

Her Prospects of Mankind:

**How Eleanor Roosevelt presented her views on the United Nations and its challenge in
the Congo on the medium Television**

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To my Dad, Ed Buddenbaum,

who graduated from this exact masters 32 years ago and married my mom that same year,

And to my fiancé, Thijs Verheul,

who during the particular period of thesis writing decided to propose and made history repeat.

*The illustration on the title page
is a composition of screenshots
from Prospects of Mankind's
episode 'Congo: Challenge to
the United Nations.'*

Preface

Did I ever tell you the story of how Eleanor Roosevelt saved my uncle's life? I heard that sentence halfway through my research, while I was at the FDR Library in Hyde Park, New York. One morning at the Golden Manor Motel right across the street, I decided to have an all American breakfast – donuts, coffee and Tropicana orange juice included – when an older couple was having coffee at the table next to me. Tim Walsch (72 years old) was excited to start the story to his wife Ruth Tepper (62 years old), when she replied: ‘Oh Tim, I hear it every time we get here...’ He almost did not continue, so I stepped in and asked them everything about the American first lady and how she did save his uncle's life. You might want to know that I am as shy as Eleanor Roosevelt herself was in her younger years, but I am happy I asked, because Tim, excited to have a new listener, said that the story was a real postwar tragedy. His uncle was a veteran who had returned cripple after the war and could not do the job he had always done: mailman. Tim's uncle had a wife and two children to sustain, so in desperate need of an income Tim's grandmother wrote a letter to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt – whom she always listened to on the radio – asking for help. Mrs. Roosevelt was ‘of course way too busy’ at the time to reply to her immediately, but 3 months later the former first lady had sent the family a reply in which she advised him to walk by the train station and ask this and this person for a job. Tim could not remember the exact names anymore, but after mentioning Mrs. Roosevelt, his uncle was hired and served a great many years behind a service desk at the station near his home. The story goes that without this tip of Mrs. Roosevelt, it could have taken him years to find a job and the family would not have survived that long. Since then, Tim and his entire family visit the Eleanor and Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Site annually, to honor the former president and especially his wife Eleanor. Tim had many stories to tell, which made history come alive to me. Ruth was there for the funny side notes on the stories, which she must have heard millions of times when visiting the Roosevelts. Therefore they are the first people I would like to thank: Tim Walsh and Ruth Walsch-Tepper, without whom Eleanor Roosevelt would not have become so *alive*.

But in the particular period of thesis writing, there are many more people and institutes to thank for their involvement, hospitality and ever-encouraging support. To start on a formal note, I would like to thank Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg and the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library in New York, the residences that aided me from the first sentence to the last word. I would like to extend my list of acknowledgements by thanking a befriended professor who will not expect me to mention her here: Dr. Anya Luscombe. One year ago, I started to read all about Eleanor Roosevelt, in quest of a worksome research question for my Thesis Proposal. It was in that month that I discovered my former Journalism teacher had written an article about Eleanor Roosevelt and the radio with an innovative method to research Eleanor Roosevelt's radio performances. I remember Anya and I once talked about Eleanor Roosevelt and how hard she could be on herself during a conversation in which I was critical of some work I had just handed in. But I did

not know Anya's research interests were with the media expert and former first lady and even though I was too critical of my work to hand-in even a simple draft in advance, Anya Luscombe's article and passion for Eleanor Roosevelt helped me to develop my own research, in method and in meaning.

I realized there were only a few scholars in the Netherlands who had done thorough research to the Eleanor Roosevelt, making it possible for me to meet nearly all of them. Especially after I got the chance to enter the Honors Program and design an additional curriculum next to the MA's regular one, doors opened when I expressed my wish to start a research about Eleanor Roosevelt thoroughly and gained some extra time to do so. I dedicated this time to deepen the knowledge needed for writing a thesis dealing with multiple disciplines. I took three additional courses: one on Human Rights in International Law at the Erasmus School of Law, a second entitled New Media and Politics at the Erasmus School of Communication and a summer school in South Africa on African International Relations which was jointly provided by the London School of Economics and the University of Cape Town. All of these courses individually provided specific insights and background information, which combined strengthened my research focus that aided me in finding unrevealed (*read: unpublished*) information on the former first lady. This made writing this thesis particularly exciting, especially with the prospect in mind that I had to write an extra master's product to complete the honors curriculum and travelled to the FDR Library in New York where I had the opportunity to work as a visiting scholar, look beyond the scope of my thesis and could write my thesis and EMP on the site that used to be Eleanor Roosevelt's home. It turned out that the Korean War and her approach to its resolution were similar to what she believed to be acceptable measures in resolving the Congo Crisis, for which I attached the extra piece in the first appendix of my thesis, and give everyone reading my thesis easy access to it.

For this thesis, I have met an amazing group of individuals that are interlinked and befriended with each other, and with me, via the Roosevelts. I have met colleagues in Middelburg and New York, where all have always been supportive, kind and energizing. First of all, Dr. David Woolner: thank you so much. I remember this one day at the Roosevelt Presidential Site, where Dr. Woolner and I would meet for a cup of coffee. Nervous as I was to meet him at first, the fact that the restaurant had already closed when we got there, broke the ice. We discussed why I had travelled all the way to New York in search of evidences, transcripts and other sources, when so much can be found online. I told him that I was simply curious, and that I knew that I could find the perfect transcript I needed here – the transcript of the *Prospects of Mankind* episode on the Congo Crisis - but that I also found so much more already. The kindest sentence followed, when he said that he had never met anyone who researched the Roosevelts who wasn't kind and warm. 'Not one bad bone in their bodies.' He said that he would support my research – as I am a friend of the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg – and pay for my copies. I met him after three days of research, and naively hadn't known that copying would cost me \$0,20 a page. So up until today I wonder whether he knew in advance how many pages I had and have had copied in his Library... Even after summer Dr. Woolner's colleague, Matthew

Hanson, helped me out tracing documents that were not (yet) part of the Roosevelt's digital collection, and therefore I would like to thank Matt too for his support and encouraging words throughout my study. And also for helping me get in contact with the archivist of the JFK Library in Washington, Mrs. Abigail Malangone, when I noticed the correspondence between Eleanor Roosevelt and President John F. Kennedy was critical for understanding their fragile relationship and some topics and guest lists for *Prospects of Mankind*.

The majority of my time I spent in the Roosevelt Study Center, and I would like to thank Leontien Joosse, Dario Fazzi and all their interns that worked there this year, for making me feel wholeheartedly welcome to drop by. To Dario Fazzi, a threefold thank you. He guided, supported and challenged me when he was my internship supervisor. He did too as my unofficial second reader whom knew so much about the life and mission of Eleanor Roosevelt that it would have been impossible to interpret any source wrong. A special thanks for lending me his draft book, *A Voice of Conscience*, which I read with joy and eagerness to learn. And the third thank you is for having been there every moment: on his birthday, at the train station in the Hague when Middelburg turned out to be too far away for both of us, one hour before last Christmas break and now again, reading my thesis as an official second reader when he is expecting a baby wonder and while his valuable book *A Voice of Conscience: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Anti-Nuclear Movement* is in print.

Writing this thesis has been a journey that was challenging to say the least, as I have never written so many words for one piece. The love-hate relationship I had developed will be recognizable for probably anyone who will have had to write a thesis, let alone a PhD. And that brings me to my supervisor Hilde Harmsen, who deserves a very special thanks for not giving up on me, always being sharp and curious about the details of my story, and for making me write when I was losing myself in reading the abundance of sources. The three binders filled with interviews, articles, transcripts and photocopies were tough to arrange in a running story. But by turning some of the feedback sessions into brainstorm sessions, we have found the narrative and composition of my thesis as it is presented below. I will not forget our long conversations about everything and nothing around the topic of my thesis, nor how much I have learned about this discipline – history – and how to carry out a historical research critically, academically and fully.

This thesis has become much more than a literature review and primary source analysis writ large. It is a critical reflective intervention in the debate on whether Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt was consciously able to promote her hopes for the United Nations – the international organization for world peace – in the United States through her media appearances. Where many scholars have either written about the first lady and the media, or the first lady and the United Nations, I have combined the two, in search of how she utilized the media to broadcast her views on the United Nations. To double-check my findings on either side, I have built up the story in two parts that mutually strengthen each other: loosely speaking, the general picture and the case study. It is the aim of this research to contribute to the knowledge about Eleanor Roosevelt and extend what is known of her use of the

medium television and the therein-presented views on the United Nations in the final three years of her life. The historiography establishes that there are plenty historical sources on Eleanor Roosevelt, the media, the UN and to a slight extent even the television, provided by both Eleanor Roosevelt herself and the historians who interpreted her. It was a luxury and a challenge to have a countless amount of searches in reach, as much as it must have been an opportunity and a limitation for Eleanor Roosevelt to reach a public by broadcasting from the White House: if skillfully exploited, the potential is great. In doing research and writing this thesis, I have found out why my father was so enthusiastic about this Master's program, which he completed exactly 32 years before me. An almost final thanks to both my dad, Ed Buddenbaum, and my fiancé, Thijs Verheul, who have been great mainstays and aided me by being there always.

Thank you to everyone who has been there one way or another while I was writing this thesis: thank you for the kind words, the relativizing speeches and for helping me become a Master's graduate.

Marit Buddenbaum



Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt statue in Hyde Park



My researchers' ID while in the FDR Library



Mrs. Roosevelt's passport at age 62, an age at which I'd also love to travel still!

List of Abbreviations

AAUN	American Association to the United Nations
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (of the United States)
ETV	Educational Television (as opposed to commercial television)
FDR	Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Also in FDR Library)
MNC	<i>Mouvement National Congolais</i> (Congolese National Movement)
NET	National Educational Television and Radio Center
ONUC	<i>Opération des Nations Unis au Congo</i> (United Nations Operation in the Congo)
PM	Prime Minister
PoM	<i>Prospects of Mankind</i>
RSC	Roosevelt Study Center
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)

Table of Contents

• Preface	2
• List of Abbreviations	6
• Table of Contents	7
• Introduction	8
Part I: Eleanor Roosevelt, the United Nations and the Television	12
• Chapter 1: Eleanor Roosevelt and her Lifelong Pursuit of World Peace via the Media	13
• Chapter 2: Eleanor Roosevelt in <i>Prospects of Mankind</i> (1959-1962)	37
Part II: Case Study on the Congo Situation (1960-1961)	65
• Chapter 3: The United Nations and all its members in the Congo Crisis	66
• Chapter 4: Eleanor Roosevelt in ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations’ (April ‘61)	87
• Conclusion and Discussion	109
• Bibliography	114
• Appendices	121
A. Extra Master Product: ‘High Hopes’	121
B. List of PoM Episodes	143
C. Questions for ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations’	144

Introduction

Both the two World Wars and the Cold War that followed were outbursts of global tensions in the international arena of the 20th century – the century that saw the birth of the United Nations, pursuing international cooperation and world peace, and the century that saw the rising popularity of a new medium: Television. A famous American figure consciously lived through these historical developments that shaped the world we live in today, and saw great potential in both the United Nations and the Television. She was a former U.S. First Lady, who presented *her prospects of mankind* to the U.S. citizens via the media. Her name was Eleanor Roosevelt and in the final three years of her life, she was the host of the talk show *Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962).

By all account, Eleanor Roosevelt (1884–1962) was a remarkable woman. Shy in her younger years, she made a name for herself through an outspoken media career in which she aimed to educate the U.S. citizens on topics she encountered in her daily life and travels.¹ Prior to the talk show, Eleanor Roosevelt broadcasted her voice via the radio, was famous for her near-to-daily *My Day* column and successfully fulfilled various roles such as First Lady, U.S. delegate to the United Nations (twice), co-author of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) and volunteer of the American Association to the United Nations (AAUN).² Grown into the position of heroine to many U.S. citizens, Eleanor Roosevelt along with her countless media appearances is a popular source for historians. From the analyses of her speeches, writings and radio broadcasts, Eleanor Roosevelt's use of the media has been qualified among scholars as skillful.³ In these media, she presented and advocated her humanitarian, pacifist and political views and made enough money to choose her own charities, which was a luxury for a woman at the time.⁴ Her views on peace and human rights have been studied extensively through her media work, but the television, the one mass medium that Eleanor Roosevelt in the final three years of her life chose over the radio, was hardly analyzed. This observation fits the comment of Chris Vos, who wrote that few historians seriously attempt to use audio-visual material as source in their research.⁵ Even though Eleanor Roosevelt starred in multiple television shows already before *Prospects of Mankind* (PoM), it was based on her own article, published in 1959 a few months before the production, that the *Eleanor Roosevelt Encyclopedia* concluded she skillfully exploited and understood the potential of the television medium as much as she skillfully exploited and understood other media, even though audio-visual analyses of her television work have not been studied (yet).⁶ This lack of research raised the question if Eleanor Roosevelt *indeed* understood the special

¹ Maurine H. Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media: a public quest for self-fulfillment* (Chicago 1987).

² Amongst others: Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media* (1987); Anya Luscombe, 'Eleanor Roosevelt as "ordinary" citizen and "expert" on radio in the early 1950's', *Sage* (2014) 1-9 & Mary Ann Glendon, *A world made new: Eleanor Roosevelt and the universal declaration of human rights* (New York 2001).

³ Respectively: Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media* (1987); Luscombe, Anya, 'Eleanor Roosevelt as "expert" on radio' (2014) and Blanche Wiesen Cook, *Eleanor Roosevelt: Volume 2, the defining years, 1933-1938* (London 1999) 215.

⁴ Cook, *Eleanor Roosevelt: the defining years*, 215.

⁵ Chris Vos. *Bewegend verleden: inleiding in de analyse van films en televisie programma's* (Amsterdam 2004) 17-18.

⁶ Douglas Gomery, 'Television', in Maurine H. Beasley, Holly C. Shulman and Henry R. Beasley (eds.), *Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia* (London 2001) 509.

opportunities of the television, and if so, from what this conclusion could be drawn.⁷ Therefore, in this thesis, the television series *Prospects of Mankind*, which was produced after Eleanor Roosevelt's article of 1959, was analyzed to find out how Eleanor Roosevelt treated the medium television.

PoM covered a wide variety of topics focused on foreign affairs issues that Eleanor Roosevelt was interested in, and in the production process of the televised discussion show Eleanor Roosevelt had the freedom to choose the guests, topics and questions herself.⁸ But in order to be able to say something about how Eleanor Roosevelt used the medium television, analyzing a topic she strongly believed in and wholeheartedly promoted would most likely give insights in her approach. The former First Lady promoted peace and equality not only from the White House but also from the United Nations Headquarters in the years after her husband's death. Even though she was recognized by scholars as a pacifist, humanitarian and mass educator, a U.S. delegate to the UN and one of the founders of the UDHR, in comparison to other topics, little is written on Eleanor Roosevelt's views on the UN, despite the fact that this was the organization she proclaimed as *the* vehicle that could achieve world peace and acclaimed her work for the UN her 'most important.'⁹ During the production period of PoM (1959-1962) Eleanor Roosevelt was actively promoting the United Nations throughout the United States as a volunteer of the AAUN. Therefore, how Eleanor Roosevelt presented her views in PoM could best be studied with a focus on the United Nations. This study angle would be even more valuable if led to new insights in her little-researched views on the UN. The combination of Eleanor Roosevelt, the United Nations and PoM leads to several questions. Did she consciously use certain tactics on screen to ensure her message was conveyed to its maximum potential? How did she use her freedom to choose the guests, topics and questions to shape an episode? What were the effects of such choices on the message an episode conveyed? To come to an answer for all these questions, this thesis focused its research around the following main research question:

*How did Eleanor Roosevelt present her views on the United Nations in her television series
Prospects of Mankind and from what can this be explained?*

The reason for choosing the analysis of specifically this television series and the reason for specifically looking at views on the United Nations within the show naturally set this study's periodization, that started from the production's start until its end (1959-1962). Right within this period, a major historical crisis broke out in the African continent: the Congo Crisis (1960-1965).¹⁰ The people in the Congo found themselves in a post-colonial struggle for independence, and national unity was endangered by conflicting views on the division of power, land and resources.¹¹ The U.S.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Dario Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, draft book (Middelburg 2015) Chapter 6, 8.

⁹ Eleanor Roosevelt, *On my own* (New York 1958) 71.

¹⁰ Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy and Paul D. Williams (eds.) *The Oxford handbook of United Nations peacekeeping operations* (Oxford 2015), 117-120.

¹¹ Ibid.

and the USSR worsened the rivalries between the different factions, because these two Cold War rivals both supported different factions in their attempt to gain influence over the region. The Congo called upon the United Nations to restore peace in the country, but challenged by many different opinions on how to resolve the international crisis, the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Congo became the first *official* operation in which armed forces were used and to provide world peace became increasingly difficult.¹² United Nations supporter Eleanor Roosevelt evidently chose to host a PoM episode on the Congo Crisis and dubbed it ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations.’¹³ This historical crisis on its own already raised the intriguing question what Eleanor Roosevelt’s views were with regard to how the United Nations should go about solving the conflicts in the struggling nation and restore peace, especially because her views had been shaped by all the other wars and conflicts that occurred throughout her life span. However, another finding intensified the need to analyze this particular episode on the Congo, for a month prior to the broadcast of April 1961, Eleanor Roosevelt, at age 77, rejoined the U.S. delegation to the UN and all of the sudden might not as freely speak her own opinion on the UN anymore. Could she present her views as bold and independent as before after accepting a position as diplomat of the U.S. delegation? Did the format of this episode differ from the other UN-broadcasts?

This thesis is divided into two parts that mutually strengthen each other – Part I: Eleanor Roosevelt, the United Nations and the Television and Part II: Case Study on the Congo *Situation*. In chapter 1, the years prior to *Prospects of Mankind* have been recounted and the questions who Eleanor Roosevelt was, what is already concluded about Eleanor Roosevelt’s use of other media than the television and which views or opinions she presented to her public, have been answered. From understanding the approaches taken in earlier studies on Eleanor Roosevelt and books on the important factors to take into account in the analysis of (historical) audio-visual sources, the chapter ends to describe the way to conduct this research and answer its main question. For chapter 2, the leading audio-visual primary source and general correspondence on the production process of PoM were analyzed. The analysis of three selected episodes covering the United Nations are herein presented. In the second part, the analysis of episode 16 is presented and incorporated another innovative topic of study, Eleanor Roosevelt and the Congo Crisis, in the form of a case study. The same set of questions was applied to the analysis of this episode, but in contrast to the analyses of episodes covered in part I, extended with a contextual background of the Congo Crisis from 1960-1961, and the production process of this particular episode hosted in April 1961.

In order to conduct the research, the little analyzed *Prospects of Mankind* DVD Collection of the Roosevelt Study Center (RSC) in Middelburg was key. In the 17th century the ancestors of Eleanor Roosevelt and her husband FDR emigrated from Zeeland, a southern province of the Netherlands, to

¹² Koops, et al. (eds.) *The Oxford handbook of United Nations peacekeeping operations*, 117-120.

¹³ Roosevelt Study Center Middelburg, *Prospects of Mankind* Digital DVD Collection, ‘Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt: *Prospects of Mankind* ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations’ (April 1961)’. (See Appendix B: episode 16).

New York.¹⁴ In the Dutch city of Middelburg, the presence of the RSC illustrates the special transatlantic relation that has existed ever since between the Netherlands and the United States. It is in the archives of this center that the unique audio-visual collection is preserved. With the combination of the DVD Collection from the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg and the transcripts and general correspondence on the show from the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library in New York, this thesis had the opportunity to reconstruct how Eleanor Roosevelt's views on the United Nations were presented in PoM and add a new angle and method to the study of Eleanor Roosevelt through the combined collection of both institutions.

Where many scholars have either written about the (former) first lady and the media, or the (former) first lady and the United Nations, this thesis combined the two, in search of how she utilized the media to broadcast her views on the United Nations and its challenge in the Congo. This thesis is the first to take an audio-visual approach for the analysis of Eleanor Roosevelt and her views on the United Nations and promises to put a compelling (hi)story in its pages.

¹⁴ Roosevelt Study Center, 'About RSC': <http://www.roosevelt.nl/about-rsc> (07-04-2016).

Part I:

Eleanor Roosevelt, the United Nations and the Television



Figure 1: Three photos from Prospects of Mankind. On the left picture, the logo of PoM is presented, which will be explained in chapter 2. In the middle, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt takes the stage, when she concludes the discussion with her guests and hopes they will tune in during the next episode again. The picture on the right presents a shot at the end credits. All photos are taken from the episode: 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations.'

Chapter 1

Eleanor Roosevelt and her Lifelong Pursuit of World Peace via the Media

Who was Eleanor Roosevelt? How did she play a role in the (shaping of the) UN, and specifically through the media? What is left to research? And how will this thesis go about that?

'Like her mother, she seemed destined for the constrained life of an upper-class lady, expected to avoid the public spotlight except for dazzling visibility in society. [...] No one expected the unprepossessing infant to become the single most publicized woman of her day – an American heroine – who gained her fame via the media of mass communication.'

- Maurine H. Beasley (1987)¹⁵

'Skillfully using a variety of forums, such as daily newspaper columns, monthly magazine articles, national lecture tours and government and Democratic Party appointments, Eleanor Roosevelt challenged America and its political leaders to recognize hypocrisy and accept their civic responsibilities.'

- Allida M. Black (1996)¹⁶

The above two quotes capture an essential illustration of Eleanor Roosevelt, that suggests historians have long recognized an important relation to mass media when studying Eleanor Roosevelt as an influence on the political- and public opinions in the U.S. during her life time. A general view by historians is that '[a]lthough Eleanor Roosevelt's activities had a political component, they reached beyond the political.'¹⁷ Whereas Beasley meant to stress that Eleanor Roosevelt, as a news item and a news writer, was on the bigger mission to empower women instead of pursuing a political career, other historians have showed that Eleanor Roosevelt *during* her political career was involved with the needs of the 'ordinary' human being and voiced her intrinsic ideals skillfully, effectively and broadly.¹⁸ Eleanor Roosevelt listened to her audience, and strived to make her communications at all media platforms a two-way street.¹⁹ Whether this was a genuine humanitarian side, conscious creation

¹⁵ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 1.

¹⁶ Allida M. Black, *Casting her own shadow: Eleanor Roosevelt and the shaping of postwar liberalism* (New York 1996) 2.

¹⁷ Maurine H. Beasley, 'Eleanor Roosevelt's vision of journalism: a communications medium for women' *Presidential Studies Quarterly* (1986) 66.

¹⁸ Allida M. Black, *Courage in a dangerous world: the political writings of Eleanor Roosevelt* (New York 1999) 1-4 & Luscombe, 'Eleanor Roosevelt as "expert" on radio', 1-8.

¹⁹ Beasley, 'Eleanor Roosevelt's vision of journalism', 66.

of a public image or a combination of both, the outcome of her ideals will be explained throughout this chapter.

The first paragraph of this chapter will provide an overview of the researches that have already been conducted on the (former) first lady and her personal beliefs in relation to the media and the United Nations in the form of a historiography. This historiography functions as a foundation from which unanswered questions come forth along with possible connections between different areas of study on the life of Eleanor Roosevelt. The second paragraph of this chapter will explain what questions are left to research, and how I will operationalize the research question of my interest: *How did Eleanor Roosevelt present her views on the United Nations in her television series Prospects of Mankind, and from what can this be explained?*

1.1 Historiography

Eleanor Roosevelt (1884 – 1962)

Part of U.S. high society from birth, Eleanor Roosevelt was born on October 11, 1884. She was the first of three children of Anna Livingston Hall and Elliott Roosevelt and the niece of former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt who was in office from 1901-1909.²⁰ Before she reached the age of eleven, both her parents died. Alcohol abuse of her father prior to his death and of her grandmother, who took her in when she was orphaned, took its toll and made her childhood difficult.²¹ On March 17, 1905, she married Theodore Roosevelt's grandson, future U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was in office from 1933-1945, making her First Lady. The couple had six children. Eleanor Roosevelt passed away on November 2, 1962, suffering from bone marrow disease.²² Her lifespan included major historical events, such as the First World War, the Second World War, the Age of Reform, the Great Depression, emancipation movements of women across the globe and the first part of the Cold War between the USSR and the United States.²³

Eleanor Roosevelt: An Enjoyable Source for Historians

The time in which she lived and all the activities she filled her time with, make Eleanor Roosevelt an interesting subject to study. And countless studies have been done. Amanda E. Annalora noted this - amongst others - and put well in words that over the years, historians have 'enjoyed studying various aspects of her public and private life', as 'she herself provides historians with all the information they need.'²⁴ Eleanor Roosevelt consciously left-behind her views and thoughts and

²⁰ Allida M. Black, 'Eleanor Roosevelt (1884-1962)': <http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/mep/displaydoc.cfm?docid=erpn-er> (7-02-2016).

²¹ Ibid.

²² Mieke van Thoor, 'Death of Eleanor Roosevelt' in Beasley et al. (eds.), *Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 122.

²³ Respectively: Richard Hofstadter, *The age of reform: from Bryan to F.D.R.* (New York 1955) in which the author sets out the populist movements between the 1890's and 1930's, ending with the New Deal, a series of domestic programs in the U.S. in the 1930's in response to the Great Depression; Robert Cohen, *Dear Mrs. Roosevelt: letters from children of the great depression* (London 2002) & Susan Ware, *Beyond suffrage: women of the New Deal* (London 1981).

²⁴ Amanda E. Annalora, 'Eleanor Roosevelt the ugly duckling to the First Lady of the world' MEd Thesis (2010) 1: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/ehd_theses/1/ (10-04-2016).

produced autobiographies, articles and essays throughout her life span.²⁵ She also presented her views in speeches, radio broadcasts and on television. Frederieke Hoogstins provided approximate numbers on the vast amount of sources Eleanor Roosevelt provided the public with.²⁶ Hoogstins counted around 8,000 newspaper columns, 580 articles and 27 books. Furthermore, Eleanor Roosevelt delivered almost 1,000 speeches to the public throughout her life and over 1,000 letters have been published over time. Most importantly to this study, Mrs. Roosevelt appeared in about 300 radio- and television shows.²⁷

Eleanor Roosevelt's personally documented historical legacy functions as an overall complete primary source for historians. She had not expressed it or it had been written up, broadcasted or recorded by herself, her cartoonist Herbert Block, her biographer Joseph P. Lash and other contemporaries, providing the world with an extensive and generally consistent narrative.²⁸ The abundance of primary sources on Eleanor Roosevelt's life and views might be the reason that conflicting views on Eleanor Roosevelt are hardly detectable among scholars during her life and after. Even though new information is added on the lady in each new study, they all seem to tell parts of the same coherent story on her life.

In an introduction to the *Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Collection*, Allida Black wrote that only '[o]nce she found her voice, she changed the world.'²⁹ Black did so in reference to Eleanor Roosevelt's early-years insecurities as a woman in a man's world. In one of her books, Black explained that Eleanor Roosevelt in 'most of her early life' lived 'in some one else's shadow' whether it be in the one of her social-elite mother, her teachers, her powerful husband and former President FDR or her mother in law.³⁰ However, the older she turned, she increasingly developed her skills and built a more positive and stronger self-image up until a point where she mastered all mass media of her era and deployed it confidently among the American public she wished to educate.³¹ In the 1930's, Eleanor Roosevelt started to speak up in the public spotlight by writing newspaper articles, columns and question-and-answer pieces.³² She earned a lot of money with these written pieces.³³ Despite various explanations on why she educated her audience through the media, historians recognize her ability to use her unconventional positions instrumentally and adroitly.³⁴ In an intriguing online source on Eleanor Roosevelt's radio broadcasts, Stephen Smith explained the multi-faceted aims of Eleanor

²⁵ Eleanor Roosevelt in Allida M. Black (ed.), *What I hope to leave behind: the essential essays of Eleanor Roosevelt* (New York 1995) 10. Scholars will have to keep in mind that these primary sources reflect how Eleanor Roosevelt *herself* defended and rationalized her ideals. She consciously left behind an image of herself and how she wanted to be remembered. This includes that she might have understood the shaping of her own image via media appearances – purposefully – left out fragments of her life and encounters that do not support this image.

²⁶ Frederieke Hoogstins, 'Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1945-1949)' MA Thesis (2013) 7.

²⁷ Hoogstins, 'Eleanor Roosevelt and the UDHR', 4.

²⁸ Eleanor Roosevelt in David Emblidge (ed.), *Mv Day: the best of Eleanor Roosevelt's acclaimed newspaper columns 1936-1962* (Boston 2001).

²⁹ Eleanor Roosevelt in Allida M. Black (ed.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt papers, vol.1: the human rights years* (Charlottesville and London 2007) xl.

³⁰ Black, *Casting her own shadow*, 3.

³¹ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 51.

³² Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 186-187 & Stephen Smith, 'Eleanor Roosevelt: The First Lady of radio': <http://www.americanradioworks.org/segments/eleanor-roosevelt-radio/> (24-02-2015).

³³ Smith 'First Lady of radio': <http://www.americanradioworks.org/segments/eleanor-roosevelt-radio/> (24-02-2015).

³⁴ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 1, 9.

Roosevelt's media work. She for one helped publicize Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal and battled her husband's critics, but she also alerted the nation on the growing threat of world war and spoke about issues that reflected her personal beliefs.³⁵ Smith extracted this view from Blanche Wiesen Cook's second volume *Eleanor Roosevelt: The Defining Years, 1933-1938*. In this volume Cook wrote that Eleanor Roosevelt in her earliest years on the radio refrained from scoops, gossip and answering political questions, but 'eventually changed her mind' and handled intrusive reporters in a way that advanced her political agenda.³⁶ In support of her husband, Eleanor Roosevelt added politics to her media performances during her 12 years in the White House, but 'strictly limited discussion to those topics that she considered newsworthy.'³⁷ Smith added to that the important note that due to her independent income she could choose the people and charities she wanted to support, even though this did not lead to clashes with President Roosevelt's political agenda.³⁸ Eleanor Roosevelt wholeheartedly believed world peace could be achieved and universal human rights could be established. President Roosevelt's successor, President Truman, even acclaimed her the title 'First Lady of the World' in tribute to her accomplishments in promoting human rights.³⁹ All of the above endorses the point of Beasley that Eleanor Roosevelt's activities reached beyond the political, because she was acting on an intrinsic idealistic motivation instead of waiting for public support on the urgency of a matter.⁴⁰ Her pro-active and self-motivated personality became visible too in how she shaped the role of U.S. First Lady.⁴¹

Eleanor Roosevelt: Redefining the role of U.S. First Lady

It was during her time as a First Lady that Eleanor Roosevelt had found the voice and strength she missed in her early life. But when she used it, to be broadcasted through different channels like her newspaper column *My Day* or the radio broadcasts from the White House, the role of First Lady became a debated topic in the U.S.⁴² Mrs. Roosevelt did not always meet the expected appearance of a First Lady since her schedule created to pursue her own career stood often in the way.⁴³ And it was possible for such a schedule to be drawn, as to Eleanor Roosevelt's advantage 'no clear-cut guidelines existed as to what was or was not appropriate for a president's wife to do on air.'⁴⁴ Whether she was allowed to express as many insights on her personal views to the public as a First Lady as she would have been as a regular woman is in no historical research clearly set out, but at the same time it is *that* role that was argued an opportunity to reach a public as big as she did, according to pioneers of

³⁵ Smith, 'First Lady of radio': <http://www.americanradioworks.org/segments/eleanor-roosevelt-radio/> (24-02-2015).

³⁶ Blanche Wiesen Cook, *Eleanor Roosevelt: Volume 2, the defining years 1933-1938* (London 1999) 214.

³⁷ Cook, *Eleanor Roosevelt: the defining years*, 215.

³⁸ Smith, 'First Lady of radio': <http://www.americanradioworks.org/segments/eleanor-roosevelt-radio/> (24-02-2015).

³⁹ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 18.

⁴⁰ Beasley, 'Vision of journalism', 66.

⁴¹ Blanche Wiesen Cook as referred to in William D. Pederson, *A companion to Franklin D. Roosevelt* (West Sussex 2011), 18.

⁴² Respectively, Luscombe, 'Eleanor Roosevelt as "expert" on radio', 1-8 & Joseph P. Lash, *Eleanor and Franklin* (New York 1971) 381.

⁴³ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 23.

⁴⁴ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 191.

research on her career Joan Hoff-Wilson and Marjorie Lightman.⁴⁵ Eleanor Roosevelt became the most published First Lady of all time, even until today.⁴⁶

Her friend, Joseph Lash, contributed with his biographies on Eleanor Roosevelt through the development of three descriptive works on Eleanor Roosevelt's intimate relationships with her husband, her friends and her network in *Eleanor and Franklin*; *Love, Eleanor: Eleanor Roosevelt and her friends* and *Eleanor: the Years Alone*.⁴⁷ In all three books, her personal life is highlighted, as much as that is separable from her political life. Intrigued by her personal life, it was Lash who described the mostly-formal relationship between her as First Lady and President Franklin D. Roosevelt in *Eleanor and Franklin*. In this relationship, Eleanor Roosevelt conceived limitations in what she could say or do publicly, as well as opportunities in terms of a nationwide audience and an influential network.⁴⁸ She was a First Lady with two faces: the expected formal upper-class lady and the unexpected hardworking lady of media and politics (See Figure 2).

Lash and Hoff-Wilson & Lightman concurred that political figures, including sometimes even Franklin Roosevelt himself, were at points very critical about Eleanor Roosevelt's career. Where these critiques seem logical to the extent that women at that time were not accepted as equal to men, it was not only politicians who were critical, nor only men. With her piece 'Critics', Therese L. Lueck contributed to *The Eleanor Roosevelt Encyclopedia*, a book composed in collaboration of many historians that appeared in 2001.⁴⁹ Lueck provides the following knowledge: Non-political critics of Eleanor Roosevelt were taken aback because she was able to move beyond the ceremonial limitations during her time as First Lady.⁵⁰ While she was broadcasting from the White House – outspokenly supporting more active roles for women – she was strongly criticized by some feminists for 'not using her position to push passage of an Equal Rights Amendment.'⁵¹ Some scholars devoted time and effort to research to what extent one might consider Eleanor Roosevelt to be a feminist herself, and if so, with what definition she was one. It is not the aim of this thesis to dive into this debate, but one of my main secondary sources, Maurine Beasley, did write about Eleanor Roosevelt's commitment to feminism, and stated that Eleanor Roosevelt's main contribution to emancipation of women was the right of every woman to earn money for herself regardless of the status of her/their husband, and that these social and cultural ideas, 'were those of the social feminists.'⁵² Lois Scharf added to this, that the way Eleanor Roosevelt redefined the role of First Lady, was clearly emancipatory for she showed

⁴⁵ Joan Hoff-Wilson and Marjorie Lightman (eds.), *Without precedent: The life and career of Eleanor Roosevelt* (Bloomington 1984).

⁴⁶ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 1 & Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 1, 4.

⁴⁷ Lash, *Eleanor and Franklin* (1971); Joseph P. Lash, *Eleanor: the years alone* (New York 1972) & Joseph P. Lash, *Love, Eleanor: Eleanor Roosevelt and her friends* (New York 1985).

⁴⁸ Lash, *Eleanor and Franklin* (1971).

⁴⁹ Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia* (2001); Therese L. Lueck, 'Critics' in Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 118.

⁵⁰ Lueck, 'Critics', 118.

⁵¹ Lueck, 'Critics', 119.

⁵² Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 193.

‘qualities that set her apart from the wives of other presidents,’ for example in the woman-only press conferences in the White House.⁵³

Lash questioned to what extent Eleanor Roosevelt was influenced by her surroundings, taken her role as First Lady and loyal supporter of FDR, and if she therefore broadcasted not all topics as extensively as her thoughts did at the time, concerning civil rights of black people and women.⁵⁴ Lash added that the Second World War eased Eleanor Roosevelt’s conscience to justly ‘free herself from social duties she hated’ and to ‘plunge into work that fitted her aptitude’, which covered advocacy for civil rights and other humanitarian causes and writing her column *My Day*.⁵⁵ The book of Lash was written about the years with FDR in the White House and the explanation was later presented that after FDR’s death Eleanor Roosevelt could more freely express her own opinions and pursued a career as a journalist over a political one.⁵⁶ President Truman, successor of FDR, asked her to become a member of his administration, however, and her political career continued.⁵⁷



Figure 2. Mrs. Roosevelt’s two appearances to the U.S. public. The left picture shows her as the upper-class lady posing in luxurious garments with the portrait of her grand father Theodore Roosevelt, Sr. (1940, FDR library), but the right photo shows her as chairman representing the United States at a meeting of the United Nations. (FDR library)

Eleanor Roosevelt’s Views on Politics

Eleanor Roosevelt’s political views were widely researched, from Beasley linking her media performances to the conclusion that she ‘solely’ wished to show women their possibilities to have careers, to Jason Berger tracking her support for her husband’s New Deal ideology until late after his

⁵³ Lois Scharf in Hoff-Wilson & Lightman (eds.), *Without precedent*, 227.

⁵⁴ Lash, *Eleanor and Franklin*, 669.

⁵⁵ Lash as quoted in Hoff-Wilson & Lightman, *Without precedent*, 6.

⁵⁶ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 165.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

death. Eleanor Roosevelt always supported her husband's articulated four freedoms, which include the freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear.⁵⁸ In the days prior to the White House, Eleanor Roosevelt already had a great heart for civil rights, and in the pursuit of human equality soon human rights dominated her agenda around 1945, and specifically black civil rights concerned her from the early 1950's onwards.⁵⁹ Black started her research on Eleanor Roosevelt's shaping of postwar liberalism with the notion that Eleanor Roosevelt promoted 'a more inclusive domestic policy agenda' that was characterized by the pursuit of fair wages and growing respect for diversity in the American society.⁶⁰ She was active within the Democratic Party and assessed her influence on the party's leadership and civil liberties associations.⁶¹

Whereas Eleanor Roosevelt saw herself as a liberal, special agents were hired in the 1930's, already, to evaluate whether she was a communist.⁶² She protested together with youth groups that were labeled ideologically communist and she publicly spoke up for her humanitarian beliefs.⁶³ Despite minor controversies in her political support, Eleanor Roosevelt is among scholars confirmed to have been an activist for (American) democracy.⁶⁴ Cook provided a study of Eleanor Roosevelt in which she called for the lady to be viewed as a 'leader who pursued her visions of a better world.'⁶⁵ Cook pointed to Eleanor Roosevelt's agenda and fight for her own social and political priorities, which included black civil rights, disarmament of the (democratic) world powers and the importance of the youth, women and minorities in society.⁶⁶ It is in all researches consistent that Eleanor Roosevelt was a whole-hearted humanitarian, which meant that she cared and fought for the welfare and happiness of people.

Eleanor Roosevelt's implementation of her humanitarian views included the promotion of her (late) husband's New Deal ideology, both domestically and internationally as described by Jason Berger for his Ph.D.⁶⁷ He argues that many of Eleanor Roosevelt's ideas were not always her own but derived from her relation with politicians like Bernard Baruch. Furthermore Berger states that Eleanor Roosevelt had a 'special quality in her approach to problems and to people.'⁶⁸ Namely, on the one hand Eleanor Roosevelt was steady in her belief that all people were equal beings with rights, but on the other she could change her mind flexibly 'if either circumstances or individuals changed.'⁶⁹ Berger's work is considered controversial when he claims Eleanor Roosevelt tried to implement the American understanding of democracy globally instead of being open minded in the pursuit of global

⁵⁸ Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the world: America's vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge 2005), 218.

⁵⁹ Respectively: Black, *The Eleanor Roosevelt papers: Volume 1*, xlii & Hoff-Wilson & Lightman (eds.), *Without precedent*, 88 and 105.

⁶⁰ Black, *Casting her own shadow*, 3.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Jason Berger, *A New Deal for the world: Eleanor Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy* (New York 1981) 42-44, 65 and 81.

⁶³ Betty Boyd Caroli, 'Eleanor Roosevelt: American diplomat, humanitarian and first lady': <http://www.britannica.com/biography/Eleanor-Roosevelt> (15-03-2016).

⁶⁴ Eleanor Roosevelt, *What I hope to leave behind*, xvii.

⁶⁵ Blanche Wiesen Cook as referred to in Pederson, *A companion to Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 18.

⁶⁶ Respectively Cook in Pederson, *A companion to Franklin D. Roosevelt*, 18; Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 1, 5 & Hoff-Wilson and Lightman (eds.), *Without precedent*, 63, 88, 135 and 201.

⁶⁷ Berger, Jason, *A New Deal for the world*, xi.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

human equality. He took Israel and India as models to prove Eleanor Roosevelt indeed visited international ‘New Dealers’ and advocated for New Deal policies to be implemented in these countries.⁷⁰

Dario Fazzi studied her humanitarian promotions too in his topical research on Eleanor Roosevelt and the anti-nuclear movement.⁷¹ Fazzi traced Eleanor Roosevelt’s views on (nuclear) disarmament, which were in favor, but at times pragmatic when arms seemed to achieve the goal of peace.⁷² In his work Eleanor Roosevelt is described as a humanitarian, pacifist and human rights activist.⁷³ Through the media, she aimed to convince her public, the United States citizens, that their government foreign policy should be to put all its defense efforts and public money ‘into ways of working for peace.’⁷⁴ Fazzi explained that after the Second World War and with the scare of the Atomic Bomb and the threatening Cold War, world peace became the topic she was passionate about.⁷⁵

Among scholars over the years consensus is achieved that grasps the essence of her political views in the key words, liberal, pragmatic pacifist and humanitarian. In individual cases however, the balance between these main views and how Eleanor Roosevelt’s actions reflected them is still under debate. An example of such a debate is the question whether Eleanor Roosevelt’s column *My Day* illustrates abrupt changes in her views.⁷⁶ Michelle Mart wrote an article on Eleanor Roosevelt, liberalism and Israel, in which she notes that the liberal view of Eleanor Roosevelt with regard to her call for the creation of a Jewish State in 1947 ‘would not have been predicted from a study of her earlier opinions, even those as late as 1946.’⁷⁷ Allida Black, however, based on the same columns claimed her views gradually developed over the years.⁷⁸ The different outcomes could be explained by the researchers approaches. Even though both used Eleanor Roosevelt’s 500-word column, Black took liberalism as a leading theoretical concept, where Mart focused on the relation between liberalism and Israel specifically. Mart’s article stated that Eleanor Roosevelt’s Jewish friends and liberal ideals influenced her view on Israel.⁷⁹ But both scholars noted that as a humanitarian who promoted human equality, Eleanor Roosevelt had strong thoughts on anti-Semitism, which had led to say the least to gross injustices in WWII that needed to be restored.⁸⁰

⁷⁰ Berger, *A New Deal for the world*, 88-101.

