Master thesis

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Interest groups and information framing at the European Parliament

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Abstract:

In Brussels, interest groups are now everywhere, and it is not a secret that they play an important role in the legislative process of the European Union. Most existing research has already studied in depth their organizational characteristics and their access to the legislators, as well as the importance of the information they give to those legislators. Thus, this thesis will focus on the way they present the information to those legislators. Therefore, the aim of this master thesis is to determine the decisive factors that influence the way interest groups choose to present the information they give to the European Parliament. To do so, this research uses the theory of "the double logic of interest groups" that Klüver, Mahoney, and Opper have used to determine the factors influencing the choice of frame of interest groups for the information they give to the Commission. This theory provides two hypotheses presenting the type of interest groups and the type of EP committee in charge of the policy debate as the two decisive factors influencing the choice of frame. In order to test those hypotheses, a statistical analysis is conducted on 102 public hearing presentations made by interest groups and addressed to the EP. The conclusion of this study is that the type of committee and especially the type of interest group are the decisive factors influencing the choice of frame at the EP level. It also concludes that interest groups tend to use public good frames more often at the EP level than at the Commission level. This last fact requires future research in order to be explained.

Table of contents

Tables:

1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) produces more and more legislatives acts, and therefore gets more and more involved in the daily life of its member states' citizens. Indeed, in the member states of the EU, a large part of the national laws are directly or indirectly issued from European legislative acts, from the law regulating the labelling of the food we eat, to the one regulating our right to vote at the municipality level (Libération, 2009). In regards to this fact, some citizens realize that an important part of their life is now governed by European laws. Consequently, those citizens are rightfully asking some questions about the legislative process producing those laws, and about its legitimacy (Koutroubas, Lits, 2011).

This concern about legitimacy is an everyday reality coming back in the complaints of some groups of concerned citizens like those of "les nuits debout", or in the discourse of some nationalistic European political parties. In response to it, the EU is trying to explain its legislative process and make it more transparent. The EU is also trying to legitimize this process by insisting that the European Parliament (EP), whose members are directly elected by the European cityzens play a more important role in the process (Koutroubas, Lits, 2011). However, those efforts of the EU to reassure its citizens about the legitimacy of its legislative process are not effective, as the increasing levels of euro scepticism clearly (The Spectator, 2015).

There are a lot of reasons for the rising level of euro scepticism among European citizens, and the incapacity of the EU to convince them of the legitimacy of its legislative process. One of those reasons is the concern about the role of lobbying in this process. Many citizens are concerned that big lobbies are dictating all decisions in the EU legislative process, and that nothing is decided without their agreement (Le Nouvel Observateur, 2014). Even if this affirmation should probably be nuanced, it is a reality that lobbying activity is important in the EU and that its role in the legislative process is not negligible. However, not all of the lobbies represent the selfish interests of firms. On the contrary, quite a large portion of them represent the interests of large groups of citizens or even the interests of the citizenrys as a whole. Thus, those lobbies could actually increase the legitimacy of the EU legislative process. It is like that that the EU justifies its openness to the lobbies. It justifies it as a way to diminish the deficit of representation (Folesdal, Hix, 2006, Saurugger, 2010). Therefore, if

the action of such lobbies acting for the public good could partly solve the problem of legitimacy faced by the EU, it would be interesting to get a better understanding of how the lobbies act to influence the legislative process, in order to be able to improve their action.

The lobbying at the EU level is essentially based on the provision of information to the EU decision-makers (Klüver, 2013). Thus, the way in which this information is presented can have a great impact on the influence a lobby has on a legislative act. While many factors concerning the influence of interest groups have been studied in depth, the way in which they frame their information has not. Therefore, this research will analyse the use of framing by the lobbies at the EP level of the EU legislative process. This knowledge would then allow the academics to get a better understanding of the use of framing by the lobbies in the EU. The research question of this study is then:

"What factors influence interest groups' choice of framing for the information that they give to the EP?"

In this research, we will first present briefly the role of the EP in the legislative process of the EU as it represents the background of our study. After that, we will introduce the theoretical framework we use to conduct this research. Then, we will present our research design and its different characteristics. Once our research design has been presented, we will move on to the analysis of the results of our research. Finally, we will conclude by answering our research question and giving the possibilities of further research that our study calls on to.

2. Literature review

2.1. Literature review

The EU, with all its access points for interest groups and its openness to them, represents a great field of study for a research on their actions. However, even if we restrict the study of interest groups at the area of the EU, it still represents an enormous field of study, which can be divided into different sections.

First of all, the structure of interest groups, regardless of the environment they evolved in, represents many possibilities of research. Indeed, their organizational characteristics offer many possibilities of studies, which have already been abundantly explored by different authors (Coen, Richardson, 2009, Marshall, 2010).

Another area of research on interest groups is how they actually influence the decision-makers, and how this influence can be measured. On the latter, a lot of research has also already been conducted by different academics. However, due to the complexity of the subject, much more research is required (Dür, 2008, Bouwen, 2002).

Also, all interest groups evolve in a particular environment, with particular characteristics, and the settings of the environment deeply affect the actions of interest groups and their success. In our case, this environment is the EU, which is an environment with very particular settings and high complexity due to the many institutions involved in its legislative system. However, this complex environment has already been studied by different researchers (Coen, Richardson, 2009, Marshall, 2010).

However, those different fields of study that we just presented are far from representing and exhaustive list, and above all, those different fields interact. The characteristics of the environment cannot be forgotten when we study the influence of interest groups, as those characteristics will partly determine the access of those groups to the decision-making process, and therefore their possibility to exercise this influence. Moreover, the characteristics of interest groups themselves will partly determine where interest groups will be more likely to gain access to decision-makers, and what type of strategies they will use to influence them. It clearly appears that all these different fields of study are closely intertwined, which offers even more possibilities of researches to conduct.

It is precisely on the intersection of these different fields that the research of this paper will focus. Indeed, as we indicated above, the EU is a very particular environment offering a multiplicity of access points to the interests groups, from the Commission to the European Court of Justice (Coen, Richardson, 2009). Nevertheless, as the goal is to influence the legislatives acts, the three most important actors are the Council, the Commission and the EP as they are the three main actors of the legislative process. Therefore, those three institutions represent the main point of access to the decision-making process of the EU (Koutroubas, Lits, 2011). A second important characteristic of the EU environment is the fact that its institutions suffer from a lack of manpower and of time. Therefore, the EU institutions involved in the decision-making process do not dispose of the information they need to make decisions, and thus rely on interest groups to get this information (Chalmers, 2013b).

To exercise any influence, interest groups need go get access to the EU institutions, and this access will only be granted in exchange of information. Therefore, interest groups will only be able to exercise an influence on the decision-making process of the EU if they are able to provide information. Like Chalmers said, "lobbying in the EU is largely structured by an exchange of information. Interest groups provide decision-makers with policy-relevant information in order to gain access to the EU legislative process and to have their voices heard at the EU level." (Chalmers, 2013b: 475). That is what Bouwen refers to as the theory of access goods, where policy information provided by lobbying groups is exchanged for access to the institutions (Bouwen, 2004a, Bouwen 2004b).

So, we have established that information is the essential mean at the disposal of interest groups to get access to the EU decision-making process and influence it (Bouwen, 2004a, Chalmers, 2013b, Klüver, 2013). However, different research show that, even if interest groups are able to provide information and get access to the EU institutions, it does not mean that they will successfully influence the political outcomes of the decision-making process. Indeed, from one interest group to another, or even from one political issue to another with the same interest group, the success of the influence varies (Eising, 2007, Klüver, 2013). Therefore, to explain this fact, researchers have looked at the information that is provided and at how this information is obtained, to see if those factors could somehow explain those variations of influence, which has already been studied in depth

(Beyers, 2004, Chalmers, 2013b). Other studies have also looked at who is providing the information, which type of interest groups, and if this can explain the differences of success obtained (Dür, de Bièvre, 2007, Eising, 2007). However, very few academics have looked at how this information is presented; in other words, at the framing of the information, which consists in "selecting and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others." (Entman, 1991: 53).

Very few studies have been done on the framing of the information, especially in the EU. However, some studies on this matter have already been conducted in the US. Those studies have shown the importance of framing and how interest groups successfully use it to influence political debates towards a favourable outcome for their interests (Baumgartner et al., 2008, Baumgartner et al., 2009). For example, Riker shows in his analysis of the campaign to ratify the US constitution how focusing the debate on some particular points changed its outcome (Riker, 1996).

If those US studies agree on the power of framing, they diverge on what factors influence the choice of frame used by the interest groups. A great number of them advocate that the choice of frame of the interest groups is essentially based on the context in which they lobby. Following this theory, the interest groups would only choose their frame based on the receptiveness of the specific institutions they are lobbying. However, most of those studies are case oriented, and therefore not generalizable (Druckman, 2001, Lakoff, 2004). Nevertheless, other studies, quantitative studies, have showed that the institutional context of a policy debate is clearly a factor influencing the interest groups' choice of frame. Thus if other authors like Baumgartner and Leech agree that the choice of frame is influenced by the contextual characteristics, they also believe that this choice is influenced by the characteristics of the interest groups (Baumgartner, Leech, 1998).

Among the scholars studying framing in the EU, all of them also agree that interest groups successfully use framing to influence political debates (Baumgartner, Mahoney, 2008, Daviter, 2007, Ringe, 2005,2009). However, concerning the choice of frame, some studies show that even if some interest groups adapt their framing in congruence with the institutional context, others do not (Mahoney, 2008). This observation that was also made made by the scholars studying the choice of frame in the US context (Baumgartner, Leech,

1998, Bery et al, 2007). Therefore, the question can be asked: what factors explain the choice of framing used by interest groups in the EU? This question has already been studied concerning the Commission stage and the formation of the legislative proposal, showing that while institutional settings of the Commission was an important factor, the type of interest group was most important (Klüver, Mahoney, Opper, 2015). Concerning the EP, its institutional settings and how interest groups use them to get the best access to the most influential decision-makers in the EP have already been studied (Marshall, 2010). Nevertheless, how interest groups frame the information they provide to the EP, and what determines the choice of frame they use, has not been studied yet. The subject of a new research could then be what best explains the framing used by interest groups for the information they give to the EP. Indeed, such research would enlighten our knowledge of the lobbying of this stage of the EU legislative process. Therefore, this thesis will try to do so by looking at answering the next question:

"What factors influence interest groups' choice of framing for the information that they give to the EP?"

2.2. Theoretical and social relevance

To be theoretically relevant, research should make a contribution to the scientific literature about the subject by extending the knowledge and the understanding of this subject (King et al., 1994: 10). Our research is theoretically relevant because this particular research question has yet to be studied; therefore, this thesis would our knowledge and our understanding of the activity of lobbying of interest groups in the EU. Indeed, even if the interest groups' choice of frame has already been studied in other policy forums, it has never been researched in the EP.

Our research can be considered as socially relevant. Indeed, to be considered socially relevant, a research has to answer a question about a political or social phenomenon that's important for the real world, which affects people. This means that the answer to this question should have political, social, or economic consequences (King et al., 1994: 12), which is the case here. The lobbying of the EU is politically important for each European citizen, as this lobbying directly affects EU legislative acts which in turn affect their daily lives. Therefore, the study of the factors influencing the choice of framing used by interest

groups is socially relevant, as it could help EU citizens to find better strategies to influence the legislative process which affects the majority of their legal environment.

3. Background

3.1. The concepts

Before starting the research it is important to precisely explain what we understand by lobbying and interest groups.

