Hegel and Deleuze on difference

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## USED WORKS:
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CE: Henri Bergson – Creative Evolution
D: Gilles Deleuze & Claire Parnet – Dialogues
D&R: Gilles Deleuze – Difference and Repetition
E&S: Gilles Deleuze – Empiricism and Subjectivity
HR: Gilles Deleuze – Review of Jean Hyppolite’s *Logique et Existence*
MD: Gilles Deleuze – The Method of Dramatization
NP: Gilles Deleuze – Nietzsche and Philosophy
N: Gilles Deleuze – Negotiations (P: Pourparlers)
S&AP: Gilles Deleuze – The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy
EL: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – Encyclopaedia Logic
LA: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – Lectures on Aesthetics
LHP: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – Lectures on the History of Philosophy
LL: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – Lectures on Logic
PG: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – Phenomenology of Spirit
PN: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – Philosophy of Nature
SL: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – Science of Logic
WA: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – Who Thinks Abstractly?
GHP: Jean Hyppolite – Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
L&E: Jean Hyppolite – Logic and Existence

Furthermore, the German volumes of Hegel’s work are indicated by W# (referring to Werke and the corresponding number). I have throughout attempted to provide original sources alongside the translations. The first page number in each case refers to the translation; the second to the original.
“What I most detested was Hegelianism and dialectics”\footnote{“Ce que je détestais avant tout, c’était le hégélianisme et la dialectique.”} [P 6/N 14], Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) recollects in 1977. To any reader of Deleuze’s work, this expression of antipathy will not come as a surprise. Nearly all of Deleuze’s major works are concerned with – in one way or another – opposing his philosophy to the dialectical philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel’s philosophy, as Deleuze sees it, constitutes a potent form of identity philosophy, betraying the complexity and constant motion of reality by representing it using a static mode of thought. Hegel, according to Deleuze, gives us the “final and most powerful homage paid to the old principle [i.e. identity]” [D&R 50/71]. Deleuze’s own philosophy of difference, outlined in Difference and Repetition (Différence et Répétition) (1968), is concerned with remedying this perceived defect. Inspired by Nietzsche’s philosophy and Heidegger’s conception of ontological difference, Deleuze offers a philosophical system in which difference, rather than identity, is the more fundamental ontological and epistemological term.

In reviewing Deleuze’s philosophy, some commentators have questioned the seriousness of Deleuze’s opposition to Hegel. Catherine Malabou, for example, argues that Deleuze’s vehement criticism of Hegel conceals an underlying affinity and creates an opposition that “has undoubtedly been made too rigid.” [1996, p. 136]. Slavoj Zizek, likewise, writes that Deleuze “obliterates precisely that dimension in Hegel which is closest to Deleuze himself.” [2010, p. 346]. Deleuze, in other words, like so many twentieth century philosophers, seems not to recognise the manner in which Hegel himself approached a philosophy of difference.

And it seems clear enough why they should say this. After all, the aim of Hegel’s dialectical philosophy, much like Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, is to overcome the limitations of a representational mode of thought (judgement) which tends to simplify and falsify its object by imprinting it with a stable form. Like Deleuze, Hegel is critical of the concept of identity, famously pledging allegiance to a Heraclitean heritage: “[T]here is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic.” [W18 320.\footnote{“Es ist kein Satz des Heraklit, den ich nicht in mein Logik aufgenommen.”}] Hegel’s project, as he himself formulates it, is to quicken the ‘dead bones’ of logic through spirit (das tote Gebein der Logik durch den Geist beleben) [SL 32/W5 47]. Hegel’s intention was to show that the categories which philosophy has taken to be self-identical, are in fact changing forms, which change into one another in a constant process. This process is the process described by Hegel’s Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik), which is an exposition of the fundamental logical categories (Being, Quality, Essence, etc.) and the way they are related in a circular logical chain.

But on a wider examination of Deleuze’s work, it appears that it is precisely Hegel’s attempt at a philosophy of difference that Deleuze takes issue with. In 1954, Deleuze writes a review of Logic & Existence (Logique et Existence), a book by Jean Hyppolite (1907-1968). Hyppolite, the leading French commentator on Hegel at the time, was a prominent influence on the generation of French philosophers to which Deleuze belonged, instructing not only Deleuze, but also Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. And Hyppolite never ceased to

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1. “Ce que je détestais avant tout, c’était le hégélianisme et la dialectique.”
emphasise what he perceived as the continuing relevance of Hegelian philosophy. For Hyppolite, Hegel’s philosophy – in its at times difficult language – had provided an answer to many of the impasses of the Kantian, subjectivistic heritage of 20th century philosophy.