⁷¹ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience* (2015).

⁷² Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 1, 17 & See Appendix A: Extra Master Product.

⁷³ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 1, chapter 2 and chapter 6.

⁷⁴ Fazzi, *A Voice of Conscience*, chapter 6, 11.

⁷⁵ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 1, chapter 2 and chapter 6.

⁷⁶ Black, *The Eleanor Roosevelt papers project*: <https://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/myday/#> (7-02-2016).

⁷⁷ Michelle Mart, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt, Liberalism and Israel’, *Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies* (2006) 58.

⁷⁸ Black, *What I hope to leave behind*, xix.

⁷⁹ Mart, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt, Liberalism and Israel’, 58; These friends were the Morgenthau’s and are in the text presented as her Jewish intimate relationships. Mart put an emphasis on the influences, possibilities and opportunities that came along with her network of ‘intimate relationships’ worldwide and in the political spheres. In the final three years of her life, Eleanor Roosevelt would work with Henry Morgenthau III, son of the above-mentioned Morgenthau couple, on the television production *Prospects of Mankind*.

⁸⁰ Black, *The Eleanor Roosevelt papers project*: <https://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/myday/#> (7-02-2016) & Mart, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt, Liberalism and Israel’, 58.

Eleanor Roosevelt: First Lady of the United Nations

The born confidence of victory in 1945 gave birth to the conviction that the ideal of a peaceful world could be turned into reality. Eleanor Roosevelt had long hoped for a universal organization that could be joined by all peace-loving nations.⁸¹ She believed in the founding of the United Nations already prior to the signing of its charter on the 26th of June 1945 in San Francisco.⁸² Together with her husband, and his political agenda to promote the Four Freedoms, Eleanor Roosevelt joined one of the first meetings on the establishment.⁸³ After her husband's death, President Truman asked Eleanor Roosevelt to serve in the United Nations. She was hesitant at first, not knowing if she could complete the task without diplomatic experience, but nonetheless she accepted Truman's offer and started a career in the UN. Eleanor Roosevelt explained why she would take on a career in the UN in her so-called *years alone*:

I knew, of course, how much my husband hoped that, out of the war, an organization for peace would really develop. It was not just to further my husband's hopes, however, that I agreed to serve in this particular way. It was rather that I myself had always believed that women might have a better chance to bring about the understanding necessary to prevent future wars if they could serve in sufficient number in these international bodies.⁸⁴

With this quote, Beasley's conviction that Eleanor Roosevelt used the public spotlight to merely set an example and emancipate women across the globe, as expressed on the first page of the historiography, would be supported. However, in other sources, setting an example for women is indicated to be just a part of her motivation, as before the UN she also supported and committed to the international organization League of Nations and 'advocated American membership in the World Court, an organization that the United States never joined.'⁸⁵

Eleanor Roosevelt contributed greatly to the intergovernmental organization, the United Nations. She worked together with many international leading politicians on the drafting of the UN Charter. The UN had decided to create different committees to deal with various world issues and Eleanor Roosevelt was placed as chairman in Committee Three, which dealt with humanitarian, educational and cultural matters.⁸⁶ The agenda for this committee fitted her priorities as conceived by historians.⁸⁷ Before her appointment to this committee, Eleanor Roosevelt succeeded to establish the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a member of the six-person U.S. delegation, in

⁸¹ Glendon, *A world made new*, 4.

⁸² Black, *Casting her own shadow*, 99.

⁸³ Lash, *Eleanor and Franklin: The story of their relationship*, 667.

⁸⁴ Black, *Courage in a dangerous world*, 236.

⁸⁵ Baker, 'United Nations' *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 534.

⁸⁶ An example of Eleanor Roosevelt's historical legacy today is her great contribution to establishing The Universal Declaration of Human Rights that is still an implemented document in the UN, binding all parties that ratified them.

⁸⁷ See the former paragraph of this chapter: *Eleanor Roosevelt's views on politics*.

which she was the only woman. Eleanor Roosevelt, furthermore, supported the specialized branches of the UN such as UNICEF, UNESCO, WHO, and other programs involved with raising the living conditions of all men on the globe, now and in the future.⁸⁸

In the abundance of sources that have been written about Eleanor Roosevelt, it surprised to see that to date, it was solely Eleanor Roosevelt herself who directly wrote and spoke about the UN. Even though Eleanor Roosevelt herself exclaimed her endeavors through the UN (especially in the Human Rights Commission) to be ‘her most important work’ in her autobiography, there is little research with a focus on Eleanor Roosevelt and the United Nations.⁸⁹ Of all scholarly work after her life just four books, one draft book and an article touched upon, to a limited extent, the relations between Eleanor Roosevelt and the United Nations.⁹⁰

Allida Black’s collection of Eleanor Roosevelt’s unedited essays and speeches shows that working for the United Nations turned Eleanor Roosevelt’s pro-active expression of views and ideas into a call for action.⁹¹ In *What I Hope to Leave Behind* Eleanor Roosevelt wrote:

‘Peace isn’t going to just drop on us all of a sudden. We have machinery in the United Nations, which we can use, if we will, to help us create an atmosphere in which peace may grow, but we will have to work to keep that machinery doing its job. And the study of human rights, the acceptance of human rights and freedoms, may be one of the foundation stones in giving us an atmosphere in which we can all grow together towards a more peaceful world but we will have to work to keep that machinery doing its job.’⁹²

After eight years of commitment, Eleanor Roosevelt signed her resignation as a delegate to the UN in 1953, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower was in office.⁹³ The policy of the Eisenhower administration clashed with Eleanor Roosevelt’s opinion, which she expressed in public writings, for instance on how the UN should act in Korea in opposition to how Eisenhower and General McArthur actually acted.⁹⁴ Even though released from her public post, she did not stop her commitment to the UN and almost immediately started volunteering in the AAUN, the American Association for the United Nations that was aimed at promoting the UN across the nation.⁹⁵ In this period, she also published books for adults and children to explain the organization and its accomplishments.⁹⁶

⁸⁸ Eleanor Roosevelt, *What I hope to leave behind*, 562.

⁸⁹ Respectively: Walter Johnson, *The papers of Adlai Stevenson* (Boston 1979) 339 as quoted by Baker, Jean Harvey, ‘United Nations’ in Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 539 & Eleanor Roosevelt, *On my own*, 71.

⁹⁰ Baker, ‘United Nations: selected bibliography’ in Beasley et al. (eds.), *Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 539; Fazzi, *A voice of conscience* (2015) & Annalora, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt the ugly duckling’ (2010).

⁹¹ Eleanor Roosevelt, *What I hope to leave behind*, 562.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Baker, ‘United Nations’ *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 539.

⁹⁴ Black, *Courage in a dangerous world*, 197-203 & See Appendix A: Extra Master Product.

⁹⁵ Baker, ‘United Nations’ in Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 539.

⁹⁶ Eleanor Roosevelt, *UN: Today and tomorrow* (New York 1953) & Eleanor Roosevelt and Jean Picker (eds.) *United Nations, What You Should Know About It* (New York 1955).

In the 1960's, eight years after she resigned a new president, John F. Kennedy, was in office. In a *My Day* column of July 16, 1960 Eleanor Roosevelt wrote that she saw the UN as the 'only body' that could 'bring together for negotiations the parties to disputes that are now threatening the peace in so many parts of the world.'⁹⁷ Fazzi states that Eleanor Roosevelt's statement criticized the U.S. and the USSR, who were in her view the parties 'hindering multilateral negotiations and undermining the role of the UN at the same time.'⁹⁸ The newly elected President appointed her friend Adlai Stevenson as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and both men agreed that Eleanor Roosevelt would be a perfect delegate to serve in the UN. The organization at that time had developed to an extent that the implementation of the original charter was shaped through peacekeeping missions of the past years and Asian and African countries had joined the original member states.⁹⁹ Eleanor Roosevelt, who was at this time also hosting *Prospects of Mankind* took on the position as U.S. delegate to the United Nations, and 'found the General Assembly very much more imposing than it had been the last time [she] sat in it, at least as far as numbers are concerned.'¹⁰⁰ A pressing topic that came before the General Assembly in her second term as delegate, was the complicated crisis in the Congo, that concerned the Congolese struggle for independence from Belgium and a struggle for unity within its vast territory.¹⁰¹ Although the UN in the 1960's had developed and was different from its initial set-up and although the Congo Crisis dealt with human rights issues and was a hot international affair at the time, there is no record of research that combined the Congo Crisis and the views of Eleanor Roosevelt on the United Nations, or at all.

Eleanor Roosevelt and the Media

Where other women from high society would only appear in newspapers three times – when they were born, when they married and when they had died – Eleanor Roosevelt pro-actively shined in the public spotlight throughout her life span, despite all commentary of family, more indirect surroundings and critics.¹⁰² Her relation to the media was both passive and active: she was on the one hand written about (passive), but she also wrote, broadcasted and published herself (active). But even in the passive media coverage, Eleanor Roosevelt exploited the attention in her own way, showing a human side of herself that her public could relate to. She positioned herself as a strong independent woman. As First Lady, for instance, she did not accept protection from the secret service, because she wanted to be able to travel as freely as possible. The compromise was that she had to carry a gun when driving alone. This did not seem to bother her at all and with wit she stated to some reporters: 'I carry

⁹⁷ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, 19 July 1960 as quoted in Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 5.

⁹⁸ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 5.

⁹⁹ Johnson, *The papers of Adlai Stevenson* in Baker, 'United Nations' in Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 539.

¹⁰⁰ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'My Day: March 10, 1961': https://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/myday/displaydoc.cfm?_y=1961&_f=md004923 (25-02-2016).

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² ...once she had overcome 'living in someone else's shadow', as noted earlier in this chapter, however: Black, *Casting her own shadow*, 3.

a pistol and I am a fairly good shot.’¹⁰³ The way Eleanor Roosevelt used the media to promote her views becomes most clear in the active form, the study of which is first and foremost Beasley’s contribution.¹⁰⁴ In her book *Eleanor Roosevelt and the Media*, the main argument Beasley advanced, was the question *why* and *how* Eleanor Roosevelt used mass communication through various types of media, such as press conferences, near-to-daily newspaper columns (i.e. *My Day*) and magazine articles. Her work, still today, is a prominent source in the argument that Eleanor Roosevelt understood the media she worked with.¹⁰⁵ From the 1930’s onwards, Eleanor Roosevelt was trained and practiced the profession of a journalist, gradually developing her skills. Through the media she ‘made herself a role model for others by combining traditional aspects of a woman’s role with the requirements of changing times.’¹⁰⁶ An example of the way she positioned herself as a person the public could relate to comes forward when after the bombing of Pearl Harbour Eleanor Roosevelt via a radio broadcast ‘spoke of her feelings as a mother of a son serving in the navy.’¹⁰⁷ In Beasley’s view, Eleanor Roosevelt used ‘her warm personality, gracious manner, enthusiasm for new ideas, and genuine interest in others to create her own media career. Undaunted by the technology of modern communications, she became its master.’¹⁰⁸

According to Beasley, Eleanor Roosevelt wished the communications to be two way including responses to her written opinions.¹⁰⁹ A famous media platform was her 500-word column, *My Day*, that appeared five times a week from 1935 until two months before she died in 1962, which she wrote almost in the form of an informal diary.¹¹⁰ Beasley explains that Eleanor Roosevelt saw her *My Day* columns as chance to educate her readers about what was happening in the world, which becomes an interesting observation for *My Day* as a primary source. In educating the American people, the limited length of each column put on Eleanor Roosevelt the task of selecting events from the global news that she deemed the most relevant and most important.¹¹¹ The column is used in the majority of studies




Figure 3. Mrs. Roosevelt carrying a pistol was front page news. Earl Miller, *The Washington Herald* printed in *Black, Allida M., Casting Her Own Shadows, 112-3.*

¹⁰³ As cited by Black, *Casting her own shadow*, 112-3.

¹⁰⁴ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media* (1987).

¹⁰⁵ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 2.

¹⁰⁶ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 3.

¹⁰⁷ Beasley as quoted in Luscombe, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt as “expert” on radio’, 3.

¹⁰⁸ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia* (2001) 3.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ Black, *The Eleanor Roosevelt papers project*: <https://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/myday/#> (7-02-2016).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

conducted by historians when researching Eleanor Roosevelt, because both the topics she wrote about as well as her comments on them are a valuable source on her views.¹¹²

Years long, Beasley pioneered as the only one to directly research *how* Eleanor Roosevelt used the media, but limited her research to exploring Eleanor Roosevelt's use of columns, newspaper articles and the radio.¹¹³ From her analyses of the *My Day* columns and other sources, Beasley concluded that Eleanor Roosevelt 'publicized and popularized ideas important to her usually by taking the raw material of her own life and transforming it through the media into a message for the masses.'¹¹⁴ Eleanor Roosevelt was able to speak through the media because her unconventional roles made her an interesting voice to be heard, but also because she was considered 'simply a lady'.¹¹⁵ She travelled



Figure 4 Eleanor Roosevelt wrote her column entries, while she traveled the world. During her visit to American soldiers in WWII this cartoon was drawn. Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc. 1942. In Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 153.

extensively throughout her life span, but never failed to miss a *My Day* wherever she ended up, according to Beasley.¹¹⁶ Figure 4 shows that her cartoonist Herblock, who would confer his drawings first with

Mrs. Roosevelt before publication, drew a caricature of her devotion to write from anywhere, placing her in a military group travelling from their post after D-Day during the Second World War.¹¹⁷ Eleanor Roosevelt in this drawing dictates the events of her day, while comfortably knitting and little affected by the situation or the fact that she is in a boat full of U.S. soldiers and German prisoners of war. She is portrayed as a strong woman who could, as an eyewitness, travel to every event in the world and report back on it to her audience from personal experiences. Through the knitting activity Eleanor Roosevelt remains 'simply a lady', and in reference to her acquired trust and fame in the U.S. throughout Eleanor Roosevelt's life time, caricatures such as these added to how the U.S. perceived Eleanor Roosevelt, for indirect sources also (wittily) cover her respectfully.

On the one hand, in her radio years, there were almost no women role models apart from actresses and movie stars, giving Eleanor Roosevelt the ideal opportunity to serve as a 'realistic

¹¹² Amongst others: Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media* (1987) & 'Vision of Journalism' (1986); Berger, *A New Deal for the world* (1981); Black, *Casting her own shadow* (1996) & *Courage in a dangerous world* (1999); Glendon, *A world made new* (2001) and Fazzi, *A voice of conscience* (in press).

¹¹³ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 5 & 192.

¹¹⁴ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 193.

¹¹⁵ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 191.

¹¹⁶ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 91.

¹¹⁷ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 153.

mentor' and voice her social concerns.¹¹⁸ On the other hand, because she was consciously portrayed as 'just' a woman, Eleanor Roosevelt could use the media also to transmit her (political) messages to the public through *modern* technology, whereas politicians or men would have been retained.¹¹⁹ In 2014, Anya Luscombe added her article 'Eleanor Roosevelt as "Ordinary" Citizen and "Expert" on Radio in the Early 1950's' to the field of Eleanor Roosevelt and the media.¹²⁰ Herein the focus was put on Eleanor Roosevelt's use of the radio, and the article introduced a new method for studying Eleanor Roosevelt. This method was supported with theories on interpretative forms of discourse analysis. This method was supported with theories on interpretative forms of discourse analysis. In this approach, Luscombe analyzes the programs aurally and takes into account the concept of context in which Eleanor Roosevelt spoke to her audience.¹²¹ In her approach listening to the broadcasted radio shows is necessary to fully understand the impact the program could have had on the listeners. Luscombe refers to Crisell's chapter from 20-years earlier to point out that words constitute on radio a binary code in which the words themselves are symbol of what they represent, while the voice heard is of great influence providing the listener with clues on the character of the speaker.¹²² To examine Eleanor Roosevelt's personality on radio it becomes a necessity to listen to the program in addition to analyzing a transcript.¹²³ In her written expressions via *My Day*, Eleanor Roosevelt was already able to speak for herself, but radio allowed her to speak for herself in a more direct way than 'via the newspaper.'¹²⁴ Her voice was 'loud and clear' and Luscombe concluded that Eleanor Roosevelt 'understood – as few others – how best to use the medium of radio and negotiate [elements] that seem at first so strikingly different' but in balancing the 'ordinary' with the 'expert' succeeded in exploiting the radio to appeal to her audience.¹²⁵ The works of Beasley and Luscombe are the sole secondary sources that evaluate how Eleanor Roosevelt used the media to convey her views, but they limit their research to her writings and radio broadcasts.

Besides communicating closely with the public through radio, Eleanor Roosevelt also broadcasted through visual appearances on the television: a new and rising medium at the time that she discovered not only to be exciting and engaging for the young, but also comfortable and accompanying for the senior citizen.¹²⁶ Overall, little is written on Eleanor Roosevelt and the medium television. A rough overview of sources that relate to Eleanor Roosevelt and this medium is provided

¹¹⁸ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 189.

¹¹⁹ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 191.

¹²⁰ Luscombe, 'Eleanor Roosevelt as "expert" on radio', 1-9.

¹²¹ Luscombe, 'Eleanor Roosevelt as "expert" on radio', 2.

¹²² Andrew Crisell, *Understanding radio: second edition* (London 1994), 3-42.

¹²³ Luscombe, 'Eleanor Roosevelt as "expert" on radio', 8.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Luscombe, 'Eleanor Roosevelt as "expert" on radio', 8 (in response to Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 111).

¹²⁶ As I was told by the tour guide in the living room of Eleanor Roosevelt at the FDR Presidential Site in Hyde Park, New York, August, 11, 2015, one of the very first television models produced in the U.S. was said to be offered as a gift to the Roosevelts, where it was accepted skeptically by Eleanor Roosevelt's mother-in-law, as a tool that would not have much added value as to the radio. In 1959, however, after thirteen years of experience with the medium television, Eleanor Roosevelt published the article 'Television's contribution to the senior citizen.' *TV Guide* (17 October 1959) and claimed to understand the great potential of the new medium to 'reach out to Americans across the nation' (on page 6-8).

by Douglas Gomery in *The Eleanor Roosevelt Encyclopedia*.¹²⁷ It captures in three pages the sixteen years of experience that Eleanor Roosevelt had with TV. According to Gomery, Eleanor Roosevelt had learned from all her television performances, and throughout these sixteen years continuously starred in shows of her own and others famous Americans. Gomery, however, did not evaluate himself *how* Eleanor Roosevelt presented herself or was presented on TV, but mainly guides his readers to primary sources that are preserved in the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library archives. One striking issue he described, concerns the NBC refusal to broadcast Paul Robeson, a black, civil rights spokesman with alleged communist sympathies.¹²⁸ It is interesting for the commentary claims that Eleanor Roosevelt politically correct refused to defend Robeson's right to appear on the program. She only said: 'He would have been only one of a number of speakers and would not have been able to determine the program's point of view.'¹²⁹ Whether or not Eleanor Roosevelt acted in a politically correct manner, her statement shows that she had thought about her guests and their influence on the general message of the program prior to their performance. Her latest (and highly politically focused) television series during the last three years of her life, *Prospects of Mankind*, is mentioned as a TV-series with a short description of the format, but without mention of any content of its episodes.¹³⁰ The lack of literature on Eleanor Roosevelt and the television fits the observation of Chris Vos, who claims few historians seriously attempt to use audio-visual material as source for their research.¹³¹ Luscombe briefly mentioned *Prospects of Mankind* in her article, but only as one of the occupations that explain why Eleanor Roosevelt did not continue with her radio broadcasts in the final years of her life.¹³² Dario Fazzi, with his topical research on Eleanor Roosevelt and the anti-nuclear movement, was the first historian to cover audio-visual analyses of two *Prospects of Mankind* episodes in one paragraph of his book.¹³³ *Prospects of Mankind* as Fazzi phrased it, was a monthly-broadcasted discussion program in which different guests 'tackled on problems affecting international affairs.'¹³⁴ Together with Henry Morgenthau III, Eleanor Roosevelt produced the series, in which she was in charge of the selection of topics, questions and guests.¹³⁵ Fazzi concludes that Eleanor Roosevelt used this special position to her advantage to convey her message to the audience – at least she did so in these two episodes with regard to her opinion in the anti-nuclear movement.¹³⁶ An example of his analysis of these episodes gives insight into Fazzi's approach that led to findings with regard to what Eleanor Roosevelt's thoughts were on the topic of disarmament as broadcasted on TV.¹³⁷ Fazzi notes that whereas her guest in one of the episodes, 'Gardner', saw the threat of the A-bomb steering the U.S.

¹²⁷ Gomery, 'Television' in Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 509-512.

¹²⁸ Gomery, 'Television' in Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 511.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Gomery, 'Television' in Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 512.

¹³¹ Vos, *Bewegend Verleden*, 133.

¹³² Luscombe, 'Eleanor Roosevelt as "expert" on radio', 8.

¹³³ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 7-13.

¹³⁴ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 7.

¹³⁵ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 8.

¹³⁶ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 13.

¹³⁷ Roosevelt Study Center Middelburg, *Prospects of Mankind* Digital DVD Collections, 'Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt: *Prospects of Mankind* 'What Hopes for Disarmament' (November 1959)' as analyzed by Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 9-11.

national and foreign policy, Eleanor Roosevelt would question how one could ‘justify morally and economically the fact that you pay to keep your land out of production when two thirds of our people go to bed hungry each night, while simultaneously diverting public money into nuclear testing?’¹³⁸ Mediator Davis agreed with Eleanor Roosevelt and extended this viewpoint. Later in the episode Eleanor Roosevelt proposed her view that a ‘system of enforcement’ of international law under the protection of the United Nations would make a gradual approach to establish nuclear disarmament possible.¹³⁹ She believed that in light of the cold war and constant fear of threats, disarmament was (still) a universal need. Her message in ‘What Hopes for Disarmament’ was convincing the public of PoM that the U.S. should put all their defense efforts and money ‘into ways of working for peace.’¹⁴⁰ Fazzi’s first insightful exploration of PoM episodes gives an indication of how Eleanor Roosevelt acted during an episode of PoM, which goes beyond her self-picked guest list and chosen questions: ‘by building an informal atmosphere that was used instrumentally to create a familiar environment through both the live audience and the people watching it at home could feel as comfortable as to devote all of their attention to the topics of the debate.’¹⁴¹ Furthermore, Fazzi described lively that during a discussion Eleanor Roosevelt ‘fiercely attacked the enormous cost of nuclear experiments [and] asked’, ‘told her audience’ and ‘added dingily’.¹⁴² He therewith shows the added value of analyzing the actual footage, which includes intonation and interruptions, non-verbal communication, the setting or environment, etc.

Another incidence that hints toward Eleanor Roosevelt consciously and skillfully exploiting the medium TV stems from the 1960’s as well: With fourteen years of television experience, Eleanor Roosevelt coached John F. Kennedy in preparation of his television performance, after which he surprisingly won the first televised 1960 Presidential Elections Kennedy-Nixon Debate, with a strikingly relaxed and natural attitude on screen.¹⁴³ Even though Eleanor Roosevelt herself nor historians writing about her recognized a direct link between Eleanor Roosevelt’s coaching and Kennedy’s ‘unexpected’ victorious television performance, it does point to Eleanor Roosevelt’s understanding of the medium, especially in comparison to the public’s reaction who listened to the same debate on the radio and expected Nixon to be the winner.¹⁴⁴ Whereas the speeches were completely the same content wise, the public who viewed both runners on the television, saw Kennedy as the winner. Kennedy answered the journalist’s questions directly into the camera, giving him a ‘knowledgeable and credible’ appearance as opposed to Nixon who would avoid the camera and look at the journalist instead. Whereas Nixon refused to wear make-up - which made him look tired, pale and sweaty on screen - and wore a grey suit that matched the background a little too well, Kennedy’s

¹³⁸ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 10.

¹³⁹ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 10.

¹⁴⁰ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 11.

¹⁴¹ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 7.

¹⁴² Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 10, 11, 12.

¹⁴³ Gomery, ‘Television’ in Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 511.

¹⁴⁴ Liette Gildlow, ‘The great debate: Kennedy, Nixon and television in the 1960 race for presidency’ *History now: the journal of the Gilder Lehrman institute* (2009): <https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/sixties/essays/great-debate-kennedy-nixon-and-television-1960-race-for-presidency> (14-02-2016).

appearance was ‘relaxed’, ‘athletic’ and ‘he just plain looked better’, something that Nixon in the presidential elections of 1968 had learned from.¹⁴⁵ And that leads this research to wonder if Eleanor Roosevelt had used the victorious and appropriate appearances in her television programs herself: did she look straight into the camera when she (was) asked a question? What did she wear? Did she come across relaxed, credible and knowledgeable? Furthermore, what type of atmosphere did she create on screen? Relaxed and real? How did Eleanor Roosevelt treat her guests? Familial? And on what basis did she select them? Did she take into account their appearance on television or their (professional) function? Or was it a combination of both? All these questions will be taken into account when analyzing *Prospects of Mankind* in this research, with the goal to come to a bigger understanding of *how* she chose to present her views in the series. The next paragraph will operationalize this research’ main question.

1.2 Operationalization

Aims and Research Question

From the historiography becomes clear that in the wealth of sources available on the persona and endeavors of Eleanor Roosevelt, there is a niche in literature: Eleanor Roosevelt’s television work. Even though much has been written on her media work, books and articles on Eleanor Roosevelt and the media are based only on writings and radio. Scholars concluded that Eleanor Roosevelt was a skillful media performer and the hypothesis was posed that she also had learnt to master the medium television.¹⁴⁶ Evidence for that hypothesis, however, is lacking sufficient analysis of (sources on) her TV work. This might be explained by the fact that the use of audiovisual material as source for historical research is a rare phenomenon.¹⁴⁷ This research is the first to study Eleanor Roosevelt based on an analysis of her TV performances. Where Dario Fazzi was the first historian to analyze the *Prospects of Mankind* by observing two of its episodes for his topical research on the nuclear disarmament movement, this study is the first research to take *Prospects of Mankind* – that was filmed in the final three years of her life – as its most important subject of analysis.¹⁴⁸ The main reasons to choose PoM as a starting point for the research on Eleanor Roosevelt and the television were the following: For one, by the time of PoM Eleanor Roosevelt had thirteen years of experience with the medium, which had allowed her media strategy to develop over time. Secondly, at the time of PoM, she preferred working on the television over radio work.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, the first innovative aspect of this research, is its adding to the current knowledge on Eleanor Roosevelt and the medium television, by providing new insights covering the largely unexplored television performances of Eleanor Roosevelt in *Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Respectively: Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 5 and 192; Luscombe, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt as “expert” on radio’, 8; For the hypothesis see: Gomery, ‘Television’ in Beasley et al. (eds.), *Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 509-512.

¹⁴⁷ Vos, *Bewegend verleden*, 133.

¹⁴⁸ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 7-13.

¹⁴⁹ Luscombe, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt as “expert” on radio’, 8.

This study focused on how she presented the United Nations in the series *Prospects of Mankind* to the American people, because during the United Nations were Eleanor Roosevelt's priority during the PoM period. Her devotion to the vehicle can be seen in her voluntary work for the AAUN (promoting the UN throughout the U.S.) and becomes even more clear when she – during the seasons of PoM – rejoined the U.S. delegation to the UN, at the age of 77. Since PoM addressed foreign affairs and international crises, the UN was a recurring topic throughout the show. The way Eleanor Roosevelt presented a topic in PoM that was important to her, can therefore best be studied through her presentation of the United Nations. Choosing Eleanor Roosevelt's views on the UN as a study angle for PoM becomes even more valuable when one considers that her views on the UN's development from its establishment up until the year she died, or her views on specific challenges the UN faced in these years were not previously researched, despite historians' consciousness that Eleanor Roosevelt devoted much of her time to the UN and the UDHR. The second innovative aspect is to come to a better understanding of Eleanor Roosevelt's views on the United Nations, using a case study on the Congo Crisis that will be explained later in this chapter. This study aimed to research Eleanor Roosevelt and the television through her *Prospects of Mankind* series and specifically the views she therein presented on the United Nations. Therefore, the main research question was formulated:

How did Eleanor Roosevelt present her views on the United Nations in her television series Prospects of Mankind, and from what can this be explained?

Developing a Method

Nature of sources

To answer the main question, this thesis primarily used audio-visual and written primary sources of the television series *Prospects of Mankind*. A large amount of the written primary and secondary sources can be found online, but most of the non-digitized primary sources are scattered across two historical archives that protect the so-called Roosevelt Legacy: the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg, the Netherlands, and the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York, the United States. The written sources include both a selection of the non-digitized Eleanor Roosevelt collections of the FDR Library and the transcript of an interview with Henry Morgenthau III in August 1978 on the nature and making of PoM. The visual sources include the RSC's Digital DVD Collection *Prospects of Mankind* series with in particular the episode on the Congo Crisis. The next paragraph will define how this thesis handled the above-mentioned sources.

Analyzing *Prospects of Mankind*

No set method from other historians was available to specifically extract how Eleanor Roosevelt presented her views in PoM episodes. There is no universal method to analyze the products of film and television, because there is no universal theory of film or television that could serve as a

sufficient base to possible claims.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, the right questions to be asked during the analysis of ‘media texts’ strongly depend on the research question.¹⁵¹ There is, however, considerable theoretical and methodological work done over the years, providing the building blocks to assemble a method tailored to the study angle of this research. The analysis of a television series, such as PoM, consists of five separate fields, according to Vos.¹⁵² The first one is the social (societal) context of the show, for PoM this could concern the historical facts and (geo)political events around time of an episode. The second field is the context in film history; for instance, PoM’s pictures are in black and white, because of technical limitations, whereas today a black and white TV fragment would be a producer’s choice over colored pictures. Thirdly one has to consider the production process. The fourth field of analysis concerns the product itself, for PoM this means analyzing the transcripts and DVD footage, the actual episode(s). The fifth and final research topic is the reception among the audience, questioning what the effect was of the television program and how it was received. Given the available sources and this study’s research question, focus is put mainly on the product (the PoM episodes on DVD), the production process and the social context of PoM.

The PoM episodes themselves can be qualitatively analyzed on three separate levels, the visual or cinematic layer, the story or narrative layer and the symbolic or ideological layer, each with its own slightly different analytical approach.¹⁵³ The first layer concerns what is visible? For example how the set of PoM was decorated and how the guests were placed in this décor or if Eleanor Roosevelt, as a host, was seated in a different type of chair? Another important aspect of the visual layer is the camera viewpoint (live au and the type of shot (close-ups versus medium or long shots)). The second, narrative, layer asks what the show was about. What was the topic? In a political talk show such as PoM, one could for instance aim to formulate the message of Eleanor Roosevelt and each of her guests. The third layer is the symbolic and ideological layer, which questions whether there was a deeper meaning of some aspects of the show found in the first two layers of analysis. As an example the description below on how Eleanor Roosevelt ended each episode could illustrate these layers. Right before the credits appeared on screen she would say: ‘au revoir!’¹⁵⁴ The visual layer exists of a close-up of her smiling face while she looked right into the camera. The narrative layer is concerned with what she says, which could be formulated as: *good bye, I hope you will watch again next episode*. The third layer is concerned with the effects of words and production-choices and could formulate hypotheses such as: *Eleanor Roosevelt wanted to stress her international interests by greeting her public in French* or *The close-up meant to show Eleanor Roosevelt controlled the conversation and had been the main character of the episode*. The generation of such claims becomes

¹⁵⁰ Vos, *Bewegend verleden*, 10-11.

¹⁵¹ Marie Gillespie and Jason Toynbee (eds.), *Analysing Media Texts* (Maidenhead 2006) 1; Vos, *Bewegend verleden*, 19.

¹⁵² Vos, *Bewegend verleden*, 17-18.

¹⁵³ Vos, *Bewegend verleden*, 15.

¹⁵⁴ Roosevelt Study Center Middelburg, *Prospects of Mankind Digital DVD Collections*, ‘Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind (1959-1962)’.

valuable if they can be tested or falsified.¹⁵⁵ In addition to the usage of the three layers described by Vos, the structure of this thesis is divided into two parts that mutually strengthen each other: the general picture and the case study. This division leads to two parts that complement and test each other's findings.¹⁵⁶ Whereas the first part of this thesis presents Eleanor Roosevelt and the United Nations in PoM through analyzing multiple episodes with the same set of questions, the second part focused on specifically one episode: 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations.' The episode was produced in April 1961 and covered the Congo Crisis as the topic of discussion. The first part aimed to provide an overview of the general aims and goals the producers and Eleanor Roosevelt had for the televised production. This provided a frame of reference for a closer analysis of one specific episode or even topic. The second part of this thesis then zoomed in on one episode and aimed to provide insight specifically in *how* Eleanor Roosevelt presented her views on the UN and its role in the Congo Crisis. For the analysis of PoM in this study, the idea had derived to put emphasis on a qualitative analysis of one episode – which could uncover hypotheses about the program as a whole. The specific differences in approach between the two parts will be explained below.

The work of Fazzi and Luscombe, who specifically studied Eleanor Roosevelt, also provided important building blocks for this study's analysis of PoM. Anya Luscombe stressed the limitations of research based solely on transcripts. Researching Eleanor Roosevelt's radio appearances, she showed the added value of listening to the programs which allows the researcher to obtain a 'sense of what it could have been like for Mrs. Roosevelt's listeners' through Eleanor Roosevelt's intonation, emphasis and pauses and dynamics in volume.¹⁵⁷ An audio analysis, provides new information that helps to understand Eleanor Roosevelt's way of conveying messages to the public. This information will not be apparent in a transcript. When analyzing a television appearance this thesis therefore, used the actual footage of the PoM series on DVD.¹⁵⁸ The importance of watching an episode instead of reading a transcript can also be derived from the work of Dario Fazzi. In his analysis of two PoM episodes he paid attention to the behavior of Eleanor Roosevelt when he explained *how* she asked questions and replied to her guests. For example Fazzi described lively that during a discussion Eleanor Roosevelt 'fiercely attacked the enormous cost of nuclear experiments [and] asked', 'told her audience' and 'added dingily'.¹⁵⁹ When analyzing episodes, this thesis aimed to capture how Eleanor Roosevelt made her statements. The second important contribution from Fazzi is the notion that Eleanor Roosevelt herself, was in charge of choosing topics, discussion questions and guests for each episode.¹⁶⁰ This is an important part of the production process, and indicates that Eleanor Roosevelt's views might also be present in for example the title, guest list and choice of topic.

¹⁵⁵ David Hesmondhalgh, 'Discourse analysis and content analysis' in Gillespie and Toynbee (eds.), *Analysing Media Texts*, 120-156.

¹⁵⁶ Hesmondhalgh, 'Discourse analysis and content analysis' in Gillespie and Toynbee (eds.), *Analysing Media Texts*, 145.

¹⁵⁷ Luscombe, 'Eleanor Roosevelt as "expert" on radio', 2.

¹⁵⁸ The transcript of episode 16 was available for analysis, but mainly used to read along while watching the episode.

¹⁵⁹ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 10, 11, 12.

¹⁶⁰ Dario Fazzi provided me with a hard copy of his draft chapters, which made it possible to develop ideas on the analysis of *Prospects of Mankind* in the book that is now in print: *The voice of conscience: Eleanor Roosevelt and the nuclear disarmament movement* (London etc 2016).

In addition to the analysis of specific episodes also the production process of *Prospects of Mankind* and the context of the episodes were considered. With reference to O'Connor, the analysis of the production process is an important element in an audio-visual study because 'production questions deal with the background elements: how and why things got on the screen'¹⁶¹ He added on the importance of understanding historical contexts that 'certain moving images can be so closely tied to the cultural situation of their times, their point is lost on audiences of a later day'¹⁶² The analysis of the production process was vital to reconstruct Eleanor Roosevelt's 'intentional meaning' with the series and was thus important to enable answering the main research question.¹⁶³ The most important sources on the production of PoM are working notes and correspondence between the producers (mainly Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau III). In light of the production questions, this study aimed to retrieve as much of this 'paper trail' as possible in various archives. Another source on the production process is the interview with main producer Henry Morgenthau III. This interview presents how Henry Morgenthau recalled the production process and his cooperation with Eleanor Roosevelt for PoM. The interview dates from 1978, years after the final episode and is therefore slightly less reliable than the working notes that originate from the actual production period.¹⁶⁴ Ultimately, the utterances of Eleanor Roosevelt herself on the production process in other media that concerned PoM will also be taken into account when episodes are analyzed.

Part I: Eleanor Roosevelt, the United Nations and the Television

As mentioned above, this thesis consists of two complementary parts. The first part focuses on the general questions relating to the views of Eleanor Roosevelt on the United Nations and her ways of conveying these views in *Prospects of Mankind*. Chapter 2 reflects upon the series PoM and its format, asking why and how the series was produced and specifically dealt with the sub-questions: What was the nature of the series and how was the show visualized for the public? When did it start, how did it develop and how long did it last? What was the role of Eleanor Roosevelt in PoM? After these questions are answered, the analysis of 3 specific episodes of PoM is presented. Particular episodes covering the United Nations that had not yet been analyzed were selected, which immediately excluded the two episodes Dario Fazzi analyzed for his study. Whether the United Nations was covered in an episode was reviewed from the program's titles and descriptions on the back of the DVD covers. After this analysis, episodes were selected that are relevant for this thesis' topic: Eleanor Roosevelt and the UN. The following selection criteria were used to narrow down the number of relevant episodes to three to five. The first criterion was that each episode with the United Nations in its title should be analyzed. Secondly, the episodes that have not been selected for this research are the ones on specific countries other than the Congo, nor the episodes on continents, cities

¹⁶¹ John E. O'Connor (ed.), *Image as artifact: the historical analysis of film and television* (Malabar 1990) 17.

¹⁶² O'Connor (ed.), *Image as artifact*, 21.

¹⁶³ Vos, *Bewegend verleden*, 15 and 193.

¹⁶⁴ Henry Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH Henry Morgenthau III', RSC, Eleanor Roosevelt oral history transcripts, iv by Emily Williams on August 30, 1978, for Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

and the American image abroad were chosen. Thirdly, the three to five selected episodes should cover episodes from each of the three years PoM was broadcasted. Lastly, to identify an episode with a reasonable chance in which Eleanor Roosevelt's views come about, also the episodes with titles and descriptions hinting towards Four Freedoms, democracy, Human Rights or pacifism were possible for selection.

Each analyzed episode was approached with the same set of questions. This enabled comparing individual episodes and by analyzing the selected episodes in chronological order aimed at detecting developments throughout the series and the effect of changes in different years of the production. The questions combined explained what views Eleanor Roosevelt (via her guests possibly) presented in the hour-long televised discussion series *Prospects of Mankind* and how she chose to present her views in this particular medium and format. The questions for each episode are: What was the topic of the episode, what were the questions and who were the guests? What message did she try to convey to her audience? Furthermore, non-textually, how did she act during an episode of PoM? Were the guests agreeing to her, was she agreeing with them? As a host, did she ever interrupt her discussants? When was she 'dingy', when was she excited? How did Eleanor Roosevelt act during an episode of PoM? What was the effect of this behavior? Which underlying ideals and views from Eleanor Roosevelt can be extracted from the episodes that concern the United Nations? The combination of all these questions will be discussed per episode, in search of a trend.

Part II: Case Study on the Congo Situation

The second part of this thesis should be read as a case study that provides insights into specific views of Eleanor Roosevelt and the United Nations.¹⁶⁵ Exactly at the time of PoM, the United Nations faced its biggest challenge so far: the crisis in the Congo. And atop of that, Eleanor Roosevelt rejoined the U.S. delegation to the UN. From a woman who could freely speak her mind, she might now all of the sudden have to speak the delegation's mind. This nonetheless did not prevent her from choosing this exact international conflict as the topic of debate for episode 16, entitled 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations.'¹⁶⁶ The episode dealing with the Congo was chosen as subject of the case study, because at the time of PoM, this crisis challenged, in the context of the Cold War, the efficacy of the UN vehicle.¹⁶⁷ This crisis could have made Eleanor Roosevelt change her views on how the UN

¹⁶⁵ To explain, aside from the methodological background of Hesmondhalgh, why in the second part of this thesis a case study was incorporated, two authors that were mentioned in the historiography, Jason Berger and Michelle Mart, are here referred to. Like Michelle Mart, who with a scope on Israel in her research to Eleanor Roosevelt's liberal ideals encountered an abrupt change in view with regard to the creation of the state of Israel, Jason Berger made a successful effort to see if Eleanor Roosevelt indeed internationally set forth the New Deal ideals of her husband after he died. Jason Berger used Israel and India as 'models' to prove Eleanor Roosevelt envisaged her husband's New Deal for the world and not only the United States.¹⁶⁵ Models are defined as simplifications of reality, but for this research I preferred to use the term 'case study' as it hints at an instance in history/reality rather than a simplification of reality. Furthermore, the load of this concept covered my aim to 'investigate a contemporary [view of Eleanor Roosevelt] in-depth and within its context'. By placing Eleanor Roosevelt's views on the UN as presented in *Prospects of Mankind* in the context of the Congo crisis and its corresponding episode of April 1961, this thesis aimed to provide a deeper understanding of the way Eleanor Roosevelt used the television series to convey her idea to the American public (Berger, *A New Deal for the world* (1981) & Mart, 'Eleanor Roosevelt, Liberalism and Israel' (2006)).

¹⁶⁶ See Appendix B: List of PoM Episodes.

¹⁶⁷ Eleanor Roosevelt was a lifelong supporter of the United Nations, but it would be a risky assumption to expect no development in her

should have acted according to her in comparison to the real action as it was taken. The fact that Eleanor Roosevelt devoted a whole episode to the crisis with the title: ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations’ might indicate that in the eyes of the former first lady the crisis posed difficulties to the United Nations and its way of operating in the newly independent country.

To analyze the views of Eleanor Roosevelt on the United Nations and its challenge in the Congo, background information on the context of the episode and the conflict were a necessity to understand which parts of the conflict Eleanor Roosevelt wished to make her audience aware of and why. Therefore, chapter 3 of this thesis describes the relevant geo-political events and explains the viewpoints of the United Nations, the United States, the USSR and Congolese factions, answering the questions: What happened in the Congo? Why did the crisis break out, who were involved in the conflict and how did the conflict develop up until the time the episode was filmed? What was the role of the UN in the conflict and what did Eleanor Roosevelt write on the crisis in other media than PoM?

