

Neighborhood Characteristics, Cultural Frames, and the Law-and-Order Vote

How the Influence of Crime, Disorder, and Cultural Diversity on Law-and-Order Voting is Shaped by Cultural Frames In Dutch Neighborhoods

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Abstract:

Recent political geographical research has demonstrated that neighborhood characteristics matter for voting behavior. Despite this, the influence of neighborhood crime, disorder and cultural diversity on voting for parties that emphasize law-and-order remains unclear. Drawing on different traditions, this research adds two cultural-sociological concepts to this line of research: individual cultural frames, and urban cultural climates. The first refers to how individuals' interpretation of their surroundings is influenced by their cultural attitudes, in specific authoritarianism. The second refers the extent to which a city's cultural climate can be seen as progressive or conservative. This climate is then the cultural context in which neighborhood characteristics become framed as problematic or not. This is investigated for Dutch natives by using multilevel analyses that tie together the individual, neighborhood, and city level.

Results show that cultural diversity decreases voting for law-and-order parties in progressive cultural climates. Cultural diversity and disorder decrease voting among non-authoritarian voters and increases it strongly for authoritarian voters. Although former research has focused on populist radical-right parties, results were stronger for the non-populist-radical-right VVD. This research demonstrates that neighborhood problems are not universally experienced as such, but that the problematizing of neighborhood characteristics is influenced by deep-seated cultural attitudes and long-standing cultural atmospheres.

Keywords: law-and-order – voting behavior – cultural frames – urban cultural climates – neighborhood characteristics

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Research in political geography shows that characteristics of neighborhoods and cities matter for voting behavior. Overrepresentation of support for a party in a certain geography (e.g. neighborhood, city, or region) can often not fully be understood by looking at the voter composition of these geographies alone (Van Gent et al., 2014). Characteristics of these geographies themselves are relevant for voting behavior over and beyond characteristics of individuals. For instance, recent research demonstrates that parties with a strong law-and-order rhetoric, e.g. (populist) right and anti-immigration parties, benefit electorally from higher local cultural diversity (Coffé, Heindels & Vermeir, 2007; Rydgren, 2008) and high local crime rates (Dinas & Van Spanje, 2011).

This demonstrates that neighborhood characteristics are particularly relevant for voting for so-called 'law-and-order parties'. The politics of law-and-order parties generally focus on neighborhood characteristics that are commonly associated with disadvantaged neighborhoods. This includes crime, but due to immigration and ethnic diversity, also cultural diversity. Beyond these also disorder, either social or physical, is commonly associated with these neighborhoods. Law-and-order parties are vocal about crime and disorder. These parties are commonly also hardliners on cultural diversity and immigration as these topics deal directly with issues of social order (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Van Assche, Roets, Dhont & Van Hiel, 2014). Voters recognize this political rhetoric as crime and immigration are seen as 'right-wing' issues in the eyes of these voters (Burscher, Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2015; Van der Brug, 2004).

Studies investigating the effect of immigration and crime on voting for parties with a strong law-and-order rhetoric mostly investigate direct relationships between these (Coffé, Heindels & Vermeir, 2007; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000; Rydgren, 2008; Smith, 2010). However, research by Dinas & Van Spanje (2011) suggests that cultural attitudes influence these relationships. A cultural-sociological look at these relationships thus seems essential to understanding these relationships.

Firstly, combining cultural-sociological and communication-science literature has led to the notion of individual cultural frames for understanding how individuals interpret reality. Here frames are understood as "principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters" (Gitlin, 1980, p. 6). According to these studies, different individual cultural frames or predispositions lead individuals to process information differently, culminating in different interpretations and attitudes about the same facts, be it information provision about technology or sentencing regimes (Achterberg, 2014; De Koster & Achterberg, 2015; De Koster, Achterberg & Ivanova, 2014) or contact with ethnic others (Manevska, 2014). This notion of cultural frames seem especially relevant to the current research by being able to influence the interpretation of people's surroundings. It is possible then that the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and voting behavior shows a similar pattern as the examples above where a particular cultural frame makes individuals more likely to problematize neighborhood characteristics, such as cultural diversity. Voting for law-and-order parties would then be moderated by cultural frames.

Beyond individual characteristics, it is also possible there is a distinct urban dimension to the framing of neighborhood characteristics. Research into urban cultural climates has demonstrated that these influence the inhabitants of cities by providing a more or less progressive context which influences

their attitudes and behaviors (Van der Waal and Houtman, 2011; Van der Waal, De Koster and Achterberg, 2013). This means that the urban cultural climate is a phenomenon which exists over and beyond individual characteristics (Florida, 2002, 2004, 2005). In more conservative contexts neighborhood crime, disorder, and cultural diversity may be seen as more problematic than in other contexts. This raises the possibility that the relationship between neighborhood circumstances and voting for law-and-order parties is moderated by these city-level contexts.

Logically, these relationships can be investigated for all residents. However, in line with earlier research this research focuses only on the cultural majority group in the Netherlands (i.e. Dutch natives) for which the relationship between the neighborhood characteristics and law-and-order voting is most salient. This inspires the following research question: *How does cultural framing, through individual cultural frames and urban cultural climates, shape how neighborhood crime, disorder, and cultural diversity affect law-and-order voting among Dutch natives?* In this paper I employ logistic multilevel regression analyses to investigate this research question, but before that I clarify these notions of cultural frames and urban cultural climates in the following theoretical section. I will end with a discussion of the results and the implications for current and further research.

Theory

The issues of law-and-order parties

The issues of crime, disorder, and cultural diversity are central to law-and-order parties. Although few parties, if any, are in favor of high crime rates and disorder, law-and-order parties are those who are most vocal about these issues. In particular law-and-order parties such as right-wing populist parties have “gained a reputation for being ‘tough’ on crime by stressing law and order issues” (Smith, 2010, p. 1475). In fact, studies into issue-ownership demonstrate that crime as a political issue is ‘owned’ by right-wing parties (Smith, 2010; Van der Brug, 2004). In contrast to crime and disorder, the desirability of cultural diversity is much more debated. However, the position of law-and-order parties is clear as cultural diversity can be seen as a threat to the (social) order of a society (Feldman & Stenner, 1997). As such, they “strive for more order in the nation by decreasing ethnic and cultural diversity” (De Koster et al., 2014, p. 587).

