TO SANCTION, OR NOT TO SANCTION?

A quantitative survey study on Dutch public opinion on sanctions

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Abstract

The merits of public opinion have been debated heavily and have been varyingly assessed to be unfounded, ill-informed, but also decisive in the shaping of policy. This thesis is based on the assumption that, while citizens may not have all relevant knowledge available, the public has an opinion on matters of foreign policy such as sanctions by drawing upon different sources or past experiences. This thesis argues that the opinion of Dutch citizens on international sanctions is in part related to generalized beliefs on foreign policy preference and to demographic characteristics, such as age and gender. Using data from the Transatlantic Trends Survey, this thesis shows that Dutch citizens hold stable and consistent beliefs on whether to sanction, or not to sanction. While the preference for sanctions is consistent, this thesis concludes that the determinants of Dutch public support for sanctions is not. It appears the Dutch public draws upon different sources and experiences when assessing whether to *prefer* or *agree with* the imposition of international economic sanctions or not. In the case of Russia, agreeance with sanctions is determined by gender, an internationalist foreign policy preference and the held opinion of Russia. Preference for sanctions against Iran is determined by age and also an internationalist foreign policy preference. A separate analysis also found support for sanctions against Russia to be a determinant of support for sanctions against Iran, and vice versa. This finding suggests at least a consistency between the public's opinion on sanctions against Russia and Iran. These different underlying factors make clear that the public opinion on sanctions as a tool of foreign policy is intricate and difficult to predict.

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List of abbreviations

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

ESDP – European Security and Defense Policy

ESS – European Security Strategy

EU – European Union

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT – Non-Proliferation Treaty

SPSS – Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

TTS – Transatlantic Trends Survey

UN – United Nations

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

USA – United States of America

WWII – Second World War

1. Introduction

In the past years, the European Union has been broadening its activities in the realm of security, through the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was set out by the European Union, identifying threats to EU security (ESS 'A secure Europe in a better world', 2003). The ESS is a document based on the notion that modern security issues are so complex that no country can single handedly address them, the cooperation of the European Union is needed. Part of the strategy is the implementation of economic sanctions as an essential foreign policy tool (Portela, 2005). The use of international sanctions has become an increasingly prominent tool of foreign policy in addressing problematic behavior (Giumelli, 2013). Sanctions are measures by the international community against a violation or threat of the international peace and security. The measures are intended to alter the behavior of a country or group, or to give off a signal to the international community. They may consist of interrupting diplomatic relations, arms embargoes, restriction on admission of listed persons, freezing of assets or economic sanctions such as import and export bans (European Council, 2016). Often, sanctions are not imposed on an entire country, but are targeted at certain people or organizations, thus minimizing adverse consequences for those not responsible for the transgressions.

Within the European Union these sanctions, or economic sanctions as they are often referred to within the EU, have become a favored tool in situations where diplomatic efforts are ineffective and military action is considered to be too rigorous (Esfandiary, 2013). The EU either imposes these measures on its own initiative, or in order to implement UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions stipulating the use of sanctions against a certain organization or country (European Council, 2016). Where the EU does not have the capacity or the desire to enforce certain foreign policies with the use of military force, economic sanctions provide a good alternative. The EU is currently imposing economic sanctions in over 35 countries and against terrorist groupings such as Al Qaeda (European Commission, 2016). According to the European Council (2016), the key objectives when adopting sanctions are:

- *Safeguarding EU's values, fundamental interests and security*
- *Preserving peace*
- *Consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law*
- *Preventing conflicts and strengthening international security, etc.*

Recent research has adapted to the trend of increasing use of economic sanctions and sanctions a foreign policy tool, and has evaluated the use and effect of these measures. However, there is little to no research on the public opinion of these measures. This seems to be a gap in the existing body of literature, as public opinion has been proven to affect, for example, domestic national defense, economic and discrimination policies 75% of the times its impact is measured (Burstein, 2003). Substantially impacting the policy over a third of the time, the importance and influence of public opinion cannot be denied. Therefore, this thesis will focus on the public opinion in the domain of international economic sanctions. Despite many activities by political or action groups, the public opinion has proven to influence political decision making and policy formation. The support of the public is also essential in domestic foreign policy making, as increased support can legitimize the policy.

Research shows that citizen access to political information has dramatically increased, as more people have access to electronic media and social media (Dalton, 2014). The public seems to be more aware of issues of foreign policy, and increasingly holds attitudes and beliefs about such issues (Aldrich et al., 2006). While in the past the public was often discarded as being uninterested, more recent research finds that the public in fact holds reasonably sensible and nuanced views on issues of foreign policy (Ibid.). While this thesis is based mainly on the Transatlantic Trends Survey, another good poll of public opinion on EU issues is the Eurobarometer. In 2015, the Eurobarometer special report on European's attitudes towards security found out that over eight out of ten people agree that war and political instability outside the EU (86% agreement) could result in a threat to the internal security of the EU (Eurobarometer 432, 2015). This shows that the European citizen is indeed aware of security issues threatening the safety of the EU. The public opinion of citizens cannot be discarded, considering the normative and legitimizing mechanisms that accompany it.

The EU's sanctions have been criticized to be 'inconsistent' and 'neorealist', implying that EU sanctions are merely driven by security and economic interests, rather than by normative concerns as is often claimed (Brummer, 2009:192). Interestingly, economic sanctions have not proven to be very effective in altering the behavior of the targets, the receiving end of the sanctions. Nonetheless, these sanctions can shape the external relations of the EU and contribute to a positive image. There are three types of sanctions to be distinguished; coercive, constraining or signaling. Coercive sanctions are imposed to bring about a behavioral change in the target, by incurring damage and costs to the target that shifts the cost/benefit calculation and results in a behavioral change (Giumelli, 2013). Constraining sanctions are aimed at 'undermining the capabilities of targets to achieve policy objectives' (Ibid.:1), by focusing on halting a certain policy. The most frequently used logic behind sanctions is signaling. Signaling is a nuanced way of sanctioning without incurring economic costs, but rather normative costs. By openly condemning a certain transgression and involving an international audience, normative pressures can be very effective measures of foreign policy (Ibid.). It is important to keep in mind that a sanction can continue for a long time and have a dynamic character. Long-term sanctions are often made up of different rounds, or episodes with new or adjusted measures. Looking at table 1, it is clear that the EU hardly uses coercive sanctions, but constraining and signaling are nearly equally often used in the episodes of sanctions by the EU.

Table 1: Frequency of dominant logic of EU sanctions

Dominant logic	Episode	Share of total of episodes (45)
Coercing	4	6.82%
Constraining	20	45.45%
Signaling	21	47.73%

Source: Giumelli, 2013:21

1.1 Objective of study

Whilst international sanctions are increasingly used by the European Union as a tool of foreign policy, there is little known on the public attitude hereon. Much research tends to focus on evaluating the effect of economic sanctions on the targeted country and the changes in behavior of that country. There are, however, no studies focused on the public opinion on sanctions imposed by the EU. Therefore, this thesis aims at contributing to the existing body of literature by making a comparison between the interesting cases Russia and Iran and the public opinion of citizens from the Netherlands. These cases have been selected as they are executed on such a large scale and are among the most well-known and recent cases of international sanctions in the Netherlands, increasing the chances of citizens having formed opinions on the matter. Both cases are also included in the Transatlantic Trends Survey (TTS), which will be utilized in this thesis, offering the opportunity to contrast and compare the two cases in a structured manner. These cases can however not be interchanged, as the TTS inquires whether respondents *agree* with imposing economic sanctions on Russia and whether they *prefer* imposing economic sanctions on Iran over other measures. As there is little known on the determinants of public opinion on sanctions, it is interesting to investigate both cases. The central research question of this thesis is therefore:

How can the Dutch public attitude towards economic sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia be explained?

The central research question aims at analyzing the different public attitudes towards preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and measures against the Russian actions in the Crimea. By comparing the influencing factors of public attitude towards Russian sanctions with the attitude towards Iranian sanctions, we can conclude if the Dutch citizens have consistent, varying or distinct pattern of public attitude towards *agreeing with* or *preferring* economic sanctions.

To narrow and guide the central research question, several sub questions have been formed:

1. What is the Dutch public attitude towards economic sanctions imposed on Russia?
2. What is the Dutch public attitude towards economic sanctions imposed on Iran?
3. Which factors determine the Dutch public attitude towards *agreeing with* economic sanctions imposed on Russia, and how can this be explained?
4. Which factors determine the Dutch public attitude towards *preferring* economic sanctions imposed on Iran, and how can this be explained?
5. What differences or similarities can be found between the determining factors of support for economic sanctions in both cases?

This thesis will build on the assumption that citizens have structured opinions on matters of foreign policy, such as the imposition of economic sanctions on other states. It is based on the theory of Popkin and Dimock (2000) that citizens base their opinion on foreign policy issues not only on knowledge relevant to the topic, but also on other sources that they use as a heuristic for shaping their preference. Starting this thesis, the expectations are that there are other determinants of support for sanctions, such as demographics. These theories and expectations will be further elaborated on in the literature review and theoretical framework.

1.2 Scientific and societal relevance

Public opinion itself is not a scarcely researched topic. On the contrary, the concept of public opinion has been subject to research since 1940-1950 and has been investigated in many fields and domains. While research on the public opinion of citizens on foreign policy has also been conducted, this research has often been quite restricted to only several policy domains and was mostly conducted on citizens of the United States of America (USA). There has however been no conducive research on the public opinion concerning international sanctions imposed by the EU. In the Netherlands, Philip Everts has conducted a wide array of research on the Dutch foreign policy opinion, but this also has not focused on economic sanctions and economic sanctions, as they have only gained popularity as a favored instrument of foreign policy in recent years. As a result, there is a gap in the literature concerning explanatory factors of public opinion on the use of economic sanctions on other countries. This thesis therefore contributes to the existing body of knowledge by investigating the Dutch public opinion on economic sanctions and the factors that underlie this attitude. This thesis will investigate a nuance between the underlying factors of *agreeing with* and *preferring* economic sanctions, and will therefore be of much relevance in understanding the dynamics of current public opinion in the Netherlands, specifically with regard to sanctions. While the Dutch public opinion is not generalizable to citizens of other countries or continents, it does offer useful insights into the mechanisms that might underlie their opinions on sanctions, and may be used to base future research on. The outcomes of this thesis are also societally relevant, as the public support of a foreign policy adds legitimacy to foreign policies decided upon by chosen politicians. Public support for policies can thus enhance the democratic nature of the political system, by reaffirming the choices of those that represent the public. Furthermore, due to the gaining popularity of economic sanctions, it is important to know what the stance is of Dutch citizens on such important issues, as the public opinion can be viewed as the 'thermometer of society'. Sanctions may in turn harm the national economy by increasing import costs or by provoking bans from targeted countries. It would seem plausible that citizens may have an opinion on such sanctions that may differ from that of national politicians. This thesis aims to shed light on the opinion of Dutch citizens on economic sanctions imposed on Russia and Iran, and to elucidate the underlying factors and reasons of this opinion. Politicians or policy makers might want to use this information in structuring future foreign policy or communications hereabout.

1.3 Structure of the study

The thesis is structured as follows: the second chapter of the study provides the reader with a literature review that outlines previous research and scholarly explanations regarding international economic sanctions and the public opinion hereon. It also considers the methods as well as the strengths and weaknesses of earlier research. The third chapter comprises the theoretical framework in which expected relations between variables will be hypothesized. The fourth chapter outlines the research design and the chosen methods of research, followed by an operationalization of the chosen variables. The fifth chapter comprises the empirical and statistical analysis on the public opinion on economic sanctions against Iran and Russia. This chapter will also provide a discussion on the found results. Concluding, chapter six will conclude the findings of the thesis as well as a brief outline of the limitations of the research, as well as suggested avenues for further research.

2. Literature review

This chapter reviews previous empirical research done on the public opinion and on sanctions. Previously drawn conclusions will be investigated and their applicability to this thesis will be reviewed. Followed by the identified gap in the existing body of literature, a summary will also be provided.

2.1 Importance of public opinion

Theoretically and normatively speaking, it is beneficial to a democracy to allow the public opinion to influence government policies (Erikson et al., 1993). A policy is democratically more sound and legitimate if it is generally approved by the public, and this warrants caution in some policies more than others, such as military operations (Verba et al., 1967). Gauging the public opinion can be beneficial to a democracy in its function to evaluate achievements and past policies and to remind political leaders of the fundamental ideals on which the democracy was built (Berelson, 1952). However, the quality of public opinion has been highly debated for the past 60 years. The most influential critic on public opinion and its merit is Walter Lippmann, who saw it simply as a 'picture inside their heads of the world beyond their reach' (1946:13). Lippmann viewed the public opinion as uninformed and unfit to weigh in on major decisions, leading to his statement that the public opinion has often been destructively wrong in critical situations. Gallup, however, viewed the public opinion as an important asset to democracy and felt the elites did not take into account the needs and wishes of the public. Gallup made the public opinion measurable and clear by providing a public opinion poll that offers a 'mandate of the people' to the governing elites. To this day, the Gallup Poll still exists after it was founded 80 years ago. The deliberation with which citizens form their opinion is also debated. Lippmann states that the public opinion is incoherent, volatile and irrelevant, and not deliberated upon. Page and Shapiro on the other hand, state that the public opinion of American citizens is not volatile, but is in fact relatively stable and quite reasonable (1988). Others have argued that the public is not able to have meaningful political opinions due to the complexity of issues for example (Arnold, 1990; Zaller, 1992). Many scholars have supported this statement and argue that most citizens are susceptible to elite and media manipulation because they don't have the right information to form an opinion (Bennett, 1988; Converse 1964). Some scholars even say citizens are mainly moved by media influences and that they answer questions or polls on public policy without thinking, reasoning or deliberating (Zaller, 1992). This intuitively makes sense, as issues of foreign policy have a remote and complex nature. There are researchers who have found that the public is unaware of foreign policy issues or was aware but 'unable to frame an intelligent argument' (Almond, 1950:238). Due to the high number of scholars who have reached different conclusions, it is difficult to say whether the public opinion is deliberate and well-informed. The prevailing consensus of scholars is however that citizens possess little information on issues of foreign policy, often have not formed sound attitudes based on concrete arguments and that they are only deeply concerned about foreign policy issues when their personal lives are affected directly by it (Aldrich et al., 1989).

As the sources used above make clear, the classical view on public opinion is rather pessimistic regarding the intelligence and opinions of the public. More recent research, however, has shown that the public is able to distinguish relevant information and to use it to

form their opinions on issues of foreign policy. Classical research focused mainly on the direct link between knowledge of foreign policy issues and public opinion, but did not focus on the various conditions that are at play or the individual differences that shape attitudes. Recent research has further investigated the process that citizens go through when shaping their opinion on foreign policy issues. Contrary to classical research, public opinion has actually been recently demonstrated to be highly structured (Everts & Isernia, 2001). Page and Shapiro (2010) find evidence that the public is able to form coherent opinions that change in understandable and sensible ways. They also found that public opinion is quite consistent and reflect underlying values. The public is however not always able to gather information on matters of foreign policy, due to its complexity (Holsti, 2004). But, with help of media and opinion leaders, citizens find informational shortcuts that help them assess matters of foreign policy (Destler, 2001; Aldrich et al., 2006). Citizens respond to cues by trusted political leaders or elites when assessing foreign policy action (Baum & Groeling, 2007). While controversial, Page & Bouton, 2006) insist that policymakers should take the public opinion into consideration. Regardless of whether the government *should* be responsive to the public opinion, several researchers have found that it is. The conditions or impacting factors that shape this process and the formation of the public opinion will be further examined in the following section 'what drives public opinion'.

Many studies have found that public opinion does in fact impact government policies. Two of the leading scholars within this domain are Page and Shapiro, who have found that changes in opinion on salient issues are often followed by policy changes (1983, 2010). For example, scholars have found that public opinion has influenced foreign policy in crises regarding Nicaragua (Sobel, 2001), Somalia (Klarevas, 2002) and Iraq (Larson & Savych, 2005). It is however, important to note that this research was based on highly salient issues; on less visible issues the public may not have an opinion. Hays, Esler and Hays (1996:56) state that the government is 'quite responsive' to public opinion and is known to take into account the public sentiment. More recent research finds that public opinion 'affects policy three-quarters of the times its impact is gauged' and that this effect can be quite substantial (Burstein, 2003:36). Confirming the results of Page and Shapiro, salience again is an important determining factor in the impact of the public opinion on public policy. Monroe (1998) has also drawn the same conclusions: the more salient an issue is, the stronger the public opinion and the more public policy corresponds with or follows that opinion. Recent research by Lax & Philips (2009) finds a high degree of policy responsiveness for the public opinion on gay rights, for example. Research conducted in the United States on the effect of media coverage on public opinion concluded that the public nowadays is more likely to be attentive to or aware of high-profile issues especially when foreign policy crises involving potential use of military force are involved (Baum, 2005). Public opinion on foreign policy issues also affects government policy by the implications of their voting behavior. Research has shown that, contrary to Lippmann's beliefs, citizens are in fact aware of issues of foreign policy and that they perceive clear differences between presidential candidates and their views on the policy (Aldrich et al., 1989). They found that candidates do not 'waltz before a blind audience' (Ibid.:135), but that the public attitude towards foreign policy has been consequential in American elections. Other recent research indicates that a positive public opinion can be instrumental in the US presidential elections and in passing controversial laws (Erikson & Tedin, 2015). Polling of public opinion on such matter has also been related to increased media attention and a larger flow of money for their campaigns (Murphy & Mellman, 2007;

Traugott & Lavrakas, 2008). However, it is important to note that the article also concludes by contemplating that candidates may be able to manipulate the degree to which specific attitudes are activated. If an issue is salient and often discussed and covered in debates among candidates, the issue might attract the attention of the public, resulting in them forming an opinion on the issue. And then there are also many scholars that claim public foreign policy attitudes may not directly change foreign policy, but it does guide and constrain it (Graham, 1994; Sobel 1993). Perhaps not surprising, a majority of the US public believes that polls are important guides for public servants and that the nations would actually be better off if their opinion was taken into account more closely (Traugott & Kang, 2000).

One of the most profound examples of the impact of public opinion is the case of the Vietnam War and the US public opinion. While at first widely supported, the Vietnam war stimulated a concern with the public. Over a period of six years, a Gallup poll asked citizens the same question each year: 'In view of developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the US made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?'. Figure 1 shows the percentage of citizens that responded 'no' to this question, who thus support the US military involvement in Vietnam. The dramatic decline in public support for the war led to a significant change in stance of the US senate on this war (Burstein & Freudenburg, 1978). Where they had supported the war in 1964, almost a decade later they opposed it in 1973. Burstein found that the US government is more responsive to the public on defense policies, as can be witnessed in the fact that the public opinion on the Vietnam war also directly influenced the military spending (Burstein, 2003).

