International economics and democracy in the UN General Assembly

Contents

Acknowledgments

List of Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
EU	European Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
COW	Correlates of War project
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organisation
IR	International Relations
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ODA	Official Development Aid
RO	Regional Organisation
TSCS	Time series cross sectional
WTO	World Trade Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialists Republics
VDPA	Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action

Abstract

Using 827 state dyads over the period 1989-2006, this thesis empirically analyses the effect of economic interdependence and democracy on state preferences in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). While the Liberal Peace theory has extensively been researched and tested in conflict research, research trying to explain state preferences in the UNGA has only focused on the democratic tradition, thereby neglecting the economic tradition. This paper reinvigorates the economic tradition by researching the effect of economic interdependence.

The UNGA has an important impact on global politics by using its mandate to create new UN bodies and adopting non-binding resolutions. Scientific research has used UNGA voting patterns to construct state preferences. This thesis uses the latest data set of state preferences based on UNGA voting behaviour: ideal point differences. This data set is the most valid data set on UNGA preferences, because it accounts for agenda change and crises.

The Liberal Peace theory consists of the economic tradition and the democratic tradition. The effect of economic interdependence (economic tradition) is explained by the theory of commercial liberalism and the theory of socialisation. Commercial liberalism lays the foundation by arguing that trade creates economic interdependence, which in turn raises the cost of conflict. The socialisation theory explains that economic interdependence will lead to cooperation on multiple levels. As a result state preferences converge. The theory of democratic peace (democratic tradition) explains that democratic citizens share a common identity and that democratic institutions create constraints to use force. Both traditions argue that an increase in democracy and economic interdependence will cause state preferences to converge.

A repeated multilevel model with an AR1 covariance structure and a random intercept is found to be the best fitting model. In conclusion, both economic interdependence and democracy cause state preferences to converge.

1. Introduction

The scientific field of International Relations is very much focused on explaining and researching state behaviour. While a lot of theories have been developed over the years, the quest continues with testing the different theories with the use of empirical data. The domain of conflict and peace research is leading this empirical field research by using huge amounts of data. A dominant theory within conflict and peace research is the Liberal Peace.

The Liberal Peace theory focuses on the effect of democracy and economic interdependence on conflict. The economic tradition argues that when trade between states increases, economic interdependence will emerge. In turn, economic interdependence will influence state behaviour by converging state's preferences. Democracy on the other hand will lead to more peaceful states and cooperation. Today, there is a lot of empirical research which concludes that democracy and economic interdependence reduce state conflict (Russet & Oneal, 2001; Gelditsch, 2008 ; Hegre et al. 2010).

In the meantime the United Nations General Assembly(UNGA) has attracted more scholarly attention. It is an institution where the majority of states worldwide come together. Scientists have used varies techniques to construct state preferences based on UNGA votes. Between 1998 and 2012, 75 articles based on voting behaviour in the UNGA were published (Bailey et al. 2013). The majority of research articles use UNGA preferences a an independent variable. The minority uses UNGA as the dependent variables and try to explain how these preferences are affected. These articles will be discussed in the Literature Review chapter and it will be clear that democracy was found to have an effect on state preferences (Russett & Oneal, 2001; Kim & Russett, 1996 ; Voeten, 2000 ; Dreher et al. ,2008 ; Dreher & Sturm, 2012).

The economic tradition is mostly neglected in scientific research on the UNGA. This master thesis contributes to the academic literature because it reinvigorates the economic tradition of the liberal peace theory in UNGA research . From a more practical point of view it addresses the question if investing in trade relations could foster more cooperation on other policy areas in world politics. The main focus is on the effect of economic interdependence on state preferences. Both democracy and economic interdependence are taken into account. Moreover, a recent data set on state preferences is

used (Bailey et al. 2013). I argue that economic interdependence should be included as a key variable next to democracy so that the liberal peace theory as a whole is investigated within UNGA research.

The first chapter will introduce the UNGA and explains why this institution is important and used for world politics analysis. Next, the Literature Review chapter addresses the literature gap by summarising the latest research on UNGA voting behaviour and it will explain how this thesis will contribute to scientific research. The Theoretical Framework chapter describes the causal links of economic interdependence and democracy and will frame the hypothesis based on theory. This way, the scientific assumptions of the Liberal Peace theory will be tested. In the chapter Research Design the method and variables are explained in detail. Different quantitative models will be constructed to find out which model is best in explaining how the observed variables influence each other and the hypothesises will be answered. The Discussion chapter discusses the research method by elaborating on the challenges that were encountered during the research project. In the last chapter recommendations are discussed for future research and the reliability and validity are discussed and how the result reflect reality. Concluding remarks are at the end of this thesis.

2. The United Nations General Assembly: Yes we care

The relevance of the UNGA is much debated. The UNGA has no authority on the issue of international security, because this topic is dealt by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Moreover, the UNSC can make binding resolutions and can overrule the UNGA if needed, whereas the UNGA can only make non-binding decisions. One could argue that the UNGA is no more than an advisory board for the UNSC and that it has no significance influence. The assembly is also overlooked by the media and academic world, since more attention is paid to the UNSC. Even NGO's are more mentioned than the UNGA (Kennedy, 2006). To summarise the critique on the UNGA, it cannot discuss or make any decisions regarding security matters, its socio-economic tasks are mainly dealt by the Bretton Woods institutions where the UNGA has no influence. The UNGA is considered bureaucratic and it has a limited time in session (once a year) Furthermore, it is inefficient in making decisions due to the one country one vote voting procedure and the large number of states, which makes it difficult to reach a simple majority or a two-thirds majority. According to Kennedy (2006:274): 'This is neither an effective nor happy principal organ of the UN'. However, by looking at historic events and the UNGA's position in the UN institution, this chapter makes clear the UNGA does matter in global politics.

The United Nations General Assembly was established by the UN Charter in 1945 and is one of the main organs of the United Nations (UNGA, 2016). The power and functions of the UNGA are found in Article IV[1] (UN Charter, 1945). All nation-states are free to apply for membership of the UNGA. Article IV is divided into three categories: 'Functions and powers', ' Voting' and 'Procedure'. To summarise the main functions, the UNGA tasks are 'to approve the annual UN budget, approve trusteeship arrangements and to supervise international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields'(Kennedy, 2006: 33). Furthermore, the UNGA can make recommendations to the UNSC on issues of international peace and cooperation, since the charter does not forbid the Assembly to discuss these topics. The voting procedure is quite clear and states that all members have one vote. 'Important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members that is present and voting (Article 18.2, UN Charter). All other questions are decided upon a simple majority. Moreover, members that fail to pay contribution do not have the right to cast a vote, unless the state in question is not to be blamed for the financial conditions for which it cannot pay (article 19, UN Charter). Finally, the

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[1] See Appendix A for article IV

'procedure' section states that the UNGA is able to establish subsidiary organs and that it will meet in annual sessions under normal circumstances[2].

The UNGA cannot be understood without looking at the relationship with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The UNSC is much more known than the UNGA and its function are described in article V of the Charter. The Security Council consist of five permanent members[3], which all have a veto power. Currently the UNSC has ten non-permanent members that are elected by the UNGA. Here we can see that the UNGA does have an important influence on the UNSC. Comparing the UNGA and the UNSC by looking at the UN charter, it seems that the UNSC is more powerful. The main reason for this can be found by looking at the wording. In the case of the UNSC, a lot of articles begin with the words 'the UNSC shall', whereas the articles regarding the UNGA begin with 'the UNGA may'. Furthermore, the UNGA can only make non-binding decisions. The UNSC on the other hand, is the only authority in the UN that can make binding decisions.

An important event for the UNGA is the 'Uniting for Peace resolution in 1950 (Un GA R 377/1950). This Resolution meant that the UNGA gave itself the power to discuss possible action or intervention when the UNSC fails to act on events that threaten peace (UNGA, 2016). The Assembly was frustrated with the Security council that couldn't act or be effective because of Cold War tensions. The USA and USSR often used their veto to block any progress. The Unity for Peace resolution gave the UNGA the right of initiative for resolutions that could lead to UN action. Another important moment for the UNGA was the adoption of resolution Un GA R 988/1956. According to Kennedy (2006: 81) it was a 'landmark event' where the UNGA made action possible. In 1956, the Assembly gave UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjöld authority to put an emergency peace keeping force along the Egyptian –Israeli border. In other words, while the UNSC was unable to act because of disagreement within the permanent members, the UNGA took action (Smith, 2006).

In the 1960's, tension between the rich Northern countries and the poor South countries began to rise because the inequality gap between the two sides did not decrease. Mainly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were founded to address the economic issue of income inequality. Since the gap did not decreased and Southern countries strongly belied that the IMF and World Bank represented Northern interests, they lost faith in these IO's (Kennedy, 2006). Dreher (2006) has

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[2] The Secretary General and the UNSC could call for additional session if needed (Article, 20, UN Charter).
[3] The US, Russia, China, UK and France

empirically shown that IMF support has a negative effect on growth rates for recipient countries when looking at the 1970- 2000 period. According to Dreher (2006) the G7 has control over the IMF. UN voting data is used to distinguish between allied countries and non-allied countries of the G7 that received support from the IMF. The conclusion is that there is no difference between the two groups. This means that even allied countries that received support were negatively affected by the IMF.

At the same time forty ex-colonial states joined the UNGA. As a result the Southern states put the economic issues on the UN agenda because they were dominant in the UNGA. Eventually an new UNGA organ was founded that would act like the World Bank, but would take recipient interests into account. This organisation is the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Another organ of the UNGA was created with the same idea: the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Although the UNCTAD was considered ineffective, Kennedy (2006) argued that the organisation, together with the UNDP, changed the idea that the least developed countries were better off with market forces. From here on end, the UN policies were adjusted by Northern countries to developing country's needs and were less orientated on market solutions. Kennedy (2006: 128) argues that 'when the General Assembly passed it famous Declaration of a New International Order[4] on May 1, it looked as though a historic watershed had been crossed'. Unfortunately, the oil crisis caused an economic downfall for developing countries and the Northern countries were affected as well. As a consequence, the Southern countries did not receive any benefits form the Northern countries. The economic gains were not achieved (Kennedy, 2006). The new development philosophy remained intact however. Eventually this lead to the adoption of the Agenda for Development by the UNGA in 1994. The document reminded the UNSC that 'security was not the only, or even major issue for the world organization'(Kennedy, 2006: 135). For example, the document stated that economic growth should be sustainable and should be considered as a goal on its own and employment should be the focus when it comes to development.

The most successful organisation of the UN is United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), an organisation task with the protection of children. UNICEF is funded by many private actors, and all member states have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is guarded by UNICEF. The organisation is mostly active in the developing world, since the UNGA gave UNICEF a permanent status and charged the organisation to focus on the developed countries (Kennedy, 2006).

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[4] The resolution contained more freedom on privatisation or nationalisation for recipient governments and equity was stated as the main goal (UNGA, 1974)

The UNGA also played an important part in putting international human rights on the UN agenda. In 1946, the UN commission on human rights initiated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was approved in the UNGA. At the time, not much attention was given to the declaration, since the UNGA resolution is non-binding. However, media and other NGO's were given a 'set of guidelines by which they can measure a government's action' (Kennedy, 2006: 182). Thus, the human rights issue would remain on the agenda due to non-state actors. In 1990, the Non-Alignment Movement successful pressured the UNGA to organise a global conference on human rights. Soon after the convention, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA) was adopted by the UNGA. The VDPA had three kinds of impact on the UN. First, the UN secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali considered human rights just as important as peace keeping and development. Second, different UN organs were set up by the UNGA that reported and gathered statistics on human rights issues in member states. Third, the office of the UN High Commissioner was established which actively promotes and gathers information on human rights.

