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Examining Motives of the Right-Wing Populist Parties' Electorate in Scandinavian Countries

Kristina Parshina

431793

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Markus Haverland

2nd Reader: Prof. Dr. Steven Van de Walle

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Abstract

In the framework of growing popularity of right-wing parties in Europe one can come up with the question of what actually drives voting behavior. Immigration issue became very relevant nowadays, specifically within the right-wing populists' rhetoric; therefore, one can assume that anti-immigration sentiment plays major role in shaping voter's preferences. This research aims at identifying the most important motive that explains right-wing voter's attitudes in Scandinavian countries within this anti-immigration sentiment. The dependent variable is votes given for right-wing parties in the last parliamentary election. Independent variables are constructed out of the theoretical concepts based on the idea that immigrants represent cultural or economic threat. Control variables are also added in the analysis. This study is quantitative and binomial logistic regression is used. The results of the research for all three Scandinavian countries show that people's voting behavior for right-wing populist parties is mainly driven by cultural motives.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 1.1 Introduction

There is a clear trend of growing popularity of right wing parties in European countries, which has already granted these parties with more seats and power in national parliaments (The Guardian, 2015). Such popularity stems from the ability of right-wing parties to mobilize grievances over migration. Right-wing parties portray themselves as protectors of the European welfare state, which is arguably burdened by the vast numbers of incoming refugees (Wigmore, 2015). Recent studies support this view (Gibson, 2002; Mudde, 2007; Malone, 2014).

Immigration has been one of the most vital issues in Europe over the past couple of years, triggered by the growing amount of immigrants flowing into European countries. According to the U.N. figures, over 700,000 refugees have moved to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea during the year 2015; and a pew survey, conducted in various European countries in 2014, has shown that the majority of respondents wanted to limit the number of new immigrants arriving in their countries. Those attitudes were especially evident for people who identify themselves as politically right-wing (PewResearchCenter, 2014; Robins-Early, 2015; The UN refugee agency, 2015).

Instead of focusing on public sentiment on immigration, this research aims to identify what drives voters to have such sentiment. This thesis emphasizes two sets of explanatory factors of voting patterns for right-wing parties: economic and cultural. Some media articles argue that concerns about immigration among the native population include both cultural and economic issues - e.g., many suppose that immigrants do not want to adopt their new country's habits and ways of life, and many believe that immigrants are taking jobs away from native-born citizens (Robins-Early, 2015). This research aims to investigate, which of the factors – cultural or economic – areis more motivating within the electorate of right-wing parties.

1.2 Thesis overview

This thesis will consist of six chapters. Chapter one provides insight intoon right-wing voters in Scandinavia, and will justifiesy the region as the area of focus with both practical and academic validation.

Chapter two will present theories about the right-wing ideology. A detailed definition of right-wing politics, as well as right-wing populism is given. Additionally, two sets of motives that are considered to be responsible for the voting behavior of the right-wing party electorate are discussed. Attitudes towards immigration can be categorized as either cultural or economic. Out of the theoretical concepts mentioned, three hypotheses are made for further testing.

In Cchapter three, issues related to research design are presented. It describes the methods used for testing hypotheses, justifies the chosen dataset, and identifies the dependent variable, independent variables, and controlled variables. Measurement of the variables is described in the operationalization section, and a detailed description of the analysis is given in the last part of the Cchapter. Important remarks are also made on the validity of the analysis.

In Cchapter four, results of various statistical tests are presented. After a short introduction, results for bivariate correlation of independent variables are given and explained. The second paragraph is dedicated to the multicollinearity test that helps to identify strong correlation between independent variables, which can cause unwanted effect on the results of logistic regression. Finally, the fourth paragraph presents the results for the logistic regression. The output is discussed for each country in the last section of the chapter.

In Cchapter five, the main findings of this research are presented and discussed. Hypotheses that have been derived out of the existing theories in Chapter 2 are supported, approved or rejected according to the main findings, and the answer to the main research question is given. The last two paragraphs of Chapter 5 provide limitations to the research and new venues for further research are given.

1.3 1.3 Selection of countries

For this research, three Scandinavian countries – Norway, Denmark and Sweden, have been selected. First and foremost, these countries have common historical and cultural heritage, and right-wing tendencies in these countries are fairly strong specifically due to specifically their strong representative voting systems. In Sweden, Norway and Denmark, there are proportional representation voting systems that proportionally represent divisions in the electorate in the nationally elected government. In Denmark, for example, the Danish Peoples Party received 21,1 % of the vote share and were allocated 37 seats out of 179 in its parliament (The Guardian, 2015). This is more successful than right-wing parties in countries that utilize alternative voting systems, like the United Kingdom. In 2015, the UK's right-wing party UKIP received 12,5% of the vote share, yet wasere only allocated one seat in the Parliament, due to its first past the post voting system.

Even though each country has its own specific political context, populist rhetoric and opinion on the issue of immigration issues are rathermore or less similar within Scandinavia (Knutsen, 2001). According to Widfeldt, (2000), anti-immigration sentiment became a key element for both the Danish Peoples Party and the , as well as the Norwegian Progress Party; and recently, the same sentiment has been used by the Swedish right-wing populist party. Another reason to choose this particular region iwas that Norway, Denmark and Sweden all are all Scandinavian welfare states, which areis characterized by generous social benefits (Leibfried, 1992; Ferrera, 1996). High living standards make these countries attractive for immigrants – for example, the amount spent on social expenditures as a percentage of GDP according to 2014 OECD figures equallwas 28,1% in Sweden, 30,1% in Denmark and 22% in Norway. Also, these countries have the lowest proportions of their populations considered to be at-risk-of-poverty or socially excludedsion in 2013, with 16,4%, 18,9% and 14,1% relatively (Eurostat, 2015). Specifically for migrants, Scandinavian countries developed a broad set of measures that fulfill all the needs of newcomers. They have integration programmes, including language classes,; as well as the possibilities to apply for a jobwork, a a residence permit and a social assistance (Euronews, 2015). Inasmuch as welfare programmes are of high importance in these countries, the immigrant flow is most likely to cause athe redistribution of budgetary spending in favor of newcomers, which lets us assume that economic reasons for voting for RWP in Scandinavian countries are relatively stronger, than cultural. However, not only economic

benefits make these countries attractive to immigrants. As it has been already mentioned, in all Scandinavian countries large-scale integration programmes have been developed. From the middle of 20th century the Nordic countries have been gradually opening their borders, providing their citizens (and the EU citizens later) with a possibility to work and live in any Nordic country (Østby and Silje, 2013). Moreover, there were various programmes on the employment of workers from countries outside of Europe, such as Turkey and Pakistan. Additionally, besides the recruitment policy, family reunification programmes with those outside of Europe hads been taking place, which simplified the process of obtaining a citizenship for immigrants' relatives and, trus, yet made Scandinavian countries more appealing for newcomers (Østby and Silje, 2013).

1.4 Objective of the research

Right-wing populist parties are often considered as anti-immigration parties (Brug, Fennema, Tillie, 2005). Therefore, this research aims at identifying the most important motive that explains right-wing voter's attitudes in Scandinavian countries within anthe anti-immigration sentiment.

1.5 Research question

Which factors explain people's support for right-wing populist parties in three Scandinavian countries?

After answering the main question, it will be possible to look at the results for these countries and provide an answer to a sub-question:

Are the factors that explain voting behavior in favor of right-wing populist parties the same for Denmark, Norway and Sweden?

As it has been discussed previously in this chapter, these countries share various similarities in their cultural and political life; therefore, the answer to the sub-question will provide the information on whether or not the right-wing party's electorate shares the same motives.

The dependent variable consists of current voting behavior, particularly votes given for right-wing parties in last parliamentary election. The independent variables will be constructed alongside the hypotheses, which will derive from the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2.

1.6   1.6 Scientific and societal relevance

1.6.1 Societal relevance

The issue of right-wing politics has not been discussed in Europe for a very long period of time after the Second World War, as the cruel events caused by fascists were still well remembered. Countries that experienced fascist occupation hadve been discrediting any manifestations of radical right-wing policies (Widfeldt, 2000). However, during the 1980s and 1990s, a revival of right-wing parties began to takinge place, contradicting the core assumptions of postwar political sociology (Rydgen, 2007). In this regard, some scientists (Inglehart, 1977) assumed that society will turn to a post-materialist era, where issues such as clean environment and personal freedom will be more valued than economic needs or national defense. The immigration issue is one of the most essential domains within athe right-wing party ideology, and as soon as this issue appeared on the political agenda, it automatically has led to the rise of right-wing parties (Lubbers, 2001) After such a significant shift in voting behavior towards the right end of the political spectrum, various scientists wanted to examine the main motivations behind these changes. Growing support for anti-immigration parties, which called for a social division on "us" and "them", caused serious tensions within the society and threatened the idea of equality.   Throughout Europe, there has been growing support for right-wing parties, fuelled by the migrant crisis and a massive rejection of the current political establishment. This has led to more seats in national parliaments for right-wing parties (see Table 1).

Table 1

Support for far-right parties in Europe

Note: Voting intention, % of respondents

Source: Economist.com

In Scandinavia, right-wing tendencies are visible in all three countries. The Danish People's Party became the second largest party in the last general election (Table 3), which affected the immigration policy towards migrants, as benefits were cut for newcomers (BBC news, 2016). Sweden is the country with the highest amount of asylum seekers per capita in the European Union (Migrationsverket, 2016). In the last general election, Swedish Democrats, the party that is opposing multiculturalism (as well as the Danish People's Party does), also gained enough support to become athe third-largest party in the country. Norway's Progress Party remains the third-biggest party as well, and right-wing tendencies are somewhat clear. In 2011, attacks by Breivik, who used to be a member of the Progress Party, illustrate the presence of radical attitudes towards migrants within the country. In

accordance with these trends, understanding of the main motivations of right-wing supporters is of high importance.