In his commentaries, Hyppolite went against the general ‘humanist’ reading of Hegel introduced by Alexandre Kojève, offering an ontological or metaphysical reading of Hegel’s philosophy. (Hyppolite’s readings corresponded closely, and often made reference to, the conclusions of Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism.) Though if Hegel was a metaphysician, Hyppolite argued that he was not a metaphysician in the ‘bad’ sense. When Hegel criticised Kant’s distinction between content and form, he in fact destroyed a more general philosophical distinction between essence and appearance, a distinction over two thousand years old, which has recurred in various forms throughout the history of philosophy. For Hegel, the essence, the ‘inner’ side of things is completely expressed by the realm of appearance – there is no inaccessible essence outside of appearance. Hyppolite quotes a remark from the Phenomenology of Spirit: “behind the so-called curtain which must cover the interior, there is nothing unless we ourselves penetrate behind it so as to be able to see as much as to have something to see” [PG §165/W3 135]. Hegel’s logic is not an interior; not a true world behind the world of appearances, but the truth of this world.

The only problem Hyppolite would always continue to struggle with, was the relationship between Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes) and the Science of Logic, or more generally between the historical, finite Hegel and the ahistorical, logical Hegel – in brief, between logic and existence. All of Hyppolite’s commentaries on Hegel end on an aperotic note, restating this problem and outlining the forms a possible solution could take.

This is the problem which Deleuze attempts to deal with in his 1954 review of Hyppolite’s book. It is here that he talks admiringly about Hegel, acknowledging the advance on traditional philosophy of identity that Hegel poses. But at the same time, Deleuze expresses doubts on whether the historical and ahistorical Hegel can ever be reconciled within the Hegelian framework. It is here, in response to this Hegelian problematic, that Deleuze first mentions the development of an original ontology. More specifically, Deleuze criticises Hegel’s conception of difference as negation (Negation) or contradiction (Widerspruch).

In my view, not enough attention has been paid to Deleuze’s relation to Hyppolite in secondary literature. It is because this link is missing that it seems unclear for some commentators why Deleuze should even oppose Hegel. Malabou claims that any academic thematisation of Deleuze’s relation to Hegel, i.e. one that lists Deleuzian arguments against Hegel, would have to be content with “repeating blow by blow the well-known pages of Nietzsche and Philosophy.” [1996, p. 118]. But this is what I would dispute: Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche is not the right place to start. It is necessary to start with Hyppolite.

That is the objective of this thesis: to elucidate Deleuze’s opposition to Hegel in a technical account, placing Deleuze’s arguments against Hegel in relation to their source in texts by Hyppolite. In my view, such a reading makes some of the more difficult to understand aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy clearer, whilst also making clear what it is precisely in Hegel’s philosophy that leads him to understand Hegel as a philosopher of

3 “hinter dem sogenannten Vorhange, welcher das Innere verdecken soll, nichts zu sehen ist, wenn wir nicht selbst dahintergehen, ebensoweit damit gesehen werde, als daß etwas dahinter sei, das gesehen werden kann.”
identity. The leading question of this thesis is simply: What is the relation between Hegel and Deleuze?
In order to do so, some forays are necessary: I will begin by going into Hegel's understanding of negation and contradiction, which I will trace back to Spinoza and Kant and contrast with Parmenides, Schelling and Plato.

In the second part, I will take up Deleuze's criticism of Hegel's philosophy of difference as a form of 'infinite representation.'

In the third part, I will explain this criticism, considering it against the background of Hyppolite's reading of Hegel. I will show how Hegel's ontology of sense poses a criticism of empiricism and immediate knowledge, but also how it eventually winds up in a dualism.

In the fourth part, I will consider Deleuze's reading of Bergson as an answer to this problem and explain how the project of Difference and Repetition relates to Hegel's philosophy of difference.

DIFFERENCE AS NEGATION AND CONTRADITION

The largest part of Deleuze's bibliography consists of philosophical commentaries. He wrote many monographs on different philosophers, including Hume, Spinoza and Bergson, monographs which are generally read and appreciated independently of one another. However, through the commentaries on other philosophers, Deleuze appears constantly at work developing his own philosophy – hence the oft-noted idiosyncratic character of these readings. Throughout the years, Deleuze gleaned philosophical insights from these various conversational partners, which he eventually combined into an original philosophy. This philosophy is what Deleuze outlines in Difference and Repetition, which provides an ontology or metaphysics proper; a systematic account of how the world works, which revolves around a reappraisal of the concept of difference. But where did the necessity of such a new philosophical system come from?