The actions on human rights issue attracted much debate, mostly regarding the effectiveness of the UN in this area. Critics address human rights disasters such as in Bosnia and Rwanda, where the UN was not able to prevent the violation of human rights. On the other hand, those who defend the human rights interventions of the UN point out to the democratic transitions in Central Africa and UN peace keeping missions in Cambodia and East Timor. Kennedy (2006:201) acknowledges UN failures, but argues that 'limping does not mean falling'. The debate regarding the effectiveness of the human rights system of the UN is beyond the scope of the thesis. The main argument is that the UNGA did play an important role in the issue of human rights and that it did have an impact on history.

The UNGA could been seen as the 'barometer of world opinion'(Kennedy, 2006: 210). It represents state's interests of past, as well as interest 'on issues of recent weeks' (Gordenker in Smith 2006: 148). The annual meetings of the assembly in New York are the largest platform where almost all governments of the world are represented. This way, thoughts and opinions of governments on multiple policy areas become visible, so that any issue could be resolved in an early stage before things get worse. Although the resolutions are not binding, they pressure governments on certain issues. The resolutions can create a 'system of reference that can influence states' (Peterson in Smith 2006 : 152). A good example are resolutions against the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the US shows much interest in the voting patterns of the UNGA. In 1985, the US Department of State released a document in which 'key votes' were analysed in the UNGA

(Department of State, 1985). A few examples of key votes in 1985 are resolutions regarding human rights in Iran and the withdrawal of forces in Afghanistan and Cambodia. The main goal of the report was to identify which states are in line with US preferences. These 'key votes' are still reported today and are used in the scientific literature, which will be described in the next chapter Literature Review.

In conclusion, the UNGA had an important impact on global issues by using its mandate to create new UN bodies and adopting non-binding resolutions. The UNGA is a platform where smaller countries can make their opinion known, which has led to new thinking and new UN organs. It seems that the UNGA tries to gain more power in relation to the UNSC, although the UNSC still remains a more powerful body in the UN system. The UNGA is thus more effective on 'soft issues'(Kennedy, 2006: 213) On the other hand, the UNGA is a global barometer and reveals what is keeping global politics busy. The US clearly shares this opinion and identifies key votes. All in all, as Kennedy (2006: 213) puts it: 'However one might feel and think of the UNGA', without it, there would be no United Nations'.

3. Literature Review: Voting behaviour in the UNGA

This chapter gives an overview of the latest research on UNGA voting behaviour and identifies which factors were empirically found to influence voting behaviour. This way, the literature gap becomes visible by making clear that the concept of economic interdependence together with democracy has been mainly overlooked in the latest research regarding the UNGA. The papers can be divided into three categories that all use a different scientific perspective. The first category of the 90's focuses on voting blocs and the West/South, West/East division. Furthermore, an influential study regarding the liberal peace theory has briefly touched upon the influence of economic interdependence and democracy on voting behaviour. The second category describes the power of the US and the use of US aid commitments to influence other states. Finally, the last part focuses on the presence of regional organisations and their voting coherence.

3.1 Voting blocs and conflict research

In 1996, Kim and Russett used roll call votes on UN resolutions between 1991 and 1993 in the UNGA to identify state preferences. Their main argument is that 'a North-South cleavage has superseded Cold War alignments' (Kim & Russett, 1996 : 629). Countries that were absent for more than 30% during voting procedures are excluded from the dataset. To begin, they identify certain issues and assign each UN resolution to a particular issue. By doing a factor analysis they find three main issues. The first is 'self-determination and disarmament'. This issue is characterised by the sub issues colonialism, disarmament and Palestine. The colonial issue calls for action on economic, social and political matters, such as UN resolutions concerning independence of colonies. The sub issue disarmament concerns issue as the banning of nuclear testing in specific areas. Two examples are liberation of remaining colonies and action against the apartheid regime in South Africa. The second main issue is identified as political rights. This issue area is mostly concerned with human rights questions in Sudan, Iraq and Iran. The third issue is dubbed the Middle East, since a lot of countries vote the same in regards to resolutions that cover the Middle East topic.

Kim and Russet (1996) find three clusters of voting blocs[5]. The biggest and first cluster is the Non-Aligned movement. This cluster contains countries that do not join a hegemonic power, nor form a voting bloc against the hegemon. The second cluster consists of Japan and some European Countries. Cluster three is formed by the US, Israel and again some European countries. The fourth cluster is made

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[5] See Kim & Russett 1996 for details.

by Eastern European countries and Russia. The fifth and final cluster is made up by Malta, South Korea and Turkey.

In the self-determination and disarmament issue area there is a strong division along a North-South line. Northern countries and Southern countries oppose one another on resolutions in this area. In regards to the political rights dimension there is much incoherence between Southern countries. On the other hand, the US and Israel are isolated on the Middle East dimension and the other countries vote much in line with each other.

Kim and Russett (1996) also investigate the voting cohesion of caucusing groups in the UN[6]. They argue that 'a caucusing group hardly ensures uniform voting behaviour (Kim & Russett, 1996: 645). The African and Arab group do vote in line with each other, but only in the self-determination and disarmament area and the Nordic countries are cohesive in the political rights issue area. To find out what drives voting behaviour, Kim and Russett (1996) employ a multiple regression model. Regarding the self-determination and disarmament dimension, GNP per capita and democracy are found to have an positive influence on voting coherence. Trade with the US has a negative relationship, which means that the more countries trade with the US the more likely they are to vote in line with the Southern countries. In the political rights dimension, GNP and democracy have a weak positive effect. Democracy has a positive relationship in both issue areas. Looking at the caucusing groups, Kim and Russet (1996) find that Western European countries, the European Community and the Nordic countries join the US and vote mostly 'No' on the self-determination and disarmament dimension.

Voeten (2000) disagrees with Kim and Russett (1996) that a North South division had superseded a North West division in the UNGA. Moreover, Voeten (2000) argues that voting alignments can be found on a one dimensional level, whereas Kim and Russett (1996) distinguish between different issues/dimensions. Therefore, Voeten (2000) uses nominate scaling[7] to construct state positions. As is described above, Kim and Russett (1996) identify three main issue areas. The main difference between the methods used in both papers is that Kim and Russett (1996) see an abstention as being indifferent between a 'yes' or 'no 'vote. In contrast, Voeten (2000) considers an abstention as an informal 'no' vote.

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[6] See Appendix B for the caucusing groups in the UN.
[7] Nominate scaling assumes that states have a ideal point on different policy fields. Then it tries to predict when a state approves or disapproves a resolution, by looking where the resolution and ideal point are located in a policy area. The larger the distance between the ideal point and resolution, the more likely a state will oppose the resolution .

Furthermore, Voeten (2000) takes all countries into account that voted at least 25 times, instead of dropping states that were absent in 30% of the time as in Kim and Russett (1996). To investigate if the voting blocs have changed after the Cold War, all adopted resolutions are used of the 1946-1988 period and the 1991-1996 period.

The East and West voting blocs were stable during the Cold War period, whereas the North South division was present, but not that consistent. The UK, France , Israel and US have had extreme positions during and after the Cold War, which implies that these countries did not vote differently during the two time periods. The only thing worth mentioning in comparing before and after Cold War voting, is the US has drifted slightly away from the former mentioned western countries. A more significant change is that most Eastern European states joined the Western countries after the Cold War. A voting bloc called 'Non-Western', that mostly consist of communist states and other states, oppose the US[8]. Voeten (2000) concludes that a counter hegemonic hypothesis is present during and after the Cold War period. The counterhegemonic bloc hypothesis predicted that after the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, other states would collaborate to counter the new hegemon; the US. Moreover, since the Non-Western countries are not democratic, regime types matters as well. In some cases Arabic countries form a voting bloc. Next, a regression analysis after the Cold War period reveals that democracy and GNP are associated with more Western voting behaviour (Voeten, 2000).

A second regression analysis distinguishes between different issues areas. These are disarmament, colonialism, Middle East and, human and political rights. There is also one category called 'important issue', which reflects the key votes as classified by the US state department (Department of State, 1985). This categorisation is almost in line with Kim and Russett (1996). Just like Kim and Russett (1996), Voeten (2000) shows that democracy has an effect on voting behaviour. Democracy is most influential in the areas of colonialism, human rights and key votes. In contrast, democracy has no effect on the Middle East issue area.

In their book *Triangulating Peace,* Bruce Russett and John Oneal argue that economic interdependence, democracy and international organisations reinforce each other to reduce interstate conflict. While their main focus is on explaining how these concept are related to conflict, they briefly investigate if democracy and economic interdependence influences state preferences. A data set that uses UN voting records is used to construct state preferences. The time period dates from 1950 till 1985. Furthermore,

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[8] Cuba, China, Vietnam, North Korea, Laos, Burma, Sudan, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Iran

power ratio and alliances between dyads are used as control variables. Russett and Oneal (2001: 234) argue that interdependent states 'fight less but cooperate more in the UN. Moreover, this means that the security interests are explained through UNGA voting. They state that: ' ... UN voting can serve as a useful indicator of state's interests, it is not, as we have seen, independent of state's regimes or their economic interdependence' (Russett & Oneal, 2001: 235). This result confirms partly the findings of Kim and Russett (1996) where democracy was found to influence UN voting behaviour. The data set used by Russett and Oneal (2001) is incomplete. This is also recognised by the authors themselves. A lot of scores for developing countries are not present, because these countries tend not to show up at voting sessions during the time period. Furthermore, some important countries, such as united Germany and South Korea were not a member of the UN. Indonesia withdrew for a period and South Africa was denied to vote for some time. This thesis, does take these countries into account. All in all, Russett and Oneal (2001) conclude that conflict is directly reduced by economic interdependence and democracy, and indirectly, because both concepts positively influence state preferences.

In conclusion, Voeten (2000) disagrees with the argument by Kim and Russett (1996) that a North-South division has superseded the East West Conflict. Voeten (2000) argues that the voting patterns have remained stable for the most part after the Cold War period and shows there is a division between the 'West' and other states. He argues that that voting patterns after the Cold War have changed because of 1) the switch of Eastern European countries to vote in line with Western countries, 2) States that have become more democratic moved more to the West and 3) Islamic countries have moved away from the West (Voeten, 2000). Finally, Russett and Oneal (2001) argue that economic interdependence influence voting behaviour in the UNGA.

3.2 The US and aid commitments

Dreher and Sturm (2012) find that UNGA voting behaviour is influenced by adjustment projects and large non-concessional loans granted by the IMF and the World Bank. The unit of analysis are the G7 countries[9], since these countries have strong political influence in the former mentioned international organisations. Using data on all votes from 1970 till 2008 , which includes 188 countries, the researchers construct a regression pooled time-series cross-section analysis. The US primarily uses the World Bank as an agent for its interests, whereas the other G7 countries use the IMF to influence voting behaviour in

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[9] Canada, France, The UK, Germany, Italy, Japan, USA.

the UNGA. Other interesting results are that democracy, political ideology, budget deficit and corruption are found to have positive relationship with voting in line with the G7. An increase in trade relations also has a converging effect on voting behaviour. However, Dreher and Sturm (2012) do no calculate economic interdependence. They only calculate the export and import flow from a G7 perspective.

