HOW AND WHY DID THE INFLUENCE OF THE OECD ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT VARY OVER TIME?

Research on the PUMA/GOV from an Internal Perspective over the Last Fifteen Years

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Preface

After one year’s studying at Erasmus University Rotterdam, this project forms the final part of the Masters Programme in International Public Management and Public Policy (IMP). There are many people I would like to thank who supported me in carrying out the programme, especially this project.

First I would like to give my millions of thanks to my superiors, Mr. Wei, Xiaodong and Mr. Fu Ning, who provided me with this rare opportunity to study abroad with a scholarship, and who released me from a busy office workload. Then great thanks from my deep heart are given to Professor Christopher J. Pollitt. Thanks for his immense patience with a student without any experience of doing such project research and with a lack of theoretical background; thanks for his encouragement, pulling me out of nerves and worries; thanks for his guiding me in the right direction; thanks for his critical and humorous comments, which made me smile, and sometimes laugh. He has made me realize, the first time in my life, that academic research is not only boring, but also fun sometimes. I am proud to be his second Chinese student.

Additionally, I would like to say thanks to Professor Frans Van Nispen for his earnest comments on my project. Thanks to Jon Blondal who admitted my internship within GOV/OECD. Thanks to all the persons I interviewed or talked with: without their valuable information, it would have been impossible for me to complete this research. Thanks to Peter Boorsma who commented on this thesis twice. Thanks to Yang, Guang and others who edited my poor Chinese English. Thanks to Sabine who help me for the final editing. Thanks for the kindly treatment by Sonja during the whole year.

Last, I would like to thank my husband, Mr. Wu Leiming, who supported my studying abroad this year from the first beginning and without any hesitation.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents.

Rotterdam, August 2005
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIAC</td>
<td>Business and Industry Advisory Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Budgeting and Management Division (BMD was divided into two divisions: BUD and PSMP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUD</td>
<td>Budgeting and Public Expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAG</td>
<td>The Committee’s Communications Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCEET</td>
<td>The Centre for Co-operation with the European Economies in Transition (created in 1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCET</td>
<td>Centre for co-operation with the Economies in Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Development Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECD</td>
<td>Economic Department (of the OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMEF</td>
<td>Co-operation with China and the Emerging Market Economy Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOV</td>
<td>Public Governance and Territorial Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRM</td>
<td>Human Resource Management Working Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBO</td>
<td>Management by Objectives</td>
</tr>
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<td>MCs</td>
<td>Member Countries of the OECD</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
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<td>NMCs</td>
<td>Non-Member Countries of the OECD</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPO</td>
<td>Non-profit Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Public Affairs and Communications Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGC</td>
<td>Public Governance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSMP</td>
<td>Public Sector Management and Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUMA</td>
<td>Public Management Committee or Public Management Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBO</td>
<td>Senior Budget Officials Working Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGMA</td>
<td>Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern European Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDPC</td>
<td>Territorial Development Policy Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDS</td>
<td>Territorial Development Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECO</td>
<td>Technical Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TQM</td>
<td>Total Quality Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUAC</td>
<td>Trade Union Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>ZRG</td>
<td>Zero Real Growth</td>
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1 Problem analysis

This chapter first introduces the ideas for doing this research. It then explains some necessary background elements concerning the relevant parts of the OECD: TECO (Technical Co-operation), PUMA (Public Management) and GOV (Public Governance and Territorial Development). Moreover, it identifies the central research question and sub-questions, followed by an analysis of the assumptions underpinning these questions. In addition, this chapter deals with the research methods and the limitation of these methods. The final part is an introduction of the structure of the thesis.

1.1 Introduction

In the international domain of public management, the influence of international organizations such as the OECD, the World Bank, the IMF, and the EC is obvious. These organizations are important players in analysing national public management reform and drawing out some principles or guidelines, serving to transfer experience from one country to another, and sometimes even helping member countries to solve their internal public management problems. Member countries (MCs) have adopted public management ideas from these international organizations (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, p. 1). Since these international organizations are able to look at country problems/issues from an external perspective, they have a point of view from a different or maybe higher angle. PUMA – the Public Management Service of the OECD is such a kind of international public management player. This project will focus upon PUMA.

1.2 Background

PUMA is an internal branch of the OECD dealing with public management issues. Its predecessor is TECO, while its successor is GOV. In general, the OECD is dominated by economists, and is famous for economic research and statistics, such as published in its Economy Survey. So public management was always a marginal area within the OECD. With regard to the influence of the OECD, we frame our arguments in the process of historical development. Compared with the economic departments in the OECD, the public management directorate have been relatively small and have exerted much less influence on MCs. One piece of relevant evidence is the budget allocation among directorates of the OECD. For example, the budget share of PUMA in 1997 was only 3.86%, which was a little higher than Territorial Development Secretariat (TDS), the smallest directorate of the OECD. The Economic Department (ECO) accounted for 14.43%, which was the highest one of the OECD (see Appendix E). Thus, our argument is framed within this general point – TECO/PUMA/GOV was only a small and marginal branch of the whole OECD, and the influence of it was much less than some other directorates, especially ECO. We will research the developmental process from TECO, to PUMA and to GOV, and dig out the reasons why the influence of the OECD in the field of public management varied in this process.

TECO, as one of the branches of the OECD, was set up to support the reconstruction of south European developing MCs, such as Yugoslavia in 1961, when the OECD was born out of OEEC. TECO provided scholarships to support students in these southern European countries to study abroad, provided technical assistant on agriculture, transportation, health and education (interview with Ormond and Bob Bonwitt). From 1971, TECO began to work in the field of international public administration, to built networks and partnerships and to
provide some information about public administration. During the whole 1980s, TECO worked on both technical assistant and public management research.

In 1990, TECO was officially changed to PUMA and started to work on international public management formally. Like the other OECD directorates, PUMA staff held meetings/conferences to share information on public management, compared and analysed public sector reforms, and published reports on public management practice.

In 2002, PUMA incorporated with TDS and changed its name to GOV. Although it still worked on international public management, the focus has been officially changed from public management reform to public governance. This is simply a brief review of the evolution from TECO to PUMA to GOV. Within this thesis, we will study this development process to investigate how and why the influence of the OECD on international public management has varied between 1990 and 2005.

1.3 Research question

As a branch of the OECD, PUMA was officially set up in 1990 and started to exert its influence on public management reform in some MCs. More and more MCs officials and academics began to know what PUMA was and what PUMA was doing. PUMA appeared to become more influential. However, the levels of influence seemed to vary over time and particularly decline toward the end of 2000. As a masters student in public administration (and previously as a Chinese official) I have had some contact with the OECD. I was curious to know the way PUMA/OECD had attained its position of influence and what primary factors lay behind the apparent decline. The analysis of these issues may lead to the identification of factors conducive to a more effective role for influential bodies such as the OECD in the field of public management in the future.

In addition, the effort to answer these questions will help to increase the awareness of the background stories so as to understand the evolution of PUMA/GOV in the past fifteen years. It will also contribute to a better understanding of PUMA management and the examination of the roles that international bodies such as PUMA could play in future.

1.3.1 Central research question

- How and why did the influence of the OECD in international public management vary in the period from 1990 to 2005?

1.3.2 Sub-questions

1) What was the background situation in international public management during the period in question? (Background-question)
2) How did PUMA operate internally – gather information, assemble into reports, and distribute publications to member countries? (Context-question)
3) What has changed during the development from TECO to PUMA, and from PUMA to GOV in terms of internal operation? (Analysis)
4) Why were some ideas, promoted by the OECD more influential while the others were less so? (Analysis)
5) How could the OECD preserve or increase its influence? (Conclusion and Recommendation)
1.4 Definitions and assumptions

1) What is meant by ‘the influence of the OECD’?
The meaning of ‘influence’ in Longmans Dictionary is ‘the power to affect the way someone or something develops, behaves, or thinks without using direct force or orders’. In this project, the ‘influence’ of the OECD means how far the OECD has affected the development of public management in its MCs. Since the OECD neither produces formal legislation (like the EC), nor offers financial resources (like the IMF or the World Bank), the way that the OECD impact on MCs is to spread ideas through publications and forums (Olsen and Peter 1996). Thus, TECO, PUMA and GOV are participants in a kind of ‘ideas game’ (Armingeon and Beyeler 2004). So the influence of the OECD is the influence of those ideas, which the OECD produced, on the ways member states develop, behave, or think.

2) The assumption that the OECD had influence
The question here is, how to prove that the OECD has had an impact on the member states? This is a big question, and is obviously quite difficult to answer point-blank. To do that, we might need to come to all thirty MCs of the OECD, to find some cases where MCs have ever used the OECD reports in their public sector reform, or have taken the advices that the OECD suggested. This would require another masters project, or perhaps even a doctoral thesis, or a book, such as the OECD and European Welfare States by Armingeon and Beyeler (2004). So we might try to solve this problem in another way.

For example, many academic researchers (Halligan 1996; Premfors 1998; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, p. 31) have discussed the influence of the OECD, especially PUMA, on public management reforms. These authorities seem to agree that PUMA has strongly influenced the international public management debate (see also Schwartz 1994). PUMA even ‘helped to shape what has now become an international ‘community of discourse’ about public management reform’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, p. 20). All the above factors help to show that the OECD had some influence on MCs.

3) How far have various influences been due to the internal operation of the OECD, and how far to the international background at different times, or to the changes in member countries?
Each of these three factors can help to explain why the influence of the OECD varied over the last fifteen years. The MCs are the final ‘consumers’ of the OECD outputs. They will decide whether they need to come to the OECD for assistance, which proposals can be used, and how to incorporate them into their own public management reforms. How far the MCs use the reports and publications of the OECD ultimately determines how influential the OECD is. Furthermore, the international background situation, including not only the development of public administration, but also the development of international economy, society and politics, will influence whether public management is an important topic worldwide at a particular time. If this was the case, more countries would presumably come to the OECD to exchange information and ideas about public management reforms and the OECD would thereby become more influential. If the topic was not ‘hot’, fewer countries would come, and the OECD would be less influential. The international background, like a ‘market’, will help to strengthen or reduce the influence of the OECD. Third, the internal operation of the OECD determines the quality of its reports, such as whether they catch the key issues facing the MCs, whether they explain and analyse the public administrative reform thoroughly, and
whether they provide rational advices and suggestions. In any case, the internal operation will decide the intrinsic quality of the ‘product’.

**Figure 1 Research Design**

All in all, MCs – ‘consumers’, international background situation – ‘market’, and internal operation – ‘product’ would interact together to determine the final influence, in another words, the reputation of the OECD (Figure 1). ‘Consumers’ and ‘market’ are the external factors; ‘product’ is the internal factor. The philosophic idea here is that both the internal and the external factors decide the final impact of the OECD’s work. So it is difficult to say which factor is most important – indeed, the most important factor may vary over time. Applying this to the case of the OECD, we simple cannot say that it is MCs, the international background situation or the internal operation that is always determinative. However, what we want to emphasize here is that changes in internal operations are one significant influence, that these changes are one of the reasons why the influence of the OECD varies over time, and that the internal perspective is therefore a valuable one in itself.

4) **The focus on the internal operation of the OECD**

For an international organization, if we want to improve its influence, what can be acted upon are the internal operations, much more so than the outside surroundings or the overall objectives to which the organization is constitutionally committed. Those of the ‘consumers’ and the ‘market’ are controlled by others. Thus it makes sense to study internal factors. Second, frankly speaking, it is extremely difficult for one Master student to address this question from all the three perspectives discussed above (Figure 1). In terms of MCs, it is impossible for him/her to travel to every OECD country, or even a substantial sample of several, to study the different influences over time during a single year of Master study. Last, but not least, I was fortunate enough to secure a one-month internship in GOV during April-May 2005. This offered a unique opportunity to study the internal operations of the OECD.

5) **How do we know that the influence of the OECD on international public management varied over time?**

As discussed above, it is difficult to evaluate the influence of PUMA quantitatively. Therefore we are obliged to rely on qualitative analysis, including the views of the OECD staff themselves and of outside experts. During my interviews with PUMA/GOV staff, some
of them mentioned the influence of PUMA/GOV. Responses to the following questions might help us to judge whether the OECD’s influence has varied over time:

- Did more MCs come to the OECD to ask for information?
- Did more MCs officials attend the OECD meetings?
- Were the MCs which attended the meeting more interested in sharing and discussing public management issues on the OECD meetings?
- Did increasing numbers of academic researchers in the field refer to or discuss the OECD?
- Were PUMA reports increasingly quoted or cited in other relevant literature?

The evidence in relation to these five questions will be reviewed in Chapter 0. At this stage it can simply be said that there seems to be a reasonable consensus both among the OECD staff (through interview) and among external academic experts that PUMA’s influence was considerable during the mid 1990s, but that it began to decline towards the end of that decade.

1.5 Research methods

The main research methods in this project are participation observation, interviews, and documentary analysis.

1.5.1 Participant observation

Fortunately, I got a one-month internship in GOV from April 11 to May 13 2005 (in its Tour Europe building in Paris-La Défense). During those five weeks, I witnessed how GOV operated in practical terms, or more specifically, how director supervised, staff communicated, and programmes were managed. This was not only valuable practice for my future career, but also precious experience for this project.

An important experience was the two-day network meeting and several regular division meetings of Public Sector Management and Performance (PSMP) that I attended. At the network meeting of Performance and Results on April 21-22, I observed how MCs delegates presented their own practice and how they discussed and argued their points of views. During the break, I sometimes listened to the communication among the delegates from different countries, sometimes discussed with them about their experiences in cooperation with PUMA/GOV. After the meeting, I had a short interview with American and Canadian delegates. In general, this two-day meeting helped me to understand how the GOV network meetings are organized and operated, and provided me with the opportunity of seeing how MCs’ perspective on GOV.

PSMP regular meeting is the new rule after Nick Manning has been appointed as the head of PSMP. Not all the PSMP staff can be present at the meetings simply because of their different schedule. There are no special topics for each regular meeting. Nick, as the new head of PSMP division, opened its critical questions to all the staff members and interns/trainees.

1.5.2 Interviews

I made an interview questionnaire consisting of twenty open questions. In those five weeks in GOV, I conducted interviews with staff including:

- Some who have worked in PUMA since around the 1980s, and some just joined around 2000;
Some who were in directorship or division head positions, and some were at working level;
Some who are still working in GOV, and some who had left or were leaving;
Some are professional staff, and some are secretaries;
Some are permanent employee, and some are employees temporal and based on country loan or programmes.

I contacted eighteen persons for interview, and got seventeen agreed responses. So finally, I conducted seventeen interviews, including one telephone interview. Interviews lasted from thirty minutes to three hours (see appendix B). I recorded all the interviews and then typed most of the transcripts. Nearly all of them tried their best to answer my questions and to provide some information. Derry Ormond, who was the first head of PUMA and worked in TECO/PUMA period, talked with me for about three hours. Bob Bonwitt, another key figure and still working inside GOV, narrated the whole story for me from his point of view, and continued to reply to my questions by email.

1.5.3 Documentation
There were two channels for gathering documents. For the data related to internal operation of the OECD, I got most of them from the OECD intranet, where I could search all the PUMA/GOV internal documents since 1990 and publications since 1997. I also used the OECD library, where I could ask for all the other historical documents and publications. The other literatures were either recommended by Professor Pollitt or borrowed from Erasmus University library. Since this project focuses on the internal operation of the OECD, most literatures in Bibliography are internal documents of the OECD.

1.5.4 Limitations of the research methods
First, this research cannot explain the central question from an outside perspective. To explain the different influence of PUMA fully, it would be better to research all the three factors discussed above (Figure 1) – member countries, the international background and the internal operation of PUMA. Then the research could provide a more complete picture of the reasons for various influences of PUMA. Moreover, it might root the reasons, compare and weigh the three factors. Since this project includes only research on the internal operation and the background situation, it can only provide ‘half’ of the whole story/picture.

Secondly, this work is somewhat constrained by the limited quantity of academic work directly related to PUMA/OECD. The total volume of academic study and analysis on the internal operation of PUMA is limited. It seems that not too many academics have conducted research on the influence of PUMA, especially from the internal perspective. I could get little reference from other scholars. Therefore, it is difficult for me to ‘stand on the shoulders of giant predecessors’ (Van Tulder 1996). This means that the present research may be highly original, but it also limits the possibilities for ‘triangulation’ with the work of others.

Thirdly, participant observation is limited. In a one-month internship in the GOV, I attended one network meeting and two internal regular meetings. This limited the author’s opportunities to achieve a deeper understanding of the programme operation of GOV.

Fourthly, some important persons who had left PUMA were not available for interview. Some people, who had come through the whole period of TECO/PUMA/GOV, such as Liz Dacier, have left. I could not arrange interviews with them. Their experiences and opinions could have been important for this research.
1.6 Structure of the thesis

First of all, Chapter 2 sets up the theoretical framework of the project based on literature review and some general theoretical materials introduction. Then, the historical development from TECO to PUMA and to GOV is scrutinised in Chapter 3, followed by a comparison between PUMA and GOV. Thirdly, since this project focuses on the internal operation of PUMA, it is necessary to make clear how the OECD operated inside. This clarification in Chapter 4 provides a fundamental depiction for in-depth analysis.

In the second part of the thesis, Chapter 5 deals with the central research question of this project: how and why did the influence of PUM vary over time. The two propositions – that the influence of the OECD has increased in the early 1990s and that it then decreased toward the end of 2000 – are explained first. Then the reasons for the two trends are dig out respectively. This analysis closely tracks the four aspects of the theoretical framework: international epistemic community, operational process as a carrier, flow of ideas, and sources of ideas. Finally, based on the conclusions and the acknowledgement of some unchangeable challenges facing GOV, Chapter 10 proposes some possible improvement in the future. These recommendations are also extended to a wider range of organizations.
2 Theoretical framework: a literature review

There are three main groups of relevant literatures: some academic arguments and debates directly related to PUMA, the OECD’s publications, and general theoretical materials related to management ideas which might be applied to international organizations such as the OECD. In this chapter a brief review of these groups will be presented first. Based on these, the theoretical framework of this project will be set up for developing further research on PUMA.

2.1 Academic debates and arguments related to the OECD

There are only a few theoretical texts directly related to PUMA, which in some ways refer directly to the role of PUMA/OECD, but none of which directly deals with GOV.

2.1.1 PUMA story

In *Reshaping the Democratic State: Swedish Experiences in a Comparative Perspective* (Premfors 1998), Premfors pointed out that PUMA was a ‘dominant story-teller’ of the New Public Management (NPM), although he did not name it the NPM. He argued that the PUMA story was by no means the only reform trajectory. Historical development is also an important factor influencing the reform trajectory and it varies between different countries. Firstly, Premfors analysed the background development over the last three decades, and translated the PUMA story into two stages: ‘let managers manage’ and ‘make managers manage’. Secondly, he argued that PUMA had identified both heroes, such as New Zealand and other Anglo-Saxon countries, and villains in the public administrative movement. Finally, he concluded that PUMA had made valuable judgments about particular reforms, no matter whether intentionally or not, and it was somehow for convergence but against divergence. Simultaneously, he also debated the ‘plus ça change story’, which emphasizes the difference in practice and reality. Based on these criticisms, he proposed the structured pluralism story, which stressed the variation among all countries.

Theoretically, he applied new institutionalist ideas – rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism – to the above three stories, and tried to prove that the structured pluralism story, rather than international convergence on the NPM, was the ‘most valid empirical account’ (Premfors 1998, p. 147) of the public management reform in the OECD countries. He showed with further evidence against convergence that Swedish public sector reforms did not really fit the NPM model.

Premfors (1998) is one of the first to argue that the PUMA story does not fit well to all countries’ contexts, and to criticize the ‘PUMA line’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, p. 20). His criticism is from an external perspective. Almost all his arguments and evidence came from publications of PUMA and other academic literature. Besides, he applied rational choice institutionalism to the PUMA story. According to the interviews conducted with PUMA staff, PUMA did not deliberately use any systemic theory to support or develop their analysis. One of the specific characteristics of PUMA reports is that they are focused on practice and experience of member governments (see also Sahlin-Andersson 2000). Nevertheless, rational choice institutionalism might be useful for the analysis of PUMA reports.

2.1.2 PUMA as a standardizer

Sahlin-Andersson (2000) argued that PUMA tended to produce standardization, although without any specific or explicit mandate to do so. Her arguments followed two lines: one is
the process by which PUMA gathers information, assembles reports and disseminates publications; the other is the historical and organizational condition of PUMA in the OECD. In the first line, she analysed the popular report of PUMA – *Governance in Transition* (OECD 1995b), and examined its editing process. The conclusion was that standardisation was not the product, but more like the ‘by-product’ of this process. Since PUMA has helped diminish the differences in public management among MCs, and draw out the common characteristics of reforms, it was producing standardisation. In the second line, she suspected the legitimacy of PUMA inside the OECD. Since PUMA faced scepticism from member states as well as its competence being put into question by other directorates ever since the transformation from TECO, a good way to earn legitimacy was to generate standardized solutions.

Sahlin-Andersson has interviewed with some PUMA officials and delegates, and has attended PUMA committee meeting. Her arguments are from an inside perspective, which is different from Premfors’. However, PUMA did not explicitly endorse standardization. In the famous report – *Governance in Transition*, PUMA emphasised from the beginning that ‘there is no single best model of public management and reforms must take account of national differences and local circumstances’ (OECD 1995b, p. 17). During the interviews with Derry Ormond, Bob Bonwitt and other PUMA/GOV staff, they always stressed that MCs are different, and one country’s experience cannot be automatically used in another country. The context of each country is very important for public management reform. Thus, it is not easy to judge whether PUMA has produced standardization. For the second line, it is true that PUMA was facing subsistence crisis from birth (see more details in later chapters). PUMA was fighting against the destiny to be cut off in many ways. To create standardization seems not the only way to earn legitimacy. There are some other approaches, such as the enlargement of mandate and the combination with another OECD branch – TDS, to make PUMA large enough to be difficult cut off.

