UNDERSTANDING PHILIPPINE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM:
THE CASE OF THE REORGANIZATION EFFORT DURING THE AQUINO ADMINISTRATION

A Research Paper presented by

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This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies; the views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute. Research papers and theses are not made available for outside circulation by the Institute.
For my beloved parents

FRANCISCO SR. AND CARMEN
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Administrative reform has, for long, been considered a panacea needed to bring the bureaucratic machinery back to its feet, to meet the ever changing requirements its environment bears upon it. In so-called "developing" countries, despite persistent failures of administrative reform efforts, governments' interest in them do not seem to be waning. Rather, reform efforts in these countries have become the rallying cries of every new political leader who comes into power.

In the Philippines, administrative reform, in theory and practice, has come a long way. It dates back to the year 1946 when the first post-independence legislative measure providing guidelines for its implementation was enacted. Since then efforts to introduce and implement administrative reform have always fallen short of expectations. For almost half a century of grappling with ways and means to improve bureaucratic performance, the Philippines, under the new political leadership of President Aquino, has once again endeavored to undertake the task of reforming the bureaucracy. While it may be premature at this time to undertake an overall assessment of the present reform effort, initial data show negative signs relative to the attainment of its avowed objectives.

This research study was undertaken in view of the need to understand why efforts to improve bureaucratic performance in the Philippines have always fallen short of expectations. The objective is not to assess administrative reform, but rather to find an alternative approach to understand the reasons why, in countries with similar historical circumstance like the Philippines, such efforts have always suffered the same disappointing fate. It is hoped, that thru this paper, new gates will be opened for adopting new alternative approaches to improve bureaucratic performance, using the lessons learned from the past.

The basic proposition presented here is that the premises and patterns of administrative reform in the Philippines have been strongly influenced by
the American "classical" administrative legacy, which is founded on the long standing obscure realization of the separation between politics and administration.

The contention is that failure to improve bureaucratic performance may be explained by the short-sighted view that politics and administration are two distinct entities in the governmental decision-making process, and that administrative reform can be effectively understood and undertaken without due regard to the dynamics of the political system which forms part of its much larger environment. It might be important to point out, however, that this paper recognizes various other reasons which may prove useful in explaining the reasons why administrative reform have failed in the past, e.g., lack of know-how, procrastination and delay, bad timing, unanticipated interruptions and diversions, etc., including the "lack of symbiotic relationship between the process of planning and that of administrative reform," but all these, however, can be rooted to the lack of what Dror calls "a high-quality policy-making system" in so-called "developing" countries.

Like Leemans, the term "administrative reform" shall be used in this paper synonymously with "reorganization of the machinery of government", and shall thus refer to a "consciously induced and directed change in the machinery of government."

It will be noted that, the definition of administrative reform given in this paper is essentially normative. As a working definition, however, it is believed that Heady's conceptualization of administrative reform, i.e., "the implanting of administrative technology mainly derived from western nations in the developing nations," would be more appropriate.

It might also be important at this point to mention some basic propositions which shall serve as the contextual guiding posts of the major arguments/theoretical constructs to be presented in subsequent parts of this paper.
First and foremost is the view that administrative reform is basically a political process. It is a political process not only because it seeks to serve political end-purposes, but also because its locus is in the heart of every governmental decision-making process. Corollarily, this paper considers that administrative reform is a means by which the machinery of the government is induced to adopt itself to the needs of the one who is considered to be politically responsible for its performance. Lastly, this paper considers that the Philippine bureaucracy has assumed a politically dominant character since the time of her "independence".

Moreover, it must be pointed out that this paper shall primarily depend on existing studies earlier conducted concerning administrative reform experience in the Philippines. Primary resource materials will be used to the extent that they would be readily available.

This paper is composed of five chapters:

**Chapter I** (Introduction) presents the background and rationale, the basic proposition and contention of the study, definition of the concept, and the theoretical guiding posts which shall be used as basis of the major arguments/theoretical constructs of the paper.

**Chapter II** (Theoretical Framework) provides for the theoretical framework that shall be used for the study. It is divided into three parts: the first, shall present a cursory review of the concept of administrative reform; the second, presents the analytical framework of the study; and, the third discusses the various strategy dimensions which shall be used as guide to describe the process of reorganization efforts in the Philippines.

**Chapter III** (The Development of American Public Administration: The Roots Of An Enduring Legacy) presents some significant developments of public administration in the USA, with particular emphasis on those which are believed to have considerable influence on the Philippine administrative reform experience.
Chapter IV (Philippine Administrative Reform: A Problem of "Dynamic Balancing") describes and analyzes Philippine administrative reform experience, highlighting the reorganization effort under the Aquino administration.

Chapter V (Conclusion) is the last chapter and presents the conclusion of the paper.
CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. A Cursory Review of the Concept

Administrative reform is an elusive and a very much abused concept. Caiden, who wrote the pioneering book on the subject, was then driven by the need "to define, crystalize and make more discernible this elusive concept." While his definition of the term is considered by some scholars as "unsatisfactory," administrative reform nevertheless has evoked the interest of those who saw it as a potential tool to build administrative capabilities to improve governmental performance. Thus, thru the years, it has evolved to refer generally to the process of curing the malaise of the bureaucratic machinery.

Dror has distinguished two principal categories of its objectives: (a) intra-administration directed objectives, which are primarily concerned with improving the administration; and, (b) objectives dealing with the societal roles of the administrative system, and with changing policies and programmes. Many scholars, however, have considered the same as mere political tool having "no other purpose than to strengthen the position of certain power holder.s".

Success stories concerning its implementation do not come in handy despite its so-called "vitality". If ever, many doubt their credibility in as much as they usually involve mere "administrative improvements", which are strictly not under the purview of administrative reform. Writing again after almost two decades since his pioneering book on the subject was published, Caiden has identified five major challenges which have obstructed administrative reform's successful implementation: complexity, inadequate technology, lack of substance, scarcity of professional diagnosticians, reform precepts as pious hopes or biased assertions.

The causes of failure of administrative reform are many. It increases as one goes on to consider the unique experiences of governments in trying
to improve their performance. One thing though is certain, and that is, despite administrative reform's disappointing results, it continues to pervade the hearts and minds of many scholars of the field and government decision-makers, who believe that "there is always a better alternative to the status quo".

Within the context of the so-called "third world" societies, administrative reform is basically premised on the proposition that the government bureaucracy should play a major role in the development of the country. It came as a result of the perceived need to develop their capacity in managing their own affairs, as newly independent states. Among the various reasons cited were: fundamentally new political situations, political demands, and institutional requirements.

Recognition of the abovecited need, however, was largely externally induced rather than internally generated. This is perhaps the reason why in many of the so-called "third world" societies, administrative reform has become synonymous with the term "technical assistance". There is this "benevolent" belief that western societies have achieved administrative capabilities which are transferable to developing nations, and that "administrative improvement or upgrading is ipso facto desirable and should be carried out whenever possible at the most rapid feasible rate".

B. The Theory of "Dynamic Balancing"

Riggs' theory of "dynamic balancing" shall be used as a framework for finding/developing a relevant approach to understand Philippine administrative reorganization.

The theory of "dynamic balancing" is founded on the presumption that the government is an organization through which a society makes decisions concerning its collective needs and welfare. Central to this theory is the notion that bureaucracies everywhere continue to play and should in fact play, an important part in decision-making, and, conversely, representative
political institutions prove extremely important in the administrative aspects of the government. This theory considers that without paying attention to the relationship between the bureaucracy and other extra-bureaucratic institutions in the government, any effort to introduce administrative reform can only be "empty rhetorics", serving parochial or special interest more than the general public.

The theory of "dynamic balancing" argues that administrative reform needs to be looked at as part of a comprehensive view of government as a system of interdependent elements and "that politics and administration are but two different ways of looking at the decision-making process of government".