Law-and-order parties thus take clear positions on, and are vocal about, these neighborhood issues. It is thus likely that when these issues are more prevalent in a neighborhood, voters will turn towards these parties to help alleviate the problems they experience. This general relationship has been demonstrated before (Rydgren, 2008). Yet, Dinas & Van Spanje (2011) demonstrate that this relationship seems to be particularly strong for individuals that are tougher on crime and advocate stricter integration policies. This implies that the influence of neighborhood characteristics is not universal but that cultural attitudes underlie it. In the following sections I take a cultural-sociological approach and discuss how urban cultural climates and individual cultural frames might affect the problematizing of these neighborhood characteristics

However, before that we formulate the initial set of hypotheses, concerning the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and voting for law-and-order parties. ‘Neighborhood residents’ in these and further hypotheses refer to Dutch natives only:

Hypothesis 1a: Neighborhood crime is positively associated with voting for law-and-order parties among neighborhood residents

Hypothesis 1b: Neighborhood disorder is positively associated with voting for law-and-order parties among neighborhood residents

Hypothesis 1c: Neighborhood cultural diversity is positively associated with voting for law-and-order parties among neighborhood residents

The contextual effect of urban cultural climates

The first possible moderator is based on research in the field of urban studies that investigate the urban variation in cultural attitudes (Florida, 2002, 2004, 2005). These studies demonstrate that cities possess a cultural climate that induces residents to be more tolerant or progressive, depending on the climate – which varies across cities (Sharp & Joslyn, 2008; Van der Waal & Houtman, 2011). This phenomenon is not compositional, i.e. one that merely describes the average tolerance of the residents of a city, it is a phenomenon *sui generis* that affects the cultural attitudes of citizens. This means that it is not simply due to a different composition of individuals living in a city, but that a specific cultural atmosphere socializes individuals of different backgrounds into more or less progressive or conservative attitudes (Florida, 2002, 2004, 2005). As this urban cultural climate affects the attitudes of all citizens, it can be seen as a ‘cultural structure’ (cf. Alexander, 2003) that provides the social context in which citizens learn to interpret and understand their surroundings.

The presence of such a structure makes it plausible that the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and voting for law-and-order parties is not absolute, but possesses a distinct urban dimension. As citizens learn to interpret their surroundings in an urban climate this means that for instance, cultural diversity is collectively and socially interpreted or framed as problematic in more conservative contexts. While not all residents share these norms in equal measure, these contexts do influence all (native) residents (Van der Waal & Houtman, 2011). All residents then gravitate towards the general norm in that context of problematizing cultural diversity, even those that normally might be quite tolerant. Similarly, in more conservative contexts the norm that crime is problematic is more prevalent among all citizens. This pattern might be most easily understood for disorder. In conservative contexts disorder is deemed much more problematic, while in more progressive contexts disorder might to an extent actually be celebrated: e.g. graffiti and squatting as signs of a subversive political identity (Pruijt, 2013).

In short, in cities with a more conservative cultural climate certain neighborhood characteristics might be more likely to become framed and understood by residents as problematic. Vice versa in cities with a more tolerant cultural climate: here disturbances in the social order would be less likely to become

defined as such. This would mean that the residents of cities with a conservative cultural climate are more likely to problematize crime, disorder, and cultural diversity and hence disapprove these (higher) levels sooner than residents living in cities with a more tolerant cultural climate. Consequently, this means that a conservative urban cultural context might compel residents to make the decision to vote for law-and-order parties, in case of a high prevalence of crime, disorder, and cultural diversity in the neighborhood, more readily than those living in progressive contexts.

Based on these expectations we can formulate the following set of hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a: The positive association between neighborhood crime and voting for law-and-order parties among neighborhood residents is stronger as the cultural climate of cities is more culturally conservative

Hypothesis 2b: The positive association between neighborhood disorder and voting for law-and-order parties among neighborhood residents is stronger as the cultural climate of cities is more culturally conservative

Hypothesis 2c: The positive association between neighborhood cultural diversity and voting for law-and-order parties among neighborhood residents is stronger as the cultural climate of cities is more culturally conservative

Individual cultural frames and the interpretation of neighborhood characteristics

Recent research on cultural frames indicates that individual cultural frames or predispositions lead individuals to process information differently, producing different conclusions about the same information (Achterberg et al., 2010; Achterberg, 2014; De Koster, Achterberg & Ivanova, 2014). This line of research argues, based on cultural-sociological literature and communication science literature, that individuals of different backgrounds possess different cultural frames for interpreting everyday life (cf. Goffman, 1974). More concretely: “the same information does not mean the same to everyone—some will be culturally predisposed to accept certain information readily, or to reach a positive conclusion about it, whereas others will find the same information problematic and will discard it or reach a negative conclusion” (De Koster, Achterberg & Ivanova, 2014, p. 4). In this literature on (cultural) frames this argument is commonly employed for interpreting media texts (Hall, 1974) and information provision (Achterberg, 2014; De Koster et al., 2014). However, considering the origins of this argument, which are rooted in interpretation of everyday life (e.g. Goffman 1974), this research line can plausibly be extended to the interpretation of the neighborhood circumstances central to the present study. In all, the empirical evidence for this line of argument is growing: whether it is about informational provision about hydrogen technology (Achterberg et al., 2010; Achterberg, 2014) or suspended sentences (De Koster, Achterberg & Ivanova, 2014), or ethnic diversity in general (Van Assche, Roets, Dhont & Van Hiel, 2014), or via contact with ethnic others (Manevska, 2014) the pattern is clear: cultural predispositions consistently show to be moderating the interpretation of external reality.

In this manner, it is likely that these neighborhood circumstances are more problematic for individuals with specific cultural frames or predispositions that make them more likely to react negatively to certain circumstances and consequently vote for law-and-order parties. In particular, *authoritarianism* serves as a likely frame which could lead individuals to produce different conclusions about neighborhood crime, disorder, and cultural diversity and consequently different voting behavior.

Authoritarianism as cultural frame

The three neighborhood characteristics under study here (crime, disorder, and cultural diversity) all involve threats to the social order. Those people who employ a frame that places great value on this social order are likely to be more prone to spot disturbances in this order. In particular individuals holding more authoritarian attitudes adhere to this view (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006; Feldman & Stenner, 2007).

