ON THE VERGE OF POWER: WENDELL WILLKIE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Internationalism, ideology and American foreign policy (1940-1944)

Rebecca Audier

Master thesis Global History and International Relations
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Preface

Since I have always been intrigued by those who go against the tide and follow their own path, I immediately took an interest in Wendell Willkie when he was first introduced to me when searching for a topic for my master thesis. Regardless of criticism and sometimes even mockery, Willkie stayed true to his ideals. Inspired by his ideals and fascinated by his views on America’s role in the world, this led me to research the connection between Willkie and American foreign policy in my master thesis.

My gratitude for finishing my master thesis goes out to both dr. Ferry de Goey and prof. Ben Wubs for the enjoyable and informative research workshops on the rise and fall of the American empire. Special thanks to my thesis supervisor dr. Ferry de Goey for his supervision, critical remarks and his patience in answering all of my slightly chaotic and panicked e-mails. Also, I want to thank dr. Dario Fazzi of the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg for his patience and his guidance through the numerous collections available there and his aid during my internship.

Last but surely not least, I would like to thank my family. My parents for their help with getting me through my rather lengthy college career. My father for creating an intellectually stimulating environment with endless discussions and lectures on trivial facts, and through it spiking my interest in history. My mother for putting everything in perspective and putting up with so many phone calls on my past, present and future worries. And of course, my two best friends and at the same time my big sisters, Esther and Charlotte, for always being there when things get tough.

Rebecca Audier

Rotterdam, June 22, 2016
1. Introduction

1.1 Inspiration Wendell Willkie

*Freedom is an indivisible word. If we want to enjoy it, and fight for it, we must be prepared to extend it to everyone, whether they are rich or poor, whether they agree with us or not, no matter what their race or the color of their skin.* – Wendell Willkie, 1942

In a time where political outsider Donald Trump is successfully making his way to the American presidential elections as the Republican candidate by pressing on the divide of people, black and white, American and ‘foreigners’, it is interesting to look back at another presidential dark horse the Republican Party was not thrilled about, but for opposite reasons: Wendell Willkie. On the complete opposite of the spectrum as Trump, Willkie fought for freedom and equality for all people, of every race and religion, and for every nation alike. Where Trump wants to withdraw America from the international arena, Willkie pushed for more international cooperation through the means of internationalism as foreign policy ideology. Willkie, a Democratic corporate lawyer who became the Republican presidential candidate in 1940, lost the election to President Franklin Roosevelt but stayed on as political leader of the Republican Party. With his internationalist ideas on foreign policy, coming out as loyal opposition to Roosevelt after the lost election, he frustrated the Republican establishment greatly.

Willkie’s loyal opposition to Roosevelt can best be explained by looking at Willkie’s views on foreign policy: he was an idealist with an international focus which he shared with his political opponent Roosevelt. Willkie is most known for his world tour in 1942 which he made as Roosevelt’s special representative, which led to the publication of his best-seller book *One World*. The travelogue meets opinion piece *One World* described Willkie’s ideas and ideals for American foreign policy during World War II and in the post-war world order. Roosevelt and Willkie’s political cooperation on foreign policy after the election of 1940 is unique in American history, but hardly researched.

Despite his best-seller, despite the uncommon bipartisanship between Roosevelt and Willkie and despite his inspiring idealism, Willkie seems to be forgotten over time. This thesis attempts to shed a new light on the importance of the remarkable character of Willkie in American politics and add to the knowledge of American foreign policy in 1940-1944. The
main title of this thesis, *On the verge of power: Wendell Willkie and American foreign policy*, can therefore be interpreted in two ways. First, Willkie’s candidacy for the presidency in 1940 and his close cooperation with Roosevelt during the subsequent years kept him close to those in power. Secondly, America was on the verge of gaining a very important, powerful position in international politics in this period.

1.2 Research question

Early in the research process for this thesis it became clear that Roosevelt and Willkie cooperated on matters of foreign policy. Therefore, the assumption made in this research is that Willkie, although not in an official position as member, influenced the foreign policy of the Roosevelt Administration. Because of this known closeness of Willkie to the executive political order, especially to President Roosevelt, the research question of this thesis is as following: to what extent did Wendell Willkie’s internationalist ideals influence American foreign policy in the period 1940-1944? The research question is answered by investigating Willkie’s views on foreign policy and Roosevelt’s foreign policy. The relationship between Roosevelt and Willkie can be seen as an indication to what extent and on which occasions Willkie influenced American foreign policy in this period.

1.3 Main concepts

1.3.1 Internationalism

Central to both Willkie’s and Roosevelt’s foreign policy views was the internationalism ideology. Internationalism and its counterpart isolationism is a hot topic within the field of American foreign policy and sparks a lot of debate among scholars until this day. There has been a great amount of scholarly research done on foreign policy ideology and the dichotomy of internationalism versus isolationism.

In this thesis Burley’s definition of internationalism is used, who describes internationalism within the United States foreign policy vocabulary as an orientation on international cooperation, made possible by the use of international law, political and economic international institutions and a reticence when it comes to using military force when it comes to conflicts.¹ For describing isolationism Gale’s definition is used. Gale states

that American isolationism means the belief and practice that interaction with other countries should be limited in order to stay neutral in times of crises and therefore benefit the national interest and security.\(^2\) More on the scholarly debates surrounding this topic and the choice for maintaining these concepts in this thesis can be found in the following historiography.

1.3.2 Foreign policy
Within this thesis the definition of foreign policy of Ghosh is used, who states that foreign policy is the set of actions and decisions to reach the goals the state has when it comes to people, materials and territories beyond its own borders.\(^3\) Adding to this simplistic definition, Padelford and Lincoln describe foreign policy as the process to achieve national objectives outside of a state’s jurisdiction. These objectives differ per foreign territorial unit. In making a foreign policy a state will make an estimate of its own power (1), the accepted principles of political conduct (2), the specific national interest in a specific international relation (3) and a general course for world affairs (4). Foreign policy does not only contain national objectives, but it also entails the strategies and tactics to reach these objectives.\(^4\) Within this thesis American foreign policy is debated mostly through literature on Roosevelt’s presidency, seeing that Roosevelt was the Commander in Chief in the period 1940-1944 and therefore maintained the responsibility of creating foreign policy.

1.3.3 Ideology
Ideology has an important role as factor of influence on the creation of distinct foreign policy discourses.\(^5\) Goldstein and Keohane argue that “ideas influence policy when the principled...
or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors’ clarity about goals or ends, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in political institutions”. Wittkopf shows in *Faces of internationalism: public opinion and American foreign policy* that ideology correlates with foreign policy discourses. To divide ideological strands, Wittkopf uses the distinction between liberals, who support interventionism and internationalism, and conservatists, who support non-interventionism and isolationism. Liberal ideology thus correlates with the foreign policy discourse of internationalism, while conservative ideology correlates with the foreign policy discourse of isolationism.

Ideology is a concept within international relations which knows many definitions. Converse called it a belief system which is formed by a configuration of ideas and attitudes which know a certain common denominator. As such, Jost, Nosek and Gosling call it a ‘system of beliefs’, while Rokeach uses the definition ‘organization of beliefs’. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford’s definition in *The authoritarian personality* is a bit more specified by saying ideology is a way of thinking about man and society.

In their article ‘Defining and doing the history of United States foreign relations: a primer’, Costigliola and Paterson describe that there is the international, national, regional and the individual level of analysis within the field of foreign policy scholarship. On the individual level of analysis of foreign policy Costigliola and Paterson describe ideology as key to analyzing an actor’s, in the case of this thesis Roosevelt’s, style of diplomacy which in turn shapes their foreign policy. To fully understand the make up of a style of diplomacy it is necessary to study a person’s personality, ideology, political ties and ambitions and others. Not only that, but it is also needed to study the shared traits and ideals that such persons had with their supporters and allies. Within this thesis American foreign policy is analyzed on this individual level as Costigliola and Paterson describe. This will be done by looking at

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Roosevelt’s background, personality, method of decision making and his foreign policy ideology. And of course, the traits and ideals Roosevelt shared with Willkie.

1.3.4 Influence

Many political science studies have focused on the issue of measuring influence. Most commonly, these scholars have researched economic influences on policy making. Helmers, Mokken, Plijter and Stokman define influence as the ability to contribute to the process of making policy choices. Where power is the ability to restrict or enlarge the choice options for policymakers, influence can be used to alter or create choices. This influence can be researched by looking at communication and interaction between influencer and influencee. They also state that leading theories on power and influence have taken a personal approach, instead of looking at the bigger units of power and influence of which individuals are part of. For example, studies should not look at the influence of a single businessman but look at the influence of the industry which he represents. This approach is convenient when analyzing institutional influence, seeing that the economic power of an industry or institution determines the level of possible influence they could have. Less so, when researching inter-political influence.

Gilens and Page divide the scholarly work on influence on American politics into four schools of theory: majoritarian electoral democracy, economic-elite domination, majoritarian pluralism and biased pluralism. Main results of their research on each of these theories are that economic elites have substantial influence on American policy while interest groups consisting of average citizens have little.

Another highly researched subject on the matter of influence on American policy, is the role of the media. Media studies have investigated the power of media outlets on public opinion and elite policy preferences. As such, the research of Robinson shows that media influence on policy is most likely to occur when it is concerned with topics which are already

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in the interest of the elite. Thus, both the economic and media approach to influence on American policy indicate that the elite is in the best position to influence policy.

In this thesis Banfield’s definition and, with it, his method of influence measurement is used. In *Political Influence*, written in 1961, Banfield defines influence as the ability to get others to act, think or feel as the influencer wants. Banfield states that the matter of influence is very important in American politics seeing that there was a lot of disagreement within Administrations and governmental authority was fragmented before and at this time. Banfield constructed a conceptual framework by which political influence can be measured. Banfield’s provides an analysis of influence for the urban political system, but for this thesis his method is extended to the national political system. For his influence analysis he sets up criteria of relevance in the form of four questions when assessing a persons influence on policy. Who has influence and who is subject to it (1), how is the influence administered (2), what are the the terms of influence (3) and how is action concerted by influence (4). Within this thesis Willkie is seen as the person who is influencing and the subject of his influence is American foreign policy which is investigated as a product of Roosevelt’s administrative power. For the administering power of the influence Banfield makes different categories on which the influence rest: by a sense of obligation and authority, through gratification and friendship, through rational persuasion on the basis of logic, by suggestion, fraud or deception on the basis of subjective information. The third criterion of influence is the question of the terms of influence, which can be found by looking at what the capabilities of the person whose influence is measured are in respect to influencing. Within this thesis this is done by looking at Willkie’s contacts with Roosevelt, seeing that Willkie was not in a position to determine policy himself as member of the Administration. And the last criterion of how the influence has concerted action is looked at by researching what the consequences were of Willkie’s influence on Roosevelt.

1.4 Historiography

The main subjects of this thesis are Wendell Willkie (1), Franklin Roosevelt (2), internationalism (3) and American foreign policy around 1940-1944 (4). In this

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historiography special attention is given to debates concerning the concepts of internationalism and isolationism.

1.4.1 Wendell Willkie
To get a sense of who Wendell Willkie was it is most convenient to draw from the biographies and essays about his personal and political life, seeing that Willkie made little to none autobiographical writings. Multiple biographies have been written on Willkie, which are used in this thesis to construct an image of his character, his views on foreign policy and his political achievements. Neal, writer of the biography of Willkie *Dark horse*, is very laudatory about Willkie. He describes him as the man who made America unified in its purpose in World War II. Neal praises Willkie’s passion, eloquence and convictions throughout his book, seldom being critical about him. In describing Willkie he regularly uses positive quotes from important political figures such as Franklin Roosevelt and Dwight Eisenhower to underscore that many shared his own opinion of Willkie as a wartime hero.\(^\text{17}\)

The work of Barnes, author of *Willkie, the events he was part of- the ideas he fought for*, describes Willkie’s metamorphosis from corporate lawyer into political crusader for internationalist ideals. Seeing that Barnes was a friend of Willkie and had travelled with him on his world tour, Barnes is in possession of otherwise unrecorded inside information. The downside to this position however, is the fact that his view of Willkie is tainted due to his personal connection with his subject.\(^\text{18}\)

A more critical work on Willkie is Madison’s edited volume *Wendell Willkie, Hoosier internationalist*, in which multiple authors shed light on different phases and aspects in Willkie’s life, both his private life as his public political career. Gregory, contributor to Madison’s *Wendell Willkie*, is critical on the sincerity of Willkie’s idealist views on the world and regularly points out the cunningness of Willkie’s political actions.\(^\text{19}\)

Political scientist Johnson’s *The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie* describes Willkie’s political career mainly by focusing on the ongoing conflict between Willkie’s political liberalism and the conservatism of the Republican Party. Johnson credits Willkie for the shift towards international cooperation and a more liberal domestic policy in the Republican Party.

\(^{17}\) Steve Neal, *Dark horse, a biography of Wendell Willkie* (New York 1984) vii-viii.

\(^{18}\) Joseph Barnes, *Willkie, the events he was part of- the ideas he fought for* (New York 1952).

program. Seeing the build-up of this thesis, the historiography concerning Willkie is extended further in chapter 2, combining it with information found in primary sources.

While multiple authors have researched Willkie, Moscow’s *Roosevelt and Willkie, the precedent breaking presidential campaign of 1940- its antagonists, its battles, its impact* is the only work completely devoted to the relationship between Roosevelt and Willkie. The downside to Moscow’s work is that it is focused on the presidential campaign in which Roosevelt and Willkie were competitors, and he only concludes his book with an analysis of the personal relationship between the two during their unique political cooperation in the period 1940-1944.\(^\text{21}\)

Although the cooperation between Roosevelt and Willkie is mentioned and elaborated on in scholarly literature on Willkie, little attention is given to the personal relationship between them. While the authors do mention Willkie’s political achievements in supporting Roosevelt’s foreign policy, they have not researched the extent of Willkie’s influence on foreign policy. Their research has been isolated on the subject of Willkie’s political career, rather than linking Willkie’s political achievements to Roosevelt and American foreign policy in general. In chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis, the relationship and cooperation on foreign policy between Willkie and Roosevelt will be elaborated on further by combining historiographical information found in secondary sources and combining this with primary sources.

### 1.4.2 Franklin Roosevelt

With an unprecedented four presidential terms, leading America out of the Great Depression and into World War II, Franklin Roosevelt is one of the most discussed American presidents in scholarly literature. Many historians have tried to fathom Roosevelt’s foreign policy, but all experience difficulty in doing so. Even those close to Roosevelt never seemed to fully grasp the logic by which Roosevelt proceeded. For example, Francis Perkins, Secretary of Labor, called him “the most complicated man I ever met”. Hugh Johnson, Army general and speechwriter for Roosevelt, described him as a “lonely” spirit”. Robert Sherwood, also speechwriter for Roosevelt, mentioned that “his [Roosevelt’s] character was

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\(^{21}\) Warren Moscow, *Roosevelt and Willkie, the precedent breaking presidential campaign of 1940- its antagonists, its battles, its impact* (1968).

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not only multiplex, it was contradictory to a bewildering degree”. Seeing that Roosevelt did not make any autobiographical writings and preferred face-to-face or telephonic contact to writing, accounts on his character and reasoning depend mostly on the people who surrounded him.

Seeing the thematic structure of this thesis a more elaborate historiography on Roosevelt can be found in chapter 3. In this chapter Roosevelt’s personal and political characteristics are set apart by drawing on leading scholarly works on Roosevelt such as Dallek’s *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy 1932-1945*, the essay collection edited by Woolner, Kimball and Reynolds, *FDR’s world, war, peace, and legacies* and Burns’ *Roosevelt, the soldier of freedom 1940-1945* and Schulte Nordholt and Gordenker’s *FDR’s place in past and present, an evaluation forty years after his death* and Cole’s *Roosevelt and the isolationists, 1932-45*. These and other works give a sense of Roosevelt’s personal and political incentives and are concerned with his role in constructing American foreign policy during his presidency. Debatable subjects within the field of Roosevelt research, such as whether Roosevelt was a realist or idealist, are elaborated on further by setting forth the different views within these scholarly debates. For this Harper’s *American visions of Europe* and Schlesinger’s, ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt: the education of a statesman’ are used.

In the existing scholarly literature concerning Roosevelt, Willkie is often only a mere footnote. Willkie is mainly mentioned in Roosevelt literature as opponent in the presidential election of 1940. A few authors mention Willkie as supporter of Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease Bill, but none go into depth on the personal and professional relationship between Roosevelt and Willkie. Seeing the shortage of research on this matter, there is still a lot that can be done.

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1.4.3 Internationalism
Within the United States foreign policy vocabulary internationalism is described as an orientation on international cooperation, made possible by the use of international law, political and economic international institutions and a reticence when it comes to using military force when it comes to conflicts. This body of thought was first developed by Immanuel Kant. Kant’s ideas on internationalism were based on his hope that states could someday form a free federation in which extensive commercial ties and common laws would ensure a peaceful situation in the long run. Kant was not naïve when it came down to international cooperation. He assumed that states would always do what was in their self-interest, but he thought that when certain preconditions of co-existence were met, each would try to reach their own goals in a peaceful way. The preconditions for such a free federation were that the world should consist out of free republics with an organized government (1), a market economy (2) and equal rights for every civilian living in these states (3). Burley states that although Kant’s internationalism was subjected to changes since the eighteenth century, the key points of international cooperation, such as equal rights and a free market economy, remained. These internationalist ideas were the vocal points in foreign policy for multiple American presidents in the twentieth century, such as Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt.

