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Master Thesis History of Society
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Policy through Pressure?

The Dutch Stance towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967-1974.



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Preface

This research came about through my participation in the Master Program History of Society: Global History and International Relations at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. My interest in Dutch-American relations in the twentieth century, and in Western intervention in conflicts in the non-Western world triggered me to choose this topic for my Master thesis. Moreover, the possibility to combine my master thesis with a research internship at the Roosevelt Study Center really appealed to me.

I would like to thank everyone who helped me during my research, particularly my thesis supervisor Ferry de Goey. Furthermore, I would like to give a special thanks to the people from the Roosevelt Study Center, in particular Dario Fazzi, for assisting me during my internship and giving me useful feedback on my thesis. I would also like to thank Ronny Naftaniel and Jan Pronk, who were willing to give an interview on the topic.

Paula de Vlas

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List of Abbreviations

AIPAC = American Israel Public Affairs Committee

BP = British Petroleum

EC = European Community

NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OPEC = Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PLO = Palestinian Liberation Organization

UAR = United Arab Republic

UN = United Nations

UNEF = United Nations Emergency Force

UNSCOP = United Nations Special Committee On Palestine

1. Introduction

For centuries there have been tensions between different religious groups in the Middle East. When the British proclaimed the Balfour Declaration in 1917 the Zionist's wish was met, because the British promised them their own state in Palestine.¹ At the same time the Balfour Declaration ensured the civil and religious rights of the Palestinians. After the First World War in Palestine, Zionists wanted to create a Jewish state, and Palestinians wanted to regain their independence. From the 1930s an increasing number of Jewish settlers immigrated to Palestine. This set the stage for conflict between the fledgling Jewish and Arab nations.² Already a substantial number of Arab people lived in Palestine, and the Palestinian Arabs joined their Arab neighbours to oppose the Jewish political entity. They proclaimed their right to self-determination as Palestinians, thereby referring to the Fourteen Points speech of Woodrow Wilson, held on January 9, 1918. After the Second World War, even more Jews immigrated to Palestine. The Arabs resented Zionist aspirations in the area, who continued buying lands and displace farmers who had lived on those lands for generations.³ In 1947 the British announced that they would end their role administrating Palestine as a mandate within one year, and transfer the negotiations about the fate of the region to the United Nations. The United Nations tried to solve the conflict by the partition of Palestine in Jewish and Arab areas. In 1948 a Jewish provisional government proclaimed the state of Israel. The Palestinians were shocked by the partition, and turned to Arab neighbouring states for help. On the other hand, the Zionists were not satisfied either with the extent of their state. Today the conflict between Israel and Palestine is still an ongoing struggle.

Historically the government of the United States saw Israel as a political and economic ally in the Middle East.⁴ This was due to Israel's successful effort to follow the Western democratic tradition. Washington gave almost unconditional support to Israel, especially after the Six Day War of 1967 and the October War of 1973. For the past decades, and especially after the Six Day War, an important feature of U.S. Middle East policy has been its relationship with Israel.⁵ By 1976 Israel was the biggest annual receiver of American foreign aid, most of it

¹ Robert Tignor, Jeremy Adelman, Stephen Aron, Stephen Kotkin, Suzanne Marchand, Gyan Prakash and Michael Tsin, *Worlds Together; Worlds Apart* (New York 2002), 406.

² Tignor, *Worlds*, 406.

³ Tignor, *Worlds*, 406.

⁴ Admin PBS Newshour, 'U.S. Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict': http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/middle_east-jan-june06-us_05-11/ (9-11-2015).

⁵ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, 'The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy', *Middle East Policy* 13:3 (2006), 30.

military hardware.⁶ Since the end of Second World War the U.S. tried to create a ceasefire between the Israeli's and the Palestinians, because it wanted to foster democracy and economic growth in the region, and because the Americans strived to oppose the growing influence of communism in the Middle East.

During the period 1948-1956 the Dutch government adopted a reserved attitude towards Israel, but ever since The Hague gave Israel military support in the Suez Crisis (1956) the Dutch kept on defending Israel. From the Dutch side, the relationship with Israel over the last sixty years has been characterized by five goals: safe and acknowledged borders for the Jewish state Israel; a viable state for the Palestinians; actual support and diplomatic restraint for Israel; avoiding Dutch vulnerability through their role in the European Union; and finally, no clash with the American policy.⁷ Even though the hierarchy of these goals changed over the years, the primary goal remained safe and acknowledged borders for the Jewish state Israel. The Hague wanted to guarantee a viable state for the Palestinians as well, and it acknowledged the right to self-determination of the Palestinians, but according to the Dutch government this should not be at the expense of their primary goal.⁸

In the Netherlands the 1960s can be seen as the heyday of Atlanticism. During the 1960s, the Dutch government was a solid advocate of Atlantic unity and American leadership. The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs (1956-1971) Joseph Luns came to personify Dutch Atlanticism.⁹ The Atlanticist position of the Dutch government in the 1960s was influenced by the tensions of the Cold War. Their loyalty was built upon the assumption that the Netherlands couldn't defend itself against a possible Soviet threat, and was therefore dependent on American military protection.¹⁰ Dutch loyalty to the United States was influenced by the intra-Atlantic political balance as well: with the support of a powerful American protector, the Netherlands, as a small country, could easily resist the tendency of larger Western-European states, like France, to dominate European politics.¹¹ In 1961, the Dutch vice-Secretary of State Hans van Houten argued that the main task of the Dutch government was the maintenance of the national integrity, and that this goal could only be secured by cooperation with the United States in the

⁶ David Reynolds, *America, Empire of Liberty* (London 2010), 504.

⁷ Frederik Grünfeld, 'Zestig jaar Nederland-Israël', *Internationale Spectator* (2008), 680.

⁸ Grünfeld, 'Nederland-Israël', 681.

⁹ Duco A. Hellema, *Buitenlandse politiek van Nederland. De Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek* (Utrecht 2006), 217.

¹⁰ Alfred van Staden, 'De rol van Nederland in het Atlantisch Bondgenootschap. Wat veranderde en wat uiteindelijk bleef', in N.C.F. van Sas (ed.), *De kracht van Nederland. Internationale positie en buitenlands beleid* (Haarlem 1991), 220.

¹¹ Van Staden, 'Het Atlantisch Bondgenootschap', 220.

field of defence.¹² Furthermore, Dutch politicians were influenced by the idea that when small countries participated in alliances, in which big powers participated as well, they could enhance their significance in world politics, for they could become an important interlocutor in international issues and conflicts.¹³ Therefore, in conflicts in the non-Western world, like the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Dutch government followed Washington's point of view.

The early 1970s marked a period of détente in the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union approached each other, in order to control the arms race. Détente between the United States and the Soviet Union made Dutch politicians less convinced of the necessity for military alertness.¹⁴ Dutch criticism on the United States increased, because the U.S. was dealing with various problems, like Watergate, the Vietnam War and the first oil crisis of 1973, which hindered American-European relations. Meanwhile, in the late 1960s and early 1970s Western-Europe became an economic factor of importance, and it started to demand a more serious position in world politics. Washington had always been in favour of European integration, however, at this time it became apparent that a tension arose between on the one hand European cooperation, and on the other Atlantic cooperation.¹⁵ In 1973 the most progressive government in Dutch history, led by social-democratic leader Joop den Uyl, took office.¹⁶ The joint election program of the PvdA, D'66 and PPR, *Keerpunt '72*, pressed for structural changes in the international political and economic system.¹⁷ Historians Alfred van Staden, Alfred Pijpers and Hans Blom argue that during the 1970s the Netherlands took on the position of a critical ally of the United States, while Jérôme Helderling, James Kennedy, Duco Hellema and Jan van der Harst argue that despite the increase in criticism towards the U.S., the Dutch government didn't implement radical changes in foreign policy, and remained Washington's loyal ally.¹⁸

¹² <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, 'Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1960-1961. 38^{ste} vergadering, 24 mei 1961', 329.

¹³ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, 'Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1962-1963. 32^{ste} vergadering, 9 januari 1963', 466.

¹⁴ Kennedy, *Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw*, 77.

¹⁵ Van der Wijngaart, *Bondgenootschap onder spanning*, 48.

¹⁶ Duco A. Hellema, 'The Politics of Asymmetry: The Netherlands and the United States since 1945' in Hans Krabbendam, Cornelis A. van Minnen and Giles Scott-Smith (eds.), *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations, 1609-2009* (New York-Amsterdam 2009), 589.

¹⁷ Duco A. Hellema, *Buitenlandse politiek van Nederland. De Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek* (Utrecht 2006), 270.

¹⁸ Alfred van Staden, *Een trouwe bondgenoot, Nederland en het Atlantisch bondgenootschap (1960-1971)* (Baarn 1974), 220; Alfred E. Pijpers, 'Dekolonisatie, compensatiedrang en de normalisering van de Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek' in N.C.F. van Sas (ed.), *De kracht van Nederland. Internationale positie en buitenlands beleid* (Haarlem 1991), 210-213.; Blom, Hans, 'Jaren van contestatie en continuïteit' Jan Hoffenaar et al. (eds.), *Confrontatie en ontspanning. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de Koude Oorlog 1966-1989* (Den Haag 2004), 13-14.

When we take the developments of the late 1960s and early 1970s into consideration, one would argue that during the October War in 1973, the Netherlands adopted a policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict that was in line with that of its European allies. Instead, the Dutch position was in conflict with that of its European allies, and it was in line with that of the Americans. What explains the Dutch support for Israel during this war? Did Atlanticism really decline during the 1970s? Is it possible that the United States pressured The Hague? In this study, I elaborate on Dutch-American relations in the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1967 and 1974. I look at Atlanticism as the intervening variable in the triangle between the Netherlands, the United States, and Israel. The late 1960s and early 1970s is an important period in the history of Dutch-American relations, for it was a period of reconsideration. For the first time since the establishment of NATO, the Dutch extensively criticized the United States. Therefore it is relevant to research this period. Furthermore, because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an ongoing struggle, it is relevant to do research in Dutch-American relations regarding this conflict.

1.1 Research Question and Sub-Questions

In this research, I focus on the Dutch stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. I research the period between 1967 and 1974. I chose 1967 as the starting point because the 1960s can be marked as the heyday of Dutch Atlanticism, and because the Six Day War took place in 1967. This war was important for Washington's support to Israel as well. I chose 1974 as ending point because in the year 1973 the October War and the subsequent oil crisis took place, and in 1974 the oil embargo was called to an end. During the Six Day War and the October War the United States, as well as the Netherlands, supported Israel. While in the 1960s Dutch-American relations were still strong, based on a shared belief in Atlanticism, by the early 1970s Dutch opinions about Atlanticism and Dutch-American relations changed, and the Dutch government strived for more European integration.¹⁹ However, during the October War The Hague followed American policy, rather than that of its European allies. The Dutch attitude towards the October War and the oil crisis, and their support for Israel, raises questions on their motives to support Israel. Therefore, this research focuses on the Dutch reasons to support Israel in the period

; Jérôme L. Heldring, 'Rhetoric and Reality in Dutch Foreign Policy', *The World Today* 34:10 (1978), 414
; James Kennedy, *Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw. Nederland in de jaren zestig* (Amsterdam 1995), 77; Duco A. Hellema, *Dutch Foreign Policy. The Role of the Netherlands in World Politics* (Dordrecht 2009), 21.; Jan van der Harst, 'Nederland in de ban van Euroscepticism?' in Duco A. Hellema, Mathieu Segers and Jan Rood (eds.), *Bezinning op het buitenland. Het Nederlands buitenlands beleid in een onzekere wereld* (Den Haag 2011), 78.
¹⁹ Erik Sweers, 'Van American Dream tot Atlanticisme': <http://www.historien.nl/van-american-dream-tot-atlanticisme/> (9-12-2015).

1967-1974. Did the Dutch support for Israel derive from their sympathy towards the Jewish state, or was it rather a result of influence exerted by the Americans? My main question is: Why did the Dutch government continued to support Israel between 1967 and 1974? Was this due to American pressure? By “pressure” I mean that the Dutch government was influenced by Washington in supporting Israel (see below: 1.2).

In order to answer my main question, I first elaborate on four sub-questions. To give context to my research, I look into the background and the roots of the conflict in chapter two. For this chapter I formulated the following sub-question: Why and how did the Arab-Israeli conflict evolve? In the next chapter I elaborate on the origins of the bilateral relations between on the one hand the United States and Israel, and on the other the Netherlands and Israel. The sub-question for chapter three is: Why did the Netherlands and the United States develop such a remarkably high amount of support for Israel? As for the Netherlands, I will look into the question whether something changed after 1945 in the Dutch stance towards Jews and the establishment of a Jewish state. In this chapter I will also elaborate on the influence of the Israel Lobby on American foreign policy regarding the Middle East. Thereafter, I move on to the two final chapters, in which I focus on the Six Day War of 1967, and October War and oil crisis of 1973-1974. The structure of these two chapters is similar: first I give an overview of the war. Then I look into Washington’s reaction to the war. Subsequently I elaborate on The Hague’s stance towards the war. Thereafter I make a comparison between the American and Dutch policies, and I look into the question on whether or not Washington pressured The Hague to adopt a certain policy. The sub-question of chapter five is: What was the American and Dutch reaction to the Six Day War of 1967, and did Washington influence The Hague in its policy decisions? The sub-question I formulated for chapter six is: What was the American and Dutch reaction to the October War and oil crisis of 1973-1974, and did Washington influence the Dutch government in its policy decisions?

1.2 Theoretical Concepts

The concepts that play a central role in this research are Atlanticism, political power, and political influence (i.e. pressure). Atlanticism, political power and political influence concern Dutch-American relations. Furthermore, the concepts political power and political influence concern the relations between the United States and Israel, as well as the relations between the Netherlands and Israel.

Atlanticism can be defined as the belief in or support for a close relationship between

Western Europe and the United States, or particularly for NATO.²⁰ Dutch Atlanticism refers to the belief in or support for a close relationship between the Netherlands and the United States through NATO.

In 1957 political scientists Robert A. Dahl defined the concept of political power as a relationship among actors, in which one actor has the power over another actor to the extent that he can get him to do something he would otherwise not do.²¹ Actors can be groups, governments, nation-states, and other human aggregates. Dahl distinguishes the base of power; the means or instruments to exert power; the amount of power; and the scope of power. The base an actor's power consists all resources an actor can exploit in order to effect another actor's behaviour; the means to exert power are often threats or promises to employ the base of power, and this can vary from threatening with a veto, to using charm or charisma; the scope of power involves the reaction of the influenced actor; moreover, the amount of an actor's power can be specified in conjunction with the means and the scope of power.²²

The concept political influence is closely related to the concept political power. Political influence can be defined as the ability to get someone to act, think or feel as one intends.²³ Political influence can be exerted in several ways. Political scientist Edward C. Banfield distinguishes five types of influence: influence that rests on a sense of obligation ('authority'/'respect'); influences that depends on the wish of the influencee to gratify the influencer ('friendship', 'benevolence'); influence that works by improving the logic or the information of the influencee ('rational persuasion'); influence that works by changing the influencee's perception of the behaviour alternatives open to him or his evaluation of them, and which does so otherwise than by rational persuasion ('selling', 'suggestion', 'fraud', 'deception'); and influence that works by changing the behaviour alternatives objectively open to the influencee, thus either absolutely precluding him from adopting an alternative unacceptable to the influencer ('coercion') or inducing him to select as his preferred, or least objectionable, alternative the one chosen for him by the influencer ('positive or negative inducement').²⁴ However, according to Banfield the distinction between these five types of influence are mere analytical, and in practice acts of influence are often a mix of several types.²⁵

This research elaborates on the question whether or not the U.S. government influenced

²⁰ Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 'Atlanticism':

<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learner/atlanticism> (5-1-2016).

²¹ Robert A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', *Behavioral Science* 2 (1957), 203.

²² Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', 203.

²³ Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence: A New Theory of Urban Politics* (New York 1965), 3.

²⁴ Banfield, *Political Influence*, 4.

²⁵ Banfield, *Political Influence*, 5.

the Dutch government in supporting Israel during the Six Day War and the October War. In chapter five and six I analyse if these types of influence were actually exerted.

1.3 Historiography

In the historiography of my research two historiographical debates can be distinguished. First, I focus on the debate on Dutch-Israeli relations. Not much research has been done on Dutch-Israeli relations yet. However, I elaborate on five important researches concerning Dutch-Israeli relations. The second historiographical debate is the debate about American-Israeli relations. Here too, I focus on five important works concerning the topic.

1.3.1 Dutch-Israeli Relations

In 1981 Annelies van den Houten and Mau Kopuit, both editors of the Dutch Jewish magazine *Nieuw Israëliisch Weekblad*, published *Wij staan achter Israel, wij stonden achter Israel, en wij hebben achter Isreal gestaan: de evenwichtige politiek van Nederland*. They elaborate on Dutch politics towards Israel and the Palestinians from the Six Day War (1967) onwards, and explore whether the Dutch attitude regarding the conflict in the Middle East changed. First, the authors give an historical overview of the historical events concerning Dutch-Israeli relations between 1967 and 1980. Thereafter, they analyse the Dutch stance according to interviews with former Dutch politicians, including Max van der Stoep, Frits Bolkestein, Jan Terlouw and Chris van der Klaauw. The authors' main conclusion is that up until the October War (1973) The Hague strongly supported Israel.²⁶ After 1973 the Dutch government took on a more critical position towards the Jewish state. The authors made extensive use of oral history. However, this research lacks any form of annotation or bibliography, which makes it unclear on what sources, apart from the interviews, the authors based their research. However, Van Houten and Kopuit's research remains useful because they interviewed a wide range of Dutch politicians.

In 1983 historian Ben Soetendorp published *Pragmatisch of principieel: Het Nederlandse beleid ten aanzien van het Arabisch-Israelisch conflict*. He examines The Hague's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1947 and 1977. Soetendorp based his research on official documents from both the Dutch government, and the United Nations General Assembly. However, the author acknowledges the possibility that many important documents were still classified while he conducted his research, and therefore suggests further research on the topic when new documents are declassified. Soetendorp's main conclusion is that the Dutch

²⁶ Annelies van den Houten and Mau Kopuit, *Wij staan achter Israel, wij stonden achter Israel, wij hebben achter Israel gestaan. De evenwichtige politiek van Nederland* (Amstelveen 1981), 99.

decision makers, involved in Dutch policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, were primarily protecting the national interest of the Netherlands.²⁷ According to Soetendorp, Dutch policy towards the conflict in the Middle East had little to do with a pro-Israeli or pro-Arab sentiment.²⁸ Furthermore, Soetendorp argues that it wasn't influenced by the moral guilt that stemmed from the Holocaust. Rather, the The Hague's stance was based on the promotion and protection of the Dutch national interest.²⁹

At the end of the 1990s, another research on Dutch-Israeli relations was published: *Gezworen vrienden. Het geheime bondgenootschap tussen Nederland en Israel* (1997), by historian Frans Peeters. Peeters elaborates on the origins of the close ties between the Netherlands and Israel, covering the period between the start of the Dutch Golden Age (approximately 1600) and the oil boycott (1973). He based his research on primary sources from the archives of the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, as well as on the Dutch National Archive and International Institute of Social History in The Hague. Peeters concludes that the groundwork for the strong ties between the Netherlands and Israel was laid in the 1950s, by Willem Drees and David Ben-Gurion.³⁰

Frederik Grünfeld researched the Dutch role in international politics in the Arab-Israeli conflict, covering the period 1973-1982. In 1991 his doctoral thesis *Nederland en het Nabije Oosten* was published. Grünfeld made extensive use of primary sources from several archives, including the archive of the Labour Party (PvdA) and the Center for Information and Documentation on Israel. He made use of parliamentary reports of the Dutch government as well. Furthermore, Grünfeld interviewed nearly forty people, most of them Dutch politicians. Grünfeld distinguishes two decision-making processes: decision-making on foreign affairs on a national level, and the international political process, which is multilateral. On the international political level, he focuses on the European Political Cooperation. The purpose of the European Political Cooperation was to involve the European Economic Community with foreign political relations, through coordinated consultations between Ministers of Foreign Affairs of member states. Grünfeld's research is focused on the Dutch role and contributions in the decision-making process on the international political level. The key question of this research is whether the Netherlands cannot but conform to the wishes of more powerful partner

²⁷ Ben Soetendorp, *Pragmatisch of principieel. Het Nederlandse beleid ten aanzien van het Arabisch-Israelisch conflict* (Leiden 1983), 205.

²⁸ Soetendorp, *Pragmatisch of principieel*. 205.

²⁹ Soetendorp, *Pragmatisch of principieel*. 206.

³⁰ Frans Peeters, *Gezworen vrienden. Het geheime bondgenootschap tussen Nederland en Israel* (Amsterdam and Antwerpen 1997), 13.

states, or whether the Netherlands can achieve some of its own preferences and objectives in international policymaking.³¹ Grünfeld argues that the main goal of the Netherlands was the continuation of Israel within safe and acknowledged borders.³² According to Grünfeld, the Dutch were isolated within the European Political Cooperation, because they took on a pro-Israel stance during the October War (1973), while other European states, like France and Great Britain did not.³³ Moreover, the latitude to act within the European Political Cooperation was limited for the Dutch. The Dutch government tried to strive for European solidarity. Therefore, Grünfeld argues, the Dutch position was made subject to decision-makers of the European Political Cooperation.³⁴ In 2008 Grünfeld published the article *Zestig jaar Nederland-Israël*, which outlined five central aspects that dominated Dutch-Israel relations between 1948 and 2008. According to Grünfeld The Hague's most important aim was to secure safe and recognized borders for the Jewish state Israel.³⁵ Furthermore, the Dutch government has been in favour of a viable state for the Palestinians.³⁶ Also, the Dutch were in favour of supporting Israel. And finally, the Dutch government aimed to avoid vulnerability through participation within the European Union, but also stressed that Dutch policy shouldn't conflict with American policy.³⁷

1.3.2 American-Israeli Relations

In 1977 political scientist William B. Quandt published his research *Decade of decisions: American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1967-1976*. Quandt argues that we need to understand the history of American-Israeli relations between 1967 and 1976 because historical research could make future policy more enlightened or effective.³⁸ Furthermore, he argues that this period is an exciting phase of the American involvement in world affairs.³⁹ Quandt based his research on secondary sources, including books on American policy regarding the Middle East, as well as articles in magazines like *Foreign Affairs* and *Journal of International Affairs*. The lack of primary sources makes Quandt's research more of a summary of what already has been written on the United States and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Quandt's most important

³¹ Frederik Grünfeld, *Nederland en het Nabije Oosten, De Nederlandse rol in de internationale politiek ten aanzien van het Arabisch-Israëliësch conflict 1973-1982* (Maastricht 1991), 265.