The general prescription for administrative reform, according to this theory, is to seek strategies which might lead toward the establishment of a "dynamic balancing" between the bureaucracy and its environment. Thus, this theory asserts that:

"If we concentrate on the effort to improve capacity by administrative reform without simultaneously making sure that the need for more political equality is met, then revolutionary turbulence will undermine and destroy whatever gains might have been made in the struggle for greater efficiency. It follows that sometimes the best way to improve administration may be to work for a more representative political system, and conversely, of course, that the most promising road to political reform will sometimes be to strive for greater administrative capabilities." (underscoring supplied)

Riggs has this to say about its significance relative to attempts by governments of so-called "developing" countries to improve their performance:

"Clearly, we should expect that an appropriate goal and strategy for reform in one country would be completely inadequate and even dysfunctional for another. Hence any hope for a general prescription for administrative reform is illusory. In principle there cannot be any such universal prescription and we must try to determine what each country, at each stage of its own development needs to do in order to advance.

Needless to say, if such prescriptions are to be effective ... reformers and leaders in each country have to recognize what needs to
be done and start promoting appropriate changes. This cannot be done by foreigners, outside observers or "experts", no matter how well intentioned they might be..." (underscoring supplied)

Having recognized the limitation of many of his colleagues vis-a-vis their role in trying to induce administrative reform in "developing" countries, Riggs likewise claims that:

"Many American political scientists...have even limited their attention even more narrowly to the study of American governmental phenomena, and have tended to generalize from this very special case, for if any polity is truly unique and different from others, it is the American system. Many writers on government have, consequently, been content to think about the kinds of reform that would be appropriate for improving the administrative performance of "bureaucracy" in the United States. Thus what passes for a general theory of administrative behavior or reform often turns out in practice to be a prescription for bureaucratic change in the American polity at a particular stage of its development, namely in the mid-twentieth century." (underscoring supplied)

In using Riggs' theory of dynamic balancing, the objective is not to assess Philippine administrative reform experience, but rather to provide an alternative approach to understand the reasons why despite persistent attempts to introduce administrative reform, Philippine government bureaucracy's problems have remained to be what they were almost half a century before.

As an approach for analyzing and understanding Philippine administrative reform, this theory may prove invaluable not only because Philippine experience with improving administrative performance has to a greater extent been influenced by American public administration which was found to have been suffering from professional schizophrenia, but also in view of the fact that it takes cognizance of the issue concerning the interdependence of politics and administration in prescribing the most appropriate strategy for administrative reform, or for that matter, government reorganization.
C. **Strategy Dimensions of Administrative Reform**

As a guide to describe the process of reorganization efforts in the Philippines, the strategy dimensions identified by De Guzman, et al., for planning administrative reform shall be used, viz., reform agents, reform agency, objectives, scope, nature, timing, duration, and funding.28

**Reform agent(s)** refer to institution(s)/persons which/who initiates or induce administrative reform. A reform agent may be internal, when initiated and/or overseen by local reform agents; or, it may be external, when induced and/or overseen by foreign reform agents. On the other hand, reform agency refers to institutions or persons which/who undertake or implement administrative reform. The **objective(s)** of reform pertains to societal or governmental values which a particular reform effort would want to achieve, as enunciated in official documents implementing the reform. The **scope** of reform may be structural, behavioral, or both. It is "structural" when it involves institutional or structural changes; it is "behavioral" when it involves changes in attitudes, outlooks and ways of thinking.

The **nature** of reform may be comprehensive, incremental or limited, and optimum. It is "comprehensive" when reform is undertaken in a relatively large or broader context such as the reorganization of the executive branch; "incremental" when undertaken in a limited context like a particular agency or unit of government, or to a series of related reforms or a series of separate and unrelated reforms; "optimum" reform is a combination of comprehensive and incremental reforms depending upon the timing and leadership at a particular period.

With regard to **timing**, reform may be introduced during normal period or crisis situation. Reform during normal period refers to reform undertaken in the normal course of government operations, while reform during crisis situation refers to those introduced during times, or as a result, of
crises or emergencies such as war, revolution, or declaration of martial law.

The **duration** of reform may either be definite, when it is undertaken within a particular timeframe; or indefinite, when reform is undertaken on a continuing basis as may be authorized by a legislative or executive fiat.

**Funding** of reform may be foreign, local, or both. Foreign funding refers to financial grant or technical assistance from other countries or international institutions; reforms are locally funded when they are solely financed by the country undertaking them.
CHAPTER III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THE ROOTS OF AN ENDURING LEGACY

This Chapter discusses in brief the development of American public administration. The state-of-the-art, so to speak, of public administration in the USA shall be presented in a very much selective historical setting, highlighting significant developments which are deemed to have considerable influence on the Philippine administrative reform experience.

As a field of study and a self-conscious profession, public administration, so it is claimed, is for the most part an American invention. It all started in the year 1887 when Woodrow Wilson’s *The Study of Administration* was published. Wilson delimited the conduct of government as a field for analytical study and generalization. He equated public administration "with strong central governmental authority commensurate with executive responsibility, the separation of administration from public policy formation, and a civil service with merit, expertise, efficiency, a sensitivity to public opinion, and a willingness to consider the suitability of foreign governmental structures and practices for domestic adaptation". While other scholars have also contributed to public administration's corpus of theory and knowledge, Wilson's essay had become the "guiding light" in the development of the field.

In 1911, the Training School for Public Service was founded by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research. As the first genuine professional school of public administration, the School was established "to provide persons who had already mastered some profession with a background in government, the functions and processes of administration, and with research techniques". While primarily oriented to local government, serving the New York Bureau of Municipal Research's urgent staffing needs, the School did not "look to political science for fundamental knowledge needed by future bureaucrats". The School was incorporated into the Institute of Public Administration in 1922, and subsequently evolved into a pilot in professional education programs at the graduate level.
L.D. White's textbook entitled, "Introduction to the Study of Public Administration," considered the first in its field, was published in 1926. Although White himself was said to have been very conscious of the politics/administration linkage, his book "contained no political analysis".

In 1937, Gulick and Urwick's Papers on the Science of Administration were published. These papers, contain the most authoritative statement of the principles of administrative "science", had been used as basis for the Brownlow Committee's recommendations to the then US President Roosevelt on the reorganization of the national executive branch. While the Brownlow Committee emphasized "effectiveness and efficiency" in the conduct of administration, it viewed the issue of the balance of power between the President and Congress as the key issue which need to be addressed in the conduct of the reorganization.

The US Reorganization Act of 1939 formalized the Brownlow Committee's recommendations. Its enactment was considered to have enhanced awareness of public administration as a field of study and generated an unparalleled demand for professional public management in the USA. Within this context, the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) was founded in December of the same year. ASPA's formation was said to have represented two profound achievements in the history of the American public administration:

"First, it signalled the emergence of public administration as a distinct and viable field of study apart from other political science specialization; and, second, ASPA represented the search for a shared sense of professionalism and a united community of interests among a wide array of substantive occupations which previously had been only loosely held together by two common characteristics, the words public and administration."