### 2.1.3 PUMA as a proselytizer

By analysing the publications of PUMA she first argued that PUMA has been ‘identified as an important mediator, proselytizer and editor of NPM idea’ (Sahlin-Andersson 2001, p. 61). Then she discussed how countries have taken public management reforms from the PUMA template. In this adoption process, PUMA strongly influenced the thinking of national officials and politicians; provided experience, instruments and debate on reforms; identified successful country cases for study. Finally, she tried to root out the reasons why PUMA circulated the NPM. Because it was facing more and more competition from other international organizations, PUMA needed to attract more attention, earn stronger legitimacy, and own more resources. For these reasons, PUMA has circulated ‘templates and prototypes’ (Sahlin-Andersson 2001, p. 63). All in all, PUMA helped to push the NPM, through the transnational construction and circulation of ideas.

Sahlin-Andersson also used the case that PUMA had pushed the NPM to prove that international organization is one force to integrate the global trend of the NPM. We are not denying that PUMA was one force to formulate the global trend. It is possible, however, that PUMA did not push the NPM on purpose. The following is what Derry Ormond, the head of TECO/PUMA in 1971-1998, said about the global fashion of NMP in my interview with him:

“We never promoted formally the NPM. We promoted some ideas, which were later considered being the NPM. We never pushed the idea of the NPM. We did push the idea of looking at the management in a wider level: what instrument to use to implement policies, how policies were made, who made the policies, how were
budgeting system, management system and expenditure system managed, and how did the control and audit take place, how did regulation take place. This is what we mean by public management in a wider sense” (interview with Derry Ormond).

We do not need to make a final judgment here as to whether PUMA has pushed the NPM idea or not. However, after one month’s internship inside GOV, the following appears to be a plausible sequence: first of all, the NMP idea, although it was not named as ‘NPM’ at first, became a hot topic in the domain of international public management. And then, many MCs were interested in it. PUMA research topics would follow the MCs’ interest and be decided by the MCs, and PUMA was eager to catch the interests of member states as well. These are the reasons why PUMA began to introduce more concerning NMP ideas. Therefore it is more like that PUMA followed the NPM, but not initatively pushed the NPM. Moreover, the first committee chair, who was French, had great interest in the exciting public management reform in the UK and New Zealand in the 1980s, where NPM ideas had their first major implementation (interview with Derry Ormond). This is another reason that PUMA has worked on the reform in those countries. Nevertheless, PUMA publications in the early 1990s only discussed NPM-type reforms. They did not introduce other more traditional types of reforms that were going on in countries like Germany and France. So whether they called it ‘NPM’ or not, and whether they consciously pursued a pro-NPM strategy or not are, in a way, secondary issues. They chose to concentrate on a set of issues, which were called the NPM later, they discussed those issues in their main publications and they did not discuss other issues much. Therefore the actual effects of what they did were to privilege the NPM.

2.1.4 PUMA’s supporters

Holmes and Shand (1995), Schwartz (1994) and Lane (1995) were considered to be the followers of the PUMA story by Premfors. Holmes and Shand though that PUMA’s analysis covered different kinds of reform styles and provided a broad analysis of changes. So PUMA suggested to be cautious of ‘over-generalizing’ the OECD public management reforms (1995, p. 553). Schwartz regarded the OECD as an external source to intensify the focus on public management problems, such as increasing financial expenditure, in some countries. At the same time, the OECD provided work placement for MCs officials.

Lane (1995) stated that the OECD analysed the public sector reform trends in MCs in the report of Public Management Developments: Survey1993. He argued that there were both pros and cons in this area (p. 188). These new ideas, especially the market-type management style, need to be located in the pre-existing administrative system, and this locating process is not easy (p. 200).

2.2 OECD publications

The second category of literature is the publications of the OECD itself. Publications are the main outputs of the OECD. To research the internal operation of the OECD, it is necessary to review the publications of PUMA and GOV. Since PUMA reports are more directly related to practice, they did not discuss any theory on the surface, but they did carry many hidden theoretical assumptions.

2.3 General theoretical materials about management ideas

There are some general theoretical approaches which can be applied to research the OECD and its ideas, such as ‘epistemic communities’ of Haas (1992), ‘policy entrepreneur’ of
Kingdon (1995), a model of public management of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004), ‘new institutionalism’ of Sikkink (1991), and ‘carriers, flows and sources’ of Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall (2002). We select epistemic communities and carriers, flows and sources theory to set up the theoretical framework. So this section introduces policy entrepreneurs, a model of public management and new institutionalism, and analyse why these theories are not selected as theoretical approach for this project.

2.3.1 Policy entrepreneurs
Kingdon (1995) employed ‘policy entrepreneur’ to explain idea producer. Policy entrepreneurs are ‘advocates who are willing to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of materials, purposive or solitary benefit (Kingdon 1995, p. 179). They could be either inside government or, outside government, such as in corporations, research institutions, or civil society. These people have personal interest to devote themselves to policy proposals, developing ideas, or influencing policy-making (Kingdon 1995, p. 122). In general, policy entrepreneurs have the following three qualities: they have some claim to be heard; they process political connections; and they are persistent (Kingdon 1995, p. 180-181).

From one perspective, the OECD staff can be considered as policy entrepreneurs. They devote talent, time, resources on some ideas, in the shape of reports, and try to have some impact on public management reform in MCs. So they are truly policy entrepreneurs, who would like to influence the policy-making in MCs. Nevertheless, for this project, it focuses more on an organization, but not one particular person. In most cases, moreover, the OECD staff do not work on policy proposals, or do not influence policy making initiatively. Their publication might have impact on some policy, but more in an indirect way.

2.3.2 New Management ideas in a model
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004, p. 24-31) designed a model to include broad forces that potentially influence (both drive and restrain) public management reforms. In the model of Figure 2, they put ‘elite decision-making’ in the middle, which is surrounded by three large groups of factors: economic and sociodemographic factors, political and intellectual factors, and administrative factors. New management ideas are put into the ‘political and intellectual’ groups. It is clear that management ideas will influence the decision-making of politicians and civil servants in many countries. However, they do not directly change the reform programmes, but ‘flow into a larger pool of ideas’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, p. 30).

According to the model of Pollitt and Bouckaert, when national governments are developing a reform programme, new management ideas are only one factor, which they take into account, in the entire framework. There are many other factors, such as socio-economic forces, the nature of the administrative system itself and even chance events that could influence the decision making of elite in individual country. So in this approach, the OECD would figure as a supplier of ideas, which might be more or less appealing to the elites, depending on a range of other contextual factors for the country concerned.

2.3.3 New Institutionalism
In general terms, the New Institutionalism stresses the match between ideas and organizations. Ideas need institutional ground to be embedding in. If they are not well institutionalised, they are unlikely to survive (Sikkink 1991, p. 248). So ideas need to be institutionalised into the context of organizations. That how far the norms embodied in new
ideas match with the existent system and ideologies dictates, will determine how influential the ideas will be (Hall 1989). New institutionalism also explains the interaction between ideas and national context. Compared with epistemic communities, it focuses more on the detailed process and interaction after ideas have been imported into the particular institution. This approach would be useful to research why the OECD is influential from the perspective of MCs, and whether ideas suit with the exiting system and ideology. For example, it may explain why PUMA had such little influence with certain government like Germany. Nevertheless, the present project concentrates on an internal perspective of the OECD, the operational process of management ideas before they are produced. Therefore, it makes only limited use of new institutionalist models.

**Figure 2 A model of public management reform**

![Figure 2 A model of public management reform](image)

Source: Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, p. 25

### 2.4 Analytical framework

Since the OECD can be seen as the carrier of ideas on public management, what we study in this project are the ideas that the OECD has produced, why some ideas expanded more widely and made the OECD more influential, and why some other ideas did not. To dig out the endogenous forces, we need to combine carrier theory with a model of ideas flow and the sources of ideas (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002, p. 283). Firstly, whether the idea is
influential or not will be directly related to the nature of the carrier. We need the theory about carriers to explain the action of the OECD. Secondly, we also need a flow model to explain why some OECD ideas are more influential than the others. Thirdly, the sources of ideas are important factor for the spread of ideas as well. In addition, all these happened in an epistemic community, which is the international public management domain. We should not ignore this wider context. In general, to explain the varying influence of the OECD, we set up our theoretical framework using epistemic communities, carrier, knowledge flow and sources theories as the main building blocks in our theoretical framework.

2.4.1 Epistemic communities

Haas (1992) has used ‘epistemic communities’ to express the kind of a group of professionals. According to his concept, ‘an epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.’ The members of transnational epistemic communities share the same normative and principled beliefs, causal beliefs, notions of validity, and a set of common practices associated with a set of problems (Haas 1992, p. 3).

Because of the complexity, uncertainty in the decision-making process, national public sector will come to epistemic communities for guidance. So ‘members of transnational epistemic communities can influence states interests either by directly identifying them for decision makers or by illuminating the salient dimensions of an issue from which the decision makers may then deduce their interests’ (Haas 1992, p. 4). Haas not only discussed the legitimacy of epistemic communities but also explained how epistemic communities interact with national authorities and effect state policy-making. ‘Epistemic communities operating through transnationally applied policy networks can prove influential in policy co-ordination’ (p. 33). The approach to the study of policy change is list in Table 1.

Yee (1996) has explained why national politicians rely on ideas from epistemic communities. His reason is that these ideas would help politicians support their policies and make policies appear more logical and reasonable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Level of analysis and area of study</th>
<th>Factors that influence policy change</th>
<th>Mechanism and effects of change</th>
<th>Primary actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epistemic communities approach</td>
<td>Transnational; State administrators and international institutions</td>
<td>Knowledge; causal and principled beliefs</td>
<td>Diffusion of information and learning; shifts in the patterns of decision making</td>
<td>Epistemic communities; individual states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Haas 1992, p. 6

In general, the epistemic communities approach is used to research the role of an international organization in national policies. Klaus Armingeon and Michelle Beyeler (2004) have used this theory to research the influence of the OECD on European welfare states. Beyeler considered the OECD as an epistemic community, which is a player in the ideas game. So, if the diffusers, such as the OECD, were full of expertise and knowledge, the ideas, which they proposed, would become more powerful. In order to gain this authority, the OECD should offer clean, scientific analysis. Researchers compared the difference between the OECD
ideas in welfare policy over time and between fourteen countries, to study the role of the OECD. In the end, Armingeon (2004) has concluded that the efficacy of the OECD recommendations is low, but the consistency is very high. She suggested that the way the OECD can influence national social policy decisions is by ‘creating epistemic communities which can guide long-term policy orientations’ (Armingeon 2004, p. 228).

This approach explains the capacity of epistemic communities to process information, presents models/trends of the world, and brings influence to bear on national policymaking. The whole international public management domain can be seen as an epistemic community, where the OECD ideas circulate. For a while, at least, the OECD (TECO/PUMA/GOV) can be regarded as the centre of it, the nodal point of this broad network. This is due to the fact, that it was composed of educated people with knowledge and information, who composed reports, published and distributed them in MCs, so as to influence public management reforms in these countries. Furthermore, there are three influential groups outside the public sectors. They are management consultants, independent ‘think tanks’ and academics (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, p. 20). So this wide international epistemic community include the flowing groups: public management officials of the OECD countries; some management consultants; think tanks concerned with reform; and academics, such as Wildavsky, Schick, Hood, Pollitt. Haas argued that the control of knowledge and information is an important power of the communities of this kind (1992, p. 3). The diffusion of new ideas based on the knowledge and information is an important element in international policy coordination. The control of public management knowledge of the international epistemic community made it diffuse new ideas on public management reform. This international epistemic community is also the ‘market’ of the OECD ideas. As a member of this community, the OECD diffused ideas to the other members, and could not avoid being itself influenced by the community - the ‘market’ - simultaneously. So epistemic communities would help us to explain the changing international background situation in different periods of TECO, PUMA and GOV.

2.4.2 Carriers

Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall (2002, p. 4) proposed that due to the wide spread of some management techniques, management knowledge has become dominant, and organizations have become more similar. All these developments interacted to make the management ideas expand. During the expansion process, both the role of the carriers of knowledge and this flow process are fairly salient (p. 7) in determining why and how certain management ideas can travel more widely, which means becoming more influential. The three features of the expansion of management knowledge are carriers, flows and sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Key Variable</th>
<th>Academia</th>
<th>Consultants</th>
<th>Media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collection</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing</td>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>Audience size</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002

According to the explanation of Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall, carriers ‘circulate management knowledge’ (2002, p. 9). These carriers are categorized into four types of organizations: multi-divisional companies, business schools, management consultancies, and media companies. The essential processes for carriers to produce management knowledge are collection, processing and distribution. Collection activity is collecting and editing
information, for which academia ranks the highest in terms of quality control (Table 2). Processing activity means the interaction between carriers and clients, for which consultants are the most influential. Distribution means how large an audience the management knowledge can reach, for which media rank the highest. There is more and more competition among them, since no one can easily dominate in any activity. International organizations are specially mentioned as new carriers (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002, p. 15-18).

When applying carrier theory to the OECD, we need to clarify the collection, processing and distribution activities of the organization, that is, the internal operation of the OECD, and to see how the OECD ranks in the above activities. Then we will compare its operations in different periods (TECO, PUMA, and GOV). Thus the further analysis can show how the different ranks of each activity influence the outputs or ideas of the OECD.

2.4.3 Ideas flow

Through comparative study of publication describing the spread of Management by Objectives (MBO), Development Dialogue (DD) and Total Quality Management (TQM) in various countries, Kjell Arne Røvik (2002) identified some common characteristics of management ideas, which flow fast and widely. Based on this, he summarized seven factors that make up a recipe for wide dissemination. These are:

- **Social authorization**: if the organizational recipe was associated with authoritative organizations or persons, it would be more likely to become influential;
- **Universalizing**: if the organizational recipe were defined as a panacea for most or all contexts, it would flow more easily;
- **Commodification**: if the recipe was formulated as a easily communicated message, resembling a user friendly product, and a cost-effective idea, it would flow more easily;
- **Timing**: if the recipe were properly timed, in close relation to the background situation and represented as a new and future-oriented answer, it would flow fast;
- **Harmonizing**: if the recipe was not conflict with other internal concepts or structure in the organization, it would be more popular;
- **Dramatizing**: if the recipe was presented in dramatic terms, it could be more popular;
- **Individualizing**: if the recipe was defined in a way that suggests benefits for individuals, such as better jobs, career, and personal development, then it would flow more easily.

So it is not whether the recipe is the best management tool to improve effectiveness or efficiency, or whether the time of the recipe has come, that decides a recipe’s wide dissemination. According to Røvik’s theory, a recipe or idea will travel faster if it contains the above seven elements. At the same time, it is not that as long as an idea has all the above seven characteristics, it will automatically gain wide spread influence. A further condition is institutional fitness, which means that whether the organizational value and structures are congruent with the recipe. It is the ‘social construction and reconstruction’ that are the fundamental reasons for popularity, not the intrinsic quality of the idea (Røvik 2002, p. 143). Røvik’s model is one version of an attempt to operationalise the idea of knowledge flow.

This theory can be applied to both PUMA and GOV ideas in the 1990s. As discussed in Section 2.1, a great number of academics considered that PUMA was pushing the NPM at that time. It is true that the NPM was very popular in the 1990s. We may ask, is there any relationship between the popularity of the NPM ideas and the increasing influence of PUMA over those years, since both of them became popular in the same period? If yes, through explaining the reasons why the NPM could become popular and widely distributed, we can elucidate why PUMA was influential at that time. Therefore, what we can do is to apply
these seven elements to PUMA ideas, to see how many factors that PUMA ideas satisfied. Simultaneously, we can apply these seven elements to GOV ideas around 2000 as well, to see how many characteristics that GOV ideas had. Comparing the two results, the reasons why PUMA ideas were more popular than GOV ideas can be dug out.

2.4.4 Sources

Where did these management ideas come from then? Their main sources are engineering, auditing, technical, and organizational understanding. These multiple sources mean that today’s management knowledge is ‘creolized’ (Sahlin-Andersson 2002, p. 27). Moreover, since management area is vital and diverse, many sources are continuing to influence it. (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002, p. 26-28) The concrete sources today are most typically business schools, management consultancies and universities. These institutions are sources as well as carriers.

The sources of an idea are very important for its circulation. PUMA is not only a carrier, but also the main source of PUMA ideas. In order to produce a fast-disseminating idea, PUMA needs enough people having appropriate expertise and motivation to produce ideas. So whether PUMA has enthusiastic and experienced staff as sources of production is another key factor impacting upon the influence of PUMA. This theory of sources can be applied to both the PUMA and GOV period, to compare whether they have enough sources for producing ideas.

2.5 Summary

In this chapter, the debates show that many scholars considered PUMA as a strong pusher of the NPM. Except Sahlin-Andersson, none of the above academics discussed PUMA from the inside-out perspective. All these arguments, from the outside perspective, help to prove the proposition that PUMA was quite influential, or maybe even dominant and salient (Schwartz 1994), during the 1990s. However, what happened inside PUMA/GOV during those years? What has been changed around 2000? Why and how have these internal changes affected the variation of the PUMA/GOV’s influence over the years? In this thesis, we will research PUMA/GOV from an internal perspective, which is different from most of the above scholars, so as to investigate the internal operation of TECO/PUMA/GOV chronologically, and to see why some of the OECD’s ideas have been more influential than others.

The theoretical review of this chapter has provided a general picture of where management ideas come from (policy entrepreneur), and how they work with national context (model of public management reform and new institutionalism). Policy entrepreneur is useful for research on people devoting to policy proposal. New management ideas in the model of Pollitt and Bouckaert provide us a wide picture in which management ideas are only one of all factors, which would influence the reform of member countries. The new institutionalism explains the interaction between management ideas and public management reform in one country after the ideas are introduced into the country. All these theories help to understand this research in a wider domain.

We consider the epistemic communities, carriers, ideas flow and sources theory are more useful for this research. Using the above four theoretical approaches, we could set up our own theoretical framework. Each approach would help to explain different assumptions (see Table 3). Epistemic communities explain how did the international epistemic community of public management affect the influence of PUMA and GOV. Carriers’ theory assists to rank
and compare PUMA/GOV as a carrier in different periods. Ideas flow theory helps to explain why PUMA ideas were more influential than GOV’s. Sources theory can analyse further whether PUMA and GOV had enthusiastic and experienced staff as sources of production. Combing all these approaches, we would answer our central research question – how and why did the influence of the OECD in international public management vary in the period from 1990 to 2005?

Table 3 Theoretical Framework of the Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Research Topics</th>
<th>Theoretical Approaches</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>International Background Situation</td>
<td>Epistemic Communities</td>
<td>1) How did the international epistemic community of public management affect the influence of PUMA and GOV?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Internal Operation of the OECD</td>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>2) How did PUMA operate internally and rank as a carrier generally speaking?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3) How did PUMA and GOV rank compared with other carriers?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ideas of the OECD</td>
<td>Ideas Flow</td>
<td>4) Why PUMA ideas were more influential while GOV ideas were not so?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sources of ideas</td>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>5) Whether PUMA and GOV had enthusiastic and experienced staff as sources of production?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, these four building blocks are related to each other. Epistemic communities provide the background for the interaction of carriers, ideas flow and sources. When the international epistemic community altered its preference, the OECD, as a carrier, would change the ideas it produced accordingly. With the change of characteristics of ideas, respectively, the capacity to flow of them would be various. In fact, all these differences came from the change of the sources of ideas. These four interrelated blocks build the theoretical framework of this project.
3 Historical development of TECO/PUMA/GOV

In this chapter, we will follow the change from TECO to PUMA to see how PUMA developed in the 1990s. Then several crises of the OECD in the late 1990s will be introduced. In addition, the change from PUMA to GOV will be introduced, followed by a comparison between PUMA and GOV.

3.1 Change from TECO to PUMA in the 1970s and 80s

The transition from TECO to PUMA lasted about two decades of the 1970s and the 1980s. It is a long course fighting for legitimacy inside the OECD. In 1971, the head of TECO retired and Derry Ormond was appointed. One of the main jobs of Ormond was to stop the TECO programme. In 1973, the OECD took the informal decision to cancel the TECO programmes, since these countries were more and more stable, and the reconstruction was more or less finished. It appeared that the task of TECO programme had been fulfilled. However, Ormond personally held the idea that problems of these developing countries were not only economy, but also public administration. So he tried to continue the mandate of TECO for another five-year in 1973-1978, with the good reason that some accidents, such as the oil crisis, revolutions, and decolonization of Portugal, happened in these countries in the early 1970s. Simultaneously, he commenced to work in the field of public administration (interview with Derry Ormond and Bob Bonwitt).

In 1979, ‘public management’ and ‘public administration’ were written into the mandate 1980-84 for the first time: “In considering the choice of activities the Committee shall focus its work on improving the responsiveness and effectiveness of public management generally, and shall have particular regard to the need to effect improvements in public administration, the economy of rural areas and industrial policy implementation” (C(79)122 (Final)).