³² Grünfeld, *Nederland en het Nabije Oosten*, 261.

³³ Grünfeld, *Nederland en het Nabije Oosten*, 262.

³⁴ Grünfeld, *Nederland en het Nabije Oosten*, 266.

³⁵ Frederik Grünfeld, 'Zestig jaar Nederland-Israël', *Internationale Spectator* (2008), 680.

³⁶ Grünfeld, 'Zestig jaar Nederland-Israël', 680.

³⁷ Grünfeld, 'Zestig jaar Nederland-Israël', 680.

³⁸ Quandt, William B, *Decade of decisions: American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1967-1976* (Berkeley 1977), 2.

³⁹ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 3.

conclusion is that Washington's goals regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict – that is: finding a solution that would secure peace and stability in the Middle East; securing Israel's survival; avoiding military confrontation with the Soviet Union; and securing oil supplies from the Middle East – remained stable during the period 1967-1976. However, according to Quandt American presidents and their advisors were unable to come up with a successful way to achieve these goals.⁴⁰

Historian Douglas Little researched the origins of the close relationship between the United States and Israel, covering the period between 1957 and 1968. He published his findings in his article *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-1968* (1993). The author based his research mainly on official documents from the United States government, varying from telegrams which were sent between the American President's and Israeli Prime Minister, to memoranda for American Presidents. Furthermore, Little consulted memoirs from American Presidents, who were in office during the period 1957-1968. Little concludes that the recently declassified documents he used in his research show that Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy laid the foundations for the 'special relationship' between the United States and Israel.⁴¹ Eisenhower strengthened the ties between Washington and Tel Aviv, because he wanted to counterbalance Soviet influence in the Middle East.⁴² Kennedy made sure that the U.S. and Israel maintained close relations, in order to prevent Israel from acquiring nuclear capability.⁴³

International relations specialist Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov states that the notion that the United States and Israel share a special relationship is accepted in both countries by its leaders, as well as its peoples.⁴⁴ However, according to the author it remains unclear what the term 'special relationship' means, and when and why this 'special relationship' was established.⁴⁵ Bar-Siman-Tov elaborates on these questions in his article *The United States and Israel since 1948: A "Special Relationship"?*, which was published in 1998. His research covers the period between 1948 until 1996. His research is mainly based on literature on the subject, as well as a small scope of primary sources, including memoirs of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. In contrast to Little, Bar-Siman-Tov concludes that the relationship between the United States and

⁴⁰ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 287.

⁴¹ Douglas Little, 'The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-68', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25:4 (1993), 563.

⁴² Little, 'Special Relationship', 563.

⁴³ Little, 'Special Relationship', 563.

⁴⁴ Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, 'The United States en Israel since 1948: A "Special Relationship"?', *Diplomatic History* 22:2 (1998), 231.

⁴⁵ Bar-Siman-Tov, 'A "Special Relationship"?', 231.

Israel became special after 1967.⁴⁶ He argues that before 1967, the United States saw Israel as a strategic and political burden, and that every attempt from Israel to tighten the relationship with the U.S. was rejected by Washington.⁴⁷ The author states that after the Six Day War in 1967, the United States government realized that closer relations with the Jewish state would not endanger U.S. interest in the Middle East, but could even increase U.S. influence on Tel Aviv's policy.⁴⁸ From that moment on the relationship between the United States and Israel became a special relationship.

In 1998 international relations specialist Robert J. Lieber published the article *U.S.-Israel Relations Since 1948*. The author elaborates on the development of the 'special relationship' that the United States and Israel share. Lieber's hypothesis is that the uniqueness of both the United States and Israel would make the interaction between the two countries unique as well.⁴⁹ His research is based on secondary literature, as well as on primary sources, like diplomatic documents on foreign relations of the United States. Lieber concludes by stating that the special relationship between the U.S. and Israel is a product of a complex composition of causal factors, and incorporates historical memory, religious values, societal ties, considerations of regional stability and the American national interest.⁵⁰ Moreover, American domestic politics, and decisions by leaders of both the U.S. and Israel played a substantial role in the development of the special relationship.⁵¹

Noam Chomsky published his book *Fateful Triangle. The United States, Israel and the Palestinians* in 1999. Chomsky's aim is to elaborate on specific elements in the relationship between both the United States and Israel, and the United States and the Palestinians. He focuses on what has been wrong and what should be changed in U.S. and Israeli policy towards the Palestinians.⁵² Chomsky concludes that the Palestinians have been neglected and misrepresented during the decade-long conflict with Israel.⁵³ He argues that consequently, the United States has pursued policies that are despicable and dangerous.⁵⁴

Several authors elaborated on the relations between both the Netherlands and Israel, and the United States and Israel. However, the scope of research that has been done of Dutch-Israeli

⁴⁶ Bar-Siman-Tov, 'A "Special Relationship"?', 259.

⁴⁷ Bar-Siman-Tov, 'A "Special Relationship"?', 259.

⁴⁸ Bar-Siman-Tov, 'A "Special Relationship"?', 259.

⁴⁹ Robert J. Lieber, 'U.S.-Israel Relations Since 1948', *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 2:3 (1998), 11.

⁵⁰ Lieber, 'U.S.-Israel Relations', 18.

⁵¹ Lieber, 'U.S.-Israel Relations', 18.

⁵² Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle. The United States, Israel and the Palestinians* (London 1999), 39.

⁵³ Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, 39.

⁵⁴ Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, 39.

relations is still small. Furthermore, there is a historiographical gap: no research has yet been done on American influence on Dutch policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.

1.4 Innovative Aspects

How does this research contribute to the academic debate? The question why the Netherlands kept supporting Israel in the period 1967-1974, and thereby following Washington's stance in the conflict, hasn't been researched yet. Therefore, I will focus my research on this key question. Because the Netherlands supported Israel in the October War of 1973 it faced an oil embargo from the Arab states, while other European states, like France and Great Britain did not. The question therefore is: Why did the Dutch government continued to support Israel between 1967 and 1974? This research will contribute to the debate on Dutch-American relations in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, as well as the debate on Dutch-Israeli relations. Why did the Netherlands continued to support Israel, and thereby following the American point of view? Did the Dutch government support Israel because it was influenced by United States, or were there other reasons why the Dutch supported Israel? By answering these questions, The Hague's reasons for retaining the Atlanticist focus in foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in the period 1967-1974 will become clearer.

1.5 Methods and Sources

In order to answer my main research question and sub-questions, I use a qualitative research method. This method includes the analysis of literature and primary sources. Furthermore, I used oral history (interviews). The interviews included former Minister for Development Cooperation Jan Pronk, and former director of the *Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israel* Ronnie Naftaniel,

I use primary sources from the National Archive, transcripts from the Dutch Parliament, and of Cabinet meetings. Moreover, I use sources from the Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS) and the Presidential Collection of President Richard Nixon, both accessible at the Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg. With these primary sources the challenge is that it might be possible that some documents are still classified. Therefore, I use relevant sources published on Wikileaks as well.

2. An Everlasting Struggle: The Origins and Course of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

In May 2015, the Arab news broadcaster *Al Jazeera* reported that UNICEF ‘warns of excessive use of force, particularly in relation to incidents where Palestinian children were shot dead’.⁵⁵ According to UNICEF Israel killed 25 Palestinian children in the last three months of 2015.⁵⁶ Furthermore, about 13,000 children were injured.⁵⁷ Most of these incidents took place on the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, territories occupied by Israel since the Six Day War (1967). The effects of the Six Day War are still visible today. To understand the Arab-Israel conflict it is important to go back to the roots. In this chapter I will elaborate on the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The key question of this chapter is: Why and how did the Arab-Israeli conflict evolve?

2.1 *The Jewish Diaspora*

The story begins in approximately 1850 BCE, when the first Hebrews, associated with Abraham and Hebron, settled in Canaan, the area that was later to become Israel.⁵⁸ Thereafter, Abraham’s grandson Jacob, who was later renamed Israel, settled in Shechem, today the Palestinian city of Nablus in the northern West Bank. Around 1200 BCE the third wave of Hebrew settlement in Canaan took place. During the third wave, several clans, led by Moses, that claimed to be descendants of Abraham arrived in Canaan from Egypt. They stated that the Egyptians had enslaved them, but a deity called Yahweh had liberated them.⁵⁹ They came to Canaan, allied with the Hebrews, and became known as the people of Israel. The ancient Israelites were a people consisting of various ethnic groups, bound by their loyalty to Yahweh.⁶⁰ Around the eighth century BCE, the Israelites developed a distinct religious vision. They claimed that Yahweh brought them to Canaan, named them the chosen people, and had given them the land

⁵⁵ Umut Uras, ‘Israel ‘killed 25 Palestinian children’ in three months’: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/israel-killed-25-palestinian-children-months-160514140833141.html> (10-6-2016).

⁵⁶ Umut Uras, ‘Israel ‘killed 25 Palestinian children’ in three months’: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/israel-killed-25-palestinian-children-months-160514140833141.html> (10-6-2016).

⁵⁷ Umut Uras, ‘Israel ‘killed 25 Palestinian children’ in three months’: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/israel-killed-25-palestinian-children-months-160514140833141.html> (10-6-2016).

⁵⁸ Karen Armstrong, *A History of God. From Abraham to the Present: the 4000-year Quest for God* (London 1999), 19.

⁵⁹ Armstrong, *A History of God*, 19.

⁶⁰ Armstrong, *A History of God*, 19.

‘where milk and honey flowed’.⁶¹ In return Yahweh demanded complete loyalty, and the rejection of all other gods.⁶²

Figure 1: Map of the Levant Circa 830 BCE



Source: Richard Prince, ‘Map of the Levant Circa 830 BCE: Illustration’: <http://www.ancient.eu/image/285/> (8-7-2016).

However, by that time the Israelites weren’t monotheistic yet. Apart from their faith in Yahweh, they worshipped the traditional gods of Canaan, like Baal, Anat and Asherah.⁶³

According to the Jewish religion, Yahweh was mad at the Israelites, for they worshipped pagan gods and performed pagan traditions. Therefore, he punished his chosen people, by masterminding an attack from Assyria.⁶⁴ During the eight century BCE, the Northern Kingdom of Israel was in near state of anarchy. In the ten years after the death of King Jeroboam II in 746 BCE, the Kingdom had known five kings, while King Tigleth Pileser III of Assyria was looking for a way to conquer the Northern Kingdom of Israel, and add the area to his expanding empire.⁶⁵ In 722 BCE the Assyrian King Sargon II conquered the Northern Kingdom of Israel, and he deported the people. King Josiah of the Kingdom of Judah didn’t want his kingdom to

⁶¹ Armstrong, *A History of God*, 29.

⁶² Armstrong, *A History of God*, 66.

⁶³ Armstrong, *A History of God*, 32.

⁶⁴ Armstrong, *A History of God*, 56.

⁶⁵ Armstrong, *A History of God*, 52.

undergo the same fate as the Northern Kingdom of Israel, and therefore he removed all images, idols, and fertility symbols from the temple and burned them.⁶⁶

However, in 587 BCE the Babylonians invaded Judah. The First Temple was destroyed, and the King, along with part of the population, was driven into exile. When Jerusalem was conquered by the Babylonians in 587 BCE, Yahweh promised to save his people, now they had learned their lesson, and bring them back home.⁶⁷ This event marks the beginning of the Jewish Diaspora: the Jewish people lost their country, and over the centuries they dispersed all over the world.

In 538 BCE Jews who were living in Babylon were permitted to return to Judah to rebuild their temple. However, most of them stayed behind and only a minority, according to the Bible 42,360 people, returned to the Promised Land.⁶⁸ Throughout the centuries Jews were spread across the Middle East and the Persian Empire. When the Persian Empire collapsed, and Alexander the Great made large conquests in the area in 356-323 BCE, the Jewish people were able to spread throughout the Hellenistic world.⁶⁹ By 200 BCE, they were scattered from North Africa to India.⁷⁰ Around 200 BCE the Kingdom of Judea was established, and the temple was rebuilt. However, in the first century BCE the people of Judea went to war against the Romans, for Judea was part of the Roman Empire. The war led to the destruction of the Second Temple, and the Jewish people from Judea were spread throughout the Roman Empire.⁷¹

Historian Robert Seltzer argues that around the year 1000 CE, the centre of gravity in the Diaspora shifted from the Middle East to Europe.⁷² According to Seltzer, the Jewish Diaspora was so widespread that nowadays there almost isn't a region in any part of the world that has not possessed a Jewish minority.⁷³ Over the centuries persecution and expulsion, caused by anti-Semitism, have been a central feature in Jewish history.⁷⁴ Some examples are the massacres that were subsequent to the Black Plague in 1348, the banishment of Jews in France

⁶⁶ Armstrong, *A History of God*, 68.

⁶⁷ Armstrong, *A History of God*, 72.

⁶⁸ Mark A. Ehrlich and David Straub, 'Jews in the Middle East' in Mark A. Ehrlich (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Jewish Diaspora. Origins, Experiences, and Culture* (2009), 752.

⁶⁹ Ehrlich and Straub, 'Jews in the Middle East', 752.

⁷⁰ Ehrlich and Straub, 'Jews in the Middle East', 752.

⁷¹ Ehrlich and Straub, 'Jews in the Middle East', 752.


⁷² Robert M. Seltzer, 'History of Jews as a Minority' in Mark A. Ehrlich (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Jewish Diaspora. Origins, Experiences, and Culture* (2009), 73.

⁷³ Seltzer, 'Jews as a Minority', 73.

⁷⁴ Frederick Schweitzer, 'History of Jewish Persecution and Expulsion' in Mark A. Ehrlich (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Jewish Diaspora. Origins, Experiences, and Culture* (2009), 95.

in 1394, the persecution of Jews in Vienna in the 1420s, the slaughters in Poland between 1648 to 1967, and the Holocaust in the 1940s.⁷⁵

Figure 2: The Jewish Diaspora 70 CE - 1497



Source: Faith Milligan, 'Simple Jewish diaspora map showing the years and migrations of the Jewish people': <https://www.quora.com/Is-there-a-simple-Jewish-diaspora-map-showing-the-years-and-migrations-of-the-Jewish-people> (10-8-2016).

Central and Eastern Europe and Russia were important areas for the growth and spread of the Jewish Diaspora.⁷⁶ From the late 18th century Jews in Russia were restricted to live in the Pale of Settlement, a large area that was set up by Czarina Catherina the Great in 1791. In 1881 the Russian Czar Alexander II was killed, and his death was blamed on the Jews. The assassination of Alexander II was followed by a wave of pogroms.⁷⁷ At this time, Jewish immigration to the United States increased. Moreover, the pogroms in Russia and Eastern Europe, as well as the growth of anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, led to the establishment of the Zionist movement Hibbat Zion, which was inspired by European nationalism of the 19th century.⁷⁸ Hibbat Zion, led by Theodor Hertzl, campaigned for the revival of Jewish life in the Promised Land, and the creation of a Jewish homeland.⁷⁹ Zionists narrowed the options for the location

⁷⁵ Schweitzer, 'Persecution and Expulsion', 99.

⁷⁶ Mark A. Ehrlich, 'Jews in Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Russia' in Mark A. Ehrlich (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Jewish Diaspora. Origins, Experiences, and Culture* (2009), 938.


⁷⁷ Schweitzer, 'Persecution and Expulsion', 102.

⁷⁸ Avram Hein, 'Jews in Russia' in Mark A. Ehrlich (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Jewish Diaspora. Origins, Experiences, and Culture* (2009), 993.

⁷⁹ Hein, 'Jews in Russia', 993.

of the creation of a Jewish state down to Palestine and Argentina. They preferred Palestine, because it was the Biblical home of the Jewish people.⁸⁰ The interests of the mostly Muslim Arab Palestinians were not considered by the Zionists.⁸¹

Figure 3: Growth of the Jewish Population in the United States 1654-2010



Source: Jennifer M. Alford, ‘How the Jews Came to America’: <http://www.archives.com/experts/alford-jennifer/how-the-jews-came-to-america.html> (10-8-2016).

2.2 *The Ottoman Empire, Zionism and the Creating of a Jewish State*

In the 1880s the first Zionists immigrated to Palestine. Back then the area counted only 15,000 Jewish inhabitants, and the Arabs constituted about 95 percent of the population.⁸² Furthermore Palestine was still part of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the success and failure of Zionist settlers was dependent on the attitude of the Ottoman rulers. The last successful Sultan to exercise effective control over the fragmented Ottoman Empire was Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1875-1908). Hamid II adopted a negative stance towards Zionism.⁸³ When the Young Turks,

⁸⁰ Jeremy R. Hammond, *The Rejection of Palestinian Self-Determination. The Struggle for Palestine and the Roots of the Israeli-Arab Conflict* (2009), 5.
⁸¹ Hammond, *Palestinian Self-Determination*, 5.
⁸² Mearsheimer and Walt, ‘The Israel Lobby’, 36.
⁸³ Illan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict 1947-1951* (London and New York 2006), 1.

a group of Turkish officers who were in favour of the abolishment of privileges for minorities, came to power by a *coup d'état* in 1908, they took on the same position as Sultan Hamid II, because they were suspicious that Zionism was yet another vehicle of European ambitions in the Middle East, and a way to undermine Istanbul's position.⁸⁴ Moreover, the first Zionist settlers in Palestine were mainly from Russia, and the Young Turks feared that they were potential allies from the Russian Empire, which threatened the Ottoman Empire as well.⁸⁵ However, the last phase of the Ottoman Empire was characterized by political instability and the inability of the Ottoman government to impose its will in several areas of the empire. By means of bribery and other persuasive ways the Zionists eventually succeeded in settling in Palestine.⁸⁶

The first group of Zionist settlers was a group of Russian intellectuals. From the moment they arrived in Palestine they experienced outrage and hostility from the Palestinian Arabs. However, historian and political scientist Illan Pappé argues that there is also historical evidence that shows Arab hospitality towards new Jewish settlers.⁸⁷ It wasn't until the late 1880s, that the two groups in Palestine clashed. Clashes occurred mainly over issues like water exploitation, pastoral territory, and harvests.⁸⁸ On March 29, 1886 the first violent clash between Arabs and Zionist settlers broke out in the coastal strip. Arab villagers from Yahudiya attacked Petach Tikva, the first Jewish settlement in Palestine. This event caused conflict in other parts of Palestine as well, and led to the first organized Palestinian protests against Jewish settlements. In 1883 Tahir Al-Husayni, Mufti of Jerusalem and one of the leaders of the Muslim community in Palestine, started to campaign against Jewish settlement in the region. According to Al-Husayni, Zionist's attempts to buy lands from the Arabs and to increase the Jewish population in the area were a direct threat to the Palestinians in the area.⁸⁹ Al-Husayni's son, Hajj Amin Al-Husayni shared this view. When he became mufti in 1920, he carried on his father ideology against Zionism on a national basis.⁹⁰ From the moment that the first Zionists arrived in Palestine, they focused on buying fertile lands. Every purchase of land by Jews was seen by the Palestinian Arabs as the next step in the realization of the Zionist dream – the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine – a dream that could only harm the Palestinians in

⁸⁴ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 1.

⁸⁵ Mim K. Öke, 'The Ottoman Empire, Zionism, and the Question of Palestine (1880-1908)', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14:3 (1982), 323.

⁸⁶ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 1

⁸⁷ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 2.

⁸⁸ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 2.

⁸⁹ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 2.

⁹⁰ T.G. Fraser, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict. Second Edition* (New York 2004), 10.

the region.⁹¹ In 1911 the struggle between the two groups was intensified by the struggle over work. The increasing Jewish population consciously competed with the local Arabs in order to secure the few jobs that were available in the cities.⁹² As the number of Jews in Palestine increased, so did Zionist's demands for land, which in its turn intensified the struggle over land and work.

2.3 Palestine under British rule (1917-1947)

During the First World War Great Britain encouraged Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire.⁹³ The Hashemites – a noble clan which had, under Ottoman rule, been responsible for the protection of the two most sacred places in Islam: Mecca and Medina – had supported Britain during the war, and therefore Britain had promised the Hashemites control over some Arab areas, which had previously been governed by the Ottomans. Pappé states that 'the British were masters of the game and could move the Hashemites around like pawns on a chessboard'.⁹⁴

In 1917 the British General Edmund Allenby, commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, conquered Palestine. Four hundred years of Ottoman rule came to an end. The British put Palestine under a military administration. Britain was granted a League of Nations mandate over Palestine, and after one year the military administration was replaced by a mandatory government. The Palestinian Mandatory Charter included the Balfour Declaration, which was signed on November 2, 1917, as well as Article 22 of the League of Nation's Covenant, the latter granting Britain with the 'sacred trust of civilization' to help the Palestinians in gaining full independence.⁹⁵ The Balfour Declaration stated: 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country'.⁹⁶ The Palestinian Mandatory Charter thus included both a vague British undertaking regarding the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and a promise to lead the Palestinians down the path to independence.

