and historical position of the Palestinian

39 Speech listed in Appendix 1
40 Parliamentary letter from Minister Timmermans (Foreign Affairs) about the Middle East process on 12-12-2012 (Appendix 1). Translated from Dutch by the author.
41 Speech listed in Appendix 1
population whose existence on the territory precedes the founding of the Israeli state. A Palestinian historical narrative that includes those facts is prohibited in the education system in Israel (Hesketh, 2011). Finally, the statement totally fails to acknowledge that Israel is an occupier and colonizer by force of large sections of the Palestinian territories – a fact recognized in international law and by the UN. Rather, this "democracy" discourse combined with the above-mentioned omissions construct Israel as a country of peace, tolerance and rule of law.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian political system is represented through continuous references to political and factional divisions, lack of democratic institutions and elections, the Palestinian National Authority’s lack of legitimacy and of the distrust it engenders in the public and among other Palestinian political actors. The Multi-Annual Strategic Plans (MSPs) of 2012-2015 and 2014-2017 highlight those constructions:

"The decision of President Abbas to engage in peace talks with Israel has been met with opposition within Fatah and PLO ranks, and scepticism among [...] population. They seem to prefer unilateral Palestinian steps such as pursuing membership of UN agencies..." (MASP 2014-2017:9)

'A further crucial factor that helps explain the declining legitimacy of the political system is the Fatah-Hamas schism' (MASP 2012-2015: 5) and (MASP 2014-2017:10)

'This progress, however, starkly contrasts the lack of constitutionally elected institutions. Gaza is a de facto one-party state. In the West Bank the PLC has not convened since mid-2007 and president Abbas rules by decree.' (MASP 2014-2017:10)

This representation of the Palestinian internal situation fails to note the broader context of the occupation, the blockade on Gaza, and the Israeli-imposed separation between the West Bank and Gaza. The MASP 2014-2017 refers to the need for greater effort in tackling Palestinian internal human rights violations, torture and political arrests, gender-based violence, and freedom of expression as issues the PNA needs to work on, and criticizes Hamas for human rights violations in Gaza. It also refers to "public sector corruption", ‘nepotism’ and ‘favouritism’ and concludes that ‘there is a need for stronger anti-corruption efforts in order to build public confidence in government accountability’ (MASP 2014-2017:10).

Emphasizing internal divisions, a democracy deficit and human rights violations by various Palestinian actors’ stands in stark contrast to a total absence of any reference to the Israeli state’s military violence against Palestinians and its violations of Palestinian human rights. Together with the references to Israeli “democracy”, such systematic negative representations of Palestinian political authorities and people contributes to sharply contrasting constructions of the Israeli and Palestinian identities, the former close to the Dutch Self, the latter as the Other.

Israel’s occupation of Palestine is similarly absent from the two reviewed Multi-Annual Strategic Plans. Critical references to Israel are limited to the mention of Palestinian -not Dutch or international- mistrust in Israel’s commitment to peace, and their concerns about settlements and restriction of mobility:

"The general lack of confidence among Palestinians in the renewed peace talks largely stems from the lack of trust that the current Israeli political leadership supports a two-state solution [...] continued settlement expansion, and a lack of Israeli steps to ease the restrictive movement and access regime.’ (MASP 2014-2017:9)

This systematic omission of any mention of the structural violence and multiple levels of oppression of Palestinians in Israel, West Bank and Gaza in the broader context of Israeli occupation and dispossession marks Dutch discourses on Palestinian identities and political system and ignores the power dynamics between the Israeli occupation authorities and the Palestinian National Authority. The latter has accepted an ambiguous governing role: it has only partial control over its

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42 Both Multi-Annual Plans are listed in Appendix 1
territory, political and social processes, lacks the ability to address violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) both in relation to Israeli occupiers (and settlers) and militant fractions within Palestinian society, and is unable or unwilling to enforce the rule of law. While none of this is a justification for the violation of human rights by Palestinian authorities, the PNA violations and its loss of legitimacy cannot be seen in isolation from the overall normalization of violence created by the Israeli occupation and regional and global dynamics.

Significantly too, Dutch policy documents show two specific characteristics when it comes to language. First, reviewed documents consistently refer to the Palestinian Territories, rather than the full, official term: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs). This omission is a post-Oslo development since reviewed policy and parliamentary documents in the period just before and immediately following Oslo consistently use the term OPTs. This use of language indicates a significant albeit not officially articulated shift in Dutch policy discourse in relation to the status of the OPTs. Secondly, the documents are systematic in the use of terms ‘Israel’ – signifying the state; and ‘Palestinians’ – signifying the people. This politics of naming consistently excludes the word ‘Palestine’ – i.e. the state entity and the country - in policy documents except when referring to pre-1948 historical Palestine. This contributes to the construct of a Palestinian identity void of rights to the state or any relationship to the country, ultimately delegitimizing those rights and relations and leaving Israel as the only rightful state on the given territory.