The activity of lobbying can be understood as the activity of trying to influence the public decisions made at the administrative or the legislative level with more or less success (Koeppl, 2001, Koutroubas, Lits, 2011). Concerning interest groups, we will refer here to the definition set by Beyers, Eising, and Maloney, which is also used by Klüver. According to this definition, interest groups, to be qualified as such, have to meet three different criteria: be an organization, defend political interests, and have a private status (Beyers, Eising, Mahoney, 2008: 1106). Therefore, to be considered as such, an interest group has to present the different features characterizing an organization, such as a clear organizational structure, formal status concerning the membership, and a permanent administration. However, being an organization is not sufficient to be considered an interest group. An interest group must also defend political interests, which means that its goal has to be to influence political decisions in order to achieve political goals that match its interests. In other words, an interest group has to have a lobbying activity. However, some groups that are not considered interest groups, such as political parties or public institutions like universities, also match those two criteria. Therefore, to be differentiated from those, interest groups have to meet a third criterion; having a private status. By private status, we understand that those groups do try to shape the political outcomes, but they do not seek public offices (which differentiates them from political parties), and are not subject to the state (which differentiates them from public institutions like universities) (Klüver, 2013, Beyers, Eising, Maloney, 2008). Therefore, according to this definition, in this paper, we will understand interest groups as groups meeting those three criteria. However, as we will see later, these interest groups are far from being homogenous.

As we stated earlier, nowadays, we hear more and more about interest groups, and the word lobbying appears everywhere, from the TV news to the job offers of the recruitment agencies. Those terms are now as much a part of our life as they are a part of the democratic system of our modern societies, where they belong next to actors such as the political

parties or the elected officials. As explained in the definition above, the role of interest groups in this democratic system is to represent the particular political interests of some groups, and try to influence the public decision-making process in order to defend those interests. Therefore, interest groups constitute an essential actor of the democratic game. Some authors go even further, saying that interest groups are not only a part of the democratic system, but that they also are essential for it to be really democratic, as they allow particular interests to be represented and counterbalance the fact that only the interests of the majority are defended by the elected officials (Koutroubas, Lits, 2011). Therefore, it appears that ignoring them would compromise any attempt to have a good understanding of the democratic system we live in. This means that their study should constitute an essential topic of the academic research, which tends to prove the increasing numbers of researchers interested in the matters.

3.2. The EU and lobbying

We will focus here on the activity of interest groups in the European Union. We made this choice for different reasons. Firstly, as a European citizen, we are directly concerned by what's happening on the political scene of the EU, and have, therefore, a personal interest in the matter. Secondly, the EU system is a sui generis system, and its political scene is in constant evolution from one treaty to another, which makes it a particularly interesting subject of study (Hix, Hoyland, 2011). More importantly, the EU system is especially interesting concerning the study of interest groups and their lobbying activity, and this for different reasons.

Firstly, the competences of the EU are constantly growing and the number of EU legislative acts with it. The different EU legislative acts (directives, regulations, decisions) become more and more an important part of the national law of each member state (Hix, Hoyland, 2011). Indeed, "annually the EU produces about 2500 new decisions that overrule domestic laws and acts and create chain effect at home." (van Schendelen, 2013: 43). This means that it became increasingly important for the different interest groups of the EU member states to move a big part of their activity from the national level to the European level. This fact is stressed by the growing world globalization (Hix, Hoyland, 2011), which resulted in a

dramatic increase of the number of interest groups active on the political scene of the EU this past decade (Greenwood, 2007).

Secondly, the EU constitutes a perfect scene for interest groups to lobby. The EU gathers the representatives of many governments, and its institutions are highly fragmented; from the Commission and the European Parliament to the Council of ministers and the European Economic and Social Committee. This fragmented structure of the EU provides many access points to interest groups to represent their interests and influence the decision-making process. A situation that makes of the EU a great political opportunity structure for interest groups (Klüver, 2013, Richardson, 2000).

Finally, the EU is especially interesting to study interest groups because it tries to be open to those groups for different reasons. One reason is that the decision-makers at the EU are understaffed and do not have a lot of time; therefore, they need interest groups to provide the information they need to make their decisions (Chalmers, 2013b). Another reason is that the EU suffers from a deficit of representation, as only MEP's are directly elected by the European citizen. Therefore, interest groups represent a means for the EU to compensate this lack of representation (Follesdal, Hix, 2006, Saurugger, 2010).

3.3. The EP and the EU legislative process

As this research is studying the way interest groups address the EP in order to influence the legislative process of the EU, it is necessary to understand the role of the EP in that process.

Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the legislative process of the EU is composed of three different actors: the Commission, the EP, and the Council of ministers. While initially, the power of the EP was quite restricted, it constantly grew over the years with the signing of new treaties, to finally become what it is today (Hix, Hoyland, 2011).

Nowadays, since the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, there are three main legislative procedures regulating the EU legislative process: the consultation, the consent, and the ordinary legislative procedure. It is this last procedure, the ordinary one, which constitutes the context of our study.

This last procedure was first introduced as the co-decision II procedure with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. The Treaty of Lisbon establicshed it as the ordinary legislative

procedure of the EU and expanded its use to nearly all areas of EU law. If this procedure represents the background of our research, it is because of two reasons. The first one is the fact that the vast majority of the EU legislative allow the EP to play a stronger role in the legislative process compared to the two other, more restrictive procedures. Therefore, it is only in that legislative procedure interest groups will have a real incentive to lobby the EP (Hix, Hoyland, 2011).

In that procedure, the first stage of the process is the formulation of the proposal by the Commission. The stage of the proposal formulation by the Commission through a public consultation is precisely the one for which the use of frames by interest groups has already been studied. The context of our research is the next stage, when the Commission submits its legislative proposal to the EP and the Council. During that stage, the EP will discuss the proposal and eventually amend it and send it to the Council through the Commission. The council will then also discuss the proposal and the amendments the EP added to it, and will eventually amend it too. At that stage, if the Council accepts the text with the EP amendments, the proposal becomes a law; if not, the proposal goes through a second reading and is sent back to the EP. The EP then decides to accept or amend the proposal amended by the Council. If the EP does not amend or reject the proposal, it becomes a law; if not, it is sent back to the Council. If the Council still does not accept the new version of the proposal, a conciliation committee equally composed of MEP's and Council members discusses an agreement. If an agreement is found and accepted by both the EP and the Council in a third reading, the proposal becomes a law; otherwise, the legislation falls (Hix, Hoyland, 2011). This particular process makes that a proposal cannot becomes a law without the EP's agreement, and more importantly, it gives the EP the possibility to modify the proposal. It is exactly for those reasons that the EP is lobbied by interest groups, and thus, why this procedure represents the broader context of our research.

4. Theoretical framework

4.1. Choice of theoretical framework

The goal of this research is to determine what are the decisive factors influencing the choice of frame used by interest groups for the information they give to the EP. However, a lot of different factors could influence this choice, and our research cannot test every single element that could possibly play a part in this process. This would require too much time and means. Additionally, those possible factors are so numerous that we would always omit one, thus discrediting our research if we choose to conduct it according to that process. Therefore, we need a way to only select the factors that have a high possibility of being determining, and to be sure not to exclude any important factors. To do so, we have to derive our factors, the independent variables, from a well-constructed theory based on the already existing literature. This method will also decrease the risk of omitting an important factor, which would endanger the internal validity of our research (Kellstedt, Whitten, 2007: 93, Vaus, 2001: 178).

A lot of different studies proved that the most important tool needed to be able to lobby the decision-making process in the EU is to have the capacity to provide the EU institutions with information that can help them in designing new legislative acts and taking decisions over those (Bouwen, 2004a: 476, Klüver, 2013: 16). As stated earlier, the lobbying in the EU is essentially built around a system well described by the access goods theory of Bouwen. According to this theory, the relation between the lobby groups and the European institutions is not a one way relationship (the institutions giving access to interest groups to the legislative process), but a two ways relationship. In exchange for access to the legislative process, interest groups give information to the European institutions. Those institutions need this information to produce more effective legislation, which requires technical knowledge and that answers the needs of society. The EU institutions need interest groups to provide this information because they do not possess the resources necessary to produce this information by themselves. Therefore, information is the good that interest groups need to get access to the EU institutions. Thus, since to exercise any influence on the decision-makers the first thing needed is to get access to them and the decision-making process, information is the key to influence in the EU (Bouwen, 2002: 369, 2004a: 476, 2004b: 340).

This theory about the role of information in the context of lobbying the EU constitutes the general framework in which this research is situated. It is because the information provided by interest groups represents their main tool to lobby; that it is interesting to analyse how they frame this information and on what is their choice of framing based on.

There are very few studies that have been conducted about the framing of the information provided by interest groups. Moreover, the majority of those studies were only looking at if the framing of information had an impact on influence. Therefore, there are very few theories that could be used to predict what interest groups base their choice of framing when they provide the EP with information during legislative debates. The only theory existing that seems suited to do so is the one constructed by Klüver, Mahoney and Opper about the factors determining the choice of framing of interest groups for the information they give to the Commission (Klüver et al., 2015). Therefore, it is this theory that we will use in this research to draw some predictions about what we will find with the empirical study that we will conduct to answer our research question. In fact, it is from this theory, which we will refer to as "the double logic of interest groups" for the purpose of our research, that we will derive the main hypotheses of this thesis.

Some studies seem to show that there is a link between the framing used by interests groups and two different elements. The first of these elements is the characteristics of interest groups themselves, and the second one the characteristics of the institutions that represent the access point to the decision-making process (Bernhagen et al., 2015: 574, Beyers et al., 2015: 538). However, those studies have not drawn any theory about why and how those to elements could determine interest groups' choice of framing. Nevertheless, the theory developed by Klüver, Mahoney and Opper does. We will now look at it more closely.

The theory of "the double logic of interest groups" starts with a simple observation, the fact that interest groups respond to the logic of influence and the logic of membership (Schmitter, Streeck, 1999). The idea developed is that those two logics affect the choice of framing of interest groups. The logic of membership is drives interest groups to use frames in accordance with their constituency, in order to get the resources from it that its survival depends on. Therefore, the type of an interest group, understood as the membership logic this interest group responds to, is an essential factor determining the type of frame used by

this interest group. The other logic is the logic of influence pushing them to use frames that decision-makers will respond positively to in order to influence them. Thus, the characteristics of the institutions in charge of the decision-making process are the other essential factor determining the frames used by interest groups, as those characteristics determine the type of framing to which the decision-makers will respond to (Klüver, Beyers, Braun, 2015: 449, Klüver, Mahoney, 2015: 226, Klüver et al., 2015: 484-486). Let's explain this in more details.

Concerning the logic of membership, the idea is that any interest group is driven by the will to survive (Lowery, 2007: 32), and in order to survive, interest groups need resources, and they get those resources from their members. Therefore, interest groups have to lobby using frames that are in accordance with what their members' positions (Schmitter, Streeck, 1999). That is why the type of an interest group is a factor affecting its choice of frame. This theory divides interest groups into three types based on their organisational form and the particular interest they defend: the sectional groups (interest groups representing the interest of a particular branch of society), the cause groups (interest groups defending a public good), and the firms (interest groups that have no members and thus do not respond to the logic of membership) (Klüver et al, 2015: 485). Therefore, the sectional groups will tend to use economic frames, as they represent the particular interests (mostly economical) of a section of society. However, as they represent concentrated interests, the support of their members is ensured, and therefore could use other frames not in accordance with the membership if they believe they will achieve more influence by doing so. On the contrary, as the cause groups represent diffuse interests, the support of their members is not as assured, and they therefore have to use frames in which people recognize themselves in order to attract their support, and thus their resources. That is why the cause groups will tend to use public good frames which many people can relate to. We see here how the problem of collective action is determining. Finally, the firms, as they do not have members that provide them with resources, will use whatever frame works the best (Klüver et al., 2015: 486).