D. Waldo's political science dissertation entitled, The Administrative State: The Political Theory of Public Administration was published in 1948. Hailed as "a major contribution to the literature of public administration," Waldo's book contains his rejection of "premature claims to a science of public administration oriented to neutrality and a narrowly conceived
efficiency, and in this as in his later publications he saw the need to reconcile public administration with democratic values and the governmental context.\footnote{42}

Despite this and all other works which purport to advance the proposition that "administration is inseparable to the process of governing," the period since Wilson's essay first appeared in 1887 until about the 1940s has often been referred to by most scholars as the period of the "classical" or "orthodox" public administration theory. Implicit in this theory is the assumption that "the modern democratic state is best served by a competent and politically neutral civil service."\footnote{43}

During the 1950s, the subfield of public administration - the "comparative administration" rose as a result of Finer and Friedrich's work delineating broad and basic issues in the relations between public administration and social, economic, and political development, as well as the increasing encounters by the American public administration scholars with immediate realities in the "developing" countries.\footnote{44}

The establishment of the Comparative Administration Group (CAG) in 1960 was considered to have brought a new hope for those who saw the need to counteract the politics-administration dichotomy myth embedded in the "classical" theory of public administration.\footnote{45} The CAG, which was created under the auspices of the ASPA, was composed of American public administration specialist who at one time or another had the opportunity to work with the governments of "developing" countries during the immediate post-World War II period. It focused its attention upon "administrative development" and "development administration", allegedly helping the governments of "developing" countries to improve their capabilities "to reshape its physical, human, and cultural environment."\footnote{46} Through the members' own participation in US international programs to induce "development", the CAG was considered to have provided an intellectual grounding for American foreign policy in the 1960s.\footnote{47}
In 1962, the Ford Foundation agreed to support CAG's programs, especially in the field of development administration. The Foundation became increasingly interested in the "applicability of American skills and experience overseas as a means of accelerating the pace of development". Together with the United Nations, and the USAID Program, the Foundation became instrumental into the transfer of public administration through technical assistance programs in the "third" world. These technical assistance programs were conceived in "classical" terms and thus were mainly concerned with improving personnel management, budgeting and financial administration, and organizations and methods of the recipient countries' governmental machinery.

The Honey Report on Higher Education for Public Service, which sparked the Minnowbrook Conference, was published in November of 1967. With the Conference came "new public administration," espousing such themes as relevance, values, social equity, and change in the conduct of governmental affairs.

The USA's firm resolve "to help the people of less developed countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential for development and to build the economic, political and social institutions which meet their aspirations for a better life, with freedom, and justice," was formalized and legalized through the enactment also in 1967 of the US Foreign Assistance Act. The Act holds, as one of its implicit assumption, that economic and administrative reform cannot be pursued in isolation from total political reform.

The years following the enactment of the US Foreign Assistance Act is history. To many, especially those in the "developing" countries, these years had become the years for hoping that public administration shall eventually lead them to the road towards the light of development. It might be well to point out, however, that despite the recognition and denunciation by leading scholars of public administration in the US of the myth of the dichotomy between politics and administration, later developments have shown
that the myth has persisted and found its way to those countries which received US technical assistance.

The preceding discussion was a heuristic attempt to trace the development of public administration in the US. It was indeed by no means exhaustive, the purpose was merely to present the historical context within which the myth of politics-administration dichotomy persisted. As will be established in Chapter 3, the myth of politics-administration dichotomy, which is the basic presupposition of the "classical" theory of public administration, has become an enduring legacy which have dominated for the most part the theoretical and practical orientation of the Philippine administrative reform experience.
CHAPTER IV. PHILIPPINE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM:
A PROBLEM OF "DYNAMIC BALANCING"

As earlier stated in the introductory Chapter, the term "administrative reform" shall be used synonymously to what Leemans refers to as the "reorganization of the machinery of government". Unlike Leemans, however, who considers that the "machinery of government" is composed of the political and bureaucratic elements, the "machinery of government" shall be used here to refer in a more limited sense to the latter component. Thus, in this Chapter, administrative reform shall more narrowly pertain to the reorganization of the government bureaucracy.

The word "bureaucracy" as used in this Chapter refers to all offices which are formally subject to the chief executive's authority. While traditionally, this is supposed to include the military, it would be well not to include the same if one talks about the Philippine bureaucracy.

It is well recognized that the limited use of the term "administrative reform" in this Chapter may be misleading and may envisage the existence of "a clearcut distinction between change of the administrative machinery, i.e., the bureaucracy, and change in the organization of the political executive organs," which is founded on the traditional theory of politics-administration dichotomy. Ostensibly, however, it can be said that the limited use of the term in the foregoing discussion is but a reflection of the manner and nature of the administrative reform effort as it was and is being implemented in the Philippines.

This Chapter is composed of two parts:

The first, shall describe the Philippine administrative reform experience starting with the immediate post-world war II reorganization effort in 1946 and ending with the present attempt at reorganization under the leadership of President Aquino using the strategy dimensions identified by de Guzman, et al., as guide.
The case of the reform effort under President Aquino shall be presented if only to prove that despite earlier attempts to improve upon the so-called "strategies for administrative reform" in the Philippines, the premises and patterns of implementing the same still remain.

The second, shall concern itself with analyzing this experience within the framework of Riggs' theory of dynamic balancing.

A. Philippine Reorganization Experience From 1946 to 1986

Reorganization Prior to 1986

Prior to 1986, five major reorganizations have been implemented in the Philippines (Please see Table 1). While attempts were made to institute administrative reforms under the American rule, all these had been part of the overall "experiment" during the critical period of the development of self-government under the Jones Law (Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916) in which the Philippines had been considered "successful" as a "test-laboratory of legislative-made reorganization".

The first major reorganization in the Philippines came shortly after the Americans granted her political independence in 1946. The newly founded Philippine Congress authorized then President Manuel A. Roxas, through Republic Act (RA) No. 51, dated 4 October 1946, to undertake a reorganization of the "different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of the Government including the corporations owned or controlled by the Government" to "meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Government of the Republic of the Philippines, and for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in its operations". The authority given to the President, by virtue of RA No. 51, include, among others, "the power to diminish, add to or abolish those existing and create new ones."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGAL BASIS</th>
<th>TITLE/OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>PRESIDENT</th>
<th>REORG. NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.A. 51</td>
<td>Authorizing the President of the Philippines to reorganize within one year the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and other instrumentalities of the government, including the corporations owned or controlled by it</td>
<td>Roxas</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.10.46)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(46-48)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.A. 422</td>
<td>Authorizing the President of the Philippines to reorganize within one year the different departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and other instrumentalities of the government, including corporations owned or controlled by it</td>
<td>Quirino</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6.1.50)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(48-54)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9.6.54)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(54-56)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.A. 1241</td>
<td>Amending R.A. 997; extending the life of the GSRC until 31 Dec. '56</td>
<td>same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9.6.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.A. 5435</td>
<td>Authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization (CR), to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, agencies, and including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it</td>
<td>Marcos</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9.9.68)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(66-86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.A. 6076</td>
<td>Amending R.A. 5435, requiring the Commission on Reorganization to submit its output - the Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP) - to the President by 31 December 1970, simultaneously with the expiration of the Commission</td>
<td>same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4.8.69)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.O. 281</td>
<td>Creating the Presidential Commission to Review and Revise the IRP, with the same membership as the defunct CR</td>
<td>same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(29.12.70)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.A. 6172</td>
<td>Amending R.A. 5435, as amended by R.A. 6076, extending the time within which the President was to submit the IRP to Congress, i.e., from 5 March 1971 to 5 May 1971</td>
<td>same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5.3.71)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
R.A. 6175 (5.3.71) Changing the date for the submission of the IRP by the President to Congress within 40 calendar days following the opening of its regular session in 1972 and delineating the powers of the Review Commission

P.D. 1 (24.9.72) Decreeing into law the IRP, reorganizing the executive branch of the government

L.O.I. 449 (18.8.76) Declaring the reorganization of the executive branch of the national government under the IRP completed as of 31 December 1976

P.D. 1397 (2.6.78) Providing, among others, for the conversion of departments into ministries

P.D. 1416 (9.6.78) Granting continuing authority to the President of the Philippines to reorganize the national government

E.O. 575 (4.1.80) Providing, among others, for the creation of a Presidential Commission on Reorganization

E.O. 5 (12.3.86) Reconstituting the Presidential Commission of Reorganization and Renaming it the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization

E.O. 17 Prescribing rules and regulations for the implementation of the provision of the Freedom Constitution on the civil service

R.A. 6056 (9.6.88) An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization

R.A. 6683 (3.12.88) An Act Providing for Early Retirement and Voluntary Separation from Government Service, as well as Involuntary Separation of Civil Service Officers and Employees Pursuant to Various Reorganization EOs Authorizing Government Reorganization After the Ratification of the 1987 Constitution

same

same

same

same

same

Aquino (86-) 6
To implement the provisions of RA No. 51, a Reorganization Committee, composed of members exclusively appointed by the President, was created. The Committee's recommendations served as the basis for then President Roxas to effect, by executive order, the reforms and changes needed in the different executive departments.