4.3 Framing Occupation: “Conflict” and “Peace”

Entman defines framing as a selective process that highlights certain elements of 'a perceived reality' in order to 'promote a particular problem definition' and a specific type of solution (1993: 52). Dutch representations of Israeli and Palestinian identities inform and are informed by avoidance in addressing the occupation and using “conflict” and “peace” as problem definitions.

Dutch foreign policy in Palestine is based on the premise that the founding of the state of Israel is in itself both legitimate and legal, with the objective to 'provide the Jewish people a place of its own and the security the countries of Europe had failed to provide'. Historically, the wars in the region were framed by the international community and in the Netherlands as an ‘Arab-Israeli conflict’, a state of (existential) war between Israel with the legitimate right to exist, and 22 Arab countries that contest that right (NL1). According to the interviewee, ‘the ongoing wars brought the Dutch public opinion closer to Israel, as it was seen as the party which was attacked’ (NL1). The Palestinians were not perceived as an entity independent of the Arab identity. In a 2007 speech at the Hirsch Institute, Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen cites Theodor Herzl and presents the Zionist historical narrative that the founding of the Israeli state led to ‘the first Arab-Israeli war since the Arabs did not accept the State of Israel despite its basis in International Law’. In his address, the Palestinian historical narrative is ignored, and reference to the Nakba is made only once in relation to the 1948 war, as a word that Palestinians use, and not as a recognition of the effects of 1948 on Palestinians: ‘Israelis refer to this conflict as their War of Independence; for the Palestinians, it is Al-Nakba’.

Apparently, ‘til after the 1967 war, there was very little attention paid [in the Netherlands] to the Palestinians as being the main victim of the foundation of the state of Israel. [...] The 1967 war is seen [in Dutch public...
opinion] as self-defence by Israel" (NL2). The interviewee adds: 'the continuation of the conflict, though, was seen as a destabilizing factor in the area and a hindrance to normal relations between Europe - the Netherlands and a large number of countries in the Middle East'. According to the interviewee, Dutch economic interests in the Arab world became apparent following the 1973 oil boycott (NL2). In a parliamentary letter on the eve of the signing of the Oslo Accord, Foreign Minister Pieter Kooijmans (CDA) commended the Oslo process as 'a prospect to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole'.

Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s speech at the opening of the Dutch-Palestinian Bilateral Cooperation Forum in Bethlehem in 2013 is an example of Dutch policy discourses on “conflict” and “peace” in Palestine: 'So, cooperation between Dutch and Palestinian partners is not only about money. The Dutch government firmly believes that prosperity, peace and security all feed into one another. The stronger the economy, the more people have the prospect of a successful future[...], and the bigger the chance of a peaceful solution to the serious problems which, sadly, the Palestinian people still face'.

This statement links “peace” to economy and “security”. The assumption here is that economic growth and prosperity will lead Palestinians to pursue peaceful solutions (rather than violent resistance). Reference to the ‘serious problems’ facing the Palestinian people is a misnomer which obscures Israel's colonialism and military occupation of Palestine.

Reviewed policy documents and statements by Dutch political actors make no reference to Palestinian grievances as framed by the Palestinians themselves. Rather than speaking of justice, Dutch policy documents refer to ‘realistic’ solutions, the need for ‘moderation’ and ‘compromise’, ‘sharing’ and ‘mutuality’, ignoring the power imbalance between Israel and Palestine. In his address at Beit Maiersdorf Faculty Club in Israel in 2009, the then Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation Bert Koenders (PvdA) noted:

'...many describe the conflict as a 'zero sum' game. This is what I mean by speaking in existential terms rather than in terms of territorial compromise'

'...the history of the Middle East conflict teaches us that the paths of military action and terrorism lead nowhere. Acknowledging this leads not to naivety but to realism and shared security. I am quite convinced that the solution to this complex conflict will only be found in compromise and restraint.'

'...it is essential to strengthen the forces of moderation on both sides so they can talk realistically about compromise based on mutual interests. This will then facilitate economic development and poverty reduction.'

These statements obscure the occupation, ignore the need for justice and presume a symmetry in the power relation between the two sides. In a 2013 statement at Tel Aviv University, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Frans Timmermans (PvdA) goes further, implying that Israel is a weaker actor that needs to be protected by Europe:

'... I notice that it is hard for many outside Israel, especially in Europe, to understand the position of Israel in this environment [...]. We need to ensure that Israel is not backed into a corner and compelled to accept every demand in the belief that Israel's strength enables it to make unlimited concessions.'