Regarding the logic of influence, the idea is that interest groups are looking to influence the decision-makers, and to do so, they need to use frames that those decision-makers will respond to. That means that they will adapt their use of frames to the characteristics of the institutions, and the particular actors inside those institutions, that they are trying to

influence (Klüver, Beyers, Braun, 2015: 453-454, Klüver et al., 2015: 486). If they know the institution they are addressing is more responsive to public good concerns, they will be more prone to use public good frames in order to influence it. This responsiveness of the institutions to particular concerns is due to the type of subjects they are designed to deal with. For example, an institution designed to deal with human rights matters will tend to be more receptive to a human rights frame because its members work on that matter every day. Moreover, they have possibly even chosen to work in that institution because of their own beliefs on the protection of human rights, which makes them more receptive to a human right frame.

Thus, interest groups respond to two different logics. Those two different logics can correspond in certain cases, but they can also be contradictory in others. For example, a cause group should use a public good frame due to the logic of membership, but it will maybe not do so if it has to influence an institution more responsive to economical frames because of the logic of influence. The two logics apply and thus sometimes are in opposition. In that case, one is maybe more important and prevails on the other.

4.2. Predictions

By following the logic of this theory, we can make some predictions about the results that we will find concerning our research about what factors determine the choice of frames used by interest groups for the information they give to the EP.

The first prediction is that the type of interest group is a determining factor for the choice of frames. Moreover, if it is the case, we will find that the cause groups use exclusively public good frames, that the sectional groups use essentially economics frames and sometimes other frames (when the logic of influence is in opposition with the logic of membership), and that the firms use whatever frame is working the best for a particular situation, which drives us to our second main prediction.

The second main prediction is that the characteristics of the actors lobbied will affect the choice of frame. If this is true, in our research we should find that the use of frame of an interest group will vary in function of what type of EP committee is in charge of the legislative proposal.

Of course, sometimes the logic of membership and the logic of influence can be in opposition. In that case one will prevail over the other. In the case of the cause groups, it will probably be the logic of membership as it is important for them that their members recognize themselves in the frames used.

From those predictions, we derive the two hypotheses of our research:

H1: “Interest groups’ choice of frame is influenced by the type of EP committee in charge. The framing used will tend to be more often economic if an economic committee is in charge. On the other hand, the framing used will tend to be more often about public good if a public good committee is in charge.”

H2: “Interest groups ’choice of frame is influenced by their type. The cause groups will tend to use more frequently public good framings, while the sectional interest groups will tend to use more economic framings, and the firms will use any framing.”

The first hypothesis is based on the logic of influence, while the second one is based on the logic of membership. Of course, as stated earlier, in some cases those two hypotheses can be in opposition, and then, one will prevail over the other, but it is not possible to predict which one.

Also, following the idea that a good hypothesis has to be “stated in a manner that corresponds to the way in which the researcher intends to test it” (Johnson, Reynolds, 2008: 71), those hypotheses have been formulated to be suited to a large-N cross-sectional design, the one we will use in this study.

5. Research design

In this chapter, we will first discuss the different types of research design available in order to choose the one most appropriated for our research. Once our type of research design is selected, we will describe it precisely and present and defend the statistical analysis used for its conduct. Then, we will present the different concepts used in our research, and explain how we operationalize them. After that, we will discuss our data collection by presenting the source of data used in our research and explain what drove us to choose this particular source. Finally, in that same section, we will also discuss our sample and explain how and why this sample was selected.

5.1. Selection of the research design

As David de Vaus said, "The function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible." (Vaus, 2001: 9). Therefore, we need a research design that will allow us to do so. In the case of our research, a cross-sectional large-N design will satisfy this requirement for various reasons.

First, we will analyse different cases of policy debates about possible EU legislative acts held in the EP that happened around the same period (2013-2014). This corresponds to a cross-sectional study, which focuses on variations between different spatial units (here different legislative debates) at the same time (Kellstedt, Whitten, 2007).

In this research, we are trying to verify hypotheses based on the predictions of a particular theory, "the double logic of interest groups", and therefore, we are testing the explanatory power of this theory. This type of study could correspond to a congruence analysis, but we have decided to opt instead for a large N design because such a design has a higher external validity, and thus allows a generalization of our findings (Gschwend, Schimmelfening, 2007, Yin, 2009). A congruence analysis is based on case studies and would, therefore, not allow such a generalization, as the less cases we analyse, the lower the external validity (Blatter, Haverland, 2012, Yin, 2009).

Moreover, we have chosen a cross-sectional design over an experimental or even quasi-experimental design because such designs, even if they increase the internal validity, require a control group and the ability to observe the dependent variable before and after the

introduction of the independent variables (Johnson, Reynolds, 2008, Campbell, Ross, 1970). In our case, it is not possible to observe the dependent variable before the introduction of the independent variables.

Also, with a cross-sectional design, it is true that there is an important risk of low internal validity; because we could forget an important independent variable that could influence our dependent variable (here the choice of frame used). However, this risk can be overcome if we use theories from the literature to choose independent variables which are highly prone to have a causal relationship with the dependent variable (Kellstedt, Whitten, 2007, Vaus, 2001). The fact is that this risk is diminished here, as our independent variables (the types of interest groups and the type of EP committee in charge of the case) are issued from the theory of "the double logic of interest groups".

5.2. Cross-sectional large-N design

As we have said earlier, we will use a cross-sectional large-N design for the different reasons that we have explained in the previous section. However, it is important to explain exactly what will be the particular features of such a design for the specific case of this study.

In this research, to answer our research question we used a theoretical framework giving us predictions, which constitute our two hypotheses:

H1: "Interest groups' choice of frame is influenced by the type of EP committee in charge. The framing used will tend to be more often economic if an economic committee is in charge. On the other hand, the framing used will tend to be more often about public good if a public good committee is in charge."

H2: "Interest groups 'choice of frame is influenced by their type. The cause groups will tend to use more frequently public good framings, while the sectional interest groups will tend to use more economic framings, and the firms will use any framing."

Therefore, the goal of our research design is to find the evidences that will allow us to verify those hypotheses. Gschwend and Schimmelfennig define the unit of analysis as "the abstract entity that we study" (Gschwend, Schimmelfennig, 2007: 5). In the context of this research, the unit of analysis is the presentation made by an interest group in a policy debate held by the EP over a particular policy. Moreover, the frame used constitutes the dependent

variable, while the type of interest group and the type of committee in charge constitute the independent variables. Therefore, our research design, as it is a cross-sectional one, consists of observing the variations of the variables between different cases, different policy debates held by the EP during the same period (2013-2014), and checking if those observations verify our hypotheses. Our goal is to conduct a large-N study to be able to generalize our observations to the entire population of frames used by interest groups with the EP. Thus, we will need the help of statistics, but we need to choose the right type of statistical analysis perfectly suited for the purpose of our research.

5.3. The choice of the type of statistical analysis

In our research, we are trying to verify whether two variables, the type of interest group and the type of committee, influence an independent variable, the type of frame used by interest groups. As stated earlier, as we are conducting a large-N study, the best way to study the relationships between our different variables is to use the tool of statistics. However, the statistical analyses can only show a relationship between variables, but it cannot attest with certitude that this relationship is a causal relationship (Bryman, 2004, Kleinbaum et al., 1998). Sometimes, the results of statistical analyses can show us that it "appears to be a relationship between two variables, but the relationship is not real" (Bryman, 2004: 235), it is just a coincidence, and therefore, the relationship is spurious. One way to limit this risk, is, as we said, to carefully choose independent variables with the help of the theory and the previous literature about the subject, which are very likely to have a causal relationship with the dependent variable. However, another way to limit this risk is to check for control variables in our study (Bryman, 2004, Vaus, 2001). Therefore, to increase the internal validity of our study, and to decrease the risk of a misinterpretation of our results, we add in our research the variable of the salience of a policy debate held by the EP. We have chosen to verify the effects of this variable, because based on the literature; it is the one that could most likely also influence the choice of frame (Klüver et al., 2015). Indeed, there is a possibility that if a policy debate is highly salient, the public will be more focused on it, and therefore, the choice of frame might be affected by it.

This said, we still have to select the type of statistical analysis that we will use in our research.

In our research, as we study simultaneously the relations between more than two variables (four), we would need to use a multivariate analysis (Johnson, Wichern, 2002). Because of the type of variables we are studying (nominal and ordinal) in this research and their small number (only three independent variables), we have decided to opt for the solution of multiple bivariate analyses and the use of three variables contingency table. This solution is to conduct several bivariate analyses and then an analysis crossing three variables. Klüver, Opper and Mahoney, also used bivariate analyses for their study on the choice of frame at the Commission level, making this solution appropriate for our research as well. We could also have used a logistic regression, which would have been useful if we had a great number of independent variables to analyse. Nevertheless, as we have only three independent variables, it is more interesting to use multiple bivariate analyses and a three variables contingency table, and this for two reasons. First, it presents the results more clearly. Secondly, it allows us to see precisely how and when our independent variables interact, a possibility that a logistic regression would not offer. With a logistic regression, we could see the degree of interaction between two independent variables, but we cannot see when they reinforce each other or when they are in opposition. The design of a contingency table offers that possibility due to the visual it gives of the crossing of the actions of the different variables.

With the use of contingency tables we also use the statistic of Cramer's V. However, those statistical tools only give the strength of a relationship between two variables, not its direction. Nevertheless, as the relationship between our variables is clearly discerned, as the type of frame used cannot influence the type of an interest group, the committee in charge of a debate or its salience, this is not a problem. Also, to be able to generalize the findings of any research, it is important to make sure that a sufficient level of statistical significance is achieved. In our study, we will do so by using a chi-square test to make sure that the level of statistical significance of our statistical findings is $p < 0,05$. The statistical significance of $p < 0,05$ being conventionally accepted as sufficient (Bryman, 2004).

It is also important to notice that in a study using statistical analysis, the sampling of the data used is extremely important, but this matter will not be discussed here, rather in the section 5.5.2. dedicated to the sampling.

However, to be able to conduct our statistical analysis, we have to be able to measure our variables. To do so, we have to operationalize those variables. To do so, we first need to give their nominal definition, what we understand by it, and then, give their operational definition, the different indicators that we can directly observe and that enable us to identify their type (Vaus, 2001).

5.4. Operationalization of the concepts

5.4.1. The type of frame

Some define a frame as "a broad organizing theme for selecting, emphasising, and linking the elements of a story such as scenes, the characters, their actions, and supporting documentation" (Bennett, 2002: 42). Looking at this definition of a frame, we could understand framing as the action of emphasising a particular aspect of a situation to understand it. Therefore, when we refer to the framing that an interest group uses for the information it gives to decision-makers, we refer to the fact that the interest group will highlight some specific aspects of the information while ignoring others, in order to present this information in a certain way (Baumgartner, Mahoney, 2008). For example, in a policy debate about a possible legislative act reducing the CO2 emissions of cars, an interest group could stress the fact that such a legislative act could engender costs so extreme that thousands of car industry workers would lose their job, while omitting to say that it would reduce global warming. By presenting the information in this particular way, the interest group frames it. Thus, we will here understand framing in this research as "selecting and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others." (Entman, 1991: 53).

Each particular fact highlighted about an issue refers to a particular aspect of this issue. For example, in the case of the frame we presented for the CO2 emissions issue, the interest group used a frame insisting on the economic aspects of the issue, but another interest group could have insisted on the ecological aspects of it, using therefore another frame. So, we can see that we can differentiate different types of frames based on which particular aspects of an issue they highlight. Of course, there could be a very large number of different types of frame, but in order to facilitate or study and make its results clearer, we divide the different framings in two categories: those insisting on economic matters, and those insisting on the matters for public good. We chose to make this division because those

categories of frames allow us to regroup the vast majority of the different frames used, and thus gives us an overview of the use of frames. Moreover, those two categories correspond to the types of frame that the different types of interest groups should be more inclined to use following the logic of membership. Finally, this main division has also been used by Klüver, Mahoney and Opper for the study at the Commission level. How those frames are codified is discussed in the section 5.4.5..