Hughes states that internationalism in America, which reached American shores in the nineteenth century through British liberalism, rose in popularity quickly since it was an ideal veil for promoting national interest. Through the idiom of internationalism, which made it seem that international cooperation meant rising above self-interest, America was in fact able to enhance its national interest. Its national interest was enlarged through the promotion of American values on a global scale and thus enhancing international trade and national welfare. According to Hughes, the internationalist world aspired was in fact America at large.

Internationalism can thus be defined as the theory and practice of communication and cooperation between states. The proponents of internationalism believe that nationalism should make room for internationalism because people are bound together globally in a

stronger sense than they are nationally. The hardline internationalist theory suggests cooperation and communication with foreign entities rises above cultural, racial and social differences and benefits all. According to Arora there are two main currents within internationalism: the liberal and the socialist view on internationalism. Liberal internationalism is based on the idea that the rights and needs of the individual are higher than the state’s sovereignty, so the people should come before the needs of the state. The socialist internationalism uses internationalism as a way to explain international class solidarity. Internationalism is often linked to idealism for it stands for global peace through international cooperation.28

Holbraad adds a third, less known, kind of internationalism: conservative internationalism. This type of internationalism is less ideological than liberal and socialist internationalism, seeing that it focusses less on what international relations ought to be like, but focusses more on what kind of international relations already exist. An example of this conservative internationalism is seen in the fact that in international relations it had been a unwritten rule that the victors of a war, shaped the peace. Once it became clear for the big Allied nations that their chances on defeating the Axis were great during World War II, they decided, following the conservative internationalist idea, to secure their dominant position in constructing the post-war world order.29

Holbraad states that the three types of internationalism can be divided by another distinction which can be made depending on the purpose of the international cooperation that is desired. Holbraad sees internationalism as ‘the ideology of international bonding’, either for maintaining the status of the international order or for changing the international society. Different from cosmopolitanism, which focusses on the collective society of human beings on a global scale, internationalism’s goal is to affect the international order by exceeding state-centric structures and, while using the existing system of nation states, creating a global network of tight international relations to deal with affairs concerning welfare and security. Conservative internationalism’s main purpose of international cooperation falls into the category of maintaining the status quo of the international order,

28 Arora, Political Science, 2-3. In his article ‘Our sovereignty: shall we use it?’ Willkie explained his viewpoint on American sovereignty and discusses the way in which sovereignty will not falter but will grow in strength by cooperating with other sovereign states on issues such as trade and security. See Wendell Willkie, ‘Our sovereignty: shall we use it?’, Foreign Affairs, 4 (1944) 347-361.
29 Holbraad, Internationalism and nationalism in European political thought, 22-25.
while liberal and socialist internationalism share the purpose of altering the international society. In this thesis the liberal view on internationalism is used, due to the fact that both Roosevelt and Willkie are believed to be liberals.

Isolationism means that interaction with other countries is limited in order to stay neutral in times of crises and therefore benefit the national interest and security. Isolationism as foreign policy strategy is said to have been the dominant foreign policy discourse in America in the interwar years. The scholarly debate surrounding the isolationism-internationalism dilemma focusses on the question whether or not it is justified to call America’s foreign policy in the interwar period predominantly isolationist or whether it was internationalist all along. Although the majority of scholars state that America focused more on domestic politics than on international politics in the first decades of the twentieth-century, hence they had a more isolationist policy, there are multiple scholars who believe that America’s isolationism is in fact a myth.

Adler for one states that the American government stayed clear of international cooperation on the issue of security and rising conflict with the European mainland in this period, but this did not mean they did not maintain international relations with the Eastern Hemisphere. Johnson claims American isolationism is a myth, seeing that the ‘isolationists movement’ within American politics at the time can be explained by an accidental chain of events rather than a national agreement to withdraw from the world stage. This chain of events started with the rejection of membership to the League of Nations by the United States after World War I and the Depression that followed in the 1930s. The fear of further economical breakdown which could be caused by meddling in wars beyond the own borders caused the United States to withdraw itself somewhat from international affairs. Johnson argues that with the exception of a few years during the 1930s which can be called isolationist, the United States have always wanted and intended to take part in world affairs. Johnsons argument is mostly concerned with the definition of isolationism, he does

30 Holbraad, Internationalism and nationalism in European political thought, 1-4.
34 Johnson, ‘The myth of American isolationism, reinterpreting the past’, 159-164.
not disagree that the United States did develop a more introspective posture in the 1930s. The same goes for Murray and Millet’s attack on the term isolationism when talking about the dominant foreign policy discourse in the interwar period. Murray and Millett do admit there were isolationist forces at work in American foreign policy, but point out that the internationalist train of thought was still much more dominant in creating foreign policy.35

In essence the range of studies done on the subject of foreign policy ideology, make use of this dichotomy although the conceptualization differs. For example, the research of Bjereld and Ekengren describe the dichotomy in foreign policy ideology in terms of militant and cooperative ideology.36 Hurwitz and Peffley use the concepts of militarism and isolationism, where Herrmann, Tetlock and Visser divide the ideology dimensions in isolationism versus accommodationalism.37 Due to the debate around the term isolationism and the correctness of using it in foreign policy context, scholars such as Klingberg have spoken about it in euphemistic terms, such as “introvert moods” which stand for isolationist policies versus “extravert moods” which stand for internationalist policies.38 Concluding, it seems that the isolationism-internationalism debate is primarily an issue of semantics, seeing that scholars agree on the fact that there was a dichotomy in the focus of American foreign policy at the time. For the ease of writing therefore, in this thesis the terms internationalism and isolationism will be maintained.

1.4.4 American foreign policy discourse
The practice of foreign policy, such as the build up of national defense mechanisms and intervention decisions, is formed and justified through discourse. The position of ideology within foreign policy discourses has been subject to debate since the origins of geopolitical writing in the nineteenth century. On the one side of the debate, publicized by scholars such as Ratzel and Mackinder, is the claim that a foreign policy discourse is predominantly the result of the natural environment and geographical setting of state. On the other side, as for

example Gray claims, there is the idea that foreign policy discourse is mostly based on idealism and ideology.39 Tuathail and Agnew, partisans of the latter view on the origin of foreign policy discourse, state that it is important to acknowledge the role of the Presidency in American geopolitical reasoning. Within American politics, the President is the most preeminent in presenting a foreign policy discourse to answer to crises in geopolitics. The historically set sanctity of the role of the American President, and with it the media’s long history of adopting the President discursive, gives the President the opportunity to shape the foreign policy discourse.40

Reynolds explains America’s change of foreign policy discourse towards internationalism by highlighting four factors needed for discourse change: international environment (1), intentions (2), interests (3) and institutions (4). According to Reynolds the international environment after World War I did not give America the intentions to seek international cooperation. Americans thought that their interest would be best met by acting on a unilateral basis.41 This led to the contraction of defense institutions, such as the army, and created a political atmosphere which can be called isolationist. In the 1930s the international environment changed dramatically, due to the rise and expansionist action of both Germany and Japan. The technological advancements in aircrafts and submarines made Americans shed the illusion of safety of the Western hemisphere due to geographical factors. America’s interest of securing their safety and their prosperity changed their intentions: a will to power originated. These changed intentions and interests created a spur in the creation of several institutions; from army and navy build up to political departments concerned with the war effort.42

Ninkovich describes the period of the 1930s and 1940s as a period in which there was confusion about the foreign policy ideology. The old type of diplomacy, characterized by balance of power, was out the door but the new type of diplomacy, that of collective security, was not crystalized yet. The late 1930s and the early years of the war can be seen

41 At the time America’s economy was only for a small part dependent on international export. For more detailed information on the subject, see David Reynolds, ‘FDR’s foreign policy and the construction of American history, 1945-1955’, in David B. Woolner, Warren F. Kimball and David Reynolds (eds.), FDR’s world, war, peace, and legacies (New York 2008) 18-19.
as a transition period in foreign policy ideology. Roosevelt eventually managed to boost internationalism enough for it to become the new ideology to base foreign policy upon. By his preaching methods, through education and continuously informing the people about the importance of America’s role in world politics, internationalism became a generally accepted ideology. In ‘The twilight of internationalism’ Hughes describes internationalism as a mindset of international cooperation, consultation and conciliation in both economic, cultural and military sense, with an idiom filled with terms as peace, collective security and justice. Internationalism settled in as the main political ideology by mid-century in America. Hughes refers to Roosevelt as the one who organized internationalism as a discourse in American foreign policy, for during Roosevelt’s presidency internationalism, in many varieties, became the mainstream ideology for both Republicans and Democrats alike.

1.5 Innovative aspects and academic contribution

Many library shelves are filled with books on the Franklin Roosevelt era and internationalism within American foreign policy. This master thesis focuses on a small aspect within these fields of research: the role of Wendell Willkie within Roosevelt’s foreign policy in the period 1940-1944. To understand Willkie’s part in international relations, it is necessary to understand the historical debates surrounding Roosevelt’s foreign policy. The main objective of this thesis is not however to contribute to the scholarly knowledge about Roosevelt, but to enlarge the body of work that has been written about Willkie. Although the two are often mentioned together, there is little elaborate and detailed information available about their personal and professional relationship. Seeing that Willkie was appointed to the position of special representative of the President, even though he was not an official member of Roosevelt’s political apparatus, this shortage of information about the relationship between these men can be seen as an omission in the scholarly work within this field. By combining Willkie’s convictions in *One World* and analyzing his role and the impact of his views on foreign policy this thesis adds to the existing knowledge on the change in American foreign policy in the 1940s.

1.6 Method, nature of sources and challenges

This master thesis uses a qualitative research method, which entails analysis of both primary as well as secondary sources and the interpretation of data found in these sources. Secondary literature is used to create a framework of already existing knowledge on the subject and point out the important historiographical debates on adjacent subjects. The primary sources are used to complement, illustrate or refute the statements found in secondary sources.

For secondary literature leading authors in research fields such as Wendell Willkie, Franklin Roosevelt, American foreign policy and internationalism, are consulted. The type of secondary sources used in this thesis are multiple: biographies, historical and political science literature and scientific articles. Concerning Willkie the most leading authors on his life and political career are used to form a picture of him as a man and a politician. Because of the abundance of scholarly writing on Roosevelt and World War II politics only a small part of the literature written about the subject is used to form a congruent view on Roosevelt’s foreign policy.

For primary sources the digital and microfilm/fiche catalogues with White House correspondence from the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg are used as well as printed collections of Roosevelt’s correspondence and Anglo-American communications. In the presidential collections on Franklin Roosevelt and the foreign policy collections of the Roosevelt Study Center there are several reels of microfilm/fiche which are concerned with the political activities of Roosevelt and his staff where Willkie is mentioned. Within these collections there are documents of Roosevelt’s ambassadors, staff and trustees about Willkie as a political opponent, political ally and his functioning as a special representative of the American government. There are also personal letters and telegrams between Roosevelt and Willkie. Aside from these collections, Willkie’s book *One World* and multiple articles from Willkie are used as primary sources.

Challenges during the research were the difficulty of defining the concept of influence (1), the limited information available on Wendell Willkie in particular and the relation between Roosevelt and Willkie (2) and limitations on time and space of the research itself (3). The concept of influence is measured by using Banfield’s conceptual framework when looking at occasions in which Willkie contributed, shaped or altered Roosevelt’s foreign policy. Due to this method it remains difficult to come to solid conclusions on the matter,
seeing that the research focusses solely on Willkie’s interaction with Roosevelt. In this research Roosevelt is seen as the prime maker of foreign policy and other political actors, interest groups and organizations are left out of the equation. Another difficulty is the fact that Roosevelt preferred face-to-face or telephonic contact with Willkie himself or on matters concerning Willkie, which leads to a limited amount of information on the relationship between the two. Also, the collections of primary sources found at the Roosevelt Study Center are limited. Due to the time and size of this master thesis it was only possible to consult primary sources on the subject which were available in the Netherlands and in online catalogues of the United States Department of State.

1.7 Thesis outline
Following this chapter, the next four chapters in this master thesis build up to the answering of the research question. This is followed by a conclusion of the results found during the research. The second chapter is concerned with Wendell Willkie’s ideas on foreign policy and the introduction and historiographical debate of the concept internationalism. The sub questions answered in this chapters are: what were Willkie’s ideas on foreign policy for America during world war II and how did he see the role of America after the war? These questions are answered by researching Willkie’s private and public views on foreign policy and his political career, highlighting the importance of internationalism within his foreign policy ideals.

In the third chapter, which goes into Franklin Roosevelt’s ideas on foreign policy, the following sub questions are answered: what were Roosevelt’s views on American foreign policy during world war II and what were his ideas on America’s role in the post-war world? These sub questions are answered by researching Roosevelt’s method and style of policy making, analyzing his private and public statements concerning foreign policy and describing the changing political landscape in the period 1940-1944.

The fourth chapter starts of with a brief comparison of Willkie and Roosevelt’s thought on foreign policy, by which the similarities and differences can be distilled. By researching the relationship between Willkie and Roosevelt the following sub question is answered: How can the relationship between Roosevelt and Willkie be defined and was the level of political collaboration between the two men?
The fifth chapter leads to the answering of the research question by making an overview of occasions in which Willkie influenced Roosevelt's foreign policy. Willkie’s role as loyal opposition to the Roosevelt Administration, his work as special representative of the President in 1941 and 1942, speculations on his influence on foreign policy by the press at the time and his contribution to the changing political discourse of internationalism are researched and analyzed. Following the final chapter, the conclusion entails the most important results found in the research by which the research question is answered and the shortcomings of this thesis and recommendations for future research are discussed.
2. Wendell Willkie and American foreign policy

This chapter is divided into multiple parts, each contributing to answering the sub question: what were Willkie’s ideas on foreign policy for America during World War II and how did he see the role of America after the war? It is important to get a sense of who Willkie was and what his ideas on foreign policy were, in order to be able to understand his role within American foreign policy in the period 1940-1944. Through debating Willkie’s political career in the period 1940-1944, highlighting his world tour in 1942, an analysis is made of his views on American foreign policy during the war and his views on America’s role in the planning of the post-war world order.

2.1 Willkie: the unconventional outsider of American politics

Wendell Willkie, officially called Lewis Wendell Willkie, was born on February 18, 1892 in the industrial town of Elwood in the countryside of Indiana as the fourth of six children. His father Herman Willkie was a well-known humanitarian lawyer in Indiana and a convinced Democrat. His mother Henrietta Willkie was the first woman to pass the Indiana bar, which made her law partner to her husband. As both of his parents were lawyers, it was natural to debate politics in the Willkie family. His parents are said to have made him the politician he later became: he shared his father’s Democratic and liberal views and his mother’s love for independent thinking and debating. During his youth, his independent streak became prominent. Especially when he was studying law at the Indiana University in 1910-1915, where he repeatedly challenged campus authorities and picked at conventions.

Soon after his graduation World War I started and Willkie enlisted immediately. During his time as first lieutenant he started dating Edith Wilk, which he married in 1918 and remained his wife until his untimely death in 1944. After the World War I Willkie debated a political career with the local Democrats, but instead chose a career in law. He became a corporate lawyer for the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company in Akron in 1919. Willkie soon made a reputation for himself and within five years time he became the president of the

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46 Neal, *Dark horse*, 1-3. For more on the influence of Willkie’s parents in forming his political ideals, in essence Democratic ideals, see Ross Gregory, ‘Seeking the presidency, Willkie as politician’, 47-49.
47 An example of this rebellious behavior was the fact that Willkie, as the class orator at his graduation in 1915, attacked the state’s constitution in his speech before his teachers, fellow students and their families. The university’s board was not pleased by this type of radicalism, but granted him his diploma anyway. See Neal, *Dark horse*, 8-13.
Akron Bar Association. His good name did not go unnoticed and in 1929 he was invited to go to New York to become law partner at the large holding company Commonwealth and Southern, just before the Great Depression began. In New York Willkie stood out as being articulate, witty and intelligent, leading to his appointment as president of Commonwealth and Southern in 1933.

At this time Willkie’s first indirect and direct contacts with President Franklin Roosevelt began, because Willkie, president of a holding company, challenged Roosevelt’s New Deal. The New Deal entailed a series of legislative measures by which the American government intervened in the economy to regain stability after the Great Depression. An important part of the New Deal consisted of measures by which a lot of formerly private companies, such as banks and holding companies, came under control or were at least subjected to inspection of governmental organizations. Since part of the Great Depression was blamed on the greedy behavior of the private corporations, the government wanted utilities to be managed by the government. Willkie, as president of one of the biggest holding companies in America, fought to secure the rights of the utilities industry by attacking Roosevelt’s New Deal. Willkie was not the only one who objected to the reforms the Roosevelt Administration pushed through. Influential interest groups in industry and utility sectors accused Roosevelt of stripping them of their freedom of enterprise and even charged him of dictatorship by pushing through such unconstitutional reforms. These groups naturally welcomed Willkie’s resistance against the New Deal. Even though Willkie was not able to fend off the New Deal reforms in the utility sector, the negotiations did get him a reputation as a possible dark horse candidate for presidency.