The fourth chapter answered the same questions as for the other analyzed episodes in this thesis, but atop focused on the background of the guests and their relation to Eleanor Roosevelt, the differences with the original set-up of PoM and views that could only be extracted when taking the social (societal) context into account. The backgrounds of the guests were analyzed for this case study and the questions that linked to this analysis were: What is known about the relationship between Eleanor Roosevelt and this guest? What could be the motive for inviting this particular guest? The aim of this thorough approach is to come to a deeper understanding of Eleanor Roosevelt’s objectives in the PoM episode.¹⁶⁸ Although this will be an in-depth dissection of the episode, the findings must still be comparable to the analysis of the other episodes. In this way the extensive analysis can validate or show discrepancies with outcomes of the second chapter. All episodes were thus analyzed according to the same method, which was based on the actual footage and took into account the role Eleanor Roosevelt had in the production. Visual clues such as the setting and non-verbal behavior were as important to the analysis as the verbal statements made during an episode, and the (political) context at the time of filming was also considered.¹⁶⁹

views over the years. The Congo Crisis was the second conflict in which the UN used armed forces. To analyze the views of Eleanor Roosevelt on the United Nations during the Congo Crisis it would be worthwhile to compare these views broadcasted in PoM to her opinion in earlier crises. A logical comparison can be made with the 1950’s: a decade in which the United Nations used armed forces for the first time, namely during the Korean War. The views of Eleanor Roosevelt in this war have not been studied before, making a comparison impossible. The secondary sources in the historiography hint that Eleanor did not agree with the way the UN operated. This makes a comparison even more interesting. Eleanor Roosevelt has made remarks about Korean War, against the actions of the American troops and President Eisenhower dismissed Eleanor Roosevelt from the U.S. delegation to the UN, during the conflict. A thorough study on the views of Eleanor Roosevelt on the UN during the 1950’s would be a complete new project, but some insights might be valuable to this thesis. For my Honours Project I therefore have written a research paper that covers the Korean War and further UN support of the former first lady in the years after her resignation from the delegation in 1952. I worked on this project simultaneously to this text and was therefore not able to incorporate it in my historiography. I will however refer to it, where its findings are of value to underpin the claims of text (See Appendix A).

¹⁶⁸ The background information on the guests, especially because Eleanor Roosevelt picked the guests herself, could provide latent information on the message that the producers (Eleanor Roosevelt) wished to convey. Gillespie, *Analyzing media texts*, 150.

¹⁶⁹ As with all (historical) researches, it is good to keep possible pitfalls in mind. The first expected challenge is the correct evaluation of sources: who wrote certain things and based on which arguments is something stated? A critical look at secondary sources will, therefore, be of great importance. Furthermore, Eleanor Roosevelt could not have known the way television would influence the world, for which the question should not aim to make claims on her impact, just on what she *thought* to be the impact. An example of such an instance is taken up in Appendix A: Extra Master Product.

Chapter 2

Eleanor Roosevelt in *Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962)

What is the nature the series and how did Eleanor Roosevelt choose to present the United Nations on Prospects of Mankind? Are there particular/remarkable instances in which her views come about?

The question whether Eleanor Roosevelt understood the special opportunities of the medium television has briefly been touched by historian Dario Fazzi and the editors and writers of the *Eleanor Roosevelt Encyclopedia*.¹⁷⁰ Her first television appearances started already in the late 1940's, at a time that the U.S. counted only a hundred broadcasting companies in total.¹⁷¹ Although she did not like appearing on screen as much at the time, and was very modest about her performance with regard to being 'photographed every minute', Eleanor Roosevelt already recognized the value this medium already in 1949.¹⁷² In her *My Day* column, she stated that the ability to broadcast (her views on) the United Nations outweighed her personal discomfort on screen.¹⁷³ She would be starring as a guest in several shows such as Ned Brooks' *Meet the Press* and host her own television show *Mrs. Roosevelt Meets the Public* throughout the early 1950's.¹⁷⁴ In January 1956, she wrote in her *My Day* column about her latest travel to Texas, and the first thing she noticed was that 'in this part of the world television seems a necessity.'¹⁷⁵ The people in Texas, to Eleanor Roosevelt's surprise, depended no longer on local-focused newspapers to inform them about news. In its place had come radio and television, which were much more concerned with national or international questions.¹⁷⁶ Eleanor Roosevelt saw relevance of world news for every individual citizen. In 1959, after some more experience with the relatively young medium, Eleanor Roosevelt wrote an article entitled 'Television's Contribution to the Senior Citizen.'¹⁷⁷ It was written and re-written several times for the most widely circulated television magazine *TV Guide*, with the aim to make the public aware of the accompanying and comforting aspect that the television had and that it could make the elderly feel less alone.¹⁷⁸ Above that, she wrote that 'no matter what one's age [was] one can develop new interests, and TV will help older people develop these interests.'¹⁷⁹ It was a function of this medium that she considered to be just as powerful as its function of being a socio-cultural information source for the

¹⁷⁰ Respectively: Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 7-12 & Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 509-512.

¹⁷¹ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 7-8.

¹⁷² Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, June 26, 1949.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ Gomery, 'Television' in Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 511.

¹⁷⁵ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, January 26, 1956.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ FDR Library New York, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt papers part II (1884-1962), box 1423, folder 15, Eleanor Roosevelt, 'What television offers senior citizens (1959)'.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ This sentence had been scrapped in the final version of the article from the earliest draft, due to the strict word count in *TV Guide*: FDR Library New York, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt papers part II (1884-1962), box 1423, folder 15.

young citizens of society.¹⁸⁰ The article appeared in the same year as the debut of the television series *Prospects of Mankind* (PoM).

By the time of PoM, also the practical aspect of this medium, which enabled her to reach a large population without having to travel to stages, conference halls and other one-time speaking engagements was a big pro for Eleanor Roosevelt personally.¹⁸¹ For the majority of the episodes, *Prospects of Mankind* was produced in one of the lecture halls of Brandeis University, where Eleanor Roosevelt formerly studied and once a week in 1959 still lectured.¹⁸² By doing the production at Brandeis, she could continue lecturing there: She would produce PoM on Sundays, stay over one night and give a lecture to the students on Monday together with the Dean of the University and occasional guest on the show, Professor Fuchs.¹⁸³ The popularity and public trust that Eleanor Roosevelt had acquired in her years at and after the White House – she fit, like Beasley mentioned, the image of a ‘stereotypical woman’ being ‘somewhat inapt but highly moral’ – were key for her being accepted as a television personality.¹⁸⁴ Besides her observations in Texas on the decreasing influence of newspapers, being accepted to appear on TV was convenient for her, because it was becoming less and less possible to continue as much with written media, for her eyes and handwriting would not allow her to read and write as much as in previous years.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, in comparison to the radio, Eleanor Roosevelt consciously stated to prefer the television medium as this popular new technology would capture the audience she wished to educate: the young and the politically involved, especially those in both New York and Washington.¹⁸⁶ It proved very helpful for her increased use of the television medium that in 1959, the American public was used to seeing Eleanor Roosevelt on TV and throughout the series many American citizens encouraged her by means of fan mail to keep on doing *Prospects of Mankind*.¹⁸⁷

Her popularity and trusted leading voice might have been just those factors Henry Morgenthau III, originator of the concept of PoM and son of close friends Elinor and Henry, was looking for to create a successful roundtable focused on American (foreign) affairs. When he introduced his concept to the broadcasting stations and to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, the preliminary working title was *The Eleanor Roosevelt Diamond Jubilee Series*, with reference to the former first lady’s 75th birthday in

¹⁸⁰ Gomery, ‘Television’ in Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 509.

¹⁸¹ FDR Library, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt papers part II (1917-1962), box 1423, folder 42, Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Strength and energy of Eleanor Roosevelt’ & Henry Morgenthau III, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 30.

¹⁸² Stella K. Hershman, *A Woman of Quality* (New York 1970) 114.

¹⁸³ FDR Library, HMIII papers relating to the television series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), box 5, newspapers clippings and background information: miscellaneous, Henry Morgenthau III, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt at Brandeis, a personal memoir by Henry Morgenthau III’, 1963.

¹⁸⁴ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 190.

¹⁸⁵ FDR Library, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Part II (1917-1962), Box 1423, Folder 42, Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Strength and Energy of Eleanor Roosevelt’; FDR Library, HMIII papers relating to the television series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), box 5, newspapers clippings and background information: miscellaneous, Henry Morgenthau III, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt at Brandeis, a personal memoir by Henry Morgenthau III’, 1963.

¹⁸⁶ FDR Library, HMIII papers relating to the television series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), box 5, newspapers clippings and background information: miscellaneous, Henry Morgenthau III, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt at Brandeis, a personal memoir by Henry Morgenthau III’, 1963.

¹⁸⁷ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 5, Newspapers Clippings, Background Information: Publicity, Henry Morgenthau III, ‘Miscellaneous letters and General Correspondence’.

the year of the program's start.¹⁸⁸ The admiration for Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt shines through Henry Morgenthau III's preliminary working title. Eleanor Roosevelt was completely on board and after a wholehearted yes to doing the series Morgenthau and Roosevelt had together extended the series' first draft proposal. The three main reasons for Eleanor Roosevelt to wholeheartedly agree to doing the series, were written down in an article on *Prospects of Mankind* by Beatrice Braude, one of her colleagues of NET. The article stated that Eleanor Roosevelt had 'found that through television she could reach and affect more people at one time than through any other medium. She found that educational television could afford to provide enough time and the right atmosphere for the thorough, penetrating, and continuing examination that serious world problems demand.'¹⁸⁹ In the multiple versions of this one-page item, the third reason why Eleanor Roosevelt focused her energy on world affairs was consistently that '[a]fter World War II and the death of her husband, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt [...] has been particularly eager to arouse a new generation of post-war Americans to more active interest in the problems abroad that will determine their own destiny.'¹⁹⁰ Eleanor Roosevelt, however, did not like the title *Eleanor Roosevelt Diamond Jubilee Show*, because celebrating her life was, to her, not the aim of the program. They therefore changed the name which was looking back on her life into one that looked to the future: *Prospects of Mankind*, which was originally a title for one of the episodes Morgenthau had in mind.¹⁹¹ The new title grasped perfectly the aim Eleanor Roosevelt had for doing the show: educating, full of hope and with the aim to successfully arouse an interest in world problems, the people on their role in dilemmas, questions and possibilities that would determine the future of all human beings. Despite the change of name in which Eleanor Roosevelt herself was no longer mentioned, the first episode of the series was recorded in the week that the former first lady had reached the age of 75.¹⁹²

2.1 Eleanor Roosevelt as host of the television program

The initial idea

The initial idea of the program was to host televised discussions with three types of guests – an international politician, a famous high-up American and a journalist of the press - on national- and foreign affairs that were relevant around the month of the broadcast.¹⁹³ This led to the episode on the Berlin Wall only two months after it was built in 1961, and to several occasions in which pressing issues and challenges for the United Nations were covered with expertized guests. Five out of 27 episodes capture the United Nations already in the episode's title, dedicating the program to the

¹⁸⁸ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 1, Folder 9, PoM Proposals Schedules - 1959-1960, Henry Morgenthau III, 'The Eleanor Roosevelt Diamond Jubilee Series: August 1959'..

¹⁸⁹ FDR Library, Box 1, Folder: Miscellaneous, Beatrice Braude, 'Mrs. Roosevelt'. (See Appendix A: Extra Master Product for the details on this source).

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 1, Folder 9, PoM Proposals Schedules - 1959-1960, Henry Morgenthau III, 'The Eleanor Roosevelt Diamond Jubilee Series: August 1959'.

¹⁹² FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 5, Newspapers Clippings and Background Information: miscellaneous, Henry Morgenthau III, 'Eleanor Roosevelt at Brandeis, A Personal Memoir by Henry Morgenthau III', 1963.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

challenges that the United Nations faced at the time or to its future prospects. Overall Eleanor Roosevelt incorporated her subtle positive promotion of the UN throughout the series, meaning she would also mention the United Nations when discussing more general foreign affairs topics, such as co-existence (episode 1), disarmament and international stability (episode 2) and democracy (episode 9). Also, in discussions on specific cities, countries and continents such as Berlin (episode 19), Russia and China (episode 23), France (episode 24) and Africa (episode 6), Eleanor Roosevelt touched upon their relationship with the United Nations.¹⁹⁴ On this note, the content of the episodes becomes an important factor, that might give an insight for answering the question what views Eleanor Roosevelt seemed to present on the UN in the series *Prospects of Mankind*. Eleanor Roosevelt's episodes as part of NET's broadcasts, however, did not always focus on the United Nations. Key to her persona as created in her personal and in historians' writings, she was interested in the emancipation of women, the U.S. domestic political course and educating her public.¹⁹⁵ Episode 17, 26 and 27 prove Eleanor Roosevelt would sometimes convey topics other than the UN's present or future challenges or even the American image abroad.¹⁹⁶ Her steady internationalism would in these episodes, however, still come forward, as she discussed *universal* ideals with spot-on guests specialized in international relations.¹⁹⁷ For instance, in episode 27 entitled *What Status for Women*, she questioned her guests, one of which was Arthur Goldberg, the U.S. secretary of labor and another Agda Rossel, Swedish ambassador to the UN, in a general, non-U.S. specific manner. This meant that she would express a worldly view on the possibilities and limitations that women faced. In this episode a one-on-one introductory interview with President John F. Kennedy preceded the discussion with the other guests, who had initiated the episode's topic with regard to his and Eleanor Roosevelt's collaboration on women's rights during his administration.¹⁹⁸ One episode earlier she would discuss the prospects of television as a medium for society as a whole. In this second-last episode, Eleanor Roosevelt invited commercial and educational television personas in the episode she titled: *New Vistas for Television*.¹⁹⁹ This episode discussed whether the public should be confronted more regularly and made more aware about educational television (ETV) in comparison to commercial television. Eleanor Roosevelt had commercial and educational TV producers John White, Irving Gitlin and Marya Mannes and telecommunications attorney Newton Minow invited to discuss in this episode the function of TV: what the function *should* be and what the prospects of the medium is according to all guests. Attorney Minow responded that the 'marriage of sight and sound' is the best way mankind had ever found to 'communicate ideas with one another', enlarge visions, understand the world, instruct and guide

¹⁹⁴ See Appendix B for the list of episodes, including date and title.

¹⁹⁵ Black, *Courage in a dangerous world*, 174.

¹⁹⁶ See Appendix B for the list of episodes, including date and title.

¹⁹⁷ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 4, Folder 4 - "New Vistas for Television, April 29, 1962", Henry Morgenthau III, 'Transcript New Vistas for Television'.

¹⁹⁸ JFK Library, folder Kennedy John F., copies of correspondence with Eleanor Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Letter to Mr. President, December 23, 1961'.

¹⁹⁹ The content and all quotes from this episode are derived from: FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 4, Folder 4 - "New Vistas for Television, April 29, 1962", Henry Morgenthau III, 'Transcript New Vistas for Television'.

people. These ideas, Roosevelt responded, should also be entertainment. And this became an interesting notion, when she later responded to Minow that he said something interesting earlier, namely that ‘commercials should be education and entertainment at the same time’, with regard to TV then being able to interest and teach the younger audience. Eleanor Roosevelt wittily added in the middle of the program that the key to good television, or in her view effective spreading of the message that video could and should convey, is *repetition*. Television work had to be in her opinion of good quality enabling it to bear this repetition. It was the personal experience of Eleanor Roosevelt that let her to believe that money and effort in making television would be best spent in ensuring that the few most interesting and relevant messages would be brought to the audience a couple of times within one program. Prior to this episode, Eleanor Roosevelt already saw the benefits of repetition which is confirmed each time Mrs. Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau III would happily respond to letters about a well-received *recurring* episodes by one of their fans.²⁰⁰ The unique communication in which Eleanor Roosevelt turned media into a two-way street with her audience is again visible in this correspondence. In the last few minutes of the episode, Eleanor Roosevelt and her guests discuss the television’s purpose with regard to international impact of American TV shows. Eleanor Roosevelt stressed that in her opinion, the purpose of TV was neither to create an American image abroad nor to use it as a propaganda platform. It is however through conveying her own views and educating her public one could argue that Eleanor Roosevelt used the medium for propaganda herself. In her steady internationalism, she had followed the development of the TV medium abroad, and noticed that the television had been growing all over the world. Minow supported her in saying that each year more countries develop TV and she reacted pleased that [all countries] could have exchanges.²⁰¹ Optimistically she looked out to the future and she hoped that the role of the television therein would show ‘different nations in their striving to arrive at something better than we now have’ and that TV would help mankind in many ways to know what to do in light of future cooperation, cultural exchanges and peace.²⁰² Even though these last two episodes were different in set-up than the initial idea planned for, Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau III succeeded in producing a show on international affairs airing Eleanor Roosevelt’s views on them.

Different Seasons

Morgenthau and Roosevelt prepared 9 topics to pitch in their first proposal for National Educational Television (NET), the American educational broadcast television network that was enthusiastic to this opportunity, and would produce the series in cooperation with Brandeis University for the most part from 1959 until 1962.²⁰³ After this proposal was approved, Roosevelt, Morgenthau

²⁰⁰ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 2, Folder 4, Season Correspondence, Henry Morgenthau III, ‘Fan Mail and General Correspondence’.

²⁰¹ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 4, Folder 4 - “New Vistas for Television, April 29, 1962”, Henry Morgenthau III, ‘Transcript New Vistas for Television’.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 1, Folder 10,

and the writer and co-producer of PoM Diana Tead Michaelis had the green light until June 1960. Formally the three agreed to their roles in the production of the series, in which Morgenthau would fulfill the role of the main producer, Michaelis would be his secondhand in writing, co-producing and assisting with the making of the shows and Eleanor Roosevelt would give her views and wishes throughout the making and hosting of the episodes.²⁰⁴ The NET News Release of an article on *Prospects of Mankind* in August 1959, generalized the monthly telecast to consist of Eleanor Roosevelt as host-moderator discussing current international problems of importance to the United States with three distinguished guests: a key foreign figure, an important American in public life and a representative of the press.²⁰⁵ More often than not, this general set-up would be complemented with a fourth guest, interpreter accompanying the foreign guest or even both. Each guest would receive \$500 - \$1000 per episode. Although PoM was not a commercial series, according to Henry Morgenthau III, Mrs. Roosevelt herself received also about \$ 1000,- a program for it.²⁰⁶

Halfway through the broadcasts all parties involved with the production of the show agreed to continuing *Prospects of Mankind*, and Morgenthau, Michaelis and Roosevelt made this official by handing in a renewed proposal with outlines of 10 topics that might be interesting in the new academic year. They specifically removed the phrase of the amount of guests, and added in the proposal for this 'second season' a fixed moderator.²⁰⁷ In the first season, Eleanor Roosevelt as the host-moderator, was meant to guide the conversation by asking follow-up, on-the-spot and personally invented questions, but after a few shows Saville Davis was added to the production to act as a kind of assistant moderator, which made it more easy for Eleanor Roosevelt to take part in the discussions herself and express her own views.²⁰⁸ It was a decision that both Michaelis and Morgenthau discussed with Eleanor Roosevelt, and which Roosevelt happily agreed to.²⁰⁹ This way she would have more time to express her own thoughts, beliefs and opinions without exceeding her role as a host as much. Lastly, in the new season proposal of PoM, a paragraph on background checks of the guests was provided. As this was implemented only after the first season, there must have been incidences where a guest would be invited under wrong expectations – for instance, a misjudged English proficiency of the foreign guest or, more importantly, an unexpected strongly opposing viewpoint among any of the guests. Whereas the series continued for more than 10 episodes, there were no official records for a third 'season'. The approval for more than the proposed second set of 10 episodes for *Prospects of Mankind* remains undisclosed to date, even though the producers, Mrs. Roosevelt and their old facilitator in need – Mr. Bennett H. Korn – shared clear visions for a continuation of the concept of PoM after the

WGB-TV General Correspondence, Henry Morgenthau III, 'Miscellaneous Letters'.

²⁰⁴ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 5, Newspapers Clippings and Background Information: miscellaneous, Henry Morgenthau III, 'Eleanor Roosevelt at Brandeis, A Personal Memoir by Henry Morgenthau III', 1963.

²⁰⁵ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 1, Folder 3, Press Release, NET Release, 'Prospects of Mankind (1959)'.

²⁰⁶ Henry Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 7.

²⁰⁷ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 1, Folder 1, Series Proposal, Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Series Proposal 10 episodes 1960'.

²⁰⁸ Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 10-11.

²⁰⁹ Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 30.

27 episodes were produced.²¹⁰ During the summer of 1962 Eleanor Roosevelt had fallen ill and Morgenthau and Korn discussed the possibility of hosting a similar program like *Prospects of Mankind* closer to Eleanor Roosevelt's home in New York, which Korn's broadcasting company was. In his recollections of Eleanor Roosevelt written in 1962, the former colleague and friend of Morgenthau III and admirer of Mrs. Roosevelt elaborated on his plan to host a show as soon as Mrs. Roosevelt would be recovered. They never had lengthy legal terms and agreements signed, he wrote, he had just sent a simple letter of understanding as that seemed less 'awkward' to him. They had written each other about possible future topics, but unfortunately Eleanor Roosevelt never recovered from her unexpected illness, that caused her death a few months later. Therewith the end of PoM (or the continuation of the concept under a different name with Mr. Korn) came more abruptly than the television stations wanted.²¹¹

The setting

Whenever a show was produced in the studios of Brandeis University, or in its lecture halls to be exact, Eleanor Roosevelt and her guests would be seated on the podium in comfortable stacking chairs displayed in a half circle around a low coffee table and in between the chairs even smaller side tables were placed with glasses of water for the guests on them (See Figure 5).




Figure 5: The setting of *Prospects of Mankind* when it was recorded at Brandeis University with four guests.



Figure 6: The public cheering at the end of the 12th broadcast.

Whereas Fazzi described Eleanor Roosevelt to want the setting of PoM almost as cozy as a living room to comfort all watching audience – at home and in the studio – in order to make them focus on the topics and the content discussed in the program, the scarce shots of the live audience throughout the program did not fit this coziness. The half circle of discussants would be facing a

²¹⁰ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 1, Folder 1, Series Proposal, Henry Morgenthau III, 'General proposals and letters'.

²¹¹ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 5, Folder 2, Miscellaneous, Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Letter Mr Korn'.

cheering audience seated in the rows where normally students would sit. The presence of the live audience, clapping and cheering for Eleanor Roosevelt and her guests, might have been a conscious choice of the producers for it rather emphasized Eleanor Roosevelt's popularity to the people at home (See Figure 6).²¹² The background of the podium was decorated with a map of the world on the projection screen that underscored the topic of PoM: international affairs. The acoustics of the hall were optimal for the discussion to be recorded loud and clear. On this almost living room-like pitched floor, Eleanor was seated on the left – not in the center or middle of the half circle – sustaining her role as host visually and thereby putting visual emphasis on her starring guests. This showed like the adaptation of the name of the show that Eleanor Roosevelt did not feel the need to be in the spotlight, but rather wanted the focus to be put on the ideas, topics and dilemmas the episodes covered. When during the discussion a speaker would direct a question to a(nother) discussant, the camera would record the answer of that discussant completely. But in some instances, where a change of speaker was not announced, the camera would be too late zooming in on the person who took the floor. The host of the show, Eleanor Roosevelt, was filmed in the same manner as her guests, but by seating in the corner of the half circle, next to one of the cameras, she would not be central in any shot apart from her usual opening and closing statements. When welcoming and thanking the audience she would look right into the camera close-up which brought her closer to the viewers at home, and gave her the opportunity to directly speak to her audience.

Some episodes were recorded outside of Brandeis' studios. Instances of this include the special episode to the Congo (filmed at the UN headquarters in New York as will be elaborated upon in chapter 4) in the second season of PoM and episode 6 of the first season, which turned out to be broadcasted at WNEW-TV in New York.²¹³ Due to an accident in New York the week before the production of this particular episode, which had made it impossible for Eleanor Roosevelt to travel to the studio of Brandeis University, she relied on Mr. Bennett H. Korn, owner of WNEW-TV and a friend and former colleague of Morgenthau III for making possible that the show would go on.²¹⁴ He lent one of his studios for the production of the PoM episode of April 1960, and in the series' later years agreed on doing that more regularly.²¹⁵ In a thank you letter to Mr. Korn in April 1960, who by making his facilities available had made the impossible possible according to the former first lady, Eleanor Roosevelt explained that broadcasting this series in New York and Washington was particularly important as these two cities were in her view 'the chief two centers in terms of government and international affairs.' She continued writing that received letters from people in positions of leadership and a great many from interested citizens in these two key areas have

²¹² Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 6, 7.

²¹³ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 1, Folder 10, WGB-TV General Correspondence, Henry Morgenthau III, 'Miscellaneous Letters'.

²¹⁴ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 5, Folder 2, Miscellaneous, Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Letter Mr Korn'.

²¹⁵ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 1, Folder 10, WGB-TV General Correspondence, Henry Morgenthau III, 'Miscellaneous Letters'.

encouraged her to believe that she and the entire crew of PoM had in some measure been achieving their goal.²¹⁶

The Goal

The goal of *Prospects of Mankind* was for Eleanor Roosevelt to educate the young and politically involved on topics of domestic and foreign affairs.²¹⁷ In this educational program, she wished to get the skeptic home front in line with the solutions she proposed to foreign crises, particularly when she saw the United Nations as the vehicle to overcome a problem.²¹⁸ The period in which Eleanor Roosevelt was making these pragmatic broadcasts, was a time of a UN-weary U.S. and as she put it in one of the episodes, PoM was meant to promote ideas in the United States.²¹⁹ She had dedicated her time to making the UN more popular among the U.S. citizens of her time, and at the same time aimed these writings, broadcasts and speeches as sources for historians.²²⁰ It had been clear from the start that the show had to cover American Affairs, and even though this was at first a domestic focus, Eleanor Roosevelt's steady internationalism would have the final say. As Human Rights activist and wholehearted United Nations supporter, most of the episodes had been devoted to the international organization and the promotions of peace. For Morgenthau the goal of PoM was to film Eleanor Roosevelt's ideas and interests, which explains why she had the freedom to design and shape the program to her liking.²²¹

In an oral interview with Henry Morgenthau III himself in 1978, Morgenthau explained the nature of the series generously, in which he left behind the motivating factors for him to ask Eleanor Roosevelt to host PoM. First of all it was the aim of Morgenthau to create an authentic expression of Eleanor Roosevelt, her thoughts and concerns, on screen as by the time of PoM Eleanor Roosevelt 'was pretty fixed by that time in the kind of ideas she had and what she knew and didn't know.'²²² Henry Morgenthau III asked Eleanor Roosevelt knowing that she was chairing at the American Association of the United Nations and would be very interested in hosting (internationalist) political conversations on American television.²²³ Also, he recognized that Eleanor Roosevelt would perform best when speaking to the public without constraints, in which she could come across more candid, making it easier for the audience to relate to her. Therefore, Morgenthau III strived to let her be

²¹⁶ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 5, Folder 2, Miscellaneous, Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Letter Mr Korn'.

²¹⁷ This target audience was not exclusively the young: as one can see in the shots of the audience in the studio, it included also old citizens of society. This fits her quote in the early draft of the article 'Television's contribution to the Senior Citizen': no matter what one's age [was] one can develop new interests, and TV will help older people develop these interests; FDR Library New York, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Part II (1884-1962), Box 1423, Folder 15, Eleanor Roosevelt, 'What Television offers Senior Citizens (1959)', and Henry Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 8-9.

²¹⁸ Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 8-9.

²¹⁹ RSC, *Prospects of Mankind* Digital DVD Collection, 'Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt: *Prospects of Mankind* 'What Hopes for Disarmament' (November 1959)'.

²²⁰ FDR Library, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Part III, Box 1606, Folder 6, 'Henry Morgenthau and Family', Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Letter to Henry Morgenthau', 1958.

²²¹ Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 30.

²²² Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 12, adding that this was the last three years of her life.

²²³ Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 8.

completely herself throughout the program.²²⁴ Roosevelt and Morgenthau had known each other years before the production. Having been a radio pioneer in her time, Eleanor Roosevelt helped her son Elliott making a career as producer of radio shows in which Henry Morgenthau III co-assisted as producer.²²⁵ When in the late fifties the idea of the series *Prospects of Mankind* came up, which was to be produced by Henry Morgenthau III, Eleanor Roosevelt was not completely new to working together with the son of her good friends Henry and Elinor: Henry Morgenthau III.²²⁶ He had asked Eleanor Roosevelt to host this program – explicitly without Elliott Roosevelt however.²²⁷ In his cooperation with the son of Eleanor Roosevelt, Morgenthau had the feeling he was using her for her fame more.²²⁸ Because of his admiration for Eleanor Roosevelt, Morgenthau wanted the program to really express her interests, so for the very first draft of the *Mrs. Roosevelt Diamond Jubilee Series* he had proposed she would be given the opportunity to draft all episodes together with him and Diana Michaelis, who was the less known co-producer and writer of PoM.²²⁹

Prior to shooting

In those days TV was not ‘live’: this means that the episode would be filmed before it was broadcasted by the station. However, Eleanor Roosevelt and her guests would only have one take per episode.²³⁰ Before shooting, it was therefore important that all producers, guests and crew would be on the same page as to how the episode should come about. PoM was recorded at Brandeis University, distributed to various stations in the U.S. and appeared monthly from 1959 onwards on the screens. The same PoM episodes would be broadcasted more than once, and even months after Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau III had produced it, a letter of a friend or fan would occasionally reach them.²³¹

In the stage prior to hosting the discussion, Eleanor Roosevelt played an important role too.²³² Whereas the remark of Dario Fazzi is true that Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau III came up with the topics of each episode and discussed the guests that would promise an interesting insight for their programs, Henry Morgenthau III explained in his interview in 1978 that there was a third person who would initiate and negotiate with Morgenthau and Roosevelt on the making of each episode: writer and co-producer Diana Tead Michaelis.²³³ During the drafting of the season proposals, all three would for the most part discuss the guests, topics and questions of each episode Eleanor Roosevelt

²²⁴ Morgenthau III, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 1 & 30.

²²⁵ Luscombe, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt as “expert” on radio, 1-9.

²²⁶ Morgenthau III, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 69.

²²⁷ Morgenthau III, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’ 3-5.

²²⁸ Morgenthau III, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’ 4 and 31.

²²⁹ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 1, Folder 9, PoM Proposals Schedules, Henry Morgenthau III, ‘The Eleanor Roosevelt Diamond Jubilee Series: August 1959’, 1959-1960.

²³⁰ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 5, Newspapers Clippings and Background Information: miscellaneous, Henry Morgenthau III, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt at Brandeis, A Personal Memoir by Henry Morgenthau III’, 1963.

²³¹ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 5, Folder 10: Publicity, Henry Morgenthau III, ‘General correspondence and letters’.

²³² Henry Morgenthau III, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 8-12.

²³³ Henry Morgenthau III, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 14.

thought would be good for a program, and Michaellis and Morgenthau would then make notes on the people she thought the program should have, and the subjects she wanted to talk about. They almost always came up with a number of ideas to pick from.²³⁴ After this long meeting, Michaellis would invite the guests.²³⁵ Then a little before each program would be filmed, Morgenthau and Michaellis would brief Eleanor Roosevelt in her New York department and Paul Noble would join to work with Mrs. Roosevelt on the style and pacing of her performance.²³⁶ If something really major had happened with regard to national or international affairs, in the month before a certain broadcast an episode would be adjusted – or if it involved a completely different topic, moved to a later time. This happened one time when President Kennedy expressed the wish to appear in PoM. In Michaellis' and Morgenthau's view this guest would be a good opportunity for Eleanor Roosevelt to reach a broader audience.²³⁷ Michaellis was the originator of the idea to invite newly elected President Kennedy for the show of March 1961, even though she and Morgenthau both knew that Eleanor Roosevelt was not friends with President Kennedy – in contrast to the claim in the Eleanor Roosevelt Encyclopedia of 2001, which claims Eleanor Roosevelt hosted *her friend* Kennedy in PoM.²³⁸ As Morgenthau recalled in his interview, when it involved her relationship with Kennedy '[t]here were some basic things she found contrary to her political beliefs.'²³⁹

Kennedy would announce a scoop on the topic of the Peace Corps, and even though Morgenthau knew Eleanor Roosevelt 'couldn't care less,' he assured Kennedy that she would really like him to be one of her guests.²⁴⁰ Morgenthau used the knowledge that President Kennedy wanted her approval as the reason to let this episode go on even when Kennedy wanted to call of the episode to announce the scoop at another station.²⁴¹ In an interview with Morgenthau in 1978, he recalled the reason for Mrs. Roosevelt not to like Kennedy, had to do with her personal favor for her friend Adlai Stevenson, who she had rather seen becoming the U.S. President – even though Stevenson at that presidential election choose not to run.²⁴² She eventually agreed to doing the program, as she realized why it was someone like Kennedy who would want her support.²⁴³ This episode with President Kennedy was received by the audience as a way of appeasement between the politically diverging President and former First Lady.²⁴⁴ A funny finding however, that proves Eleanor Roosevelt still had her way overrule, was the letter of Morgenthau that was sent to Adlai Stevenson in February that

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Henry Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 18.

²³⁶ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 5, Newspapers Clippings and Background Information: miscellaneous, Henry Morgenthau III, 'Eleanor Roosevelt at Brandeis, A Personal Memoir by Henry Morgenthau III', 1963.

²³⁷ Henry Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 18. Also, there was a mix up in dates and times in Henry Morgenthau III, 'Overview of Programs 1960-1962', for the episode of Kennedy was not present in this document yet. FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 1, Folder 2, Program List.

²³⁸ Beasley, *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 511.

²³⁹ Henry Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 17.

²⁴⁰ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 5, Newspapers Clippings and Background Information: miscellaneous, Henry Morgenthau III, 'Eleanor Roosevelt at Brandeis, A Personal Memoir by Henry Morgenthau III', 1963.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Henry Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 17.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Henry Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 22-23 and 30.

year.²⁴⁵ Stevenson had appeared in PoM almost a year earlier and had not enjoyed doing this program, and in this personal letter of Morgenthau to Stevenson, Morgenthau apologized for this episode and invites him to doing an episode with Mrs. Roosevelt in April 1961, one episode after Kennedy's. It seems to point towards another reason why Eleanor Roosevelt agreed to having Kennedy in PoM, especially when both Kennedy and Stevenson star in a one-on-one introductory interview with Mrs. Roosevelt these two programs. 'When she felt that people were trying to push her in the direction that she didn't believe in, she was not in any sense a pushover in terms of her basic beliefs or areas where she thought she should lend her support,' Morgenthau recalled in 1978.²⁴⁶ He continued: 'Somewhere inside she must have had a sense of her worth and effectiveness.'²⁴⁷ From this example, one can extract that Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau III would sometimes both give in to each other's wishes for the good of the program, and also that Eleanor Roosevelt was not completely responsible or in charge for the design of each PoM episode.

An hour from beginning until the end

Each episode started with an introduction by narrator Bob Jones, which provided the audience with the needed context and explanations to follow the episode's debate.²⁴⁸ The voice-over would introduce the view or problem Eleanor Roosevelt wanted to broadcast and provided the producers with an opportunity to construct a frame of reference among the audience without interruptions of the guests, that made Eleanor Roosevelt's claims in the rest of the episode sound more logical and objective. While the audience would see the series' logo, Jones would read out the title, the names of the guests. The logo of *Prospects of Mankind* displayed Leonardo Da Vinci's 'Vitruvian Man,' the symbol of mankind that Da Vinci drew in 1490 (See Figure 7). Even though Eleanor Roosevelt nor Henry Morgenthau III explained their reason to use this depiction, the meaning of the Vitruvian Man links to the initial idea to center the attention on *mankind*. Eleanor Roosevelt shared her fascination and hope for humanity through this Da Vinci drawing. The introductory frame of each episode prior to the title of the program depicted, as Figure 7 shows, the name and title of the host: 'Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt'. Visible in Figure 1 is the second frame, which depicted the title of the show. When this frame faded away, the cameras started shooting the stage, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and her guests for the episode.



Figure 7: Photo from *Prospects of Mankind's* introduction preceding the shots of the stage, in which the logo is presented.

²⁴⁵ FDR Library, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 2, Folder 4, Season Correspondence, Henry Morgenthau III, 'Letter to Adlai Stevenson, February 1961'.

²⁴⁶ Henry Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 89.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ See RSC, *Prospects of Mankind* Digital DVD Collection (1959-1962).

After that, he would shortly introduce the topic of the episode and its current stance in the nation or even world, while on screen the audience would see the coinciding imagery. Often this would be a shot outside of the UN headquarters, in which the flags of all united nations wavered in front of the building, subtly hinting the audience to see the UN as the vehicle through which the solution for world affairs could come forth. After his introduction, he would present Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and her guests one by one more elaborately, while the audience saw a close-up of them individually. Jones would do this introduction at the beginning of the actual broadcast, as becomes clear when looking at the guests: they are listening to their introduction and respond with flattered facial expressions, or even make a comment that the audience would not be able to hear, for only Jones' voice and background music would be tuned. As soon as Jones had finished this routine, he would say: 'Now, here is Mrs. Roosevelt,' after which one camera would zoom-out, providing an overview of the roundtable and another would follow up with a close-up of Mrs. Roosevelt, even after the introduction of a co-host this start of the show stayed the same. This spotlight on Eleanor Roosevelt made her both the star of the show and the bridge between the introduction and the debate she would always open by proposing the first question. From here, the episode did not have a set-agenda on who would talk or for how long. When the hour had passed, the camera would always zoom in on Eleanor Roosevelt again and she would provide a summary of the discussion, thank her guests and audience, give some remarks on next week's discussion and close off with a French 'Au Revoir'. The audience would clap and as soon as the camera zoomed out again, narrator Jones would close off by reading out loud the credits that appeared on screen. In the final ten seconds of the episode the audience was made aware of what they personally could do about world affairs – something Jones' voice assured was an often-heard question. They could for a list of agencies concerned with individual participation in international issues write to Intercom: 345 East 46 Street, New York 17, New York. This addition at the end vouches for Eleanor Roosevelt's *a little less conversation a little more action please*-attitude towards the show; despite it being a talk show, she would consider it a success only if her audience was compelled to actively do something after watching the program.²⁴⁹ The date of recording and the producer of the show would then be mentioned, and finally the narrator himself: Bob Jones.

2.2 The United Nations in *Prospects of Mankind*

The nature of the television series *Prospects of Mankind* has been explored through primary sources that explained the aim of the program, like the interview with its producer Morgenthau held in 1978 but also through archival pieces from the time of PoM in the 1960's such as proposals, articles, and correspondence on the series. In this paragraph particular episodes that cover the United Nations (and that have not yet been analyzed) will be selected to further answer the questions of this thesis. Already in the operationalization in chapter 1, it was clear that this paragraph would not include the

²⁴⁹ Black, *Courage in a dangerous world*, quote under sixth picture in between page 174 and 175.

two episodes Dario Fazzi analyzed for his study, episode 2 ‘What Hopes for Disarmament’ and episode 13 ‘The Scientist and World Politics.’²⁵⁰ Even though Fazzi explained in his draft book that PoM planned 29 roundtables, it turned out that there were only 27 episodes in total.²⁵¹ In Appendix C. a list of all episodes has been provided in which all episodes that cover the UN (to an extent) have been checked. It turned out that 14 of the 27 included the United Nations. Three of these particularly had the UN as its topic and mentioned the UN its title: episode 12 ‘The Changing Shape of the United Nations’, episode 16 ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations’ and episode 20 ‘United Nations: Future Endangered’. All three episodes will be analyzed, but the nr. 16 on the Congo has been selected for the case study in Part II of this thesis and will therefore not be mentioned in this paragraph. The original aim was to select three to five episodes. With the two episodes mentioning the UN in their title, at least one other episode should be added to the selection. To select this third episode from the remaining episodes that include the UN, the additional criteria as mentioned in chapter 1 were used. Therefore the episodes that were not selected were the ones on specific countries other than the Congo or the episodes on continents, cities and the American image abroad. Also, as the aim was to have a spread selection of episodes, it will be a must to pick an episode from the first season, as the selected two for this part are each outside of this season. Still, the choice fell on episode 1, ‘New Possibilities for Coexistence’, episode 3, ‘Foreign Aid and Economic Policy’ or episode 9, ‘The Future of Democracy Abroad’, for which the last criterion was consulted: ‘to identify an episode with a reasonable chance in which Eleanor Roosevelt’s views come about also the episodes with titles and descriptions hinting towards Four Freedoms, Democracy, Human Rights or Pacifism will be possible for selection.’²⁵² The third episode to be added to the selection for analysis was ‘The Future of Democracy Abroad’, for it linked to the criterion the closest. The analyses of these three episodes provided enough material to come to a general understanding of the series and Eleanor Roosevelt’s therein-presented views on the United Nations. Therefore it was not necessary to add a fourth or fifth episode to the selection.

The following paragraph will in chronological order discuss the content of the selected PoM episodes by answering the same set of questions. These questions combined should explain what views Eleanor Roosevelt (via her guests possibly) presented in the hour-long televised discussion series *Prospects of Mankind* on the United Nations and how she chose to present her views in this particular medium and format. For each episode the questions are: who were the guests, what was the topic and what were the questions? What messages did Eleanor Roosevelt convey with regard to the United Nations? Eleanor Roosevelt’s views become apparent when a closer look is taken at the remarks and questions she used as well as on her timing during the discussion. In this light, also non-textually the episodes will be analyzed, wondering how did Eleanor Roosevelt act? When did she feel the need to interrupt a guest? And when did she clearly show to agree and support a statement by one

²⁵⁰ See Appendix B.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² See 1.2 Operationalization in chapter 1.

of her guests? Analyzing her reaction might give clues that a textual analysis might not uncover. It is in answering all these questions, that her views on the UN might become visible: the answers will provide a description of the narrative layer (what she said about the UN) and the visual layer (how she (re)acted).²⁵³ These two can in combination lead to the ideological layer in order to explain how Eleanor Roosevelt presented her ideals or views on the UN in the episodes.