If we look at Deleuze's philosophical development, the first sign of his intention to produce a philosophical system appears in a review that Deleuze wrote on Logic & Existence, a book by Jean Hyppolite on Hegel's speculative logic. It is in this book that Hyppolite developed the aforementioned ontological reading of Hegel. Hyppolite develops a reading in which Hegel's philosophy is considered to express something true of the things themselves, rather than our merely human viewpoint. As Deleuze puts it in a review: "Philosophy must be ontology, it cannot be anything else..... That philosophy must be ontology means first of all that it is not anthropology." [HR 191/18]4.

Hyppolite's book contains a thematic treatment of Hegel's philosophy intended to draw out Hegel's most original points. Perhaps the most important of these points is Hegel's conception of difference. Hegel's philosophy, as Hyppolite points out, contains an entirely

4 "La philosophie doit être ontologie, elle ne peut pas être autre chose …. Que la philosophie soit une ontologie signifiera d'abord qu'elle n'est pas anthropologie." There is an important ending to this citation, which will be treated later, in the section on sense.
unprecedented treatment of the concept of difference, which involves two important ‘forms’ of difference, which are part of the same dialectical movement. These two important forms are negation (Negation) and contradiction (Widerspruch). Hyppolite’s book contains admiring passages of Hegel’s innovation, showing how these conceptions of difference appear as criticisms of the essentialist tradition.

This, however, is what Deleuze will be critical of. In order to understand his criticism, we must first go into what Hegel understands by negation and contradiction. This has the bonus advantage of making several of the more perplexing features of Hegel’s philosophical system intelligible.

*Hegel’s concept of negation*

Hegel constantly reiterates throughout his philosophy, that the nature of subjectivity, or what he calls its principle of self-movement (Selbstbewegung) is negativity; the subject is that which negates [PG §18/W3 24]. Negation here means an exclusive difference, a difference that we would introduce using the suffix ‘-not’ (this is not that etc.) Hegel thus argues that the subject is that which makes these kinds of differences, which distinguishes between one thing and another by saying ‘this is not that.’ What does this mean and why does Hegel say it? We can understand this if we consider two theses that Hegel adopts from Kant and Spinoza.

First of all, Hegel follows Kant in making the faculty of understanding (Verstand) or (determining) judgment (Urteil) a major part of subjectivity. For Kant, the subject understands the world around it through judgments, which are acts of thoughts that place a logical subject under a predicate. A judgment corresponds the form of a logical proposition such as S is P, where S is a subject and P is a predicate. To judge is thus to say, for instance, ‘this rose is red.’ Such a judgment is also what we call a determination (Bestimmung); in a judgment, we determine a subject as this or that (we determine the rose to be red.) So for Hegel, judgment is indeed one of the things the subject does, it says ‘S is P’.

The second, Spinozist point is the thesis that to determine something is always to negate something else. Hegel paraphrases a letter from Spinoza to Jarig Jelles in a formula: omnis determinatio est negatio. Or: Every determination is a negation. What does this mean? As noted earlier, a negation is a difference introduced by the suffix ‘not.’ Now for Hegel to follow Spinoza and say that every determination is a negation, means that he asserts that in every seemingly positive determination of the form ‘S is P,’ there is also a negation present (‘S is not Q’), although the positive form of the judgment makes this negation implicit.

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5 Cf. Sartre’s treatment of consciousness as néantiser.
6 Kant will later introduce another form of judgment called reflective, aside from the determining. But it need not concern us at this point.
7 Spinoza says literally: “Quia ergo figura non alid, quàm determinatio, & determinatio negatio est; non poterit, ut dictum, alid quid, quàm negatio, esse.” Which translates to: “Because figure is nothing other than determination, and determination is negation, it [i.e. figure] can, as was said, be nothing other than negation. “ [See: Melamed, 2012.]
Returning to our example, when we say ‘this rose is red,’ we are not only affirming the redness of the rose, we are also negating its other properties. As a note\(^8\) in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* puts it

“If we say 'this rose is red', then it lies in the copula 'is' that subject and predicate agree with one another. But now the rose, as something concrete, is not merely red; instead it also has an odour, a determinate form, and many other sorts of determinations that are not contained in the predicate 'red'.” [EL §172a/W8 324]\(^9\).

Although the rose has a plurality of properties, the judgment can only affirm one of them. We are privileging one aspect over the others. Whenever we say this is X, we are thus also saying that it is not Y or Z, though this does not appear explicitly in a positive proposition.