Authoritarianism is an attitude which stresses the importance of the maintenance of social order and is primarily driven by a regard of the world as highly threatening (Adorno et al., 1950; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Van Assche et al., 2014). Threats to or violations of this order are seen as highly problematic and should thus be prevented or at least punished harshly. Therefore authoritarianism has a low tolerance of non-conformity (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2012). Authoritarianism is regarded as a general social-ideological attitude that advocates a rigid organization of society and is often positioned opposite to libertarianism¹ in a (socio-)cultural political dimension (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2012; Achterberg & Houtman, 2009; Lipset, 1959). Authoritarianism is therefore not merely a policy position, but indicates a broader attitude towards socio-political issues. Beyond the fact that authoritarian individuals are more likely to vote for law-and-order parties (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000), it is likely that in neighborhoods with high crime, disorder, and cultural diversity they are especially inclined to move towards law-and-order parties. Authoritarianism thus serves as a plausible cultural frame that moderates the interpretation of neighborhood characteristics.

The aversion authoritarian individuals have to diversity make them more likely to notice cultural diversity and react negatively towards it. Under influence of a large cultural diversity these individuals would be swayed more readily towards those parties that advocate a clear and *singular* social order, i.e. law-and-order parties. However, the relevance of authoritarians aversion to cultural diversity is not limited to cultural diversity itself.

Various studies have argued that crime and immigration are, in the eyes of citizens, often linked together as corresponding phenomena. Indeed, as crime and immigration can both be seen as indicators of a cultural value dimension then “immigration is closely linked to security. Where the immigrants are concentrated it is assumed that delinquency increases” (Ignazi, 1992, p. 23-24). In addition, Smith (2010) demonstrates that crime and immigration is often successfully (electorally-wise) linked together by populist right parties. He appropriately quotes Mudde (2000, p. 176 in Smith, 2010): “the multi-cultural

¹ Though often understood as an ideology promoting economic liberalism, libertarianism is here understood as culturally libertarianism focusing on individual liberty

Table 1: Hypothesized relationships between law-and-order voting and neighborhood characteristics, and their moderators

<i>Independent variables</i>	<i>Dependent variable</i>		<i>Moderator variables</i>	
	H1: Law-and-order voting	H2: More conservative cultural climate	H3: More authoritarianism	
<i>Neighborhood characteristics</i>				
(a) Crime	+	Stronger	Stronger	
(b) Disorder	+	Stronger	Stronger	
(c) Cultural diversity	+	Stronger	Stronger	

Note: moderator variables moderate the effect of neighborhood characteristics.

society is depicted [in a populist right party newspaper] as a society full of crime and confusion in which the common Dutchman has lost all feeling of belonging and of order.” Even for disorder, this link with immigration has been established. Sampson & Raudenbush (2004) demonstrate that perceptions of disorder are influenced strongly by the proportion of Blacks which makes it likely that those with a dislike of cultural diversity are more sensitive towards crime and disorder as these might be indications of (perceived) negative consequences of cultural diversity. With this cultural frame in mind I can formulate an additional set of hypotheses which describe the possible moderation by this cultural frame of the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and voting for authoritarian parties. In table 1 all hypotheses are shown.

Hypothesis 3a: The positive association between neighborhood crime and voting for law-and-order parties is stronger as individuals are more authoritarian


Hypothesis 3b: The positive association between neighborhood disorder and voting for law-and-order parties is stronger as individuals are more authoritarian

Hypothesis 3c: The positive association between neighborhood cultural diversity and voting for law-and-order parties is stronger as individuals are more authoritarian

Reductionism and the link between cultural contexts and individual cultural frames

The influence of the urban cultural climate, as theorized above, is by providing a context for interpreting reality, above and beyond individual characteristics. However, urban cultural climates affect also the socialization of individual attitudes (Florida, 2002, 2004, 2005), e.g. the ethnocentrism of the lower educated in Dutch cities is moderated by the cultural climate in these cities (Van der Waal & Houtman, 2011). This opens up the possibility that the effect of the urban cultural context moves through the individual cultural frames people employ to interpret their surroundings. However, this does not mean that the cultural climate and the individual cultural frames can be reduced to one another. The effect of an urban cultural climate is possible to influence the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and law-and-order voting in more ways than merely through individual cultural frames, and cultural frames are likely to be shaped by more factors than only the cultural climate. Thus, it is likely that urban cultural

Figure 1: Visual overview of hypothesized relationships between neighborhood characteristics, moderator variables and voting for law-and-order parties



Legend: The main relationship (H1): solid line. Moderator relationships: dashed lines (H2 & H3). Mediator relationship between urban cultural climate and individual cultural frames: dotted line.

contexts influence, but do not wholly shape, the cultural predispositions that are the basis for these cultural frames. With this caveat in mind, these relationships and accompanying hypotheses, which are made visual in figure 1, can be tested.

Data and Methods

The dataset Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Survey (NELLS, wave 1) can be used to test these hypotheses (Tolsma, Kraaykamp, De Graaf, Kalmijn and Monden, 2014). The dataset comprises 5312 individuals picked through a stratified (by degree of urbanization and region) sample of Dutch municipalities (including the four biggest cities: Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht). This makes this dataset very well-suited for a multilevel regression analysis, which includes besides the individual level, also the neighborhood and city level. In total this dataset comprises 265 neighborhoods and 35 cities. These analyses will focus on all native Dutch individuals between the ages 18-47 (with 18 being the minimum voting age in the Netherlands, and 47 the maximum age in the dataset). In the analyses the N differs between 1020-1733, with around 200 neighborhoods. No cities were excluded. See table 3 (below) for detailed information on the number of individuals, neighborhoods, and cities.