More recently, Dreher & Jensen (2013) argue that leadership change will cause a country to vote more in line with the US on key votes. They build upon the previous model of Dreher and Sturm (2012) and distinguish between key votes and non-key votes. The US actively removes political leaders from office that do not vote in line with the US on key votes. To influence these noncompliant leaders, the US uses aids flows , bilateral as well as multilateral, to strip financial benefits away from the political leader so that electorate will choose a different candidate. It is in the leader's interest to receive US financial support to satisfy domestic actors. This is applicable to democracies as well as autocracies. The control variables ,which are the same as in Dreher and Sturm (2012), remain significant.

Back in 2008, Dreher et al. looked with more detail at the concept of aid and conclude that the US uses aid programmes to make sure recipient countries vote in line with US preferences. The dependent variable is voting coincidence with the US. The independent variable aid is measured by using aid commitments and not disbursements. The reason for using aid commitments is because there is no good track record of disbursements. States will adjust their behaviour to aid commitments as well. Second, the database on tied aid is not available[10]. Therefore, they consider all aid that is not categorised as tied aid. In the research design Dreher et al. (2008) use an OLS regression and a Two-Stage-least-Squares (2LS) method. Other control variables are national capability and democracy. Furthermore, they compare US results with other G7 countries[11] (Dreher et al. 2008).

The results make clear that the more a country receives US aid, the more it votes in line with the US. This in contrast with the other G7 countries, because results regarding the G7 countries were not found to be significant in both regression methods. The concept aid is further dived according to different types of aid. General Budget Support (GBS) is the main type of aid that influences voting behaviour. Loans (considered as aid) have no effect and the significance of grants depends on the regression method used. In the case of untied grants it seems that countries do align themselves with US voting the UNGA. When the key vote and non-key votes are separated, the effect of aid in regards to key votes is

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[10] 'When aid is tied, funds intended to foster development and alleviate poverty have to be spend on suppliers from the donor country' (Molle, 2014:140).
[11] France, Japan, Germany, Canada, Italy, UK.

stronger than when all votes are included. This result is in line with the findings of Dreher and Jensen (2013), where the effects on voting behaviour is based on key votes. The control variables national capability and democracy are also found to be significant for the US and the other G7 countries. When a country is more democratic, it will be more likely to vote along US preferences. In the case of national capability a negative relationship is present: the greater the national capability, the less likely the country will vote in line with the US. The greater the trade flows are with the US also has a converging effect on voting's behaviour.

The most recent research on US aid and voting behaviour in the UNGA is done by Carter and Stone (2015). They argue that democratic governments oppose US positions in the UNGA at first, but in second instance they support the US positions due to American influences. Carter and Stone (2015) construct a Voting Aid game. The first decision a recipient country can make is to vote with or against the US. Second, states can expect the US to punish or to reward them. Next, Carter and Stone (2015) set up a statistical analysis of the strategic model. Just as Dreher et al (2008), they use aid commitments instead of disbursements. The dependent variable consist of votes with or against the US and consist on key votes only. The results are based on the likelihood that the US will punish or reward states. Carter and Stone (2105) argue that democracies vote in line with the US, because the US uses aid commitments as a tool for punishment or reward. Autocracies on the other hand tend to oppose most resolutions that the US favours. Moreover, democracies are believed to be more vulnerable to aid commitments than autocracies, because the political leaders can be more easily replaced in a democratic states. Democracies are especially sensitive to the threat of lowering aid commitments in case the US favours a 'Yes'.

Potrafke (2009) uses the model of Dreher and Sturm (2012) to investigate if government ideology has any effect on a country to vote in line with the US[12]. He analyses the UNGA between 1984 and 2005. Right wing governments vote more in line with the US than left wing orientated governments. More specifically, when the US had a republican president, the difference in voting alignment increases even more in comparison to left wing governments. The results are applicable to key and non-key votes are in contrast with findings of Dreher and Sturm (2012), where government ideology was found to be insignificant. The main reason for a different result is because Potrafke (2009) only uses OECD countries

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[12] The Dreher and Strum (2012) article was first publicly available as a working paper in 2008.

for analysis and he uses a different ideology index. The results found for the control variable are the same as in Dreher and Sturm (2012).

3.3 Regional Organisations

Burmester and Jankowski (2014) compare the voting cohesion in the UNGA of the European Union with other regional organisations[13]. They conclude that the voting cohesion of the EU has increased over time. The UN resolutions are divided in six categories: Middle East, nuclear weapons arms, human rights, colonialism, economic development and resolutions where the US votes no. This last category is used because the authors argue that the US is the most powerful state in the world and that a 'no vote' resembles a strong statement, since most resolutions are adopted by large majorities. There are four time periods use for analysis[14]. Abstentions are marked as missing values.

When looking at the different issues, the EU shows an increase of voting alignment on the Middle East dimension and a decrease on the nuclear arms and colonialism dimension. When the overall voting cohesion is compared for different time periods, there was low cohesion in the 70's. In the second period, the beginning of the 80's, the cohesion declined even further and it seems that voting cohesion was at its lowest during this time period. This changed after 1988, when the EU votes very cohesive on contested votes while other RO's did not vote cohesive. In the 90's and 00's the trend increased further. The overall voting cohesion in the UNGA declined, while the EU score on cohesion increased. Burmester and Jankowski (2014:1505) conclude: 'There is a high level of coordination and strategic voting behaviour of the EU' . This result was also found by Hosli et.al (2010).

According to Ferdinand (2014a) the regional organisation ASEAN has a higher degree of voting cohesion in comparison to the EU. The time period used for analysis is 1974 till 2008 and focuses on resolution votes. China together with North Korea, seem to vote more in line with ASEAN as time goes by. This is mainly on the human rights issue, since ASEAN members together with China and North Korea are critical towards sanctions on other countries regarding human right abuse. Ferdinand (2014a) argues that the convergence of voting behaviour in the UNGA is 'at least a basis for increasing policy cooperation and even integration in ASEAN foreign policy in the future' (Ferdinand, 2014a: 675).

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[13] African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Caribbean Community, the Economic Community of West African States and the Mercado Común del Sur.
[14] 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, 2000-2009

Ferdinand (2014b) has also researched the UNGA voting patterns of the BRICS[15]. The main conclusion is that the voting patterns of BRICS convergence in the UNGA. The same time period as Ferdinand (2014a) is used for analysis. The convergence of BRICS is found to be larger than the convergence of the caucusing groups the NAM and the G77 group. However, the voting cohesion within the group has not increased. South Africa votes very different in regards to disarmament issues compared to India and Russia. When it comes to human rights, India and China vote more often 'No' than Brazil. Why the voting patterns of the BRICS converge remains unclear in the article, because the cohesion of the BRICS countries is lower in recent years compared to the cohesion between the countries before the BRCIS was established. For example, the voting cohesion was larger in the 1980-1989 period than the 2009-2011 time period (Ferdinand, 2014b). It has been argued that the BRICS have increased their cooperation in global politics from 2008 (Keukeleire & Hooijmaajers, 2014). However, is seems that cooperation in the UNGA has not improved due to the BRICS organisation.

3.4 Economic interdependence and democracy in the Assembly

From the literature review it is clear that regarding the voting blocs there is disagreement. Kim and Russett (1996) conclude that a North South division appeared after the East West division of the Cold War ended. On the other hand, Voeten (2000) does not agree with this statement and argues that state preferences could be measured on a one dimensional level instead of looking at different issues. Next, the US seems to have a strong influence , especially with the use of aid commitment. Finally, the regional organisations seem to experience an increase in voting coherence over time.

The voting bloc research done by Voeten (2000) and Kim and Rusett (1996) both show that democracy positively influences voting coherence. The impact of democracy however is dependent on the issue area. Russett and Oneal (2001) have also shown that democracy causes state preferences to converge in the period 1950-1985. The US and aid commitments group also argues that democracy in relationship with aid positively influences voting cohesion (Dreher & Sturm 2012; Dreher et al. ,2008; Dreher & Jensen, 2013 ; Potrafke, 2009 ; Carter & Stone, 2015). Only Dreher and Sturm (2012) extend the research population by including the G7 countries. The research on regional organisation in the UN do no use the variable democracy.

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[15] Brazil, Indian, Russia, China, South Africa

The only research that has investigated economic interdependence in regards to UN state preferences is done by Russett & Oneal (2001) when they investigate the period 1950-1985. They conclude that economic interdependence and democracy cause state preferences to converge. Since trade is a part of economic interdependence, it is worth discussing it as well. Kim and Russett (1996) argue that trade with the US reduces voting cohesion, while Dreher and Strum (2012) and Drehert et al. (2008) argue that an increase in trade improves voting cohesion with the US. This group of researchers has only used trade figures that have an US perspective. They also found that democracy has positive effect on voting cohesion.

Clearly, the effect of economic interdependence in the UNGA after the Cold War era has not been studied. Only one side of the liberal peace, the democratic tradition, has been used in scientific research. Thus, it can be argued that the Liberal Peace theory as a whole has not been investigated in regards to UNGA research. The research done by Russett and Oneal (2001) is outdated and used a crippled data set that cannot be compared to a more recent time period. Moreover, the previous chapter has shown that the UNGA has increased its influence during and after the Cold war in the UN. Therefore, it is worth to investigate the effect of economic interdependence together with democracy on state preferences in the UNGA.

4. Theoretical Framework: The two traditions of Liberal Peace

This chapter follows the lines of Gartzke (2007), who distinguishes between two traditions of the Liberal Peace theory: the economic tradition and the democratic tradition. The theories derived from the Liberal Peace theory are important since they explain the effects of economic interdependence and democracy on state behaviour. The economic tradition consist of two theories that supplement each other. These are the theory of commercial liberalism and the theory of socialisation. The democratic peace theory is explained in the second part of this chapter. Both traditions will be organised in the same manner. First, the theory and causal relationship(s) are explained. Next, the empirical findings are discussed to see if the theoretical assumption are supported in the real world. This way the credibility of the theories is examined. Finally, each part ends by formulating a hypothesis based on the theory and empirical findings.

The foundation of the liberal peace theory is based on the core assumptions of liberalism. The liberal stream in IR explains where state preferences come from and how they influence state behaviour. Three core assumptions are the basis for different streams of liberalism. The theory uses a bottom-up approach by looking at individuals or groups within a state. The first assumption is that ' [actors] organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values and variations in societal influence (Moravcsik, 1997: 516). Furthermore, the actors pursue material welfare with rational and risk averse behaviour.

The second assumption is that states represent the interests of some subset of society. In other words, a state is not a single actor with interests of its own. Liberalism therefore argues that there are no identical preferences among states. Instead, the state interests are formed by the interests of individuals and actors within a state. Important is that state preferences are considered to be independent of interstate politics (Moravcsik, 1997).

The third core assumption is that ' interdependent state preferences determines state behaviour' (Moravcsik, 1997: 520). According to the liberal theory, state preferences are not always conflicting in global politics, but sometimes converging. In this sense, mutual benefits could be achieved. State preferences which are formed by groups within society, could cause positive externalities towards another state. In this scenario there is no conflict. Second, state preferences could be mixed. In this case states will try to coordinate policy to reach mutual gains. Finally, state preferences could be conflicting,

this increases the risk of conflict. These core assumptions are the foundation for several other streams of liberalism: Ideational, commercial and republican liberalism (Moravcsik, 1997).

4.1 The Economic Tradition

The causal link of economic interdependence is explained by two theories: the theory of commercial liberalism and the theory of socialisation. The opportunity cost argument by commercial liberalism lays the foundation by arguing that trade between states creates economic interdependence that in turn raises the costs of war. The next part will outline the theoretical debate and critique to show that commercial liberalism has withstand critique and empirical testing. The socialisation process goes further than commercial liberalism by arguing that states will not only become more peaceful, but will also share ideas and identities that influence state preferences on a larger scale. Finally, a hypothesis is framed.