The Future of Democracy Abroad – June 1960

‘The Future of Democracy Abroad,’ the ninth and therewith the last episode of the first season, examined factors that assailed the long-term spread and survival of democracy in the West and the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and their implications for U.S. policy.²⁵⁴ The episode’s introduction explained the audience the basic conditions of a democracy that secures freedom for individual citizens. The relevance of the topic was explained by pointing at the difficult implementation of democracy in underdeveloped post-colonial states. Especially the need for free education for all is stressed by the voice-over during the introduction. Not one critical note on democracy or its boundaries was broadcasted and throughout the introduction *democracy* and *American Democracy* are used as synonyms indicating the producers wanted the show to discuss how the American understanding of democracy should be successfully implemented around the world, instead of whether the American system would be beneficial for all countries.

The program marked one of Adlai Stevenson’s – two times democratic nominee for the U.S. Presidential Elections – rare appearances on television to that point. The other guests for this episode were: Dr. Mohammed Hatta, former Prime Minister and former Vice President of Indonesia and Hatta’s interpreter a little behind him; Henry Kissinger, Associate Director of Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs and author of the bestseller *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* and Saville Davis, Managing Editor of the Christian Science Monitor. With Stevenson as a U.S. official, Davis as a journalist and Hatta as foreign voice the guests fulfill the original set-up. A fourth guest is added to this concept, being Kissinger. Although an academic guest was not part of the original draft for the series, there were more episodes who starred a scholar, for instance episode 20, ‘United Nations: Future Endangered.’²⁵⁵

Adlai Stevenson and Eleanor Roosevelt were close friends. Stevenson did not particularly like his time on the show, because he felt the limited English proficiency of Hatta hampered his ability to broadcast his views as Hatta consumed a lot of time per statement.²⁵⁶ The next time Stevenson was seen on PoM, it is in a one-on-one introductory interview and not in the plenary discussion (see chapter V for an extensive analysis of this episode).

²⁵³ Vos, *Bewegend verleden*, 15.

²⁵⁴ The content and all quotes from this episode are derived from the DVD: RSC, *Prospects of Mankind* Digital DVD Collection, Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘The future of democracy abroad’, June 1960.

²⁵⁵ See Appendix B.

²⁵⁶ As was both recalled in Henry Morgenthau III, ‘INTERVIEW WITH, 14, and remarked in this episode. Even though Morgenthau III did not mention the title of this specific episode, the similarity of his memory and the analysis of this episode evinced that Morgenthau was talking indeed about this particular episode.

The message of Eleanor Roosevelt in this episode was closely linked to the Four Freedoms, the mission she and her late husband, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, promoted throughout his final years as U.S. President. In the introductory part of the episode freedom of worship was directly mentioned and the descriptions of totalitarian and military regimes expressed the need for freedom of speech and freedom from fear. When Hatta then at the beginning blamed part of the Indonesia's difficulties with implementing *western democracy* on the fact that it was one-sided and focused only on the political without concerning the economical, Mrs. Roosevelt refrained from defending western or American democracy and concluded that Mr. Hatta was talking about freedom from want. This way, within the first ten minutes of the show, all of the four freedoms were mentioned and linked to democracy. Eleanor Roosevelt linked the four freedoms to democracy by identifying them together with the availability of free education as the result of a genuine and successful implementation of democracy.

In this episode Eleanor Roosevelt did not really pose a set of questions to her guests, even though her guests Stevenson and Davis throughout the episode were both steering the conversation in the direction she wanted the discussion to enter. However, miscommunication on the concept of democracy and whether or not its objective or its practical existence were the topic interfered with any debate to arise. Stevenson and Davis were mainly trying to get Hatta on the same level of understanding, without Eleanor Roosevelt interrupting at any moment to take control. In any remark, both Stevenson and Davis received confirming nods of Mrs. Roosevelt. Both of them at some point took the lead by giving their standpoint and coinciding opinions in the form of quite extensive monologues. Eleanor Roosevelt let them, and seemed not to take on her role as host as much as she had done in previous episodes. The way Eleanor Roosevelt nodded to both Stevenson and Davis showed that she was actively following the discussion. Therefore, Eleanor Roosevelt not stepping in – like one would expect a host to do in cases of extensive monologues – cannot be explained by simple daydreaming or a loss of attention. The fact that Stevenson and Davis were both on a same page in opinion and were allowed such speaking time hints towards the idea that Eleanor Roosevelt shared their view on the concept of democracy.

The definition of democracy was hard to grasp, and basically the four freedoms were respected world-round. Where democracy was considered to be a capitalist concept, a variation of soft dictatorship and completely impossible in countries where there was no capital or prosper economic market, according to Hatta, the message that all experts would choose democracy over other forms was in danger. The question of democracy almost drifted to whether the preconditions existed in developing countries, instead of whether or not democracy applied at all, but then Mrs. Roosevelt finally stepped in and stressed that when it came down to the implementation of democracy abroad, it was necessary that the ideal of the concept was strived for, which was, increasing everyone's individual (four) freedom(s). In the developing postcolonial countries the American democracy should be the ideal too. The people in these countries are, however, not educated enough yet, for which an in-between solution should be found in which vigorous yet modest leaders could make free universal

education possible. Expertized personnel of the UN might offer a solution to a lack of educated governors, she added. The democratic ideal that the government should improve the standard of living of the individual people is in the short-run more important and more realistic than an exact mimic of the American political democracy – which required literate voters. Eleanor Roosevelt gave for this the example of India, which welcomed a democratic method successfully, in her view, to come to a standard of living that could ensure universal elementary education for all children, without the country being completely literate: ‘they voted with colored sticks.’ She specifically mentioned the UN as the vehicle to provide the experienced and educated personnel these countries should employ on their staff to bridge the gap towards a well-implemented form of democracy. The message she wished to convey was secured, and well-summarized towards the end, when Adlai Stevenson provided a summary of the passed hour. He, annoyed as he was, stressed that the problem for this discussion was the definition of democracy and especially the understanding of the term abroad. Whereas it would have been an easy bridge to the UN from here, Eleanor Roosevelt did not interrupt Stevenson but thanked him personally for his ‘beautiful conclusion’ and thanked the other guests altogether for their presence. Eleanor Roosevelt, not interrupting Stevenson, shows that she did not use every opportunity to discuss the United Nations.

With respect to the development of *Prospects of Mankind*, by contrasting this episode with later ones, Eleanor Roosevelt has not repeated the presence of Mr. Hatta. In comparison to other episodes Eleanor Roosevelt seems reserved, which could be a default reaction to Hatta, whose faulty English, that could not be solved sufficiently through the presence of his interpreter, and aversion against western capitalism, both did not meet her expectations (See Figure 8). Also, Saville Davis’ performance, who acted almost as if he was the moderator or episode’s guiding voice was noticed. He tried to incorporate Kissinger in the discussion by asking him direct questions, and together with Stevenson tried his best to pose easy questions to Hatta. (T)his journalistic skill was repeated by either Saville Davis himself or William Frye in later episodes (and seasons). At the end of the show, Mrs. Roosevelt thanked her guests and audience and invited them to continue watching the show in fall, when the second season would start. Whereas no clear records were found that this specific episode was the reason for the series to continue with a moderator, it clearly posed an example and argument on the necessity to do so.



Figure 8 This still from the episode shows a close-up of Mr. Hatta and his interpreter who was clarifying the conversation

The Changing shape of the United Nations – November 1960

The episode starts with an interesting introduction by the narrator, that gives insight into the opinions of the producers and of Eleanor Roosevelt.²⁵⁷ He started with the topical notion that in November 1960, the United Nations was confronted with an increasing Asian-African bloc, that did not only cause a change in UN membership, but also in the function of the UN. Dag Hammarskjöld had developed the role of Secretary General to the United Nations into one in which he or she should meet situations which are threatening peace, or are considered aggressive acts. According to the narrator, he acted completely in line with the UN Charter, when in the Suez Crisis (1956), he acted on a GA resolution by hastily improvising and implementing a UN emergency force consisting of a national body of trained people. The force nonviolently kept a cease-fire in order to buy the UN time to resolve the conflict without ongoing violence. And in the next crisis, namely the one of the Congo that had just started a few months before in July 1960, Hammarskjöld would act again in line with the UN Charter, but ‘because the Soviets were not in accord’, their representative Khrushchev ‘bitterly attacked’ the Secretary General at the headquarters in New York, accused him of impartiality and proposed replacing him with a three men board. The majority of UN members supported Hammarskjöld ‘in the face of his attack’, and there was little likelihood that the other UN nations, including the small new nations ‘would let their champion be overthrown’. With respect to the Cold War between the Americans and the Soviets as well as in light of Eleanor Roosevelt’s wholehearted devotion to the United Nations, this introduction to the following discussion on the changing shape of the United Nations is an important side note to understand how Eleanor Roosevelt promoted the UN in PoM. Eleanor Roosevelt was fond of Dag Hammarskjöld and his views on the UN, and that shines through the introductory speech against the Soviets. The mission of the UN was remarked by Jones before he gave word to Mrs. Roosevelt. For this episode, Eleanor invited the four guests: Lawrence Fuchs, Dean of Brandeis University and co-instructor with Eleanor Roosevelt of a course on international organization and law; Raymond Aron, France’s leading political writer and author of a three volume study of war; General Carlos Romulo, Philippines’ Ambassador to the United States, President of the United Nations Fourth General Assembly, former President of the Security Council of 1957, and co-author of the United Nations Charter in 1945 and fourthly Senator Michael Mansfield, probable successor of Lyndon Johnson as Senate Majority Leader and two-time delegate to the United Nations General Assembly.

All these guests seemed at first sight to be the right invites on a discussion in line with the message Eleanor Roosevelt conveyed: The UN as an important and unique vehicle for world peace is slowly but surely growing to its peacekeeping mission. Especially when both Mansfield and Romulo started their arguments in the episode by recalling their previous experience with Eleanor Roosevelt, serving under her in the U.S. delegation to the UN a few years earlier or drafting the UN Charter with

²⁵⁷ The content and all quotes from this episode are derived from: RSC, *Prospects of Mankind* Digital DVD Collection (1959-1962), Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘The changing shape of the United Nations’, November 1960.

her in 1945. She opened with the remark that the UN ‘has suddenly become the most interesting topic of conversations, not only here but also in other countries.’ In her opinion, what happened now and what would happen in the future, was of great importance and therefore it was ‘natural’ that her first question should be directed to Senator Mansfield: ‘What do you think has suddenly made the UN so important to everyone? Is it just Mr. Khrushchev’s coming here or are there other reasons?’ Excited she then comments that ‘we don’t have to explain the United Nations to anyone anymore.’ Up until that point Eleanor Roosevelt had written multiple books to explain the basic mission and function of the UN to the general public, including children’s books and an introduction to the fifteenth annual report in the *United Nations Review* three months prior to this episode.²⁵⁸ As of this episode she felt her hope for an informed public had finally come true. As she had said in 1945, after joining the American Delegation to the UN for the first time: ‘If I can reach only one person with my message about the importance of the United Nations, I feel that my efforts were rewarded and my time not wasted.’²⁵⁹

French sociologist and political writer, Raymond Aron, took a middle stance in the debate. Throughout the episode he tried to convince the other discussants that the Cold War tensions between the U.S. and the USSR affected the UN’s way of operating greatly. For Aron it was harder to believe that the UN, without neutralizing these effects, could be the effective solution for world peace. In first remarks of the episode he immediately sought to bring the Cold War tension to the table by trying to provoke Eleanor Roosevelt to make a comment on Mr. Khrushchev. Ignoring his question, Mrs. Roosevelt changed the topic and just continued with her next question to co-host Fuchs, asking him whether he agreed the UN was growing more and more toward its initial goal of obtaining world peace. Fuchs in turn decided to bring up Aron’s question again suggesting Khrushchev might have felt threatened by the UN’s growing number of member states. He however did not give word to Aron, but let Romulo answer. In favor of the Western bloc, Romulo sustained the beliefs of Roosevelt, Fuchs and Mansfield. Being neither American nor Russian, Aron kept expressing his resentment towards the influence of the two superpowers within the United Nations as an ‘advocate of the devil’ stressing that he just wanted to explain how he saw the world. Not even half-way the show he seems to have become an example of a guest that did not support the message of Eleanor Roosevelt in ways she would have expected when inviting him. Throughout the argument the tension in the studio built, which was visible in the serious expressions on all discussants’ faces (See Figure 9). The main problem of Aron lay in the fact that UN actions were attacked by either the U.S. or western bloc and seen as a favor to the other side or the actions are attacked by the USSR and seen as a favor to the western side. Both Roosevelt and Fuchs were on the tip of their chairs after this comment when Fuchs asked permission to continue the debate on this subject. Not willing to let go of the accusations against her beloved organization Eleanor Roosevelt heartily granted permission: ‘Please, Do!’

²⁵⁸ Eleanor Roosevelt, *The UN: Today and Tomorrow* (1953); *The United Nations: What You Should Know About It* (1955) and ‘The Positive Role of the United Nations in a Split World’, *United Nations Review*, August 31, 1960.

²⁵⁹ Eleanor Roosevelt, *Courage in a dangerous world*, quote under sixth picture in between page 174 and 175.



Figure 9 On the left Eleanor Roosevelt and mediator Fuchs were reacting to Raymond Aron's statement, which he was giving on the right. These stills illustrate how Eleanor Roosevelt and her guests through body language and facial expressions gave clues on their views, without the use of words. Most clear in these stills with regard to body language are the pointing finger of Aron and the active position of Fuchs. With regard to facial expressions, the dissatisfied look on Eleanor Roosevelt makes clear that she did not agree with Aron. The medium shot on the left intentionally displays Eleanor Roosevelt's negative reaction to the argument of Aron, instead of focusing only on Fuchs in a close-up, as was done with Aron. This shows the producers wanted to convey Eleanor Roosevelt's non-verbal reaction to the audience at home.

Eleanor Roosevelt then stepped in to defend the UN: 'But of course the neutral is always attacked by both sides, that is the unfortunate position of the neutral!' Aron disagreed, saying that the UN had so far not been able to take a neutral stand because two-sided attacks over the same issue had not occurred. Aron stood his ground and broke the tension when concluding (t)his view: 'The UN has not been attacked by both, just by one or the other. If they were attacked by both, it would have been fine!' As if they were relieved, the live audience laughed by this remark, giving all the more force to their role as interested spectators who closely follow and enjoy the discussions. Eleanor Roosevelt who regained all seriousness bridged Aron's firm opinion to inform her audience of her point of view: 'How it works out really, the UN takes a position. I don't really know what position the UN *will* take, but as far as I see it, the UN operates entirely under the Charter at the present: it is trying to keep the peace, and trying to do it without violence and to keep violence down to the greatest possible amount,' or in other words: she disagreed with a counter-argument. Fuchs explained that Roosevelt thought that the UN should recapture for itself the image of a revolutionary power, that Mr. Khrushchev wants the forces to look to Moscow for inspiration and that Romulo was suggesting that the UN may develop, through all its employees, supporters and work, a personality or imagery of its own that transcends the Cold War. Eleanor Roosevelt then allowed Fuchs to say that all Khrushchev wants is trouble, and destruction of the UN for when it decides a course on its own with regard to solving issues in the world, without looking to Moscow ['or the U.S.,' Eleanor Roosevelt added] it is a big threat for Mr. Khrushchev.

This led to a whole new discussion on the future of the UN, in which on the one side, Romulo, Fuchs and Mansfield agreed with Mrs. Roosevelt that 'we know what our beliefs are, so we know what to strive for,' and this may end up in possible changes to the charter, if that suits the large increase in member states and therewith more voices who express their desired peaceful future. With

regard to changing the charter, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. would agree that necessary changes have to be implemented. Romulo, co-writer of the charter, started his argument in favor of changes by mentioning that the A-bomb only dropped two months after the Charter was signed. Brandeis Dean, Professor Fuchs, then added that the right to veto is an American addition, that did not make sense with as many members in the UN either, so changing that would be good. Explicitly not in the way of a three men board as Khrushchev would like to see that change, Roosevelt, Fuchs, Romulo and Mansfield agreed. To challenge this viewpoint, Aron forced the response of Senator Mansfield, that if the majority of the UN members would vote, for instance, in favor of *Communist China* becoming a member, that he would agree to it. Mansfield replied that either he would accept it, or leave the UN. In other words, the Soviet Union should also sometimes have to accept a decision, or leave. The hour had nearly passed after all these viewpoints were exchanged, but in the final minutes, as writer of *War and Peace*, Aron mentioned to see limitations to the actions of the UN with the belief that it is better to abstain in certain conflicts than to risk war to be an outcome. On top of that, with regard to disarmament, Aron noted that the men working on the question are not the President or Secretaries of State, but experts and in adding another dozen voices of new member states, it will not improve or make easier the solution for the problem of nuclear arms. These statements, that are clearly not in line with Eleanor Roosevelt's personal beliefs for the possibilities of the UN or the addition of more voices to come to the disarmament and therewith a step closer to world peace, caused arousal by all three other guests and Mrs. Roosevelt. One by one, Mansfield, Romulo and Fuchs gave their final opinion that all counter-argued Aron's say and lastly Eleanor Roosevelt concluded: 'we find the United Nations, with some reservations of Mr. Aron, a useful body.'

United Nations: Future Endangered - November 1961

With the death of Dag Hammarskjöld, second Secretary-General of the United Nations, just six weeks before the shooting of this episode, the message Eleanor Roosevelt wished to convey was loud and clear: What is next? Who will succeed Hammarskjöld who passed away in the midst of reorganization of the Secretariat in order to give equal representation to the Asian and African states?²⁶⁰

Hammarskjöld whom had served in the United Nations since September 1953, died in an airplane crash near the border of the Congo and Zambia while on his way to cease-fire negotiations in the Congo. A week prior to his flight he was informed that the pacifist 'non-combatant' UN forces were fighting Katangese troops of Moïse Tshombe, President of the government of the Province of Katanga in the Congo since Belgian independence. Studies still run anno 2016 on whether the airplane of Hammarskjöld and his 13 travel companions was purposefully being attacked and shot down by Katangese shooters who would have known Hammarskjöld was on board. Of the fourteen men in the

²⁶⁰ The content and all quotes from this episode are derived from: RSC, *Prospects of Mankind* Digital DVD Collection (1959-1962), Eleanor Roosevelt, 'United Nations: Future Endangered', November 1961.

airplane, there was only one heavily injured survivor who had stated little but that “there had been some explosions” in the vehicle.²⁶¹ At the time of her My Day column entry on September 20th as at the point of this episode in November, Eleanor Roosevelt still hoped for explanations on why the world suffered the loss of a man of ‘extraordinary integrity and great unselfishness and personal courage.’²⁶² She added:

‘I hope that from all over the country there will come expressions of sympathy for the great loss which the U.N. has sustained, and also expressions of confidence in the organization and in its power to go on with its work in the interest of peace in the world.’²⁶³

The sincerity with which Eleanor Roosevelt stressed Hammarskjöld’s death not only as a personal suffering, but also as one for the world, had been covered in an extra-long introductory speech by Bob Jones who would normally only introduce the topic and the guests of the roundtable at the beginning of each program. Jones gave an overview of Dag Hammarskjöld’s final contributions to United Nations – not remarkably starting with the sentence: ‘At the United Nations Headquarters last year, Dag Hammarskjöld stressed the United Nations’ unique role in avoiding armed conflict’ and citing his first comment on the Congo Crisis in July 1960. Hammarskjöld, just like Mrs. Roosevelt, understood that the use of the means and methods of the United Nations makes it possible to overcome international conflict, as was in his life time demonstrated in cases such as Suez and Gaza, Lebanon and Jordan, and presumably, Laos and the Congo. Whatever the initiative for the international organization to be founded was, Jones commentated that the vehicle might be useful in overcoming power bloc differences too, and that this was a belief that for the most part was leading Hammarskjöld’s decisions for the course of the United Nations as a whole as for specific missions. He wished to ‘eliminate a so-called political, economic and social or military vacuum.’²⁶⁴ In the last few years the United Nations had been gaining in its power effectively: ‘No longer a simple forum of international debate, it was on its way to becoming a dynamic instrument of government.’²⁶⁵

The extensive introduction gave insight into the hopes of Dag Hammarskjöld for the United Nations and into the problem that his death posed to the present and the future of the organization – leaving the organization with a division of ideologies, specifically when it regarded the support of ONUC, the United Nations Congo Operation. In the former few weeks there had already been quite some debate among students, let alone politicians, as to how to elect a new Secretary-General.²⁶⁶ The program continued with the introduction of the guests, who dared to debate on the future of the United

²⁶¹ My Day, September 20, 1961.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Introduction of *United Nations: Future Endangered*, November 1961.

²⁶⁵ Introduction of *United Nations: Future Endangered*, November 1961.

²⁶⁶ My Day, September 22, 1961.

Nations on American Television and under the watchful eye of Mrs. Roosevelt. In order of occurrence they were Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and at that time in charge of the United Nations Affairs, C.S. Jha, Indian Ambassador to the United Nations, Stanley Hoffman, Professor of Government at Harvard University and lastly, William Frye, United Nations correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor about who – as a side note – for the first time in PoM was mentioned to have had published a lot on the topic of disarmament and might therefore have been a recurring guest in the program. As a colleague of Saville Davis at the Christian Science Monitor, it might very well have been that William Frye's presence was tipped by the PoM's mediator to balance an anti-arms voice in those programs that dealt with UN troops.

At first sight the title of this episode conveys concerns about the future of the UN. A closer look at the exact formulation – United Nations: Future Endangered – however, makes this less obvious. The colon ':' following United Nations makes it possible to question whether the title (and thus Eleanor Roosevelt) mentions the future of the UN or an endangered future in general and the role of the UN therein. The words that Mrs. Roosevelt chose to open the conversation with: 'We are here today to discuss the United Nations; its present and its future' seem to be far less alarming than the episode's title. Taking the entire episode in account it will become clear from this paragraph that both aspects of the title are present within the show. Not even one concern was mentioned before she asked her first question to one of her guests, Harlan Cleveland: '...what your feeling is about the *role* of the Secretary General?' This question shows that Eleanor was focused on actions the UN and its member states should take. Although speculations on *who* would be the successor of Dag Hammarskjöld might have been an interesting start for the conversation with her guests, Eleanor chose to prioritize the interpretation of the role of the Secretary General of the UN and thus *how* Dag Hammarskjöld should be succeeded. The first debate informed the viewers on the question whether the Secretary General had executive power or if he was merely executing the decisions made in the UN Security Council and General Assembly. Ambassador Jha concluded this part of the discussion with the remark that the Secretary General should find the balance between the two. He then steers the conversation into another direction: the conversation according to Jha should not be about what the UN should do, but what it can do. Mrs. Roosevelt then gave her view on the role of the Secretary General of the United Nations thereby answering her own opening question. The Secretary General has the ability to send people to countries and the presence of the UN in a country would function as a 'safeguard' there and would be perceived as the 'world's eye' in the country, which in turn would be a 'restraining influence.' For Eleanor Roosevelt it was very important that the new Secretary General would keep in mind the mission of the international organization. She explained: 'He [SG] does have an obligation to try to keep as peaceful a world as possible and at times that might be in his mind.'

The third time Eleanor Roosevelt spoke she directly interrupted Jha. Where in the other episodes, Eleanor Roosevelt would have waited for the guest to have completely finished a sentence, she seemed triggered by the international alarm about recent tests by Khrushchev with heavy nuclear

bombs, and the topic of discussion was at this point drifted to the topic of nuclear weapons. Jha was talking about the need for international obligations concerning the development of nuclear bombs in the form of a treaty. Mrs. Roosevelt sternly interrupted him: ‘wasn’t it an Indian resolution which would have practically made it possible to have no inspection?’ Jha: ‘No, no we have never said that.’ Instead of his respectful and reserved demeanor during the rest of the episode, Jha became very defensive and agitated. Co-host Frye then went on to challenge Jha making this look like a planned attack by Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. Frye who pointed out that India did not make a difference between large or small tests of nuclear bombs. Jha seems to change tactic and responded from a moral and idealistic angle:

‘Now what you are saying is that you should speak more strongly against the Soviet Union than you speak about the United States because there the magnitude of the bomb is different. There it is 50, here it is about 10 or 5. If the thing bad and I think it is bad (although somebody else may differ), if it is morally wrong, if it is bad, what is the use of making a distinction if something is less bad or something is more bad?’

Instead of agreeing to his moral point about nuclear weapons being bad, Eleanor Roosevelt surprisingly defended the U.S. and noted that their nuclear weapon program was ‘less bad’ than that of the USSR, and with a disagreeing facial expression, she stated:

‘Ooo I think there is a slight distinction, because (and one that they have been very unwilling to make!) we have made no tests in the atmosphere; only underground tests. There is a great difference in the effect of that and I think you have to acknowledge that the first tests that were made by mister Khrushchev were not so very large, but certainly the present ones the very large sized ones are then simply to intimidate, because they can’t be as far as I understand it of any military value really.’

Without mentioning world peace or disarmament, Eleanor Roosevelt defended the U.S. interests in this instance. Her reply to ambassador Jha was intended for the American citizens, her intended audience. Jha agreed that there was no justification for the explosions, but he went on to say that even smaller explosions were inexcusable. Jha was now acting in the role Eleanor Roosevelt would usually perform herself, defending the morals of world peace and appealing to the global conscience, where Mrs. Roosevelt was more concerned with national interest. During the conversation professor Hoffman made the same observation and almost took the role of co-host focusing the discussion again on what the UN can do and on situations in which the UN can do something. His warning “otherwise we will get into propaganda debates” can only be a reference to the expressions of Mrs. Roosevelt. Ambassador Cleveland agreed that the most important things to discuss are the things the UN ‘can do,

not the things it can say.’

Ambassador Jha described the situation the UN was in, in a slightly dramatic way: ‘This [nuclear weapon development] is taking humanity into very wrong channels and nations are really losing their perspective. How can we live with all this violence? Really the world doesn’t know the answer!’ It begins to become clear why the episode was entitled *future endangered*. The conversation then moves on to the next topic: Should Red China enter the UN? In this part Mrs. Roosevelt does not contribute to the discussion.

Mrs. Roosevelt’s next and fourth remark was a warning. She provided no room in her show for contemplation on negative scenarios for the future of the UN. She however refers to her experiences in the League of Nations and warned the guests and the audience with a parallel between what ‘wrecked’ the League of Nations and a big challenge to the UN at the time of the episode.

‘We couldn’t get anybody among the big countries to realize that actually they had come into an organization to try to bring about peace in the world. And that in order to do that, you could no longer think only of your own interest. You had to think of your own interest in the context of world interest if you were a great power. Now, are we going to make the same mistake all over again?’

In the view of Mrs. Roosevelt in the League of Nations countries did put too much emphasize on their own interest instead of a worldwide peace ideal. She saw this same problem occur in the daily functioning of the United Nations, which made her suggest in the episode:

‘If we believe, as I think we show that we do believe, that the United Nations has the possibility of being extremely valuable to the world than somehow even the new nations coming in should be in a training school where they would see that thinking of interest as a whole in the world is an important thing.’

Cleveland was quick to nuance this view stating that the United Nations could not be seen as some ‘pure or holy vessel’. Defending the daily practices of bloc voting and vote selling he claimed that the UN was a place for politics. Jha partially agreed with this analysis noting that countries would never be able to completely let go of their own interest. But with Mrs. Roosevelt Jha also speaks out a warning. At the time of the episode Jha saw: ‘a tendency to exploit the United Nations’. When he expressed his optimistic hope that the UN would do better in the future Mrs. Roosevelt’s frowned and (possibly) worried face was won over by her characteristic, enthusiastic smile. Right after this positive future scenario Mrs. Roosevelt concluded the episode by asking professor Hoffman whether he had some final things to say. This indicates that her message for this episode matched the statement of Jha. Although some things must change, the UN machinery stays a vital and valuable organization in the

realization of world peace and international cooperation. Co-host Frye was the one who formulated the conclusion of the episode in which he appeals to the United States audience:

‘It is going to take a great deal of sophistication on part of the United States public to continue supporting an organ which does not always demonstrably forward our concept of our national interest. I do hope though that we will have that sophistication and that confidence, because one of these days the UN is going to see that it must rebuild the kind of structure which mister Dag Hammarskjöld was attempting to build, must recover its momentum and when that day comes, I think again we will have a strong UN. We will be glad we stuck with it through the storm.’

Eleanor Roosevelt thanked her guests for their contribution and concluded: ‘We have seen the dangers and most of us seem to understand them rather clearly. I hope we will avoid them and that really your hope will come true Mr. Frye.’ Making clear in her last episode that was specifically United Nations-related, she had high hopes for this vehicle to promote world peace.

Conclusion

Not bothered by her age Eleanor Roosevelt saw the advantages of the television and described the medium as a new and rising medium that she discovered not only to be exciting and engaging for the young, but also comfortable and accompanying for the senior citizen.²⁶⁷ Her final show was *Prospects of Mankind* which lasted for three years. As the television medium grew bigger nationally and internationally, she noted in PoM’s second-last episode ‘New Vistas for Television’ TV to be another opportunity for future idea and entertainment exchanges.

All in all, the program producers, Morgenthau III and Michaelis provided Eleanor Roosevelt with the space to present her discussions, views and herself the way she wanted (them) to be presented in PoM. At the end of the 27 episodes, PoM had produced a series that included an impressive guest list, including names such as key foreign figures General Romulo, President Hatta, Raymond Aron, press representatives such as Saville Davis and William Frye and finally prominent American men Harlan Cleveland, President Kennedy and Adlai Stevenson. Overall the series would reflect exactly those issues that Eleanor Roosevelt deemed relevant international and domestic affairs for the audience to understand, in which her dedication to the United Nations and steady internationalism shined through the lines of her sentences. Despite some occasions in which Henry Morgenthau III and Diana Michaelis would propose a guest or propose a discussion question she would rather not have broadcasted, Eleanor Roosevelt would have complete say of which guests, which topics and which questions would appear in her monthly hour-long broadcast. Throughout the series’ seasons, episodes were adjusted from experience, meaning introductions could be extended, one-on-one interviews

²⁶⁷ Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Television’s Contribution to the Senior Citizen.’ *TV Guide* (17 October 1959), 6.

could be incorporated and an official mediator could be hired in order to create a suitable atmosphere in which Eleanor Roosevelt and her guests could most comfortably express themselves throughout the televised discussion.

For doing the series, Eleanor Roosevelt had the popularity and the developed journalistic skills to run all episodes without too much preparation. Everything she said and discussed on the program was what was on her mind and what she wished the public to continue thinking about. There were instances in which she would agree to, counter-argue or complement her self-picked guests. Whereas in the beginning of PoM, the political backgrounds of the guests were not screened and it seemed as if she was surprised by the opinions of one or two of them, later the background check was incorporated and a spread of opinions would enhance the possibility to have a lively discussion. Instances that would include comments or guests who dared to question or doubt the UN would be counter-argued with hopeful and positive remarks on the vehicle or its Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld personally. In support of the United Nations and through her leading voice, she dedicated herself to educating the American public on the significance of the UN as the primary engine to international cooperation and peace, even when the international organization again faced challenges with the Cold War, or as will be more closely examined in the following chapters, the Congo.

This chapter's analysis of several individual episodes and the way Eleanor Roosevelt brought her message to the audience brought new insights to her methods of hosting a talk show. Her approach to the role of host allowed multiple tactics. For example, the number of questions Eleanor Roosevelt used to steer the conversation varied between the different episodes. Instead of posing a strong thesis or personal viewpoint to get the discussion going, she would rather ask a broad question hinting to a topic she knew to be important to one of the guests. The conversation that followed would only be interrupted in one of two instances. The one being, when the conversations came across the point Eleanor Roosevelt wanted the audience to grasp. She would then jump in and stress the statement made by one of her guests as a conclusion for the discussion on that topic that was the true or real answer. This way she always had the final saying in a matter and it seemed as if she was not the one who came up with the answer. As an alternative she would sometimes continue with a suggestive question persuading one of the guests to agree to her point of view. The other moment Eleanor Roosevelt would step in was whenever a guest made an argument she did not agree on and there was no sign of other guests opposing it. If possible, her tactic would be to join a counterargument provided by another guest, but if such a reaction was absent she would step in and come up with a counter argument or just changed the subject. This resulted in an uneven division of speaking time among her guests, where guests presenting an idea in line with Eleanor Roosevelt's views would be granted more space to present their arguments. The analyses of Eleanor Roosevelt's behavior on screen to the advantage of the episodes' messages, led to the conclusion that the added value of the medium television would not be recognized when only reading a transcript of an episode. Where a transcript would provide views as specifically narrated in an episode, the audio-visual material shows there are

non-verbal clues in the way Eleanor Roosevelt responded. In the program with Mr. Hatta, Eleanor Roosevelt would for instance interrupt him multiple instances, but that would not have been visible in a transcript as this did not always occur *halfway* his sentence, but right at the end of a sentence. Reading a transcript, an interruption by Eleanor Roosevelt would not be clearly visible, because of the stop at the end of her guest's sentence. Her body language, intonation and quick 'stepping in', however, do indicate she did not want the guest to continue with the point she 'interrupted.' From the way Eleanor Roosevelt handled the discussion, one can conclude that she understood the power and the advantage she had as a host. She skillfully used this power to convey her views in an effective yet subtle way. Eleanor Roosevelt chose her words with care. She claimed to be educating the public through explanations from various viewpoints. After critical analysis of PoM, arguments are found that suggest part of the show was propaganda. The most striking example in this chapter was the defense of U.S. nuclear tests as being less bad than USSR nuclear tests. Among other examples this showed that Eleanor Roosevelt was not only interested in explaining the factual situation, but promoted her view on international events. From the analysis of several episodes, the conclusion that she exploited the medium television to influence her audience in multiple ways is a safe one. Primarily, Eleanor Roosevelt used the televised discussion to spark an enthusiasm among her audience for international relations or U.S. foreign affairs. In the second place, her personal view and opinion on specific matters and topics was presented. Therefore, propaganda is too heavy of a word to attach to her television series, but one should remain watchful for the subtle framing of a message on air. When she agreed or disagreed with a certain guest, this could become clear in her (non-verbal) response or a guest's (limited or extensive) presence during the discussion, which is an important finding to take into account while focusing on a specific episode, or in this thesis, the case study in part II.

Looking forward to the case study on one PoM episode concerning the Congo Crisis, valuable information is won in this chapter leading to the hypothesis that throughout an episode it is indeed possible to extract Eleanor Roosevelt's views. For that particular episode the draft questions and correspondence on the guests and topics provide a valuable resource to check whether watching an episode is a complete or rather specific look on her views on the topic at hand.

Part II:

Case Study on the Congo Situation (1960-1961)




Figure 10: The above figure is a edited from the official CIA report to the U.S. government 'Current Intelligence Weekly Summary' of the 14th of July 1960. In the figure an interpretation of the vast territory and some key events of / challenges to the UN as taken up in this part are depicted. The figure functions solely as an illustration for the reader, not as an argument for the story in the following pages, for which no specific references to the figure or explanation(s) of the figure's content, here, will be provided.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁸ RSC Middelburg, *CIA Research Reports Africa: 1946-1976*, Reel I 0464, 'Current intelligence weekly summary, July 14, 1960'.

Chapter 3

The United Nations and all its members in the Congo Crisis

What happened in the Congo? Why did the crisis break out, who were involved in the conflict and how did the conflict develop? What was the role of the UN in the conflict?

Introduction

At the beginning of the 1960s, the U.S. and the UN faced a challenge to international security coming from the Congo and, along with other meddling parties, the United States and the United Nations interfered in an international conflict: the Congo Crisis. Part II of this thesis contains a case study on the sixteenth episode of *Prospects of Mankind* entitled ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations.’ As Vos explained, for the analysis of a television series, the social (societal) context of the show is one of the separate fields to take into account, which for PoM concerns the historical facts and (geo)political event around the time of an episode.²⁶⁹ To understand the context of this episode, chapter three starts by taking a closer look at the rise of the Congo crisis and follows its development until April 1961, when Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau III produced the episode.²⁷⁰

In the first paragraph, several questions will be addressed, namely: what happened in the Congo? Why did the crisis break out, who were involved in the conflict and how did the conflict develop? And most important for this study: What was the role of the UN in the conflict? While providing this contextual overview and describing relevant (geo)political events that occurred during the Congo Crisis, this chapter will aim to provide an understanding of the viewpoints that led to the actions taken by the United Nations, the U.S., the USSR and Congolese factions. In the second and last paragraph of the chapter, Eleanor Roosevelt’s utterances in the media with regard to the Congo ‘situation’ will be addressed. Since the conflict played a major role on the world stage, Eleanor Roosevelt had followed the developments in the Congo and the UN responses to it. Furthermore, the title of the episode hints to the idea that she saw the crisis as a test for the efficacy of the UN and its ability to maintain international peace and stability. This chapter will research how Eleanor Roosevelt reacted to the news of the crisis in the Congo and what she did believe to be the role of the UN in resolving it. The background information provided in this chapter will lay the foundation for researching Eleanor Roosevelt’s questions, answers and comments in the television episode ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations’. The goal of this chapter is therefore to find out what the U.S., the UN and Eleanor Roosevelt believed to be the problem (and solution) for the Congo Crisis, so that

²⁶⁹ Vos, *Bewegend verleden*, 17-18.

²⁷⁰ See Appendix B.

Eleanor Roosevelt's peace promotions in *Prospects of Mankind* can be compared to her approach as to how she presented the Congo Crisis to her PoM audience.

3.1 Congo-American relations, just a containment move?

Less than two weeks after its official independence from Belgian rule on July 1st 1960, the Congo entered a period of violent turmoil that lasted from 1960 until officially 1965.²⁷¹ The Congo crisis began in the relatively early days of the cold war, and played out on a continent that was little known or understood, which made it particularly challenging to cope with for all parties involved.²⁷² Where the Congolese factions strove to take power following independence, the U.S. and USSR also sought influence in the Congo.²⁷³ Containment politics were not the only motive for the U.S. to want the Congo under their control. Uranium deposits and other local natural resources formed a big incentive to be involved in the conflict.²⁷⁴ The crisis in the Congo would enter the United Nations' arena directly at the initiative of the newly independent Congolese leaders, who sought to exploit the vehicle to their interest. The concern for Congolese independence automatically reached the United Nations indirectly through their members, the U.S. and the USSR, in the Security Council. For the United Nations, a solution in the Congo was needed to keep peace and stability in as well the African country as in the Cold War geopolitical context. The Congo became a landscape in which different political views were played out: In light of (de)colonization, the cold war and economic interests, the Congo, Belgium, the United States, the USSR and the United Nations met and fought each other. The U.S. tried to maintain control over their interests in the Congo via their relations with NATO-ally Belgium.²⁷⁵ The Russian leader Khrushchev had not paid much attention to the Congo until the chaos arose after its independence. The USSR saw Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba as a chance to influence the government and gain access to the Congo.²⁷⁶ To understand why the U.S. and the UN decided to intervene an overview of the historical events prior and during the crisis will be useful.

Explaining the relation between the US, Belgium, and the Congo

In the 1880's, the United States were the first to recognize the international association of the Congo as an independent, sovereign entity. This strengthened the ambition of Belgian king Leopold II to establish what he called the 'Congo Free State.'²⁷⁷ In 1885, during the Berlin Conference, the Belgian king received the approval from other European countries to put the stretch of African land

²⁷¹ Erik M. Davis, 'The United States and the Congo, 1960-1965: containment, minerals and strategic location' Master's dissertation (2013) 18.

²⁷² K. A. Spooner, 'Canada, the Congo Crisis and United Nations Peacekeeping: 1960-1964', Ph.D. Dissertation (2002) 1 & E. Nwaubani, 'Eisenhower, Nkrumah and the Congo Crisis' *Journal of contemporary history* (2001) 605-606.

²⁷³ In the midst of the cold war, the last thing the Americans were out for was a "Hot War", yet their suspicion and fear of the USSR expanding communism, drove them to put in practice their containment politics: Lawrence R. Devlin, *Chief of station, Congo: fighting the Cold War in a hot zone* (New York 2007) xi.

²⁷⁴ Jonathan E. Helmreich, *United States relations with Belgium and the Congo, 1940-1960* (Lodon 1998) 16.

²⁷⁵ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 28.

²⁷⁶ A. Iandolo, 'Imbalance of power: the Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis, 1960-1961' *Journal of cold war studies* (spring 2014) 33 & Devlin, *Chief of station*, 28.

²⁷⁷ Fabian, J. 'Naming colonialism: history and collective memory in the Congo, 1870-1960 (review)' *Africa: the journal of the international African institute* (2010), 510.

under his personal control.²⁷⁸ The land became part of the country Belgium in 1908. The relations between the Congo and the United States have therefore long been defined by the ones between the United States and the small European country. But even Belgium, now in control of the Congo, was also of little interest to the US foreign affairs.

In spite of the fact that the small state of Belgium did not represent an element of great concern for the rising star of the United States in the early twentieth century, right after the First World War the relations between these two countries started changing deeply. Belgium and the United States became closer mostly due to the activities of the Commission for Relief of Belgium (CRB), a U.S. private international organization that provided food and clothing to Belgians during and immediately after the German occupation in the First World War. These actions were significant and created a positive response among the Belgians, described by Helmreich as ‘the embodiment of the generosity and the ‘can-do’ capacity of the American people.’²⁷⁹ Such a benevolent attitude from the Belgian public towards Americans continued in the interwar years and soared during WWII, when Belgian people regarded Franklin D. Roosevelt as the effector of the ‘priceless blessing of their liberty’



Figure 11 The extensive response to the death of president Franklin D. Roosevelt showed American popularity among the Belgian population. The Belgians showed their respect and grief in numerous ways. The poster above was created by Belgian school children and is kept in the FDR library.

(See Figure 11).²⁸⁰ Because of this bond between the two nations, Belgium naturally sided with the U.S. after the Second World War and immediately became part of the military alliance – the NATO – that opposed the Western powers to the Eastern, Communist bloc of states led by the USSR.