The dependent variable is voting for law-and-order parties. I recoded the answers on the item asking respondents “what is your preferred political party?” to create a variable measuring whether the respondent votes for a party that emphasizes law-and-order (coded 1), or for one of the other parties (coded 0). This dichotomous operationalization is normally used in electoral research. I have taken data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP, Volkens et al., 2015) to identify the stance of parties on the issue of law-and-order. The CMP is a data collection effort that, through content analyses of party

manifestos, gathered data on the stances of political parties on various political issues. The dataset indicates per party, per election what percentage of a party's manifesto is dedicated to a particular issue. The CMP distinguishes between positive and negative mentions of these issues in order to detect the party's stances. I have taken the mean of the standardized scores of the measure for positive mentions of law-and-order for the elections of 2003, 2006 and 2010. These three elections were chosen to get a measure of the longer term stance of parties on the issue of law-and-order, as voters might not base their assessment of a party's stance solely on the last election. Although the 2010 election occurs after the data collection, this election was included to account for the (smaller) emphasis parties might put on law-and-order in the political discourse in the wake of the economic and financial crises during and after 2007. These scores indicate that only two parties deviate from the mean by more than one standard deviation (either positively or negatively): the VVD (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy; z-score: 1.07) and the PVV (Party for Freedom; z-score: 2.36). These parties are thus coded as law-and-order in the dichotomous law-and-order variable.

This linear variable of law-and-order indicated that the scores for the VVD and the PVV were strong outliers compared to the rest, hence this violates the assumption of linearity in linear regressions. Because of this, this variable cannot be used to test the hypotheses. However, if we remove these two parties we can investigate if the relationships also exists among the non-law-and-order parties. These analyses will be performed as additional analyses, after the main analyses in the next section.

The neighborhood characteristics were taken from the NELLS dataset and one additional source. Firstly, the NELLS dataset does not include data on crime, so these are taken from Netherlands Statistics (CBS Statline²). These data describe the general crime rate per *municipality*, as there is no complete data on crime rates per neighborhood. As the data collection for the NELLS occurred from end 2008 to begin 2010 I took the average crime rate over 2008 and 2009. Further, the dataset does include questionnaire items concerning neighborhood disorder. A principal component analysis showed that all seven items for the perceived disorder scale belonged to the same dimension (Eigenvalue: 3.01, explained variance: 0.44) and the Cronbach's alpha for this scale is 0.78. Skogan (2015) suggests that individual reporting of neighborhood disorder shows high internal consistency at the neighborhood level. This suggests that the means of perceived disorder can be taken as a good measure of neighborhood disorder. This is confirmed with calculations of the intra-class correlation.³ These analyses showed that when taking the mean of neighborhoods with at least four respondents (native and non-native), this results in an intra-class correlation of 0.72. This is above the recommended threshold (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007) while still maintaining a high N. Hence, the means per neighborhood can be used as a reliable measure of neighborhood disorder. The seven items for neighborhood disorder are:

² <http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=83032NED&D1=2&D2=0,18&D3=6,9,16,64,70,77,80,96,105,118,120-122,141,162,171,175-176,219,229,232,254,261,278,283-284,321,327,330,339,341,358,364,395&D4=3-4&HDR=T,G1,G3&STB=G2&VW=T>

³ Intra-class correlation is calculated with ((between group mean square – within group mean square)/ between group mean square) (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007)

Do the following ever happen in your neighborhood?

1. smudging of walls or buildings
2. disturbances by youth groups
3. damage or destruction of public spaces
4. noise (by local residents)
5. litter, dog poo in the streets
6. nuisance through alcohol and drug use
7. disruptive traffic behavior (speeding, reckless driving, scooters/cars on sidewalk, etc.)

Cultural diversity is measured by taking the percentage of non-native citizens⁴ per neighborhood (in 2009). This measure is included in the NELLS dataset, but originates from Dutch Statistics (CBS).

The moderator variable *authoritarianism* is measured with five items. The first four of which ask respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statements listed below (five answer categories ranging from totally disagree to totally agree). The fifth item asks whether individuals approve or disapprove of the death penalty (four answer categories ranging from always wrong to never wrong). These statements capture authoritarianism as an aversion to disturbances in the rigid social order of a society (e.g. cultural and religious diversity) and the harsh punishments that should follow such disturbances.⁵ The principal component analysis showed that all five items belonged to the same dimension (Eigenvalue: 2.19, explained variance: 0.44) and the Cronbach's alpha for this scale is 0.65. The item on death penalty was recoded to match the scale of the first four statements and the mean was taken of all five items. The five items for this scale are:

1. it is better for a country if everyone has the same habits and traditions
2. it is better for a country if different religious beliefs are present [reversed]
3. it is better for a country if everyone speaks the same common language
4. if a country wants to lessen tensions, the immigration has to stop
5. Do you approve or disapprove of the death penalty?

Lastly, the data on urban cultural climates were taken from the Atlas for Municipalities (Marlet & Van Woerkens, 2008; Marlet, Van Woerkens & Van den Berg, 2011). These atlases include measurements of the bohemian and gay index for the 50 biggest municipalities in The Netherlands that can be used as (reliable) proxy measures for the urban cultural climate (Florida, 2008; Qian, 2013; Van der Waal & Houtman, 2011). These indices measure the share of artists in the labor force or population

⁴ More accurate: Western and non-Western '*allochtonen*': Dutch citizens who are, or of whom at least one parent is, born outside the Netherlands.

⁵ The dataset does include the battery of questions about child-rearing values that are normally used for measuring authoritarianism (Feldman & Stenner, 1997). However, in this survey these items were asked separately instead of the normal bipolar fashion (*ibid.*). Since all these items loaded on one dimension in a principal component analysis they were regarded as unsuitable for measuring authoritarianism.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of main variables

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Party characteristics</i>					
Law-and-order (dichotomous)	10	0.20		0	1
Law-and-order (continuous)	10	3.65	2.68	1	10
<i>Neighborhood characteristics</i>					
Crime (city level)	35	4.75	2.68	1	10
Disorder	137	4.51	1.58	1	10
Diversity	246	3.15	1.59	1	10
<i>Moderator variables</i>					
Conservative cultural climate	20	5.79	2.09	1	10
Authoritarianism	2280	5.55	1.52	1	10

Note: descriptive statistics of control variables in appendix table A1

(bohemian index) and the share of gays in the population (gay index). The bohemian index was measured in 2007 and 2010, the gay index in 2010 only. These three measures were combined in a two-step strategy by first taking the mean of the two bohemian indices and then taking the mean of the resulting scores and the gay index. This balances the relative weight of each indicator. The three measures were first standardized before combining them. Initially Amsterdam was considered an outlier due to its high score, this was corrected by logging (natural log) the final scale as there is no reason to believe Amsterdam is qualitatively different from other Dutch cities. Lastly, as some (smaller) cities in the dataset are not included in the Atlas for Municipalities these towns have the same scores as a bigger city in the vicinity. This was done on the assumption that these smaller cities are still affected by the cultural climate of these primary cities due to their close geographical proximity (almost without exception no more than 10km). This means that in all analyses which include the urban cultural climate the city level includes 20 city-groups instead of 35 separate cities. In the analysis that includes both cultural climate and crime the 15 smaller cities are excluded from the analyses due to the large differences between the crime rates of the larger cities and the smaller cities. The data initially measured the tolerance or cultural progressiveness of an urban cultural climate, hence this variable was reversed to measure cultural conservativeness: higher values means more conservative. All these variables were, similarly as the law-and-order scores, recoded to a 1-10 range to aid interpretation. In table 2 all the descriptive statistics of the main variables are listed.