4.1.1 Commercial Liberalism: First economics, then politics

The commercial Liberalism theory states that commerce will affect the actions of states. In other words, 'politics is determined by economics' (Keohane, 2002: 48). The theory argues that the actors or groups within a state are driven by economic interests. Therefore, commercial liberalism relies on market incentives and actors pursue their economic interests with the use of rational choice (Moravcsik, 1997). Moreover, transnational economic exchange is used to increase economic welfare.

Domestic politics is made up of interests groups and individuals that will try to gain power in government for their own economic interests. Olson's (1965) theory of collective action shows that groups with economic interests are likely to join forces to influence the government, since the benefits are only divided among group members. In contrast, actors that promote public interests are less likely to join forces since some of the benefits will flow to free riders.

Commercial liberalism argues that changes in the global economy or the domestic economy change the pay-off system in international economic exchange. The main argument is that economic interdependence increases opportunity costs. Economic interdependence is created when states trade with one another. Trade has the possibility to refrain adversaries from using force. Conflict becomes more costly if the level of economic interdependence is high. From a rational perspective, the costs are

higher than the benefits. In other words, the opportunity costs of war increase. As a result, commercial liberalism argues that trade reduces conflict (Russett & Oneal, 2001).

Switching trade relations to another state is usually not an option. The theory of comparative advantage by Ricardo explains that states will specialise their production process to generate more output and outcome (Brue et al. ,2007). There are high costs involved when states stop trading, because they have to start producing the input resources to continue production .Therefore, the benefit of specialisation is lost. Moreover, it remains uncertain if the same level of trade could be established with a different trading partner. Again, conflict is less likely to occur when economic interdependence increases (Russett & Oneal, 2001). It is clear that state behaviour is changed due to trade; states are less likely to end up at war with each other.

The opportunity costs argument was theoretically criticised by Gartzke et al. (2001). The main argument is that economic interdependence will lead to less costly contests, but it will have no effect on state behaviour, because it does not reduce uncertainty. To back up their argument they use a rational approach and construct an interaction game. The two underlying assumption for this game is the existence of an excludable good (zero-sum) and that states choose a settlement method.

Two states want to maximise their benefit out of an excludable 100$. The costs of fighting for both states is 20$. The winner gets the whole 100$ and both states have an equal opportunity of victory. Combine these assumption into a formula[16] and the predicted value of fighting is 30$. Next, presume the costs of fighting is different for each state and that one state is informed about the costs of fighting of the other state. For example, state's B costs of fighting is between 0$ and 40$. State A is aware of this. Gartzke et al. (2001) argue that state B has an incentive to bluff that its costs for fighting are low. In the bargaining game that follows, state A will use its information to propose a sum of the 100$ that is preferred over fighting by state B. If the costs of fighting for state B is 40$, the predicted value of war is 10$ for state B, thus state A will make an offer of 11$ and take 89$. In case B and A are economic interdependent, both receive a benefit of 10$. In the interaction game, the 10$ benefit of interdependence has to be added to the offer. In the example, the benefit from an offer for state B would be 21, instead of 11. Gartze et al. (2001) argue that state A will decrease its offer, since the gains of economic interdependence would added to the offer of 11$. Thus, state A will lower its offer to 1$ and take 99$.

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[16][0.5(100$) + 0.5(0$)-20$]

Looking at the theory of Gartzke et al. (2010), it has a strong realist assumption. A good example is the emphasis on the excludable 100$; the value of economic interdependence (10$) is much lower than the relative gains (100$). It is clear that the relative gains are considered more important than the mutual benefit of interdependence. The model could be seen as an idea to develop a realist model of commercial liberalism (Schneider, 2014).

The model of Gartzke et al. (2001) has been criticised by Polachek and Xiang (2010). In their argument Polachek and Xiang show that Gartzke et al. (2001) came up with incomplete information models. The main problem is that Gartzke et al. (2001) did not take into account that state's B reaction is dependent on the value offered by state A. In other words, the probability, in this case 0.5 is affected by the amount offered by state A. Polachek and Xiang (2010) developed the ultimatum bargaining game and show that the opportunity costs argument does indeed explain how economic interdependence reduces the risk of conflict and therefore changes state behaviour.

4.1.2 The realist critique and the theory of trade expectations

In his research on war, Copeland (1996) neatly described the different views on economic interdependence by the realism and liberal stream in IR. Whereas the liberals argue that economic interdependence acts as ' material constraint' on war, the realists in fact believe that economic interdependence increases the chance of war (Copeland, 1996:23). Instead, they argue that high economic interdependence increases the probability of war, because states are more vulnerable and will start a war to become independent. In contrast with liberalism, low economic interdependence decrease the likelihood of war. Naturally, the realist are confident that states will do everything to secure their own existence: States are compelled ' to control what they depend on'(Waltz in Copeland 1996:10). This means that 'one must discount the liberal optimism that great trading partners will always continue to be great trading partners simply because both states benefit absolutely' (Copeland, 1996: 11).

Copeland (1996) disagrees with both theories on economic interdependence and comes up with his own solution: A theory on trade expectations. At first sight the theory sounds appealing, but a good look reveals that it is outdated and completely flawed. The main critique by Copeland (1996) on both realism and liberalism is that both are 'comparative statistics drawing predictions from a snapshot of the level of interdependence at a single point in time' (Copeland, 1996: 17). The theory on trade expectations

argues that expectations of future trade have an effect on state preferences. If future trade is expected to increase, the risk of war will decrease. The theory does not reject the liberal and realist assumptions, it merely argues that expectations of the future need to be taken into account. In other words: Trade today does not matter.

My counter argument why the theory on trade expectation is flawed is twofold. First, I argue that states encounter a lock-in effect, so that the opportunity costs are high and signalling negative trade expectations is unlikely. Second, the effects of globalisation results in a high trade volatility, which means that predicting trade has become nearly impossible.

First up it the lock-in effect as explained by Moravcsik (1997). The lock-in effect by the WTO results in a loss of effective policy instruments for states. National actors or groups are able to stable state preferences in some degree by joining international regimes (Moravcsik, 1997). When a state joins an international regime and ratifies the international laws, it results in ' fixed investments by private firms, ideological commitments by political parties about their reputation, costly institutional adaptation by domestic bureaucracies, or government investment in military defence' (Moravcsik 1997: 537). In turn, it means that exit costs are increased for future political leaders: a lock- in effect is present.

The lock-in effect regarding to global trade is found in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO represents a regime where global free trade is the main goal. That the WTO matters is demonstrated by the large number of state memberships[17]. The WTO encourages free trade and membership is only available if states agree with the WTO rules. When states agree with these rules, states lose a certain degree of policy tools to intervene in global trade (Molle, 2014). Thus, the signalling game between states introduced by Copeland (1996) ,where states signal their future trade expectations, has lost a lot of explanatory power in today's world.

Molle (2014) explains how globalisation has changed the world economy. Globalisation has increased cross border activities enormously. Globalisation of the economy is caused by a decrease in transport and communication costs. Increasing economies of scale have also increased world trade. Globalisation made trade more volatile due to the former mentioned effects of globalisation. Furthermore, firms are self-interested actors and cannot be controlled financially by states that are member of the WTO [18]. Moreover, states are not capable to estimate future trade. For example, in 2008 states were not

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[17] WTO members and observers, consulted on 08/02/2016,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
[18] The assumption here is that states in the WTO comply with the international rules to enter the WTO: they do not control firms or the investment of firms.

prepared for the financial crisis that had a negative effect on global trade. Global trade is thus hard to predict and this mean that a variable as expectations of trade is highly unpredictable.

All in all, the lock-in effect by the WTO that caused a loss of policy control and the high volatility of trade have severely weakened the prediction power of the theory on trade expectations.

Just like Copeland's (1996) theory on trade expectations, the realist theory does not account for national (second image) factors or actors. The other main problem of the realist argument is that high economic interdependence could decrease the likelihood of victory. According to realism, high economic interdependence should lead a state to attack and become independent. However, by severing trade in a case of high economic interdependence, high production losses are expected as well (Copeland 1996). It remains to be seen if a state would still be capable of defeating the opponent, especially if the aggressor is dependent on oil and raw materials that are necessary for warfare.

Although the realist argument on economic interdependence might seem unconvincing, it could be right after all. This master thesis does not look at the effect of economic interdependence on likelihood on war, but instead looks at the effect on state preferences in the UNGA. If the realist are right ,state preferences would diverge instead of converge. This master thesis takes the realism perspective into account by using realism control variables, which will be explained in the chapter Research Design.

To sum up, the theory of commercial liberalism uses an opportunity costs argument why states are less likely to engage in conflict when economic interdependence is high. Although Gartzke et al. (2001) criticised the opportunity costs argument with the use of an interaction game model, Polachek and Xiang (2010) show that the model is flawed and that the opportunity cost argument does influence state behaviour in theory. Next, the realist argument that high economic interdependence will result in conflict is unlikely, since states will lose a great degree of striking capability. The commercial liberalist argument seems therefore the best theoretical explanation regarding the effect of high economic interdependence on state behaviour.

4.1.3 The empirical debate: the effect of trade on state behaviour

The empirical findings regarding the effect of trade on conflict has been highly debated in scientific research. The research of trade and conflict is important since the research design of the master thesis is based on the same research model (Russett & Oneal, 2001). The findings are important because reducing conflict is the first step in cooperation between states, so that the socialisation process is

possible. Therefore it is important to find out if trade has an effect on state behaviour. The empirical research papers presented here only include research on a dyad state level, because this master thesis conducts research on the same level. This means that the research regarding the effects of trade within a state or at a systemic level is considered irrelevant.

Russett and Oneal (2001,) argue that trade does reduce conflict. The authors examine country dyads from 1886 to 1992 and use a multivariate analyses. With increase in trade by one standard deviation, the chance of conflict decreases by 35 percent. Moreover, the difference in size between two economies does not affect the impact of trade. This means that the level of dependency, instead of interdependence, is not important when it comes to the risk of conflict.

The results of Russett & Oneal (1999,2001) have been contested by many other scholars. The main critique points are that economic interdependence would increase the chance of conflict (Barbieri, 1996) or that trade has no impact at all (Keshk et al. ,2004 ; Beck et al. ,1998). The debate between the two sides was settled in 2008 by Xiang, Xu and Keteku (2007) when it was shown that the critical scientists did not control for the power of the dyad members (Schneider, 2014). In 2010, Russett, Oneal and Hegre (2010) provide evidence again that trade does promote peace. Other scholars have also agreed that trade does reduce conflict (Jervis, 2002 ; Gleditsch, 2008).

4.1.4 Commercial Liberalism and socialisation
Although commercial liberalism is based on market incentives, it does not promote liberal values such as free trade (Moravcsik, 1997). The main emphasis of the theory is on material gains. However, a constructivist approach to commercial liberalism argues that trade is not value free and that it will affect state preferences on multiple dimensions.

The liberal stream argues that transnational transmission of ideas matter (Moravcsik, 1997). These transnational ideas could diverge of convergence in existing international institutions. In addition communication between states increases when trade relations flourish. In turn, these 'communications are expected to foster cooperative political relations' (Mansfield & Pollins, 2009: 3). Therefore, the liberal peace literature contains the concept of socialisation (Harrison, 2004).