⁹¹ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 3.

⁹² Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 3.

⁹³ Hammond, *Palestinian Self-Determination*, 3.

⁹⁴ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 5.

⁹⁵ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 7.

⁹⁶ Arthur James Balfour, 'The Balfour Declaration: Text of the Declaration, November 2, 1917' : <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/History/balfour.html> (8-8-2016).

The Zionists wanted to convince Britain of the necessity of creating a Jewish state in Palestine by arguing that Israel would be an outpost of civilization, opposed to barbarism. Furthermore, they stated that the people living within the Jewish state could form an effective guard for the Suez Canal.⁹⁷ Also, Zionists argued that they could serve as an effective link between the West and the Middle East.⁹⁸ These arguments, combined with the fact that before World War Two a strong Jewish lobby was present in London, caused the British government to gain sympathy for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.⁹⁹

Figure 4: The British Mandate, 1922



Source: ProCon.org, ‘Map – British Mandate 1922’: <http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.background-resource.php?resourceID=945> (8-7-2016).

Overtime, Great Britain became increasingly dependent on the Hashemites in order to maintain peace and order alongside the troubling border of Palestine.¹⁰⁰ London installed Hashemite rule in Transjordan. Not only was this the cheapest way of controlling this relatively unimportant area, it served as a way of compensation for the Hashemites’ loss of Damascus as well.¹⁰¹ The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was in favour of Hashemite rule in the area, mainly because he was convinced that Hashemite presence would facilitate British control over several Bedouin clans, which traditionally rejected every form of central government.¹⁰² For Zionists Hashemite rule in Transjordan signalled a very clear limitation on the area of Jewish settlement

⁹⁷ Hammond, *Palestinian Self-Determination*, 8.

⁹⁸ Hammond, *Palestinian Self-Determination*, 8.

⁹⁹ Hammond, *Palestinian Self-Determination*, 8.

¹⁰⁰ Ian J. Bickerton, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict. A History* (London 2009), 55.

¹⁰¹ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 8.

¹⁰² Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 8.

in Palestine. The decision to install Hashemite rule in Transjordan raised a problem for the British promise – the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine – to Zionists. When Palestine came under British control in 1917, Zionists expected Britain to immediately undertake steps towards the establishment of a Jewish homeland. Most Zionists considered Transjordan to be a part of biblical Palestine. However, because the Jewish community in Transjordan was relatively small – Jews constituted only ten percent of the population – most Zionists didn't object to the creation of a Hashemite entity in this area.¹⁰³ Due to this reason, Vladimir Jabotinski, head of an extremist Zionist group, separated himself from the mainstream Zionists.¹⁰⁴ The fact that the mainstream Zionists didn't object Hashemite rule in Transjordan enabled Churchill to pursue his plans.

Overtime the two promises included in the Palestinian Mandatory Charter – on the one hand the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and on the other the promise of Palestinian independence – appeared to be irreconcilable. Not only the demographical situation – the fact that Jews only constituted ten percent of the population – but also the rise of Arab nationalism, that demanded Palestinian independence, made it hard for Great Britain to find a suitable solution for both groups.¹⁰⁵ During the first decade of the mandate the British government hoped that, due to the influence of British power and authority, the two groups in Palestine would eventually accept coexistence.

However, in the 1920s and 1930s Jewish immigration to Palestine increased, due to the rise of fascism and Nazism in Europe. Historian Bernard Lewis argues that the persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany was the main driving force behind the immigration of Jews to Palestine.¹⁰⁶ Before the Second World War broke out the Nazi's even facilitated and encouraged this process.¹⁰⁷ Just like in the 1890s Jewish immigration and the purchase of fertile lands by Zionists alerted the Palestinians, who still saw this development as a direct threat to Arab livelihood in Palestine. The Palestinians repeatedly resorted to violence against Jewish inhabitants, some of whom were not even Zionists themselves.¹⁰⁸ An example was a raid against Jews in 1929, when 133 Jewish people were killed. During this eruption of violence, in Hebron more than 60 Jews were slaughtered, while they were mostly anti-Zionist.¹⁰⁹ The eruption of

¹⁰³ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 7.

¹⁰⁴ Fraser, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 17.

¹⁰⁵ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 8.

¹⁰⁶ Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East. 2000 years of History from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day* (London 1995), 349.


¹⁰⁷ Lewis, *The Middle East*, 349.

¹⁰⁸ Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, 177.

¹⁰⁹ Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, 177.

violence made the British administration aware that Palestine was becoming more of a burden than a strategic asset, and therefore Britain's will to dominate Palestine diminished. Lewis states that Great Britain suffered from economic weakness, thus their will and confidence to keep administrating the area weakened.¹¹⁰

Figure 5: Arab and Jewish population in Palestine/Israel, 1914-1970



Source: ProCon.org, 'Population Statistics: II. Israel / Palestine: Arab / Jewish Population':
<http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000636> (9-6-2016).

From the 1930s onwards, the British government undertook several attempts to solve the conflict, varying from the partition of the lands to its canonization. The Palestinian leaders hoped that Arab involvement and a basically pro-Arab foreign office would lead Britain to set aside the Balfour Declaration, and would give permission to establish a unitary Arab state in Palestine.¹¹¹ Therefore the Palestinians rejected the British attempts to solve the conflict. However, the Zionists in Palestine, led by David Ben-Gurion, accepted most British attempts to solve the conflict, for they all included the acknowledgement of the right of the Jews to create their own state.¹¹² Meanwhile, the Jewish community continued to grow, and the Palestinians became increasingly aware of the threats that mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni had described.¹¹³ When Adolf Hitler in Germany openly declared the expulsion of Jews in the 1930s, followed by Benito Mussolini in Italy, Jewish immigration and the purchase of land reached record

¹¹⁰ Lewis, *The Middle East*, 345.

¹¹¹ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 9.

¹¹² Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 9.

¹¹³ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 9.

levels. In the context of the events in Europe, the Arab position on the necessity to solve the conflict faded in comparison to the immediate necessity to save Jews from the onslaught in Europe, and built them a safe haven.¹¹⁴

Frustration and desperation towards London's policy caused the Arab leaders to revolt against the mandatory government in 1936. This revolt lasted for three years. Regular strikes soon turned into a full-scale guerrilla war targeted against the British in Palestine, and involving Arab volunteers from the Palestinian cities, as well as from the rural areas and from Syria and Iraq.¹¹⁵ Mediation by three Arab rulers, King Ibn Saud from Saudi Arabia, King Faruq of Egypt, and King Abdullah from Transjordan, caused Britain to agree with a change in its policy in Palestine in 1939. The goals of Britain's new policy were secured in the White Paper (1939), which promised the rejection of the Balfour Declaration, and strict limitations on Jewish immigration and the purchase of land by Zionists in Palestine.¹¹⁶ However, by the time the new policy had to be inflicted Britain was fully occupied with the Second World War in Europe, and the Jewish organization in Palestine was therefore able to organize illegal immigration and settlement operations.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, the Arab Revolt negatively influenced the cohesion of the Palestinian leadership.

During the first years of the Second World War, most Arabs were convinced that the success of the German field marshal Erwin Rommel in the Middle East heralded a new era, which would be favourable for the Arabs.¹¹⁸ The Jews aligned with the Allies, while at the same time they focused on realizing the creation of a Jewish state. The Zionist leaders opted for the impossible: on the one hand, they cooperated with Great Britain to fight the Nazi's, and on the other they were preparing a possible post-war conflict with Britain.

After the Second World War a new British government took office, led by Labour Party politician Clement Attlee. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs in this government was Ernest Bevin. While the Labour Party had adopted a pro-Zionist attitude during the elections, their policy towards Palestine remained similar to that of the pre-war government, trying to satisfy the Arabs in the Middle East by limiting Jewish immigration and the purchase of land.¹¹⁹ The new British government tried to solve the conflict in Palestine by providing several solutions, which were all rejected both by the Palestinians and the Jews.

¹¹⁴ Fraser, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 11.

¹¹⁵ Fraser, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 11.

¹¹⁶ Bickerton, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 65.

¹¹⁷ Bickerton, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 65.

¹¹⁸ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 10.

¹¹⁹ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 10.

2.4 The United Nations, the State of Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1947-1967)

Britain's incompetence to find a fitting solution, the increase in Jewish operations against British personnel and installations in Palestine, and a cold winter in Great Britain together with a shortage of coal and bread, led London to realize that it couldn't solve the conflict.¹²⁰ Palestine had become a British economic and military liability. In February 1947, London decided to hand over the question of Palestine to the United Nations.¹²¹ When the United Nations became responsible for the fate of Palestine, the organization was only two years old, and had few experience with solving regional problems. Palestine became the first major challenge the United Nation's Security Council had to deal with. The United Nations installed a special committee to handle the question, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The abominations of the Holocaust strongly influenced UNSCOP's choice on what to do with Palestine.¹²² UNSCOP and the Palestinian leadership, consisting of the Arab Higher Committee and controlled in great part by the al-Husayni family, didn't have much contact. This was partly caused by the fact that the Palestinian leadership was convinced that their fate would be directly affected by that of the survivors of the Holocaust.¹²³ Furthermore, the Palestinians were, at this crucial moment, unable to effectively unify themselves, and present a coherent stance on the conflict.¹²⁴ The Palestinian leadership had handed the political initiative for finding a solution over to the Arab League, what caused the Palestinians to play only a marginal role. UNSCOP was impressed by will of the Jewish Agency to cooperate, and by its pragmatism.¹²⁵ Furthermore, the British attitude towards the immigration of Jews and purchase of land in Palestine caused UNSCOP to make yet another step in a pro-Zionist direction.¹²⁶ Eventually UNSCOP presented a partition plan, which was on November 29, 1947 passed as Resolution 181 in the United Nations General Assembly. This resolution was not accepted by the Palestinians, for the majority of the lands of Palestine were given to the Jews.¹²⁷

The result was a civil war in Palestine which, when Great Britain withdrew from the

¹²⁰ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 14.

¹²¹ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 15.

¹²² Fraser, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 33.

¹²³ Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 23.

¹²⁴ Fraser, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 34.

¹²⁵ Fraser, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 34.

¹²⁶ Fraser, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 34.

¹²⁷ Hammond, *Palestinian Self-Determination*, 58.

area, developed into a war between the new-born state Israel, founded in May 1948, and the Arab states Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Transjordan, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.¹²⁸ Zionist's ultimate objective, the vision of a 'Greater Israel', could only be achieved by the expulsion of large number of Arabs from Israeli territory. During the war the Jewish forces drove up to 700,000 Palestinians into exile.¹²⁹ Ever since, the Israeli leaders repeatedly denied Palestinians' national ambitions.¹³⁰ The war lasted until March 10, 1949 and is called the 'War of Independence' by the Jews, while the Arabs call it the 'Nakba', which means catastrophe, for the Palestinians not only lost soldiers, but they also lost part of their homeland.¹³¹ The war of 1947-1949 fuelled the flames of the Palestinian national movement.¹³²

Figure 6: Palestinian refugees after the War of Independence/Nakba 1948



Source: Joseph E. Katz, 'How many Palestinian Refugees? Inflating the numbers': <http://www.eretzyisrael.org/~peters/refugees.html> (29-7-2016).

¹²⁸ Bickerton, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 66.

¹²⁹ Mearsheimer and Walt, 'The Israel Lobby', 37.

¹³⁰ Mearsheimer and Walt, 'The Israel Lobby', 37.

¹³¹ Shlomo Ben-Ami, 'A War to Start All Wars. Will Israel Ever Seal the Victory of 1948', *Foreign Affairs* 87 (2008), 151.

¹³² Pappé, *Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict*, 271.

After the establishment of Israel in 1948 almost 2.5 million people lived in the area.¹³³ Israel was inhabited mostly by Jewish immigrants from European and Arab countries, but also by 160,000 Palestinians, who had been able to stay on the land after the Jewish state was proclaimed.¹³⁴ Almost 500,000 Palestinians from Israel had become refugees, most of them expelled to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and others alongside the borders of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.¹³⁵ About 500,000 non-refugee Palestinians inhabited the Palestinian areas, where they were outnumbered by approximately 1.5 million Jews.¹³⁶ From the 1950s onwards, the Palestinian refugee camps became a flashpoint for guerrilla activities. The refugee community became politicized, and movements like al-Fatah ('victory'), led by Yasser Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir, who were striving to win back lost Palestinian territory, arose. Meanwhile, basic laws passed by the Knesset, the Parliament of Israel, led to discrimination towards Palestinians in Israel that exist up until today. This included the law of return, the naturalization law, and the law of Keren Hakeyemet gave priority to Jewish immigration – even potential Jewish immigration – at the expense of the indigenous Palestinian people in almost every sphere. In property, they created an Apartheid-style system of land transactions, and were used to retrospectively legalize the expropriation of land, and to prohibit the selling of state land and absentee land to Palestinians.¹³⁷ These developments show a sharpening in the conflict on both sides.

In the wake of the Suez Crisis (1956) the marginalization of the Israeli moderate dovish statesman Moshe Sharett by the more hawkish and uncompromising Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion activated an aggressive Israeli policy against the Arab neighbouring states.¹³⁸ Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan, the chief of the army staff, dreamed of a greater Israel that would expand towards the north, east and south. Furthermore, Ben-Gurion considered the Arab states to be hostile towards Israel. In his opinion this hostility was never a reaction to Israeli aggression.¹³⁹ Ben-Gurion and Dayan wanted to crush the Palestinian resistance movements, because they stated that these movements formed a threat to Israeli security. According to Pappé, Ben-Gurion and Dayan were looking for a reason to start a war against the Arab states, and they found one in aligning with the British and the French to fight against the

¹³³ Illan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine. One Land, Two Peoples* (Cambridge 2004), 142.

¹³⁴ Pappé, *History of Modern Palestine*, 142.

¹³⁵ Pappé, *History of Modern Palestine*, 142.

¹³⁶ Pappé, *History of Modern Palestine*, 142.

¹³⁷ Pappé, *History of Modern Palestine*, 160.

¹³⁸ Pappé, *History of Modern Palestine*, 161.

¹³⁹ Pappé, *History of Modern Palestine*, 162.

regime of the Egypt President Gamal Abdel Nasser during the Suez Crisis.¹⁴⁰ A result of the 1956 war was that the involvement of the army in Israeli life was deepened to an extraordinary level. The militarization of Israeli society had started with the victory in 1949, and was completed by Israel's victory in the 1956 war. On the Palestinian side, the war paved the way for a revolution in strategy, tactic, and structure in the Palestinian political movement that was rising in the refugee camps.

Nasser united Syria and Egypt in 1958 and formed the United Arab Republic (UAR). Moreover, the role of al-Fatah was formalized. Political Scientist Mark Tessler argues that the Palestinian Arabs didn't occupy the centre stage in the Arab-Israeli conflict up until 1967.¹⁴¹ The most important confrontations were between Israel and its Arab neighbouring states. Tessler states that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was a creation of the Arab States. Al-Fatah joined the PLO, and in 1969 al-Fatah managed to take over PLO leadership.¹⁴²

2.5 Conclusions

The key question of this chapter was: Why and how did the Arab-Israeli conflict evolve?

The eight century BCE marks the starting point of the Jewish Diaspora. In the centuries that followed the Jewish people were dispersed throughout all distant corners of the world. The notion of wandering from place to place has been a central feature in Jewish history. According to the Jewish religion, Yahweh wanted to bring his people back to the Promised Land. In the late 19th century, Zionism arose in Eastern Europe. Fostered by pogroms, and inspired by European nationalism, Zionists strived for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. In the late 19th century the first Zionists arrived in Palestine, and they started purchasing fertile lands from the Palestinians. Back then, Palestine was still part of the Ottoman Empire. From the late 1880s, conflicts between Jews and Palestinians increased.

After the First World War, Palestine became a British Mandate, and the Mandate Charter included both a vague promise for the creation of a Jewish homeland in the area, and the promise for full Palestinian independence. Over the years, the immigration of Jews to Palestine increased, and thus the struggle over land and work intensified. The Palestinians saw the Jewish immigration as a direct threat to Palestinian livelihood. Britain tried to solve the conflict, but after it became clear that Britain's solutions weren't accepted by both parties, it became aware that Palestine was more of a burden than a strategic asset. Therefore, the British

¹⁴⁰ Pappé, *History of Modern Palestine*, 163.

¹⁴¹ Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington and Indianapolis 1994), 336.

¹⁴² Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 373.

handed over Palestine to the United Nations, which provided the Partition Plan in 1947, which divided Palestine in two areas: Israel and Palestine. This solution wasn't acceptable to the Palestinians, and therefore a civil war broke out. When the British withdrew from the area, this turned into a war between Israel, Palestine, and several Arab states. The war lasted until 1949. The war fuelled the flames of the Palestinian national movement. Furthermore, lots of Palestinians had become refugees, and guerrilla activities were organized from the refugee camps. In Israel, discriminatory laws were imposed. These developments show that the war of 1947-1949 intensified the conflict on both sides. Tensions between the Palestinians and Israel culminated yet again in the Suez Crisis (1956). With the Suez Crisis, the militarization of Israeli society was completed, and the Palestinian political movement underwent a revolution in strategy and structure. However, it wasn't until the Six Day War of 1967, that the Palestinians themselves came to play an important role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Now I've elaborated on the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I will look into the origins of the close ties between on the one hand the Netherlands and Israel, and on the other hand the United States and Israel in the next chapter.

3. Two Special Friendships: Dutch-Israeli Relations and American-Israeli Relations

The relationship between Israel and the Netherlands is a sensitive topic in Dutch politics and society. It can be described as a special and close friendship between the two countries.¹⁴³ During the Six Day War and the October War the Netherlands supported Israel. Not only The Hague, but also the majority of the Dutch people sympathized strongly with the Jewish state during both wars.¹⁴⁴ A survey from 1983 showed that the majority of the Dutch people adopted a positive attitude towards the Jewish state. In this survey people were asked to rank eighteen countries on several topics. On the topic ‘feelings of admiration’, Israel got first place, and on the topic ‘positive attitude towards the country’, Israel scored second place.¹⁴⁵ During the Cold War, a special relationship between the United States and Israel emerged as well. In this period, few issues have been considered more critical in American foreign policy than the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis. This can be explained by several factors, like the tensions of the Cold War, and the deep American commitment to Israel.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, for a significant number of Americans the safety and well-being of Israel were top priority concerns.¹⁴⁷

In this chapter I will focus on the development of the strong ties between on the one hand the Netherlands and Israel, and on the other the United States and Israel. The key question of this chapter is: Why did the Netherlands and the United States develop such a strong support for Israel? First I will look into the origins of the close relationship between the Netherlands and Israel. I will elaborate on the question whether or not something changed after 1945 in the Dutch attitude towards Jews, and the establishment of a Jewish state. Then I will focus on the origins of the close relationship between the United States and Israel. I will also look into the influence of the Israel Lobby on American foreign policy regarding the Middle East.

3.1 A Strong Bond between Two Small States: The Netherlands and Israel

Vitzak Shamir, the seventh Prime Minister of Israel, once said that the close relationship

¹⁴³ Grünfeld, *Nederland en het Nabije Oosten*), 31..

¹⁴⁴ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerraad, nummer toegang 2.02.05.02, inventarisnummer 1237, Fiche 433. ‘Notulen van de vergadering gehouden op vrijdag 26 oktober 1973’, 9.

¹⁴⁵ Grünfeld, *Nederland en het Nabije Oosten*, 32.

¹⁴⁶ William B. Quandt, *Decade of decisions: American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1967-1976* (Berkeley 1977), 1.

¹⁴⁷ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 1.

between the Netherlands and Israel, and between the Dutch and the Jewish people, goes back to the sixteenth and seventeenth century.¹⁴⁸ However, according to historian Frans Peeters we need to let go of the myth that over the centuries the Dutch people have had a large amount of sympathy for the Jewish people. He states that the Dutch sympathy for Israel is a relatively recent phenomenon, which originates from after the Second World War.¹⁴⁹ The myth of the secular friendship between the two states is fed by the Dutch toleration of Jews during the Dutch Golden Age. Toleration is often confused with interest, respect, or even solidarity. Such feelings were rarely present among most Dutch people. During and after the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648), Jews were welcome in the Netherlands, but this had more to do with their mercantile skills than with sympathy for the Jewish faith and people.¹⁵⁰ The Dutch attitude towards the culture and religion of newcomers was an attitude of indifference. 'Live and let live' became a commandment, especially in the towns, to keep social peace. After the Reformation cracks appeared in the Reformed Church, and there was no longer a religious majority. This indifference, and the fact that people from different religions lived alongside each other, led to pillarization of the Dutch society, and in the 1930s this pillarization climaxed.

From the moment when Adolf Hitler proclaimed the *Judenboykott* on April 1, 1933, the Netherlands was confronted with the arrival of Jewish refugees from Germany. Dutch foreign policy in this period was, just like it was during the First World War, aimed at staying neutral.¹⁵¹ This goal left little room for dissidents and Jewish refugees from Nazi-Germany, for this would badly affect the relations between the Netherlands and Germany. When in August 1933 the Dutch police made clear that there were approximately 6,000 refugees, of which 5,000 Jews, present in the Netherlands, the Dutch Minister of Justice Josef van Schaik stated that he didn't want to admit any more refugees to the Netherlands, and the refugees that were already in the Netherlands had to go back to Germany.¹⁵² The Dutch embassy in Berlin argued that the situation for Jews in Germany wasn't life threatening, and believed that Jews only had to face social discrimination. From 1934 Jews were only allowed to stay in the Netherlands if they could prove that they were in grave danger.

Van Schaik's successor, Carel Goseling stated on May 7, 1938 that refugees were

¹⁴⁸ Vitzak Shamir, cited in Frans Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden. Het geheime bondgenootschap tussen Nederland en Israel* (Amsterdam and Antwerpen 1997), 19.