The reorganization which was implemented for a period of one year following the approval of RA No. 51 was conducted within the limits of the total authorized appropriation for the fiscal year 1947.

A year after the first reorganization was implemented, President Elpidio Quirino during his inaugural address in 1949 indicated "that we must reorganize our administrative machinery with a view to securing greater efficiency, the improvement of the public service, and economy of means and effort in the discharge of the government's responsibilities, in order to make that machinery more responsive to public need with the limits of our available resources". President Quirino's call for a reorganization did not fall on deaf ears and soon after, on 6 January 1950, then Philippine Congress enacted RA No. 422 authorizing him "to reorganize within one year the different departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and other instrumentalities of the government, including corporations owned or controlled by it". A Reorganization Commission, composed exclusively of appointees of the President, served as the latter's workhorse in effecting "from time to time, for a period of not more than one year from the date of the approval of this Act, by executive order, such reforms and changes in the different executive departments, bureaus, and offices as he may consider necessary".

Reading the onerous tasks he had to face given the country's limited resources, President Quirino sought American assistance. Without hesitation the Americans responded positively and then US President Truman immediately sent an economic survey mission - The Bell Mission - to lay the groundwork for economic aid and technical assistance.
Among other recommendations, the Bell Mission proposed the following administrative reforms: adoption of merit as the basis of civil service; increase of salaries; a balanced budget; improvement of efficiency by supervisory training courses, job rotation, and staff assistance in administrative management; modernization of fiscal administration to improve fiscal controls; and, maintenance of efficiency and integrity in tax collection.

The total amount of loans and grants made available to the Philippine Government under this package of assistance was US $250 million. The amount was to be made available over a five-year period and its availability was "to be strictly conditioned on steps being taken by the Philippine government to carry out the recommendations of the Bell Mission". Citing the crucial role of public administration in the total undertaking, the Bell Mission was quoted in saying that "the success of the development program may depend more on the efficiency and honesty of the public service than on any other factor".

In assessing the Philippine situation at that time vis-à-vis the immediate positive response of the US with Philippines' request for assistance, one noted Filipino scholar cited then US Secretary of State Dean Acheson's diagnosis of the communist takeover in China and America's strategic position in the cold war:

"The spread of communism could not be stopped by military means, but rather by assistance to develop a soundness of administration of [the] new governments and to develop their resources and their skills so that they are not subject to penetration either through ignorance, or because they believe false promises, or because there is real distress in their areas."

The third major reorganization was implemented during the time of President Ramon Magsaysay when then Philippine Congress enacted RA No. 997 on 9 June 1954. R.A. No. 997, otherwise known as the "Reorganization Act of 1954", provided for the creation of the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission (GSRC) charged with the task of conducting "a study and investigation of the present organization and methods of operation of all
departments, offices, bureaus, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the Government, and determine what change or changes are necessary to accomplish the objectives of the reorganization.

Unlike previous reorganization commissions, the GSRC was composed of mixed membership - four, appointed by the President; four senators, appointed by the Senate President; and four congressmen, appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Operating primarily on the concepts developed by the proponents of "scientific management", the GSRC called for a more effective management of government, the promotion of economy to the fullest, and the efficiency of operations of the administrative system. In the performance of its task, the GSRC was assisted by an American management consulting firm - Louis J. Kroeger and Associates - the reason being that "the country did not as yet have the necessary technical knowhow". Around P15 million, which includes a large contribution from the US Foreign Operations Mission and the Philippine Council for USAID, was spent since the time the GSRC was created in 1954 up to the time of its termination by the end of 1956.

During the GSRC's final year, then President Magsaysay endorsed to Philippine Congress 53 out of 61 plans submitted to him; the House of Representatives rejected 20, while only 4 have been rejected by the Senate. In their final report on the reorganization, Kroeger and Associates commented that "some improvements might have been gained if RA No. 997 and its amendment RA No. 1241 had been more specific as to what was to be reorganized. Moreover, among the reasons for the non-implementation of a number of reorganization plans are: (a) opposition to the plans by the operating agencies; (b) lack of understanding of the meaning of some provisions of the plans; and (c) Presidential inaction.

It would also be interesting to note that in addition to the abovementioned problems, the GSRC itself can be considered guilty of having narrowly interpreted its mandate, provided under Section 3 of RA No. 997, to mean that it had the duty to recommend plans pertaining primarily to the structure and
functional relationships of government agencies. This narrow construction of the objectives of RA No. 997 and the GSRC mandate "seems unfortunate because there are reasons to suspect that the confusion, inaction or delayed reaction, overlapping of functions, inefficiency, and extravagance in the Philippine executive offices today are due not only to the inherent nature of such offices as social systems but also to the policies, practices, and attitudes of the leaders in government." 

The fourth major reorganization was legislated during the incumbency of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Upon President Marcos' behest, the then Philippine Congress enacted RA No. 5435 on 9 September 1968 authorizing him "to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, agencies, and including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it." 

While the reorganization instituted under RA No. 5435 was considered unique in the sense that it went beyond the orthodox dimensions of "simplicity, economy, and efficiency" embracing the more meaningful objective of "reorganizing for national development," doubts then persisted regarding the effectiveness of the effort considering that it was being formulated and planned at a time when the incumbent Chief Executive is seeking reelection. 

The reorganization objectives were to be attained by:

1. limiting expenditures to the lowest amount consistent with the efficient performance of essential services, activities, and functions;

2. eliminating duplication and overlapping of services, activities, and functions;

3. consolidating and integrating services, activities, and functions of a similar nature;

4. abolishing services, activities, and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of government; and,

5. defining and limiting executive services, activities, and functions."
Under RA No. 5435, the Commission on Reorganization (CR), a joint executive-legislative body of nine members (with three from the Senate, three from the House of Representatives, and three Presidential appointees) was created and tasked to conduct the reorganization study and formulate the necessary recommendations for submission to the President on 31 December 1970. The entire reorganization effort, as provided for under RA No. 5435, was appropriated a total amount of P 1 million.

Despite the seemingly guileful manner in which the reform effort was conceived, the reorganization plan's formulation and subsequent implementation had been considered significant for the following reasons: (1) it did not involve foreign assistance, a welcome recognition of native competence on the challenging task of reorganization; and, (2) it was characterized by increased participation from the academe and the private sector. It might also be worthwhile to mention that during the time of President Marcos, administrative reform was being pursued at two principal levels: (1) the comprehensive reorganization of the government, being implemented under RA No. 5435; and, (2) the further revision of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC). Problems, however, such as the lack of funds, have held the project to revise the R.A.C. in abeyance.

Pursuant to RA No. 6076, dated 4 August 1968, the Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP) was submitted by the CR to the President on 31 December 1970. Surprisingly, however, President Marcos issued, two days prior to this date, on 29 December 1970, Executive Order (EO) No. 281, creating the Presidential Commission to Review and Revise the Integrated Reorganization Plan (PCRRP), with the same membership as the CR. As if "the ideas and insights of a wide cross-section of the more knowledgeable elements of the community" were not enough inputs to the preparation of the IRP, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 281 allegedly "to maintain its integrity and facilitate its passage through Congress". Thereupon, Congress enacted RA Nos. 6172 and 6175, on 5 March 1971, giving legislative sanction to the creation of the PCRRP and extending the deadline given to the
President to submit the IRP to Congress "within 40 calendar days following the opening of its regular session in 1972."

When Martial law was declared on 21 September 1972 Congress was abolished and the IRP's enactment was indefinitely postponed. On 24 September 1972, however, President Marcos, by virtue of his "extraordinary constitutional powers," issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 adopting the IRP as the first administrative reform measure under the "New Society".