An important aspect to explaining Willkie’s political career was the influence of his mistress Irita Van Doren, book editor of the *New York Herald Tribune*. After their initial meeting in 1937, Willkie and Van Doren developed a romantic relationship, although Willkie remained married to Wilk. Van Doren was surrounded by the literary and journalistic elite and triggered Willkie to pursue a political career. Even though Van Doren knew their

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49 Neal, *Dark horse*, 20-35.
50 George Herring, *From colony to superpower* (Oxford 2008) 494-495.
51 Neal, *Dark horse*, 23-36. The term ‘dark horse’ in American politics is used to describe candidates who were little-known and unfamiliar with politics, but came into the political limelight nonetheless.
relationship would suffer under a political campaign, it was she who convinced Willkie to make work of his presidential aspirations.53

During his law career Willkie remained politically active as a Democrat in Akron and in New York. Willkie was part of the Democratic National Convention in 1924 and 1932 and supported several Democratic campaigns in these years both verbally and financially. The battle against the New Deal however had caused Willkie to criticize the Democratic party more and more. During the last years of the 1930s Willkie had expanded his political activity by writing articles and giving speeches beyond the subject of the New Deal, such as domestic and foreign policy. Seeing that Roosevelt was expected to run for an unprecedented third term, Willkie saw more chance in him beating Roosevelt and criticizing current governmental problems as a Republican than as a Democrat. This made him do the unconventional: he switched parties a few weeks before the Republican nomination in October 1939.54 Willkie differed from his Republican opponents mainly on foreign politics, seeing that Willkie was an open internationalist opposed to the other more isolationist Republican candidates. Because of his openness to and good contacts with the press, due to Van Doren, he got an advantage in media coverage. And although the odds were against him, he won the Republican nomination in November 1939.55

Important to remember when researching the surge of Willkie’s political career is the fact that Willkie received a lot of support from the press.56 His close relationship with Van Doren and her acquaintances in the press gave him the advantage of good media coverage. With the sympathy of the press backing him up, it was possible for Willkie to frame his ideas and speeches in a way which spurred his popularity. An example that the press at the time had good intentions with Willkie was the fact that his affair with Van Doren was widely known in journalistic circles, but no newspaper or magazine ever reported it.57 Johnson also mentions that the engine behind ‘the Willkie movement’ were the Willkie-for-President

53 Neal, Dark horse, 37-42.
54 Gregory, ‘Seeking the presidency’, 47-55.
56 Gregory mentions that the so often mentioned nonchalance of Willkie was not an undeliberate attribute, but a political strategy to convince the public of the pureness and the fact that Willkie was ‘just an American country boy’. For the strategy of portraying Willkie as a loveable and upfront outsider, for both Democrats as Republicans, to work it was necessary to make Willkie seem more like a country boy from Indiana than a big-shot in corporate New York to enlarge his reliability. This image was copied and strengthened by the press. See Gregory, ‘Seeking the presidency’, 56-59.
Clubs and a group of publishers, from magazines and papers such as *Fortune* and *the Saturday Evening Post*, who were committed to framing Willkie as the sincerest and ideal presidential candidate.⁵⁸ In a letter from Paul Leake, vice-president of the California Newspaper Publishers Association, to senator McAdoo which was later sent to Roosevelt himself, Leake talked about the fact that all the reporters travelling with Willkie during his campaign viewed him as a likeable, democratic and open person. Although Leake himself stated that Willkie did come across as friendly and trustworthy, his speeches for big audiences failed in bringing across a serious message. This did not seem to matter much however, seeing that Willkie enjoyed so much goodwill.⁵⁹ This lack of critical journalistic review of Willkie at the time makes it more difficult to establish the measure of sincerity behind Willkie’s ideals and statements, for only his political opponents pronounced possible opportunistic tendencies which can be seen as a logical consequence of being competitors in the same field.

The presidential election was a different cup of tea. As Gregory explains, Americans were more inclined to vote the familiar in turbulent times and Europe at war: Roosevelt. Roosevelt had already completed two terms and had proven himself during the financial crisis of the thirties. Because Willkie and Roosevelt mostly agreed with each other on foreign policy, supporting internationalism and opposing isolationism, there were mainly the domestic issues to quarrel about. Many say that the developments in Europe and the advancing danger of war were decisive in Roosevelt’s victory. This bold assumption that Roosevelt only won the election because of the war at hand however cannot in anyway be verified.⁶⁰

### 2.2 Willkie’s travels and ideals: *One World*

In contrast to many defeated presidential candidates, Willkie remained in the public eye after the lost election of 1940. As Barnes explains, Willkie’s reputation grew after the failed elections, opposed to many former defeated presidential candidates. Willkie decided to stay on as leader of the Republican Party and to fight against isolationism in American politics.

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⁵⁹ Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), *Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4*, reel 45, Letter from Paul Leake to William Gibbs McAdoo, September 23, 1940.
⁶⁰ Gregory, ‘Seeking the presidency’, 60-65.
Motivated to sway both political and public opinion to internationalism, Willkie travelled to Great-Britain in the spring of 1941 to experience the destruction of the war himself and to retrieve information on how America could possibly contribute to the Allied forces. This journey to Great-Britain, during which he also visited Churchill for whom he carried a letter from Roosevelt, was the inspiration for the journey around the world which followed the year after. His world tour in 1942 was the inspiration for his best-seller book One World, which was published in 1943.61

The question of what the incentive was for Willkie to decide to go on a world tour during the war is much debated. Barnes states that Willkie was influenced by three reporters close to him, Maurice Hindus, Eddy Gilmore and Ben Roberston, who suggested that Willkie would help his reputation as an international man of state by making a visit of good will to Russia.62 Neal does not mention any influence of journalists in Willkie’s decision, but states that Willkie came up with the idea himself for two purposes: to show their allies in the war the unity of the American political parties on the war effort and to find out how the war could be won the most quickly. Willkie’s third purpose for his world journey followed after he informed Roosevelt of his plan: that was to deliver certain messages from the President to the leaders and the people of those nations he visited.63 In a letter to Roosevelt on July 29, 1942, Willkie informed Roosevelt of his wish to make a world tour and asked the President for permission of the government. It appears that Willkie had no pre-arranged plans to cooperate so closely with Roosevelt leading up to his decision to make a world tour.64

Willkie’s journey around the world began in the Middle East, where he talked with politicians, army generals and common people alike. Due to the information he gathered, he became convinced that winning the war on a material level would only create another short-lived armistice, like it did after World War I. For a peace to develop and continue, Willkie thought it necessary to change relations with the people of the East and grant them equal rights, opportunity and self-rule. Ways to achieve this were helping these countries to

61 Barnes, Willkie, the events he was part of- the ideas he fought for, 239-242.
62 Barnes, Willkie, the events he was part of- the ideas he fought for, 289.
63 Neal, Dark horse, 230-233.
64 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45, Letter from Wendell Willkie to Franklin Roosevelt, July 29, 1942.
develop an education system, public health, modern industry and freedom and self-rule.\textsuperscript{65} In his book \textit{One World} and subsequent speeches, Willkie talked a lot about the feeling he had that something was stirring in the Middle East. The people were looking toward America with a sense of hope and skepticism. Willkie was convinced that America should use these feelings to its benefit and prove to them that America was trustworthy. If America failed to do this, Willkie was afraid that the people of the Middle East would eventually organize and fight against America, for they were getting sick of being maltreated and left behind.\textsuperscript{66}

After visiting the Middle East, Willkie moved on to visit the Soviet Union: from Moscow to the outskirts of Yakutsk. Despite his surprise of the communist system and the lack of critique from the common people to this system, Willkie was convinced that America should not fear the Soviet Union. He believed that democratic values would conquer communist ideas as long as they were honestly and fearlessly administered.\textsuperscript{67} He pointed out that America should be aware of the power of the Soviet Union and that they should therefore work in closer cooperation with them to get more acquainted with each other. \textsuperscript{68} How these democratic values should be displayed in a way they would be preferable to the people living in the Soviet Union is not mentioned.

After leaving the Soviet Union, Willkie travelled to China. Willkie stressed the fact that the West had largely ignored East Asia in the international political arena, but that this time should be over. The Americans would have to understand the power and possibilities which lay in East Asia, and in particular in China, and would have to fight to secure a mutual honest relationship with them instead of the colonial approach of the European empires.\textsuperscript{69}

All in all, Willkie found that in all the parts of the world he visited he came across peoples with hope for America to change the future of the world. He called this trust in America the ‘reservoir of good will’. This reservoir of good will would have to be put in good use, or else the rising of millions of unsatisfied people could perhaps be the downfall for America in the long run. To do good for America, was to do good for the people in the Middle East, Soviet Union and China. What he meant by ‘doing good’ is not neatly defined by Willkie, except for the fact that the regularly mentions the imperialist European empires as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Wendell Willkie, \textit{One World} (New York 1943) 1-36.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} Willkie, \textit{One World}, 37-44.
  \item \textsuperscript{67} Willkie, \textit{One World}, 75-86.
  \item \textsuperscript{68} Willkie, \textit{One World}, 89-102.
  \item \textsuperscript{69} Willkie, \textit{One World}, 103-109.
\end{itemize}
an example how not to treat other nations. Although the war at the time had not ended when Willkie wrote *One World*, Willkie was sure that America should already decide what they wanted after the war. Concluding his book, Willkie mentioned that the failure to keep the peace after World War I was due to an inconsistent foreign policy. Detachment from world affairs had failed, and so it was necessary for America to become the leader of the world in taking the path of equality. For this to succeed, America should plan for peace on a world basis through internationalist policies.

*One World* was generally enthusiastically received. It broke sales records by being a book which was bought by so many people so quickly, with one million copies sold in the first two months and over two million within the first year of publishing. Many journalists and politicians applauded *One World* because of its honest and clear way of laying out a future dream for America and the world. There were however critics. The moderate critics shared the argument of the lack of realistic ideas and solutions for problems which are pointed out by Willkie in *One World*. A more critical analysis of the book was given by Shushter. Shushter has three points of critique: the fact that Willkie made foreign policy conclusions after visiting a dozen countries in under fifty days (1), the fact that Willkie spoke a lot about freedom but fails to define it (2) and Willkie’s anti-imperialism while he at the same time wishes to carry American ideas and institutions into areas where these were unknown, which could be seen as a form of cultural and economical imperialism.

The main opposition to *One World* could be found in Willkie’s Republican opponents, who saw Willkie’s trip and book as a way to spread out the New Deal to an international level. Kaspi is critical about the usefulness of Willkie’s trip when it comes to solving world issues, seeing that he did not even visit Europe, India and other countries around the Pacific.

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70 Willkie, *One World*, 157-161.
72 Willkie, *One World*, 196-205.
73 Madison, ‘Thinking about Wendell Willkie’, xviii. Jordan describes the popularity of Willkie’s radio speeches in further detail. To understand the enormity of the public who heard Willkie’s message, he describes that thirty-six million people heard Willkie’s radio speech after his world tour which was twice as much as the most popular commercial program on the radio at the time. See John Jordan, ‘A small world of little Americans: the $1 diplomacy of Wendell Willkie’s “One World”’, *Indiana Magazine of History*, 88, 3 (1992) 188.
75 George Shuster, ‘*One World*, by Wendell L. Willkie’, *Political Science Quarterly*, 58, 3 (1943) 426-429.
Kaspi says that Willkie touches the subject of colonialism, but does not go into depth to the how-question of dismantling colonialism. Willkie talks about the war at hand, but stays clear of an explanation for the rapid rise of Nazi-Germany and their war on the Jews. Willkie’s analysis in general stays superficial according to Kaspi. The true cynics of One World even doubted whether Willkie’s goal of internationalism was in fact worldwide peace or whether it was the mean to create an economic imperial America.

Kaspi is right in that One World sometimes feels rushed. That One World lacks sufficient historical background and geographical explanations to form a complete and congruent vision of the post-war world is obvious. However, the purpose of One World was not that of an official foreign policy, but that of a travelogue and opinion piece to convey Willkie’s internationalist ideals and ambitions to a broader public. Also, Willkie mentioned in his book that he would not elaborate on certain conversations with statesmen during his travels in One World because of confidentiality and security matters. Therefore, it is important to be aware of what is not being said in the book about a more specific political course and policy. Shushter’s claim that Willkie in a sense promotes a different kind of imperialism, cultural and economic imperialism, by spreading American values through the world, is convincing, but this is not contradictory to the ideal of peace and freedom per se.

2.3 Willkie on American foreign policy: America as example

Jones points out that few authors have given attention to Willkie’s ideas on foreign policy and have focused more on Willkie’s ideas on domestic policies. This can be seen as a shortcoming in the literature on Willkie, seeing that Willkie saw domestic and foreign policies as being intertwined, for the fight for freedom was the main issue for him in both areas of policy. Nevertheless, it is possible to deduct key issues in Willkie’s thinking on foreign policy through analysis of both secondary literature and primary sources. Jones states that Willkie’s main objective was to promote equality on a global basis, with America as the propagandist of this equality in the form of a global peace organization. He promoted a new universal order in which imperialism and isolationism were replaced by self-determination,

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international cooperation and equality. According to Jones, Willkie saw World War II as a chance for America to make amends with the past and to make better choices than they did after World War I.

2.3.1 Willkie on the role of America in the war

On the role of America during the war, Willkie made many suggestions as the Republican leader but also as an internationalist politician in general. The most important aspects of his statements on foreign policy during the war were that America should: build up its own security and defense system (1), enlarge and enhance the American trade network to increase international relations (2), support the Allied by use of the Lend-Lease program (3) and help relieve the Russians by creating a second front (4).

A crucial aspect to Willkie’s foreign policy ideals, and his biggest criticism on the Roosevelt Administration, was the build up of America’s security and defense system during the war. In multiple addresses in 1940, such as the Boston Address on October 11, 1940 Willkie criticized Roosevelt for delaying the build up of the defense system. The only way America could defend itself against a possible hostile expeditionary force making its way across the Atlantic was by creating a strong American air force, navy and army to protect American commerce, interests and rights. In his Baltimore Address Willkie set forth a six point defense program in which housing for new recruits should be provided as soon as possible (1), raw materials from outside the United States such as tin and rubber should be obtained as quickly as possible (2), the production of defense weaponry should be quickened and enhanced (3), America should specialize in certain types of defense machinery (4), responsibility for the war effort should be centralized (5) and the congressional support for building up the defense system should grow.

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81 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 3, reel 23, Boston Address October 11, 1940.; Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 3, reel 23, Chicago Address October 22, 1940.; Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 3, reel 23, Akron Address October 24, 1940.
82 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 3, reel 23, Baltimore Address (date unknown).
In his San Francisco Address on September 21, 1940 Willkie blamed Roosevelt and his Administration for the downfall of European democracy and thus for having a role in the origins of World War II. Because Roosevelt wrecked international exchange at the London Conference in 1933, which led to years of deflation for the European nations, these democracies weakened and this gave way to Hitler’s expansionist plans. Returning to 1940, he stated that America should be vigilant on the fact that if Europe would fall in the hands of the Germans permanently, America would be on its own in a totalitarian world. Willkie blamed this isolated position on the American foreign policy in the 1930s. Willkie warned the American government and the people that America must stop believing in the strategy of non-intervention and fighting with words against the weapons of the Axis.83

In his New York World’s Fair Address on October 26, 1940 Willkie emphasized the importance of international trade. As trade, peace and liberty could not be separated and trade should be seen as the base for peaceful international relations with other nations.84 Adding to this statement in his Long Island Address on the same day, he formulated his foreign policy views on trade: European democracies should be strengthened against hostile forces by aiding them economically and commercially through trade with honest tariffs.85

Already in 1940, before the presidential campaign, Willkie made it clear that he was pro helping the British in their war effort. In his Cleveland Address on October 2, 1940 Willkie said that America’s words of support should have consequences and that they should actively support the British, since they were fighting for ‘the liberty of all’. This help to the British should not only entail verbal support, but also material military support.86 During the Philadelphia Convention Willkie openly supported Roosevelt’s foreign policy on the subject of the Lend-Lease Bill. More on this matter, will follow in chapter 5 of this thesis.87

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83 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 3, reel 23, Statements by Wendell Willkie (date unknown).
84 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 3, reel 23, New York World’s Fair Address October 26, 1940.
85 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 3, reel 23, Long Island Address, October 26, 1940.
86 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 3, reel 23, Cleveland Address, October 2, 1940.
87 The Lend-Lease program was an American policy that was created first to support the war effort of France and Great Britain, and eventually other allies such as China and the Soviet Union, by supplying food, oil and military equipment between 1941 and 1945. Food and raw materials were free, but some military machinery should be returned after the war. In return for this support the Americans got military bases in the allied nations which they helped. Roosevelt saw this program as a possibility to not only support the allied, but create
preparing his trip to England in 1941, Willkie also made clear that America should give aid to Britain, not only out of loyalty but also for America’s own national security. The longer the British could resist the Germans, the more time America bought itself for building up their own defense system.88

A more controversial point in Willkie’s foreign policy ideas was the fact that he spoke out about creating a second European front during the war to relieve the pressure on the Russians. During his visit to Stalin, the Russian leader had made clear his hopes that the Allies would create a second front. Although Churchill and Roosevelt planned a secret invasion in North Africa they had told Stalin a second European front was not yet possible. Willkie, knowing nothing of the planned invasion, spoke out about the subject of the need of a second front in Europe after his return to America. His statements caused a storm of critique.89 Top governmental officials rebuked Willkie for talking about matters he knew nothing about and Churchill criticized him for making undesired public statements about offensive operations of the Allies.90 These statements caused Roosevelt to publicly distance himself from Willkie’s statements.91 During this same visit, Stalin had made clear his dissatisfaction with the Lend-Lease arrangements, after which Willkie pushed through more liberal terms for the Lend-Lease program to the Soviet after his returns to the United States.92

2.3.2 Willkie on the role of America after the war

Jordan calls *One World* the most clear-cut view of Willkie’s foreign policy ideals, for it was a call for an interconnected global order.93 Willkie’s conviction about America’s role after the war, as formulated in *One World*, can be summed up as following: America had to grant

faith in the United States and a possible victory for the allied with less costs of life and material for the American themselves. More on this subject can be found in Herring, *From colony to superpower*, 549-552.