Figure 1: US Public Support for Vietnam War

Source: Gallup Polls 1965-1971 in Lunch & Sperlich, 1979

2.2 Determinants of public opinion

This section will further investigate how citizens make sense of complex issues of foreign policy. It will dive into the factors that underlie the formation or adoption of an attitude towards foreign policy issues. Several factors have been identified as determinants of public opinion, such as the social and political environment, generational effects, self-interest and rationality and lastly, elites. The environment in which a person grows up and lives has a significant impact on how they view the world and what political attitude they have towards issues of foreign policy. Citizens draw on a wide array of predispositions and past experiences when reasoning about politics. Each identified factor to influence the public opinion, specifically on foreign policy, will be elucidated hereafter.

Preferences: Isolationism and internationalism
The extent to which a country will attempt to affect what happens internationally is the basis of the country's foreign policy (Chanley, 1999). This range of influencing international affairs can be subdivided into internationalism and isolationism. Following this division, internationalism can then also be subdivided into militant internationalism and cooperative internationalism. The militant version describes the willingness to use military force as a way of international involvement (Brewer et al., 2004). Cooperative internationalism refers to the willingness to be internationally involved in a more accommodating way, by providing economic assistance or humanitarian aid for example (Chanley, 1999). Both versions of internationalism support involvement from one's own government in international foreign policy issues, but differ in opinion on the correct way to do so. Isolationism is a policy of avoiding entanglements with other countries and keeping the affairs of other countries at a distance, regardless of the purpose (Rathbun, 2007). Isolationists prefer to keep to themselves and to not enter into international alliances or conflicts. A preference for internationalism or isolationism may influence a person's foreign policy opinion, but it is not interchangeable. A person may generally favor internationalist foreign policies, but can still oppose certain policies such as the invasion of Iraq or the increased economic support to Greece for example.

Other studies have focused on whether citizens are isolationist or internationalist when it comes to trade and economic globalization. Margalit (2012) found out that less-educated individuals more often oppose economic globalization than higher-educated citizens. If this holds for foreign policy issues related to security as well, this could mean that higher-educated citizens are more likely than lower-educated citizens to prefer internationalism, and vice versa. Margalit also states that, similar to foreign policy, citizens do not simply base their opinions on directly influencing matters, but also on past experiences and their gut feeling. He calls public attitudes towards trade as only one component of a much larger 'package of openness' (2012, 487). He concludes that the attitudes of citizens are shaped by social and cultural changes, which coincides with the conclusions of Popkin and Dimock (2000) that citizens use other sources as a heuristic for shaping their preference for either internationalism or isolationism.

Party identification and ideology
A connection between party identification and foreign policy attitudes has been found as early as 1951, when Belknap and Campbell concluded that the division of the public on foreign affairs was directly related to party identification. Political views have also found to be linked to opinions on climate change and energy policy (Pew Research Center, 2015). Also, Bartels

(1994) found a connection between the political identification and the willingness to support military involvement internationally. Brewer et al. (2004) have also found coinciding results; party identification significantly influenced public support for military action against Iraq, as well as age and education. The same research also found that Republicans are generally less trusting of other nations. Popkin and Dimock (2002) found that ideology has a negative relation to support for the Gulf war, indicating that liberal citizens are less supportive of the war. Interestingly, other scholars have found that Republicans are only slightly more likely than Democrats to support international military intervention. (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987).

Most research focuses on the impact that the party leadership or president can have on the public attitude, as they function as opinion leaders. The influence of elites or opinion leaders has a significant impact on public opinion. Research on European integration has found that the magnitude of the effect of elite messages is often underestimated and that negative communication by elites on EU integration has led to a negative public opinion on the matter (Gabel & Scheve, 2007). British statistical research has also found that elites can dominate the political environment and can steer public opinion on matter such as immigration (Statham & Geddes, 2006).

Age and generation
Generational effects have also been found to impact the public opinion, through major events such as 9/11 or the election of the first black president Barack Obama (Geer et al., 2014). Statistical modelling also shows there are large differences in public opinion of older and younger people that are independent of other factors such as political belief or education (Pew Research Center, 2015). Also, people of younger age have been linked to higher support for gay marriage than elderly people for example (Ibid., 2011). Also interesting is the notion of generational differences in public attitudes towards foreign policy. Collective experiences have the strongest impact on people's social and political attitudes when they are young, accounting for generational changes in attitude when the international environment shifts (Brewer et al., 2004). The same research by Brewer et al. (2004) also found that age significantly influenced the public support for military action against Iraq, and that older citizens were less supportive against this military action. In this case, older people who have experienced the uncertainties and conflicts of the Cold War might be more distrusting and isolationist than younger people who grew up in a relatively safer environment.

Education
Education has also been known to influence the public opinion, also in the field of foreign policy. Wittkopf (1990) found that citizens with college educations often have internationalist foreign policy preferences. He also found that citizens without a high school diploma were often found to be more supportive of military action. Recent research also found that support for internationalism also increases with education (Brewer et al., 2004). However, the same research also found that education has a negative effect on the support for military action against Iraq, indicating that higher-educated people are less supportive of this military intervention. This might indicate that education does not increase all forms of internationalism, but only cooperative internationalism rather than military. Education has also been found to have a negative relation to support for the Gulf War, meaning that higher-educated people were less supportive of the war (Popkin & Dimock, 2002).

Images of foreign nations

Previous research has found that citizens draw on many sources to form an opinion on foreign policy, for example the image of another country. Brewer et al. (2004) found that citizens who did not trust specific countries were more likely to prefer isolationism. Likewise, citizens who *did* trust other countries were more likely to prefer internationalism and to support foreign policies aimed at providing humanitarian aid. Popkin and Dimock (2002) describe this reasoning of citizens also as the 'gut reasoning' of citizens, fundamental assumptions that they use to form an opinion on a foreign policy issue. These gut feelings, while not very scientific, are often based on actual information that is not available for conscious processing (Schwarz and Clore, 1988). That images of other nations shape foreign policy attitudes was confirmed in a study by Hurwitz and Peffley (1990), in which they found that the attitude of US citizens towards the USSR was very influential. Herrmann, Tetlock and Visser (1999) have also found that the image of the adversary is critical in shaping an opinion. Interesting to note is however the manipulative character of the image of other nations. If the media or an opinion leader such as the president frames the image of a country as an enemy, the public opinion may follow.

Political trust

The amount of trust in and knowledge on political institutions people influences their attitude on foreign policy (Popkin & Dimock, 2000). But people without this knowledge tend to draw upon other sources when formulating an opinion, such as contextual knowledge, personal experiences and an evaluation of the (economic) performance of the government (Citrin and Green, 1976). If citizens are to evaluate an unfamiliar international situation, they tend to draw upon domains with which they are familiar. Trust in domestic institutions has been known to decrease concerns over foreign involvement, and tends to make people less isolationist (Popkin & Dimock, 2000). This political trust is defined as a "general orientation toward the government predicated upon people's normative expectations of government operation" (Hetherington & Globetti, 2002:254). Popkin and Dimock argue that citizens use this trust as a heuristic for judging whether to favor internationalism. In other words: those that believe that their own government does not fulfill their normative expectations may reason that other nations are unlikely to do so either. This trust has been known to strongly influence the evaluation of citizens on the Gulf War.

Trust in domestic government hinges not only on knowledge but also on a citizens' subjective assessment of the economic situation, which in turn can result in support for foreign involvement. Kramer (1971) showed that economic conditions influence election outcomes, possibly indicating that voters are either self-interested or sociotropic: motivated by the public interest (Kiewiet & Lewis-Beck, 2011). Self-interest and rationality are known to play a role in shaping public opinion. Studies have found that citizens are less concerned about climate change in times of recession and in case of poor labor market conditions and unemployment (Scruggs, 2010). Concern for own advantage increase interest in a certain area of policy, and shape public opinion. Likewise, on a national scale, when citizens feel national interests are at stake, they are more likely to favor intervention, even isolationists, albeit not as strongly (Herrmann, Tetlock & Visser, 1999). Kiewiet (1983) found that citizens evaluate the government and policies based on their perceptions of national economic conditions, resulting in support for foreign involvement from those who view the economy optimistically.

2.3 Dutch public opinion on foreign policy

In this paragraph the history of the Dutch public opinion and changes herein will be explored. It will also further investigate the attitude towards certain specific issues such as the willingness to engage in harsh measures such military operations as well as softer measures such as diplomacy.

The leading scholar on the Dutch public opinion on foreign policy is Philip Everts, a Dutch lawyer and sociologist who has studied the Dutch attitude towards issues of foreign policy for decades. When considering the Dutch foreign policy attitudes in the post-Cold War era, certain public moods can be distinguished (Everts, 1985). After the end of WWII, the Dutch foreign policy opinion had a tendency to be pro-Americanism due to the instrumental role the US played in liberating Europe and the gratitude that followed. Criticism on the US was both mild and scarce, until the US involvement in the Vietnam war and racial tensions reached the Dutch citizens. The foreign policy attitude shifted to a less favorable opinion of the US, and actually became more favorable to Israel in the 1960s, most likely based on feelings of sympathy and guilt towards the Jewish people. Again, when confronted with the harsh reality that countries are not always as noble as they might seem, the Dutch public support for Israel declined when faced with the plight of the Palestinians. The zenith of Dutch internationalist motives was during the public mood of 'third worldism', a time in which the Dutch were very sympathetic towards developing countries and felt a moral obligation to help those in need (Ibid.53). This mood was followed by an anti-nuclear mood, the most 'sweeping public mood ever to prevail in a postwar Dutch society' (Ibid.:54). The Dutch feared to be in the middle of superpowers on the verge of war, and feared the addition of nuclear power to the already fragile situation would topple it. This attitude has reinforced the Dutch support for the removal of nuclear weapons from both the national and international community.

Generally, Dutch policy making is traditionally quite consistent and not crisis-driven (Lijphart, 1975). Due to the history of coalitions, bargaining and compromises a radical change in policy has not often occurred in the Netherlands. However, in recent years the public mood has been affected more than ever by crises such as the assassination of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002, who advocated for a withdrawal of the Schengen agreement and openly spoke out against immigration and asylum seekers. Fortuyn gained a lot of support from the public for his isolationist foreign policy preferences, and his murder heavily impacted Dutch society, sparking isolationist sentiments (Pakes, 2004). Dissatisfaction and discontent resulted in a hardening of opinions regarding law-breakers, a call for more severe punishment and a stricter criminal system (Ibid.). While these crises are domestic, this discontentment may also influence the Dutch public foreign policy preferences and the determining factors of sanctioning transgressing countries such as Iran and Russia, making the Netherlands a very interesting case.

The Flash Eurobarometer of 2003 investigated the public opinion of, among others, Dutch citizens and their perspective on which countries threaten the peace. Of the Dutch citizens, 61% viewed Iran to be a threat to the peace, which is significantly higher than the European average of 52% (Flash Eurobarometer 151, 2003). The Dutch also seemed to be more worried about Russia threatening the peace than the European average (25% to 21% respectively). The significant gap in Dutch concern for these countries can be explained by the discovery of the Iranian secret facility to enrich uranium in 2003, initiating the discussion and concerns on a

nuclear Iran. The relationship between the Netherlands and Russia was relatively stable in this period, and was not strained until the annexation of the Crimea and the MH17 disaster.

Another important poll of the public opinion is the National Freedom Research (Nationaal Vrijheidsonderzoek) that is conducted each year for the National Committee of 4-5 May, the Dutch national days of remembering the victims and the liberation of the second World War. In this polling citizens are asked not only about their perspective on this tradition, but also on the context of international security. The citizens are always asked what international affairs concern them the most, resulting in an overview as can be seen in figure 2 below. In the past year, concerns on the economic crisis, terrorism and war were most prevalent. The graph is not directly linked to Iran, but is linked to the annexation of the Crimea. In the year of the Ukrainian crisis, 43% of Dutch citizens marked it in their top three worldly concerns.

Figure 2: Development of three biggest world concerns

Source: National Freedom Research, 2014

The survey always touches upon the concerns citizens might have depending on actual occurrences as well as the question: 'If we talk about war, which war comes to mind first?'. Due to the permanent mark WWII has imprinted on the Dutch citizens, this war has come to mind first since the beginning of the survey. In the 2015 edition, however, Dutch citizens placed the Ukraine conflict in the top three associations with war, indicating the salience of the issue. While the Netherlands is a relatively small country, its citizens do believe that it can 'do a lot' regarding world problems such as the poor-rich divide, criminality, the environment and violations of human rights. Where terrorism, fundamentalism and wars are concerned, the Dutch citizens are more pessimistic and state the Netherlands can't do a lot to change these world problems. Interestingly, the researchers concluded that older and higher educated

citizens worry more about international affairs than younger, lower educated citizens (National Freedom Research, 2014). As can be seen in figure 3 below, especially elderly people aged 50 and upwards are often concerned about international affairs, whereas younger people tend to be less concerned. The survey also concluded that older and higher educated people are also the citizens that follow international news more intensively. Especially citizens aged 65 and older follow both national and international news more closely (National Freedom Research, 2015).

Figure 3: Concern by age group

Concern by age group
(% 'often concerned' by international affairs)

Source: National Freedom Research, 2015

2.4 Summary

Where early research assumed the public was not able to form an intelligent opinion on well-based arguments, this view of public opinion has been contested in more recent years. More recent research found that the public sentiment in fact can and does impact government policies. While the public may not always have the information on or knowledge of types of foreign policy, they tend to draw upon other sources and experiences to fill these gaps and base their opinion on something similar to a gut feeling (Popkin and Dimock, 2002).

Identified drivers of public opinion are quite diverse and range from demographic factors to more broad and political factors. For example, the citizens' opinion on foreign policies are known to be influenced by demographic characteristics such as age, education level and gender. The context and happenings that occur when a person comes of age can define the preferences in foreign policy, resulting in generational effects that can affect policies and public mood on a large scale. Furthermore, higher-educated citizens are known to have more information available and are thus more likely to favor international involvement and foreign policies.

Other factors that may influence or drive a public opinion are the party identification or ideology that a person identifies with, as the party leaders that they support can act as opinion leaders and shape public opinion by offering compelling arguments. Whether a person identifies as left- or right-wing can also influence their knowledge or interest in

matters of, for example, trade, security and humanitarian assistance. Additionally, trust in national institutions, among which are the previously mentioned political parties, is also detrimental in shaping the public opinion, as a government that is trusted is more likely to receive support for its policies.

Finally, drivers that are also of crucial importance to the shaping of public opinion are the foreign policy preferences of citizens and their perception of other nations. More recent research by Brewer et al. (2004) found that the image citizens have of other nations shapes their opinion on foreign policies. They also found that citizens can either have an internationalist preference, that supports international involvement, or an isolationist preference, that supports an individual national approach without international entanglements. This preference has been found to drive a citizens' opinion when assessing foreign policy measures, as well as the image of a foreign nation and the potential level of threat they pose.

When looking back at years of research on the Dutch public opinion, I find that the public mood has shifted over time, as is most often linked to external crises or events, such as the war in Iraq or the Arab spring. Thanks to many years of research conducted by Philip Everts, there is a wide array of public opinion polls of Dutch citizens. From these results, it is clear that the Dutch public mood has been shifting from a widely internationalist view, to a more isolationist perspective with less support for international involvement and entanglement in international organizations. Additionally, the Dutch have always been very strongly condemning of nuclear weapons and fear the dangers these weapons pose, and it is clear the Dutch are quite worrisome about foreign security issues, more so than their other European counterparts. Especially the elderly in the Netherlands are very concerned about such affairs.

The gap in previous research lies in the hiatus of research on European citizens and their opinion on foreign policy, specifically economic sanctions and economic sanctions. While there is no shortage of literature concerning international sanctions and public opinion, there is a severe scarcity of literature combining these concepts. There is ample research on what drives public motivation for the imposition of economic sanctions. Further, most research has been conducted on citizens of the United States of America, which, considering its very longstanding position of hegemon and one of the largest military powers, is not representative for a country such as the Netherlands. Conclusions drawn from American research thus may not be generalizable to European countries, and the Netherlands in specific. Additionally, public opinion polls on matters of security are held in most countries of the world, including the Netherlands, but often fail to include the foreign policies aimed at sanctioning or restricting a target. This gap in the literature can be addressed through this thesis, as an extensive analysis will be conducted on the Dutch public opinion on the imposition of economic sanctions in two different cases, testing for significant correlations and explanatory factors. It offers an opportunity to substantially enhance the knowledge in this field, thus leading to a more extensive body of literature.

3. Theoretical Framework

This chapter of the research elucidates the theoretical assumptions that arise from the reviewed literature in the previous chapter. As has been seen above, there are many factors that can influence the public opinion on international economic sanctions imposed by the European Union. However, it is still unclear to what extent this public opinion is impacted by either elites, generational gaps or other factors. To be able to devise a theoretical framework around the public opinion on sanctions on Iran and Russia, it is necessary to identify a dependent variable. In this thesis, the support for economic sanctions is the dependent variable. The theoretical assumptions that follow are based on the previous empirical works of academic scholars, as identified in the literature review section.

Foreign policy preferences

Dutch research has shown an increase in isolationist motives from Dutch citizens regarding solidarity (Everts, 2004). In the period 2002-2006, Dutch support for financial aid for developing countries declined significantly, and the percentage of citizens that feel 'the Netherlands should interfere *less* with the problems of other countries' rose from 29% to 49% in this same period (Everts, 2008:35). Support for Dutch assistance in military operations also declined in this period, regardless of whether NATO allies are involved in the hypothetical conflict or not. Another more isolationist feature is the decline in support for the active contribution of the Netherlands to international law and justice through war tribunals and the International Criminal Court that is situated in The Hague. The Dutch have never been avid supporters of military operations, but have favored softer measures and greatly valued human rights, individual freedom and justice (Ibid.:41). This decline in support for internationalist policies does not bode well for the internationalist character of the Dutch today, however, it is difficult to predict just how supportive the Dutch will be of economic sanctions on Russia and Iran. Thus, the main assumption of this thesis is that there is a connection between the public attitude on economic sanctions against Iran and Russia and the public preference for the principles of foreign policy; isolationism or internationalism.

H1: Respondents with stronger internationalist foreign policy preference are more supportive of economic sanctions against Iran and Russia.