¹⁴⁹ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 19.

¹⁵⁰ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 20.

¹⁵¹ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 22.

¹⁵² Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 23.

unwanted elements in society, which had to be sent back.¹⁵³ After *Kristallnacht* on the night of November 9-10, 1938 thousands of German Jews applied for asylum in the Netherlands, but entire families were sent back from the Netherlands to Germany.¹⁵⁴ This policy was criticized by Dutch intellectuals and Catholics, who held a petition to change this policy, which was signed over 5,000 times. Goseling replied by saying that he would admit a limited number of refugees, about 7,000, to the Netherlands.¹⁵⁵ However, he wanted the Dutch Committee for Special Jewish Interests to cover the costs. Goseling argued that most refugees were economic refugees, and he didn't want them to take over jobs from the Dutch people.¹⁵⁶ Eventually, the Netherlands did receive about 30,000 to 40,000 refugees. However, this was not a result of a change in politics: it was made possible because many Dutch soldiers at the border turned a blind eye.¹⁵⁷ With help from leftist organizations, like the communist Red Help, Jews were smuggled into the Netherlands.¹⁵⁸

From May 1940, the Netherlands was occupied by Nazi-Germany. Of all Western-European countries the Netherlands, except from Germany, was the country from which the largest percentage, around 75 percent, of Jews were deported.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, most Jews were arrested by Dutch police men, who kept operating under the Nazi regime. When we take these facts into consideration the positive bond that the Netherlands and Israel share today is hard to explain. Historian Hans Blom argues that in the Netherlands the deportation of Jews went according to plan. Adolf Eichmann, a German SS-functionary, even said that in the Netherlands 'the transports ran so smoothly that it was a joy to watch them'.¹⁶⁰ However, anti-Semitism, though it was present in the Netherlands, wasn't as extreme as in other European countries, like Germany and France.¹⁶¹ Peeters argues this was due to the fact that the Jewish community in the Netherlands was more integrated in Dutch society than in other parts of Europe.¹⁶² This was partly caused by the Calvinist character of Dutch society, and because in the perception of Calvinists the Bible occupies a central role Jews were not reckoned to be an outside group.

¹⁵³ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen der Staten Generaal 1937-1938, 'Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 55e vergadering 9 juni 1938', 1703.

¹⁵⁴ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 24.

¹⁵⁵ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 24.

¹⁵⁶ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen der Staten Generaal 1937-1938, 'Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 55e vergadering 9 juni 1938', 1723.

¹⁵⁷ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 23.

¹⁵⁸ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 23.

¹⁵⁹ Hans J.C.H. Blom, 'The persecution of Jews in the Netherlands: A comparative Western European perspective', *European history quarterly* 19 (1989), 333.

¹⁶⁰ Adolf Eichman, cited in Hans J.C.H. Blom, 'The persecution of Jews in the Netherlands: A comparative Western European perspective', *European history quarterly* 19 (1989), 337.

¹⁶¹ Blom, 'Persecution of Jews in the Netherlands', 341.

¹⁶² Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 27.

After the Second World War, the main goal of the Dutch government was the restoration of the pre-war relations, especially in the Dutch East Indies, what was to be disturbed by the Indonesian struggle for independence.¹⁶³ The restoration of the pre-war relations couldn't be hindered by a, in the eyes of the people of the Dutch East Indies, wrong reaction by the Dutch government to the events in Palestine, where the Jewish guerrillas against British rule in the Palestinian mandate succeeded.¹⁶⁴ The Dutch people had sympathy for the Jewish aim to establish a homeland in Palestine. This sympathy was notably large among supporters of the Dutch Labour party, the PvdA, but also among several Protestant parties.¹⁶⁵ The Islamic majority of the population in the Dutch East Indies was against the creation of the state Israel, because this would badly affect the Palestinians. In order to prevent conflict with the people in East Indies, the Dutch government initially adopted a reserved stance towards the situation in Palestine. When the United Nations voted for the Partition Plan in 1947 the Dutch were reluctant to vote. Large pro-Jewish groups in the Netherlands were in favour of the partition, whereas the pro-Arab inhabitants in the East Indies were against it. However, an intervention of social-democrat Willem Drees, back then still Minister of Social Affairs, caused the Dutch government to vote in favour of the United Nations Partition Plan.

Political scientist Fred Grünfeld argues that from 1947, the goal 'safe and recognized borders for Israel' have been a central feature in Dutch foreign policy concerning Israel.¹⁶⁶ However, when on May 14, 1948 the state Israel was proclaimed by David Ben-Gurion, the Dutch government refused to recognize the new-born state – unlike the United States, which recognized Israel after several hours – in order to satisfy the people living in the East Indies, but also because Great Britain had asked the Netherlands not to recognize it, for this would deteriorate the relations between Great Britain and the Arab states. Because The Hague saw Great Britain as one of its most important allies the Dutch obeyed London's request.¹⁶⁷ Ronny Naftaniel, former head of the Center of Information and Documentation on Israel in the Netherlands, argues that the main reason for the fact that the Dutch didn't immediately recognize Israel, was that the Dutch wanted to handle the issue carefully because they were afraid to trigger conflict with the people from the East Indies.¹⁶⁸ On January 23, 1949, the

¹⁶³ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 30.

¹⁶⁴ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 30.

¹⁶⁵ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 30.

¹⁶⁶ Grünfeld, 'Zestig jaar Nederland-Israël', 680.

¹⁶⁷ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 42.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Ronny Naftaniel, April 6, 2016.

British ambassador informed the Netherlands that Great Britain would recognize Israel *de facto* the next day. Following the British example, the Dutch recognized the Jewish state *de facto* on January 29, 1949.¹⁶⁹ The Netherlands recognized Israel *de jure* in 1950, when it was made clear that Indonesia would gain independence.¹⁷⁰ Even though the Dutch recognized Israel, this had little to do with Dutch sympathy for the Jewish state, and more with the fact that the Netherlands didn't want to fall behind its main allies, like the United States and Great Britain.¹⁷¹ In the period 1948-1956, The Hague's stance towards the Jewish state was reserved, but in 1956 the Dutch granted Israel a considerable amount of weapons and munitions.¹⁷²

What caused this shift in The Hague's attitude? According to Peeters, the special relationship between the Netherlands and Israel originates from the 1950s, and is based on an agreement between two likeminded social-democratic Prime Ministers: Willem Drees and David Ben-Gurion.¹⁷³ Willem Drees was born in 1886 in Amsterdam, the city that was home to a large socialist Jewish community. The well-known Union official Henri Polak, and the Dreyfus Affair (1894-1906) both nourished Drees' interest in Zionism.¹⁷⁴ During the Second World War Drees was arrested by the Nazi's, and sent to camp Buchenwald. After a year, he returned to Amsterdam, due to a stomach disease, and he soon became a main character of the resistance movement. These factors caused Drees to develop a fierce, unconditional sympathy for the Jewish aim for the creation of a safe homeland. As mentioned before, the PvdA, Drees' political party, sympathized greatly with Israel. The Catholic politician Joseph Luns, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1952-1971), had a strong passion for the Jewish state as well.¹⁷⁵ Drees' sympathy for Israel was not only determined by his respect for the Jewish people, but also by the socialist and democratic nature of the Jewish state. He even saw Israel as an example for the Netherlands: 'Israel has a mixed government, but with a socialist majority. The government relies on a verified Parliament, which is also mixed but mainly socialist. You might understand what kind of thoughts and emotions these factors trigger'.¹⁷⁶ In 1948 Drees became Prime Minister and he occupied this position for ten years. During his time in office, he kept in close contact with David Ben-Gurion. The two had an understanding: 'Whenever you need us, let us

¹⁶⁹ Peeters, *Gezworen vrienden*, 39.

¹⁷⁰ Interview with Ronny Naftaniel, April 6, 2016.

¹⁷¹ Peeters, *Gezworen vrienden*, 40.

¹⁷² Grünfeld, 'Zestig jaar Nederland-Israël', 680.

¹⁷³ Peeters, *Gezworen vrienden*, 13.

¹⁷⁴ Peeters, *Gezworen vrienden*, 63.

¹⁷⁵ Peeters, *Gezworen vrienden*, 70.

¹⁷⁶ Willem Drees, cited in Frans Peeters, *Gezworen vrienden. Het geheime bondgenootschap tussen Nederland en Israel* (Amsterdam and Antwerpen 1997), 70.

know'.¹⁷⁷ The pro-Israel position of the Dutch government was increasingly supported by the Dutch people.¹⁷⁸

Ronny Naftaniel argues that the Dutch support for Israel was partly caused by a high degree of mutual respect between the two countries.¹⁷⁹ Religious motives were an important root for this respect. Traditionally the Netherlands was a Protestant state. Protestant children were taught biblical stories and names already in primary school, and therefore developed a special interest in the Jewish state. Another motive could be that the Netherlands and Israel are both small states, surrounded by, as for the Netherlands the sea, and as for Israel the desert.¹⁸⁰ The two countries both tried to dominate their surroundings. Furthermore, the Netherlands, as well as Israel, had powerful neighbouring states. As for of the Netherlands, Naftaniel referred to Germany, and Israel is surrounded by large Arab states.¹⁸¹ Another factor that strengthened Dutch-Israeli relations was the fact that the Netherlands and Israel were both countries with an Atlantic orientation. The Dutch anti-French and pro-American attitude converged in the pro-Israeli stance.¹⁸²

In 1950 the United States, Great Britain, and France signed the Tripartite Agreement. The goal of this agreement was to prevent an arms race in the Middle East, and therefore it restricted arms sales to the Arab States and Israel. From that moment on the Netherlands became an increasingly important seller of arms and munitions to Israel.¹⁸³ The growing friendship between the two countries caused The Hague to support Tel Aviv during the Suez Crisis.

In 1959, the Catholic De Quay government took office in The Hague. During the German occupation, Jan de Quay had been one of the leaders of the Dutch Union, an authoritarian mass movement, that wanted to come to terms with the Germans. However, De Quay's personal history didn't affect the relationship between the Netherlands and Israel.¹⁸⁴ With the installation of the Marijnen Government, and of a new vice-Secretary of Defence Joop Haex, in 1963, Dutch-Israeli relations developed an element of reciprocity. It was no longer only important in what aspects the Netherlands could be of service to Israel, but also in what ways the Israeli's could help the Dutch, since Israel could assist the Netherlands in the

¹⁷⁷ Willem Drees, cited in Frans Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden. Het geheime bondgenootschap tussen Nederland en Israel* (Amsterdam and Antwerpen 1997), 67.

¹⁷⁸ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 68.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Ronny Naftaniel, April 6, 2016.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Ronny Naftaniel, April 6, 2016.

¹⁸¹ Interview with Ronny Naftaniel, April 6, 2016.

¹⁸² Grünfeld, 'Zestig jaar Nederland-Israël', 683.

¹⁸³ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 75.

¹⁸⁴ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 109.

improvement of their Centurion tanks.¹⁸⁵

Historian Duco Hellema argues that during the 1960s the Netherlands gained a pro-Israel reputation.¹⁸⁶ According to Hellema, Israel wasn't supported unconditionally in every situation, but it was clear that in the case of serious conflicts and wars, especially with the neighbouring Arab states, the Dutch government supported the Jewish state.¹⁸⁷ This statement appeared to be true particularly in the Six Day War (1967), but also in political conflicts over the territories Israel occupied since the Six Day War. Furthermore, for a long time the Dutch government saw the Palestinian question as a refugee problem and humanitarian problem, and not as a political question.¹⁸⁸ Up until the 1970s, the Dutch voted against United Nations' resolutions that demanded the right to self-determination of the Palestinians.

However, editors from the *Nieuw Israelisch Weekblad*, Annelies van Houten and Mau Kopuit, argue that since the Six Day War Dutch politics towards the Arab-Israeli conflict shifted from a pro-Israeli stance, to a better understanding of the Palestinian side.¹⁸⁹ They also argue that this shift was associated with a more critical stance towards Israeli politics.¹⁹⁰ After the Six Day War, The Hague came to see the occupation of West Bank and Gaza as a barrier for the establishment of peace in the Middle East. However, according to former Minister of Foreign Affairs Max van der Stoep this shouldn't be conceived as a shift in the Dutch attitude towards Israel. He argues that it is true that The Hague became more critical towards some elements of Israeli politics, like the occupation, but he also makes clear that since 1967 the existence of Israel within safe and recognized borders has been the most important element in the Dutch stance towards the conflict.¹⁹¹ The pro-Israel mood was not only present in Dutch politics, but also among the people of the Netherlands. Ronny Naftaniel remembers that people from the Dutch Labour Unions each granted three hours of their wage to Israel.¹⁹² This was also noted by the American embassy in The Hague, which estimated this financial support for Israel to be as high as \$5.5 million.¹⁹³

In February 1970, Luns visited the Middle East. In a report on his visit he stated that

¹⁸⁵ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 123.

¹⁸⁶ Duco A. Hellema, *Buitenlandse politiek van Nederland. De Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek* (Utrecht 2006), 251.

¹⁸⁷ Hellema, *Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek*, 251.

¹⁸⁸ Hellema, *Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek*, 251.

¹⁸⁹ Annelies van den Houten and Mau Kopuit, *Wij staan achter Israel, wij stonden achter Israel, wij hebben achter Israel gestaan. De evenwichtige politiek van Nederland* (Amstelveen 1981), 10.

¹⁹⁰ Van den Houten and Kopuit, *Wij staan achter Israel*, 10.

¹⁹¹ Van den Houten and Kopuit, *Wij staan achter Israel*, 101.

¹⁹² Interview with Ronny Naftaniel, April 6, 2016.

¹⁹³ Roosevelt Study Center, Dutch-American Diplomatic Relations Collection, Reel 2, 'Airgram to Department of State from American Embassy The Hague. Subject: Joint Weeka 3. Date: January 23, 1968', 5.

Israel had to be willing to withdraw from the, since 1967, occupied territories, and should take into account the demands of the Palestinians. Israel criticized this report, and the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir expressed disappointment in Luns.¹⁹⁴ The next year, in December, the United Nations adopted another resolution on the Arab-Israeli conflict. This resolution was also supported by the Netherlands, and stated that in order to establish peace, Israel should withdraw from the occupied territories.¹⁹⁵ In 1972, the Dutch delegation in the United Nations General Assembly supported a resolution in which the right to self-determination of the Palestinians was recognized. In that same year, the Dutch Foreign Minister Norbert Schmelzer argued that only small border corrections were permitted, and that these border corrections could only be applied if they were accepted by all involving parties.¹⁹⁶

When in 1973 the social-democratic Den Uyl government took office, a new Minister of Foreign Affairs was installed: Max van der Stoel. Van der Stoel introduced the term ‘even-handed policy’ in Dutch policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. By ‘even-handed policy’ he meant that the Dutch government still cherished strong feelings of sympathy towards Israel, but on the other hand wished to maintain friendly relations with the Arab states.¹⁹⁷ Van der Stoel pressed for Israel’s right to exist within safe and recognized borders, but also stated that the Palestinians had the right to self-determination.¹⁹⁸ Therefore, he deemed it necessary that Israel withdrew from the occupied territories.¹⁹⁹ The Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation in the Den Uyl government, Jan Pronk, also argued that, even though the Dutch adopted a pro-Israel stance, The Hague slightly nuanced its view by developing a more understanding position towards the Palestinians.²⁰⁰ The events in the period February 1970 - September 1973 show a slight deterioration in Dutch-Israeli relations. However, in the October War of 1973 the Netherlands stood, just like in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Six Day War of 1967, solidly with Israel.²⁰¹ Now I’ve outlined the origins of the special relationship between the Netherlands and Israel, I will elaborate on the roots of the close relationship between the United States and

¹⁹⁴ Van den Houten and Kopuit, *Wij staan achter Israel*, 15.

¹⁹⁵ Van den Houten and Kopuit, *Wij staan achter Israel*, 16.

¹⁹⁶ Hellema, *Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek*, 269.

¹⁹⁷ Van den Houten and Kopuit, *Wij staan achter Israel*, 22.

¹⁹⁸ ‘Telegram from the American Embassy, The Hague to Secretary of State, Washington. Subject: GON’s latest statement on Middle East Policy. Date: December 3, 1973’:

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973THEHA05261_b.html (5-10-2016).

¹⁹⁹ ‘Telegram from the American Embassy, The Hague to Secretary of State, Washington. Subject: GON’s latest statement on Middle East Policy. Date: December 3, 1973’:

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973THEHA05261_b.html (5-10-2016).

²⁰⁰ Interview with Jan Pronk, April 21, 2016.

²⁰¹ ‘Telegram from the American Embassy, Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, Washington. Subject: Extent of political support for Israel in the World. Date: October 27, 1973’:

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973TELA08672_b.html (5-10-2016).

Israel.

3.2 Domestic and Strategic Reasons: The United States and Israel

After the Suez Crisis of 1956, the United States demanded Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the other territories that it had obtained, because Washington feared that Egypt would seek more support from the Soviet Union, but after the Six Day War the United States accepted that Israel had conquered Gaza, the Jordan West Bank and the Syrian Golan Heights. Authors Edward Tivnan, Cheryl Rubenberg, and Isaiah L. Kenen explain this tilt in policy by the strengthening of ties between the Johnson Administration and the Israel Lobby.²⁰² Others, like Ethan Nadelmann and William Quandt argue that this shift was caused by Johnson's admiration for Israel's muscular doctrine of self-defence.²⁰³ However, according to historian Douglas Little, Johnson's predecessors in the Oval Office, Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy, laid the groundwork for closer relations between the United States and the Jewish state.²⁰⁴

During the 1950s, Eisenhower was disturbed by Soviet interference in the Middle East, and he gradually came to see Israel as a potential ally in the struggle to contain Soviet-backed revolutionary Arab nationalism. During the early 1960s, Kennedy was upset by the fact that Israel was about to acquire nuclear weapons, and therefore moved to strengthen Israel's conventional deterrent by providing Tel Aviv sophisticated military hardware, and by declaring that the U.S. would assist Israel in the event of Arab aggression.²⁰⁵ By the time Johnson took office in November 1963 the idea that a strong Israel would serve as a pro-Western bulwark against future Soviet gains in the Middle East, and the fear of Israel going nuclear, had laid the foundations for the special relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv. In the early 1960s the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), an interest group which lobbies with the American Congress in order to secure a close relationship between the United States and Israel, called Johnson one of the most loyal allies of Israel in Washington. After Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, Johnson said to an Israeli diplomat: 'You have lost a great friend, but you have found a better one'.²⁰⁶ During his years in office Johnson kept to his promise, and sold Israel tanks and jet planes, gave Nasser and other Arab radicals the cold shoulder, and agreed with Israel's territorial gains made in the Six Day War.²⁰⁷ Furthermore,

²⁰² Little, 'Special Relationship', 563.

²⁰³ Little, 'Special Relationship', 563.

²⁰⁴ Little, 'Special Relationship', 563.

²⁰⁵ Little, 'Special Relationship', 563.

²⁰⁶ Lyndon B. Johnson, cited in Douglas Little, 'The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-68', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25:4 (1993), 572.

²⁰⁷ Little, 'Special Relationship', 572.

he appointed several pro-Israeli's, like Hubert Humphrey, Arthur Goldberg, Walt and Eugene Rostow, and John P. Roche, to occupy key posts in his administration. Little argues that Johnson's pro-Israeli attitude was in part caused by friends of Zion in the White House, the Congress, and the American Jewish Community.²⁰⁸ Johnson's personal sentiment towards Israel was warm and admiring. During his years in office he maintained close relations with the American Jewish community. Johnson's admiration for Israel didn't automatically mean he was in any sense anti-Arab, but Johnson did have little sympathy for radical Arab nationalism voiced by the Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser.²⁰⁹

According to Noam Chomsky the special relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv was caused both by U.S strategic interests, and by domestic pressure groups and their interests. Political scientist John J. Mearsheimer and Professor in international relations Stephen M. Walt argue that the overall thrust of the United States in the Middle East is mainly caused by American domestic politics, especially the activities of the Israel Lobby, on which I will elaborate in this chapter.²¹⁰ According to Mearsheimer and Walt, during the Cold War Israel was a strategic asset to the United States. By serving as Washington's proxy after the Six Day War Israel helped to contain Soviet expansion in the Middle East, and inflicted humiliating defeats on Soviet's allies Egypt and Syria. Israel also helped to protect other American allies in the region, like King Hussein of Jordan, and its military courage forced Moscow to spend more in backing its allies. However, Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the strategic value of Israel during the Cold War must not be overestimated. Supporting Israel wasn't cheap, and it complicated Washington's relations with the Arab states.²¹¹ Furthermore, another reason to question Israel's strategic value is that Tel Aviv did not always act like a loyal ally: Israeli officials often ignored U.S. requests and reneged on promises made to top U.S. leaders.²¹²

Mearsheimer and Walt downplay moral arguments for Washington's support to Tel Aviv. The first moral argument why the U.S. should support Israel is because it was weak and surrounded by enemies, but according to Mearsheimer and Walt this was far from true. They argue that Israel had larger, better equipped, and better-led forces, and was far from helpless, even in its early days.²¹³ The second moral argument is that Israel deserved support because it was a democracy, which was,

²⁰⁸ Little, 'Special Relationship', 578.

²⁰⁹ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 37.

²¹⁰ Mearsheimer, and Walt, 'Israel Lobby', 32.

²¹¹ Mearsheimer, and Walt, 'Israel Lobby', 32.

²¹² Mearsheimer, and Walt, 'Israel Lobby', 34.