Karl Deutsch et al. (1957) has argued that security communities could arise because of transactions between sovereign states. International transactions can be categorised as political, economic, social or

cultural. The foundation for creating a community is peaceful interaction. People involved in these transaction become aware of mutual benefits. As interaction increases and expands, people develop more responsiveness toward each other: 'Responsiveness and community arise out of social transactions through which people learn to respect and trust others, and through which they receive respect and trust in return'(Russett & Oneal, 2001: 75). As a result, peoples or states become interdependent. Eventually, a 'we feeling', trust and mutual consideration is created between members in the community (Deutsch in Russett & Oneal, 2001).

In this socialisation perspective, trade consist of much more than material objects. Trade could be seen as a 'media for communicating on a broad range of matters beyond the specific commercial exchanges that take place' (Russett & Oneal, 2001: 54). According to Buzan (1993: 341): 'Trade automatically creates pressures for codes of conduct that facilitate the process of exchange and protect those engaged in it'. In other words, trade has a converging effect on ideas and people's intentions.

Wendt (1999) builds on the work of Deutsch et al. (1957) and argues that an international community could arise if a collective identity is created. Interdependence is seen as one of the four master variables that could lead to a collective identity. Important to mention here is that identities are the basis of state preferences (Wendt, 1992). Identities are shaped by the outside world and through interaction between states, such as in the case of interdependence. In regards to interdependence, Wendt (1999) identifies two types: objective and subjective interdependence. The concept of objective interdependence exists when actor A is aware that changes to actor B will lead to domestic changes of actor A. The concept of subjective interdependence goes further, both states think as a collective entity. For example, state A will analyse that when changes to actor B are present, 'our' welfare is affected, instead of focusing solely on its own welfare. Eventually states can internalise a Kantian culture[19] because of the economic benefits produced by interdependence. This is called the logic of consequences (Wendt, 1999).

The transformation from objective to subjective interdependence and the change of preferences is dependent on the degree of interdependence: 'Dense networks of interdependence affect the identities of actors not just their strategic bargaining' (Harrison, 2004: 527). All in all, it is clear that high

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[19] ' A Kantian culture is dominated by the role of conception of friendship. Friendship implies that disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war, and that they will fight as a team if any one state is threatened' (Wendt in Harrison, 2004: 526).

interdependence leads to a psychological transformation to states, thereby converging their identities and interests[20] (Wendt, 1999).

Commercial liberalism would argue that the socialisation as described above, starts with individuals or societal groups that pursue their own economic interests. Although commercial liberalism would argue that trade is value free, the constructivist argument of Deutsch (et al. 1957) and Wendt (1999) would argue that trade is not value free, but does effect ideas and, in turn state preferences . Important to note here is that societal groups are not seen as a factor that would hold back the socialisation process. Although national actors act rational on the basis of market incentives, the socialisation process to internalise cultural change is only slowed down (Moravcsik in Harrison, 2004).

The socialisation theory would mean that through economic interdependence the interaction and cooperation on other levels would improve as well. Eventually a common culture could arise in a community. The UNGA could be analysed as a form of community where states interact on a global level. Therefore, this paper investigates if economic interdependence causes more than just material benefits and could affect state preferences in the UNGA.

4.1.5 The Economic tradition: what to expect?

The theory of commercial liberalism predicts that politics is determined by economics. The theory of raising opportunity cost due to economic interdependence is the foundation. The socialisation theory shows that the effects of trade are more than material benefits. Trade will effect political relations on multiple dimensions. Finally, state preferences are influenced by economic interdependence is empirical found in peace research and research on UNGA voting behaviour (Russett & Oneal, 2001 ; Herge et. al, 2010 ; Kim & Russett, 1996). All in all, the follow hypothesis is stated:

H$_1$: State's preferences converge when economic interdependence increases

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[20] The main goal of Wendt (1999) is to explain how a collective identify could be established. Since this thesis only looks at state preferences and not at collective identity, the argument that interdependence leads to converging preferences is considered as sufficient theoretical evidence.

4.2 The Democratic tradition

The theory on democratic peace explains why democratic states are less likely to fall into conflict, because state behaviour is changed due to democracy. The line of reasoning for avoiding conflict is explained by two complementary explanations: cultural and structural (Russett & Oneal, 2001). Furthermore, a lot of empirical research has shown that democratic states do no fight each other. This has caused other IR streams to come up with their own theoretical explanations.

4.2.1 Theory and findings of Democratic Peace

Politicians in a democracy are likely to be doves, because the costs of starting a war is high for political leaders (Russett & Oneal, 2001). Thus, democracies try to avoid conflict with other states. From a structural explanation, elected leaders are held accountable for the outcome through elections . If the outcome of conflict is perceived as negative, the political leaders will be forced out of office after an election. Since the outcome of a war is uncertain, political leaders will try to avoid any sort of conflict. Moreover, Russett and Oneal (2001 : 56) argue, from a cultural perspective, that citizens living in a democracy are 'accustomed to a peaceful resolution'. This means that starting a war, regardless of the outcome, will most likely be met with disproval from the electorate. In other words, leaders in a democracy are punished for a failed outcome or starting a war, because they are accountable to the citizens.

That political leaders are turned into doves could also be explained by an interaction game. When tensions between two democracies arise, both states are informed by each other's actions since democratic states are transparent to outsiders due to freedom of press and freedom of movement. Free press, free movement and opposition groups publicly share the state's perception or intensions of a potential conflict. As a result, a state will lose the element of surprise when striking the opponent. The change of a successful attack decreases, so a state will resort to a peaceful solution. The opposing democracy is informed of the other state's peaceful intentions and will engage in a peaceful resolution as well. Therefore, both democracies are encouraged to resort conflict in a peaceful manner (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992).

On the other hand, the interaction game would explain the increased chance of conflict between autocracies and democracies. Although democracies are less likely to go to war because the political leaders are accountable, a military defeat is more costly than being accountable. Since a democracy is

transparent and is aware that this is a strategic disadvantage, a pre-emptive attack on a autocracy is a mean to secure victory. However, this theory has not been proven empirically (Russett & Oneal, 2001). The structural institutions of a democracy as explained above, create constraints to use force. The theory describes that war is socially unacceptable from a cultural perspective (Gartzke, 2007: 1 68). This line of reasoning is in line with the socialisation process , since it would mean that a common identity is shared between democracies.

There is a vast amount of empirical research on democracy and conflict. Gartzke (2007) summarises most of the literature and concludes that the general consensus is that democracy does reduce conflict. This has made other streams within IR to come up with other causal explanations by expanding the structural and cultural explanation described above to explain the democratic peace. Rationalist argue that the democratic institutions do not only constraint the use of force, but the institutions are efficient tools for bargaining. Lipson (2005) concludes that democracies are more reliable partner than non-democracies because they are transparent. The efficient institutions that make democracies reliable partner will increase the costs of war.

Constructivist go even further by arguing that democracies will form a democratic security community because of their democratic identity (William, 2001). According to Owen (1997), democratic states will not only share the same democratic institutions, but will also share a common identity. This is in line with the socialisation process by Deutsch et. al (1957) and Wendt (1999). Economic competition is argued to be an important driver of socialisation (Snyder, 2012). As a consequence, it has been argued that democracies will form a large democratic (voting) bloc against the non-democracies (Owen, 2003). Important to note here is that research in this field is on a systemic level, not at a dyad level.

4.2.2 The Democratic tradition: what to expect?

It is clear from theory and mainly the empirical research in the Literature Review chapter that democracy will have an effect on state preferences. The theory describes from a cultural point of view that citizens oppose any sort of conflict. Due to the structure of a democracy, political leaders can lose power and will try to avoid conflict. Finally, the empirical research has shown that democracy is found to an important factor that influences state behaviour in the UNGA and in regards to conflict research. All in all, the following hypothesis is stated:

H$_2$: State's preferences converge when democracy increases

5. Research Design

5.1 Research method and case selection

The preferred level of analysis is dyadic year, because the causality of theory explained in the former chapter is on a bilateral basis. The concept of economic interdependence is also based on trade between two states. More specifically, the political relevant dyads are used for analysis, since including all country dyads may lead to a biased result.

Politically relevant dyads are often used in research on conflict (Russett & Oneal, 2001). Politically relevant dyads include at least one major power and states that are contiguous[21]. The main reason for using politically relevant dyads in the conflict literature is to exclude dyads that have no probability to engage in conflict (Benson, 2005). This reasoning could also be applied to the concept of trade, since some dyads have negligible economies ties. Furthermore, voting in the UNGA is mostly on the basis of consensus in regards to a 'yes' vote. (Smith, 2006). As a result, country dyads that have hardly any economic relationship could vote the same on different issues and therefore have a low ideal point score. Including these dyads may lead to a biased result, since the economic interdependence could have no effect or the effect could be underestimated. The significance of democracy is not different when using politically relevant dyads or not (Lemke & Reed, 2001). The research population, in this case the political relevant dyads, are operationalised as two groups that are combined. First, are the permanent members of the of the UNSC. The second group are the rest of the G20[22] countries that meet the contiguity criteria.

The socialisation process described in the Theoretical Framework chapter is a process that evolves over a long time span. Therefore, it is necessary to measure the effect of economic interdependence over multiple time points. In addition, to answer the hypothesis it is important to compare as many different dyads as possible. The preferred research method is a time series cross sectional analysis (TSCS). By using a TSCS it is possible to account for the fact that variables or cases are related to each other. For example, the time series dimension account for the fact that the economic interdependent of year 1 is correlated with the economic interdependence of year 2. The cross sectional design makes it possible to compare time different units, so it is possible to test a theory on a population.

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[21] Contiguous means touching borders and states separated by 400 miles or less of open water (Correlate of War Project. *Direct Contiguity Data 1816-2006.* Version 3.1.
[22] See Appendix C for G20 countries

On the flip side, multicollinearity is a particular problem in TSCS (Field, 2009). n case of multicollinearity, one of the independent variables in the regression is linearly related to one or more independent variables to some degree. If multicollinearity increases, the standard errors increase. In turn, this will affect significance testing. In other words, variables are insignificant, but are significant when multicollinearity is absent.

To deal with multicollinearity or prevent it there are some practical solutions. To prevent multicollinearity a large sample may be a solution (Berry & Feldman, 1985). This thesis uses a large sample. A comforting fact is that multicollinearity can cause a problem in multilevel modelling when data is hierarchic. In this thesis, there is no hierarchical data. Another simple solution is to remove a variable. However, in case of removing economic interdependence or democracy it would be unwise, because both are the main focus of the thesis. Finally, if multicollinearity has been detected one might just 'live with its consequences'(Berry & Feldman, 1985 : 49).

Since I'm only able to use SPSS for analysis , the best possible option is to construct a repeated-measures multilevel model. By using this method, a regression analysis with multiple dyads over a long time span is constructed and used to answer the hypothesises. Furthermore, the time period used for analysis is 1989 till 2006. First, scientific literature has shown that the post-Cold War era has changed voting behaviour significantly (Voeten, 2000 ; Kim & Russet, 1996). Second, a large data set is preferred. The time span is chosen according to available data.

5.2 Dependent variable: Ideal point differences

The dependent variable state preferences is operationalised as ideal point distance score in voting patterns between members of the UNGA. Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2015) recorded voting behaviour on resolutions in the UNGA from 1996 till 2012 to estimate ideal-points along a single dimension for each member. These ideal points represent state preferences. First, they calculate the ideal points for each year of a state and then compare this ideal point with another ideal point to calculate the ideal point distance, thereby creating dyadic-year ideal point distances. The lower the ideal point distance score, the more states vote in line with each other.