Political trust

As previous research (Herrmann, Tetlock & Visser, 1999; Popkin & Dimock, 2000) has pointed out, knowledge on and trust in the domestic government is an underlying factor of public attitudes on foreign policy issues. The Eurobarometer of 2013 measured public trust in national institutions and found that Dutch citizens are highly trusting of domestic institutions such as the national parliament, government and political parties. The same report also indicated that the Dutch trust in such institutions has been rapidly declining in recent years, making it difficult to hypothesize to what extent the Dutch are trusting of their government in 2014, and what effect this would have on the public support for economic sanctions on Iran and Russia. The assumption is that trust in the government, also called political trust, impacts the public opinion on sanctions. This assumption offers the following hypothesis:

H2: Higher levels of political trust in government result in more support for economic sanctions against Iran and Russia.

Age
Dutch research revealed that older people follow international news more closely and are also more concerned about international affairs than younger generations (National Freedom Research, 2014). This concern could be linked to international concern for others, which might result in cooperative internationalism, or could be concern for security and safety, which has been known to result in support for harsher measures such as military action (Chittick et al., 1995). Considering the strong impact international affairs can have on those coming of age (18) and the generational effects that can result from this, I expect older citizens of 65 years and older to be warier of these transgressing states and to support intervention and economic sanctioning. Those citizens of 65 years and older came of age at the height of the Cold War, a time in which the Red Army was the biggest threat to the Netherlands, as Russian tanks were stationed just outside the borders. The Dutch joined NATO to defend itself against the red scare, which I expect to have left a lasting mark on the older citizens of the Netherlands.

H3: Respondents of older age are more supportive of economic sanctions against Iran and Russia.

Education
Higher educated citizens tend to be more informed and knowledgeable on matters of international affairs, and are more likely to support cooperative internationalism rather than militant internationalism (Brewer et al., 2004). As the TTS also takes into account the highest completed education of the respondents, it is possible to test for a causal link between education and support for the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia and Iran. In the Dutch educational system, a person is classified as being higher-educated when they have completed either a HBO or WO education, which is similar to the US system of college and university. In the TTS there are three categories of education: primary, secondary and post-secondary, in which primary is the Dutch version of elementary school, secondary level is high school completed and finally, post-secondary corresponds with higher levels of education such as HBO and WO. As previous research (Wittkopf, 1990) pointed out that citizens with lower levels of education often prefer harsher measures such as military action, and higher educated prefer softer diplomatic measures, I expect there to be a relation.

H4: Higher levels of education of respondents result in more support for economic sanctions against Iran and Russia.

Image of foreign nation
The existing body of literature suggests that the image of a foreign nation is an underlying factor for the shaping of public opinion on foreign policy issues (Brewer et al., 2004). A person who distrusts other nations is more likely to prefer isolationism over internationalism and would support internationalism only when the national interests are threatened. A positive image of other nations is known to increase a preference in internationalist foreign policies when considering cooperative measures such as humanitarian aid. Adversely, a negative image of other nations can also increase distrust and the threat perception of citizens. Considering both options are possible in this case, I expect citizens with a negative view to be

support the sanctions, and citizens with a positive view to disagree with the measure. Also, in this research I expect the Dutch to have a negative image of the Russians due to the large threat they posed in the Cold War period to the Netherlands. I therefore expect that the Dutch respondents with a negative perception of Russia to be more supportive economic sanctions.

H5: Respondents with a negative view of Russia are more supportive of economic sanctions against Russia.

Party identification
As earlier research demonstrated that party identification and ideology can influence the public attitude towards foreign policy (Popkin & Dimock, 2002; Bartels (1994), this thesis will investigate whether this factor also underlies the Dutch opinion on economic sanctions. Dutch political parties have become more outspoken on matters of foreign policy, and more attentive to the public opinion hereon, due to an increased awareness of such issues in the domestic arena (Verbeek, 2008). Considering most research on party identification and foreign policy is based on the US and its two-party system, comparison with the Dutch multi-party system may be slightly more difficult. The US concept of 'left' is still quite 'right' in the Dutch political system. Also, the Dutch multi-party system, with more than ten parties, offers a wide range of political parties to identify with. Due to the many parties in the Dutch political system, parties often have to form coalitions to obtain a majority within parliament when voting on an issue. As mentioned earlier, a lot of research has been conducted on the US and its single party government. These outcomes may not be generalizable to the Dutch case, as Kaarbo & Beasley (2008) found that coalitions and single party governments tend to behave differently concerning matters of foreign policy. They also found that coalitions actually engage in more extreme behaviors than single party governments, perhaps due to the influence of junior populist parties or due to a lacking sense of accountability in a government with so many ruling parties (Ibid.). To test whether these outcomes still hold for the citizens of the Netherlands, both the party identification as well as the ideology of citizens will be investigated. Following the research of Bartels (1994), I expect respondents who voted for left-wing liberal parties to be more supportive of economic sanctions.

H6: Respondents with a left-wing political and ideological identification are more supportive of economic sanctions against Iran and Russia.

Gender
Gender is another driver of public opinion, and among the most important demographic predictors of foreign policy attitudes (Fite et al., 1990). Gender differences in foreign policy attitudes have been quite contested, as there are not many differences to be found for all domains. While there has been no previous research conducted on the relation between gender and sanctions, other research has found that males are more likely to support harsh measures such as military action, whereas females are more likely to support softer diplomatic measures (Ibid.). I therefore expect females to be more supportive of economic sanctions than males.

H7: Respondents with the female gender are more supportive of economic sanctions against Iran and Russia.

4. Research design

This chapter of the thesis elucidates how the theoretical framework will be empirically tested and analyzed. It outlines how data will be collected and which methods will be employed. The thesis aims to answer the research question through both quantitative as well as qualitative research.

4.1 Data collection
Transatlantic Trends Survey
To collect the data on the public opinion of European citizens on the imposition of economic sanctions, the results of the Transatlantic Trends Survey (TTS) will be used for quantitative analysis. The TTS dates back to 2002, when it first began under the name of World Views. Polling the opinion of EU and US citizens was the basis of this survey, but in recent years they have expanded their research population to also include the Russian Federation and Turkey. For over a decade, the TTS has provided valuable, consistent and trusted information of the public opinion on multiple issues of foreign policy and transatlantic issues. It has proven to be an invaluable tool for policymakers, think tanks and academics. Furthermore, the TTS inquires on much of the same topics each year, providing excellent opportunities to compare and contrast findings from previous years, providing another reason to make use of this data.

Collection method
Each year, the TTS surveys a random sample of approximately 1,000 men and women per country. The European countries investigated are: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. Furthermore, all who are interviewed are 18 years of age and older, ruling out the possibility of minors answering questions they have no knowledge about. All interviews are conducted by Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews in all countries except for Poland, Turkey and Russia. In these areas face-to-face interviews were conducted due to the little access to telephones. This research, however, will not make use of the data of either of these countries, ruling out any unreliability or discrepancies in the data collection. The results of the survey after 2010 are weighted in order to ensure that the sample matches characteristics of population such as age, gender, education and region. This also enhances the external validity of the survey, as the results can be better compared and generalized across samples.

Limitations
An important limitation of a telephone interview is the limited depth of the research. Due to time restraints, the researcher can often only study several aspects of the chosen object of research (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007). In qualitative research, the object of research is investigated in a more in-depth and integral way. In this case, there are only two questions asked on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, since these same questions have been asked each year from 2010 onwards, this does provide a high validity and offers easily comparable results. Another limitation of survey research is that they can be difficult to apply in dynamic and changing situations (Ibid.). The extent of structuring and preparing needed before taking the survey offers little room to adapt to unforeseen situations. The TTS, however, has proven over the years that the structuring has been standardized,

allowing for adaptations to dynamic changes in the international community. For example, immediately after the EU imposed economic sanctions on Russia, the survey for 2014 was adjusted to include questions on this matter (TTS, 2015). On the other hand, telephone surveys also offer a range of useful advantages for researchers. The reach of a survey is very large compared to a qualitative case study for example. A large number of responses offers a broad overview and externally valid results and conclusions (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007). The large number of research objects also offers the possibility of calculating statistical correlations between variables, using SPSS or STATA for example. The uniform information acquired through a standardized survey also offers comparability of data (Kumar, 2011).

4.2 Case selection

In the research, the public opinion on economic sanctions imposed by the European Union will be tested for the case of Iran as well as Russia. The case of Iran has been selected due to the relatively long time period that Iran has been sanctioned, making it possible to identify and further investigate patterns in the public opinion towards the economic sanctions. Also, since the questions on Iran have been asked since 2010, when Iran was already being sanctioned since 2006, I assume the European citizen has had more time to be aware of the situation, gather information or form an opinion on the matter. The extensive media coverage on sanctions by the UNSC, the US and the EU have made citizens increasingly aware of matters of foreign policy and international security (Baum, 2005), which is the basis for this assumption. Also, considering that security is an increasingly greater issue for Europeans (Special Eurobarometer 432) and that 35% of US citizens most fear nuclear war will put an end to humanity (ROPER Center, 2014), I have the expectation that citizens will be engaged in countries secretly acquiring nuclear weapons and will have an opinion on the matter. The case of Russia has been selected due to the high media coverage and relatively recent occurrence. Russia annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea on March 18 2014, followed by a flurry of media items and extensive coverage on the subject. Although this question has been only asked once, in the Transatlantic Trends Survey of 2014, I assume that citizens will have formed an opinion on the matter due to the high prevalence of the annexation in the news. Furthermore, the two cases have been selected to fulfill a verification function. It is interesting to assess whether the factors that influence the public attitude towards economic sanctions imposed on Russia are the same factors that influence their attitude towards the measures imposed on Iran. By comparing the two cases it can be concluded that the theories hold for both cases, or not, in which case it is interesting to examine why not.

In this thesis the public attitude of Dutch citizens towards economic sanctions will be investigated. The research subject has been selected due to the earlier research on the Dutch attitude towards foreign policy by Philip Everts, making it possible to compare and contrast and to detect historical patterns that can aid in the explanation of the Dutch attitude towards economic sanctions. Also, according to Google Trends, Dutch citizens massively researched terms such as Russia, Putin and Crimea in the period after the annexation, indicating that the average Dutch citizen is at least aware and informed of the happenings (Google Trends, 2014).

Timing of survey
The time period that will be analyzed is the year 2014. In the 2014 edition of the Transatlantic Trends Survey the citizens were asked questions on measures to be taken against both Russia and Iran, providing a good opportunity to compare the results of the survey for both cases. While the

questions on Iran have been asked for the past three years, this is the first year that questions on measures against Russia are asked due to the annexation of the Crimea that did not occur until 2014.

Russia

The interviews were taken in the Netherlands in the period 2-25 June 2014. At this point, the only economic sanctions in place were travel bans and asset freezes against persons involved in actions against Ukraine's territorial integrity (Europa Newsroom, 2016). The EU imposed economic sanctions on Russia in July 2014, and reinforced them in September 2014. As at this point the measures taken against Russia were fairly mild, it is important to realize that when citizens support the imposition of stronger sanctions these would be the targeted sanctions that ban business with Russian banks, energy and defense companies and export licenses. Also, as the interviews were taken June, the MH17 disaster had not yet occurred, but would a month later (July 17, 2014). In this disaster 193 Dutch citizens were killed by presumably pro-Russian separatists, which probably would have strongly impacted the opinion of Dutch citizens towards Russia and might have changed determinants of supporting the stronger economic sanctions.

Iran

As mentioned earlier, the TTS 2014 was conducted on Dutch citizens in the period 2-26 June 2014. In this period, the relations with Iran were relatively stable, as in 2013 Hassan Rohani was elected president, a candidate open to reform and reconciliation with his western counterparts. During this time, Iran was not very prominent in the media or on the political agenda, which might lead to different threat perceptions between the Russia and Iran cases. It is important to note that at this time there were also no prominent attempts at reconciliation, the negotiations and consultations that led to the EU joint statement released on April 2 2015 had not yet begun openly. The Dutch respondents at this time thus would not have been aware of any activities by Iran that might create goodwill or heighten/lower the perceived threat level.

4.3 Background

This chapter provides a background for the reader on the selected cases and an account of the transgressions made. It identifies the type of economic sanctions imposed on both Russia and Iran as well as the transgressions that provoked these measures. The aim of the background is to offer the reader a more comprehensive view of the differences and similarities between the two cases by comparing and contrasting the situational context.

Sanctions on Iran

This thesis will focus partly on the economic sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran considering the measures have lasted for almost a decade, providing opportunities to research the effect of the entire process properly. While the history of US sanctions on Iran dates back to 1979, the EU as well as the UN have started imposing economic sanctions on Iran since 2006, following three years of negotiations. In 2003, it was discovered that Iran had been secretly building a facility to enrich uranium, and this was deemed to be a violation of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT (INFCIRC/140, 1970) aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technology and establishes a safeguards system under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The election of conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad disrupted negotiations and continued the enrichment of uranium in the country. The UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on the country in 2006, banning all export and import on materials related to nuclear equipment. The EU followed with a transposition of the economic sanctions. In table 2, an overview of the imposed sanctions by the EU can be found. Several rounds or episodes of sanctions were imposed on Iran, ranging from soft measures such as travel bans to more severe measures such as import bans. While most are complementary to the measures by the UN and US, the EU has also autonomously targeted missile programs and national banks. The EU economic sanctions on Iran have mostly been targeted at the energy and financial sectors, in an attempt to cripple the Iranian economy swiftly (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2015). A turning point in the sanctions regime was the introduction of sanctions aimed at the oil industry of Iran. In 2012, the US and EU banned the "import, purchase or transport" of Iranian crude oil (Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP). The total export of crude oil by Iran dropped with over 60% after the imposition of oil sanctions, resulting in a particular heavy round of sanctions for Iran. A shrinking economy and rising unemployment have forced Iran to rejoin the negotiating table, resulting in relieved sanctions in exchange for dismantling parts of its nuclear program. The Iran Nuclear Deal has come into force mid-January 2016.

Table 2: EU Sanctions against Iran

Name	Date	Description of selected elements
Council Common Position 2007/140/CFSP	February 2007	• Banned export of sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile technology. • Prohibited financial and technical assistance related to nuclear or missile activities. • Froze assets and denied travel of designated individuals and companies.
Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP	July 2010	• Banned export to Iran of all arms and materiel. • Prohibited financial and technical assistance related to nuclear activities or weapons acquisition. • Banned export to Iran of "key equipment and technology" related to oil and natural gas industry. • Prohibited provision of insurance or re-insurance to Iranian entities. • Expanded list of designated individuals and companies.
Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP	April 2011	• Froze assets and denied travel of individuals involved in human rights abuses.
Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP	January 2012	• Banned "import, purchase or transport" of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products. • Prohibited provision of financing, insurance or reinsurance related to Iranian crude oil sale or transport. • Prohibited export to Iran of equipment for petrochemical industry and provision of technical or financial assistance. • Prohibited sale of gold, precious metals and diamonds to Iran.
Council Decision 2012/152/CFSP	March 2012	• Banned provision of financial messaging services to designated Iranian banks (i.e, denied access to SWIFT).
Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP	October 2012	• Banned "purchase, import or transport" of natural gas from Iran. • Banned export of shipbuilding technology.

Source: Belfer Center, for Science and International Affairs, 2015:9

Sanctions on Russia

In March 2014 Russian forces seized control of Crimea, a peninsula in the south of Ukraine, followed by an abundance of international media coverage. It has been called the worst East-West crisis since the Cold War and was followed by violent protests in the Ukrainian capital Kiev (BBC, 2016). As the Crimea had been annexed by the Russian empire before in 1793 and remained a part of Russia until 1954 the majority of its population are ethnic Russians. The EU and the Ukraine however, consider the annexation by the Russian Federation to be a violation of international law and agreements. The European Union refers to the annexation as illegal and a *'deliberate destabilization of a neighboring sovereign country'* (EU Newsroom, 2016). The transgression was perceived of such severity that the (then) G8 even suspended Russia from the group. Many world leaders and supranational bodies such as the Visegrád Group, United Nations and NATO have also strongly condemned the illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory and have urged the Russian Federation to respect the sovereignty of the Ukraine, to no avail. When it became clear that the Russian Federation had no intent of taking de-escalatory steps, the European Union imposed the first round of economic sanctions on the Russian Federation by banning persons involved in actions against Ukraine's territorial integrity from travelling to the EU, as well as freezing their assets (EU Newsroom, 2016). In July 2014, the situation still had not progressed and presumably Russian rebels destroyed a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 plane on its flight MH17, killing 298 people. While this disaster had 193 Dutch casualties and might have made the conflict more salient for Dutch citizens, the Transatlantic Trends Survey was conducted *before* this. Thus, there is no resulting influence on the Dutch attitude on economic sanctions towards Russia in the Transatlantic Trends Survey 2014 edition. Following these happenings, the EU decided to step up the economic sanctions by imposing economic sanctions such as suspending financing operations by the European Investment Bank and suspending the implementation of a bilateral cooperation program between the EU and Russia. Again, the Russians remained in the territory of the Ukraine and even imposed counter-sanctions on the EU, Australia, Canada, the US and Norway by banning imports of different foods. The lack of de-escalatory steps taken by Russia resulted in again another round of economic sanctions. In September 2014, the European Union reinforced the economic sanctions to also include the prohibition of providing loans and financial instruments to state-owned Russian banks, energy and defense companies. Embargoes were placed on the import and export of arms and military material, as well as energy-related equipment (Ibid.). In March 2015, one year after the illegal annexation of the Crimea, the situation remained unchanged, leading to the decision of the European Council to link the duration of economic sanctions to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements to halt the war. The EU remains willing to reverse the sanctions, but only when the Minsk agreement is fully in order. The Russian Federation responded to this decision by prolonging the counter-sanctions that prohibit the import of certain foods by a year.

4.4 Operationalization

In order to measure the in the theoretical framework identified areas of interest it is necessary to clarify what these concepts entail. In this part of the thesis each of these concepts will be clarified and operationalized into measurable variables.

Dependent variables

The dependent variable in this research is the support for the imposition of economic sanctions on either Iran or Russia. In the case of Iran, the subjects that have chosen the imposition of economic sanctions will be looked at most closely, but the other chosen measures will also be briefly analyzed. It is important to note that both dependent variables cannot be directly compared, as there is a difference in the type of question. In the case of Iran, respondents are asked to pick their most preferred option, out of 9 different answer possibilities. In the case of Russia, respondents are given different options in separate questions, and then asked if they would agree with that single option. As mentioned before in the introduction, this thesis will investigate whether the underlying factors for *agreeing with* or *preferring* sanctions are similar or varying.

To examine the EU public opinion on the measures to be taken against Iran, the question from the Transatlantic Trends Survey as stated below will be made use of.