88 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), *Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4*, reel 45, Letter on diner with Willkie by unknown author, January 16, 1941.

89 More extensive information on this political mishap of Willkie on the second front can be found in Jones, ‘*One World: an American perspective*’, 112-113. For a part of the speech Willkie made after returning to America after his world tour can be seen, when he talked about opening up the second front, see British Pathé, ‘Wendell Willkie back in USA (1942)’: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmRCEe4DHmQ (19-03-2016).

90 Neal, *Dark horse*, 248-249.


92 Neal, *Dark horse*, 246-247.

equal rights to people in the East, through giving them opportunity (in education, public health and industry) and self-rule (1), America should look for common grounds with big powers such as Russia and China for cooperation could lead to democratization of these countries (2), America should fight against imperialism and build honest and reciprocal relationships with other nations (3) and America should use the reservoir of good will in a way that benefited all countries and therefore the national interest by enlarging trade and security (4). The planning for peace on a world basis should not be based solely on consensus of elites and institutions, but should have the acceptance of all people. People over the world had woken up and began realizing men around the globe were interdependent. To secure the support of the people, America should thus lead the way together with the United Nations to a new society of independent nations, based on self-determination and the abolishment of colonialism, isolationism and racism.

During his time as leader of the Republican Party, Willkie gave numerous speeches and wrote many articles on the future role of America, in which he also pronounced ideas on foreign policy after the war. Although the messages of these speeches and articles differ from time to time, there is a certain degree of overlap in his statements on foreign policy from which a general course can be constructed. America must make haste with creating a Council of the United Nations in which both great powers and smaller and less developed nations would get a say (1), America must break with its tariff policy through consultation with other nations to enhance trade (2), the Lend-Lease policy must be brought to conclusion in a fair and long-term way (3) and America must become a beacon of democracy and freedom (4).

During his visit to both Russia and China, Willkie made several speeches in which he called upon the Russian and Chinese government and the people to help create a new post-war world order. By using the United Nations, every nation would gain self-determination and could aim for freedom for all people of every race within these nations. In this new world order the focus would have to be on freedom, racial equality, justice and opportunity.

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to all. In his article ‘Proposed platform’, Willkie states that the creation of a Council of the United Nations should be of utmost importance in order to secure a peace that will last. The decisions of such an international organization should not lay solely in the hands of great powers, but in the hands of all nations included in the United Nations.

In *An American Program*, a collection of seven articles on the future of America, Willkie stated that world trade should be rehabilitated through stabilization of world currency. To stabilize currency exchange rates after the war international agreements should be made on trade. For honest trade to exist America should change its tariff policy and alter trade barriers to be an example for other nations to follow this course. The transition period between war and peace should be used to carefully fulfill foreign owned balances. The Lend-Lease policy should be brought to its natural end in an organized and long-term manner so to give the allied nations who received support can rehabilitate successfully.

When talking about the post-war world order in 1944 to officials from the Roosevelt Administration, Willkie saw an opportunity for America to seize leadership of the ‘One World’. Willkie’s idea about the new world order entailed freedom and thus the annihilation of imperialism, in which America had an important role to play. If the American people wanted freedom, they had to share this freedom with others and take a stance against the Old World imperialistic tendencies. World War II gave America an opportunity to redefine itself as a nation, and America should choose the road of creating an equal world. Because of his travels, Willkie was convinced that the peoples living under European imperial rule would rise against their governments if imperialism continued. As one of the great powers in the world, it was the responsibility of America, both out altruistic reasoning and for the national interest, to lead the other great and smaller nations by example and renounce imperialism and promote democracy and liberal education. In many television and radio speeches after his world tour, Willkie repeated this message of America’s moral

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96 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), *Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45*, Letter from Chungking American Embassy to president Roosevelt on October 8, 1942.
leadership in creating a new world society based on equality instead of Western domination.\textsuperscript{101}

2.4 Conclusion
Recapitulating, the sub question of what Willkie’s ideas were on foreign policy for America during World War II and how he saw the role of America after the war, is answered. In short, central to Willkie’s ideas on American foreign policy during the war was his belief that aid should be given to the Allied, a second front should be opened to help relieve Russia’s war effort and America should already plan for an international organization to plan the post-war world order. Willkie’s ideas on American foreign policy for after the war were characterized by the importance of the Council of the United Nations and America’s leading role in securing equality and freedom for all.

\textsuperscript{101} Historycomestolife, ‘Wendell Willkie discusses war and peace’: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c73Azpc8jeo (20-03-2016).
3. Franklin Roosevelt and American foreign policy

Roosevelt first became President in 1933, at a time that America was in turmoil due to the Great Depression. Due to the fact that America had had a loosely regulated economy, the crisis hit hard. The domestic crisis forced Roosevelt to focus on bettering domestic policies and reassuring the American people that after the rain, the sun would come. Thus, Roosevelt dedicated his first and second term as President mostly to enhancing the American economy through measures such as the New Deal as domestic policy and the Good Neighbor Policy as foreign policy.102

But while America was concerned with its domestic issues and turned its back to the European mainland more and more, the international political arena changed rapidly. After Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 and the threat of war mounting in the years following, American politics became deeply divided. This division in American politics did not follow Party-alignment, but cut through both Democratic and Republican Parties. On the one end of the spectrum there were the isolationists, who wished to remain neutral in case of any conflict on the European soil, and on the other end there were the internationalists, who saw international cooperation as a must to better America’s position in world affairs. And so, with the 1930s coming to a close and the presidential election of 1940 coming up, it was time for Roosevelt to pick a side.103

This chapter covers Roosevelt’s persona and his ideas on American foreign policy. The following sub questions are answered: what were Roosevelt’s views on American foreign policy during World War II and what were his ideas on America’s role in the post-war world? Within this chapter Costigliola and Paterson’s individual analysis of foreign policy is applied by analyzing Roosevelt’s method of policy making through using secondary literature on the subject.104 Then the connection between Roosevelt and the changing discourse of foreign policy is elaborated on. Lastly Roosevelt’s foreign policy ideals during and after the war are recounted. Understanding Roosevelt’s method of policy making and his views on foreign policy, is critical to understand the political landscape at the time in which Willkie cooperated with Roosevelt.

102 Herring, From colony to superpower, 484-499.
103 Herring, From colony to superpower, 502-515.
3.1 Roosevelt’s method of policy making

When analyzing a number of Roosevelt’s biographers, certain characteristics stand out which form the base of Roosevelt’s foreign policymaking. Roosevelt’s policy making was not structured but the result of day to day crisis management (1), he rejected depending on bureaucracy and relied more on his gut feeling and the advice of those persons he trusted in his inner circle (2), his foreign policy ideals were based on his internationalist background and his Democratic, liberal and Christian ideals (3) and his foreign policy approach was influenced by both idealism and realism (4).

When it comes to Roosevelt’s personal convictions about foreign policy, scholars agree that he seemingly had no ‘grand strategy’.105 Schneider talks about Roosevelt’s foreign policy in *Should America go to war?* as one of the hardest subjects to analyze for historians.106 Dallek says: “following Roosevelt in this way gives on the feeling of peering into a kaleidoscope in which a shifting array of pressures moved him from one position to another”.107 Although Roosevelt caused an enormous expansion of military power in the years 1940-1945, he did not form a congruent long-term military strategy in international affairs. LaFeber points out that the reason for this could have been that the sole coordinator of military actions and foreign policy was Roosevelt himself. He did not have enough faith in his Secretary of State Gordon Hull nor his Secretary of War Henry Stimson for them to define an official, consistent and long-term implementable foreign policy.108 LaFeber also states that Roosevelt did have a birds-eye view of the world, but he did not have an integrated worldview. He had ideas and ideals, but lacked realistic long-term strategies to form a firm foreign policy.109 Dallek however, who does concur that Roosevelt lacked a solid foreign policy strategy, points out that the lack of a consistent foreign policy was more an American characteristic than it was Rooseveltian. Dallek sees American foreign policy before 1945 as highly erratic, changing course with every domestic or international issue that came up. Before 1945 foreign policy and domestic policy were largely intertwined and American participation in the international arena was always motivated by domestic frustrations about

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106 James Schneider, *Should America go to war?* (1989) IX-XIII.
107 Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy*, VII-VIII.
advancing the national interest. Only after 1945 did America adopt a realism-based foreign policy which was not altered at every whim.\textsuperscript{110} Whether a product from his time or from his own personality, scholars agree that Roosevelt’s foreign policy was unstructured and did not follow bureaucratic protocols and changed from crisis to crisis.\textsuperscript{111}

For advice on foreign policy Roosevelt did not rely on the common consolation of the White House bureaucracy, such as his Secretary of State Hull, but rather depended on a small inner circle of trustees such as his Under Secretary of State Summer Welles. This way he kept many governmental officials in the dark on his decisions on foreign policy.\textsuperscript{112} As active Commander in Chief during the war, Roosevelt handpicked new chiefs for the military which caused a close relationship between him and the Joint Army-Navy Board, who became his most important strategic advisors.\textsuperscript{113}

At the base of Roosevelt’s most important foreign policy accomplishment, implementing an internationalist discourse in American politics, scholars point out several experiences which created Roosevelt’s internationalism in foreign policies ranging from his youth to his early political career. Brought up in a wealthy, enterprising family, Roosevelt had travelled a lot during his youth which led him to have an international orientation.\textsuperscript{114} Another important influence was his time as Assistant Secretary of Navy from 1913 to 1920 under idealist and internationalist Woodrow Wilson and his campaigning for American membership in the League of Nations following this period.\textsuperscript{115} When asked to describe his main characteristics, Roosevelt called himself a Democrat and a Christian. His Democratic values entailed a firm belief in liberal and progressive ideals which he first pronounced in the

\textsuperscript{110} Robert Dallek, \textit{The American style of foreign policy, cultural politics and foreign affairs} (New York 1983) XV-XVII.
\textsuperscript{111} Buckley, Thomas and Edwin Strong Jr, \textit{American foreign and national security policies, 1914-1945} (Knoxville 1987) 113-118.
\textsuperscript{112} Buckley and Strong, \textit{American foreign and national security policies}, 116.
\textsuperscript{113} David Woolner, ‘FDR: Reflections on legacy and leadership – the view from 2008’, in David B. Woolner, Warren F. Kimball and David Reynolds (eds.), \textit{FDR’s world, war, peace, and legacies} (New York 2008) 230-232. The role of Commander in Chief for the American President is anchored in Article II of the American Constitution. Through this clause the executive power for the American Army and Navy is vested in the single person of the President. The way Presidents use this clause has been topic of discussion in both scholarly and political circles, since acting upon this title can mean circumventing the Congress. Although every President has the Constitutional power to act as Commander in Chief in war, few Presidents have acted upon it without support of Congress. Roosevelt was one of the Presidents, next to for example Abraham Lincoln, who was an active Commander in Chief and chose to take lead of the war-effort without sharing this responsibility with Congress. See, Barron, David, and Martin Lederman, ‘The Commander in Chief at the lowest ebb: a Constitutional history’, \textit{Harvard Law Review}, 121, 4 (2008) 1042-1053.
\textsuperscript{114} Schlesinger, ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt: the education of a statesman’, 44-45.
\textsuperscript{115} Wayne Cole, \textit{Roosevelt and the isolationists, 1932-45} (Lincoln 1983) 3-5.
New York senate in 1911 and he shared all throughout his political life. Roosevelt saw Christian morale as the guidebook to do good for God, his nation and humanity.\textsuperscript{116}

Despite the absence of a grand strategy, Roosevelt is often mentioned as a follower of the idealist strand of thought about American foreign policy, initiated by Woodrow Wilson.\textsuperscript{117} Wilsonianism can be characterized by several aspects. First, by multilateralism and international cooperation (he is said to be the father of internationalism). Second, through the expansion of democracy and the rejection of Old World diplomacy with all its intrigues. Third, the making of a, as Rothbard called it, ‘welfare-warfare’ state by which the government used wartime to enlarge the governmental apparatus. Fourth, the spreading of American values such as liberty and human rights as ‘principles of mankind’. And lastly, through the creation of international institutions to maintain peace such as the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{118} Roosevelt saw a great many flaws in Wilson’s approach to foreign policy, but his Wilsonianism could be seen in his antagonism against Old World politics and diplomacy, his enthusiasm for international cooperation and institutions and his, as Ninkovich called it, ‘idealist definition of threat’ by stating that the liberal way of life was threatened by the Axis and in his conception of the President’s sole responsibility over foreign policy decision making.\textsuperscript{119}

But Roosevelt was not a mere copy of Wilson; he was more of a pragmatist and opportunist than his idealistic predecessor. For Roosevelt there were multiple means to reach his goals, and the chosen means differed per crisis. Some scholars claim that Roosevelt was in fact a Realist, proven by his admiration of Captain Alfred Mahan’s \textit{realpolitik}.\textsuperscript{120} The self-proclaimed imperialist and realist Mahan became known for his statements on American expansion. Mahan’s strong believe in American leadership of the world, and thus America’s will-to-power, led to his advocacy of a strong American navy. This navy could help America gain an internationally dominant position through commercial and economic competition and the spread of American values. For Mahan military power was the key to

\textsuperscript{116} Harvey Kaye, \textit{The fight for the four freedoms, what made FDR and the greatest generation truly great} (New York 2014) 32-33.
\textsuperscript{117} Mark Mazower, \textit{No enchanted palace}, 98.
both financial wealth, securing the national safety and gain world-wide supremacy in international relations.\textsuperscript{121} The Mahanian influences in Roosevelt’s foreign policy could be seen in his will for a strong American defense system, especially a big naval preparedness, and use of power politics.\textsuperscript{122} Being a ‘practical idealist’, as Range calls it, Roosevelt combined both idealism and realism. This led Roosevelt to not base his policy primarily on ideals, but on principles. In his policies he aimed at a better, more democratic world on the bases of his liberal, Christian values but knew the human shortcomings enough to not believe in a peaceful utopia.\textsuperscript{123} To quote Schlesinger: “in effect he [Roosevelt] used the means of Mahan to strive toward the ends of Wilson”.\textsuperscript{124}

3.2 Roosevelt and changing the foreign policy discourse

The change in foreign policy discourse in the early 1940s did not appear without a fight. Roosevelt, an internationalist by heart, was mainly preoccupied with domestic problems due to the Great Depression in the first two terms of his presidency. Isolationism flourished, because of the domestic problems caused by the financial crisis as well as the disillusionment of the post-World War I developments.\textsuperscript{125} It was in October 1937 when Roosevelt first took tentative steps toward proclaiming internationalism publicly in his Chicago speech. In this speech he told the public that America loved peace, and therefore it should fight for peace by helping those whose freedom was threatened.\textsuperscript{126}

When the war in Europe broke out in 1939, America proclaimed its neutrality. Roosevelt soon realized however that his talk about peace did nothing against the Axis aggressors if these words was not backed up by military force. Although Roosevelt privately supported the Allies and planned supporting them, he did not say so publicly seeing that the presidential election of 1940 was coming up and such a statement could harm his chances at

\textsuperscript{122} Cole, Roosevelt and the isolationists, 3-5.
\textsuperscript{123} Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s world order, 30.; Schulte Nordholt, ‘FDR: A personal view’, 11-12.
\textsuperscript{124} Schlesinger, ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt: the education of a statesman’, 57.
\textsuperscript{125} Examples of isolationist policies in the 1930s were the Johnson Debt Default Act in 1934, which made sure that nations who did not pay their war loans back on time could not claim any other financial support from the United States. The Neutrality act in 1937 went even further by prohibiting both loans and creating a weapons embargo towards foreign nations. See Buckley and Strong, American foreign and national security policies, 125-131.
\textsuperscript{126} Buckley and Strong, American foreign and national security policies, 113-133.
getting re-elected. While the debate between isolationists and internationalist in both the Democratic Party as well as the Republic Party became more heated, Churchill asked Roosevelt for help in loaning the British American destroyers to fight the Germans. The matter of aiding the British became very pressing after the German invasion led to the subsequent fall of the Netherlands, Belgium and France in the summer of 1940. With Britain now alone in fighting the Germans, Roosevelt had to act upon Churchill’s request. Luckily for Roosevelt, his Republican opponent Willkie shared his ideas on internationalism. Therefore, Roosevelt worked on a plan to get Congress to support his aid for the British without the danger of losing the election on this subject. Circumnavigating the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s, Roosevelt proposed the Lend-Lease Bill to aid the Allies.127