The advantage of this data set is that it accounts for agenda change in the UNGA. (Bailey et al, 2015). The agenda change is not accounted for in data sets that uses S scores to measure state preferences. Some of the UN resolutions in the UNGA occur when crisis are present. During these crisis states could

vote very differently compared to other resolutions. Since this thesis is interested in time series effects of economic interdependence and democracy, using a data set that includes these 'crisis resolutions' could result in a biased outcome. To account for the agenda change caused by crisis, Bailey et al. (2015) look at resolutions that were identical over time to bridge observations. They identified identical resolutions votes by downloading all the PFD files on adopted resolutions. Next, the researchers used plagiarism software to detect similarities or changes. They constructed a model to calculated an ideal point for each member state. The effect of the democracy and economic interdependence is measured by reflecting on the ideal point score. If the ideal point score decreases, state preferences converge.

5.3 Independent variables

Economic interdependence

The operationalisation of economic interdependence is calculated on the basis of bilateral trade data and GDP. The trade data is obtained from the Correlates of War project (COW) (Barbieri & Keshk, 2012). To measure interdependence, the dependence of trade of one country is calculated by the import and export divided by the country's GDP. This formula strongly correlates with the technique used by Russett & Oneal (2001) when lowest score of interdependence is used. Moreover , the formula below is preferred by Hegre (2003) over the formula used by Russett & Oneal (2001). In conclusion, the more common formula of economic interdependence is used (Barbieri, 1996 ; Hegre et al. , 2010 ;Benson, 2005).

$$\textbf{\textit{Economic interdependence}} = \sqrt{\frac{Imports\ ij + Exports\ ij}{GDPi} \times \frac{Imports\ ij + Exports\ ij}{GDPj}}$$

Joint Democracy

The degree of democracy is retrieved from the Polity IV data (Marshall., Gurr & Jaggers ,2014). This data set is commonly used in IR dyadic research. The variable democracy is constructed with a 10 point scale. The higher the score, the more democratic a country is. The variable democracy is calculated by a number of sub variables that all have their own weight. This same procedure is used to construct autocracy with other sub variables. The Polity IV data sets contains a variable called 'Polity2'. This

variable consist of an average score on a ten point scale of both democracy and autocracy combined. In this case 10 is considered very democratic and 0 strongly autocratic. Furthermore, the Polity2 variable is constructed with time series in mind. Events such as interruption or transition have been taken into account. Both Polity 2 scores are added to construct the joint democracy score:

$$Joint\ Democracy = Polity2i\ + Polity2j$$

5.4 Control Variables

National Capability

A state's ability to effect the UN is dependent on its relative power in the international system (Smith, 2006). Obvisouly this is a realist perspective in which it is argued that states use the UN as a tool to pursue their own interests. The concept of power can have many forms. A state with a lot of military power can make the difference between a successful or failed UN a peace keeping mission by joining the UN operation. On the other hand, states with a lot of financial power have threaten the UN not to pay their contribution. This is an informal way of expressing their views on UN topics and to influence the UN's position (Smith, 2006).

To take the effect of power into account the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) index is used as a control variable. The CINC data is obtained from the COW project and consists of 6 sub variables that measure an overall power score for each state [23] (Singer et al. 2014). The dyadic score is calculated as:

$$National\ Capability = CINCi + CINCj$$

Dyad Size

In peace and conflict research is has been show that trade is correlated with the size of the domestic economy. The bigger the economy, the more likely a country will be to trade (Barbieri, 1996 ;Voeten, 2000 ; Benson, 2005).

$$Dyad\ size: GDPi + GDPj$$

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[23] Total population of country ratio , Urban population of country ratio, Iron and steel production of country ratio, Primary energy consumption ratio, Military expenditure ratio , Military personnel ratio.

Voting bloc: West vs. Non-West

The most recent research on voting blocs by Voeten (2000) clearly points out that a western voting bloc and a non–western voting bloc are present. The following states are found to be part of the western voting bloc: USA, Canada, UK, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Austria, Malta, Greece, Australia, New Zealand. The West vs. non- West is a dummy variable. When both states are found to be part of the Western voting bloc, the dyad will be valued as 1. All other dyads are valued 0.

5.5 Repeated measures multilevel modelling with SPSS

For a time series analysis the data has to be restructured so that the time intervals are vertically displayed. Most of the data is coded according to the Correlates of War Project. Each country has a unique country code. By using the country codes and the corresponding years, a large data is set up. To align the data properly, each country code and dyad code will be given a unique case number so that the corresponding score can be matched.

The first step is to select the research population mentioned above by using the 'data' and then 'select cases' option. All other dyads will be deleted from the data set. This way no duplicates codes are present. In total there are three unique case number types: 1)ccode2_year, 2)ccode1_year, 3)Dyad_year_code and 4)Dyad_code. These are constructed by using the 'transform' and then compute new variable' 'option. Each concept (year, ccode etc) will be root squared and added to the other concept root squared. For example, ccode2_year= $\sqrt{ccode2}$ +$\sqrt{year}$. To make sure no duplicates are present, the ' identify duplicate cases' under the data tab is used and random samples are compared with the original data set.

The polity 2 variable and the variable 'year' are recoded. The polity2 scores ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy). To make sure no negative values are present, -10 is recoded into 1. The highest value of 10 becomes 22. To account for time series , the variable 'year' is computed into a variable named 'time'. Obviously, time in the real world is a continuous variable. To account for time series in the model, the dyads have to be grouped according to the variable time. This method is also used in conflict research to account for time series and could be seen as making a sort of dummy variable (Beck et al. 1998). The year 1989 is given the value 1, the year 1990 become 2 etc. In total,

there are 18 values for the variable time (1989 till 2006). This way the data is grouped with an observational interval of one year. In other words, the time variable looks at the effects within one year at a time.

For the analysis of the repeated measures multilevel model the 'mixed models' command is used in SPSS 22. When setting up the mixed models, the first step is to choose a covariance structure. According to Fields (2009), the AR1 structure is often used for data with points in time and the diagonal is the default option for repeated measures. When comparing the AIC and BIC scores between an AR1 structure and diagonal structure, the latter reports significant greater values then the AR1 structure (see appendix D). Therefore, the AR1 structure is used. Also necessary at this stage is to identify the subjects and repeated measures.

By selecting the variable 'Dyad code' under subjects and the variable 'time' variable in the repeated measure box, the observations are considered dependent. If both options are left open, the observations are considered independent. The next step is similar the linear regression model: the independent variables and dependent variable are selected. Then the fixed and random variables are activated using the 'fixed' or/and 'random' option. The 'include intercept' box is checked to include a random intercept.

6. Results

The repeated multilevel model is designed with the use of the SPSS 22 statistical software package. To start off, all variables will be included in a fixed model. The next step is to apply a random intercept and /or random slopes to try and increase the level of fit. The descriptive statistics will be described first. Next, the effect of variables will be compared. In the last part the model with the best fit will be selected to answer the hypothesises.

After constructing the fixed model, two other models are found to be valid. The number of cases (N) in all three models is 13.207 , the number of different dyads is 827 and the repeated measure (time) is 18. The descriptive statistics are displayed in table 1. Important to note is that models with a random slope for the variable economic interdependence were found to be not 'valid' or the variance was 'redundant' (the variance of the slopes is 0), according to the SPSS output. Therefore, only 3 models are worth comparing. These are displayed in table 2. In Model 1 all independent variables are fixed. Model 2 contains a random intercept and Model 3 contains both a random intercept and random slope for the variable democracy. The parameters of Model 2 and 3 could be interpret in two ways: They show the difference between dyads and within dyads. The control variables are fixed in all models. At the bottom are different score on criteria that are used to assess the level of fit. These will be explained in detail in the last section. First the descriptive statistics are discussed[24].

6.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 1 shows that the ideal point difference scores ranges between 0 and 4,887. The average ideal point score for a dyad is 1,619. The standard deviation displays the measure of dispersion (Healey, 2012). When the score of 1 standard deviation is taken, it is possible to calculate the range of scores. For example, 1 standard deviation added and subtracted from the ideal point score mean of 1,619 gives a range of 0,509 to 2,729. In turn it means that 68,26% of all score are found within this area. When 2 standard deviation are used, the area gives 95,44 % of all scores.

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[24] The descriptive statistics apply to all 3 models.

Table 1

	Mean	Std.dev	Minimum	Maximum
Independent variable Ideal point difference score	1,619	1,11	0	4,887
Independent variables				
Economic interdependence	0,006	0,013	0	0,181
Democracy	30,42	9,711	2	42
National Capability	0,078	0,063	0,005	0,334
Dyad Size	$2,828^E+12$	$3,34^E+12$	$8,12^E+10$	$1,81^E+13$

N=13.207

In case of the variable economic interdependence, one standard deviation subtracted from the mean will lead to a score below 0, which is not possible considering that the minimum score is 0. This shows that the distribution is strongly skewed to the right. The distribution is positively skewed. In other words, lots of observations with a score of 0 are clustered on the left side of the distribution and a few high values are found on the right side. The same goes for the variables national capability and dyad size. On the other hand, the variable democracy is negatively skewed or skewed to the left, since 2 standard deviations added to the mean exceeds the maximum score of 42. A lot of high values are centred in the right side of the distribution and a few scores are found on the left side.

One of the rare cases were the ideal point difference score is 0 and state preferences are identical, is the Germany-The Netherlands dyad in 2001. This dyad-year score has also the highest possible score on democracy and the economic interdependence value is 0,849, which is located on the far right in the distribution curve of economic interdependence. The dyad is also part of the Western voting bloc and the other control variables exceed their mean. On the other hand, when the ideal point difference has the maximum value of 4,887 it represent the dyad US- Cuba (1996). No surprise there, since both are arch enemies at the time. The economic interdependence sore is 0 and democratic score is 25, where the US scores 21 and Cuba 4.

6.2 Three different models

Looking at table 2, Economic interdependence has a negative effect on the dependent variable ideal point differences in all models. This is in line with the theoretical expectation. When economic interdependence increases with one standard deviation, the ideal point score decreases with 1,272 in Model 1. In turn it means that state preferences converge. In Model 1 economic interdependence is only significant at a confidence level of 90%. When the democracy variable is been given a random slope in Model 3, the variable economic interdependence is not significant anymore. This relationship between democracy and economic interdependence could be explained by the fact that democratic states tend to trade more with one another (Russett & Oneal, 2001). In other words, a relationship between democracy and economic interdependence is expected.

Table 2

	Model 1 All fixed effects	Model 2 Random intercept	Model 3 Random intercept + random slope Democracy
Intercept	1,737	1,746	1,830
Economic Interdependence	-1,272+	-1,252+	-0,878
Democracy	-0,008***	-0,008***	-,0097***
National Capability	-0,742*	-0,583	-0,763+
Dyad Size	0***	0***	0***
West vs Non-West (dummy)	-0,753***	-0,739***	-0,710***
AIC	-3069,463	-3000,536	-3157,622
CAIC	-3001,555	-2975,072	-3123,670
BIC	-3009,555	-2978,072	-3127,670
Dyads	**827**	**827**	**827**

*+ p<0,1 ; *p<0,05; *** P<0,001*

The results regarding economic interdependence are difficult to compare with other articles because no other recent research paper has used this variable in UNGA research. When comparing the results with Russett and Oneal (2001), this thesis also argues that economic interdependence is found to cause state preferences to converge after the Cold War period in a larger research population. Voeten(2000) and

Kim and Russett (1996) use the concept of trade to explain voting patterns, but only use trade concerning the US. Dreher and Sturm (2012) extend the population by including G7 countries and use both import and export values. They state that interdependence does have an effect. A critical note here is that import and export figures are not the same as the concept of economic interdependence. All in all, this paper reinforces the fact that interdependence has a converging effect on state preferences in a more diverse population.