Control variables and analyses

Control variables are added on all three levels: individual, neighborhood, and city level. Beyond the standard socio-demographic variables (age, gender, marital status etc.), variables controlling for economical explanations (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000) are included as well. These variables include: unemployment, household income (individual level), percentage of unemployment benefit receivers and average income per capita (neighborhood), and unemployment rate and average income per capita (city level). All these data are about 2008. Lastly, on the individual level I control for religious denomination and attendance of religious services as religious attitudes are strongly correlated with authoritarianism,

Table 3: Number of individuals, neighborhood and cities/city-groups for each model

	Individuals	Neighborhoods	City-groups	Cities
<i>Crime^a</i>	1733			35
Conservative climate	1020			20
Authoritarianism	1733			35
<i>Disorder^a</i>	1678	180		
Conservative climate	1678	180	20	
Authoritarianism	1678	180		
<i>Cultural diversity^a</i>	1725	219		
Conservative climate	1725	219	20	
Authoritarianism	1725	219		

Note: city-groups include 35 cities, grouped together into 20 groups.

^a: these rows refer to the regression model that includes no moderators.

although the former drives people towards the religious right and the latter to the secular right (De Koster & Van der Waal, 2007).

The analyses that will be employed are logistic multilevel regressions as individuals are nested in neighborhoods which are nested in cities. Though, this multilevel structure differs per analysis as not all analyses include the neighborhood level. In all analyses with the crime variable individuals are nested in cities, either all 35 cities or only the 20 with progressive cultural climate. All other analyses are done either with individuals nested in neighborhoods, or when progressive cultural climate is included, individuals nested in neighborhoods in cities. City level control variables thus come in two: first for all 35 cities and secondly for the 20 city-groups where some smaller cities are grouped with the larger cities for the progressive cultural climate analyses. Again, the analysis with crime and the cultural climate include not the 20 city-groups but the 20 cities that are the largest per city-group. In table 3 I have listed all the analyses, including the N at each level.

Results

The analyses are performed with logistic multilevel regressions. For the sake of brevity the full results of these analyses are listed in the appendix (tables A2-A4), the main coefficients are listed in table 4. These coefficients describe the coefficients of the three main variables: the neighborhood effect, the direct effect of the moderator variable and the interaction effect between these two. The table lists per neighborhood effect the three models per neighborhood characteristic, the first model does not include the moderator effect nor any interaction effects, so it describes the direct effect of the neighborhood characteristics. The second and third models include interaction effects with conservative climate and authoritarianism. The first models show that the characteristics have a negative effect on law-and-order voting, however these effects are not significant (only disorder on $p < 0.10$ level). To reiterate, the crime variable is measured at city-level and not on neighborhood level, which would have been more in line with the hypotheses.

Table 4: Summary of main coefficients of multilevel regression analyses on law-and-order voting


	Neighborhood characteristic		
	Crime	Disorder	Cultural diversity
<i>Without moderators</i>			
Neighborhood characteristic	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.11+ (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)
<i>Conservative climate</i>			
Neighborhood characteristic	-0.73 (1.59)	-0.30 (0.21)	-0.28 (0.18)
Conservative climate	-0.84 (1.61)	-0.13 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.13)
Neighborhood characteristic *	0.15 (0.30)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)
Conservative climate			
<i>Authoritarianism</i>			
Neighborhood characteristic	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.61* (0.25)	-0.51* (0.24)
Authoritarianism	0.44*** (0.09)	0.17 (0.18)	0.33** (0.12)
Neighborhood characteristic *	0.02 (0.02)	0.09* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)
Authoritarianism			

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

Of the six interaction effects in the second and third models only two are significant ($p < 0.05$). However, these coefficients are difficult to interpret in isolation (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). The coefficients of the neighborhood characteristic variable, the moderator variable and the interaction variable in each model should be taken together to understand the implications for voting behavior. In order to make these results more interpretable the results of these analyses are plotted in figures 2 and 3. The figures plot the predicted values of voting for law-and-order parties for cities with different levels of conservative cultural climates and individuals with different levels of authoritarianism across crime, disorder, and cultural diversity. The figures include three groups of cultural climates and authoritarian individuals (the maximum, the mean, and the minimum scores on these variables). With the Stata package *mlincom* (Long and Freese, 2014) I have calculated for these three groups and an additional four intermediate groups (one and two standard deviations above and below the mean) what the trends are and whether they are significant. These results are listed in table 5. They describe the change in law-and-order voting going from neighborhoods with low to high crime, disorder, or cultural diversity.


Figure 2 show the effects of the neighborhood characteristics on law-and-order voting for minimum, mean and maximum scores on conservative climate. In all three graphs similar patterns are visible: the predicted values of cities with the lowest conservative climates (i.e. progressive) decline and the cities with the highest conservative climate tend to rise (though stays constant with cultural diversity). Although the trends for crime seem the most dramatic, they are not significant as can be seen in table 5. The trends for disorder are only slightly significant, and only for the most extreme values on the progressive side (-2SD: $p < 0.10$; min: $p < 0.10$). On cultural diversity conservative climate does reach

Figure 2: Predicted values of law-and-order voting for different cultural climates across crime, disorder, and cultural diversity



Note: confidence intervals are not featured to prevent clutter. Refer to table 5 for information on significance levels.