Essentially, the IRP was a strategy for structural reforms in the bureaucracy. Considered as among its important features were: (1) the introduction of a uniform administrative model; (2) the attachment of independent boards and commissions to the pertinent regular ministries; (3) decentralization through the establishment of regional centers and councils; and, (4) the formation of a pool of executives and administrators in a professional Career Executive Service.

Prior to its completion on 18 August 1976, which was proclaimed officially through Letter of Instruction (LOIns.) No. 449, the IRP has undergone 12 major amendments.

On 2 June 1978, as one of the measures adopted to pave the way for the transition from presidential to parliamentary form of government, President Marcos issued PD No. 1397, providing, among others, for the nominal conversion of then existing government departments into ministries. Pursuant to Section 2(b) of said PD, a political deputy minister, who shall serve as a liaison between the ministry and the still to be convened Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP) (Philippine Legislature), is to be appointed by the President from among the members of the IBP. The transition towards the parliamentary form of government was effected through the 1976 Constitutional amendments ratified in a referendum-plebiscite held on 16-17 October 1976.

On 9 June 1978, three days before the then IBP was scheduled to convene, President Marcos, through PD No. 1416, granted himself continuing
authority to reorganize the national government. Under PD No. 1416, "there is a need to periodically review the organizational structure in order that needed administrative reforms can be expeditiously effected to attain an efficient government machinery". Following this, on several different occasions, President Marcos continously sought to amend the IRP by issuing EOs and LOIns, leading one noted Filipino political scientist to conclude that "it was very clear that the bureaucracy had been transformed into an instrument aimed at sustaining and perpetuating the rule of one man". De Guzman and Reforma, on the other hand, consider that "the most important lesson to be learned from the 1972 reorganization plan was that the assumption that the problems in the bureaucracy could be resolved only through the technical expertise of management analysts was overrated. The formulation and implementation of the reorganization plan necessitated the recognition of its political feasibility." 

Reorganization Under the Aquino Administration

The sixth (6) since the Philippines gained her independence, the present reorganization effort was mandated under EO No. 5 by President Aquino on 12 March 1986. As contained in the preambular paragraphs of said executive fiat:

"There is a need to effect the necessary and proper changes in the organization and functional structures of the national and local governments...in order to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services;

"...these major changes in the government bureaucracy must be responsive to and consistent with the national goals for an accelerated socio-economic recovery and progress." (underscored supplied)

Pursuant to said EO, then existing Presidential Commission on Reorganization (PCR), which operated under the provisions of EO No. 575, dated 4 January 1980, issued during the time of President Marcos, was reconstituted and renamed the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization (PCGR), the Chairman and three members of which were appointed by President Aquino.
To fulfill the all-important task of helping to "de-Marcosify" the bureaucracy, the PCGR was given the functional jurisdiction encompassing, among others, the:

1. reorganization of the national and local governments, its agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and,

2. provision of staff assistance and consultative advice to the President, ministries and other agencies and instrumentalities of the government on development administration relative to, among others, reorganization, decentralization and regionalization, the career executive service, and the rationalization of government corporation management and function.

To guide the implementation of the reorganization, the PCGR formulated five (5) guiding principles, viz., promotion of private initiative, decentralization, cost-effectiveness, efficiency of front-line services, and accountability.

In recognizing the multitude of problems that any reorganization effort must address, the PCGR also identified a number of strategic issues which it believed if resolved will result in the solution of other problems, viz.:

1. the need to control the proliferation of government corporations which has added to the imbalance and inefficiency of the government structures;

2. the need to re-examine the structural and operational relationships between local governments and major governmental units at the national level with the end in view of strengthening the former as an effective instrument for managing growth with equity in the rural regions;
3. the need to implement the proper ministry model to remove the waste and inefficiencies that now exist in various ministries, and insure a more productive internal ministry structure;

4. the need to redefine, clarify and refocus the mandates of the various ministries to prevent duplication and overlap in the performance of certain functions and in the delivery of certain services;

5. the need to redefine the nature, thrusts and emphasis of government regulatory powers;

6. the need to improve front-line services as the most visible measure of effectiveness and efficiency of the entire governmental machinery; and,

7. the need to rationalize, redefine and clarify hierarchical ambiguities, standardize definition of terms, develop workable measures of performance, and strengthen the civil service.

PCGR personnel were exempted from the application of rules and regulations of the Office of Compensation and Position Classification (OCPC). As a critical agency, the PCGR was given the flexibility to determine the salary rates of its regular and contractual personnel, as well as the rates of honorarium of detailed personnel, and the authority to secure the services of those from other government agencies on temporary detail either on a full-time or part-time basis.

Given a limited time of 100 days to get the reorganization through, the PCGR was given a budget of P10 million by virtue of the provision contained in Section 7 of EO No. 5.

In the performance of its role, the PCGR has recognized that, while it was given the mandate to undertake the reorganization, the ultimate responsibility for shaping a unit of government lies in the hands of the heads of each agency to whom the President directly entrusted its performance.
Thus, in this overall reorganization effort, the PCGR only sees itself as an external consultant, "with the responsibility of providing a disinterested and objective view of the reorganization needs of each unit".

Following are the steps illustrating the processes involved before the reorganization of a particular department or agency of the government is implemented:

1. Submission of agency reorganization proposal, which may or may not contain a draft reorganization EO;

2. Review by the PCGR Chairman of the proposal, including the draft EO;

3. Transmittal of the same to Malacañang for the President's approval/signature;

4. Review by the Executive Secretary of the reorganization proposal submitted by the PCGR Chairman;

5. Review by the concerned agency/department representative at the Cabinet Assistance System (CAS); and,

6. Finally, submission of the reorganization EO to President for her approval and signature.

Before the PCGR disbanded, it submitted to the President a total of 45 draft EOs and 13 administrative orders (AOs) reorganizing the various agencies of the executive branch of the government.

Following approval/signing of these draft EOs and AOs, activities undertaken include:

1. the operationalization and assessment by concerned agencies, in consultation with the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), of the
detailed design of the structure and organization, including the staffing pattern of the agency concerned;

2. submission of the same to the DBM for approval; and,

3. the monitoring of the implementation of the reorganization by the Civil Service Commission (CSC).\[95\]

While the call to reorganize the bureaucracy has been popularly supported at the initial phases of its implementation, the so-called "democratic space" created by the coming into power of President Aquino and the subsequent establishment of democratic institutions, e.g., the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the consequent election of the members of the new Congress, dampened the implementation of the program. Pressure groups, which include employee organizations and political parties, lobby for the suspension of the implementation of the program, advancing the cause of those people whose right to security of tenure have been violated.

As a result, President Aquino issued EO No. 17, prescribing rules and regulations for the implementation of the reorganization. Said EO, directs the heads of the various government departments to ensure that -

"the separation or replacement of officers and employees is made only for justifiable reasons to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of personnel in the career civil service whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of public service of the new Government." (underscoring supplied)

The CSC, for its part, issued Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 10, dated 2 September 1986, providing guidelines for the placement of personnel. Under said MC, selection of personnel to be retained in the government service was to be made on the basis of their status of appointment, competence to perform their duties, and moral fitness to discharge their responsibilities.\[97\]

All these, notwithstanding, complaints were raised over what were perceived as the arbitrariness and abuses concerning the implementation of
the reorganization, leading Senator Rasul, the Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Civil Service and Government Reorganization, to move for its suspension "if only to enable Congress to enact measures that will assure, among others, respect for the right to security of tenure of deserving civil service employees". Senator Rasul cited that the results of the public hearings conducted by the Committee she chairs reveal that:

1. There is an increase in the number of positions from 605,123 to 614,256 or an increment of 9,133 positions after the reorganization, indicating that, contrary to one of the objectives of the reorganization which is to streamline the bureaucracy, the same has grown "fatter" as a result of the reorganization.

2. There was hardly any effort on the part of the agencies to make the reorganization process open and transparent.

3. There is inadequate representation of employees in the placement or screening committees in the government agencies.

4. There were blatant violations of CSC MC No. 10, s. 1986, which set forth priority of regular and permanent employees in employment; and, Presidential Memo, dated 2 October 1987, which provides that "placement in the new staffing pattern of incumbent personnel shall be completed prior to hiring of new personnel.