²¹³ Mearsheimer, and Walt, 'Israel Lobby', 35.

in the eyes of the U.S. government, a moral preferable form of government. Moreover, in a toast to the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, U.S. officials stated ‘Israel is a reflection of so much of our own history, and of so much that we admire in others’.²¹⁴ However, the U.S. didn’t support all democracies in the world, and it has even supported dictatorships, so therefore this is not a valid argument. Furthermore, Israel was a different kind of democracy than the United States: the U.S. was a liberal democracy in which any person should enjoy the same rights, whereas Israel was founded as a Jewish state, where Palestinians were often seen and treated as second-class citizens.²¹⁵ Another moral argument is that the U.S. had to support Israel because the Jewish people suffered from past crimes and therefore deserved special treatment, but according to Mearsheimer and Walt the tragic history of the Jewish people didn’t obligate the U.S. to support Israel.²¹⁶ The final moral argument is that Israel deserved support because Israel’s conduct was morally superior to its adversaries’ behaviour. Israel was often portrayed as a country that searched for peace at every turn, and showed great restraint even when provoked. The Arabs were often portrayed as the opposite, and are said to have acted with depravity. However, Mearsheimer and Walt argue that his narrative is a myth, and in terms of actual behaviour Israel’s conduct wasn’t morally distinctive from that of its adversaries.²¹⁷

Mearsheimer and Walt argue that both strategic and moral arguments fail to explain the degree of American support to Israel. According to them, the explanation can be found in the political power of the Israel Lobby. They define the Israel Lobby as a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively try to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israeli direction.²¹⁸ The United States has a divided government, offering many avenues for influencing the policy-making process. As a result, interest groups can influence and shape policy in various ways, like lobbying elected representatives and members of the Executive Branch; making campaign contributions; voting in the elections; and moulding public opinion. In promoting American support to Israel, the Israel Lobby adopts two strategies. First, the lobby significantly influences the U.S. government, and pressures both the Congress and the Executive Branch to support Israel. Within the Congress there is little debate about Israel. This

²¹⁴ Roosevelt Study Center, Presidential Collection Richard Nixon, Papers of the Nixon White House. Part 7. President’s Personal Files, ‘Suggested Remarks: Toast for Prime Minister Meir, December 28, 1973’, Fiche 455, 2.

²¹⁵ Mearsheimer, and Walt, ‘Israel Lobby’, 35.

²¹⁶ Mearsheimer, and Walt, ‘Israel Lobby’, 37.

²¹⁷ Mearsheimer, and Walt, ‘Israel Lobby’, 37.

²¹⁸ Mearsheimer, and Walt, ‘Israel Lobby’, 40.

is due to the fact that some key members within the Congress are Christian Zionists.²¹⁹ Furthermore, AIPAC offers supporters of Israel financial support from pro-Israel political action committees, and punishes those who criticize Israel by not giving any financial support. Money is key in the elections, so therefore AIPAC is able to influence the Congress.²²⁰ The influence of AIPAC on Capitol Hill extends even further. Douglas Bloomfield, former AIPAC staff member argues: ‘It is common for members of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional Research Service, and committee staff or administration experts. (...) AIPAC is often called upon to draft speeches, work in legislation, advice on tactics, platform research, and collect co-sponsors and marshal votes’.²²¹ The Israel Lobby also has a significant influence on the Executive Branch. This is partly caused by the influence of Jewish voters in the elections. Even though there is only a small percentage of Jews in the United States (less than three percent), Jewish-Americans make large campaign donations.²²² The Washington Post estimated that democratic President candidates are dependent on Jewish donations as much as sixty percent.²²³ Furthermore, Jewish voters have a high turn-out, and they are mostly concentrated in key states like California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. The lobby’s other strategy is putting Israel in a positive light in the public discourse, by repeating myths about Israel and its founding and by publicizing Israel’s side in the policy debates. The goal of this strategy is preventing criticism on the Jewish state.²²⁴

However, Chomsky downplays the role of domestic pressure groups. He argues that this explanation undermines the scope of the support for Israel, and overestimates the role of political pressure groups in the decision-making process. According to Chomsky American politics and ideology are much more pluralist, and no pressure group would be able to dominate public opinion, or to exercise continuous influence on the policy-making process, except when their goals are synonym to the goals of the people with real power.²²⁵ Chomsky argues that the strengthening of the ties between Washington and Tel Aviv can mainly be explained by the changing role that Israel fulfilled in the context of America’s changing conceptions of its political-strategic interest in the Middle East. Israel has not represented the major U.S. interest

²¹⁹ Mearsheimer, and Walt, ‘Israel Lobby’, 42.

²²⁰ Mearsheimer, and Walt, ‘Israel Lobby’, 42.

²²¹ Douglas Bloomfield, cited in John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy’, *Middle East Policy* 13:3 (2006), 43.

²²² Mearsheimer, and Walt, ‘Israel Lobby’, 43.

²²³ Mearsheimer, and Walt, ‘Israel Lobby’, 44.

²²⁴ Mearsheimer, and Walt, ‘Israel Lobby’, 42.

²²⁵ Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, 61.

in the Middle East, but the energy reserves of the region, especially the Arab peninsula, have.²²⁶ Ever since the Second World War, Washington's foreign policy was aimed at keeping these energy reserves under American control.²²⁷ Little argues that the U.S. came to see Israel as an ally in the struggle to contain Soviet-backed revolutionary Arab nationalism. However, it was not the Soviets posing a serious threat to U.S. dominance in the region, as they were hesitant in entering on what was acknowledged to be American soil, but it was the Europeans, by whom the Americans were challenged. In 1973, in his 'Year of Europe' address, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger voiced his concerns about the possibility of a Europe-dominated trading bloc including the Middle East and North Africa, from which the Americans might be excluded.²²⁸ Apart from the European and Soviet threat, there was also an indigenous one: the threat of radical nationalism. It was within this context that the American-Israeli relations matured. Since the late 1950s, Washington took on an increasingly pro-Israel position, convinced by the idea that a powerful Israel would serve as a barrier against radical Arab nationalistic threats to American interests.²²⁹ Israel would serve to protect U.S. control over the oil producing regions in the Middle East.

3.3 Conclusions

The key question of this chapter was: Why did the Netherlands and the United States develop such a remarkably high amount of support for Israel? First, I elaborated on the origins of Dutch-Israeli relations. During the sixteenth century, Jews were tolerated by the Dutch. However, this didn't mean that the Dutch people had respect or admiration for the Jewish faith. This attitude was sustained up until the Second World War, mainly due to the pillarization of Dutch society. In the years prior to the Second World War, the Netherlands was confronted with thousands of German refugees, of which many were Jews. Because the Dutch government was aiming to stay neutral, and didn't want to deteriorate the relations between the Netherlands and Germany, the Dutch government wasn't eager to accept many refugees. During the war, a large percentage of Jews was deported from the Netherlands. However, this wasn't due to anti-Semitism, but because the Dutch people had respect for authority and their bureaucratic system was effective and efficient.

²²⁶ Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, 61.

²²⁷ Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, 65.

²²⁸ The Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE), 'Address given by Henry A. Kissinger (New York, 23 April 1973)':

http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/address_given_by_henry_a_kissinger_new_york_23_april_1973-en-dec472e3-9dff-4c06-ad8d-d3fab7e13f9f.html (4-1-2016).

²²⁹ Noam Chomsky, *Fateful Triangle*, 67.

Did something change in Dutch-Israeli relations after the Second World War? After the war the PvdA and Protestant parties developed sympathy for Israel. However, the Netherlands recognized the new-born state Israel relatively late, *de facto* in 1949 and *de jure* in 1950, because it didn't want to trigger conflict with the people from the Dutch East Indies, and with their ally Great Britain. Therefore, the Dutch stance towards the Jewish state remained reserved. During the Suez Crisis, the Netherlands stood by Israel, and in the 1950s the foundations for close relations with the Jewish state were established, because of an understanding between Prime Ministers Willem Drees and David Ben-Gurion. The ties were strengthened due to the Protestant culture of the Netherlands, the social-democratic features of Israel, and the fact that both were small states with an Atlantic orientation. During the Six Day War, the Dutch wholeheartedly sympathized with Israel. Even though criticism on the Jewish state increased in the early 1970s, The Hague still granted Israel support during the October War.

The close relationship between the United States and Israel originates, just like the close bond between the Netherlands and Israel, from the 1950s. The reasons for developing a strong bond with the Jewish state were, however, somewhat different. The special relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv can both be explained by strategic interests, and by domestic pressures. During the 1950s Eisenhower came to see Israel as a potential ally against Soviet interference in the Middle East. Eisenhower's successor Kennedy strengthened the ties with Tel Aviv because he was afraid that Israel would acquire atomic weapons if it wasn't protected by the Americans. Thereafter, Johnson, who admired the Jewish state, maintained a close relationship with Israel. However, these strategic interests are only part of the explanation of why the United States developed such a high amount of support to Israel. The American support to Israel can be explained by the power of the Israel Lobby as well. The Israel Lobby can be defined as a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively try to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israeli direction.²³⁰ The Israel Lobby tries to increase American support for Israel by pressuring the Congress and the Executive Branch. Furthermore, it tries to influence public opinion by putting Israel in a positive light and trying to prevent criticism on the Jewish state.

²³⁰ Mearsheimer, and Walt, 'Israel Lobby', 40.

4. Helping Out a Friend in Need: The Six Day War, 1967

In June 1967 Israel made substantial territorial gains by conquering the Sinai, Golan Heights, West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. These territorial gains were the result of the Six Day War. What was the American and Dutch reaction to the Six Day War? Did Washington influence The Hague in its policy decisions? First, I will give an overview of the war itself. Thereafter, I will move on to Washington and The Hague's policies towards the Six Day War. I will also elaborate on the question whether or not the Dutch policy was unique within the European context. Subsequently, I will compare the American and Dutch policies, and I will look into the question whether or not the United States government influenced the Dutch government's policy.

4.1 *The Six Day War, 1967*

The growing tensions between Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab neighbouring countries were visible long before the outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967. Israel's borders with Syria and Jordan were the stage of military conflicts already before the war started.²³¹ In 1966, for example, a battle was fought out between Israel and Syria in the region of the Sea of Galilee. It was in the light of this background that Egypt was willing to sign a mutual defence pact with Syria in 1966. Egypt signed this agreement hoping to restrain Damascus, and in order to minimize the chances on a large Arab-Israeli confrontation.²³²

In January 1967 al-Fatah, operating from Jordan, organized a series of raids against Israel. Alongside the Israeli-Syrian border guerrilla attacks against Israel were launched as well. On April 7 violence between Israel and Syria erupted again. This was caused by conflict over the cultivation of disputed lands in the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized zone, and led to a major engagement between the two countries.²³³ In the weeks that followed the Arabs became more and more suspicious that Israel was planning to invade Syria.²³⁴ Tel Aviv, on the other hand, stated that the attacks were only launched by Israel because the Israeli government was convinced that Damascus supported attacks by al-Fatah against the Jewish state.²³⁵ The United Arab Republic (UAR) stated that there was a large concentration of Israeli troops alongside

²³¹ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 378.

²³² Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 378.

²³³ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 382.

²³⁴ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 382.

²³⁵ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Outgoing Telegram Department of State. Subject: Status of Arab-Israeli Crisis, May 31, 1967', 2.

Israel's borders with Syria, and therefore, on May 16, the Egyptian authorities declared a state of emergency, and Egypt instructed the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to withdraw from the Sinai.²³⁶ Three days later UNEF withdrew, and the buffer that had separated Israel and Egypt since 1956 disappeared. This increased the chances on an armed conflict between Israel, Egypt and Syria.²³⁷ When UNEF withdrew from the area, Egypt forces started to move towards the border.²³⁸ At that moment, they had unrestricted control over Sharm el-Sheikh. On May 23 Nasser used his forces in this area to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, because he was suspicious that Israel was planning an attack on Syria. Nasser was aware that Israel would interpret this move as a *casus belli*. A war in the Middle East had become inevitable, and on May 21 Egypt mobilized its reserves.

On May 23, the Israeli government held an emergency meeting. All Israeli politicians agreed that the closing of the Straits of Tiran couldn't be tolerated, but they differed in opinion on how to re-open the Strait. Some, led by Foreign Minister Abba Eban, were in favour of searching for a diplomatic solution, and letting the international community pressure Nasser to re-open the Strait, while others, mostly military chiefs, argued that Israel had to re-open the Strait by itself.²³⁹ On May 27 Tel Aviv voted on the question whether or not Israel had to go to war. Nine percent of the members voted in favour and 91 percent voted against.²⁴⁰ Several members of the government voted against going to war because they doubted Israel's Minister of Defence Levi Eshkol's ability to lead Israel in a war.²⁴¹ On May 30 Nasser signed a mutual defence agreement with Jordan, which stated that Jordan forces would be placed under Egypt's command in the event of a war. Israel perceived the signing of this agreement and the closing of the Straits of Tiran as an alarm that war was around the corner.²⁴² On May 29 Eshkol resigned from his position as Minister of Defence and a new Minister, Moshe Dayan, was installed. The Israeli military argued that if Israel wouldn't strike first, the Arabs would. Waiting to strike meant, according to the military, that the military positions of Israel's enemies would

²³⁶ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Outgoing Telegram Department of State. Subject: Status of Arab-Israeli Crisis, May 31, 1967', 2.

²³⁷ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 388.

²³⁸ Pappé, *History of Modern Palestine*, 186.

²³⁹ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 395.

²⁴⁰ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 395.

²⁴¹ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 395.

²⁴² Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum from W. Rostow to President Johnson, May 31, 1967', 2.

improve.²⁴³ Furthermore, Tel Aviv was convinced that it would win the war within a week.²⁴⁴

Therefore Israel launched a surprise attack on the Arab neighbouring states on June 5. After only a few hours, it became clear that Israel would win the war.²⁴⁵ This was due to Israeli superiority in maintenance, leadership, training and discipline, rather than numerical superiority.²⁴⁶ Israeli aircrafts attacked the airfields of the surrounding Arab states. More than 350 Arab bombers and warplanes, and several transport aircrafts were disabled during the first two days of the war.²⁴⁷ On the ground the war started on June 5 as well. The Israeli army attacked the Sinai and Gaza on the Egypt front, the Golan Heights on the Syrian front, and the West Bank on the Jordan front. Despite strong resistance in some areas, the Israeli army succeeded on all fronts, and soon controlled large stretches of Arab territory.²⁴⁸ By June 10 the Arab states agreed with a cease-fire, and the war came to an end. Not only did the Arab states lose territory, but they also lost prestige due to the Israeli victory.

The most direct result of the Six Day War was the change in the territorial *status quo*. After the war Israel was in control of the Sinai, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem.²⁴⁹ This granted Israel control not only over territories that first belonged to Egypt, Syria and Jordan, but also over the entire area that the United Nations had appointed to the Palestinians. Figure 1 shows the increase in Israeli territories over the years 1947-1967. As for the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the war had demographic implications as well, for it not only expanded Jewish State Control over Palestinian land, but also put thousands of Palestinian Arabs under Israeli military administration.²⁵⁰ On November 22, 1967 the United Nations adopted Resolution 242. This resolution stated that Israel must withdraw its armed forces from the territories it gained during the Six Day War.²⁵¹ Furthermore, the resolution pressed for the termination of states of belligerency, and respect for, and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,

²⁴³ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Intelligence Memorandum. Subject: The Current Focus of the Near East Crisis, June 3, 1967', 2.

²⁴⁴ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum of Conversation Between U.S. and U.K. Representatives. Subject: Middle East, June 2, 1967', 4.

²⁴⁵ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 397.

²⁴⁶ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum. Subject: National Security Council Meeting, June 7, 1967', 3.

²⁴⁷ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Outgoing Telegram Department of State. Subject: Middle East Situation as of June 5, June 6, 1967', 1.

²⁴⁸ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 397.


²⁴⁹ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 399.

²⁵⁰ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 402.

²⁵¹ United Nations Security Council, 'Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967': <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136> (5-8-2016).

territorial integrity, and political independence of all states in the area, and their right to live in peace within safe and recognized borders, free of threats and acts of violence.²⁵²

Figure 1. The increase in Israeli territories, 1947-1967



Source: '1947 UN Partition Plan': <http://histomil.com/viewtopic.php?t=8463> (9-6-2016).

After the Six Day War the Palestinian refugee camps were confronted with a new wave of displaced persons, some of them fled from their homes, others driven out by force from the territories Israel occupied since the Six Day War. In 1972 as much as 1.5 million refugees were registered, of whom 650,000 lived in the thirteen large refugee camps in Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.²⁵³ Meanwhile, 590,000 Palestinians in the West Bank, and 380,000 in the Gaza Strip had fallen under Israeli hegemony.²⁵⁴ The Israeli government aimed at expulsion of the Palestinians from the occupied territories, and they brutally and violently reacted to every form

²⁵² United Nations Security Council, 'Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967': <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136> (5-8-2016).

²⁵³ Pappé, *History of Modern Palestine*, 188.

²⁵⁴ Pappé, *History of Modern Palestine*, 197.

of resistance by the Palestinians.²⁵⁵ The Israeli occupation led to a constant violation of human and civil rights, which wasn't supported by the Netherlands and the United States.

4.2 The United States and the Six Day War

In 1967 Johnson's main priority in foreign policy was the Vietnam War (1955-1975). Middle Eastern issues were often handled by the State Department. Between 1964 and 1967 American-Egyptian relations gradually deteriorated, in part because of the conflict in Yemen (1962-1970). After an Israeli raid on the Jordan city Asu-Samu in November 1966, and especially after the Israeli-Syrian air battles of April 1967, the State Department began to worry about the growing tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbouring states.²⁵⁶ Johnson's adviser Walt Rostow feared that the Soviet Union would use tensions in the Middle East to increase its influence in the region.²⁵⁷ During the first week of May 1967 the conflict took a new turn. Overnight it changed into a situation in which full scale war seemed possible.

When Nasser sent his troops into the Sinai, and demanded UNEF withdrawal from the borderlines, Johnson undertook diplomatic efforts to prevent a war. Johnson wanted to prevent Israel from taking unilateral action and therefore to restrain Israel from attacking, and gather allied support for any action that could be undertaken. Johnson didn't want the United States to take unilateral action, for this could weaken America's position in the Middle East.²⁵⁸ Furthermore, the United States didn't have the means to take unilateral action, because its troops were deeply committed to Vietnam. Therefore, Washington was committed to restrain Israel and to build a multilateral context for diplomatic action. On May 22 Nasser declared that Egypt would close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli vessels.²⁵⁹ U.S. statements about the international character of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba led Arabs to believe that Washington was pro-Israel. However, the United States wanted to emphasize its neutrality, by arguing its main goal was guaranteeing political independence and territorial integrity of all states in the region.²⁶⁰ U.S. policy began to develop towards multilateral action to break the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, on behalf of the international community.²⁶¹ Washington hoped to get at least

²⁵⁵ Pappé, *History of Modern Palestine*, 197.

²⁵⁶ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 38.

²⁵⁷ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 48.

²⁵⁸ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 40.

²⁵⁹ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Outgoing Telegram Department of State, to American Embassies in the Middle East. June 1, 1967', 2.

²⁶⁰ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Telegram from American Embassy Jidda, to Secretary of State Washington. June 1967', 1.

²⁶¹ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Outgoing Telegram Department of State. Subject: Status of Arab-Israeli Crisis. May 31, 1967', 4.

fourteen countries to sign a maritime declaration of free shipping.²⁶² On May 23 Johnson received a letter from Secretary of State Dean Rusk, stating that Congress would support Israel, but would oppose unilateral action by the United States.²⁶³

Israel repeatedly asked the Americans for strong, public support for its actions. According to Tel Aviv, this kind of commitment would decrease the chance of Israel taking unilateral action.²⁶⁴ However, a strong American commitment to Israel would be controversial regarding Washington's wish to undertake multilateral action. According to Johnson a plan of multilateral action was essential for granting public and Congressional support.²⁶⁵ This support was essential in times of controversy over the American role in Vietnam. The goals of restraining Israel and taking multilateral action weren't necessarily conflicting. Though, the necessary condition for obtaining these goals was that there would be sufficient time, at least two-three weeks.²⁶⁶ Within this period the situation on the ground couldn't change radically, nor should the balance of forces in Israel be allowed to shift towards those who were in favour of war. If these conditions wouldn't be met, the assumptions of U.S. policy would be undermined, and war was likely to break out. However, in the last week of May it became apparent that time was running out.

On May 27, Washington received information that Israel was planning to attack. Johnson warned Israel to restrain itself for at least two weeks, and stated: 'Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone'.²⁶⁷ On June 3, Israel decided that there was no chance on unilateral action by the Americans, nor was there a chance on successful multilateral action. Tel Aviv concluded that Israel was on its own. Two days later the Israeli air force attacked and destroyed the Egyptian and Syrian air forces within several hours. This was good news to the Americans, since Washington considered the defeat of Israel the worst-case scenario.²⁶⁸ The outbreak of the war changed the situation completely for American policymakers: new issues gained priority. Why was Johnson willing to support Israel from the moment the war broke out? The key to understanding Johnson's position was his fear that the U.S. would be drawn into another war, possibly involving confrontation with the Soviets.²⁶⁹

²⁶² Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Outgoing Telegram Department of State, to American Embassy Tel Aviv. June 3, 1967', 1.

²⁶³ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 44.

²⁶⁴ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 45.

²⁶⁵ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 45.

²⁶⁶ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 45.

²⁶⁷ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 54.

²⁶⁸ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands.

'Memorandum of Conversation Between the U.S. and U.K. Subject: Middle East, June 2, 1967', 3.

²⁶⁹ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 60.