The battle between isolationists and internationalists carried on all through the war, but international events swayed public opinion towards supporting internationalism. Public opinion however did not change over night, Roosevelt put in real effort to influence it. Roosevelt saw the education on global affairs of the American people as very important. Through the education of Americans in radio- and television programs where he showed world maps and explained difficulties in international politics, he tried to open up the minds of the American people to the complexities of the international arena.128 That Roosevelt’s emphasis on education to influence public opinion in matters of foreign policy was a smart move, can be seen in Wittkopf study on the relationship between public opinion and American foreign policy. Wittkopf states that education is the most important predictor for the stance on foreign policy in American history. The more acquainted people were with world affairs, the more they supported internationalist foreign policy. The less they knew on international affairs, the more they supported isolationist foreign policies.129

Eventually, the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 pushed America out of its neutral position. America was in the war, there was no denying it. Where Roosevelt had before called himself “Dr. New Deal”, this title was now changed in “Dr. Win-The-War”. This change of denomination was also noticeable in his policies: the focus shifted from domestic

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127 Buckley and Strong, American foreign and national security policies, 134-148.
129 Wittkopf, Faces of internationalism, 37.
policy to foreign policy. Roosevelt saw an important role for America in shaping and setting terms for the peace after the war: “Dr. Win-The-War” also became “Dr. Build-The-Peace”.130

3.3 Roosevelt’s foreign policy: internationalism and America on top

Roosevelt’s first two terms as President were characterized by a focus on domestic policies. World War II offered Roosevelt a chance of promoting an internationalist agenda for foreign policy. Dallek points out that important elements in understanding Roosevelt’s foreign policy strategy both during World War II and his plans for the post-war world were his militancy, fed by his years as Assistant Secretary of Navy, and his love for the military and navy in general, and his believe that America was served best when it had a major role in world affairs.131

3.3.1 Roosevelt and American foreign policy during the war

Although Roosevelt’s foreign policy can be said to be unstructured and crisis orientated, it is possible to discern certain key elements within his foreign policy during the war. Being an internationalist, Roosevelt saw a great importance in creating an economically stable trade system with fair international tariffs (1), supporting friendly nations under attack through Lend-Lease policies (2), the build up of the American defense system (3) and international cooperation for (inter)national security which led to formation of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 (4). These foreign policy pillars were intertwined with the goal of enlarging American security and prosperity and the ideals for a better world as proclaimed in Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms.

After having learned his lesson from the Great Depression and the subsequently tariff protection initiated by the Republicans in the 1930s, Roosevelt was set on breaking down trade barriers to enhance international economic stability. Through the set up of the Export-Import Bank in 1934 and lifting export tariffs, Roosevelt had already hoped to not only increase American prosperity but to advance America’s position of commercial leadership

131 Dallek, Franklin Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 3-14.
and strengthening the ties with Western democracies.\textsuperscript{132} The idea that financial prosperity would increase the changes of peaceful international relations was based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which also advocated equal trading requirements. During the war, America became more dependent on import, since their shortages of coal, steel and wheat for the war industry. This caused Roosevelt to put emphasis on international economic stability.\textsuperscript{133} Since, as Roosevelt said: “commerce is the lifeblood of a free society”.\textsuperscript{134}

So unlike the Neutrality Acts in the 1930s was the introduction of the Lend-Lease Bill. Times had changed and Roosevelt saw an importance in aiding Britain (and after that many other Allied nations) in its war effort because of the dangers America would face if Britain failed to withstand Nazi-Germany. The Lend-Lease program gave Roosevelt the opportunity to lend or lease defense machinery to any nation in exchange for American bases in their territories, which in turn contributed to the power and security of America. Later on, the Lend-Lease program extended to not only defense machinery, but also weaponry, logistical supplies, the supply of food and natural resources. Lend-Lease gave an enormous influx to America’s war industry and underscored America’s loyalty to the Allied forces in the war.\textsuperscript{135} Lend-Lease however was not solely based on self-interest and national security, it also adhered to Roosevelt’s moral view of neutrality that America had a task at protecting the victims of aggressors. Roosevelt believed in the Grotian concept of neutrality, which makes a division between just and unjust wars and emphasizes the obligation for any nation to help the victim in an unjust war.\textsuperscript{136}

Hand in hand with the Lend-Lease Bill was Roosevelt’s determination to build a strong American defense system. Already in the late 1930s Roosevelt had called for a strong army and navy, but this call became louder after the fall of France in 1940. In 1941 he renewed military conscription and fastened the rearmament as much as he could without needing the support of the hesitant Congress. As a result of this rearmament, the American armed forces grew from 175,000 enlisted men in 1939 to 12 million enlisted men in 1945. This accumulated to America having the largest army, navy and air force in the world at the time.

\textsuperscript{134} Burns, Roosevelt, the soldier of freedom, 514.
\textsuperscript{135} Buckley and Strong, American foreign and national security policies,146-150.
\textsuperscript{136} Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt's world order, 22-25.
Aside from the conscription of millions, Roosevelt also initiated numerous defense institutions, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, War and Navy Departments and the national intelligence service the Office of Strategic Services (which later developed into the Central Intelligence Agency).137

The close relation between America and Britain and Roosevelt’s will for further international cooperation was epitomized through the creation of the Atlantic Charter in August 1941, which was endorsed by other Allied nations in the months following its foundation. Through debating shared foreign policy (post-) war aims, Churchill and Roosevelt came up with a set of eight principles for international cooperation and organization. The eight common principles which made up the foundation of the Atlantic Charter were: no glorification of either the United States or Great Britain (1), action is taken when territories are changed undemocratically (2), self-governance for all (3), equal rights to the trading market and raw materials (4), international economic collaboration (5), promotion of postwar peace and security through Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms (6), disarmament of aggressors nations (7) and less pressure on peaceful nations through this disarmament (8).138 Still officially neutral at the time, Roosevelt hoped to awaken America to the peril that threatened them overseas and promote the idea of international cooperation. Aside from goals set for the post-war world, the Atlantic Charter also entailed war aims such as the restoration of governments which were shattered by the Axis, the defeat and disarmament of the Axis nations and the liberalization of international trade.139

3.3.2 Roosevelt and the post-war world order

Because of America’s crucial role during World War II, thanks to their economic and military dominance which became eminent as the war carried on, it became apparent that America would also be dominant in the debate about the post-war world order. Already in the early years of the war there was talk about how the post-war world order should look like, who should have a say in creating it and what the ideals were on which this order should be based. For Roosevelt this post-war world order was defined by a set of ideals which he

138 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 282-283.
139 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 282-287.
pronounced in his Four Freedoms speech in January 1941 (1). On a more practical note, Roosevelt prioritized the recovery of Europe over other war-torn regions (2), he saw a leading role for America in creating a new world order (3) and he aspired to form a coalition of big powers, the Four Policemen, who would set this new world order in motion (4).

Part of the Roosevelt legacy came to be on January 6, 1941 when he delivered his Annual Message to Congress in which he pronounced the so called Four Freedoms. In an attempt to quiet isolationist forces and waken America to the dangers of the war, Roosevelt articulated America’s ideal for the nation itself and for the world at large. These ideals became known as the Four Freedoms: the freedom of speech, the freedom of worship, the freedom from want and the freedom of fear; all of which statements ended with “anywhere in the world”. “Dr. Win-The-War” shape shifted into “Dr. Build-The-Peace” through this statement. Although the realist within Roosevelt did not believe in the absolute fulfillment of these freedoms, he did see them as a noble ideal to pursue. The Four Freedoms were also recorded in the Atlantic Charter by which they became official foreign policy goals.

Already in early 1941 it was clear that Roosevelt saw Europe as a priority. Still neutral, Roosevelt agreed that the Atlantic area was the most important to secure first. Atlantic First was adopted as a foreign policy strategy because of military reasons, most dangers for American security were thought to come from Europe, and diplomatic reasons, seeing the long history of Anglo-American relations. Aside from security reasons during the war, Roosevelt saw a strong, stable and democratic Europe after the war as important for America’s economy. Seeing that America had gained an immense industrial capacity during the war and Europe was in dire need of all sort of manufactured goods, Roosevelt saw his chance through adopting an economic multilateralism foreign policy. Economic multilateralism, characterized by creating a world market with specialization in commodity producing, the lifting of trade barriers and maximizing profit by enhancing quantity of goods and distribution prices, was seen as the solution for unemployment in America and at the same time rehabilitating Europe. Through this policymaking Roosevelt hoped that it was also possible to protect liberal capitalism against the fascist and communist powers in Europe.

140 Kaye, The fight for the four freedoms, 1-7.
142 Burns, Roosevelt, the soldier of freedom, 86-87.
According to Woolner a very dominant factor in Roosevelt’s foreign policy was his belief that the world needed America for the re-formation of the international arena. Gordenker endorses this view by describing Roosevelt’s idea that the most important foreign policy task during the war was the creation of a new international order on which America and its allies agreed upon. This main task of this international order would be keeping the peace and enhancing welfare on a global scale. To give a lasting peace a chance, Roosevelt thought colonial empires should be dismantled in the long run, since the oppression of peoples gave way to possible uprising and war. Economic growth and global welfare were also top priority seeing that Roosevelt was convinced that economically satisfied people were more inclined to remain peaceful. Through international cooperation and institutions, with America at the head of these developments, human rights were to be promoted and protected. Roosevelt’s thinking on America’s role in the world fits the notion of the dominant narrative in American foreign relations of American exceptionalism. American exceptionalism presumes a uniqueness to American values, qualities and freedoms. It also surmises that American policy makers make their decisions for the greater good instead of for their own advantage. As a consequence of this idea, it is often believed that other states and peoples welcome and appreciate American involvement and the ‘gift’ of American values to their states.

Roosevelt’s idea of American domination in the new post-war world order can be explained through his past experiences with international institutions, according to Divine. After World War I Roosevelt had become disappointed in the League of Nations, which he called nothing more than ‘a debating society’. Thus Roosevelt did not believe in Churchill’s idea of an international organization to keep the peace. At the Atlantic Conference in 1941, Roosevelt made clear that he did not believe in shared responsibility of all nations to keep the peace, but that big-power domination was the key to international organization. He thought it was possible to create an international organization in which every nation had equal say in the long run, but this should not be the situation to start with after the war. According to Divine, Roosevelt never aspired the Wilsonian principle of equality for all nations, but he did not talk about this in public. In private however, Roosevelt made clear

that peace could only be achieved by the use of force from the big powers, excluding the small countries as otiose to a world order.  

This was the start of Roosevelt’s idea of the Four Policemen, created in 1941. In the original version of the plan, the Four Policemen, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and China, would have sole responsibility for global peace keeping. The inclusion of China in the Four Policemen plan was not without a fight, since China did not belong to the great powers yet in capital or military power. The British were very skeptical about Roosevelt’s intention to include China in such a pact. Roosevelt knew that China was not up to par yet with the other three big powers, but saw not only the potential in the rapid Chinese growth but thought China could be a useful counter-weight against possible Soviet trouble. Roosevelt was convinced that many parts of the world were too underdeveloped or too divided to be given complete self-governance straight away. With the disarmament of aggressor nations after the war and the dismantling of colonial empires, rising conflicts would be subdued by the coalition of the four big powers who had a combined population of over one billion people. Within a few years Roosevelt had turned from no involvement in international affairs, to leadership in conflict-solving in the international arena. Kimball writes that even though Roosevelt did have some highly authoritative tendencies by his ambition to remodel the world in favor of American interests, he did this not only out of self-interest. It was also in the hope that other nations could further develop themselves under the wings of the American eagle. Although Roosevelt regularly mentioned the idea of Four Policemen administering law and order on a global scale after the war, he failed to define it and so it never came to be. Eventually the United Nations was created in October 1945 together with the Security Council which could agree on force against aggressor nations.

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151 Most remarkable of this issue is that while Roosevelt advocated the Four Policemen concept, the Department of State and Treasury meanwhile only worked on plans of an international organization in which responsibility was shared between all states much like the League of Nations. These drafts helped the formation of the United Nations. See Georg Schild, ‘The Roosevelt Administration and the United Nations: recreation or rejection of the league experience?’, *World affairs*, 158, 1 (1995)26-33.
3.4 Conclusion
Through use of the individual level of analysis of foreign policy of Costigliola and Paterson this chapter has studied Roosevelt’s personality, style of diplomacy and ideology. Roosevelt’s views on American foreign policy during World War II were inspired by internationalism and mainly focused on the build-up of American defenses, aid to the Allies and setting up an international organization to plan the post-war world order. Roosevelt used his authority as Commander in Chief to circumvent Congress and chose to rely on a small circle of trustees instead of the White House bureaucracy in order to achieve his foreign policy goals. His ideals for the post-war world order were summed up in his Four Freedoms, but his foreign policy goals were set on more practical instruments such as a coalition of big powers within the Four Policemen and American leadership of the new world order.
4. Roosevelt and Willkie: friends or foes?

With exception of a few paragraphs in the literature about both Roosevelt and Willkie, their relationship is not defined in a detailed matter. The goal of this chapter is to explain how their relationship was formed, how it changed over time and what characterized it. The sub question answered in this chapter is: how can the relationship between Roosevelt and Willkie be defined and was the level of political collaboration between the two? In this chapter the relationship between Roosevelt and Willkie on a professional and personal level is reviewed by using both primary sources as well as secondary literature. The nature of their relationship is important to investigate seeing that it is known that Roosevelt build his foreign policy on the advice of those he trusted (see chapter 3). The better their relationship therefore, the likelier it is that Roosevelt was indeed influenced by Willkie in regard of his foreign policy.

The lack of information about their relationship makes it difficult to assess the exact reasons why Roosevelt chose to cooperate with Willkie except for opportunistic short-term reasons, such as the elimination of the threat of political opposition. Regardless of the initial reasons for the cooperation, Moscow states that the cooperation between Willkie and his former opponent Roosevelt was unique in American politics. No President in office had ever worked so closely, publicly nor privately, with his former political nemesis. Striking is the fact that Republican Herbert Hoover tried to do the same as Willkie in 1932. He proposed cooperating with Roosevelt after he lost the presidential campaign in 1932, but Roosevelt declined this invitation.152

In the relationship between Roosevelt and Willkie there are four phases to dissert: as opponents on the New Deal when Willkie was still a lawyer for Commonwealth and Southern (1), as opponents in the 1940 presidential campaign when Willkie became the Republican nominee (2) the period after the presidential election in which Willkie became the leader of the opposition and at the same time functioned as Roosevelt’s special representative on international journeys (3) and the last six months of Willkie’s life in which he was no longer the leader of the Republican Party and in which Roosevelt and Willkie discussed changing the American political system (4).

152 Moscow, *Roosevelt and Willkie*, 200-204.
Before going into the relationship of Roosevelt and Willkie, a short summary is made by combining the information given in chapters 2 and 3. The table above (table 1) is made to compare the main characteristics and views of Roosevelt and Willkie, to show both similarities and differences. The overlap in foreign policy views is an important part of explaining why Roosevelt chose to cooperate with Willkie. As can be seen in the table, both Roosevelt and Willkie were liberals and can be described as open to the press, although Roosevelt was much more sophisticated in what he shared and how he said it. It is not clear whether this was a result of political experience or simply a difference in character. They both had an internationalist background and were both set on aiding the Allies. They were both anti-imperialist, but Roosevelt chose to go about the subject subtler than Willkie, so to

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<th>Pillars foreign policy post-war world</th>
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Table 1 Comparison characteristics and views Franklin Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie 1940-1944
not antagonize Bigger differences can be seen in the organization of the post-war world order.

An important difference is in which foreign policy approach they appended: Roosevelt tended to fluctuate between realist and idealist approach to foreign policy, where Willkie was much more firm on an idealist approach to foreign policy. Except for the creating of a second front in Europe, Willkie and Roosevelt mostly agreed on American foreign policy during the war. Roosevelt preferred an international organization in which the power was held by only a few, the Four Policemen, while Willkie desired a truly global international organization where every nation had an equal say. Although the Four Freedoms and the ideals in One World do overlap, the intention behind these ideals differed. Roosevelt saw his Four Freedoms as an example of an utopian world, to be strived towards but never fully achieved, while Willkie was set on working towards the fulfillment of his One World ideals.