5.4.2. The type of interest groups

As stated in the theoretical framework, we divide interest groups into three types based on their organisational structure and the type of interest they defend: the sectional groups, the cause groups, and the firms. The sectional groups are characterized by the fact that their structure is one of an association representing the interest of its members. Moreover, sectional groups represent the interests of a particular group of society with concentrated interests, such as fishermen or farmers. Concerning the cause groups, they are also associations acting for their members, but they do not defend the interest of a particular group. They defend the cause of a particular public good; for example, advocating for animal rights, or protecting food quality. Finally, the firms are not associations as they only represent their own interests (Klüver et al, 2015).

Therefore, to be able to identify each group unambiguously, their type is coded into the sectional groups, the cause groups, and the firms based on the information retrieved from their websites about their organizational structure and the interests they represent.

5.4.3. The type of committee

There are more than twenty committees in the EP. Each committee is in charge of examining and debating the possibilities of legislative acts concerning a particular field. They do so in order to write a report about it that will be discussed during a plenary session of the EP. There is for example the committee of human rights, which will be in charge of any report concerning possible legislative acts related to that subject. Another example could be the committee of employment and social affairs, which will debate any subject related to this particular field.

We divide the different committees in two groups or types, following the same division we used for the types of frames. Therefore, we code each committee as the type in charge of economic matters, or as the type in charge of public good matters. We have decided not to work with the committee that cannot be classified in either one of those two categories, like the budget committee. The details about this coding system are given in the section 5.4.5..

5.4.4. The salience of a policy debate

The salience of a policy debate can be understood as the importance of a policy debate in terms of the number of interest groups who have an interest into it. Therefore, the more stakeholders involved in a policy debate, the most salient the debate is (Klüver et al., 2015). Therefore, for each frame analysed we will report the level of salience of the policy debate in which it was used. The operationalization of those different levels, categories, of salience, is based on the number of speakers doing a presentation at the public hearing held for a particular policy debate in the EP. The level of salience of a policy debate will therefore increase with the number of speakers present at a hearing. To make it easier to read and in order to fulfil the necessary conditions of our statistical analysis (at least 5 estimated frequency are needed for each cell of a contingency table, see section 6.1.3.), we have decided to divide the different levels of salience into two categories. The presentations made for a hearing with 1 to 6 speakers, will be considered as having a low level of salience, while those with 7 to 13 speakers will be considered as having a high level of salience, and 13 being the greatest number of speakers found for a hearing in our sample. This operationalization of the level of salience could be criticised by saying that the hearings have a fixed structure, and that therefore, the number of interest groups present at those hearings is not representative of the policy debate for which these hearings are held. However, the structure of these hearings are absolutely flexible, which is shown by the fact that for some policy debates, very large hearings were organized, and sometimes even several of them for the same policy debate in order to hear from all the different stakeholders. In light of these facts, our operationalization of the salience of a policy debate seems quite suitable.. The exact details of the coding used are presented in the section 5.4.5..

5.4.5. The coding of the data

5.4.5.1. Type and method of coding

The source of data of our study is the interest groups' presentations at the hearings organized by the EP (see section 5.5.1.). Therefore, we need to analyse those documents in order to extract the information about the type of frame used in it. Thus, we need to conduct a content analysis. A content analysis, understood as any "techniques for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages" (Holsti, 1969: 14), must respect two important principles: objective and systematic. Objective refers to the fact that the information we extract from the document and how we characterize it must not be influenced by the personal characteristics of the researcher. Content analysis is systematic if the information and its characterization respects a procedure in order to always be the same, and thus be reliable (Bryman, 2004). This means that we have to code the data we analyse, "to arrange and organize the data according to social scientific perspectives and interests" (Prior, 2003: 160). In other words, we organize the data into categories issued from the concepts we use in our theoretical framework. Indeed, "codes refer to concepts and their identification through specific criteria" (Given, 2008: 86).

However, when we move from raw data to its assignment to categories, we need to have clear rules and procedures to do so in order to assure the reliability of our coding. To do so, we have produced a clear coding manual. This manual defines the categories of the concepts, the variables codified, and the criteria used for identifying those concepts from the raw data (Given, 2008, Haden, Hoffman, 2013). However, as the coding of the frames is slightly tricky, we explained in details the method used for it in section 5.4.5.2. of this thesis. We also explain in that section our choice of the classification of some committees which were a bit ambiguous. Also, in order to verify the inter-coder reliability of our system, a second coder codified 5 presentations that we had already codified. The results of this second coder were the same as ours. Moreover, we also conducted a test of intra-coder reliability by randomly picking some documents already coded that the same coder recoded, in order to verify that the coding was the same.

In our research, we are doing a content analysis. For this type of analysis there are two different types of coding; inductive and deductive. Inductive coding derives the categories for the classification of the data directly from the raw data itself. This type of coding is appropriate to explore an unknown phenomenon, but not to test a hypothesis. On the contrary, with deductive coding, the different categories of each variable are predefined and do not come from the analysis of the data. In our research, we are precisely trying to verify hypotheses. Therefore, the deductive coding, also called hypothesis coding, where "the codes are developed from a theory/prediction about what will be found in the data before they have been collected or analysed" (Saldana, 2009: 123), is the one we have decided to use.

Concerning the method of coding, different methods could be employed, and thus the choice "will be dependent on the size of the project, the funds and time available, and the inclination and the expertise of the researcher" (Basit, 2003: 143). In our case, we do not analyse many texts; thus, it is important that our measures are not misleading. Therefore, the use of a method based on the occurrence of certain words to identify categories is not appropriate. This is because this method can be risky for the identification of complex things like frames (Boräng et al., 2014, Given, 2008). In that perspective, we have decided to use a hand coding method. Indeed, the hand coding method is recommended for small case studies, because it is more reliable (Bazeley, 2007). Moreover, Klüver, Mahoney and Opper explain in their research about framing at the Commission stage that if they would have used another method, it is because they had to analyse more than 3000 documents. Even then they sometimes used hand coding to verify that the other method was reliable.

5.4.5.2. Precisions on EP committees classification

So, in this research, we have classified the EP committee between those in charge of matters concerning the public good, and those in charge of economic matters, leaving those in charge of other matters like the budget on the side. However, if the classification of most of the committees was quite manifest, the classification of few of them was a bit more tricky. Generally, we just transposed the classification used by Klüver, Mahoney and Opper with the DG's of the Commission. For example, if the DG environment was classified as a public good, we classified the committee environment as public good committee, a classification that makes already sense by itself. Nevertheless, some committees did not have a correspondent

DG or did not exactly match with it. For most of them, the classification was still obvious, like for the committee of women's rights and gender equality, which we have, of course, classified as public good committee. Nevertheless, three committees remained, which were still not classified: the committee of tourism and transport, the committee of employment and social affairs, and the committee of internal market and consumer protection. For the committee of tourism and transport, we have looked at the debates held by that committee and noticed that all those debates were about the business of tourism and transport. Therefore, we have decided to classify this committee as an economic one. Concerning the committee of employment and social affairs, all the debates held by that committee were about economic matters, like jobs and formations of people to find jobs; thus, we have decided to classify it as an economic committee. Finally, for the committee of internal market and consumer protection, the classification was harder. Indeed, as there is a DG consumer protection, classified as a public good one by Klüver, Mahoney, and Opper, we were tempted to classify the committee as a public good one; however, the term internal market seems to clearly refer to economic matters. Therefore, once again, we have looked at the matters discussed by that committee, and we have witnessed that it is always about laws to make sure that the consumer is protected. Thus, as the DG consumer protection was classified as a public good one, we have decided to classify the committee for the internal market and consumer protection as public good one too.

5.5. Data collection

5.5.1. The source of data

In order to conduct our research, we have to find sources that allow us to identify the type of framing used by the different interest groups for each policy debate held by an EP committee we selected in our sample of cases. Such a source exists for any policy debate held by the European Commission, as this institution launches a "public consultation" for each legislative proposal that it decides to propose, and for each of these "public consultations", the different stakeholders involved, the different interest groups, produce a position paper that is publicly available. Therefore, to know the frames used by interest groups, we can simply analyse those position papers and look at what type of frame they correspond to. However, this is absolutely not the case for the policy debates held by the EP.

When an EP committee works on a particular policy, it does not launch a "public consultation" for which every interest group interested in the matter submits a position paper, like the Commission does. During the work of an EP committee on a possible legislative act, interest groups do also act and give information to the committee to defend their interests; however, they are not asked to submit an official, publicly available position paper, like the Commission requires. Therefore, it is very hard to have access to the information that interest groups give to a committee in order to analyse it and determine the frame used for it. One solution could be to conduct interviews with a member of every interest group studied for every case to ask them what type of frame they used. Then, the same could be conducted with some members of the committee of each case to cross the information. However, this solution is not possible for this research for different reasons. The main reason, is that it would represents a lot of interviews, especially because we want to conduct a large-N study. Therefore, it would be time consuming, and given the restricted amount of time we have to conduct this study, it is not possible to do so. The other reason is that there is a risk that a lot of interest groups will not accept to give interviews as they prefer to keep their action discreet. Thus, we would not be able to collect the information for every interest group. Moreover, the information that the interest groups would give us might not be trustworthy, as they can lie or have forgotten what they did.

However, there is another source that can give us the information we need. This source are the hearings that the committees sometimes organize when they want to know more about the different issues at stake in a particular policy debate. During these hearings, the committee in charge of a policy invite different stakeholders concerned by this policy to hear what they have to say about the matter. Thus, during these hearings, different interest groups concerned by the policy debate express themselves and present information to the committee. The presentations conducted by interest groups during those hearings are publicly available on the EP website database (European Parliament, 2016), and thus, by analysing those presentations, it is possible to identify the frames used by interest groups for the policy debate for which the hearing has been organized.

Moreover, this source of data is reliable because it is a content analysis of already existing documents, and therefore, it is a non-obstrusive method as there is no contact between the

researcher and the subject, and thus the subject cannot be influenced by the researcher (Bryman, 2004).

5.5.2. Sampling

Nevertheless, if the solution of the hearings is the only one feasible in the context of our research, this solution does present some problems. The first problem is that there are no hearings organized for each policy debate. This means that we cannot select our cases randomly as we should for a quantitative study (Goertz, Mahoney, 2006), but that we would only select the policy debates for which a public hearing has been organized.

Nonetheless, as those hearings represent the only solution to conduct this research in regard to the time we have for it, we have no other choice than to accept this possibility of selection bias. Moreover, among those hearings, the selection is completely random.

Concerning our sample size, we have decided to analyse the hearings held between two years, from April 2012 to April 2014, which represents 102 different presentations. Of course, as increasing the size of a sample increases its likelihood of being representative of the overall population, and thus the external validity of the study, it would be interesting to analyse more frames. However, "invariably, decisions about sample size represent a compromise between the constraint of time and cost, the need for precision, and a variety of further considerations" (Bryman, 2004: 97). Therefore, as the time and the means to conduct this thesis are limited, analysing 102 frames represent a good compromise between those constraints and the external validity of our research. Also, it is important to notice that in the presentations of our sample, we have rejected those which were made for a hearing with a committee that was not a public good or an economic frame, like the budget committee or the committee of foreign affairs.