Figure 3: Predicted values of law-and-order voting for authoritarian and non-authoritarian individuals across crime, disorder, and cultural diversity.



Note: confidence intervals are not featured to prevent clutter. Refer to table 5 for information on significance levels.

significance. The predicted values for conservative cities do not significantly increase, the predicted values for the progressive cities do significantly decrease (mean: $p < 0.05$; -1SD: $p < 0.05$; -2SD: $p < 0.05$; min: $p < 0.10$). The predicted values for authoritarianism are displayed in figure 3. All three graphs show similar patterns: authoritarian individuals show an increase, non-authoritarian individuals show a (slight) decrease. These effects seem stronger for cultural diversity and disorder than crime. Table 5 confirms this. The trends for crime are not significant for any of the groups of (non-) authoritarian individuals. The trends for disorder are only significant for two out of three groups of non-authoritarian individuals (-1SD: $p < 0.05$; -2SD: $p < 0.10$) and two out of three groups of authoritarian individuals +2SD: $p < 0.10$; max: $p < 0.5$). The trends for cultural diversity are significant for five out of seven groups, only the mean and the +1SD groups are not significant. The other groups range from $p < 0.05$ to $p < 0.01$. All significant effects

Table 5: Change in scores on law-and-order voting for various groups on the moderator variables

	Min.	-2 SD	-1 SD	Mean	+1 SD	+2 SD	Max.
<i>Crime</i>							
Conservative climate	-0.85	-0.79	-0.38	0.06	0.70		0.91
Authoritarianism	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.05	0.12	0.13
<i>Disorder</i>							
Conservative climate	-0.32+	-0.30+	-0.20	-0.11	0.09		0.29
Authoritarianism	-0.11	-0.14*	-0.17*	-0.12	0.14	0.39+	0.41*
<i>Cultural diversity</i>							
Conservative climate	-0.27+	-0.26*	-0.22*	-0.18*	-0.09		0.01
Authoritarianism	-0.04*	-0.07**	-0.10*	-0.03	0.26	0.39**	0.31**

Note: Scores indicate the difference between predicted score on law-and-order voting moving from low to high crime, disorder, cultural diversity neighborhoods. For conservative climate, +2 SD is equal to maximum. See table 1 for descriptive statistics. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

are also substantially large, especially for the authoritarian individuals. For non-authoritarian they are slightly smaller, however since they have low predicted scores even in neighborhoods with low disorder and cultural diversity they show a strong floor effect where values cannot logically be lower than 0.

All in all, even though the results are mixed it is possible to draw some conclusions with respect to the hypotheses. First of all, hypothesis 1a, b, and c can be rejected, as the neighborhood characteristics show no direct positive effect on law-and-order voting. Both the urban cultural climate and authoritarianism show that they can moderate the effects in the hypothesized directions, though these moderation effects are present only for disorder and cultural diversity. Furthermore, these moderation effects appear most strongly for the cultural frame authoritarianism. The cultural climate moderates the effect of disorder and cultural diversity. However, the coefficients of disorder in progressive cities were only slightly significant. The results for cultural diversity on law-and-order voting were more convincing, though the negative effects were present in progressive cities only. Authoritarianism moderates the effects of both disorder and cultural diversity, where the significance is higher for cultural diversity but for disorder the coefficients are higher. Cultural diversity and disorder show effects among both authoritarian and non-authoritarian individuals. Since crime did not show any effects (whether moderated or not) this means that there is no support for hypotheses 2a and 3a. There is some support for hypothesis 2b and 2c (cultural diversity moderated by conservative climates). The strongest support is for hypothesis 3b and 3c: the effects of cultural diversity disorder seem strongly moderated by authoritarianism.

Additional analyses

Issue ownership theory posits that parties may own a particular issue in the eyes of the voters (Van der Brug, 2004). Finding a relationship among the non-law-and-order parties would thus not be expected based on this theory, as these are not likely to be seen to be owning the issues investigated here. The analyses with the linear law-and-order variable, with the two law-and-order parties excluded (not shown) indicate that indeed this relationship does not exist among the non-law-and-order parties, only the

Table 6: Change in scores on law-and-order voting for various groups on the moderator variables (PVV voters excluded)

	Min.	-2 SD	-1 SD	Mean	+1 SD	+2 SD	Max.
<i>Crime</i>							
Conservative climate	-0.53	-0.44	-0.09	0.16	0.56		0.79
Authoritarianism	-0.06+	-0.05	-0.03	0.06	0.21*	0.41**	0.55***
<i>Disorder</i>							
Conservative climate	-0.13	-0.12	-0.06	0.00	0.15		0.31
Authoritarianism	-0.23	-0.2*	-0.14*	0.02	0.44*	0.79***	0.89***
<i>Cultural diversity</i>							
Conservative climate	-0.16	-0.15	-0.09	-0.03	0.16		0.38
Authoritarianism	-0.07*	-0.09*	-0.08+	0.07	0.47*	0.71***	0.73***

Note: Scores indicate the difference between predicted score on law-and-order voting variable moving from low to high crime, disorder, cultural diversity neighborhoods. For conservative climate, +2 SD is equal to maximum. For authoritarianism the minimum and maximum scores are around 3 SD from the mean. See table 1 for descriptive statistics. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$.

authoritarians scoring above the mean show slightly significant ($p < 0.10$) effects of disorder on law-and-order voting. When only the PVV is excluded (and thus VVD included) the analyses with a linear variable show moderation effects by authoritarianism only, but on all three neighborhood characteristics (i.e. even on crime). This indicates that since the relationships are not linear, the issues investigated here seem to be owned by only the VVD and the PVV. Additional analyses with the dichotomous variable, but with the PVV excluded shows even stronger moderation effects than with the linear variable. These results are listed in table 6. Though crime did not show moderation effects in the full analyses above, these are present (and strongly significant) when the PVV is excluded. That the results without the PVV are so much stronger than when both are included implies that these particular neighborhood effects are not only relevant for radical-right parties. In fact, they might even be more relevant for non-radical-right parties like the VVD than for the radical-right.