SThe success of right-wing populist parties is linked to the ability of these parties to mobilize grievances around the migration (Malone, 2014; Rydgren, 2005). After 2013, the number of asylum applicants in Europe has increased sharply (Eurostat, 2016), which led to the European migrant crisis, which in turn made right-wing politics more appealing to a growing number of the electorate. It appears, that the majority of the voters in European countries hadve largely been disenchanted with their governments' attempts at dealing with this issue. For example, in Germany, Merkel's approval ratings hadve significantly fallen because of the way she approached the issue of immigration. According to a poll carried out by Infratest Dimap in June 2016, only 50% of German voters approve of her performance as a chancellor, down by five percentage points compared to May 2016. While this is not per se indicative of the dissatisfaction of German voters with Angela Merkel over the issue of immigration, it shows that the voters are perceptive enough to see whether their preferences are reflected in the policies adopted by their government or not. If one looks at the Merkel's approval ratings over time, hone can easily discover that they sharply declined in August of 2015. This coincides with the German chancellor's statements on the state of the asylum policy in Germany, and her unwillingness to implement a cap on the maximum number of refugees that were arriving in Germany (Die Welt, 2015). In short, after the occurrence of the migrant crisis, some of the European governments showed incapability to cater to the preferences of their constituents, which has made the right-wing rhetoric more appealing to a huge amount of voters.

The research at hand deals with two sentiments that inform the preference for one or another political party – economic and cultural – which are deemed to be relevant for the formulation of the voters' preferences. If one looks at the practical relevance of current paper, one can say, that understanding these factors can be crucial for the formulation of an effective immigration policy that would be acceptable to the majority of voters. As the example above has demonstratesd, the right-wing populist parties capitalize on the unwillingness or the inability of some of the European governments to take cultural and economic concerns into consideration when formulating national immigration policies. Thus, understanding the factors that make voters support right-wing party platforms is

crucial due tofor the several reasons. First, it would allow European governments to develop a more acceptable stance on immigration that would enjoy broader popular support. Forging a new consensus on immigration policy is crucial to help reverse the state of apathy and disenchantment ensuing among the populations of some of the European countries, which have arisen from the failure of national governments to find publicly endorsed solutions to the migrant crisis. Consequently, a move towards thea new consensus would signal to the voters at the national level that their governments take their preferences seriously, and, hence, it could help to rebuild thesome of the political trust and tohelp restore voter's confidence. Second, it could also curb the influence of right-wing populism on the political process by catering to the preferences of broader segments of the national electoral bases, and hence preventing right-wing populism from taking strong root in political cultures of the European countries.

1.6.2 Scientific relevance

As it has been previously mentioned, the amount of research examining voting behavior, specifically motives of right-wing voters, has increased over past decades. Detailed information on the most significant studies concerning this issue is presented in Chapter 2. This enables a comprehensive review of established knowledge on the study's general and specific topics. Even though the amount of studies is significant, theyit haves certainits limitations. First of all, political environment is not static, it is highly dependent on the events that are occurring unpredictably and may influence anthe established political order. Since many studies have been conducted years or even decades ago, they cannot adequately address the problems and tendencies that are taking place in Europe nowadays. Current research is based on the newer data and latest events. In this regard, this research is academically relevant, because the amount of research done on the issue of right-wing voter's attitudes since the occurrence of migrant crisis is limited, and current investigation can make an important contribution to already existing body of knowledge. Another limitation found in previous researches is that most of studiesthem are concentrated on a specific socioeconomic class, such as worker-class or low-educated people, which makes the results too specific (Oesch, 2008; Powdthavee and Oswald, 2014, Siedler, 2007). Some studies are examining voters from numerous countries with very different cultural, social and political background, which makes it tempting to overgeneralize results (Ivarsflaten,

2008; Gibson, 2002). In addition, there is a relatively small amount of studies, which are focused only on Scandinavian countries (Widfeldt, 2000), and this gap is going to be addressed.

A large segment of literature regarding the topic of right-wing parties is dedicated to research on extreme right-wing parties, such as fascist or racist parties. Surprisingly, scientists were focused less on right-wing populist parties, which do not belong to an "extreme family" (Rydgen, 2005; Mudde, 2007).

Exploration of voters' behavior is generally including the protest-vote model (Van der Brug ,2000), sentiments of dissatisfaction with politics or euro-skepticism, or are considering this issue with "supply" and "demand" side. For example, Van der Brug in his research (2000) is explaining voting behavior only with the party ideology, claiming that protest voting is not always the case for those, who prefer right-wing parties. According to that, right-wing electorate represents a policy voting, rather than a demonstration of a the protest. However, Lubbers (2001) suggests that dissatisfaction with politics can result into an increase in support for right-wing parties, because those are usually opposing current political establishment. On the other hand, various studies considering voting behavior from the supply-side argue, that the sentiment of political dissatisfaction is not correlated with radical right-wing party voters, since the latter still showed satisfaction with their government (Norris, 2005). While examining the supply-side of extreme right-wing voting, studies are mainly focused on such issues as party ideology, structural organization and electoral systems (Carter, 2005; Fennema, 2006). Demand-side explanations are commonly covering socio-economic conditions, however, most of the researchers are using both demand and supply side while conducting their investigations (Koopmans and Muis, 2009). While examining voting behavior, the latest events that may utterly trigger electorate's preferences must be taken into consideration. In this regard, the current migrant crisis has changed the way people are voting and it showcases a shift in the attitudes people hold (The Economist, 2016). Parties under investigation are opposing multiculturalism and are calling for more strict immigration policies; therefore, there is a particular interest in focusing on anti-immigrant sentiment independently and see, how economic or cultural factors are driving immigrant attitudes of voters.

2. Theoretical framework

In this chapter the main theoretical concepts related to the issue under investigation will be discussed. First of all, it is necessary to give a proper explanation to the concept of right-wing parties, as well as to provide a definition of populism in the framework of right-wing politics. The next step is to discuss the main motivations among right-wing voters and to derive hypotheses for further investigation.

2.1 Right-wing parties: definition and typology

Right-wing ideology assumes social stratification and inequality in various domains such as welfare or privileges (Johnson, 2005). It is based on the assumption of national distinctiveness, and therefore, right-wing parties are known for protection of rights of native citizens, arguing that they should be distinguishable from those of the foreigners. Therefore, a central issue behind right-wing politics is a defense of national identity.

Some scientists distinguish various types of right-wing parties, however, most of them are focusing on the extreme ones such as fascist, racist and nationalist parties (Fennema, 2005). However, conservative, populist or liberal parties can also be right-wing. In the framework of current research it is more important to focus on the populist parties, and since those are sometimes taken for radical parties, one needs to provide a definition for each extreme type of the party in order to make thea difference clear.

First type of right-wing party, which does not necessarily can be called extreme, is a populist party. The most significant feature of these parties is that they juxtapose current political elites and the ordinary citizen, claiming that established political power is self-oriented and do not represent interest of a common man. Populists are appealing to public sentiments of anxiety and frustration (Bertz, 1994). Therefore, populist parties are sharing anti-establishment themes, and even though they are commonly addressing immigration issue in the framework of social predicaments, it is not their main target, as in the case of racist parties.

Fascist parties are extreme right-wing parties based on a specific party organization, where leadership is made into a general party principle. To be called a fascist party, it has to share some principles of fascist ideology. The most common elements of fascist doctrine are:

- ethnic nationalism, which excludes those who do not belong to a specific ethnic community;
- anti-materialism, which emphasizes the idea of holistic society and considers individualism as an egoism, because individual should 'subordinate himself to the nation" (Fennema, p.6);
- critique of democracy, which assumes that political elites in the democracy only care about their own welfare and material benefits while not pursuing the common good.

Another type of the right-wing parties is a racist party. To distinguish it, one must look at its policy, which commonly stands on anti-immigration sentiment. These parties are stressing hereditary biological differences within the society, which lead to a natural social inequality. Therefore, out-groups are tending to be excluded from the "nation". Moreover, this biological argumentation is followed by the proposition of incompatibility between native and foreign cultures. Since nowadays it is illegal to make claims based on the race, neo-racist parties are concentrating on the incompatible cultural differences, where foreign cultures are presented as a threat too a homogenous national culture. Another aspect allowing to distinguish a racist party is their belief that immigrants are worsening crime situation or can be even blamed for all social problems. However, Rydgen and Fennema (2005) are suggesting that there is often a a difference between racist and extreme right-wing parties, because formerirst are usually the single-issue partiesy.

So, to conclude, one should be able to recognize the differences between these types of parties. Fascist and racist parties are not perceived as democratic parties (Mudde, 2008), and both of them are often radical in their attitudes towards out-groups. In this regard, anti-immigration sentiment is the most important (and in case of racist parties, the exclusive) within their ideology. Right-wing populist parties are less radical; they anticipate presence of different groups within a one nation and address various issues within their agenda.

In current investigation the main focus is on right-wing populist parties. It has been done so, because in the countries chosen only this type of parties are gaining large support of the electorate, and they are not forbidden by the law, as could be the case with the other extreme party types. Therefore, it is necessary to provide a definition of populist politics. Several approaches to the definition of populist ideology are to be examined. Populism is highly adaptable to the environment it appears in, and thus, it claimed not to have strong core principles (Taggart, 2000). However, it is believed that populism as an ideology is based on the concepts of "democracy", "sovereignty" and "the people" (Abts and Rummens, 2007). These principles may also be applicable for other democratic parties; however, the concept of populism is based on the struggle between common man and elites, while democracy itself focuses on the distribution of governance to the people regardless of social classes. Populism focuses more on the struggle between the common class and the elite class It is argued, that populism is a reaction against elites, their policies and entrenched power (Taggart, 2000). It appeals to those, who are dissatisfied with the established order in various domains, such as political, social or economic spheres. It advocates for a defense of community and political interests of a common body (Taggart, 2000). Populism opposes sovereign people with their values, beliefs and voice to "elites", which are encroaching on people's prosperity (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Groshek and Engelbert, 2013). In this regard, Cas Mudde (2004) describes populism as a concept where a division within the society between "the pure people" and "corrupted elite" takes place, characterizing both of the groups as highly antagonistic and homogenous. "Elites" are blamed for overrepresentation of their interests while being ignorant to real interests and needs of people. Therefore, another element of populism is a return of power back to common man and revival of popular sovereignty (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Schedler, 1996). From this point of view, people considered to be a unity with common will and single voice, which they are capable to express. Nevertheless, there are different approaches to populism among the scientists. Some of them consider populism as thea strategy of political mobilization (Betz, 2002; Canovan, 1999). By providing clear solutions to complicated political or social problems, populists are appealing to the the common body striving to fundamentally renew current political order.

Moving from a broad concept of populism towards a specific right-wing populism, one must say that right-wing populist parties are advocating for a defense of national identity

inherent to particular country in order to preserve cultural heritage and authenticity. One of the main incentives of right-wing populists is not only to protect the interests of a common man against corrupted elites, but also to protect society from the enormous immigrant flow (Fennema, 2005).

According to Mudde (2007), there are various aspects that lead to the electoral support of right-wing populist parties. Even though in his book he is focusing on radical right parties, his classification is still considered to be useful in the framework of current research. As stated in his investigation, ideology, leadership and organization are of significant importance among the internal factors leading to a success of these parties. Fennema and Rydgen (2005) believe, that populist anti-immigration parties will become an essential part of political life of European Union, and success of these parties is linked with the integration problem caused by the migrant flow towards Europe and structural changes in European democracies.

2.2 Voter motivation: Immigration

In this part the most significant theories explaining the RWP voter's motivations will be discussed, resulting in hypotheses for this research.

A comprehensive literature review was conducted in order to identify the most perceptible theories as to what motivates people to support right-wing populist parties. As already discussed above, according to the theories, the strongest sentiment behind voting for RWP is anti-immigration. This idea has been previously developed in various studies, that all agreed upon the ultimate importance of this sentiment. Elisabeth Ivarsflaten (2008) in her research provided strong evidence supporting the fact, that successful RWP in several European countries mobilized grievances over immigration, whereas the link between mobilization of grievances over political or economic issues and electoral success was relatively weak. Moreover, some of the scientists tended to name "right-wing parties" as "anti-immigration parties", as Brug, Fennema, Tillie (2005) did in their research. Therefore, there is a general consensus on the idea that right-wing parties mobilize on anti-immigration attitudes (Malone, 2014; Rydgren, 2005).

Several scientists have already mentioned in their researches different framing of anti-immigrant sentiments that citizens tend to have: some of them link immigration with loss of cultural distinctiveness and national identity, when they feel, that European values are endangered with "invasion" of immigrants with the lack of incentive to assimilate into European society, so the "cultural conflict" is stressed (Rydgen, 2008; Oesch, 2008; Zaslove, 2004). Others link immigration to job losses, fear of competition over other welfare benefits, and stressing the "economic conflict" (Rydgen, 2008; Oesch, 2008). It is not clear yet whether the key anti-immigration stance taken by voters is due to cultural reasons or economic. Thus, in the following part of this chapter both economic and cultural sentiments in the framework of anti-immigration attitudes are going to be discussed.

2.2.1 Economic reasons

Most of the previous studies were based on the assumption that immigrants are creating a threat to the job market by increasing the competition and thus leaving native citizens unemployed (Oesch, 2008; Jackman and Volpert, 1996).

According to Kitschelt, the free market and neo-liberal position promoted by the right-wing parties is almost a direct and natural consequence of the opening up of a global market economy following the post industrialization process. Politics promoting this free market often go hand in hand with proposals for severe tax reductions. This type of economy is very attractive to migrants because the chances of welfare prosperity are in reach. In result, migrants tend to be attracted to move to such countries as long as it provides them with the opportunity to get a well-paid job (Kitshelt, 1997).

With regard to voting behavior, a shift of voting behavior to the right end of the political spectrum could also be explained by the fact that the libertarian left, traditionally regarded as protectors of redistribution politics, have increasing difficulties satisfying an electorate consisting of both materialist and post-materialist voters. To be more precise, materialist issues are covering the conflict over ownership of the means of production and income (Meret, 2010). Post-materialist values started to appear later on in the 60-s, when the

significant shift in voter's attention took place. Values concerning minority rights, environmental problems and gender issues were shaping post-materialist voter's choice.

Since the materialist voters could not affiliate themselves with the libertarian and multicultural politics promoted by the left-wing parties, the right-wing parties provide and alternative characterizing a more authoritative and anti-multiculturalist position. This has led to a materialist voter's shift from the left-wing parties to the right-wing. In result a shift from a neo-liberal position to welfare chauvinist position cleared the reservations for the materialist electorate.

Immigrants are considered not only to take jobs, but in cases are perceived as undeserving recipients of social benefits (Kitshelt, 1997). The phenomenon called "welfare state chauvinism" has appeared in many investigations connected with the exploration of the rise of RWP and its linkage with increasing immigration into European countries. The main focus of welfare state chauvinism is on who is actually entitled to welfare state benefits, such as unemployment benefits or pensions. According to welfare chauvinists, social benefits provided by the welfare state are meant only for those who they believe belong to the community. (van der Zwaard, 2014). Referring back to the right-wing standard, social affiliations within society are based in national, cultural, and ethnic or racial aspects. In result, those included in this community are considered 'nourishing' to the welfare state. Inherently it refers to the ethnically homogeneous native population, where elderly and children are considered justifiable recipients of welfare benefits (Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). In the eyes of welfare chauvinists, those who fall outside this community are unjustly utilizing the societal scarce resources provided by the welfare system. This means a demand for increasing restrictions against those considered undeserving recipients of welfare benefits.

Such growing competition for the resources produced social division into "in-group" and "out-group" (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002), or "us" and "the foreigners" (Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990). In line with welfare state chauvinism, increasing competition proved to cause exclusionary reactions of in-group people towards outsiders, as they are more likely to blame foreigners rather than members of the same group (Scheepers, Gijsberts, Coenders, 2001). Furthermore one could argue that it moves people

into a protectionist position driven by feelings of risk, fear, threat, and insecurity about one's economic position in society in the future. In terms of welfare politics the substantial difference parties promoting universal welfare and right-wing parties is that welfare supported by right-wing parties is not 'for all', but consists of a system of social benefits belonging to the ethnically homogeneous community. This understanding of welfare politics considers migrants as freeloaders, who did not directly help build the system and are nonetheless claiming its benefits today. Right-wing economic policies are assumed to be a vital part of electoral success of right parties as they are able to address economic grievances of native population (Mudde, 2000). Therefore, in the conditions of growing competition for the resources and the increase of government spending on the immigrants, people may prefer to vote for RWP, whose agenda is oriented towards protection of national welfare. Examples of how economic motives are affecting voter's anti-immigrant attitudes and in turn increase their support for right-wing parties are largely presented in the real life. In Greek elections in 2015 winning party gained great support only due to its coalition with right-wing party "Independent Greeks" (Dearden, 2015). The latter is claiming that the amount of immigrants has to be strictly limited, because enormous amount of newcomers and following spending on them damages economical sustainability of the country (Dearden, 2015).

These empirical and theoretical notions presents us with the hypothesis that within the right-wing populist party' electorate there are more people who hold the opinion that immigrants take away jobs in country and take out more in terms of taxes and services than they put. At this point, it is possible to develop the first pair of hypotheses out of the identified theory:

1. People who believe that immigrants take away jobs in the country are more likely to vote for right-wing populist parties (economic threat);
2. People who hold the opinion that immigrants are undeserving recipients of social benefits are more likely to vote for right-wing populist parties (economic threat).

2.2.2 Cultural reasons

The Issues of immigration and culture are highly correlated to one another, because newcomers have to adapt to the new way of living. This is the point, where most of the concerns of native citizens occur, because Europeans are not well prepared for the cultural conflict inherent to religious minorities' culture. During many centuries Europe was a region of Christianity, whereas other religions were not largely represented there, and therefore, citizens are not familiar with inherent ways of living. In order to avoid conflicts within the society and address cultural and religious diversity policy of multiculturalism has been widely applied. This kind of policy focuses on helping to overcome various shortcomings that may occur with a group belonging to a different cultural or religious minority. Policy of multiculturalism is aimed at the legal establishment of different groups within the society and acceptance of its different habits, celebrations and ways of living. It is aimed at including minorities into majority group, but instead allows to preserve their traditions and to push their goals (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016). Therefore, this kind of policy is addressing the problem of underrepresentation of minorities and stands for providing everyone with the same rights. However, as it has been mentioned previously, right-wing populist parties are advocating for a defense of national identity inherent to a particular country, and their policies are usually contradicting with the main ideas of multiculturalism. To be more precise, the question of protection of national identity against the policy of multiculturalism is one of the most important within the right-wing ideology. Foreigners might be perceived as a threat to "Western values and social cohesion" (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002). There are fairly strong assumptions on the ideas that foreigners can harm the well-being of national in-group in the issues related to the religion and language, believing that immigrants' lifestyle is way too different (Berning, Schlueter, 2016; Schlueter, Scheepers, 2010, Witte, Kladermans, 2000). When migrants arrive to the country with a purpose of living there, they are expected to integrate into the society. However, sharp differences inherent to some cultures are not allowing to do so, therefore, causing conflicts within the society. One of the examples of such a conflict can be found in France in 2010, when wearing items that are coveting face became prohibited in public places (Willsher, 2014). Adoption of this law caused many protests in France and abroad, where some politicians from Islamic countries demanded United Nations to take action on France (Menegaux, 2011). Another example is the increased number of mosques in Europe. For Muslim people, mosque symbolizes "ownership of the land" (Allievi, 2009). There are already over 2600 mosques in Germany, 2100 in France and there are many

ones still under construction. Growing amount of Islamic temples finds a response of Christian society, as it happened in Switzerland in 2007, when local authorities did not give a permission to build the biggest Islamic center in Europe with mosque, museum of Islam and etc. This occasion has led to a lot of criticism and protests among muslim population (The Guardian, 2007). Therefore, it has been argued that these out-groups are not able to integrate fully into society, and supporters of the extreme right-wing ideology claim that minorities should not have the same rights as native citizens (Betz, 2009). Some scientists argued, that globalization has also made its input into the shift in people's voting behavior in favor of right-wing parties, because people are experiencing loss of identity and turn to nationalism to find a state as "an anchor for collective identities"(Koopmans, 2005). Immigration flow to European countries and rising dissatisfaction with policy of multiculturalism allows right-wing populist parties to appear on the political agenda, mostly because of their policies, oriented to the protection of cultural identity.

It has been argued that right-wing parties are more successful at the electoral performance while mobilizing grievances over immigration associated with cultural issues, rather than over economic and political issues (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Empirical evidence on how cultural threat is affecting people's anti-immigrant attitudes can be found in France, where National Front, French right-wing populist party, is becoming more and more popular throughout last years (Lihfield, 2016). After various terrorist attacks that French nation has faced, people became less tolerant to the Islamic culture. All of the attacks were committed by Muslims and were related to religious issues (Telegraph, 2016). Citizens do not feel safe anymore and are afraid of inherent culture. In this regard, Marine Le Pen, leader of a National Front, highly criticizes Muslim people, believing that they are imposing their values and traditions to French. Noticeably, some public opinion polls are predicting Marine Le Pen to win the first round of presidential elections that will take place in 2017 (Reuters, 2015).

These theoretical notions together with empirical evidence allow to create third hypothesis:

3. People who believe that immigrants undermine countries' culture and make the country worse place to live are more likely to vote for right-wing parties (cultural threat).

Taking all the theoretical notions discussed in this Chapter, following conceptual model can be formed:


Figure 1. Outline of the thesis

3. Research design

In this chapter the research design is presented, and it is divided into three parts. Part 3.1 "Introduction to research design" gives an overview of technique used in current investigation, as well as describes and justifies the choice of methods. Part 3.2 "Selection of Cases, Data and the Operationalization of Hypotheses" provides with a particular data used for the research, describes sample and measurements of the variables for binomial regression analysis. In other words, it answers the question of how independent variables can be operationalized. Last part, 3.3, "Research design" is dedicated to the detailed explanation of the binomial regression analysis and shows to what extend independent variables are influencing dependent variable.

3.1 Introduction to research design

This research aims to discover main motives within right-wing populist party electorate in Scandinavia, where these parties gained large support on the last national elections (The Guardian, 2015). To that end, factors that are influencing the rise of support of these parties will be analyzed, and the results for each country will be compared to one another (Malone, 2014). Two explanatory sets of factors are chosen for this investigation. First, the fear of loss of cultural identity. Second, the fear that immigrants may cause economic problems due to the increased competition they bring on the job market and increased budgetary spending on social benefits (Malone, 2014). It will be examined what motivates electorate to support right-wing policies, which advocate for stricter policies towards migrants (Spanje, 2011), so the relative importance of economic and cultural set of factors is going to be measured through quantitative analysis (Malone, 2014). Researchers in various social sciences use regression analysis to investigate social and economic phenomena, such as for example to examine the effect of gender, ethnicity and etc. on voting behavior (Lubbers and Güveli, 2007). The results of regression analysis have proven to be very useful for determining the causes of a phenomenon (Yang and Miller, 2008). Since this paper aims at quantitatively analyzing the relationship between two or more variables, thus it is reasonable to choose regression analysis as the main research method. The aim of this analysis is to estimate the way in which voting behavior (in this regard, votes given to a right-wing populist party or to another party) varies by two types of

attitudes mentioned earlier. In order to get accurate results, age, gender and education will be also added as control variables. This method refers to a non-experimental research, when an investigator employs on surveys, statistic control, case studies and other observations to come to a conclusion. This type of research does not provide a possibility to control over all the conditions in observation and to manipulate the independent variable. A disadvantage of this kind of research design is that these methods are believed not to be very strong for making causal inferences (Buttolph and Reynolds, 2004). However, this type of research usually demonstrates high level of external validity that is related to generalizing, which in this particular case is highly applicable: large N design corresponds to the large number of cases in the sample, in the framework of current research, to a population of three countries. This population can be represented by a drawn sample, and the results can be generalized back to the population. In this research, a sample consists of thousands of persons, so those are the cases. In contrast, in single case-studies or in a comparative only few cases (or just one) are studied in depth.

3.2 Selection of Cases, Data and the Operationalization of Hypotheses

As it was previously mentioned, current research is concentrated on Scandinavian region – Norway, Sweden and Denmark. For each country one right-wing populist was chosen: Progress Party (FrP), Sweden Democrats (SD) and Danish People's Party (DF). Selection of these particular parties is determined by various criteria, such as the size of their electorate, political ideology, populist rhetoric and internal structure. A short description of all the parties will be presented. To get a better understanding of the political environment in each country, a short introduction containing the information about largest political parties will be provided.

1. *Progress Party, Norway*

It was established in 1973 as a protest movement against taxes. Nowadays, Progress Party became third largest party in Norway, and it reached 16,342 members by the year of 2014 (Fremskrittspartiet, 2015). As stated in the party program, it aims at ensuring prosperity for the society and is focusing on individual freedoms (Fremskrittspartiet, 2015). Moreover, throughout the whole list of Progress Party' goals, there is always a point made on a highly bureaucratic government, which is not able to fulfill all the real demands of a common man. This type of rhetoric is typical for right-wing populists. However, it is also

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necessary to take a look at the particular suggestions made by Progress Party. First of all, they are calling for lowering taxes and giving better opportunities for small businesses, which "have been drenched in red tape" (Fremskrittspartiet, 2015). Next point in party's agenda is dedicated to the elderly care and health care, where equal rights and quick help must be provided for everyone who needs them. In the field of foreign policy, Progress Party is calling for following interests of Norway, and assumes that there can be a possibility to join European Union, if citizens express their will to do so on a nationwide referendum. As for the immigration issue, this political party suggests that asylum policy is to be rearranged in order to avoid uncontrolled flow of migrants to the country. Moreover, Progress Party claims that immigration policy has to be changed to ensure sustainability in public service, so that the money can be redistributed to the schools, health care and infrastructure. Last point in the Party program is made on justice, where more efficient measures has to be undertaken to ensure low crime rates.

Political environment: Norway

Largest party in Norway is the Labor Party, which in 2013 got 30,8% of votes and got 55 seats out of 196 in the national parliament. It was established in 1887, and since 1927 it has been the largest party in the country. (Arbeiderpartiet, 2016). It's ideology can be described as social-democracy and it is based on the center-left in the political spectrum. The biggest achievement that party admits is the decreased gap between socio-economic classes, when the distinction between rich and poor is relatively small. Labor party is pro-European and shares the ideas of democratic society and market economy. Another party worth mentioning is the Conservative party, which also became the second largest party on the last parliamentary elections with 26,8% of votes and 18 seats in the parliament (Hoyre, 2014). As the Labor party, this one was established in 19th century and has been performing actively in the political arena for several decades. It is center-right party with liberal-conservative ideology. Conservative party stands for an active cooperation with the European Union and NATO. Regarding the immigration issue, party claims that Norway is a multicultural country, where opportunities must be provided for everyone. So to conclude, one can say, that Progress Party, which was chosen for current investigation and also gained large electoral support, differs sharply in it's views and ideas from two other largest parties mentioned in this section, therefore, representing opposition to current political establishment.

2. Sweden Democrats, Sweden

This is a right-wing populist party, which was established in Sweden in 1988 (Swerigedemokraterna, 2016). It entered parliament in 2010, and on the general election of 2014 Sweden Democrats became third largest party in the country. It claims to be the only "real opposition party" and has more than 23 000 members (Swerigedemokraterna, 2016). Party's program is very comprehensive; therefore, only main points will be discussed. For the labor market Party is proposing to lower taxes and to apply national legislation in the field of labor market for all of the citizens of European Union who are working in the territory of Sweden. Then, Sweden Democrats is calling for a referendum on EU membership and is questioning concentration of power in Brussels. As for the public services, Party is focusing on developing efficient health care for elder people and increased control over young generation's education. Immigration policy proposed by Sweden democrats is covering a wide variety of aspects, such as calling mass immigration a halt and focusing on the community, instead of policy of multiculturalism. Party claims not to be against immigration, however, they are suggesting to rethink current policies in this field and provide generous support to those, who are willing to return to their home countries.

Political environment: Sweden

Biggest party in Sweden, Sweden's Social Democratic Workers' Party (SSDWP), has it roots in 19th century and has over 100000 members by 2014 (Holmqvist and Röstlund, 2014). It is a center-left party, which is promoting the ideas of welfare state and prosperity for all the Swedish. Party is mainly focused on tax cuts, education and jobs (Socialdemokraterna, 2016). Moreover, it strongly opposes any kinds of discrimination. The second largest political party in Sweden is Moderate Party, which was established in 1904. On the last parliamentary elections it took 84 seats out of 349 with 23.2% of votes (Riksdag, 2014). It is a liberal-conservative party. Among main points in their program are education, integration and migration. European Union is seen as a central platform for Swedish foreign and security policy, and Party highly supports further integration. Notably, Party describes its migration policy as "less radical than the one provided by Sweden Democrats" (Moderat, 2016). It means, that SSDWP admits the fact that the number of asylum seekers received by Sweden is quite large and some restrictive measures has to be undertaken;

however, it is not looking for deprivation of opportunities of migrants to have the same rights as Swedish citizens. Again, as in the case of Norway, chosen party has opposite to its opponents' views on the most vital issues of political life of the country.

3. Danish People's Party, Denmark

Danish People's party was established in 1995, and after general election in 2015 it became second largest party. Party has its principle program dated by 2002, where basics of party ideology are stated. The main objective of Danish People's Party is to ensure country's independence and people's freedom. In the opinion of this party, country's independence is undermined by transition of sovereignty to the European Union bodies. Therefore, it opposes EU and suggests "friendly and dynamic cooperation with all democratic nations" (ForesDanmark, 2016). Health care, education and family are also mentioned as the issues of a high importance. As for immigration, Denmark is called a country, where a number of foreigners should be limited. Moreover, Party is not accepting a multi-ethnic transformation of society and stands for the preservation of Danish culture. Notably, Party presented a list of policies that have already been adopted during the parliamentary year 2015-2016 and were directed to the tightening of immigration. List includes various restrictions on the receiving of residence permit and reduction of spending on the newcomers.

Political environment: Denmark

According to the results of last general election of 2015, Social Democrats is the largest political party in Denmark with 26,3% of votes and 47 seats out of 179 (Folketingsvalg, 2015). It was founded in 1871 and shares social-democratic ideology. It is a pro-integration party, and its central issues are tax cuts, improvement of public sector and fight against inequality. Social Democrats party has a special view on the migration policy: despite the fact that Denmark has to help those, who need an asylum, it has been stated that "Denmark is a small country, which has to fulfill its own needs; therefore, the number of asylum-seekers accepted by country has been limited" (Socialdemokraterne, 2016). Now, one should proceed to another party, which is of interest in the framework of political environment of the country. Venstre party, or "Left" party is the third biggest party in Denmark with 19,5% of votes and 34 seats in the national parliament. It shares conservative-liberal ideology (Kichner and Thomas, 1988) and is an opposition party. Even

though it is not opposing Europen integration, it admits that decision-making process and distribution of power have to be overthought in order to be closer to citizens. Venstre is advocating for making education and housing available for everyone (Venstre, 2015). Venstre has made quite radical suggestions on how to shape Denmark's migration policy: it emphasizes the role Christian-based society in the country and proposed to treat newcomers differently depending on their religion (The Local, 2014). Interestingly, these views were largely supported by anti-immigration Danish People's party, which was chosen for this research. As one can see, in Denmark all of the main political parties to a different degree share same views on the migration policy.

There were also some right-wing parties, whose voters have been excluded from current analysis, such as voters for Party of the Swedes (SvP) and Christian Unity Party (KsP) in Norway.

1. *Party of the Swedes, Sweden*

Party of he Swedes is a Nazi party, which was established in 2008 and was dissolved in 2015 due to poor election results – in 2014 party gained only 4,189 votes (Riksdag, 2014). However, in 2010 the amount of votes was even less significant (681), so there was a slight nationalistic trend within Swedish electorate. Party's program is based on the assumption that Swedish citizenship must obtain only people belonging to "western genetic and cultural heritage" (Svenskarnasparti, 2015). Moreover, access to the process of governance should be restricted to non-Swedes. Party is against any forms of supranational agreements, claiming that Sweden must be an independent state, both military and economically. Even though some points are related to health care, resources and environment, Party of Swedes is always referring to the issues of nationalism. Due to its radicalism, it was decided to exclude this party from current research.

2. *Christian Unity Party, Norway*

It was founded in 1998 and has no parliamentary representation. Its program is very comprehensive, and mostly has references to the Bible. For example, while mentioning issues related to the Norway's external relations, it says that in the European Union there is a high degree of anti-Semitism, and United States are closer to Norway economically, culturally and religiously (Kristentsamlingsparti, 2016). Christian Unity Party emphasizes

the importance of education and health care, together with environmental and transport issues. As for the immigration policy, Party claims that Islamic culture possesses a threat to the uniqueness of Norwegians, and the immigration policy should be very strict regardless the country of origin of a newcomer. Additionally, migrants are obliged to learn Norwegian.

Both of the parties mentioned above are far-right in their ideology and their electoral support on the last national elections was quite weak. Therefore, they have been taken away from the analysis.

Referring to the parties that meet all the necessary requirements mentioned in the beginning of the paragraph, on the last parliamentary elections all of them were among three leading parties in their country (Table 3), and thus, their support among the population is not to be questioned. Moreover, all of them are commonly agreed by scientists to be right-wing populist (Widfeldt,2000; Mudde, 2007; Arter, 2006).

Table 3.

Results of last parliamentary elections in Sweden (2014), Norway (2013) and Denmark (2015)

Country	N voters	N of RPP voters	Proportion of RPP voters	Rank
Sweden	6,231,573	801,178	12,9 %	3
Norway	2,836,029	463,560	16, 3 %	3
Denmark	3,560,060	741,746	21,1 %	2

Note: Column "Rank" denotes the position of a party according to the results of the national elections, where "1" is for the party that obtained the majority of votes

Source: Valgresultat, Valmyndigheten, Danmark Statistik

As stated in the Chapter 1, voting behavior, specifically the votes given for the right-wing party on the last parliamentary elections, is the dependent variable. Data is taken from the European Social Survey 2014, where participants were questioned about the party they voted for in last national elections. European Social Survey was established by the European Science Foundation and aimed at examining cross-national attitudes and beliefs within European countries trough surveys. These surveys contain a variety of questions

related to the political, economic, religious, social and other features of life. Continuity of surveys allows to examine shift in people's attitudes, which is very relevant in terms of social and political science. In case of current research, European Social Survey was chosen due to its wide coverage both of the countries and population. Since the information is carefully collected and interviews are conducted every two years, the data is believed to be representative for the chosen period of time. Table 3.1 represents number of observations, number of voters for right-wing populist parties and the proportion of latter in the whole sample.

Table 3.1.

Countries, parties and the number of observations in European Social Survey 2014

Country	RPP party	N observations in sample	N RPP voters in sample	Proportion of RPP voters in sample (%)	Party's score in last election (%)
Denmark	DF	1,118	135	12	12,3
Sweden	SD	1,344	65	4,8	5,7
Norway	FrP	1,051	129	12,2	16.3

Note: ESS provides with the results for last available national elections which for Round 2014 was 2010 for Sweden, 2011 for Denmark and 2013 for Norway.

Source: European Social Survey 2014

A dependent variable in this research is whether citizens gave their votes to a right-wing populist party. The next step is operationalization of independent variables, in other words, a transformation of the abstract concept under investigation into measurable variables (Hu and Olshfski, 2007). Concepts under examination in current research are anti-immigration sentiment based on the view that immigrants represent a cultural threat and anti-immigration sentiment based on the perception that immigrants represent an economic threat. Independent variables, they are representing the answer from the survey on the following questions:

1. Would you say that country's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?
2. Do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?

3. Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in country, or generally help to create new jobs?

4. Is country made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?

First two questions are representing two hypotheses for economic motives and last two were generalized and represent one hypothesis related to cultural motive.

Since this research attempts to investigate voters' main motivation, it is possible to take the data from ESS 2014 where people expressed their attitudes towards these issues and compute these attitudes into two groups:

1.People who come to live here are taking jobs away in the country (economic threat).

2.Immigrants take out more in terms of taxes and services than they put (economic threat).

3. People who come to live here undermine countries' cultural life (cultural threat).

4. People who come to live here make country a worse place to live (cultural threat).

This analysis also contains a number of control variables. While examining political attitudes, one should pay attention to some confounding factors. Numerous studies suggested that social background characteristics determine personal attitudes towards right-wing parties and specifically stress the impact that level of education has on anti-immigration attitudes (Lubbers and Güveli, 2007; Betz, 2009). In other words, because various factors may have impact on the behavior of participants and may shape their interpersonal differences in support of right-wing parties (Margolis, 2007; Berning and Schlueter, 2016), one has to include control variables. In the current research, control variables are gender, age and education. All of these characteristics are commonly agreed to be important while conducting a research on a microlevel (Givens, 2004; Elchardus and Spruyt, 2010).

The most important thing before conducting the analysis is to operationalize variables properly. However, some types of analysis hold strict requirements on the type of variables, and those requirements will be stated further in this chapter. Chosen variables

then will be checked in order to see, whether they are meeting the assumptions of each analysis.

Now it is necessary to proceed to the variables chosen for this investigation. First of all, a dependent variable, which is "party voted for last national elections", needs to be recoded. The original one contains 15 categories, where 1-11 are various political parties, "66" for "not applicable", 77 for "refusal", 88 for "don't know" and 99 for "no answer". Therefore, this variable is proved to be nominal. Next step was to recode it into a dichotomous variable with value "1" in favor of right-wing party and "0" for the rest. However, to make the results more precise, all the values for those who did not give their vote to any party or refused to answer those questions were taken away from the analysis.

Moving on to the independent variables, they are representing the answer to the four survey questions mentioned above. People were given a scale from "00" to "10", where "00" was coded for "cultural life undermined" and "10" for "cultural life enriched" and so on. Moreover, there was an option "88" to refuse to answer the question. These measurements appeared to be suitable for the analysis, therefore, it has been decided to leave variable measurements as it is with the exception for those, who refused to answer the question. Therefore, new variable is also ordinal, and those who did not give answer were excluded from the analysis.

Alongside with independent variables, analysis contains three control ones. First one, age, is a ratio variable, presented with numerical values. Second one is gender, which originally was a nominal variable with "1" for male, "2" for female and "3" for those, who was not sure about their group. This variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable with "0" for female and "1" for male excluding people, who didn't provide with the information about their gender.. The last control variable is education. This variable is measured with the alternative measure of education, provided by European Social Survey dataset, the ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) coding. The values are assigned from 1 to 7, containing categories starting from less than lower second education and finishing with higher tertiary education. UNESCO established this coding system in order to standardize different educational systems in different countries. Using such classification allows comparisons and enables monitoring the progress for policymakers. In a recoded version of education variable "0" for "not possible to harmonize into ES-ISCED" and those

who refused to answer this question are missing. Moreover, two dummy variables were created: low education and high education. In the first one, values from 1 to 2 were assigned "1" and "0" for the rest. In high education variables values from 5 to 7 were coded as "1" and the rest "0".

3.3 Statistical choices

After justification of the operationalization of variables, the next step is to put them into models. In order to get more accurate results, it has been decided to compute variables representing same attitudes into one variable. To do that, it is necessary to see if these variables are correlated to one another. Linear correlation analysis helps to describe the nature of the relationship between two variables, allowing the investigator to predict the value of one variable based on the value of the other (Yang and Miller, 2008). It is also useful in terms of measuring strength of the association between the variables. For this purpose, various types of bivariate analysis can be used, such as Pearson correlation, Spearman's correlation, Chi-square test for independence, Goodman and Kruskal's gamma analysis and etc. While choosing the type of analysis, one should take into consideration the type of variables allowed to use in each test. Spearman's test is suitable for identification of the strength and direction of association that exists between two variables measured an ordinal scale (Laerd Statistics, 2016), therefore, it will be used for measuring the correlation between two pairs of independent variables, representing economic and cultural motives. In this regard, two tables for each country will be presented in the next Chapter. These correlations will be helpful for the purpose of further computing two variables, which prove to have a strong correlation with each other.

Logistic regression is preferred over the other techniques, such as cross-tabulation, correlations, descriptive statistics and etc. It has been done so, because logistic regression is often used to predict the probability that an observation suits one of two categories of a dichotomous dependent variable based on one or more independent variables (Laerd Statistics,2016). Moreover, it is more suitable when there is a combination of continuous (interval or ratio) and categorical (nominal or ordinal) independent variables.

Now it is necessary to provide chosen type of analysis with the proper justification. Among the possible types of analysis that are generally involved in social science research, one should also mention multivariate regression analysis. Multivariate regression analysis is

one of the most widely used quantitative methods; therefore, it is commonly used among researchers who are looking for an explanation of the causes of a phenomena (Yang and Miller, 2008).). However, there has been an increase in usage of various statistical methods that are focused in handling situations in which the outcomes of interest fall into two distinct possible categories. The dependent variable in binomial logistic regression analysis is a dichotomous variable, and there lies the significant difference between this method and multivariate regression. Binomial logistic regression produces models that classify outcomes for a categorical dependent variable (Yang and Miller, 2008). In case of current research, where outcome variable is either voted for right-wing party or not, binomial logistic regression is more suitable.

After a justification of choice of a regression model, it is necessary to proceed to a detailed description of the analysis that is going to take place. In order to perform a logistic regression correctly, data and variables should meet various assumptions. First of all, a dependent variable has to be measured on a dichotomous scale, which means a presence of only two groups within a variable. This assumption has already been justified earlier in this chapter. Moreover, categories in the dependent variable should be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and this assumption is not violated in this case. Secondly, there have to be two or more independent variables, which need to be continuous (interval or ratio) or categorical (ordinal or nominal). After our independent variables have been recoded, they are meeting this requirements, because four representing attitudes are measured on an ordinal scale, age is a ration variable, gender is a nominal one and education contains various ranked groups, which means it is ordinal. Another assumption that has to be met while running a logistic regression is that there should be an absence of multicollinearity between independent variables. For this purpose, various tests using SPSS can be made.

While putting the variables into a binomial regression model one seeks to predict the probability that an observation suits one of two categories of a dichotomous dependent variable. In this research, the strength of influence of four independent variables is going to be observed in order to understand which of the two sentiments – economic or cultural – values the most among right-wing party voters.

For current research, SPSS Statistics software is going to be used, as this program is the most convenient while conducting a statistical analysis in social science.

Chapter 4 Analysis

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter results of the analysis will be presented. First section is dedicated to the results of bivariate correlation for each country. Second paragraph contains information about the results of logistic regression. In the last part of the chapter results of logistic regression will be interpreted.

4.2 Results of the bivariate correlation

In this section bivariate correlations are presented in order to justify further possibility to compute two variables that express same attitude into one. Two sets of independent variables have been put into a simple correlation model, which is used to measure the strength and direction of association between them. Spearman's test was chosen for this purpose, and r_s, which stands for the correlation coefficient, can value from -1 to 1. r_s of 1 of -1 indicates a perfect correlation, which can be either positive or negative. The closer is r_s to zero, the weaker is association between the variables. If the correlation between two cultural and two economic variables proves to be at least "moderate" ($r_s = 60$-.79) then it is possible to compute them together into two variables. The results will be presented in the Table 4.3.

Before running a correlation, one can take a look at the data in a Table 4.2, where descriptive statistics of all the variables is presented. Descriptive statistics is helpful for visualizing a data and identification of missing cases.

Table 4.2

Descriptive statistics for variables

	Denmark			Sweden			Norway		
	Mean	std	N	Mean	std	N	Mean	std	N

Cultural threat	11.71	4.337	1118	14.14	3.924	1344	11.45	3.918	1051
Take jobs away	5.53	1.884	1118	6.37	1.911	1344	6.01	1.780	1051
Taxes/services	4.70	2.002	1118	5.56	2.038	1344	4.95	1.891	1051
Age	51.08	16.754	1118	50.75	18.395	1344	49.70	16.982	1051
Gender	.52	.500	1118	.50	.500	1344	.52	.500	1051
Low educated	.16	.369	1118	.16	.371	1344	.13	.339	1051
Highly educated	.48	.499	1118	.52	.500	1344	.54	.499	1051

As one can see, there are no missing cases and deviations, so it is possible to proceed to further analysis.

Table 4.3

Correlation results for independent variables in three Scandinavian countries

			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Denmark	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants (1)	Correlation coefficient (Spearman's)	1	.782**		
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.000		
		N	1118	1118		
	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live (2)	Correlation coefficient (Spearman's)	.782**	1		
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000			
		N	1118	1118		
	Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs (3)	Correlation coefficient (Spearman's)			1	.436**
		Sig. (2-tailed)				.000
		N			1118	1118
	Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less (4)	Correlation coefficient (Spearman's)			.436**	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)			.000	
		N			1118	1118
Sweden	Country's	Correlation coefficient	1	.734**		

Country	Variable	Statistic	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants (1)	Correlation coefficient (Spearman's)		.000		
		Sig. (2-tailed)	1344	1344		
		N				
	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live (2)	Correlation coefficient (Spearman's)	.734** .000	1		
		Sig. (2-tailed)	1344	1344		
		N				
	Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs (3)	Correlation coefficient (Spearman's)			1	.541** .000
		Sig. (2-tailed)			1344	1344
		N				
	Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less (4)	Correlation coefficient (Spearman's)			.541** .000	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)			1344	1344
		N				
Norway	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants (1)	Correlation coefficient (Spearman's)	1	.628** .000		
		Sig. (2-tailed)	1051	1051		
		N				
	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live (2)	Correlation coefficient (Spearman's)	.628** .000	1		
		Sig. (2-tailed)	1051	1051		
		N				
	Immigrants take jobs away	Correlation coefficient (Spearman's)			1	.387** .000

			1051	1051
in country or	Sig. (2-tailed)			
create new	N			
jobs (3)				
Taxes and	Correlation coefficient		.387**	1
services:	(Spearman's)			
immigrants	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	
take out more	N		1051	1051
than they put				
in or less (4)				

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The discussion of the results one would like to start with Denmark. After running a Spearman's test, one can see, that both variables representing cultural attitudes are positively correlated and statistically significant (p=.000). Correlation coefficient is strong (r_s = .782), which means that both variables can be computed into one. Test for economic variables for Denmark shows that the results are statistically significant, and strength of association between variables is moderate (r_s = .436). Proceeding to Sweden, one can see, that Spearman's test for cultural variables shows positive correlation with strong association (r_s = .734), which denotes that variables can be put together. Correlation results for economic variables are statistically significant (p=.000), and strength of association between them for Sweden is moderate (r_s = .541). For the last country, Norway, Spearman's test shows that strength of the association between cultural variables (r_s = .628) allows to compute them together. However, this is not the case for economic variables – test denotes a weak association between them (r_s = .387) and lack of possibility to compute them into one.

To briefly sum up, bivariate correlations were done for two sets of variables in order to justify the possibility to compute two variables representing one type of attitude together. It has been decided to put them together in order to avoid multicollinearity that may occur when two variables are strongly correlated. After putting those two sets of variables into correlation model, one can see that for all of three countries results for both sets of variables are positively correlated and statistically significant (p=.000). However, positive correlation does not mean strong association between variables. In case of Denmark, association between two cultural variables is strong (r_s =.782) and moderate for economic

variables (r_s = .436).   Results of Spearman's test for Sweden are also meeting the requirements, stated above, as both variables are at least at a "moderate" level (r_s =.734 and r_s=.541). In case of Norway cultural variables are correlating strong enough to put them together (r_s =.628), but it is not the case with economic variables, because strength of association is weak (r_s = .387). Therefore, it is not possible to compute two economic variables for Norway. In order to run the regression carefully, it has been decided to compute only cultural variables for each country into one, as they proved to be strongly correlated. Both economic will be therefore added independently.

4.3 Results of multicollinearity test

Before running the logistic regression, one has to be sure that independent variables do not have a strong correlation coefficient. If predictor variables are strongly correlated among themselves, the problem of multicollinearity arises. In this case, strong correlation means that Pearson coefficient has value greater than 0.8. It can disturb the results of regression weaken the statistical power of the analysis by making coefficient estimates ambiguous difficult to interpret. To avoid multicollinearity problem, various tests in SPSS can be performed. If the predictor variables are highly correlated, the model will not be able to distinguish the effect. For this analysis, examination of correlation matrix of predictor variables is done.
In the Table 4.3.1 results for multicollinearity test for Sweden are predented.

Table 4.3.1

Pearson correlation test for Sweden

		gender	age	culture	education _high	educati on_low	jobs	taxes
gender	Pearson Correlation	1	-,002	-,102**	-,105**	,062*	-,042	-,055*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,933	,000	,000	,023	,128	,043
age	Pearson Correlation	-,002	1	-,222**	-,124**	,356**	-,145**	-,181**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,933		,000	,000	,000	,000	,000

		gender	age	culture	education_high	education_low	jobs	taxes
education_low	Pearson Correlation	,062*	-,222**	-,245**	, -,460**	1	-,120**	, -,140**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	.000	,000		,000	,000
education_high	Pearson Correlation	-,105**	-,124**	,317**	1	-,460**	,193**	,200**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000		,000	,000	,000
culture	Pearson Correlation	-,102**	-,222**	1	317**	-,245**	,533**	591**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,023	,000		,000	.000	,000	,000
jobs	Pearson Correlation	-,042	-,145**	,533**	,193**	-,120**	1	,549**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,128	,000	,000	,000	,000		,000
taxes	Pearson Correlation	-,055*	-,181**	,591**	,200**	-,140**	,549**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,043	,000	,000	,000	,000	,000	

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

As one can see, in case of Sweden, none of the variables, have significant correlation coefficient, so the assumption for multicollinearity is not violated.

In the Table 4.3.2 predictor variables for Norway are tested.

Table 4.3.2

Pearson correlation test for Norway

		gender	age	education_ low	education_ high	culture	jobs	taxes
gender	Pearson Correlation	1	-,007	-,047	-,023	-,052	,022	,018
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,826	,129	,457	,089	,470	,564
	N	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051
age	Pearson Correlation	-,007	1	,268**	-,021	-,031	,040	,009

		gender	age	education_low	education_high	culture	jobs	taxes
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,826		,000	,499	,321	,190	,779
	N	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051
education_ low	Pearson Correlation	-,047	,268**	1	-,419**	-,136**	-,063*	-,039
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,129	,000		,000	,000	,040	,203
	N	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051
education_ high	Pearson Correlation	-,023	-,021	-,419**	1	,225**	,177**	,149**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,457	,499	,000		,000	,000	,000
	N	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051
culture	Pearson Correlation	-,052	-,031	-,136**	,225**	1	,391**	,475**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,089	,321	,000	,000		,000	,000
	N	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051
jobs	Pearson Correlation	,022	,040	-,063*	,177**	,391**	1	,408**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,470	,190	,040	,000	,000		,000
	N	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051
taxes	Pearson Correlation	,018	,009	-,039	,149**	,475**	,408**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,564	,779	,203	,000	,000	,000	
	N	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051	1051

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

All the independent variables for Norway are not correlated significantly, so, they are meeting the requirements for performing a logistic regression. Table 4.3.3 shows the results of Pearson correlation for Denmark.

Table 4.3.3

Pearson correlation test for Denmark

		jobs	taxes	gender	age	culture	education_ low	education _high
jobs	Pearson Correlation	1	,443**	-,067*	-,018	,470**	-,110**	,237**

	Sig. (2-tailed)			,000	,026	,541	,000	,000	,000
	N	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118
taxes	Pearson Correlation	,443**	1	,021	,004	,474**	-,098**	,204**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000		,476	,900	,000	,001	,000
	N	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118
gender	Pearson Correlation	-,067*	,021	1	,005	-,136**	,015	-,137**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,026	,476		,871	,000	,615	,000
	N	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118
age	Pearson Correlation	-,018	,004	,005	1	-,057	,192**	-,092**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,541	,900	,871		,057	,000	,002
	N	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118
culture	Pearson Correlation	,470**	,474**	-,136**	-,057	1	-,203**	,359**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000	,057		,000	,000
	N	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118
education_low	Pearson Correlation	-,110**	-,098**	,015	,192**	-,203**	1	-,425**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,001	,615	,000	,000		,000
	N	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118
education_high	Pearson Correlation	,237**	,204**	-,137**	-,092**	,359**	-,425**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000	,002	,000	,000	
	N	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118	1118

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

One can see from the table for Denmark, that likewise Norway it did not violate the assumption for multicollinearity.

After running a correlation matrix it is possible to conclude, that none of the predictor variables are correlated significant enough to disturb the results of binomial regression. Therefore, one can proceed to logistic regression.

4.4 Results of logistic regression analysis

Two models for each country were made, one containing the cultural independent variable together with control variables, and another one included economic and control variables.

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Table 4.4 represents the B coefficients, odd ratios and general results for each model. B coefficient shows strength of the relationship or the size of the effect that predictor variable has on the dependent variable. Odd ratio (OR) is generally used for measuring probabilities of an event happening or of an outcome to fall into a category.

Table 4.4

B coefficients, odds ratio and model results for logistic regression

	1 Denmark Cultural		2 Denmark Economic		3 Sweden Cultural		4 Sweden Economic		5 Norway Cultural		6 Norway Economic	
	B	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR
Constant	,616	1.851	-,513	.599	2,023**	7.562	,085	1.089	-,259	.772	-,665	.514
Independent variables												
Cultural threat	-,272***	.762			-,380***	.684			-,248***	.780		
Take jobs away			-,065	.937			-,092	.912			-,123**	.884
Taxes/services			-,331***	.719			-,472***	.624			-,334***	.716
Control variables												
Age	,007	1.007	,010*	1.010	-,016*	.984	-,010	.990	,013**	1.013	,014**	1.014
Gender Ref: female												
Male	,038	1.038	,243	1.275	,462	1.588	,477*	1.612	,734**	2.083	,848***	2.335
Education level Ref: graduate												
Low educated	-,412	.662	-,257	.774	,016	1.016	,321	1.378	,063	1.065	,197	1.217
Highly educated	-,638**	.528	-1,016***	.362	-,188***	.829	-,496	.609	-,744**	.475	-,813***	.443
Nagelkerke R Square	.273		.163		.316		.174		.244		.185	
Cox & Snell R Square	.142		.085		.101		.056		.128		.097	
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients	.000		.000		.000		.000		.000		.000	
Predicted Percentage Before	87,9		87,9		95,2		95,2		87,7		87,7	
Predicted Percentage After	88,1		87,8		95,2		95,2		88,2		88,0	
N	1118		1118		1344		1344		1051		1051	

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01;***p<0.001
OR= odds ratio

These are the results of regressions, where each independent variable was put together with control variables, and the estimation of their effect on the dependent variable is done by looking at the explained variance in R Squares. Nagelkerke R Square and Cox & Snell R

Square are parameters, which indicate how much of the variation is explained by the factors in each model. It is normally constrained between 0 and 1, so the closer this parameter is to 1, the more variation it explains. This indicator is very important in the framework of current analysis, because by comparing values of R^2 for each country one can conclude, which of the variables made greater contribution to the explanatory variance of the model.

Besides that, another regression has been done including all three independent variables alongside with control ones, and in this case, one has to look at the B coefficients and odds ratios. These two ways of testing the impact that predictor variable has on the outcome variable are complementing each other. The results for a second regression for three countries are presented in the table 4.5. It includes general results of the models containing all the independent variables. Table 4.5 can help to understand the importance of each set of variables in a more direct and clear way.

Table 4.5

B coefficients, odds ratio and model results for logistic regression

	Denmark		Sweden		Norway	
	B	OR	*B*	OR	*B*	OR
Constant	,574	1.776	1,952**	7.045	-,209	1.232
			Independent variables			
Cultural threat	-,252***	.777	-,365***	.694	-,206***	.814
Take jobs away	-,068	1.071	,112	1.119	-,037	.964
Taxes/servi ces	-,136**	.873	-,157*	.855	-,161**	.851
			Control variables			
Age	,008	1.008	-,017*	.983	,013**	1.013
Gender Ref: female						
Male	,080	1.083	,460	1.584	,761**	2.140
Education level Ref: graduate						
Low educated	-,418	.659	,052	1.054	,104	1.110
Highly	-,649**	.524	-,155	.857	-,716**	.489

educated

Nagelkerke R Square	.280	.324	.257
Cox & Snell R Square	.146	.104	.135
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients	.000	.000	.000
Predicted Percentage Before	87,9	95,2	87,7
Predicted Percentage After	88,4	95,1	88,2
N	1118	1344	1051

Note: +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01;***p<0.001
OR = odds ratio

In both Tables presented above "B" coefficient and odds ratio for each predictor variable can be found. Predictor can be also called "logit". It denotes the expected amount of change in the dependent variable for each one-unit change in the independent variable or predictor. The closer a logistic coefficient is to 0, the less effect it has on predicting the dependent variable. B coefficient can be also positive or negative; therefore, it shows the direction of the correlation between independent variables and dependent one. P-value is indicating the probability that a given event occurs, so if p<0.1, the independent variable is very likely to have an effect on the outcome variable; the p<0.05 denotes insignificant effect and p<0.001 is indicating a very strong influence that variable has on predicting logit. "Constant" parameter , which can also be labeled as "intercept" of the model, is logit estimate of the dependent variable when model predictors are equal to zero. More detailed explanation of the values of B for each variables will be discussed in the next section. While discussing logistic regression, it is common to report on odds ratio. It denotes the likelihood of an event to happen with increase in the value of independent variable in one unit.

Now it is possible to proceed to the general results of the models. "Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients" in this the Table shows whether the independent variables led to an improvement in prediction of the dependent variable. As one can see from the results, they all are statistically significant. Explained variance of the models is between 10,4 – 32,4%,

which is relatively low. Last parameters to mention are predictive percentages before and after adding independent variables into the model. In this case, predictive value has not significantly improved or has even remained the same.

4.5 Discussion of the results

4.5.1 Denmark

Cultural variable

Results given in a Table 4.7 suggest that the independent variable for cultural motives can be used to predict voting in favor of Danish People's Party (p=.001). The value for B for variable responsible for cultural motives in the first Model indicates that there is a negative relationship between this variable and voting for right-wing populist party. It means, that an increase in variable, where "10" was for those, who hold the most positive attitudes towards migrants within the framework of cultural motives, leads to the decrease in likelihood of a dependent variable having a value of 1. In other words, those, who are more likely to think that cultural life of the country is enriched by immigrants and that they are making country a better place to live are less likely to vote for right-wing populist party. The odds for cultural variable are smaller than one, which means that the likelihood of voting for the right-wing populist party decreases when person holds more positive opinion about the immigrants. The model explained 27,3% (Nagelkerke R^2) of the variance in right-wing voting behavior in Denmark.

Economic variables

Second model for Denmark provides with at least three significant variables with one representing the opinion on immigrant's contribution to the taxes and services amongst them. B coefficients for both economic independent variables are showing negative direction of correlation, meaning that those who hold less tolerant attitudes in terms of taxes and services are more likely to vote in favor of Danish People's Party. The odds for the economic variable "Taxes/services" are also less that one, meaning that voters who believe that immigrants put more in terms of taxes are less likely to vote for Danish People's Party. For a model with economic variables, model's Nagelkerke R^2 is 16,3%.

Control variables

Control variables are not significant except for one responsible for people with higher education. The common assumption that less educated people are voting for right-wing populist party is correct. In the model for economic variables, age has high significance level and is positively correlated with the dependent variable. The odds for control variables show, that man are more likely to vote in favor of Danish People's Party than female, and that less educated people are also more likely to choose this right-wing party.

Conclusion

One can see, that Model with cultural motives explains more variance than the one with economic ones. Moreover, by looking at the table 4.4 one can confirm that B coefficient for a variable representing cultural threat (*B*= -,252) is stronger than for economic ones (*B*= ,068 for a variable "taxes and services"; *B*= -,136 for a variable representing opinion on jobs) , as well as it is more statistically significant.

4.5.2 Sweden

Cultural variable

The value for B for variable responsible for cultural motives in the third Model shows a negative relationship between this variable and voting for right-wing populist party (*B* = -,380). According to the theory discussed in previous chapters, this outcome was expected to be correct, which has been proved by the logistic regression. The odds for cultural variable are 0.694, which denotes that as in the case with Denmark, voters holding positive attitudes towards migrants are less likely to be in favor of Sweden Democrats. While looking at the Nagelkerke R^2, one can see, that the model responsible for cultural motives explained 31.6% of the variance in right-wing voter attitudes.

Economic variables

Now it is possible to proceed to the second model for Sweden, where two variables representing economic motives are added alongside with the control variables. It can be concluded, that people who hold the opinion that immigrants take away more in terms of taxes and services than they put are more likely to vote for Sweden Democrats than those,

who do not hold the same opinion. Moreover, it is the only variable in the model that has a high significance level. Nagelkerke R^2 of the second model explains 17.4% of the variance. The odds for a variable "Take jobs away" is larger than one, which in this case means, that the likelihood of voting for Sweden Democrats decreases with stronger positive attitudes towards immigrants.

Control variables

Control variables did not make a significant contribution to the model, however, some of the theoretical assumptions were met. In this regard, males are more likely to vote for right-wing populist party than females (B=.477) and people with higher education are less likely to vote in favor of right-wing populist parties in comparison with middle-educated group, which was used as a reference category. The odds for age suggest that the younger the person is, the more likelihood there is that he votes for Sweden

Conclusion

The next step after examination of results of two models is to compare these results in order to derive the most responsible factor for voter's support for right-wing populist party. The explained variance of model with cultural motives is significantly higher than the one with economic factors. In Table 4.8 with al the variables put together one can see that variable for cultural threat is the only statistically significant one and its B coefficient is relatively bigger (B= -,365 for cultural variable, B= ,112 for a variable "taxes and services"; B= -,157 for a variable representing opinion on jobs). Therefore, one can conclude that in Sweden perception that immigrants represent a cultural threat is stronger than the perception concerning economic threat. This is also the case for Denmark, therefore, there is a divergence in right-wing voting motives for the electorate of both countries.

4.5.3 Norway

Cultural variable

In Model 5 results for the logistic regression for Norway are presented, where cultural variable was added alongside with the control variables. Statistical significance of chosen

independent variable is high (p=.001). The direction of correlation between cultural variable and the probability of voting for Progress Party is negative, suggesting that the voters who do not perceive immigrants as a cultural threat are less likely to vote for this right-wing populist party. This idea is also proved if one looks at the odds for cultural variable (OR = 0.814).   The Nagelkerke R^2 for the first logistic regression for Norway is 24.4%.

Economic variables

In Model 6 two economic variables alongside with the control ones are presented. If one compares only two independent variables, one can say that between two of them the most significant variable is the one concerning issues on taxes and services (p = 0,001), and this case is fair for all three countries that have been investigated in this research. In case of Norway, the odds of both of the economic variables are indicating decreasing likelihood of voting for a Progress Party if voters hold positive attitudes towards immigrants. The explained variance of the last model is 18.5%, which again is smaller than for the model including cultural variable.

Control variables

All of the control variables are of relative significance in the Model 5, with the exception of variable representing poorly educated people. In Model 6, where control variables were added alongside with the economic ones, the only insignificant variable again is representing people with low education. If one takes a look at the odds, one can see that there is a slight convergence in tendencies for all of the three countries, including the likelihood of man giving their vote for a right-wing populist party and for less educated people to do the same.

Conclusion

Evidence of relatively strong effect of cultural variable can be found in the Table 4.5; B coefficient for this variable is the biggest and statistically significant, as well as in case of Denmark and Sweden (*B*= -,206 for cultural variable, *B*= -,161 for a variable "taxes and services"; *B*= -,037 for a variable representing opinion concerning migrants taking jobs away in the country).

After a detailed explanation of results of logistic regression, it is possible to sum up main

findings; therefore, it is necessary to precede to the last chapter of current analysis.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter main findings related to the analysis will be discussed, and the answer to the main research question will be given. Following parts of the chapter will be dedicated to the provision of venues for further investigation.

5.1 Main findings: hypothesis testing

1.People who believe that immigrants take away jobs in country are more likely to vote for right-wing populist parties.

First hypothesis within the framework of economic attitudes was referring to the fear of job competition with the newcomers. This statement did not find enough evidence after performing a logistic regression. Only in Norway this sentiment gained relative significance, while in Sweden and Denmark this sentiment was not supported significantly within right-wing populist party voters.

2. People who hold the opinion that immigrants are undeserving recipients of social benefits are more likely to vote for right-wing populist parties.

This is the second statement that has been tested within the framework of economic motives. Even though it gained relative significance in all of the countries in comparison with the previous hypothesis, the variation that was explained by these two factors together was sharply lower in contrast with the one explained by adding variable for cultural attitudes. Therefore, these two hypotheses did not find enough evidence to be approved.

3. People who believe that immigrants undermine countries' culture and make country worse place to live are more likely to vote for right-wing parties;

Last hypothesis was about voter's perception of immigrants representing cultural threat. The evidence from three Scandinavian countries suggested that this sentiment was clearly

the strongest one among right-wing populist party voters, as it was significant and had relatively high explanatory variance. In this regard, last hypothesis has been approved.

Table 5.1

Outcome of hypotheses test

Country	Jobs	Taxes and services	Culture
Denmark	-	-	+
Sweden	-	-	+
Norway	-	+/-	+

Note: "-" for disapproval, "+/-" mixed evidence, "+" approval

5.2 Conclusion

The electorate of right-wing populist parties in three Scandinavian countries has been analyzed in order to answer main research question: "Which factors explain people's support for right-wing parties in three Scandinavian countries?". After a logistic regression was performed with the use of SPSS, it is also possible to give an answer to the sub-question: "Are the factors that explain voting behavior in favor of right-wing populist parties same for Denmark, Norway and Sweden?". It can be clearly seen, that the results for Norway, Sweden and Denmark are similar. It has been proved, that models with variables representing cultural threat had more explaining variance than models representing economic threat. Therefore, while answering to the main research question, one can conclude, that within the right-wing populist party voters cultural motives play more significant role. In the first chapter it has been assumed that due to high importance of welfare programmes in these countries the immigrant flow is most likely to cause the redistribution of budgetary spending in favor of newcomers, and therefore, economic reasons for voting in favor of right-wing populist parties in Scandinavian countries should be stronger than cultural. However, this idea was disapproved after the performance of the analysis, which suggests that even though these

countries are welfare states with big budgetary spending on social programmes, cultural reasons for voting in favor of right-wing populist parties remain more important for the voters. Multiple researches regarding the issue of voting behavior have also proved this idea. Despite the unemployment rate and socio-economic class allocation, right-wing populist parties are gaining more support while mobilizing their electorate with questions of cultural identity, rather than economic grievances (Oesch, 2008). Regarding the issue of unemployment, one can say, that in these Scandinavian countries unemployment rate is one of the lowest in Europe – 7 % in Sweden, 4.6% in Norway and 6.1% in Denmark, especially while compared countries such as Spain (19.8%) or Greece (24.1%), where the situation with employment is worse (Eurostat, 2016). Since in Scandinavian countries citizens are not struggling with getting a job, they are less concerned that migrants can take jobs away. This can be a possible explanation for the insignificance of one of the economic motives included in current research.

5.3 Research limitations

Likewise every research, this one has met various limitations, which are mostly related to the research design and data.

The data used in current investigation was taken from European Social Survey. The reliability of this particular source is not to be questioned, but there are general limitations connected with the survey data use. First of all, it obviously did not cover the whole right-wing populist party electorate, because surveys are conducted on a group of people representing generalized opinion, and it is very hard to cover the whole amount of voting population. Size of the sample can also vary because people are not always willing to admit their political preferences, specifically while talking about right-wing parties. While dealing with people's perceptions in general, one has to admit that respondents sometimes do not feel encouraged to provide honest answers, so it is arguable whether these perceptions correspond to the reality. The second limitation is that only closed-ended questions were used, which in turn may have lower validity than other types of questions. Qualitative data is harder to analyze with this type of research, but it can provide with more detailed and comprehensive information. However, the limitations related to data are not only about the reliability of people's answers, but also about the scope. While conducting operationalization of the variables, a lot of data was taken away from the

analysis, because people were giving uncertain answers or refused to answer at all. Even though the size of the sample is big enough to be able to generalize it, bigger still the examination of bigger sample would have given an opportunity to reach more accurate results.

5.4 Research implications

Since one investigation cannot give the answers to all of the questions related to the issue of voting behavior in favor of right-wing populist party, it provides with various venues for further investigation. First of all, the same type of analysis is applicable for other regions and countries in order to explore people's motives that are controlling for their political party preferences. Moreover, while exploring voter's attitudes in the framework of anti-immigration sentiment, scientists can also take into account the size of immigrant group in the country, because the presence of huge amount of immigrants can increase the competition for scarce resources. Additionally, presence of big group of people from different cultures can somehow affect people's attitudes. Another venue worth investigation is the gender gap within right-wing party voters. It has been acknowledged, that the electorate mostly consists of males, which also was proved within this investigation. However, this phenomenon has not been much analyzed yet.

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