The Palestinian armed struggle for liberation is framed as terrorism and as a security threat to Israel. Reference to violence by Israeli occupation forces is framed as retaliation and legitimate self-defence, which focuses any debate of Israeli violence only on its proportionality:

46 Parliamentary Letter 23 432, Nr. 1 on 23 September 1993. Translated from Dutch by the author. (Listed in Appendix 1)
47 Speech listed in Appendix 1
48 Listed in Appendix 1
49 Speech listed in Appendix 1
Several years of cooperation in the field of security between the PA and Israel has produced positive results, in particular with regard to preventing terrorist attacks. The violence that is flaring up once in a while, is nevertheless very damaging for the strengthening of mutual trust. Rocket attacks from Gaza are a shocking example. Israel has the full right to protect its population against that threat at all times with due regard to the proportionality prescribed by international law. The (Dutch) cabinet support Israel in this matter.50

Dutch discourses on the two-state solution consistently note the need for Palestine to become democratic, and Israel to become secure. In his address to Palestinians at the opening of the Bilateral Cooperation Forum in Bethlehem, Prime Minister Mark Rutte (VVD) referred to the resumption of the peace talks:

“This will be good for Palestinians in the region, and for the relationship with Europe and the wider world. And it offers the prospect of a future in which Israel and the Palestinians can live side-by-side in peace, prosperity and security in two democratic states ... ”51

In his policy address52 about the Middle East the Hirsch Institute in 2007, a Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Maxime Verhagen stated:

“A second goal of Dutch policy is capacity building [...]. The aim is to lay a solid foundation for the creation of a viable, democratic Palestinian state with an effective transparent leadership.’

In reference to the right of return of Palestinian refugees he added:

‘...large-scale return to Israel by Palestinians is not realistic. It would put the two-state solution, which entails a Jewish Israeli state and a Palestinian Arab state, in question. Finally, any comprehensive settlement will also have to include guarantees to Israel’s security.’

These statements illustrate Dutch policy assumptions of what constitutes a ‘fair solution’ to the “conflict”: security for Israel as both a Jewish and a democratic state, with no contradiction seen between democratic and Jewish-only, and a peaceful (read: without violent resistance to Israel), democratic (read: in western terms) and economically viable Palestine. The “peace” in Palestine is thus continuously subsumed under economic prosperity and the ability of Palestinian leadership to learn how to exercise democratic governance, with a total rejection of any righting the wrongs of occupation, especially the internationally recognized right to return.

4.4 Dutch Role in Development Aid for Palestine: Acting for “Peace” and “Stability” in “the Region”

All interviewed Dutch development actors and all reviewed documents refer to the two-state solution and Dutch development cooperation is framed as ‘one of the tools to contribute to the achievement of this goal’ (ToR IOB 2014)53. In the letter to the House of Representatives presenting the pillars of Dutch development cooperation policy, Palestine is classified as a ‘fragile state’ where ‘an integrated approach to peace, security and development (including the development of the rule of law) forms the core of the

50 Letter to the Parliament about the Middle East peace process, by Minister Timmermans on 12-12-2012 – translated by the author (Listed in Appendix 1)
51 Speech listed in Appendix 1
52 Listed in Appendix 1
53 Document listed in Appendix 1
Hence, Palestinian development needs are framed by linking peace, development and security.

Duffield (2007) defines development as a liberal Eurocentric modernization project geared towards the protection of Western prosperity, market economy and the hegemony of liberal values. Dutch policy choices in Palestine focus on economic reconstruction and growth, security and stability, good governance, and the rule of law through capacity-building, institutionalization and “state-building” to support the PNA. These choices are part of a blanket approach towards ‘fragile states’ – even though Dutch policy documents carefully avoid referring to Palestine as a state (as noted earlier) - characterized by ‘interdependence between development and security’ (Duffield 2005: 142). In light of this, Dutch policy choices constitute what Jacoby (2014) calls the imperative of liberal peace. One Dutch interviewee confirms that ‘in the case of Palestine, development cooperation is political and is about stability in the region’. (NL4)

According to interviewed Dutch development actors, 20 years on, Oslo remains the premise for Dutch development interventions. While the process was ongoing the goal was to maintain it and keep the momentum, and when the process broke, the focus shifted to restarting it ensuring continuity for the PNA and institution-building (NL5). The MASPs frame economic progress and functioning state as ‘enabling factors’ to serve the political settlement. Hence, food security, water management, and state-building through professionalization, capacity-building and institutionalization especially in the security and justice sectors are deemed essential to maintain stability and security and engender a resolution for the “conflict”. Referring to the role of Dutch and other donors, one Palestinian interviewee remarks 'donors tend to try and manage the occupation. Their support to the Palestinians is only a tool to pacify the Palestinians, because nobody wants to touch the hot potato, and to deal with the real issue which is the occupation and its impact on the lives of Palestinians' (PAL3). Reflecting on his work in Palestine, one Dutch interviewee says: 'everything we did post-Oslo was geared towards creating a sense of normalcy... It was clear that the Palestinians were on a sloop, with international aid the downfall has been slowed down' (NL4). NL4 added 'we do not want to antagonize Israel'. Clearly, Dutch development policies in Palestine – according to those who formulate and implement them – are not designed to challenge the limitations of occupation and securitization imposed by the Israeli military regime. Consequently, such policies impede any prospect for transformative change in Palestine, which remains captive to the Israeli colonial regime.