Discussion and conclusion

In this paper the relationship between the neighborhood crime, disorder, and cultural diversity on the one hand and voting for law-and-order parties on the other, and its possible moderation by cultural frames, either through individual cultural frames or through urban cultural climates, is investigated. Earlier research could not consistently demonstrate the importance of neighborhood characteristics (typically restricted to crime and cultural diversity or other measures of the effects of immigration) for voting behavior. While some research showed consistent effects, others did not. Recent research suggests that this might be possible due to this relationship not being universal, i.e. this effect is not present under all circumstances or might be different between different groups (Dinas & Van Spanje, 2011). The current research adds to this body of literature by demonstrating that especially cultural framing plays a role, mainly on an individual level through authoritarianism but also through urban cultural climates.

In the main analyses only crime did not seem to be moderated by either cultural climates or individual cultural frames. Both disorder and cultural diversity were moderated by authoritarianism. This moderation went in both directions, e.g. authoritarian individuals are more likely to vote for law-and-order parties in culturally diverse or disorderly neighborhoods than in homogeneous or orderly neighborhoods, non-authoritarian individuals are *less* likely to vote for such parties in culturally diverse or disorderly neighborhoods. The non-results for crime was limited to the main analyses, additional analyses that excluded the populist radical-right PVV and thus focused only on the VVD, showed strong, significant, positive effects for authoritarian individuals. However, crime was measured, due to data limitations, on the city level which perhaps diminishes its effect. Although, the problematizing of crime is likely to be less influenced by cultural frames as the desirability of crime much less controversial than disorder and cultural diversity.

The results confirm two things: firstly, the existence of neighborhood effects on voting behavior. Characteristics of neighborhoods have effect on voting behavior. However, these effects depend on the cultural frame of the individual and in the case of ethnic diversity also on the cultural climate. This confirms the second thing, namely that the different results of crime and immigration are most likely due to a lack of moderating variables. Dinas & Van Spanje (2011) showed that this is likely when they tested this with single policy positions on crime and immigration. In this paper this is tested with the more general attitude of authoritarianism. The current measure of authoritarianism consists of items on cultural diversity and capital punishment and constituted a reliable scale. As the single items on crime and immigration used in Dinas & Van Spanje (2011) are strongly related to this, these items could well be two different implicit approximations of an underlying authoritarian attitude. Thus, when investigated, as is done in the current research, with a multi-level model that specifies a broader cultural attitude rather than single policy positions and that also looks at disorder beyond crime and cultural diversity, it is confirmed that such effects are more easily discerned when cultural attitudes and climates, i.e. cultural framing, are taken into account.

The results for the conservative cultural climate, although only present for cultural diversity, imply that at least this neighborhood characteristic is not only interpreted individually through cultural frames, but also collectively, through people socially constructing certain things as more or less problematic. This is in line with the literature on neighborhood effects, that theorize *sui generis* effects of macro-level contexts such as neighborhoods or cities (Sampson 2012; Van Gent et al. 2014). Although this *sui generis* effect of the cultural climate exists on the city level, i.e. a city effect, this is, beyond the general effects of the neighborhood characteristics among certain individuals, additional support for the idea of neighborhood effects.

The negative effects of disorder and cultural diversity among non-authoritarians and in progressive climates show that the prevalence of neighborhood characteristics that are normally associated with disadvantaged neighborhoods might be seen as less problematic after being experienced. In other words, not only might disorder and cultural diversity be initially less problematic for some, when certain neighborhood residents are confronted with this disorder and cultural diversity they seem to experience

these characteristics as even less problematic than before. This ‘defusing’ of the threat of disorder and cultural diversity implies that cultural diversity or disorder might sometimes be a stronger motivation to vote for law-and-order parties in their absence than when actually present. Although, longitudinal/panel studies might be better suited to accurately investigate how people react to changes in disorder or cultural diversity in the neighborhood.

Beyond the theoretical innovations this paper advances several other changes, such as expanding the aim beyond populist radical-right parties by including the conservative/economically-liberal party VVD, which also has a strong law-and-order rhetoric. Results suggests that this was a right choice as the patterns were even more pronounced for this party than for the PVV. Perhaps this is due to the PVV, as populist radical-right party, being a relative outsider with a negative image, contrary to the VVD which is more *bon ton*. It is clear however, that the label law-and-order party can be applied to more than just one party and that effects of crime and immigration etc. can be applied to other parties rather than only ‘idiosyncratic’ populist radical-right parties. A second addition to the literature was the inclusion of disorder. Although crime and disorder are often spoken of together, disorder was hitherto left unexplored. Again this research shows that this was unnecessary. The results show that disorder is also likely to affect voting behavior for law-and-order parties, if moderated by authoritarianism. Further research should consider including this measure beyond indicators of crime and immigration or diversity and consider including parties that do not conform to the label of populist radical-right, but are likely to receive electoral benefits from rising crime, disorder, or cultural diversity etc.

Although neighborhood problems picture frequently in media and politics, these ‘problems’ are not experienced in the same manner by all citizens, nor are the electoral effects of these problems as straightforward as some might assume. The problematizing of certain neighborhood characteristics is influenced by the urban cultural climate and especially strongly by individual cultural frames. This gives insight in how people experience their neighborhood and what factors influence this and how this consequently influences their voting behavior. Thus, public debate about neighborhood problems should take into account that these problems are not universal and do not have universal effects, yet as the experiences of residents are influenced by sometimes deep-seated cultural attitudes and long-standing cultural atmospheres these may prove difficult to change.

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Appendix

Table A1: Descriptive statistics of control variables

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Gender (female=1)	2378	0.53	0.50	0	1
Age	2378	32.8	8.31	18	47
Household income	2146	7.13	3.05	1	16
Education	2378	14.2	3.33	0	22
<i>Marital status</i>					
No partner	2378	0.24		0	1
Married and cohabiting	2378	0.42		0	1
Unmarried and cohabiting	2378	0.22		0	1
Not cohabiting (married or unmarried)	2378	0.12		0	1
<i>Religion</i>					
Non-religious	2378	0.66		0	1
Christian	2378	0.30		0	1
Islam	2378	0.01		0	1
Other	2378	0.03		0	1
Church attendance	2378	1.54	.67	1	5
Egalitarianism	2287	3.28	.69	1	5
Unemployment (city level)	35	4.43	1.04	2.90	6.70
Unemployment (city-group level)	20	5.14	.85	4	6.70
Unemployment (neighborhood level)	242	31.15	12.77	0	67
Income per capita (city level)	35	14.54	.92	13.10	16.80
Income per capita (city-group level)	20	14.31	.92	13.10	15.90
Income per capita (neighborhood level)	244	13.12	1.77	8.20	24.40