5. Placement and selection of personnel were done in an arbitrary manner.

In view of these, Congress, on 29 June 1988, enacted RA No. 6656, entitled, "An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization". Section 1 of RA No. 6656 declares that it is:

"...the policy of the State to protect the security of tenure of civil service officers and employees in the reorganization of the various agencies of the National Government and of local
governments...without sacrificing the need to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service pursuant to Article IX, B, Section 3 of the Constitution."

The said R.A. requires, among others, that government agencies make known the list of personnel appointed to authorized plantilla positions in line with the "spirit of transparency and openness". Likewise, any officer or employee who were aggrieved by the appointments made may file an appeal with the appointing authority who is required to make a decision within 30 days. Section 11 thereof also provides that "all departments and agencies which are authorized by executive orders promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act within which to implement their respective reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act".

The government-wide reorganization, implemented pursuant to E.O. No. 5, was considered to have been completed with the reorganization of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) in May and October 1988, respectively.


It may be interesting to note that while the process of reorganization, as conceived under E.O. No. 5, should have been guided by the five (5) guiding principles of reorganization formulated by the PCGR, developments
following indicate that this has been delimited to merely the "promotion of efficiency in the delivery of frontline services".

This seeming limited orientation in the conduct of the reorganization is particularly evident in the manner by which the development administration objectives enunciated in the *Updated Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP), 1988-1992* were formulated. An examination of these objectives, including the policies and strategies formulated to implement the same, would show a lack of complementarity, despite earlier attempts by the PCGR to adopt a holistic approach in the conduct of the government reorganization as a means to "de-Marcosify" the bureaucratic machinery. This could be the reason why there was a reported increase in the number of regular government departments from 17 in 1986 to 20 by 1989, and the consequent expansion of the personnel size of the entire administrative system (Please see Table 2). This made Iglesias, et al., to conclude that "while the post-reorganization size of the administrative system may not indicate the promotion of the cost-effectiveness principle, the distribution of positions between the central and regional offices had accomplished small gains for the decentralization principle."
### TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE OF THE NUMBER OF POSITIONS IN THE BUREAUCRACY BEFORE AND AFTER REORGANIZATION: JANUARY 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>% DIFFERENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Government</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Services</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Offices</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Sectors</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-technical</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Levels</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Location of Assignment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Office</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Office</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Locations</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Philippine Reorganization: As A Problem of Dynamic Balancing

Before proceeding, it may be worthwhile to present a summary of the Philippines' experience with administrative reform.

Characteristically, all the six Philippines reorganizations were borne out of the particular demands of the circumstances of a particular period. While all of them were introduced and implemented within the context of varying historical situations, e.g., during crisis or emergency situations, or during the transition from one form of government to another, their avowed objectives contained only one thematic orientation - "the promotion of economy and efficiency in the delivery of public goods and services".

It should also be noted that in all of these reorganizations, the President, has played a pivotal role, either acting on the basis of the authority delegated by Congress or by virtue of the powers inherent in and/or conferred upon his/her position as Chief Executive (or Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces during times of crisis) by the Constitution.

In terms of scope, the six reorganizations have largely been "structural", involving institutional changes in the executive branch of the government. It may also be noted that only two of these reorganizations have external reform agents. These two, which have been conducted during the time of Presidents Quirino and Magsaysay, were implemented with direct financial support from the US (Please see Table 3 for a comparative analysis of the various strategy dimensions of the Philippine reorganizations).

It can be said from the foregoing that, while these reorganizations have been implemented with the end-in-view of improving the "delivery of public goods and services", they have through the years remained to be founded on the "classical" orientation, emphasizing for the most part the "institutional" or "structural" rather than on what Riggs refers to as the "functional" aspect of intragovernmental relationships. This is not at all
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy Dimension</th>
<th>Reform Agent</th>
<th>Reform Agency</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Nature of Reform</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Time-frame or Duration</th>
<th>Source of funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>President, as authorized by Congress, through Reorganization Committee of 1947</td>
<td>to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Gov't. of the Republic of the Philippines, &amp; to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in its operations</td>
<td>structural</td>
<td>comprehensive</td>
<td>crisis situation (immediate post war period)</td>
<td>implementation: one year</td>
<td>local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorganization</td>
<td>external</td>
<td>President, as authorized by Congress, through Government Survey Reorganization Commission of 1950</td>
<td>to make the administrative machinery more responsive to public need through the promotion of greater efficiency, improvement of the public service, and economy of means &amp; effort in the discharge of theGov't's responsibilities</td>
<td>structural and behavioral</td>
<td>comprehensive</td>
<td>emergency situation (&quot;alarming spread of communism&quot;)</td>
<td>implementation: one year</td>
<td>local and foreign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>President, through Commission on Reorganization</td>
<td>to effectively manage government; promote economy to the fullest; and make the operations of administrative system efficient</td>
<td>basically structural</td>
<td>comprehensive</td>
<td>(same as in no. 2) crisis situation (declaration of Martial Law)</td>
<td>implementation: indefinite</td>
<td>local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>President, through Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization</td>
<td>to accelerate social and economic development, and lay the groundwork to accelerate socio-economic recovery &amp; economic growth by effecting the transition from presidential to parliamentary form of government; promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency in the government</td>
<td>structural</td>
<td>comprehensive</td>
<td>transition period from presidential to parliamentary form of government</td>
<td>implementation: indefinite</td>
<td>local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>President, through Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization</td>
<td>to lay the groundwork to accelerate socio-economic recovery &amp; economic growth by effecting the transition from presidential to parliamentary form of government</td>
<td>basically structural</td>
<td>comprehensive</td>
<td>crisis situation (post-&quot;revolution&quot; administrative reform)</td>
<td>implementation: indefinite</td>
<td>local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>President, through Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization</td>
<td>to lay the groundwork to accelerate socio-economic recovery &amp; economic growth by effecting the transition from presidential to parliamentary form of government</td>
<td>structural</td>
<td>comprehensive</td>
<td>crisis situation (post-&quot;revolution&quot; administrative reform)</td>
<td>implementation: indefinite</td>
<td>local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>President, through Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization</td>
<td>to lay the groundwork to accelerate socio-economic recovery &amp; economic growth by effecting the transition from presidential to parliamentary form of government</td>
<td>basically structural</td>
<td>comprehensive</td>
<td>crisis situation (post-&quot;revolution&quot; administrative reform)</td>
<td>implementation: indefinite</td>
<td>local</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

surprising in view of the fact that Philippine administrative doctrine has largely been influenced, directly or indirectly, by western (i.e., US) ideas and perspectives. Without belaboring on this issue, however, a review of the U.N. and USAID programs concerned with developing the administrative capability of the so-called "emerging" states during the period 1950s to 1960s conducted by Abuvea reveals how great US influence in "transnationally diffusing" this "classical" administrative doctrine. Whatever caused the US, through the U.N. and USAID programs, to "transnationally diffuse" said administrative doctrine is not the concern of this paper. Suffice it to say, however, that the immediate post-World War II US foreign policy vis-a-vis the third world was said to have been shaped by the need to provide a non-Marxist way of administering development.

The US' "classical" administrative legacy implanted through their post-World War II foreign policy did not lose ground in the more recent experience in implementing bureaucratic reorganization in the Philippines. While later reorganization efforts have attempted to veer away from the "classical" orientation, they have virtually remained to be founded on the traditional objectives of "promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the delivery of public goods and services".

Historically speaking, the President, not so much because of the nature of the presidential office, but more on the person occupying the position, has played a dominant role in the affairs of the government vis-a-vis the other actors in the legislative and judicial branches. Due to the immense powers that are perceived to have been vested in the position, some scholars of Philippine history and political science consider that all Philippine presidents, from the time of Aguinaldo (the first President of the Philippines under 1899 Malolos Constitution) to Marcos, and even to Aquino, were "trying to be dictators, each in his (or her) own way".