The Cold War and its quintessential, direst feature, the nuclear arms race, contributed to reshuffle the relationship between the U.S. and Belgium, mostly due to the fact that the Congo’s natural resources became crucial to the building of atomic weapons. The key ingredient for a nuclear

²⁷⁸ Helmreich, *United States relations with Belgium and the Congo*, 15.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ The archives of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Historic Site in Hyde Park, New York, to this day, are filled with files from Belgium paying their respects and expressing their grief - sometimes directly to Mrs. Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The late president appeared not only in the news; signatures in a condolence-book, poster-sized memorial obituaries and many photos of the king from Belgium and FDR together, all from Belgium (See Figure 11).

warhead – the exploding part of a nuclear bomb – was indeed uranium.²⁸¹ The Belgian-controlled region deposited the single-largest amount of uranium in the world. Americans knew it and had used Congolese uranium in the production of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs.²⁸² According to the United States the purity of uranium from the Congo was unmatched. Both the quality and the quantity of the Congolese mineral natural sources made its strategic, economic and diplomatic relevance enormous. This made Americans very much concerned about any possible Soviet influence in the Congo and transformed a local crisis into a matter of global concern. From Washington's point of view, indeed, the Congo should be kept out of the hands of the USSR at any cost.²⁸³

The Cold War in the decolonized Third World

With the process of decolonization in Africa in the 1960s, many countries of the so-called third world gained a degree of independence.²⁸⁴ This posed a threat to the United States. Decolonization could indeed open the door to communist influence and interference in huge areas of the world. 'Communism was still seen as an aggressive, vigorous ideology, with continuing support from the Soviet Union but drawing also on indigenous revolutionary groups and idealistic new leaders around the world.'²⁸⁵ The new leaders in post-colonial countries tried to put the east-west conflict to their advantage to accelerate the development of their country. This is what Indian President Indira Gandhi pulled off when the U.S. provided financial aid to his country while the USSR built heavy industry in India.²⁸⁶ More leaders of developing countries, such as Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt and Nkrumah of Ghana saw this opportunity and they found each other in the non-aligned movement, that shared a vision of anti-imperialism and disarmament.²⁸⁷ These leaders sought not to pick a side in the Cold War conflict and tried to stay free from capitalist or communist tags while they joined their efforts and expanded trade through economic cooperation.²⁸⁸

The Congo's involvement in the Cold War dynamics was unique in two respects. First, the Congo crisis in the early 1960s took part relatively early in the Cold War compared to the involvement of other African countries. Second, seen from the American perspective the strategic relevance of the Congo was not at all met by the level of knowledge about the country.²⁸⁹ Prior to the 1960s the United States got their intelligence about an African country from the local colonial power. The U.S. also held this European country accountable for the prevention of Soviet infiltration or influence in the region.²⁹⁰ Large-scale decolonization, however, put Washington in a difficult position. When Belgium quite abruptly granted independence to the Congo, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

²⁸¹ Helmreich, *United States relations with Belgium and the Congo*, 16.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Davis 'The United States and the Congo, 1960-1965', 4.

²⁸⁴ Richard N. Cooper, *The Cambridge history of the Cold War: volume II crises and détente* (Cooper 2010) 259.

²⁸⁵ Cooper, *The Cambridge history of the Cold War*, 45-46.

²⁸⁶ Robert Woode, *Third World to First World - by one touch: economic repercussions of the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah* (USA 2011) 29.

²⁸⁷ Cooper, *The Cambridge history of the Cold War*, 258.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 270.

²⁹⁰ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 28.

had to hastily set up a network of agents to get grip on the situation and to acquire the needed knowledge and understanding about the area.²⁹¹ The agents would also track the movements of powerful faction leaders among the Congolese. Already in August 1960 the weekly CIA report from the Congo to the U.S. administration mentioned the potentially threatening *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) leader Lumumba. The report warned that if Lumumba would take power he would find support from not only the MNC, but also from the African countries and the USSR.²⁹²

Congolese Independence

Under Belgian colonial rule the tensions in the Congo kept rising prior to the country gaining independence. Patrice Lumumba, soon to be the first Prime Minister of the independent Congo, founded the Congolese National Movement (*Mouvement National Congolais*, or MNC) in October 1958, setting up a nationwide political party striving for unification of all Congolese regardless of their ethnicity.²⁹³ In a CIA report of February 1960, it turned out that the numbers of people supporting this movement exceeded 200.000, and the U.S. followed Lumumba's steps towards a planned economy for the Congo with the Congolese government.²⁹⁴ The Belgian rulers closely followed his activity and despite the nature of his goals — national unity within the Congo and the development of the African continent – he was labeled a militant nationalist.²⁹⁵ Riots in the Congo made the Belgian government search for ways to get the situation under control.

Belgium had no experience dealing with nationalist movements. Unlike Britain or France the Belgians did not have centuries of colonial history behind them. Repression seemed to worsen the riots and the Belgian government started to think about an independent Congo.²⁹⁶ However, granting independence would not be easy or without terms. The political phenomenon of decolonization implicates that the colonizers hand over their colony voluntarily, but in most instances this 'voluntary' act would have been enforced by circumstances and local and international pressure on the colonizer. In order to prevent disgrace of the former colonizer, the country gaining independence was not allowed, to be seen as a victor.²⁹⁷ There are at least two conditions to making the process of independence tolerable for the image of the colonizer instead of a humiliating rupture. First, Belgium had to make sure that in the post-independence period a special relationship with the Congo would still exist. This would prove that the country was completely civilized and ready to be a full-grown

²⁹¹ In his book, Devlin comments about the difficulty in understanding the country: 'In more settled places, identifying and attempting to recruit the oppositions intelligence officers usually occupies much of a station chief's time and energies. But, in the Congo the first priority was to single out the key Congolese players and get a handle on the political situation that, like desert sand, was constantly shifting under our feet'. Devlin, *Chief of station*, 24.

²⁹² RSC Middelburg, *CIA Research Reports Africa: 1946-1976*, Reel I 0464, non-digitized collection, 'Current intelligence weekly summary, August 18, 1960'.

²⁹³ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 25.

²⁹⁴ RSC Middelburg, *CIA Research Reports Africa: 1946-1976*, Reel I 0419, non-digitized collection, '1960 information report – views of Albert Deconinck on election propaganda and economic aid for the Congo, February 12, 1960'.

²⁹⁵ Frank R. Villafaña, *Cold War in the Congo: the confrontation of Cuban military forces, 1960-1967* (New Brunswick 2009) 18.

²⁹⁶ Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: decolonisation and independence* (London 1965) 35.

²⁹⁷ Young, *Politics in the Congo*, 35.

partner of Belgium. Second, Belgium would require the Congo to have functional political institutions that were in line and consistent with the political values of Belgium and its allies.²⁹⁸

In December 1958, the Belgian approach started to take form. The government developed a plan, which should have led to independence in a five-year timespan. The first step of this plan would be to hold elections in the Congo one year later, in December 1959. On that year, the Belgian King Baudouin announced his willingness to *consider* Congolese independence, for the first time.²⁹⁹ The MNC led by Lumumba did not appreciate this gesture. Convinced that these elections would be a sham, organized only to install puppets before independence, a boycott of the elections was announced. The Belgian rulers answered this rebellion with repression, but as the restraints became more severe, so became the riots and the violence in the country.³⁰⁰ Feeling the urgency and need for a solution, a conference was set up in Brussels to discuss the future of the Belgian Congo in-depth and in specifics. Representatives of the Congolese political class and chiefs and Belgian political and business leaders all attended the two parts (January 20-February 20 and April 26-May 16) of the meeting. Partaking in the Congolese delegation were both Joseph Kasavubu and Patrice Lumumba. During the Round Table Conference of Brussels - or the Congolese Round Table Conference - in 1960 the date was set for Congolese independence: the 30th of June 1960.³⁰¹ The American CIA reported that during the conference in Brussels, Deconinck remarked that 'before its conclusion, the Congolese delegates will demand and receive control of Congo defense, justice and foreign affairs.'³⁰²

Independence for the Congolese followed, but the transition went not in any way smooth. On the 30th of June 1960, Patrice Lumumba held a short (unannounced) political speech at the *Ceremony of the Proclamation of the Congo's Independence*, a special event to celebrate the harmonious end of Belgian rule in the Congo. The speech, however, was to a large extent a reaction to the earlier address of King Baudouin of Belgium, in which it was argued that the Congolese Independence - and therewith the end of colonial rule - was a culmination of the civilizing mission that King Leopold II begun already in the years of the Congo Free State. In his speech, Lumumba, the future Prime Minister of the African country, reacted agitated and marked apart from independence of the Congo, also an attack on colonialism.³⁰³ The relationship between Belgium and the Congo was tense, but only worsened after the remarks of Belgium military leader Émile Janssens, who stated that since Belgium troops would stay in the Congo the situation before the declaration of independence would equal the situation after independence.³⁰⁴

Again riots broke out in the Congo when the Congolese realized that their ideal for independence - without Belgian troops present - was not in line with the Belgian vision. Besides

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Mark Edwards, 'The United Nations in the Congo: success or failure?' Thesis submitted for Deans' and Chancellor's Undergraduate Award (Santa Cruz 2009) 46.

³⁰⁰ Villafaña, *Cold War in the Congo*, 18.

³⁰¹ Davis, 'The United States and the Congo', 16.

³⁰² RSC Middelburg, *CIA Research Reports Africa: 1946-1976*, Reel I 0419, non-digitized collection, '1960 information report - views of Albert Deconinck on election propaganda and economic aid for the Congo, February 12, 1960'.

³⁰³ Spooner, 'Canada, the Congo Crisis and United Nations peacekeeping', 30-31.

³⁰⁴ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 8.

oppositions against the remaining Belgian troops, the Congolese unity was lost and multiple factions took-up arms against each other over local or national power.³⁰⁵ Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu flew around the country trying to restore the order internally and to calm down the Congolese people.³⁰⁶ Only five days after independence, the Belgians and Congolese came into conflict in clash of views on the presence of Belgian troops. Congolese troops revolted against the Belgian soldiers who were still in the country. However, from the Belgian perspective, this presence was legitimized by the outcome of the Round Table Conference. In Brussels, it was agreed that Belgian troops were allowed to stay in the Congo until the local forces were trained enough to be able to replace them. In less than two weeks following independence, the entire country was in a state of chaos. The situation was not only confusing and chaotic for the Belgian leaders and the people living in the Congo, but also neighboring countries, the U.S. and the USSR closely followed the local developments.³⁰⁷

Part of the explosion of chaos following the Congolese independence can be explained by the emotional dimension of the decolonization. The newly gained independence was welcomed by the Congolese people in an atmosphere that combined delirious joy with underlying uncertainty and insecurity.³⁰⁸ Trying to get control over the situation the leaders of the Congolese national army tended to overreact to events taking place. Afraid the situation would further deteriorate they became paranoid of a Soviet invasion. For example, on July 7, 1960, the Congolese army sent 2,000 soldiers to rush to the Leopoldville airport when only one USSR plane landed.³⁰⁹

The Americans and Europeans can easily be accused of being as paranoid as the Congolese. Rumors had it that prior to the independence Soviet troops had been evacuated from Africa via Uganda to be trained in Bloc countries in order to later on invade the Congo.³¹⁰ Although this invasion never happened, the suspicions were not all based on thin air. It is clear that the Soviets tried to increase their influence in the Congo right from the first day of independence. They soon sent funds and advisers to the newly appointed Prime Minister Lumumba. To the American president, John F. Kennedy, this was a serious threat to his interests in the Congo and its natural resources, resulting in countervailing measures on his part.³¹¹

The United Nations and the Congo Crisis

The Congo Crisis did not go by without the involvement of the United Nations. The local UN representative in the Congo was Ralph Bunche who attended the Congolese independence ceremony

³⁰⁵ RSC Middelburg, *CIA Research Reports Africa: 1946-1976*, Reel I 0429-0432, non-digitized collection, 'CIWS: Appeal to the U.N. for aid and denunciations of Belgian intervention, July 14'.

³⁰⁶ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 34.

³⁰⁷ Iandolo, 'Imbalance of power', 32.

³⁰⁸ Young, *Politics in the Congo*, 308.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Cooper, *The Cambridge history of the Cold War*, 46.

and the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the time was Dag Hammarskjöld.³¹² The process of independence and the following crisis were closely followed by the UN personnel and its member states. In 1960, during the crisis, Ralph Bunche was succeeded by Rajeshwar Dayal, who would be invited as one of the guests in the PoM episode on the Congo.³¹³

Being a new nation the initiative at the UN was first taken by Congolese representatives. On the first day of independence, 1 July 1960, PM Lumumba requested admission to the United Nations.³¹⁴ On July the 7th the UN Security Council passed resolution 142 recommending the UN General Assembly to admit the Republic of the Congo to membership in the United Nations.³¹⁵

The conflict between the Congo and Belgium over the remaining Belgian soldiers would lead to the next Congolese request to to UN. In light of the ‘conditions for independence’, PM Lumumba was urged by the Belgians to allow their troops. He, however, refused this with the statement that ‘the Congolese could handle it themselves.’³¹⁶ The Belgians, seeing the state of ‘their’ Congo decided to take action and on the 9th of July it was announced that 1,200 paratroopers would be sent to the Congo to reinforce the 2,500 Belgian soldiers that were still present in the country. This Belgian announcement provoked Lumumba and Kasavubu to ask the United Nations to intervene and restore order. This request to the UN representative Ralph Bunche was, however, not their own idea, but originated with the United States ambassador Clare Timberlake, who in fear of Soviets making use of the chaotic situation, would have liked the Belgian troops to fall under a UN mandate.³¹⁷

The UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld saw the situation in the Congo deteriorating and decided that it ‘posed a threat to international peace and security’, which was crucial, because this allowed the UN to take direct military action under the United Nations Charter as signed in 1945 in San Francisco.³¹⁸ In response to the Congolese request for a UN intervention, the UN Security Council gathered on July 13 and 14. In this meeting — after some brief opposition by the USSR — the 143rd Resolution was passed considering the ‘Congo Question’ as the UN dubbed it.³¹⁹ The Belgian government was asked to withdraw its troops and the Secretary General was authorized to provide assistance to the Congolese government in the form of military force.³²⁰

The next day, July 15, the first UN troops arrived in the Congo. These were Tunisian soldiers who flew to Leopoldville by means of the American air force.³²¹ From details as these, it became clear that the support of the U.S. government enabled the United Nations to intervene in the Congo Crisis. The relation between the UN and the U.S. was not one of complete trust, however, as the CIA had its

³¹² Iandolo, ‘Imbalance of power’, 41.

³¹³ RSC Middelburg, *Prospects of Mankind* Digital DVD Collections, Eleanor Roosevelt, *Congo: Challenge to the United Nations*, April 1961.

³¹⁴ Edwards, ‘The United Nations in the Congo’, 43.

³¹⁵ ‘142 (1960) Resolution of 7 July 1960,’ *United Nations Security Council*: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/142\(1960\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/142(1960)) (26-11-2015).

³¹⁶ Edwards, ‘The United Nations in the Congo’, 7.

³¹⁷ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 35.

³¹⁸ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 36.

³¹⁹ ‘143 (1960) Resolution of 14 July 1960,’ *United Nations Security Council*: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/143\(1960\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/143(1960)) (26-11-2015).

³²⁰ *Ibid.*

³²¹ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 37.

own covert intervention set out in the Congo.³²² Furthermore, Eleanor Roosevelt perceived an unpopularity of the vehicle among the U.S. public, as she literally entitled her speech of 1952 before the Citizens Conference on the International Economic Union in Town Hall, New York City. Eliciting enthusiasm and support of U.S. citizens remained a big item on the agenda of the AAUN, which their popular volunteer Eleanor Roosevelt carried out throughout the nation until her return to the U.S. delegation to the UN in 1961.³²³ The United Nations Operation in the Congo (*Opération des Nations Unies au Congo*, or ONUC) was underway and was, as Hammarskjöld stressed, a neutral force cautious not to become a party in any internal conflict.³²⁴ Within a month 14,500 soldiers originating from ten different countries were stationed in the Congo for ONUC. At its peak there were more than 20,000 men of military personnel and over 2,000 civilians, from more than 30 countries, working in the Congo under ONUC.³²⁵ The Swedish General Carl van Horn, who had prior UN experience in the Middle East, was given the command over the mission in the Congo.³²⁶

Although the UN intervened and thereby followed their request, Kasavubu and Lumumba were not immediately satisfied by its results, since there were still Belgian soldiers in the country. To force the Belgian troops out of the Congo, they used an unconventional measure, further increased the international (i.e. Cold War) tensions: on July 17 an ultimatum was issued by the Congolese stating that they would request a Russian intervention if the Belgians troops had not left the country by midnight on July 19.³²⁷ In line with the non-alignment movement Kasavubu and Lumumba try to use the tension between east and west to their own advantage, but their aggressive method threatening to side with the USSR clearly showed disunity within the Congolese administration. Devlin, chief of the United States CIA station in the Congo, reported a meeting that followed the ultimatum.³²⁸ In this meeting General Roger Gheysen, commanding general of the Belgian forces, sat down with Bunche, who headed the UN operation, ambassador Timberlake from the United States and two Congolese politicians. Bomboko, the Congolese minister of foreign affairs, and Kanza the Congolese ambassador to the United Nations, appeared nearly as shocked by the ultimatum as the Americans and Belgians did. They promised to do whatever they could to get the ultimatum reversed during the next Congolese cabinet meeting. The attendees of the meeting all agreed the ultimatum was ‘unfortunate’, because the Belgian troops could never be withdrawn within two days even if they wanted to.

Although the ultimatum was unrealistic and its demand could not be met, it produced some significant effects nonetheless. On the one hand it put extra pressure on Belgium to leave the Congo, but on the other hand ‘Lumumba’s move backfired.’³²⁹ In response, the Eisenhower administration decided that Lumumba could not be influenced enough and was endangering US interests in the

³²² Ibid.

³²³ FDR Library New York, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Part II (1917-1962), Series 57: United Nations Material, Box 1916, AAUN files, Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Why the United Nations is unpopular and what we can do about it’ November 19, 1952.

³²⁴ Andrej Sitkowski, *UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality* (London 2006) 65.

³²⁵ Sitkowski, *UN Peacekeeping*, 66.

³²⁶ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 37.

³²⁷ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 39.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Ibid.

Congo.³³⁰ Instead of using the east-west conflict to his own benefit, Lumumba saw the Congo crisis turned into a Cold War Conflict. His move became problematic for his relation to the US and made USSR leader Khrushchev more interested in the African country. This further alarmed the United States who wanted the Congo and its valuable sources to stay within their sphere of influence.

On July 22, the UN Security Council again spoke about the situation in the Congo. Drawing on the first report of Hammarskjöld on the ONUC, the Council appreciated the swift set-up of the operation and the willingness of the member states to participate actively in the settlement of the crisis. But during that same meeting the Council also adopted a new resolution, numbered 145 in which:

‘[The Security Council c]alls upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily Security Council resolution 143 (1960) on the withdrawal of its troops and authorizes the secretary general to take all necessary action to this effect.’³³¹

This resolution was followed by a third resolution on the Congo question on August 9 when the Security Council adopted its Resolution 146. Again prompting the Belgian troops to leave the Congo and especially the province of Katanga. The resolution also declared that UN troops were necessary in the province of Katanga.³³²

Internally the Congo conflict was far from being resolved. On September 5 Lumumba was removed from his post, illegally, by President Kasavubu. As an excuse, Kasavubu used a statement from Hammarskjöld, who had said that the massacre at Mbuji-Mayi in East Kasai had the characteristics of a genocide.³³³ What had happened in the region was that Lumumba and his army of the MNC attacked Katanga through South Kasai in late August that year and ‘Lumumba’s reliance on Soviet planes to move his troops into Kasai further alienated him from the West.’³³⁴ Hammarskjöld had noted that the event was a ‘flagrant violation of elementary human rights’, and the UN needed to respond, even though its Charter legally restricted intervention within a state.³³⁵ In fear of a civil war, the successor of Bunche before Dayal, Andrew Cordier, ‘ordered the UN to take control of airports throughout the Congo to prevent the movements of troops.’ Lumumba could not move his troops after this action and the call of Cordier, therewith, seriously compromised the UN’s impartiality.³³⁶ The crisis carried on and from September 17-20, 1960 and the UN General Assembly had to convene for the fourth time in an emergency session.³³⁷

³³⁰ George Wright, *The destruction of a nation: United States’ policy towards Angola since 1945* (London 1996) 27.

³³¹ ‘145 (1960) Resolution of 22 July 1960’, *United Nations Security Council*: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/145\(1960\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/145(1960)) (27-11-2015).

³³² ‘146 (1960) Resolution of 9 August 1960’, *United Nations Security Council*: [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/146\(1960\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/146(1960)) (27-11-2015).

³³³ G. Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila - a people’s history* (New York 2002) 271.

³³⁴ Spooner, ‘Canada, the Congo Crisis and United Nations peacekeeping’, 159.

³³⁵ E. M. Miller, ‘Legal aspects of the U.N. action in the Congo,’ 18, as quoted by Spooner, ‘Canada, the Congo Crisis and United Nations peacekeeping’, 159.

³³⁶ Spooner, ‘Canada, the Congo Crisis and United Nations peacekeeping’, 160.

³³⁷ United Nations ‘Questions relating to the situation in the Congo (leopoldville)’, 52: <http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/docs/congo60.pdf> (05-03-2016).

On the 8th of November the American Presidential Election took place. Due to the ongoing crisis, this event was particularly important for the Congolese politicians. The minister of foreign affairs Bomboko supported Kennedy, as did Dayal. The latter expected that Kennedy would change the strategy of the U.S. in the Congo, more in line with Dayal's own vision, after Kennedy's victory this turned out to be true. The newly elected U.S. president contacted Hammarskjöld, asking him for more information about the situation in the African country and, Hammarskjöld briefed him according to what he had understood from Dayal.³³⁸

In the written version of his political speech on the U.S. policy in Africa, Kennedy's writer, Mr. Averell Harriman and consultant on African Affairs, Winifred Armstrong, gave an overview what he should address to inform his listeners.³³⁹ The people in Africa, and therewith also the Congolese, should foremost 'determine their own direction', as any attempt to do so for them would be 'to deny their dignity.'³⁴⁰ In the new year, Ghanaian President Nkruma and the appointees of President Kennedy, who all determine monitored the situation in the Congo sent Kennedy a letter, explaining their observations that 'there is no turning the clock insofar as Congolese independence is concerned' and that 'this independence must be nurtured and perfected.'³⁴¹

By that time, however, the support for the UN mission started to fall among citizens of the U.S. and some members of the United Nations (See Figure 12).³⁴² On November 14 the Belgian minister of foreign affairs dared to call ONUC a failure. The costly operation did not seem to have met its goals yet and it was not finished. A week later Hammarskjöld announced to the General Assembly and the Security Council that the funds were running low. Without more money the UN peacekeeping force would not be able to stay in the Congo.³⁴³ Things only worsened at the beginning of December, when Lumumba was captured at Lodi. The UN denied him protection, so Lumumba was flown to Leopoldville and held in custody. The support for ONUC further



Figure 12 U.S. newspaper headline on the Congo and the diminishing support amongst UN-member states. FDR Library

³³⁸ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 124-125.

³³⁹ In her *My Day* column on January 18, 1960, Eleanor Roosevelt praised Mr. Harriman for his beautiful speech writing, which becomes a notable connection in the way Eleanor Roosevelt supported Kennedy in his election, despite their fragile relationship: RSC Middelburg, President John F. Kennedy office files 1961-1963, part 5, reel 5, non-digitized collection, 'Countries file: general 1959-1960', John F. Kennedy, 'Political Speech'.

³⁴⁰ RSC Middelburg, President John F. Kennedy office files 1961-1963, part 5, reel 5, non-digitized collection, 'Countries file: general 1959-1960', John F. Kennedy, 'Political Speech'.

³⁴¹ RSC Middelburg, President John F. Kennedy office files 1961-1963, part 5, reel 5, non-digitized collection, Countries file: general 1959-1960, 'Letter from Dr. Nkrumah, President of Ghana and Kennedy's appointees Rusk, Stevenson and Bowles to President Kennedy on February 2, 1961'.

³⁴² In a call for attention on the support of the Congo, William Frye published an article stating the current problems for solving the conflict in the Congo: William Frye, 'UN gropes for Congo policy' *Christian Science Monitor*, March 9, 1961 (note: William Frye is a discussant in the 16th episode of *Prospects of Mankind*).

³⁴³ Edwards, 'The United Nations in the Congo', 43.

diminishing, the first troops were withdrawn from the operation on December 12 by Guinea, Morocco and Malaya.³⁴⁴ The year so ended with apparently no substantial improvement in the political and military situation in Congo and stalemate prevailed.³⁴⁵

Lumumba's assassination

After just 10 weeks in office, outspoken nationalist and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba had been discharged and put in jail. This posed a problem to the United Nations operation when, in January 1961, several African states called for the release of Lumumba, and threatened to withdraw their troops if their demands were not met.³⁴⁶ The United States and Belgium, however, saw Lumumba as a dangerous man because of his alliance with the Soviet Union.³⁴⁷ U.S. President Eisenhower supported the assassination of Lumumba, to make sure he would not come back into power. Later that month the CIA helped assassinate the former Congolese prime minister.³⁴⁸ The agency, however, would repeat the denial of its responsibility in this matter, even though from the CIA papers from August 1960 about Lumumba's possible communist takeover this agency called for 'Lumumba's removal.'³⁴⁹ His death months later, in January 1961, was kept silent until mid-February 1961, and only in May that year did the UN establish the *Commission of Investigation* to ascertain his cause of death.³⁵⁰ The PoM episode on the Congo was filmed between the establishment of this commission and the official announcement of Lumumba's death. Because of the American role in his assassination, it will be interesting to see what Eleanor Roosevelt and her guests said about Lumumba.

On January 17th, 1961, Lumumba was flown to Elisabethville together with two other captives, all of whom were severely beaten on the plane. And once landed, in the evening of the 17th, they were shot by a Belgian fire squad made up of military and police officers – one by one and Lumumba was the last. One of the Belgian policemen was Frans Verscheure, and till date Verscheure's diary entry is the sole source from the moment of Lumumba's death, in which he wrote: '9.43 L. dead.' indicating the exact time of the shots.³⁵¹ This would not have been known by Eleanor Roosevelt because the diary did not come to light until 2001 during a Belgian-Parliamentary Investigations.³⁵² A document approved for release by the CIA in 1980 included a 'memorandum for the record' in which the CIA plotted in November 1960 already the assassination of Lumumba, but by that time it was believed 'poison was to have been the vehicle.'³⁵³

³⁴⁴ Edwards, 'The United Nations in the Congo', 43.

³⁴⁵ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 127.

³⁴⁶ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 130.

³⁴⁷ Devlin, *Chief of station*, 131.

³⁴⁸ Cooper, *The Cambridge history of the Cold War*, 141.

³⁴⁹ Respectively: Gerard & Kucklik, *Death in the Congo*, 193 & RSC Middelburg, *CIA Research Reports Africa: 1946-1976*, Reel I 0449, non-digitized collection, 'CIWS: Lumumba and a possible communist takeover, August 26'.

³⁵⁰ Edwards, 'The United Nations in the Congo', 14.

³⁵¹ Gerard & Kucklik, *Death in the Congo*, 204.

³⁵² Gerard & Kucklik, *Death in the Congo*, 205.

³⁵³ RSC Middelburg, *CIA Research Reports Africa: 1946-1976*, Reel I 0464, non-digitized collection, Memorandum for the record, November 1960'.

After the death of Lumumba, the civil war in the Congo worsened, making the peacekeeping mission for the UN even harder. More and more troops pulled out of the Congo: on March 14 the Soviets proclaimed the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in the Congo *illegal* and refused to pay any check to the UN. Two weeks after that, on March 28, also France stated that they would not support the UN actions in the Congo (financially) any longer. Smaller players in Latin America were unable to pay for their percentages and joined in pulling out their troops from the UN peacekeeping mission. In April 1961 the UN had a total number of 16,689 peacekeepers left for their mission.³⁵⁴

3.2 Eleanor Roosevelt's views on the Congo until April 1961

Out of the fact that Eleanor Roosevelt devoted a whole episode on the Congo Crisis in April 1961 and entitled it 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations', the suggestion arises that in the eyes of the former first lady the crisis posed difficulties to the United Nations and its way of operating in the newly independent country, especially when the former paragraph illustrated the declining numbers of UN peacekeeping troops in the Congo around that time. With the goal to uncover clues on Eleanor Roosevelt's views on the UN and its challenge in the Congo, this paragraph overviews the publicized views of Eleanor Roosevelt and how she presented them in the written contributions from the start of the Congo Crisis until the moment in which the particular PoM episode was shot. From June 1960 until April 1961, Eleanor Roosevelt was not actively involved with the radio anymore, but followed the developments in the Congo closely and informed her public about its crisis mainly via her *My Day* column, her public speeches for the AAUN and some articles for newspapers.³⁵⁵ She directly addressed the United Nations' actions in it and, essentially, gave her views on the Congo 'situation.'³⁵⁶ Eleanor Roosevelt, in her near-to-daily column, discussed both domestic and foreign affairs of her interest. Since she touched upon multiple topics in each entry, it is not surprising she sometimes only mentioned the Congo in only a brief line. The fact that she mentioned the Congo is already a significance, for her column had a limit of only 400 words per entry, and as Beasley noted that even though this seemed much to her in the very beginning, this often was too short to her liking in her later entries.³⁵⁷ Through chronologically tracing Eleanor Roosevelt's *My Day* entries, the following views on the Congo Crisis came about.

The UN in the Congo after independence

The first entry that mentioned the Congo was written one week after Congolese official independence from Belgium, on 7 July 1960. In the U.S., and more specifically New York at the time, the race for a new president is a hot topic. Eleanor Roosevelt, who still had hoped that Adlai

³⁵⁴ Edwards, 'The United Nations in the Congo', 44.

³⁵⁵ See: Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day* from July 1960-April 1961 for publications on the Congo Crisis.

³⁵⁶ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, February 15, 1961.

³⁵⁷ Beasley, *Eleanor Roosevelt and the media*, 82-84.

Stevenson would run for office one more time, wrote in her *My Day* column of July 7 that Senator Kennedy held an impressive broadcasted speech, in which he made a good plea for youth. The matter Kennedy touched upon of course fitted well with Eleanor Roosevelt's conviction that the youth is utterly important, but still she loyally noted with regard to Adlai Stevenson to 'feel that a Stevenson-Kennedy ticket would not only be the best for the country but for our political party, too.'³⁵⁸

In the same column entry, Eleanor Roosevelt commented on international affairs, in which Congolese independence was not overlooked. She literally wrote that 'it is encouraging to see that the United Nations is helping the new countries, such as the Congo and Somaliland, with their problems of government.'³⁵⁹ She specified that the United Nations was represented already at the independence celebrations by Dr. Ralph Bunche, who was as of then appointed to 'make a report on the kind of technical aid that the U.N. could provide to the Congo.'³⁶⁰ Peace in the world was an important prerequisite to secure peace in the United States then and in the future. Thus now that new countries called upon the United Nations – the vehicle she understood as the vehicle preserve and promote world peace, Eleanor Roosevelt surely covered the event in *My Day* and encouraged the U.S. public to have faith in the vehicle too and see the benefits of the UN for the U.S.

Chaos in the Congo

Within two weeks after this entry, on July 16, the news that the Congo was not peacefully celebrating its independence had landed in the U.S. and Eleanor Roosevelt opened her *My Day*, still optimistic about the UN and Bunche, with: 'I am happy that the U.N. is taking affirmative action in the troubled Congo. I have great confidence in Dr. Ralph Bunche's diplomatic ability.'³⁶¹ Her wholehearted pursuit of world peace and hope for disarmament, however, were addressed immediately after, when she wrote: 'I would like, however, to see the U.N. move, and move quickly, for an agreement against the use of atomic weapons and for the creation as soon as possible, within the U.N. organization, a body to bring together for negotiation the parties to disputes that now are threatening the peace in so many parts of the world.'³⁶² Her views on the United Nations vehicle and how the UN should act in international conflicts, was continued upon for the Cold War tensions – or her personal difficulty in communicating with the Russians – had also been addressed, and in this the UN is again the vehicle for conflict resolution in her opinion. A solution for the tensions with the USSR was deemed important with an eye on a peaceful future.³⁶³

³⁵⁸ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, July 7, 1960.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁶¹ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, July 16, 1960.

³⁶² *Ibid.*

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

UN intervention in the Congo Conflict

Another week Eleanor Roosevelt reported from St. Louis on the Congo Crisis.³⁶⁴ She stressed the important function of the UN as she explained to her readers on the 23rd of July that Dag Hammarskjöld intervened in the Congo neutralizing ‘Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s threat to send in troops if anyone else did.’³⁶⁵ Her disdain for the Russian president became clear when she wrote: ‘We are fortunate in having an organization where people with cool heads can control the hotheads.’³⁶⁶ Eleanor Roosevelt was an advocate of the UN-peacekeeping mission and seemed optimistic about the effects the UN-troops could have, but she also saw the need for international support for the mission from nations throughout the world. Foreseeing the financial burden ONUC would place upon the U.S. and other UN-member states she not only praised the aims of the mission but immediately started to explain her audience that the U.S. should be willing to pay what was needed. She claimed it would be ‘certainly less expensive to put the U.N. Force in the Congo than to undertake the job of preventing other nations from going to war.’³⁶⁷ The United States’ financial support should make sure the UN-troops were ‘kept at a strength that enables it to keep order.’³⁶⁸ In that same column Eleanor Roosevelt made another interesting remark on how she got her information on world events such as the Congo Crisis. Being a member of the American Association for the United Nations, she explained that this was a non-governmental organization, but that the U.S. government would keep them informed of any situation in countries the U.S. send delegates to. She believed this information on world events was important to know for American citizens: ‘We feel that as citizens we should be cognizant of such a situation.’³⁶⁹

‘Dr. Hammarskjöld has shown great courage’³⁷⁰

From the entry on August 24, 1960, it turned out that two of the episodes of *Prospects of Mankind*, to be exact, episode 10 ‘Britain: Ally or Neutral’ and episode 11 ‘European Unity: Obstacles and Goals’ were shot in the BBC studios in London. Even though the topics of both episodes were primarily focused on European and British affairs and did not at all discuss the United Nations, Eleanor Roosevelt still covered the Congo situation and the UN’s response in her *My Day* column of this date.³⁷¹ ‘Since arriving I have had time to glance at only two evening newspapers and the only thing I found of worldwide interest was the report that the Belgian troops would be out of the Congo as they had promised in eight days. A few technicians will be left behind.’³⁷² Eleanor Roosevelt believed only the United Nations could resolve the crisis in the Congo, and with this entry she let her audience know that a hot topic in Europe was the Belgian presence in the country. The fact that

³⁶⁴ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, July 23, 1960.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, August 24, 1960.

³⁷¹ Respectively, Appendix B & Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, August 24, 1960.

³⁷² Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, August 24, 1960.

Belgium left was a hopeful development for it made room for the UN, led by the by Eleanor Roosevelt appraised Secretary-General, to intervene in the conflict.

In this column entry Eleanor Roosevelt made the first reference to Lumumba, noting that the UN Security Council ‘evidently endorsed’ Dag Hammarskjöld in his interpretation of the mandate in the Congo, ‘in spite of the Congolese Premier’s bitter criticism.’ This shows that Eleanor Roosevelt herself believed the UN mission in the Congo was executed in the right way. She praised Hammarskjöld’s ‘great courage’ and put it in contrast to the rhetoric of the Soviet Union’s delegate who ‘of course backed the Congolese in their criticism.’³⁷³ An example of the rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR over influence in African nations could be found in Eleanor Roosevelt’s remark that since Tunisia agreed with Hammarskjöld, the USSR’s understandable actions in the Congo did not ‘seem to be fooling the African government officials.’³⁷⁴ Later editors who posted this entry in the *Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project* added at the end that Lumumba, weeks after this entry, suddenly dropped his efforts to have the UN mission in the Congo revised. Lumumba ‘had conferred with the Soviet Ambassador to the Congo as well as members of other African nations’, and probably revised his criticism as commented upon by Eleanor Roosevelt.³⁷⁵ It is unclear whether Eleanor Roosevelt was aware of this information prior to the episode ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations’, but it is safe to say that she was strongly in favor of ONUC and broadcasted this favor to her audience through *My Day*.

Educating the American people on the UN

Around the episode that was analyzed in the previous chapter, ‘The Changing Shape of the United Nations’, Eleanor Roosevelt discussed the entrance of new members to the United Nations on September 24, 1960. With this, an important message was presented, for Eleanor Roosevelt wrote: ‘the time has come for every United States citizen to study the U.N. more carefully than he ever has before.’³⁷⁶ She continued to recommend two books to her audience, one of which *The First Book of the U.N.* aimed primarily on the youth and would have been best suited for citizens who were not yet too familiar with the UN. The second book *The U.N.: The First Fifteen Years* was written by Clark Eichelberger, who was in the AAUN with Eleanor Roosevelt and provided a more detailed explanation of the UN. The recommendation of books for every member of her audience shows two things: Eleanor Roosevelt wanted to educate the American people on the organization and she thought it to be relevant for every single reader regardless of their age or their involvement with foreign affairs. She would even go so far as to stress the importance of getting to know ‘the representatives of

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, September 24, 1960.

all the countries',³⁷⁷ Her leading argument in raising the interest in foreign affairs was that what happened in other parts of the world would effect the 'daily lives' in the U.S.³⁷⁸

Recommending books was not the only approach Eleanor Roosevelt took to activate her public in this entry, she also tried to raise their commitment to non-governmental organizations that aimed for higher living standards in developing countries by adding to her entry the following remark: 'The actions of these organizations, which are international in scope, can have an influence on the thinking of new nations.'³⁷⁹ She explained that while events in foreign countries could effect the lives of American citizens, their own actions could in turn effect the post-colonial nations.

Eleanor Roosevelt concludes this entry by comparing the United Nations with the League of Nations: 'The League died because it became a political football for the great nations. The U.N. is stronger today than it has ever been.' She rewarded the credits for the UN's success to Dag Hammarskjöld, who she praised for his 'understanding of the charter.' In the previous chapter it became clear, however, that among the member states, different visions existed on the role of the Secretary-General. Eleanor Roosevelt must have thought herself to be an authoritative speaker on this subject, because she presented herself in these sentences as the one who was able to know the right and objective understanding of the charter, by formulating her words in an objective manner (read: 'his understanding' instead of for instance *his interpretation*).

'Our Role in the U.N.'³⁸⁰

In December that year, Eleanor Roosevelt qualified the Congo Crisis as the most difficult situation the UN had ever faced. To the U.S., in her view, it had become a challenge that made a change, in their 'whole relationship through the U.N. to the African continent' a necessity.³⁸¹ She seemed optimistic, when she, in the opening lines of this column, approved of the key figures President Kennedy had appointed on foreign affairs-positions. Especially Adlai Stevenson as permanent delegate to the United Nations added value to, what she believed to be, 'a very good team.'³⁸²

In this entry she does not refer to her own role, which indicated that she might not have known by then that she would become part of the team when she would join Stevenson's delegation. Compared to her earlier column statements concerning the UN, such as on July 16, which is discussed above, in this entry Eleanor Roosevelt put a stronger emphasis on the role of the U.S. On this role she writes to her audience that the newly appointed officials might strengthen '*our* role in the U.N. and

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, December 14, 1960.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² Ibid.

our whole position in world affairs.’³⁸³ In doing so she showed not only to see the UN as a means to realize world peace, but also as a means to gain U.S. influence around the globe.

This observation is in line with the realistic approach Eleanor Roosevelt took in the rest of the entry discussing the problems in living standards around the world and especially in Cuba. The way she addressed the public showed idealism, but she put the emphasize not on the realization of these ideals by the United Nations, but on the *role* of the United States in these matters: ‘I do not mean that overnight the same wages and working conditions should be applied to every country in the world. But I do mean that *our businesses* throughout the world should be known as gradually raising the living standards of the people.’³⁸⁴ It seems as if she, making this statement, was already shifting from her position in the AAUN defending the importance of the UN in general, to her role in the U.S. delegation to the UN that tried to defend U.S. concerns within the UN.

She, however, would still conclude this column entry by underlining the commitments the U.S. had made to the UN, explaining to her audience that it was important for the Cuban people to realize that their fear of a U.S. invasion to conquer Cuba would be unimaginably.³⁸⁵

U.S. delegate to the United Nations at age 77

At the beginning of March, Eleanor Roosevelt returned to the United Nations General Assembly, after both President Kennedy and his appointed U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, agreed she would be of value in the delegation. This entry on the UN is different from the earlier entries that were published before her appointment to the UN delegation. She opens her column with a reference to all the new nations that had become UN-member states. As she described the UN General Assembly became ‘much more imposing than it had been the last time [she] sat in it, at least as far as numbers are concerned.’³⁸⁶ This is, however, the only text she wrote herself. The rest of the entry was build-up out of two quotes. The first quote was derived from the speech President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana gave during the opening session of the UN. Eleanor Roosevelt provided her readers with an overview of his four principles and eight steps the UN should take. She did not write down whether she agreed to the principles and steps of this program, but stated: ‘I think it would be well for everyone in the United States to have it before them as negotiations go on in the next few weeks.’³⁸⁷ Instead of giving her own views, she continued by stating that there was ‘a little misunderstanding in some quarters about the U.S. position.’ She then literally quoted Adlai Stevenson's statement and without any comments of her own she ended the entry with her initials: E.R. In not using her own words, but quoting others (whom she picked to quote) she framed her support for what was said during the UN meeting as if she was completely objectively informing her public, whereas this was probably a tactic to increase credibility and support among her audience. The

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, March 10, 1960.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

difference in style might also indicate that in her new role within the delegation Eleanor Roosevelt could not speak as freely as before, and in quoting could stay as politically correct as was expected from a U.S. delegate to the UN. The PoM episode on the Congo that will be analyzed in the next chapter was filmed while she was still a member of the delegation and therefore this role should be kept in mind when analyzing her views as they come about during the show.