The question who stroke first was quickly overtaken by events. When it became clear that Israel launched the first attack, it didn't seem to matter anymore. Washington strived for putting an end to the fighting through the United Nations, and feared to become involved in the war.²⁷⁰ Johnson wanted to make it clear that the U.S. wasn't involved in any of the fighting, thereby securing American interests in the region, decreasing the chance on Soviet intervention, and trying to facilitate a cease-fire.²⁷¹ Washington aimed at cooperation with the Soviets in facilitating a cease-fire. Therefore, Johnson was mainly focused on Moscow's behaviour once the war started. Now that Israel was safe from defeat by the Arab countries, only Soviet behaviour could trigger a direct American military reaction.²⁷² Soviet intervention, and the possibility of superpower confrontation occurred on the sixth day of the fighting, June 10. The United States and the Soviet Union wanted Israel to accept a cease-fire, for Israeli forces were threatening Damascus. Moscow stated that it would intervene if Israel didn't accept an immediate cease-fire. Johnson sent the Sixth Fleet, the United States Navy's operational fleet, to the Syrian coast, to ensure that the Soviets didn't underestimate the fact that Soviet intervention would trigger American intervention.²⁷³ In the end it didn't come to a confrontation, and a cease-fire went into effect.

Washington opted for restoration of the pre-war frontiers, but eventually agreed with adjustment of the pre-war frontiers, accepting Israeli gains during the war: the Sinai, the West-bank, Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem.²⁷⁴ The war was over, and there was a new situation which asked for a new policy. During the war, the president became the centre of the policy-making arena.²⁷⁵ It's also noteworthy that the powerful pro-Israeli interest groups and the oil lobby played a particularly small role in the decision-making process of the war. However, when the war started the pro-Israel sentiment in the American public opinion did make it easier for Johnson to pursue a policy in which the U.S. supported Israel.²⁷⁶ Now I've elaborated on American policy during the Six Day War, I will move on to the Dutch stance towards the war.

4.3 The Netherlands and the Six Day War

²⁷⁰ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Draft Message from President Johnson to King Faisal, June 6, 1967', 1.

²⁷¹ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 61.

²⁷² Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 63.

²⁷³ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 63.

²⁷⁴ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Middle East Settlement, June 8, 1967', 3.

²⁷⁵ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 68.

²⁷⁶ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 70.

The pro-Israel reputation of the Netherlands was clearly shown by the Dutch support for Israel in the Six Day War.²⁷⁷ The close relationship between The Hague and Tel Aviv, as described in chapter three, contributed to the Dutch support for Israel in 1967. Moreover, the Dutch sympathized with the idea of free passage through the international waterways. Because Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and thereby also Israel's access to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Israeli port Eilat, the Dutch government took on a pro-Israel attitude towards the conflict.²⁷⁸ The Dutch political parties viewed the blockade of the Straits of Tiran as an act of aggression from the Arab states.²⁷⁹ In May 1967 the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns argued that the Egyptian blockade should be seen as an attack on Israel, for the principle of free passage through the international waterways was violated.²⁸⁰ During an informal meeting of NATO representatives on the topic of free passage through the international waterways, held on May 30, only the Netherlands, the United States, Belgium and Germany proved to be clearly in favour of the principle of free passage.²⁸¹ Italy wanted the United Nations to solve the crisis in the Middle East, and rejected all other initiatives.²⁸² When the United States wanted to establish a multinational fleet in order to break the blockade the Netherlands, besides the United States itself, Great Britain and Canada, was willing to participate. However, Britain and Canada soon withdrew their support, and France didn't answer Washington's request.²⁸³ Despite the pro-Israel sentiments in France's public opinion, France aimed to stay neutral in the conflict.²⁸⁴ Ultimately, the Dutch remained the only ones to support Washington's request for the establishment of a multinational fleet. Luns argued that, because the Netherlands was a maritime power, it was automatically involved the war.²⁸⁵ After all, the idea of free passage through the international waterways emanated from the Dutch Early-Modern jurist Hugo de Groot (1583-1645).²⁸⁶

Given the atmosphere of sympathy and compassion with Israel, it was obvious that the

²⁷⁷ Hellema, *Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek*, 251.

²⁷⁸ Van den Houten and Kopuit, *Wij staan achter Israel*, 9.

²⁷⁹ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen Der Staten Generaal 1965-1967, 'Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 13^e vergadering 6 juni 1967', 311.

²⁸⁰ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 139.

²⁸¹ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'CIA Intelligence Memorandum. Subject: Arab-Israeli Situation Report, June 2, 1967', 1.

²⁸² Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'CIA Intelligence Memorandum. Subject: Arab-Israeli Situation Report, June 2, 1967', 1.

²⁸³ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 139.

²⁸⁴ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 139.

²⁸⁵ Roosevelt Study Center, Dutch-American Diplomatic Relations, 1784-1973 Collection. National Archives. Record Group 49. Reel 2. Subject-Numerical File 1967, 'Airgram to Department of State, from American Embassy, The Hague. Subject: WEEKA 21, Date: May 30, 1967', 2.

²⁸⁶ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 140.

Dutch government would support the Jewish state. On May 30 Israel requested the Netherlands to supply them with arms. The Dutch government and opposition agreed that Israel needed such help, and should get it when a war would break out. The governing parties agreed on providing Israel with arms and munitions without any discussion.²⁸⁷ All parties, except for the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP) expressed their sympathy for Israel. PSP politician Otto Boetes argued that the Arab grievances were legitimate, and he stated that Israel was not always right.²⁸⁸ However, eventually the PSP decided to vote in favour of Dutch support for Israel.²⁸⁹ The PvdA stated that arms supplies could continue in the event of a war, unless the United Nations would impose and embargo on all parties.²⁹⁰ In the debate in the Second Chamber on June 7 the sympathy for Israel among politicians from the PvdA was expressed even more clearly. Prime Minister Piet de Jong, from the KVP, stated: ‘Israel was founded by the United Nations, and we are strong believers of the United Nations. It’s a small country, surrounded by enemies. The Netherlands, a small country as well, was threatened by the Russians. Moreover, the memory of our usurpation during the Second World War is still fresh and bitter’.²⁹¹ Prime Minister De Jong was, just like Willem Drees, an important character in the establishment of the strong friendship between the Netherlands and Israel.

After the outbreak of the war De Jong blamed the Arabs, and he reaffirmed Dutch insistence on the guarantee of the survival of the Jewish state. According to De Jong, the war was caused by the positions the Arab states took on, and especially the blockade on the Straits of Tiran.²⁹² De Jong stated that Israel’s right to exist should have priority over all other discussions, and could never be questioned.²⁹³ This statement was supported by all political parties, and subsequently a unanimous supported motion was passed, calling on the government to do what it could do, inside and outside the United Nations, to re-establish peace in the Middle East.²⁹⁴ De Jong stressed that if the Dutch were able to play a part in solving the

²⁸⁷ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 147.

²⁸⁸ Roosevelt Study Center, Dutch-American Diplomatic Relations, 1784-1973 Collection. National Archives. Record Group 49. Reel 2. Subject-Numerical File 1967, ‘Airgram to Department of State, from American Embassy, The Hague. Subject: Foreign Affairs Debate in the First Chamber, Date: July 21, 1967’, 2.

²⁸⁹ Roosevelt Study Center, Dutch-American Diplomatic Relations, 1784-1973 Collection. National Archives. Record Group 49. Reel 2. Subject-Numerical File 1967, ‘Airgram to Department of State, from American Embassy, The Hague. Subject: WEEKA 22, Date: June 6, 1967’, 2.

²⁹⁰ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 147.

²⁹¹ Piet de Jong, cited in Frans Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden. Het geheime bondgenootschap tussen Nederland en Israel* (Amsterdam and Antwerpen 1997), 147.

²⁹² <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen Der Staten Generaal 1965-1967, ‘Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 13^e vergadering 6 juni 1967’, 330.

²⁹³ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen Der Staten Generaal 1965-1967, ‘Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 13^e vergadering 6 juni 1967’, 330.

²⁹⁴ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen Der Staten Generaal 1965-1967. Kamerstuknummer 9161, Ondernummer 1. ‘Toestand in het Nabije Oosten’ motie van de heer Schmelzer, 1.

crisis, it should be aimed at the containment of violence, and establishing a cease-fire as soon as possible. He argued that United Nation's Security Council had the key to solving the conflict, for the United Nations was in De Jong's view the only body that could find a successful solution for the conflict.²⁹⁵ PvdA politician Joop den Uyl argued that the existence of Israel should be secured once and for all. He agreed with De Jong, stating that Israel's right to exist, and its integrity should have priority.²⁹⁶ Den Uyl also argued that Israel's attack on its neighbouring states was a legitimate act of self-defence, and therefore the Jewish state couldn't be marked as the aggressor.²⁹⁷ The reason why there wasn't an actual lively debate in the Netherlands was that the Dutch media didn't have editorial offices in the Middle East.²⁹⁸ The Dutch broadcast channels didn't even have a reporter in Cairo. Therefore, when the war started, the Dutch media hastily signed a contract with the German *Westdeutscher Rundfunk*, in order to take over their reporting on the war. This led to an uninterrupted series of radio reporting and newspaper articles about the small and threatened underdog Israel that defended itself like King David from the Arab Goliath.²⁹⁹ Israel's military superiority was unknown to Dutch journalism.

Not only Dutch politicians, but also the majority of the Dutch people sympathized with Israel. A survey held by the Dutch Institute for Public Opinion and Market Research showed that 67 percent of the Dutch people supported Israel.³⁰⁰ The Jewish firm supported Israel by giving it 20,000 guilders.³⁰¹ The newspaper *Het Parool* collected money as well, and eventually gathered 153,000 guilders.³⁰² The Labour Foundation asked employees to donate three hours of their salary, and asked the employers to triple the amount of money donated by their employees.³⁰³ Companies like KLM, Philips and Unilever didn't support these donations, because they feared that the Arabs would impose a boycott on the Netherlands.³⁰⁴ Furthermore, the Dutch Ministry of Finance stated that whoever gave Israel financial support would receive a fiscal compensation.³⁰⁵ In Rotterdam, The Hague, Assen, Venlo, Hilversum and Bussum, pro-

²⁹⁵ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen Der Staten Generaal 1965-1967, 'Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 13^e vergadering 6 juni 1967', 330.

²⁹⁶ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen Der Staten Generaal 1965-1967, 'Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 13^e vergadering 6 juni 1967', 331.

²⁹⁷ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen Der Staten Generaal 1965-1967, 'Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 13^e vergadering 6 juni 1967', 331.

²⁹⁸ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 147.

²⁹⁹ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 147.

³⁰⁰ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 144.

³⁰¹ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 144.

³⁰² Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 144.

³⁰³ Interview with Ronny Naftaniel, April 6, 2016.

³⁰⁴ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 145.

³⁰⁵ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 145.

Israel committees were established. Moreover, nine Dutch volunteers left for Israel, in order to assist the country in the war. Furthermore, approximately 10,000 Dutch citizens participated in a pro-Israel demonstration in Amsterdam.³⁰⁶

The Dutch stance towards the situation in the Middle East in May and June 1967 differed from that of other Western European countries. Other Western European countries were less supportive of Israel, for they were aware that this would deteriorate their relations with the Arab states, and would jeopardize European access to Middle Eastern oil.³⁰⁷ The Spanish government was clearly pro-Arab, and would definitely not participate in a U.S. sponsored action on Israel's behalf.³⁰⁸ However Spain's sympathy for the Arab states didn't mean that Madrid would give the Arab states military support. Spain wanted to establish a cease-fire as soon as possible.³⁰⁹ During the years preceding the war France had been one of Israel's major weapon suppliers, however, it had also improved its relations with the Arab states. Before the war broke out the French government had claimed to be neutral. However, because this neutrality contrasted with France's previous pro-Israeli stance, Washington stated that this neutrality had a pro-Arab air about it.³¹⁰ The British government sympathized with Israel, and adopted an antagonistic attitude towards Nasser. The British Labour politicians viewed Israel as a besieged socialist country, and most Tories remembered Israel as Britain's partner during the Suez Crisis.³¹¹ Yet, because the government remained indecisive London decided on June 5, the day the war started, that Britain should stay neutral and try to establish a cease-fire as soon as possible.³¹² The British position was mainly caused by the fact that the Arabs states could use powerful economic weapons against Great Britain. If London was to support Israel, the U.K. could lose earnings of shipping, profits and dividend, and could be confronted with an oil embargo.³¹³

³⁰⁶ Roosevelt Study Center, Dutch-American Diplomatic Relations, 1784-1973 Collection. National Archives. Record Group 49. Reel 2. Subject-Numerical File 1967, 'Airgram to Department of State, from American Embassy, The Hague. Subject: WEEKA22, June 6, 1967', 2.

³⁰⁷ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Gely Skritsky of the Soviet Embassy, June 6, 1967', 4.

³⁰⁸ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Report on International Reactions to Mid-East Hostilities, June 6, 1967', 5.

³⁰⁹ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Report on International Reactions to Mid-East Hostilities, June 6, 1967', 5.

³¹⁰ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Report on International Reactions to Mid-East Hostilities, June 6, 1967', 5.

³¹¹ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Report on International Reactions to Mid-East Hostilities, June 6, 1967', 8.

³¹² Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Report on International Reactions to Mid-East Hostilities, June 6, 1967', 8.

³¹³ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Report on International Reactions to Mid-East Hostilities, June 6, 1967', 8.

The Dutch enthusiasm and sympathy for Israel slightly faded when it became clear that Israel had crushed its Arab neighbouring states.³¹⁴ After the war ended the Dutch trade unions, who collected money to support Israel, stated that the financial donations would not only be directed at the Jewish State, but also at the refugees in the Middle East.³¹⁵

4.4 Comparing American and Dutch Policies

When it became clear that the outbreak of a war between Israel and the Arab states was likely, the American government tried to prevent a war by searching for a diplomatic solution. Even though the Americans supported Israel during the Six Day War, Washington kept emphasizing their neutrality, for they wanted to guarantee the political independence and territorial integrity of all states in the region. On the contrary, The Hague strongly sympathized with Israel, and there was no actual debate on whether or not to support the Jewish state in the event of a war. In this respect the American and Dutch policies were clearly distinct. While the United States was hesitant to declare full support for Israel, the Netherlands stood solidly with the Jewish state. Washington opted for the establishment of a multinational fleet to break the blockade on the Straits of Tiran. Eventually the Dutch remained the only ones willing to participate in a multinational fleet together with the Americans. The willingness of the Dutch to participate in a multinational fleet could rest on a sense of obligation to the Americans – this way of influencing rests on ‘authority’ or ‘respect’ – or the wish to gratify the U.S. government – this way of influencing rests on ‘friendship’. When we take into account that during the 1960s strong Atlanticist feelings were present in the Netherlands, it can be argued that strong Atlanticism in 1967 contributed to the Dutch support for Israel. However, the Dutch political parties made it clear that their support for Israel rested on their sympathy with the idea of free passage through the international waterways, as well as their sympathy and respect for the Jewish state itself, and the need to secure its existence. Transcripts of meetings of the Dutch government show that there wasn’t any discussion on whether or not to support Israel.³¹⁶ Moreover, the Dutch government didn’t discuss Washington’s views on the matter.³¹⁷ In this respect The Hague’s support for Israel rested rather on a sense of obligation to Israel, than a sense of obligation to

³¹⁴ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 145.

³¹⁵ Roosevelt Study Center, Dutch-American Diplomatic Relations, 1784-1973 Collection. National Archives. Record Group 49. Reel 2. Subject-Numerical File 1967, ‘Airgram to Department of State, from American Embassy, The Hague. Subject: WEEKA25, June 27, 1967’, 2.

³¹⁶ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen Der Staten Generaal 1965-1967, ‘Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 13^e vergadering 6 juni 1967’, 330.

³¹⁷ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen Der Staten Generaal 1965-1967, ‘Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 13^e vergadering 6 juni 1967’.

the United States. However, The Hague's sympathy towards Israel converged with the American position towards the conflict. Because the transcripts of meetings of the Dutch government don't show discussion on the American point of view, we can't conclude that the Dutch were pressured by the Americans, but we can state that Atlanticist feelings made it easy for the Netherlands to support the Jewish state, since their stance was in accordance with that of the United States. During the war the United States tried to establish a cease-fire, and aimed at preventing Soviet intervention. In the Netherlands, several initiatives were launched to provide the Israeli's with financial support. However, these organization of these initiatives didn't rest upon pressure or influence from the United States.

4.5 Conclusions

The key question of this chapter was: What was the American and Dutch reaction to the Six Day War, and did Washington influence The Hague in its policy decisions? Before the outbreak of the Six Day War tensions between on the one hand Israel, and on the other hand the Palestinians and the Arab States grew. Violence erupted between Israel and Syria, and therefore Nasser instructed UNEF to withdraw from the Sinai, and subsequently closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli vessels. On June 5 Israel attacked its neighbouring Arab states, and the war lasted until June 10. The most direct result of the Six Day War was the change in the territorial *status quo*: after the war Israel controlled the Sinai, Golan Heights, West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. When the war ended the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 242, which demanded Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, and stated that the independence and sovereignty of all states in the region should be recognized.

During the Six Day War Washington adopted a set of key principles which preceded the decision-making process. In the period prior to the war Washington's key principles included no unilateral action by the U.S., and therefore trying to prevent hostilities and developing a multilateral context to end the blockade of the Straits of Tiran. During the war the Americans aimed at preventing Soviet intervention, creating a cease-fire that wouldn't be based on the *status quo ante*, which was dangerous and unstable in Washington's eyes. In the post-war period the U.S. wanted to create full peace as soon as possible, by trading territory for peace. Furthermore, it wanted to strengthen Israel by providing arms shipments.

The pro-Israel reputation of The Hague was clearly shown by their support for Israel in the Six Day War. The Hague sympathized with the idea of free passage through the international waterways, and therefore stated that Nasser's closing of the Straits of Tiran conflicted with international law. All political parties sympathized with Israel, and there was no actual debate

on the question which party could be blamed for the outbreak of the war. Furthermore, key positions in the Dutch government were occupied by people who were pro-Israel: De Jong was Prime Minister, and Luns was Minister of Foreign Affairs. When the United States proposed to establish a multinational fleet in order to break the blockade on the Strait of Tiran, the Dutch proved to be the only country willing to join the fleet. The Dutch stance in the Six Day War therefore differed from that of its European allies.

The willingness of the Dutch government to participate in a multinational fleet could rest on a sense of obligation – ‘authority’ or ‘respect’ – to the United States, as well as on The Hague’s wish to gratify the United States government – ‘friendship’. However, the Dutch political parties made it clear that their sympathy lay with the Jewish state, and that they would do anything in their power to support Israel in the event of a war. Because the Dutch government didn’t discuss the American point of view on the matter, we cannot conclude that the Americans pressured the Dutch, in order to support Israel. Yet, the Dutch position was in accordance with that of the United States, so it definitely made it easier for the Netherlands to pursue a policy in which they supported Israel.

5. The October War and the Oil Crisis, 1973-1974

On Sunday November 4, 1973, no cars and trucks filled the Dutch highways. This was caused by The Hague's introduction of the Car Free Sundays in the Netherlands, in order prevent oil shortages due to the oil crisis of 1973-1974. The oil crisis was a direct result of the October War: a war between on the one hand the Arab states Egypt and Syria, and on the other hand Israel, in October 1973. In this chapter I will elaborate on the October War, and the American and Dutch support for Israel during this war. The key question of this chapter is: What was the American and Dutch reaction to the October War and oil crisis of 1973-1974, and did Washington influence the Dutch government in its policy decisions? Given the declining Atlanticism in the early 1970s, one would argue that the Netherlands adopt a position that was more in line with its European allies. However, the question is, did Atlanticism really decline, or did it still occupy a central position in The Hague's policy? First, I will give an overview of the October War. Thereafter, I will move on to Washington and The Hague's policies towards the war and the subsequent oil crisis. I will also elaborate on whether or not Dutch policy was unique within the European context. Subsequently, I will compare the American and Dutch policies, and I will look into the question whether or not Washington influenced The Hague's policy.

5.1 *The October War, 1973*

In October 1973 Israel was taken by surprise by a joint attack from Egypt and Syria. Egypt and Syria launched the surprise attack, called Operation Badr, on October 6 alongside the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights in order to win back the territories lost during the Six Day War of 1967.³¹⁸ Strong concentrations of Egyptian artillery bombarded the Israeli gantries on the Eastern shore of the canal, followed by units crossing the canal.³¹⁹ Egyptian fire boats made breaches in the walls Israel had put up for defence. Egypt installed a bridge over the Suez Canal, enabling tanks, jeeps and trucks with artillery and supplies to cross the canal.³²⁰ The Israeli military leaders were not prepared to go to war. When Israel mobilized their troops on that same day, it was already too late. October 6, Yom Kippur, which means the Day of Atonement, is an important Holiday/religious day for Jews. Therefore, most reserves were in the synagogue when

³¹⁸ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 187.

³¹⁹ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 187.

³²⁰ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 188.

Israel was attacked, and only the Israeli air force and navy were mobilized.³²¹ The Israeli front alongside the Suez Canal was defended by an understaffed brigade of several thousands of reserves. The defence was not able to stop the Egyptian soldiers, and eventually Egypt succeeded to occupy a strip of land of approximately 4.5 kilometres east of the canal.³²² During the first days of the war the Israeli air force focused on the battle in the Golan Heights, where Israel was attacked by Syria. On October 6, 60 Israeli tanks were confronted with 600 Syrian tanks, supported by an inferno of shelling.³²³ The Israeli tanks were superior in mobility, and were therefore able to destroy dozens of Syrian tanks, but because Syria had far more tanks it slowly succeeded in pushing Israel back.³²⁴ Meanwhile, the Israeli air force bombarded Syria. The Syrian air force was only superior in the air above the Golan front, where it destroyed several Israeli aircrafts.³²⁵

In the course of October 8 the successes of Damascus came to an end. That same day Israeli tanks attacked the Egyptians, but they failed and many Israeli tanks were eliminated by Egyptian bazookas and rockets. During the first three days of the war Egypt and Syria made advances and shut down 500 Israeli tanks and 49 Israeli aircrafts.³²⁶ On October 8 Israel declared a nuclear alarm and provided the rockets on the mountains south of Jerusalem with nuclear heads, pointed at the Egyptian and Syrian military headquarters in Cairo and Damascus.³²⁷ In order to prevent a nuclear war, the United States decided to grant Israel new conventional weapons, military spare parts, and munitions.³²⁸ In the meanwhile the Soviet Union aided Syria and Egypt.³²⁹ From October 9 onwards Israel was able to make advances on the Syrian front, what enabled Tel Aviv to concentrate more of its forces on the Egyptian front. An important factor that contributed to turning the war's tide was the superior tactic flexibility of the Israeli field commanders, including their ability to improvise.³³⁰ Because Israel received military supplies from the United States it was able to succeed on both fronts, and therefore rejected the propositions for a cease-fire. The fighting came to an end on October 24. What

³²¹ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 188.