Number	Question
14	As you may know, efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons are under way. Which of the following do you think is the best option?
	Answer options
1	Offer economic incentives
2	Impose economic sanctions
3	Provide support to opponents of the government
4	Use computer technology to sabotage nuclear installations
5	Take military action
6	Accept that Iran could acquire nuclear weapons
7	More than one option
8	None of the above
9	Don't know/refusal

In the case of Russia, the following question will be used to measure how many citizens support the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia. As mentioned before, respondents were given an array of options in separate questions, asking if they agreed with that specific action. The questions on potential measures against Russia was asked after the inquiry: 'should the EU continue to provide economic and political support to Ukraine, even if there is a risk of increasing conflict with Russia?' (TTS Topline data, 2014:58). This question makes the respondent think about potential consequences of taking action on the relationship with Russia. Following this question, respondents were then offered a number of different options, each time asking them if they agreed. Among these options are: offer NATO or EU membership to Ukraine, increase economic assistance to Ukraine and send military supplies and equipment to Ukraine. The last option, imposing stronger economic sanctions on Russia, is the second dependent variable in this thesis. This question can be found on the next page.

Number	Question
16b.5	There have been a number of proposals for how the EU should react to Russian actions in Ukraine. For each of the following, please tell me if you agree or disagree with the proposed action: Impose stronger economic sanctions on Russia
	Answer options
1	Strongly agree
2	Somewhat agree
3	Somewhat disagree
4	Strongly disagree
5	Don't know/refusal

Independent variables

The independent variables that have been identified in this research are political trust, preferences for foreign policy, image of foreign nation, party identification, education, gender and age. Each of these independent variables will be further elucidated and operationalized with use of the TTS 2014 questions to make the variables measurable.

Political trust

As research has pointed out that trust in domestic political institutions can increase the support for internationalist interventions, one of the independent variables is political trust. However, considering the rare circumstances of European countries having two governing bodies, citizens can have political trust in their national government as well as their European government. Since the economic sanctions are carried out by the European Union as a whole, and the Netherlands' government being a part of the Union, I will take both forms of political trust into account. To measure both domestic as well as European political trust, the following questions from the Transatlantic Trends Survey 2014 will be used, as can be seen below.

To measure trust in the national government and its ability to make sound decisions in the case of Iran and Russia, questions will be asked on the way the government is handling international policies. As research pointed out that citizens base their opinion on the government not only on facts and informed knowledge but also on predisposed ideas and earlier experiences, this thesis will also take into account whether the opinion of the EU is favorable or not and if the Netherlands has gained from the membership. The original idea was to merge question 4.2 and 22 into a comprehensive variable for European political trust. However, preparatory analyses in SPSS concluded there is *no* multicollinearity between the questions, implying that the questions are not interchangeable. Both questions also gave different results in the bivariate correlation analysis, again affirming that these questions should not be merged. In the research, both questions will be used as separate independent variables.

National trust

Number	Question
3.1	Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Netherlands' government is handling international policies?
	Answer options
1	Approve very much
2	Approve somewhat

Number	Question
3	Disapprove somewhat
4	Disapprove very much
5	Don't know/refusal

EU political trust

Number	Question
4.2	Please tell me if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the European Union?
	Answer options
1	Very favorable
2	Somewhat favorable
3	Somewhat unfavorable
4	Very unfavorable
5	Don't know/refusal
22	Generally speaking, do you think that the Netherlands' membership in the EU has been a good thing or a bad thing for the Netherlands?
	Answer options
1	Good
2	Bad
3	It hasn't made a difference
4	Don't know/refusal

Foreign policy preference

The second independent variable is the measure whether citizens are internationalist or isolationist, which is also referred to as foreign policy preference. Isolationism is a policy of avoiding entanglements with other countries and keeping the affairs of these countries at a distance. Internationalism is the opposite, and describes the willingness to be internationally involved. To measure the preference of either isolationism or internationalism by Dutch citizens, question 1B from the TTS 2014 will be utilized. Citizens that do not think it desirable that the EU exerts strong leadership would rather the EU keeps these affairs at distance, and are classified as having an isolationist preference. The question follows a similar question, focused on the desirability of strong US leadership in world affairs. Since the question specifically inquires on the desirability of strong leadership in international affairs, a positive answer to this question would indicate an internationalist foreign policy preference.

Number	Question
1B	How desirable is it that the European Union exert strong leadership in world affairs?
	Answer options
1	Very desirable
2	Somewhat desirable
3	Somewhat desirable
4	Very desirable
5	Neither or both equally
6	Don't know/refusal

Image of specific foreign nations

The third independent variable is focused on the image citizens have on a specific nation, in this case Russia. As this question is not asked in the case of Iran, it will be omitted in the analysis of the Dutch public opinion on measures to be taken against Iran. The image citizens have of Russia will be measured by the questions stated below. The opinion of citizens on Russia can be an important factor in shaping their opinion on which economic sanctions should be taken against them. Question 1C also indicates whether citizens deem it desirable that Russia gets involved in world affairs, or if they would prefer an isolationist approach from the Russians, which I originally intended to include in the analyses. However, multicollinearity tests pointed out that these questions are not simply interchangeable, and both offer different results in the preparatory bivariate correlation analysis (see appendix). Further, question 1C was apparently experienced as quite complex or perhaps too controversial, as the number of respondents was extremely low. By taking this variable into account, this low N will affect the entire research and compromise results and conclusions. Question 1C will therefore *not* be taken into account.

Number	Question
4.4	Please tell me if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Russia.
	Answer options
1	Very favorable
2	Somewhat favorable
3	Somewhat unfavorable
4	Very unfavorable
5	Don't know/refusal

Party identification and ideology

As multiple researchers in the US have concluded that party identification and ideology play a significant role in preferring a particular foreign policy, this thesis will also examine whether there is a correlation between political ideology and public attitude towards economic sanctions. It is however important to note that citizens in the US can only choose between the Democratic or Republican party, or none at all. The multiparty system of the Dutch makes this slightly more complicated, as there are eleven parties to choose from. Question D7B_NL was recoded into a new variable, with all the Dutch political parties rearranged to the values to the Manifesto project scores for left and right ideology, ranging from 1-10 where 1 is very left-winged and 10 is very right-winged.

Number	Question
D7B_NL	Which party did you vote for? *
	Answer options
1	Christen Democratisch Appel (CDA)
2	Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)
3	Socialistische Partij (SP)
4	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)
5	GroenLinks (GL)
6	Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)
7	ChristenUnie (CU)
8	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)

9	Democraten 66 (D66)
10	Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD)
11	50Plus
12	Don't know/refusal

D9	In politics, people sometimes talk of 'left' and 'right'. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 7, where '1' means the extreme left and '7' means the extreme right?
	Answer options
1	Extreme left
2	Left
3	Center left
4	Center
5	Center right
6	Right
7	Extreme right
8	Don't know/refusal

*Question D7B_NL ended up being *excluded* from all explanatory analyses, as the number of respondents who refused to answer was very high, resulting in unreliable outcomes.

Education

Higher levels of education have been known to correlate with the amount of knowledge a person has on foreign policy. Research has shown that highly educated people are more often internationalist rather than isolationist. In the Dutch educational system, a person is classified as being higher-educated when they have completed either a HBO or WO education, which is similar to the US system of college and university. To measure the level of education of the research subjects, question D11 will be used.

Number	Question
D11	At what stage did you complete your full-time studies?
	Answer options
1	Primary education
2	Secondary education
3	Post-secondary education
4	Don't know/refusal

Gender

Previous research has shown that gender is also an influencing factor on foreign policy attitudes. To identify the gender of the research subjects, the following question will be used.

Number	Question
D1	Gender
	Answer options
1	Male
2	Female

Age
Previous research has shown that age is also an influencing factor on foreign policy attitudes.
To identify the age of the research subjects, the following question will be used.

Number	Question
D1	How old are you?

4.5 Methodology

Models
In order to test for a causal relationship between independent and dependent variables
statistical analyses should be carried out. These analyses will be made by using the IBM
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Statistics. In this thesis, two separate
analyses will be conducted in SPSS. The dependent variables 'Sanctions Russia' and
'Measures against Iran' will each be further investigated by using different analyses. It is
important to note that these two variables are not interchangeable as there is a difference in
the way of questioning. Model 1, sanctions against Russia, measures *agreeance* of
respondents with imposing economic sanctions on Russia in reaction to the illegal annexation
of the Crimea. Model 2, measures against Iran, measures the *preference* of respondents for
imposing economic sanctions on Iran, in reaction to their illegal enrichment of uranium.

In the case of the sanctions on Russia, respondents have the option to choose whether
they support the imposition of stronger economic sanctions on Russia with help of an ordinal
Likert scale, measuring the degree of agreement with these sanctions. For this dependent
variable, an ordinal regression will be conducted to assess the correlation between variables.
When executing the ordinal regression analysis, I found the model to have a significant
goodness-of-fit test, indicating that the model does not fit the data well. The rejection of the
proportional odds assumption gives cause to use an alternate type of analysis, the multinomial
logistic regression, that does not account for the ordinal features of the dependent variable. It
is however important to note that the proportional odds assumption is more often rejected
when the number of explanatory variables is high (Brant, 1990) and the sample size is large
(Allison, 1999), as is the case in this research. To circumvent this issue, I recoded the
variable into a dichotomous dependent variable that offers the values 'agree' or 'disagree'
with the imposition of stronger economic sanctions on Russia. A dichotomous dependent
variable allows for the execution of a binary logistic regression, which did pass the goodness-
of-fit test in SPSS.

The second dependent variable, 'Measures Iran', offers respondents a wide array of
potential measures to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, ranging from sanctions to
computer technology. For this thesis, a multinomial regression analysis will be conducted to
assess correlations for this dependent variable. While the thesis is mainly focused on the
underlying factors for economic sanctions, there are many respondents who opted for a
different measure, such as offering economic incentives to Iran. Of the eight options
respondents could choose from, 37,5% of respondents preferred economic sanctions as the
measure to take against Iran to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. The many
respondents who opted for a different measure will not be discarded in this thesis, as it would
greatly reduce the sensitivity and predictive value of the model. Reducing seven vastly

different answer options into one category 'other' would not improve the model, as it oversimplifies a complex reality. Using SPSS to find out whether this variable can distinguish between the option for economic sanctions and all others combined is a difficult test, and would lead to different results than keeping the original question and answer model. To uphold the integrity of outcomes and to prevent any possibility of p-hacking, I will make use of the original answer options and not reduce the eight options to a binary response. Instead, the outcomes of the other options will also be shown in the results table, as leaving out variables in the model in the results table does not improve the integrity of the study. While this thesis focuses mainly on economic sanctions, a short explanatory analysis of the other chosen measures will also be provided to strengthen the statistical model and outcomes. Considering the analysis will already have been fully conducted, it would be a waste not to portray the results as it may aid others researching similar topics or spark new research through interesting finds. These short analyses will not separately analyze each of the seven measures, but will discuss the most interesting finds and will be categorized under 'other measures'.

Variable decisions
The option arose to either use the expanded versions of the questions, including all degrees of answering (very much agree, agree, etc.), or to transform each variable by recoding them into different variables and leaving merely two options rather than four. To be able to make a choice in using either of these, bivariate correlation analyses have been conducted for both the expanded variables as well as the recoded variables. The outcomes of these analyses can be found in the appendix. The results showed more significant bivariate correlations between expanded variables than between recoded variables, indicating that some correlations might have gone lost in the recoding process. While using the expanded variables will create more complexity in assessing and comparing results, I have decided to use these variables considering the higher and stronger number of bivariate correlations.

Logistic regression

A binary logistic regression, or logit model, is used to model dichotomous outcome variables and predicts the probability of an event occurring for a given person (Field, 2005). The dependent variable for sanctions against Russia in this analysis has a binary response, in which the respondent can either opt for sanctions or not. Binary logistic regressions do not assume a linear relationship between variables, as is the case for a linear regression. However, when variables have binary responses, the assumption of linearity is usually violated (Berry, 1993). A logistic regression expresses equation of the multiple linear regression in logarithmic terms, circumventing the lack of linearity (Field, 2005).

The equation that belongs to a logistic regression is as follows:

$$logit(p) = b_0 + b_1 X_1 + b_2 X_2 + b_3 X_3 + \ldots + b_k X_k$$

In which:
- *logit* is the predicted natural logarithm from the
- Parameter B_0 is the y-intercept (Constant)
- b1 is the gradient of the straight line, indicating the influence of x1 on the logit
- x1 is the value of the predictor variable

With use of the logit, the probability P can be calculated as follows:

$$p = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-logit(p)}}$$

In which p is the probability of the dependent variable occurring and e is the base of natural logarithms. It is important to note that only the logit is a linear combination of the independent variables, and that changes in probability P are not linear, but follow an S-curve (de Vocht, 2013).

Assessing the model

In linear regression, the R^2 value is a measure of gauging the substantive significance of the model and whether the model fits the data. There is no direct equivalent to the R^2 value in logistic regressions, but there have been alternatives offered by several scientists, called Pseudo R^2 values. First, Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) have developed a measure to indicate the goodness-of-fit of the data and corresponding model. The value of the Hosmer and Lemeshow test can vary between 0 and 1, where a zero means that the predicting variables are not contributing to predicting the outcome variable. The maximum score of one on the other hand, indicates that the variables predict the outcome variable Y perfectly (Field, 2005). Another frequently used alternative to R2 is the Nagelkerke (1991) value. The Nagelkerke value also ranges from 0 to 1 and indicates to what extent the outcome variable Y can be predicted by predictor variables X. A model with a Nagelkerke R^2 of 1 indicates the predictor variables predict the outcome variable perfectly.

5. Analysis

In this part of the thesis, answers to the main research question and the sub questions will be sought. Firstly, a short analysis on the Dutch public opinion on the economic sanctions against Russia and Iran will be provided, followed by the explanatory analyses of the underlying factors hereof. Where the first parts will focus on descriptive analyses and statistics, the second part will focus on explanatory analyses with use of SPSS.

Dutch public opinion on measures against Russia

Following the Russian annexation of the Crimea in early 2014, respondents of the Transatlantic Trends Survey were asked several questions on the matter. This part of the thesis will focus on the Dutch view on the happenings in the Crimea and the appropriate actions to be taken in response.

Opinion of Russia

As can be seen in figures 4 and 5, the Dutch public opinion of the Russian Federation is quite unfavorable in 2014. The majority of respondents view Russia either as somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable (73%). Only 20% have a somewhat or very favorable opinion of Russia, and 7% of respondents either did not have an opinion or refused to answer. As can be viewed in figure 4, the opinion of Russia was significantly more favorable in the past, with the peak of favorability in 2011. Since then, the opinion of Russia has shifted from favorable to unfavorable, with a slight increase in citizens who either don't know or refuse to answer.

Figure 4: Dutch opinion of Russia 2010-2014

Figure 5: Dutch opinion of Russia in 2014

Russian leadership

Each edition, the Transatlantic Trends Survey contains questions inquiring about the desirability of leadership by a certain country or group of countries. The results of this enquiry are portrayed in figure 6. Since 2012, respondents have been asked how desirable they find it that Russia exert strong leadership in world affairs. When asked in 2014, a majority of Dutch citizens deemed strong Russian leadership in world affairs to be undesirable, slightly more than a quarter of citizens deemed it desirable and 5% did not know or refused to answer. What is interesting, is that the trend in desirability of the past few years does not match that of the opinion of Russia. While in both graphs popular demand for Russia and its involvement drops, this change is much more significant in opinion than in desirability of leadership. Also interesting to note is that in 2012 the Dutch looked very favorably upon the Russians, but at the same time did not desire their strong leadership in world affairs. Also, while the annexation of the Crimea damaged the Dutch opinion of Russia, the desirability of leadership did not suffer greatly. This might implicate that the Dutch citizens do not strongly relate the image of a country with its advantages of adapting a leadership role in world affairs. In part, this could be explained by the findings of Hurwitz and Peffley (1992) that US public perceptions of the Soviet Union the 80s and 90s were remarkably stable even in the face of drastic international happenings.

Figure 6: Desirability of strong Russian leadership in world affairs 2012-2014

Distinct measures

There have been a number of proposals for how the European Union should react to the annexation of the Crimea by the Russians. In the 2014 edition of the TTS, respondents were given an array of possible measures to take in response to the Russian actions in Ukraine, and asked if they agreed with each separate measure. As can be read from figure 7, Dutch citizens favored the use of economic instruments in reaction to the Russian actions. Increasing economic assistance to Ukraine and imposing stronger economic sanctions on Russia were deemed most favorable by a majority of 65% and 67% respectively. The least supported measure was sending military supplies and equipment to the Ukraine, which coincides with the findings of earlier research by Everts (2008) on Dutch public foreign policy opinion that the Dutch prefer soft rather than military measures. While in this research only the respondents that supported the imposition of stronger economic sanctions on Russia will be further investigated, it is interesting to know which other measures the Dutch would support.

Figure 7: Support for measures in reaction to Russian actions in Ukraine

Dutch public opinion on measures against Iran

Following the Russian annexation of the Crimea in early 2014, respondents of the Transatlantic Trends Survey were asked several questions on the matter. This part of the thesis will focus on the Dutch view on the happenings in the Crimea and the appropriate actions to be taken in response.

Figure 8: Dutch opinion on Iran (in %)

General view

In the years 2010-2012, the issue of Iran possibly acquiring nuclear weapons was very salient, resulting in several additional questions in the TTS. In 2012, the question was asked whether respondents had a favorable opinion of Iran, of which the results are shown in the pie chart. As can be viewed in figure 8, almost three quarters of the Dutch respondents had an unfavorable opinion of Iran, followed by 13% and 14% response for favorable and don't know/refusal respectively. This image coincided with the average European opinion of Iran, of which 76% of respondents viewed Iran as unfavorable.

In the year prior to this assessment of Dutch opinion of Iran, the TTS inquired citizens on whether they had any concern about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. As can be seen in the figure 9, a majority of Dutch citizens did worry about Iran acquiring these weapons. It is interesting to see that the Dutch seemed to be significantly less concerned about the matter than their other European counterparts. The average European concern over Iran lies at least 10 percentage points higher than the concern of the Dutch.

Figure 9: Dutch and EU concern about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons

Distinct measures

Since 2010, the TTS inquires on the possible measures to be taken to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The respondents are given an array of options from which they have to pick the best option according to them. The result offers a more hierarchical overview of the preferred options than the result of the question on possible actions to take against Russia, which were all evaluated separately rather than combined. Similar to the Dutch opinion on measures to be taken in reaction to the Russian actions in the Ukraine, a majority of the respondents again thinks economic measures are the best option. As is clear from figure 10, over a third of Dutch citizens are of the opinion that imposing economic sanctions is the best option, followed by 21% who think offering economic incentives would be more effective. A new option in 2014, Dutch citizens rank using computer technology to sabotage nuclear installations as the third best option. Again, there is little support for taking military action against Iran, but there is also little support for simply accepting that Iran could acquire nuclear weapons. The preferences of the Dutch citizens on measures to be taken against Iran are very similar to the European average and do not show any significant discrepancies (TTS Topline Data, 2014).