Given that our data collection is based on the analysis of written documents (the presentations made during the hearings), our research is a desk research. Such research can present the risk of report bias. However, in our case, the documents studied are the exact transcripts of the presentations of interest groups, our even directly documents written by interest groups for their presentation. This means that the documents used in this study constitute primary sources. Therefore, the risk of report bias inherent to documents like summaries of a presentation done by another person than the one who did it, or reports

about a presentation, is non-existent. If there was such a risk, we should cross the information of those documents with information coming from another source in order to limit this risk of report bias (Yin, 2009), but here it is useless. Even more, using another source of information which is not a primary source, like interviews, would not decrease the risk due to a report bias, but increase it.

5.6. Example of the coding procedure

While the coding of the committee in charge and the type of interest group for each presentation made by an interest group is quite easy, that is not always the case for the coding of the type of frame it uses. If for some presentations the type of frame appears clear as day, for others, different frames seem to mix, and determining the main one requires an unequivocal procedure which allows the reliability of the measure. It is this procedure that we will describe now.

If the type of frame does not appear very clearly, the first step is to look at what the interest group is asking for in its presentation. For example, in the case of a debate over a law about fish quotas, it could be that the interest group is asking for bigger quotas. Once we have identified what the interest group is asking for, the next step is to list all the arguments used by the interest group to explain why the EU should do what it is asking for. Then, we look at each of those arguments, and we classify their type of frame. In the case of our example, one argument could be that the population of fish has increased a lot and is safe. This would be an environmental argument, which is a public good one. Another argument could be that 500 hundred fishermen live off this fish, and that with small quotas the benefits would be too small to continue this activity. This argument would then be classified as an economic one. Finally, when all the arguments are classified, we count how many times each frame has been used. We add up the different public good frames and we compare it to the number of economic frames. If the number of economic frames is bigger, the presentation is coded has having an economic frame. If the number of public good frames is bigger, we look at what specific public good frame has been more used, and we code the frame of the presentation with that specific public good frame. For example, if the sub-public good frame of human rights has been used 5 times and the sub-public good frame of consumer protection has been used once, the presentation is coded as having a human rights frame.

By respecting this procedure, the coding of our sample of presentation is assured of a good reliability.

In order to make this clearer, we will now show an example of this coding procedure by analysing a presentation made by Facebook for a hearing at the EP about a new legislative framework about data protection.

Presentation of Facebook:

"*Erika Mann, Managing Director, Facebook*

Facebook is strongly regulated by the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (DPC). We have our European Headquarters in Dublin, which is a symbol of our commitment to working with EU authorities and citizens. The recent audit by the Irish DPC recognized that Facebook's Current privacy practices go far beyond the existing legal requirements, which proves how seriously we take the issue.

'Privacy-by-design' is an important principle which is recognized in the Commission's proposal. It is also one of the core principles of Facebook's privacy programme:

From the conception of our products we have dedicated privacy experts working with our engineers to ensure that the products are built taking into account all privacy implications. Facebook's implementation of 'privacy-by-design' is a prime example of how companies offer control to citizens over their own information and online footprint. Our users are empowered with control over each piece of content they share, and the possibility to choose the audience with whom they are sharing it with. The European Commission's objective in bringing more harmonization in Data Protection legislation in Europe is welcomed. This approach will be an enabler for online businesses to thrive and operate across a variety of platforms and national markets. For businesses to operate by the same rules across Europe, principle like the 'one-stop-shop' is essential. This rule is important in terms of harmonization and ensuring legal certainty for companies, large and small, operating iin the EU.

The 'one-stop-shop' approach is an important incentive for European Start-up companies who will be relieved of the burden of complying with 27 different legal regimes. If defined appropriately, this regulatory method will contribute to the further development of the EU single market, and will support the digital economy. A recent study from Deloitte shows that

positive economic effect, concluding that Facebook added more than 15 billion euros in value to the European economy in 2011, driving more than 32 billion euros in revenue to European businesses and supporting more than 230 000 jobs.

The current legislative proposals have the potential to facilitate innovation, as well as providing consumers with greater transparency and control over the use of their personal data. It is possible to have sound privacy regulation and thriving digital sector, and at Facebook we believe that we are leading the way in promoting both objectives."

Analysis of the presentation:

In this presentation, Facebook tells the EP how much it respects the privacy of their consumers and how concerned it is about it:

"The recent audit by the Irish DPC recognized that Facebook's Current privacy practices go far beyond the existing legal requirements, which proves how seriously we take the issue."

"From the conception of our products we have dedicated privacy experts working with our engineers to ensure that the products are built taking into account all privacy implications. Facebook's implementation of 'privacy-by-design' is a prime example of how companies offer control to citizens over their own information and online footprint."

This could lead to think that Facebook is maybe using a consumer protection frame here, but at the same time, Facebook talks also about development of the EU market and jobs:

"If defined appropriately, this regulatory method will contribute to the further development of the EU single market, and will support the digital economy. A recent study from Deloitte shows that positive economic effect, concluding that Facebook added more than 15 billion euros in value to the European economy in 2011, driving more than 32 billion euros in revenue to European businesses and supporting more than 230 000 jobs."

Therefore, what frame is used is not clear, and that is where the procedure will come at help. So, the first step is to identify what the interest group is asking for. In this case, Facebook is encouraging for a harmonization of the legislation on data protection at the European level called the 'one-stop-shop' approach:

"The European Commission's objective in bringing more harmonization in Data Protection legislation in Europe is welcomed."

"For businesses to operate by the same rules across Europe, principle like the 'one-stop-shop' is essential."

Once we have identified this, we look at the arguments that the interest group gives to back its request. Here, there are several economic arguments like the development of the EU market, a support for the digital economy, the jobs it helps Facebook to provide, how it encourages innovation:

"If defined appropriately, this regulatory method will contribute to the further development of the EU single market, and will support the digital economy. A recent study from Deloitte shows that positive economic effect, concluding that Facebook added more than 15 billion euros in value to the European economy in 2011, driving more than 32 billion euros in revenue to European businesses and supporting more than 230 000 jobs."

"The current legislative proposals have the potential to facilitate innovation"

There is also one consumer protection argument saying that it will give consumers more control over their personal data:

"as well as providing consumers with greater transparency and control over the use of their personal data."

As there are many economic arguments and only one consumer protection argument, the frame is thus identified as an economic frame. Indeed, the part in purple at the beginning of the text about how much Facebook is concerned about the privacy of its consumers is not an argument for what Facebook is asking and thus does not intervene in the counts of arguments to identify the frame.

6. Analysis

In this chapter, we are going to look at the results of the research we have conducted following our research design in order to test our hypotheses, and thus answer our research question. Nonetheless, let's specify what does that involves.

So, for this research, we have analysed a sample of 102 presentations made by interest groups during the hearings held by the EP during two years going from April 2012 to April 2014. For each of those presentations, we have identified the EP committee in charge of the hearing for which the presentation was made, the type of interest group which made it, the level of salience of the policy debate for which the hearing was held, and finally, the type of frame used in the presentation. Once the data of the four variables of our research collected (available in annexe 2), we have conducted different statistical analyses on them through the statistical software SPSS in order to test our different hypotheses. We have conducted bivariate analyses between the independent variable of the type of frame used and each of our three independent variables in order to verify if a relationship could be found between them, and if there was one, to check the strength of this relationship. To conduct those bivariate analyses, we have used contingency tables and Cramer V statistics. We have also conducted an analysis with three variables with the help of a contingency table. When we have found noteworthy relationships, we have also conducted chi-square tests in order to test the significance of those results, and thus make sure that the relationship found was real and representative of the entire population.

Therefore, in this chapter we will expose and analyse the results we have found through the process explained above. Nevertheless, we will start by giving some precisions about the statistical tools we have used. It is only then that we will move to the results of our statistical analysis. We will begin by the bivariate analysis between the variable of the type of frame used in an interest group presentation and the one of the EP committee in charge of the hearing for which the presentation was made. Then, we will move to the bivariate analysis between the type of frame used in a presentation and the type of interest group which made the presentation. After that, we will look at the bivariate analysis between the type of frame used in a presentation and the salience of the policy debate of the hearing for which the presentation was made. Then, we will look at a three variables contingency table

analysing the interactions between the type of frame, the type of interest group and the type of committee. Finally, we will globally look at the findings of our different analyses, which will allow us to draw the final findings of our research.

6.1. Precisions on the statistical tools

To have a good understanding of the results of this statistical analysis that we will present in this chapter, we think that it is important to first give some precisions about some of the statistical tools used for it.

6.1.1. Cramer V

When we observe that there is a relationship between two variables, it is interesting to have an indication on the strength of that relationship, to know how much the data of one variable can help us predict the results for the variable related to it. In the case of our research, we use the statistic Cramer V to get this indication. This statistic once calculated gives a value varying between 0 and 1. The more the value is close to 0, the lowest is the strength of the relationship, 0 meaning that the two variables are absolutely not related. On the contrary, the more the value is close to 1, the highest is the strength of the relationship, 1 meaning that if we know the independent variable, we can perfectly predict the dependent variable. If the value of Cramer V is under 0,20 the relationship between the variables is weak, that between 0,20 and 0,25 the relationship is moderate, and that if the value is above 0,25 the relationship is strong (Bryman, 2004, Lewis-Beck, 1995).

6.1.2. The chi-square test

The relationships that we observe in our sample are maybe not generalizable to the entire population from which this sample was drawn, as this sample is maybe not representative of the entire population. Therefore, it is important to conduct a statistical significance test. In the case of our research we decided to use chi-square to test the statistical significance of our results. Also, it is important to remember that for this study, we have chosen to use a statistical significance level of $p < 0,05$ as it is conventionally accepted by the scientific community as sufficient.

The chi-square test is always applied to a contingency table, and its value (p-value) is in fact the statistical significance level achieved by the information that the contingency table gives

us. So, if for example the p-value obtained with the chi-square test for a contingency table is 0,045 , it means that there is 4,5% of chance that the relationships observed in our sample are not generalizable to the entire population. In other words, it means that there is 4,5% of chance of rejecting the nul hypothesis while we should not (the nul hypothesis stipulating that the variables studied are not related at all) (Bryman, 2004, Lewis-Beck, 1995).

It is also important to notice that to be able to run a chi-square test and for it to mean something, the variables must be mutually exclusive, meaning that the participation in one category should exclude the participation in any other category, and that the estimated frequency of each cell of the contingency table can be less than 5. This last requirements due to the fact that the chi-square test is based on the assumption of a quasi-normally distributed data, and that to be sure the data is quasi-normally distributed, each expected frequency must at least be 5 (Richland EDU, 2016).

Now that we have given the precisions necessary to a good understanding and an enlightened interpretation of the statistical analysis of the data we have collected, let's look at it.

6.2. Bivariate analysis between the type of frame and the EP committee in charge

We will now compare at the type of frame used by the interest for a presentation with the type of the EP committee to which the presentation was addressed, to see if it exists a relationship between them. To do so, we will first have look at the contingency table of those two variables.

6.2.1. Contingency table

We will begin by examining the contingency table of those two variables which provide information only about the two main categories of frame; economic frame and public good frame. It is only later that we will look at the contingency table including the different sub-categories of public good frames in order to precise our main findings about the relationship between the type of frame and the type of EP committee.

Table 1.