Table A2: Logistic multi-level regressions of crime on law-and-order voting (Maximum likelihood)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	3.71*	11.67	1.38
	(1.84)	(27.61)	(1.79)
Crime	-0.06	-0.73	-0.13
	(0.05)	(1.59)	(0.10)
Conservative climate		-0.84	
		(1.61)	
Crime * Conservative climate		0.15	
		(0.30)	
Authoritarianism			0.44***
			(0.09)
Crime * Authoritarianism			0.02
			(0.02)
Gender (1=female)	-0.34**	-0.26	-0.16
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.13)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Household income	0.07*	0.06	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Education	-0.06***	-0.07**	-0.03+
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
<i>Marital status</i> (ref=no partner)			
Married and cohabiting	-0.47*	-0.28	-0.51*
	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.21)
Unmarried and cohabiting	-0.20	-0.14	-0.18
	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.22)
Not cohabiting (married or unmarried)	-0.02	-0.05	-0.12
	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.22)
<i>Religion</i> (ref=non-religious)			
Christian	-0.49**	-0.49*	-0.66***
	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.18)
Islam	0.07	-0.07	0.11
	(0.73)	(0.74)	(0.74)
Other	-1.02*		-1.15*
	(0.51)		(0.53)
Church attendance	-0.36**	-0.33*	-0.34**
	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.13)
Egalitarianism	-0.70***	-0.73***	-0.80***
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Unemployment (city level)	0.03	0.10	-0.02
	(0.14)	(1.09)	(0.13)
Income per capita (city level)	-0.03	-0.31	-0.07
	(0.11)	(1.53)	(0.11)
City-level variance	0.23**	0.00	0.17*
	(0.09)	(.)	(0.08)
Random effect of crime at city-level		0.82	
		(.)	
-2LL	1810.45	1144.48	1643.95

Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Full information about the N on all three levels in table 3.

Table A3: Logistic multi-level regressions of disorder on law-and-order voting (Maximum likelihood)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	3.26** (1.05)	3.24 (2.97)	0.66 (1.50)
Disorder	-0.11+ (0.07)	-0.30 (0.21)	-0.61* (0.25)
Conservative climate		-0.13 (0.16)	
Disorder * Conservative climate		0.04 (0.04)	
Authoritarianism			0.17 (0.18)
Disorder * Authoritarianism			0.09* (0.04)
Gender (1=female)	-0.37** (0.12)	-0.37** (0.12)	-0.18 (0.13)
Age	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Household income	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)
Education	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.04+ (0.02)
<i>Marital status</i> (ref=no partner)			
Married and cohabiting	-0.40+ (0.21)	-0.44* (0.21)	-0.48* (0.22)
Unmarried and cohabiting	-0.17 (0.21)	-0.20 (0.21)	-0.17 (0.22)
Not cohabiting (married or unmarried)	-0.02 (0.21)	-0.02 (0.21)	-0.14 (0.22)
<i>Religion</i> (ref=non-religious)			
Christian	-0.41* (0.17)	-0.48** (0.17)	-0.59** (0.18)
Islam	-0.02 (0.76)	-0.10 (0.73)	0.09 (0.77)
Other	-1.15* (0.51)	-1.08* (0.51)	-1.17* (0.53)
Church attendance	-0.31* (0.12)	-0.32** (0.12)	-0.31* (0.13)
Egalitarianism	-0.73*** (0.10)	-0.72*** (0.10)	-0.82*** (0.10)
Unemployment (neighborhood level)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Income per capita (neighborhood level)	0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Unemployment (city-group level)		0.04 (0.16)	
Income per capita (city-group level)		0.02 (0.16)	
District-level variance	0.23* (0.10)	0.00 (0.00)	0.14 (0.09)
Random effect of disorder on city-group-level		0.01 (0.01)	
City-group-level variance		0.09***	

		(0.00)	
-2LL	1768.98	1738.95	1593.80

Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Full information about the N on all three levels in table 3.

Table A4: Linear multi-level regressions of cultural diversity on law-and-order voting (Maximum likelihood)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	3.09** (0.98)	2.07 (3.01)	-0.45 (1.23)
Cultural diversity	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.28 (0.18)	-0.51* (0.24)
Conservative climate		-0.05 (0.13)	
Cultural diversity * Conservative climate		0.03 (0.03)	
Authoritarianism			0.33** (0.12)
Cultural diversity * Authoritarianism			0.09* (0.04)
Gender (1=female)	-0.33** (0.12)	-0.32** (0.12)	-0.15 (0.13)
Age	-0.02+ (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Household income	0.08* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)
Education	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.04+ (0.02)
<i>Marital status</i> (ref=no partner)			
Married and cohabiting	-0.40+ (0.21)	-0.43* (0.20)	-0.43* (0.22)
Unmarried and cohabiting	-0.16 (0.21)	-0.19 (0.21)	-0.13 (0.22)
Not cohabiting (married or unmarried)	0.01 (0.21)	0.00 (0.20)	-0.10 (0.22)
<i>Religion</i> (ref=non-religious)			
Christian	-0.44* (0.17)	-0.49** (0.17)	-0.62*** (0.18)
Islam	0.13 (0.77)	0.07 (0.74)	0.05 (0.80)
Other	-1.15* (0.51)	-1.05* (0.51)	-1.20* (0.53)
Church attendance	-0.33** (0.12)	-0.34** (0.12)	-0.32* (0.13)
Egalitarianism	-0.71*** (0.10)	-0.71*** (0.09)	-0.80*** (0.10)
Unemployment (neighborhood level)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Income per capita (neighborhood level)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)
Unemployment (city-group level)		0.13 (0.16)	
Income per capita (city-group level)		0.07 (0.17)	

District-level variance	0.26*	0.00	0.16+
	(0.10)	(0.00)	(0.09)
Random effect of cultural diversity on city- group-level		0.00	
		(0.00)	
City-group-level variance		0.25***	
		(0.00)	
<hr/>			
-2LL	1826.66	1795.07	1646.51

Standard errors in parentheses; + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; Full information about the N on all three levels in table 3.