Figure 10: Preferences for measures against Iran

5.1 SPSS

This chapter of the thesis entails the analysis of the study for each of the two identified dependent variables. Following this part, the results of the regression analyses for each of the dependent variables. The explanatory analysis will provide the results of both models for Russia and Iran, followed by a description of findings for these models. Concluding, the chapter will end with a brief summary of the found results.

Descriptive analysis

As most variables and their corresponding values are divided on an ordinal Likert scale, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree for example, a standard descriptive analysis including the mean, minimum and maximum is not useful. Instead, this part of the analysis will focus on what percent of the research population has certain demographics, or how they think about certain matters such as the economic sanctions.

General demographics

The descriptive and frequency analysis points out that a slight majority of respondents is female, with 519 females to 481 males respectively. From the frequency tables (see appendix), we can also derive that the average respondent is 51 years of age and has completed its full-time studies at the stage of secondary school. Concerning party identification and ideology, the average respondent considers him or herself to be ideologically center-left to center in the spectrum ranging from extreme left to extreme right. This coincides with the parties most voted for, namely; D66, PvdA and CDA, who are all considered to be ranging politically from left to center. Interestingly, Dutch citizens have quite a high level of trust in the way their government handles international policies (66,6%) compared to the Eurobarometer's survey, measuring trust levels in the Dutch national government at 43% (Eurobarometer 432, 2015). Frequency tables show a large majority of Dutch citizens have a foreign policy preference for internationalism, rather than isolationism. About 76% of respondents view strong European leadership in world affairs to be desirable, and only 32 out of 1000 respondents did not know or refused to answer, indicating the Dutch are quite sure of these preferences. Generally speaking, Dutch citizens are quite positive when it comes to the European Union. About 69% of respondents have a favorable opinion of the EU, and 73% views the Dutch membership of the EU to be a good thing.

Before the data can be analyzed, it is necessary to check for multicollinearity and correlation between variables (see appendix for multicollinearity test). As there were no correlations greater than 0,61, it can be concluded that there are no variables that measure the same phenomenon. Secondly, a bivariate correlation analysis has been conducted for all variables, as can be found in the appendix. A bivariate correlation analysis of all variables needs to be conducted to investigate correlation between the variables, the results of this analysis are portrayed in table 3. This is necessary to see whether there are any direct correlations or perhaps suppressor effects. Table 3 shows the results of interesting bivariate relations. For example, a higher level of education correlates with a stronger preference for internationalism. These respondents favor EU leadership in world affairs more than those who are lower educated. Also, higher educated respondents are more trusting of the government and hold the European Union in higher esteem than their lower-educated counterparts. There also appears to be a positive correlation between a preference for EU international involvement and for many other independent variables. If a respondent is classified as isolationist, he will more likely disapprove of the government handling policies, have an

unfavorable opinion of the EU, feel NL membership in the EU has been a bad thing and feel economic sanctions against Russia are undesirable. While the bivariate correlation analysis did not find a direct link between party identification and other variables, there do appear to be correlations between a respondents' identification of left/right and the assessment of Dutch membership in the EU, where right-wing oriented respondents are more likely to view the NL' membership in the EU as a bad thing.

Table 3: Bivariate correlation analysis

	Ideology	Gender	Age	Education	Sanctions RU	Measures Iran	EU leadership	National Trust	Opinion EU	Opinion Russia
Gender	,000									
Age	-,009	,007								
Education	-,050	-,116**	,096**							
Sanctions Russia	,042	-,027	,006	-,026						
Measures Iran	,009	,032	-,062	-,067*	,120**					
EU leadership	,047	,040	,010	-,198**	,133**	,084**				
National Trust	,041	,056	-,028	-,086*	,084*	,120**	,306**			
Opinion EU	,053	-,030	,037	-,137**	,094**	,094**	,485**	,388**		
Opinion RU	,013	,105**	-,009	-,035	-,215**	,046	,082*	,104**	,106**	
EU Membership	,106**	,064	-,081*	-,236**	,065	,114**	,416**	,354**	,454**	,019

Sanctions against Russia

To find out who or what type of person supports the imposition of stronger economic sanctions on Russia, a crosstab descriptive analysis has been performed on dependent variable 'Sanctions Russia' and each of the independent variables. Significant Chi-squares were found for the independent variables: EU leadership, national trust, opinion EU, opinion Russia and measures against Iran. The results of these crosstabs show that respondents with a completed education at the secondary or post-secondary level are most likely to favor economic sanctions against Russia, whereas those with a completed education at the primary level are most likely to disagree (see table 4).

Table 4: Support for sanctions against Russia by education category

		Primary	Secondary	Post-secondary	Total
No sanctions	*N*	75	83	107	265
	% education	33,2%	28,6%	29,3%	30,1%
	% total	8,5%	9,4%	12,1%	30,1%
Sanctions	*N*	151	207	258	616
	% education	66,8%	71,4%	70,7%	69,9%
	% total	17,1%	23,5%	29,3%	69,9%
Total	*N*	226	290	365	881
	% education	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
	% total	25,7%	32,9%	41,4%	100,0%

The respondents who identify with the political parties SGP, CU and PvdA are most likely to agree with the sanctions, which is quite interesting as SGP is considered to be one of the most right-wing parties, CU is considered to be center-right and PvdA is center-left (Manifesto Project, 2016). When considering gender, females are more supportive of economic sanctions against Russia than males are, where 72.1% of females and 67.5% of males are supportive of sanctions. When categorizing age into different groups, I find that especially youngsters (aged 18-24) are most likely to disagree with sanctions, but that age groups 45-54, 55-64 and 65+ are most likely to agree. A crosstab with significant Chi-square results also provides the insight that most who agree with the sanctions also agree on the desirability of strong EU leadership in world affairs, indicating that they have an internationalist preference rather than isolationist, as can be viewed in figure 11.

Figure 11: Support for sanctions against Russia and desirability of EU leadership in world affairs (in number of respondents)

Most of these findings coincide with previously found results and drawn conclusions, but I did not find a significant Chi-square for EU membership, ideology, age, gender, education and Russian leadership, which does *not* coincide with previous research.

Measures against Iran

To investigate whether the same factors shaping a respondents' opinion on economic sanctions against Russia also underlie their opinion on sanctions in other situations, I will also investigate the case of economic sanctions against Iran. Again, to find out who these respondents might be and what their characteristics are, several crosstab analyses have been performed. In these crosstab analyses, I find significant Chi-squares for the independent variables: EU leadership, opinion EU, EU membership, ideology, age, education and sanctions Russia. One of the crosstabs indicated that, similar to the Russian case, respondents with a secondary or post-secondary level of education favor the imposition of economic sanctions. Interesting in this case, is the higher number of *males* that support the sanctions rather than females, as was the case with the dependent variable on Russia. One of the crosstab analyses conducted was aimed to test for correlation between a respondent's preference for economic sanctions in the case of Iran and in the case of Russia. As can be seen in table 5 below, many respondents who opted for economic sanctions in the case of Iran, also agreed with sanctions in the case of Russia. The 7 other potential measures against Iran have been placed under the category 'no sanctions' in this table, explaining the high number of respondents who opted for 'no sanctions' in the case of Iran.

Table 5: Support for economic sanctions against Iran by support for economic sanctions against Russia

			Russia		
			No sanctions	**Sanctions**	**Total**
Iran	**No sanctions**	*N*	216	371	587
		% sanctions Ru	76,3%	56,0%	62,1%
		% total	22,9%	39,3%	62,1%
	Sanctions	*N*	67	291	358
		% sanctions Ru	23,7%	44,0%	37,9%
		% total	7,1%	30,8%	37,9%
	Total	*N*	283	662	945
		% sanctions Ru	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
		% total	29,9%	70,1%	100,0%

Among other findings in the descriptive analyses conducted is the positive relationship between ideology and support for sanctions against Iran. Cross-tab analyses show that the respondents who identify as left-winged on the political spectrum are *less* supportive of imposing economic sanctions on Iran, and those who identified as right-wing ideologists are more supportive of this measure. Respondents who preferred the imposition of economic sanctions also often have a favorable opinion of the EU. Similar to the Russian case, more males opted for sanctions than females. Also coinciding with the results of the Russian case, respondents with an education at the secondary or post-secondary level more often preferred economic sanctions against Iran than those with a primary education. And finally, descriptive analyses suggest that respondents in higher age groups are more often supportive of sanctions against Iran than younger respondents, as can be seen in figure 12.

Figure 12: Support for economic sanctions against Iran by age category (in %)

Other measures

Since the question on measures against Iran also takes into account the other options such as taking military action and accepting the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weaponry, the crosstab analyses have also taken them into account. By quite a large margin, respondents with a secondary education are very supportive of military action as preferred measure. Quite interestingly, it seems that younger people are more supportive of military action (age groups 18-24 and 25-34) than older respondents, perhaps because they have never experienced warfare and the detrimental consequences it brings about. Regarding gender, while males and females are almost completely equal on the matter, a small percentage of women are more in favor of military action than men. Previous research has shown males to be more in favor of military interventions than women, but as the difference is only 0,1%, this is not large enough to dispute these previously drawn conclusions for Dutch citizens at this point. Coinciding with previous research stating that respondents who identify as right-wing are more likely to be in favor of military action, I find that those who vote for the political parties PVV, VVD and CDA (center to right ideologists) are more likely to favor military action against Iran. Regarding the other quite popular option 'offering economic incentives', I find that mostly respondents who have strong internationalist foreign policy preferences and higher levels of education prefer this option. They also tend to be more trusting of the national government and to have a more positive image of the European Union.

5.2 Results

Table 6 reports the results of the Models 1 and 2, based on the dependent variables Economic sanctions on Russia and Measures against Iran. In Model 1 the Russian case is portrayed, with the dependent variable recoded into a dichotomous variable with two options: no sanctions or sanctions, providing the opportunity to run a binary logistic regression. The logistic regression model was statistically significant, and the model explained 9,2% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in support for sanctions. Furthermore, the fit of the model was assessed to be good with the Hosmer Lemeshow test (p > ,05) and the model correctly classified 72,0% of cases.

Model 2 has been set up for the Iranian case, with the dependent variable recoded to leave out the values 'none of the above' or 'more than one option'. A multinomial regression has been performed to ascertain the effects of nine independent variables on the likelihood that citizens support the imposition of stronger economic sanctions on Russia. The multinomial logistic regression model was statistically significant (p <,001) and the model was able to explain 12,7% of the variance the preferred measure to be taken against Iran to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. The goodness-of-fit test showed a non-significant Pearson value for the Chi-Square, indicating that the model fits the data well.

Table 6: Logistic regression results Model 1 and 2

	Model 1: RU Economic sanctions	*Model 2: IR Economic sanctions*	*Model 2: IR Economic incentives*	*Model 2: IR Support opposition*	*Model 2: IR Computer sabotage*	*Model 2: IR Military action*
Ideology	-,080 (,924)	-,022 (,978)	-,286 (,752)+	-,095 (,909)	-,006 (,994)	,076 (1,079)
Gender	,296 (1,345)	,288 (1,334)	,373 (1,451)	1,020 (2,772)*	,866 (2,378)*	,233 (1,262)
Age	-,001 (,999)	,025 (1,026)*	,034 (1,034)**	,046 (1,047)**	,014 (1,014)	-,008 (,993)
Education	,068 (1,071)	-,013 (,987)	,046 (1,047)	,033 (1,034)	-,143 (,867)	-,436 (,646)
EU Leadership	-,221 (,802)+	-,371 (,690)+	-,400 (,671)+	-,641 (,527)*	-,239 (,788)	-,387 (,679)
National Trust	-,163 (,850)	-,214 (,808)	-,204 (,816)	-,220 (,803)	-,171 (,843)	-,217 (,805)
Opinion EU	-,073 (,930)	-,183 (,833)	-,240 (,786)	,112 (1,119)	-,079 (,924)	,005 (1,005)
EU Membership	,045 (1,046)	,361 (1,435)	,078 (1,082)	,103 (1,109)	,510 (1,665)	,783 (2,187)
Opinion RU	,625 (1,868)***					
Intercept						
N	672	644	644	644	644	644

(*Notes*. standard errors in parentheses +p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001)

As table 6 indicates, I find no evidence that a higher level of trust in the national government would lead to more support for the imposition of economic sanctions in both the cases of Russia and Iran. Neither do I find any evidence that the opinion on the European Union or the Dutch membership in this union has any significant effect on respondents' opinion on sanctions for both Iran and Russia. This suggests that Dutch citizens do not draw upon their levels of trust in both domestic and EU institutions, who are responsible for imposing the sanctions, when contemplating the preferred measures against these countries. This does not coincide with previously found results (Popkin and Dimock, 2000). Furthermore, I find no evidence that a higher level of education would lead to more support for the imposition of economic sanctions in both the cases of Russia and Iran.

While the analysis investigates the determining factors for respondents *agreeing with* economic sanctions against Russia and *preferring* economic sanctions against Iran, I considered the possibility that citizens might still draw upon the same sources or factors when assessing the need for economic sanctions on both cases, but it appears that they do not. Instead, I find that the underlying factors that prove significantly correlated for agreeing with economic sanctions against Russia and preferring economic sanctions over other measures against Iran to be quite different for each case. While this may not be surprising, considering the different nature of both questions, it does bode interesting results.

As table 6 indicates, I find evidence of a strong correlation between the support for economic sanctions against Russia and the respondent's opinion of Russia. As the values for the variable Opinion Russia varied from 1-4, 1 being very favorable and 4 being very unfavorable, the positive relation between the variables suggests that the respondents who had an *unfavorable* opinion of Russia were 1,868 times more likely to support the imposition of economic sanctions against Russia. This coincides with previous research by Brewer et al. (2004), stating that the image people have of a country strongly impacts their opinion on matters concerning that country. In light of this finding, I can accept the hypothesis stating that an unfavorable opinion of Russia will lead to higher support for sanctions.

Furthermore, I find evidence in the outcomes of model 2 that respondents who are of older age are more likely to support the imposition of economic sanctions on Iran in order to prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons. In fact, with each year a person grows older, they are 1,026 times more likely to be supportive of the sanctions. While this correlation is not very strong, it does indicate a very interesting connection between age and preference for sanctions, that was not found in model 1 for the sanctions on Russia

Another finding in model 1 is the correlation between the independent variable EU leadership and support for sanctions (p=,052). I find evidence that more internationalist foreign policy preferences lead to higher support for sanctions against Russia. In fact, results indicate that those who strongly favor strong EU leadership in world affairs are 1,79 times more likely to support the sanctions than respondents who don't. This finding suggests that high preferences for internationalism also coincide with high support for sanctions. I find similar, albeit slightly weaker, results for the variable economic sanctions in model 2. Again, I find a negative relationship between the variables, indicating that those who favor strong EU leadership in world affairs are more likely to support the imposition of economic sanctions on Iran. In light of these findings, the hypothesis stating that higher internationalist preferences are causally linked to a higher support for economic sanctions, is accepted.

Other measures against Iran
While this thesis focuses mainly on the imposition of economic sanctions in the cases of Russia and Iran, the multinomial regression analysis offers very interesting results for the other options. As mentioned earlier, as a majority of respondents (58%) did *not* prefer economic sanctions as the measure to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, it would weaken the statistical model to discard these options. Instead, the other options for measures against Iran have also been taken into account, resulting in very interesting outcomes. For example, the results in table 6 indicate that internationalist preferences are significantly causally linked to a respondents' preference for economic incentives and supporting the opposition of the government as measures to be taken against Iran. While these findings are not focused on economic sanctioning, it does reaffirm the results from previous research that internationalist preferences are linked to international involvement by the national

government (Popkin and Dimock, 2000). Also, I find statistically significant relationships between age and the preference for economic incentives and support for the opposition as well. In both cases, I find that older respondents are more likely to prefer either of these options. Interestingly, gender seems to affect a respondents' choice for supporting the opposition and opting for computer sabotage. Males are 2,772 times more likely than females to support the opposition, and 2,378 times more likely to prefer computer sabotage as a measure to be taken against Iran. While I did not find any evidence that any of the variables significantly correlate for military action as preferred option, I do find that ideology has a causal relationship with the preference for economic sanctions against Iran. I find a slightly weaker negative relationship between these variables, indicating that those who identify with a left-wing ideology are more likely to support offering incentives than those who identify with a right-wing ideology. And lastly, I find evidence that EU leadership positively correlates with acceptance (p=,079[+]). This finding suggests that those who have an isolationist foreign policy preference are more likely to support the option of accepting a potentially nuclear Iran.

Controlling for sanctions

To investigate whether the Dutch public opinion on economic sanctions is consistent for both the Russian an Iranian case, I add the variables Sanctions Russia and Sanction Iran to the models as control variables. Both variables have been recoded into a dichotomous, or binary, variable that simply measures a value for 'agree' or 'disagree'. The results of this second round of analyses can be found in table 7 below. The new model proves to be more effective at predicting the outcome variable in both cases. In the case of Russia, the model now explains 12,4% of the variance in support for sanction. Model 2, for the Iranian case, is now able to explain 17,2% of the variance in the preferred measure to be taken. In both cases, adding the variable on sanctions for the other case has significantly increased the model's predictive and explanatory capabilities.