Democracy remains significant at all confidence levels. From the theoretical framework it became clear that democracy was found to have an effect in earlier research mentioned in the Theoretical Framework chapter. In this paper the same result is found. The strongest effect of democracy is found in Model 3, when democracy has a random slope. In this case it means that when democracy increases with one standard deviation, the ideal point score drops with 0,0097. The variance of the slope is positive with a value of 0,0002. This means that when the intercept increases, the slope of democracy increases as well. The variance score of 0,0002 is low and this is reflected in the difference on the score of democracy in Model 2 and 3. The value of democracy increased slightly in Model 3 from 0,008 to 0,0097. Surprisingly enough, the value of -0,008 found in this paper is very close to the result found in Dreher et al. (2008) and Dreher and Sturm (2012). Comparing the results with the former mentioned papers is difficult, because the methods and dependent variables are different. For example, this paper used dyads as the unit of analysis. However, we can compare the research population. Dreher and Sturm (2012) use the G7 countries for analysis whereas this paper uses the G20 with contiguity criteria and the permanent members. Expanding the research population seems to have no effect for the significance of democracy. This paper confirms that democracy also has an effect in a wider research population when using dyads for analysis.

National capability also has a negative relationship with the dependent variable. Dyads with higher scores on national capability have converging state preferences. Again it could be argued that democratic states are usually states with a high score on national capability. It is surprising that the effect is stronger than democracy. On the other hand , the significance of national capability fluctuates strong: in Model 1 it is significant at a 0,05 level, in Model 2 it is insignificant and in Model 3 it is found to be significant at a 0,01 level.
The fluctuation of significance regarding national capability is also found when comparing other research articles. In 2008, Dreher et al. found that national capability was insignificant. However,

Dreher and Sturm (2012) found that national capability is significant and conclude that when national capability increases, the voting coherence decreases. In contrast, if national capability is found to be significant in this paper, it has the opposite effect: higher national capability leads to converging state preferences. The difference might be explained by a difference in research population. By including less powerful states in dyad analysis, the level of national capability could be on average lower than in Dreher and Sturm (2012).

The fact that GDP was found to be insignificant and has no effect is also surprising. Multicollinearity might but be present and an attempt was made to see if GDP would have an effect when the variable national capability was removed from the model[25]. The reason for multicollinearity could be reasoned by assuming that a dyad with a higher GDP value, has also more resources to obtain more national capabilities. However, when the national capability variable is removed from the model, the effect of variable dyad size remains 0 and significant. Other research articles used GDP per capita and GDP growth (Potrafke, 2009; Dreher & Strum 2012 ; Dreher & Jensen, 2013). The effect and significance of GDP per capita and GDP growth varies a lot across these papers and the effect is modest compared to other variables. The effect of GDP remains unclear, but this paper argues that it has no effect on state preferences.

Finally, The dummy variable West vs. non-West confirms that bloc voting between western states is present in all models at a confidence level of 0,05. This is the expected because the research on UN voting by Voeten (2000) has concluded that a western voting bloc exists.

6.3 Assessing level of fit and answering the hypothesises

To answer the hypotheses from the theoretical framework chapter, the best fitting model will be selected first. To compare the models the Akaike's information Criterion (AIC), the Bozdogan's criterion (CAIC) or the Schwarz's Bayesian criterion (BIC) could be used (Field, 2009). A lower level is considered a better fit (Field, 2009). All scores are presented in table 2. Comparing all three criteria it is clear that Model 3 is the best fitting model. The last step is to select the alpha level. Since the sample is very large compared to the population, the alpha level of 0,1 satisfies to answer the hypothesises.

When Model 3 is used to answer the hypothesises, both are accepted. An increase of economic interdependence and democracy will lead to converging state preferences in the UNGA. If economic

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[25] See Appendix D

interdependence increase by one standard deviation, the ideal score decreases with 1,252 between the dyads and within the dyads. In case of democracy the ideal score decreases with 0,008. The model clearly shows a negative relationship with the ideal point difference score. A lower score on the dependent variable means converging state preferences. The effect of economic interdependence is stronger compared to the effect of democracy.

7. Discussion

One of the most difficult questions in this paper is to assess the effect between democracy and economic interdependence. The main reason for not answering this question is that the effect is on a different level and that the research method of multilevel modelling is sensitive to multicollinearity (Field, 2009). First off, if democracy and economic interdependence influence each other, they should not be studied at the dyad level, but at state level (Russett & Oneal, 2001). In theory, it is possible that democracy will lead to more prosperity and more trade, thereby positively influencing economic interdependence. It has been recorded that democratic states tend to trade more with one another (Russett & Oneal, 2001). Second, the presence of multicollinearity could not be determined in this paper. The main reason is that the researcher (me) does not have the statistical skills and know-how to track down multicollinearity in multilevel modelling. Moreover, according to Field (2009) there is no tool available to detect multicollinearity with SPSS with multilevel modelling. Looking at the results and in particular Model 3, it seems that when the effect of economic interdependence decreases, democracy gains more influence. This could be a sign of multicollinearity. Then again, in conflict research it has often been argued that the interaction between democracy and economic interdependence will not lead to a biased result when measuring the effect on the dependent variable (Russett & Oneal, 2001 ; Hegre et al. ,2010).

SPSS is severely limited when it is used for time series cross section analysis or multilevel modelling (Field, 2009). Most researchers use the statistical software packages of R or STATA. The method used in this thesis was very much dependent on the options available in SPSS. Using SPSS for this thesis was a real challenge.

Testing the repeated multilevel model for different assumption is not possible in SPSS . This has been explained in detail in Appendix D. Next, it has to be noted that the dependent variable was not lagged, which is often done in conflict and UNGA research. It is argued that the effect of the independent variable does not influence the dependent variable in the same year. Therefore, the dependent variable is lagged. SPSS has a function available to lag variables, but it merely 'pushes' the variables down by a chosen factor. The problem is that the ideal point score of 2006, becomes the ideal point score of 1989 for the dyad that is next in line. Lagging the ideal point difference score was not possible.

8. Conclusion

This chapter starts off by discussing the validity and reliability. Next, variables that influence the UNGA are presented that could benefit future research. Finally, a general conclusion will sum up the findings of this thesis.

8.1 Validity and Reliability

The validity of this thesis requires some special attention since the concepts are abstract and can be interpreted in many ways. It is not uncommon that a lot of valuable information is lost in quantitative analysis. In regards to the dependent variable, only the visible state preferences have been observed in UNGA votes (Bailey et al. , 2015). Therefore, it could be argued that not all state preferences are include in the ideal point difference score, so that actual state preferences are not accounted for. Nevertheless, Bailey et. al (2015) address the concept of face validity in detail by comparing the ideal point scores with other measurements in UNGA research. They conclude that the ideal point scores are more valid than other measurements. For example, with the use of S scores the US and USSR have preferences that are more in common before the Cold War, instead of after the Cold War. This thesis used the most valid data set on state preferences in the UNGA.

The concept of economic interdependence has been operationalised according to the classic way in conflict research by looking at trade flows and GDP between countries. However, economic interdependence could be interpreted in many other ways (Cooper, 1985). Some countries do not have big trade flows compared to other countries, but are interdependent nonetheless. For example, states that consume a lot of oil are highly dependent on oil exporting countries. The type of goods could determine the level of economic interdependence. In other words, the content validity of economic interdependence is low.

The content validity problem is also present with the concept of democracy. The polity data set (IV) measures democracy on a 10 point scale using different variables and sub variables (Marshall., Gurr & Jaggers, 2014). The main variables for measuring democracy are 1) the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective constraints on executive power, 2) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive and 3) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives in acts of political participation. For example, the actual level of political participation is not included in this conceptualisation. It could be argued that the score

is biased towards Western countries since these states receive the highest score on democracy. This problem is also recognised by the researchers themselves: "Every country in Western Europe and North America, for example, received the highest score—a perfect ten—on the Polity IV Democracy Index. The problem is we need to compare the quality of democracy within Western countries, not whether it exists"(Marshall., Gurr & Jaggers , 2014: 15)

The reliability of this thesis is strong. The sample of dyads is large compared to the population. The only reason why the whole population is not used for analysis is because the data is not available for certain states. Furthermore, the data is publicly available so there are no financial barriers to replicate this study.

8.2 Recommendations for future research

It is recommended that other variables which were found to have an effect on voting behaviour should be added to the models in this thesis to create a more comprehensive model and increase validity. GNP per capita was found to have a positive effect on voting coherence in the UNGA (Kim & Russett, 1996 ; Voeten, 2000). Unfortunately, there was no data set available of GNP that would allow for the population size used in this thesis.

Voeten (2000) argues that voting blocs in the UNGA could be found when using the different cultures from 'clashes of civilizations' by Huntington (1996). The cultures are categorized according to the map made by Huntington (1996). It is not sure if this map still represents today's world. Furthermore, it is difficult to categorize a country according to the dominant religion. This way, other religions and the ratio between them are not taken into account.

An important variable in recent UNGA research is the effect of aid (Dreher & Strum 2012 ; Dreher & Jensen,2013 ; Carter & Stone,2015). It is argued that the US buys votes through the use of aid commitments. I would have like to have done a replication study of Dreher and Sturm (2012) by adding the variable economic interdependence to their model, but there was not enough time. The variable political colour for OECD countries should be included in future research since it was found to have an effect (Potrafke, 2009 ; Carter & Stone, 2015). Political colour figures are not available for non OECD countries. Finally, the literature review showed that regional organisation seems to vote more and more coherent. This also should be accounted for in future research.

Two other factors that have not been researched in regards to state preferences in the UNGA are agent error and the influence of NGO's. Carter and Stone (2015) describe agent error as a miss match between a diplomat actions and state preferences. It could be unintentional, because the diplomat is not informed or intentional when the diplomat decides to use it discretion to pursue its own agenda. According to Kennedy (2006), NGO's intensively lobby UNGA members and permanent missions. So far there is no statistical research done on how this form of influence could be measured and how it influences state preferences in the UNGA.

8.3 Concluding remarks

This thesis started by explaining why the UNGA matters. It has created a number of UN organisations that influenced world politics, for example in the area of human rights issues. The UNGA is a platform where developing countries pressed other states to acknowledge their interests and have accomplished this goal to some degree. Furthermore, the UNGA is also the largest organisation where most of the world states are represented so that issues can be resolved. Scholars examine the UNGA to measure the state of world politics and preferences of the present and the past. The Literature review chapter made clear that UNGA research could be divided among three groups of researchers. A group researching voting blocs, one interested in aid commitment and US influences and a group interesting in regional organisations. The effect of economic interdependence the Liberal Peace theory as a whole was not taken into account.

The liberal peace consist of the economic tradition and democratic tradition. Economic interdependence is a part of the economic tradition and its effect is explained by commercial liberalism and the process of socialisation. Commercial liberalism argues that actors within a state pursue economic gains out of self-interest. Increasing trade relations with another state is a way to safely pursue these economic gains. Economic interdependence is created when trade increases between states. As a consequence, the opportunity costs of war increase and states will become more benign. Trade does not only create mutual gains, it also starts the process of socialisation. The socialisation process is a constructivist line of argument were states begin to influence each other ideas. Eventually state preferences on different policy fields converge. The democratic tradition explains why democratic elected leaders are peaceful to try and secure re-election. Furthermore, the democratic institutional model constraints the use of force

and the citizens are more likely to favour cooperation than conflict. The theory also uses a socialisation perspective to explain why state's preferences will converge.