The MASP 2012-2015 attributes the ability of the Netherlands to be "effective" to its strategic position in the following way: 'As a relatively large donor the Netherlands has leverage with the Palestinian Authority, while the special relationship with Israel allows for political openings' (MASP 2012-2015: p.3). This statement illuminates the Dutch understanding of their position and role vis-à-vis each party. Whereas they frame their relationship with the Palestinians in terms of leverage based on development intervention - a clearly uneven power balance, they refer to Israel in terms of a special relationship allowing space for political influence. Yet, Dutch policy actors also present themselves as a 'small player' in a 'big field which is dominated obviously by the Americans'. (NL5)

Accepting and promoting the dominance and geopolitical leadership of the US in the Middle East in general and in Palestine and Israel in particular is a pillar of Dutch foreign policy in the region. Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen (CDA) refers to the US in his policy address in 2007 as ‘the only power that can play [a] role’ in this “conflict”. Minister Bert Koenders, the then Minister

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54 Listed in Appendix 1
55 MASP 2012-2015 and MASP 2014-2017 (Appendix 1)
56 Sectors identified in the MASPs as well as the ToR for the evaluation of the Dutch development cooperation in the Palestinian Territories 2008-2014 (Listed in Appendix 1)
57 Policy Address on the Middle East in the Hirsch Institute on 29-11-2007 (Listed in Appendix 1)
of Development Cooperation, refers in his speech in Israel in 2009 to US relations with the Muslim world and his support for President Obama’s approach to the Middle East. In his policy address in Tel Aviv in 2013, Minister of Foreign Affairs Frans Timmermans (Pvda) states that ‘Europe’s task is to fully support what the Americans have put on the table….and to be there once a solution is found, if guarantees and support are needed’. Thus Dutch foreign and development policies in Palestine are perceived as subordinate and complementary to US interventions.

Whereas four of the six interviewed Dutch development actors refer to Dutch development aid in Palestine as political, many projects are excluded or dismissed as being ‘politically sensitive’, either in Israeli perception or considering Dutch domestic, politically polarized debate on Palestine and Israel. According to one Dutch interviewee, ‘the main challenge was that we had to weigh everything carefully. ...We had to be sure that we would not be funding any organization that would be considered or might have a link to a terrorist organisation, or that would be considered as actively anti-Israel’ (NL3). This interviewee added that when financial support was provided to a distance learning project for Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli jails they were ‘rapped over the knuckles [...] because we would not be able to guarantee that the participating prisoners were not people with “blood on their hands”’. By framing a group of Palestinian political prisoners as people with ‘blood on their hands’ (NL3), Dutch foreign and development policy actors borrow Israeli discourse to describe Palestinians participating in resistance, and ignore the fact that many political prisoners are stone-throwing youth, human rights activists and others who are not even part of armed struggle.

In the light of Dutch understanding of actors in the “conflict”, direct financial support (as well as indirect financing through Dutch development NGOs) to some Palestinian non-governmental organizations calling for boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) as a strategy to resist the occupation was contested by Foreign Minister Rosenthal (VVD). He requested that the NRO conduct an investigation to identify which organizations supported by Dutch direct funding were actively promoting BDS (NL5 and NL6). According to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz (December 2010), Minister Rosenthal commented on the funding of Palestinian website Electronic Intifada by a Dutch development organizations using government funds:

‘this website promotes policies which are totally at odds and dramatically opposite to the position of the Dutch government,...Now I don’t think all publically-funded organizations have a duty to adhere precisely to the position of the government, but there is a limit.’

While Dutch political actors and policies continuously de-politicize the Israeli occupation, One Palestinian interviewee referred to two interventions by Dutch development actors as donors in the mandate and priorities of the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) which are clearly political. The first relates to a suggestion ‘to give up on Gaza and focus only on the West Bank as a matter of priority given the limited resources of the Commission’ (PAL4). This suggestion feeds into the geopolitics of the West Bank/Gaza split, pursued by Israel, and would limit monitoring of the conduct of the PNA institutions to within the West Bank, ignoring any of its human rights violations in Gaza. The second refers to questioning whether advice to the PNA to sign up to the Rome Statute in preparation for accession to the International Criminal Court (ICC) is part of the ICHR mandate. The interviewee adds ‘We were asked why we include in our strategic documents a component urging the PNA to sign the Rome Statute after the upgrading of Palestine to a member state [at the UN] as a component of our work in the future’ (PAL4). According to this interviewee, this ignores the fact that the PNA does not function in isolation from Israeli military occupation policies. In addition, this impedes

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58 Policy speech of Minister Koenders in Beit Maiersdorf Faculty Club in Israel on 28-06-2009 (listed in Appendix 1)
59 Address of Minister Timmermans in Tel Avi University on 16-12-2013 (listed in Appendix 1)
on the human rights organization’s independence. Another Palestinian interviewee also referred to the pressure exerted by Dutch (and other governments) on the PNA to refrain from signing up to the Rome Statue and accession to the ICC (PAL2). The intervention in the mandate of ICHR is significant in light of the Dutch official position opposing any UN upgrading of Palestine’s status and accession to the ICC.