Table 7: Logistic regression results Model 1 and 2 (Controlling for economic sanctions)

	Model 1: RU Economic sanctions	Model 2: IR Economic incentives	Model 2: IR Economic sanctions	Model 2: IR Support opposition	Model 2: IR Computer sabotage	Model 2: IR Military action
Ideology	-,107 (,072)	-,346 (1,50)*	-,039 (,142)	-,147 (,189)	-,055 (,156)	,053 (,187)
Gender	,382 (,187)*	,436 (,392)	,288 (,379)	1,079 (,495)*	,893 (,414)*	,176 (,499)
Age	,001 (,005)	,036 (,012)**	,027 (,011)*	,047 (,015)**	,014 (,012)	-,008 (,015)
Education	,065 (,119)	,038 (,245)	-,013 (,236)	,018 (,311)	-,166 (,259)	-,482 (,315)
EU Leadership	-,225 (,115)[+]	-,398 (,226)[+]	-,333 (,216)	-,639 (,302)*	-,174 (,238)	-,365 (,295)
National Trust	-,179 (,116)	-,171 (,236)	-,165 (,226)	-,192 (,300)	-,138 (,249)	-,174 (,300)
Opinion EU	-,055 (,131)	-,239 (,255)	-,184 (,244)	,111 (,333)	-,122 (,270)	,029 (,329)
Opinion RU	,589 (,123)***					
EU Membership	,014 (,246)	,025 (,499)	,313 (,471)	,037 (,652)	,519 (,510)	,810 (,602)
Sanctions Iran	,744 (,197)***					
Sanctions Russia		,310 (,382)	1,206 (,372)**	,440 (,497)	,753 (,412)[+]	1,630 (,570)**
Intercept		1,912 (1,302)	,757 (1,242)	-2,237 (1,806)	-,650 (1,370)	-,297 (1,635)
N	656	635	635	635	635	635

(*Notes*. standard errors in parentheses +p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001)

In both models, I find that the support for economic sanctions against Russia correlates significantly with support for sanctions against Iran. As mentioned before, the variable Measures against Iran has been recoded to a dichotomous independent variable, with values 'no sanctions' or 'sanctions' to ascertain whether the preference for sanctions holds for both cases. Results suggest that the respondents' preference for sanctions against both cases does indeed hold. This indicates that respondents are at least consistent in preferring to impose sanctions or not.

Interestingly, when controlling for economic sanctions against Iran, I find that gender is a significantly correlating factor for support for against Russia, while it is not for Iran and it was not for Russia either in the previous model. In the new model, males were 1,46 times more likely to support the imposition of stronger economic sanctions against Russia than females. This suggests that there is indeed a relationship between gender and support for sanctions. However, the previously formulated hypothesis stated that females would be more likely to support sanctions than males. In light of these findings, this hypothesis can be rejected.

Looking at model 2, where the dependent variable is Measures against Iran, I find that the previously significant correlation for EU leadership, indicating an internationalist foreign policy preference, is lost. The results in table 7 indicate that there are statistic correlations only between the preference for sanctions and the independent variables age and sanctions Russia. Age was also found to be a statistically significant variable in the first round of analysis, but a significant correlation with sanctions against Russia is newly found. Results indicate that there is a strong correlation between a respondents' preference for sanctions in both the Russian and Iranian case. I find evidence that those who agree with the sanctions on Russia are 3,341 times more likely to support the sanctions on Iran than those who do not.

In short, it appears that Dutch citizens do not draw upon the same sources or factors when deciding upon sanctions against Iran and Russia. When leaving out the variable for sanctions against Russia in the Iranian model, I find significant correlations for the variables age and EU leadership. In the vice versa case, I find the opinion of Russia and EU leadership to be significantly correlating. When controlling for sanctions against Russia in the Iranian model and vice versa, I find in both cases that there is at least a strong positive correlation between economic sanctions against Iran and economic sanctions against Russia, indicating that they are consistent in preferring sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. There are however also many different underlying factors of the Dutch opinion on sanctions when controlling for the variables on sanctions for the other case. In model 1, where the dependent variable was Sanctions Russia, I find evidence that gender, foreign policy preference and the opinion of Russia significantly affect the Dutch opinion. In model 2 however, where the dependent variable was Measures against Iran, I find that only age significantly influences the preference for sanctions, additional to the preference for sanctions.

6. Conclusion

6.1 Concluding remarks

The many varied results gained from the previous analyses offer a lot of findings and implications to digest. This part of the thesis aims to conclude the research conducted by answering the central research question:

How can the Dutch public attitude towards economic sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia be explained?

The central research question aims at analyzing the different public attitudes towards preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and measures against the Russian actions in the Crimea. By comparing the influencing factors of public attitude towards Russian economic sanctions with the attitude towards Iranian economic sanctions, I will in this section of the thesis conclude if the Dutch citizens have consistent, varying or distinct patterns of public attitude towards agreeing with or preferring economic sanctions over other measures. The conclusive part of the thesis will first be aimed at answering the sub questions that have been formed to narrow and guide the central research question.

In the primary analysis of the Transatlantic Trends Survey I was able to find answers to the first two (merged) sub questions: *what is the Dutch public attitude towards economic sanctions imposed on Russia and Iran?* As the primary analysis indicated, the Dutch do not have a very positive image of the Russian Federation and have found strong Russian leadership in world affairs to be increasingly unfavorable in recent years. It is clear that the Dutch opinion of Russia has also become increasingly unfavorable. The downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, in which 193 Dutch citizens were killed by Russian separatists, had not yet occurred at the time the survey was conducted. This disaster might have clouded or altered the judgment of the Dutch citizens in assessing which measures to be appropriate in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimea by Russia. Since the disaster had not yet occurred, I believe this thesis to be better able to test the previously found conclusions and theories by finding underlying factors that are not influenced by strong emotions. When conducting the primary analyses, I also found the Dutch citizens to mostly favor economic measures to be taken against Russia in response to the illegal annexation of the Crimea. Offering economic assistance to the Ukraine and imposing stronger economic sanctions on Russia were most often picked as an appropriate response.

The Dutch public attitude towards economic sanctions against Iran has also been researched in the primary analysis, in which I found that the average Dutch citizen is significantly less concerned about the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons than their European counterparts. I find a similar pattern to the Russian case, as the Dutch again prefer economic measures to be taken against the transgressing state such as imposing economic sanctions and offering economic incentives. These findings coincide with previously conducted research by, among others, Everts (2008) who stated that the Dutch have never been very fond of military engagement but prefer soft diplomatic measures. Interestingly, when offered new and modern options in the TTS 2014 such as sabotaging Iran's nuclear power plants with help of computer technology, the Dutch have been keen to adopt this option as their third favorite measure against Iran.

In the second part of the analysis I aimed to find evidence of factors that shape the

Dutch opinion on economic sanctions against Iran and Russia. Through this secondary analysis, I was able to find answers to the last two (merged) sub questions: Which factors influence the Dutch public attitude towards agreeing with or preferring economic sanctions imposed on Russia and Iran, and how can this be explained? The results of model 1, with dependent variable Sanctions Russia, indicated that among these underlying factors are the respondents' foreign policy preference, opinion of Russia, gender and their preference for imposing economic sanctions on Iran. I find that respondents with a strong internationalist foreign policy preference, a male gender and a negative opinion of Russia are more likely to support the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia.

In the case of Iran, I find that within model 2 the only significantly correlating relationships are age, foreign policy preference and the preference for sanctions against Russia. Interestingly, an internationalist foreign policy preference is only causally related when isolating the case of Iran, without controlling for economic sanctions against Russia. When sanctions against Russia is added to the model as another independent variable, the significant correlation disappears. Coinciding with my earlier hypothesis, in both rounds of analyses older citizens are more supportive of economic sanctions against Iran than younger citizens. While I did not find any evidence that age also influences the respondents´ opinion on sanctions against Russia, I do find that it influences their decision for offering incentives to Iran and supporting the opposition of the Iranian government as most appropriate measures to be taken against Iran. Furthermore, it can be concluded that an internationalist foreign policy preference definitely correlates with a respondents' preference for the measures offering economic incentives, economic sanctions and supporting the opposition of the Iranian government. As these measures are all examples of internationalist policies, this thesis reaffirms previously found results (Popkin and Dimock, 2000; Brewer et al., 2004).

Contrary to previous findings and research, I have not found a significant effect of preference for sanctions against either Russia or Iran for the variables national trust, opinion of the EU, opinion of the Dutch membership in the EU, ideology and education. While I have found strong correlations for these variables when conducting the cross-tab analyses, these do not hold when conducting the logistic regression analysis that accounts for all other independent variables as well. These findings, or lack thereof, result in the rejection of the previously formulated hypotheses in the case of Russia, expecting any causal relationship between the variables. Considering not a single independent variable held for both the Russian and the Iranian case when controlling for sanction in the vice versa case, no hypothesis can be completely affirmed. As age, foreign policy preference and gender only held for one of these cases, it cannot be said with full certainty that these factors underlie the Dutch opinion *in general*, but only for a specific case. Why these variables only hold for one case is unclear. If another country were to commit any transgressions resulting in the possible imposition of economic sanctions such as economic sanctions, it is not quite possible to predict which citizens will support them. A possible explanation for this phenomenon might be found in the previous statements by Popkin and Dimock (2000), who argue that citizens draw upon different sources when assessing complex issues of foreign policy. Citizens may not have the knowledge at hand to assess whether to economically sanction Iran and/or Russia, and might draw upon different sources to do so. As both cases are different, they might draw upon different sources.

Due to the lack of any mutual significantly correlating relationships with independent variables except the preference of sanctions in either the Iranian or Russian case, I conclude that Dutch citizens draw upon different sources when assessing whether to agree with or

preferring the imposition of economic sanctions. Contrary to previous findings, they do *not* draw upon their trust in the domestic government or in the European Union, no matter the height of this trust. Early research on public opinion pointed out that the average citizen is unable to form an intelligent, well-founded opinion on matters of foreign policy (Almond, 1950). While this research does not offer any affirmation or rejection of this statement, it does find that the underlying factors that shape the opinion of Dutch citizens on economic sanctions are *not consistent.* The only consistency I was able to find was the strong correlation between the preference for sanctions against Iran and against Russia, indicating that the respondents are at the least consistent in preferring sanctions. Also, while the significant correlation for internationalist foreign policy preference and sanctions against Iran was lost after controlling for sanctions against Russia, there does seem to be some kind of connection. Considering I found similar results for sanctions against Russia and other measures to be taken against Iran such as offering economic incentives and supporting the opposition of the Iranian government it can be concluded that a preference for strong EU leadership in world affairs indeed coincides with support for foreign policies.

This thesis investigated on what sources a citizen draws when assessing the matter of sanctioning Iran and Russia economically. However, as both cases are quite complicated and would ideally require knowledge on both cases, the average Dutch citizen might not completely comprehend the situation or be able to assess the matter of sanctioning fully. When starting to design and conduct this research, I assumed citizens would assess both cases in a similar manner, as they assess the same consideration: to sanction or not to sanction. The results as portrayed in the previous chapter have however made clear that it is not that simple for Dutch citizens. Considering that Iran poses a nuclear threat to the entire international community (including the Netherlands) and Russia illegally annexed the Crimea, the underlying transgression of both countries differ significantly.

Another possibility, coinciding with classical scholars on public opinion, is that there simply is no clear fundament to the Dutch public opinion on economic sanctions, because the public is not able to formulate a well-based argument on complex matters of foreign policy (Almond, 1950). While this thesis does not provide a definite answer, Almond's conviction seems unlikely, considering the consistency in preferring the imposition of sanctions in both cases and the consistent preference for strong EU leadership in world affairs and internationalist policies. Following the results of this thesis, it appears the Dutch citizens make different assessments when considering if they merely agree with sanctions, or would also prefer them over other options. The determinants of the Dutch opinion on economic sanctions are far from standardized, and are shaped by different underlying factors for each case.

6.2 Limitations

In this part of the conclusion a reflection on this research is offered. It will discuss the limitations of my thesis and will touch upon the reliability and validity of the research. This thesis is based mainly on the data of the Transatlantic Trends Survey. When using an already established survey there are certain limitations to the research design, as the researcher is unable to formulate questions or change the wording. In a sense, the researcher is dependent on the set questions, which also limits the specific avenue of research I was able to choose. Also, each variable that is selected impacts the entire model and its outcomes. For this thesis, I have made a selection in variables based upon previous research and theories. However, it is

possible that the chosen questions may not adequately measure the theoretical concept of other scholars. It is also possible that I have not included variables that may have been crucial in explaining the occurrence of the dependent variable, thus perhaps missing out on the biggest predictor.

Reliability and validity
To ensure the quality of research, two fundamental criteria should be met: reliability and validity. Meeting the criteria of reliability entails the outcomes of the research are not coincidental, but systematic (Van Thiel, 2010). A research is reliable when it is accurate and consistent, ensuring that the researcher is measuring variables as intended (Verhoeven, 2004). Not only is it necessary that each variable is properly operationalized, but the research also has to be consistent, or repeatable. Ideally, repetition of the same research should deliver the same results. In social sciences however, where the main research subjects are people, results may vary due to changes in opinion or characteristics (Van Thiel, 2010). Reliability may be enhanced by triangulation, peer-evaluation and keeping raw data for possible reanalysis. For this thesis, each part of the research has been reviewed by the supervisor, offering a different perspective. The raw data, coming from the Transatlantic Trends Survey is openly available to other scholars, providing the opportunity to repeat the research and check for similar outcomes. By using the TTS, an established and highly-esteemed questionnaire, I rely on the professional and accurate formulation of questions, increasing the reliability of my research. But, as the main focus of this research is the public opinion of Dutch citizens, of *people*, repeating this research for the TTS 2015 edition may not offer similar results due to the changing nature of people and their preferences.

The validity of a research entails the lack of systematic faults in measurement. It is the degree to which the researcher has 'measured what he set out to measure' (Smith, 1991:106). This is called the internal validity, and a proper operationalization is fundamental hereto. The external validity of a research concerns the generalizability of the outcomes and conclusions of the research. It questions whether the results of this research are also valid for other situations or contexts, if the same conclusions apply (Van Thiel, 2010). Regarding the internal validity, much thought has been put into the used variables and in choosing the corresponding questions in the TTS to adequately measure this variable. The formulation and operationalization of each variable has been described in detail, and was evaluated by my supervisor. Concerning external validity, in this thesis, only the public opinion of Dutch citizens has been investigated further. As there are many differences to be found between the 193 countries in this world, it is impossible to generalize these findings to other populations of citizens. Even when looking at the European Union, there are many variations in demographics, culture, political or economic situation that may influence the national public opinion on matters of foreign policy and the imposition of sanctions. The external validity of this research could have been strengthened by including multiple countries, for example within the European Union.

6.3 Avenues for further research

Taking into consideration the outcomes of this research and the previously mentioned limitations, the final part of this conclusion will identify avenues for further research. This research attempted to contribute to theoretical discourse on public opinion on matters of foreign policy such as the imposition of international economic sanctions. Considering the several outcomes of this thesis that varyingly reaffirm or reject previously found results, more research on the subject is needed. While this thesis offers very interesting insights into the formulation and shaping of Dutch public opinion on economic sanctions, the nature of this opinion may differ from the Dutch public to other nations. To examine whether the underlying factors of the Dutch public opinion on sanctions are similar or different to factors that underlie public opinion in other countries, it would be an excellent avenue for further research to also investigate other European countries. This would allow a comparison between EU-countries and provides a higher external validity and generalizable outcomes. Conducting similar research on non-European countries as well furthermore provides the opportunity to compare and contrast results and to find out *why* similarities or differences exist. I believe it would also prove useful to compare the TTS results of the Dutch research population over a span of years. In this thesis, only the year 2014 is investigated closely, but it should be interesting to find out whether the factors that shape and underlie the Dutch opinion on sanctions in 2014 are the same as the underlying factors in previous or coming years. Other strategies that may be pursued could involve a questionnaire that was developed specifically for this goal, allowing the researcher to form questions that measure exactly what the researcher has in mind, thus increasing the internal validity of the research. And lastly, another potentially useful direction would be to examine the very strong correlation between support for sanctions against Russia and the preference for military action as best measure to take against Iran, as found in this thesis. This outcome indicates that economic sanctions and military action are strongly linked, offering interesting opportunities for further research. All in all, little is known about the public opinion on international economic sanctions, especially in Europe. Further research on this subject is needed, and this thesis can hopefully contribute to the scholarly discourse constructively.

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Appendix

Contents

Collinearity diagnostics – DV Sanctions Russia

IV1: EU leadership
IV2: National trust
IV3: Opinion EU
IV4: Opinion Russia
IV5: EU Membership
IV6: Ideology
IV7: Age
IV8: Gender
IV9: Education
IV10: Russian leadership
IV11: Party identification
IV12: Measures against Iran

DIMENSION	IV1	IV2	IV3	IV4	IV5	IV6	IV7	IV8	IV9	IV10	IV11	IV12
1	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00
2	,01	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,01	,00	,00	,00	,00	,85
3	,14	,01	,02	,00	,00	,04	,00	,01	,02	,01	,17	,00
4	,05	,00	,03	,01	,02	,03	,02	,02	,16	,00	,09	,00
5	,27	,13	,00	,00	,02	,00	,01	,25	,09	,02	,00	,01
6	,01	,25	,08	,03	,01	,00	,00	,14	,19	,08	,01	,06
7	,03	,28	,04	,04	,03	,01	,04	,17	,04	,25	,01	,00
8	,13	,00	,01	,01	,03	,00	,61	,10	,15	,01	,04	,01
9	,06	,07	,37	,00	,18	,36	,01	,01	,00	,00	,25	,01
10	,00	,01	,24	,10	,28	,36	,02	,00	,02	,02	,24	,00
11	,28	,24	,18	,03	,29	,11	,14	,05	,03	,15	,00	,04
12	,01	,01	,03	,61	,09	,04	,00	,13	,04	,42	,18	,00
13	,01	,00	,00	,18	,06	,05	,14	,12	,25	,04	,00	,01

Collinearity diagnostics – DV Sanctions Russia

Collinearity diagnostics – DV Measures against Iran

IV1: EU leadership
IV2: National trust
IV3: Opinion EU
IV4: EU Membership
IV5: Ideology
IV6: Age
IV7: Gender
IV8: Education
IV9: Party identification
IV10: Measures against Iran

DIMENSION	IV1	IV2	IV3	IV4	IV5	IV6	IV7	IV8	IV9	IV10
1	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00
2	,04	,01	,01	,01	,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	,61
3	,06	,02	,01	,00	,05	,00	,02	,00	,35	,04
4	,11	,00	,01	,01	,00	,05	,00	,21	,05	,18
5	,31	,19	,00	,00	,00	,02	,28	,09	,00	,02
6	,07	,41	,05	,00	,00	,02	,40	,01	,00	,08
7	,23	,07	,12	,08	,00	,38	,06	,21	,04	,00
8	,12	,24	,32	,03	,10	,29	,02	,10	,12	,00
9	,00	,01	,46	,30	,28	,01	,05	,00	,20	,01
10	,05	,02	,01	,51	,51	,03	,00	,07	,23	,00
11	,02	,03	,00	,06	,07	,19	,18	,30	,00	,06