The best fitting model is a repeated multilevel model with a random intercept. Economic interdependence and democracy are both significant and positively influence the convergence of state preferences in the UNGA. More specifically, economic interdependence has a stronger effect on state preferences than democracy. The realist arguments were found not to be valid. The results however should be interpreted with caution, since multicollinearity could be present. To improve this research other variables should be added to the model. The reliability is strong, while the content validity is questionable. However, data sets used in this thesis have been used in high quality research. This way I have tried to obtain a high level of face validity.

From a scientific perspective this thesis has shown that the Liberal Peace theory is not only applicable to conflict research, but also to state preferences in the UNGA. The economic tradition of economic interdependence should not be overlooked. Another way of contributing to scientific literature is that the theory of commercial liberal and the socialisation process of the constructivist stream are combined into one and this effect is confirmed by empirical data. At the same time the realist theory has not been confirmed in the results found here. This should be seen as optimistic for the future, since realists predict nothing other than global chaos.

From a more practical perspective it is clear that trade relationships between states can cause more than just prosperity. Therefore, it is worth to acknowledge the importance of trade relationships and recognise that these are also valuable for cooperation in other policy fields. I hope this thesis could be seen as evidence to make sure that international institutions and trade agreements remains high on the political agenda, despite a lot of criticism where it is argued that trade should be less important in world politics or is used as political tool for domination.

Appendix A: UN Charter Chapter IV: The General Assembly

Article 9
The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.
Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 10
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11
The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

1. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.
2. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.
3. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

Article 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 13

1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:
   a. promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;
   b. promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
   c. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1 (b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

Article 14

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.
2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

Article 16

The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international trusteeship system as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the approval of the trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic.

Article 17

1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.
3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.

VOTING

Article 18

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.
3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Article 19

A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the

amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

PROCEDURE

Article 20

The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

Article 21

The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for each session.

Article 22

The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

# Appendix B Caucusing groups UNGA, Kim & Russett 1996: 646

3

Albania	Kyrgyzstan
Armenia	Latvia
Azerbaijan	Lithuania
Belarus	Moldova
Bosnia and	Poland
Herzegovina	Russian
Bulgaria	Federation
Croatia	Slovak Republic
Czech Republic	Slovenia
Estonia	Tajikistan
Georgia	Turkmenistan
Hungary	Ukraine
Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan

1

Romania

Yugoslavia

2

Antigua and Barbuda	Haiti
Argentina	Honduras
Brazil	Mexico
Costa Rica	Paraguay
Dominica	St. Kitts and Nevis
Dominican Republic	St. Vincent
El Salvador	Uruguay

4

Bahamas	Ecuador	Peru
Barbados	Grenada	St. Lucia
Belize	Guatemala	Suriname
Bolivia	Guyana	Trinidad and
Chile	Jamaica	Tobago
Colombia	Nicaragua	Venezuela
Cuba	Panama	

Legend

1 = Group of 77
2 = Latin America and Caribbean group
3 = East European group (including all former Soviet republics)
4 = Nonaligned movement
5 = African group
6 = Islamic conference
7 = Arab group
8 = Asian group
9 = Western Europe and other states
10 = European Community
11 = Nordic group

5

Angola	Equatorial	Madagascar	Seychelles
Benin	Guinea	Malawi	Swaziland
Botswana	Ethiopia	Mauritius	Tanzania
Burundi	Ghana	Mozambique	Togo
Cape Verde	Ivory Coast	Namibia	Zaire
Central African	Kenya	Nigeria	Zambia
Republic	Lesotho	Rwanda	Zimbabwe
Congo	Liberia	Sao Tome	

6

Burkina Faso	Guinea Bissau
Cameroon	Mali
Chad	Niger
Comoros	Senegal
Gabon	Sierra Leone
Gambia	Uganda
Guinea	

7

Algeria	Morocco
Djibouti	Somalia
Egypt	Sudan
Libya	Tunisia
Mauritania	

8

China
Japan

Bangladesh	Malaysia
Brunei	Maldives
Indonesia	Pakistan
Iran	

Bahrain	Qatar
Iraq	Saudi Arabia
Jordan	Syria
Kuwait	United Arab
Lebanon	Emirates
Oman	Yemen

Turkey

9

Australia
Austria
Canada
Liechtenstein
New Zealand
San Marino

Afghanistan	Mongolia
Bhutan	Nepal
Cambodia	Papua New Guinea
Cyprus	Singapore
India	Sri Lanka
Korea, D.R.	Vanuatu
Laos	Vietnam

Fiji
Korea, Republic of
Marshall Islands
Micronesia
Myanmar
Philippines
Samoa
Solomons
Thailand

Malta

10

Belgium	Netherlands
France	Luxembourg
Germany	Portugal
Greece	Spain
Ireland	United Kingdom
Italy	

11

Denmark

Finland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden

Member of no group:
Israel
South Africa
United States

FIGURE 5. *Overlapping caucusing groups in the United Nations as of January 1993*

Appendix C: G20 countries[26]

Argentina
Australia
Brazil
Canada
China
France
Germany
India
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Russia
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
South Korea
Turkey
UK
US

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[26] There are 19 countries in the G20. The EU is also represented.

Appendix D: Testing model assumptions

The assumptions of a linear regression model are also applicable to a multilevel model (Field, 2009). This appendix will try to address the assumptions if possible, in a step by step manner. Furthermore, the tests will be conducted with a model where all variables are fixed, since this is recommended (Field, 2009). The first step however is to look if coefficients are normally distributed. Next, a covariance structure has to be selected.

To find out if the variables are normally distributed, the residuals could be used for analysis (Field, 2009). The theory states that if the regression is normally distributed, the residuals are as well. The other way around it means that if residuals are not normally distributed, the coefficients aren't either. Residuals are the difference between the estimated regression line and the value of an actual observation. The mean of the residuals is 0 for this model. A way to test the normality of residuals in SPSS is to run a normal probability plot by using standardized residuals. This means that residuals scores are converted to Z scores , so that the mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1. The probability plot is displayed in figure 1.


Figure 1

To see if the residuals are normally distributed, the dark line and thin line in the graph need to be compared. The thick dark line is made up by all the residuals. The closer the dark black line is to the thin line, the more likely the residuals are normally distributed. Between 0,2 and 0,4 on the x-axis and between 0,6 and 0,8, the dark line slightly deviates from the thin line, but generally speaking the dark line is fowling the thin line. All in all, there is no severe deviation present. Therefore, it is to be concluded that the residuals are normally distributed.

In figure 2 the actual values and predicted value are plotted in a scatter gram. If the predicted values would be perfectly matched with the actual values, a straight linear line would be visible. Often a scatter gram is used to spot outliers. However, because the scores are not independent from one another, it is not possible to treat a single case on its own, because its value belongs to a particular dyad with multiple values. Therefore, any outliers have not been removed from the data set.


Figure 2

After testing the normality, a covariance structure has to be chosen. The diagonal structure is the standard option for repeated measures and the AR1 structure is used for data measured over time (Field, 2009). Table 3 compares both variance structures. For comparison the AIC, CAIC and BIC are used. Both models can be compared since the same number of variables are included. A lower value is considered to be a better fit. When comparing all three measurements it is clear that the AR1 structure reports lower values. Therefore, the AR1 structure is used for analysis.

Table 3 covariance structures

	Model 1 Fixed effects AR1	Model 2 Fixed effects Diagonal
Intercept	1,737	1,825
Economic Interdependence	-1,272+	-11,625***
Democracy	-0,008***	0,012***
National Capability	-0,742*	-5,856***
Dyad Size	0***	0***
West vs Non-West (dummy)	-0,753***	-0,903***
AIC	-3069,463	32709,386
CAIC	-3001,555	32961,110
BIC	-3009,555	32937,110
Dyads	827	827

*+ p<0,1 ; *p<0,05; *** P<0,001*

The next step is to determine if a specification error is present. This means that the wrong model has been used by using irrelevant variables or excluding relevant variables (Berry & Feldman, 1985). The Literature Review chapter has theoretical explored which variables are relevant, this part only uses a statistical perspective and looks if an irrelevant variable is present in the model. In case a irrelevant variable is included, there is a possibility the variable may correlate. When a specification error is present due to an irrelevant variable, it affects efficiency, but not the significance of the relevant variables. This means when an independent irrelevant variable is present, the standard errors increases of independent relevant variable(s). Another way of detecting an irrelevant variable is looking at the

coefficient of the slopes. If the slope is 0 and significant, the variable could be irrelevant. The standard errors are presented between brackets in table 4.

Table 4

	Model 1	Model 1 (excluding national capability)	Model 1 (excluding dyad size)
Independent variable			
Ideal point difference score	1,737 [0,052]	1,689 [0,05]	1,8 [0,056]
Independent variables			
Economic interdependence	-1,272+ [0,659]	-1,31+ [0,659]	-0,8 [0,66]
Democracy	-,008*** [0,001]	-,008*** [0,001]	-,007*** [0,001]
National Capability	-0,742* [0,374]	-	0,616+ [0,371]
Dyad Size	0*** [0]	0*** [0]	-
West vs. Non-West (dummy)	-0,753*** [-,154]	-0,74*** [0,155]	-0,62*** [0,173]

*+ p<0,1 ; *p<0,05; *** P<0,001*

When looking at table 4, it is clear that the standard errors do not change dramatically when one of the interval ratio control variables is removed. In case dyad size is removed, the standard errors for economic interdependence increase by 0,01 and the standard error of national capability decreases with 0,003. These results do not provide clear evidence that removing a variable improves efficiency. On the other hand, the slope of the variable dyad size is 0 and significant.

In conclusion, the variable dyad size does not seem correlate due to a speciation error since the standard errors did not increase when one of the interval ratio control variables is left out. Furthermore, from a statistical point of view, dyad size is irrelevant since its slope is 0. However, following the advice from Berry and Feldman (1985) on dealing with an irrelevant variable, the variable dyad size is taken

into account because from a theoretical point of view it was expected to have an effect. Since it does not have an effect, it is still worth comparing and discussing it (see Results chapter).

The second assumption of measurement error consists of random and non-random error (Berry & Feldman, 1985). The concept of non-random error concerns the validity issue, which is discussed in the Conclusion chapter. Non-random error involves that random error(s) is found in data sets that are used for regression analysis. The best way to deal with non-random error is before a model is built up (Berry & Feldman, 1985). All that can said is that reliable data sets have been used since these data sets are cited in high quality scientific articles. Therefore, it is expected that the non-random error is reduced as much as possible.

Multilevel modelling is vulnerable to multicollinearity (Field, 2009). As mentioned before, a large data set is used and the data is non-hierarchical, which both reduce the risk of multicollinearity. Furthermore, a covariance matrix is not applicable, because it does not take into account that some values are dependent since they belong to the same dyad. Moreover, the variable time is not accounted for in the matrix. Unfortunately, there is no option available in SPSS to track down multicollinearity. One manual option remains left; removing one of the interval variable to see if this affects significance testing. The results are also shown in table 4.

When removing the variable national capability, the p values do not change. If the variable dyad size is removed, the angle of slope for economic interdependence decreases and become insignificant. National capability become only significant at a 0,1 level. In this case there might be a correlation, but the variable dyad size does not seem suppress to the p value of another variable. It is very unlikely that perfect collinearity is present, because no other variable has become significant. In this case, model 1 is still preferred.

Unfortunately ,there are no other options available in SPSS to test for other model assumptions, such as linearity. The main problem is that the scores are dependent because they belong to a particular dyad and they are related over time. SPSS is not capable to take these two consideration into account. However, it has been argued that a large sample size will decrease the risk of biasness (Field, 2009).

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