³²² Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 190.

³²³ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 191.

³²⁴ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum. Subject: Arab-Israeli Hostilities and their Implications, October 6, 1973', 4.

³²⁵ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 192.

³²⁶ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 194.

³²⁷ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 195.

³²⁸ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum of Conversation. Subject: The Middle East, November 12, 1973', 1.

³²⁹ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum of Conversation. Subject: The Middle East, November 12, 1973', 1.

³³⁰ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 476.

initially seemed a disaster for the Israeli army, was transformed into a complete victory. Israel recaptured most territories in the Sinai and even managed to establish positions west of the Sinai.³³¹ In the north Israel won back the Golan Heights and pushed deeper into Syria.³³² A near defeat on the battlefield for Israel shocked the Israeli political system entirely.³³³ Intelligence failures of the Israeli army and battlefield losses during the first days of the war created doubt on the military capabilities of the Jewish state.³³⁴

5.2 The United States and the October War

The October War produced a massive revision of the underlying assumptions in American policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in the period 1970-1973.³³⁵ According to the Republican President, Richard Nixon, the October War was one of the most complicated conflicts in the Cold War since the Cuba Crisis (1962). Nixon's national security adviser between 1969 and 1973, Henry Kissinger, argued that there was a 75 percent chance that the Soviets would intervene in the Middle East on behalf of the Arabs.³³⁶ It was also one of the first challenges for the growing détente between the United States and the Soviet Union.³³⁷ Kissinger was often warned about the growing tensions in the Middle East. However, the outbreak of the war took Washington by surprise. The American government assumed that a military balance between Israel and its Arab neighbouring states was key to whether there would be another war in the Middle East.³³⁸ This assumption had been a key aspect in American Middle East policy since 1967. Because the Israeli's had the upper hand in the military situation, it was not likely that the Arabs would go to war, since they would probably be defeated. Moreover, Israel didn't expect war to break out either. On October 5, the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir told Kissinger that she wasn't expecting an attack from neither Egypt, nor Syria. Apparently, Egypt and Syria did manage to observe high standards of secrecy and deception.³³⁹

On October 6 word reached Washington that Egypt and Syria were planning to go to war that same day. The initial reaction was one of caution, for Washington didn't know who stroke first. If they were to point fingers many interests would be at stake: United States-Soviet

³³¹ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 477.

³³² Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 477.

³³³ Pappé, *History of Modern Palestine*, 209.

³³⁴ Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 477.

³³⁵ The October War can also be called the Yom Kippur War. Because the name Yom Kippur War is often used from a Jewish perspective, I use the more general name October War.

³³⁶ John L. Scherer, 'Soviet and American Behavior During the October War', *World Affairs* 141:1 (1978), 3.

³³⁷ Scherer, 'October War', 3.

³³⁸ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 168.

³³⁹ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 169.

détente; American-Israeli relations; American credibility with the Arabs; and the weakened authority of President Nixon.³⁴⁰ When it became clear that it were Egypt and Syria who stroke first Nixon and Kissinger ignored the issue, partly because of the growing importance of American-Arab relations, due to the oil.³⁴¹ Meanwhile, the Soviet Union declared that it would assist the Arab states in recapturing the territories they lost to Israel in 1967. Washington expected Israel to win the war within a short amount of time. Moreover, it wanted to avoid confrontation with the Arabs. Therefore, the U.S. would keep a low profile, while aiming to establish a cease-fire.³⁴² Tel Aviv repeatedly requested Washington to resupply Israel. Kissinger accepted this request, but deliberately slowed down the resupplying process in order to buy time.³⁴³

As for Washington, the war entered a new phase on October 9. Between October 9 and October 12, the idea of a quick Israeli military victory faded, Soviet restraint began to erode, for it was airlifting weapons to Damascus, and pressures for an urgent military resupply of the Israeli forces began to build up.³⁴⁴ The United States government wanted to avoid passage of a cease-fire resolution based on the pre-1967 borders.³⁴⁵ This position can be explained by the fact that the United States and Israel had minimum constituency in the United Nations. In a briefing memorandum to the secretary is argued that, in order to expand this constituency, the U.S. had to sacrifice Israeli claims and adopt a more pro-Arab position.³⁴⁶ A cease-fire based on the *status quo ante*, though, would not help decrease the tensions in the region.³⁴⁷ Therefore, Washington's call for a cease fire based on the *status quo ante* was replaced by a search for a cease-fire-in-place.³⁴⁸ In the meanwhile the weapon supplies to Israel started. The changing circumstances led Nixon to make one of the most controversial decisions during the conflict: he used the resupply of Israeli troops to get Israel to accept a cease-fire-in-place.³⁴⁹ Alarmed by

³⁴⁰ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 170.

³⁴¹ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 171.

³⁴² Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 173.

³⁴³ Scherer, 'October War', 6.

³⁴⁴ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 176.

³⁴⁵ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands 'Briefing Memorandum to the Secretary, from David H. Popper. Subject: Our UN Strategy in the Present Crisis, October 13, 1973', 1.

³⁴⁶ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Briefing Memorandum to the Secretary, from David H. Popper. Subject: Our UN Strategy in the Present Crisis, October 13, 1973.', 2.

³⁴⁷ Roosevelt Study Center, Presidential Collection Richard Nixon, Papers of the Nixon White House. Part 7. President's Personal Files, 'Meeting with Bipartisan Leadership October 1973, October 9, 1973', Fiche 492, 3.

³⁴⁸ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands 'Briefing Memorandum to the Secretary, from David H. Popper. Subject: Our UN Strategy in the Present Crisis, October 13, 1973', 1.

³⁴⁹ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 176.

the number of casualties, and realizing that U.S. might not send arms to Israel if she refused, the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir accepted a cease-fire-in-place, and on October 13 President of Egypt Anwar Sadat did too. After talks between Washington and Moscow on October 21, the U.N. Security Resolution 338 went into effect a day later.³⁵⁰ Though it was violated by Israel a day later, a new resolution ended the war on October 23.

The October War challenged the basic assumptions in the U.S. policy-making process which were present in the pre-war period. Washington learned that a military balance in favour of the Israeli's didn't guarantee stability. Furthermore, détente wouldn't decrease the danger of regional conflicts. However, détente did seem successful in resolving the crisis, even though the two superpowers couldn't help but get involved. Détente appeared to be no illusion, but did seem limited in scope. Moreover, the attitude of American policymakers towards the Arab world was challenged: the Arabs were more successful than initially expected, and above all there was a high amount of Arab solidarity: the oil embargo was well coordinated with diplomatic and military moves.³⁵¹ These changes in U.S. policy are often explained by domestic or bureaucratic factors. However, the key decisions were not the result of domestic politics.³⁵² The crisis isolated policymakers from domestic pressures, because decisions had to be made quickly. Furthermore, important information about the conflict was often closely held, and therefore interests groups weren't able to undertake effective measures.³⁵³ In resolving the war, Nixon and Kissinger became the centre of the policy-making process.

The American support for Israel in the October War provoked an oil embargo imposed by the Arab states. The Arabs repeatedly warned Washington, but Nixon didn't take these threats seriously. When Nixon formally requested \$2.2 billion for aid for Israel on October 19, Saudi Arabia announced an oil boycott, which had direct effect on the economies of the United States and its main Western allies, including the Netherlands, followed by a reduction of five percent of the oil production every month until Israel would withdraw from the territories it gained in 1967.³⁵⁴ The embargo, however, wasn't as disastrous for the United States. In October 1973, the U.S. imported about 1.7 million barrels of Arab crude oil and refined products originating from Arab countries per day.³⁵⁵ This constituted about ten percent of the total

³⁵⁰ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 181.

³⁵¹ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 201.

³⁵² Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 203.

³⁵³ Quandt, *Decade of decisions*, 203.

³⁵⁴ Scherer, 'October War', 9.

³⁵⁵ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum. Subject: Oil Contingency Paper, October 7, 1973', 1.

American oil consumption.³⁵⁶ During the winter the oil import would increase to 2.3 million barrels a day imported oil from Arab countries, what would cover about fifteen percent of the total consumption.³⁵⁷ Moreover, the United States had oil in stock for 210-250 days. However, a problem for the Americans would be that there could occur regional shortages, which would demand the implementation of formal rationing.³⁵⁸

The American government was much more worried about the effects of the embargo on its European allies: Arab oil covered about seventy percent of the oil consumption in Europe.³⁵⁹ Washington was willing to help its European allies. Due to the oil crisis, the U.S. developed more leverage with the Europeans, for Washington had the power to improve or deteriorate the situation.³⁶⁰ This leverage was caused by several political, economic and technical factors. First, the U.S. was the only state with sufficient leverage over the Israeli's to force them a satisfactory peace settlement.³⁶¹ Without a settlement the oil cutbacks could not be fully recovered. Moreover, apart from voluntary action like oil sharing, the U.S. was hurt as much as they were going to be by the embargo, while the European situation could still deteriorate considerably.³⁶² The United States could easily get by energy-wise without any help from its allies, while the Europeans desperately needed America's help if the situation would worsen. Also, most international oil companies were U.S. owned and could be manipulated by Washington to the disadvantage of the Europeans.³⁶³ Furthermore, Washington had considerable economic and political influence on Saudi Arabia, an influence unmatched by the

³⁵⁶ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum. Subject: Oil Contingency Paper, October 7, 1973', 1.

³⁵⁷ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum. Subject: Oil Contingency Paper, October 7, 1973', 1.

³⁵⁸ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum. Subject: Oil Contingency Paper, October 7, 1973', 1.

³⁵⁹ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger, from John A. Love. Subject: Emergency Oil Contingency Plan, October 14, 1973', 1.

³⁶⁰ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, from Jan Lodol and Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Subject: Next Steps in the European Oil Situation, December 4, 1973.', 4.

³⁶¹ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, from Jan Lodol and Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Subject: Next Steps in the European Oil Situation, December 4, 1973.', 4.

³⁶² Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, from Jan Lodol and Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Subject: Next Steps in the European Oil Situation, December 4, 1973.', 4.

³⁶³ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, from Jan Lodol and Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Subject: Next Steps in the European Oil Situation, December 4, 1973.', 4.

Europeans.³⁶⁴ During the oil crisis Washington strived to help solve the Dutch problem, and since the Netherlands was a large crude oil distributor as well, thereby also helping other European states, like Germany, with oil shortages. Furthermore, the U.S. aimed at resisting other Arab pressures.³⁶⁵ In March 1974, the Arab oil ministers decided to lift the oil embargo. However, Washington did not want to speed up diplomatic efforts for seeking a final settlement, for the diplomatic process had its own pace.³⁶⁶ Now I've elaborated on the American reaction to the October War and the oil crisis, I will move on to the Dutch stance towards the October War and the subsequent oil crisis.

5.3 *The Netherlands and the October War*

When the October War broke out the Dutch Prime Minister Joop den Uyl declared that the Netherlands should consult its Western allies in order to find a solution for the conflict.³⁶⁷ He stated that consultation should be primarily with the nine members of the European Community.³⁶⁸ This shows that initially the Dutch government was aiming to develop a similar stance to that of its European allies, rather than following the Atlantic (i.e. American) course. This indicates a decline in Dutch Atlanticism. Den Uyl argued that the conflict should be solved by international consultation. According to Den Uyl and Van der Stoep, the United Nations Security Council had to find a solution acceptable to both parties, in order to establish a cease-fire.³⁶⁹ Because the Netherlands wasn't a member of the Security Council at that time, Den Uyl stated that the Dutch UN representatives had to insist on the necessity to solve the conflict through the Security Council, in consultation with the nine members of the European Community.³⁷⁰ However, when Great Britain and France proposed that they would represent the entire European Community in the Security Council, The Hague rejected this. The Netherlands was the only country within the European Community that didn't accept Britain's

³⁶⁴ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, from Jan Lodol and Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Subject: Next Steps in the European Oil Situation, December 4, 1973.', 4.

³⁶⁵ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger, from Jan Lodol and Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Subject: Next Steps in the European Oil Situation, December 4, 1973.', 5.

³⁶⁶ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. 'Memorandum for President Nixon, from Henry Kissinger. Subject: Arab Lifting of the Oil Embargo, March 19, 1974', 1.

³⁶⁷ Van den Houten and Kopuit, *Wij staan achter Israel*, 19.

³⁶⁸ Van den Houten and Kopuit, *Wij staan achter Israel*, 19.

³⁶⁹ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen Der Staten Generaal 1973-1974, Kamerstuknummer 12600, ondernummer 8, 9 oktober 1973, 1.

³⁷⁰ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen Der Staten Generaal 1973-1974, Kamerstuknummer 12600, ondernummer 8, 9 oktober 1973, 1.

and France's proposal.³⁷¹ Van der Stoel argued that this was due to the fact that the Dutch and French position were opposed to each other, while Great Britain adopted a more nuanced position.³⁷² According to Jan Pronk, the strong pro-Israel stance in the Netherlands differed from France's position, for France showed a better understanding for the Arab position.³⁷³

Van der Stoel argued that a solution should be based on UN Resolution 242, adopted in November 1967, which stated that Israel should withdraw from all occupied territories, and that the war should be ended while recognizing the sovereignty and independence of all states in the area, as well as their right to safe and recognized borders.³⁷⁴ In the October War the Dutch government, as well as the Dutch people, became more nuanced towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, in comparison to the Six Day War of 1967. The Dutch were still pro-Israel, but initially The Hague aimed at operating cautiously, because the Dutch government didn't want to take sides.³⁷⁵

However, almost immediately after the outbreak of the war the Dutch granted Israel support in the form of weapon supplies.³⁷⁶ This was kept a secret for several years, for both Den Uyl and Van der Stoel denied up until the late 1980s that the Israeli's made use of this offer. On October 7 the Israeli ambassador in the Netherlands, Hannan Bar-On, requested Van der Stoel to help Israel. Van der Stoel then contacted Den Uyl and Minister of Defence Henk Vredeling, and they all agreed that Israel should be supported by the Netherlands.³⁷⁷ Den Uyl later stated 'for me it was crucial that, during the first two days of the war, Israel's survival appeared to be in danger. In my view, Israel couldn't be wiped off the map, and therefore it became clear that the Netherlands should support Israel'.³⁷⁸ Den Uyl, Van der Stoel, and Vredeling decided that the Americans would be permitted to use the Dutch military airbase Soesterberg for stopovers.³⁷⁹ The American President Richard Nixon was unsatisfied and disappointed with the fact that, apart from the Netherlands and Portugal, no other European

³⁷¹ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerraad, nummer toegang 2.02.05.02, inventarisnummer 1260.

'Ministerraad van het Koninkrijk. Notulen van de vergadering gehouden op vrijdag 12 oktober 1973', 3.

³⁷² Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerraad, nummer toegang 2.02.05.02, inventarisnummer 1260.

'Ministerraad van het Koninkrijk. Notulen van de vergadering gehouden op vrijdag 12 oktober 1973', 3.

³⁷³ Interview with Jan Pronk, April 21, 2016.

³⁷⁴ <http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/>, Handelingen Der Staten Generaal 1973-1974, Kamerstuknummer 12600, ondernummer 8, 9 oktober 1973, 1.

³⁷⁵ Interview with Jan Pronk, April 21, 2016.

³⁷⁶ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 187.

³⁷⁷ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 201.

³⁷⁸ Joop den Uyl, cited in Frans Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden. Het geheime bondgenootschap tussen Nederland en Israel* (Amsterdam and Antwerpen 1997), 201.

³⁷⁹ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 201.

state was willing to make their airbases available for the airlift to Israel.³⁸⁰ Eventually Washington dropped the idea of making use of the Dutch airbases, because the Netherlands didn't have sufficient capacity to enable the American airlift to function effectively and efficiently.³⁸¹ Furthermore Den Uyl, Van der Stoel, and Vredeling agreed that the Israeli's could be supplied munitions from airbase Volkel.³⁸² Vredeling handed over the question of Dutch support to Israel to the vice-Secretary of Defense Bram Stemerding (PvdA), and the high Dutch military officials. Vredeling asked the Israeli ambassador Bar-On not to say anything specific about the support that was actually given.³⁸³ This secrecy was directed at curiosity from the Arab states, but also towards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On October 8, an Israeli airplane landed on the Dutch military airport Gilze-Rijen. It was supplied with munitions, bombs, guns, gasmasks and spare parts for Israel's Centurion tanks.³⁸⁴ In the following days, every day one or more Boeings from the Israeli airline El Al landed on Gilze-Rijen for military supplies. Stemerding stated that 'The British conservative government refused to supply Israel with spare parts for their Centurion tanks, even though they were obligated to supply. Therefore, the Netherlands did so. Israel got everything it asked for. Everything'.³⁸⁵ In the historical records of the airbase Gilze-Rijen the flights were not mentioned. The Dutch military forces knew about the supplies, but the story didn't reach the outside world during the war.³⁸⁶ When politician Fred van der Spek (PSP) after the war asked if the Netherlands had supplied Israel, Van der Stoel responded by saying that, during the October War, no authorization had been provided for the transit or export of weapons to Israel. Bar-On states that it was remarkable that Den Uyl and Van der Stoel weren't aware of the weapon supplies to Israel, for they adopted a strong pro-Israel stance.³⁸⁷ Historian Frans Peeters argues that the reason why Vredeling resorted to secrecy with respect to his fellow party members because he didn't completely trust them in their loyalty toward Israel.³⁸⁸ In an interview in the 1970s Vredeling argued that he did trust the people in his party, but he was

³⁸⁰ 'Telegram from American Embassy, The Hague, to American Embassy, Cairo. Press Report on Alleged Netherlands Willingness Support US Airlift During October War, Date: January 6, 1974': https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976THEHA00057_b.html (19-4-2016).

³⁸¹ 'Telegram from American Embassy, The Hague, to American Embassy, Cairo. Press Report on Alleged Netherlands Willingness Support US Airlift During October War, Date: January 6, 1974': https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976THEHA00057_b.html (19-4-2016).

³⁸² Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 201.

³⁸³ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 202.

³⁸⁴ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 198.

³⁸⁵ Bram Stemerding, cited in Frans Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden. Het geheime bondgenootschap tussen Nederland en Israel* (Amsterdam and Antwerpen 1997, 199).

³⁸⁶ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 200.

³⁸⁷ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 203.

³⁸⁸ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 204.

afraid that if he would propose something, his party members wouldn't react as fast as they should have.³⁸⁹ Yet, the loyalty of the Dutch government to Israel was widespread.

The pro-Israel stance the Dutch government adopted during the October War was not shared by its European allies. France and Great Britain were much more critical of the Jewish state.³⁹⁰ The Dutch policy didn't remain unnoticed in the Arab world. In the Middle East, rumours circulated that the Netherlands had provided military assistance to Israel, and moreover the Dutch veto against the British and French proposal to represent the countries from the European Community in the Security Council, didn't stay a secret.³⁹¹ Hellema, Wiebes and Witte argue that Van der Stoel's position was rather pro-United States than pro-European Community, and thus favoured an Atlantic policy over a European one.³⁹² The British newspaper *The Guardian* stated that France and Italy had, in secrecy, informed the Arab states about the Dutch reluctance to support a joint neutralist European stance on the conflict in the Middle East.³⁹³ On October 13 a pro-Israel demonstration in Amsterdam was organized, in which Vredeling took part.³⁹⁴ The fact that Vredeling joined the demonstration clearly showed the support and sympathy for Israel within the Dutch government.³⁹⁵ On October 17 a declaration of solidarity with Israel appeared on the front page of several Dutch newspapers, which was signed by many prominent figures in Dutch society, including former politicians.³⁹⁶

As a reaction to the Dutch support for Israel the Arab states imposed an oil embargo on the Netherlands.³⁹⁷ However, the Dutch support to Israel was not the only reason to impose an oil embargo on the Netherlands. The oil crisis was a struggle for power in the international oil sector. The Arab countries, organized in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), aimed at breaking the traditional affiliations in the international oil sector.³⁹⁸ In the oil sector the Netherlands occupied a significant position, for it was the home of Shell, and the seven major oil companies had branches in the Netherlands. Furthermore, Rotterdam was a crucial hub for the processing and distribution of crude oil in North-western Europe. Pronk also argued that the oil boycott had less to do with the conflict in the Middle East, and more with

³⁸⁹ Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 204.

³⁹⁰ Interview with Ronny Naftaniel, April 6, 2016.

³⁹¹ Duco A. Hellema, Cees Wiebes, and Toby Witte, *The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis: Business as Usual* (Den Haag 1998), 38.

³⁹² Hellema, Wiebes and Witte, *The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis*, 39.

³⁹³ Hellema, Wiebes and Witte, *The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis*, 39.

³⁹⁴ Interview with Ronny Naftaniel, April 6, 2016.

³⁹⁵ Hellema, Wiebes and Witte, *The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis*, 39.

³⁹⁶ Hellema, Wiebes and Witte, *The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis*, 39.

³⁹⁷ Hellema, *Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek*, 274.