Contingency table looking at the relationship between the type of frame for a presentation, and the type of EP committee for which the presentation was made

			type of the committee in charge of the hearing		
			public good committee	economic committee	Total
general type of frame used for the presentation	economic frame	Count	5	42	47
		% within type of the committee in charge of the hearing	20.0%	54.5%	46.1%
	public good frame	Count	20	35	55
		% within type of the committee in charge of the hearing	80.0%	45.5%	53.9%
Total		Count	25	77	102
		% within type of the committee in charge of the hearing	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In table 1. we can see that for 80% of the times when a public good committee was in charge of the hearing, the frame used by interest groups was a public good frame. This observation lets suggest that when a public good committee is in charge of the hearing, interest groups strongly tend to use a public good frame. However, it is important to notice that in our sample of 102 presentations made by interest groups, only 25 of them were made for a hearing with a public good committee in charge. This represents only 24,5% of the presentations. Therefore, if 80% of times that a public good committee is in charge, the frame used is a public good one, does seem like a strong relationship, we have to put it in perspective, as it represents only 24,5% of the presentations. We could wonder if this relationship would still be so strong if the number of presentations made for a public good committee was higher, because with a small number of presentations like that, the risk that it is not representative of the entire population is higher.

Concerning the cases when an economic committee is in charge of the hearing, the results are less striking, as the difference of percentage is much smaller. When an economic

committee is in charge, the percentage of interest group presentations using an economic frame is 54,5%, while it is 45,5% for those using a public good frame. If there is a difference in the percentages, this difference is only of 9 points, which is not really substantial. This observation lets us suggest that the fact that an economic committee is in charge of the hearing does not really influence the choice of frame that interest groups use for their presentation.

So, based on our observations of the contingency table in table 1., it seems that there is a relationship between the type of frame used by interest groups, and the type of EP committee for which the presentation is made. The fact that the EP committee in charge is a public good one seems to strongly influence the choice of frame of interest groups. On the other side, the fact that an economic committee is in charge does not seem to influence so much the choice of frame. We will now look at the Cramer V statistic in order to have an indication of the strength of this relationship between those two variables.

6.2.2. Cramer V

Now, let's have a look at the Cramer V for the relationship between the type of frame and the type of committee in charge.

Table 2.

Cramer V of the relationship between the type of frame and the type of EP committee in charge

		Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.298
	Cramer's V	.298
N of Valid Cases		102

We can see in table 2. that the value of the Cramer V statistic for the relationship between the type of frame and the committee in charge is 0,298. Thus, we can say that in our sample, the type of frame and the type of EP committee are moderately strongly related. Also, even if Cramer V does not give the direction of the relationship, we can say that in our sample, the type of committee influences the type of frame used by interest groups, as those two

variables are clearly discerned. Indeed, the type of frame influencing the type of committee does not make any sense. However, to be able to generalize this finding based on our sample to the entire population of presentations made by interest groups, we need to look at the chi-square test of this bivariate analysis.

6.2.3. Chi-square test

Our bivariate analysis shows that there is a moderately strong relationship between the type of frame and the type of EP committee in charge in our sample. This observation would tend to let us believe that the type of committee in charge does, at least to a certain extent, influence the type of frame. However, this finding could only be due to the fact that we have accidently selected a sample that is not representative of the entire population. We thus need to make sure that level of statistical significance of our bivariate analysis is under $p < 0,05$.

The result of the chi-square test is: $X2$ (1, N = 102)= 9.065, p = .003.

So, the p-value found through this chi-square test is 0,003. As this value is lower than the value of the level of statistical significance that we have fixed four this research, which is 0,05, we can reasonably reject the nul hypothesis and generalize the findings drawn from the analysis of our sample. Therefore, we can say that the type of committee in charge does influence the choice of frame used by interest groups to lobby the EP. We will precise those findings in the last section of this chapter, once we will have compared them with the findings about the other variables studied in this research. Nevertheless, before going any further, we will now look at the contingency table of those two variables which specify the sub-categories of frame. This contingency table could possibly bring us some interesting information that could enlighten the results found for the relationship between the type of frame and the type of EP committee.

6.2.4. Contingency table specifying the sub-categories of frame

The contingency table of table 4 presented here allows us to verify if any interesting information lies in the sub-types of frame used, concerning the relationship between the type of frame and the type of EP committee.

Table 3.

Contingency table looking at the relationship between the type of frame and the type of EP committee, and specifying the sub-categories of frame

			type of the committee in charge of the hearing		
			public good committee	economic committee	Total
specific type of frame used for the presentation	economic frame	Count	5	42	47
		% within type of the committee in charge of the hearing	20.0%	54.5%	46.1%
	environmental frame	Count	0	9	9
		% within type of the committee in charge of the hearing	0.0%	11.7%	8.8%
	human right frame	Count	11	3	14
		% within type of the committee in charge of the hearing	44.0%	3.9%	13.7%
	consumer protection frame	Count	8	17	25
		% within type of the committee in charge of the hearing	32.0%	22.1%	24.5%
	health and security frame	Count	1	6	7
		% within type of the committee in charge of the hearing	4.0%	7.8%	6.9%
Total		Count	25	77	102
		% within type of the committee in charge of the hearing	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The table 3. does not really gives any new interesting information about the relationship between our two variables. The only really noticeable information that this table provides is that when an economic committee is in charge, the consumer protection frame is the most used public good frame. We can see that it has been used 17 times when the committee in charge was economic, which represents 48,6% of the public good frames used in that

situation. This information will maybe be relevant when we will compare the findings of our different bivariate analyses.

6.3. Bivariate analysis between the type of frame and the type of interest group

We will now compare the type of frame used by interest groups with our second independent variable, the type of the interest group which made the presentation. We will thus see if a relationship exists between those two variables. To do so, we will begin by looking at their contingency table.

6.3.1. Contingency table

The contingency table that we are looking at here presents only the two main types of frame, which will give us the main patterns of the relationship between those two variables. However, as we the previous bivariate analysis, we will have later a look at a contingency table presenting the sub-categories of frame, which will maybe provide us with information specifying the kind of relationship linking those two variables

Table 4.

Contingency table looking at the relationship between the type of frame for a presentation, and the type of interest group which made the presentation

			type of the interest group doing the presentation			
			firm	sectional group	cause group	Total
general type of frame used for the presentation	economic frame	Count	12	32	3	47
		% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	85.7%	60.4%	8.6%	46.1%
	public good frame	Count	2	21	32	55
		% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	14.3%	39.6%	91.4%	53.9%
Total		Count	14	53	35	102

	% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

We can see in table 4. that a large majority of the firms, 86,7%, use an economic frame. However, it is important to notice that the presentations made by firms are only 14 for a 102 sample. As it is quite a small number, we should probably not give too much credit to what this observation suggests. Nonetheless, even if it is based on only 14 presentations, the difference of percentages is so important, that we can presume that there is a real tendency of firms to use more the economic type of frame.

Concerning the sectional groups, the difference in the use of the two types of frame is less striking. While 60,4% of them use an economic type of frame, 39,6% use a public good frame. However, even if the difference between the two is not as big than with the firms, the difference is still of 20,8 points, which is quite important. Based on this observation, we can say that in our sample the sectional groups use largely use the two kinds of frame, but with a biggest tilt to use the economic frame.

When we look at the cause groups, we can clearly see that they are more incline to use a public good frame. 91,4% of them use a public good frame, which represents a really impressive tendency. With an observation like this one, we can safely say that in our sample, the cause groups present a very high tendency to use a public good frame.

When we look at those three observations, we can easily notice that there is a relationship between the type of frame that an interest group chooses to use, and its type. Moreover, the percentages are so striking that we can presume that this relationship is very strong. However, in order to have a clear indication about the strength of this relationship, we will now look at the Cramer V statistic of this contingency table.

6.3.2. Cramer V

We will now have look at the Cramer V statistic of the relationship between the type of frame and the type of interest group.

Table 5.

Cramer V of the relationship between the type of frame and the type of interest group

		Value
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.569
	Cramer's V	.569
N of Valid Cases		102

We can see in table 5. that the value of Cramer V for the relationship between the type of frame and the type of interest group is 0,569. This value is very high and indicates a very strong relationship between those two variables. With a Cramer V of 0,569, we can say that the relationship between the two variables is extremely strong and, the knowing of the independent one giving a strong predictability of the dependent one. This means that the type of interest group strongly influences the choice of frame. We can say this because even if Cramer V does not give us any information about the direction of the relationship, we know that the type of frame is the dependent variable as our two variables are clearly discerned. However, to know if we can reasonably generalize this finding about our sample to the entire population, we will now proceed at the chi-square test of this bivariate analysis.

6.3.3. Chi-square test

The results of our bivariate analysis showed us that there is an extremely strong relationship between the type of frame and the type of interest group in our sample. However, if we want to be allowed to generalize this to the entire population, we need to make sure that the statistical significance level of this analysis is at least P < 0,05.

The result of the chi-square test is: $X3$ (1, N = 102) = 33.030, p = .000.

The p-value for this chi-square test is 0,000. Therefore, as this value is lower than 0,05, the value of the level of statistical significance that we have fixed for this research, we can reject the nul hypothesis and generalize the findings drawn from the analysis of our sample. This means, that we can say that in general, the type of an interest group influences the type of frame that it will choose to lobby the EP. We will now check if the specification of the sub-categories of frame can bring an interesting element for a better understanding of the relationship between those two variables.

6.3.4. Contingency table specifying the sub-categories of frame

The table 6. presented underneath is there to help us verify if the sub-categories of frame can give us any relevant information for a better understanding of the relationship between the type of frame and the type of interest group.

Table 6.

Contingency table looking at the relationship between the type of frame and the type of interest group, and specifying the sub-categories of frame

			type of the interest group doing the presentation			
			firm	sectional group	cause group	Total
specific type of frame used for the presentation	economic frame	Count	12	32	3	47
		% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	85.7%	60.4%	8.6%	46.1%
	environmental frame	Count	0	3	6	9
		% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	0.0%	5.7%	17.1%	8.8%
	human right frame	Count	0	2	12	14
		% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	0.0%	3.8%	34.3%	13.7%
	consumer protection frame	Count	2	15	8	25
		% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	14.3%	28.3%	22.9%	24.5%
	health and security frame	Count	0	1	6	7
		% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	0.0%	1.9%	17.1%	6.9%
Total		Count	14	53	35	102
		% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

What is interesting to notice when we observe table 6. is the fact that the vast majority of the sectional groups which have used a public good frame, have used a consumer protection frames. 15 of the presentations made by a cause group have used a consumer frame, which represents 71,4% of the public good frames used by the sectional groups. This observation raises some questions. We will discuss later what could this observation possibly mean, and how it could relate with the fact that when an economic committee is in charge, the consumer protection frame is the most used public good frame.

6.4. Bivariate analysis between the type of frame and the salience of the policy debate

In this section, we will compare the type of frame used by interest groups for their presentations with our third independent variable, the salience of the policy debate of the hearing for which the presentations were made. We will thus see if there is any kind of relationship between them.

6.4.1. Contingency table

The contingency table underneath only presents the two main categories of frames, as they are the only frames used in our hypotheses, and thus those for which we are looking for a relationship with the salience of the policy debate. Nevertheless, we will also look at the one specifying the sub-categories of frame to see if it gives us any other relevant information on the relationship of the two variables.

Table 7.

Contingency table looking at the relationship between the type of frame for a presentation, and the salience of the policy debate of the hearing for which the presentation was made

			salience level of the policy debate for which the presentation is made		
			low level of salience	high level of salience	Total
general type of frame used for the presentation	economic frame	Count	29	18	47
		% within salience level of the policy debate for which the presentation is made	47.5%	43.9%	46.1%
	public good frame	Count	32	23	55
		% within salience level of the policy debate for which the presentation is made	52.5%	56.1%	53.9%
Total		Count	61	41	102
		% within salience level of the policy debate for which the presentation is made	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In order to understand the table 7., it is important to remember that the salience of the policy debate of a hearing was measured by the number of speakers doing a presentation at this hearing.