4.1 Political opponents: from New Deal to elections

As mentioned before, Roosevelt and Willkie’s paths first crossed when Willkie attacked the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), part of Roosevelt’s New Deal, as the president of Commonwealth and Southern. Although most negotiations on this matter went through David Lilienthal, co-director of the TVA, Willkie and Roosevelt met in person for the first time in December 1934. Albeit their meeting was friendly in tone and pleasantries were shared, both kept their position on the subject firmly. In the years following, the two met several times and clashed regularly on the TVA subject. Insiders of the Roosevelt Administration and in the Willkie entourage commented that the men rejected each other ideas on the subject but seemed to appreciate each others knowledge and abilities. Although their personal contact was mostly friendly in tone, both remained critical about one another in the press.153

When Willkie appeared on the political stage in 1940 as the Republican dark horse, the Roosevelt Administration began to take more of an interest in this political newcomer. During the campaign the Roosevelt Administration chose a harsh strategy. Among other things they leaked rumors to the press about alleged fraud cases during Willkie’s time as president of Commonwealth and Southern. The discrediting methods used by Roosevelt’s

153 Neal, Dark horse, 27-35.
Administration were not enough to make Willkie falter, but it did make him despise Roosevelt’s strategy. In the meanwhile, Willkie hit back by calling Roosevelt a warmonger; allegations which led to even more brute repercussions by Roosevelt’s staff. In order to shush Willkie, it is said that Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s chief diplomatic adviser and policy maker, called Willkie to threaten him with making his affair with Van Doren public. Who the real minds were behind the smear campaign was never revealed, but Willkie’s relationship with Van Doren never made it to the newspapers. Roosevelt himself did know about the affair and disapproved of Willkie’s carelessness about it, but chose not to attack him on it.154 Besides the slander on his good name, Willkie was primarily frustrated by the fact that Roosevelt hardly acknowledged the campaign and instead chose to position himself as the irreplaceable Commander in Chief.155

With respect to content, Willkie criticized Roosevelt mostly on domestic policy in this period. Concerning foreign policy, Willkie predominantly criticized the Roosevelt Administration on the form and method of handling issues, seldom criticizing on the content of the Administration’s foreign policy plans.156 The most important reason for this was the fact that both men were convinced internationalists, so their views on foreign policy overlapped greatly. Roosevelt’s speech writer Robert Sherwood described Willkie’s stance on foreign politics as being equal to Roosevelt’s, only Willkie thought that he could do the same in a better way. Willkie and Roosevelt clashed more on a professional level, rather than personality wise. Gregory states that there was a sense of mutual respect and understanding between them.157

In a confidential memorandum to the President on September 29, 1940 off-the-record information about Willkie and his campaign was discussed, since “the boss might be interested”. In this memorandum information from an Administration source about Willkie’s campaigning and views on foreign policy are discussed, such as the fact that Willkie had said privately that he would not go into depth into the aid to Britain during his campaign speeches. According to the memorandum, Willkie had called Roosevelt’s foreign policy “fair” for the most part, except for some instances in which Roosevelt chose to please isolationist

forces within the political system.\textsuperscript{158} This did not mean however that Willkie did not challenge Roosevelt’s foreign policy at all. For instance in his San Francisco Address on September 12, 1940 Willkie criticized Roosevelt on his weak foreign policy strategy of non-intervention and fighting with words against weapons.\textsuperscript{159} In his Long Island Address on October 26, 1940 Willkie added that American foreign policy should be focused on strengthening the European democracies who are threatened by the Axis and points out that the believes that Roosevelt’s New Deal did the exact opposite.\textsuperscript{160}

According to Freedman, the interaction between Willkie and Roosevelt before the election can be seen as the birth of the bipartisan tradition in American foreign policy, seeing that it was Willkie’s idea initially to work together on foreign policy with Roosevelt. In a letter from Frankfurter to Roosevelt on July 23, 1940 the scheme of Willkie to already agree on foreign policy with Roosevelt during the election campaign is mentioned. This scheme consisted of Roosevelt and Willkie agreeing on foreign policy so that the people would see that there was in fact no difference between the Democratic and the Republic party on this issue and that Willkie, who would be portrayed as a consultant in foreign policy, could be seen as a statesman already. Although Frankfurter and Roosevelt saw this idea as a political strategically plan from Willkie to win votes, they did see a chance in this plan for themselves: to create the possibility of bipartisanship in foreign policy to advance their position and silence dissidents.\textsuperscript{161}

4.2 Start of political cooperation between Roosevelt and Willkie

The start of the political cooperation between Roosevelt can be divided into two parts: the first part is concerned with Willkie calling out his loyal opposition to Roosevelt and the second part is concerned with Willkie in relation to Roosevelt during his world tour.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{158} Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), \textit{Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4}, reel 45, Memorandum to the President, September 29, 1940.
\textsuperscript{159} Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), \textit{Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 3}, reel 23, Statements by Wendell Willkie, September 12, 1940.
\textsuperscript{160} Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), \textit{Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 3}, reel 23, Long Island Address, October 26, 1940.
\textsuperscript{161} Max Freedman (ed.), \textit{Roosevelt and Frankfurter, their correspondence 1928-1945} (1967) 539-540.
\end{flushleft}
4.2.1 Loyal opposition

After losing the election Willkie was quick to announce his support for Roosevelt.

Immediately after his defeat, Willkie sent a telegram to Roosevelt congratulating him with his victory. Moscow calls Willkie’s ungrudged reaction to losing the election as the main reason for Roosevelt’s willingness to cooperate with Willkie afterwards. Willkie was convinced that since the people of the United States had elected Roosevelt, he had to respect this choice. During the National Radio Address Willkie made on November 11, 1940 a week after losing the presidential election, he said the following: “We have elected Franklin Roosevelt President. He is your President. He is my President. All of us owe him the respect due to his high office. We give him that respect. We will support him with our best efforts for our country.” After this statement he continued explaining that he did not wish to submit his ideology for the sake of wartime unity, but rather serve the country by continuing to debate governmental policies as loyal opposition. By loyal opposition Willkie meant that American unity would best be met when the opposition overcame its initial antipathy and combine forces with the Administration. In this same address Willkie also touched the subject of bipartisanship. He stated that although the American political system did not allow national unity by coalition cabinets, this did not mean that Republicans should oppose to Roosevelt merely for the sake of politics while there was crisis in the world.

After Roosevelt’s third inaugural, Willkie and Roosevelt met in the White House for the first time as allies. Roosevelt made his intentions clear about cooperating and made a joke that Willkie could have easily taken the inaugural, seeing as they were fighting for the same cause. In later meetings Roosevelt advised Willkie on diplomatic affairs and even mentioned that he did well to remember these meetings since it was very possible that he would very well be the next President of the United States. Now as allies, the meetings between the men were more informal and on a much friendlier basis than before. Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins later said that the men took an immediate liking to each other while they had not expected to do so. Roosevelt had told Perkins that he thought Willkie was a “good

162 Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 203.
164 Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie, 165-166.
165 Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 204.
fellow with a lot of talent, which should be used for the Democratic case.” 166 Moscow mentions that intimates of Willkie said that Willkie was often called upon by the President in the years 1940-1944, after which he was collected by plane to fly to the White House to talk with Roosevelt. These alleged trips however have unfortunately gone unrecorded. 167

For Willkie losing the election did not mean disappearing from the public eye. Speculation spiked about party loyalty after Willkie had claimed the position of loyal opposition to the Administration. An illustrative example of the criticism directed at Willkie is seen in a news article in the Chicago Daily Tribune on January 20, 1941. Within the article there is talk of Willkie’s ‘conspiracy’ with Roosevelt. After Roosevelt had positioned Republicans in important positions, the newspaper writes: “Republicans now realize that they were the victims of an audacious and unscrupulous conspiracy”, and that “the least honorable part taken in this was taken by Mr. Willkie. But he is out of the Republican Party, if he ever was in it”. 168 These speculations and accusations did not appear out of thin air. Willkie was asked for a position within a coalition government just after losing the election, but declined the offer. This job-offering leaked to the press quickly and was ideal munition for Willkie’s political enemies to discredit him and raise doubts about his sincerity. Although his Republican counterparts pushed Willkie to take a stance against Roosevelt’s foreign policy, Willkie kept supporting Roosevelt’s fight for more aid to the Allies through the Lend-Lease Bill. Willkie’s support of the Administration’s foreign policy agenda, led Roosevelt to believe that Willkie’s political skill and personality would be a very useful in negotiations with the Allies. This conviction is said to have influenced Roosevelt in naming Willkie as special representative of Roosevelt in international affairs during his visit to Britain (1941) and on his world tour (1942). 169 The fact that Roosevelt appreciated Willkie’s loyal opposition becomes apparent in his letter of introduction to Chiang Kai-Shek on August 21, 1942, in which he wrote about the coming visit of Willkie to China. Roosevelt wrote that

166 Neal, Dark horse, 189-193.
167 Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 205.
168 Chicago daily tribune, January 20, 1941, Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 15 (microfilm edition, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands).
169 Neal, Dark horse, 181-188.
Willkie “has given unstinted support to the government in its foreign policy and in the conduct of war and has helped to create the excellent state of unity which exists today”. 170

However convenient Willkie’s loyal opposition was for the Administration, they were not pleased with Willkie’s personal contact with Churchill during and after his first trip to Great Britain. In a letter to the American Embassy in London from Hull on May 19, 1941, it becomes apparent that direct contact between Willkie and Churchill should be cut off, seeing that this could leak out and create revulsion with Congress and give shame to the Administration. From this letter exchange it seems that Willkie was seen as useful for the Administration’s goals, but was not supposed to undertake any foreign policy relations on his own without approval from the Administration.171

4.2.2 World tour

As Jordan states, Willkie’s trip around the world could be seen as a win-win situation for both Willkie and Roosevelt. For Willkie, the title of presidential representative meant he was provided with governmental transportation, staff, safe passage and letters of introduction to meet foreign governmental officials. For Roosevelt, the trip had great propaganda value; it showed both domestically as internationally a sense of wartime unity between Administration and opposition. Seeing that Willkie’s loyal opposition could be beneficial for the Administration’s cause, Roosevelt felt it was needed that Willkie got more educated in foreign affairs. A world tour could help Willkie in understanding governmental decision making and could lead to more support from Willkie and his supporters for the Roosevelt Administration.172 When asked about Willkie’s role during his world tour, Roosevelt mentioned in a press conference on August 21, 1942: “At any rate he is going for me, he is going as a special representative of the President”, since “we have unity and [...] we are going all-out”.173

Willkie’s role as a special representative of the President did not mean he was fully trusted however, as becomes apparent by the fact that the civil servants whom

171 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, Map room messages of president Roosevelt, 1939-1945, part I, Reel IV, Letter to American Embassy London from Hull, May 19, 1941.
accompanied Willkie on his world tour and the American Embassies of the nations he visited reported in secret to the White House on how the trip was experienced. For example, a Chinese Foreign Officer who shadowed Willkie during his time in China was quite critical on the impression Willkie left there. In an extensive day-to-day rapport he wrote that Willkie offended most Chinese officials during his visit and his advances to Madame Chiang Kai-Shek were highly inappropriate. The accompanying staff during the world tour, such as the pilot Major Kight, were interviewed on their return to Washington to not only rapport their own experiences but also commented on the way Willkie behaved.

The relationship between Roosevelt and Willkie at the time was not only peace and harmony. Aside from the earlier mentioned political mishap of Willkie by publicly proposing a second front in Europe, Roosevelt also set certain boundaries to Willkie’s travel itself. Even though Roosevelt ultimately agreed with Willkie on his anti-imperialist views, the more realist side of Roosevelt did not think it wise to push for the dismantling of colonialism immediately. Not willing to compromise the good relationship with the British by attacking their imperialism, Roosevelt forbade Willkie to visit India during his world tour. Willkie in turn tried to persuade Roosevelt to force Churchill to agree on the dismantling of British colonies after the war had ended. Roosevelt refused to do so and rapped over Willkie’s knuckles for speaking out about the subject to the press.

4.3 Bipartisanship: united in fighting isolationism

As early as September 1940 Willkie had made it clear that he supported Roosevelt’s cause of fighting isolationism, even though these statements caused Willkie a lot of political resistance. In an off-the-record conversation, described in a memorandum to the President on September 29, 1940 Willkie mentioned: “that if I had wanted to play politics, I could have come out as an isolationist but I have not done so because that was against my

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174 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45, Letter from Chungking Embassy to FDR, December 2, 1942 with enclosures of rapport of Chinese official who shadowed Willkie.

175 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45, Interview with Major R. T. Kight, October 23, 1942.

176 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Foreign Relations, Records on council on foreign relations, 1921-1951, Meetings of the council on foreign relations, M321, Wendell L. Willkie on observations on a recent journey, Digest of a dinner report, November 18, 1941.
convictions”. As Johnson describes in *The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie* the relationship between Willkie and the Republican Party establishment deteriorated rapidly after Willkie chose to be loyal opposition to the Administration. From 1941 onwards, Willkie shunned partisan politics and focused on advocating internationalism. He not only supported Roosevelt’s aid to Britain, but even took an advance to Roosevelt’s position by stating that the Lend-Lease Bill was not sufficient enough in the long run. When Roosevelt announced in July 1941 that American troops had occupied Iceland, Willkie not only supported Roosevelt’s decision but suggested that American bases should also be instated in both Ireland and Scotland. Criticism grew even more during the summer of 1941, as can be seen in Alfred Landon’s broadcast ‘The Roosevelt-Willkie program’. In this broadcast Landon, former Kansas governor and presidential candidate in 1936, accused Roosevelt and Willkie of smothering political debate and eliminating opposition by their joined fight against isolationists. Landon’s main criticism can be summed up in his quote: “Thus, fighting to preserve democracy in the world, we lose it at home”.

In 1942 Willkie stated that he would actively support the more internationalist Republicans during the off-year elections. Not only that, he promised not to mingle in campaigns where internationalist Democrats attacked isolationist Republicans. After Willkie’s visit to Britain and his world tour, he and Roosevelt worked together privately and secretly on a plan of action for the fight against isolationism, by which they alternated in speaking out publicly about matters of defense and foreign policy.

In his article ‘Economic freedom for the world’, written in 1944, Willkie openly endorsed Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms as a starting point for his ideal new world order. However, Willkie remained critical about words without action. He stated in his article that Wilson’s Fourteen Points and Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms were both examples of idealistic expressions by those in power, but that ideals only would not change the course of history. The Four Freedoms were what Willkie called political internationalism: outspoken intentions of internationalist policies and ideals. For real freedom and equality to exist this political

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177 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), *Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45*, Memorandum to the president, September 29, 1940.
internationalism would have to be joined with economic internationalism and America would have to break with all isolationist policies and practices, both political and economic. The most important aspect to the economic internationalism Willkie promoted, was the creation of basic conditions for all people to access all products and the ability to bring their own produce to the world market. Thus, while endorsing Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, Willkie called for practical measures to make these freedoms truly international.182

Not all scholars agree on the close relationship between Willkie and Roosevelt. On the matter of influence, Henrikson talks about Willkie as being a Rooseveltian. According to Henrikson, Roosevelt’s war time speeches about the Four Freedoms and the necessity of world unity had great impact on those close to him, whether in his own Administration or outside of it. His Vice-President Wallace and Willkie therefore framed their own global beliefs in a typical Rooseveltian style. Henrikson goes as far as saying that One World is in essence based on Roosevelt hopes for the future, as the trip itself was initiated by Roosevelt.183 Gardner also talks about the colonial question, the question how colonialism should be ended after the war, as the Roosevelt question. He is convinced that Willkie’s convictions about ending colonialism were in essence Roosevelt’s idea.184 Seeing that Willkie already manifested his views on freedom, equality and international cooperation, in the late 1930s, Henrikson’s proposition that Willkie’s ideas were Rooseveltian ideas, is a bit of a stretch. The fact that Willkie could have been influenced by Roosevelt’s Four Freedom speech is possible, but only underscores the similarities in their thinking.

4.4 Roosevelt and Willkie in cahoots: job offers and plans for a third party

Proof that Willkie and Roosevelt maintained a close relationship can also be found in the fact that Roosevelt himself and his governmental officials offered Willkie multiple positions within the Administration during the years 1941-1944. In a letter to Roosevelt on October 27, 1941 a governmental official writes that Roosevelt’s message about wanting Willkie inside of the Administration has been delivered to Willkie. Although flattered, Willkie declined since he thought “he would be much more useful to your [Roosevelt] foreign policy

183 Henrikson, ‘FDR and the “world-wide arena”’, 50.
if he were not part of the Administration”. The letter ends with the statement that Roosevelt’s desire to see Willkie face-to-face to discuss the political situation in the following year, was also delivered to Willkie. A few months later in a letter to Morris Ernst on December 29, 1941 Roosevelt talked about the chances of getting Willkie to accept a position in the new Labor Board. In a letter to Roosevelt from an unknown author of April 28, 1944 it becomes apparent that Willkie was considered as a replacement of William Know, Secretary of Navy, who died that day. Rumor even had it that Willkie was a possible candidate for the Vice-Presidency if Roosevelt’s won a fourth term, as appears in a letter from Roosevelt to George Norris on July 27, 1944. Lewis also talked about the possibility of Willkie as Vice-President, stating that Roosevelt thought that the unconventional Willkie could trump the more traditional Henry Wallace. As with the other job-offers Willkie, given this opportunity in July 1944, declined the offer.