A worsening financial problem for the UN

Reporting from back in New York two weeks before the PoM episode, on March 29, 1961, the war in Laos was a pressing issue on ‘everybody’s mind’ and the citizens of the United States had been ensured by the news in *My Day* that President Kennedy was ‘taking every possible step to prevent active participation in a war so far away from home.’³⁸⁸ Eleanor Roosevelt blamed the USSR for the possibility a war could arise in this area of the world, and that Communist China would certainly back the USSR in case it would. The Presidents of the U.S. and India as well as the Prime Minister of the U.K. requested the USSR to ‘back a neutral Laos.’³⁸⁹ In light of all conflicts in the international arena, Eleanor Roosevelt ends her first part by saying that she ‘hope[s] that the Soviets will realize that any war anywhere is highly dangerous today.’³⁹⁰ She continued her column by making a bridge from the conflict in Laos to the United Nations financial issue:

‘If one can bring about the neutralization of the country and an acceptance of civilian aid from the various *United Nations agencies*, perhaps some of the grievances of the rebels can be met and *better conditions* for the people can be brought about in Laos. There is no doubt that, *given the proper support financially, the U.N. could bring about some improvement in the life of the people more rapidly than can any other agency at the present time.* The U.N. is facing again an acute financial problem to raise the \$120,000,000 needed to maintain the U.N. force in the Congo in 1961.’³⁹¹

The funding of the United Nations had consistently been a difficult issue, because its members wanted to have a say in how the money would be spent. In this entry again the USSR was highlighted as one of those members, and Eleanor Roosevelt explicitly mentioned the amount they needed to be able to cope without the financial support of the USSR. Already a good job had been done in raising voluntary extra funds in support of the UN emergency force in the Congo, namely a share of \$60,000,000. In the final line to her readers of *My Day*, Eleanor Roosevelt called for continuing to raise these funds:

³⁸⁸ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, March 29, 1961.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

‘It is perfectly understandable that the Soviets should try to use this financial weapon to obtain their own ends. But it looks as though *the rest of the world would have to unite more firmly to raise the necessary funds* unless they wish to be forced by purely financial means *to knuckle under to whatever demands the Soviets may make now or in the future.*’³⁹²

Even though Eleanor Roosevelt called for financial support to disarm the USSR of their ‘financial weapon’, one should keep in mind that the way the UN was operating fitted the vision of the U.S. and Eleanor Roosevelt herself. In the midst of the Cold War Eleanor Roosevelt cannot be called impartially in favor of the UN, she was, however, one of the strongest promoters, advocating all the benefits of the international organization. Being a U.S. politician, in her role within the delegation, she never lost sight of the U.S. interests, agreeing to the UN functioning at times as a vehicle operated by the U.S. In the Cold War she saw an opportunity in the UN to place the entire non-communist world (for example Africa and South America) under western influence.

Conclusion

All in all, the conflict in the Congo was a tough one to follow already for the agents active in the field. Each day the battlefield seemed to alter politically, economically or even military and historians have provided a great insight in the Congolese fragmentation of areas and parties after the 30th of June, Cold War struggles played out in the African country and the United Nations’ involvement in the crisis. The relevance of the provided background information is illustrated by the fact that some of the players in the Congo Crisis described in this chapter, starred in the *Prospects of Mankind* episode that will be analyzed in the next chapter, which fits chapter 2’s finding that Eleanor Roosevelt aimed to host her televised discussions with (political) experts on the topics.

The described *My Day* columns show that Eleanor Roosevelt followed what happened in the Congo closely. The three main views of Eleanor Roosevelt that became apparent through subtle hints in her columns deal with the restriction of armed conflict in July 1960, the (in her view) appointment of the capable men by President Kennedy to the UN delegation in November 1960, and the difficult issue of financial responsibilities for all UN members as expressed in March 1961.³⁹³ From Part I we know the added value of analyzing Eleanor Roosevelt’s visual performances on television, when trying to explain her views on the UN and message to the public, compared to just observing her words. In chapter four the analysis of the episode based on the visual footage might complement the insights in Eleanor Roosevelt’s views that were extracted from her written columns in this chapter. During the U.S. Presidential Debate between Kennedy and Nixon, it became especially interesting for

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, July 16, 1960; December 14, 1960 & March 29, 1961.

this case study that Eleanor Roosevelt commented on TV's 'usefulness' herself and explicitly used the medium *My Day* two weeks before the PoM episode to activate her public in the support of the UN mission in the Congo (financially).³⁹⁴ Did she instrumentally use the television medium in an appeal to activate her public to (financially) support ONUC? How did she present her views in 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations'?

³⁹⁴ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, October 24, 1960 & March 29, 1961.

Chapter 4

Eleanor Roosevelt in ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations’ (April ‘61)

What views of Eleanor Roosevelt can be extracted from this episode and from what can these views be seen, heard and explained? Who were the guests invited to the discussion? And are the findings from an extensive analysis consistent with the general view on PoM presented in the second chapter?

Introduction

As much as scholars have been writing on Eleanor Roosevelt’s ideals and beliefs regarding the moral world-uniting and peace-providing sides of the United Nations, so little is known about her views on the pragmatic implementations and implications of the UN’s peacekeeping operations. The chapters of Dario Fazzi on Eleanor Roosevelt and the nuclear disarmament movement and my extra master product on Eleanor Roosevelt during the Korean War in Appendix A do provide topical researches of the development of these views, and this chapter aims to provide an overview of her views on the Congo Crisis at the time of the episode. This crisis being the second conflict to provoke a UN intervention since its foundation posed several dilemmas on the legitimate role of the UN and the public support in the U.S. for the international organization. The UN General Assemblies, together with the meetings of the UN Security Council held during the crisis, steered the organization’s way of operation. If Eleanor Roosevelt had an opinion on whether the organization was on the right track, it is to be expected that she would have broadcasted these views to the best of her abilities. A great opportunity to gather new insights in this regard is the television series *Prospects of Mankind*, in which the former first lady invited expertized guests and discussed pressing world issues. This chapter will analyze the episode recorded at the UN headquarters on the 31st of March 1961. In this episode Eleanor Roosevelt led a conversation on the Congo with her self-picked guests. As has been described in the previous chapter, the Congo Crisis was going on for months already, but far away from a solution in 1961. Eleanor Roosevelt had just returned to the U.S. delegation in the UN after eight years, and had followed the conflict both via the news and from a seat during the General Assembly. Since Eleanor Roosevelt herself was in charge of the selection of topics, guests and questions of the *Prospects of Mankind* series, a thorough analysis of this episode will provide an insight into her personal views and opinion on the Congo Crisis and ONUC. The chapter will be built around the questions of how the episode came about, who the guests were, if the episode differed from the ‘standard outline’ of an episode and which questions, replies and comments Eleanor Roosevelt herself added, as well as which replies and comments Eleanor Roosevelt (subtly) seemed to support, negotiate or even neglect. In the archives of the FDR library many primary sources on the shaping of the episode were found, and with the digital DVD collection of PoM in the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg the setting, the intonations and the emotions of Eleanor Roosevelt and her guests were

possible to analyze. Keeping in mind the findings of all previous chapters with regard to who Eleanor Roosevelt was, how she used the media to root (pragmatically) for peace, what *Prospects of Mankind* aimed to televise and which views Eleanor Roosevelt broadcasted, and with an idea of the context and Eleanor Roosevelt's interest in the Congo, this chapter is fully equipped in pre-knowledge to research extensively: 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations'. In a similar trend to how the episodes researched in chapter 2 were analyzed, this episode will look into the same questions more extensively. Devoting this entire chapter to one specific episode leaves room for a more elaborate discussion of the invited guests, the making of the televised discussion, the setting and the participants' claims. Therefore, in addition to analyzing the episode's DVD footage, time and effort was devoted to trace and reconstruct the formation through which the episode came into being, based on correspondence between producers and guests, archived notes from the production process and official press releases that announced the episode.

4.1 Drafting 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations'

In March 1961, Eleanor Roosevelt shot her first and only episode on the Congo Crisis to be televised in the beginning of April, and together with her producers she entitled the episode: 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations.' In comparison to the general structure, setting and outline of the PoM episodes, two things are remarkable: for this episode the crew of National Educational Television's *Prospects of Mankind* was allowed to use the UN Headquarters in New York as its set, and the episode is recorded at two separate days, which resulted in two separate interviews and two separate sets of questions. Where normally all guests sit together for the whole episode, this episode started with a special introductory one-on-one interview with Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. Why did Eleanor Roosevelt choose to alter the method of her show in this particular case? What is the effect of this new outline and was it part of her strategy concerning the message she wanted to convey to her public? An analysis of the guests in this episode and their relationship to Eleanor Roosevelt will answer these questions.

The interview, with the United States Representative to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, was broadcasted as an introduction, opening the conversation with the other four self-picked guests. These guests were G. Mennen Williams, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and former governor of Michigan; Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal, Special Representative to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld; Jaja Wachuku, Chairman of the Nigerian delegation to the UN and chairman of the Congo Conciliation Commission and William Frye, UN correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*.

The making of the guest list

In the production process of *Prospects of Mankind*, Eleanor Roosevelt was free to shape each episode in a way that she would feel comfortable with. This freedom included the selection of the guests she was interested in, and who were interested in her in turn.³⁹⁵ The fact that Eleanor Roosevelt herself picked the guests makes it worthwhile to take a closer look at them. For each guest in this episode, this paragraph will question: What was their background and what was their role in the Congo crisis? What was their personal or professional relationship to Eleanor Roosevelt and why did she choose to invite these specific guests?

Adlai Stevenson — The first guest for this episode was U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson. President Kennedy had appointed both Stevenson and Mrs. Roosevelt as two of the five U.S. delegates to the United Nations at that time.³⁹⁶ Stevenson and Roosevelt already knew each other before the delegation and were close friends, both in a personal and in a political way.³⁹⁷ In 1952 and 1956 Eleanor Roosevelt campaigned for Stevenson who was the democratic nominee in the U.S. Presidential Elections. Stevenson lost both elections to his opponent Dwight Eisenhower and was not willing to run for a third time. This decision was not accepted at first by Eleanor Roosevelt who chaired the ‘Draft Stevenson Campaign’ against his will, causing some distance between them. Although their relation altered, Eleanor Roosevelt strongly supported his nomination as Chair of the U.S. Delegation to the UN and they remained good friends and, after Eleanor Roosevelt’s appointment as member of the delegation, colleagues.³⁹⁸ On the 24th of October 1952, Eleanor Roosevelt praised Stevenson’s ability to ‘make the people understand the complicated situations before us so well, and in such beautiful prose ... for this reason I think that the overriding concern about peace, and about preserving the well-being that the people now enjoy in this country, will make them vote for governor Stevenson, when they face the momentous decision on November 4.’³⁹⁹ Even though Stevenson did not get the Democratic nomination in the run for the U.S. presidency her admiration for his verbal skills might have, nonetheless, weighed in the producers’ decision to invite Stevenson to a one-on-one interview where he would have plenty time to address the public.

This episode marked the second appearance of Stevenson in PoM. Henry Morgenthau III mentioned in his interview of 1978 that in one of the earlier episodes of *Prospects of Mankind*, Stevenson felt surpassed after the videotaping of the show, because his time on air was overshadowed by another guest at the table.⁴⁰⁰ According to Henry Morgenthau III Stevenson was furious, and in this light, a one-on-one appearance just a few months later could have been preferable for his participation in another episode.⁴⁰¹ The one-on-one interview between Ambassador Stevenson and Mrs. Roosevelt

³⁹⁵ Henry Morgenthau III, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 10.

³⁹⁶ R. Henry, *Eleanor Roosevelt and Adlai Stevenson* (New York 2010), 185.

³⁹⁷ Henry, *Eleanor and Adlai*, 159.

³⁹⁸ Allida M. Black (ed.), ‘Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt Glossary: Adlai Stevenson (1900-1965)’ *The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project*, <https://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teaching/glossary/stevenson-adlai.cfm> (06-12-2015).

³⁹⁹ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, October 24

⁴⁰⁰ Morgenthau III, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 17.

⁴⁰¹ Morgenthau III, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 14.

that introduced the topic to the audience was not part of the usual PoM outline and at first sight might show a link between this special treatment and Stevenson's earlier experience with PoM. This, however, might not have been the full explanation and it is more likely that the explanation of the choice for a one-on-one interview lay in the joint effort of Eleanor Roosevelt and Adlai Stevenson in the U.S. Delegation to the UN at that time. Eleanor Roosevelt simply could not act as a genuine journalist because she had a representative function, and Adlai Stevenson was on the same team. This might also be the reason the two of them valued a broadcasting of his (their) message without interruption from other guests. The format of a one-on-one interview with Adlai Stevenson at the beginning of the episode, turned out to be recurring a few times from episode 15 (one episode before 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations') up until the very last episode 'What Status for Women?' (See Appendix B). The introductory interviews occurred the first two times with President Kennedy and Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, which at first sight hinted towards an equal treatment between the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, and the long friend of Eleanor Roosevelt, Adlai Stevenson, whom she always hoped to become President of the United States. Especially when the letter popped up which dated two days after Kennedy was invited to episode 15.⁴⁰² In the letter, Henry Morgenthau III apologized deeply to Ambassador Stevenson for his negative experience when starring the first time on PoM and invited him personally to the Congo episode, only one episode later in which Adlai Stevenson is given the exact same time on PoM as was dedicated to President Kennedy. Later in the PoM series, however, in episode 19, entitled 'Berlin: What Choice Remains?' Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was also invited for an introductory one-on-one (see Appendix B). From this, the hypothesis that the new format was a success according to the producers and Eleanor Roosevelt becomes trustworthy. Just like Stevenson, Rusk was a great diplomat and the fact that the format is exactly repeated with Rusk, Minister of U.S. Foreign Affairs, serves the explanation that the format of a PoM episode was adjusted with one-on-one interviews to translate the American message of Eleanor Roosevelt clearly to her public without her having to speak aloud herself. Her most important guests, who were at all incidents American leaders, received the opportunity to broadcast their vision (which was shared by Eleanor Roosevelt) to Eleanor Roosevelt's public on *Prospects of Mankind* without any interruption. This explanation reduced the likelihood that Adlai Stevenson *only* re-appeared in a special one-on-one because he did not like the regular discussion format and also that he only re-appeared because Eleanor Roosevelt wished her friend Stevenson to receive the same treatment as President Kennedy, with whom she had a more difficult relationship.⁴⁰³ The fact that Dean Rusk, John

⁴⁰² FDR Library, Henry Morgenthau III Papers Relation to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind*, 1959-1962, Box 2, Folder: 'Congo: Challenge to the UN' Correspondence, transcript, Henry Morgenthau III, 'Invitation to Adlai Stevenson'.

⁴⁰³ As has been mentioned multiple times in this thesis, the relationship between John F. Kennedy and Eleanor Roosevelt was not as easy as just friendship. However, shortly after each of the episodes in which President Kennedy starred in the introductory interview – the one on the topic of the Peace Corps and the other on the status of women (See Appendix B, episodes 15 and 27) – Eleanor Roosevelt was personally invited by President Kennedy to serve in the committees that dealt with the topics they discussed on PoM: the National Advisory Committee of the Peace Corps and the Commission on the Status of Women ('Biography of Eleanor Roosevelt', *FDR Library*: http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/education/resources/bio_er.html (21-03-2016). In all the years of the Kennedy Administration (and even before that, during his election campaigns in which Eleanor Roosevelt helped him prepare for the televised discussion against Nixon) the two big American figures became more and more friendly. A few months before her death, the Kennedy's

F. Kennedy and Adlai Stevenson all received a preferential treatment in PoM indicates that the format is adjusted at request of the producers (Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau III primarily) and not on the basis of a personal request of or special treatment for Stevenson. As U.S. diplomat, Stevenson attended the UN General Assembly to promote and defend U.S. interests. By inviting him to her show on the Congo Crisis, Eleanor Roosevelt made sure that the message of their delegation (and therewith her political goals) would be broadcasted in the episode and at the same time she knew Stevenson would share a positive and hopeful voice on the UN.

G. Mennen Williams — Moving on to the other guests that starred in the second part of the show, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, was invited to *Prospects of Mankind's* special episode on the Congo, for his function linked him to the Congo Crisis. Representing the U.S. government, Mennen Williams had just travelled to several African countries, including the Congo. By inviting G. Mennen Williams, Eleanor Roosevelt had added another U.S. official who could share a view on the conflict that was in line with Eleanor Roosevelt's and Adlai Stevenson's. In addition, his personal experiences from the trip could bring a lively description of the current state of the Congo.⁴⁰⁴

Eleanor Roosevelt and G. Mennen Williams must have known each other long before the episode, because both of them were very active within the Democratic Party. Already in his younger years, Mennen Williams was a strong supporter of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal and started his career at the U.S. Social Security Board.⁴⁰⁵ He, later on, ran successfully for governor of the state Michigan and was elected five times. Instead of running against John F. Kennedy to become the democratic nominee for the 1960 presidential campaign, he threw his support behind Kennedy. After the elections, President Kennedy appointed him Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.⁴⁰⁶

Rajeshwar Dayal — As the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in the Congo, Dayal was an influential man during the Congo Crisis. His reports on the situation in the Congo were the main intelligence where Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, the man responsible for the implementation of UN interventions, depended on for the vehicle's course of action. Dayal was the perfect example of the type of guests Eleanor Roosevelt was interested in and vice versa.⁴⁰⁷ In her *My Day* column of 18 January 1952 Eleanor Roosevelt described a dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Dayal and Afghan Prince and Princess Naim. Her description clearly showed her broad interest in her guests and where they came from: 'The more I talk with people from distant parts of the world, the more I want to see their countries.'⁴⁰⁸ According to her column, the dinner resulted in her wish to see the

were even kept in close contact about her health, sent flowers and letters back and forth and *friendship* would not be a false word to place on the relation. Respectively: Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, July 7, 1960; Gildlow, 'The great debate: Kennedy, Nixon and television in the 1960 race for presidency' (2009); Henry Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 17 & JFK Library, folder Kennedy John F., copies of correspondence with Eleanor Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Letter to Mr. President, December 23, 1961'.

⁴⁰⁴ The background of Mennen Williams (including his recent trip to Africa) was presented in correspondence prior to the PoM episode. The fact that Mennen Williams in the episode was introduced with mentioning of his recent trip to the Congo and other African countries make the claim valid.

⁴⁰⁵ Allida M. Black (ed.), 'Eleanor Roosevelt, John Kennedy, and the Election of 1960' *The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project*: <https://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/mep/displaydoc.cfm?docid=erpintrob> (8-12-2015).

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Morgenthau III, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 3.

⁴⁰⁸ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, January 18, 1952.

Himalayas. Eleanor Roosevelt's interest in her political colleagues was broader than their political views, which made it possible for her to act as a bridge between different parties. The relationship between Dayal and Roosevelt was warm and friendly. When Dayal faced difficulties getting the Belgian representatives to speak with him in a constructive matter, Eleanor Roosevelt organised a high tea where the two parties for the first time came to a fruitful conversation. What she added there, according to Dayal, was her way of acting like a 'motherly figure.'⁴⁰⁹ For Eleanor Roosevelt the presence of Dayal was a welcome addition to the show, because it strengthened the message that the UN machinery was the only means by which the Congo conflict could be resolved.

The professional relationship between Ambassador Dayal and Ambassador Stevenson was more complicated. In their first meeting both men avoided the topic on which they met: the Congo Crisis. Dayal blamed this on the demeanor of Stevenson and called this meeting 'an insult to the intelligence of both men.'⁴¹⁰ When reporting this frustration to Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary General called Ambassador Stevenson a 'failed politician' (most probably referring to his two unsuccessful presidential campaigns).⁴¹¹ Although, according to Dayal, the political working-relationship improved, his portrait of Stevenson stood in sharp contrast with Eleanor Roosevelt's view, which was that Stevenson was unmatched in his understanding of foreign affairs.⁴¹² This might have also weighed in the decision to interview Ambassador Stevenson separately at the beginning of the show.

Jaja Wachuku — Jaja Wachuku was the first black speaker of the Nigerian Parliament from 1959 to 1960. As First Speaker of the House, he was on the 1st of October 1960 the one who received Nigeria's Instrument of Independence, which marked the country's official independence.⁴¹³ At the time of the episode Wachuku fulfilled his next task as the Nigerian minister of foreign affairs. He held this position from 1961 to 1964.⁴¹⁴ Meanwhile Mr. Wachuku was also the chairman of the UN Reconciliation Commission to the Congo, looking for solutions for the Congo Crisis. Eleanor Roosevelt and Jaja Wachuku had not known each other for long, for Wachuku was an international UN politician for only a year at the time of the episode. He was very assertive in both the UN General Assemblies and in the meetings of the UN Security Council, where Eleanor Roosevelt and Wachuku got acquainted. During these meetings, he strongly supported the Congo's central government on behalf of the Nigerian administration.⁴¹⁵ Nigeria played an important role in the United Nations' reaction to the Congo Crisis. The country contributed the third largest amount of troops to join the UN mission and paid 44 million dollars, which was an enormous amount of money for an only recently

⁴⁰⁹ Rajeshwar Dayal, *A life of our times* (Hyderabad 1998) 455.

⁴¹⁰ Dayal, *A life of our times*, 456.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² Black (ed.), 'Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt Glossary: Adlai Stevenson (1900-1965)' *The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project*: <https://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teaching/glossary/stevenson-adlai.cfm> (6-12-2015).

⁴¹³ Hyacinth Kalu, *The Nigerian nation and religion: Interfaith series Vol. I* (Bloomington 2011) 4.

⁴¹⁴ U. B. Inamete, *Foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria* (London 2001) 27.

⁴¹⁵ Stephen M. Saideman, *The ties that divide: Ethnic politics, foreign policy, and international conflict* (New York 2001), 53.

independent nation.⁴¹⁶ Wachuku's invitation to the program might be explained by his positive view on the UN mission (in which he and his country played a major role).

William Frye — Along with these politicians Eleanor Roosevelt also invited a journalist, who occurred more often in PoM: William Frye, who worked as a UN correspondent to the Christian Science Monitor, just like Saville Davis, the official moderator from PoM's second season onwards. Being the author of the book *A United Nations Peace Force*, Frye specialized in global security issues.⁴¹⁷ Some background information on the Christian Science Monitor is needed to show that although religion is quite prominently present in its title, inviting Frye was not necessarily a religious statement. This national newspaper was printed on weekdays throughout the United States and founded in 1908 by Mary Baker Eddy who also founded the religious movement Christian Science.⁴¹⁸ In comparison to orthodox Christianity this movement was more concerned with providing reassurances in this life, than promises about the next life.⁴¹⁹ As a result of this theology and the mission of the newspaper: 'To injure no man, but to bless all mankind', the medium shows a global approach, albeit not a neutral one.⁴²⁰ This explains the Monitor's efforts to closely follow world events such as the UN General Assembly held at the UN headquarters where the episode was filmed. The newspaper was intended for a broader audience than its name suggests and its international journalistic work was already recognized with a Pulitzer Prize at the time of the PoM episode.⁴²¹ The global scope and pro-active evaluation of the world's problems must have fit Eleanor Roosevelt's personal efforts towards world peace. There is no evidence Eleanor Roosevelt wanted to voice a Christian or religious sound in the episode, but she neither tried to avoid it. There is no record of why Frye was invited to this episode by Eleanor Roosevelt, but accordance to the initial set-up the journalist of the Christian Science Monitor fulfilled the role as representative of the press.⁴²², as a journalist he fulfilled one of the roles the original concept for the program set out, namely representative of the press, and at the same time he brought an interesting opinion on the UN and peace keeping operations to this discussion on the Congo Crisis.

It can be said from this paragraph that Eleanor Roosevelt in the episode on the Congo, did not select the guests fortuitously. Coincidentally this episode turned out to be the recalled second appearance of Stevenson in PoM, right after the episode in which Kennedy starred in a one-on-one interview. Furthermore, the foreign guest, Jaja Wachuku, the famous American G. Mennen Williams and the journalist of the press, William Frye, were all present according to the initial format of *Prospects of Mankind*, and for this special episode on the United Nations extended with a fourth guest, UN official, Rajeshwar Dayal. Each of the guests were in one way or another positively connected to

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

⁴¹⁷ William R. Frye, *A United Nations peace force* (New York 1957).

⁴¹⁸ 'About The Christian Science Monitor' *The Christian Science Monitor*: <http://www.csmonitor.com/About> (4-12-2015).

⁴¹⁹ B. Wilson, *Sects and society: A sociological study of the Elim Tabernacle, Christian science and Christadelphians* (Berkeley 1961) 125.

⁴²⁰ 'About The Christian Science Monitor' *The Christian Science Monitor*: <http://www.csmonitor.com/About> (4-12-2015).

⁴²¹ 'Winners 1950, Journalism' *The Pulitzer Prizes*: <http://www.pulitzer.org/awards/1950> (4-12-2015).

⁴²² FDR Library New York, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 1, Folder 1, Series Proposal, NET Release, 'Prospects of Mankind' (1959).

Eleanor Roosevelt's (political or humanitarian) views, which promised to become an episode in which her ideas and opinion could be aired.

The setting(s) of the episode

As mentioned in the description of her first guest, Eleanor Roosevelt chose to divide the episode into two separate parts: a one-on-one introductory interview and a main discussion with four guests (See Figure 13). The entire episode was filmed at the UN headquarters, but in different rooms. Figure 11 shows the settings of these two parts. The room that was chosen for the first part of the episode showed a prominent logo of the United Nations behind Eleanor Roosevelt and her guest Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. This emphasized the location of the set, stressing to the people at home that this episode's main topic was the United Nations. The room looks official and luxurious, underlining the importance of Roosevelt and Stevenson who were both U.S. diplomats at the UN. In the long chairs Roosevelt and Stevenson sat in, the vibe of friendship and harmony among the two was visible from their smiles and relaxed body language, in which they would both lean in to each other and nod to affirm each others comments, questions and replies.⁴²³ The four guests invited to the main discussion were seated at a table in one of the conference rooms of the United Nations Headquarters. This meeting room conveys a more serious vibe, as if the episode was filmed at the exact place where important decisions on the course of the UN were taken. Eleanor Roosevelt joined her guests at the meeting table and the fact that she is sitting in the same type of chair presents her as one of the authoritative speakers, just like her guests, who were all introduced as experts. From the screenshot that provides an overview of the setting it is not possible to discern Eleanor Roosevelt as the host of the discussion, which fits the findings of the second chapter that she liked to be part of the discussion, rather than to strictly moderate.



Figure 13 On the left Eleanor Roosevelt and Adlai Stevenson during the introductory interview and in the right picture Eleanor Roosevelt with her other guests during the discussion part of the episode

⁴²³ RSC Middelburg, *Prospects of Mankind* Digital DVD Collections, Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations' (April 1961).

In the first part of the show Eleanor Roosevelt held notes in her hand, that were only a few times visible, but she would look down to them every now and then. The small size of the notes fitted the informal atmosphere. These notes visually distinguish her as the host and leader of the conversation and also hint to a thorough preparation. During the second part of the episode the serious atmosphere was intensified by the fact that every guest had a small stack of papers in front of him, that looked the same as the one in front of Eleanor Roosevelt. She did not make use of the note cards in this part of the show. Her notes might have been in this stack of paper but this cannot be known for certain. In any case, she was not filmed while reading from her papers. The contrast between the two rooms strengthens contrast between the two types of invited guests. Direct colleague and friend versus indirect colleague and acquaintances from Eleanor Roosevelt's broad network.

(Pro)posed questions

In answering what type(s) of questions were written down before the episode, one has to take a special look at the (scrapped) questions proposed by Henry Morgenthau III and the topics that Eleanor Roosevelt therefore purposefully avoided. This will show the difference in opinion between Henry Morgenthau III and Eleanor Roosevelt on what should be discussed with the guests and conveyed to the audience. Finding this sheet in the FDR Library (See Figure 14 and Appendix C) was one of the most valuable findings for this case study. It provided a special insight on the views that Eleanor Roosevelt expressed in this episode of PoM via a list of questions as proposed by Henry Morgenthau III, edited by Eleanor Roosevelt herself in preparation of the episode and again changed before or during the actual discussions. As with all episodes of *Prospects of Mankind* Henry Morgenthau

III and Eleanor Roosevelt prepared the topics together. For this episode's special introduction with ambassador Stevenson, Henry Morgenthau III sent a proposal with potential questions to Eleanor Roosevelt on the day of the interview, the 29th of March, 1961. There is no record that these questions were thought of together in advance, and no one (so also not Eleanor Roosevelt) scribbled notes next to the typed questions. The paper was entitled: 'Proposed questions for Mrs. Roosevelt's introductory interview with Ambassador Stevenson prior to Congo discussion', indicating that this paper indeed was presented to Eleanor Roosevelt in advance of her conversation with Stevenson, and opened the first line with the exact words she would speak when posing her first question to Adlai Stevenson. However, not one of the questions was literally posed during the interview. The second proposed question was the only one with a preconceived expected answer, that explained why this questions




Figure 14 'Suggested questions for the Congo discussion - March 31, 1961' The draft of questions for the episode Henry Morgenthau III suggested to Eleanor Roosevelt on the day the second part of the episode (the main discussion) was filmed.

could relevant to pose to the Ambassador. The formulation of this question and answer even hints to the idea that the questions might originate with Ambassador Stevenson himself or his staff. The questions would ask how to characterize the objectives of U.S. policy through the UN ‘([t]o give Ambassador Stevenson an opportunity to discuss need to isolate cold war issues form Congo and Africa, to demonstrate that we are no longer weakening our leadership in Africa by always siding with colonial power.)’ This also provides the main message of the U.S. delegation to the UN that Stevenson and Morgenthau III might have agreed to convey to the American public. The fact that Eleanor Roosevelt did not use this literal formulation (while she was holding a note card) during the episode shows that she was headstrong and took the freedom to improvise, even when interviewing her professional superior. Ambassador Stevenson, during the interview, mentioned bits of the preconceived answer on the questions sheet, which substantiates the above hypothesis.⁴²⁴

On the day of the broadcast and the discussion with the other guests, Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau III again exchanged suggested questions for the second part of the Congo discussion. Their working method resulted likewise in a sheet of questions as proposed by Henry Morgenthau III, yet this time with the notes of Eleanor Roosevelt written next to it. This means that the questions for the other guests were only finalized after the interview with Ambassador Stevenson took place. This not only made the episode more coherent, but also allowed the rest of the conversation to be molded in the direction of substantiating or complementing the introductory dialogue. When compared, there are slight differences in the formulation of questions as they were suggested by Henry Morgenthau III, and the formulation that resulted from combining the suggested questions with the way they were commented upon in pen, by Eleanor Roosevelt. Eleanor Roosevelt’s views on the situation in the Congo might shine through the lines of this documented process of the drafting of the questions. How she actually posed them in the episode, might provide insight into her aims for the questions and deliver arguments in favor of the hypothesis that she thought of the message she wanted to convey, during the preparation of the episode, when deciding on which questions would be asked in what way. To give insight in the method of analysis, first one of the questions will be addressed, and traced from its original formulation by Henry Morgenthau III tot the revised version by Eleanor Roosevelt and eventually the definitive question as it was asked during the discussion in the episode. After that the results of the analysis of the other questions, which copied this approach, will be explained. At the top of the list of seven questions Henry Morgenthau III proposed to Eleanor Roosevelt, the first question was:

1. The UN mission in the Congo has been assailed with *one dilemma after another*, how is the UN presently trying to resolve the situation?⁴²⁵

⁴²⁴ RSC Middelburg, *Prospects of Mankind* Digital DVD Collections, Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations’ (April 1961).

⁴²⁵ FDR Library New York, Henry Morgenthau III Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* 1959-1962, Box 2, Folder: ‘Congo: Challenge to the UN’ Correspondence, transcript, Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Suggested questions for the Congo

In pen, Eleanor Roosevelt edited this question by replacing ‘one dilemma after another’ with criticism from all sides’ changing the question into:

1. The UN mission in the Congo has been assailed with *criticism from all sides*, how is the UN presently trying to resolve the situation?⁴²⁶

This changed the essence of the question. The first proposed question might have depicted the UN too weak to Eleanor Roosevelt’s likings, because it basically questioned whether the UN would be capable of dealing with the Congo Crisis. In its new formulation the capabilities of the vehicle are no longer questioned, but the guest is invited to defend the UN against criticism. The addition ‘from all sides’ suggests that the criticism was considered (at least in part) scurrilous by Eleanor Roosevelt. By asking this question Eleanor Roosevelt seemed to purposefully aim, at triggering her guest to defend the UN, while she, naming the criticism, would come across as objective. During the introductory interview with Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, Eleanor Roosevelt brought up the way the UN operation functioned as well as the difficulties it faced. The content of the proposed question was, thus, already discussed in this one-on-one interview. She literally asked the question only in the main discussion, when she, in reference to Stevenson’s statements, asked Dayal:

‘The UN mission in the Congo has been assailed with criticism from all sides. What do you think **can be done** for the **relations** between the Congo and the United Nations, Ambassador Dayal?’⁴²⁷

In this third and final version of the question Eleanor Roosevelt again made some adjustments. The question is preceded by the edited claim ‘The UN mission in the Congo has been assailed with criticism from all sides.’ It therefore seems evident that she was using her prepared question here. The changes, however, again altered the essence of the question giving yet another perspective on what she aimed to trigger as a response. Instead of the formulation ‘how is the UN’ which would have led to an explanatory answer on the operation the UN was currently implementing, she asked ‘what can be done’? This new formulation asked for an opinion what could happen rather than a factual description of what was happening, leaving more room for optimism. The second part of the question shifted the suggested focus on how the UN would ‘resolve the situation’ to the needed improvement of ‘relations between the Congo and the United Nations.’ Where, in the first suggested formulation, ‘the situation’ seemed to address the national crisis in the Congo, the way Eleanor Roosevelt asked the question

discussion - March 31, 1961’, *Prospects of Mankind*.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ FDR Library New York, Henry Morgenthau III Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind*, 1959-1962, Box 2, Folder: ‘Congo: Challenge to the UN’ Correspondence, transcript, 5, Eleanor Roosevelt, Transcript for ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations’, April 1961.

during the show clarifies, that she was not talking about a Congolese problem, but about a *UN problem* in its relation with the Congo. By asking Dayal, who represented the UN Secretary-General and therefore during the show represented the UN, she hoped to evoke a defensive yet optimistic answer. In Eleanor Roosevelt's view, the UN needed to prove its critics wrong, and by inviting Dayal and asking him this question, she provided a podium where he, on behalf of the UN, could try to do so.

When it comes to the other six proposed questions, not all of them are as easy to read (See Figure 14 and Appendix C). The second proposed question was struck through by Eleanor Roosevelt. She changed the numbers in front of the questions so that the third proposed question became the second and so on. This indicates that she purposefully avoided the question: 'Has the UN changed its concept since the beginning of its operations last July?' By leaving this question out of the episode the way the UN operated was not discussed, neither was their room for any of her guests to criticize the way the UN operated. The new second proposed question asked how the Congo could be isolated from outside intervention. This question was left untouched by Eleanor Roosevelt and no comments were added. During the discussion isolating the Congo was discussed extensively and multiple guests were allowed to share their opinion. From the fact that Eleanor Roosevelt used this proposed question without alterations, it is safe to conclude that she and Henry Morgenthau III were on the same line in the wish to convey two things to the audience: one, there was a real threat of expanding Soviet influence in the Congo and two, the UN was the only organization with the right to intervene in the Congo. This explanation of her aims with the second question is strengthened with 'Soviet influence' which Eleanor Roosevelt wrote as a comment and even underlined in the margin of the third question, that addressed the Congolese possibilities to build its own political machinery. The fourth question was numbered the fifth by Eleanor Roosevelt and with an arrow she seemed to plan an extra question about 'Marxism' prior to it. The word Marxism is, however, not used during the show. The fifth suggested question asked what would happen if the UN military operations were reduced. Eleanor Roosevelt also wrote a comment between the lines of this question, which explains the angle of the question. She did not aim to share a critical note on the use of armed forces by the UN, but planned to ask the question in the light of economic development.⁴²⁸ The sixth question on the bottom of the first page of suggested questions was hardly readable and therefore a reliable analysis could not be performed. On the second page the seventh proposed question was well-preserved including handwritten comments by Eleanor Roosevelt. The original proposed question asked, in general, how situations like the Congo Crisis could be prevented in the future. Providing us insight in what she wanted to convey to her public once again Eleanor Roosevelt changed this question from the general angle to a UN-specific angle: 'How can the UN be strengthened to deal with Congo-like situations.' In

⁴²⁸ Her slightly hard-to-read handwriting unmistakably started with: 'What is the best way of getting economic development?' from FDR Library New York, Henry Morgenthau III Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind*, 1959-1962, Box 2, Folder: 'Congo: Challenge to the UN' Correspondence, transcript, 'Suggested questions for the Congo discussion - March 31, 1961'.

this new question she addressed the public as if everyone agreed with her that the UN was crucial and needed to be supported. Her concern was not in preventing international political crises, but in making sure that everyone saw the UN as the one and only organ that could solve these situations. Where Eleanor Roosevelt was consistent in her promotion of the UN as the vehicle to pursue world peace, at times, one could argue that she might have seen her media performances as the means to pursue popularity and support for the UN as a goal in itself. From analyzing the drafting of the questions it is safe to say that she avoided the the legitimacy of the United Nations and tried to broadcast a positive sound promoting the UN throughout the entire episode.

4.2 Hosting ‘Congo: Challenge to the United Nations’

For this special episode, National Educational Television and Radio Center’s information services presented the episode not only in their TV guide, but also in a formal format in which the guests for the episode were introduced, the places of their discussion were denoted and the reserved times for the press to take photos was announced. In internal correspondence, the episode’s content is referred to as a discussion whereas in the external information services, NET would speak of a ‘symposium.’⁴²⁹ This shows that there was a strategy to promote the episode on the Congo to the public and the press.

Introductory one-on-one

The main topic of interest in the 15th UN General Assembly (1960-1961) was the role of the United Nations in solving international conflicts. The situation in the Congo was the most pressing issue, but time was dedicated too to possible future conflicts and how the UN could prevent them from happening. And at the beginning of the PoM episode in April 1961, Eleanor Roosevelt chose to hold a separate interview with Ambassador Stevenson, who chaired her U.S. delegation to this UN assembly, in which she questioned primarily the role of the United Nations as it was discussed in the General Assembly.⁴³⁰

The interview with the ambassador discussed the main questions that were raised in the General Assembly. Eleanor Roosevelt emphasized particularly those aspects of the United Nations (or American foreign policy) that she thought her public might question: why should the public support and keep faith in the United Nations? What is its purpose, and how can we make sure that the United Nations delivers successful work in the Congo in this stage? Throughout the interview, Eleanor Roosevelt’s tone was not one of harsh critique towards the UN. In the way she posed the questions to the ambassador, Eleanor Roosevelt provided Adlai Stevenson with the opportunity to defend the UN and its peacekeeping operation in the Congo. In the very first opening sentence, Eleanor Roosevelt claimed that understanding the conflict in the Congo was a day-to-day challenge. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, one should understand that within the African country there was no unity.

⁴²⁹ FDR Library New York, HMIII Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind* (1959-1962), Box 1, Folder 3, Press Release, *NET info services*, NET Release, ‘Prospects of Mankind (1961)’.

⁴³⁰ Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Congo:’ *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 1-4.

Different Congolese areas were fighting each other as much – if not more – as they were fighting the multiple intervening and interfering foreign parties throughout the conflict. To the United Nations it therefore became a particularly difficult quest in peacekeeping, for as long as the Congolese did not decide on a course unanimously (or with a democratic majority), the United Nations could not impartially help out. Ambassador Stevenson promoted the relinquishing of the several private armies belonging to the various Congolese factions. Explaining to the audience that private armies stood in the way of the formation of one Congolese state, Stevenson borrowed an example Jaja Wachuku told him at the UN assembly. His indirect reference to Jaja Wachuku ‘the very intelligent Nigerian’ who was invited to the second part of the episode is the only time Stevenson intentionally hinted to the second part of the show.⁴³¹

One of the issues Adlai Stevenson addressed, without specific instruction of Eleanor Roosevelt, is the Matabi Port where the troops of the Kasavubu government had forced out the UN troops. Stevenson stressed that this harbor should fall under UN control since it was the ‘commencement of our lines of supplies.’⁴³² This example is used by Stevenson to explain the difficult relation between the UN and the Congolese. Where the UN was concerned to provide peace and protection to inhabitants of the entire country, the Congolese leaders wanted to UN to strengthen their individual sovereignty. The need for unity within the country as a prerequisite for a solution was herewith made concrete by the ambassador to any audience listening. Although Stevenson in his argument also claimed that a solution that would pull the country together depended fully on the United Nations, Eleanor Roosevelt did not underline this remark but summarized Adlai Stevenson’s answer as: ‘there’ll be no real solution’, which in return Adlai Stevenson agreed with and repeated: ‘No, there’s going to be no real solution.’⁴³³ Eleanor Roosevelt did not respond to or summarize any other answers of Stevenson, and even though Eleanor Roosevelt was visibly enjoying the one-on-one interview with him, the particular choice of words in this fragment showed that Eleanor Roosevelt’s views and the way she conveyed them to her public might have shifted from the idealistic approach in the AAUN to the realistic approach in the UN Delegation: Could it be that she was burdened by the difficulties this Congo situation posed to the effectiveness and efficient functioning of the United Nations? A reason for Eleanor Roosevelt to have refrained from her usual commentaries anywhere else in the conversation, might lay in the chosen format of an an interview, for which she might have kept the one-on-one introduction strictly a Q and A. This way the interview remained an interview (not a discussion) and offered a clean and clear explanation on the difficult aspects of the Congo Crisis, so the audience would follow the main discussion with the information they needed. The format of the interview was completely as followed: Eleanor Roosevelt asked a question to which Adlai Stevenson had all the time to reply, and Eleanor Roosevelt when he had finished would gently continue with another question. These were not even follow ups. Only in the end of the interview

⁴³¹ Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Congo:’ *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 2-4.

⁴³² Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Congo:’ *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 3.

⁴³³ *Ibid.*

Eleanor Roosevelt showed her authoritative role of interviewee and guard of time, when she formulated her last question to Stevenson, asking: ‘And now just one quick question. Do you think there is any way we can prevent another situation like that in the Congo?’ To which Stevenson answered: ‘Yes.’ With an eye on the time she concluded the introductory interview in line with the General Assembly; most time was spent on the pressing situation in the Congo, but there was also room for the future role of the UN in preventing (other) international crises. Although Eleanor Roosevelt entitled the episode: *Congo: Challenge to the United Nations*, she ended with an optimistic note, making sure to tell her audience that the faith of the United Nations was not depending on the outcome of the *Congo challenge*.

Adlai Stevenson’s replies to Eleanor Roosevelt’s questions were in line with what Eleanor Roosevelt might have expected: critical on the lack of USSR support for the UN mission in the Congo and positive about the UN, stating that a solution was most likely to be achieved through the UN. He noted that the Soviets completely backfired the UN mission, and that the disunity within the Congo posed a threat to how the UN could resolve the situation. To make things even more difficult, at the time of filming this episode, France had ceased to (financially) support the UN’s mission in the Congo any longer. He was disappointed that Western powers withdrew their support. When Adlai Stevenson mentioned this toward the end of his interview, it was the first time the audience would clearly feel his frustration, for this posed *yet another* big threat to the United Nations since the crisis broke out ten months before. The promotion of the UN was in this episode clearly linked to the U.S. foreign policy, because France started to act in line with the USSR.