Crosstabs – DV Sanctions Russia

CASE PROCESSING SUMMARY

	Valid		Missing	
	N	Percent	N	Percent
RU SANCTIONS BINARY * IDEOLOGY	923	92,3%	77	7,7%
RU SANCTIONS BINARY * GENDER	968	96,8%	32	3,2%
RU SANCTIONS BINARY * D2. AGE RESPONDENT (CATEGORICAL)	963	96,3%	37	3,7%
RU SANCTIONS BINARY * EDUCATION	881	88,1%	119	11,9%
RU SANCTIONS BINARY * EU LEADERSHIP	940	94,0%	60	6,0%
RU SANCTIONS BINARY * NATIONAL TRUST	911	91,1%	89	8,9%
RU SANCTIONS BINARY * OPINION EUROPEAN UNION	936	93,6%	64	6,4%
RU SANCTIONS BINARY * OPINION RUSSIA	907	90,7%	93	9,3%
RU SANCTIONS BINARY * EU MEMBERSHIP	872	87,2%	128	12,8%
RU SANCTIONS BINARY * PARTY ID	475	47,5%	525	52,5%
RU SANCTIONS BINARY * Q1C. RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP	463	46,3%	537	53,7%
RU SANCTIONS BINARY * IRAN SANCTIONS BINARY	945	94,5%	55	5,5%

RU Sanctions Binary * Ideology

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total
No	Count	4	32	63	87	59	26	6	277
Sanctions	%row	1,4%	11,6%	22,7%	31,4%	21,3%	9,4%	2,2%	100,0%
	% column	21,1%	31,1%	27,4%	28,0%	38,1%	32,5%	24,0%	30,0%
Sanctions	Count	15	71	167	224	96	54	19	646
	% row	2,3%	11,0%	25,9%	34,7%	14,9%	8,4%	2,9%	100,0%
	% column	78,9%	68,9%	72,6%	72,0%	61,9%	67,5%	76,0%	70,0%
Total	Count	19	103	230	311	155	80	25	923
	% row	2,1%	11,2%	24,9%	33,7%	16,8%	8,7%	2,7%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,269

RU Sanctions Binary * Gender

		MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
NO SANCTIONS	Count	154	138	292
	% row	52,7%	47,3%	100,0%
	% column	32,5%	27,9%	30,2%
SANCTIONS	Count	320	356	676
	% row	47,3%	52,7%	100,0%
	% column	67,5%	72,1%	69,8%
TOTAL	Count	474	494	968
	% row	49,0%	51,0%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,123

RU Sanctions Binary * D2. Age respondent (categorical)

		18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	TOTAL
NO SANCTIONS	Count	37	21	28	72	62	71	291
	% row	12,7%	7,2%	9,6%	24,7%	21,3%	24,4%	100,0%
	% column	34,6%	23,1%	28,0%	33,2%	26,4%	33,3%	30,2%
SANCTIONS	Count	70	70	72	145	173	142	672
	% row	10,4%	10,4%	10,7%	21,6%	25,7%	21,1%	100,0%
	% column	65,4%	76,9%	72,0%	66,8%	73,6%	66,7%	69,8%
TOTAL	Count	107	91	100	217	235	213	963
	% row	11,1%	9,4%	10,4%	22,5%	24,4%	22,1%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,227

RU Sanctions Binary * Education

		PRIMARY	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY	TOTAL
NO SANCTIONS	Count	75	83	107	265
	% row	28,3%	31,3%	40,4%	100,0%
	% column	33,2%	28,6%	29,3%	30,1%
SANCTIONS	Count	151	207	258	616
	% row	24,5%	33,6%	41,9%	100,0%
	% column	66,8%	71,4%	70,7%	69,9%
TOTAL	Count	226	290	365	881
	% row	25,7%	32,9%	41,4%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,489

RU Sanctions Binary * EU leadership

		VERY DESIRABLE	SOMEWHAT DESIRABLE	SOMEWHAT UNDESIRABLE	VERY UNDESIRABLE	TOTAL
NO SANCTIONS	Count	70	123	42	47	282
	% row	24,8%	43,6%	14,9%	16,7%	100,0%
	% column	23,7%	29,3%	35,3%	44,3%	30,0%
SANCTIONS	Count	225	297	77	59	658
	% row	34,2%	45,1%	11,7%	9,0%	100,0%
	% column	76,3%	70,7%	64,7%	55,7%	70,0%
TOTAL	Count	295	420	119	106	940
	% row	31,4%	44,7%	12,7%	11,3%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,001**

RU Sanctions Binary * National Trust

		APPROVE VERY MUCH	APPROVE SOMEWHAT	DISAPPROVE SOMEWHAT	DISAPPROVE VERY MUCH	TOTAL
NO SANCTIONS	Count	34	129	70	40	273
	% row	12,5%	47,3%	25,6%	14,7%	100,0%
	% column	22,4%	28,4%	34,5%	39,2%	30,0%
SANCTIONS	Count	118	325	133	62	638
	% row	18,5%	50,9%	20,8%	9,7%	100,0%
	% column	77,6%	71,6%	65,5%	60,8%	70,0%
TOTAL	Count	152	454	203	102	911
	% row	16,7%	49,8%	22,3%	11,2%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,013*

RU Sanctions Binary * Opinion European Union

		VERY FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT UNFAVORABLE	VERY UNFAVORABLE	TOTAL
NO SANCTIONS	Count	42	131	68	41	282
	% row	14,9%	46,5%	24,1%	14,5%	100,0%
	% column	27,5%	26,6%	35,1%	42,3%	30,1%
SANCTIONS	Count	111	361	126	56	654
	% row	17,0%	55,2%	19,3%	8,6%	100,0%
	% column	72,5%	73,4%	64,9%	57,7%	69,9%
TOTAL	Count	153	492	194	97	936
	% row	16,3%	52,6%	20,7%	10,4%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,006**

RU Sanctions Binary * Opinion Russia

		VERY FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT UNFAVORABLE	VERY UNFAVORABLE	TOTAL
NO SANCTIONS	Count	4	89	112	64	269
	% row	1,5%	33,1%	41,6%	23,8%	100,0%
	% column	33,3%	47,1%	27,7%	21,3%	29,7%
SANCTIONS	Count	8	100	293	237	638
	% row	1,3%	15,7%	45,9%	37,1%	100,0%
	% column	66,7%	52,9%	72,3%	78,7%	70,3%
TOTAL	Count	12	189	405	301	907
	% row	1,3%	20,8%	44,7%	33,2%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,000***

RU Sanctions Binary * EU Membership

		GOOD	BAD	TOTAL
NO SANCTIONS	Count	182	80	262
	% row	69,5%	30,5%	100,0%
	% column	28,3%	34,8%	30,0%
SANCTIONS	Count	460	150	610
	% row	75,4%	24,6%	100,0%
	% column	71,7%	65,2%	70,0%
TOTAL	Count	642	230	872
	% row	73,6%	26,4%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,068$^+$

RU Sanctions Binary * Party ID

		SP	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+					TOTAL
NO SANCTIONS	Count	12	13	19	9	31	6	18	24	11	2	145
	% row	8,3%	9,0%	13,1%	6,2%	21,4%	4,1%	12,4%	16,6%	7,6%	1,4%	100,0%
	% column	30,0%	28,3%	25,0%	36,0%	32,6%	23,1%	37,5%	35,8%	28,9%	14,3%	30,5%
SANCTIONS	Count	28	33	57	16	64	20	30	43	27	12	330
	% row	8,5%	10,0%	17,3%	4,8%	19,4%	6,1%	9,1%	13,0%	8,2%	3,6%	100,0%
	% column	70,0%	71,7%	75,0%	64,0%	67,4%	76,9%	62,5%	64,2%	71,1%	85,7%	69,5%
TOTAL	Count	40	46	76	25	95	26	48	67	38	14	475
	% row	8,4%	9,7%	16,0%	5,3%	20,0%	5,5%	10,1%	14,1%	8,0%	2,9%	100,0

	%			%			%	%			%
%	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
column	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

Chi^2: ,718

RU Sanctions Binary * Q1c. Russian leadership

		VERY DESIRABLE	SOMEWHAT DESIRABLE	SOMEWHAT UNDESIRABLE	VERY UNDESIRABLE	TOTAL
NO SANCTIONS	Count	13	33	36	47	130
	% row	10,0%	25,4%	27,7%	36,2%	100,0%
	% column	35,1%	34,7%	26,3%	24,6%	28,1%
SANCTIONS	Count	24	62	101	144	333
	% row	7,2%	18,6%	30,3%	43,2%	100,0%
	% column	64,9%	65,3%	73,7%	75,4%	71,9%
TOTAL	Count	37	95	137	191	463
	% row	8,0%	20,5%	29,6%	41,3%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,355

RU Sanctions Binary * Iran Sanctions binary

		NO SANCTIONS	SANCTIONS	TOTAL
NO SANCTIONS	Count	216	67	283
	% row	76,3%	23,7%	100,0%
	% column	36,8%	18,7%	29,9%
SANCTIONS	Count	371	291	662
	% row	56,0%	44,0%	100,0%
	% column	63,2%	81,3%	70,1%
TOTAL	Count	587	358	945
	% row	62,1%	37,9%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,000***

Crosstabs – DV Measures against Iran

CASE PROCESSING SUMMARY		Valid		Missing	
		N	Percent	N	Percent
MEASURES AGAINST IRAN * IDEOLOGY		855	85,5%	145	14,5%
MEASURES AGAINST IRAN * GENDER		898	89,8%	102	10,2%
MEASURES AGAINST IRAN * D2. AGE RESPONDENT (CATEGORICAL)		893	89,3%	107	10,7%
MEASURES AGAINST IRAN * EDUCATION		821	82,1%	179	17,9%
MEASURES AGAINST IRAN * EU LEADERSHIP		870	87,0%	130	13,0%
MEASURES AGAINST IRAN * NATIONAL TRUST		848	84,8%	152	15,2%
MEASURES AGAINST IRAN * OPINION EUROPEAN UNION		865	86,5%	135	13,5%
MEASURES AGAINST IRAN * EU MEMBERSHIP		806	80,6%	194	19,4%
MEASURES AGAINST IRAN * PARTY ID		442	44,2%	558	55,8%
MEASURES AGAINST IRAN * RU SANCTIONS BINARY		875	87,5%	125	12,5%

Measures against Iran * Ideology

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total
Economic Incentives	Count	3	24	79	63	29	16	1	215
	%row	1,4%	11,2%	36,7%	29,3%	13,5%	7,4%	0,5%	100,0%
	% column	14,3%	27,6%	36,4%	21,6%	20,9%	20,8%	4,5%	25,1%
Economic Sanctions	Count	5	33	80	132	55	34	12	351
	% row	1,4%	9,4%	22,8%	37,6%	15,7%	9,7%	3,4%	100,0%
	% column	23,8%	37,9%	36,9%	45,2%	39,6%	44,2%	54,5%	41,1%
Support Opposition	Count	4	5	15	13	9	5	1	52
	%row	7,7%	9,6%	28,8%	25,0%	17,3%	9,6%	1,9%	100,0%
	% column	19,0%	5,7%	6,9%	4,5%	6,5%	6,5%	4,5%	6,1%
Computer Sabotage	Count	4	15	20	47	28	11	4	129
	%row	3,1%	11,6%	15,5%	36,4%	21,7%	8,5%	3,1%	100,0%
	% column	19,0%	17,2%	9,2%	16,1%	20,1%	14,3%	18,2%	15,1%
Military Action	Count	3	4	9	20	12	4	3	55
	%row	5,5%	7,3%	16,4%	36,4%	21,8%	7,3%	5,5%	100,0%
	% column	14,3%	4,6%	4,1%	6,8%	8,6%	5,2%	13,6%	6,4%
Acceptance	Count	2	6	14	17	6	7	1	53
	%row	3,8%	11,3%	26,4%	32,1%	11,3%	13,2%	1,9%	100,0%
	% column	9,5%	6,9%	6,5%	5,8%	4,3%	9,1%	4,5%	6,2%
Total	Count	21	87	217	292	139	77	22	855
	% row	2,5%	10,2%	25,4%	34,2%	16,3%	9,0%	2,6%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi²: ,014*

Measures against Iran * Gender

		MALE	FEMALE	Total
Economic	Count	115	112	227
Incentives	%row	50,7%	49,3%	100,0%
	% column	26,1%	24,5%	25,3%
Economic	Count	190	175	365
Sanctions	% row	52,1%	47,9%	100,0%
	% column	43,1%	38,3%	40,6%
Support	Count	18	37	55
Opposition	%row	32,7%	67,3%	100,0%
	% column	4,1%	8,1%	6,1%
Computer	Count	58	77	135
Sabotage	%row	43,0%	57,0%	100,0%
	% column	13,2%	16,8%	15,0%
Military	Count	28	30	58
Action	%row	48,3%	51,7%	100,0%
	% column	6,3%	6,6%	6,5%
Acceptance	Count	32	26	58
	%row	55,2%	44,8%	100,0%
	% column	7,3%	5,7%	6,5%
Total	Count	441	457	898
	% row	49,1%	50,9%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,067[+]

Measures against Iran * D2. Age respondent (categorical)

		18-24	25-34	34-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Total
Economic	Count	23	12	23	58	58	52	226
Incentives	%row	10,2%	5,3%	10,2%	25,7%	25,7%	23,0%	100,0%
	% column	23,5%	13,3%	23,5%	29,0%	26,5%	27,7%	25,3%
Economic	Count	28	38	40	76	99	81	362
Sanctions	% row	7,7%	10,5%	11,0%	21,0%	27,3%	22,4%	100,0%
	% column	28,6%	42,2%	40,8%	38,0%	45,2%	43,1%	40,5%
Support	Count	3	2	2	15	18	15	55
Opposition	%row	5,5%	3,6%	3,6%	27,3%	32,7%	27,3%	100,0%
	% column	3,1%	2,2%	2,0%	7,5%	8,2%	8,0%	6,2%
Computer	Count	24	16	17	26	28	23	134
Sabotage	%row	17,9%	11,9%	12,7%	19,4%	20,9%	17,2%	100,0%
	% column	24,5%	17,8%	17,3%	13,0%	12,8%	12,2%	15,0%
Military	Count	12	15	2	13	9	7	58
Action	%row	20,7%	25,9%	3,4%	22,4%	15,5%	12,1%	100,0%
	% column	12,2%	16,7%	2,0%	6,5%	4,1%	3,7%	6,5%

Acceptance	Count	8	7	14	12	7	10	58
	%row	13,8%	12,1%	24,1%	20,7%	12,1%	17,2%	100,0%
	% column	8,2%	7,8%	14,3%	6,0%	3,2%	5,3%	6,5%
Total	Count	98	90	98	200	219	188	893
	% row	11,0%	10,1%	11,0%	22,4%	24,5%	21,1%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,000***

Measures against Iran * Education

		PRIMARY	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY	Total
Economic Incentives	Count	52	47	108	207
	%row	25,1%	22,7%	52,2%	100,0%
	% column	25,0%	16,9%	32,2%	25,2%
Economic Sanctions	Count	76	122	135	333
	% row	22,8%	36,6%	40,5%	100,0%
	% column	36,5%	43,9%	40,3%	40,6%
Support Opposition	Count	16	15	20	51
	%row	31,4%	29,4%	39,2%	100,0%
	% column	7,7%	5,4%	6,0%	6,2%
Computer Sabotage	Count	36	48	42	126
	%row	28,6%	38,1%	33,3%	100,0%
	% column	17,3%	17,3%	12,5%	15,3%
Military Action	Count	14	25	11	50
	%row	28,0%	50,0%	22,0%	100,0%
	% column	6,7%	9,0%	3,3%	6,1%
Acceptance	Count	14	21	19	54
	%row	25,9%	38,9%	35,2%	100,0%
	% column	6,7%	7,6%	5,7%	6,6%
Total	Count	208	278	335	821
	% row	25,3%	33,9%	40,8%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,001**

Measures against Iran * EU leadership

		VERY DESIRABLE	SOMEWHAT DESIRABLE	SOMEWHAT UNDESIRABLE	VERY UNDESIRABLE	Total
Economic Incentives	Count	74	99	30	16	219
	%row	33,8%	45,2%	13,7%	7,3%	100,0%
	% column	27,7%	25,1%	26,8%	16,7%	25,2%
Economic Sanctions	Count	106	175	45	30	356
	% row	29,8%	49,2%	12,6%	8,4%	100,0%

	% column	39,7%	44,3%	40,2%	31,3%	40,9%
Support	Count	20	23	5	4	52
Opposition	%row	38,5%	44,2%	9,6%	7,7%	100,0%
	% column	7,5%	5,8%	4,5%	4,2%	6,0%
Computer	Count	33	58	18	23	132
Sabotage	%row	25,0%	43,9%	13,6%	17,4%	100,0%
	% column	12,4%	14,7%	16,1%	24,0%	15,2%
Military	Count	19	21	5	10	55
Action	%row	34,5%	38,2%	9,1%	18,2%	100,0%
	% column	7,1%	5,3%	4,5%	10,4%	6,3%
Acceptance	Count	15	19	9	13	56
	%row	26,8%	33,9%	16,1%	23,2%	100,0%
	% column	5,6%	4,8%	8,0%	13,5%	6,4%
Total	Count	267	395	112	96	870
	% row	30,7%	45,4%	12,9%	11,0%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,015*

Measures against Iran * National Trust

		APPROVE VERY MUCH	APPROVE SOMEWHAT	DISAPPROVE SOMEWHAT	DISAPPROVE VERY MUCH	Total
Economic	Count	39	110	53	16	218
Incentives	%row	17,9%	50,5%	24,3%	7,3%	100,0%
	% column	27,3%	25,6%	28,5%	17,8%	25,7%
Economic	Count	61	190	69	31	351
Sanctions	% row	17,4%	54,1%	19,7%	8,8%	100,0%
	% column	42,7%	44,3%	37,1%	34,4%	41,4%
Support	Count	13	24	9	7	53
Opposition	%row	24,5%	45,3%	17,0%	13,2%	100,0%
	% column	9,1%	5,6%	4,8%	7,8%	6,3%
Computer	Count	15	61	29	18	123
Sabotage	%row	12,2%	49,6%	23,6%	14,6%	100,0%
	% column	10,5%	14,2%	15,6%	20,0%	14,5%
Military	Count	9	21	15	7	52
Action	%row	17,3%	40,4%	28,8%	13,5%	100,0%
	% column	6,3%	4,9%	8,1%	7,8%	6,1%
Acceptance	Count	6	23	11	11	51
	%row	11,8%	45,1%	21,6%	21,6%	100,0%
	% column	4,2%	5,4%	5,9%	12,2%	6,0%
Total	Count	143	429	186	90	848
	% row	16,9%	50,6%	21,9%	10,6%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,111