Reflecting on the above, it seems that when there is no match between the Dutch policy frame for “conflict resolution” in Palestine or the underlying assumptions on the nature of the “conflict” and that of Palestinian development and other actors, these actors will be trumped as they stand “at odds … [with] the position of the Dutch government” 61. This sheds light on the power balance between the two parties and highlights the vested geopolitical interests informing Dutch development intervention in Palestine.

One interviewed Palestinian development actor who participated in the Oslo bilateral and multilateral negotiations, argues that there is a strong connection between foreign policy and development projects on the ground. According to the interviewee the issues of water and waste-water provide a clear example: ‘the NRO is the only driver behind the trans-boundary waste-water cooperation and waste-water protocol…this project is in line with the Dutch policy to promote Palestinian-Israeli cooperation regardless of political developments, because they believe that some issues like water and environment can be the entry points to solve some daily problems [for the Palestinians], and create cooperation regardless of any progress at the political level. These facts on the ground can then serve further political arrangements’ (PAL3). According to the interviewee, by pushing for signing a joint protocol, the Dutch aim is to normalize and institutionalize Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. The problem with this approach, in the view of the interviewee is that ‘it moves the negotiations from talking about rights and sovereignty into talking about needs, transferring Palestinians into consumers and stripping them thereby of their (water) rights’. (PAL3)

These examples illustrate the politics of Dutch development cooperation policies in Palestine. Because security is a significant element in this politics, the next section focuses on security discourses.

4.5 Dutch Security Discourses and Policies in Palestine

Dutch security policies are framed by number of factors: Dutch-Israeli bilateral relations and Dutch relationships with the US and EU; Dutch discourses on their own and Palestinian identities, and Palestinian development needs; discourses on the nature of the “conflict” and the requirements for “peace”; and the relationship between peace, security, and development. In a Letter to the House of Representatives, security and the legal order were identified as the first spearhead of Dutch development cooperation, in response to what was perceived as the changing nature of global security problems62. In this document, insecurity and instability are framed in relation to the rise of extremism ‘especially in areas where governance and the rule of law are both weak’. It is also argued that conflict and instability ‘are increasingly undermining our prosperity’ and ‘lead to a swelling refugees flow and more illegal immigrants’. (p 4)

These assumptions constitute the rationale behind Dutch development policy decisions in the field of security in Palestine and provide the ideological and political foundation for those decisions. The same Letter argues that conflict resolution and state-building efforts will contribute to ‘preventing the emergence of ungoverned spaces, which may be exploited by terrorist groups’. Furthermore,

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61 Interview Minister Rosenthal (Foreign Affairs) in Haaretz on 17-12-2010 (see footnote 57)
62 Letter to the House of Representatives on the Spearheads of Dutch Development Cooperation Policy on 16-02-2012 (listed in Appendix 1)
human security is presented as an instrument to ‘foster stability in fragile states, and this in turn is important for the security of the Netherlands.’ (p4)

The Letter to the House of Representatives presenting the main strands of the Netherlands’ Development Cooperation policy (2012) also explains the link between Dutch foreign policy objectives and ‘work on security and legal order in fragile states’. Among these linkages are ‘human rights policy, and security policy in a wider sense (counterterrorism, efforts to fight international crime, refugee flows and illegal migrants’). (p5)

These policy considerations inform the link between Dutch security and development policies in Palestine.

Paradoxically, although Palestine is not referred to as a state in Dutch development policy documents, it is framed as a ‘fragile state’ when it comes to security discourses. A Dutch interviewee asserts that ‘[Palestine] is for sure fragile: Even though it is so-called middle income country, it is not yet a country, and it has proved to be fragile. If you look at the wars and what is happening right now politically, it is definitely still a very fragile state’ (NL6). This fragility serves to justify the security-development nexus approach of Dutch engagement in Palestine.

It is not surprising that security acquires a very specific meaning in Dutch policy documents. Firstly, by adopting Israel's discourse on “security” and “security requirements” as their own, Dutch security policies construct Palestinians as a threat to Israel, and design their interventions accordingly. Reflecting on that, a Palestinian interviewee argues: “The irony is that the victim - the people under occupation – are held responsible for the safety and security of their occupiers, while they themselves have no security whatsoever and no protection against the military force of the occupier” (PAL1).

Two other discourses mark Dutch security policies in Palestine: one that constructs Palestinian civil and police authorities as a threat to the human rights of Palestinian civilians (discussed earlier), and another that constructs Palestinian men as a security threat to Palestinian women. In that respect, discourses of criminal justice and the rule of law are defined as the cornerstones of Dutch security portfolio in Palestine.

Through the Oslo years, and especially early on, according to Dutch interviewees, Dutch assistance included training and equipment that were supposed to address this three-pronged understanding of “security” in Palestine: riot control training and equipment, and training of Palestinian border guards tasked with ‘securing Israeli borders’ from possible Palestinian attacks (NL3). The aid moved in time towards more structural assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) through contributions to the Palestinian Police training academy and through EUPOL COPPS including the UNDP Access to Criminal Justice Program and the Rule of Law Program (EUPOL1). Assistance was also provided to ‘maintaining stability within the PA’ (MASP 2014-2017:16). Equipment included security scanners for the Karm Salem border in the Gaza Strip (mentioned in the introduction) and on the Allenby Bridge border of West Bank and Jordan (NL5).63

Such security policy choices and interventions de-politicize security, obscure the occupation and limit the concept of security and respect for Palestinian human rights to functional PNA institutions: civil police, criminal justice and the rule of law. This narrows the recognition of the causes of Palestinian insecurity to internal threats, neglecting the individual and collective insecurities and injustices that result from the multiple levels of oppression of the Israeli colonial occupation regime.

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63 The author also reviewed the MoU and other project documents relating to the support provided to purchase the scanners. These documents were provide by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on the Right to Information Act (WOB).
Reflecting on the role of donors in post-Oslo Palestine, a Palestinian interviewee sees a correlation between domestic political realities in donor countries, their attitude towards Palestinian liberation and sovereignty, and their development portfolio choices:

"Countries that are not quite friendly to the Palestinian cause would divert funding from development to security, judicial and legal system and the rule of law to enhance the work on security, public order, and security cooperation with Israel... In this sense Palestine is looked at instrumentally, to maintain law, order and stability, and to save the security of Israel." (PAL1)

Dutch policy choices are based on a direct link between PNA stability and Israel’s security. The scenarios of several possible political developments in Palestine and consequent Dutch interventions, listed in MASP 2014-2017, are telling in that respect. One such scenario is the collapse of the Palestinian National Authority:

"The collapse of the P.A, whether through major reduction in international assistance, a refusal of Israel to transfer funds or a Palestinian decision to dissolve the P.A, would create a high level of uncertainty and a state of chaos. It may also drive Israel to take unilateral measures and it may require international involvement - different from previous interventions. It would also require redeployments of Israeli forces, possibly in area A, which would result in growing Palestinian resistance. The centre of power would then be moved from central to local level, which would strengthen local clan-based forces. In this scenario, the Netherlands would need to reassess its level of engagement [...]. There would also be a need for a direct or indirect intervention to counter extremism." (p 12)

Underlying potential solutions to such a scenario are very specific political choices: sustaining the PNA – even though often referred to as corrupt and without legitimacy - is seen as the option for stability as opposed to ‘chaos’; favouring the concentration of power in the existing centre of power alongside the use of Israeli and other militaries, as opposed to strengthening local ‘clans’ and ‘extremism’ implies opposing levels of civilizational progress and modernity. This ties up closely with previously discussed discourses on liberal peace that link economic prosperity, democracy, stability and security, while totally ignoring the context of occupation.

Importantly, the issue of justice is reduced to the rule of law and, as already noted, limited to the ‘internal’ – Palestinian - threats and actors.

For example, on the operational level, the successive MASPs identify ‘a functioning state’ as one of the main objectives of Dutch development cooperation in Palestine. Dutch contribution to a ‘functioning state’ includes support to security and criminal justice institutions, enhancing government capacity and civic participation in these sectors, with special attention to the ‘vulnerable groups including women’ (MASP 2014-2017:p 16), and respect for human rights by the Palestinian government. The assumptions underlying the domestic violence track of police training, and the focus on domestic violence in the Access to Justice Program with the UNDP and UN Women (EUPOL1) portrays Palestinian men as a security threat in their own society – while already defined as a security threat to Israel. Palestinian women are portrayed as mere victims, with no agency, and thus also depoliticized as actors of resistance.

This approach towards security fails to take into consideration the violence and insecurities confronting both Palestinian men and women as a result of the Israeli occupation, while the interpretation of justice only within this rule of law discourse denies historic injustices and the violations of individual and collective Palestinian rights.
5 Conclusions

My research investigated the politics of Dutch post-Oslo official development aid policies. Analysing the framing of these policies - using Entman’s and Desrosiers theoretical and conceptual frameworks - shed light on their underpinnings and the ways in which these policies are constructed and legitimated according to historical and geopolitical dynamics and within the context of the Oslo process dictates. My analysis focused on a set of interrelated discourses on identity representation and "conflict", "peace", "security" and development frames in Dutch foreign and development aid policies in Palestine.

Theorizing the convergence between foreign and development aid policy choices is the starting point of my research. Unpacking post-Oslo Dutch foreign and development aid policies in Palestine and their discourses and representations, allowed for in-depth interrogation of the mutually constitutive and discursive dynamics between them, and examining their underlying assumptions and how these inform the specific policy choices; thereby illustrating the convergence between them. My research demonstrates that Dutch foreign and development aid policy choices in Palestine are guided by a realist conception of peace, security and development. The stated general Dutch foreign and development aid objectives are geared towards serving Dutch (economic) and geopolitical interests, and enhancing global security and stability. Development cooperation is seen as serving these interests and strengthening the Netherlands’ role as a significant geopolitical actor contributing to global stability. Dutch policy discourses link security and stability to prosperity and economic growth. Dutch policy documents categorize Palestine as a ‘fragile state’ and Palestinian development needs are identified and framed by a development-security nexus. On a political level, Dutch policy actors perceive foreign and development policy interventions in Palestine as subordinate and complementary to the role of the US in the region in general and in Palestine and Israel in particular, thereby serving the US geopolitical agenda. This ties up with one of the pillars of Dutch foreign policy; namely reinforcing US-led transatlantic relations and linking development to security and stability to serve the (western) values of freedom and market economy.

Dutch-Israeli relations also underpin Dutch foreign and development policy choices in Palestine. Dutch-Israeli connectedness is historical, political and economic. The Netherlands has maintained close ties with the State of Israel since the 1950s and as well as political and public support, relations include strong diplomatic ties and cultural and scientific cooperation. While Oslo provides the framework for Dutch political and development aid interventions in Palestine, economic and security cooperation is a pillar of Dutch-Israeli relations and is pursued unconditionally and irrespective of the occupation of Palestine or the Oslo process. Its geopolitical, economic and military vested interests in these relations inform Dutch foreign policy towards Israel and Palestine and contribute to framing Dutch development aid to Palestine.

Using Hansen’s ‘ontological conception of identity as both a pre-condition for and as constituted through foreign policy’ (2006:23), my research engaged with Dutch foreign and development aid policies in Palestine. My analysis illuminates the central role of identity representations in constructing, (re)producing and legitimizing Dutch foreign and development policy discourses in Palestine, and confirms Hansen’s conception of the political nature of identity representations of the Self and the Other in foreign policy formulation. Official Dutch policy discourses consistently construct Israeli identity in terms of shared history and shared values - implying sameness - and Dutch-Israeli relations in terms of equality, collaboration and mutual interest, while Palestinian identity is produced through difference and Othering. Palestinians are mainly depicted as development subjects, and discourses on Dutch-Palestinian relations reflect dependency, hierarchy and unequal power relation, echoing Escobar’s conceptual framework of development as a Eurocentric, modernization and power tool for domination and oppression. Dutch policy discourses construct the Palestinian identity as void of national and state rights and any historic relationship to the country, thereby
delegitimizing Palestinian rights to resistance for liberation and self-determination, and depicting Israel as the only rightful state on the given territory.

Reifying certain aspects in Israeli and Palestinian identity representations in Dutch policy discourses while glossing over other aspects, combined with systematic omissions of certain aspects of the reality, contributes to sharply contrasting constructions of the Palestinian and Israeli identities. Consistent negative representations of the Palestinians -- emphasizing internal divisions, democracy deficit, lack of legitimacy of political actors and internal violations of human rights -- stands in stark contrast to the "democracy" discourse that casts Israel as a subject of peace, tolerance and rule of law. These discourses fail to acknowledge the role of Israel as an occupier and a colonizer, overlook Israeli (structural) violence against Palestinians and its systematic violation of Palestinian human rights, and ignore the power imbalance between Palestinian political actors and Israel. While not denying Palestinian agency as far as internal violations and loss of legitimacy, these developments cannot be seen in isolation from Palestinian dispossession, the multiple layers of oppression and overall normalization of violence created by the Israeli occupation. These political identity representations of the 'self', 'close to the self' (Israel) and the 'other' (the Palestinians) inform Dutch perceptions of the nature of the "conflict" and the requirements for "peace" and "security", and are reflected in policy choices accordingly.

Dutch conception of development, conflict, security and aid in Palestine is informed by Dutch framing of the nature of the "conflict", the requirements for "peace" and the relationship between conflict, peace, security and development. The discourse on justice is reduced to criminal justice and rule of law and limited in focus to internal Palestinian actors and threats, ignoring historic Israeli injustices and violations of individual and collective Palestinian rights. The need to achieve "peace" or 'a fair solution' is framed solely by the Oslo process and the ultimate goal of a "democratic" (economically) viable Palestinian State and guaranteed security for Israel. Palestinian development needs are framed by linking peace and development to security. Dutch development policy choices in Palestine concentrate on economic growth and reconstruction, security, good governance and the rule of law, and 'state-building' -- through support to the PNA.

Hence, Dutch development policy choices are political: Promoting 'liberal peace' and a (neo) liberal economic agenda to ensure stability in the region generally and security for Israel in particular. This approach fails to address the structural violence of the repressive Israeli military regime and the injustices of occupation. Consequently, and in light of the ongoing Palestinian resistance to the occupation, one can question whether such policies are capable of fulfilling even the limited stated objectives of liberal peace, let alone of engendering transformative change in Palestine.
References


Whittall, Joathan (2009), 'It's like talking to a brick wall': humanitarian diplomacy in the occupied Palestinian territory, Progress in Development Studies 9(1): 37 – 53

Appendices

Appendix 1. List of Dutch policy Documents used in the analysis

Policy addresses by ministers


- ‘Thinking Forward’, Speech by Minister Maxime Verhagen (Foreign Affairs) about the Middle East at the Hirsch Institute in Enschede (29-11-2007). [accessed on 02-11-2015]


Parliamentary Letters (Kamerbrieven)


Policy and Programme Documents


Appendix 2. Communique from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken

Mevrouw G. Zeidan
ghadazeidan@yahoo.co.uk

Datum 14 augustus 2015
Betreft Uw verzoek om informatie

Geachte mevrouw Zeidan,

In uw e-mail van 30 mei 2015 heeft u verzocht om informatie over het Nederlandse Ontwikkelings samenwerkingsbeleid met betrekking tot de Palestijnse Gebieden. Het betrof een breed verzoek met als doel naar ik begrijp informatie te verkrijgen voor het schrijven van uw scriptie. We hebben geprobeerd de zoekvraag zo helder mogelijk te krijgen door een aantal gesprekken en e-mailwisselingen in de afgelopen tijd. In uw e-mail van 21 juli jl. heeft u uw zoekvraag nader gespecificeerd.

Voortbouwend op ons contact, zijn de volgende onderwerpen geïdentificeerd:
1. Cross border cooperation, waarbij het gaat om samenwerking tussen Israëliërs en Palestijnen;
2. Douane-apparatuur (Security Scanner) door Nederland gefinancierd;
3. EUPOLOPPS in samenhang met de Nederlandse inspanningen op het gebied van rechtsstatelijkheid (Rule of Law);
4. Bilaterale fora met Israël en de Palestijnse Gebieden.

Ad 1) Voor wat betreft onderdeel 1 zijn de volgende projecten geïdentificeerd: Middle East Desalination Research Centre (MEDRC), EXACT en het Trans-boundary wastewater management and pollution control project, training Israëlische en Palestijnse diplomaten. Voor het project MEDRC zijn documenten toegevoegd die op overzichtelijke wijze inzicht geven in de doelstellingen en de opzet van het project. Voor meer informatie over het EXACT project, dat zich richt op samenwerking op het gebied van water tussen Israëliërs, Palestijnen en Jordaniërs, kunt u contact opnemen met Dr. Wim Douven, Associate Professor of Integrated River Basin Management, UNESCO-IHE, Delft via e-mail adres w.douven@unesco-ihe.org.

Het Trans-boundary wastewater management and pollution control project in Wadi Abu Nair betreft een goed voorbeeld van een fysiek grensoverschrijdend project met Israëliërs en Palestijnen. Een set aan documenten is toegevoegd om u een compleet beeld te geven van dit project. Tevens hebben wij op uw verzoek documenten over een training van Clingendaal voor Israëlische en Palestijnse diplomaten toegevoegd.

Ad 2) Nederland, de Palestijnse Autoriteit en Israël zijn in 2012 overeengekomen dat Nederland twee container scanners zou doneren aan de Palestijnse Autoriteit, die allebei door Israël worden bediend. De Nederlandse en respectievelijk de Israëlische regering en Palestijnse Autoriteit hebben gezamenlijke verklaringen
ondertekend in het kader van de donatie van de containerscanner bij Kerem Shalom en de Allenby brug.

Ik heb na consultatie met Israël en de Palestijnse Autoriteit besloten de
verklaringen openbaar te maken. De documenten zijn toegevoegd. Verder is een
set aan aanvullende documenten toegevoegd om een beter beeld te geven van de
scanner.

Ad 3) Voor wat betreft de Europese politiemissie in de Palestijnse Gebieden
(EUPOL COPPS) heb ik begrepen dat uw interesse specifiek uitgaat naar de
samenhang van de Nederlandse inzet in de missie en de inspanningen in het
kader van het Rule of Law programma. Op basis hiervan hebben wij een groot
aantal documenten gevonden, die betrekking hebben op de jaren 2007 tot en met
2014. Deze documenten gaan voornamelijk in op de personele bijdrage van
Nederland aan de Missie.

Ad 4) Het beleid ten aanzien van de bilaterale fora is uitvoerig toegelicht in
communicatie van het kabinet met de Tweede Kamer. Bijgaand treft u de
relevante documenten aan.

Voor alle hiervoor onder ad 1 t/m ad 4 genoemde documenten geldt dat waar
aanwezig persoonsgegevens en bedrijfseigen informatie is verwijderd ter
bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer en bedrijfsvertrouwelijke informatie.
Daar waar het belang van de internationale betrekkingen van Nederland zou
c kunnen worden geschaad is de informatie oneensbaar gemaakt.

Op basis van uw brede verzoek zijn verschillende sets documenten
gelanceerd. Aangezien het veel stukken betreft, heb ik besloten de
documenten door middel van enkele achtereenvolgende e-mails aan u te zenden.
Ik vraag uw begrip hiervoor.

Ik hoop dat u zo voldoende informatie heeft en wens u veel succes met uw studie.

Met vriendelijke groet,

Frank Keurhorst
Hoofd Maghreb, Egipte en Midden-Oosten Vredesproces
Directie Noord-Afrika en Midden Oosten
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken
### Appendix 3. Dutch Ministers since 1982

**Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs (those cited in bold)**

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<td>Uri Rosenthal</td>
<td>VVD</td>
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**Dutch Ministers of Development Cooperation (those cited in bold)**

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