Main debate

One day later, the four remaining guests in the program were filmed while they discussed the Congo Crisis with Eleanor Roosevelt. Throughout the program it became clear that these four guests had all seen the interview with Adlai Stevenson, because they made specific references to its content. It is not clear, however, from the episode how long before their discussion the other guest saw the introductory part on video or read a transcript. Frye referred to statements from the one-on-one interview with ‘just now’, whereas Mennen Williams mentioned what was discussed on the Congo by Stevenson with ‘the other day.’⁴³⁴ In the introductory interview Eleanor Roosevelt referred to the Congo Crisis in line with the title of the episode dubbing it a challenge, where Ambassador Stevenson throughout their conversation spoke of a mission or operation. To refer to mission or operation implies that the UN has been called to send help, whereas a challenge is something hard to do and implies the need to *win*. The effect of both words is different, for one can *succeed* in a mission, but *overcomes* a challenge. In the discussion with the other guests one day later Eleanor Roosevelt in contrast, took over Stevenson’s choice of word speaking no longer about a challenge but of a mission of the UN too. One cannot ascertain whether this change in reference was suggested by others (Adlai Stevenson as

⁴³⁴ Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Congo.’ *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 13.

her ambassador, Henry Morgenthau III as her producer or yet someone else) or was a (conscious) abrupt personal shift of viewpoint. This would explain why her sentence ‘there’ll be no real solution’ was not at all repeated, but instead was framed the other way around: As became clear in the introductory interview, being a member of the U.S. delegation to the UN, even though no concrete solution was posed, Eleanor Roosevelt saw the UN as the only vehicle that could provide a solution to the Congo Crisis. The debate in the second part of the show was also framed in a way that conveyed this message to her audience. The crisis in the Congo was posing such serious questions on the way the UN functioned, that Eleanor Roosevelt was concerned for the public support of the organization. Instead of presenting these difficult questions the Congo Crisis posed to the UN, the episode has been partially framed the other way around: Resolving the tensions in the Congo was presented as the solution to doubts and (weary) questions on the UN. This reveals Eleanor Roosevelt’s motives in the production of the episode, with which she wanted to regain and increase public support and trust in this international organization aiming for peace through global cooperation. In the main part of the discussion, Eleanor Roosevelt rephrased one of her questions asked to Stevenson and posed it to Dayal, as was mentioned too in 4.2. He was the first to note that the image of the UN as drawn in the media was biased because one ‘only reads the bad things.’⁴³⁵ Even though Dayal used an easy argument to the question ‘why should one keep faith in the UN’ – especially seeing that he did not elaborate on it with an example of a good thing the UN had accomplished – Eleanor Roosevelt was not critical of his answer. This could be explained by the fact that the answer supported her message for this show, and the instances in which Eleanor Roosevelt critically questioned her guests, occurred with guests that did not specifically support the message of the episode or agree to her viewpoints, like for instance happened with Raymond Aron in episode 12 (See Chapter 2).⁴³⁶

During the discussion the guests soon agreed that the UN intervention needed to be impartial. The different interests of the different Congolese factions, however, made it difficult to prevent accusations of partiality following every possible course of action. Where Stevenson promoted the creation of a federation (modeled after the U.S.) in which nationalism and patriotism would be key elements to create Congolese unity, the main discussion in the second part of the show did not stress the need of a federation in the Congo. Creating unity in the Congo was not a point that Eleanor Roosevelt wished to elaborate upon. This shows that she had other priorities and was more interested in the bigger international picture: uniting the Congo would be great, but global unity within the UN was her real goal. Instead of stressing the importance of a federation the guests in the main debate proposed another option to defend UN impartiality. Because the Congo was recognized as a state based on its constitution, that same constitution would legitimize Kasavubu as ‘rightful president’ and leader of the whole nation. Especially Jaja Wachuku underlined the importance of UN support for the Kasavubu government. His position could be explained at least in part by the fact that he himself

⁴³⁵ Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Congo:’ *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 5.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

represented a government of a newly formed post-colonial nation that needed the international community to respect their rule based on the Nigerian constitution. Eleanor Roosevelt agreed that in following the constitution as the solution of this internal political struggle would prevent her (or the UN) to have to pick sides. She almost over-simplified the issue claiming that as long as they followed the constitution, the disunity in the Congo could be solved via the UN. During the episode, Wachuku was the only guest seated next to Eleanor Roosevelt. She seemed to agree with almost anything he said, even when he, instead of defending impartiality, called upon the Congolese constitution to support Kasavubu as legitimate leader of the Congo.

Eleanor Roosevelt did not support Kasavubu's personal position, but merely any leader that would be chosen according to the Congolese constitution by the Congolese people. 'They need to decide for themselves' she stated, using the exact same words Stevenson chose in the introduction.⁴³⁷ The question arises whether she did use his words on purpose. One cannot tell from the episode whether it is was the influence of Stevenson on Eleanor Roosevelt's views that made her copy his vocabulary or whether he was already influenced by Eleanor Roosevelt prior to filming the introduction, meaning he was borrowing her statement. Given the fact that they were both on the same delegation, however, this statement presents a clear indication that Stevenson and Roosevelt were on the same line regarding their view on the Congo. This consensus between Eleanor Roosevelt, a member of the delegation, and Stevenson, her chair, might be the result of the political agreement that members of the delegation would all broadcast the same message to national and international press.⁴³⁸

Where Adlai Stevenson did not answer directly to the question how the relation between the UN and the Congo could be improved, Rajeshwar Dayal commented on this during the main debate. He stated that in order to improve these relations a better understanding of the UN mandate would be necessary. ONUC was frustrated at times by different Congolese factions who questioned the motives of the UN or challenged the organization 'to try and utilize the UN machinery to further their individual or factional political interest.'⁴³⁹ The disunity in the UN stands in the way of resolving disunity in the Congo. The UN members differed in their interpretations of the mandate for the mission and as mentioned above, some nations including the USSR and France did not support ONUC financially. Dayal, representing the UN Secretary General, called for one statement by the UN backed by all its member states. The ONUC mandate resulted from a democratic decision in the UN Security Council. Nations that opposed the decisions from the Security Council endangered, however, the functioning of the entire organization. To Eleanor Roosevelt, this was a one of her key messages for the episode. The episode made clear to her audience that the biggest threat to the peacekeeping (or peace-providing) operation in the Congo was not posed by countries that publicly denounced the operation, but by nations that withdrew their financial support. Lack of financial recourses decreased

⁴³⁷ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 12.

⁴³⁸ This would be consistent with one of the *My Day* columns discussed in chapter 3 that literally quoted a statement from Stevenson without any personal commentary by Eleanor Roosevelt: Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, March 10, 1960.

⁴³⁹ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 5.

the UN's chances in international peacekeeping extremely. Eleanor Roosevelt therefore asked her guests (and her audience): 'what can we do to get more people to feel that this is a part of the peace burden of the world?'⁴⁴⁰ Eleanor Roosevelt looked around the room to all of her guests and introducing the question with 'I don't know who can answer this', Eleanor Roosevelt did not choose one of her guests to answer this question underlining the importance of the issue to every individual in the room and even her viewers at home.⁴⁴¹ She did not look into the camera directly and therewith did not give off the effect of addressing her public directly.

Eleanor Roosevelt's views on U.S. foreign affairs were difficult to extract from what she said during the episode, which could reasonably be because she was part of the UN delegation and had other viewpoints to protect for this episode. In between the topics of the UN impartiality discussion and the financial support issue, Eleanor Roosevelt, however, addressed a political view which she always personally broadcasted: the humanitarian plus of the UN (and in this episode, of ONUC). Each time one of her guests touched upon this point, Eleanor Roosevelt agreed enthusiastically. And from watching the episode, one strongly gets the impression that Eleanor Roosevelt and Jaja Wachuku discussed the 'human story' in the Congo already prior to these 60 minutes, and that she knew he would bring this point to the episode. Whether or not this earlier conversation took place, the guest list showed that Jaja Wachuku's background was at least considered.⁴⁴²

One dimension of the human side of the story was that the Congolese people and leaders should be seen as equal human beings by the international community. Jaja Wachuku depicted them as the victims of the situation: 'the Belgians just dropped them like a hot cake, hoping the Congolese would come to them for help.'⁴⁴³ If the Congolese would be treated as 'babies' or uneducated beasts any longer, the relation with the UN would not improve. As chair of the reconciliation Commission Wachuku noted that his members had no problem at all in dealing with the Congolese key figures, whereas in the U.S. Lumumba was called an 'idiot' (See chapter 3). The assassination of Lumumba happened prior to the episode, but was not discussed or mentioned. The details of the assassination could not have been known by the guests or Eleanor Roosevelt herself, but she did change the subject when someone would speak about Lumumba. Continuing his argument, again supporting the Kasavubu government, Wachuku stated one has to treat the leader (whoever was chosen) as a leader.⁴⁴⁴ Diplomats who tried to resolve the crisis in the Congo should be sensitive and respectful towards the pride and position of Congolese key figures: 'A colonel is a colonel... give them that respect!'⁴⁴⁵ Even though Dayal stated that the Congolese army was 'a considerable source of embarrassment' to the Congolese people and that from an international perspective it was far from clear whether speaking of rebels or a 'glorious army' would make any difference, it was Eleanor

⁴⁴⁰ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 19.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴² FDR Library New York, Henry Morgenthau III Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind*, 1959-1962, Box 2, Folder: 'Congo: Challenge to the UN' Correspondence, transcript, 'Guest List'.

⁴⁴³ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 6.

⁴⁴⁴ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 8-9.

⁴⁴⁵ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 9.

Roosevelt who in agreement with Wachuku supported the realistic approach respecting self-proclaimed status among Congolese leaders: 'It makes a lot to them though.'⁴⁴⁶

In this same fragment, Eleanor Roosevelt's vision on peace became clear as a concept broader than solely no armed conflict. Eleanor Roosevelt did not show to share the view of Wachuku when he claimed that the militaristic aspect of the operation was out of proportion to the humanitarian aspect. Even though throughout the episode Eleanor Roosevelt did not seem to convey her viewpoint being against arms in the Congo, she did acknowledge that the balance between military and humanitarian interventions was the added value of the United Nations peacekeeping operation. The aim of ONUC, in her view, was also in raising the living standards of all people in the Congo (and anywhere else in the world). To achieve support from her public, Eleanor Roosevelt discussed in multiple instances what she believed the UN mission and goals should be: impartial politically, the UN should pursue access to Human Rights for all (Congolese) citizens and treat any civilization with human dignity.⁴⁴⁷

The final topic of the main discussion considered the nature of the UN intervention. Who was a challenge to who? The dynamics of the international powers (U.S., USSR, African Bloc and Belgium) were discussed in the context of the Cold War. It was especially Frye who stressed that the east west conflict should be kept in mind at all times when deciding on a course of action in the Congo. Mennen Williams and Frye both spoke from an American perspective. The difference was their role in the U.S. Mennen Williams was a politician and his contributions to this public TV show cannot be seen separate from the U.S. foreign policy at the time. Frye, however, being a journalist acted independent and could therefore make stronger statements and ask bolder questions. He had no political interests to promote, which allowed him to speak his mind more freely than his political peer discussants could. He focused on the dangers of 'communist influence' and even asked whether specific Congolese politicians were 'communists.'⁴⁴⁸ The other guests used a different vocabulary. They talked about 'Russian' or 'Soviet influence.'⁴⁴⁹ Jaja Wachuku's replied to Frye at a certain point that he took communism in Africa 'with a grain of salt.'⁴⁵⁰ During the episode, Frye sat at the end of the table and did not add much to the main argument of the episode, hence, his position at the table fitted his role in the conversation, to guard the conversation from one end of the table, assisting Eleanor Roosevelt across the room in her role as host and moderator (See Figure 15). Frye also opposed Wachuku's opinion that the military aspect was too prominent, stressing that the UN operation was not fully using its mandate. For instance, the UN peace force could make more use of its arms defending its supply chains.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁶ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 8-9.

⁴⁴⁷ RSC Middelburg, *Prospects of Mankind* Digital DVD Collections, Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations' (April 1961).

⁴⁴⁸ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 14: Frye might have been comparing beliefs (communist atheism vs. Christian capitalism) where the others were comparing world powers (the US and the USSR); Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 9 & 15.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁰ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 14.

⁴⁵¹ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 18.




Figure 15 During the second discussion of the show, the four guests and their host Eleanor Roosevelt were seated on two sides of a conference table at the UN headquarters in New York.

Eleanor Roosevelt's message for the episode was well-summarized by Frye who compared ONUC, and therewith the UN peace force, with a set of teeth. In Eleanor Roosevelt's view the UN was the organization that could bring about peace, and the use of armed forces as a means to this end seemed acceptable to her. In the analogy of the set of teeth there are, however, two important additions. One, as Frye put it, the teeth could only be effective if the UN could afford to bite (with which Frye referred to the lack of financial support) and two, as Mennen Williams added, between the teeth was a tongue enabling speech (conversation would be a preferable over armed conflict in guarding international peace). Frye also addressed the point that in order to make the UN intervention a success there 'should be no outside intervention.'⁴⁵² He first asked Wachuku whether Ghana was (with the help of the USSR) planning an intervention. Promoting containment of Soviet influence in the Congo he then asked whether Dayal would accept a 'communist' as high official in the Congolese administration. While warning about increasing Soviet influence in the Congo, Frye did not advocate a U.S. intervention and sided with Mennen Williams who claimed 'channeling all efforts through the UN' was the right way to resolve the Congo Crisis. Frye, however, questioned whether this statement of Mennen Williams reflected the U.S. foreign policy when he qualified the CIA activity in the Congo as an American intervention: 'How much money do you suppose the Central Intelligence Agency has poured into the Congo?'⁴⁵³ Eleanor Roosevelt did not comment on these accusations against the U.S. Ignoring Frye's critique she remained silent until he for himself decided to change tone: 'I would not, of course, want to indict our [U.S.] policy... but I wonder if it is quite honest to represent our policy as completely angelic and as completely in support of the United Nations.'⁴⁵⁴ Dayal is then the first to come with a positive example of the U.S. working together with the UN, which posed the opportunity Eleanor Roosevelt waited for to share her optimistic view. 'Well I am delighted to *feel* that we have done our cooperation through the UN.'⁴⁵⁵ Since she used the word 'feel' her statement did not have to

⁴⁵² Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 11.

⁴⁵³ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 18.

⁴⁵⁴ Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Congo:' *Prospects of Mankind*, Transcript, 19.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

reflect the actual situation, let alone be in line with the utterances of Frye. From this statement Eleanor Roosevelt's goal for the episode becomes clear ones again: She wanted her audience to believe in and see the benefits of the UN in the pursuit of world peace.

Conclusion

In this chapter the PoM episode on the Congo was analyzed in a way similar to the analyses of episodes in chapter 2. The analysis of several episodes in the second chapter resulted in hypothetical claims on the way Eleanor Roosevelt used to convey her message through PoM. This chapter's thorough analysis with the added knowledge of the context and production process proved that this broader analysis provides a deeper understanding of Eleanor Roosevelt's views compared to just analyzing the actual episode. Although one might argue that the extended analysis nuances and substantiates the views of Eleanor Roosevelt that can be found in the episode, this chapter did not find significant inconsistencies between the views found in the production process and the views that Eleanor Roosevelt presented to her public in the episode. This chapter therefore legitimized the approaches of both chapters 2 and 4 in answering the main research question: *How* did Eleanor Roosevelt present her views on the UN in her television series *Prospects of Mankind*?

The analysis of this episode showed the message Eleanor Roosevelt wanted to convey to her public. The United Nations was, in her view, the only organization that could deal in a successful manner with international crises such as the one in the Congo. Eleanor Roosevelt believed the UN to be indispensable in this function, because solutions, especially given the Cold War tensions, could not be achieved through the actions of individual nations. Through the analysis of both the preparations for the discussion and the episode itself, Eleanor Roosevelt's main motive to pick the Congo Crisis as a topic became apparent. Although she stated during the introduction that the episode's goal was to educate the U.S. public by explaining the situation in the Congo, questioning how the crisis could be resolved, her underlying motive must have been to promote the UN rather than to solve the difficult situation in the Congo. Although one might ask to what degree she was aware of her own motives. The best example, in the preparation of the episode, showing that she wanted to legitimize and stress the importance of the role of the UN, was the proposed question on the prevention of situations such as in the Congo, that she altered into a question how the UN could effectively resolve similar crises in the future. She therewith plainly presented the UN as an organization that would stay irreplaceable in the future, to preserve and pursue peace. The obvious argument for her main motive to be UN promotions rather than solving the Congo Crisis, from the actual footage of the episode is the way Eleanor Roosevelt chose to conclude the episode. In this conclusion, a solution for the Congo Crisis, or at least a specific proposal, was conspicuous in its absence. Eleanor Roosevelt, instead, ended with her statement that she *felt* the way the UN and through it the U.S. operated was the right way. Again explaining her audience that the UN was the only vehicle suited for the effective pursuit of

world peace and at the same time guaranteeing that the UN, as an organization, provided a lot of advantages to the U.S. interests.

For these claims to be extracted, the third chapter proved quintessential to understand both the context of events in the Congo and the opinions on the events in the world, mainly the U.S., and to understand – with a possibility to compare – the written views of Eleanor Roosevelt from her personal perspective (or at least the perspective she wished to convey to her public). The added value of television fragments became particular in comparison to Eleanor Roosevelt's *My Day* writings when Eleanor Roosevelt joined the U.S. Delegation to the UN. In her column that followed her return to the delegation, Eleanor Roosevelt solely quoted official statements without any personal comment. Even though it is unclear whether or not she *chose* this approach in full liberty, in PoM her approach to air Adlai Stevenson in a one-on-one interview without interruption still revealed personal response via the questions she phrased and her non-verbal communication in body language and facial expression. The audience of PoM could clearly see if Eleanor Roosevelt agreed or disagreed with a guest's opinion or statement, even if her words (in a transcript or in a column that appeared around the time of the production) would not show so. Also, reconstructing the creation of the show from traces in correspondence and notes provided insight in the purposeful preparation of an episode that enabled Eleanor Roosevelt to create a consistent discussion saturated with her main thesis: the situation in the Congo at that time proved the importance and efficacy of the United Nations (to the U.S.). The backgrounds of the guests were considered comprehensively and Eleanor Roosevelt knew all of them prior to the show. Except for Wachuku, who only emerged in international politics shortly before the episode, Eleanor Roosevelt's relations to her guests would go back years before the episode. It is therefore plausible that she invited each of them with a preconceived role in mind, to add a specific voice to the discussion. Although the introductory voice-over spoke of authoritative speakers with *contrasting* viewpoints, this chapter substantiates the claim that she orchestrated the voices of her guests in way that they together would promote her vision without her having to say too much. Chapter 2 led to the hypothesis that even though the male voice-over was speaking, Eleanor Roosevelt's voice could be heard through the introductory sentences, providing an extra source for her view to be extracted from. This chapter nuances that hypothesis that turned out to be partially true. Eleanor Roosevelt's influence is present in the monologue of the male voice-over, but not with her view on the UN or her real aim for the episode as mentioned above, but with a carefully constructed presentation of how she wanted the public to perceive her goals, views and the episode. This chapter presented the inconsistencies that can be found when the introduction is compared with Eleanor Roosevelt's main goal that become apparent during the discussion and its preparation.

Thanks to her thorough preparation of the episode in cooperation with Henry Morgenthau III, during the actual discussion Eleanor Roosevelt acted relaxed and improvised. The fact that the formulations of her questions, her non-verbal behavior and facial expressions, and her timing when to speak and when to be silent, were not planned in advance in all these aspects of her visual appearance

lay clues as to what she wanted to convey to the U.S. public. The analyses in this chapter show that the views extracted from her behavior are consistent with the views extracted from the production process, and thus validates the approach of chapter 2. The additional sources around the actual episode did, however, provide a more complete understanding of her views and her strategies to present them.

Conclusion and Discussion

This study concludes that in the series *Prospects of Mankind*, Eleanor Roosevelt used a multi-faceted approach to present views (on the UN) as one coherent message throughout an episode. This approach is visible from her words and actions during the episodes as well as from the reconstruction of the production process and the analysis of the topic she chose in its social and historical context. The views Eleanor Roosevelt presented through PoM were studied specifically in regard to the United Nations, because the organization was an important recurring topic in both the series and Eleanor Roosevelt's life. One of the main features of her approach was to let the other characters in her show, the guests and voice-over, formulate the message she wanted the episode to convey. She regulated the amount of speaking time depending on what point a guest made. Instances were described where she interrupted guests soon after they attacked the UN – and thus threatened Eleanor Roosevelt's message in the promotion of the UN – which stand in sharp contrast with instances of guests who were allowed to bring an extensive monologue that defended the United Nations or its actions, and thus reinforced what Eleanor Roosevelt wanted to tell the audience. Furthermore, she used an introductory voice-over that could shape a frame of reference among her audience that made her view seem the logical and best way to look at the topic. The second main feature of her approach was the shaping of the coherent message during the production process. When composing a guest list, she would preferably invite guests who were more or less on the same page with regard to the topic and, when drafting the questions, she would reformulate suggested questions that were open and informative into suggestive questions that made it more likely for a guest to react in a certain way. The clearest example was a question described in chapter 4 that was reformulated in a way that forced UN official Dayal to defend the United Nations instead of letting him answer *from* the UN perspective. The third feature of her approach that influenced her message to the public was her choice of topics. Almost all PoM episodes dealt, in line with the original proposal of the series, with international (geo)political and U.S. foreign affairs topics. The process of Eleanor Roosevelt's topic selection could, in this study, not be reconstructed in detail, but the analysis of an episode's topic became possible when in addition the social and historical context of the episode's topic were taken into account. This was illustrated in the case study of this research. The episode itself could be analyzed more effectively because the development of the Congo Crisis in the midst of the Cold War and Eleanor Roosevelt's role in the UN were provided as background knowledge for the episode that Eleanor Roosevelt entitled: 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations.' The added value of the analysis of the context in chapter 3 became apparent in chapter 4. An example is the subtle change of subject by Eleanor Roosevelt when one of her guests brought up Congolese politician Lumumba. Only with plot of the CIA to assassinate Lumumba in mind, was her behavior noteworthy, for this little nuance in how she presented the episode's content to her public would have been missed without the knowledge from sources of the CIA.

The findings of the two parts in this thesis will be presented, starting with the analysis of PoM in general and the analysis of several episodes from the first part. To understand how Eleanor Roosevelt presented her views through PoM, it was a necessity to research her views to an extent that enabled the recognition of her message in an episode. The analysis of several episodes resulted in clues on *what* she thought about the UN and *how* presented these views. In the televised discussions, her body language proved to be an important aspect for analysis, because even when she did not react with words, a reaction was sometimes present in the form of an affirmative nod or enthusiastic smile. She was able to come across as an openly discussant when she shared her views on the television in the company of expertized guests. Through her self-composed guest list, suggestive questions and choice of topics she tried to mold the entire episode into one single coherent whole, repeating and substantiating her message. In this strategy she, to some extent, used her guests instrumentally to stress, to complement or even to speak out her view on the topic. As a result, Eleanor Roosevelt did not, during the episode, seem to be interested or curious in why a guest would have a certain opinion, but rather in how this uttered opinion fitted the angle she wanted the conversation to express take. Even though, sometimes her guests would not share a same viewpoint or be convinced of her viewpoint, she would try to prevent this from happening by introducing background checks of her potential guests to the production process from the second ‘season’ onwards. To get a better understanding of the ambience in the studio, it was also valuable to keep track of the response(s) of the audience. The cameras would rarely show the public, but if they did, an enthusiastically cheering live audience formed the background, confirming to the viewers at home that something special was going on. During her introductory and closing lines, Eleanor Roosevelt would look directly into the camera, as if she wanted to make contact with the viewers at home and give them a sense that she was addressing them personally. The setting in which the episodes were filmed, also influenced the way her message came across. The ‘standard’ location was a university lecture hall, but the guests sitting in a half-circle made the debate look like a living room discussion, stressing the agreement among Eleanor Roosevelt and her guests and a coziness for the audience watching PoM at home.

An additional feature of the first part is its general description of the series PoM. This study was the first to collect all primary sources available on the little-researched series and provided insights in its aims and character. This factual information led to new insights on the series, such as the fact that there were three ‘seasons’ and that originally proposed title was: ‘Eleanor Roosevelt Diamond Jubilee Show.’ These insights might not all have been relevant in answering this study’s main research question, but in describing them this thesis added knowledge that could be useful when future reference works such as the *Eleanor Roosevelt Encyclopedia* are collecting background information on the series. The aims and original set-up, however, proved to be relevant to the analysis of how Eleanor Roosevelt presented her views through the series, because if an episode changed part of the concept this would be a way to strengthen her presentation. For example, if the discussion was filmed at a different location, it was a way to further stress the importance of the topic. The episode on

the UN and the Congo as analyzed in part II was, therefore, recorded at the UN Headquarters and during its introductory one-on-one interview the UN logo was clearly visible in the background.

The second part analyzed one particular PoM episode more extensively as part of the case study on the Congo Crisis, which concluded that the added value of an in-depth analysis of the production process and guest list is substantial, but did not uncover errors in the analysis based purely on the DVD footage of the episode. The most important additions to the analysis of the production process was the comparison of this thematic episode to the standard PoM episode. Both in the location and the layout of the episode, choices were made that helped Eleanor Roosevelt create a consistent message for the entire show. The effects of filming at the UN Headquarters in New York were already mentioned, but another difference in the Congo episode is the division of the episode into two parts. Eleanor Roosevelt separated one of her guests from the main discussion in an introductory interview and let the other guests watch the introductory interview prior to their discussion in the second part of the program. The guest invited for the introductory interview was Adlai Stevenson, Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the UN at the time. As superior of Eleanor Roosevelt in the delegation, the interview between these colleagues provided an understanding of the multiple dilemmas the Congo Crisis posed to the United Nations to set a frame of reference for the viewers at home. The way Eleanor Roosevelt presented the first part – in which both Roosevelt and Stevenson were acting friendly, laughed and sat comfortably in long chairs - stood in sharp contrast to the way Eleanor Roosevelt chose to present the rest of the episode – which was filmed in an official UN meeting room and all discussants seriously continued the episode. For both parts, there was no live audience present in the studio, which added to the exclusiveness and authenticity of the set. Viewers could get the impression that they watched an actual UN meeting that defined its course of operation. The main message of the episode was not that the UN was in trouble because of the complicated situation in the Congo, but Eleanor Roosevelt's optimistic and steady prediction that the UN was the only vehicle that could resolve the Congo Crisis and prove its efficacy in the pursuit of world peace.

Discussion of the findings and future research

The study was designed in line with the main research question and aimed to explore how Eleanor Roosevelt handled the possibilities and limitations of the television in her series PoM and in one episode in particular. The qualitative method uncovered numerous examples of how Eleanor Roosevelt shaped her episodes and how she aimed to influence the viewers at home. Some of these tactics were seen in all analyzed episodes, such as the intentional selection of the guests, and are most likely to be applicable throughout the entire series. Other instances of how Eleanor Roosevelt presented the UN are not as easy to generalize, because they were closely linked to the socio-historical situation at the time of an episode or to a particular moment in the discussion. An example of the latter would be Eleanor Roosevelt's visible agitation when Aron attacked the UN during the episode on the changing shape of the United Nations in November 1960. In general, it could be claimed, however,

that Eleanor Roosevelt would affirm positive statements on the UN in the analyzed episodes and would also show her discontent when the organization was attacked. Eleanor Roosevelt's freedom in designing each PoM episode from topic to guests to questions asked in the televised discussion, her non-verbal communication during the episodes and her voice (its tone or emphases) denoted why television in the analysis of Eleanor Roosevelt is a valuable source to find out about opinions or messages regarding topics she displayed on air. The added value of analyzing the audio-visual material of the television series in addition to a transcript, supports Luscombe's finding that only through listening to a radio show one could capture Eleanor Roosevelt's emotions, tone and which words she stressed.

How Eleanor Roosevelt presented her messages to the public could not disclose the effectiveness of her messages in terms of how they reached the audience. With regard to the reception of the series, apart from some fan mail, not enough records have been preserved for which claims on how PoM was generally received by the audience could not be made. The question if Eleanor Roosevelt skillfully exploited the medium, as has been suggested by Gomery in the *Eleanor Roosevelt Encyclopedia*, can therefore be answered only to a limited extent.⁴⁵⁶ This study provided an overview of Eleanor Roosevelt's tactics on screen and during the different steps of the production process, and the described choices consistently supported her positive message on the UN. This consistency supports the idea that she developed a strategy that combined all these different elements of working with the television. It cannot be known, however, if her strategy was defined consciously, or if she handled the television the way she did based on her intuition. In her written work, such as columns, her television strategy was never commented upon by herself. Maurine Beasley pointed out that Eleanor Roosevelt in her radio broadcasts and written media appearances aimed to make the communications a two-way street.⁴⁵⁷ Through a few preserved fan mails that presented reactions to specific topics or questions in the PoM episodes and through letters that praised Eleanor Roosevelt's *Prospects of Mankind* series and let her know they watch each production, the two-way communication seems to have continued also when Eleanor Roosevelt broadcasted via the television. The approach of Eleanor Roosevelt to sometimes directly look into the camera, address her audience in the introductory and closing lines and center the series around *their* prospects, hints to the conclusion that also in television Eleanor Roosevelt aimed the communications with her audience to be a two-way street.

This study was the first step in the analysis of the series *Prospects of Mankind* as an historical source on the life of Eleanor Roosevelt and her use of the television, but future research is needed to generalize claims on the series as a whole or on her use of the medium throughout her television career. Throughout the process of analysis many possibilities for further research surfaced. Some of these notions might be relevant in the next steps that look deeper into the series and Eleanor

⁴⁵⁶ Gomery, 'Television' in Beasley et al. (eds.), *Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 509.

⁴⁵⁷ Beasley, 'Eleanor Roosevelt's vision of journalism', 66.

Roosevelt's aims and views. The role of co-moderator for one of the guests was added to the PoM concept, as described in the analysis of the guest lists. If future research would touch upon (or take as its topic) the religious aspect of Eleanor Roosevelt's views as they were conveyed through PoM, it will be an interesting point to research why this co-moderator was a journalist from the *Christian Science Monitor*. In this study no evidence is found that Eleanor Roosevelt wanted to add a specific Christian or religious voice to the program. She, however, did not purposefully avoid the association with Christian or religious sounds either. Eleanor Roosevelt's view on religion is just one of the topics that could be chosen as study angle when analyzing Eleanor Roosevelt and her televised legacy. Another interesting angle would be to further research specific guests invited to the episodes' main discussion or one-on-one interviews. The fragile relationship between Eleanor Roosevelt and President John F. Kennedy appeared to improve in the years of *Prospects of Mankind*, when the president was in office and appeared in multiple episodes of the show. After two of his appearances in PoM, Eleanor Roosevelt was invited to join committees that deal with the topics of their discussion, such as the Peace Corps and the special commission on the status of women. Was this a direct result of the episode or was the episode planned to publish her new roles in these committees?

In light of future research, it would be great to call for more information on the reception of the television series, as presently no numbers or polls as to how the show was perceived by Eleanor Roosevelt's audience are preserved. Today members of the audience might still be alive and able to recall part of its significance, impact or success. Future research could clarify whether her PoM series – especially when she was officially working for the U.S. government after rejoining the U.S. delegation to the UN – expressed her own independent views or to what extent it was influenced by the U.S. foreign affairs policy.

Lastly, it is advisable to future researchers to use the extensive method of the case study for every episode, to get a useful overview of the U.S. historical context in the final years of Eleanor Roosevelt's life and her views and media techniques as presented in the series. This approach could uncover her views on (other) specific topics and events, such as European unity, the United States' relations with Asia or her views on economics and the common market. With regard to Eleanor Roosevelt's advocacy of women's rights, her final episode on the status of women might be an interesting subject for a case study too. An understanding of the context of the Congo Crisis proved to be indispensable to grasp Eleanor Roosevelt's subtle tactics in episode 16, but if sources on the production are not preserved, each episode itself can still be analyzed in a reliable way. All in all, personally, I hope that this study will contribute to future researches on Eleanor Roosevelt, the United Nations and the television series *Prospects of Mankind* or studies related to any of these topics.⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁵⁸ Now that the findings of this thesis opened up the path for further research of PoM, a valuable addition of this study would also be the tracking of all preserved the sources concerning PoM. A wealth of information on the series is available in multiple archives. The FDR Library filed program transcripts, season proposals and personal correspondence between Eleanor Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau III, her guests and audience/fans and the series' episodes are available on DVD in the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg, the Netherlands.

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Appendix A. Extra Master Product

Throughout my research in the archives in New York, multiple findings that not directly linked to the subject of my thesis were easily accessible. At a younger age, Tim Walsch for instance was a volunteer at the FDR Library when a researcher had found a letter of a twelve-year-old Fidel Castro to President FDR with the request to send him a \$10 bill with which he could go to school in the United States (See Figure I). This letter, which I immediately wanted to see for myself, had become a famous finding that made the headline in multiple newspapers at the time, in which the writers on the topic jokingly commented that the(ir) present could have had taken a very different shape were it that the young Castro had received this one little piece of paper. The clue of the story, however, is that also looking at different sources has provided me with indirect, but very valuable sources that aided me in understanding the viewpoints of and on Eleanor Roosevelt, the United Nations and the television.

For this master product a selection of sources has been studied in which Eleanor Roosevelt's views on the means to create a peaceful world come about. One of them arose because little is written on Eleanor Roosevelt and the United Nations, and my thesis only studied her views in the final three years of her life - in the 1960's. However, the United Nations in the 1950's had faced already a big challenge, that shaped the public opinion on the vehicle in the United States to a large extent: the Korean War (1950-1955). In contrast to the crisis in the Congo, the Korean War is by some - mostly American - scholars believed to be the first armed challenge to the United Nations. Even though this war played out prior to the television series *Prospects of Mankind*, Eleanor Roosevelt did discuss the topic of re-armament after the Second World War, with a focus on the war in Korea.

With regard to my Congo case study in the chapters of my thesis, this extra chapter marks an important addition to understand what happened politically and what Eleanor Roosevelt's views were on the United Nations in times of crises preceding the Congo Crisis. This chapter provides an additional backdrop against the televised performances of Eleanor Roosevelt that were central in my study in two respects: First of all, the paragraph on the Korean War in this chapter indicates how and why Eleanor Roosevelt shifted in viewpoint from




Figure I – Newspaper Article in the Hyde Park Times on Fidel Castro's Letter to President FDR in 1944. September/October Issue of 1993.

anti-arms pacifist to what she called ‘realistic pacifist’ through the outcomes of actions of the United Nations as *The Eleanor Roosevelt Encyclopedia* suggests.⁴⁵⁹ Secondly, whereas I researched Eleanor Roosevelt’s views on the UN as deliberately presented in *Prospects of Mankind* from 1959-1962, this chapter will unravel the hidden views on an earlier challenge to the UN and coincidentally too on her earlier television program *Mrs. Roosevelt Meets the Public* in 1951.

In the *Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions*, the Korean War is not added as one of the official peacekeeping missions of the UN, but rather as the legitimate alibi for the Americans during the Cold War period to send armed forces into the South Korean area and keep the Soviet ideology – which was approaching from North Korea – from expanding.⁴⁶⁰ Whether or not one recognizes the Korean War as a UN mission, it remains a particularly interesting research to analyze the initial response of Eleanor Roosevelt to the use of (U.S.) troops in solving the conflict, her political promotions of her viewpoints at the time, and especially the way she broadcasted the Korean War in her earlier television series of the 1950’s. Therefore, this Extra Master Product will take a multiplicity of primary sources that did not fall within the scope of my thesis, but did aid me in understanding the views and techniques of Eleanor Roosevelt at instances before or outside *Prospects of Mankind*.

⁴⁵⁹ Baker, ‘United Nations’ in Beasley et al. (eds.), *The Eleanor Roosevelt encyclopedia*, 534.

⁴⁶⁰ Koops, et al. (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of United Nations peacekeeping operations*, 115.

High Hopes:

Eleanor Roosevelt and the United Nations throughout the Korean War and outside of PoM

*How did Eleanor Roosevelt discuss the United Nations on the medium Television **before and outside of PoM**? How did she do so specifically during a crisis to the UN, such as its first major challenge: the Korean War?*

Introduction

As much as scholars have been writing on Eleanor Roosevelt's ideals and beliefs regarding the moral world-uniting and peace-providing sides of the United Nations, so little is known about her views on the use of armed forces by the UN. The Congo crisis of the 1960's - being the second conflict to provoke a UN intervention since its foundation - posed several dilemmas on the legitimate role of the UN and the public support in the U.S. for the international organization. But in the 1950's too, the UN was challenged with a war in Korea. Both the USSR and the U.S. were involved by supporting one of the armies each. The UN General Assemblies, together with the meetings of the UN Security Council held during 1950-1955, steered the organization's way of operation, and when the UN agreed to get involved via an armed peacekeeping mission, they backed the side that the U.S. was supporting. If Eleanor Roosevelt had an opinion on whether the organization was on the right track, it is to be expected that she would have broadcasted these views to the best of her abilities. A great opportunity to gather new insights in this regard is the television series *Eleanor Roosevelt Meets the Public*, a talk show in which Eleanor Roosevelt selected three questions of her audience and discussed the questions with experts on the topic. This chapter will analyze the episode recorded on the 14th of January 1951, when the Korean War and the challenge of re-armament of the democratic powers (post-WWII) were a hot debated topic in the U.S. As has been described in chapter 4, the Congo Crisis was going on for months already, but far away from a solution in 1961. So it is too for the Korean War in 1951, for which the development of Eleanor Roosevelt's views is traced until 1955 – the year that marks the end of the Korean War. In respect to Eleanor Roosevelt's attitude in *Prospects of Mankind* as a UN delegate in chapter 4 – especially in comparison to her more neutral position in the other episodes of the series as presented in chapter 2 – the differences in opinion should be distinguished from when she was speaking as a U.S. delegate to the UN (instances from 1945 until 1952) and the years thereafter, in which she volunteered for the AAUN as soon as she signed her resignation letter when the new president, Eisenhower, took office.

In this chapter it will be the aim to look at the United Nations prior to her *Prospects of Mankind* series, and to look at instances in time that aided me in understanding general claims about Eleanor Roosevelt through mainly primary sources. The chapter is built chronologically, and used

video fragments, transcripts of interviews, two of Eleanor Roosevelt's books and many of her entries and other articles to come to an understanding of Eleanor Roosevelt's views on the Korean War, the AAUN and other television series and how she presented those views via the media to her public.

Pre-UN: The Second World War

Dr. Thomas F. Soapes started in 1977 an oral history project that involved interviewing some key figures from the life of Eleanor Roosevelt. Among them were: Henry Morgenthau III, the main producer of *Prospects of Mankind*; Trude Lash, close friend of Eleanor Roosevelt and wife of her biographer Joseph P. Lash; Estelle Linzer, colleague of Eleanor Roosevelt in the AAUN and Clark Eichelberger, chairman of the AAUN. Soapes interviewed Mrs. Lash first, in the year prior to Henry Morgenthau III, Ms. Estelle Linzer and Mr. Clark Eichelberger. She was the friend of Eleanor Roosevelt from the 1930's onwards and therewith a valuable source who could comment on Eleanor Roosevelt's ideals already prior to the establishment of the United Nations and how they had developed until as late as 1962. The interview with Lash mainly looked into the period of the Second World War, for the Lash family was a Jewish family whom were supported by both Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt wholeheartedly.

Literally crying over the cruelties and horrors that occurred during the Second World War, Trude Lash often turned to Eleanor Roosevelt. She said that Eleanor Roosevelt and her husband, already prior to Japan, supported the idea of taking sides in the Second World War against Germany. This was the first moment in which Eleanor Roosevelt differed in viewpoint from other pacifist friends and her friend circle changed, for she was no longer active in their campaigns. The political side of Eleanor Roosevelt, that Trude Lash in later fragments substantiated with other examples, did indicate that as far as it concerned the use of armed forces to achieve a goal, Eleanor Roosevelt was a 'realist pacifist.'⁴⁶¹ Lash told Soapes that Franklin Delano Roosevelt once explained to her that there are two things at play during a crisis (like the Second World War):

'You have to keep the country with you (...) so even if you were convinced certain acts and action were necessary, you had to try very hard to do the educational job and trust people, that once they were educated they would move in the right direction. (...) The second one was that American war aims, which certainly were "saving the world for democracy" and trying to bring democracy to as many downtrodden nations as possible, were necessarily the war aims of all the people in the war: (...) There were obviously selfish or self-interest reasons in addition.'⁴⁶²

⁴⁶¹ FDR Library, Eleanor Roosevelt oral history transcripts, Trude Lash, 'INTERVIEW WITH Mrs. Trude Lash' by Dr. Thomas F. Soapes on November 21, 1977 for Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 11.

⁴⁶² Trude Lash, 'INTERVIEW WITH', 10-11.