When we observe table 7., we see that no real relationship appears between the type of frame and the salience of a policy debate. The salience of a policy debate does not seem to give any indication on which kind of frame interest groups will use for their presentation, as a change in the level of salience does not induce a noticeable change in the type of frame used. Therefore, based on these observations, we cannot really identify any patterns of association between the salience of a policy debate and the type of frame used. This indicates that the salience does not seem to influence the type of frame in any way. We will now look at the contingency table specifying the sub-categories of frame, as it could maybe reveal something more about the relation between those two variables.

Table 8.

Contingency table looking at the relationship between the type of frame and the salience of a policy debate, and specifying the sub-categories of frame

			salience level of the policy debate for which the presentation is made		
			low level of salience	high level of salience	Total
specific type of frame used for the presentation	economic frame	Count	29	18	47
		% within salience level of the policy debate for which the presentation is made	47.5%	43.9%	46.1%
	environmental frame	Count	3	6	9
		% within salience level of the policy debate for which the presentation is made	4.9%	14.6%	8.8%
	human right frame	Count	9	5	14
		% within salience level of the policy debate for which the presentation is made	14.8%	12.2%	13.7%
	consumer protection frame	Count	15	10	25
		% within salience level of the policy debate for which the presentation is made	24.6%	24.4%	24.5%
	health and security frame	Count	5	2	7
		% within salience level of the policy debate for which the presentation is made	8.2%	4.9%	6.9%
Total		Count	61	41	102
		% within salience level of the policy debate for which the presentation is made	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 8. does not show us any other interesting information, as the sub-categories of public good frame do not show any particular patterns of association with the level of salience. This observation therefore confirms the fact that no real link seem to exist between the type of frame and the salience of a policy debate, and it is therefore useless to go any further in the analysis of this relationship.

6.5. Comparison of the findings

In this section, we will first present the main findings of the different bivariate analyses we have conducted, and compare them through the help of a table crossing the main information provided by those bivariate analyses. A step that will allow us to look for any enlightening interaction between the different independent variables. After that, we will compare our final findings with our two hypotheses and see to what point they confirm or contradict them.

6.5.1. Presentation of the main findings

The first bivariate analysis we have conducted allowed us to find that there is a relationship between the type of frame used by an interest groups and the type of EP committee to which the interest group address its presentation. We have found that when a public good committee is in charge of the hearing, the interest group tend to choose a public good frame. On the other side, when the committee in charge is an economic one, the choice of frame seems more ambivalent. In that case, the distribution between the two frames seems more equivalent, but nonetheless with a tendency to favour an economic frame. Also, by looking at the sub-categories of frames, we have noticed that when an economic committee is charge, the consumer protection frame is the most used public frame.

Concerning the relationship between the type of frame and the type of interest group, we have found that it does exist and that it is extremely strong. So, we have found that the firms have a strong propensity to use an economic frame, even if we have to moderate this finding due to the fact that the number of firms in our sample is very low. On the contrary, we have found that the cause groups will nearly always opt for a public good frame, while the sectional groups will tend to use both, but nonetheless with a clear propensity for the economical one. Finally, by looking at the sub-categories of frames, we have found that the vast majority of the public good frames used by the sectional groups are in fact consumer protection frames.

Regarding the relationship between the type of frame used and the salience of the policy debate, we have found no real pattern of association. Having a look at the sub-categories of frame did not provide any interesting additional information about any possible link between those two variables.

Now that we have a look at each of the relationships between our dependent variable and our independent variables, it would be interesting to look if the different independent variables interact by strengthening or weakening each other. To do so, we will use a cross tabulation of the relationships between the type of frame and the different independent variables.

6.5.2. Analysis of the interactions between the independent variables

A cross tabulation with more than one variable is presenting a lot of information and is thus not always easy to read at first sight. Therefore, in order to make it easier to read, we have decided to exclude the independent variable of salience from this table. As we have seen that no real relationship exists between the salience of a policy debate and the type of frame used, including this variable in the table would only cloud our analysis of the interactions between the type of interest group and the type of committee.

Table 9.

Cross tabulation looking at the relationship between the type of frame and the type of interest groups and of committee

				type of the interest group doing the presentation			
type of the committee in charge of the hearing				firm	sectional group	cause group	Total
public good committee	general type of frame used for the presentation	economic frame	Count	1	4	0	5
			% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	100.0%	50.0%	0.0%	20.0%
		public good frame	Count	0	4	16	20
			% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	0.0%	50.0%	100.0%	80.0%
	Total		Count	1	8	16	25
			% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
economic	general type of frame	economic frame	Count	11	28	3	42

committee	used for the presentation		% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	84.6%	62.2%	15.8%	54.5%
		public good frame	Count	2	17	16	35
			% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	15.4%	37.8%	84.2%	45.5%
	Total		Count	13	45	19	77
			% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	general type of frame used for the presentation	economic frame	Count	12	32	3	47
			% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	85.7%	60.4%	8.6%	46.1%
		public good frame	Count	2	21	32	55
			% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	14.3%	39.6%	91.4%	53.9%
	Total		Count	14	53	35	102
			% within type of the interest group doing the presentation	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In table 9. we can see that there is a bit of an interaction between the type of committee and the type of interest group. We can observe here that when the interest group is a sectional one, the choice of frame is really fifty-fifty if the committee in charge is a public good one. In fact, the tendency of the sectional groups to prefer economic frames (observed in our bivariate analysis) seem to be moderated by the type of committee in charge, as the tendency is only observable when the committee in charge is an economic one. However, it is important to notice that there are only 8 presentations of sectional groups with a public good committee in charge, which is a bit low. Nevertheless, the type of committee does seem to have an effect on the choice of frame of the sectional groups.

We can also observe in table 9. that 100% of the cause groups use a public good frame when the committee in charge is a public good one. The cause groups seem to sometimes use (but still very rarely) an economic frame only when the committee in charge is an economic one.

So, it seems that the type of committee does have an impact on the choice of frame of the cause groups, showing like that another interaction between those two variables on their impact on the choice of frame.

Concerning the firms, we cannot say much as there is only one case of firm doing a presentation for a public good committee.

Thus, this cross tabulation have allowed us to see that there is an interaction between the type of interest group and the type of committee on the influence they have on the choice of frame. The type of committee is either increasing or moderating the predictability of the choice of frame when we know the interest group type.

Now that we have specified the findings of our analysis, we can go back to our hypotheses and verify if those findings confirm or contradict them.

6.5.3. Comparison of the findings with the hypotheses

Based on the theory of "the double logic of interest groups", we have formulated two hypotheses that we will now compare with the findings of our analysis. The first hypothesis is:

H1: "Interest groups' choice of frame is influenced by the type of EP committee in charge. The framing used will tend to be more often economic if an economic committee is in charge. On the other hand, the framing used will tend to be more often about public good if a public good committee is in charge."

The first and main part of this hypothesis is confirmed by our analysis, which does show that the type of committee in charge influences the type of frame used. However, as the statistic of Cramer V has showed us, this influence is moderately strong. Nevertheless, this part of the hypothesis is still confirmed. Concerning the part saying that if an economic committee is in charge the frame used will be more often an economic one, our analysis barely confirms that proposal. In that case, the economic frame is only used 9% more than the public good one. Finally, the last part of the hypothesis is clearly confirmed as 80% of the presentations use a public good frame when a public good committee is in charge. So, globally, we can say that our analysis confirms our first hypothesis. Let's now see if it is also the case four our second hypothesis.

H2: “Interest groups ’choice of frame is influenced by their type. The cause groups will tend to use more frequently public good framings, while the sectional interest groups will tend to use more economic framings, and the firms will use any framing.”

Our analysis clearly confirms the main part of our second hypothesis saying that the choice of frame of interest groups is influenced by their type. The analysis showed that the relationship between the type of frame and the type of interest group was extremely strong. The part of the hypothesis on the use of frame by the sectional and cause groups is also clearly confirmed by our findings. However, the last part of the hypothesis seems to be overturned by our findings as the firms clearly seem to favour the use of economic frames. However, we have to keep in mind that this observation is based on a small number of observations as we have only 14 presentations made by firms in our sample. So, we can say that our second hypothesis is mainly confirmed by our analysis, but still not entirely.

We can also add to this, based on the observation of table. 9, that due to their interactions, the combination of the knowing of the type of interest group and the type of committee in charge offers a better prediction of the type of frame than if we only know one of those two independent variables. Also, when the two hypotheses, the two logics, are in opposition, the logic of membership seems to prevail, has in the large majority of cases, the cause groups will still continue to use a public good frame when the committee in charge is an economic one.

7. Conclusion

In this last chapter, we will first discuss the answer to the research question of this thesis. After that, we will address the limitations of this research. Finally, we will discuss the implications of this study for the research concerning the use of framing in the lobbying of the European Union.

7.1. Research question

The research question of this thesis is:

"What factors influence interest groups' choice of framing for the information that they give to the EP?"

In order to answer this question, we have used the theory of "the double logic of interest groups" to identify two factors that seemed to have a decisive influence in the choice of framing. Then, for those two factors, respectively the type of interest group and the type of EP committee in charge, we have formulated hypotheses based on this same theory of "the double logic of interest groups". Those two hypotheses were stating that those two factors have indeed an influence on the choice of frame.

Therefore, in order to verify our hypotheses, we have conducted a statistical analysis on a sample of 102 pieces of information given by interest groups to the EP. This analysis, like it is explained in details in section 5.5.3., globally confirmed our hypotheses. Moreover, it did not only confirm that the type of interest group and the type of EP committee are factors influencing the type of frame used by interest groups to lobby the EP. The results of our analysis also show that those factors have strong influence on the choice of framing, especially the type of interest group, the logic of membership seeming to prevail on the logic of influence when the two are in opposition. Furthermore, our analysis has also shown that due to their interactions, the knowledge of both those variables offers a possibility of a good prediction of the type of frame.

In light of those findings, we can answer our research question and say that the main factors influencing the interest groups' choice of frame are the type of the interest group giving the information, and the type of EP committee receiving the information. It could be argued that

there can be other decisive factors influencing the choice of frame. However, as the existing literature presents those two factors as the only ones which seem relevant, and as we have also tested the only other factor that seemed possibly relevant, the salience of the policy debate, we can reasonably believe that we have found the decisive factors influencing the choice of frame at the EP level.

7.2. Limitations of the research

One of the limitations of this research is precisely what we have just mentioned in the precedent paragraph, the fact that we have maybe missed a factor that does have an important influence on the choice of frame by interest groups at the EP level. Even if the extensive use of the literature looking for another relevant factor considerably reduces that risk, it is still possible to have missed another important factor. The fact that the existing literature has missed to report other important factors is, indeed, absolutely possible.

Another limitation is the fact that the sample we have used is not very wide, especially concerning interest groups classified as firms. In fact, the number of presentations made by firms is so small, and especially when a public good committee is in charge, that the findings concerning them do not really allow us to draw trustworthy conclusions from them.

Finally, the last limitation of this study, is that we only analyse the information that interest groups give to the EP through the hearings. We do not analyse the information they send by emails to some MEP's or that they give during private meetings with the MEP's. To access this information would have required interviews or surveys. This would have been too hard to collect in sufficient number to be able to conduct a statistical analysis on them in regard of the time at our disposal to conduct our thesis. However, it is unlikely that the use of frame would have differed from those used during the hearings, as they address the same people. Maybe it would differ if it were addressed to a particular MEP in order to use a frame to which he/she would be more sensitive. Nonetheless, there is no reason for it to be different if it is addressed to the MEP's in general, to the EP as a whole, which is the subject of our research.

7.3. Research implications

This research focuses on the use of frame by interest groups at the EP level, and uses, to do so, a theory that was previously used to study the same thing, but at the Commission level. Therefore, it seems interesting to compare the results found at those two different stages of the legislative process of the EU.