In their effort to preserve their powers, all of those who had become Presidents have either tampered with the Constitution and/or, resorted, in a similar fashion, to the conduct of bureaucratic reorganization.
Notwithstanding the fact that past Philippine Presidents have recognized the bureaucratic machinery's role in nation-building, it may seem that the priority accorded to making it a more effective instrument of development has always been at a dismally low level. As shown in the preceding discussion, the bureaucratic machinery has virtually remained a pawn in the Philippine political power game, and bureaucratic reorganizations, gambits to ensure a checkmate.

From the preceding section, it can be observed that bureaucratic reorganizations have always been implemented at the time when a new President is elected into office. Indeed, what was quite revealing was that the reorganizations' immediate casualties were all too often those people whose loyalty to the incumbent President were tainted by their association with the previous administration which, in the Philippine political tradition, always belong to the other side of the political fence.

Moreover, it may seem interesting to mention that, while "reform agencies", starting with the third Philippine reorganization up to the reorganization attempt under the Aquino Administration, have initially thought of preparing just one comprehensive reorganization plan, political hemmings and hawings caused the reorganization plans to be submitted separately, if only "to provide maximum discretion to the President and the Congress to approve or reject individual and separate proposals".

Another interesting case in point was the attempt by President Marcos, cited in the earlier section, to continously amend the IRP, which led one Filipino scholar to conclude that the bureaucracy was then transformed as an instrument for dictatorial rule.

During the Aquino Administration, the limited time of 100 days given to the PCGR can be considered a function of the perceived urgency to get the reorganization through before the so-called "democratic" institution are subsequently put in place. As shown earlier, subsequent implementation of the reorganization was dampened by pressures from the members of Congress
who heeded the call of those whose right to security of tenure have been violated.

The CSC report showing that a relatively high percentage of those who were separated from office belong to the non-career or "executive" positions (30.44% or 11,533), when said reorganization was considered to have been completed, indeed would corroborate the observation earlier cited. From Table 4, it can be seen that of this number, 3,846 (25.65%) are those who are considered to be the "real victims" of the reorganization. These figures are indeed disturbing, especially if one relates them with the very high percentage difference, i.e., 51.2%, between the number of executive positions before and after reorganization contained in Table 2.

One noted Filipino scholar therefore has this to say about the manner in which bureaucratic reorganizations are being resorted to by Philippine Presidents, if only to preserve their political power:

"The fact that these became necessary to repeat after every five years or so attest to the continuing struggle of the executive, the legislature and the bureaucracy to change the distribution of power among them during and after reorganization."

Thence, it is as if the "spoils system" of old have once again come in a new age bringing to forth what may seem to be a paradox between the theoretical and historical roots of Philippine administrative reform, which was earlier said to have been founded on the obscure realization of the separation between politics and administration, and the political nature of the various reform efforts at the time of their implementation.

This seeming paradox between the "theory and practice" of administrative reform in the Philippines, the writer would like to believe is the crux of Riggs' theory of dynamic balancing.

Given the present state of affairs of Philippine politics and administration, therefore, any attempt to institute administrative reform or bureaucratic reorganization will not have any significant bearing in making
TABLE 4. PERSONNEL SEPARATION BY LEVEL OF POSITION AND MODE OF SEPARATION, FOR THE PERIOD 25 FEBRUARY 1986 TO 30 JUNE 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODE OF SEPARATION</th>
<th>FIRST LEVEL</th>
<th>SECOND LEVEL</th>
<th>THIRD LEVEL</th>
<th>NON-CAREER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dismissal</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1,433</td>
<td>3,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>2,576</td>
<td>10,009</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>12,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in Force</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,658</td>
<td>3,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>2,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropped from the Rolls</td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>2,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phased-out</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>1,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>1,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resignation</td>
<td>1,223</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,517</td>
<td>3,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,833</td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3,846</td>
<td>6,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,043</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,066</strong></td>
<td><strong>243</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,533</strong></td>
<td><strong>37,885</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.15</strong></td>
<td><strong>39.77</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.64</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.44</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of Planning and Management, Civil Service Commission
the bureaucratic machinery more effective as an instrument to attain the goals of national development. Sad to say, it would only serve to perpetuate the so-called "imbalance" in the existing political power relationships between the various actors in the Philippine political arena.
V. CONCLUSION

In a nutshell, the foregoing discussion has attempted to present an alternative approach to understanding Philippine administrative reform experience.

For the most part, Philippine administrative reform experience can be considered to have been influenced by the US' enduring "classical" administrative legacy, which is founded on the theory of politics-administration dichotomy. It started soon after the Americans granted her independence in 1946. Though initially, administrative reform was instituted in view of the need to meet the so-called exigencies attendant upon the establishment of an independent government, it has evolved through the years to embrace the traditional objective of "promoting efficiency and economy in the delivery of public services".

Quite noticeable in the Philippine experience would be the important role given to administrative reform everytime a new President is elected into office as a means to introduce changes in the existing bureaucratic machinery which has always been perceived to be ill-suited to address the ever changing societal requirements.

Notwithstanding, these changes were basically structural and have served to become a convenient justification to attain political end-purposes. More often than not, they have been used as an instrument for weeding-out political "misfits" in the new politico-administrative setting.

The case of the reform experience under the Aquino Administration, despite its seeming altruistic dedication to cure the malaise of the bureaucracy inherited from the past administration, ostensibly has become an exercise in political purification, unduly displacing a number of civil servants who, in one way or the other, have been guilty of association with the Marcos Administration.
Without having made an assessment of the Philippine experience with administrative reform, the fact that the problems of the bureaucracy has remained to be what they were for almost half a century before can be considered symptomatic of the failure of past attempts with bureaucratic reorganization.

This paper, in using Riggs' theory of dynamic balancing as an analytical framework for understanding Philippine administrative reform experience, advances the proposition that the disappointing results of past attempts at improving bureaucratic performance can largely be explained by the myopic nature of the reform efforts, instituted as they were on the basis of the US' "classical" administrative legacy founded on the theory of politics and administration dichotomy, and subsequently implemented with a view to serving the more parochial interests of those involved in the political power game in the Philippine political arena.

Thus, it may seem that the best way towards a more effective strategy for administrative reform in the Philippines would be to work first for political reform deemed to guarantee the establishment of a more representative and effective political system. Short of instituting a radical reform, which can take the form of a bloody revolution, a more effective strategy would be to work for the attainment of a "dynamic balancing" of the political forces in the overall governmental structure.

As a concluding note, it would be apt to quote the following remark made by a Filipino scholar concerning this Philippine administrative reform experience:

"Perhaps, when government administration will be more concerned with service to as large a portion of the population as possible than with serving the interests of privileged segments of society and the policymakers' orientation will be more universalistic than particularistic, then government-wide reorganizations will no longer be necessary. After all, it is the human factor in the political and administrative systems which can determine the character and course of the public service."
ENDNOTES

CHAPTER I

1. It might be interesting to note that, in citing the case of the US, Salamon, in his article, has argued that if reorganization (or for that matter administrative reform) has failed to achieve its objectives, it has failed only in terms of a narrow and inappropriate standard. He considers that in point of fact, the purposes of reorganization go well beyond the narrow confines of economy and efficiency to embrace the purposes of politics itself. Please see L.M. Salamon, "The Goals of Reorganization: A Framework for Analysis," in Administration and Society, Vol. 12, No. 4, February 1981.

2. In trying to reexamine administrative reform within the context of the experience of three Latin American nations, viz., Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, Hammergren was driven by the same concern, i.e., so little was learned from its failure. Thus, according to her, "without an understanding of how and why programs failed, a new generation of policies runs the risk of repeating the same mistakes under different names". Please see L.A. Hammergren, Development and the Politics of Administrative Reform: Lessons from Latin America (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1983) p. 2.