Then, Derry Ormond began to think that public administration is not only a problem of these few poor countries, but also a problem of all the other OECD countries. So TECO began to work with all MCs, not only the five recipient countries (interview with Ormond and Bonwitt). On February 5-9 1979, the Symposium on ‘Managing Change in the Public Administration’ was held in Madrid. Sixty-two officials and academics from twenty-one MCs participated this meeting and discussed the changes and substantive issues in public sectors. The symposium summarized the following methods for further co-operation: general conferences, workshops, information exchanges and diffusion, and country’s specific activities (OECD 1980, p. 30-32). This is the first symposium of all the OECD countries in the field of public administration, and is a symbol that TECO has began to switch from technical assistance to public administration (interview with Derry Ormond). Later on, the OECD decided to further renew the mandate of TECO, and began to recognize the legitimate role of TECO in public administration.

With this legitimacy, TECO continued to develop public management programmes. For the time when nobody had ever done the similar job in an international domain, the problems were defining subjects and methods. In regard to subjects, the PUMA founders selected the three main reform topics as the basic strategy: budget reform, regulatory reform, and HRM (interview with Bob Bonwitt, see also Table 4). Under this strategy, four working groups were set up: Senior Budget Officials (SBO) in 1980, Central Governmental officials, Human Resource Management (HRM), and Regulatory Reform in the early 1980s. Based on this frame, they designed programmes and developed co-operation with all the OECD countries in
the area of public management.

In the 1980s, although TECO has begun to work on public management, the joint activities (networks) on public management were still the second level networks under the TECO committee. Things cannot be changed immediately. Ormond gradually limited the former joint activities in urban and rural development, and transferred TECO budget to public management programmes (interview with Derry Ormond and Bob Bonwitt). In the early 1980s, TECO committee began to realize these changes. When they discussed the new mandate of TECO in 1985, some powerful countries did not agree to change to PUMA, because either they did not think the research on public management could be shared or transferred from one country to another, or they did not think that public management was a major problem in their own countries. The consensus decision-making system inside the OECD Council delayed the birth of PUMA to 1989 (interview with Derry Ormond). At the 711th Council Session on June 23 1989, TECO was officially changed to PUMA (C(89)92(Final)). All the four working groups were moved to the upper level. The last thing to do is to make some inactive countries more active (interview with Derry Ormond). Eventually, after working in the field of public management for around fifteen years, the Council of the OECD began to realize the importance of public management in supporting economic and social development.

Table 4 Strategy for TECO on Public Administration-horizontal System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Governmental Reform</th>
<th>Fields Important for Governmental Reform</th>
<th>Ministries/Departments to Contact</th>
<th>TECO Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Economic Pressure</td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Budget Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Globalisation</td>
<td>Policy-making &amp; law-making system</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
<td>Regulatory reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Civil Service Department</td>
<td>Human Resource Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interview with Bob Bonwitt

In 1991, PUMA Committee submitted a report – *Serving the Economy Better* – to the Council to address the relationship between public management and structural adjustment of economy. The report analysed the complex linkages between the public and private sectors. With the political authorities, the public sector ‘affects every part of the economy and society’ (OCDE/GD(91)121). So it is necessary for the public sector to be more cost-effective and more managerial. Based on this point, PUMA recommended that countries should ‘share a degree of common understanding of the nature of the problem and following the same broad direction of change’ (OCDE/GD(91)121). They even suggested the agenda for governmental reform in the 1990s, e.g. ‘greater understanding of where public, private or mixed production can be used and of how the public and private sectors interact’. This report provided the space for PUMA to play a role in public management reform in the OECD.

To summarize, TECO began to think about the idea of public administration since 1975, started to work on public administration from the Madrid meeting in 1979, was officially changed to PUMA in 1990, and earned legitimacy by supporting economy in 1991. It took about fifteen years to manage this idea and put it into reality. This long process of fighting for
legitimacy inside the OECD provided foundation for further development of PUMA in the 1990s. Still, it appeared this struggle for legitimacy inside the OECD, commonly perceived as an economic organization, has just begun.

3.2 The development of PUMA in the 1990s

In this section, we will introduce the main PUMA programs in the 1990s, and the two lines behind this developing process in a nutshell.

Following the framework on public administration-horizontal system in the 1980s (section 3.1 and Table 4), PUMA developed four main programmes in the 1990s. Although there had been some adjustments and changes over time, four themes remained quite clear. The first topic was concerned with the programme of policy making. It covered the co-ordination of the policy-making process from its planning stage, through the Cabinet cycle and to the implementation monitoring. The second theme addressed budgeting and performance management, including the introduction of market mechanisms. The third subject was concerned with human resources management. This activity aimed at stimulating the effectiveness of human resources in order to improve the productivity and quality of the public sector. The last theme dealt with regulatory review and reform. PUMA investigated the adoption of appropriate methods and procedures for assessing regulations, so as to improve the quality of regulations (PUMA annual reports 1990-1999). From 1990 to 2000, PUMA has followed these subjects to do research public management and has published more than ninety reports, in addition to some unpublished reports.

The fundamental research that PUMA conducted was public management development in the OECD countries. From the end of the 1980s until the end of the 1990s, PUMA has followed the public sector reforms in all the OECD countries. They provided an overview to identify the common issue and practices, and completed a series reports – survey on public management development from 1987 to 1997 (see more in 5.2.3.1). In 1995, based on these surveys, PUMA published Governance in Transition (OECD 1995b), which was regarded as the key report pushing the NPM (see more in 5.2.3.1).

In addition, there were two lines behind the evolution of PUMA in the 1990s: the subjects of the programmes and the working methods. The first line is that the programmes included topics from public administration, public management, and governance. Initially, PUMA worked on the internal operation of governments, such as policy-making cycles, which was public administration. Around the 1990s, PUMA began to look at public management in a wider level, for example which instrument is better for policy implementation; how did budgeting and expenditure systems managed. In the late 1990s, PUMA began to concern itself with governance, which was larger than public management. It included more horizontal works in the whole OECD, such as sustainable development (interview with Ormond). This line of development from public administration, then public management, and finally to governance, expanded the scope of PUMA programmes.

Secondly, the working methods evolved through experiences exchange, problems analysis, conclusion summary, and recommendation. In the beginning, PUMA gathered officials from MCs to exchange experiences. Later on, since this kind of sharing practice depended much on agenda and interest of MCs and personal capacity of attendants, PUMA has began to carry out analysis since 1984. They collected five hundred different initiatives on how to improve civil services, analysed the important issues and experience, and ended up with indicators.
Then in the 1990s, PUMA tried to draw some conclusions with good practice, such as Policy Brief. The first PUMA policy brief was on Management Government Ethics on February 1997 (PUMA 1997). There was a shift from description and analysis to shorter and more prescriptive advice such as guidelines on best practices for the management of contracting out of government services, and on implementation of user charges (PUMA(98)4). Ultimately, PUMA went further to make recommendations. The first was Principles for Managing Ethics (PUMA 1998) in the Public Service: OECD Recommendation (interview with Ormond). The Committee approved the following twelve principles:

‘The Committee agreed on a set of Principles for Managing Ethics in the Public Service, to be presented to the OECD Council [C(98)70] for consideration as an OECD Recommendation. … This consensus was achieved as countries agreed that they shared common principles involving a combination of approaches, but that each had to find the right balance adequate to their own national circumstances. Sixteen countries spoke in support of the (ethics) Principles, with many delegates urging prompt Council consideration and publication for use in Member countries (the Council approved the Principles as 23rd April).’ (PUMA/M(98)1)

Generally speaking, based on these two lines of both the working content and methods, PUMA has expanded the scope of their attention, become more directly prescriptive, and thus developed new forms for disseminating their ideas.

### 3.3 Several crises in the OECD in the late 1990s

Several crises, which happened around 2000, affected the influence of the OECD. Some occurrences took place at the end of the 1990s, or even earlier than that. However, the impact of these events appeared later. Therefore, we will identify several crises in the mid- and late 1990s that may have affected the influence of GOV.

#### 3.3.1 The crisis of the OECD in 1996

In 1996, the Secretary-General, Jean-Claude Paye (1984-1996; see Appendix D), was forced out of his post for about six months. The main reason of this accident was that Paye held the different opinion from USA on certain issues. After drastic political fighting, Paye continued to finish his tenures until the end of 1996 and was replaced by Canadian Donald Johnston. So there has been six months that the OECD had no secretary-general, and in those six months, nobody knew whether and when Paye would come back, and how long the OECD would have no Secretary-General. Even though he came back to his position ultimately, he was not so strong as before. It seemed to be a turning point when the influence of the OECD started to decline. Since then, the administrative power at secretary-general level has been weakened, while the influence from MCs became stronger and stronger (anonymous interview).

#### 3.3.2 The budget crisis in the late 1990s

In the late 1990s, the OECD budget became the reason for another crisis, which influenced the PUMA significantly. Generally, the OECD budget is divided into Part I, which is primary contributions coming from the MCs., and Part II, which is grants. Each member country holds different percentage/scale of the whole contributions according to its GDP growth. For example, USA is 25% of the whole and Japan is 24%. Part I is allocated among all directorates for the operation of the programmes and work annually. The largest proportion...
of the OECD budget is spent on the staff expenditure, which is around 77% in 1994, and around 80-85% after 1996 (OECD Annual Report 1994-2004).

Since 1996, on the one hand, most member states wanted to reduce contribution to the OECD or at least did not increase, because of their internal economy problems and budget limitation. Since then, most MCs contributions have experienced Zero Real Growth (ZRG) (C/PWB(2002)1), and the OECD have suffered continued budgetary cut (OECD 1997, p. 9). In real terms including the price change of other goods, the OECD budget was reduced by about 18% in 1996-1999. Simultaneously, the growing pensions since 1996 had been another serious problem. Consequently, the administrative cost had been cut by 23%, and staff numbers were reduced by 15%. The OECD had to launch a financial reform to improve the efficiency of the organization in 2001 (OECD 2002, p. 9). After 1996, the total budget of the OECD was reduced in general and the budget crisis became more and more serious. This was bound to affect PUMA, especially as it had always been perceived as a ‘non-central’ unit within the overall OECD organization.

3.3.3 The crisis of PUMA in 1998

In 1998, a crisis in the leadership level of PUMA led to further problems. The OECD was trying to get rid of staff and proposed an extremely attractive package for early retirement. Derry Ormond, the head of PUMA, took this pension and retired in 1998 since he reached his highest pension limit from the OECD for working there for more than thirty years. There were rumours that PUMA would be abolished once Ormond retired. On the day Ormond left, the Secretary-General decided to cut 50% of PUMA staff and split up the rest PUMA into other directorates, because of the budget crisis of the whole OECD (3.3.2). Bob Bonwitt was appointed as the acting director since the new head had not been appointed yet. At last, although the structure was saved, 20% of PUMA staff were cut. Following that, the political appointment of a new head of PUMA became something of a disaster (anonymous interview). Bob Bonwitt served for six months as acting secretariat head until the new head of PUMA, Jean Jacques Noreau, was appointed in March 1999 and served the position for about one year. After the retirement of Ormond, the terms of next five heads were short - between three and fifteen months. From 1998 to 2002, the change of the head/director of PUMA/GOV was quite frequent until Odile Sallard, the present director of GOV, was appointed in February 2002 (Table 10). During 1999-2000 when Jean Jacques Noreau was the head of PUMA, many PUMA staff left (interview with Bob Bonwitt, Katherine Poinsard and Michael Ruffner).

3.4 The change from PUMA to GOV

PUMA was merged with TDS, another undersized branch of the OECD in 2002, and changed name to GOV Directorate, which served two committees – PUMA Committee and Territorial Development Policy Committee (TDPC). Two years later, the PUMA Committee was changed to the PGC Committee. Therefore, although the directorate was changed, the committee was still called the PUMA Committee between 2002 and 2004. In order to obviously compare PUMA in the 1990s with PUMA/GOV around 2000, we called PUMA/GOV 2000-present as GOV in the later chapters. So GOV hereafter includes the entire period from the end of the 1990s to 2005.
3.5 PUMA and GOV: a comparison

The change from PUMA Service to GOV Directorate in 2002 is a kind of enlargement. The intension of enlargement urged PUMA to search for a new name, which would cover both public management and territorial development (interview with Michael Ruffner). At that time, around 2000, ‘governance’ had become a new and popular term, and many people in the relevant epistemic community were discussing and using it. At last, they selected GOV, knowing that they risked losing the established reputation of ‘PUMA’ (anonymous interview). From 2005, www.oecd.org/gov replaced www.oecd.org/puma as the official website of GOV.

Inside GOV, the substance of PUMA part, including the structure, the internal operations and most programmes, has hardly been changed (interview with Bob Bonwitt and Ruffner Michael). Except the combination with TDS, this is more or less just a re-labelling. The difference between PUMA and GOV is more like a kind of gradual adjustment. In this section, we will examine this shift.

3.5.1 Enlargement of the mandate of GOV

The mandate of GOV was enlarged from governmental operation to governance perspective (interview with Edwin Lau). In the mandate 1995-99, the responsibility of PUMA was to design and implement ‘a co-operative programme focused on improving the quality and cost-effectiveness of public sector management’ (C(94)125/Final). While in the mandate 2000-04, the responsibilities were enlarged into three items:

- To identify and help address the emerging forces and trends which constitute strategic governance challenges;
- To assist Members and non Members to raise the performance of their public institutions so that they are better equipped to manage those forces;
- To focus on key elements of good governance framework including: developing capacities for more coherent and globalised policies, delivering on policy commitments in a changing world, institutionalising transparency, honesty and accountability in government, intervening effectively in society and markets to achieve public policies and promote competition as well as social cohesion.’ (C(99)175/Final)

The ‘customers’ of GOV were enlarged from the MCs to both member and non-member countries (NMCs). The responsibility was broadened by including international trends in international public management. The research content was enlarged from the quality improvement of public sectors management to the whole framework and system of public sectors. Guided by this mandate, the work of GOV increased to thirty activities, with six books, eleven symposiums/meetings/seminars, and twenty reports in 2000 (PUMA(2000)9). This was almost unachievable given the limited resources of GOV at that time (anonymous interview).

3.5.2 Budget changes

GOV suffered the budget cut of the whole OECD quite heavily. Although PUMA was kept after the crisis in 1998 (3.3.3), the budget was cut by FF three million. Some activities had to be cancelled accordingly. Therefore, facing the reduced budget, GOV had to look for other channels of funding. There were more and more voluntary contributions (VC) to fund the programmes of GOV. These VCs are from the third channel, which are different from the Part I or Part II budget. They are project-based, and come to certain units, such as division or programme groups inside the GOV directly. At the same time, 4.5% of VCs are transferred to the OECD and 5% to directorate as tax (anonymous interview). The donors can be the OECD
MCs and NMCs as well. Accordingly, the workload of GOV staff included not only the mandate of the PGC committee, but also some extra tasks based on these contributed funds. Furthermore, although the outputs were still titled by the OECD, the contributing countries will decide the topics and direct the work. Since these VCs do not go through the Council and Secretary level of the OECD, this senior executive level had little control on these projects. Simultaneously, the control ability inside the GOV transferred from director – managing level, to division heads or project managers – the operational level, since it is these division heads or project managers that find money and manage the projects (anonymous interview). Finally, not only the Council, but also the directors were losing control. The work of GOV is not only decided by the Council, the director or the PGC committee, but also by the contributing countries and project managers. As a result, the blueprint – mandate of GOV was, to a certain extent, undermined, since some programmes might not be the same subjects with the GOV coincidentally.

3.5.3 Shift from permanent to project-based staff

With the reduction of GOV budget from the OECD, and the increase of voluntary contributions, some GOV employees, who were paid by the OECD budget, will also work for these contributed countries. Table 5 shows the reduction of staff number based on the OECD budget. GOV had 28 staff under the budget of Part I, 4 less than PUMA. The limited human resources of the GOV were reallocated again. These employees had to divide their time and energy to programmes of both the GOV and the contributed countries. Furthermore, more and more staff in GOV were paid by VCs; and more and more projects works were written by project-based consultants. On the other hand, since a lot people have left GOV around 1999 (3.3.3) and the workload has been increased dramatically, GOV recruited many new staff around 2000. It took years for them to become permanent staff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Professional (Grade A)</th>
<th>Support (Grade B)</th>
<th>Total Part I</th>
<th>PUMA Total</th>
<th>OECD Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18,513,700 FRF</td>
<td>997,600,000 FRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18,761,640 FRF</td>
<td>976,840,000 FRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17,406,363 FRF</td>
<td>956,200,000 FRF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 A comparison of staff and budget of PUMA & GOV based on the OECD budget Part I

Sources: C/PWB(2000)01/02/FINAL, C(2000)49/FINAL, C/PWB(99)99/VOL3/ANN1/FINAL, C/PWB(95)96/ANN1/FINAL, C/PWB(94)95/ANN1/FINAL, C/PWB(93)94/ANN1/FINAL.

Furthermore, with the reduced budget of the whole OECD, it was more and more difficult to transfer from temporary staff to permanent staff. Consequently, the permanent staff of GOV have been reduced. With the total number of staff increased, the number of temporary staff based on projects has increased. This raises a possible quality issue – are the new staff as senior, experienced and committed to the medium and long term as were the staff in the mid 1990s?
3.5.4 Increasing resource limitations
This limitation included both human resources and budget. With the staff change around 1999 (3.3.3 and 3.5.3), there have been less experienced and younger staff. In the divisions of Budgeting & Public Expenditures (BUD) and Public Sector Management & Performance (PSMP), no more than three professional staff out of all twenty-five staff has worked in PUMA before 1999. It took time for those young and inexperienced staff to be more professional. Thus, although the total staff numbers has increased after 1999, the number of experienced professional staff has decreased. Part I budget allocated to GOV has decreased since 1999 too (Table 5). The Part I budget from the OECD around 2000 was less than the mid 1990s even after excluding the price change of other goods. It is impossible for this budget to cover the whole costs, such as missions and travels, especially the staff time (anonymous interview). Overall, GOV does not get sufficient resource for internal operation.

3.5.5 Growing acknowledgement of country-specific differences
The programmes of GOV have also been changed to more systemic study, and have emphasized more on different country contexts. Around the mid 1990s, PUMA set some general principles, and tried to adapt them to different countries. Later on, people realised that some principles might not work in some countries. It is more and more clear inside GOV that different countries have country-specific contexts, and these differences are very crucial for public management reforms (anonymous interview). The so-called ‘Best Practices’ were changed back to ‘Guidelines’. GOV tried not to give country specific suggestions, instead to help them to learn their own dynamics, and to understand what has happened and why. In fact, GOV seldom gives advice or recommendation after 2000. The only suggestion exists in the reports of Country Review studying certain subjects in the reviewed country. In this case, the context of that country would be considered of course (interview with Michael Ruffner and Elsa Pilichowski). At the same time, with the shift of mandate from public management to public governance around 2000, GOV was trying to take many reform factors into consideration together, and to put them into a study system of how this system worked as a whole. Thus, GOV prefers system orientation to a single programme orientation.

3.5.6 Top-down instead of bottom-up work programmes
In the past, the subjects of PUMA came from networks. A number of intelligent people would discuss the future topics. Then PUMA staff tried to figure out how to fit this into a coherent work programme. This was more like a bottom-up process for the selection of work programmes. After 2002, it has been trying to take a top-down approach. The general objective of GOV was decided at first, and then all divisions designed programmes to support it so as to fulfil the overall objective. So the development of the work programme is not just for the sake of the interest of individual country, but also supports to the common identity and purpose. This is very important new change from PUMA to GOV (anonymous interview).

3.5.7 More programmes with NMCs
Until 2000, there were few programmes with the NMCs. Following the whole outreach strategy of the OECD after 1997, the first outreach fund about 500,000FF was used to launch Governance programme outreach to NMCs around 2000. From then on, GOV increased profile in working with NMCs, such as Russia and China (interview with Edwin Lau). So the mandate grew again without increasing resource.
3.5.8 Moving towards an economic perspective

Inside the OECD, PUMA/GOV was actually always marginalized. As the NPM was politically a quite popular topic in the mid 1990s, this marginalisation of PUMA was not so visible. From around 2000, this marginalisation issue was more and more obvious. There was always difficulty to make other directorates understand the work of GOV (anonymous interview). So GOV had to try to integrate into the mainstream of the OECD, which means the work of GOV should support economic growth. This trend was much more distinct after 2002 when Odile Sallard became the director of GOV. She seemed to have strong idea in the direct support of the economic objective of the whole OECD (anonymous interview). Another reason might be that her personal background was in trade, economy and statistics. Thus, all activities should support one common purpose – the capacity of economy growth. Developing indicators became priority of GOV. Some programmes such as relationship with the citizen, which is not specifically tied to economy, had much less priority. Because of the radical difference between economy and public governance, it might be difficult to achieve this in reality. One thing we could not make certain is how far the PGC committee agreed with the GOV director. Since most delegates of PGC are from public management departments/ministries, they might or might not agree with the director completely. No matter what their opinions are, the programmes of GOV are more and more economy orientated.
4 The internal operation of the OECD

As discussed earlier (2.1), the most famous idea connecting with the OECD in the 1990s is the NPM. Many academics considered PUMA as the strong and successful carrier and pusher of the NPM in the 1990s. But the head of PUMA for about twenty-seven years, Mr. Derry Ormond, has denied this in my interview with him (2.1.3). So what had happened inside PUMA in the 1990s? Whether did they really produce and push the idea of the NPM? What was the relationship between PUMA and the NPM? To answer these questions, first, we need to understand the internal operation of PUMA, and to analyse the key tache (key link) inside this process. Then we will apply the carrier theory of Sahlin-Andersson to the OECD, to analyse how it ranks compared with other carriers in general cases.

Although the size, scope and staff numbers of TECO, PUMA and GOV are different, their basic organizational structure, internal operation, and the process for producing reports have not changed too much. Therefore the PUMA structure will be introduced as a reference for further analysis and argument.

4.1 Internal organizational structure – PUMA

PUMA Committee, the networks, and the PUMA Service are the three components of PUMA. In this section, these three parts are introduced respectively.

4.1.1 The PUMA Committee

Like other committees of the OECD, the PUMA Committee was set up to direct the programmes of PUMA Service, functionally like a decision-making board (Figure 3). It is composed of representatives – senior officials from central government, such as Cabinet Office/Prime Minister’s Department, Ministry of Finance/Budget, and Ministry of Public Administration – from all the OECD countries. Each member country has one representative. The Committee meets bi-annually for two days to discuss, oversee and direct the work of PUMA Service. The mission of committee is to:

- ‘Provide information, analysis and assessment on public management for policy-makers in MCs and for the OECD, and to develop the tools to do this;
- Facilitate contact and exchange of experience on good practice amongst public management practitioners, particularly those working in central management agencies in government;
- Report regularly on issues and developments in governance and public management, and on their relevance to economic and social development’ (OCDE/GD(91)121 and PUMA (2001)15).

Table 6 shows the members of the PUMA/GOV Bureau, which is composed of the chair and the vice-chairs of the Committee, from 1990 to 2004. There was more or less a balance among all countries to avoid the domination of big countries. The Committee has three detailed tasks:

- Provide country preferences on the direction and subjects of PUMA by discussing the next mandate of PUMA every five years and approving the annual programmes and work of PUMA.
- Act as the communication link between PUMA Service and the member states. Committee delegates contact officials of MCs to provide practical information to the
Service. PUMA Service disseminates the reports and other output to member states through Committee delegates.

- Review and approve the publication of PUMA reports. Committee will check up the reports to make sure that their countries’ practice is portrayed correctly, and will be responsible for the publication. More important, it is also to ensure that there is not criticism of member states on politically sensitive issues. If they do not agree with the comment, PUMA will delete it (anonymous interview). In other words, PUMA texts are not independent academic or scientific documents; they are partly ‘diplomatic’ texts.

One principle to make the committee operate effectively is ‘one country one voice’. So the delegates should present the country’s view instead of their own opinions.

**Figure 3 Organizational Structure of Public Governance Committee in 2004**

![Organizational Structure Diagram]

Source: OECD (2004b) GOV Brochure

### 4.1.2 Networks

Under the Committee, there are several working parties, networks or steering/experts groups. Figure 3 shows the organizational structure of Public Governance Committee in 2005. There were eleven networks altogether and no difference between them officially (interview with Edwin Lau and Michael Ruffner). They are composed of specialists (civil servants) of all MCs from different ministries/departments according to different subjects of the networks. These networks comment upon PUMA’s programmes topics and outputs, and also provide related data. Compared with the committee, they provide more specific practices and expertise on PUMA reports (interview with Edwin Lau and Michael Ruffner).

### 4.1.3 PUMA Service

If the PUMA Committee is a ‘board’, PUMA Service is just like an executive office. All the programme activities are carried out by PUMA Service, and most reports and publication are written by PUMA staff.

As one branch of the OECD, PUMA Service reports, compares, analyses and assesses public management developments in the OECD countries. It co-ordinates and carries out all the research and analysis, draws good practices and principles. PUMA Service is divided into
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Bureau members</th>
<th>Years for Chair</th>
<th>Years as vice-Chair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Russell Higgins (1992)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Elisabeth Dearing (November 2003)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Jean-Marie Mottoul (1990-1991)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Nicole Jauvin (1997-2000), Linda Gobeil (2 months in 2003)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Roberta Santi (November 2003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Bernard Pêcheur (Chair 1990-1992), Serge Arnaud (November 2003-2004)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Klaus-Henning Rosen (2002-2003)</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Eric Embleton (2000-2001)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Pia Marconi (1998-2001, Chair 2002-present)</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Jorge Chavez Presa (1997-1998)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Benita Plesch (Chair 1996-1998)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Derek Gill (2002-present)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Jacek Czaputowicz (2000-present)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Angel M. Acebes (1993)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Lennart Aspegren (1990-1992), Knut Rexed (2003-present)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Reyyan Odemis (1994-1996)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOV intranet
several divisions according to different subjects (Figure 4). In May 2005, there are altogether seven divisions plus one central management unit. Each division is composed of Head of Division, Deputy Head of Division, Administrator, Project Manager, Consultant and Assistant.

Figure 4 The Organizational Structure of GOV Secretariat in May 2005

![Organizational Structure Diagram]

Source: www.oecd.org/gov

PUMA human resources can be divided into four types: professional staff, project staff, support staff and consultants. Figure 5 shows the proportion of these four types of staff according to its 1997 budget. At the same time, there are two types of grades in regular employment (excluding consultants): Staff in Grade A (or administrators), which are responsible for composing reports; and Grade B (support staff), which are responsible for organizing meetings, managing project and the other secretarial affairs.

Figure 5 Types of PUMA Staff (Budget) in 1997

![Staff Distribution Pie Chart]

Sources: C/PEB/PUMA(96)1 Provisional Programme of Work 1997-98 and Provisional Budget 1997 Chapter VII – Public Management
Through all kinds of meetings, PUMA exchanges practice and expertise with member states, reports what governments have done, draws out some general principles and good practice, publishes its outputs, and tries to help member states to improve their public service quality.

### Table 7 Types of PUMA Staff (Budget) 1995-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional Staff</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Staff</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Staff</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultants¹</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>33.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>33.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>33.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-PUMA Resources²</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUMA Resources</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: the same with Figure 5

### 4.1.4 Conclusion

**A. Time is limited for Committee to fully discuss items on meeting agenda.**

PUMA committee only holds two-day meetings twice a year. Thus, the time for PUMA committee delegates to meet and work on PUMA issues is extremely limited. Since the OECD has no independent authority, there is no bound rule for PUMA Service to impose any control to make sure the high quality of committee meeting. So the committee meeting output would rely much on the following factors:

- How many topics for discussion are covered in each meeting?
- Whether the meeting items are completely discussed?
- How much the delegates devote themselves to PUMA affairs?
- How senior and experienced the delegates are?

When the committee discusses about future work programmes, the decision-making is by majority. So if one country delegate holds different opinions about certain topics, it is difficult for him or her to change this topic. It seemed that the influential countries decided the subjects of programmes sometimes (anonymous interview).

**B. The delegates of Committee are not stable.**

The tenure of chair and vice-chairs are two years. For the other delegates, there is no stable tenure. They were decided by MCs for each meeting. In the tenth Committee meeting in 1994, forty-two delegates from twenty-three countries attended the meeting. Compared with the ninth committee meeting, twenty members were changed, nearly half. So their contribution to PUMA might be limited to the comment on the reports, provision of information, sharing of experience. It is difficult for these new comers, to suggest on the strategy of PUMA, such as analysing the challenge of PUMA, which need a continued connection with PUMA.

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¹ Equivalent Full time staff
² These include auxiliaries, trainees, seconded staff and SIGMA Programme posts (12 in 1997, of which 1 financed by CCET and 11 by grants)
C. The members of networks are more flexible for their responsibility
Since whether and who will attend the networks meetings were totally decided by MCs, in most cases the specific ministry (4.1.2), it was not easy for PUMA to manage these networks meetings over the last more than twenty years. The networks are very unique all over the world (interview with Jon Blondal and Michael Ruffner). None of the other international organizations can make this kind of networks, to gathering officials from different countries to meet and share their practical experiences. The OECD networks meetings seem the only international meeting table for member countries’ officials to meet around (interview with Jon Blondal).

However, since the choice is in the hand of MCs, the networks are more flexible compared with committee meetings, although each member country formally owned a position. Since 2000, only the committee meetings and SBO network could make almost all MCs to attend (anonymous interview). When I took part in the meeting of network on Performance and Results on April 21-22 2005, five MCs, including Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, and Slovenia, did not send officials. Furthermore, people tended to only attend particular networks meetings in their fields. Few officials continued to attend the whole series networks meetings for years.

Another flexibility is those officials’ responsibility for PUMA affairs. It is much more difficult for PUMA Service to put any bounding rule on networks meetings. Their contribution to the PUMA highly depends on personal professions and characters. In that performance network meeting on April 21-22, some MCs were always very active; some hardly spoke for the whole two-day meeting. As a result, the performance of network meeting might depend on the following items:

- Whether member countries are interested in the topic?
- Whether there is someone available for the networks meeting?
- How professional and active the member attendants are?
- How familiar s/he is with the PUMA affairs?

In general, the OECD can neither impose any financial force, nor bound any formal laws on MCs, the contribution of PUMA committee and networks meetings are uncontrollable. So the output of PUMA depends more on the operation of PUMA Service, which is the internal operation process for producing reports (4.2).

4.2 Internal Operation

4.2.1 Annual process
The internal operation of PUMA includes five processes: formulation of mandate, plan of programmes and work, approval of budget, allocation of budget, and implementation of programmes. First, the mandate is formulated for the next five years. PUMA Service prepares the first draft of mandate, which is the development direction for the next five years, and submits it to the Committee for discussion. Since Derry Ormond continued the mandate on 1975-1979 of TECO in 1974, there have been six five-year mandates of TECO/PUMA/GOV until 2004. After the discussion on the committee meeting, the mandate is submitted to the Council for approval.
Second, guided by the mandate, each division of PUMA Service discusses programmes topics with the working groups/networks. Sometimes, members of networks also give suggestions on programmes subjects. Then, based on their suggestions, discussions and choices, each division formulates its two-year programmes plan including topics, activities, and output. The division then submits the programme plan to the head/director of Service. Gathering all the programmes plans into one proposal, the director holds the right to give comments and make adjustments.

Third, the Secretary submits this programme proposal to the Committee to get approval. There are sometimes negotiations and trade-offs between Committee and the director. After approved by the Committee, it is presented to the Council – the highest decision-making organ of the OECD. The Council decides not only the programme subjects and activities, but also the budget allocation among all directorates. The Council usually cuts some budget (interview with Michael Ruffner). For example, PUMA budget was cut in 1998, along with most the other OECD substantive directorates, by less than five per cent. The work on public sector pay, employment, and profiles were reduced accordingly (PUMA/M(97)2). Besides, PUMA budget is only a small part of the total OECD budget. Appendix E shows the budget allocations among twelve directorates inside the OECD in 1997. In general, PUMA is a rather small branch. The budget of PUMA in 1997 was only 27 FF million, about 3.86% of the total budget of the OECD (Figure 6).

Figure 6 Total PUMA Share of Budget - 1997

Source: CE(98)3/CORR2 the OECD committees structure – A Review (Final Report)

Fourth, after the programmes and budget come back to the Secretary from the Council, if there are some changes on budgets or programme activities, the director decides how to re-allocate funding among all activities. The committee cannot interfere with this process.

Fifth, the Secretary carries out these programmes. Normally, one professional staff, at most two, is responsible for one report, except for the OECD horizontal programmes and PUMA big programmes (interview with Edwin Lau, Elsa Pilichowski and Michael Ruffner). At the end of each year, the secretary summarizes all programmes and output for that year. The annual report is also submitted to PUMA Committee and then to the Council.

4.2.2 Activities

Based on the carrier theory of Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall (2002), the essential activities for carriers to produce management knowledge are gathering, compilation, processing, and
distribution. In this section, we will apply her theory to these four internal processes of PUMA operation, and analyse the rank of PUMA in this process comparing with other carriers. This is only the rank of PUMA in general, which does not mean any particular period of TECO, PUMA or GOV. In later chapters, we will analyse and rank it in different periods.

One point needs to be addressed here is that we divide the ‘Collection’ into ‘Gathering’ and ‘Composing’. One reason is that information gathering and reports compilation are two key nodal points for PUMA carrier respectively. Another more important reason is that we consider PUMA ranks different levels in ‘Gathering’ and ‘Composing’ in different periods.

### 4.2.2.1 Gathering

PUMA does not research academic theory of public management, but reform practice in the real world. In most cases, PUMA gathers the public management reform policies, measures, processes, effects, and sometime lessons from MCs. The channels for information gathering are as follows (Interview with Michael Ruffner):

- Committee meetings
- Networks meetings
- Questionnaires to MCs
- Missions to MCs
- Academic works
- Sometimes the previous PUMA reports

According to the agreement with the OECD, member states should provide all the information that the OECD required. This is quite unique compared with any other international organizations or other kinds of carriers. In terms of this point, PUMA possesses a quite strong advantage, especially when it comes to current reform information in practice. It, nonetheless, is not the case that whatever information the OECD request will be provided by MCs without hesitation. In general, MCs would like to provide their successful experience, but not the failure cases (interview with Michael Ruffner and anonymous interview). As discussed before (4.1.1 and 4.1.2), most practical data gathering is carried out through committee and networks.

According the theory of Sahlin-Andersson (2002), the degree of quality control is the key point for this process. Both the cooperation of MCs and the professional level of PUMA staff determine the quality control in data gathering. As discussed before (4.1), several unmanageable factors decided the quality of committee meetings and networks meetings. For PUMA staff, their professional levels determine how much they know the background situation of MCs, how well questionnaires are designed. All of these determine the quality of the data gathering. Compared with the other carriers, the professional levels of PUMA staff are generally lower than academics. That is because academics have more public management knowledge; are good at asking critical questions, and have experience and training in producing well-designed questionnaires. PUMA ranks higher than media by owning more public management knowledge, being more good at questionnaires design, and discussing more professionally than media interview. In general, the quality control on information gathering of PUMA ranks between academia and media (Table 8)

### 4.2.2.2 Composing

Composers of PUMA reports include PUMA professional staff, academics, MCs’ officials,
and consultants. Since only one person is responsible for one programme generally (interview with Michael Ruffner, Elsa Pilichowski and Edwin Lau), the professional level of these PUMA professional staff directly determined the quality of output. Sometimes, they choose academics to write reports too. MCs officials sometimes wrote chapters or reports directly, especially for the country-based reports. Now and then, PUMA employed consultants to write several chapters or one paper for them.

After the first draft was finished, PUMA usually gave chapters to working groups (networks) or academic for reviews and comments (interview with Edwin Lau). And then, the final draft will be submitted to PUMA committee for approval. After that, some reports will be transferred to the Public Affairs and Communications Directorate (PAC) for publication. Normally it takes about ten weeks for the PAC to publish the reports (interview with Edwin Lau). In general, the quality of published reports is higher than the unpublished (interview with Sang-In Kim).

There is hardly any internal procedure to improve the quality of reports. They only invited some academics to comment on the drafts of reports before publication. In most cases, committee delegates just checked the report to make sure ‘their country’s practices are portrayed accurately’ (PUMA(2001)15 handbook).

So the quality of the reports also depends on the professional level of PUMA staff. PUMA does have some professional staff, and consultants who compose and publish reports. Some of them have worked in international public management for many years with rich experiences. So PUMA staff rank on a higher professional level compared with journalists in media in terms of compilation. For instance, PUMA invited a journalist to write a summary of Governance in Transition. Because of quality problems, PUMA staff had to re-write it (interview with Ormond). However, PUMA ranks lower than academia on this perspective because of its lack of the scientific precision and academic strictness of. By using theoretical approaches, which PUMA did not use, academics improve the profundity of literature. Arguments and debates, which PUMA did not use either, in social science force professors to make their reports accurate to the best of their abilities. Consequently, PUMA ranks higher than media and consultants, but lower than academia in information compilation (Table 8).

### 4.2.2.3 Processing

In this course of events, the interaction between carriers and clients is the key point for ranking. PUMA’s clients, broadly speaking, are all MCs’ officials, from central level to local level; from politicians to civil servants; from senior officials to clerks. In reality, it is impossible for PUMA to directly contact all these people from all MCs. Even PUMA staff themselves do not consider this broad population of people as their clients. The people they interacted with and influenced are only those who came to PUMA meetings and those who met with PUMA staff in missions (interview with Jon Blondal and Michael Ruffner). These are only small parts of the millions of staff working in public sectors in all MCs. Furthermore, these people come primarily from such departments as Ministries of Finance, Ministries of the Civil Service, and Cabinet Offices – in other words from ‘core departments’, which are often far from the operational levels of governments. Sometimes PUMA also research reforms, such as performance management, agencification and contracting out, in line ministries. These ministries are also ‘target clients’ of PUMA, while PUMA hardly has contact with them. So PUMA do not always have direct connections with their ‘target clients’.
The way that PUMA interacts with its clients is either through committee and networks meetings, or through missions to MCs. Committee delegates are considered as the ‘key communications link’ (PUMA(2001)15) between PUMA and MCs in terms of communication related to PUMA work (4.1.1). Networks members suggest on PUMA subjects, comment on PUMA reports (4.1.2). These interaction processes more or less depend on officials from MCs. Another channel is mission to MCs. Nevertheless, there seems no rule to regulate whether they should send missions or not, how many and when. It more or less depends on the orientation of programme manager and the project budget (anonymous interview).

In general, PUMA has some interaction channels with some target clients. However, sometimes PUMA cannot reach target clients. Sometimes, this kind of communication seemed not so tight because of the dependence on committee delegates and networks members. For the case of consultants, since clients ask for expertise according to their demands, and consultants want to offer information that clients really want, both of them interact each other initiatively and actively. The OECD countries, strictly speaking, lack intention to interact with PUMA. So PUMA ranks lower than consultants. For academia and media, there is no this kind of direct channel for them to interact with clients. So PUMA ranks higher than them, but lower than consultants (Table 8).

### 4.2.2.4 Distribution

For distribution, the size of client is the key issue. PUMA distribute through the following channels:

- PUMA committee delegates
- PUMA home page on World Wide Web
- Symposium or conference

Committee delegates assist PUMA to distribute most reports to officials in their own countries (4.1.1). For example, Newsletters are distributed to more than 7000 people, most of whom are government practitioners (PUMA(2001)15). The question arises, how these reports are used in MCs. It appears that PUMA has not undertaken any research on how this has happened. However, based on my personal experience it can be suggested that MCs actually used these documents. When I asked the Dutch Ministry of Finance for some information on performance management, they forwarded the OECD country reports of the Netherlands and the UK to me. In addition, the PUMA website provides a good amount of reports, including reports, Newsletters, Focus and Policy Brief. The website enlarges the audience of PUMA reports to academics and consultants. It seems that the OECD has been one of the major data channels for researchers. The third distribution channel is through symposia or conferences organized in MCs. This channel will enlarge the target clients of PUMA in that specific country.

The target clients of PUMA should be reformers and practitioners in all public sectors of all member states. The above channels help PUMA to reach some target audiences and even some non-target audiences. This channel cannot compete with the mass, which can reach everybody in theory and large audiences in reality. PUMA obviously ranks lower than media. Nevertheless, the PUMA clients are larger than academia audience, which are only groups of students and some scholars. Generally speaking, PUMA ranks higher than academia, but lower than media (Table 8).
4.2.3 Outputs

The main outputs of PUMA are reports, networks forums and website. PUMA reports include those published and unpublished ones. From 1990 to 2005, PUMA has published more than one hundred and sixty (around 165) reports, besides the Journal on Budgeting (15 issues from 2001 to 2005) and the unpublished ones. Some reports were written according to certain topics, such as *Administration as Service the Public as Client* (OECD 1987a), and series of reports on public management development (OECD 1986-1997), while others according to different countries, such as country review, which the PUMA staff was proud of (interview with Edwin Lau).

Sometimes there is close link between publications and conferences. Some books are based on symposia. For instance, *Government of the Future* (OECD 2000b) was a publication based on the symposium on “Government of the Future: Getting from Here to There” held in Paris on 14-15 September 1999.

4.2.4 Conclusion

**A. In the annual operational process, the preference of the director is very powerful.**

Before the programme proposal is submitted to the committee, the director can amend it. After the authorized programmes of work and budget are transferred back to PUMA, the director holds the second right to change it again. So the director has the power to control the direction of the PUMA development. The committee can only impose on the first draft before it comes to the Council. As discussed earlier, the function of committee depends on many uncontrollable factors. So normally, the director would be more powerful in determining the general direction of PUMA (interview with Michael Ruffner and Edwin Lau).

**B. The programme subjects are closely linked with the PUMA budget.**

Since the programme of work and budget are submitted and approved together, the programme subjects and budget are bounded together. If budget is reduced, some activities have to be cut off. In the whole OECD, there is a balance among different directors. Inside the PUMA, there is a balance among different divisions as well (anonymous interview). Since the limited budget needs to be re-allocated inside PUMA, the potential competition among all divisions existed.

**Table 8 A Comparison of PUMA with other Carriers in General Sense**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium+</th>
<th>Medium-</th>
<th>Low</th>
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<td>Collection</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering</td>
<td>Academia</td>
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<td>Media</td>
<td>Consultants</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PUMA</td>
<td>Media</td>
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<td>Distribution</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>PUMA</td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Consultants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C. PUMA ranks medium+ compared with other carriers.**

PUMA ranks medium+ compared with academia, consultants, and media generally speaking (Table 8). This does not mean that the ranks of PUMA compared with other carriers are always stable. In the different historical periods of TECO, PUMA and GOV, it ranked differently. For example, the special attention to distribution strategy in 2000 increased the amount of reports reaching target audiences. This might make the distribution of PUMA outputs rank higher than medium in that specific year. In the next chapter, we will compare
the difference of PUMA in different periods, and to discuss how these three factors rank and influence the popular of PUMA ideas.
5 Analysis

In this chapter, the central research question and sub-questions are analysed concretely. First, how did the influence of PUMA vary over time is explained. Then the two trends – the influence of PUMA increased in the 1990s, and began to decrease around 2000 – are investigated. This investigation follows theoretical framework: epistemic community, carrier, ideas flow and sources directly.

5.1 How did the influence of PUMA vary over time?

It is evident that the influence of PUMA has increased in the early 1990s. PUMA began to work on international public management since the 1980s, and was officially set up in 1990. Before that, PUMA did not exist. Since 1990, more and more people began to learn what PUMA was and what PUMA was doing. More MCs came to PUMA to ask for information and exchange experiences (interview with Derry Ormond, Bob Bonwitt and Elsa Pilichowski). With the increasing of PUMA networks from zero to four in 1980-1995, more MCs officials attended the OECD networks meetings. With the formulation of international epistemic community on public management, more countries were interested in sharing reform experiences in PUMA meetings. Sometimes, there were excited arguments in the meetings (anonymous interview). More academic professors began to argue the outputs of PUMA. For example, Premfors considered that PUMA had been ‘very successful in stimulating interest and debate among both member governments and wider audiences and in formulating and propagating a particular mode of thinking about administrative reform’ (1998). The report, Governance in Transition (OECD 1995a) has been widely quoted (Sahlin-Andersson 2000). When discussing about the NPM, it seemed that many researches and studies were based on the OECD data (Sahlin-Andersson 2000). PUMA definitely became more and more influential in the early 1990s (interview with Derry Ormond, Bob Bonwitt and Edwin Lau).

The evidence of my interviews is that the influence of PUMA has begun to decrease since the end of the 1990s. In the interviews with GOV staff, some persons mentioned that they felt that the influence and importance of PUMA/GOV has began to decrease since the mid 1990s; some considered it around 1998/99 (interview with Bob Bonwitt, Edwin Lau and Elsa Pilichowski). For the PUMA meetings, it seemed that only the committee and SBO networks meetings could call in all the OECD countries to attend (anonymous interview). For the quotation, in the publication of PUMA/GOV towards the end of the 1990s, we could not find any report similar with Governance in Transition, which was quoted so many times.

It should be noted however that ups and downs existed in both increasing and declining phases. Despite the turbulences, the two main trends seemed quite clear. In the next two sections, we will discuss these two trends respectively.

5.2 Why did the influence of PUMA increase in the early 1990s?

This section researches the first proposition that PUMA was more and more influential in the early 1990s. Firstly, the international epistemic community is analysed to scrutinise what kind of role PUMA played within it. Secondly, carriers’ theory is applied to PUMA to examine the gathering, composing, processing, and distribution of ideas, for the ranking of PUMA in the 1990s. Thirdly, by applying ideas flow theory to PUMA ideas, the relationship
between PUMA’s ideas and the NPM is studied. Finally, sources theory is applied to examine the strength of PUMA’s position in relation to the production of influential ideas.

5.2.1 The international epistemic community in the 1980s and 90s
The relevant international epistemic community was formed gradually over the last three decades. So there was a “space” for the transfer of public management experiences, which was the role of PUMA in this epistemic community. In order to fully understand this epistemic community, we need to go back to the 1970s to examine the development of this community itself.

5.2.1.1 International public management in the 1970s
In the 1970s, there appeared to be little or no transfer of public management ideas in the international domain. Public administration tended to be considered as more or less part of a country’s domestic affairs. Little exchange was made among countries in their experiences and practices in governmental management. There was neither an inter-governmental nor an international body, researching international public management or working on sharing public management experiences among countries.

5.2.1.2 Similar challenges for the OECD members
Around 1980s, most western countries were facing some common problems, such as public deficits, rising public debt, outdated public administration and bureaucracy (Hood 1991). A global market had been developed; globalization and internationalization had taken challenges to governments. The role of public sector was questioned (OECD 1995, p.19). Facing all above challenges, governments were not fully certain what they should do. Some countries came to PUMA for information and ideas.

5.2.1.3 NPM in the 1980s and 90s
In the early 1980s, facing the above pressures, many countries such as New Zealand and the UK, were carrying out some drastic public sector reforms following the private sector model. These reforms focused on reducing budget, while improving efficiency. Hood (1991) and Pollitt (1990) were two of the first academics whose research coined the phrases ‘New Public Management’ and ‘Managerialism’ (Sahlin-Andersson 2001). It seemed that there was no doubt that the NPM was a global movement in the 1990s. This background made the NPM internationally popular at that time, and in some ways almost a global trend (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, p. 30-31; Sahlin-Andersson 2001, p. 43).

5.2.1.4 ‘Space’ for transfer of public management experiences
Since nobody worked on transferring public reform experiences between countries in the 1970s, there was a “gap/space” in the international domain. Officials working in the areas of economy and trade could meet each other in the other directorates of the OECD, or some other international organizations. However, for officials working in the field of public administration, there was no place for them to meet. Derry Ormond realized that there was a gap and he decided to fill this gap (interview with Ormond and Bob Bonwitt). He was one of the first few persons who began to work in this field. He held the opinion that there are some information and experience in public administration that can be shared and exchanged, and this kind of communication is useful for developing countries, and some developed countries as well. PUMA, which was named TECO at that time, was almost the first international organization that worked on sharing public management idea among the OECD countries. This made PUMA virtually unique at that time. Nobody else could compete with PUMA. Countries, who were interested in public administration, or who had specific difficulties,
could come to PUMA to share their information and experiences, and to clarify their uncertainty. USA, Germany, Swiss and Japan had become quite keen members in different ways for different reasons (interview with Ormond). With more and more countries coming to PUMA, the international epistemic community was formulated. PUMA seemed to be the centre of the community.

5.2.2 PUMA as a carrier

Applying the carrier theory of Sahlin-Andersson (2002) to PUMA period, the process to compose reports is analysed, so as to rank PUMA comparing with the other carriers.

5.2.2.1 Gathering

How was the quality control in information gathering of PUMA in the 1990s? As discussed in 4.2.2.1, there are six channels for PUMA to gather information. For the MCs side, PUMA was almost the only place for member officials to share information in the early 1990s (5.2.1.1). At the same time, MCs were facing some similar problems in public sectors (5.2.1.2), so they would like to co-operate with PUMA. Sometimes MCs even documented failed experiences (anonymous interview). This good relationship has allowed PUMA to get a large amount of information and data. In *Public Management Developments: Update 1991* (OECD 1991b), PUMA gathered reform practices from twenty-three countries in ‘close collaboration with the network’ (OECD 1991b, p.3). The report, published in 1991, reflected the reforms in ALL these countries at the end of 1990. Furthermore, this programme continued to 1997 and a series of reports were published, presenting the annual reforms practices in the year before publication. It is hardly possible for academics to gather all the recent information in such a short time and to compose into reports. In this sense, PUMA surpasses academia and ranks ‘High’ in data gathering (Table 9), even though the networks are officials from centre of the governments, but not from the line ministries in operational areas.

5.2.2.2 Composing

To guarantee the quality of reports, PUMA consciously employed people who had working experiences in MCs, such as Jon Blondal, who had worked in the Ministry of Finance in Iceland and was recruited to work on budget programme. Others are directors of budget of Norway and Australia (Interview with Ormond). Since they had done similar jobs in their own countries, they could understand the situation better.

For the content of reports, they intended to make it vivid and attractive. Such as *Administration as Service, the Public as Client* (OECD 1987a). The first paragraph in Introduction described a story about a young woman, who was not satisfied with the service of government, and ‘smashed every glass window and screen in sight’ (OECD 1987a, p. 9).

For the publications to senior officials, they intended to be kept concise (interview with Ormond). Since, nowadays, officials hardly read the whole detailed long reports, PUMA made a clearer structure in shorter contents. One example is Policy Brief No.1 (PUMA 1997) with only five pages, including problems definition, analysis, and solution. People can read through it in about five minutes. If they were interested in any specific question, they could ask for further information.

As discussed above (3.2), PUMA developed a report gradually from experience exchange, problem analysis, to conclusion summary and recommendation. It is not easy to make MCs agree with recommendations. The Council also approved it and titled as ‘OECD
Recommendation’ (PUMA 1997). This is a continued process, showing that PUMA has made a large progress in composing data.

The quality control in the process of composing data is improved by the experienced country officials, the world leading experts, the attractive prologue, the appropriate length of publication, as well as the continuing development line. It is difficult for academia to satisfy with the above five items altogether. They are normally considered as lacking in practical experience, and at some time not worrying too much about the length of reports. So these factors increase the ranks of PUMA from ‘Medium’ to ‘High’ (Table 9).

5.2.2.3 Processing

According the theory of Sahlin-Andersson (2002), the interaction between carriers and clients is important. On the carrier side, PUMA paid much attention in interacting with MCs in the 1990s. Since PUMA was a new branch of the OECD, not all MCs accepted it at first. PUMA staff spent good deal of time in communicating with MCs. In each year, top executives travelled to countries such as the USA, UK, or Germany and talked with officials from different departments. Staff in charge for certain topics also went to MCs to discuss public management reform with them. They held the idea that they could not only read the information provided by MCs. What more important is to go to countries to understand what they were concerned with (Interview with Ormond).

From the clients’ side, MCs were also facing some similar problems in public sectors (5.2.1.2), which they would like to discuss with PUMA. Sometimes, MCs discussed in the meetings intensely. They argued why some policies worked or not in their own countries (anonymous interview). This not only improved the reputation of PUMA, but also strengthened the interaction between PUMA and its clients. Even though it seemed that PUMA did not improve the ranks (Table 9). Compared with the interaction between consultants and their clients, which is a kind of necessity for both sides, the interaction between PUMA and MCs is still incompact. Although PUMA still ranks ‘Medium’ in processing, which is higher than the normal situation discussed in 4.2.2.3.

5.2.2.4 Distribution

In the TECO period, PUMA only worked for the five southern European countries. Later on, more countries began to take an interest in PUMA. By the end of the 1990s, all the OECD countries had shown strong interest to it. For example, USA, Germany, Switzerland and Japan, each of them had become quite keen members in different ways for different purposes (interview with Ormond).

Table 9 A Comparison of PUMA in the 1990s with other Carriers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium+</th>
<th>Medium-</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collection</td>
<td>PUMA</td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composing</td>
<td>PUMA</td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing</td>
<td>Consultants</td>
<td>PUMA</td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>PUMA</td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Consultants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So the audience size of PUMA outputs enlarged from five countries to all twenty-nine OECD countries. Based on the discussion in 4.2.2.4, PUMA did not exceed media (Table 9).
Nevertheless, PUMA definitely increased clients from nearly ‘Zero’, to five south European countries, and then to all the OECD countries at last.

All in all, PUMA increased the ranks in the course of gathering and composing from medium to high (5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2). Although the rank in processing and distribution did not ascend, the interaction with some clients was strengthened, and the audiences also increased (5.2.2.3 and 5.2.2.4). The enthusiasm of PUMA staff encouraged the entire internal mechanism of creating management ideas. All of these improvements led the ‘new’ PUMA to attach large importance to its reputation. As a carrier, PUMA improved the internal operational process of gathering, composing, processing and distribution (Table 9), which in turn improved the influence of PUMA in international epistemic community in the 1990s.

5.2.3 Relationship between PUMA ideas and NPM

When people said that PUMA had promoted the NPM, they normally pointed to one particular publication – *Governance in Transition* (OECD 1995b). This report was cited as a key source of NPM by many academics (e.g. Premfors 1995; Holmes and Shand 1995; Mathiasen 1999; Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002; Sahlin-Andersson 2000 & 2004). It seems that this report has evoked a great deal of debates and arguments in the international epistemic community of public management. In this section, we will examine what ideas that PUMA was trying to produce and distribute within this report? Was it the NPM? If so, what has made these ideas flow (become popular) so fast in the 1990s? Why PUMA was so influential?

5.2.3.1 Ideas in ‘Governance in Transition’ (OECD 1995b)

TECO began to report on public management reform in MCs from 1985. It composed several reports – *Survey of Public Management Initiatives* on 1986-1988 (unpublished). The first report – *Public Management Development: Survey 1990* (OECD 1990) was published in 1990. After that, PUMA had launched a series of reports on this subject from 1990 to 1997 (see list of series reports in Bibliography). The report *Governance in Transition* was based on these researches. This programme continued from 1986 to 1997, which was also the period when PUMA became more influential (interview with Ormond and Edwin Lau).

Generally speaking, they thought that they did “a pretty good job” (interview with Ormond). The first draft was finished in 1993. When PUMA submitted it to 9th Committee meeting in April 1994 for discussion, the reactions were positive in general: ‘the report was seen as comprehensive, pitched at the right level and suitably provocative’ (PUMA/M(94)1). Passing through the other internal procedures, the report was published in 1995. From accomplishment in 1993 to publication in 1995, it had already been delayed for eighteen months. One reason was that PUMA wanted to compose a good summary. In order to make it comprehensible and accepted widely, PUMA asked a journalist to write it. However, the journalist did not do it very well. So PUMA staff had to rewrite it completely (interview with Ormond).

The report is divided into two parts: A and B. Part A generalized the common characters of MCs’ reform in the last several years. A few clear lines were drawn: devolving authority, performance, competition, responsive service, human resource management, information technology, regulation, strengthening central government. Along each line, the report analysed the substantive reform measures. In part B, further discussion was given on subjects on performance management, market type mechanisms, human resource management, and regulations. In general, the report drew upon the common reform measures in MCs, to
provide opportunity for public management comparison between the OECD countries. At the same time, the report also set the future reform agenda at last (e.g. p.10, p.16, p.89).

These ideas are based on the similar challenges MCs were facing, such as global interdependence, uncertainty and accelerating change. In this circumstance, governments must do some reform to improve the cost-effectiveness. The ideas include two major points. Firstly, the common reform agenda has developed and a new paradigm has emerged. This paradigm emphasized performance-orientated, result-improvement, and customer-oriented. Through the strategy that ‘let managers manage’ and ‘make managers manage’, which is ‘reforming management’, government reforms still aim at making good use of limited resource to improve efficiency. The other point is ‘managing reform’. Report suggested that the ‘optimum’ reform strategy should be radical, and significant, so as to bring ‘fundamental changes in behaviour and attitudes’ of civil servants (OECD 1995b, p. 7-10).

Are these ideas of ‘reforming management’ and ‘managing reform’ the NPM or not? First, that what is the NPM need to be clarified. The first two persons who named these ideas the ‘NPM’ or ‘managerialism’ in academe are Christopher Hood (1991) and Christopher Pollitt (1990). Hood explained the NPM in four substantive trends:

- Attempts to slow down or reverse government growth in terms of overt public spending and staffing;
- Shift toward privatization and quasi-privatization and away from core government institutions, with renewed emphasis on ‘subsidiary’ in service provision;
- The development of automation, particularly in information technology, in the production and distribution of public services; and
- The development of a more international agenda, increasingly focused on general issues of public management, policy design, decision styles and inter-governmental cooperation, on top of the older tradition of individual county specialisms in public administration.’ (Hood 1991, p.3)

Beyond all doubt, these are exactly the PUMA ideas in Governance in Transition. PUMA translated these trends into detailed reform policies and programmes. For example, the trend of privatisation and quasi-privatisation was translated into contracting-out, performance management. Simultaneously, nobody could deny that the NPM was the most popular model in the field of public management reform in the 1990s (5.2.1.3). So, why was the NPM so popular and why did it grow into one of the most ‘striking international trends’ (Hood 1991, p. 3) in public management? In the next section, to trace this reason, the flow of the NPM is scrutinised, as well as the relationship between the popularity of the NPM and the influence of PUMA in the 1990s.

5.2.3.2 Flow and popularity of PUMA ideas and the NPM

In this section, the idea flow theory of Røvik (2.4.3) is applied in order to analyse why the PUMA ideas as represented in the NPM have been so popular in the 1990s. Of the seven factors, which have been identified earlier as being the factors for wide dissemination (2.4.3), six fit the NPM and thus also the ideas of PUMA. These concepts are social authorization, universalizing, commodification, timing, dramatizing, individualizing, with the exception of harmonizing. Now the following questions are answered:

- **Social authorization**: was the NPM originally associated with authoritative organizations or persons?
The NPM was always linked to the UK, New Zealand, Australia, (and sometimes USA). In the PUMA report of *Governance in Transition*, these four countries are expressed as models. The UK was referred to 16 times, New Zealand 19 times, Australia 22 times, and USA 13 times. Most of the other countries were mentioned only 3-4 times, and this normally in the tables of all countries, with the exception of Canada, which was mentioned 12 times. The comparatively great attention the UK, New Zealand and Australia have received in the report may be connected with the fact that in the period from 1980 to 1999 PUMA directors have originated from the UK (Table 10). Or, to put it another way, individuals from the continental European countries (which tend to have been more resistant to NPM trends) have held the director’s role for less than 4 years of the last 34 years (see Table 10)! At the same time, the majority of PUMA staff around the 1990s came from Anglo-Saxon countries (interview with David Shand). Moreover, the reforms in these countries were portrayed as significant success. The UK and New Zealand were even considered as pioneers of NPM reform. Original bounding with the successful and authoritative countries is one reason for the NPM to spread so fast.

### Table 10 TECO/PUMA/GOV Heads and Directors from October 1971 to May 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971-1998 October</td>
<td>Derry Ormond</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>27 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 October-1999 March</td>
<td>Bob Bonwitt</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 March-2000 March</td>
<td>Jean Jacques Noreau</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 March-2000 September</td>
<td>Geraldine Byrne-Nason</td>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 September-2001 December</td>
<td>Tony Hutton</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>15 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 December-2002 February</td>
<td>Rolf Alter</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 February - present</td>
<td>Odile Sallard</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>3 years &amp; 4 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOV Poinsard, Katherine: assistant to director

Furthermore, as discussed before (5.2.1.1), PUMA seemed to be the only international organization researching on public management in the early 1990s, which was a kind of monopoly. This also provided PUMA with a certain authority (Table 11).

- **Universalizing**: was the NPM defined as a panacea?
  By ‘panacea’, we mean that the NPM was seen as a solution to virtually every different context and situation in the OECD member countries. There were drastic debates in academe on this issue. The NPM was presented generally applicable, a ‘public management for all seasons’ (Hood 1991, p. 8). In the *Governance in Transition*, the reforms and recommendations discussed were not described as fitting only particular countries but not the others. The context of reform in this report is the general situation for all countries. The ‘recipe’ was ‘universal and general’ (Sahlin-Andersson 2000, p. 105).

- **Commodification**: was the NPM idea formulated as an easily communicated idea, resembling a user-friendly product, and a cost-effective idea?
  The underlying logic of the PUMA ideas, as with the NPM, was to introduce private sector mechanisms and procedures into the public sector, such as reducing staff numbers, introducing more individual incentives, privatization and performance management. These ideas are new in the public sector, but are well formed in the private sector. So it could be
easily understood and communicated by people. Although PUMA never used the term ‘New Public Management’, it was soon well labelled and packaged by the wider epistemic community as the NPM. This kind of well-packaged recipe certainly helped this set of ideas to flow.

Furthermore, no matter how easily or with difficulty the PUMA ideas could be installed in public sectors in reality, it was described as easily implemented. In forms such as contracting-out, and agencification, people were almost ‘feverish’ to try these programmes (Pollitt etc. 2001).

Lastly, the PUMA ideas were aimed to solve the budget deficit and to improve effectiveness, which facing all the OECD countries at that time. The potential result of this idea was quite positive. In conclusion, the NPM was well commodified into a user-friendly and cost-effective idea (Table 11).

- **Timing**: was the NPM properly timed, in close relation with the background situation and being new and future-oriented answer?

  Røvik described that the 1980s and the 1990s as decades for new management ideas in changing the past and foretelling the future. As discussed (5.2.1.2), most the OECD countries were facing similar problems in the 1980s and the 1990s and governments were trying to solve these troubles. This was the time calling for new management ideas. The PUMA ideas appeared just around the 1990s to the moment. They were almost the same decades that Røvik termed.

  Furthermore, it is brand-new for most public managers to introduce private management ideas into public sectors. This character of ‘new’ was not stressed by PUMA but by the wider international epistemic community in the form of ‘New Public Management’. This ‘new’ decentralization system seemed to replace the ‘old’ traditionally hierarchical bureaucracy. This bright contrasting made the PUMA ideas flow rather fast in the format of the NPM (Table 11).

- **Dramatizing**: was the NPM described like a drama?

  The NPM was always connected together with the UK, New Zealand, Australia and USA together. The reforms in these countries, especially in the UK and New Zealand in the 1980s were quite excited. The most outstanding reform programme in the UK was ‘Next Steps’. This programme was portrayed that it had taken much more flexibility to agencies to achieve higher performance. The reforms in New Zealand were titled ‘dramatic structural reforms’ (Holmes and Shand 1998). The achievement of New Zealand government was ‘most comprehensive and radical’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). These dramatic stories in original countries speeded up the flow and transfer of the NPM (Table 11).

- **Individualizing**: was the NPM defined that it would provide better jobs, career, and personal development?

  In order to create flexibility and to make good use of revenue, the NPM tried to reform the civil service payment system so as to make government more accountability. So HRM was one of the key reform measures. Based on personal performance and skills, this programme gave more flexibility to the individual payment. Although the related simple motivational model of performance related payment did not always work out in practice (OECD 1993c), these ideas were enough to inspire the personal motivation to achieve higher performance. By providing a better career foregoing, the NPM idea got more impetus to flow.
Harmonizing:
Harmonizing is the only element that the NPM did not fit in. In nature, the NPM is in conflict with the existing traditional governmental organizations. This was also the reason why such an idea was more successfully put into practice in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries, but not in some other OECD countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004).

Table 11 Apply Røvik’s theory to PUMA ideas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideas</th>
<th>Social Authorization</th>
<th>Universalizing</th>
<th>Commodification</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Harmonizing</th>
<th>Dramatizing</th>
<th>Individualizing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUMA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

All in all, the NPM satisfied six out of seven requirements (Table 11). These intrinsic qualities of the NPM, and the PUMA ideas as well, were the reasons for great popularity and influence in those years.

5.2.3.3 Interaction between PUMA and NPM
The idea of the NPM was very popular in the early 1990s (5.2.1.3) and became the ‘hot topic/idea’ in both academia and practice. Many academicians were discussing the NPM, including both inspirers and critics (Mathiasen 1999). Many OECD countries were interested in this idea and would like to get more information about it (interview with Ormond). PUMA caught this ‘hot topic’ in the early 1990s, and promoted it in the whole 1990s. Not only MCs of the OECD (interview with Edwin Lau), but also many academy researchers (Schwartz 1994; Holmes and Shand 1995; Premfors 1998; Sahlin-Andersson 2001; Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall et al. 2002, p.23) regarded the PUMA as the ‘carrier’ and ‘distributor’ of the NPM (2.1.3). PUMA was considered as a strong and successful pusher. Some characteristics were more emphasized by PUMA; some more by international epistemic community; and others by both. Additionally, the NPM in practice seemed rigorously applied only in some Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the UK and New Zealand (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). PUMA, however, became famous in an international epistemic community, in ways that most academics could not compete with. The NPM idea seemed travel faster and exerting more influence than other ideas that PUMA produced in the 1990s. So it is difficult to judge whether it is PUMA that has made the NPM more and more popular or, if it is the NPM that has made PUMA more and more influential. Whatever it was, the interaction between PUMA and the NPM induce the increasing influence of PUMA in the 1990s.

5.2.4 Sources of PUMA ideas
PUMA reports were written by its staff. They were based on ideas that developed through the interaction with the MCs. When Derry Ormond began to think about working in the field of public administration in 1970s, he introduced the American expert on public administration, Ravi Kpil, and recruited a student, Bob Bonwitt, who was just graduated from university and was looking for a job in the international organization. They are three ‘founders’ of PUMA. It was these three persons that began to work on Ormond’s idea and to set up the future PUMA with great enthusiasm (interview with Ormond and Bonwitt). Ormond spent almost his entire career life – twenty-seven years – in transferring TECO to PUMA, and in establishing the reputation of PUMA. Even when he considered retirement, he negotiated with secretary-general the condition of “not touching my baby” (anonymous interview). Bob Bonwitt got his first job in TECO in 1976, designed the basic structure and model of PUMA, and devoted himself into PUMA career (interview with Francis Henin). Their enthusiasm was put not only on the research work of PUMA, but also the outreach reputation of PUMA.
David Shand was one of persons working on the reputation. He was also one of the persons who though that PUMA could not just wait for MCs to come to Paris. It was better for PUMA to go to countries for the enlargement of its reputation (interview with David Shand). Thus, they are trying to ‘sell’ PUMA and PUMA’s ideas to MCs.

All in all, whether they realized or not, these early staff working in TECO/PUMA period were almost the first generation who dedicated to international epistemic community of public management, to transfer of public management ideas and knowledge among countries. Their enthusiasm enriched PUMA and made PUMA more and more influential in the 1990s.

To summarise, the international ‘market’ on public management was cultivated bigger and bigger in the 1980s and 90s. PUMA, taking a demanding ‘product’ – the NPM, came into this market in the early 1990s. With many enthusiastic ‘producers and vendors’, PUMA became more and more popular and influential in almost the whole 1990s, with the popularity of the NPM.

The title of PUMA was finally replaced in 2004 by GOV. ‘The PUMA times’, if it is allowed to call it, lasted fourteen years from 1990 to 2004. With the more critical attitudes towards the NPM ideas around 2000, the influence of GOV, as the successor of PUMA, seemed diminished simultaneously. In the next section, the reasons why the influence declined around 2000 are analysed.

5.3 Why did the influence of PUMA/GOV decrease in the late 1990s?

5.3.1 The international epistemic community around 2000

The crisis of the OECD discussed in 3.3 reduced the capacity of the OECD and GOV as well. Many people in the international epistemic community knew this trend and a perception of weakness of GOV began to spread (see also interview with Edwin Lau). At the same time, several other factors in this epistemic community also reduced the influence of GOV. The first is the more challenges from other international organizations forming the similar functions with GOV. The second is the absence of a clear global trend. The third is the growing complexity of public management reforms. The last but not least one is the increase in bilateral cooperation between MCs.

5.3.1.1 Challenges from other international organizations

After the WWII, the number of international organizations increased dramatically (Boli and Thomas 1999). In the early TECO/PUMA period, there were not many organizations or groups doing research on public management. Nowadays, however, more and more international organizations like the World Bank, IMF and UE, as well as some national consultancies like universities, institutions, and private companies are doing similar research to GOV. This is a challenge to the OECD as they perform similar functions.

The increase of number also reflects more and more fierce competition among them (see also Sahlin-Andersson’s 2001). The World Bank has a division of governance research. Although it is more debt programmes oriented, it provides the OECD countries with another source of information and analysis. Besides, its Governance Indicator is worldwide famous, and is almost a dominant one among all the related indicators, even though it only tells you that good countries are good and bad countries are bad (anonymous interview). In addition, EC has a group of public management. They held some high-level officials meetings, which
poses another competition as well. It is true that up to now they have not produced too much output; it is true that the OECD has higher reputation than EC in terms of research in public management; and it is also true that some counties would prefer to talk with more developed countries outside the EC like USA or Canada (interview with Edwin Lau). Nevertheless, nobody can tell what it will be in the future. All of these developments constitute increased international competition for GOV.

5.3.1.2 Absence of a clear global trend

In the 1990s, it was clear that the NPM was a global trend and popular topic (5.2.1.3). When it came to the year 2000, it is not so obvious which topic was dominant in the international epistemic community of public management. Some people might argue that ‘governance’ was the big new idea. But what is ‘governance’ then? The concept is very broad and quite vague:

‘By governance we mean the process and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group. Government is the subset that acts with authority and creates formal obligations. Governance does not necessarily need to be conducted exclusively by governments. Private firms, associations of firms, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and associations of NGOs all engage in it; sometimes without government authority.’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, p10; see also Keohane and Nye 2000, p37; Pierre and Peters 2000).

According to this concept, governance is so broad that it includes both public and private sectors. Even in the public domain, it covers so many subjects related to public management, seemingly everything. Consequently, it is considerably less concrete and operational than the NPM. Even if someone might regard ‘governance’ as a core topic, it is not as directly influential as the NPM. Besides, no other ideas or concepts can be considered as a dominant global trend in the international public management domain after 2000.

Also there was some evidence of ‘reform fatigue’ in some countries – many reforms had taken place but the old problems had not gone away. A more sceptical attitude began to develop among some ‘carriers’, such as academics and politicians. It seemed more and more difficult for an idea to become influential or dominant nowadays.

Unlike the interaction between the NPM and PUMA in the 1990s, there seemed no popular idea interacting with GOV. Lacking of the impetus from a popular idea, it is more difficult for GOV to become popular and influential.

5.3.1.3 Increase in bilateral cooperation

With the complexity of the society, public management reforms in the OECD member countries are more and more complicated too. Understanding has grown up that reform in public sectors cannot be implemented straightforwardly. It is not simply to introduce an idea from one carrier, e.g. the OECD, and carry it out in the real world. So MCs are not simply getting some information and suggestions from GOV, and then trying to put into reform policies in their own countries. In most cases, there is a need for more concrete information such as detailed policies, reform programmes, measures, possible problems, failure lessons from the idea producer and the original country. However, the OECD is only an international organization. The majority of GOV staff either has limited national experiences (since they mainly worked for the GOV), or has no national governmental practical experience at all.
When one country really wants to introduce a reform idea from another country, they cannot simply rely on the information of GOV, but have to visit this specific country to exchange more information with national officials most of the time. Some MCs just came to GOV to identify which of the countries’ experiences were better to be introduced in their own country. Afterwards they would visit these specific counties to communicate with country officials directly (interview with member states officials on Performance Network Meeting). National officials do not rely on GOV to summarize all reform practices, especially the detailed programmes. They are doing bilateral exchange and intercommunication much more than the early 1990s. In a sense, MCs have ‘outgrown’ GOV, and have ‘shopped’ for reforms on their own. The space for an international organization to act seemed increasingly ambiguous. So the role of the OECD, as an idea carrier was decreasing. Sometimes the function of the GOV was just to make country know where to search for further information, like a bridge.

All in all, the above three factors diminished the role of GOV in this international epistemic community. GOV needs to be a strong carrier in order to be influential. However, it seems that GOV ranks lower than PUMA as a carrier.

5.3.2 GOV as a carrier

In this section, we will apply the conceptual scheme of Sahlin-Andersson (2002) to the internal operation process of GOV, and compare GOV with PUMA on the dimensions of gathering, compilation, processing, and distribution.

5.3.2.1 Gathering

In terms of the six channels for GOV to gather information from MCs (4.2.2.1), for the reasons discussed above (3.3, 3.4, and 5.3.1), GOV ranks lower than PUMA. Since MCs perceived the weakness of GOV, and were doing more bilateral cooperation in public management reform domain, the GOV meetings were not so attractive as before. Not all MCs would attend GOV meetings, only with the exception of the Committee meetings and SBO network meetings. For questionnaires, with the complaint about too much work from MCs, GOV limited the number of questionnaires and questions (anonymous interview). By the budget squeeze (3.3.2), GOV had to reduce the missions to MCs. All these factors reduce the amount and the quality of data gathering, and make GOV rank lower than PUMA on this perspective (Table 12).

5.3.2.2 Composing

On the one hand, the mandate of GOV was enlarged (3.5.1), and the programmes increased by including NMCs (3.5.7). On the other hand, both human resource and capital sources were reduced (3.5.4). So there was too much work but too few people, which was a kind of controversial between ideal objectives and actual ability. As a result, GOV staff endure much more workload than before. Most of the time, people are too busy to review their own work, or to share others’ work (anonymous interview). There was simply no time to work on the improvement of reports quality.

The second problem is the professional level of GOV staff. Fewer people have the ability to comment and improve the quality of the reports. The cancellation of public management development in 1999 was partly because of quality (anonymous interview). In the regular meetings of PSMP, quite a few staff posed the issues of quality. There was no specific quality control procedure inside GOV to ensure the professional level of outputs. Some staff complained the low quality of unpublished reports, and few people at management level could comment on staff’s reports (anonymous interview). Over the long run, this lack of internal
control of quality would hurt reputation and decrease the influence of GOV on international public management.

Another factor, which might influence quality, is that some authors of reports, who are in this case project-based consultants (3.5.3), lack practical data. Because of the limitation of budget, they hardly had opportunity for missions or other practical data gathering activities. Sometimes, they composed reports based on academic research or paper data gathered by permanent staff of GOV. Since GOV generalized reforms in real world, the lack of practical data for actual writers might hurt the quality. All in all, the quality control in composing process ranks much less than normal (Table 12).

5.3.2.3 Processing

The interaction in processing relies on both carriers and clients. In terms of the carrier of GOV, the interaction with MCs was hardly considered by staff. With too much workload, people had less energy left to handle this issue. With the reduction of budget, it was more difficult for GOV to go to countries to understand what PUMA used to be concerned about (5.2.2.3). In terms of the clients of MCs, they were losing interest in coming to GOV inititatively. It seemed that only a few countries (particularly the new comers, such as Korea and Mexico) still have strong interest in communicating with GOV. Many interviewees mentioned the GOV’s influence only on these countries. Thus, the lessening of enthusiasm on both sides reduced the interaction between them greatly, which in turn makes GOV rank much lower than PUMA (Table 12).

5.3.2.4 Distribution

In 2000, communication was a high priority for the work of PUMA Committee. GOV accepted the recommendations by Committee’s Communications Advisory Group (CAG) such as to increase the accessibility for reports, to select instruments, such as CD-ROMs and media event, to maximize the impact and influence of GOV (PUMA(2000)11). Since then, most of the PUMA reports, except the for-sale publications, have been put on website without charge. All the executive summaries of GOV reports were put on website or repackaged. The OECD Governance Database was also placed on website. Consequently, access to the website grew to 30,000 users per month during 2000, more than tripled the amount of last year. The free distribution of Policy Briefs increased to more than 7,000 copies, and quarterly Newsletters were 6,000 copies (PUMA (99)3). All these measures were to save GOV from the crisis at the end of the 1990s. So distribution is the only activity that GOV inherited from PUMA (Table 12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12 A Comparison of GOV with PUMA as carriers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering</td>
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<tr>
<td>Composing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Processing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
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GOV ranks lower than PUMA in all the above four activities (see Table 12). For the quality control in data composing, GOV ranks much lower than PUMA. This will have an effect on
the quality of the OECD outputs directly. In terms of composing and processing, GOV even ranks lower than the normal level in Table 8. It seems that GOV is not so successful as PUMA being an ideas carrier.

5.3.3 The flow of GOV ideas

As discussed above (3.5.1), GOV enlarged the mandate after 2000 and shifted the focus to a governance perspective. Starting around 2000, the programme of Modernising Government was trying to review the public management reform in the last twenty years, to understand how the NPM worked in reality, to draw some lessons, and to recognize some challenges. Although the report Modernising Government has not been published yet, it reiterated the ideas that GOV produced and distributed after 2000. It was more or less similar with Governance in Transition in 1995. Both of these two programmes were reviewing the reforms in the past, and drawing some principles and ideas for the future public management reforms, except that the Modernising Government report was considerably more willing to recognize that different countries had different trajectories and needs than sometimes was the case with reports in the early and mid 1990s. In this section, the principles/ideas in Modernizing Government are generalized and compared with the NPM, so as to observe whether these ideas would flow fast, and why.

5.3.3.1 Ideas in ‘Modernising Government’

In this report, governance means ‘the formal and informal arrangements that determine how public decisions are made and how public actions are carried out, from the perspective of maintaining a country’s “constitutional” values as problems, actors and times change (GOV/PGC/RD(2005)2, p. 8). In this concept, GOV put emphasis on two points. The first is the different ‘constitutional’ value of individual country. Although the OECD countries share the basic values, the various contexts of the countries will shape reforms in different ways. GOV emphasized the differences between countries and the importance of contexts for reforms. Another point is the importance of the governmental system as a whole. Because of the interdependence and inter association among public sectors, reform in one area would have long-term influence upon the whole system, a governance perspective. GOV underlined the interconnection between short-term reforms and long-term impact, and the importance of the whole system of governance structure.

In the later six chapters, it examined the public management reforms in the following six areas:

- Open government;
- Enhancing public sector performance;
- Modernising accountability and control;
- Reallocation and re-structuring;
- Organising and motivating public servants;
- The use of market mechanisms to provide government services.

It reviewed the reforms in past twenty years, analysed the problems and challenges, and presented some findings. The whole report was emphasizing the different contexts, challenges and lessons. There was no one-fit-all reform measure. Any reform needed to apply to the specific country background, which was formed in history. This is a significantly different message from ‘Government in transition’. In fact, some prominent reform ideas – NPM ideas, were not implemented as imagined. The reforms were deeply linked with governance institutions. Thus, the line inside the report of Modernising Government seemed
that there are challenges and problems when put the NPM in governmental reform in the last
 ten years. It is time for government to draw some lessons from the past, and to meet the new
demand simultaneously.

If we say that GOV summarized the reform principles in public management reform in all the
OECD countries, and drew some principles and ‘best practices’, what GOV was doing, at
least in *Modernising Government*, is to analyse the failure lessons of reforms and to stress the
dependency on the contexts of individual country.

Based on the dependence of ‘modernisation’ on contexts, GOV illustrated five most sensitive
factors in public management reforms (p. 148-150):

- Organizational structures
- Budgeting
- Employment
- Accountability and control
- Performance

The reforms in above areas are much more context dependent. It seems that the time for ‘best
practices’ has passed. This, however, does not stop the sharing and exchanging of reform
experience and practice in the international public management. Although it is rather difficult
to transfer the different cultural and political contexts, there are still many transferable ideas
and practices, especially among similar governmental systems, which can be
intercommunicated.

**5.3.3.2 Analysis**

Applying the seven factors of Røvik (2002) to GOV ideas in *Modernising Government*, we
will also answer the following seven questions:

- **Social authorization**: whether GOV ideas were originally associated with authoritative
organizations or persons?

There was a greater recognition of legitimate national diversity within the international
epistemic community. So a body like GOV, which had previously been perceived as
producing general messages for all, became less persuasive/attractive. As discussed in
5.3.1.3, the growing complexity of public management reform made it difficult for one or few
countries to be outstanding out of the other OECD countries. We could not figure out any
country dominant in this epistemic community around 2000, just like the UK and New
Zealand in the 1990s.

At the same time, the challenges from other international organizations (5.3.1.1) reduced the
monopoly of GOV compared with PUMA in the 1990s. The crises of the OECD/PUMA in
the 1990s (3.3) were witnessed by the international epistemic community. They knew that
GOV was short of resources of professional people and they were losing interest in GOV
reports. GOV began to lose its own authority too.

- **Universalizing**: whether GOV ideas were defined as a panacea?

GOV ideas were by no means a panacea. What they reiterated was the importance of
different contexts, and there was no one off-shelf solution for public management reform
(5.3.3.1). These ideas are just on the opposite of PUMA ideas, which were panacea.
Alongside, they were not really particular to each country either. For example, they realized
that both career and position-based civil service systems have good and bad points. So they tended to accept the ideas of career bases for some countries and position bases for others. It would depend on the situations and contexts of countries (interview with Elsa Pilichowski, see also GOV/PGC/RD(2005)2, p. 117). They were trying to generalize about groups of similar countries, those with career civil service system and those with position-based civil service system. It is quite obvious that GOV ideas were not universalising (Table 13).

- **Commodification**: whether GOV ideas were formulated as an easily communicated idea, resembling a user-friendly product, and a cost-effective idea?

It seems that GOV ideas were not easy to apply given the complexities and differences between countries. None of the above five sensitive factors (5.3.3.1) is simple, or straightforward in public management reform. The context itself was formed from tradition and cultures, which was formed in a long historical process. How could it be easy or user-friendly?

In addition, GOV ideas seemed not cost-effective. On the contrary, the main target of GOV ideas was not to improve efficiency, but the effect and impact of reform. This means that reforms need to interact with background situation, and to show impact in the long run. It seems to have little relation in reducing input or improving efficiency, at least not in a direct way.

Furthermore, unlike the NPM in the 1990s, the epistemic community did not embrace GOV ideas around 2000. Although the epistemic community, such as Premfors (1998), highlighted the importance of country contexts, it is difficult to use two or three words to express GOV ideas clearly. So GOV ideas were not easily applicable, less related to cost-effectiveness, and not well packaged. In general, they did not satisfy the criteria of commodification.

- **Timing**: whether GOV ideas were properly timed, in close relation with the background situation and being new and future-oriented answer?

It is too early to make a rational judgment on the public management reforms of the OECD countries in 1995 (OECD 1995, p. 16). Ten years is time for people to check how public management ideas worked in reality, and to learn lessons (also interview with Elsa Pilichowski). In 2000, it seemed time for GOV to go back to review how PUMA ideas worked and to draw some lessons, but not time calling for new ideas, which was the case of NPM ideas in the 1990s. GOV ideas are properly timed, but in a different way from PUMA.

GOV ideas seemed less novel than those of PUMA in the early 1990s. The importance of context looks like a home truth. Governance seemed a new word, but the ideas of governance, or a ‘whole-of-government approach’ (GOV/PGC/RD(2005)2, P. 13) were not new. GOV reviewed the past and generalized lessons from that. The main line of GOV ideas was less future-oriented. Thus GOV ideas only satisfied the factor of timing partly.

- **Harmonizing**: whether GOV ideas challenged the conflict dimensions in governmental organization.

It is obvious that GOV ideas were emphasizing the different contexts, which means fitting reform programmes with the existing governmental structures. This kind of fitness was trying to avoid the divergent contexts between different OECD countries, and the possible conflict between different departments inside one country. Maybe it is because PUMA ideas conflicted too much with the traditional governmental system, GOV worked hard to conciliate the internal unfitness taken by the PUMA ideas, and tried to make the reform programme
harmonized with the governmental organization. Therefore, GOV ideas fulfil this requirement better than the PUMA messages in the early and mid 1990s.

- **Dramatizing**: whether GOV ideas were described like a drama?

GOV ideas were trying to be harmonizing and avoiding possible conflicts. The ideas of satisfying different country situation were not exciting at all. Concurrently, GOV ideas seemed to have no connection with any particularly story, either exciting or not. The original source of GOV ideas might come from Alex Matheson, the former head of Budgeting and Management Division (BMD) of GOV (interview with Elsa Pilichowski and Michael Ruffner). With years of working experiences in several ministries and departments in the central government of New Zealand, he deemed that PUMA had pushed the NPM idea too much, and NPM idea did not fit all different situations of the OECD countries (interview with Elsa Pilichowski and Michael Ruffner). This may have been correct absolutely, but unfortunately it was neither dramatic nor exciting.

Table 13 Compare PUMA with GOV in idea flow factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideas</th>
<th>Social Authorization</th>
<th>Universalizing</th>
<th>Commodification</th>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Harmonizing</th>
<th>Dramatizing</th>
<th>Individualizing</th>
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<td>PUMA</td>
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<td>GOV</td>
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- **Individualizing**: whether GOV ideas were defined that it would provide better jobs, career, and personal development?

It seemed that GOV ideas have hardly been linked with personal development. For the reason that the cultural and tradition environment is crucial and the governmental system as a whole is important, individualization is diminished in this situation. Even for the factor of ‘performance’, which is most personally inclining out of the five sensitive elements, “it must address the nature of the control environment” (GOV/PGC/RD(2005)2 P. 150). So GOV ideas were not individualizing.

All in all, as Table 13 shows, GOV ideas seemed only fit one and a half of all seven requirements, and elements that GOV ideas did not fulfil were largely satisfied by PUMA ideas. From the perspective of ideas flow, the characteristics of GOV ideas make them less influential than PUMA ideas.

5.3.4 Sources of GOV ideas

The sources of GOV ideas came from GOV staff principally. It seemed that GOV staff could not compete with PUMA staff.

5.3.4.1 Lack of enthusiasm and expertise

Most new comers, who came to GOV after 2000, have no special feeling about the ‘history’ of TECO/PUMA. They were not alike with the staff in PUMA period, who worked with great enthusiasm (5.2.4). I still remembered that one time I mentioned unintentionally Derry Ormond and TECO to a new staff joining GOV around 2002, she asked about who was Ormond and what was TECO. I suddenly realized that Ormond period/TECO period had really gone. It had become a history. Meanwhile, internal promotion of GOV staff seems
very rare, and the incremental salary scale means that people received an increase each year whether or not they perform well.

In my interviews, several GOV staff mentioned the lack of professional staff. It seemed that only two real professional staff of PUMA period were still working in GOV (anonymous interview). Without the enthusiasm and expertise, GOV need to find other dynamics to stimulate the improvement of its reputation.

5.3.4.2 Lack of continuity of leadership
The alternation of the head of GOV was most frequently from 1998 to 2000 (Table 10). In that two years, there were three directors, the tenure of two were only six months. The quick changes did not stop until Odile became the director in 2002 (3.3.3). As discussed before (4.1.3), since the perceptions of the director are very important, especially for the primary direction and the internal operation of GOV, the continual changes of directors indicate the frequent alternation of direction and operation of GOV, at least to a certain extent. This, of course, influenced the products of GOV.

5.3.4.3 Incompatibility of resources and mandate
The mandate of GOV has been enlarged since 2000 (3.5.1); and the budget resource has been cut (3.5.2). So the more they enlarged their programmes and activities, the fewer resources they would have on average. Moreover, some project managers have to look for VCs themselves for the continuity of their groups. Several managers had difficulty and pressure in finding enough VCs (anonymous interview). The quality of report was ignored in the process of internal operation. Eventually, it would influence the reputation.

5.3.4.4 Strong internal competition of GOV
The potential possibility to be cut off existed in GOV for many years especially after the crisis in 1998 until the combination of PUMA with TDS. Even though, it still seemed to exist inside people's subconscious. In GOV, there was latent competition for the limited budget between different divisions (anonymous interview). People defended their own domain sternly and fought for enlarging their portfolios. The introduction of performance management inside the whole OECD speeded up this internal competition. This contest was not in a positive way to improve quality of products but reduced the co-operation between divisions. It appeared that this internal waste was weakening the capacity of GOV.

To sum up, the sources of GOV were much less than PUMA in terms of enthusiasm and expertise, the continuity of leadership, the workload, and the internal competition. All these are reasons why GOV was not so influential as PUMA.
6 Conclusions and recommendations

In this chapter, the research questions are answered first. Based on the whole research, we will draw out some continuing challenges facing GOV, which are difficult for GOV to overcome. Even though, some possible improvement in the future is proposed. These recommendations close this chapter and the whole thesis as well.

6.1 Conclusions

This project researched how and why the influence of the OECD in international public management varied in the period from 1990 to 2005. From an internal perspective, the four key factors governing the OECD’s influence include changes in the international epistemic community, the OECD’s operational process as a carrier of ideas, the characteristics of the ideas themselves, and the sources of these ideas as well. In this thesis, we have applied the theories and concepts of epistemic community, carriers, ideas flow and sources. Using these theoretical approaches, the differences among PUMA and GOV over time are compared. The reasons that increased the influence of PUMA during the early 1990s are dug out, as well as the reasons for the decline of GOV.

6.1.1 Sub-questions

1) What was the background situation in international public management during the period in question? (Background-question)

The background situations in the early and the late 1990s were extraordinarily different. In the early 1990s, the international epistemic community was formulated gradually. Since many OECD governments faced similar challenges, there was a ‘space’ for transfer of public management experience among the OECD countries. The NMP became a global movement and PUMA was almost the only international player distributing the NPM in this epistemic community. In the late 1990s, nevertheless, many other international organizations performed the similar function with PUMA/GOV. Because of the growing complexities of public management reforms, the OECD countries did more bilateral cooperation. With the absence of a clear global trend, GOV was losing its core statue in this international epistemic community in the late 1990s.

2) How did PUMA operate internally – gather information, assemble into reports, and distribute publications to member countries? (Context-question)

In normal sense, as a carrier of management ideas, PUMA ranks medium+ in the quality control of information gathering and data composing, the interaction of processing, and the size of audience in reports distribution comparing with the other carriers of academia, consultants, and media (Table 8).

3) What has changed during the development from TECO to PUMA, and from PUMA to GOV in terms of internal operation? (Analysis)

Both the rank of PUMA and GOV as carriers and the sources of the OECD ideas have been changed during the development from TECO to PUMA to GOV. The carriers of PUMA and GOV rank differently in different development period in the last fifteen years (Table 12). In the early 1990s, PUMA surpasses academia in information gathering and data composing and ranks the first compared with other carriers. Nevertheless, GOV ranks lower than PUMA in all the four internal activities.
In terms of sources of ideas, PUMA staff were almost the first generation devoting to transferring international public management experiences among the OECD countries. Their enthusiasm and expertise have make PUMA attractive in the early 1990s. However, the sources of GOV are weaker. Fewer staff owned enthusiasm and expertise. With the discontinuity of leadership, the internal competition between divisions and staff reduced the limited sources.

4) Why were some ideas, promoted by the OECD more influential while the others were less so? (Analysis)

Applying the idea theory of Røvik to PUMA ideas and GOV ideas, we analysed the reasons that why some ideas were more influential than others. Regard as the seven factors of social authorization, universalising, commodification, timing, harmonizing, dramatizing, and individualizing, PUMA ideas satisfy six of them, while GOV ideas satisfy only one and half. PUMA ideas were bound with successful and authoritative countries, defined as a panacea, formulated as an easily communicated idea, properly timed, described like a drama, and defined to provide better personal development. On the contrary, GOV ideas were only harmonizing and partly timing. Satisfying fewer requirements is the reason why PUMA ideas were more influential than GOV ideas.

6.1.2 Central research question

To summarize all the above answers to sub-questions, the central research question can be explained: HOW AND WHY DID THE INFLUENCE OF THE OECD IN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT VARY IN THE PERIOD FROM 1990 TO 2005?

The influence of the OECD increased in the early 1990s, and decreased around 2000. For the background situation, the epistemic community in the 1990s embraced a better surrounding for the wide spread of PUMA ideas, but the community spread the weakness of GOV around 2000. As carriers of ideas, PUMA is much more successful than GOV in terms of ranking in four activities. Regard as ideas flow, PUMA ideas satisfy more factors than GOV ideas. For the last factors of sources, PUMA owned more enthusiastic experts and lacked internal competition than GOV. All these are the reasons why the influence of the OECD varied over time.

All in all, if we consider the OECD as a ‘manufacturing factory’ for management ideas, the only ‘machine’ is its staff – both the professional/supporting staff and the consultants as well. Member state contributions, like ‘electricity or gas’, make the machine operate. The VCs seems make the machine bigger. The ‘raw materials’ are information and data from the OECD countries. The approaches to gather these raw materials are questionnaires, networks meetings and missions. The production process is analysing data and the composition of reports. The ‘main products’ are the ideas in the reports and publications. The market for the products is the international public management epistemic community. The reputation of the factory will be determined by the effectiveness of the marketing results. Accordingly, the influence of the OECD in the last fifteen years has been mainly determined by the spread of its ideas.

6.1.3 Reflections

Analysis in Chapter 5 shows that the theories of epistemic communities, carrier, flow and sources are very helpful in explaining the history of TECO/PUMA/GOV and particularly why the influence of GOV decreased during the twenty-first century. In these four theories,
epistemic communities, carriers and flow appear more useful than sources. For these three theories, PUMA and GOV fit them quite well. The changing of the international epistemic community provided less space but more difficulties for GOV to play an influential role. PUMA ranks higher than GOV in the four activities in terms of internal operation as a carrier, and satisfies fewer factors, which impose power on ideas to flow faster as well. These proved successfully that PUMA was more influential than GOV. For the concept of sources, it seems not as strong as the above three approaches. One reason might be that it is more difficult to scrutinise the sources of PUMA and GOV ideas, since these ideas came from not only PUMA/GOV staffs, which are the main sources, but also MCs and academics.

This analysis has also shown that consideration of the production, packaging and transmission of ideas needs to be complemented by a more material analysis of the volume and quality of resources available for these tasks. The material conditions, such as the quality and number of professional staff and the amount of budget, are also important. Complementary to the analysis of ideas, the material conditions should be taken into consideration in order to obtain a more rounded explanation and understanding of the situation. The decline of these material conditions around 2000 has greatly affected the varying influence of PUMA/GOV. These material conditions were X.

### 6.2 Continuing challenges for GOV

Based on the above research, we also consider the challenges that GOV is facing now. In some cases, it is quite difficult for GOV to overcome some issues, which are regarded as the permanent problems.

#### 6.2.1 Increasingly complex situation for public management reform

Because of the complex and dramatic change of the international public management situation, it is hard to predict what will happen in the future. Thus, it is not easy for GOV staff to plan the next two-year programmes (anonymous interview). Besides, the different contexts in MCs would be much more different with the joining of more developing countries, following the outreach strategy of the OECD. As far as country contexts such as culture and political system are concerned, the differences between these developing countries and the former OECD countries are much larger than those among the former OECD countries themselves. Meanwhile, GOV can do nothing in altering this situation. These are the continuing challenges facing GOV.

Undoubtedly, as an idea producer, GOV will try to increase its influence in international public management. Therefore, one of the key dynamics in determining whether or not GOV would be influential is how it produces and operates a widespread idea suitable to both the complex situation in one country, and the different contexts of both former MCs and new members.

#### 6.2.2 Lack of legitimacy

Another permanent challenge facing by GOV is the internal structure of the OECD. GOV needs legitimacy inside the OECD. However, facing restructuring pressure inside the OECD, GOV appears to lack this kind of legitimacy ever since it was born, which is also the innate shortcoming of PUMA at an earlier time. Since the whole OECD is an organization of economic cooperation, economic policy study is the core and dominant part. Thus PUMA/GOV has always been at the edge of the whole OECD process. Although the purpose
of PUMA establishment is to ‘serve the economy better’ (OECD 1991a), public management is public management, which is not economic development. In addition, other directorates do not consider PUMA/GOV as particularly necessary sometimes, no matter how well or badly it performs. Moreover, the entire OECD has been suffering budget crisis ever since 1996. PUMA was often the first one to be selected for cutting. This kind of subsistence crisis reached a climax in 1998, just after Derry Ormond retired. After the merging of PUMA and TDPC in 2002, the danger of being actually eliminated seemed reduced. Nevertheless, the trend to be marginalized inside an economic co-operation organization continues. This is another permanent challenge that GOV will confront with in the future.

Sometimes, this crisis consciousness could transform into impetus to inspire the energy of PUMA/GOV, while sometimes, it would detract the energy, and weaken the ability of PUMA/GOV. Thus, another key dynamics to determine whether or not GOV will be influential is how to earn legitimacy inside the whole OECD without undermining the limited energy.

6.2.3 Lack of resources

As discussed earlier (3.3.2), the OECD budget crisis began in 1996, and ZRW continues until the present. PUMA/GOV suffered this tremendously during this period. For example, the change of budget channel (3.5.2), the shift from permanent staff to temporary consultants (3.5.3), and the reduction of professional staff all derived from the budget limitation. In view of this fact, it seems difficult to remedy the lack of capital and human resources. The OECD is directly and totally dependent on the financial contributions from member countries, and has less financial autonomy than, say the World Bank or the IMF. Furthermore, as I have indicated above, the public management function is a ‘junior partner' within the OECD, and therefore tends to suffer disproportionately when cuts have to be made.

To survive this situation, GOV not only needs to make good use of its limited resources to produce well-flowing ideas, but also to make a case for some increase in its resource base. This is the third key dynamic for the influence of GOV.

In general, all these three items are easy to verbalize on paper but difficult to realize in practice. GOV itself can do little to modify these situations/challenges. The only thing left to GOV is to find ways to survive. In the next section, we will analyse some ways in which GOV might be able to improve its influence.

6.3 Recommendations

Although facing many unchangeable challenges, it seems that GOV still has room to improve. As discussed, the international epistemic community is like a ‘market’ of GOV products, GOV can do little to change it. The seven factors are by no means the standards/criteria of ‘factory productions'. The ideas flow model is not really a theory about the conditions for the production of management ideas, but a theoretical tool for analysing how they flow after they have been produced. GOV could not produce an idea following those seven requirements. So what GOV can improve might be how to act a superior carrier, and how to obtain high-quality sources of ideas.

6.3.1 A superior carrier – quality control procedure

Quality is always the core of the production, which directly connects with the reputation of the factory. PUMA might be more influential than GOV by controlling the quality in the
process of internal operation named gathering in formation and composing data. With limited budget, it might be difficult for GOV to employ senior researchers to compose reports regularly. The solution might be an introduction of an internal procedure to improve the quality of outputs, especially the unpublished reports. Since the published reports have a special process through PAC, their quality is normally better than those of the unpublished ones. However, GOV distributed a substantial quantity of those unpublished reports (anonymous interview). So the quality control procedure for the unpublished reports might be helpful to improve the reputation of the entire GOV.

6.3.2 High-quality sources of ideas – professional staff

The only fixed asset (capital asset) of a factory is the machine. The capital asset of GOV is the professional staff. The quality of staff not only influences the first two stages of the activities cycle of carrier – collections and processing, but also influences the production of ideas. Lack of professional staff in GOV (in comparison with PUMA) is a key reason for the reduced influence. The professional staff and supporting staff are almost half and half in GOV (Table 5). The majority of supporting staff are permanent staff, and there is lack of incentive or punishment to improve their motivation (anonymous interview). Besides, the limited budget for professional staff was reduced again. For that reason, there might be a need for internal human resource reforms to either reduce the total number of supporting staff so as to employ more professional staff, or to improve their creativity and enthusiasm to work at a more professional level. In both ways, the purpose is to increase professional level of staff, so as to owning high-quality sources of ideas.

In fact, these two recommendations are closely connected. A quality control procedure is important for improving the quality of products. It can also be an internal process for training the young and inexperienced GOV staff. The increase of professional staff will also improve the quality of products. As an old saying goes: ‘If you pay peanuts then you get monkeys’.

6.3.3 Reflections

In the same way, quality control procedure and professional staff are not only important for GOV, but also for the whole OECD. In a certain extent, the organization of the OECD also has legitimacy and resources issues compared with other international organizations in the worldwide. The budget dependence on MCs puts great pressure on the entire organization. Quality control and professional staff are also crucial to maintain and increase the reputation of the entire OECD. In addition, we might also extend these two factors to the other international organizations, such as the IMF, the World Bank and EC. These two factors are also fundamental for the influence of these international organizations. All in all, in the international epistemic community, quality control procedure and professional staff are two key factors determining the reputation of an international organization from an internal perspective.

I would finish this thesis with a story. On April 22, 2005, after the Performance Network Meeting at the Headquarter of the OECD, I took the shuttle (between the headquarter office and Tour Europe building) to go back Tour Europe office. In the lobby of Tour Europe, I had a short talk to an OECD senior official, who took the same bus back with me. I asked: ‘Do you think that the OECD is important for MCs?’ He answered indirectly: ‘If the OECD was abolished one day, nobody will notice it on the second day. But two years later, people will realize…’
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Appendix

Appendix A: Interview Questionnaires to PUMA/GOV staff

--WHAT DO YOU THINK THE MAIN CHANGES OR DEVELOPMENTS WERE DURING YOUR PERIOD AS DIRECTOR?
--Whether you thought the influence of PUMA on member states had increased or diminished over time, and if so, why?
--Which programme is more successful and which is not in the GOV? Why?

1. Who initiated PUMA in 1990? Where did the idea for it come from?
2. Why did they want to establish PUMA at that time?
3. What was the original/foremost purpose or function of PUMA? Did it change during the time in which you were a member of PUMA?
4. Was the work of PUMA controversial – either inside or outside the OECD? Were there critics?
5. What has the PUMA achieved in the past 15 years – the history of PUMA? Which programme do you think is successful, and which is not so successful? Would you please give me more explanation how these programme operate, and why they successful or not so successful?
6. What theories models of dissemination and learning that PUMA have used in the work?
7. How does Department of Public GOV operate now? How was data collected and assembled into the published reports (how many methods that GOV has used to collect data and assemble into publication)? Whether there is some difference from the operation in the early 1990s? What and why?
8. How important do you think was the role PUMA played in public management reform in member states?
   (Very important, somewhat important, not too important, not at all important?)
9. Did PUMA give more or less the same advice to all member states, or did it give differentiated advice according to the circumstances of the particular member state? Whether there are some changes in terms of this point? Why and how?
10. Was there a dissemination strategy? Apart from publishing reports, how did you attempt to influence member states?
11. Where did the main ideas for the ‘PUMA model’ of the mid 1990s come from – the PUMA staff themselves, the member states, consultants or somewhere else? Who were the influential?
12. During your time, were there important shifts in the kind of advice given? If so, why?
13. Do you think there has been shifts in the OECD ‘line’ compared with the mid 1990s? Why?
14. Whether some member states are more influential than the others? Why?
15. What to you think about the outcome of PUMA? Is that successful?
16. Why PUMA changed name to ‘Governance’?
17. What did PUMA think is the most effective way to influence Member States?
18. What are strengthens and weakness of PUMA/OECD model/story?
19. What are the future challenges that PUMA/OECD are facing?
20. Are there any particular sources of further information – either academics or official – which you would recommend me to consult?
21. Would you like to give any comments or suggestions on my questionnaire?

Any further question, may I come to you again? Thank you!
## Appendix B: Names list of Interviewees

### Name List of Interviewees in GVO April 11 - May 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Working period in PUMA/GOV</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Andrea Uhrhammer</td>
<td>PGC Committee Secretary, Communications Manager</td>
<td>1988-present</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Barry Anderson</td>
<td>Head of BUD Division</td>
<td>2005 April-present</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bob Bonwitt</td>
<td>Head of SIGMA programme</td>
<td>1974-present</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Claude Jacqmin</td>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>1984-present</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>David Shand</td>
<td>Head of Budgeting &amp; Management</td>
<td>1993-1996</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Deirdre Wolfender</td>
<td>Assistant</td>
<td>1984-present</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Derry Ormond</td>
<td>Head of PUMA</td>
<td>1971-1998 October</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Edwin Lau</td>
<td>Administrator (E-Government)</td>
<td>1999-present</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Elsa Pilichowski</td>
<td>Administrator (Human Resources Management)</td>
<td>2000-present</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Francis Henin</td>
<td>Principal Administration (Institution Building)</td>
<td>1980s-present</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Jon Blondal</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Division (Budgeting &amp; Public Expenditures)</td>
<td>1995-present</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Katherine Poinsard</td>
<td>Personal Assistant to the Director</td>
<td>1984-present</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Michael Ruffner</td>
<td>Administrator (Budgeting and Finance Management)</td>
<td>2000-2005 (leave)</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sang-In Kim</td>
<td>Project Manager (Korea)</td>
<td>2003-present</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Teresa Curristine</td>
<td>Administrator (Budgeting &amp; Performance)</td>
<td>2002-present</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
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</table>

In addition, I carried out other short informal interviews with two other OECD staffs who wish to remain anonymous. On Performance Network Meeting on April 24-25, I conducted a few non-attributed interviews with candidates from some member countries.
Appendix C: Some Records of interviews

INTERVIEW WITH BOB BONWITT
2005-4-22 FRIDAY 15:00 IN OECD OFFICE OF BOB BONWITT

This interview focuses mainly on the origins of the OECD’s Public Governance Committee (PGC). It does not address in any depth the current work or situation of GOV.

1. Early history and background
This is very long story and this is going to be a short version of it. It concerns 25 years of effort to create something new in a difficult environment. So I will simplify and leave out important things, and I only mention a few of the people who helped build Puma and then GOV.

After the war, in April 1948, the Organization of European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was created to provide a policy framework for implementation of the Marshall plan. Most of Europe, including Germany, had economic and institutional bases but needed physical reconstruction. The southern part of Europe was weak: – civil war in Greece; potentially unstable dictatorships in Spain and Portugal; potential fragmentation in Turkey, regional imbalances and potential instability in Italy. The dynamics are that southern Europe was very poor, underdeveloped and weakly connected to the rest of Europe, and perceived to be at risk from Communist infiltration.

Within OEEC, a special program was set up to support the Southern tier countries; with the establishment of the OECD (1961), this program became known as the Technical Co-operation Program (TECO). The practical role was to provide technical assistance. However the underlying purpose of the Program was geo-political – keeping those countries aligned with the West and stabilizing them.

TECO assisted on virtually anything, agricultural development, monetary policy etc. The focus was not on public management. The technical assistance was based on experts from member countries. The Program included scholarships to study abroad and building up university institutions (capacity building). The financing for the Program was from the main budget of the OECD – therefore essentially from the richer countries such as US – with an element of counterpart financing from the beneficiaries. Accountability was to a Committee in which the beneficiary countries were represented by people responsible for public administration reform (substantive specialists of politicians) but the richer countries were represented by diplomats. The TECO staff were essentially project managers and contract administrators with little substantive skills.

During the Sixties, there was huge immigration from Southern to Northern Europe, especially Germany, to fuel the post war reconstruction and the “economic miracle”. At the beginning of the seventies, TECO beneficiaries were Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia which had become and Associate State of OECD in 1961 and a full beneficiary of TECO.
These Southern tier countries were relatively stable – if undemocratic – and benefited from increased integration with the rest of Europe, especially through labour and tourism, and had greatly increased their intellectual assets (universities and foreign studies programs). In the early 1973, OECD decided that the countries were sufficiently stable to permit the phasing out of TECO over the following 3 years. The director retired and his replacement, Mr. Derry Ormond, was given the job of bringing the program to an orderly close.

However, the oil shock of 1973 provoked fear that there would be a massive return flow of migrants, with potentially destabilizing (economic and political) effects. Then in the mid 70s, momentous events took place in all of the countries. In Portugal there was a communist revolution in 1974, which was replaced by Constitutional democracy two years later in 1976, and the withdrawal from the colonies. The same period saw the death of Franco in Spain (1975), end of the Greek Colonels in 1974 and crises in Turkey (Cyprus 1974) during the period of “troubled democracy”. Yugoslavia went through a Constitutional reform introducing the “self-management system” (1974). The seventies in Southern Europe were characterized by economic and political turbulence and, amongst other NATO members a re-awakening of the need to ensure their stabilization.

Derry Ormond had the idea that the problems of the countries lay in their inability to formulate and implement public policy. But this was not a lack of technical ability or of the skills of individual policy-makers – there were sufficient people in government who had trained in economics abroad or passed through the new universities at home. The problem was ineffective public administration. Furthermore, Derry Ormond felt that public administration capacity was going to be a main problem for all OECD members especially as they struggled to cope with stagflation and structural adjustment. When the crisis came in the mid 70s, Derry Ormond got permission to extend TECO for another further few years, to assist the countries through the oil crisis. During this period he brought about a revolution in TECO, which ultimately led to the creation of first the Public Management Committee (PUMA, 1990) and subsequently the Public Governance Committee (GOV, 2005).

2. Emergence of PUMA
Derry Ormond had to pursue a dual strategy. He had to transform the program while at the same time maintaining the stabilization element for Southern Europe. The latter meant satisfying the old customers in the beneficiary countries as well as the foreign offices of the rich countries. It was the Southern Europe element that justified the budget for TECO. Further, at the time, neither the rich countries nor the poor countries accepted that public administration was a problem, and no one accepted that international organizations had any legitimacy to discuss it. Furthermore, the idea was not accepted in the OECD itself which was dominated by economists.

To help him carry out the transformation, Derry Ormond brought in an American expert on public administration – Dr. Ravi Kapil in 1973. As program officer responsible for Turkey in TECO, Derry Ormond had previously recruited Ravi Kapil from the University in Wisconsin – Madison in the early 60s to assist the Public Administration Department in the Middle East Technical University in Ankara. He and Derry Ormond had become good friends and had
often discussed the idea of creating a Public Administration element in OECD. Derry Ormond and Ravi Kapil complemented each other: Derry Ormond was an expert in managing the bureaucratic environment in OECD and in sensing the politics of the countries; Ravi Kapil was an expert in public administration. Bob Bonwitt joined then in 1976, after finishing post-graduate work at London Business School. He was recruited for an initial 3 months consultancy to assist Derry Ormond and Ravi Kapil develop a “business plan”, on the basis of an unsolicited application.

These three persons designed and implemented the transformation of TECO, with the aim of creating a public management committee by 1990. By the 1979/80 mandate renewal exercise, they would have to be ready to justify a further mandate, moved towards legitimising public administration, and created support in Southern Europe and some other countries.

The context was characterized by three factors:

- TECO was, politically, intellectually and in terms of resources and reputation, the least viable part of the OECD
- There was no tradition or acceptance of the idea of international work on public administration
- OECD was a clientelistic operation – directorates had links to counterpart Ministries in capitals who supported their budgets. Although the Foreign Ministries were in most cases nominally in charge of programme and work and budget, in fact it was a locked incremental process. TECO was one of the very few areas where the Foreign Ministries had direct control.

The strategy had seven mutually supportive components:

- Subject definition
- Client definition
- Geography
- Methodology
- Communication
- Staff
- Budget

2.1 Subject definition

In an important sense, everything OECD does is about public administration. Policy means very little unless it is implemented: it is difficult to talk about education policy while ignoring how schools are managed. So gradually all parts of OECD were getting involved in administrative issues. Public administration as a topic is vast covering hundreds of thousands (millions) of people and thousands of institutions. The problem of subject definition was to

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3 The OECD “founding committees” like Economic Development Review Committee or the Agriculture Committee, Committee were permanent structures. Other Committees were given time-bound mandates (usually 5 years). Mandate renewal was decided on the basis of performance and need. TECO’s (and later Puma’s and Gov’s) were at the beginning and half way through each decade, with negotiations starting at least 1 year earlier.
find a manageable, scope which did not bring TECO into conflict with the more powerful substantive directorates.

TECO built on the idea of horizontal management systems of government as conditioning, to a significant extent the overall behaviour of the administrative system. Most administration is concerned with vertical/sectoral operations delivering hospital care, environmental inspections, schooling, tax collection etc. These bodies were already well networked internationally.

TECO would focus on horizontal, cross-governmental management system, primarily:

- resource allocation and control
- personnel
- policy making

with an overarching theme of design of administrative reform to improve services to citizens and enterprises.

This definition of was supported by analysis of how governments actually drove administrative reform. The broad agendas of increasing efficiency and effectiveness were usually led by Ministries of Finance or public personnel offices and subsumed under the “managerial approach”. It was influenced particularly by the Canadian central management offices (PCO, PMO, TBS, MoF) and the description by Colin Campbell in “The Superbureaucrats”.

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Although this subject definition worked at a broad level there was a key difficulty for TECO. The main proponents of better management in government were, first, predominately Anglo-Saxon, and, secondly, advanced. Above all their reforms were marginal improvement on systems that had a strong public service ethos, and robust controls. The reforms were not suitable for the more fragile and less developed administrations of Southern Europe, which were anyway rooted in the continental administrative law tradition.

Finally a main substantive constraint on developing a program was that governance was as an element of a country’s competitive advantage and there were no identifiable interdependencies on which could be based an internal collaborative program.

2.2 Client definition
The subject definition enabled TECO to identify client organizations in Governments who could be used to build a support base for the budgetary battles within OECD i.e. to become TECO’s clients. The target bodies included:

- Government secretariats
- Budget offices
- Financial control bodies
- Public personnel departments
- Administrative reform groups

These bodies would probably have much to learn from each other, but, up to that time, had not become internationally networked; more specifically they were not already “captured” by other parts of the OECD.

2.3 Geography
The prime mandated focus of TECO was Southern Europe, where there were very specific administrative problems. If TECO were to be able to spread interest in international dialogue on public administration, it had to find countries which were either willing to admit that they had everything to learn (e.g. Belgium), or who were willing to expend resources to prove that they had everything to teach (e.g. the UK) and were encouraged (and paid) by the Foreign Office to participate, in order to influence development in the South of Europe. To the extent that the benefited themselves from participation, it was a free good to the British beneficiaries.

The classification of

- A rich, large, advanced – (US, Canada…)
- B middle sized and average – (Belgium, Finland…)
- C small poor and relative other OECD less developed (southern Europe)

was simplistic. It ignore for example the interest of the US in spreading better administration and the US genuine desire to learn (this was in during Carter Presidency, when there was lot if influence form the comparative public administration schools (e.g. Indiana) and from the people who had been active in “development administration”.

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The Southern Europeans supported the shift to PUMA because, politically, it took them out of a donor/recipient relationship within the OECD while focusing on a major problem. The other main supporting countries at the beginning were the Scandinavians, Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Ireland, Italy, Canada and New Zealand. US support dropped off after the defeat of Carter. The UK support was always ambiguous.

2.4 Methodology
TECO was originally a classical technical assistance “brokerage”. This type of work was phased out over time with the last operation was to Turkey in 1994. Spain dropped out TECO assistance early. Greece and Portugal dropped out when they joined EU (1981 and 1986). Yugoslavia continued until its break-up in 1991.

The classical approach to TA (experts giving advice to passive uncritical recipients was deemed to be unsuitable for the subject area, because public administration was assumed to be context specific and observation showed no clear administrative patterns and no clear relationships between inputs (organization, civil service systems) and outputs in terms of effectiveness.

We needed to find a modus operandi, which would be suitable for dealing with public administration and which, at the same time, would enable non-Southern Europe countries to participate without losing face.

The methodology was called the “Joint Activity”. The fundamental idea was that nobody had “right” answers and that everyone could learn from each other. We fixed topics and invited all countries to participate in discussions on an equal footing basis. This enabled “northern” countries to learn that hey had something to learn from each other, and by facilitating (subsidizing and fostering) southern countries participation they were encouraged to advance their reforms. Joint activity work could then be deepened by more targeted interventions in the South. This method of Joint activities was employed initially on neutral topics such as urban documentation and computers in public administration. It was then extended to the key central horizontal management systems. The various activities on these systems were brought together in one programme (the “Joint Activity on Public Management” or JAPMI). A steering committee of PA practitioners was created in 1981 to advise the TECO committee on the work programme.

By 1986 the JAPMI was in effect driving almost the entire work programme of TECO and all other joint activities were stopped. From then on all the TA work in the countries was directly linked to the work programme of the JAPMI. The conversion of TECO into the Public Management Committee (PUMA) in 1990 was in fact the replacement of TECO by the replaced by the JAPMI.

The other approach was to network public administration. We didn’t want to work at theory level. There is no best practice. There were only good and less good practices. Any practice needed to fit specific cultures and contexts. So we launched networks, discussions, panels, and policy papers.
2.5 Communication and positioning

Two high profile and high-level launch events were used to put JAPMI on the map. The Carter administrative reform team were interested in resurrecting the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS) to pursue a development administration agenda. They hosted a meeting in Washington in 1979, in which different group were made responsible for “tracks”. As supporters of the emergence of OECD public management work, they invited TECO to organize a track on modernizing public administration, which focused on decentralization, privatisation and participation. TECO on its own account held a symposium in Madrid on “Managing Change in Public Administration” (1979).

Both events were given high-level political prominence, and involved senior management from OECD. They provided the backdrop to the 1980 Mandate renewal at which the focus on public administration was recognized and it was admitted that other (non South) countries could benefit from the Program. In late 1979 a high level meeting of JAPMI was held which considered a work programme for the future.

To organize these events and the first activities in the early 1980, TECO engaged some of the most outstanding academics in the field particularly Aaron Wildavsky—one of the fathers budgeting and administrative study, who bridged the gap between policy studies and implementation (ref: “Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland”), and Yehzkel Dror, father of policy analysis and a few others (Allen Schick, Daniel Tarschys, Michel Crozier etc). These people helped establish public/academic reputation and engaged administration in their own countries, as well as providing some intellectual reputation within the OECD.

2.6 Staff

The staff of TECO in the early 70s was essentially made up of economists or project managers. Some of them were also people who had been in the OECD for a long time and came from elsewhere in the Organization for various reasons. These people were not able to interact with the administrative professionals coming from the countries.

The twin approach to this problem was to use very high-level consultants (see above) and gradually to turnover the staff as the JAPMI work grew in volume and as natural wastage allowed.

2.7 Budget

TECO’s budget in the 1970s was voted for support to Southern Europe and was structured as a small core of staff managing a large operational sum to spend on consultancy and travel. The problem was to convert to a larger agenda without creating a “zero-budget” decision situation. The effectiveness of the methodology of co-operation and exchange was used to justify switching money from direct country actions to network operations. The need to have in-house administrative expertise allowed some of the operational budget to be transformed into “project staff” posts to run administrative reform activities.
3. Creation of PUMA and GOV

In 1990 the Technical Co-operation Committee was formally renamed the Public Management Committee (PUMA) although this was recognizing a change that had taken place in substance from mid 80s. The PUMA work programme and delegates were essentially taken over from the JAPMI and by then included specific activities on regulatory reform and improving service to citizens.

However the decision on this new Committee and Mandate was not evident. The objections were threefold:

- Narrow budget reduction concern: once TECO was eliminated it meant that the Foreign Office contributions to OECD could be reduced and if domestic Ministries wanted to continue with PUMA they could take on the financial burden of paying for it, which they were for the most part not prepared to do.
- Political concern: by the 1990 attitudes to Government had changed radically with the inheritance of Reaganism and Thatcherism. A programme on public management was thought to reflect a political stance with respect to government.
- Some, especially continental countries like France, felt that PUMA could become a mechanism for promoting Anglo-Saxon visions of public management which was seen as highly ideological and inimical to the continental (especially French) vision of the State and the role of administration as the postwar vanguard of modernization.

The main issue facing the Organization in the late 80s was the need for structural adjustment and the reinvigoration of national economies. The new mandate depended on winning acceptance of the idea that administrative reform (seen as managerialism) was an essential element of structural adjustment of the economy. Based largely on the work on citizens (see Administration as Service: the Public as Client and the follow up case studies, and the work on regulation, we wrote a paper called “Serving the Economy Better” which was negotiated with all the main protagonists France, Germany, Italy, US, UK, New Zealand etc. which was eventually accepted by the Technical Co-operation Committee and used as the justification for the transformation into PUMA.


4. Why was creating PUMA Controversial?

Most of the answers have been indicated in the explanation above. Apart from the purely bureaucratic and budgetary, I believe the issues were largely two types of high-level ideological concern:

- Liberal ideas related to new (then) thinking about the role of the State in the economy, tended to argue against creating an instrument which might legitimise a stronger state;
this school of thought included many of the OECD economists, and had a strong (malignant) influence on attitudes to State reform when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.

- Traditional continental ideas that saw the danger of competing concepts of the State and elite roles

At a lower level of ideology was a view that PUMA was promoting the managerial model of NPM and a false notion of convergence. Look at the papers by Premfors and Olsen especially the latter, which contrasts PUMA and SIGMA. Both of these papers basically accused PUMA of unthinkingly promoting the managerial model of NPM, which was not always correct.

Finally there was a school of thought (sovereignist) that simply resisted the idea of international involvement in “internal matters, or, more weakly, that there would be anything to learn from others since administration was so contingent. This was linked with the view (especially of some economists) that administration was not a subject suitable for analytical study NB see Ronald Moe, and his views on how administrative law has been (wrongly) obliterated by economics.

All of these currents made the creation of PUMA controversial and limited its potential for future growth. In my view some of the problems that GOV now faces derive from the lack of wholehearted commitment to the idea from within the Organization and its membership.

I also believe that the failure of PUMA to create a real analytical underpinning for its work linked to economic development left the economics profession, the OECD and other international bodies, ill-prepared for the transitions in the ex-communist countries of the 90s.

5. GOV today – problems and perspectives

PUMA/GOV missed its chance to become mainstream in the OECD and to develop an intellectual capital of its own. Its chance came when PUMA was institutionalised and at the same time transition from Communism invited a fresh look at the role of the State in the economy. The intellectual foundation of institutional economics should have provided a sufficient base. Although the idea occurred inadequate resources were allocated to the task. It was a chicken and egg problem: because PUMA did not have a rigorous intellectual framework situating it in the mainstream of OECD, it was under-resourced and its long-term decline – temporarily halted in 1990 – continued, and therefore it never again had the resources to invest. The sole area where it succeeded in creating a sufficient space was in regulatory management. But this proved highly dependent on one supremely talented individual – Scott Jacobs – and failed as a sector as soon as he left.

In my view, PUMA/GOV has therefore declined since Derry Ormond’s departure, although such is the inertia of such bodies that the decline is not strikingly evident as real failure. Some of the problems are:

- Lack of an integrated strategic framework for substance or programming: as a result GOV is a collection of activities where funding is available and staff have interests
• Weak staffing and access to top quality consultancy (two recent hires at senior level may reverse the trend but the depth is still not there)
• Inability to address economically relevant, priority, issues in a way which earns credit elsewhere in the Organization, and a consequent lack of sustained interest of senior management and thus few allies
• Unstructured approach to Outreach
• A managing committee with a restricted vision of governance, and difficulties in substantive terms to move from management to governance
• A destructive reliance on voluntary funding
• Continuing reliance on Angle Saxon models and cultures

6. GOV outreach
Outreach has become priority for all parts of OECD because of the wish of the Council and because of the high potential for additional external funding. However Puma/GOV Committee members are driven by domestic agendas and see no benefit to themselves in engaging with Outreach countries,

In line with OECD doctrine, GOV’s outreach endeavours have had to be based on policy dialogue in an area where policy is difficult to express cross-nationally. Outreach activity appears to be driven entirely by opportunity and is only weakly linked to a coherent vision of which countries matter and where GOV could have a comparative advantage.

An exception to this is Sigma, but Sigma is essentially a creature if the European Union and driven by quite different strategic interests. These interests are strongly formulated and institutionalised, creating a clearer if more exigent space in which to operate.
The influence of PUMA has decreased since 1995. The main reason is that there was more competition. Before that few people worked on public management at an international comparative level. Now there are more and more international organizations, like the World Bank and IMF, and universities working in the same areas. In E-Gov, there are a lot private companies working on it. PUMA has the advantage of being impartial. Private companies were trying to sell their products, but PUMA did not have a product to sell. The disadvantage is that PUMA has fewer resources than private companies. Counties are also doing lot of things bilaterally with one another. The second reason is that the outside perception is that PUMA became less neutral and was promoting NPM. It was too much seen that NPM would solve all problems. That is how countries saw OECD. The 3rd reason is that GOV has less resource, staffs and fund. That is why it is less influential.

I don't think that PUMA controversial. The biggest market for our work has been from smaller countries. They need external forces to support their internal reform. What we did for them is not to provide information that they don't know, but to help them to mobilize the support in the name of the international community. The larger the country is, the less they need that. Eastern countries did not support much. There is some criticism the quality of GOV work. People felt that it is too general.

GOV is not a theoretical body. When we do more academic work, it is not always easy for countries to use it because it is too long, too technical and too theoretical… the mandate document is supposed to provide a systemic picture of the whole work of GOV, explain the reason why GOV exists.

Country reviews are done by staff inside GOV. People are proud of that. For the most recent reports, some chapters were written by MCs, some by consultants, and some by staff of GOV. Even for the chapter written by MCs or consultants, we need to rewrite it again. Normally only one person is responsible for one project. Many projects have work written by consultants, or external consultants in university. Usually we will give each chapter to the working party or working group for review, and also to GOV committee. Working party is much better because they know the topic well. They review the report and give examples and comments, and then the Secretariat revises it again. Sometimes we send it to editor, someone to correct the English. Then it goes to PAC. Sometimes PAC will work with us at the beginning and to try to help us to with marketing, and framing documents.

Usually the report goes to working group first to read it and comment on it, then editor, and then committee. By the time it goes to committee, it is almost done. Consultant usually was found based on topic each time. There is no fixed consultant. I created an Associates Group for the E-Gov Project made up of academics, private sector people and public sector people not in our network. This is not our E-Gov network (which is more high level), but it contains many potential consultants. People will come to work for the OECD because of reputation of the OECD. Once the document goes to PAC, it takes about ten weeks in order to prepare for
publication. Some OECD documents were published, but some were never published. There are some called OECD papers, which is compendium document and not published, they are distributed but not sold. Quality of this kind of unpublished document is mixed, sometimes good and sometimes not. One problem of scarce resources is that there is no time to review it. That is a major problem. Over the long run, it hurts reputation. There is almost competition in every area. Since GOV is more horizontal, it covers all areas. There is almost nothing special just for GOV. It is substantive directorate. GOV is substantive but in the different way because public management crosses all substantive issues.

Committee did not get involved in everyday work.

We say a lot that no one solution is best. It is handicap and it makes us difficult to give strong advice. The only time that we gave suggestion to MCs is the country review. It is very specific suggestion to each reviewed country.

Communication committee was created inside the PUMA committee in 1997/8. It has disappeared. There was a communications strategy. The responsibility for each member of the Committee was to distribute the outputs, to make sure they disseminate in their countries. Normally people came to Paris to the meeting and then just go back. No one knows what has happened after that meeting. Other directorates will do survey on quality, and spend a whole to promote it.

It is important to have flexibility of programme. The OECD is trying to make programme more accountable, but in fact it is more rigid. If you did not do as planned 2 years ago, you need to explain that it is because MCs don’t want it anymore. It is a logical reason. However it sounds like an excuse to try to do what GOV wants. GOV had already been forward looking.
Appendix D: Secretary-General of the OECD 1948-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>1948-1953</td>
<td>Robert Marjolin</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1953-1961</td>
<td>Rene Sergent</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>1961-1969</td>
<td>Thorkil Kristensen</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1969-1984</td>
<td>Emile van Lennep</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984-1996</td>
<td>Jean-Claude Paye</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996-2005</td>
<td>Donald Johnston</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix E: Budget allocations among directorates in the OECD in 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directorate</th>
<th>ECO</th>
<th>ENV</th>
<th>DCD</th>
<th>PUMA</th>
<th>TRA</th>
<th>DAF</th>
<th>STI</th>
<th>ELS</th>
<th>AGR</th>
<th>TDS</th>
<th>DEV</th>
<th>CCET</th>
<th>Fut. Prog</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>14.43</td>
<td>7.71</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>7.71</td>
<td>12.43</td>
<td>12.57</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>7.29</td>
<td>13.43</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>100.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CE(98)3/CORR2 the OECD committees structure – A Review Final Report