Crucial in describing the Roosevelt-Willkie relationship is the little known fact that they took tentative steps to planning the creation of a new third party. In the election year of 1944, times were tough on both Roosevelt and Willkie. Both men had trouble in fending off the conservative isolationist in their party; Willkie having the harder time. After being set aside by the Republican party, who elected and supported isolationist Thomas Dewey, Willkie forged a plan. In a meeting with Gifford Pinchot, former Pennsylvania governor, he displayed his plan: it was time for renovation of the political system. Roosevelt heard of this plan and agreed with Willkie’s idea of a new party. Seeing that both the Republican and Democratic Party were divided in liberal and conservative camps, with Willkie being the candidate of choice of the liberal Republicans, it would be possible to form a new liberal party with liberals from both parties. However, this plan could not be agreed upon overnight seeing that elections were coming up and Willkie refused coming out in support for the Democratic Party. This did not stop Roosevelt to send Samuel Rosenman, member of the White House Counsel, to Willkie to inform him about his wish to cooperate with Willkie on

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185 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45, Memorandum for the president, October 27, 1941.
187 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45, Letter to Roosevelt from unknown author, April 28, 1944.
188 Letter from FDR to George Norris, July 17, 1944, in Roosevelt, Elliott, Joseph Lash (eds.), FDR his personal letters 1928-1945 (New York 1950) 1523.
such an undertaking. In a secret meeting in a New York hotel room Rosenman and Willkie agreed: after the election Willkie and Roosevelt would meet to try party realignment. The plan was never set into action, and the true how and why therefore never retrieved, since Willkie died of a heart attack in the fall of 1944. It does however illustrate the extent to which Roosevelt trusted Willkie and the extent to which Roosevelt and Willkie concurred on a course for American politics.\textsuperscript{190}

4.5 Conclusion
Roosevelt and Willkie’s relationship knows multiple phases. As opponents during the 1930s Willkie criticized Roosevelt’s New Deal and as political opponents during the presidential election of 1940 Willkie criticized Roosevelt’s lack of action concerning the war-effort. After Willkie lost the election however, the two decided to cooperate on matters of foreign policy seeing that they shared the internationalism-ideology and their shared efforts could eliminate isolationist in both Democratic and Republican Parties. Willkie became the loyal opposition to Roosevelt. To show American unity in the war, Roosevelt appointed Willkie as special representative of the President on his world tour in 1942. Proof of Roosevelt’s closeness to Willkie cannot only be seen in their shared views on foreign policy, but also in the fact that Roosevelt offered Willkie jobs within the Administration multiple times during the period 1940-1944. The secret plans in 1944 in which Roosevelt and Willkie schemed to create a third Party together can be seen as a sign of the mutual trust between the two.

\textsuperscript{190} Burns, \textit{Roosevelt, the soldier of freedom}, 509-512
5. A matter of influence: Willkie and American foreign policy

Recapitulating the information given in the previous chapters, the political cooperation between Willkie and Roosevelt can best be explained by the personal chemistry between the two and their shared foreign policy ideology, being internationalism. Following Banfield’s criteria of measuring influence, it seems that through Willkie’s loyal opposition to the Roosevelt Administration, his position as special representative on international travels and that of occasional sounding board to Roosevelt, Willkie was in a position to help form and influence Roosevelt’s foreign policy decision making. Following this train of thought, the research question, to what extent did Wendell Willkie’s internationalist ideals influence American foreign policy in the period 1940-1944, is answered in this chapter.

To answer the research question Banfield’s measurement of political influence is used. Following the four criteria of Banfield, this chapter will look at Willkie’s influence on American foreign policy, by which Roosevelt is seen as the source of American foreign policy, on multiple occasions chronologically: the passing of the Bill for Lend-Lease and Conscription Bill (1), Willkie’s world tour (2), speculations on Willkie’s influence by the press at the time (3) and Willkie’s influence on the changing the political discourse towards internationalism (4). Within this methodological framework the Willkie is the influencer and Roosevelt, as primary creator of foreign policy, the one who gets influenced. The influence of Willkie is administered in different ways corresponding with Banfield’s categories of influence types: through a sense of obligation, through gratification and friendship and through rational persuasion. Banfield’s fourth criterion, how influence concerted action, can be seen by looking at the consequences of Willkie’s support or suggestions on foreign policy.191

5.1 Willkie and support for the Allies’ cause (1940-1941)

Already before the election of 1940 Willkie cooperated with Roosevelt on matters of foreign policy. In the early 1940s by which Willkie helped facilitate a Bill to enlarge America’s war effort was the endorsement of Roosevelt’s plan for selective service in the fall of 1940.192 Afraid to incur the anger of the isolationist and lose votes in the upcoming election, but convinced that America should prepare for war, Roosevelt tentatively introduced selective

191 Banfield, Political influence, 2-7.
192 Cole, Roosevelt and the isolationists, 376-377.
service for the first time in the summer of 1940. The idea for selective service was brought to the table by army officers who believed that universal military training was necessary. Roosevelt, knowing that peacetime drafting would cause political upheaval, chose to package the selective service Bill as a necessity for America’s defense in the Western Hemisphere. The isolationists responded as was expected, accusing Roosevelt of killing of American democracy and sacrificing American boys for the sake of foreign countries. Roosevelt, afraid that Willkie would use this subject to campaign against him, was surprised in August 1940 when Willkie joined in the debate, supporting Roosevelt’s call for conscription. Willkie’s support to Roosevelt’s draft was enough to break the deadlock which existed in Congress over the issue, which resulted in the Congressional approval of selective service in September 1940.193

Another instance of Willkie’s support of Roosevelt’s foreign policy was in the matter of aid for the Allies in 1940-1941. The Destroyers-for-bases deal which came to be in September 1940 was the predecessor for the Lend-Lease Bill and entailed the exchange of old American destroyers for bases in British colonies in the Western Hemisphere. It was the American reaction to Germany’s fast advances on the continent and Churchill’s ongoing plea for help from across the pond. With the Senate full of isolationist who would get in the way of this plan, Roosevelt used bipartisan tactics to secure this deal, by working together with internationalist Republicans. Through deploying Republicans such as William Knox as Secretary of the Navy and most importantly Willkie as the Republican leader to sway the press and the American people to get behind the Destroyers-for-bases deal, Roosevelt hoped to push through the decision. While Willkie was at first apprehensive on the deal, not because he disagreed on aiding Britain but because of his vulnerable political position, he eventually agreed seeing that the exchange could be sold as beneficial to America’s safety and strength. Although the deal was not enough to help Britain defeat the Axis, Roosevelt thought it wise to count his blessings seeing that it was election year and he could not risk any further steps without causing political upheaval from the isolationists.194 Although Willkie was criticized harshly by the Republican Party elite, it did not make his popularity falter. A Gallup survey in January 1941 shows that the majority of his electorate were behind

193 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American foreign policy, 247-249
194 Cole, Roosevelt and the isolationists, 370-374
Willkie’s choice to support Lend-Lease, with 62 percent of Republicans and 74 percent of Democrats approving the Bill.\textsuperscript{195}

After being reinstated for a third term, Roosevelt went on in January 1941 with presenting his Lend-Lease Bill in his annual message to Congress. More openly internationalist than ever before he attacked isolationism fiercely. Despite Roosevelt’s inspiring Four Freedoms speech, he found a lot of resistance against the Lend-Lease Bill. At a debate from the Foreign Relations Committee on the subject, Willkie came to the rescue. Just returning from his trip to Britain, Willkie took the stage on February 11, 1941 and wholly endorsed the Lend-Lease Bill but demanded some minor alteration. When he was accused of being in cahoots with Roosevelt, Willkie retorted: “I struggled as hard as I could to beat Franklin Roosevelt [...] He was elected President. He is my President now”.\textsuperscript{196} The Bill was officially passed in March 1941. The Bill included almost all of Willkie’s demands for alternations such as a presidential report to Congress about the Lend-Lease decisions every three months and a safety cap on the worth of defense items by limiting the dollar value.\textsuperscript{197}

The support from his formally political opponent made Roosevelt secure enough to go through with his plan of action in supporting the Allied forces. In early 1945, after Willkie’s death in 1944, Roosevelt gave Willkie the credits for pushing through the Lend-Lease Bill stating that he could not have done it without Willkie’s support.\textsuperscript{198} Walter Lippmann, influential journalist and political commentator at the time, later wrote on this subject: “The sudden rise and nomination of Willkie was the decisive event, perhaps, providential, which made it possible to rally the free world when it was almost conquered. Under any other leadership but his, the Republican Party would have turned its back upon Great Britain, causing all who still resisted Hitler to feel that they were abandoned.”\textsuperscript{199}

Thus it seems that Willkie and Roosevelt consulted on matters of foreign policy even before Willkie’s world tour as special representative of Roosevelt. That Willkie not only endorsed some of Roosevelt’s foreign policies but also submitted his own ideas can be seen in the transcripts of dinner discussion on March 5, 1941 of the Council on Foreign Relations,

\textsuperscript{195} Donald Bruce Johnson, \textit{The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie} (Urbana 1960) 173.
\textsuperscript{196} Burns, \textit{Roosevelt, the soldier of freedom}, 43-50.
\textsuperscript{197} Johnson, \textit{The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie}, 183.
\textsuperscript{198} Paul Glastris, ‘Roosevelt, Churchill and… Willkie?’, 41-43.
\textsuperscript{199} Johnson, \textit{The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie}, 186-187.
who invited Willkie to inform them on his trip to war-torn Britain.\footnote{The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an American nonprofit think tank that specializes in American foreign policy which was created in 1921 by a group of scholars, businessmen, governmental officials and journalists who had also been present at the Versailles peace conference. In meetings held by the CFR politicians, important businessmen and leaders of intelligence and security agencies convene. Through their publishing of the journal \textit{Foreign Affairs} and their recommendations to both the American president, diplomats and Congress they try to influence foreign policy. In the period 1939-1944 the CFR had great influence on the Roosevelt Administration because of their secret \textit{War and Peace studies} of which only very prominent members who were concerned with this topic were notified on. See, William Diebold, ‘A survey of the archives of the council on foreign relations, Records of the council on foreign relations, 1921-1951’, vii-x \texttt{http://www.cfr.org} (25-04-2016).} During the dinner discussion in March 1941, in which Willkie was interviewed by the participating members of the CFR, Willkie explained that he had no official foreign policy significance on his trip except for delivering a couple of letters from the President. Although the sole purpose of his visit to Britain was to inform himself of their situation, his actions overseas seem to extent to discussing matters of foreign policy. During this meeting Willkie elaborated on his talks with Churchill, who informed him about his expectancies on Hitler’s ground movements through Europe.\footnote{Churchill expected Hitler to strike an en masse attack on the Balkans, then on Spain, by which they could take in Gibraltar and launch an offensive in North Africa. Churchill thought an attack on the British Isles was very plausible, since there was no other way in which the Germans could get a quick victory. See Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), \textit{Foreign Relations, Records on council on foreign relations, 1921-1951}, \textit{Meetings of the council on foreign relations}, Wendell Willkie on my trip to Britain, Digest of a Diner Discussion March 5, 1941.} Willkie continued by informing the Council what America should do to help the British: send ships, merchantmen and destroyers. Also, he stated to the Council that he had asked the Administration to send Britain five to ten destroyers each month on his return to the United States. Secretary of Navy Knox had subsequently replied to him that this was too much machinery for the American navy to miss. But, Willkie stated: “The President privately assured me that the plan was entirely feasible”.\footnote{Wendell Willkie on my trip to Britain, Digest of a Diner Discussion March 5, 1941, \textit{Foreign Relations, Records on council on foreign relations, 1921-1951}, \textit{Meetings of the council on foreign relations}, M286 (microfilm edition, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands).} This statement indicates, that although Willkie did not have any official foreign policy power his opinion on foreign policy matters was appreciated and taken to heart by Roosevelt.

5.2 Willkie’s world tour and the consequences for foreign policy (1942)

Willkie’s world tour did not only have propaganda value of showing the world America’s wartime unity, it also had a foreign policy purpose. Willkie was to ‘put some pep’ in the Allied forces in war, inform himself of the military and humanitarian situations in those parts
of the world he visited and spread the message of America’s unity and power. During a press conference on August 21, 1942 Roosevelt told the journalists present that “what he [Willkie] says will carry very great weight on what the United States is doing to win the war”. That Roosevelt saw Willkie as a source of advise and information on foreign policy matters concerning the areas which he would visit, also becomes apparent in a telegram which he sent to Willkie on August 2, 1941. In this telegram Roosevelt mentioned that aside from the Middle East, both Russia and China would be interesting subjects that Roosevelt and Willkie could discuss after Willkie’s return to America. And that he would like Willkie to visit the White House as soon as possible after his arrival to hear his views on several matters of foreign policy personally.

Willkie’s world tour did create a stir in the Roosevelt Administration on what Willkie’s role entailed: as a private person flying in a converted military airplane as a special representative of the President of the United States, his title and function were more than complex. The difficulty of Willkie’s position becomes apparent in a memorandum for the President on July 31, 1942 which followed a letter from Roosevelt to Chief of Staff Joseph McNarney on Willkie’s proposed world tour. In this memorandum it is mentioned that Willkie should be clearly instructed on the fact that foreign governments should not deposit any questions on military support to him. If Willkie would get such questions and would act on these requests, it would be possible that Willkie’s influence on the Administration and the Department of War would become too large. McNarney feared that this could cause dispersion of military means and should thus be avoided. McNarney’s wish for Willkie to stay clear of foreign policy matters did not come true however. While visiting China, Willkie made a speech for the Central Training Corps at Chungking on October 3, 1942 in which he promised the Chinese that: “since you have fought this war against aggression for five years, it is the duty we owe you to get the planes and the weapons to China as rapidly and as much as possible”.

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204 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45, Telegram from Roosevelt to Willkie, August 2, 1942.
205 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45, Memorandum for the president, July 31 1942.
On September 10, 1942 Willkie sent a telegram to Roosevelt from the American embassy in Turkey stating that Turkey has a dire need for wheat. By asking Roosevelt to act upon this Turkish shortage of wheat by sending them the sufficient amount, he also stressed the fact that the Turkish prime minister had urged him to convince the President that America should send planes, tanks and motor trucks to the Middle East. Roosevelt answered Willkie on September 15, 1942 thanking him for the given information and stating that he would give the matter immediate attention. He also added that Willkie’s visit was highly effective and beneficial to the cause of the Administration.

Another instance in which Willkie’s influence on foreign policy shows is the matter of sending American army officers to Iran. Willkie had sent a letter to Roosevelt during his visit in Iran stating that the Iranians would like to have American high ranking officers come over to train their army. In a letter to the Undersecretary of State on October 20, 1942 Roosevelt submitted this question to the War Department. The Under Secretary of State hereafter replied to the President that the War Department would think about an American military dispatch to Iran and agreed that American influence in Iran could be useful in the future. Following this exchange of ideas Roosevelt wrote to Willkie on October 22, 1942 that he is glad that Willkie informed him of the situation. He also sent along a confidential memorandum he got from Welles on plans for a Persian Mission, following Willkie’s requests. The effect on longer term of Willkie’s visit to Iran is seen in a letter sent by Louis Dreyfus, United States Minister in Iran, to the Secretary of State on July 5, 1943. In this letter Dreyfus explains that the Iranian government is finally considering adhering the United Nations Declaration ever since Willkie had visited. Willkie had opened up the debate in Iran and caused the Iranians to contemplate being part of the United Nations.
By the time of 1941-1942, Willkie was seen as an extension of Roosevelt in foreign policy by some foreign politicians. In a telegram from Stalin to Churchill, who in turn sent the message to Roosevelt, Stalin mentioned that he talked in great detail with Willkie about the fact that the Soviets were in dire need of Spitfires and Aircobras, hoping that Willkie could arrange American support for air protection. In a memorandum from the Secretary of State on May 16, 1941 it is stated that Willkie had received a peace proposal from “a certain Japanese individual”, which he in turn forwarded to both the Australian minister and the White House. Regarding the Japan-issue Willkie was also put forward as possible negotiator by the State Department. In a memorandum by Hamilton, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, to the Secretary of State on December 12, 1941 plans for handling the problems in the Pacific are discussed in the form of the set up of a joint strategic board in Chungking with membership of American, British, Dutch and Chinese representatives. Hamilton stated: “We suggest that such a political strategic mission be headed by an outstanding personage such as Mr. Willkie or Mr. McNutt.”

That Willkie could bring a topic of concern to the table in the matter of foreign policy seems apparent through analyzing the telegram contact between Roosevelt and Willkie during his world tour. This did not mean however that Willkie was informed on all matters of foreign policy. In an off-the-record conversation with a journalist of the American Newspaper Guild in December 1942, Willkie remarked that both Churchill and Roosevelt refused to give him information of Britain’s post-war aims. This lack of information on certain confidential aspects of foreign policy can also be seen in the earlier mentioned fact that Willkie was not up to date with the plans for a North African invasion.

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212 ‘Telegram Churchill to Roosevelt, C-158, October 6, 1942’ in Warren Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, the complete correspondence, alliance emerging, 618.
213 Digital archive United States Department of State, Digital collections of the University of Wisconsin, Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic papers, 1941, The Far East, document 197, Memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, May 16, 1941.
214 Digital archive United States Department of State, Digital collections of the University of Wisconsin, Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic papers, 1941, The Far East, document 745, Memorandum by the chief of the division of far Eastern affairs (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State. December 12, 1941.
215 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45, Memorandum from Edgar Hoover, December 9, 1942.
216 More extensive information on this political mishap of Willkie on the second front can be found in Jones, ‘One World: an American perspective’, 112-113.
5.3 The press: speculations on Willkie’s influence on foreign policy

Although the topic of Willkie’s influence on Roosevelt’s foreign policy was never extensively researched by scholars, it was a matter of interest to the press at the time. When asked directly whether Willkie’s trip around the world, his report and his conversations with the President would lead to changes in the American military strategy on a press conference on October 13, 1942 Roosevelt answered evasive: “I think all that I can tell you is this, that we had an exceedingly successful and very interesting talk the other day. I cannot disclose military secrets. Very excellent time we had together.” However vague this answer, the fact that the press asked questions on possible changes in foreign policy with relation to Willkie multiple times during press conferences is a sign of the presumptions that existed on Willkie’s influence on foreign policy.