³⁹⁸ Hellema, *Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek*, 274.

the fact that the Arab states were taking a hard line on the affiliations in the oil sector.³⁹⁹

From 16 to 21 October OPEC held a conference in Kuwait, where it decided to raise the price of crude oil by seventy percent.⁴⁰⁰ During the following months the price was again raised several times. Moreover, the OPEC countries agreed to lower the production of crude oil in the OPEC states with five percent.⁴⁰¹ The oil production would be lowered every month until ‘such time as total evacuation of Israeli forces from all Arab territory occupied during the June 1967 war is completed, and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are restored’.⁴⁰² On October 19, Libya announced an oil embargo on the United States, for the U.S. had airlifted Israel during the war. The next day Saudi Arabia joined Libya in its decision. Two days later the bureau of the Arab League announced an oil embargo on the Netherlands.⁴⁰³

At first, the imposition of an oil embargo on the Netherlands seemed problematic. Rotterdam imported about 3.8 million barrels of oil a day, from which 2.4 million barrels were re-exported as crude oil.⁴⁰⁴ The remaining 1.4 million barrels were stored and refined in the Netherlands, and half of these barrels were re-exported again.⁴⁰⁵ Even if the Arab states imposed an embargo on the Netherlands, the Dutch were still able to provide their domestic oil demand from non-Arab sources. However, the Netherlands would lose income from exports, and other European countries, to whom the Dutch exported oil, like Western-Germany, would face a shortage in oil.⁴⁰⁶ After the Arab states Algeria, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Oman, Libya and Saudi Arabia heeded the Arab’s League proposal to impose an oil embargo, the Dutch government turned to its European allies, in order to propose a redistribution of Arab oil in Europe. The EC countries, however, were not willing to help the Dutch. France stated that during the October War, the Netherlands hadn’t shown solidarity with its European allies when France and Britain proposed to represent the EC in the Security Council.⁴⁰⁷ The British

³⁹⁹ Roosevelt Study Center, Dutch-American Diplomatic Relations, 1784-1973 Collection. National Archives. Record Group 49. Reel 5. Subject-Numerical File 1967, ‘Airgram to Department of State, from American Embassy, The Hague. Subject: Views of Minister for Development Cooperation Assistance Pronk. Date: December 14, 1973. Enclosure: Interview by A.S. Spoor and J.H. Sampieson of NRC with Minister Pronk’, 1.

⁴⁰⁰ Hellema, *Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek*, 274.

⁴⁰¹ Hellema, *Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek*, 274.

⁴⁰² Rüdiger Graf, ‘Making Use of the “Oil Weapon”: Western Industrialized Countries and Arab Petropolitics in 1973–1974’, *Diplomatic History* 36:1 (2012), 185.

⁴⁰³ Hellema, *Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek*, 274.

⁴⁰⁴ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. ‘Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger. Subject: Assistance for the Dutch, Date: November 27, 1973’, 1.

⁴⁰⁵ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. ‘Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger. Subject: Assistance for the Dutch, Date: November 27, 1973’, 1.

⁴⁰⁶ Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS), Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands. ‘Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger. Subject: Assistance for the Dutch, Date: November 27, 1973’, 1.

⁴⁰⁷ Hellema, *Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek*, 276.

government argued that a joint EC policy towards the oil embargo would trigger Arab states to impose harsher measures, and therefore didn't support the Dutch idea.⁴⁰⁸ Other European countries, like Belgium and Western-Germany, were more cooperative and showed more sympathy for the Dutch position.⁴⁰⁹

The United States, however, supported The Hague.⁴¹⁰ In the case of an emergency, Washington was willing to provide the Netherlands with oil supplies.⁴¹¹ When Van der Stoel met the American Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger, Van der Stoel underscored The Hague's solidarity with the American position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. When we take this into consideration, it can be argued that Atlanticist feelings still occupied a central position in The Hague. Van der Stoel criticized the European allies, especially Great Britain, for 'trying to save their own skin'.⁴¹² Furthermore, Van der Stoel informed Schlesinger that the Netherlands was in favour of full cooperation within NATO on the situation in the Middle East, and he stated that it was important that 'the Netherlands and the U.S. had stuck together'.⁴¹³ This shows that Van der Stoel was a strong advocate of Atlantic solidarity regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Den Uyl discussed the situation in the Middle East with Schlesinger as well. In this conversation Schlesinger argued that the United States admired the Netherlands for its brave stance, and that the Netherlands should not suffer for its virtues.⁴¹⁴ Den Uyl stated that it was a good thing that the United States and the Netherlands now found themselves in a similar position, both threatened by an Arab oil boycott.⁴¹⁵ Schlesinger and Den Uyl agreed that the Atlantic alliance remained important, despite détente and independent European views.⁴¹⁶ The meeting between Schlesinger and Den Uyl also shows that, despite European integration and

⁴⁰⁸ Hellema, *Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek*, 276.

⁴⁰⁹ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerraad, nummer toegang 2.02.05.02, inventarisnummer 1237, 'Notulen van de vergadering gehouden op vrijdag 23 november 1973', 10.

⁴¹⁰ Hellema, Wiebes and Witte, *The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis*, 40.

⁴¹¹ Hellema, 'The Politics of Asymmetry', 590.

⁴¹² 'Telegram from Secretary of State, to American Embassy Bonn. Subject: Secretary Schlesinger's Meeting with Foreign Minister Van der Stoel, Date: November 12, 1973':

https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973STATE223064_b.html (19-4-2016).

⁴¹³ 'Telegram from Secretary of State, to American Embassy, Bonn. Subject: Secretary Schlesinger's Meeting with Foreign Minister Van der Stoel, Date: November 12, 1973':

https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973STATE223064_b.html (19-4-2016).

⁴¹⁴ 'Telegram from Secretary of State, to American Embassy, Bonn. Subject: Secretary Schlesinger's November 7 Meeting with Prime Minister Den Uyl, Date: November 12, 1973':

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973STATE223063_b.html (19-4-2016).

⁴¹⁵ 'Telegram from Secretary of State, to American Embassy, Bonn. Subject: Secretary Schlesinger's November 7 Meeting with Prime Minister Den Uyl, Date: November 12, 1973':

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973STATE223063_b.html (19-4-2016).

⁴¹⁶ 'Telegram from Secretary of State, to American Embassy, Bonn. Subject: Secretary Schlesinger's November 7 Meeting with Prime Minister Den Uyl, Date: November 12, 1973':

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973STATE223063_b.html (19-4-2016).

Dutch criticism on American policy, for example Washington's policy in Vietnam, both parties were highly in favour of maintaining close relations.

Transcripts from the Dutch Cabinet meetings show The Hague's willingness to follow an Atlanticist course, rather than the European course. On November 23, 1973 Van der Stoel stated that the Netherlands couldn't adopt a policy that would conflict with U.S. policy, for Washington had proved to be willing to assist the Dutch in the oil crisis.⁴¹⁷ However, soon it became clear that the oil embargo didn't work. Primarily the performance of the large oil companies, like Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum (BP) caused the embargo to fail in depriving the target countries of oil from the start.⁴¹⁸ The oil companies prevented a scarcity of oil in the Netherlands, by providing the Dutch with oil from other countries, like Venezuela and Iran.⁴¹⁹ Furthermore, the effects of the oil embargo were minimized because the Dutch still had access to natural gas.⁴²⁰ In the meanwhile Jan Pronk, Minister for Development Cooperation in the Den Uyl Government, kept in contact with Algeria, and convinced the Algerians that an oil boycott against the Netherlands wasn't justly, for The Hague had adopted a positive attitude towards economic reforms in the international system in favor of developing countries, as well as the Arab countries, in the 1970s.⁴²¹ In January 1974, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources from Saudi Arabia acknowledged that the embargo didn't work as planned. OPEC hoped that, with the oil embargo, the Netherlands would revise its support to Israel, but this didn't happen.⁴²² Den Uyl argued that even though the Arab states imposed an oil boycott on the Netherlands, there was no need for The Hague to come up with a new Middle East policy.⁴²³ He stated that the Arab states had singled out the Dutch in order to put pressure on Europe as a whole, and that it had less to do with the Dutch support for Israel.⁴²⁴ On July 1, 1974, the embargo was lifted. The Israeli forces hadn't withdrawn from the occupied territories.⁴²⁵

⁴¹⁷ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerraad, nummer toegang 2.02.05.02, inventarisnummer 1237, 'Notulen van de vergadering gehouden op vrijdag 23 november 1973', 10.

⁴¹⁸ Graf, 'Making Use of the "Oil Weapon"', 207

⁴¹⁹ Interview with Ronny Naftaniel, April 6, 2016.

⁴²⁰ Hellema, *Nederlandse rol in de wereldpolitiek*, 277

⁴²¹ Interview with Jan Pronk, April 21, 2016.

⁴²² Peeters, *Gezwoeren vrienden*, 226.

⁴²³ 'Telegram from American Embassy, The Hague, to Secretary of State. Subject: Dutch Parliament Debates Arab Oil Boycott, Date: November 1, 1973': https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973THEHA04806_b.html (19-4-2016).

⁴²⁴ 'Telegram from American Embassy, The Hague, to Secretary of State. Subject: Dutch Parliament Debates Arab Oil Boycott, Date: November 1, 1973': https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973THEHA04806_b.html (19-4-2016).

⁴²⁵ Graf, 'Making Use of the "Oil Weapon"', 185.

5.4 Comparing American and Dutch Policies

While Washington's initial reaction to the outbreak of the October War was one of caution, for détente with the USSR and U.S.-Arab relations were at stake, the Dutch government soon decided that it would support Israel. When it became clear that Soviet restraint began to erode, the United States agreed to resupply Israel through an airlift. The Dutch government was willing to enable U.S. airplanes to land on Dutch airbases, in order to make the American airlift to Israel possible. Eventually, the Americans didn't make use of this offer. However, the Dutch vice-Secretary of Defence Bram Stemerdink resupplied Israel in secrecy. The American and Dutch support for Israel caused the Arab states to impose an oil embargo on the United States and the Netherlands. Initially it was thought that the embargo would hit the Netherlands hard, and therefore the United States government declared that it would help the Dutch in case of emergency. American assistance to the Netherlands would help the United States to gain leverage with the Dutch country. In the Netherlands, this didn't go unnoticed, for Van der Stoel stated that the Dutch couldn't adopt a policy which would conflict with U.S. policy, for Washington was willing to help the Netherlands. The oil embargo didn't cause the Netherlands to change their stance towards the conflict in the Middle East. If the Dutch abandoned their support for Israel due to the oil embargo, it was possible that Washington wouldn't be willing anymore to help the Netherlands. This indicates that the United States could have influenced or pressured the Netherlands in retaining their pro-Israel stance during the oil embargo. This type of influence rests upon a sense of obligation that the Netherlands had towards the United States – 'authority' or 'respect' – as well as the possibility that the United States precluded the Netherlands from adopting an alternative unacceptable to the United States – 'coercion'.

5.5 Conclusions

The key question of this chapter was: What was the American and Dutch reaction to the October War and oil crisis of 1973-1974, and did Washington influence the Dutch government in its policy decisions? In the October War Syria and Egypt tried to win back the territories they lost in the Six Day War. However, after succeeding in the first days of the war, Israel managed to strike back, and keep the territories. The war ended on October 24, 1973. The outbreak of the October War was a surprise to the U.S. government. During the war the United States tried to keep a low profile because it didn't want to trigger Soviet intervention. When Israel requested

weapon supplies, Washington deliberately delayed the supplying process. Eventually, Washington airlifted Israel, and thereby resupplied the Jewish state. The Dutch supported Israel as well. The Hague rejected the British and French proposal to let Britain and France represent the EC countries in the Security Council, because France's position in particular differed considerably from that of the Netherlands. Den Uyl, Van der Stoel and Vredeling agreed that the Dutch should support Israel, because they feared the possibility that the Jewish state would be wiped off the map. This indicates that the Dutch support for Israel during the October War rested on The Hague's sense of responsibility to protect Israel, rather than on pressure from the Americans. In secrecy, vice-Secretary of Defence Bram Stemerding supplied Israel. During the October War, key positions in Dutch politics were occupied by politicians who were pro-Israel. Den Uyl, Van der Stoel, Vredeling and Stemerding stated that the survival of Israel should be secured.

The American and Dutch support for Israel confronted the two countries with an oil embargo. The subsequent oil crisis didn't hit the Americans hard, but it did affect the Netherlands. After the Dutch were faced with the oil embargo the EC countries stated that they didn't want to help the Netherlands. But the United States was, in case of emergency, willing to provide the Netherlands with extra oil supplies. By helping the Dutch, the U.S. gained leverage, for it had the power to improve or deteriorate the situation. Van der Stoel and Den Uyl argued that it was a good thing that the United States and the Netherlands had stuck together, and that the Atlantic unity was still of large importance. Furthermore, Van der Stoel argued that Dutch policy shouldn't conflict with American policy, because the Americans were willing to help the Netherlands in the case of oil shortages. The American willingness to assist the Netherlands, and Van der Stoel's statement that Dutch policy shouldn't conflict with American policy, for the Americans were able to help the Dutch, indicate that the United States could have influenced or pressured the Dutch government in remaining their strong pro-Israel position during the oil crisis. If the Dutch were to change their stance on the conflict in the Middle East, it would be possible that the Americans weren't willing to help the Dutch anymore. The influence that Washington might have exerted over The Hague rests on both 'authority' or 'respect', and 'coercion'.

6. Conclusion

The main question of this research is: Why did the Dutch government continued to support Israel between 1967 and 1974? Was this due to American pressure? In order to answer my main question I elaborated on four sub-questions.

First: Why and how did the Arab-Israeli conflict evolve? The eight century BCE marks the beginning of the Jewish Diaspora. The people from Israel lost their land and were dispersed all over the world. In the late 19th century in Eastern Europe the Zionist movement wanted to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine. In the late 1880s the Palestinian Arabs and the Zionists in Palestine clashed for the first time, mainly because Zionists were buying fertile lands from the Palestinians. Britain in 1917 promised both the establishment of a Jewish homeland, and Palestinian independence. Because Britain couldn't find a solution to the conflict London handed over Palestine to the United Nations after the Second World War. The state of Israel was proclaimed in 1947, and a war between Israel and the Arab states broke out. After the 1947-1949 war the conflict sharpened on both sides, and over the years' tensions increased.

The second sub-question elaborates on the origins of Dutch-Israeli and American-Israeli relations: Why did the Netherlands and the United States develop such a remarkably high amount of support for Israel? From the sixteenth century until the Second World War, Jews were tolerated by the Dutch. However, this didn't mean that the majority of the Dutch people admired the Jewish faith or culture. After the Second World War the PvdA and Protestant parties developed a strong sympathy for Israel. The ties between the two countries were strengthened due to the Protestant culture of the Netherlands, the socialist features of Israel, and the fact that both were small states with an Atlantic orientation. During the 1950s and the 1960s Washington and Tel Aviv developed a close relationship. This was caused by both strategic factors, and domestic factors, like the Israel lobby. During the 1950s Eisenhower was convinced that Israel would serve as a pro-Western bulwark in the Middle East. Eisenhower's successor Kennedy was afraid that if the U.S. didn't strengthen its ties with Israel, the Jewish state would acquire nuclear capability. Eisenhower and Kennedy laid the groundwork for the close relations between Israel and the United States. Thereafter, Johnson made sure this close relationship was maintained. Apart from strategic reasons, domestic reasons, like the Israel Lobby, explain the close relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv. By pressuring the Congress and Executive Branch, the Israel Lobby tries to increase American support for the Jewish state.

The next chapter focused on the sub-question: What was the American and Dutch reaction to the Six Day War of 1967, and did Washington influence The Hague in its policy decisions? During the war, Washington tried to prevent Soviet intervention, and was aiming to create a cease-fire. After the Six Day War the U.S. wanted to strengthen Israel again, by providing arms shipments. During the Six Day War The Hague's sympathy, and that of the Dutch people, clearly lay with Israel. The Netherlands was the only country which supported the American idea of an international fleet to break the Egyptian blockade, so therefore the Dutch position was distinct from that of other European countries. The Hague's willingness to participate in a multinational fleet together with the United States may have rested on a sense of obligation towards the Americans – 'authority' or 'respect' – or The Hague's wish to gratify the United States – 'friendship'. This indicates that perhaps the United States influenced the Dutch government in its decision to join a multinational fleet. However, it is unlikely that the United States directly pressured the Netherlands in supporting Israel, for the Dutch government itself was already strongly pro-Israel. Furthermore, no documents or indications are found that it discussed the American point of view during the Six Day War. A strong sense of Atlanticism during the 1960s made it easier for the Dutch to support Israel, for the United States was pro-Israel as well.

In the last chapter I focused on the sub-question: What was the American and Dutch reaction to the October War and oil crisis of 1973-1974, and did Washington influence the Dutch government in its policy decisions? During the war Washington aimed to keep a low profile in order to prevent Soviet intervention. When it became clear that the Soviet Union was already supplying the Arab states, the U.S. began to supply Israel with weapons through an airlift. After the war broke out, Den Uyl, Van der Stoel, and Vredeling agreed that Israel had to be supported. Subsequently Stemerding secretly provided Israel with military supplies. The Dutch support for Israel during the war rested on Den Uyl's, Van der Stoel's, Vredeling's and Stemerding's sense obligation to secure the survival of the Jewish state. Because the Dutch government supported Israel, the Arab states imposed an oil embargo on the Netherlands. The European allies didn't want to help the Dutch, for the Dutch had rejected the British and French proposals earlier on. The United States was willing to help the Dutch in case of emergency, for this would increase American leverage. Van der Stoel and Den Uyl argued that it was important that the U.S. and the Netherlands stuck together and they stressed the importance of Atlantic unity. This indicates that Washington, by showing its support for Dutch policy towards Israel, influenced The Hague to maintain this pro-Israel position during the oil crisis. The influence the United States exerted rested upon a sense of obligation the Netherlands had towards the

United States – ‘authority’ or ‘respect’ – as well as the possibility that the United States precluded the Netherlands from adopting an alternative unacceptable to the United States – ‘coercion’.

Why did the Dutch government continue to support Israel between 1967 and 1974? Was this due to American pressure? There were several reasons why the Dutch government supported Israel during the wars of 1967 and 1974. First of all, from the 1950s onwards there was a large sympathy for the Jewish state within the Netherlands. Especially politicians from the Labour Party (PvdA) and Protestant parties. Key politicians, including De Jong, Luns, Den Uyl, were clearly pro-Israel. During the Six Day War (1967) the Netherlands was willing to participate in a multinational fleet with the United States. It is possible that the United States influenced the Netherlands in participating in this multinational fleet. This influence could rest upon a sense of obligation to the Americans – ‘authority’ or ‘respect’ – or The Hague’s wish to gratify the United States – ‘friendship’. However, feelings of sympathy for the Jewish state were widespread in both the Dutch government and among the Dutch people. Furthermore, the 1960s can be marked as the heyday of Atlanticism in the Netherlands, and because the Dutch pro-Israel position was in line with American policy, it made it easier for the Dutch government to express their support for Israel.

During the October War of 1974 The Hague again didn’t hesitate to support Israel. In secrecy, the Israeli’s were resupplied. Like in 1967, Dutch support for Israel in 1974 derived from the pro-Israel position of key politicians, including Den Uyl, Van der Stoel, Vredeling and Stemerding. During the oil crisis Den Uyl and Van der Stoel made clear that it was important that the United States and the Netherlands stuck together, and they pressed for maintaining Atlantic unity. This shows that The Hague preferred an Atlantic policy over a European one. Van der Stoel’s argument that the Netherlands shouldn’t have a policy that conflicted with American policy because the Americans were willing to help the Dutch, implies that the United States pressured the Netherlands to maintain a pro-Israel position during the oil crisis. If the Dutch abandoned their pro-Israel position, thereby conforming to the European point of view, the Americans might not be willing to help out the Dutch in case of oil shortages. The type of influence the United States exerted rests upon a sense of obligation that the Netherlands had towards the United States – ‘authority’ or ‘respect’ – or the possibility that the United States precluded the Netherlands from adopting an alternative unacceptable to the United States – ‘coercion’.

We can conclude that during the Six Day War (1967) and the October War (1974), the Dutch were not directly pressured by the Americans. There are no documents available to support such a conclusion. However, the available records of the meetings between Den Uyl, Van der Stoel and their U.S. colleague Schlesinger show that during the oil crisis of 1973-1974, the United States exerted some pressure on the Netherlands in maintaining a pro-Israel position.⁴²⁶ But perhaps this was at all necessary, because the Dutch belief in Atlanticism remained strong in the 1960s and 1970s. The claim of some Dutch historians about the waning of Atlanticism during the Den Uyl cabinet is overstated and rather based on political programs, than on actual foreign policy. It is possible that a substantial number of documents on this topic is still classified. Therefore, I suggest further research on this topic if new documents will be declassified in the future.

⁴²⁶ ‘Telegram from Secretary of State, to American Embassy, Bonn. Subject: Secretary Schlesinger’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Van der Stoel, Date: November 12, 1973’: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973STATE223064_b.html (19-4-2016); ‘Telegram from Secretary of State, to American Embassy, Bonn. Subject: Secretary Schlesinger’s November 7 Meeting with Prime Minister Den Uyl, Date: November 12, 1973’: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973STATE223063_b.html (19-4-2016).

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Appendix I: Method Interviews

During my research, I conducted two interviews. The first one was with Ronny Naftaniel, former head of the Center for Information and Documentation on Israel, and the second interview was with Jan Pronk, Minister for Development Cooperation in the Den Uyl Government.

For each interview I set up five questions. These were broad questions, what caused the interviews to be semi-open interviews. I chose this approach because I didn't want to steer the answers in a certain direction. If I didn't get enough information on a topic, I would improvise and ask more specific questions. I sent the interviewees the questions a couple of days in advance, so the interviewees were able to think about the questions in advance.

I recorded both interviews, and I made transcripts of both interviews as well. Furthermore, I gave the interviewees the option to check the transcripts or the citations I used for my research. The transcripts of the interviews are available for request.