When we compare our results with those found by Klüver, Mahoney and Opper for the use of frame at the Commission stage, two observations stand out. The first one is that when we compare the relationship between the type of DG (economic or public good) and the frame used, with the one between the type of committee and the type of frame, nearly the same pattern occurs. The public good DG's, like the public good committees, seem to strongly encourage the use of a public good frame. While on the other hand, when the DG or the committee are economical, interest groups seem to use either type of frames, with just maybe a small difference in favour of economic frames. The second observation is that, on the contrary, the results concerning the relationships between the type of interest and the type of frame are not the same at the two different levels. If at the Commission level like at the EP level, they show that cause groups tend to use more often a public good frame and the sectional ones an economic frame, the proportions are not the same. When at the Commission level the sectional groups use two times more often an economic frame than a public good one, at the EP level they use it only one time and a half more than the public good one. The same way, while at the Commission the cause groups use two times more often a public good frame than an economical one, at the EP the public good frame is nearly the only one they use (Klüver, Mahonay, Opper, 2015). However, our study confirms that the theory of "the double logic of interest groups" is relevant to analyse the use of frame at the EP level, as the hypotheses we have derived from it were globally confirmed. Therefore, this could push us to use this theory to explain the use of frame of interest groups in different contexts, like in the lobbying of the US Congress, and see if this theory is adapted to other scenes than the European one.

This second observation of the comparison is really interesting because it shows that globally the different types of interest groups tend to use more often a public good frame at the EP level than at the Commission level. The question is then: what causes this difference?

One possible path to answer this question has already been scratched by researchers such as Chalmers or Michalowitz. They say that in general, the EP parliament, as it is an elected body, is more receptive to information about the well-being of the citizens than the Commission, which, as an administration, is more demanding for technical information (Chalmers, 2013a, Michalowitz, 2004). Therefore, as the public good frames are especially centred over the well-being of the citizens it then seems logical that interest groups would more often use a public good frame at the EP level. However, it is important to remember that 70% of the frames used at the EP level by sectional groups in our sample are consumer protection frames. The same way, the consumer protection frame is the most used public good frame in our sample when an economic committee is in charge. This observation counterbalances our finding about the difference between the Commission and the EP. Maybe the difference is simply due to the fact that the consumer protection frame should be considered as an economic frame and not a public good one. In any case, this difference between the use of frame at the Commission and the EP levels asks for more research in order to be explained.

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Annexes

Annex 1: Coding scheme

Coding scheme:

For each presentation of an interest group during an hearing, the following dimensions of this presentation are code: the type of committee in charge of the hearing, the type of the interest group doing the presentation, the type of frame used for the presentation, the salience of the policy debate for which the presentation is made.

Dimension 1: the type of committee in charge of the hearing

Code	Category	Description
1.	Public good committee	The following committees have to be coded as public good committees: human rights committee, development committee, environment public health and food safety committee, culture and education committee, civil liberties justice and home affairs committee, women's rights and gender equality committee, internal market and consumer protection committee
2.	Economic committee	The following committees have to be coded as economic committees: international trade committee, economic and

		monetary affairs committee, employment and social affairs committee, transport and tourism committee, industry research and energy committee, agriculture and rural development committee, fisheries

Dimension 2: type of interest group doing the presentation

Code	Category	Description
1.	Firm	The interest group is a firm
2.	Sectional group	The interest group represents only the interests of a particular group such as farmers or boat builders, and it is structured as an association regrouping different members
3.	Cause group	The interest group is structured as an association composed of members, but it is defending a public interest, not the interests of a particular section of society

Dimension 3: the salience of the policy debate for which the presentation is made

Code
The code corresponds to the number of interest groups doing a presentation at the policy debate for which the presentation is made. Therefore, if there are 4 interest groups doing a presentation at that policy debate, the salience will be coded 4, if there are 20 interest groups, then the salience will be coded 20

Dimension 4: the type of frame used for the presentation

Code	Category	Description	Key words
1.	Economic frame	The presentation highlights the economical points of a policy debate, like the economical profits or losses that the discussed legislative act could engender, the jobs it could create or remove	Productive activities, economic growth, financial, economic development, profitability, economic performance, competitiveness, jobs, investment, insolvancy
2.	Sub-codes and categories	Description	Key words
	2.1 Environmental frame	The presentation highlights the environmental consequences of the legislative act discussed, such as the ecological problems it could	Ecosystem, sustainability, environmental impact, biodiversity

		cause or solve	
	2.2 Human rights frame	The presentation highlights the human rights consequences of the legislative act discussed, such as a better respect of those rights or, on the contrary, a violation of those rights	Human rights, rights, respect, human dignity, discrimination, equality
	2.3 Consumer protection frame	The presentation highlights the positive or negative consequences that the legislative act discussed could have on the protection of consumers	Safety, consumer rights, consumer expectations, protection, services
	2.4 Health and security frame	The presentation highlights the positive or negative consequences that the legislative act discussed could have on public health or public security	Health problems, illnesses, diseases, deaths

If different types of frame are used in a presentation, the next procedure has to be followed:

Step 1: identification of what the interest group is arguing for

Step 2: listing of the arguments used by the interest group to explain why the EU should do what they are asking for

Step 3: identification of the frame of each argument

Step 4: counting of the number of arguments using a public good frame, and the number of arguments using an economic frame

Step 5: if most arguments use an economic frame, the frame of the presentation is coded as economic, if most arguments use a public good frame, the frame of the presentation is coded as the sub public good frame the most used in the arguments

Coding schedule:

Presentation number	Name of the interest group	Type of committee in charge	Type of the interest group doing the presentation	Salience of the policy debate for which the presentation is made	The type of frame used for the presentation

Annex 2: Coded data

Number of the interest group	Name of the interest group	Type of committee in charge	Type of the interest group doing the presentation	Salience of the policy debate for which the presentation is made	The type of frame used for the presentation
1.	Center For Reproductive rights	1.	3.	6.	2.2
2.	Federation for Women and Family Planning	1.	3.	6.	2.4
3.	Marie Stopes Internattional	1.	3.	6.	2.2
4.	PRO-ECPAT	1.	3.	6.	2.2
5.	European Transport Security Council	2.	3.	9.	2.2
6.	The Motorcycle Industry in Europe (ACEM)	2.	2.	9.	1.
7.	European Automobile Manufactuers' Association	2.	2.	9.	1.
8.	European Garage and Test Equipment Association	2.	2.	9.	2.3
9.	International Road Transport Union	2.	2.	9.	1.

10.	North West Automotive Alliance	2.	2.	9.	2.3
11.	Deep Sea Conservation Coalition	2.	3.	8.	2.1
12.	Bloom Association	2.	3.	8.	1.
13.	BusinessEurope	1.	2.	8.	1.
14.	Ecommerce Europe	1.	2.	5.	2.3
15.	ALSTOM	2.	1.	9.	1.
16.	Leaseurope	1.	2.	7.	2.3
17.	ICTSD	2.	3.	3.	2.1
18.	CEFIC	2.	2.	3.	1.
19.	General Electric	2.	1.	3.	1.
20.	CELACAT	2.	2.	3.	1.
21.	European Transport Workers Federation	2.	2.	3.	1.
22.	International Road Transport Union	2.	2.	3.	1.
23.	PGNiG	2.	1.	4.	2.1
24.	New World Resourcess	2.	1.	4.	1.
25.	CEE Bankwatch Network	2.	3.	4.	1.
26.	European Photovoltaic Industry Association	2.	2.	4.	1.
27.	EURODAD	2.	3.	4.	1.
28.	European Banking Federation	2.	2.	4.	1.

29.	ACI	2.	2.	7.	2.3
30.	International Air Transport Association	2.	2.	7.	2.3
31.	European Regions Airline Association	2.	2.	7.	2.3
32.	ELFAA	2.	2.	7.	1.
33.	TUI Travel PLC	2.	1.	7.	1.
34.	The European Consumer Organisation	2.	3.	7.	2.3
35.	Telefonica Digital	2.	1.	5.	2.3
36.	The European Consumer Organisation	2.	3.	5.	2.3
37.	NFFO	2.	2.	7.	2.1
38.	Scottish White Fish Producers Association	2.	2.	7.	1.
39.	Scapèche	2.	1.	7.	1.
40.	The International Air Carrier Association	2.	2.	4.	1.
41.	European Transport Workers Federation	2.	2.	4.	2.3
42.	European Cockpit Association	2.	2.	4.	2.3
43.	NGVA Europe	2.	2.	10.	2.1
44.	EV Plug Alliance	2.	2.	10.	1.
45.	European Automobile Manufacturers	2.	2.	10.	1.

	Association				
46.	International Road Transport Union	2.	2.	10.	1.
47.	International Road Transport Union	2.	2.	8.	2.1
48.	Transport and Environment	2.	3.	8.	2.4
49.	European Cyclists Federation	2.	3.	8.	2.4
50.	International Union for Road-Rail combined transport	2.	2.	8.	1.
51.	CEE Bankwatch Network	2.	3.	4.	2.1
52.	BEUC	1.	3.	3.	2.3
53.	ECTAA	1.	2.	3.	1.
54.	ETTSA	1.	2.	3.	1.
55.	Arche Noah	2.	3.	9.	2.1
56.	European Seed Association	2.	2.	9.	2.3
57.	Copa-Cogeca	2.	2.	9.	1.
58.	BusinessEurope	2.	2.	4.	1.
59.	European Trade Union Confederation	2.	2.	4.	2.2
60.	Orange	2.	1.	5.	2.3
61.	BT Group	2.	1.	5.	1.
62.	Deutsche Telecom	2.	1.	5.	1.
63.	Coalleanza delle Cooperative Italiane	2.	2.	5.	1.
64.	WWF	2.	3.	5.	2.1
65.	Amnesty	2.	3.	3.	2.4

	International				
66.	Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe	2.	2.	3.	1.
67.	FORATUM	2.	2.	4.	2.4
68.	Friends of the Earth Europe	2.	3.	4.	2.4
69.	Amnesty International	1.	3.	8.	2.2
70.	FIFA	1.	2.	8.	2.2
71.	Human Right Watch	1.	3.	8.	2.2
72.	AMCHAM EU	1.	2.	4.	2.3
73.	BEUC	1.	3.	4.	2.3
74.	VDA	1.	2.	4.	1.
75.	EUROFOUND	1.	3.	4.	2.2
76.	Pêcheurs de Bretagne	2.	2.	6.	1.
77.	CEPESCA	2.	2.	6.	1.
78.	European Association of Fish Producers	2.	2.	6.	1.
79.	SEDC	2.	2.	4.	1.
80.	ENPA	2.	2.	4.	1.
81.	ORACLE	2.	1.	4.	1.
82.	Communia	1.	3.	4.	2.2
83.	Privacy International	1.	3.	13.	2.2
84.	Facebook	1.	1.	13.	1.
85.	BEUC	1.	3.	13.	2.3
86.	Bloomberg	2.	1.	8.	1.
87.	Finance Watch	2.	3.	8.	2.3

88.	Blackrock	2.	1.	8.	1.
89.	BEUC	1.	3.	5.	2.3
90.	Which	1.	3.	5.	2.3
91.	PRAC	2.	2.	2.	1.
92.	ECTAA	2.	2.	5.	2.3
93.	European Disability Forum	2.	3.	5.	2.2
94.	International Air Transport Association	2.	2.	5.	2.3
95.	CER	2.	2.	5.	2.3
96.	ADFM	1.	3.	3.	2.2
97.	FIDH	1.	3.	3.	2.2
98.	The PEW Environment Group	2.	3.	7.	2.1
99.	Association of European Airlines	2.	2.	6.	1.
100.	Association of Italian Airport Managers	2.	2.	6.	2.3
101.	UECNA	2.	3.	6.	2.4
102.	Federation of Irish Fishermen	2.	2.	5.	1.