In a report from an anonymous journalist from 1943 named ‘Willkie influence in Office of War Information’ a pattern is displayed in which a multitude of incidents combined could show Willkie’s influence in the Office of War Information (OWI) according to the author. The Office of War Information was a governmental agency which was created in 1942 and distributed governmental information and propaganda in America and abroad. Roosevelt created the OWI because he wished to relieve the confusion and misinformation about matters of war and create support for the war effort of the public. The incidents which the author presents as proof of Willkie’s influence on the OWI in his rapport can be summarized as following: the promotion of Willkie through governmental propaganda (1), the elimination of opposing politicians in the Administration (2) and the sabotage of OWI programs which are favorable for the Administrations effort to sway public opinion to their side (3). Arguments which are used to underpin these allegations are the fact that the Deputy Director of OWI Joseph Barnes went on the world tour with Willkie and helped editing his book *One World* and the fact that the overseas broadcasts from the OWI featured Willkie more than Roosevelt himself.

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219 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), *Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45*, Report Willkie influence in office of war information by unknown author, July 21, 1943.
In a memorandum to Roosevelt on August 9, 1943 Robert Sherwood addressed the article which he received by Jonathan Daniels, White House Press Secretary. Daniels said that the report was made by a young journalist who was sympathetic to the Administration and who had written the report “in a completely sincere effort to present the situation truthfully”. Sherwood went on explaining that he suspected that the journalist has received information from an intern source in the OWI seeing the detailed information in the rapport. Sherwood then continued to refute the arguments made in the article about the overseas branch of the OWI. To quote: “I can say that seldom have I seen a more malicious piece of manipulation and distortion of fact”. He argued that, not only is the President featured far beyond any American in the overseas broadcasts, but Willkie was only featured as opposition leader and isolationism-opponent. More so, Willkie was refrained from quoting controversial and critical passages of One World in the one interview Willkie did with the OWI broadcast. Sherwood defended Barnes by stating that Barnes was enthusiastic about a world trip but at first reluctant because he feared being seen as ‘a Willkie man’. All in all, Sherwood refuted the idea of a ‘Willkie infiltration’ on all aspects mentioned in the article. Whether or not there is truth in the bold statements of the anonymous journalist about Willkie’s influence in the OWI is impossible to ascertain in hindsight. What the article and the following letter exchange do show is the fear for some, both Democrat and Republican, that Willkie had a bit too much to say on foreign policy as they would like.

Questions from the press on the matter of influence did lessen over the course of Roosevelt’s third term, seeing that the frequency of Willkie and Roosevelt’s public meetings lessened. The reason for this seemingly less intense public cooperation was twofold. First of all, Roosevelt had less need for public support for his foreign polices from Willkie after Pearl Harbor, seeing that America was now officially at war and the support for the war effort grew considerably. With public opinion on the hand of the internationalists, the battle against isolationism became a matter of internal struggle within the Parties predominantly. Secondly, Willkie was becoming more focused on his ambition to win the Republican presidential nomination in 1944 and positioned himself more carefully. Although Willkie

220 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45, Memorandum for the president, Jonathan Daniel, July 21, 1943.
221 Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45, Memorandum to the president from Robert Sherwood, August 9, 1943.
refused to surrender his internationalist views, he did feel the Republican Party elite breathing down his neck. The Party establishment saw him leave sooner rather than later, attacking him on his deceitful cooperation with Roosevelt, which caused Willkie to become more cautious in the hope he would gain enough support to be re-elected as presidential candidate once more.222

Although lesser in frequency, the questions of the press on Willkie’s influence on foreign policy matters did not die out. On June 27, 1944 Roosevelt was asked during a press conference whether Roosevelt had consulted Willkie on the subject of post-war security organization. Roosevelt refused to go into details of Willkie and his relationship. During a press conference on August 28, 1944 a journalist asked Roosevelt about the rumors going around about an invitation which Roosevelt would have sent out to talk to Willkie on matters of post-war foreign policy. Roosevelt evaded the question by stating that the contact between Willkie and himself was a personal matter. 223

5.4 Willkie’s influence on the changing discourse of foreign policy?

The most difficult aspect of Willkie’s influence on foreign policy in the period 1940-1944, is that of his share in the changing foreign policy discourse. Since Willkie’s part in influencing American foreign policy in the years 1940-1944 is still an area which is largely unexplored, it is difficult to draw conclusions on the matter seeing that this thesis is limited in its length, depth of research and the consulted primary sources. However, the primary sources and the secondary literature analyzed in this research indicate that Willkie’s foreign policy ideology may have contributed to the discourse change within American foreign policy in this period. Albeit more indirectly and less verifiable than the direct support of certain foreign policy decisions or the creation of awareness on certain subjects of foreign policy, such as the wheat shortage in Turkey, there are indications of Willkie’s influence on this discourse change.

First of all, Willkie’s constant advocacy of internationalism, through his speeches and articles, his book *One World* and open support for internationalist foreign policy decisions,

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222 Moscow, *Roosevelt and Willkie*, 204-212.
created more room and opportunity for Roosevelt to step up to the plate and declare an internationalist foreign policy more openly than he could have done with a more critical opposition. Jordan writes that although Willkie’s *One World* did not cause any post-war policy directly, the debate which followed the publication of the book and Willkie’s statements throughout the years 1940-1944 contributed to a political change in which America followed a more internationalist foreign policy.\(^{224}\)

Secondly, there is the issue of Willkie’s share in the replacement of isolationist politicians with internationalist politicians. Though internationalism was steadily winning terrain in 1940-1944, powerful forces in both political parties, especially in the Republican Party, kept on hindering the process of America’s adoption of internationalism. Both Roosevelt and Willkie were set on quieting these isolationist elements from their Parties. In a personal letter from Willkie to Roosevelt on March 6, 1942 it is apparent that the two cooperated in reforming the political discourse of isolationism into internationalism. As Willkie writes: “I am exceedingly hopeful that all traces of isolationism can be washed out of both Republican and Democratic Parties, so that whatever debates may occur hereafter will be within the framework of America’s necessary position in world affairs and of world leadership”.\(^{225}\)

The strongest evidence of Roosevelt and Willkie’s cooperation on ‘washing out all traces of isolationism’, is the replacement of isolationist politicians for internationalist politicians in important governmental position. On multiple occasions, such as the appointment of a Solicitor General, Roosevelt asked Willkie for advice. In a letter on October 14, 1941 Roosevelt asked Willkie’s thoughts on the matter of naming Ben Cohen, co-writer of the Lend-Lease Bill, as Solicitor General. The appointment of Cohen to such a high position could be very beneficial to the Administration’s cause of spreading internationalism, Roosevelt wrote.\(^{226}\) Willkie in turn responded to this question from Roosevelt in a letter on October 13, 1941. He wrote that although he has had many disputes with Cohen, especially during the New Deal discussions, he sincerely respected his ability and character. He ends his letter by stating that his approval of Cohen is merely based on Cohen’s political merits and not

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\(^{225}\) Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), *Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 3*, reel 23, Letter from Willkie to FDR on march 6, 1942.

\(^{226}\) Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), *Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4*, reel 45, Letter from Roosevelt to Willkie, October 14, 1941.
because any personal interest. Willkie concurred that Cohen could be an excellent choice to enhance internationalism.\footnote{Roosevelt Study Center (RSC), \textit{Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45, Letter from Willkie to Roosevelt, October 31, 1941.}}

During 1942 Roosevelt and Willkie regularly convened on creating a more internationalist political system as can be seen in their correspondence on possible candidates for important political positions. In a personal letter from Roosevelt to Willkie on February 21, 1942 Roosevelt asks Willkie for his opinion on possible candidates for the House of Representatives. In this letter Roosevelt brings attention to the problematic situation surrounding the replacement of Hamilton Fish. Fish was known as a member of Congress who opposed Roosevelt greatly and was one of the fiercest anti-intervention isolationists walking around in Washington. In the 1942 election, there was considerable talk about Fish not making the re-election. Roosevelt, already anticipating Fish’s departure from American politics, hoped to finally replace one of his toughest critics by a candidate with a more internationalist character.\footnote{Letter from Roosevelt to Willkie on February 21, 1942. \textit{Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45 (microfilm edition, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands).}} Willkie in turn responded to Roosevelt’s inquiry to possible candidates on March 6, 1942 stating that the possible resignation of Fish is good news, seeing that isolationism needs to eliminated in both parties. While not offering Roosevelt specific choices for candidates, Willkie underscored the importance of choosing the right candidate for the future of America and the flourishing of internationalism in American politics.\footnote{Letter from Willkie to Roosevelt, March 6, 1942, \textit{Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45 (microfilm edition, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands).}} Coming back to the subject in a letter to Roosevelt on June 2, 1942 Willkie informed the President that ‘things are looking up and up’ in the ‘Ham Fish matter’. Willkie wrote that he had consulted both Dan Gleason and judge John Mack, friend of Roosevelt, who gave their word to doing everything in their power to prevent nomination of Fish.\footnote{Letter from Willkie to Roosevelt, June 2, 1942, \textit{Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 4, reel 45 (microfilm edition, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands).}

While neither Ninkovich nor Hughes mentions Willkie when describing the changing foreign policy discourse in the early 1940s, the research in this thesis points out that it can be argued that Willkie played a part in this changing discourse. Seeing the fact that Willkie
supported Roosevelt’s tentative steps towards full blown internationalism it can be said that Willkie attributed his fair share towards making the change of foreign policy ideology possible. By promoting internationalist ideas in the press, in his articles and book, in his speeches and within the Republican Party and his support and influence on Roosevelt’s internationalist foreign policy Willkie contributed to the settlement of an internationalist foreign policy discourse in the period 1940-1944. For Willkie thought the implementation of internationalism in foreign policy was needed for America and the world to flourish, a goal which he saw as more important than his own political gain. This belief is illustrated by the following quote, made in 1941 by Willkie: “If I could write my own obituary and I had a choice between saying I had been an unimportant President or a person who had contributed to saving democracy at a critical moment, I’d prefer the latter”.  

5.5 Conclusion

During the period 1940-1944 there were multiple occasions in which Willkie exerted influence on foreign policy. In 1940-1941 Willkie supported Roosevelt’s plans for aiding the Allies through the Conscription Bill and the Lend-Lease Bill which were proposed by Roosevelt. This support was crucial for pushing through these Bills, as Roosevelt stated in 1945. Willkie also discussed the interpretation of the aid to the Allies with Roosevelt. During his world tour Willkie called on Roosevelt multiple times and made suggestions on foreign policy. In this same year, Willkie and Roosevelt also discussed ‘washing out isolationist forces’ in American politics. In 1943-1944 Willkie advised Roosevelt on appointing internationalist politicians to important governmental and congressional positions and aided Roosevelt in changing the foreign policy discourse to internationalism through his speeches, articles and his book One World.

\[^{231}\text{Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie, 186.}\]
6. Conclusion

Concluding this thesis, the research question, to what extent did Wendell Willkie’s internationalist views influence American foreign policy in the period 1940-1944, is answered. Willkie’s internationalist views on foreign policy in this period are elaborated on, by highlighting his advocacy of internationalism in American politics in this period, from which his views on aid to the Allies, the build-up of the defense system and his emphasis on America’s role within an international organization follow. Through researching Roosevelt’s foreign policy it becomes clear that there was a strong amount of overlap between their views seeing that both saw the internationalist ideology as the starting point of foreign policy. Their corresponding views on matters of foreign policy and the personal liking between Roosevelt and Willkie enabled the political cooperation between the two after the presidential election of 1940.

During the period 1940-1944, Willkie influenced foreign policy directly on multiple occasions. Already as political opponents in the election-year Willkie chose to side with Roosevelt on certain foreign policy issues, for he thought that politics should not get in the way of what was good for America and for the world. When Willkie called himself out as loyal opposition to Roosevelt after the presidential election, their cooperation deepened. Willkie’s open support of Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease Bill in 1941, is an example of an occasion in which Willkie enabled American foreign policy.

Through appointing Willkie as special representative of the President, Roosevelt created a political ally from his political opponent. During Willkie’s world tour in 1942, Willkie regularly contacted Roosevelt to keep him informed on what political and military leaders around the world expected from America. This position also made him make suggestions for foreign policy to Roosevelt. Suggestions which, in some instances such as the wheat-shortage in Turkey and the call for army officials to Iran, were taken to heart by Roosevelt. The relationship between Willkie and Roosevelt also developed further in this period, into sparring partners, when discussing their joined fight against isolationism in American politics. In 1943-1944 Roosevelt and Willkie conferred on appointing internationalist politicians for influential positions in both the government as well as in Congress. During this time, Willkie also endorsed Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms as a goal for the post-war world order.
Although Roosevelt refused going into depth on his relationship with Willkie to the press in this period, the primary sources indicate that Roosevelt saw Willkie as one of his trustees. This statement can be strengthened by the fact that Roosevelt offered Willkie multiple jobs within the Administration and even schemed with him to create a third Party together. Roosevelt played the most prominent part in creating foreign policy in this period, seeing that he was an active Commander in Chief and was known for his unconventional policymaking by trusting on a small circle of trustees instead of the White House bureaucracy. This gives reason to assume that Willkie, as part of this inner-circle, was able to influence the course of foreign policy through his contact with Roosevelt himself. And with this, contributing to the changing foreign policy discourse from isolationism in the 1930s to internationalism in the 1940s which Roosevelt is accredited for by scholars.

This thesis has shown occasions on which Willkie supported, enabled or suggested foreign policy of and to Roosevelt. There are however limitations to this research. Due to limited resources and time, it is possible that there is more data available on their political cooperation on foreign policy in archives in the United States or elsewhere. This reconstruction is solely based on the documents available in the Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg and the online catalogues from the U.S. Department of State. On the issue of changing the foreign policy discourse and Willkie’s (possible) influence on this matter, this thesis can only speculate. Further research on this matter can be done through extensive sales research on Willkie’s book One World and research on public opinion on American foreign policy. Also, this research has focused solely on Roosevelt as executive of foreign policy by using Costigliola and Paterson’s method individual foreign policy analysis. As a consequence of this focus, other possible actors in foreign policy making, such as internationalist organizations and White House officials, are not addressed.

Finalizing this thesis, it appears that Willkie’s influence on American foreign policy in the period 1940-1944 is underestimated and is a neglected field of research. Despite Willkie’s best-seller One World and the unique cooperation between Roosevelt, as leader of the Administration, and Willkie, as leader of the opposition, he seems to be forgotten through time. This thesis has shed light on Willkie’s role in American foreign policy in a time which was crucial to both the future of America and of the world. While Willkie per forcedly pretreated from politics in 1944, he did contribute to the process of bringing America to the verge of power.
Bibliography

The bibliography of this thesis contains both primary sources as well as secondary literature. Within the primary sources a division is made in the type of sources used: digital collections, microfilm/fiche collections, printed collections and printed sources. For the first four categories of the primary sources, the sources are presented chronologically. The printed sources are ordered alphabetically, like the secondary literature.

Primary sources

Digital collections (chronologically)

Digital archive, U.S. Department of State, Office of the historian


Memorandum by Mr. Troy L. Perkins of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, October 3, 1942, Foreign relations of the United States: Diplomatic papers, 1943, China, document 426.

Digital archive, United States Department of State, Digital collections of the University of Wisconsin

Memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, May 16, 1941, Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic papers, 1941, The Far East, document 197.

Memorandum by the chief of the division of far Eastern affairs (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State. December 12, 1941, Foreign relations of the United States Diplomatic papers, 1941, The Far East, document 745.

Microfilm/fiche collections (chronologically)

Foreign relations, Records on council on foreign relations (Microfilm, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands)

Wendell Willkie, on my trip to Britain, Digest of a Diner Discussion, March 5, 1941, Foreign Relations, Records on council on foreign relations, 1921-1951, Meetings of the council on foreign relations, M286.
Wendell L. Willkie on observations on a recent journey, Digest of a Dinner Report, November 18, 1941, *Foreign Relations, Records on council on foreign relations, 1921-1951*, *Meetings of the council on foreign relations*, M321.

Presidential collections and Administrations, Map room messages of President Roosevelt *(Microfiche, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands)*

Letter to American Embassy London from Hull, May 19, 1941, *Presidential collections and Administrations, Map room messages of President Roosevelt, 1939-1945, part I, Reel IV.*

Presidential collections and Administrations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s office files, part 3, reel 23 *(Microfiche, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands)*

Baltimore Address (date unknown).

Statements by Wendell Willkie, September 12, 1940.

Cleveland Address, October 2, 1940.

Boston Address, October 11, 1940.

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