Eleanor Roosevelt supported her husband in this line of thought, that even if you go to war for all the right reasons, you would have to keep in mind that even your allies might have different motives. Lash explained that almost everyone in the U.S. she knew during the Second World War was pro-Russian, for they were (still) allies at the time and the ones that needed to win the war almost at any cost. It was Eleanor Roosevelt who had calmed her down and said that the accusation that people who would not support going to war, like Lash, were ‘not committed to save democracy’, was not exactly what they believed. ‘They are angry and they don’t want to sit down and understand what nations are all about.’⁴⁶³ Education and trying to understand the motives of both enemies and allies were key points that President Roosevelt used in his ‘enormously difficult’ decisions and act of balancing various interests, and Eleanor Roosevelt supported him in this completely - even though her personal thoughts on the use of armed forces were not as ‘realist’ as Franklin’s were, nor as pacifist as Lash was.⁴⁶⁴ At the end of the war and short after a common progressive belief in preventing wars and solving international conflicts in the pursuit of world peace arose, meetings for the establishment of a United Nations, a term FDR had coined before the end of the war already, started and Eleanor Roosevelt was present and supportive from the foundation of the UN until her death.⁴⁶⁵

In a miscellaneous primary source among the biographies of Eleanor Roosevelt, someone called Beatrice Braude wrote: ‘After World War II and the death of her husband, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt has centered her interest and energies on world affairs. She has been particularly eager to arouse a new generation of post-war Americans to more active interest in the problems abroad that will determine their own destiny (...) and get great support for the UN from the citizens of this country.’⁴⁶⁶ The source is written in the present tense, for which it must have been at a date that Eleanor Roosevelt was still alive. Especially when later the remark in the letter is made that Eleanor Roosevelt chose to dedicate her time and effort to *Prospects of Mankind*, the hypothesis that this letter was written by someone who asked Eleanor Roosevelt directly for her reasons to ‘center her interest and energies’ on world peace and ETV, just like she was actively involved with the authors of other biographies, such as Joseph P. Lash.⁴⁶⁷

Developed throughout his presidency, late husband Franklin Delano Roosevelt steadily believed in an international organization with the aim to achieve world peace. He dubbed the name United Nations, and Eleanor Roosevelt shared his belief in nations uniting for the common goal of a peaceful world for all human beings.⁴⁶⁸ After his death she would promote Human Rights, the New Deal and United Nations pro-actively and historians have written that it was due to her great humanity that she won the respect of people – the public, politicians and even U.S. opponents such as the

⁴⁶³ Trude Lash, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 7.

⁴⁶⁴ Trude Lash, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 11.

⁴⁶⁵ Trude Lash, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 15.

⁴⁶⁶ FDR Library, Box I, Folder: Miscellaneous, Beatrice Braude, ‘Mrs. Roosevelt’.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Lash, *Eleanor and Franklin*, 720.

Russians – to follow her lead.⁴⁶⁹ The U.S. government played a major role in the foundation of this international organization. Therefore, Eleanor Roosevelt's views on and belief in the UN need to be carefully approached. To give an example, Eleanor Roosevelt was the founding mother of the UDHR, which promotes U.S. (or Western) values that even today UN member countries disagree on – look for instance at the debate on China and their neglect of Human Rights nationally.⁴⁷⁰ Jason Berger showed that in the promotion of democracy worldwide, Eleanor Roosevelt chose the American form, and was less open-minded to other's governments and ideals.⁴⁷¹ Slightly visible in the *Prospects of Mankind* episode starring Indonesia's former Vice President Dr. Hatta, Eleanor Roosevelt would give Stevenson the opportunity to recap the episode and summarize the future of democracy abroad in accordance to the Four Freedoms. Even though Berger did not look at PoM for his dissertation, he did show that the extent to which Eleanor Roosevelt promoted democracy, Human Rights and the Four Freedoms as the way to achieve peace and prosperity could be called 'globalized containment.'⁴⁷²

The Korean War in writing and on TV

First challenge to the UN: the Korean War

As an introduction to the Korean War one should know that already from 1910 Japan had occupied Korea. At the end of World War II, the USSR declared war on Japan and occupied the North of Korea until the 38th parallel. The Americans invaded the South and later on Japan surrendered. These actions effectively split Korea in two: the U.S. supported the South and the USSR supported the North. In 1947, during the Truman administration, the United Nations declared 'that elections should be held for a government for the whole country' and that the United Nations would 'oversee these elections to ensure that they were fair.'⁴⁷³ In 1948, the elections installed two governments: in what was to become South Korea, the United Nations declared that the elections had been fair. The Russian presence in what was to become North Korea complicated matters, however, as the Russians would not allow United Nations observers in. As a result, the United Nations declared that the election results from North Korea were not acceptable, as they had not been independently observed. So by the end of 1948, both North and South Korea had formed separate states. The North was supported by communist Russia and later also communist China. The South was supported by America and was considered by the west to be the only democratic nation out of the two.⁴⁷⁴

On June 25, 1948, artillery fires from both sides (North and South) occurred. And it is tragic but also insightful to know that up until today both representing parties – Russia and the U.S. – still

⁴⁶⁹ FDR Library, Box I, Folder: Miscellaneous, Beatrice Braude, 'Mrs. Roosevelt'.

⁴⁷⁰ Human Rights Watch, 'World Report 2015: China': <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/china-and-tibet> (27-03-2016).

⁴⁷¹ Berger, *A New Deal for the world*, 88.

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ Allida M. Black, 'The Eleanor Roosevelt papers project': <http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teaching/glossary/korean-war.cfm> (10-04-2015).

⁴⁷⁴ John P. Glennon (ed.), *Foreign Relations of the United States Collection: United States Department of State - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950-1952. United Nations and general international matters* Volume II: <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195860v02> (14-04-2015).

blame each other for starting it.⁴⁷⁵ The North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. By that time, communist China also supported the North Korean government. The Security Council of the United Nations met the same day. The Russian delegation to the Security Council did not attend the meeting as they were boycotting the United Nations for recognizing Chiang Kai-shek's government in Taiwan as the official government for China, whilst ignoring Mao's communist regime in Beijing. Therefore, the obvious use of the veto (which was assumed the USSR would have used in this case) did not occur.⁴⁷⁶

Two years and two days later - on June 27, 1950 - the U.S. called on the United Nations to use force to get the North Koreans out as they had ignored the Security Council's resolution of June 25th. This was also voted for and once again the Russians could not use their veto as they were still boycotting the United Nations. Sixteen member states would provide troops under a United Nations Joint Command. This United Nations force was primarily dominated by America even to the extent of being commanded by an American general, Douglas MacArthur. However, the choice of MacArthur was hardly contentious as his ultimate success in the Pacific War made him one of the most famous generals of his era. He was also very popular with the American public, who may have been less supportive of yet more foreign military intervention if a non-American had been chosen.

During the Truman presidency, Eleanor Roosevelt was a loyal American diplomat, but that did not stop her mentioning in her column that she disagreed with MacArthur's tactics to cross the 38th parallel to invade North Korea and his public call on bombing China. Eleanor Roosevelt wrote: 'I cannot feel, however, that a commanding general in the field, particularly when he commands for a group of nations, should take it upon himself to announce the policy that in his opinion should be followed in the area of the world where he commands troops.'⁴⁷⁷ For stating this, Eleanor Roosevelt used her own tactic to persuade the public of her opinion, for the popular general was introduced with:

'I have a very great admiration for General MacArthur as a soldier and, from all I hear, he has been a good administrator in Japan who has made some wise and far-reaching reforms. I feel that this country owes him a debt of gratitude for the part he played in World War II, and I hope when he comes home he will be received with the honors due one of the great American generals of that war.'⁴⁷⁸

The American public would not change abruptly their positive opinion on MacArthur, would they agree to Mrs. Roosevelt's view. Even though it is not suggested that Eleanor Roosevelt lied when writing these opening lines, she did subtly write exactly those points with which she did agree

⁴⁷⁵ Allida M. Black (ed.), 'The Eleanor Roosevelt papers project': <http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teaching/glossary/korean-war.cfm> (10-04-2015).

⁴⁷⁶ Allida M. Black (ed.), 'The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project': <http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teaching/glossary/korean-war.cfm> (10-04-2015).

⁴⁷⁷ Eleanor Roosevelt, *My Day*, 9 April 1951.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid.

positively, to later be able to take on a more critical note on the matter she did not agree with. This way she would not lose those readers among her public who were great admirers of General MacArthur.

On September 15, 1950, United Nations troops landed in an amphibious assault at Inchon, South Korea. The landing was a huge success and the United Nations effectively cut the North Korean army in half and pushed them out of South Korea. MacArthur then advanced into North Korea – despite the warnings from Communist China.⁴⁷⁹ This resulted in Chinese military support and an attack on United Nations troops. Between November 1950 and January 1951 the Chinese managed to push back the United Nations force. After a clash with President Truman, MacArthur was sacked and the war degenerated into a war of stalemate with neither the United Nations or the Chinese managing to gain the upper hand.⁴⁸⁰

Things changed with the election of president Dwight Eisenhower in November 1952 and the death of Stalin in March 1953. Elected on a promise that he would ‘go to Korea’, Eisenhower was prepared to escalate the war unless the negotiations moved forward.⁴⁸¹ One can imagine the clash with Eleanor Roosevelt’s ideals, for Eleanor Roosevelt was advocating against armament in her television show of 1951 and did not particularly promote McArthur’s approach to the War in her *My Day* column of the same year.

The Korean War gave a clear indication that the United Nations was dominated by America – nearly 90% of all army personnel, 93% of all air power and 86% of all naval power for the Korean War had come from America. U.S. foreign policy hardened on containment policy – started by Truman in 1947.⁴⁸² During the Korean War, Eleanor Roosevelt, as a pacifist, was overruled by her pragmatic ‘realpolitik’. Since the foundation of the United Nations in 1948, the organization was challenged with a skeptical public at the home fronts. For starters, the aftermath of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki due the atomic bomb and the threats of Cold War politics in the 1950’s were remarkably influencing the American domestic and international sphere. It seems quite extraordinary for a woman who had seen the League failing to keep faith in the UN.⁴⁸³ She backed the necessity of the Korean War, because she feared that doing otherwise would weaken the UN and send a message of appeasement to the Soviet Union, which she blamed for starting the conflict.⁴⁸⁴

Peace promotions during the Korean War via the media

From instrumentally using her position at the White House – also to overcome her loneliness due to being away from her beloved Hyde Park and friends – until promoting FDR’s New Deal

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ Steve Neal (ed.), ‘Eleanor and Harry: the Correspondence of Eleanor Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman,’: <https://www.trumanlibrary.org/eleanor/1951.html> (08-04-2015).

⁴⁸¹ Allida M. Black (ed.), ‘The Eleanor Roosevelt papers project’: <http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teaching/glossary/korean-war.cfm> (10-04-2015).

⁴⁸² Ibid.

⁴⁸³ Fazzi, *A Voice of Conscience*, chapter 1, 12.

⁴⁸⁴ Blanche Wiesen Cook, ‘Turn Toward Peace: Eleanor Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs,’ in Joan Hoff-Wilson and Marjorie Lightman (eds.), *Without precedent: The life and career of Eleanor Roosevelt* (Bloomington 1984), 108-121.

coalition after his death and broadcasting her views via the media, Fazzi already noted that ‘[h]istorians recognize her ability to use [her unconventional] position instrumentally’⁴⁸⁵ As a skillful journalist and human rights activist up until 1962, Eleanor Roosevelt seemed to wisely insert her leading voice in dedication to educating her audience in the media mentioned in earlier chapters. Yet as much as she used the media skillfully, I wonder *how* she presented her views to the U.S. in a time that its citizens were weary of the UN and eager to a solution to the Korean War. In the example of how she subtly expressed her thoughts on the methods of General MacArthur in 1951, a clue to her how is already presented. But the FDR Library revealed two interesting books, multiple articles and the transcript of an episode of her TV show *Eleanor Roosevelt Meets the Public* which directly tackled the Korean War in its content and sometimes even title.

Mrs. Roosevelt Meets the Public

One of Eleanor Roosevelt’s first television programs, *Mrs. Roosevelt Meets the Public* (1950-51), was a Sunday night discussion program in which she moderated the questions asked by her audience and had them answered with guests of all sorts. A striking episode of this series was the broadcast on 14 January 1951, entitled ‘Problems of Re-Arming the Democratic Powers’ with subtle reference to both the U.S. and the USSR who decided to use arms in their war of winning over South Korea to their personal ideology.⁴⁸⁶ Two weeks prior to this episode, the show’s hostess, Mrs. Roosevelt, had invited two of the three expertized guests invited to this episode too, who now would continue their discussion and answer a new set of three questions from the general public. These questions had been sent in beforehand, and out of all the questions that were sent in, ultimately ten were chosen to present to Mrs. Roosevelt and she would have the final say which three her specialized guests would answer. The ten-forwarded questions had landed in the FDR Library archives in Hyde Park, New York, together with the introductory and closing lines of the broadcast.⁴⁸⁷ However, the show or a transcript of the show had not been preserved, and therefore it is unfortunately not possible to recollect which three of these ten had been answered in the show. What can be said, however, is that all of them pointed towards answering the same message: do arms solve *any* conflict? From the title of the episode ‘Problems of Re-Arming the Democratic Powers’ and the knowledge that Mrs. Roosevelt at the time had an outspoken anti-armament attitude, it would be safe to assume the answer would have been no, especially in the knowledge that Eleanor Roosevelt at the time spoke publicly against the use of arms to resolve world crises. Another striking reason to elaborate on the episode, despite lacking information on the exact content of the broadcast, is that the UN vehicle was not present in any of the audience’s posed questions and therewith assured that the episode would not go into detail on the UN as the solution to this episode by the audience. Even though missing content makes it tough

⁴⁸⁵ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 1, 9.

⁴⁸⁶ FDR Library, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Part 2, 1884-1964, Speech and Article File, 1917-1962, Box 1420, Problems of Re-Arming the Democratic Powers. Mrs. Roosevelt Meets the Public TV Show, ‘Questions for: *Mrs. Roosevelt Meets the Public*, 14 January 1951’ January 14, 1951.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

to conclude anything major, but a lack in the audiences' interest in the United Nations (or in the producers' interest, for they selected the ten questions) does point in the direction that Eleanor Roosevelt could perceive and unpopularity for the UN across the United States and throughout her career and life.

Publications toward the end: two of Mrs. Roosevelt's books

Two and four years after this broadcast, the messages Eleanor Roosevelt sent to her American public via *My Day* and the television program *Eleanor Roosevelt Meets the Public* seemed to have developed into a less anti-arms and more pragmatic pacifist attitude, as Trude Lash and Dario Fazzi had explained in their personal relationship with and research on the former First Lady. In 1953 and 1955 two books appeared on the United Nations, the first of which was written by Eleanor Roosevelt and the second being edited by her. In the first book from 1953, entitled *UN: Today and Tomorrow*, the former First Lady explained what the UN had accomplished in five years, from the establishment of its charter in 1948 until 1953, the year of this book's publication. The book elaborates on how the UN functions, what its future is and answers 101 questions by the public. On the last pages, the entire charter is added and Eleanor Roosevelt began her foreword with human rights advocacy. She stated literally that her hope with this book was to 'strengthen the belief of our people in the value of the UN and the absolute necessity of giving it our full support.'⁴⁸⁸ The first chapter, that focuses on what the UN has accomplished, evidently discusses the justification of the use of armed forces during the Korean War. In the form of an anecdote, Eleanor Roosevelt opened the book with a voice against the United Nations: a cab driver who would not visit the UN Headquarters' Tour as long as the UN does not stop the war in Korea. She openly wrote that his attitude is rightful, for 'the UN *was* set up to keep peace in the world and it clearly hasn't.'⁴⁸⁹ She continued to write that the UN is only a vehicle, that could be used to overcome differences without the use of armed forces, but that has no power to prevent wars if nations choose to start one. She added that the UN has two options to stop a war: by means of negotiation was the first, and the use of military forces by member nations was the second. After this, Eleanor Roosevelt explained the way of action in Korea, which was a combination of both options:

'What the UN tried in the case of Korea was something unique in the annals of modern warfare – a combination of patient, protracted negotiation, and at the same time military action that was powerful enough to stand off the aggressors and demonstrate to them plainly that they could not win, but limited to re-establishment and defense of the South Korean border that existed before the invasion.'⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁸ Eleanor Roosevelt, *UN: Today and Tomorrow* (New York 1953), ix.

⁴⁸⁹ Eleanor Roosevelt, *UN: Today and Tomorrow*, 1-2.

⁴⁹⁰ Eleanor Roosevelt, *UN: Today and Tomorrow*, 2.

This passage supports the idea that Eleanor Roosevelt used the realistic approach when it came to the use of armed forces. Being a pacifist, peace was her main goal and she saw great potential in the UN as the vehicle to secure this goal, but when solving an armed conflict, the UN in her view was allowed to militarily intervene, which supports the idea that she could be qualified as a pragmatic pacifist. Instead of remaining against all kinds of armed forces, in the passage above Eleanor Roosevelt tried to justify the role of the UN as it was played out in Korea. Even though the UN action in Korea has been qualified as merely an American operation supported by the UN, Eleanor Roosevelt in this passage and in the later book, did not link the U.S. and the UN mission to each other. In the second book entitled *UN: What you should know about it*, which was published two years after, the approach was to inform or educate specifically the audience that knew the UN exists, but had no idea how it works and what it does.⁴⁹¹ In this book again, the Korean War is taken up in a particular narrative and the angle through which the authors chose to describe the Korean War is also made visible in an info-graphic (See figure II and III). The text that preceded the cartoon-like figure presented the history of the Korean War without mention of its U.S. member, almost as if all nations agreed in the Security Council that sending in armed forces would result in solving the international conflict. The schematic summary of the peacekeeping actions of the UN since 1948 that followed illustrated armed forces with a check mark, and is drawn almost more peaceful than the cease fire cartoons (See Figure III). According to the scheme, the armed forces that Eleanor Roosevelt described one book earlier to be limited to defense and too powerful to win from, resulted in the armistice of 27 July 1953.⁴⁹² What should be noted is, however, that this armistice did not bring a political solution and no peace treaty was ever signed. Even up until today, Korea remains divided.




Figure II Page explaining the question: What has the UN done in Korea? SC stands for Security Council. Source: Picker & Roosevelt, *The United Nations: What You Should Know About It*, (1955) 27.

Eleanor Roosevelt has never brought out an article, column, radio broadcast or television episode in which she admitted to have chosen pragmatism over idealism in any instance. In 1951, however, Eleanor Roosevelt realized that the actions of the U.S. were not in line with the fundamental ideology of the Charter as it was agreed on in 1948 and broadcasted that via *My Day* to the public. Despite her pacifist character, she later mentioned Korea's relatively successful ending in her books of the fifties – almost as if she approved of the U.S. military action in Korea that led to this outcome, supporting the pragmatic pacifist character of Eleanor Roosevelt that Fazzi and Lash commented upon.⁴⁹³

⁴⁹¹ Eleanor Roosevelt & Jean Picker (eds.), *UN: What you should know about it* (1955), 1.

⁴⁹² Black, 'The Eleanor Roosevelt papers project': <http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teaching/glossary/korean-war.cfm> (10-04-2015).

⁴⁹³ Fazzi, *A voice of conscience*, chapter 1, 17 & Lash, *Eleanor and Franklin*, 381.




Figure III Info-graphic explaining the question: What has the UN done since 1948? Source: Picker & Roosevelt. *The United Nations: What You Should Know About It* (1955) 28.

The AAUN: Two Mrs. Roosevelts

During the Korean War, and whenever her columns specifically concerned the Korean War, Eleanor Roosevelt did not hesitate to explain and defend U.S. foreign policy through UN mandates. Even though Eleanor Roosevelt was at the beginning of the war still a U.S. Delegate to the UN, this is not true for the second half of the war: When in 1952 President Dwight Eisenhower took office,

Eleanor Roosevelt was soon notified on her resignation from the delegation. As a UN supporter, and officially a delegate for still a short while, Eleanor Roosevelt aimed to spark enthusiasm, understanding and support for the UN in a speech at the end of that year, on the 19th of November to be exact. She perceived unpopularity for the vehicle, because of a twisted line of reasoning that she could set straight. She started her say to her audience by:

‘It is a little difficult to say what makes the United Nations so unpopular – what is the trouble with the United Nations – because I think that there isn’t really so much wrong with the United Nations as there is a good deal wrong with us, the people of the United States.’⁴⁹⁴

A strong claim, in which the journalistic trick to trigger an audience by something provocative came forth, Eleanor Roosevelt explained to the audience that blaming a machinery is strange, for the vehicle functions only when humans use it. The fact that the UN has not succeeded, therefore really meant that ‘we, the sovereign nations within the United Nations, have not succeeded.’⁴⁹⁵ Eleanor Roosevelt explained that in her personal experiences, such as travelling to India, encounters with heads of governments who face situations such as for instance famines, asked her how it is possible that the U.S. has a surplus of wheat, where their people were starving. She said to her public that her explanation was unawareness, or literally ‘unfamiliarity’ of the U.S. citizens, which again was a clever phrasing to make people listen, and feel guilty but showing compassion to their response. She added that it is needed that the U.S. citizens support their government to support the UN, so that the United Nations could care for the wellbeing of all humans on earth, and therewith deemed it *the* solution to overcome world problems. Her ‘a little less conversation, a little more action, please’ attitude was literally presented to the audience, too, but only after stressing that before one can stop talking, everyone should have heard and ‘should get acquainted with what is going on in the world, and what is being done by the specialized agencies and action groups of the United Nations.’⁴⁹⁶ Even though numbers or polls in which the U.S. population’s support for the UN are not traceable, to find out why Eleanor Roosevelt promoted the United Nations just her perception of their support is needed, which was as the title of her speech ‘WHY THE UNITED NATIONS IS UNPOPULAR, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT’ suggested, not yet at the level she hoped it would be. After the delegation, this duty to educate the world and teach them about the vehicle she supported was still on top of her list, and she decided to apply to volunteer at the AAUN. Mr. Clark Eichelberger, Chairman of the American Association of the United Nations, was visited by Eleanor Roosevelt in the beginning of 1953. Out of the blue to him, Eleanor Roosevelt one day came into his office and said:

⁴⁹⁴ FDR Library, Box 1956, UN Material, Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Why the United Nations is unpopular, and what we can do about it’ November 19, 1952.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid.

‘Now, you know, there has been a new group elected to Washington, and I know that under the new administration I will not be a member of the U.S. delegation, nor will I be the U.S. representative on the Human Rights Commission. (...) I want to volunteer, and I want to serve. Can I be a volunteer in the AAUN?’⁴⁹⁷

Eichelberger, happily surprised, replied with an ‘of course’ and made Eleanor Roosevelt Chairman of the Board of the AAUN later on. Clark Eichelberger and Eleanor Roosevelt knew each other long before 1952. He recalled that they first met at a luncheon somewhere in the 1930’s, but as a UN delegate the two were in contact when she was involved with the Human Rights Commission. With regard to her work for the UN and the AAUN, Eichelberger said that he too, like other contemporaries had said to recognize, knew two Mrs. Roosevelts. There was the practical politician, and the idealist. Eichelberger recalled instances of both Eleanor Roosevelt’s from UN meetings that she attended and he listened in on, and told Soapes the famous story of the first UN meeting in London, where she was told that ‘her work would be in the humanitarian sphere, human rights and so on’ and she replied: ‘That just shows that they don’t want a woman to have anything to do with the major political subjects that come before the Assembly.’⁴⁹⁸ However, somewhere during the UN meetings, the USSR took Human Rights so seriously that they appointed one of their delegates as a representative, and it was in this happening that the U.S. called upon Mrs. Roosevelt. By showing knowledge, courage and a directness of speech Eleanor Roosevelt handled her position so well that even Senator Vandenburg, one of the men in the U.S. delegation to the UN who had not been happy Eleanor Roosevelt was part of the delegation, was heard to say: ‘There goes a great woman, and I take back everything I have said against her. And that was plenty.’⁴⁹⁹ He added: ‘the practical politician expressed itself in her determination to get something done, to talk to other statesmen. And the idealism showed up in the things she stood for.’⁵⁰⁰ Eichelberger could not remember any moment in which Eleanor Roosevelt’s directness of speech worked against her or caused any diplomatic trouble. In the contrary, it was this personality for which shortly after the United Nations was set up people from all over the world wanted to travel to Hyde Park to meet her.⁵⁰¹ There was once the meeting with Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, for instance, where Eleanor Roosevelt would be given a minute-by-minute schedule by the State Department for his visit. However, when he wanted to take a rest – which she interpreted as a wish to take a nap – and they both laughed when she later realized it meant just taking of his shoes and playing with her children and the television dial.⁵⁰² Eichelberger stated that it was exactly in the UN meetings that she *really* overcame her shyness and self-doubt – even if some

⁴⁹⁷ FDR Library, Eleanor Roosevelt oral history transcripts, Clark Eichelberger, ‘INTERVIEW WITH *Mr. Clark Eichelberger* by Dr. Thomas F. Soapes on November 15, 1977 for Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 2.

⁴⁹⁸ Clark Eichelberger, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 3.

⁴⁹⁹ Clark Eichelberger, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 3-4.

⁵⁰⁰ Clark Eichelberger, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 7.

⁵⁰¹ Clark Eichelberger, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 8.

⁵⁰² Clark Eichelberger, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 9.

scholars recognize courage earlier. She had, however, already overcome her difficulties in speech – she was always giggling when she had to speak up – prior to these meetings through radio trainings and experience with speeches in earlier times.⁵⁰³

In the practical politician and advocate for Human Rights, Eichelberger remembered that Eleanor Roosevelt hoped to accomplish more than simply making pronouncements. He thought that she thought that ‘the human rights movement as far as a practical application of human rights in the UN, could move faster than it has.’⁵⁰⁴ With the growing number of member states especially, Eleanor Roosevelt understood that some countries were mostly thinking about having something to eat than being able to read or write, and she would not have written either of the rights to food or education in the UDHR if it meant to leave out the other.⁵⁰⁵ In one of the articles she published shortly before her volunteering position in the AAUN, Eleanor Roosevelt literally wrote that education is ‘essential to both health and the improvement of the world food supply’, which augments why she valued the two as both very important.⁵⁰⁶ Long before that 1952, in her first fully written work as First Lady in 1933, this idea(l) already shined through the lines of ‘It’s Up to the Women’ in which Eleanor Roosevelt literally wrote that she saw a ‘national responsibility to educate.’⁵⁰⁷ With the United Nations and its special agencies, Eleanor Roosevelt recognized the potential of the vehicle, if people were willing to make it work. Trude Lash said that because of this strong view, she and more friends made fun of Eleanor Roosevelt when she thought that after her husband’s death she would ‘retire and be really quiet.’⁵⁰⁸ But she added that Eleanor Roosevelt would not have been happy if she would have gotten through with this plan, ‘because she was fully aware of the fact that she had a contribution to make at the highest level of power and that it is important to make one’s contribution where one is able to make it.’⁵⁰⁹

As one of the final remarks in the interview with Soapes, Eichelberger commented about her way of interaction with other people. He wittily said that she was hard of hearing, so when touring the country to promote UN ideas to the U.S. citizens, he would know exactly when she was up for a chat or up for a silent travel, just by observing whether she would keep on her hearing aid. But with respect to how she treated her guests, colleagues, discussants, and so on Eleanor Roosevelt treated everyone who talked ‘sincerely’, ‘with great dignity.’⁵¹⁰ And that brings this part to the interview with Ms. Estelle Linzer, who was a volunteer at the AAUN a little while before ‘the’ Eleanor Roosevelt walked in that one day and all of the sudden was her colleague.⁵¹¹ Eleanor Roosevelt was a much valued addition to the AAUN team, and despite a start in which everyone felt like royalty had asked to

⁵⁰³ Clark Eichelberger, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 4-5.

⁵⁰⁴ Clark Eichelberger, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 7.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ FDR Library, Box 3056: United Nations Material, Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘For Foreign Policy Association: the United Nations and its Special Agencies’ 10 January 1952.

⁵⁰⁷ Cook, *Eleanor Roosevelt: Eleanor Roosevelt: Volume 2*, 7.

⁵⁰⁸ Trude Lash, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 21.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ Clark Eichelberger, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 10-11.

⁵¹¹ FDR Library, Eleanor Roosevelt oral history transcripts, by Dr. Thomas F. Soapes on February 24, 1978 for Franklin D. Roosevelt Library 1, Estelle Linzer, ‘INTERVIEW WITH Ms. Estelle Linzer’.

volunteer – not knowing how to approach or respond to Mrs. Roosevelt – Eleanor Roosevelt quickly won over the hearts of everyone on the work floor and ‘disarmed [Linzer and the other co-workers] completely, because she was so natural. (...) We got over our shyness, because some of us realized she was almost as shy as we were.’⁵¹² Linzer and Roosevelt travelled throughout the United States to promote the United Nations, made speeches from all over the country and taught everyone who wished to learn the tricks of speech writing and public speaking, and referred to her personal teacher Louis Howe for the credits.⁵¹³ The AAUN was mainly an association to find and raise the political support for the United Nations, not really a fund-raising operation.⁵¹⁴ To Estelle Linzer, Eleanor Roosevelt once expressed her wish to enlist more members in the AAUN, a note that made me laugh when I found two letters of her to Henry Morgenthau Jr. –Henry Morgenthau III’s father – and his second wife Marcelle (whom he had married after Elinor Morgenthau had passed away) in which her wish turned out to have come true for these two members.⁵¹⁵ One stemmed from the 25th of October, 1954, in which Eleanor Roosevelt thanked him for his wonderful job as chairman of the Committee of the AAUN in the last few months at her request, and the other from September 10, 1959, to invite the Morgenthau’s to have tea with her and Princess Beatrix of Holland on the 17th and with Mr. Khrushchev of Russia one day later in her residence in Hyde Park.⁵¹⁶

Estelle Linzer expressed her admiration for Eleanor Roosevelt’s warmth and wit in personality and at the same time the quick, analytical and critical mind she possessed, that made her a greater politician than some voices gave her credit for.⁵¹⁷ Throughout her time in the AAUN, according to Linzer, Eleanor Roosevelt was consumed ‘by the obsession that the world had to be made better in a very practical way.’⁵¹⁸ Estelle Linzer continued with an example, that could be used as an example too, for pointing to Eleanor Roosevelt setting forth Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s idea(l)s. The example they discussed involved one of the special agencies of the United Nations, its Children’s Fund, UNICEF.⁵¹⁹ The U.S. public found out that UNICEF was helping the *Polish children* to survive and upset Linzer made the side note, before continuing to the clue of the example, ‘do you realize the idiocy that would make Americans say, “Let’s not support the organization, because they’re feeding communist children.”’⁵²⁰ Eleanor Roosevelt at the time immediately went to UNICEF and said that these Polish children will grow up, because they’re fed and one day ‘sit across the table from American children grown up. And the one thing they are going to remember is that they were kept alive by an organization which had American support, and was started by Americans.’⁵²¹ She added to

⁵¹² Estelle Linzer, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’ 3.

⁵¹³ Respectively, Clark Eichelberger ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 2 & Estelle Linzer, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 16.

⁵¹⁴ Eichelberger, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 8.

⁵¹⁵ Respectively: Estelle Linzer, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 2; FDR Library, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Part III, Series 57: United Nations Material, Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Letter to HM Jr. & Marcelle (October 25, 1954)’ & FDR Library, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Part III, Series 57: United Nations Material. ‘Letter to HM Jr. & Marcelle (September 10, 1959)’.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid.

⁵¹⁷ Estelle Linzer, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 26.

⁵¹⁸ Estelle Linzer, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 25.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Estelle Linzer, ‘INTERVIEW WITH’, 26.

⁵²¹ Ibid. But note that this was a type of ‘U.S. propaganda’ that Berger criticized in his Ph.D. dissertation, for the United Nations is

that, and to the letters of the U.S. public directed to her and UNICEF complaining about their support to save these lives, that she had ‘never met a child who was a communist,’ tearing down their argument.⁵²²

What she hoped to leave behind

Not in *Prospects of Mankind*, but in another television show in 1960, Eleanor Roosevelt made a contributing appearance that was notable after the analyses of her writings, speeches and *Prospects of Mankind* episodes in which she used the word ‘hope’ in titles, questions and answers extensively. As Eleanor Roosevelt put it in an interview with Frank Sinatra: ‘without hope there can be no solution to any of mankind’s troubles.’⁵²³ In this special show, Eleanor Roosevelt was selected number one on the list of most admired women of the world of ‘their time.’⁵²⁴ After songs and dances of the other ladies on Sinatra’s list, Eleanor Roosevelt was the last to come to the stage and chat with host and friend ‘Mr. Sinatra.’⁵²⁵ During the short televised conversation the two of them held, Eleanor Roosevelt would clearly read all her comments from a sign or screen nearby. She smiled from ear to ear being on the stage and jokingly said to Mr. Sinatra that she could not sing or dance, so ‘how could [she] possibly entertain his audience?’ ‘Well, by being you,’ Sinatra replied and he wondered what the one word would be that the woman who travelled more extensively than anyone he knew would leave with the audience that night – which was ‘let’s say... twenty five million people.’ She chose hope, ‘the most neglected word in our language’ and part of the title of one Sinatra’s (children) songs, *High Hopes*, about an ant and its endeavors near the rubber trees. And like the damage caused during the crisis in the Congo, a few months away from this episode, ‘oops there goes another rubber tree plant, so keep your high hopes.’⁵²⁶ In the performance during this entertainment show, Eleanor Roosevelt seemed to be as prepared as when filming her own show PoM, because during the interview between her and Sinatra she clearly seemed to read her answers and song from a screen or sign. For this staged performance, it is then particularly interesting that for his question ‘what one word would you leave behind for let’s say twenty five million people?’ she chose hope. ‘Just hope?’ ‘Yes.’⁵²⁷

Beatrice Braude, the miscellaneous source who had commented on Eleanor Roosevelt’s life in a folder filled with biographies, was someone who had worked with Eleanor Roosevelt for ETV. She wrote that as a ‘symbol of great humanity’ Eleanor Roosevelt had the ‘unique opportunity to assemble about her the great and the wise. As a tactful and knowing hostess, she can induce them to talk together with astounding candor and freedom. Thus it is front of [ETV] cameras she had persuaded

specifically promoted as an organization ‘which had American support, and was started by Americans.’

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ *The Frank Sinatra Timex Show: Here’s to the Ladies* of ABC TV and Timex on February 15, 1960.

⁵²⁴ FDR Library, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Part 2, 1884-1964, Speech and Article

File, 1917-1962, Box 1423, ‘Mrs. Roosevelt and Frank Sinatra’, Frank Sinatra Program, ‘Transcript *The Frank Sinatra Timex Show: Here’s to the Ladies*’ February 15, 1960.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

⁵²⁶ Ibid.

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

[her guests] to speculate, to discuss and to exchange views with her' on the episodes' topics.⁵²⁸ In chapter 2 of this thesis, an explanation of the above description has come about after the analysis of some of the PoM episodes. This source sustained some of the key conclusions I drew from my research, so even though from the source we cannot tell whether or not Eleanor Roosevelt was in on the auditing of the piece, the resemblance between the piece and what I concluded from watching PoM is great, making it safe to say Eleanor Roosevelt used the medium television in the manner she wished to use it.

Conclusion

When the Korean War challenged the United Nations directly, military action of American troops was called in. It is in this example that the limitations and challenges of the UN were for the first time revealed, and the subtle response of pacifist Eleanor Roosevelt in this case provides an insight into the smart, reliant ways of this woman to stay true to her ideals, and implementing opportunities whenever she spotted them.

As became clear in this chapter and the previous ones, Eleanor Roosevelt deliberately left behind tangible products of many of her thoughts in columns, radio broadcasts, speeches, personal writings and the television programs *Prospects of Mankind* and *Eleanor Roosevelt Meets the Public*. Of the latter show no digital relic has been preserved, but only part of the transcript and preparation documents of this broadcast were possible to analyze. Primarily the difference in analysis and perception of the show stood out, but as far as the content was concerned, the same devotion to address critical world events to the public was present, and even though her performance, emotions and body language remain unpreserved, it was clear that before *Prospects of Mankind* Eleanor Roosevelt had gained experience with a similar format: a televised discussion, with expertized guests. In the show of the 50's she selected questions of her audience, however, which made the link to pursuing two-way communicating with her public directly traceable. At the same time, the transcript revealed that the audience did not mention the UN at all in any of their questions, for which her later self-picked questions in PoM might have been to make sure the right questions would come forward and the message she wanted to convey would have the best chance to actually be conveyed, for as a host of the discussion, she was in control of the course of the conversation with her guests.

As to her peace promotions, and promoting the UN as the vehicle to achieve the solution to the Korean War, Eleanor Roosevelt throughout the 1950's showed journalistic expertise in the way she wrote her *My Day* columns, presented infographics in her promotional books on the United Nations and spoke aloud her strong faith in the vehicle and its specialized agencies even when a majority of the crowd was perceived to have an opposing idea. Like Trude Lash explained, after the Second World War and

⁵²⁸ Beatrice Braude, 'Mrs. Roosevelt' FDR Library, Box I, Folder: Miscellaneous. This unexpected source only came to my attention because I was purposefully searching folders that did not directly link to (any of) the topic(s) of my thesis. The fact that this source answered one of the questions of my supervisor, Hilde Harmsen, directly is therefore the perfect example of how looking beyond the boundaries of a topic sometimes leads to a funny and valuable finding – like the Castro letter was for a historian in the FDR Library before me.

the death of her husband, Eleanor Roosevelt devoted the majority of her time in creating immersive products and therewith educating the American people on topics she felt were essential for (future) world peace, for she had the means, popularity and energy to do so.⁵²⁹ It is safe to say that the United Nations, in which Eleanor Roosevelt wholeheartedly believed, was frequently promoted in her abundance of outputs – also when facing the limitations of this organization due to conflicts between her idealistic emancipatory monologue and the realist political conversation among the delegations (or even among the U.S. delegates alone already) of the UN. From the pacifist Trude Lash had known at the beginning of their friendship, she recognized, however, a shift in Eleanor Roosevelt's view to action in the United Nations throughout the Korean War (1950-1955), when the use of arms was accepted by the former first lady of the United States (and even published in a children's book with a approving checkmark) as these means she formerly protested against, had reached the end. This is not the first time Eleanor Roosevelt recognized a limit to the then-current United Nations vehicle, as in the Korean War she did not see in any way how the U.S. could be mandated by the UN justly to interfere in South Korea. Even though this view cost her a spot in the U.S. delegation to the UN in the Eisenhower administration, years after her death this view was shared by experts and the U.S. action in Korea has been noted as an authorization by the UN of an 'American-led defense of the South against the North, permitting the use of the UN name and symbols.'⁵³⁰ Even though this conclusion did not come forward in this research, it was a cornerstone finding to understand why Eleanor Roosevelt was in favor of acting in accordance with the Charter and the resolutions, which was a returning comment she broadcasted on TV. Unfortunately, the question how Eleanor Roosevelt promoted her views on the UN on American television in an earlier series than *Prospects of Mankind* was impossible to answer, for the motion pictures are not preserved, only a small part of the transcript was available and the questions of the audience as were kept in the folder of preparatory material to the episode of 14 January 1951, did not even mention the United Nations. How did Eleanor Roosevelt discuss the United Nations on the medium Television before PoM?

From the memories of friends and colleagues a personality of Eleanor Roosevelt, including her motives for certain of her goals, emerged from the transcripts that not one secondary source I encountered, counter argued. Even Berger's criticism on the spread of American ideals throughout the U.S. did not deny the instrumental use of her personality, skills and popularity to educate the world on matters Eleanor Roosevelt wanted the U.S. citizens to be aware of in the pursuit of world peace. In the position of AAUN volunteer, despite her resignation from the delegation, Eleanor Roosevelt's hard work for the UN did not stop. In her time at the AAUN she had written both books set out in the previous paragraph, to explain the UN to the American Public in 1955 when the country's hope for this machinery had dropped. She continued to write speeches, booklets and articles and gave lectures on Universities throughout the country to students interested in American and Foreign Politics, for as

⁵²⁹ See: Black (ed.), *What I hope to leave behind*, Black (2001); Black, *Casting her own shadow* (1996); Cook, *Eleanor Roosevelt: Vol. 1 & 2*; Black (ed.), 'The Eleanor Roosevelt papers project' (since 2000).

⁵³⁰ Koops et al. (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of United Nations peacekeeping operations*, 115.

Trude Lash noted students were 'idealistic and arrogantly assuming they knew better.' After the AAUN, in 1961 when UN Governor and good friend Adlai Stevenson made her a delegate again, Eleanor Roosevelt returned to professionally promote the United Nations, and broadcasted on the digitized *Prospects of Mankind Series* the implications of the second crisis to the UN: the Congo Crisis, of which a thorough analysis is presented in the thesis above.

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Appendix B. List of PoM Episodes

[Approved Proposal for 9 Programs of NET, Brandeis and WGBH-TV as of August '59]

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>UN-Related*</u>
1.	1959 October	New Possibilities for Coexistence	✓
2.	1959 November	What Hopes for Disarmament?	✓
3.	1959 December	Foreign Aid and Economic Policy	✓
4.	1960 January	Europe Faces East and West	
5.	1960 February	Latin America: Neglected Neighbors	✓
6.	1960 March	Africa: Revolution in Haste	✓
7.	1960 April	The American Image Abroad	
8.	1960 May	China: Shadow on the Summit	
9.	1960 June	The Future of Democracy Abroad	✓

[Approved Proposal for 10 programs of NET, Brandeis and WGBH-TV as of August '60]

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>UN-Related*</u>
10.	1960 September	Britain: Ally or Neutral	
11.	1960 October	European Unity: Obstacles and Goals	
12.	1960 November	The Changing Shape of the United Nations	✓
13.	1960 December	The Scientist and World Politics	
14.	1961 January	Rethinking Our Alliances	
15.	1961 March	The Peace Corps: What Shape Shall it Take?	✓
16.	1961 April	Congo: Challenge to the United Nations	✓
17.	1961 May	The New Aid Policy in Action	✓
18.	1961 September	American Capitalism: Challenged at Home and Abroad	
19.	1961 October	Berlin: What Choice Remains	



[No Official "Approved Proposal" for a third season, but see: final note in Appendix D]

20.	1961 November	United Nations: Future Endangered	✓
21.	1961 December	South Asia in Crisis	
22.	1962 January	Latin Americans Look at Cuba	✓
23.	1962 February	Russia and China: What Does the Future Hold	✓
24.	1962 March	The Future of France	
25.	1962 April	Our Relationship with the Common Market	
26.	1962 May	New Vistas for Television	
27.	1962 June	What Status for Women?	✓

* Legenda on how the episode relates to the UN:

- ✓ = The topic of the episode is the UN / the UN is presented in the episode's title
- ✓ = Starring representatives of or experts on the UN
- ✓ = Other, meaning that the UN was mentioned in the introduction or by earlier researchers who analyzed the episode

Appendix C. Questions for 'Congo: Challenge to the United Nations'⁵³¹



⁵³¹ FDR Library, Henry Morgenthau III Papers Relating to the Television Series: *Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind*, 1959-1962, Box 2, Folder: 'Congo: Challenge to the UN' Correspondence, transcript, Eleanor Roosevelt, 'Suggested questions for the Congo discussion - March 31, 1961' *Prospects of Mankind*.