Measures against Iran * Opinion European Union

		VERY FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE	SOMEWHAT UNFAVORABLE	VERY UNFAVORABLE	Total
Economic	Count	42	117	46	13	218
Incentives	%row	19,3%	53,7%	21,1%	6,0%	100,0%
	% column	30,2%	25,7%	25,7%	14,3%	25,2%
Economic	Count	56	197	72	27	352
Sanctions	% row	15,9%	56,0%	20,5%	7,7%	100,0%
	% column	40,3%	43,2%	40,2%	29,7%	40,7%
Support	Count	9	25	10	7	51
Opposition	%row	17,6%	49,0%	19,6%	13,7%	100,0%
	% column	6,5%	5,5%	5,6%	7,7%	5,9%
Computer	Count	14	67	31	21	133
Sabotage	%row	10,5%	50,4%	23,3%	15,8%	100,0%
	% column	10,1%	14,7%	17,3%	23,1%	15,4%
Military	Count	13	22	7	12	54
Action	%row	24,1%	40,7%	13,0%	22,2%	100,0%
	% column	9,4%	4,8%	3,9%	13,2%	6,2%
Acceptance	Count	5	28	13	11	57
	%row	8,8%	49,1%	22,8%	19,3%	100,0%
	% column	3,6%	6,1%	7,3%	12,1%	6,6%
Total	Count	139	456	179	91	865
	% row	16,1%	52,7%	20,7%	10,5%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,002**

Measures against Iran * EU Membership

		GOOD	BAD	Total
Economic	Count	172	36	208
Incentives	%row	82,7%	17,3%	100,0%
	% column	29,1%	16,8%	25,8%
Economic	Count	245	83	328
Sanctions	% row	74,7%	25,3%	100,0%
	% column	41,4%	38,8%	40,7%
Support	Count	38	11	49
Opposition	%row	77,6%	22,4%	100,0%
	% column	6,4%	5,1%	6,1%
Computer	Count	70	49	119
Sabotage	%row	58,8%	41,2%	100,0%

	% column	11,8%	22,9%	14,8%
Military	Count	32	18	50
Action	%row	64,0%	36,0%	100,0%
	% column	5,4%	8,4%	6,2%
Acceptance	Count	35	17	52
	%row	67,3%	32,7%	100,0%
	% column	5,9%	7,9%	6,5%
Total	Count	592	214	806
	% row	73,4%	26,6%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,000***

Measures against Iran * Party ID

		SP	GL	PVDA	PVDD	D66	CU	PVV	CDA	VVD	SGP	Total
1	Count	6	16	29	4	32	4	8	16	10	1	126
	%row	4,8%	12,7%	23,0%	3,2%	25,4%	3,2%	6,3%	12,7%	7,9%	0,8%	100,0%
	% c	15,8%	37,2%	40,3%	19,0%	35,6%	14,8%	18,6%	26,2%	29,4%	7,7%	28,5%
2	Count	16	19	28	8	37	14	13	28	15	8	186
	% row	8,6%	10,2%	15,1%	4,3%	19,9%	7,5%	7,0%	15,1%	8,1%	4,3%	100,0%
	% c	42,1%	44,2%	38,9%	38,1%	41,1%	51,9%	30,2%	45,9%	44,1%	61,5%	42,1%
3	Count	6	4	4	1	4	1	0	3	1	1	25
	%row	24,0%	16,0%	16,0%	4,0%	16,0%	4,0%	0,0%	12,0%	4,0%	4,0%	100,0%
	% c	15,8%	9,3%	5,6%	4,8%	4,4%	3,7%	0,0%	4,9%	2,9%	7,7%	5,7%
4	Count	6	3	4	5	9	5	11	7	5	2	57
	%row	10,5%	5,3%	7,0%	8,8%	15,8%	8,8%	19,3%	12,3%	8,8%	3,5%	100,0%
	% c	15,8%	7,0%	5,6%	23,8%	10,0%	18,5%	25,6%	11,5%	14,7%	15,4%	12,9%
5	Count	2	0	2	1	1	1	4	3	3	1	18
	%row	11,1%	0,0%	11,1%	5,6%	5,6%	5,6%	22,2%	16,7%	16,7%	5,6%	100,0%
	% c	5,3%	0,0%	2,8%	4,8%	1,1%	3,7%	9,3%	4,9%	8,8%	7,7%	4,1%
6	Count	2	1	5	2	7	2	7	4	0	0	30
	%row	6,7%	3,3%	16,7%	6,7%	23,3%	6,7%	23,3%	13,3%	0,0%	0,0%	100,0%
	% c	5,3%	2,3%	6,9%	9,5%	7,8%	7,4%	16,3%	6,6%	0,0%	0,0%	6,8%
T	Count	38	43	72	21	90	27	43	61	34	13	442
	% row	8,6%	9,7%	16,3%	4,8%	20,4%	6,1%	9,7%	13,8%	7,7%	2,9%	100,0%
	% c	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi^2: ,040*

Measures against Iran * RU Sanctions Binary

		SANCTIONS	NO SANCTIONS	Total
Economic	Count	81	142	223
Incentives	%row	36,3%	63,7%	100,0%
	% column	32,1%	22,8%	25,5%
Economic	Count	67	291	358
Sanctions	% row	18,7%	81,3%	100,0%
	% column	26,6%	46,7%	40,9%
Support	Count	18	36	54
Opposition	%row	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
	% column	7,1%	5,8%	6,2%
Computer	Count	43	86	129
Sabotage	%row	33,3%	66,7%	100,0%
	% column	17,1%	13,8%	14,7%
Military	Count	13	42	55
Action	%row	23,6%	76,4%	100,0%
	% column	5,2%	6,7%	6,3%
Acceptance	Count	30	26	56
	%row	53,6%	46,4%	100,0%
	% column	11,9%	4,2%	6,4%
Total	Count	252	623	875
	% row	28,8%	71,2%	100,0%
	% column	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Chi²: ,000***

Binary Logistic Regression – DV Sanctions Russia

Case summary

	N	Percent
Included in analysis	656	65,6
Missing cases	344	34,4
Total	1000	100

Block 0: Beginning Block

Predicted cases

	No sanctions	Sanctions	Percentage correct
No sanctions	0	186	0
Sanctions	0	470	100
Overall percentage			71,6

Variables in the equation

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Constant	,927	,087	114,513	1	,000	2,527

Variables not in the equation

	Score	df	Sig.
Ideology	2,600	1	,107
Gender	4,580	1	,032
Age	,000	1	,998
Education	,554	1	,457
EU leadership	7,927	1	,005
National Trust	3,935	1	,047
Opinion European Union	4,719	1	,030
Opinion Russia	25,531	1	,000
EU Membership	4,019	1	,045
Iran Sanctions binary	16,470	1	,000
Overall statistics	57,368	10	,000

Block 1: Method = Enter

	-2 Log Likelihood	Cox & Snell R^2	Nagelkerke R^2
Step			
1	723,114[a]	,086	,124

Chi^2: ,000***

Classification table

	No sanctions	Sanctions	Percentage correct
No sanctions	28	158	15,1
Sanctions	23	447	95,1
Overall percentage			72,4

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Ideology	-,107	,072	2,195	1	,138	,898
Gender	,382	,187	4,175	1	,041	1,465
Age	,001	,005	,023	1	,880	1,001
Education	,065	,119	,299	1	,585	1,067
EU leadership	-,225	,115	3,824	1	,051	,798
National Trust	-,179	,116	2,374	1	,123	,836
Opinion European Union	-,055	,131	,174	1	,676	,947
Opinion Russia	,589	,123	22,860	1	,000	1,802
EU Membership	,014	,246	,003	1	,954	1,014
Iran Sanctions binary	,744	,197	14,293	1	,000	2,104
Overall statistics	-,476	,741	,413	1	,520	,621

Without IV Iran

Case summary

	N	Percent
Included in analysis	672	67,2
Missing cases	328	32,8
Total	1000	100

Block 0: Beginning Block

Predicted cases

	No sanctions	Sanctions	Percentage correct
No sanctions	0	192	0
Sanctions	0	480	100
Overall percentage			71,4

Variables in the equation

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Constant	,916	,085	115,144	1	,000	2,500

Variables not in the equation

	Score	df	Sig.
Ideology	2,083	1	,149

Gender	4,010	1	,045
Age	,220	1	,639
Education	,538	1	,463
EU leadership	7,613	1	,006
National Trust	3,251	1	,071
Opinion European Union	4,307	1	,038
Opinion Russia	26,395	1	,000
EU Membership	3,304	1	,069
Overall statistics	42,808	9	,000

Block 1: Method = Enter

Step	-2 Log Likelihood	Cox & Snell R²	Nagelkerke R²
1	760,692[a]	,063	,090

Chi²: ,000***

Classification table

	No sanctions	Sanctions	Percentage correct
No sanctions	18	174	9,4
Sanctions	14	466	97,1
Overall percentage			72,0

Parameter Estimates

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Ideology	-,080	,070	1,295	1	,255	,924
Gender	,296	,181	2,678	1	,102	1,345
Age	-,001	,005	,055	1	,815	,999
Education	,068	,116	,345	1	,557	1,071
EU leadership	-,221	,113	3,786	1	,052	,802
National Trust	-,163	,113	2,062	1	,151	,850
Opinion European Union	-,073	,128	,324	1	,569	,930
Opinion Russia	,625	,121	26,750	1	,000	1,868
EU Membership	,045	,241	,035	1	,851	1,046
Overall statistics	-,272	,720	,143	1	,705	,762

Multinomial Logistic Regression – DV Measures against Iran

Case summary

		N	Marginal Percentage
Measures against Iran	**Economic incentives**	167	26,3%
	Economic sanctions	266	41,9%
	Support opposition	38	6,0%
	Computer sabotage	91	14,3%
	Military action	35	5,5%
	Acceptance	38	6,0%
Valid		635	100,0%
Missing		365	
Total		1000	

Model Fitting Information

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	1887,154			
Final	1773,938	113,216	45	,000***

Pseudo R-Square	
Cox and Snell	,163
Nagelkerke	,172
McFadden	,060

Goodness-of-Fit

	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Pearson	3169,395	3095	,172
Deviance	1768,157	3095	1,000

Likelihood Ratio Tests

	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept	1786,187	12,249	5	,032
Ideology	1791,111	17,173	5	,004
Gender	1785,637	11,698	5	,039
Age	1801,183	27,245	5	,000
Education	1779,232	5,294	5	,381
EU leadership	1780,341	6,403	5	,269
National Trust	1774,564	,626	5	,987
Opinion European Union	1776,840	2,902	5	,715
EU Membership	1778,070	4,132	5	,531
RU Sanctions Binary	1799,210	25,272	5	,000

Parameter Estimates

		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Confidence intervals	
Economic Incentives	Intercept	1,912	1,302	2,158	1	,142			
	1	-,346	,150	5,339	1	,021	,708	,528	,949
	2	,436	,392	1,240	1	,265	1,547	,718	3,332
	3	,036	,012	9,803	1	,002	1,037	1,014	1,060
	4	,038	,245	,024	1	,877	1,039	,643	1,679
	5	-,398	,226	3,094	1	,079	,671	,431	1,047
	6	-,171	,236	,529	1	,467	,843	,531	1,337
	7	-,239	,255	,882	1	,348	,787	,478	1,297
	8	,025	,499	,002	1	,960	1,025	,386	2,725
	9	,310	,382	,658	1	,417	1,363	,645	2,880
Economic Sanctions	Intercept	,757	1,242	,372	1	,542			
	1	-,039	,142	,073	1	,786	,962	,728	1,272
	2	,288	,379	,581	1	,446	1,334	,635	2,802
	3	,027	,011	6,013	1	,014	1,027	1,005	1,050
	4	-,013	,236	,003	1	,957	,987	,622	1,568
	5	-,333	,216	2,372	1	,123	,716	,469	1,095
	6	-,165	,226	,534	1	,465	,848	,545	1,320
	7	-,184	,244	,567	1	,451	,832	,515	1,343
	8	,313	,471	,441	1	,507	1,367	,543	3,443
	9	1,206	,372	10,526	1	,001	3,341	1,612	6,924
Support Opposition	Intercept	-2,237	1,806	1,534	1	,215			
	1	-,147	,189	,606	1	,436	,863	,596	1,250
	2	1,079	,495	4,761	1	,029	2,943	1,116	7,761
	3	,047	,015	9,662	1	,002	1,049	1,018	1,080
	4	,018	,311	,003	1	,955	1,018	,554	1,871
	5	-,639	,302	4,485	1	,034	,528	,292	,954
	6	-,192	,300	,409	1	,523	,825	,458	1,487
	7	,111	,333	,110	1	,740	1,117	,582	2,145
	8	,037	,652	,003	1	,955	1,037	,289	3,725
	9	,440	,497	,782	1	,377	1,552	,586	4,114
Computer Sabotage	Intercept	-,650	1,370	,226	1	,635			
	1	-,055	,156	,125	1	,723	,946	,696	1,285
	2	,893	,414	4,654	1	,031	2,444	1,085	5,503
	3	,014	,012	1,364	1	,243	1,014	,990	1,039
	4	-,166	,259	,412	1	,521	,847	,509	1,407
	5	-,174	,238	,536	1	,464	,840	,527	1,340
	6	-,138	,249	,307	1	,579	,871	,535	1,419

	7	-,122	,270	,204	1	,651	,885	,522	1,502
	8	,519	,510	1,034	1	,309	1,680	,618	4,568
	9	,753	,412	3,340	1	,068	2,124	,947	4,764
Military	Intercept	-,297	1,635	,033	1	,856			
Action	1	,053	,187	,080	1	,778	1,054	,730	1,522
	2	,176	,499	,125	1	,724	1,193	,448	3,173
	3	-,008	,015	,287	1	,592	,992	,963	1,022
	4	-,482	,315	2,339	1	,126	,618	,333	1,145
	5	-,365	,295	1,527	1	,217	,694	,389	1,239
	6	-,174	,300	,338	1	,561	,840	,467	1,512
	7	,029	,329	,008	1	,930	1,029	,540	1,962
	8	,810	,602	1,809	1	,179	2,249	,690	7,323
	9	1,630	,570	8,185	1	,004	5,105	1,671	15,596

Reference category is Acceptance

List of variables

1. Ideology
2. Gender
3. Age
4. Education
5. EU leadership
6. National trust
7. Opinion EU
8. EU Membership
9. Sanctions Russia binary

Without IV Russia

Case summary

		N	Marginal Percentage
Measures against Iran	Economic incentives	168	26,1%
	Economic sanctions	269	41,8%
	Support opposition	38	5,9%
	Computer sabotage	94	14,6%
	Military action	35	5,4%
	Acceptance	40	6,2%
Valid		644	100,0%
Missing		356	
Total		1000	

Model Fitting Information

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	1913,694			
Final	1831,000	82,694	40	,000***

Pseudo R-Square	
Cox and Snell	,121
Nagelkerke	,127
McFadden	,043

Goodness-of-Fit

	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Pearson	3122,825	3125	,508
Deviance	1821,060	3125	1,000

Likelihood Ratio Tests

	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept	1845,211	14,211	5	,014
Ideology	1844,900	13,900	5	,016
Gender	1841,859	10,859	5	,054
Age	1855,688	24,688	5	,000
Education	1835,504	4,504	5	,479
EU leadership	1836,924	5,924	5	,314
National Trust	1832,080	1,080	5	,956
Opinion European Union	1833,980	2,980	5	,703
EU Membership	1834,560	3,560	5	,614

Parameter Estimates

		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Confidence intervals	
Economic	Intercept	1,979	1,264	2,454	1	,117			
Incentives	1	-,286	,144	3,937	1	,047	,752	,567	,997
	2	,373	,372	1,002	1	,317	1,451	,700	3,010
	3	,034	,011	9,088	1	,003	1,034	1,012	1,057
	4	,046	,236	,038	1	,845	1,047	,659	1,663
	5	-,400	,223	3,217	1	,073	,671	,433	1,038
	6	-,204	,223	,834	1	,361	,816	,527	1,263
	7	-,240	,252	,911	1	,340	,786	,480	1,288
	8	,078	,492	,025	1	,874	1,082	,412	2,839
Economic	Intercept	1,659	1,189	1,949	1	,163			
Sanctions	1	-,022	,136	,026	1	,872	,978	,749	1,277
	2	,288	,357	,653	1	,419	1,334	,663	2,684
	3	,025	,011	5,638	1	,018	1,026	1,004	1,047

		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
	4	-,013	,225	,003	1	,953	,987	,634	1,535
	5	-,371	,211	3,103	1	,078	,690	,456	1,043
	6	-,214	,212	1,013	1	,314	,808	,533	1,224
	7	-,183	,239	,588	1	,443	,833	,521	1,330
	8	,361	,460	,615	1	,433	1,435	,582	3,536
Support	Intercept	-2,141	1,756	1,487	1	,223			
Opposition	1	-,095	,184	,267	1	,605	,909	,634	1,304
	2	1,020	,479	4,525	1	,033	2,772	1,083	7,092
	3	,046	,015	9,224	1	,002	1,047	1,016	1,078
	4	,033	,304	,012	1	,912	1,034	,570	1,875
	5	-,641	,298	4,628	1	,031	,527	,293	,945
	6	-,220	,291	,570	1	,450	,803	,454	1,420
	7	,112	,331	,116	1	,734	1,119	,585	2,139
	8	,103	,649	,025	1	,874	1,109	,311	3,954
Computer	Intercept	-,277	1,323	,044	1	,834			
Sabotage	1	-,006	,150	,002	1	,969	,994	,740	1,335
	2	,866	,394	4,832	1	,028	2,378	1,098	5,147
	3	,014	,012	1,335	1	,248	1,014	,991	1,037
	4	-,143	,250	,326	1	,568	,867	,532	1,414
	5	-,239	,234	1,042	1	,307	,788	,498	1,246
	6	-,171	,236	,521	1	,470	,843	,531	1,340
	7	-,079	,266	,089	1	,765	,924	,549	1,555
	8	,510	,503	1,028	1	,311	1,665	,621	4,458
Military	Intercept	,731	1,553	,222	1	,638			
Action	1	,076	,183	,175	1	,676	1,079	,755	1,544
	2	,233	,480	,234	1	,628	1,262	,492	3,235
	3	-,008	,015	,267	1	,606	,993	,965	1,021
	4	-,436	,307	2,023	1	,155	,646	,354	1,179
	5	-,387	,289	1,796	1	,180	,679	,386	1,196
	6	-,217	,292	,551	1	,458	,805	,454	1,427
	7	,005	,322	,000	1	,988	1,005	,535	1,888
	8	,783	,593	1,741	1	,187	2,187	,684	6,995

Reference category is Acceptance

List of variables

1. Ideology
2. Gender
3. Age
4. Education
5. EU leadership
6. National trust
7. Opinion EU
8. EU Membership