6. Leemans considers that "reforms are often directly or indirectly occasioned by events in world around the organization (interpreted as a generic term which can be used to refer to the bureaucracy or the administrative machinery of the government), and can only be effective when designed with proper attention to the environment in which it operates. Ibid., p. 2.

7. Ibid., p. 8.


CHAPTER II


11. Leemans (ed.), op. cit., p. 27.

12. Ibid., p. 8.


15. For a detailed enumeration and explanation of these causes, please see G.E. Caiden, "Implementation - The Achilles Heel of Administrative Reform," in Leemans (ed.), op. cit., pp. 142-167.

Another interesting explanation for failure of administrative reform can be found in W.E. Bjur and G.E. Caiden, "On Reforming Institutional Bureaucracies," International Review of Administrative Science, No. 4, 1978. Bjur and Caiden contend that the basic flaw in administrative reform strategy is the failure to appreciate the difference between reforming instrumental and institutional bureaucracies.

Please see also materials cited in endnotes 3 and 4.


18. Please see Bjur and Caiden, op. cit.

In talking about public administration and its role as one of the powerful sources of change within the context of developing countries, Esman concluded that "much of change desired today must be induced, and


23. According to Riggs, the bureaucratic environment consists, among others, of the political parties, popular elections, and elected assemblies. He generally would refer to all these as the constitutive system. Riggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-118.


CHAPTER III


32. Stone and Stone, in Mosher (ed.), op. cit., p. 27.


37. Ibid.


39. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
46. Loveman, op. cit., p. 617.
47. Ibid.
49. Siffin, op. cit., p. 66.

52. For a comprehensive discussion on the reasons why the politics-administration dichotomy persists, please see Riggs ("Interdependence..."), op. cit.

CHAPTER IV
54. The political element, pertains mainly to the political executives who are responsible for part or all of the making and execution of policies (e.g., President, Prime Minister); on the other hand, the
bureaucratic element, pertains specifically to the government bureaucracy. Leemans, op. cit., p. 19.


56. Leemans also raised the same concern when he used the term in the limited sense in the book he edited. Please see Leemans, op. cit., p. 7.


The Jones Law, or Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, took effect on 16 October 1916. It was the first American formal and official commitment to grant independence to the Philippines. T.A. Agoncillo and M.C. Guerrero, History of the Filipino People (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing Company, 1977) p. 312.

58. Section 1, Republic Act No. 51, approved by Philippine Congress on 4 October 1946.

59. Austria, op. cit., p. 294.

60. Inaugural Address of President Elpidio Quirino, 30 December 1949, p. 6, as cited in J.V. Abueva (ed.), Perspectives in Government Reorganization (Manila, Philippines, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1969) p. 6.


Gonzalez and Deapera said that the creation of the GSRC was also part of the Daniel Bell Mission's recommendations. The Mission's recommendations include, among other, the establishment of the first school of public administration - the Institute of Public Administration (now the College of Public Administration) in the University of the Philippines, which imported from the State University of Michigan tools and experiences from western models and faculty members; and, the creation of wage and position classification office which standardized pay and established a position classification system. J.L. Gonzalez and L.R. Deapera, "A Review of Philippine

64. Abueva, in Braibanti (ed.), op. cit., p. 569.

65. Ibid., p. 570.


66. Ibid.


Also cited in Gonzalez and Deapera, op. cit., p. 261.

It was found out that during the first two decades of the postwar period, the US was the main donor of economic assistance not only in the Philippines but the entire third world. The US was providing assistance to third world countries because of "a humanitarian impulse to aid the less fortunate, a desire to promote sound and expanding world trade, the necessity of increasing supplies of raw materials, and the firm determination to forestall the spread of communism (underscoring supplied)." N. Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989) p. 246.

70. The joint contribution of the U.S. Foreign Operations Mission and the Philippine Council for U.S. AID amounts to P681,468.37; the total amount appropriated by the Philippine Congress under R.A. 997 and R.A. 1241 was P800,000. Please see Tadena, in Abueva (ed.), op. cit., p. 94.


75. De Guzman, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

Despite the existence of a provision in R.A. No. 5435 stipulating that the reorganization shall include banking or financial institutions and government corporations, the Commission interpreted this to mean that these institutions could only be reorganized "within the limits of their respective charters". Please see Gonzalez and Deapera, *op. cit.*, p. 263.


The RAC of 1978 was never published. A "new" Administrative Code of 1987 was promulgated by President Aquino, through EO No. 292, on 25 July 1987.


83. PCR, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-110.

84. On 27 different occasions until May 1984, President Marcos issued E.O.s. and LOIns., to amend the Reorganization Plan. *Ibid.*


87. Section 1, E.O. No. 5, dated 12 March 1986.

88. Section 2, Ibid.


90. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

91. Section 8, E.O. No. 5.

92. Section 5, Ibid.

93. Ibid., p. 7.


95. Iglesias, op. cit., p. 11.

96. Section 1, E.O. No. 17.


99. Ibid.

100. Section 7, R.A. No. 6656.

101. Please see Republic of the Philippines, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), 1988 Philippine Development Report, Initial Draft of Chapter 13, "Development Administration and Plan Implementation".

102. Section 1, R.A. No. 6683, dated 3 December 1988.


104. Ibid., p. 15.


109. Brillantes though concluded that the notion of a historically dominant Philippine President may be mistaken. A.B. Brillantes, "The Executive," in De Guzman and Reforma (eds.), op. cit., p. 129.

110. Ibid.


The writer would like to believe that the IRP under the Marcos Administration only came to fruition in view of the fact that it was decreed into law during Martial Law.

Basically the same thing happened during the Aquino Administration, when the PCGR failed to submit a single reorganization plan as a result of disagreements within the commission itself. Please see Iglesias, et al., op. cit., p. 7.


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A. Articles


B. Books


C. Philippine Government Materials/Documents


REPUBLIC ACT NO. 51, approved by Philippine Congress on 4 October 1946.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 422, approved by Philippine Congress on 6 January 1950.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 997, approved by the Philippine Congress on 9 June 1954.


LIST OF TABLES

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2. Percentage difference of the number of positions in the bureaucracy before and after reorganization: January 1989

3. Comparative analysis of strategy dimensions of Philippine reorganizations, 1946-1986

4. Personnel separation by level of position and mode of separation, for the period 25 February 1986 to 30 June 1987
LIST OF ACRONYMS

ASPA - American Society for Public Administration
CAG - Comparative Administration Group
CAS - Cabinet Assistance System
CSC - Civil Service Commission
CR - Commission on Reorganization
DBM - Department of Budget and Management
DECS - Department of Education, Culture and Sports
DOTC - Department of Transportation and Communications
EO - Executive Order
EROPA - Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration
GSRC - Government Survey and Reorganization Commission
IBP - Interim Batasang Pambansa
IRP - Integrated Reorganization Plan
LOIns - Letter of Instructions
MTPDP - Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan
MC - Memorandum Circular
NEDA - National Economic and Development Authority
OCPCA - Office of Compensation and Position Classification
PCR - Presidential Commissioner on Reorganization
PCCRP - Presidential Commissioner to Review and Revise the Reorganization Plan
PGCR - Presidential Commissioner on Government Reorganization
PD - Presidential Decree
PDR - Philippine Development Report
RA - Republic Act
RAC - Revised Administrative Code
UN - United Nations
USA - United States of America
USAID - United States Agency for International Development
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION CHART
(As of October 1986)

PRESIDENT

NEDA BOARD

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

General Government Departments

FINANCE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JUSTICE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
NATIONAL DEFENSE

Social Development Departments

EDUCATION, CULTURE and SPORTS
HEALTH
LABOR and EMPLOYMENT
SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT

Economic Development Departments

AGRARIAN REFORM
AGRICULTURE
ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES

PUBLIC WORKS and HIGHWAYS
TOURISM
TRADE and INDUSTRY
TRANSPORTATION and COMMUNICATION

Support Offices

BUDGET and MANAGEMENT
NEDA (SECRETARIAT)
SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY