ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM
Faculty of Social Sciences

EXPLAINING THE EMERGENCE OF EUROPEAN UNION BATTLEGROUP CONCEPT: THE TEST FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORIES

Anastasiia Koreneva
436820ak

Master's Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for a Degree in

INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY
MASTER OF SCIENCE

1st Reader: Prof. Dr. Michal Onderco
2nd Reader: Prof. Dr. Markus Haverland

Word Count: 24290

20th July, 2016

Master Thesis

MSc International Public Management and Public Policy

Student

Anastasiia Koreneva (436820ak)

University

Erasmus University Rotterdam

1st Reader/ Supervisor

Prof. Dr. Michal Onderco

2nd Reader

Prof. Dr. Markus Haverland

Word Count Excluding Bibliography and Appendices

24 290

Date

20th July 2016

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

The thesis could not have taken off the ground without a number of people, whom I must thank. First of all, I am grateful to my family for their support and encouragement throughout the whole project. Second, I would like to express my gratitude to my close friends, especially Kristina and Ivan for coining brilliant pieces of advice when the most needed. I should also thank the other MSc International Public Management students and alumni for creating an extremely intellectually inspiring atmosphere inside and outside the classroom. A special thank you I say to my 'Thesis Circle' – Wietse Wigboldus, William Ozbun and Max Verhoeven – for their useful advice and our manifold fruitful discussions, as well as always-reasonable critique, which helped enormously to find new ideas and angles.

I am grateful to MSc programme staff, especially to Professor Geske Dijkstra, who organised the study process from the very first minutes in an effective and sensible way and could have always found words of support. I must thank Professor Mika Kerttunen (Finnish National Defence University) for an insightful correspondence about the project, which helped to gain more rigorous outlook on the subject matter. I am also immensely thankful to my second reader, Professor Markus Haverland, for his exhaustive and very helpful comments.

Finally, my most sincere words of gratitude go to my extremely talented supervisor Professor Michal Onderco, who provided an excellent guidance to a project through always-ready advice and precise comments, as well as a thorough organisation of the work process. Without Professor Onderco this thesis would not have been possible.

Abstract

This study intends to contribute to the discussion of European defence cooperation by testing two – process-centric and state-centric – EU integration theory' explanations of Battlegroup policy pattern. The first explanation rests on the argument about spillover logic of development of operational set of EU military forces and the importance of supranational regulation. The second takes as its reference point an intergovernmental nature of the Common Security and Defence Policy, with Battlegroup Certification process being driven by self-interested policy choices made by European nations.

The importance of this policy is determined by the fact, that it is the first and the only experiment of the Union to jointly establish military force, which is to be deployed by the common decision. Correspondingly, the attempt must be made to find a place of this empirical object within the milieu of International Relations, and, more specifically, European Integration theory. I assume, that two alternative explanations – Neo-functionalist an Intergovernmentalist – must be employed, as they can provide comprehensive alternative outlooks on studied phenomenon.

The study is conducted in logic of Congruence analysis, which allows for confronting of two theoretical perspectives. The data is obtained from unclassified sources – official European and country reports on the certification progress and documents setting standards for certification and evaluation, including the NATO documents, and via expert survey. The results suggest that Intergovernmentalist account is more accurate in its explanation of empirical facts, although a set of strong arguments can be found on Neo-functionalist side.

Abbreviations

BGCC Battlegroup Co-ordination Conference
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESS European Security Strategy
EU BG European Union Battlegroup
EUMC European Union Military Committee
EUMS European Union Military Staff
FHQ Force Headquarters
FOC Full Operational Capability
GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council
IOC Initial Operational Capability
MoD Ministry of Defence
MSO Military Strategic Option
NAC North Atlantic Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBG Nordic Battlegroup
NRF NATO Response Force
OHQ Operation Headquarters
PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters
PSC Political and Security Committee
SG/HR Secretary General/High Representative
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
USA United States of America

Tables and Figures

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter I. Puzzle and Disposition

1.1 Introduction

The opening chapter aims at presenting empirical puzzle and disclosing theoretical disposition. It introduces the research question: 'Which theory of European integration, Intergovernmentalism or Neo-functionalism, provides more insights into emergence of European Union Battlegroup Concept and the pattern of European Battlegroup Evaluation and Certification within the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy?' It does so by pointing out the lack of knowledge about the drivers behind the European Union (EU) Battlegroup (BG) Concept formulation and implementation in form of BG Evaluation and Certification procedures, thereby justifying the search for most plausible theoretical explanation. The chapter proceeds by a problem statement and a glimpse of theoretical disposition, then giving evidence of academic and societal relevance of the research question. It wraps up by a brief grasp of project structure.

1.2 Problem Statement and the Key Concepts

1.2.1 EU Battlegroup Concept as a Point of Reference

In a Post-Cold War Western world the idea of national defence undergoes a fundamental metamorphosis: albeit a risk of conventional inter-state war is reduced[1], social instability in developing and former colonial states gives the security concerns new momentum. Today the advent of international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction catalyse the process that can be largely referred to as 'denationalisation of defence' (Østerud and Matlary, 2007).

The European security and defence cooperation presents a vivid example of akin military transformation, where countries opt for a joint strategic thinking, thereby challenging a Weberian (1919) concept of state monopoly of the legitimate use of force – which has for long been considered a nucleus of modern statehood. While mass armies and territorial defence seem less obstinate, rapid response capabilities in form of readily deployable, targeted force packages become a more common concern. In this work, I spotlight European Union Battlegroups, which constitute European-level military capabilities deployed by a common decision. Following sections aim at making the reader familiar with the policy content and implementation strategy.

[1] As it is shown by results of the special Eurobarometer European Opinion Survey 'Public Opinion and European Defence' (Manigart, 2001).

The EU BG Concept

The European Union Battlegroup (BG) Concept, incorporated in the European Common Security and Defence (CSDP) policy, implies a development of rapid-reaction force to address the low-level conflicts in multiple settings. According to the European Union Council Secretariat Factsheet (2007, p. 2), a BG is 'the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations', and is being composed of 'about 1500 personnel', depending on the type of mission in hand. As Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Hamelink (2005, p. 11) reports, 'The Battlegroup has a kind of 'magical' sound. If it is mentioned during a discussion, suddenly everyone shifts to the edge of the chair and straightens their backs'. However, although widely discussed, BGs had never been deployed for an actual mission. In that sense, they remain an ambitious project, which is yet to be tested in practice. Since 2007, the force packages are declared fully operational: two BGs are being present on a standby with a 6-month rotation period.

As a peculiar case of defence internationalisation, the BG Concept challenges traditional intergovernmentalist notion of infeasibility of integration in sensitive 'high politics' domain, where the sovereignty concerns are most pronounced. Some analysts also emphasise the importance of BG Concept as a possible precursor of European army (See Major and Mölling, 2011).

Hence, the BG Concept appears to be suggestive from both academic and utilitarian standpoints. It can be observed, that the effort of member states to establish a common ground in this policy area is considerable; however, *de facto* scope of co-operation remains limited – as the fact that the BGs had been never deployed (albeit requested by the UN during the Libyan crisis in 2011[2]) indicates.

This study takes on the EU BG Concept as its focal point. Employing the most divergent theories of European Integration – Neo-functionalism and Intergovernmentalism[3] – and devising two alternative explanatory lenses, it seeks to broaden the arguably incomplete understanding of this empirical phenomenon. It is important to notice, however, that I do not devote myself to analysis of the cases of BGs (non)-deployment[4], which are often discussed in the literature – because they do not allow to approach more casual policy-making; rather, I focus on policy background, its formulation and implementation in form of EU BG Evaluation and Certification (E&C) process. I argue, that attention to more 'day-to-day' policy-making – which, in the

[2] For detailed academic and analytical overview of these events see Adler-Nissen R. and Pouliot V. 2014. Power in practice: Negotiating the international intervention in Libya // European Journal of International Relations, 20(4), pp. 889–911; Fabbrini S. 2014. The European Union and the Libyan crisis // International Politics, 51, pp. 177–195; Koenig N. 2014. Between Conflict Management and Role Conflict: the EU in the Libyan Crisis // European Security, 23(3), pp. 250-269.

[3] In its Liberal variant.

[4] As a matter of fact, EU BGs, have never been deployed, although reached full operational capacity in January 2007.

context of BGs, is a BG E&C – provides more room for theoretical scrutiny than the irregular pattern of strategic decisions and non-decisions.

The following section provides a brief glimpse of what Evaluation and Certification mean in the context of joint military capabilities.

Evaluation and Certification of the EU BG

It is needed to be explained what the Evaluation and Certification of BGs imply and why they are deemed important. As soon as there is no definition of evaluation and certification in the related EU documents (the reasons to which are explained in Chapter II), and the EU BG Concept suggests that 'Wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures (...) are analogous to those defined within NATO (NRF)' (Council of the European Union, 2007, p. 12), the following NATO definitions can be employed:

Evaluation is '*a structured process of the critical examination of either any activity and/or capability against defined standards and criteria*' (Lindberg, 2006, p. 27, op. cit.).

In turn, Certification is '*the procedure by which a military authority gives formal assurance that an Headquarter, force or unit scheduled to be, or already, under his command complies with the demands and requirements to fulfill a specific task or mission (...) Certification may be based on existing evaluation and on other available supporting information.*' (Ibid.).

The rationale behind the EU BG certification procedure is to guarantee that the force packages meet 'detailed military capability standards' (Military Capability Commitment Conference, 2004, p. 4), and are fully prepared in light of a possible mission (Volpi, 2011, p. 154). The task of certification is performed by contributing Member States and is monitored by the EU Military Committee, with assistance of the EU Military Staff (EU External Action Service, 2013), thus making it a realm of joint national-EU responsibilities. Importantly, the standards and criteria for BG E&C are 'items identified as recommendable though not verifiable' (Council of the European Union, 2005), which makes it not clear how the competences are divided between the national- and Union-level (See Lindberg, 2006; Lindstrom, 2007) and creates a significant room for the rules' interpretation.

Evaluation and certification are extremely important: they can be seen as an official approval of Member States contributions aimed at establishing common defence capabilities; differently put, they constitute a mechanism of ensuring compli-

ance with joint commitments (Chappell, 2009). It is logical, that some member states are more committed to have their assets trained and ready then the others: as an illustration, the E&C of Nordic BG (NBG) and Balkan BG (HELBROC) can be considered. While Nordic countries based their contributions on extensive research, employing the think-tank knowledge and submitting exhaustive reports throughout the process (See Lindberg, 2006; Lindstrom, 2007), Balkan states were much less active in addressing joint commitments, which raised numerous concerns about overall operationability of the force package (Major and Mölling, 2011). From that stance, E&C procedure serves as a mechanism of harmonisation of national inputs and holding the parties accountable. Such harmonisation is seen in the literature as a key priority in ensuring policy effectiveness (See, e.g., Andersson, 2006).

The content of the BG Concept, as well as the notions of BG Evaluation and Certification are more thoroughly discussed in the following chapters.

1.2.3 Explaining the EU Battlegroup Concept

The EU BG Concept is central to European security architecture: it constitutes a feasible result of defence integration – i.e., member states jointly develop European-level military capabilities, which are to be deployed by collective decision (European External Action Service, 2014). Acknowledging the limited effectiveness (or *de facto* failure) of prior initiatives, including the Helsinki Headline Goal 1999[5], the BG Concept thus far presents the most meaningful manifestation of member states' desire to collectively build up European military capabilities (Major and Mölling, 2011, p. 7). These units have a potential to become core of permanent EU military cooperation, possibly giving the leverage to the project of European army.

However, the noticeable tension persists between those sharing an optimistic outlook, who argue that policy is 'ripening but is, admittedly, not quite ripe' (Jacoby and Jones, 2008), and those being critical of the fact that BGs had never been deployed due to the deficits of consensus and power (See, for instance, Balossi-Restelli, 2011; Brattberg, 2011; Simón, 2012).

It can be linked to the fact that a rather shaky balance is stroke between the two layers of European security and defence governance: on the one hand, BGs constitute a high-profile Union-level defence capability and are therefore managed by supranational institutions – European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and European Union Military Staff (EUMS); on the other hand, however, the evaluation and certification of BGs remains a national responsibility and is largely driven by member states' political and military elites, which leaves a limited room for an EU engagement.

The major empirical puzzle one encounters here is well known among International Relations and, more specifically, European Integration scholarship. The ques-

[5] Which suggested that member states are to be able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 60000 persons in order to fulfil Petersberg tasks (See Garrett, 2013).

tions of ‘Who pulls the strings of Union-level integration in security and defence and by what means they do so?’, ‘How to explain the fact that the standards and criteria for EU BG E&C are not defined in the documents?’ and ‘What are the implications of this to a general dynamics of European cooperation?’ are likely to arise. To approach these and several other concerns, two confronting theories of European Integration are being clashed: I argue, that this will yield a comprehensive explanation of highly thought-provoking empirical phenomenon. Next section looks at the theoretical disposition, justifying the choice of confronting perspectives.

1.2.3 Theoretical Disposition

As Schout and Wolff (2011, p. 3) duly note, ‘supranationalism and intergovernmentalism can hardly be considered as Weberian ideal-types’. It implies, that the scholarship of European integration persistently faces the problem of theoretical demarcation – especially given some normative saturation of the subject matter (Rosamond, 2000, p. 49).

Equivocal nature of observable EU-level reforms causes certain degree of complication while drawing the line between two opposing, albeit highly interrelated perspectives. It can be said even, that distinguishing neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism serves mainly heuristic purpose; however, it enables undertaking the grounded analysis, which directs attention to certain aspects of empirical phenomenon (Sager et al., 2014). Occasionally, though, policy practitioners as well as scholars arrive at assumption that there is a strong interconnection between the two poles, opting for language of ‘continuum’, ‘marble cake’ and ‘trade-off’ (See, e.g., Schmitter, 1996; Saeter, 1998; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998).

This study admits the presence of certain degree of affinity between the mentioned European integration theories; however, acknowledging the blurring effect of abovementioned constructs, it attempts to consistently divide the perspectives in order to gain more distinct explanation of observable reality. Referring to Howorth (2011, p. 3), the ‘distinction between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism has always been fundamental’, and nowhere the quest for retaining member-state influence has ‘considered to be more central than in the area of foreign and security policy, which has consciously been set within the rigid intergovernmental framework (…)’.

The selected theoretical perspectives are more rigorously discussed in Chapter III, which is concerned with juxtaposition of theories.

1.3 Research Objective

The brief introduction of theories aims at establishment of a preliminary ground for approaching an empirical phenomenon. The objective of current study is to gain better outlook on the EU BG Concept and the pattern of EU BG evaluation and certification, accounting for factors and driving forces standing behind the process. The thesis will be anchored in two conflicting theories of European Integration – Neo-

functionalism and Intergovernmentalism – to explore which provides a better explanation of policy development. Consequently, I argue, the notions of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism can be refined via giving them a thorough examination, thereby informing both theoretical and policy discussion.

The guiding aim of the research is to determine whether intergovernmentalism provides more insights into BG certification than neo-functionalism, or vice versa. In doing so the study will rely on the knowledge of security experts, competent in EU security and defence organisation, as well as whole multitude of available empirical data. The methodology to be utilised combines elements of qualitative and quantitative analyses.

1.4 Research Aim and Question

Consistent with presented empirical puzzle and research objective, the main research question of the study is formulated as follows:

Which theory of European integration, Intergovernmentalism or Neo-functionalism, provides more insights into emergence of European Union Battlegroup Concept and the pattern of European Battlegroup Evaluation and Certification within the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy?

In line with selected method of analysis – the Congruence analysis – the set of sub-questions consists of six propositions – three for each theoretical perspective, which take a form of explanatory statements (Blatter and Haverland, 2012, p. 145). Propositions are deductively derived from two theories and will form the pairs in order to gain alternative explanations of the same chain link in policy evolution. This will inform my inquiry by a solid two-cornered clash of perspectives (Ibid., p. 144-145). The set of sub-questions is developed in Chapter V on the basis of operationalization[6] of theories. They will direct the attention to the potential driving forces of EU BG Concept formulation and implementation.

1.5 Theoretical and Societal Relevance

1.5.1 Theoretical Relevance

The theoretical contribution made by this study comes in three forms: the test for theoretical lenses, the addressed lack of scholarly attention to selected subject matter, and the application of relatively novel in social sciences methodology.

[6] Blatter and Blume (2008, p. 326, 327) note, that in Congruence analysis it is more accurate to talk about 'interpretation instead of operationalisation', as the 'sensitivity for making inferential leaps between concrete observations and abstract concepts/meanings puts interpretative techniques into the center of a CON approach'.

Firstly, as Bergmann and Neumann (2013, pp. 7, 9) indicate, the European Integration accounts of common foreign policy are dominated by heuristic, descriptive research designs, without probing or applying the basic theoretical propositions, or theses, explicitly or systematically. This study, in turn, aims at taking the assumptions derived from the concrete theories of European integration as its point of departure. By doing so, it adds up to the fruitful debate between advocates of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism within the larger International Relations and European integration scholarship.

Secondly, the subject matter of current analysis had rather rarely appeared in political science research. There is a group of works taking BGs as their focal point; however, the aspect of evaluation and certification, although extremely thought-provoking, is yet to be explored. This study will carefully examine available unclassified data on the pattern of BG certification, thus bridging the gap of knowledge about this highly important empirical phenomenon.

Thirdly, the study combines rigorous qualitative analysis of primary and secondary data with quantitative examination of expert survey results. Conducted within a larger framework of Congruence analysis (CON), it develops two-stage strategy of gaining empirical evidence. At the first stage, the multitude of available data on the explored phenomenon are collected and analysed to obtain possibly clearer vision of policy 'as it is lived', i.e. without taking it out of its context. At the second stage, the expert surveys are examined to gain behind-the-scenes insights into balance between the two levels of decision-making. The methodological contribution made by this work, thus, rests on the fusion of research techniques, allowing for capturing both factual and analytic accounts of empirical reality.

1.5.2 Societal Relevance

From the societal point of view, the study approaches a highly problematic policy aspect of EU Battlegroup E&C, which appears to be especially relevant given the recent escalations of violence in the European Union's periphery, namely in Libya, Ukraine, Turkey and Syria. The focus on policy implementation in a form of BG certification will provide an essential insight into the interplay between national- and European-level bodies in sensitive domain of EU common security and defence policy. A more comprehensive understanding of the state of affairs, as well as of policy drivers, will allow for addressing the multiple policy shortcomings and, by this, for future policy improvement.

It has become a commonplace among politicians and public to regard European military cooperation as inefficient and lagging behind compared to other areas of EU integration. Hence, the value added by studies, which bring to the light the motives underlying security and defence decision-making, is hard to overemphasize. This work will look at the place of different actors in a complex system of joint commitments. The practice-grounded argument developed throughout the study, which analytically approaches the role of individual member states in the EU decision-

making, will help to successfully capture the nature of their interaction in a dynamic policy domain, informing discussion of policy orientation, including possibilities for further denationalisation of defence and widely debated establishment of European army (Østerud and Matlary, 2007).

1.6 Chapter Outline

The remainder of the study will proceed as follows. In Chapter II, the factual background of subject matter is reconstructed, which will anchor the work in a concrete empirical phenomenon. The BG Concept, as well as the concept of BG evaluation and certification, and the E&C criteria are explained and shown in their larger context – namely, the framework of CSDP in its Lisbon reading.

Charter III examines the available theoretical approaches to the subject matter, selecting most applicable explanatory perspectives from the stance of the research objective. It analyses main arguments presented by general IR and middle-range theoretical paradigms, opting for arguably two most divergent European Integration theories – neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism.

Chapter IV provides a detailed account of research design. It discusses available experimental and non-experimental research designs, giving arguments in favour of selection of peripherally mentioned above research strategy. It refines upon the main strengths and weaknesses of methodology, further invoking the notions of reliability and validity the project can gain.

In Chapter V I undertake operationalization of key theoretical concepts presented by two tested theories. At this first stage of analysis I select the most insightful elements of two theories and then one-by-one derive theory-grounded propositions on the basis of which the theories will be subsequently tested.

Chapter VI encounters the analytical examination of the empirical phenomenon. It draws on the extensive primary and secondary data, as well as the data acquired via expert survey, in order to give comprehensive test to derived propositions. It arrives at partial or complete confirmation or disconfirmation of each of the statements, allowing to observe which explanatory perspective proves more insightful – neo-functionalism or intergovernmentalism.

Finally, Chapter VII discusses the findings, putting them into the larger context of the related literature, and offers the analytic conclusions. It provides the answer to the research question and points out the possible implications of these findings. It then suggests possible avenues for further research.

Chapter II. Policy Background

2.1 Introduction

The Chapter aims at providing a comprehensive description of the EU BG Concept in a larger common defence policy framework. It departs from the discussion of the policy purpose and of its place within the milieu of European common security and defence. It then looks at the background of policy development, and the policy content. It proceeds by discussing the regalement of policy implementation in form of BG Evaluation and Certification.

Correspondingly, it is deemed important to introduce key institutions – European Union Military Committee and European Union Military Staff, which represent Union-level bodies tasked with the policy implementation.

2.2 Introducing EU Battlegroup Concept

2.2.1 Basic Features

The rationale behind the European Union Battlegroup Concept can be understood from the Council's call for the Union to become 'more active, more coherent, and more capable' international agent (Council of the European Union, 2003, p. 11). The need for establishment of the BGs has been articulated in Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council in 1999, suggesting that in light of Petersberg tasks 'particular attention will be devoted to the capabilities necessary to ensure effective performance in crisis management' (Council of the European Union, 1999, p. 2).

The EU Battlegroup Concept aims at development of rapid-reaction force to address low-level conflicts in multiple settings. Depending on the type of the mission in hand, BG is composed of 'about 1500 personnel' (EU Council Secretariat Fact-sheet, 2007, p. 2) and is projected to be sustainable for up to 120-days period. BGs are formed multilaterally. In each specific case they are composed according to the preferences of the contributing European states; however, as Gustav Lindstrom suggests, a 'standard' BG is organized as a 'headquarters company, three infantry companies, and corresponding personnel', including the 'mechanised infantry, combat support elements and combat service support elements' (Lindstrom, 2007, p. 15). Importantly, the Council's decision precedes the launch of an operation, which then has to be set up in 10 days after the Council agreed on it. Since the 1 January 2007, BGs are fully operational, with two BGs being steadily on standby with a 6-month rotation period.

The basic features of BG include combined arms, battalion-size, and possibility of reinforcement with Combat Support and Combat Service Support components (See Appendix 3). Notably, although the structure of key units is pre-defined, the

composition can be tailored for demands of certain mission, forming the ready 'force package'.

Importantly, transition to the European level of BG-related responsibilities – i.e., overseeing the process of Evaluation and Certification, and monitoring the progress of standardisation and harmonisation of the states' military capacities – provided EU Military Staff and EU Military Committee with tangible opportunities for broadening 'Brusselsisation' of common defence (Hamelink, 2005, p. 9).

2.2.2 EU Battlegroup Concept in a Larger European Security and Defence Framework

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty institutionalized current structure of CSDP. The strategy-making bodies consist of the President of the European Council and the High Representative (HR). Both roles were introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (Articles 15, 18, The Lisbon Treaty) to address the lack of political leadership. The suggestion/initiative-proposing bodies consist of the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Article 27.3, Ibid.), the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (Article 38, Ibid.), and the COREPER (Article 16.7, Ibid.). When a crisis occurs, the PSC serves as the political power for the promotion of a coherent strategy. The HR and member states can submit to the Council proposals or initiatives referring to CSDP (Article 27.1, Ibid.). If the immediate decision is required, the High Representative can initiate an extraordinary Council meeting (Article 30.2, Ibid.).

Table 1. Summary of key events leading to the EU BG Concept adoption (1999-2004)

Event	Date	Significance
Helsinki European Council	December 1999	Initial mentioning of rapid response elements
Franco-British Summit in Le Touquet	February 2003	Notion of 5-10 day deployment horizon raised
Operation Artemis	June 2003	1st EU autonomous military rapid response operation
Franco-British Summit	November 2004	Call for battlegroup-sized force packages
UK, French, German Food-for-Thought Paper	February 2004	Introduction of the EU BG Concept
GAERC	March 2004	Welcomes the proposal of EU BG Concept at EU level

GAERC	May 2004	Approval of EU BG Concept
EUMC	June 2004	Agreement on the EU BG Concept
European Council	June 2004	Endorsement of the 2010 Headline Goal
Military Capability Commitment Conference	November 2004	Initial EU BG pledges made

Sources: Lindstrom, 2007; Sweeney, 2015.

European Rapid Reaction Force and two standby battle groups represent deployable military forces (Major and Molling, 2011). Battlegroups were designed to be used in so-called 'bridging operations' – support operations on the basis of EU mandate to back the pending deployment of the UN troops and the troops of various regional organisations (Volpi, 2011). They are composed usually of the soldiers, including only army personnel (with air force and navy not being present up to date) and equipment provided by certain member states and non-EU countries (Volpi, 2011). The 'Framework nation' or 'Lead nation' in each BG has the command of the group, accordingly supplying the most of equipment and military staff. As Valerio Volpi (Ibid., p. 158) puts it, 'both in the case of battlegroups (…) and ad hoc missions with troops provided by the member states of the EU, member states coordinate their participation in missions, but their forces remain in any case independent'.

Under the Framework nation leadership, contributing states carry out planning, training, evaluation and certification of BGs, subsequently putting deployable units on stand-by for a six-months period. In addition, the Framework nation provides availability of Operational Headquarters (OHQ) and military capabilities. Finally, the Operations Commander takes on responsibility for the unit in the event of deployment. These elements constitute a 'blueprint' for composition of a specific force package.

The modules may come from different countries (combined) or different armed services (joint) – i.e., consisting of varying elements of air force, navy, and army. Possibly the BG can be expanded according the needs of particular mission, incorporating niche structures – e.g., Special Forces. The OHQ provides coordination of separate units. Accordingly, all assets must align with the defined standards and criteria in order to ensure operational capability.

2.3 Introducing the Concept of BG Evaluation and Certification

The major characteristic of the Battlegroup Concept is that to qualify as an EU Battlegroup force packages, the BGs must rely on a 'commonly defined and agreed, detailed military capability standards' (Military Capability Commitment Conference,

2004, p. 4), with member states being responsible for their setting and respective certification. The concept of certification is central for the EU repaid response formulation.

The purpose of certification, as well as the subsequent responsibilities of member states, is defined in The EU BG Concept as follows: 'Certification of formed elements is required, in order to guarantee that the defined standards are being met. The certification remains a national responsibility of the contributing Member States, who should undertake this certification according to fixed EU-agreed procedures (...).' (Council of the European Union, 2007, p. 11). Certification is a highly important chain link in ensuring the Battlegroup preparedness for a possible mission (Volpi, 2011, p. 154). The process of certification is monitored by the EU Military Committee, with assistance of the EU Military Staff (EU External Action Service, 2013).

The standards of certification procedure aim at alignment with NATO Response Force certification procedure. In the EU BG Concept, it is stated that 'The EU BG seeks to be complementary with NATO (NRF) documents. Wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures (...) are analogous to those defined within NATO (NRF). This is of utmost importance as Member States may commit their assets and capabilities (...) to both the BG and the NRF (Council of the European Union, 2007, p. 12).

The BG-Training and Certification also stresses the importance of an analogous character of the procedure (Council of the European Union, 2005). According to the analysis presented by Swedish Defence Research Agency, apart from these recommendations, there are no other certification methods present in the documents (Lindberg, 2006). Thus, complementarity with NRF serves as an important point of reference.

However, it is important to acknowledge the difference between NRF and BG Concept, which appears to be rather substantial. NRF is admittedly larger in size (initially planned to be composed of up to 25000 troops) and capabilities, representing the integrated air, land and sea elements. Thus, it is equipped for addressing more complex crises and conflicts (Major and Mölling, 2011).

The process of certification can be seen as a three-step procedure. At the first step, member states shape the BG package training in accordance to their perceived needs. Then, before being added to BG package, they need to meet unit-level standards. Finally, contributing member states 'are to certify that their BG package meets the BG Standards and Criteria' (Ibid.).

Standards and Criteria for EU Battlegroups are designed in the same complementary fashion: 'Commonly defined and agreed, detailed military capability standards for BGs are a necessity. Wherever possible such standards should be the same as those required for similar formations assigned to the NATO Response Force' (Council of the European Union, 2007, p. 10). There is, however, a set of concrete criteria found in the documents. They are given in Standards and Criteria for EU Battlegroups (7185/05 dated 9 March 2005) and include the notions of asset availability, flexibility, employability and deployability, readiness, connectivity sustainability, survivability, medical force protection and interoperability.

These criteria are being applied as the 'items identified as recommendable though not verifiable' (Council of the European Union, 2005). It is, thus, puzzling to measure the fulfilment of standards based on the given criteria: taking into account their recommending orientation, it can be noticed, that they leave a significant room for interpretation (See Lindberg, 2006). Consequently, the rationale underlying successful certification appears problematic.

Thus, it is important to formulate a series of questions regarding the practical aspects of certification procedure in order to understand how the goal of meeting the standards can be *de facto* achieved (Ibid., p. 23).

2.4 European-Level Bodies Responsible for BG Evaluation and Certification

The section looks closely at the Union-level bodies responsible for EU BG E&C in order to build up the ground on which policy implementation can be analysed. Since a substantial part of the study aims at understanding the balance between member states' and EU-level capacities to shape the policy outcomes, 'the catalogue of competencies' has to be discussed.

2.4.1 The EU Military Committee in European Security Architecture

The EU Military Committee (EUMC) represents 'the highest military body established within the Council' (Council of the European Union, 2001, p. 2). Its purpose is to provide military advice to the Political and Security Committee as well as expert directions to the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMC is composed of the highest military authorities of member states – the Chiefs of Defence; regularly it meets at the level of their competent representatives – senior officers based in Brussels. Twice a year the EUMC meets in the Chiefs of Defence configuration, e.g., to decide upon the candidature of next Chairman – a four star flag officer, appointed by Council for a three-year period.

The EUMC plays a decisive role in EU operational planning, acting as a top-level supplier of military instruction in a joint organizational structure comprised of EUMS, responsible for military assessments, the HR and the PSC, and the services of Council Secretariat. On a more orderly basis, the EUMC monitors the progress of ongoing missions and directs the work of the EUMS – e.g., crisis management procedures and military capability-related exercises.

2.4.2 The EU Military Staff in European Security Architecture

The basic mandate of EU Military Staff (EUMS) is to provide military advise and support to the CSDP. The establishment of Civil-Military Cell in 2005 and subsequent implementation of post-Wiesbaden and Hampton Court agendas in 2008 led to

a significant extension of the initially small cell of organizational personnel – namely, seconded military officers – whose number up to date reached more than 200 (Grevi, 2009).

The EUMS is charged with two sets of tasks: firstly, it is responsible for early warning, situation assessment and CSDP strategic planning, and secondly, they participate in the process of elaboration, review and assessment of military capability goals. In accomplishment of these tasks, EUMS provides the EUMC with advice and expertise. It also cooperates closely with the Directorate-General External and politico-military affairs' Directorate VIII 'Defence aspects' (DG-E VIII) and Joint Situation Centre within the Council Secretariat, where it is responsible for definition and political framing of EU military initiative.

Before 2007, when EUMS became authorized of supplying military expertise upstream, the EU had in its disposal only two options for operational planning and mission conduct under CSDP – namely, access to NATO's operational HQ under the terms of Berlin Plus agreement, or transformation of national HQs to arrange multinational command. The debate about build-up of the solely European operational capabilities pushed member states towards creation of permanent, full-fledged military HQ.

Chapter III. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Main Explanatory Perspectives

3.1.1 Encountering the Patchwork of Explanatory Perspectives

It has become a commonplace in academic and political discussion to account European common security architecture as ineffective and falling short to its stated priorities. The 'capability-expectations' gap, indicated a decade ago in Chris Hill's classic work on EU's international action, suggests that it can be linked to the Union's lack of capacity to 'produce collective decisions' and influence the events (Hill, 1993, p. 306).

The rise of critical accounts of the EU common security action was triggered by its perceived failure to harness the escalation of conflict in Yugoslavia in 1993 (Cohen, 1993). The second wave of vigorous criticism was triggered by Union's incoherent response to the crisis in Libya, which can be considered Europe's closest neighbourhood (Juncos and Whitman, 2015). One reason for this recent appraisal is the viewed lack of the progress of CSDP, reformed by the Treaty of Lisbon in order to strengthen political leadership within the sensitive 'high politics' realm and, thus, address the lack of agreement upon common action.

Correspondingly, a number of studies appeared, which aimed at explaining the unsatisfactory outcomes of the CSDP from the standpoints of various theories. One set of explanations links the problem of finding consensus to a largely intergovernmental nature of cooperation on security and defence matters. However, employing the argument made by Wolfgang Wagner, it can be misleading to assume that intergovernmental policy set-up itself is responsible for the lack of coherence: 'without a sufficient degree of consensus' CSDP could have never been able to take off the ground (Wagner, 2003, p. 589).

Thus, the other major part of explanations derived from the Integration theory can be categorized as explanatory models, which 'point to the fact that the multiplicity of relevant actors (...) does not preclude that nation-states still play a decisive role in the formulation and implementation of European foreign policies' (Bergman & Neumann, 2013, p. 15). Hence, they focus on the role of other relevant policy drivers – which can be quiet productive in a way that allows the study to spotlight more effectively the less pronounced factors influencing policy formulation than the mere political will of the states. These theories include neo-functionalism, federalism, the governance approach and policy network analysis (Ibid., p. 2).

3.1.2 International Relations Explanations

The first set of explanatory perspectives is derived from a general IR theory. Four main perspectives hence can be distinguished: realist, liberal, institutionalist, and constructivist. There a central cleavage within the IR theory scholarship takes place.

Realists put the stress on the balance of power and interests in CSDP operation and development (Gegout, 2009; Art, 2004; Posen, 2004, Howorth and Menon, 2009). However, realist stance can be struggling in dealing with European security cooperation – mainly, because, the classical realist agenda predicts that delegation of military responsibilities, even if limited, would not be possible, since it makes major players prone to negative externalities of sovereignty transfer (Jones, 2007).

Liberals argue, that policy decisions are taken by democratic governments willing to be re-elected and, thus, are shaped primarily by the set of domestic opportunity structures and constraints (Moravcsik, 1997; Robinson, 2001; Pohl, 2013). Correspondingly, when a certain CSDP operation is in question, two sets of factors are being weighed by domestic governments: political gains from demonstrating to domestic constituencies the ability of 'influencing international events', and political losses from 'paying too high a price in blood or treasure for foreign policy projects whose benefits are dubious, incalculable or essentially public goods' (Pohl, 2013, p. 3).

Institutionalists explain the outcomes of CSDP by bargaining between the EU officials within its institutional framework. Hylke Dijkstra (2012a, p.458) points at the fact that the initial efforts to launch the CSDP were made by civil servants in the Council General Secretariat and the former High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security policy in order to gain the leverage in the 'turf battles' with the European Commission.

Constructivists, in turn, emphasize the role of ideational factors in policy formulation and implementation. Certain scholars argue, that the deployment of CSDP operations – namely, Operations Artemis and Concordia – is driven by consolidation of European strategic culture (Pentland, 2011; Schmidt, 2011). However, constructivist arguments appear to be flawed in two respects: first, they draw generalist conclusions from single case studies; second, they tend to analyse the EU as a single unit, which can obscure several important explanatory variables (Nováky, 2015).

3.1.3 European Integration Explanations

The other set of analyses turns to the specifically European integration explanations. They include neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, federalism, the governance approach and policy network analysis.

Neo-functionalists bridge the lack of account given to the dynamics of integration (See, for instance, Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963). In short, they focus more on the process of incremental change, to a major extent driven by the intended or unintended consequences of the previous decisions (Haas, 1970, p. 627). Integration is perceived as a process, evolving with the course of time and having its own dynamics (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991). From this viewpoint, integration in traditional policy

fields possibly requires further integration in more sensitive policy areas (Peters & Wagner, 2005).

Intergovernmentalism emerged in 1950s as a result of urge to explain the outcomes of integration process (Bergmann and Niemann, 2013). It suggests, that the pattern of integration is determined by the states' preferences and interests, which are being clashed in the process of collective bargaining (Hoffman, 1966). The role of supranational institutions is very limited, with domestic politics shaping the cooperation dynamics.

Federalists tend to focus on normative rather than analytical discussion, arguing that the integration in foreign, security and defence policy is inevitable within the gradual process of building of functional links between sovereign states, as 'the nation states have lost their property rights since they cannot guarantee the political and economic safety of their citizens' (Spinelli, 1972, p. 68). However, this approach focuses predominantly on the integration's end product, which makes it less prominent in explaining the way to achieve this result.

The governance approach scholars focus on studying the impact of the EU's political system on the initial stage of policy cycle: policy formulation (Jachtenfuchs, 2001; Stephenson, 2013). As Neumann duly notices, 'While in classic integration theory the Euro-polity is the dependent variable, the governance approach treats it as the independent variable' (2010, p. 10). However, this external approach remains a useful analytical tool, being less coherent then the more general theory.

Policy network analysis is based on the assumption of polycentric character of the European political system (Peterson, 1995). Research conducted within this paradigm demonstrates, that policy formulation and implementation are influenced by the range of institutions, such as the Commission, European Parliament, General Affairs Council and NATO. The main shortcoming of this paradigm, similarly with the governance approach, is its less theoretically substantial and explanatory nature.

3.2 Selection of the Theories

Existence of rather strong arguments on different sides of theoretical spectrum suggests that the theoretical clash across different paradigms in small-N research can allow us to generate a strengthened explanation of mechanisms underlying evaluation and certification of EU BGs (Blatter, 2012, p. 11). The study can bridge the gap of literature juxtaposing alternative theoretical explanations to build up a comprehensive understanding of policy fundamentals (Blatter and Blume, 2008).

From this point of view, I argue, it can be productive to derive propositions from two European Integration theory approaches. General IR theory accounts, some of which had been extensively criticized within the field of cooperation in security and defence policy (as it was shown above, realist and constructivist theories are deemed to a lesser extent productive in this respect), can give more general interpretation of policy outcomes. In this sense, studying the development of the EU BG Con-

cept from the standpoint of European integration theories can help to acquire a more comprehensive and focused explanation. As soon as the federalist theory concentrates mostly on the normative side of the cooperation, and the governance and network approaches tend to be mainly instrumental, thereby giving more limited opportunities for theorizing (Neumann, 2010), I opted for selection of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism as the main explanatory lenses.

3.2.1 Critique of Neo-functionalism

The criticism for neo-functionslism emanates both from empirical and theoretical sides. From the empirical stand, neo-functionalism is accused in inability to explain slowed down pace of integration in Europe in the 1970s - 1980s (the famous 'empty chair crisis'): according to paradigm, the cooperation is supposed to gradually deepen. From the theoretical stand the weakness of neo-functionalism is related to its interconnectedness with the constructivism, which fails to account for structural limitations of political process. As it has been admitted by Haas (2001, p. 22), neo-functionalist paradigm can be 'a precursor of what has lately been called Constructivism'. The basis of convergence between the two theories is built on a concept of socialisation: for neo-functionalists, socialisation of elites within the supranational institutions leads to gradual enhancement of supranational level; for constructivists, it substantiates the importance of intersubjectivity.

Finally, intergovernmentalists criticize the theory for the undue attention to supranational actors, who at the end are mere agents of nation-states. Even if one may get an impression that EU-level institutions are able to act independently, it is always in hands of the member states to withdraw from an unfavourable commitment.

3.2.2 Critique of Intergovernmentalism

One of the most fundamental critiques of Intergovernmentalist approach emanates from its distinction between 'low' and 'high' politics: in such, the existence of European foreign policy, and, even more unexpected, the establishment of European Common Security and Defence Policy arguably challenge this theoretical claim. Hoffmann acknowledged this criticism in his later works, admitting that this distinction is not over-arching.

The other critique comes from intergovernmentalist propensity to downplay the role of supranationally devised constraints of the member states' behaviour.

However, the advent of new schools, the most notable of which is the Liberal Intergovernmentalism introduced by Andrew Moravcsik in the early 1990s, to a significant extent addressed this and other criticism, presenting the arguments of 'lowest-common-denominator' and 'positive-sum' bargaining. From the point of view of LI, the EU is 'a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy coordination' (Cini, p. 79).

3.5 Conclusion

The chapter approached the theoretical debate surrounding the development of European Common Security and Defence policy, including the EU Battlegroup Concept. It explained the selection of theoretical paradigms and gave a brief glimpse of neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist explanatory perspectives. It also mentioned the key criticisms attributed to these theoretical accounts. In Chapter V these theories are examined more firmly with the aim of operationalization of their key concepts, as the congruence analysis research design requires comprehensive understanding of theoretical knowledge in order to avoid mistakes in concepts' interpretation and derive valid predictions (Blatter, 2012, p. 29).

Chapter IV. Research Design

4.1 Introduction

This study intends to contribute to the discussion of European defense cooperation by testing two – process-centric and state-centric – EU integration theory' explanations of BG policy pattern. The Chapter presents the research design of this study, discussing available methodologies and justifying selection of mixed methods' research strategy. It then goes in detail with congruence analysis logic of research conduct and issues of reliability and validity. Finally, it presents the method of expert survey and describes the study's strategy of data attainment.

4.2 Discussion of Available Research Designs

The research question, which the study seeks to answer, cannot be approached via quantitative research design for a number of reasons. To start with, it is impossible to quantify explanation of the policy emergence. Focus on one case – a concrete policy with its background and implications – suggests, that quantitative account would be extremely limited in capturing policy' driving forces and providing the insights into policy-making practices. On the contrary, qualitative techniques can make it possible to approach causal attributes of the explored phenomenon (Leuffen, 2007), as well as understand its dynamics. Therefore, I opted for an explanatory approach that combines qualitative analysis with quantitative tool for data attainment.

The dependent variable for the research is the EU BG policy. Experimental and quazi-experimental designs are not applicable for goal of the research due to a non-variability of the examined case.

Non-experimental designs try to explain a certain real-life phenomenon without taking it out of its context, studying factors that had directed its development (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). The independent variable is not manipulated. The small-N design had been chosen as it provides the opportunity for building up the new knowledge trough comprehensive test of the theories, with the case-study research strategy allowing to focus on different aspects of policy and to gain the relevant insights. Congruence analysis (CON) approach to the data analysis, which allows for deductively deriving propositions, or predictions, from the explanatory theories, has been selected as the key element for this research design.

The other possible qualitative methodology in view of the formulated research question is the Causal-Process Tracing (Coller, 2011). However, this approach does not provide better tool for testing and confronting the competing theoretical assumptions than the CON does: in light of existence of two opposing theoretical perspectives within the realm of European Integration, CON, thus, is deemed more relevant.

This study takes on a mixed methods research strategy, where quantitative data is used to fortify rigorous qualitative analysis. The quantitative technique used for the study is the method of expert survey, which is discussed in the following section. Other possible strategy could have been elite interviewing. However, expert survey is a comparatively inexpensive and easy-to-administer technique of data attainment (Budge, 2000), as it does not require meeting respondents in person, thus allowing for obtaining larger number of observations. Furthermore, while answering survey questions, respondents have no opportunity to redirect the discussion, which is considered to be one of key perils of interviewing. Accordingly, no additional input from the researcher is needed to ensure that the answers align with the vector of study.

4.3 Selection of the Research Strategy

In this study the Congruence Analysis (CON) approach, which allows for a juxtaposition of alternative theoretical explanations (Blatter, 2010, p. 11). This method is considered the most appropriate for my research design, as the comprehensive theoretically anchored explanation of Battlegroup Concept, has to be acquired.

In the literature two subtypes of CON are being mentioned (Blatter and Blume, 2008). The first subtype is a 'competing theories approach', and the second is a 'complementary theories approach' (Ibid., p. 12). In this study the first approach was selected since there are two evidently competing explanations at stake – Intergovernmentalism and Neo-functionalism.

According to Blatter, first subtype 'assumes that divergent theories lead to contradictory implications in the empirical world, that theories stand in stark opposition to each other, and that the goal is to identify the best or most important theory' (Ibid.). This research design implies the formulation of predictions, derived for each of the tested perspectives. It is productive to stress that regardless of the subtype, CON suggests remaining firmly in the 'epistemological middle ground' between more fundamentalist accounts of Positivism, Constructivism and Realism (Blatter and Haverland, 2012, Ch. 1).

4.4 Reliability and Validity

The internal validity, or control of causal claims in CON is achieved through 'rivalry between various theories' (Blatter and Blume, 2008, p. 325). Hence, CON relies on discriminatory power of a broad set of specific observations and bases the interference on competition between the conflicting theories. In that sense it is crucial to utilise broader set of predictions, which are to be internally consistent (Ibid.). Importantly, the predictions derived from these theories are to be 'as diverse as possible' (Ibid., p. 326). External validity cannot and does not have to be safeguarded due to a

small-N scope of the study. Operationalization of theoretical concepts in CON approach takes form of theories' Interpretation and is provided in the following chapter.

The issues of reliability ('objectivity'), which is concerned with the quality of measurement, are addressed by a two-level mode of analysis, where qualitatively obtained conclusions are compared with the expert judgements. Furthermore, the predictions for CON analysis are derived after rigorous overview of the subject-related data at the initial stages of research (Ibid.).

It is logical that expert surveys raise the validity concerns. I use the definition of 'measurement validity' given by Munck and Verkuilen (2002, p. 15): 'whether data measure what they are supposed to measure'. Budge (2000) distinguishes three possible sources of bias: experts may differently interpret similar questions, use divergent evaluation criteria or possess differing levels of expertise. Moreover, expert evaluations can be context-bound, which leads to limited capacity of data and concepts to 'travel' (Sartori, 1970). These challenges are likely to be more pronounced when the subject matter is complex, multifaceted and fluid, or has an ideational dimension. The results of recent study on potential sources of bias, administered by Coma and Van Ham (2015, p. 306) indicate, however, that 'even when treating complex issues in diverse contexts, such as electoral integrity, expert surveys are useful', with 'very little systematic variation' associated with differing level of experts.

In current study these highly important concerns are addressed by, firstly, the detailed explanation of purpose and goal of the research attached to distributed questionnaire; secondly, the scrupulous selection of competent and politically neutral respondents; and, thirdly, the structured and unequivocal survey questions. Moreover, the adoption of analysed policy dates back to the beginning of the 2000s, which makes the topic less ideologically saturated.

4.5 Sources of Data

The sources of empirical data used in this study are multiple. First, the evidence is derived from the relevant policy documents, such as archival records, proposals, and progress reports. Second, the expert survey is conducted to gain valuable insights in policy development. Third, public opinion is studied through the secondary sources of data, namely European opinion polls provided by Eurobarometer. These sources would allow for understanding the *de facto* policy development and gain behind-the-scenes knowledge of policy drivers.

4.5.1 Primary and Secondary Sources of Data

Primary and secondary data for this study is obtained from a variety of sources, including policy proposal and other forms of European and national documentation archival records, academic research, newspapers and specialised journals,

and public opinion polls. These data sources are deemed important as they would allow to build on a grounded and detailed explanation of empirical phenomenon. The research question I seek to address requires a rigorous examination of the EU BG policy content. Since the study encounters a sensitive area of security and defence, it is logical to assume, that some documents would not be publically available; to address this concern, the additional data is being obtained from the expert survey.

4.5.2 Quantitative Expert Survey

I opted for the rather novel in social sciences method of expert survey due to a series of reasons. First of all, it presents an unparalleled opportunity to gain the knowledge of more sensitive policy realms, such as the area of security and defence, where a significant number of records and documents are classified. Second, the method allows for a succinct and structured collection of data, omitting the possible ambiguities and inconsistencies, which may result from interviewing. Third, this form of knowledge gathering allows for approaching practically the majority of experts working with the explored phenomenon, as the questionnaire can be distributed via the Internet. Forth, the method of expert survey permits the attainment of knowledge in any domain 'for which experts are available (which does not necessarily have to be the case with other data)' (Onderco, 2010, p. 20). Finally, the validity considerations are addressed by the cognisance of respondents' qualification in respect to the subject matter.

Quantifying the Policy

The value added by experts rests on the premise of their unsurpassed expertise, which they have built on the sensible analysis of empirical evidence, as well as on practical experience. Since the 1990s, expert surveys are becoming increasingly common in political science, most notably in comparative and international studies. They have been applied in research on corruption, e.g. Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2012, 2013, 2014), studies of policy and party positioning (Castles and Mair, 1984; Laver and Hunt, 1992; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Laver et al., 2006; Steenbergen and Marks, 2007; Saiegh, 2009), electoral systems' evaluations (Bowler et al., 2005), perceptions of democracy (Gervasoni, 2010), influence of policy horizons (Warwick, 2005), the power of prime ministers (O'Malley, 2007), foreign policy choices (Onderco, 2010) and electoral integrity (Coma and Van Ham, 2015). The earlier surveys have been shown to be reliable over time.

The distinction must be pointed out between two types of expert surveying strategies: while the first aims at gathering academic knowledge (e.g., research on party positioning), the second uses the professional, 'in-the-field' accounts (e.g., Corruption Perception Index). In this study, I opted for academic expert survey. Thus I do not survey the military elite (which appears infeasible in light of sensitivity of the issue), collecting the theory-based academic knowledge instead.

The Survey

The purpose of the survey was to identify the dominant driving forces behind the EU BG Concept adoption and implementation, as well as to compare the explanatory power of two opposing theoretical perspectives. I opted for a comparatively short questionnaire - the estimated completion time had equalled 5-10 minutes. The questions were separated in three groups in line with three tiers of theoretical assumptions. Each group consisted of two statements, one for each of the tested explanatory perspectives. The experts were asked to evaluate their degree of agreement with the presented statements via traditional Likert-type five-point scale, where '1' inferred 'Strongly disagree' and '5' – ' Strongly agree' (Likert, 1932; Carifio and Perla, 2007). The survey had been pre-tested on a political scientist who had provided a valuable feedback. What I understood as 'Brusselisisation' and 'Lowest common denominator' is presented and explained in Chapter V. The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1.

Used for this study expert survey has enabled me to gain the behind-the-scenes knowledge of European Common Security and Defence Policy, which otherwise would not be possible to obtain. The unambiguity of designed questions, in turn, allowed for a manageable incorporation of expert knowledge in my research design.

The Experts and the Return Rate

The survey was distributed via the Internet to academic specialists working with EU BG Concept. In order to gain a more reliable estimate of academic opinion, the experts were selected on the basis of two parameters: academic affiliation (being affiliated with an academic institution and/or a high-profile think-tank) and expertise in the subject matter (having published on EU BG Concept recently or regularly). Attachment to these criteria allowed me to establish a list of European and American political scientists who had published in English. The questionnaire was sent to 38 experts via e-mail. The reminder has been sent after a two-week interval to ensure higher return rates. The survey was conducted under the Chatham House Rule[7], which is generally acknowledged as a means to achieve greater truthfulness. The return rate of the survey reached 39,5%, with 15 collected responses in total. Indeed, response rate is the key soft spot of surveying; however, the number of responses can be considered significant in light of previous research. The list of experts selected for the survey can be found in Appendix 2.

[7] As explained by Chatham House, 'When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.'
https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule#sthash.jg7LHiGA.dpuf

Chapter V. Expectations and Operationalization

5.1 Introduction

The debate between the proponents of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism has been a constant bone of contention in European integration literature. While several scholars advocated neo-functionalist reading (Haas, 1967; Sandholtz and Sweet, 1998; MacGowan, 2007; Dougan, 2008), others were supportive of the view that EU member states are consistent in their control of the process of joint development (Hoffman, 1966; Putnam, 1988; Milward et al., 1992; Moravcsik, 1993; Tosiek, 2008). While Hoffman (1966) claims that nation state is obstinate, Haas (1976, p. 179) points out that the EU became 'sub-national, national, regional, inter-regional and global – all at the same time'.

5.2 Interpretation instead of Operationalisation

The research conducted in logic of CON research strategy entails designing a sort of 'code-book' in which the arguments of tested theories are being transformed into concrete propositions (Blatter and Haverland, 2012, Ch. 1). Unlike the experimental and large-N research designs, where the dependent and independent variables are being selected and co-varied, the methodology of current study does not prescribe developing metric measurement instruments. Instead, main stress is put on the interpretation – hence, the safeguarding of concept validity (Blatter and Haverland, 2012, p. 166). Thereby, theories need to be read very carefully in order to yield accurate understandings and, thus, firmly grounded propositions. Put differently, interpretation is the most significant part of the task.

It is important to distinguish between the terms used in operationalization. First, *propositions* correspond to main conceptual units and causal linkages pointed out by different theories. Second, *predictions* represent lower level of abstraction, which aligns with empirical observations and, thus, can be applied to them. Third, by *expectations* I mean *both* the propositions and the predictions, since they generally refer to the formulated theoretical explanations, which I expect to observe in empirical world.

Exploring real-life phenomenon requires preliminary revision and adaptation of theories. In order to descend along the ladder of abstraction (Sartori, 1970), the key assumptions, or propositions of tested theories need to be turned into explicit predictions, which will take form of the concrete falsifiable statements. By formulating such statements, the theory will be linked to empirical observations.

Further, the test of predictions will yield their confirmation or disconfirmation. Each of the three pairs of predictions addresses certain aspect of empirical phenomenon, allowing for comparing the explanatory power of two studied theories. In doing

so, the explanatory power of two opposing perspectives can be revealed and weighed. Importantly, the stronger explanation can be identified for both of the cases.

The other point to be made here is that we don't necessarily seek generalisation of research findings – since we concentrate on certain cases in hand and study them closely and rigorously aiming at their theoretical understanding, we need to control for internal validity at the first place. The primary task is thus to ensure that the concepts are firmly rooted in theory and correspond to the subject matter.

To answer the research question, the levels of congruence between the two sets of predictions and the observed and compared.

5.3 Propositions of Neo-functionalism

5.3.1 Introduction

Neo-functionalists conceptualize integration as a function of institutionalised interest politics emerging within the international organisations (Bono, 2002). The spillover can be defined as a process whereby member states attempt to address the perceived lack of progress in one policy sector by collaborating in another. From this viewpoint, the pressing need in security and defence cooperation manifested itself as a result of observable deficiency of previous arrangements.

There are three main pillars on which neo-functionalist perspective builds on: the notion of 'spillover', the part of societal groups and transnational organisations in facilitating cooperation (pluralism), and the paramount role of experts and executives in pushing the project further. These three elements will be taken as the basis for my theoretical predictions.

5.3.2 First Proposition: Functional Spillover

Neo-functionalism emphasises the apolitical nature of states cooperation, which originates from functional needs and technical interdependences arising within international milieu. Hence, one can expect the policy convergence between all actors faced with the advancement-induced functional pressure. Schmitter (1969, p. 162) describes spillover as 'the process whereby members of an integration scheme – agreed on some collective goals for a variety of motives but unequally satisfied with their attainment of these goals-attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction either by resorting to collaboration in another, related sector (expanding the scope of the mutual commitment) or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the level of mutual commitment) or both.'

Functional spillover comes into play when a technical objective cannot be safeguarded without furthering integration (Lindberg, 1963, p. 10). Functional pressures arise due to the growing interdependence between different policy areas, pushing the actors toward increasing the scope and/or the level of mutual commitment in order to secure new goals (Haas, 1958, p. 297).

Not surprisingly, the multiple changes and developments continuously taking place in the European Union's security surrounding present it with new challenges and needs. Oftentimes the previous arrangements cannot address these needs; hence, the realization becomes more persistent that the advancement is required. In view of the EU BG Concept, which constituted a completely novel form of European defence cooperation (albeit highly interrelated with the bulk of preceding commitments), a number of factors placed a priority on the expansion of integration in this military policy domain.

5.3.3 Second Proposition: Political Spillover

The other crucial premise of discussed theory suggests that throughout the gradual process of institutional development actors, including appointed international public officials or domestic interest groups develop new supranational loyalties (Haas, 1958). One good example of this comes from the European Parliament modus operandi: although the members of Parliament (MEPs) today are elected within the states, they often vote along the political and party lines instead of by national principle (See Hix and Høyland, 2011).

Thus, shift towards supranational loyalties is deemed a crucial element of neofunctionalist understanding of integration. As formulated by Haas (1958, p. 16), 'political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.'

Political spillover predicts, that national elites shift their perceptions throughout the gradual process of policy learning and socialisation (Bergmann and Niemann, 2013, p. 5). When they understand that some solutions can be more effectively produced on a supranational rather then domestic level, they promote wider integration, thereby adding a political momentum to integration process (Haas, 1958). The concept also assumes that the progress of cooperation affects the loyalties of key national-level political actors (Niemann, 1998).

5.3.4 Third Proposition: Cultivated Spillover

Cultivated spillover informs the searches for place of supranational institutions in furthering integration (Haas, 1961, 1964). The concept points out their concerns over bolstering power vis-à-vis member state governments in order to subsequently become the chief agents of integration. According to the concept, supranational institutions are likely to benefit from growing scope of cooperation, and to seek lesser control put over them by the national level (Rosamund, 2000). They also possess a body of means to foster supranational stance, namely policy entrepreneurship, agenda-setting power and brokerage (Bergmann and Niemann, 2013, p. 6).

From the viewpoint of the concept of cultivated spillover, the integration does not progress purely automatically: instead, the important role is played by the agents of integration – supranational bodies – which seek to gain more leverage vis-à-vis nation states in day-to-day decision-making. In this respect, the pattern of BG Concept implementation provides an invaluable insight into the balance between supranational and intergovernmental forces operating within the policy process. In the context of EU BG policy, the implementation can be best approached from the angle of EU BG evaluation and certification: as it has been justified in preceding chapters, this process allows to observe how the responsibilities are *de facto* being distributed between the two levels of European governance. Logically, two corresponding predictions are to be derived from the opposing theories: for neo-functionalism, it is the rooted in the concept of cultivated spillover assumption that supranational bodies possess a significant control over the policy implementation, which they acquired in a gradual process of shifting of responsibilities from national to supranational level.

5.4 Propositions of Intergovernmentalism

5.4.1 Introduction

The key feature of Intergovernmentalism is the premise of state-centrism: it presumes the dominant decision-making role of national governments in international affairs. The origins of intergovernmentalism lie in the realist and neo-realist theories of international relations, specifically in their understandings of inter-state bargaining (Pollack, 2012). Neo-realism, preoccupied with the notions of state power, accredits a certain degree of feasibility to international cooperation; however, divergent state interests will limit it significantly (Keohane, 1988). European Union is seen as one of the many international institutions serving the purpose of alleviating the mistrust induced by anarchic structure.

The nucleus of intergovernmental understanding of European project lies in the political, rather than functional or technocratic expansion of decision-making. This pattern is visible in distribution of competences, where the cooperation in less politically saturated and less controversial low-politics realm[8] is much more profound than it is the high-politics realm, which is dominated by the balance of interests' games (O'Neill, 1996).

The broadening of scope of cooperation is catalyzed by much more fundamental force than the urge for a functional advancement. Instead, it is the phenomenon of growing global interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1976) that facilitates the convergence within international economic and political systems and thereby challenges traditional modus operandi. Thus, European integration is merely one implication of this phenomenon.

The pragmatic calculus of costs and benefits determines the states' decision-

[8] Which includes primarily most of the aspects of economic cooperation (See Cini, 2013).

making about the membership in European cooperation: the reasons for participation lie on the plane of the national interests. For intergovernmentalists, there is nothing particularly unusual about the European project (O'Neill. 1996). Accordingly, they are unwilling to look at European integration as a continuous process, preferring to use the term 'cooperation' instead of 'integration' (Cini, 2013). Mearshimer (1990), for instance, assumed that the Union would cease to exist after the breakdown of communist regimes.

Moravcsik's (1993) writing on 'intergovernmental institutionalism' was an attempt to adjust a realist perspective to practice of European bargaining. This approach reemphasized the centrality of relative power and interest, which represent the key tenets of realism, insisting that preferences of states are determined not simply by balance of material power, but also by domestic priorities, stemming from aggregate of domestic political processes. The theory was based on the principles of lowest-common-denominator bargaining and limited transfer of sovereignty to supranational bodies (Moravcsik, 1992). Notice, however, that in later works he acknowledged the capability of institutions to act as the facilitators of positive-sum bargaining.

On the basis of this organisation of theoretical assumptions, three key elements can be deduced: the inter-state bargaining following the initial stages of policy development, namely the 'lowest-common-denominator' decision-making; the occurrence of domestic political pressure which facilitated the policy formulation; and the intergovernmental control over transfer of responsibilities to international level associated with the leadership of member states over policy implementation. The following section discusses each theoretical element more profoundly.

5.4.2 First Proposition: Lowest Common Denominator

In line with the central notion of intergovernmentalism, inter-state bargaining constitutes a key driving force of joint decision-making. The inter-state bargaining becomes possible due to the interdependence, which creates a need for certain level of agreement (Ibid.). Institutions in this light are seen as the mere facilitators of positive-sum bargaining (Keohane, 1989). Thus, the preferences of member states are deemed supremely important in explanation of EU BG policy formulation, including the initial arrival of the issue on the European agenda. Differing and often opposing national interests clash on artificially constructed arenas, with European Common Security and Defence being an example of such. The eventual disposition – i.e., the content of the BG Concept – indicates the arrival at the 'lowest common denominator' between those more and less supportive of the initiative.

5.4.3 Second Proposition: Domestic Pressure

National representatives tend to build on the domestic interests, which are expressed, for instance, in public opinion. Thus, the demand for cooperation predominantly originates from the domestic milieu (Moravcsik, 1998).

The significance of domestic preferences derives from the liberal concept of

domestic preference formation, which implies that the interests of the states are conditioned by the economic and societal dynamics of national polities – more specifically, by preferences of dominant social groups (Hillman, 1989). Acknowledging these preferences, states represent domestic interests on international arena (Moravcsik, 1993). Importantly, geo-political interests, as well as prestige concerns are not relevant for this model albeit they influence the domestic society (Moravcsik, 1998).

According to this perspective, decision-makers take a thorough account of opinions and perceptions dominating their domestic constituencies as they seek reappointment. From the stance of common security and defence, it is deemed particularly important to identify and respond to persisting among public perceptions of threats: in view of the Union-level strategic thinking, it helps to project the ways to common tackling of security issues.

In line with this view, the second prediction for intergovernmentalism seeks to capture the influence of domestic preferences and fears on the development of the EU BG Concept.

5.4.4 Third Proposition: Limited Sovereignty Transfer

Central to intergovernmentalist debate is the concept of sovereignity, which Cini (2013, p. 74) defines as 'the legal capacity of national decision-makers to take decisions without being subject to external restraints'. According to intergovernmentalist view of European cooperation, the states remain in charge of the delegation of sovereignty to supranational institutions (Pollack, 2002). The latter, in turn, are not seen as independent, autonomous bodies; rather they are the agents of national governments. It can be illustrated by the observation that in more sensitive policy areas functions of supranational institutions are notably constrained, whereas the Council of the European Union has larger mandate.

In line with this perspective, intergovernmentalism suggests that international organisations are governed according to the interests of states involved and become the arenas for negotiation and bargaining. The key argument presented by intergovernmentalists points out the fact that European member states control the transfer of sovereignty to supranational bodies, thus retaining the right to withdraw it at any moment. Supranational institutions, in turn, often struggle to enforce compliance when some states are opposed to the initiative (Cini, 2013).

In the interplay between two tiers of European governance, member states tend to be mindful about the degree to which the responsibilities are being delegated to the EU-level bodies. The final element of intergovernmental explanation looks closely at the role of national governments vis-à-vis supranational institutions in the process of policy implementation – the BG evaluation and certification practice.

5.5 The Trajectory of Data Analysis and the Theoretical Predictions

5.5.1 First Tier of Analysis

In order to establish a comprehensive and plausible theoretical explanation of the content of Battlegroup Concept, we need to bring together all meaningful chain links of corresponding policy cycle, including initial arrival of the issue on European agenda, the following policy formulation, its progress and broader implications. This study aims at exploring empirical phenomenon 'as it is lived', i.e., without taking it out of its context – as it would allow for arriving at aggregate picture and, hence, detect relevant forces operating behind the matter of interest.

Accordingly, the first tier of analysis needs to be preoccupied with the initial stage of policy development – namely, the key forces that had drawn the Union's attention to the initiative, motivating its elaboration and adoption. In many respects, it is the ideational aspect that we are to capture – in other words, an input, which gave the initial momentum to searches of optimal policy solution. From that stance, it can be productive to look closely at the role of spill over dynamics vis-à-vis intergovernmental bargaining in the agenda setting. The first set of theoretical propositions, hence, will identify more significant prerequisites for policy adoption – namely, the acknowledged functional pressure and the political interests of individual member states.

Neo-functionalism
Prediction 1a: Functional Spillover

> If Neo-functionalist account is correct, there will have been evidence of the perceived lack of progress in previous EU military cooperation arrangements, and there will have been evidence of the leverage created by the policy agents to revise the policy, introducing the EU Battlegroup Concept.

Intergovernmentalism
Prediction 1b: 'Lowest-Common-Denominator' Bargaining

> If Intergovernmentalist account is correct, the content of the EU BG Concept will have reflected the lowest common denominator of member states' interests, with the outcome corresponding to the preferences of the least supportive state or societal group.

5.5.2 Second Tier of Analysis

The second layer of theoretical analysis must take as its centrepiece the actors that influenced policy formulation. Attention to the forces shaping the policy content is deemed crucial since it constitutes rather indicative segment of policy development:

here the balance between intergovernmental and supranational driving forces can be thoroughly explored. Specifically, we need to focus on the leverage provided by Brussels-based public officials versus the pressure of member states' domestic constituencies. From the neo-functionalist perspective, supranational elites pushed the project further to gain bigger say in security and defence; on the contrary, from intergovernmentalist perspective, the public opinion on security and defence matters acknowledged by the government officials in national capitals determined the form the BG Concept eventually took, including the aspects of BG Certification.

Neo-functionalism
Prediction 2a: Political Spillover

> If Neo-functionalist account is correct, there will have been evidence of the active involvement of EU-level political elites in the process of BG evaluation and certification.

Intergovernmentalism
Prediction 2b: Domestic Pressure

> If Intergovernmentalist account is correct, the content of the EU BG Concept will have addressed the domestic preferences of member states, reflected in public opinion.

5.5.3 Third Tier of Analysis

Finally, the third tier of analysis will focus on the question of what end is more potent in the BG Evaluation and Certification process – the Union-level bodies, namely the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff, or the member state governments, acting through the PSC and Framework nation. This aspect is highly important, as it allows for juxtaposition of two distinct powers responsible for joint implementation of commonly defined tasks. In that sense, it can provide an insightful evidence for comprehensive test of two theoretical perspectives.

Neo-functionalism
Prediction 3a: Cultivated Spillover

> If Neo-functionalist account is correct, there will have been evidence of active involvement of EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff in pushing towards furthering their control over BG evaluation and certification.

Intergovernmentalism
Prediction 3b: Limited Sovereignty Transfer

If Intergovernmentalist account is correct, there will have been evidence of control of the national governments over the delegation of responsibilities for EU BG Evaluation and Certification to supranational bodies.

Table 2. Theoretical Expectations, Related Indicators and Evidence

Expectations	Indicators	Evidence (Required)
Functional Spillover Effect	• New system-induced tasks and the absence of means to address them • Articulated 'functional need' • Interconnectedness between a new policy and the earlier arrangements • The evidence from expert survey	• Historical background of the EU BG Concept • BG Concept agenda-setting and content overview • Articulated by (trans) national- and/or EU-level public officials lack of progress/need for new solutions
Brusselisation of defence integration	• Brusselisisation in the field of European defence; • Influence of European supranational elites on the EU BG Concept decision-making; • Confirmed by experts significant role of elite socialisation	• Evidence of elite socialisation in the area of European defence • Evidence of the leverage put by supranational military elites on the decision-shaping • Timeline and content of initial EU-level decision-making activities (meetings, proposals, drafts and official statements)
Control of supranational bodies over the policy implementation	• Mandates of the EUMC and the EUMS enabling them to influence the EU BG E&C process • De facto opportunities of the EUMC and the EUMS to influence the EU BG E&C process • Confirmed by the experts 'bigger say' of the EUMC and the EUMS in the EU BG E&C process	• Overview of the documents setting up the supranational-level procedures for BG Evaluation and Certification • Official reports on the progress of BGs Evaluation and Certification • Announcements made by the public and military officials
'Lowest common denominator'	• Agenda-setting by the member states • Inter-state bargaining • Affinity of final outcome to preferences of the most reluctant member states • Confirmed by the experts 'lowest-common-denominator' policy formulation	• Overview of the initial national-level decision-making activities (meetings, proposals, drafts and official statements) • Positions of the member states relative to the final policy outcome

Domestic pressures	• Significance of domestic public opinion on security and defence matters • Shifts in public opinion preceding and/or accompanying the adoption of EU BG Concept • Confirmed by experts influence of public opinion	• Data on threat perceptions among the domestic constituencies of the member states • Data on public support of the CSDP and Rapid Reaction Force project • Evidence of the account of public opinion by national governments
Control of governmental bodies over the policy implementation	• Mandates of the national governments • De facto ability of member states to alter the EU BG Concept implementation • Confirmed by the experts 'bigger say' of the national governments	• Overview of the documents setting up the national-level procedures for BG Evaluation and Certification • Official reports disclosing the influence of member state governments on the BG Evaluation and Certification • Announcements made by the public and military officials

5.6 Conclusion

Following the logic stipulated by selected research design, Chapter V carried out the Operationalisation of the selected explanatory theories and justified the focus on certain elements of the explored phenomenon. It will be the goal of the following chapter to analytically approach formulated theoretical predictions and answer the emanating from those predictions sub-questions.

Chapter VI. Data Analysis: Evidence and The Results

6.1 Introduction

The chapter encounters the data analysis, which is guided by logic of sequential testing of the deductively formulated propositions. This will allow for consistently approaching the research question of this study – *'Which theory of European integration, Intergovernmentalism or Neo-functionalism, provides more insights into emergence of European Union Battlegroup Concept and the pattern of European Battlegroup Evaluation and Certification within the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy?'*

6.2 Neo-functionalism

6.2.1 Functional Spillover

New Tasks and Old Means

As Granholm (2006, p. 62) notices, 'the development of the European Union Battlegroup Concept has been swift'. In remarkably short time – between 2003, when the concept has been jointly introduced by the UK and France, and 2004, when it was incorporated in the Helsinki Headline Goal 2010 – it became an inevitable part of European security architecture. As Leutenant Colonel in the Finnish Army and Doctor in Political Science affiliated with the Baltic Defence College Mika Kerttunen (2010, p. 131) notes, 'The 'speed of light' development can be based on the institutional and political will to have something more concrete than a list of potential capabilities.'

Multitude of analytic accounts suggests that the key source of functional pressure has derived from the outbreak of violence in the post-communist Europe on the brink of the XXI century. The origins of the policy can be traced back to the post-Cold War Europe, where suddenly the pressing need arose in new concepts and material capabilities: the demand for expeditionary operations stepped up at the beginning of the 1990s facilitated by post-communist turmoil. Specifically, the Gulf War in 1990-1991 and the following Balkan wars made visible the shortcomings stemming from the absence of concept of operations and guidelines for civil-military cooperation. Literature stresses the triggering role of the Kosovo crisis, which raised frustration of the UK and France with state of affairs in security and defence, namely the lack of military capabilities to effectively participate in crisis management (Pond, 1999).

Furthermore, the relations between the EU and the US were virtually aggravated to breaking point, which created a demand for new defence solutions. As The Guardian's Brussels-based editors Richard Norton-Taylor and Ian Black (2000) put it, 'The Franco-British initiative was given added impetus by last year's Kosovo conflict

which demonstrated, almost to the point of humiliation, how dependent the European allies were on the US'. Some authors also highlight the EU's ambition to strengthen its global say via involvement in largely overseen by NATO conflicts in its surrounding (Major and Mölling, 2011).

The evidence suggests, that there was a significant demand for European Rapid Reaction capabilities on the side of the United Nations, which did not possess the sufficient means of tackling new forms of international conflicts (Reykers, 2016). In light of tangible demand for armed forces to start and maintain operations before the arrival of the UN troops on site, the development of BG Concept allowed the EU to fulfil the task of cooperation with the UN Security Council, stipulated in Helsinki Headline Goal and the European Security Strategy. For the purpose of reducing the prohibitive time-lag required by the UN Secretary-General to consolidate military assets in face of the need for particular operation, the Security-General has to rely on what he termed a 'reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment and partnership between governments that need equipment and those ready to provide it' (United Nations General Assembly, 1995).

Arguably other crucial contribution has been made by the US-declared 'war on terrorism' in the aftermath of the events of September 11. Welcoming bilateral cooperation with Britain, France, Germany and Italy in Afghanistan and Middle East, which entailed the establishment of ad hoc coalitions and structuration of military capabilities, the US indirectly gave a new legitimacy to the idea of BGs (Bono, 2002).

Hence, the new security challenges presented by the political and social instability in post-Cold War Europe contributed to the eventual search for more effective policy solution. These pressures are less politically saturated; rather, they correspond to more instrumental needs. I.e., the urge to reconfigure defence alliance in accord with the changing threat environment is a logical step on the path of functional advancement.

Articulated Functional Need

In this section I look at the evidence of the 'functional' rhetoric diffused among national, supranational and transnational milieus.

To start with, the need for widening cooperation has been articulated by the German Chief of Staff of the *Bundeswehr* General Wolfgang Schneiderhan during the BG exercise 'European Endeavour' in southern Germany in 2008 (Mardell, 2008, op. cit.): '*I am utterly convinced that the European Union has to develop its ability to react to military and civil crises. Working together with NATO we can improve the ability of both organisations to tackle the threats that face our world*". This notion is supported by at that time British Shadow Defence Secretary and future Secretary of State for Defence Liam Fox (Ibid.): "*NATO is big, old and ugly enough to cope with it*[9]*. If you want something doing where a lot of furniture needs to be broken then you do need NATO. But not everything needs furniture to be broken and sometimes it's*

[9] The EU autonomous military initiative.

possible to do something with this sort of force at an early stage and before you need to break a lot of furniture." He also notes, that '*if the EU feels comfortable doing this it is another club in their golf bag. So if the countries of the EU are willing to do it in this setting and they are a bit more reluctant to do it under the NATO setting, it's probably better that we do it, than worry about the packaging'*.

The instrumental need for EU BGs was earlier articulated by at that time the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, who also endorsed the project during the 2004 Forum on Europe in Dublin: '*I want to leave you in no doubt of how important strengthened EU capacities are to the UN. The EU is in a position to provide specialised skills that our largest troop contributors may not be able to give us, and to deploy more rapidly than we can*'. He also pointed out that '*Many people are alive today because of the French-led Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which in turn handed over to the UN. Artemis pre-dated the Joint Declaration, but it is a model of EU co-operation with the UN, based on the primary role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security*.' (De Breadun, 2004, op. cit.).

Other bulk of support for the project came from NATO. NATO's newly appointed secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced at the international security conference in Munich in 2004 that it is possible that the alliance would not be able to deploy troops by every demand in such, as it needs to address serious shortcomings in its force packages: '*If this shortfall is left unaddressed we will soon reach a point where our political reach goes beyond our military grasp,*" noticed Mr de Hoop Scheffer (Norton-Taylor, 2004, op. cit.).

It can be seen thus that need for functional advancement came from various sources, including European military and political elites, the upper tier of the United Nations and transatlantic allies.

Interconnectedness with Previous Arrangements

The precursors of the EU BG Concept can be found in the mid 1950s Europe, when the initiative called 'The European Defence Community' opened discussion about the possibility of creation of a full-fledged European army. The progress in this respect materialised only in February 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty established the second pillar of the EU – the Common Foreign and Security Policy. As the Brussels-based correspondent Derek Brown (2001) explains in his account of the EU Rapid Reaction Force initiative, '*It's as old as the EU itself*'.

The Treaty (1992, p. 62) stipulated that the issues should be addressed related to the security of the Union, 'including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence'. In December 1999 The EU Helsinki Summit set up the ambitious Helsinki Headline Goal, according to which the European Council had to ensure that by 2003 the member states possess up to 50000-60000 military personnel and are capable to deploy joint forces within the 60-days period in order to meet their responsibilities stipulated in Petersberg tasks (Lindstrom, 2005). The progress, however, has been extremely limited due to the

multiple incompatibilities with member states' political, military and legal arrangements (Pavolka, 2010).

It took a few more years until the ground had been prepared for introduction of the EU BG Concept: at the Military Capability Commitment Conference held on 22 November 2004, the new Headline Goal 2010 (2004, p. 2) has been agreed upon. It emphasized the importance of 'the ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis (…)'.

It proves, that the EU BG Concept is not a very radical idea; instead, it is a result of gradual policy development, with incremental, internally consistent and task-driven widening of inter-state cooperation. As Northon-Taylor and Black (2000) notice in their analytical account of the initiative, *'The (Kosovo) conflict proved to be the catalyst in what hitherto had been a slow-moving process'*.

Expert Judgment

The results of the expert survey are presented in Figure 1. They suggest, that the majority (56%) of the experts assume, that there was only marginal functional pressure at the time of policy formulation. However, the divide can be clearly seen, as a substantial part of respondents (27%) confirms the occurrence of need for new policy and the lack of progress with the previous arrangements.

Figure 1. Results of Expert Judgment for the Prediction 'Functional Spillover'



Legend: 1 = 'Strongly Disagree', 5 = 'Strongly Agree'

Overall, the results point out somewhat a middle ground explanation: indeed, the functional pressure has been at play. However, it was not the key to policy adoption, although it had indeed facilitated it.

Conclusion: Confirmed or Disconfirmed

In view of these findings, the deductively formulated prediction of occurrence of the functional spillover can be confirmed by empirical evidence.

Table 3. Outcome: Functional Spillover

Indicator	Observed
New tasks – absence of means	YES
Articulated 'functional need'	YES
Interconnectedness with previous arrangements	YES
Evidence from expert survey	PARTLY

6.2.3 Political Spillover: Brusselisisation of Defence

The Rationale

Attempts to build on comprehensive explanation of a policy, which encounters a sensitive security and defence domain, are inevitably associated with certain pitfalls of generation of empirical evidence (Deschaux-Beaume, 2012). While discussing the changing allegiances and shifting loyalties, we are to look closely at the behaviour and rhetoric of policy-makers involved (Sager et al., 2014); however, in the area of defence a significant share of information is classified, including the records of meetings and negotiations; moreover, the militants rarely make press announcements and express their opinions aloud (Higate, 2006).

Acknowledging this, I opted for a strategy of gathering evidence that combines three elements: first, I look for the studies that register for the spillover of Brusselisisation to the field of common security and defence. In order to build up my argument, I present findings from different parts of methodological continuum – among them socialisation theory, multi-level governance, transgovernmental networks and committee governance. In so doing, I seek to deductively prove the development of supranational loyalties within European institutions responsible for military cooperation – namely, Political and Security Committee, EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff. Secondly, on the basis of available documents and other sources of factual data I assess the role that was played by above institutions in BG Concept formulation and development: it is deemed plausible that if they developed supranational loyalties *and* substantially influenced decision-making process, the effect of political spillover constitutes the important part of theoretical explanation and strengthens the overall power of neo-functionalist outlook. Finally, the third part of evidence is acquired through the expert survey, which (as it has been discussed in the

Chapter IV) notably lowers the need to engage with the whole multitude of data sources – documents, archival records and press publications – since expert judgements are already based on these data (Onderco, 2010, p. 20). This parameter makes expert survey especially relevant for defence research, where many documents are not publically available.

The Role of EU-level Bodies in BG Concept Formulation

In December 1999 The Helsinki European Council had taken decision to establish a permanent political and military decision-making and intelligence units within the Council body. Following an interim period, the Political and Security Committee guided by the Council decision on January 2001 established both the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff. One can observe that these bodies were set up *before* the BG Concept arrived at the Union-level agenda; later, they were chosen to lead the policy formulation and decision-making process in light of future military operations.

Three mentioned military bodies have different tasks and mandates. In order to envisage their institutional juxtaposition, it is important to mention them. Table lists the responsibilities for these institutions.

Table 4. Tasks of the Political and Security Committee

Tasks of the PSC
• Keeping track of the international situation • Helping to define policies by drawing up 'opinions' for the Council • Monitoring implementation of agreed policies • Providing guidelines for other Committees on issues within the CFSP • Sending guidelines to the Military Committee

Source: Council Decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security Committee of the European Union (2001/78/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities 30 January 2001.

Table 5. Tasks of the EUMS

The tasks for which the EUMC provides advice and recommendation

• The development of the overall concept of crisis management in its military aspects • The military aspects relating to the political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations and situations • The risk assessment for potential crises • The military dimension of a crisis situation • The elaboration, assessment and review of capability objectives • The military relationships with non-EU European NATO-members, other EU candidates and other organizations, including NATO • The financial estimation for operations and exercises

Source: Council Decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the Military Committee of the European Union (2001/79/CFSP), Official Journal of the European Communities 30 January 2001.

In developing of the EU BG Concept, the EUMS has had a central task of producing the key documents – for instance, the roadmap of policy implementation. It was as well responsible for the bilateral and multilateral cooperation, predominantly with the NATO, where the EUMS gets and provides an access to information exchange and consultation (Kerttunen, 2010).

The policy began to shape in April 2004, when Secretary General/High Representative Javier Solana issued the methodology for a Battlegroup Concept development and a calendar stipulating the steps of set-up of the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) up to 2005, with the eventual goal of arriving at the Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2007. Then, in May 2004 the proposal has been endorsed by The Council and integrated into the Headline Goal 2010 – the document that provides military and political guidance for establishment of the EU military capabilities and the components of BG Concept, including the outline of corresponding objectives and tasks.

In June 2004 the BG Concept got the approval of the EU Military Committee. The key priorities included formulation of elaborate standards and criteria for the BG certification and the set up of BG generation process – since it would have provided the foundation of further policy build-up activities. In July the EUMC tasked the EUMS to provide a detailed timeline, or 'roadmap' of BG Concept establishment. In January 2005 the roadmap containing the detailed procedures to achieve the IOC in 2005 and the FOC in 2007 was agreed upon and submitted by the EUMC to the PSC.

At that stage the issues such as the number of BGs to be kept on standby, the organisation of command and control, and, most importantly, evaluating standards and criteria for training and certification took centre stage. Thus, the supranational institutions were largely responsible for providing the content of the BG Concept (Kerttunen, 2010). However, they have had very limited opportunities to influence political dimension of the reform, being more of a technical agents of integration (under the guidance). On the followed in May first BG Generation Conference, member states submitted their initial offers and commitments for the period of the next three and a half years.

It can be concluded, that although almost fully responsible for elaboration of the functional content of the EU BG policy – i.e., the definition of number of the BGs on standby, the standards and criteria for certification and the detailed roadmap of the policy implementation, the European military bodies had had a negligible say in the political direction of the initiative. Specifically, it was the PSC, which is composed of the military ambassadors of member states and thus is fully accountable to national governments provided political guidance, securing domestic objectives. In turn, the EUMC and EUMS, where one can expect more independent outlook, served a purely technical, instrumental role in policy formulation – employing their military expertise in order to develop the policy content along the PSC guidelines.

Expert Judgement

The results of expert survey are presented in Figure 2. It can be observed that most of the experts (60%) did not agree with the statement, that the formulation of the policy has been largely influenced by supranational elites. 27% of the experts, however, arguet that such effect took place.

Figure 2. Results of Expert Judgment for the Prediction 'Political Spillover'



Legend: 1 = 'Strongly Disagree', 5 = 'Strongly Agree'

The average of expert stands suggests, that although the Brusselisation could have influenced the policy formulation, it is unlikely that it significantly varied its outcome, which is in line with the findings of qualitative analysis.

Conclusion: Confirmed or Disconfirmed

Table 6. Outcome: Political Spillover

Indicator	Observed
Brusselisisation of European defence	YES
Influence of European supranational elites	PARTLY
Confirmed by experts significant role of elite socialisation	NO

Acknowledging these arguments, the prediction of importance of political spillover in the field of European defence for the formulation of the EU BG Concept in large part cannot be confirmed.

6.2.4 Role of EUMC and EUMS in BG Evaluation and Certification

E&C Decision-making: Role of the EUMC and the EUMS

The basic principle suggests that the training and certification of BGs falls under the responsibility of the participating member states (European Union Council Secretariate, 2007). According to the institutional design, the EU acts as a facilitator of coordination between the latter, with EUMC and EUMS being responsible for monitoring of the certification process. In that respect, it is deemed productive to look at the tasks that give these supranational institutions possibility to influence BG E&C process.

The first domain where the EUMC and the EUMS have the leverage is BG training. Training is considered the key in the BG preparedness for possible mission.

The member states are conducting it in a form of military exercises[10]. To successfully complete certification, member states need to assure the EU in their readiness and interoperability. According to the specific needs of particular mission, appointed by the Council Operation Commander tailors command and control of force package to certain security needs. Then, formed by the member states units are presented at the six-monthly BG Coordination Conference (BGCC) chaired by the EUMS, given the planning horizon of five years. The composition of package and the term for which it is offered, however, remain a voluntary decision of the countries. Hence, although technically arranging the multinational training activities, the supranational bodies are limited in their competences to monitor member states' contributions, without any plausible instruments enabling them to enforce compliance if they have some discontent with the progress of training.

[10] The exercise European Endeavour 06 that was carried out in November 2006 in Germany in the context of certification of German-Dutch-Finnish BG Force Headquarters, Belgian-led exercise Quick Response taking place in September 2006, exercise 'Illuminated Summer' in Sweden in July 2007 for the Nordic BG and the Greek-led exercise EVROP II-07 in May 2007 featuring 'HELBROC' BG are examples of such activities.

Secondly, the EUMS is responsible for preparing and issuing the capability profile and training requirements, with the provision that they align with the NRF standards. From that standpoint, the EUMS has the opportunity to conduct a policy reform, which includes the harmonisation of BG E&C standards. Such harmonisation, which is seen by many analysts (Andersson, 2006; Lindberg, 2006; Lindstrom, 2007) as a key priority in light of increasing the overall effectiveness of the policy, appears feasible only in event of establishment of the clearly defined common standards for BG training, evaluation and certification – in form of a common training syllabus and the assessment criteria. It is deemed crucial, since only the process of training can entail a huge variety of the procedures[11]. However, the evidence suggests that although the key for development of various standards and criteria, EUMS appears to be an appointed planner who is paradoxically 'not allowed to plan' (Bailes et al., 2006, p. 127). The auditing function that European military bodies were granted at the end of the 1990s, thus, seemingly goes 'beyond their mandate' (Ibid.). Although made responsible for the surveillance of member states' commitments, the EUMS has no authority to determine technical requirements and assess contributions in a form of force packages made by the member states.

Thirdly, the important function possessed by the EUMC is providing advice for the member states on all military aspects (Andersson, 2006, p. 27). In regard to this, Quille (2004) notes, that it is more likely that member states and PSC would seek advice from NATO on terms of 'Berlin Plus' agreement[12], or consult national capitals. This suggests, that although highly relevant, the EUMC advisory role is also greatly limited.

Forth, one of the guidelines of E&C procedure specifies that selection of mission for the training exercise cannot be decided upon without consideration of the possible strategic demands of the Union. Thus, member states are to a certain extent constrained when it comes to EU BG training. The timeframe of training procedures should also meet existing objectives of common defence, which produces additional leverage on the contributing states. It can be said, that this aspect of BG E&C is more dependent on EU-bodies then member states, albeit it does not significantly increase their overall mandate.

Overall, albeit rather impressive on paper, in reality the potential of European military agencies to influence implementation of EU BG policy is extremely limited. Although given the high-profile task to assess member states contributions and give a strategic guidance in the process of BG E&C, as well as give advice on corresponding technical matters, the EUMS and the EUMC are not provided with actual means to perform these tasks.

[11] For example training could be delivered in different forms with a variety of methodologies and be divided in the following categories: CPX OHQ-(F)HQ, CPX (F)HQ BG-"ENABLERS", Coaching, Seminars and lectures, Project Groups, Simulation training and etc. (See Lindberg, 2006).

[12] Berlin Plus agreement provides member states with the opportunity to consult with NATO intelligence units on defence matters (See SHAPE Support to the EU Operational Headquarters, 2013).

Results of an Expert Survey

Figure 3 presents the results for an expert survey. It can be seen, that experts more agree then disagree on the significance of the European military bodies in the process of EU BG evaluation and certification. However, 8 experts do not have a strong opinion on the matter, and the gained support can be attributed to the factual mandate these agencies have.

Figure 3. Results of Expert Judgment for the Prediction 'Cultivated Spillover'



Legend: 1 = 'Strongly Disagree', 5 = 'Strongly Agree'

To address this issue, it can be productive to look at the expert opinion on the importance of governmental institutions in the implementation of the policy. This would allow for comparison and, on its basis on drawing conclusion about the *de dacto* degree of control that different levels of European governance possess in the context of EU BG certification.

Conclusion: Confirmed or Disconfirmed

The juxtaposition of stipulated in the documents mandates of the EUMC and the EUMS in the EU BG Concept implementation and *de facto* capabilities of these institutions to direct the process show that although rather potent on paper, European military bodies have no real influence over the process, being observers rather than policy-makers. More specifically, they have very distinct functions, among which are the monitoring of performed by member states BG training (including the knowledge-based assessment of contributed by member states force packages), the development

of a full range of BG E&C standards and criteria, and the advisory role. However, regardless the potential significance of competences, in practice the European military agencies have almost no means to enforce the compliance with joint commitments.

One relevant example which is illustrative of this paradox is related to the pointed out by academics and analysts East-West divide in European military structure. In the absence of commonly defined standards of EU BG E&C, it presents serious difficulty to comparatively assess the preparedness and interoperability of different BGs. In their analytical report, Major and Mölling (2011, p. 18) conclude, that the 'NATO standards have certainly been broadly applied', giving the member states a significant room for manoeuvre. Consequentially, although a number of experts (See Ibid.) doubted the preparedness of 2007 Balkan Battlegroup (HELBROC) and the 2009 Czech-Slovak Battlegroup, there had been no opportunities for the responsible EU-level bodies to alter these contributions.

Table 7. Outcome: Cultivated Spillover

Indicator	Observed
Mandates of the EUMC and the EUMS	YES
De facto opportunities of the EUMC and the EUMS to influence the EU BG E&C	NO
Confirmed by the experts 'bigger say' of the EUMC and the EUMS	PARTLY

6.3 Intergovernmentalism

6.3.1 'Lowest-Common-Denominator' Bargaining

Arrival of EU BG Concept on European Agenda

The Battlegroup Concept has been first introduced at the joint Franco-British summit in Le Touquet in February 2003 and further shaped at the London summit in November 2003. The success in Ituri conflict management, with the EU-led Operation Artemis being the first autonomous mission completed jointly by the EU member states outside Europe (Jacoby & Jones, 2008), became a milestone in the decision to materialize deployable EU standby forces. During the operation, France took the role of 'Lead nation', providing the bulk of the troops – 900 out of 1400 in total, with other European states making varied contributions.

In the bilateral 'Declaration on Strengthening European Cooperation in Security and Defence', presented at the Franco-British Summit in London on 24th November 2003, Paris and London state that

'the EU should aim to build on this precedent so that it is able to respond through ESDP to future similar requests from the United Nations, whether in Africa or elsewhere. The EU should be capable and willing to deploy in an autonomous operation within 15 days to respond to a crisis. The aim should be coherent and credible battle-group sized forces, each around 1500 troops, offered by a single nation or

through a multinational or framework nation force package, with appropriate transport and sustainability. (…) This idea will need to be developed across the EU and hand in hand with the UN and relevant regional partners.' (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2003, p. 3).

In line with 'Big Three' integration logic, where the ESDP compromise upon common military advancement is first reached and negotiated between Britain and France, further gaining support of Germany and eventually entering the debate on European organizational level, the bilateral initiative was further taken up by Berlin. During Security Conference in Munich in February 2004, the German Minister of Defence Dr Peter Struck brought to discussion the need for official finalization of Battlegroup Concept.

On 10 February 2004, the respective initiative has been jointly submitted by Germany, France and the UK to the Political and Security Committee. Then, the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) and the EU Military Staff advanced the concept (Koops, 2011). Finally, on the Military Capability Commitments Conference (currently an annual event) in Brussels on 22 November 2004 the EU BG concept became an integral part of the 2010 Headline Goal, and EU member states pledged the creation of first set of BGs.

Hence, it can be observed, that the development of the EU BG concept was entirely based on trilateral French-British-German initiative.

3 Camps: Atlanticists, Europeanists and Neutrals

Since the inception of the ESDP, the compromise between London and Paris – the only European capitals capable of rapid deployment of hard power tools (See Williams, 2006) – was shaping and directing policy development.

Jolyon Howorth (2000) lists three main elements that, according to his theoretical inquiry, shaped the genesis of CSDP: first, the political will, which followed up the Franco-British Summit in St. Malo in December 1998; second, the dynamics of transatlantic relationships at the moment; and third, the commitment of Britain to the initiative. In that respect, understanding between Atlanticists and Europeanists, with Britain and France being the paramount actors, could have been the key to a swift adoption of the EU BG Concept in the aftermath of the 1990s crises on the European borders. The main axis along which member states had positioned themselves is, hence, the vision of transatlantic cooperation – or, differently put, of place of NATO in European defence.

In terms of view of transatlantic relations, France and Britain represented two extremes. France had been frustrated by the US primacy in European defence. Since 1966, it is not participating in NATO North Atlantic Council. On the contrary, Britain is the key proponent of cooperation with NATO and has a unique intelligence ties with the US. Logically, if the agreement could have been brokered between these two extremes, other member states in principle 'could be brought to the party' (Sweeney, 2015, p. 12). Let me explore more rigorously the stances of three different camps

along the lines of EU-NATO relations – the 'Atlanticists', the 'Europeanists' and the 'Neutrals'.

Atlanticists

The position of Atlanticists[13] can be summarised as follows: for Atlanticist' member states NATO holds incontestable primacy in defence policies. At the period when the BG Concept has been elaborated, the Atlantist outlook was shared by Denmark, Spain and, most importantly, the UK, which has traditionally been a paramount proponent of EU-NATO cooperation (Gariup, 2013).

As British Ministry of Defence noted, 'The EU Battlegroup initiative was driven by the UK (…)' (Mardell, 2008, op. cit.). The British position on CSDP is marked by a firm conviction in a primacy of NATO cooperation. Consequently, for a British government it has been of utmost importance that CSDP would not develop at the expense of the NATO. However, despite the perceived threats, the UK has been at the forefront in giving birth to EU BG project. For instance, Jones (2007, p. 73) argues, that although it has been a Franco-British initiative, 'much of the emphasis must be placed upon the 'Anglo''.

The are two important goals that Britain hoped to address by the widening of cooperation: first, to cope with the crisis in European-American relationships, which followed the unsatisfactory results of crisis management in Kosovo by proving Europe's commitment to pooling and sharing of responsibility for its closest neighbourhood and second, by desire to more evenly redistribute between member states the immense expenses of European defence. From that stance, the initiative does not aim at making the EU more independent from NATO; instead, it seeks to demonstrate the readiness to go hand and hand with the Alliance. As senior British defence official argued, 'We do not envisage the EU taking on a nation state.' (Norton-Taylor and Black, 2000, op. cit.).

Not unexpectedly, the key opposition to the project came from the British House of Lords: Eurosceptic Tory were reluctant to the project, as it could have had provided ground for subsequent establishment of European army and growth of French influence in European affairs (Ibid.). However, the benefits have had bigger weigh, and British conservatives eventually endorsed the ambitious project. As the official letter from the British Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon (2005) to the Chairman of the Select Committee on European Union states, 'The UK is playing a leading role in its (Battlegroup Concept) development'. It cannot be denied, thus, that the Atlanticists led by the UK had a substantial stake at the policy adoption.

Europeanists

[13] As Dunne (2004, p. 895) notes, ''Atlanticism' is a term with many meanings' – for instance, it can refer to uniquely British political debate on the place of bilateral Anglo-American relationships in former's diplomacy, as it is the case in Dunne's account; in this work, 'Atlanticism' is used in its European reading.

The Europeanists tend to advocate more impetus for cooperation (Gariup, 2013). They seek to build up European independence – above all, from the United States, and broaden the scope of integration to more effectively reach common goals. Among the 'old fifteen' member states, Europeanists are represented by France, Germany, Italy (apart from the Berlusconi's NATO turn), Benelux countries, Portugal and Greece.

French notion of 'L'Europe de la défence', which refers to an autonomous EU military policy, can be seen as a core of Europeanist aspirations. From this standpoint, the reliance on the US support during the 1990s' Balkan wars has proven a fatal mistake: it must have had been admitted, that there should be an end to dependence on NATO capabilities, especially when the crisis takes places in European vicinity (The Economist, 2013). The new challenges revived the 1998 St. Malo aspirations to develop European military capabilities. The success of operation Artemis only strengthened these ideas.

For Germany the international expectations were an exceedingly important concern, given the stress that country's diplomacy puts on multilateral cooperation. In that respect, it can be observed that the German policy-makers sought to politically engage in the BG Concept formulation as it was consistent with their directive role in the EU. Correspondingly, Germany is in the foreground of Concept implementation, being one of the most active contributing nations and taking the lead as a Framework nation (Chappell, 2009).

Neutrals

Neutral member states (Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Austria) were to a much lesser extent involved in the debate about the future of transatlantic cooperation in light of EU military reform. One factor that arguably facilitated wide support for formulation of the BG Concept is participation of all CSDP-states in the Protocol of Permanent Structured Cooperation, adopted during the EU Constitutional Convention in the mid-2000s. It necessitated member states to fulfil the provisions, in many respects standing in line with those required for joining in the BGs (Tocci, 2014). In that regard, it was beneficial for neutral member states to endorse the proposal as soon as it appeared on the agenda, as it would allow them to meet their commitments with less expenses.

Most importantly, the Neutrals had to assure that there was no war-fighting or army ambition behind the initiative, as for these states the use of hard power tools remains highly unfavourable. Some countries – for instance, Sweden – were not the members of NATO – for them European cooperation in defence was a matter of greater significance and responsibility. Thus can be seen in the future policy implementation, where Swedish-led Nordic BG has shown the most pro-active (See Lindberg, 2006).

Affinity to the Final Outcome

The above shows, that although the UK and France both took the lead in the BG Concept development, they had been driven by differing purposes. Arguably, the in many ways contrasting perception of BG project allowed London and Paris to arrive at the compromise, and the agreement between practically 'two sides of the spectrum' had been brokered. Accordingly, the presence of strong arguments in favor of EU military cooperation for all three camps made it easier to convince public opinion and domestic parliaments to support the initiative.

In line with the arguments presented in above section, the final outcome of inter-state bargaining needs to be assessed from the standpoint of its implications to transatlantic cooperation.

The types of tasks that NATO Response Force and BGs are to address are designed to exclude duplication – specifically, while NRF is capable of high intensity war-fighting mission, the BGs are equipped for robust humanitarian and peacekeeping missions upon the request of the UN (Council of the European Union, 2004).

Thus, it can be identified, that the development of EU BG Concept has consciously been kept within the margins of complementarity with NRF. A good example of this approach is the widely criticised in the literature (Lindstrom, Lindberg, 2006;) absence of even minimal defined standards for EU E&S, which 'are to be analogous' with those of the NATO force packages (Ibid.).

Consistent with these observations, it can be argued, that eventual policy outcome to a great extent corresponds to the disposition of member state interests at the stage of policy formulation: the UK, which has proven the most reluctant, was ready to back the policy only if it does not endanger the transatlantic relationships and complements the existing NATO structures. France introduced and consistently supported the project from the beginning, agreeing the British ambitions in order to make the initiative take off the ground. Germany Finally, the Neutral states were ready to endorse the policy if it would not imply the creation of European army and participation in war-fighting. The policy content certainly fits all the mentioned requirements, thereby satisfying the members of all three camps.

Expert Judgment

Figure 4 contains the results of expert survey for the prediction of lowest-common-denominator bargaining. Comparatively, more experts (34% against 33%) confirmed the importance of inter-state bargaining for the policy adoption.

Figure 4. Results of Expert Judgment for the Prediction ‘’Lowest Common Denominator’ Bargaining’



Legend: 1 = ‘Strongly Disagree’, 5 = ‘Strongly Agree’

Although a marginal difference, this prediction gained more support of the experts than the prediction of functional pressure. It allows to conclude, that this explanation of the policy adoption is more accurate from the aggregate expert point of view.

Conclusion: Confirmed or Disconfirmed

Table 8. Outcome: ‘Lowest-Common-Denominator’ Bargaining

Indicator	Observed
Agenda-setting by the member states	YES
Inter-state bargaining	YES
Affinity the final outcome/reluctant member states	YES
Confirmed by the experts ‘lowest-common-denominator’ policy formulation	YES

Hence, the prediction of ongoing inter-state bargaining throughout the process of policy formulation, as well as the ‘lowest common denominator’ outcome of such, can be largely confirmed.

6.3.2 Domestic pressure

Public Opinion and European Defence Policy: Can a Link Be Identified?

The significance of domestic preferences derives from the liberal concept of

domestic preference formation, which implies that the interests of the states are conditioned by the economic and societal dynamics of national polities – more specifically, by preferences of dominant social groups (Hillman, 1989). Acknowledging these preferences, states represent domestic interests on international arena (Moravcsik, 1993). Importantly, geo-political interests, as well as prestige concerns are not relevant for this model albeit they influence the domestic society (Moravcsik, 1998).

The determinants of public support for the European integration are quiet comprehensively approached in the literature (See, e.g., Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2005); however, the research rarely has taken the attitudes towards cooperation in defence as a focal point (Gabel and Anderson, 2002; Irondelle et al., 2015). As Harald Schoen (2008, p. 7) indicates, the analysis 'cannot adopt a tailor-made model of support for common European policies in this area'.

The exhausting study of Foucault and Irondelle (2009) provides the insight into the role of the perceived threats, namely of their character and relative significance, in preference formation. Scholars come to the conclusion, that the stronger fear of threats is associated with the stronger general support for European defence project. They also indicate that 'new transnational threats' (terrorism and pandemics) are more robust determinants of collective support than the traditional threats (e.g. these of the World War III). These findings are sound with the results of the earlier study by Ray and Johnston (2007), where effects of different kinds of threats are compared. According to research, only the threat of terrorism is significantly correlated with higher rates of support to the EU security and defence integration, while other two tested threats – that of conventional war and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – had proven less weighty. The above suggests, that the public opinion is subject to crucial global events (De Vreese and Kandyla, 2009).

Schoen (2008) analyses the factors of support for European foreign and defence policies with the use of three statistical models. The exceedingly comprehensive study reveals that the national identity acts as the most powerful predictor of public support for the European defence. Historically, there are countries where support for defence cooperation is more pronounced – Benelux, France, Italy; and others where it is more marginal – United Kingdom, Sweden and other Scandinavian countries) (Peters, 2011).

Public Opinion: The Data

The Researchers of public opinion on European defence show that September 11 terrorist attacks on the US constitute an ultimate shift in Europeans' common threat perceptions, as well as in their opinions on the progress of CSDP (Kernic et al., 2002; Yanakiev, 2004; Caforio, 2009). The data reveals, that a transition 'from traditional to non-traditional security risks' (Caforio, 2009, p. 126) has been observed.

The Eurobarometer survey (2001) conducted after the tragic events of September 11 identifies the significant growth of anxiety among Europeans, with 83.2 per cent of respondents declaring a personal fear of terrorism, which is on 11.6 percentage

points higher compared with 2000 Special Defence Survey (Caforio, 2009). Moreover, it registered a surge of 11.5 per cent in awareness of threats connected to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons), with the number of concerned respondents reaching three-fourth (76.5 per cent) of the sample. The fears of world war had also increased on 15 percentage points and reached the two-thirds (61.7 per cent) of explored population. In following years, the threat of international terrorism had persistently proven the strongest.

The survey data suggests that, as an average the support for a common security policy among European citizens is rather stable and high, varying from 65 to 75 percentage points (after the year of 2000). However, there is a tangible divergence between old member states with respect to the levels of support, where three groups of countries can be identified.

The most supportive to ESDP throughout the analysed period are Belgium, Germany and Greece. The second group is represented by France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain. Finally, the third group comprises Austria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK, where the public proves more cautious to the developments in this common policy realm.

Table 9. The Support for the CSDP among European Population (1992-2005)

Year	**1992**	**1993**	**1994**	**1995**	**1996**	**1997**	**1998**	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**
For	76	77	79	73	68	73	70	72	73	71	74	73	77	77
Against	14	14	11	16	19	14	14	14	14	16	15	16	14	15
DK	10	9	10	11	13	13	16	14	13	13	11	11	9	8

Data are expressed in the percentage of respondents in favour or against the defence integration.
Source: Eurobarometer 146, 2001.

There are also varied levels of support in respect to the different aspects of ESDP. The largest support comes for independency of European foreign policy from the US, and common position in a crisis. The establishment of European rapid reaction force, however, gets comparatively lower support (less then 50 per cent), especially in Euro-sceptic countries.

In attempt to explain this phenomenon, Yanakiev (2004) looks at the data for 1996, indicating that at that stage over 70 per cent of respondents were supportive of set up of a ‘defence organisation to deal effectively with crisis such as in the Gulf War’, and over 50 per cent – of establishment of a ‘Common European Military Intervention Force’, which signal the significant backing for the project. Lesser support, however, has been shown to the idea of ‘European Rapid Reaction Force’ and, espe-

cially, ‘European Army for common defence’ (less then 50 percentage points). According to Eurobarometer data, at the beginning of 2000s the support to the RRF project was growing, reaching two-thirds (67 per cent) in 2005 (Caforio, 2009, p. 134). The support is higher is Benelux countries, France, Greece, Sweeden and the UK. Among the least approving member states are Germany, Finland and Denmark.

The above allows to assume, that, although slightly differing in their outlooks on European Security and Defence (with higher levels of support coming from Benelux countries and lower support from the UK, Denmark, Portugal and other ‘Eurosceptics’), the domestic constituencies of European member states had similar opinion about the changing nature of threats and the need in new means to address them. Hence, there transformation of public perceptions had indeed taken place, which could have influenced substantially the decision-making.

Expert Judgements

The results of expert survey for the prediction of domestic pressure are presented in the Figure 5.

They suggest that the experts are coherently sceptical about the possible influence of European public opinion on the progress of the EU BG Concept development, with 93% pointing out its insignificance.

Figure 5. Results of Expert Judgment for the Prediction ‘Domestic Pressure’



Legend: 1 = ‘Strongly Disagree’, 5 = ‘Strongly Agree’

These results can be explained by the fact, that public is usually not very knowledgeable about the matters of security and defence, which is why it has no real interest in pushing certain project further. However, it can be said, that the awareness of the European population of the new threats could have helped to keep the development of BG Concept in the spotlight of government officials.

Conclusion: Confirmed or Disconfirmed

Table 10. Outcome: Domestic Pressure

Indicator	Observed
Significance of public opinion	YES
Shifts in public opinion	YES
Confirmed by experts influence of public opinion	NO

In light of empirical findings, the intergovernemntalist prediction of the catalysing role of domestic pressure put on the member state governments can be largely confirmed.

6.3.3 Limit of Sovereignty Transfer: The Role of Member State Governments in EU BG Evaluation and Certification

Responsibilities and Capabilities

The aim of BG evaluation and certification 'is to certify the BG ability to fulfil relevant tasks or missions' (Lindberg, 2006, p. 27). The assignment of BG evaluation and certification to member states aims at providing the European policymakers with a necessary assurance that the force package is fully prepared for a possible mission (Lindstrom, 2007). The EU BG documents do not provide a definition for certification, stipulating that it is to be analogous to the NRF practice.

The evaluation and certification process, according to Lindberg's (2006) exhaustive report, is analogous to NATO Operational Capability Concept Evaluation and Feedback Programme (OCC E&F) and consists of two tiers. On the first tier, the interoperability and capability are evaluated and graded against given standards. On the second tier, upon condition that the criteria are being met, the package is officially declared certified. On both of these stages member states hold the full responsibly, undertaking all range of required exercises without any intermediacy of European bodies. This being said, there are sufficient reasons to assume that the national governments and military elites have a significant discretion in their pursuit of the commonly defined obligations.

To meet their obligations, EU member states have to ensure that the contributed armed forces meet the requirements stipulated in the *Standards and Criteria for EU BG* (Council of the European Union, 2007, p. 11). The process of evaluation and certification is an important chain link in ensuring the Battlegroup preparedness for a possible mission (Volpi, 2011, p. 154). The EUMC and the EUMS are responsible for

monitoring of the process (EU External Action Service, 2013) but have no practical tools to intervene the state-led procedures.

Hence, although it is emphasised, that member states are to comply with a set of criteria, the officially formulated standards determining the outcome of BG certification appear to be admittedly vague (Andersson, 2006). Careful examination reveals, that on the current stage, the EU BG Concept includes only one tool for certification – the BG Questionnaire (Lindberg, 2006; Andersson, 2006), in which the Framework Nation is to declare any existing caveats and set up the date and place of the training events. There is, however, a set of criteria given in the Standards and Criteria for EU Battlegroups (7185/05 dated 9 March 2005), which consist of nine elements (Availability, Flexibility, Employability and Deployability, etc.). Yet, those are being applied as the 'items identified as recommendable though not verifiable' (Council of the European Union, 2005). This suggests, that even though the member states are obliged to follow the guidelines for certification of their force packages, the absence of unambiguous principles and the recommendatve nature of these guidelines allows them to unilaterally decide upon the timelines and compositions of their contributions, as well as declare units certified.

The significant room for interpretation left by the documents implies that the member states are practically free to form, train and certify the BGs according to their preferences. It enables the Framework Nation – the member state government responsible for the multilateral implementation of the BG Concept in a given period of time – to vary the outcome of evaluation and certification according to its will, thus turning it into political instrument[14].

Not surprisingly, member states make contributions to the BGs from already existing forces. Accordingly, their backgrounds and training standards differ significantly, which leads to a rather loose interpretation of stipulated requirements. This flexibility can be seen as inevitable (as there is hardly 'one size fits all' principle in internationally composed armed forces), albeit it does not allow policy-makers to fully count on the BG preparedness and interoperability, with a number of experts advocating the more profound harmonisation of standards (See, for instance, Andersson, 2006; Lindberg, 2006; Lindstrom, 2007). There are a number of shortcomings, which result from the currently utilised self-certification strategy – for instance, the EU BG documents do not define a minimum acceptable level of performance.

However, any initiatives to increase the overall efficiency of the project are not likely to be successful, due to the lack of political will of the member states to delegate more actual responsibilities to European level. It can be argued, that national governments are reluctant to give up a part of their autonomy in military affairs, even though it could have allowed them to embrace the material gains of coherence (by

[14] Namely, Major and Möling (2011) talk about the fact that some member states – e.g., Balkan and recently joined Eastern European countries – tend to declare the preparedness of the contributed by them force packages despite the widespread concerns of observers that these packages are not operational; it is explained by the fact, that some member states (e.g., Poland and Slovakia) see participation in BG at the first place as an exercise of commitment to common European goals, thus putting less stress on actual operationability.

preventing the EU from the military and political costs of deployment of comparably less prepared units) and conceivably more balanced burden sharing.

Expert Judgement

Figure 6 presents the results of expert survey for the prediction of member state' control over the delegation of responsibilities to supranational level. As it can be seen, experts largely agree on the fact that the national governments and the Framework Nation hold primacy in the Concept implementation, with 73% of overall support for the notion.

Compared to the similar statement about the European-level institutions, the data suggests that the states are more readily seen as the leaders of the evaluation and certification process, which is in line with qualitative findings.

Figure 6. Results of Expert Judgment for the Prediction 'Limited Sovereignty Transfer'



Legend: 1 = 'Strongly Disagree', 5 = 'Strongly Agree'

Conclusion: Confirmed or Disconfirmed

Table 11. Outcome: Limit of Sovereignty Transfer

Indicator	Observed

Mandates of the national governments	YES
De facto ability of member states to alter policy implementation	YES
Confirmed by the experts 'bigger say' of the national governments	YES

From that stance, the prediction of control of the national actors over the sovereignty transfer to the European level in relation to the process of EU BG E&C can be confirmed by empirical evidence.

Chapter VII. Discussion and Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter looked at the multiple factors, which triggered and shaped the EU BG Concept development, as well as at those that continue to determine policy implementation. The findings suggest that the rather strong arguments can be found on the both sides of the theoretical continuum, although some propositions had proven to be more artful in capturing the empirical reality.

7.2 Discussion of Findings

The posed by the study research question aimed at acquiring of comprehensive explanation of the unique in the context of the European Union phenomenon of European Battlegroups. The research question has been formulated as follows:

'Which theory of European integration, Intergovernmentalism or Neo-functionalism, provides more insights into emergence of European Union Battlegroup Concept and the pattern of European Battlegroup Evaluation and Certification within the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy?'

In attempt to answer this question, the analysis of empirical data looked at three stages of the EU BG Concept policy cycle: the arrival of the issue on European agenda, the policy formulation and implementation. It was deemed important to account for the different dimensions of the project in order to capture its dynamics and arrive at the possibly more valid explanation.

Three pairs of explanatory statements had been formulated on the basis of two traditional theories of European integration – Neo-functionalist and Intergovernmentalist paradigms. Since the theories provide alternative reflections of empirical reality, it has been decided to select a research strategy, which would allow for theoretical juxtaposition. Thus, the research design has been established according to the logic of Congruence analysis, which required deriving concrete propositions from both explanatory perspectives. For Neo-functionalism, these propositions included the occurrence of functional spillover on the stage of the policy agenda-setting, the subsequent influence of Brusselisisation of European defence on the concept formulation and the leverage of supranational bodies in policy implementation in form of EU BG evaluation and certification. The propositions for Intergovernmentalism focused on the lowest-common-denominator bargaining dominating the initial stage of policy development, the role of domestic pressure in facilitation of the concept adoption and the control of member states over the sovereignty transfer to supranational bodies.

The results of data analysis can be summarised as follows. The first assumption for Neo-functionalism had been largely confirmed: there is plentiful evidence

suggesting the change in European security environment resulting from the political instability in Post-Cold War Europe, including the outbreak of violence in the post-communist states, as well as the cooling down of the relationships with transatlantic allies, the call from the UN, the success of operation Artemis and the emergence of new transnational threats created the functional pressure on the European member states. In order to respond to the multitude of events, the EU needed to adapt its defence policy accordingly. Importantly, we discuss here a largely apolitical, instrumental pressure, which is connected to realisation of lack of progress with existing arrangements. However, the predicted facilitative role of European military elites on the process of policy development can be only partially confirmed: although there is a convincing academic evidence of progressing socialisation in the milieu of European defence, there were no tangible ways for supranational agents influence EU BG Concept formulation. Instead, they served an instrumental role – providing the policy content under the strict control from the national governments; accordingly, there are a number of inefficiencies at the policy design, which cannot be addressed due to the lack of political will of state agents. Finally, the prediction of significant role of the EUMS and the EUMC in the EU BG evaluation and certification also cannot be confirmed. Although on paper these agencies have a set of rather powerful instruments to vary the outcomes of policy implementation, in practice they are significantly constrained by the fact that the contributing states retain the factual control over all stages of the process.

The above allows to conclude, that Neo-functionalist explanation, although extremely accurate in certain aspects, cannot account for some crucial policy dimensions and drivers.

The intergovernmentalist prediction of presence of 'lower-common-denominator' bargaining has been supported by the available data. The analysis has shown, that in fact the policy agenda has been initiated by bilateral effort of Britain and France. There has also been identified the divergence between the member states in their views of the policy, which has been based in their outlook of transatlantic relations: British conservatives, who feared of the breakdown in EU-NATO cooperation, represented the most reluctant group. The content of the policy reflects this divide: the EU BG Concept has been designed specifically to be complementary with the NATO RRF mechanism. The prediction of domestic pressure can also be largely confirmed, although downplayed by the experts. The fears of terrorism and the overall stable support for European common defence secured the required domestic backing for the project, providing it with legitimacy. Finally, it can be proven that member states remain in control over the policy implementation: although the expert persistently point out the need in delegation of certain important functions to the European level, the states are reluctant to reconsider the roles. Even though the project is struggling due to additional costs and inefficiencies arising from lack of harmonization and coherence, no reform is at stake.

Overall, the Intergovernmentalist perspective has proven more successful in giving explanation of the EU BG Concept development, with all of the three propositions having been largely confirmed.

Table 12. Summary of the Results

	I prediction	II prediction	III prediction
Neo-functionalism	Largely Yes	Largely No	Largely No
Intergovernmentalism	Yes	Largely Yes	Yes

7.3 Conclusions

The contemporary consensus present in the literature suggests that intergovernmentalism is highly potent in explaining fundamental, historical decisions – i.e., that involve changes of treaty agreements, whereas neo-functionalism better captures the day-to-day dynamics of European cooperation.

The results of my study are not overly surprising, as it has been often observed that control over the area of security and defence constitutes the 'last outpost' of nation-statism. Although some drift towards more supranational say is hard to deny – it takes form of elite socialisation and urge to address pressing functional needs, on current stage of European integration it is the nation-states who pull the strings. However, the 'state' itself undergoes a tremendous change. Some authors talk about appearance of new category – 'member state', which is unique in a number of aspects. Some academics also talk about denationalization of defence, which in the context of Europe gradually acquires more and more international dimension.

The future of European defence is not perfectly clear: while some experts give arguments in support of more integration, others insist on the project elimination and shifting attention to more profound cooperation with NATO. All in all, as for today, the power to decide remains in hands of European nations, whose interests, as this study reveals, are the key driving forces behind the security integration.

7.4 Limitations

There were a number of limitations, which this study has encountered. The first set of such is related to time and scope of the research: the research has been written in one year and had a limited word count, which did not allow to explore several important aspects – e.g., the concrete cases of EU BG E&C – more in-depth.

The other set of limitations stemmed from the weaknesses associated with sources of data I used. First, the expert judgements are prone to a certain level of bias, since experts may differently interpret similar questions, use divergent evaluation criteria or possess differing levels of expertise (Marks, 2007), which could lowered a measurement validity. Moreover, the survey was limited to six questions in order to gain higher response rate, which could have limited the comprehensiveness of expert analysis. The ideational divergence among the experts could also have influenced the results. Second, the use of primary data has been largely limited to unclassified, publically available documents and archival records. Third, I could not have approached

the members of national- and EU-level military elites, as they are restricted in sharing information about sensitive issues of common defence.

Finally, the operationalization, which took form of an interpretation of theories, could have limited possible outcomes, attracting attention to certain aspects of empirical reality and not the others.

Appendix 1: The Expert Survey: Questionnaire and Supporting Letter

The Likert-type Scale Used in the Questionnaire

STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

The Questionnaire

- **Q1a:** The adoption of Battlegroup Concept was largely a response to the functional pressure, i. e. perceived lack of progress in common external policy realm.
- **Q1b:** The adoption of Battlegroup Concept was a 'lowest common denominator' of individual Member States' interests.
- **Q2a:** The EU BG Concept formulation was largely influenced by Supranational elites (The 'Brusselisation' of defence integration took place).
- **Q2b:** The EU BG Concept formulation was largely influenced by the domestic public of Member States, i.e. by public opinion.
- **Q3a:** De facto, supranational institutions - EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff - have major say in the EU BG Evaluation and Certification procedure.
- **Q3b:** De facto, Member States' governments, especially the Framework Nation, have major say in the EU BG Evaluation and Certification procedure.

The Supporting Letter

I am an MSc International Public Policy student at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Currently I am conducting a research in European Battlegroup Concept, where I look for most insightful theoretical lens to explain the phenomenon.
One of the methods I employ is an expert survey. As you have published extensively on the subject of European security, your perspective is of great value for mentioned work.
The survey is conducted under Chatham House Rule and takes 5 minutes to complete. The deadline is the 15th of June. You can find a link below:
http://goo.gl/forms/POpB0WpuUmWz4FtD3
Should you be interested in results, I can report them to you in September.
If you have any further questions, do not hesitate to contact me!

Appendix 2: The List of Experts to Whom the Questionnaire Has Been Sent

1. Doctor Jan Joel Andersson, European Union Institute for Security Studies.
2. Mister Adam Balcer, University of Warsaw.
3. Doctor Christopher Bickerton, University of Cambridge.
4. Doctor Laura Chappell, University of Surrey.
5. Doctor Mai'a Cross, Northeastern University.
6. Professor Hylke Dijkstra, Maastricht University.
7. Doctor Tom Dyson, University of London.
8. Doctor Daniel Fiott, The Institute for European Studies.
9. Doctor Catherine Gegout, University of Nottingham.
10. Doctor Bastian Giegerich, The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
11. Mister Richard Gowan, Center on International Cooperation.
12. Mister Niklas Granholm, The Swedish Defence Research Agency.
13. Professor Stephanie Hofmann, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
14. Professor Jolyon Howorth, Yale University.
15. Professor Adrian Hyde-Price, University of Gothenburg / Centre for European Research.
16. Doctor Wade Jacoby, Brigham Young University.
17. Doctor Ana E. Juncos, University of Bristol.
18. Professor Christian Kaunert, University of Dundee.
19. Professor Mika Kerttunen, Finnish National Defence University / Cyber Policy Institute.
20. Professor Stephan Keukeleir, College of Europe.
21. Professor Emil Kirchner, University of Essex.
22. Professor Joachim Koops, The Institute for European Studies / Vesalius College.
23. Professor Xymena Kurowska, Central European University.
24. Doctor Maxime Larivé, University of Miami.
25. Doctor Chantal Lavallée, Universite Laval.
26. Doctor Gustav Lindstrom, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.
27. Doctor Claudia Major, German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
28. Professor Anand Menon, King’s College London.
29. Professor Frederic Mérand, Centre D' études et de Kecherches Internationales de L'Université de Montréal.
30. Professor Cristoph Meyer, King’s College London.
31. Doctor Christian Mölling, German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
32. Doctor Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.
33. Professor Luis Simón, The Institute for European Studies.
34. Professor Michael E. Smith, University of Aberdeen.
35. Doctor Simon Sweeney, University of York.
36. Professor Daniel Thym, University of Konstanz.
37. Professor Thomas G. Weiss, The Graduate Center, City University of New York.
38. Doctor Neil Winn, University of Leeds.

Appendix 3: Composition of EU Battlegroups

Period Semester/year	Participants	
I/2005	BG1	UK
	BG2	France
II/2005	BG1	Italy
	BG2	none
I/2006	BG1	France, Germany
	BG2	Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal
II/2006	BG1	France, Germany, Belgium
	BG2	none
I/2007	BG1	Germany, Netherlands, Finland
	BG2	France, Belgium
II/2007	BG1	Italy, Hungary, Slovenia
	BG2	Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus – HELBROC Battlegroup
I/2008	BG1	Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Ireland – Nordic Battlegroup
	BG2	Spain, Germany, Portugal, France
II/2008	BG1	Germany, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Spain
	BG2	UK
I/2009	BG1	Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece
	BG2	Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus – HELBROC Battlegroup
II/2009	BG1	Czech Republic, Slovakia
	BG2	France, Belgium, Luxemburg
I/2010	BG1	Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania
	BG2	UK, Netherlands
II/2010	BG1	Italy, Romania, Turkey

	BG2	Spain, France, Portugal
I/2011	BG1	Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Austria, Lithuania
	BG2	Sweden, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Ireland – Nordic Battlegroup
II/2011	BG1	Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus – HELBROC Battlegroup
	BG2	Portugal, Spain, France, Italy
I/2012	BG1	France, Belgium and Luxembourg
	BG2	Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Macedonia, Ireland
II/2012	BG1	Italy, Slovenia, Hungary
	BG2	Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Macedonia
I/2013	BG1	Poland, Germany, France – Weimar Battlegroup
	BG2	Belgium, Luxembourg, France (Unconfirmed)
II/2013	BG1	UK, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden and the Netherlands
	BG2	Belgium (Unconfirmed)
I/2014	BG1	Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus – HELBROC Battlegroup
	BG2	Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, the Netherlands and Macedonia – EUBG 2014 II

Sources: IISS, 2009; Major and Mölling, 2011.

Appendix 4: General Composition of EU BG



Source: German Ministry of Defence, Major and Mölling, 2011.

Bibliography

Adler-Nissen, R. and Pouliot, V., 2014. Power in practice: negotiating the international intervention in Libya. European Journal of International Relations, 20(4), pp.889–911.

Allen, D., 1998. Who speaks for Europe? The search for an effective and coherent external policy, in: J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (Eds.) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? London: Routledge.

Allen, D., 2012. The Common Foreign and Security Policy, in: E. Jones, A. Menon and S. Weatherill (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, C.J. and Kaltenthaler, K.C., 1996. The dynamics of public opinion toward European integration, 1973-93. European Journal of International Relations, 2(2), pp.175-199.

Andersson, J.J., 2006. Armed and ready: the EU Battlegroup Concept and the Nordic Battlegroup. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Report No. 2.

Art, R. J., 2004. Europe hedges its security bets, in: T. V. Paul, J. J. Wirtz, and M. Fortmann (Eds.) Balance of power. theory and practice in the 21st Century. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Aspinall, E., 2006. The Helsinki agreement. Policy Paper No. 20, East West Center, Washington D.C.

Bailes, A. J. K., Herolf, G. and Sundelius. B., 2006. The Nordic countries and the European Security and Defence Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI.

Balfour, R., 2011. The Arab Spring, the changing Mediterranean, and the EU: tools as a substitute for strategy? Brussels: European Policy Centre Policy Brief, June.

Balossi-Restelli, L. M., 2011. Fit for what? Towards explaining Battlegroup inaction. European Security, 20(2), pp.155-184.

Baumann, R., Rittberger, V. and Wagner, W., 2001. Neorealist foreign policy theory, in V. Rittberger (Ed.), German foreign policy since Unification: theories and case studies, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Bergman, J. and Niemann, A., 2013. Theories of European integration and their contribution to the study of European foreign policy. Paper prepared for the 8th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Warsaw 2013.

Bickerton, C. J., Irondelle B. and Menon, A., 2011. Security co-operation beyond the nation-state: the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(1), pp.1–21.

Bickerton, C., 2013. European integration: from nation states to Member States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Biscop, S., 2011. Mayhem in the Mediterranean: three strategic lessons for Europe. Brussels: Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations Security Policy Brief, 19.

Blatter, J., 2012. Innovations in case study methodology: congruence analysis and the relevance of crucial cases. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Swiss Political Science Association, Lucerne, 2-3 February.

Blatter, J. and Haverland, M., 2012. Chapter 2. Co-variational analysis, in: Blatter (Ed.) Designing Case Studies, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp.33–78.

Blatter, J. and Haverland, M., 2012. Chapter 3. Causal-process tracing, in: Blatter (Ed.) Designing Case Studies, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp.79–143.

Blatter, J. and Haverland, M., 2012. Chapter 4. Congruence analysis, in: Blatter (Ed.) Designing Case Studies, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp.144–204.

Blatter, J. and Blume, T., 2008. In search of co-variance, causal mechanism or congruence? Towards a plural understanding of case studies. Swiss Political Science Review, 14(2), pp.315-56.

Bono, G., 2002. European Security and Defence Policy: theoretical approaches, the Nice Summit and hot issues. ESDP and Democracy.

Bono, G., 2004. The EU's military doctrine: an assessment. International Peacekeeping, 11(3), pp.439–56.

Brattberg, E., 2011. Opportunities lost, opportunities seized: the Libya crisis as Europe's perfect storm. EPC Policy Brief, June, http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_1310_opportunities_lost.pdf.

Brown, D., 2001. The European Rapid Reaction Force. The Guardian, 11 April https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/apr/11/qanda.derekbrown

Bull, H., 1966. International theory: the case for a classical approach. World Poli-

tics, 18(3), pp.361-377.

Bulmer, S., 1991. Analyzing European political co-operation: the case for two-tier analysis, in: M. Holland (Ed.) The future of European political co-operation: essays in theory and practice. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Bulmer, S., 1993. The governance of the European Union: a new institutionalist approach. Journal of Public Policy, 13(4), pp.351-380.

Caforio, G., 2009. Contributions to conflict management, peace economics and development. Volume 12, Part 1 - Advances in military sociology: essays in honor of Charles C. Moskos. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Carifio, J., and Perla, R. J., 2007. Ten common misunderstandings, misconceptions, persistent myths and urban legends about Likert scales and Likert response formats and their antidotes. Journal of Social Sciences, 3(3), pp.106-116.

Carruba, C. J., and Singh, A., 2004. A decision theoretic model of public opinion: guns, butter, and European Common Defence. American Journal of Political Science, 48(2), pp.218-31.

Castles, F. G., and Mair, P., 1984. Left–right political scales: some 'Expert' judgments. European Journal of Political Research, 12(1), pp.73-88.

Chappell, L., 2009. Differing member state approaches to the development of the EU Battlegroup Concept: implications for CSDP. European Security, 18(4), pp.417- 439.

Checkel, J. 2005. International institutions and socialisation in Europe. International Organization, 59(4), pp.801-26.

Checkel, J., 2007. International institutions and socialisation in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chen, W-F. 2012. National Interests vs. Security and Defence Integration in the EU: A comparative case study of Britain and Germany / Durham theses, Durham University.

Chen, W.-F., 2015. The EU as a security actor under the framework of the CSDP? A case study of the EU in the Ukraine. UACES 45th Annual Conference Paper, 7-9 September.

Christiansen, T., and Kirchner, E., 2000. Committee governance in the European Union. Manchester.

CIni, M. and Borragan, N. P.-S., 2013. European Union politics (Fourth Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cohen, L. J., 1993. Broken bonds: the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Boulder: Westview.

Coller, D., 2011. Understanding process tracing. Political Science and Politics, 44(4), pp.823-30.

Cooper, R., 2004. The breaking of nations: order and chaos in the Twenty-First Century. London: Atlantic Books.

Cornish, P., and Edwards, G., 2005. The strategic culture of the European Union: A progress report. International Affairs, 81(4), pp.801-820.

Council of the European Union, 1999. Presidency Conclusions, Annex I to Annex IV, 'Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence', Helsinki, 10-11 December, 1999.

Council of the European Union, 2001. Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP Setting Up the Military Committee of the European Union, 22 January 2001. Official Journal L 27/4, 30 January 2001.

Council of the European Union, 2004. 2582 Council Meeting. General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels: Council of the European Union, 17 May, 9210/04.

Council of the European Union, 2005. BG Generation Process - 14336/04 - 8 November 2004 (Released to NATO: 14336/1/04 REV 1– 19 July 2005).

Council of the European Union, 2005. EU Battle Groups Offers and Commitments (EU BG Roster), Brussels: Council of the European Union, 11 November, 14337/05.

Council of the European Union, 2005. EU Battlegroups Concept - 10501/04 - 14 June 2004 (Released to NATO: 10501/1/04 REV 1 - 19 July 2005).

Council of the European Union. 2005. Standards & Criteria for EU Battlegroups - 7185/05 - 9 March 2005 (Released to NATO: 7185/1/05 REV 1 – 19 July 2005).

Council of the European Union, 2007. The European union battlegroups. Brussels: Council of the European Union, January.

Council of the European Union, 2011. 'Council decides on EU military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in Libya', Brussels, 1 April 2011.

De Breadun, D., 2004. Value of EU 'Battlegroup' plan stressed by Annan. The Irish Times, 15 October http://www.irishtimes.com/news/value-of-eu-battlegroup-plan-stressed-by-annan-1.1162012

Deschaux-Beaume, D., 2012. Investigating the military field: qualitative research strategy and interviewing in the defence networks. Current Sociology, 60(1), pp.101-117.

Devuyst, Y., 2012. The European Council and the CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty. European Foreign Affairs Review, 17(3), pp.327–350.

Dijkstra, H., 2009. Commission versus Council Secretariat: an analysis of bureaucratic rivalry in European Foreign Policy. European Foreign Affairs Review, 14(3), pp.431-450.

Dijkstra, H., 2011. The political influence of the EU Council Secretariat in Security and Defence Policy. Paper Delivered at European Union Studies Association Biennial Conference, Boston 3-5 March.

Dijkstra, H., 2012a. The influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence. European Security, 21(3), pp.311-327.

Dijkstra, H., 2012b. Agenda-setting in the Common Security and Defence Policy: An institutionalist perspective. Cooperation and Conflict, 47(4), pp.454-472.

Eckstein, H., 1975. Case study and theory in political science, in: Handbook of Political Science, F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (Eds.), Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Edwards, G., 2013. The EU's foreign policy and the search for effect. International Relations, 27(3), pp.276–291.

EU Council Secretariat, 2006. Factsheet. Financing CSDP Operations, Brussels: EU Council Secretariat.

European Council, 1999a. Cologne European Council 3-4 June. Presidency Conclusions. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol1_en.htm

European Council, 1999b. Helsinki European Council 10-11 December. Presidency Conclusions. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm

European Council, 2001. Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Laeken. 14-15 December. SN300/1/01 REV1 http://ec.europa.eu/smart- regulation/impact/background/docs/laeken_concl_en.pdf

European Council, 2004. EU – UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations Elements of Implementation of the EU – UN Joint Declaration, Brussels: European Council, 17-18 June.

European Council, 2008. Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World. 11 December. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104

630.pdf

European Council, 2010. Council Conclusions on Bosnia Herzegovina: EUFOR Althea. Foreign Affairs Council Meeting. 25 January.

European Council, 2012. Council Conclusions on Pooling and Sharing of Military Capabilities 7682/12 22 March.

European Council, 2013. Council Conclusions EUCO 217/13 19/20 December. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140214.pdf.

European Council, 2013a. Draft Report Committee on Foreign Affairs 2012/2253(INI) 25 March. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bCOMPARL%2bPE-504.043%2b03%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN

European Council, 2013b. Plenary Sitting: Motion for a Resolution 9 December. B7-0560/2013.

European Council, 2015. European Parliament Committees web pages. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/home.html

European External Action Service, 2013. Diplomacy and the CFSP: With new hands on the wheel, have we something that's real? 63-67 in: Biscop, S. and Whitman R. (Eds.) Routledge Handbook of European Security London: Routledge.

European External Action Service, 2013a. *EEAS Review* Brussels: European External Action Service. http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf

European External Action Service, 2013b. EU Battlegroups Factsheet, January. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/91624.pdf

European External Action Service, 2013c. Serbia and Kosovo reach landmark deal. 19 April. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413__eu-facilitated_dialogue_en.htm

European External Action Service, 2014a. EUFOR Althea. Factsheet. April. Brussels: European External Action Service. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/althea-bih/pdf/factsheet_eufor_althea_en.pdf

European External Action Service, 2014b. Ongoing missions and operations. Brussels: European External Action Service.

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm

European External Action Service, 2014c. EEAS Graphic representation. 1 December. http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf

European External Action Service, 2014d. 'NATO International Military Staff and European Union Military Staff cooperation towards complementarity' 27 January. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-military-staff/news/archives/2014/20140127_en.htm

European Parliamentary Research Service, 2013. European Defence in Times of Austerity. 4 July. Brussels: EP Library. http://epthinktank.eu/2013/07/04/european- defence-in-times-of-austerity/

Fabbrini, S., 2014. The European Union and the Libyan crisis. International Politics, 51, pp.177–195.

Gabel, M. J., and Anderson, C. J., 2002. The structure of citizens attitudes and the European political space. Comparative Political Studies, 35(8), pp.893-913.

Gariup, M., 2013. European security culture: language, theory, policy. London: Routledge.

Gaub, F., 2014. The EU and Libya and the art of the possible. International Spectator, 49(3), pp.40-53.

Gegout, C., 2005. Cause and consequences of the EU's military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a realist explanation. European Foreign Affairs Review, 10(3), pp.427-443.

Gegout, C., 2009. EU conflict management in Africa: the limits of an international actor. Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 8(3-4), Special Issue: EU Conflict Management.

Gilpin, R., 1981. War and change in international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Giumelli, F. and Lavallée, C., 2013. EU security governance: from processes to policies. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9(3), pp.365-371.

Gowan, R., 2005. The Battlegroups: a Concept in search of a strategy? In: S. Biscop (Ed.) E Pluribus Unum? Military integration in the European Union, Egmont Paper 7. Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels: Academia Press.

Granholm, N., 2006. EU-battlegroups: some new capabilities, actually. RUSI Journal, 151(6), pp.62-66.

Grevi, G., 2007. The Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy of the European Union: ever-closer cooperation. dynamics of regime deepening. Doctoral thesis, Free University of Brussels, June 17.

Grevi, G., Helly, D. and Keohane, D., 2009. European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999-2009). Paris: The European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Gross, E. and Juncos, A. E., EU conflict prevention and crisis management: roles, institutions, and policies. London: Routledge.

Haas, E., 1958. The uniting of Europe. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Haas, E., 1964. International integration: the European and the universal process, in Dale Hekuis, C., McLintock A. and Burns, A. (Eds.) International Stability. London: Wiley.

Haas, E., 1970. The study of regional integration: reflections on the joy and anguish of pretheorizing. International Organization, 24(4), pp.606-646.

Hamelink, R., 2005. The Battlegroups Concept: giving the EU a concrete 'military' face. EuroFuture, Defence and Security Brief, Winter 2005.

Héritier, A., and Rhodes, M., 2011. New modes of governance in Europe. Governing in the shadow of hierarchy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hertz, R. and Leuffen, D., 2007. Business as usual? Analysing the effects of enlargement on EU legislate output // CIS Working Paper, 38. Zurich: Center for Comparative and International Studies.

Heully, A., 2003. Is it an autonomous European army in gestation or an American auxiliary force? The Rapid Reaction Force has been set up, but it is neither rapid nor permanent... // Café Babel, March 25, 2003 URL: http://www.cafebabel.co.uk/article/what-has-happened-to-the-rapid-reaction-force.html.

Higate, P., 2006. Reflexivity and researching the military. Armed Forces & Society, 32(2), pp.219-233.

Hill, C., 1990. 'European foreign policy: power bloc, civilian model, or flop?' In R. Rummel (Ed.) The evolution of an international actor: Western Europe's new assertiveness. Boulder: Westview.

Hill, C., 1993. The capability-expectations gap, or conceptualizing Europe's international role. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), pp.305-328.

Hillman, A. L., 1989. The political economy of protection. Chur: Harwood Aca-

demic Publishers. Reprinted 2001, London: Routledge.

Hinich, M. J., and Munger, M. C., 1997. Analytical politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hix, S. and Høyland, B., 2011. The political system of the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hoffmann, S., 1966. Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of Western Europe. Daedalus, 95(3), pp.862-915.

Hoffmann, S., 2000. Towards a common foreign and security policy?. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(2), pp.189-98.

Hoffmann, S., 2011. Why institutional overlap matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture. Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(1), pp.101-120.

Hooghe, L., 1999. Images of Europe: orientations to European integration among senior commission officials. British Journal of Political Science, 29(2), pp.345-367.

Hooghe, L., and Marks, G., 2005. Calculation, community and cues public opinion on European integration. European Union Politics, 6(4), pp.419-443.

Hooghe, L. and Marks, G., 2008. A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political Science, 39, pp.1-23.

Hoon, G., 2005. Letter from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence to the Chairman
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/16/16100.htm

Howorth, J., 2000. European integration and defence: the ultimate challenge? Chaillot Paper 43, Paris.

Howorth, J., 2004. Discourse, ideas and epistemic communities in European Security and Defence Policy. Special edition of West European Politics: Europeanisation, Policy Change and Discourse 27(2), pp.211-234.

Howorth, J., 2010. The Political and Security Committee: a case study in 'Supranational Inter-Governmentalism'? Cahiers Européens, 1/2010, Sciences Po: Paris.

Howorth, J., 2011. Decision-making in Security and Defence Policy: towards supranational intergovernmentalism?. KFG Working Paper Series, 25, March 2011, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) 'The Transformative Power of Europe' Freie Universität Berlin.

Howorth, J., and Menon, A., 2009. Still not pushing back: why the European Union is not balancing the United States. Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(5), pp.727-744.

Huber, J. and Inglehart, R., 1995. Expert interpretations of party space and party locations in 42 societies. Party Politics, 1(1), pp.73-111.

Hyde-Price, A., 2006. 'Normative' power Europe: a realist critique. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(2), pp.217-234.

Irondelle, B., Mérand, F. and Foucault, M., 2015. Public support for European defence: does strategic culture matter? European Journal of Political Research, 54(2), pp.363–383.

Jachtenfuchs, M., 1995. Theoretical perspectives on European governance. European Law Journal, 1(2), pp.115-33.

Jachtenfuchs, M., 2001. The governance approach to European Integration. Journal of Common Market Studes, 39(2), pp.245-64.

Jacoby, W. and Jones, C., 2008. The EU Battle Groups in Sweden and the Czech Republic: what national defense reforms tell us about European Rapid Reaction Capabilities. European Security, 17(2-3), pp.315-338.

Jones, A., 2007a. Britain and the European Union (Poltics study guides). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Jones, S.G., 2007b. The rise of European security cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Juncos, A. and Whitman, R., 2015. Europe as a regional actor: neighbourhood lost? Journal of Common Market Studies, 53, pp.200-215.

Juncos, A. E. and Pomorska, K., 2011. Invisible and unaccountable? National representatives and Council officials in EU foreign policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 18(8), pp.1096-1114.

Keijzer, R., 2013. National foreign policy and the Common Security And Defence Policy: the 'Big Three' and large-scale military operations under the CSDP. MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities University of Amsterdam.

Keohane, D., 2015. The unbearable lightness of European defense. Carnegie Europe - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 24 November.

Keohane, R. O., 1984. After hegemony. Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, R. O., 1989. International institutions and state power: essays in international relations theory. Boulder: Westview Press.

Kernic, F., Callaghan, J. and Manigart, P., 2002. Public opinion on European security and defence. A survey of European trends and public attitudes toward CFSP and ESDP. Bern: Peter Lang.

Kerttunen, M., 2010. The EU Battlegroup – its background and concept. Diskussion and Debatt, NR 1, January/Mars.

Kerttunen, M., Koivula, T. and Jeppson, T., 2005. EU Battlegroups. theory and development in the light of Finnish-Swedish co-operation. Helsinki: National Defence College. Department of Strategic and Defence Studies.

Koenig, N., 2012. The EU and the Libyan crisis in quest of coherence? The International Spectator, 46(4), pp.11–30.

Koenig, N., 2014. Between conflict management and role conflict: the EU in the Libyan crisis. European Security, 23(3), pp.250-269.

Koops, J. A., 2011. The European Union as an integrative power: assessing the EU's 'Effective Multilateralism' with NATO and the United Nations. Brussels: Brussels University Press.

Krasner, S. D., 2013. New terrains: sovereignty and alternative conceptions of power in: M. Finnemore and J. Goldstein (Eds.) Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World. Oxford: University Press.

Krotz, U. and Maher, R., 2011. International Relations theory and the rise of European Foreign and Security Policy. World Politics, 63(3), pp.548-579.

Lau, R. R. and Redlawsk, D. P., 2001. Advantages and disadvantages of cognitive heuristics in political decision making. American Journal of Political Science, 45(4), pp.951-971.

Lavalée, C., 2013. From the rapid reaction mechanism to the instrument for stability: the empowerment of the European Commission in crisis response and conflict prevention. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 9(3), pp.372-389.

Lavenex, S., 2001. Migration and the EU's new Eastern border: between realism and liberalism. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(1), pp.24-42.

Laver, M. and Ben Hunt, W., 1992. Policy and party competition. New York and London: Routledge.

Léonard, S. and Kaunert, C., 2012. ‘Between a rock and a hard place?’: the European Union’s financial sanctions against suspected terrorists, multilateralism and

human rights. Cooperation and Security, 47(4), pp.473-494.

Lewis, J., 2005. The Janus face of Brussels: socialization and everyday decision making in the European Union. International Organization, 59(4), pp.937–72.

Likert, R., 1932. A technique for the measurement of attitudes. Archives of Psychology, 140, pp.1–55.

Lindberg, L. N., 1963. The political dynamics of European economic integration. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Lindberg, E., 2006. Evaluation and Certification of the Nordic Battlegroup. FOI Swedish Defence Agency Defence Analysis, Stockholm.

Lindstrom, G., 2007. Enter the EU Battlegroups. Chaillot Paper 97, Institute for Security Studies: Paris.

Majone, G.,1989. Evidence, argument and persuasion in the policy process. New Haven: London.

Major, C. and Mölling, C., 2011. EU Battlegroups: what contribution to European Defence? Progress and prospects of European rapid response forces. SWP Research Papers, 2011(8).

Mardell, M., 2008. In defence of Europe. BBC, 5 June http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/markmardell/2008/06/in_defence_of_europe.html

Maresca, J. J., 1985. To Helsinki: the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1973-1975. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Matlary, J. H., and Østerud, Ø., 2007. Denationalisation of defence. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Menon, A., 2011. European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya // Survival, 53(3), pp.75-90.

Michalski, A. and Norman, L., 2015. Conceptualizing European security cooperation: competing international political orders and domestic factors. European Journal of International Relations, pp.1-24.

Military Capability Commitment Conference, 2004. Declaration on European Military Capabilities, Brussels, 22 November.

Missiroli, A. and Schmitt, B., 2004. More Euros for ESDP: what convergence, what criteria? In: K. von Wogau (Ed.) The path to European defence. Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu.

Moravczik, A., 1993. Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), pp.473–524.

Moravczik, A., 1997. Taking preferences seriously: a liberal theory of international politics. International Organization, 51, pp.513-53.

Moravczik, A., 2011. European foreign policy Scorecard 2010 review. Foreign Affairs, 90(5), p.182.

Morillas, P., 2011. Institutionalization or intergovernmental decision-taking in foreign policy: the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. European Foreign Affairs Review, 16(2), pp.243-257.

Morillon, P., 2004. Lessons learned in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in: K. von Wogau (Ed.) The Path to European Defence. Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu.

Niemann, A., 2006. Explaining decisions in the European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Njolstad, O., 1990. Learning from history? Case studies and limits to theory-building, in: O. Njolstad (Ed.) Arms Races: Technological and Political Dynamics. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2007. Bi-SCD 80-90, NATO Task List (NTL), dated 16 November 2007.

Norton-Taylor, R. and Black, I., 2000. Europe sets up rapid reaction force. The Guardian, 20 November 2000 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/nov/20/eu.politics1

Novaky, N. I. M., 2015. Deploying EU military crisis management operations: a collective action perspective. European Security, 24(4), pp.491-508.

Nuttall, S., 1992. European political cooperation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O'Donnell, C. M. and Pawlak, P., 2012. Are Europeans a better Transatlantic security partners than meets the eye? Brookings Institution, Centre for European Reform Opinion, July 6.

Ojanen, H., 2006. The EU and the UN: a shared future. FIIA Report No. 13. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Onderco, M., 2010. Trade and foreign policy choices: explaining why France, Germany and UK differ on Iran. Working Paper Series, Department of Political Science, 28. Amsterdam: VU University Amsterdam.

Pavolka, D., 2010. What is NATO and EU response force good for? In: M. Majer, R. Ondrejcsák, V. Tarasovič, T. Valášek (Eds.) Panorama of Global Security Environment 2010. Bratislava: CENAA.

Pentland, C.C., 2011. From words to deeds: strategic culture and the European Union's Balkan military missions. Contemporary Security Policy, 32(3), pp.551-566.

Peters, D. and Wagner, W., 2005. Die Europäische Union in den internationalen Beziehungen. Die Europäische Union. Theorien und Analysekonzepte. Paderborn: Schöningh.

Peters, D., Wagner, W. and Deitelhoff, N., 2008. The Parliamentary control of European Security Policy. ARENA Report N7/08, RECON Report N6. Oslo: ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo.

Peterson, J., 1995. Policy networks and European Union policy-making: a reply to Kassim. West European Politics, 18(2), pp.389-407.

Phillips, L., 2011. UN says EU soldiers could endanger aid workers. EU Observer 21 April. Brussels. Available from: http://euobserver.com/foreign/32224

Pohl, B., 2013. The logic underpinning EU crisis management operations. European Security, 22(3), pp.307-325.

Pohl, B. and van Willigen, N., 2015. Analytic eclecticism and EU foreign policy (In)action. Global Society, 29(2), pp.175-198.

Pollack, M. A., 2001. International relations theory and European integration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(2), pp.221–244.

Pond, E., 1999. The rebirth of Europe. Revised Edition. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

Posen, B.R., 2004. ESDP and the structure of world power. International Spectator, 39(1), pp.5-17.

Posen, B.R., 2006. European Union Security and Defense Policy: response to unipolarity? Security Studies, 15(2), pp.149-186.

Powner, C., 2008. Consensus, capacity, and the choice to cooperate. Doctoral Dissertation, The University of Michigan.

Presidency Report on Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy, Annex I to the Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Santa Maria da Feira, 19-20 June 2000.

Quille, G., 2004. The European Security Strategy: a framework for EU security interests? International Peacekeeping, 11(3), pp.422-38.

Ray, L., and Johnston, G., 2007. European anti-Americanism and choices for a European Defense Policy. PS: Politics and Science, 40(1), pp.85-91.

Reykers, Y. F., 2016. Hurry up and wait: EU Battlegroups and a UN Rapid Reaction Force. Global Peace Operations Review, January 21.

Rhodes, C., 1998. The European Union in the world community. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Robinson, P., 2001. Theorizing the influence of media on world politics: models of media influence on foreign policy. European Journal of Communication, 16(4), pp.523-544.

Rosamond, B., 2000. Theories of European integration. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Rutten, M., 2001. From Saint Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents, vol. I. Chaillot Paper no. 47. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.

Saeter, M., 1998. Comprehensive neofunctionalism. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Sartori, G., 1970. Concept misformation in comparative politics. American political science review, 64(04), pp.1033-1053.

Sandholtz, W., and Stone Sweet, A., 1998. European integration and supranational governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schmidt, P., 2011. The EU's military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo: security culture, interests and games. Contemporary Security Policy, 32(3), pp.567–581.

Schmitter, P. C., 1969. Three neo-functional hypotheses about international integration. International Organization, 23(1), pp.161-166.

Schmitter, P. C., 1996. Imagining the future of the Euro-polity with the help of new concepts, In: G. Marks, F. W. Scharpf, P.C. Schmitter, W. Streeck (Eds.) Governance in the European Union. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Schoen, H., 2008. Identity, instrumental self-Interest and institutional evaluations: explaining public opinion on common European policies in Foreign Affairs and Defence. European Union Politics, 9(1), pp.5-29.

Schout, A., and Wolff, S., 2011. Ever closer Union: supranationalism and intergovernmentalism as scale or concept? In: F. Laurson (Ed.) The EU's Lisbon Treaty: Institutional Choices and Implementation. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Simón, L., 2012. CSDP, strategy and crisis management: out of area or out of business? The International Spectator, 47(3), pp.100-115.

Sinkler, A., 2011. Retroduction, congruence analysis, and causal inference in case study research. Paper presented at the WPSA Conference, San Antonio, TX, April 21, 2011.

Smith, A., 1976. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Vol. 1 in: The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, 7 vol. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, M. E., 2003. Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: the institutionalization of cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Spinelli, A., 1972. The European adventure – tasks for the enlarged Community, London.

Stahl, B., Boekle, H., Nadoll, J. and Jóhannesdóttir, A., 2004. Understanding the Atlanticist–Europeanist divide in the CFSP: comparing Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands. European Foreign Affairs Review, 3, pp.417-441.

Stephenson, P., 2013. Twenty years of multi-level governance: 'Where Does It Come From? What Is It? Where Is It Going?' Journal of Common Market Studies, 20(6), pp.817-837.

Stinchcombe, A., 1965. Organizations and social structure, in: J. March (Ed.) Handbook of Organizations. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2006. SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Sweeney, S., 2015. Explaining the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP): power, bureaucratic politics and grand strategy. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Leeds.

Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C., 2010. SAGE Handbook of mixed methods in so-

cial and behavioral research (Second edition). London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

The Economist, 2013.Europe in a foreign field. 19 January http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21569718-europeans-ability-deploy-force-abroad-falling-mali-shows-it-still-needed-europe

Thym, D., 2011. The intergovernmental constitution of the EU's foreign, security and defence Executive. European Constitutional Law Review, 7(3), pp.453-480.

Tocci, N., 2014. Imagining Europe: towards a more united and effective EU. Roma: Edizioni Nuova Cultura For Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).

Tonra, B. 2001. The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy. Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in the European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Tonra, B., and Christiansen, T., 2004. The study of EU foreign policy: between international relations and European studies, in: B. Tonra and T. Christiansen (Eds.) Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J., 1991. Neo-functionalism: obstinate or obsolete? A reappraisal in the light of new dynamism of the EC. Millennium-Journal of International Studies, 20(1), pp.1-22.

Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results 2013 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results 2014 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results

Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. Official Journal of the European Union, 2007/C 306/01.

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Issued Nov. 24, 2003. Franco-British Summit: Strengthening European Cooperation in Security and Defence http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/verbatim/4/29324/rumsfeld-on-transforming-the-us-military.html

United Nations Security Council, 1995. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the organisation, General Assembly Fiftieth Session, 3 January.

Vaïsse, J., and Dennison, S., 2013. European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013. London, ECFR.

Volpi, V., 2011. Why Europe will not run the 21st Century: reflections on the need for a new European federation. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

de Vreese, C. H., and Kandyla A., 2009. News framing and public support for a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(3), pp.453-482.

Wagner, W., 2003. Why the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy will remain intergovernmental: a rationalist institutional choice analysis of European crisis management policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(4), pp.576-595.

Wagner, W., 2010. Rehabilitation or retribution? 'Cultures of Control' and policies vis-à-vis renegade regimes. Paper presented at the 9th Belgium/Dutch Politicologieetmaal.

Waltz, K., 1979. Theory of international politics. Long Grove: Waveland Press.

Watson, G. R., 2004. European Security and Defence Policy: prospects and limitations, in: K. von Wogau (Ed.) The Path to European Defence. Antwerp-Apeldoorn: Maklu.

Weber, M., 1946 (1919) Gerth, H.H. and Wright Mills, C. (Translated and Edited), Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.77-128.

Wendt, A.E., 1992. Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. International Organization, 46(2), pp.391-425.

Wessels, W., 1982. European political cooperation: a new approach to Foreign Policy, in: W. Wessels, D. Allen and Rummel, R. (Eds.) European Political Cooperation. London: Butterworth Scientific.

Yanakiev, Y., 2004. Measuring public opinion on international security. Paper Presented to the UNESCO MOST – ISSC International Summer School, Sofia.