That determination is negation means that for Hegel – and this is where he parts from Kant – judgment is a *limited* faculty. The negativity attached to judgment means that a subject always judges in a one-sided way. judgment is a faculty of *disassociation*, of separation. It is quite literally an *Urteil*; it separates (teilen) one determination out from all others. Because judgment always privileges one aspect of its object (the redness of the rose) to the detriment of the plurality of all its other aspects (its odour, its form, etc.), it is a *finite* faculty.

judgment, for Hegel, is quite literally abstract, it pulls away (abstrahere) one property out from a complex web of more properties. In a popular article Hegel wrote on precisely this topic, called *Who thinks abstractly?*, Hegel argues that abstract thought does not belong to the educated (e.g. the philosopher), but to the uneducated, who make simple judgments. He cites the example of the people’s judgment of a murderer:

“A murderer is led to the place of execution. For the common populace he is nothing but a murderer. Ladies perhaps remark that he is a strong, handsome, interesting man. The populace finds this remark terrible: What? A murderer handsome? How can one think so wickedly and call a murderer handsome; no doubt, you yourselves are something not much better! This is the corruption of morals that is prevalent in the upper classes, a priest may add, knowing the bottom of things and human hearts …. This is abstract thinking: to see nothing in the murderer except the abstract fact that he is a murderer, and to annul all other human essence in him with this simple quality.” [WA/W2 577-578]\(^10\).

As this example shows, there is a tendency towards simplification in judgment; a judgment makes things appear as simple, whereas they are really complex. Judgment is a principle of identity, applying a homogenous form which conceals a deeper layer of differences. The

\(^{8}\) This note is one of the so-called Zusatze to the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, which are additions by Hegel’s students. The rose example is Hegel’s own, but the Zusatz is more clear in its meaning.

\(^{9}\) “Wenn wir sagen: ‘diese Rose ist rot’, so liegt in der Kopula ‘ist’, daß Subjekt und Prädikat miteinander übereinstimmen. Nun ist aber die Rose als ein Konkretes nicht bloß rot, sondern sie duftet auch, hat eine bestimmte Form und vielerlei andere Bestimmungen, die in dem Prädikat ‘rot’ nicht enthalten sind. “

\(^{10}\) “Es wird also ein Mörder zur Richtstättegeführt. Dem gemeinen Volke ist er nichts weiter als ein Mörder. Damen machen vielleicht die Bemerkung, daß er ein kräftiger, schöner, interessanter Mann ist. Jenes Volk findet die Bemerkung entsetzlich: was, ein Mörder schön? wie kann [man] so schlecht denken und einen Mörder schön nennen; ihr seid auch wohl etwas nicht viel Besseres! Dies ist die Sittenverderbnis, die unter den vornehmen Leuten herrscht, setzt vielleicht der Priester hinzu, der den Grund der Dinge und die Herzen kennt … Dies heißt abstrakt gedacht, in dem Mörder nichts als dies Abstrakte, daß er ein Mörder ist, zu sehen und durch diese einfache Qualität alles übrige menschliche Wesen an ihm [zu] vertilgen.”
pedagogical task of philosophy is to combat such abstractions and to find a way to overcome their one-sidedness.

Before we go on to Hegel’s account of overcoming this one-sidedness, we have to note that what adds one more layer of complexity to Hegel’s understanding of judgment is that this judgment, for Hegel, is not distinct from the object judged. Judgment is not conceived, as it is for Kant and many others, as a form of what Hegel calls external reflection, which is a type of thought that places subject outside of the object or applies determinations to the object that are not already there. Hegel argues that in order for us to distinguish between two different determinations in a judgment, these determinations have to be really distinct in themselves. To judge the murderer as a murderer, the murderer has to himself already possess certain differentiating characteristics that render this judgment possible. These differentiating characteristics are what Hegel calls inner difference. As an example in the Phenomenology puts it:

"The distinguishing marks of animals, e.g., are taken from their claws and teeth; for in point of fact it is not only cognition that thereby distinguishes one animal from another, but each animal itself separates itself from others thereby; by means of these weapons it maintains itself in its independence and in its detachment from the generality." [PG 246/W3 190]¹¹

The things themselves exist in a constant mode of strife, whereby they separate themselves out from one another. Our judgment, the judgment that we carry out as particular subjects, is not something that, so to speak, draws lines between things that are not already there. Judgment, and thought for Hegel in general, is rather an act of tracing¹² over pre-existing lines that belong to the thing in itself. This is why Hegel says, following Plato, that thought is memory or Erinnerung. When we think, we make the distinctions that exist within Being our own; we memorise and interiorise – erinnern – them.

However, just because the judgment corresponds to something in the things themselves, does not mean that it is therefore true, or at least not wholly true. Judgment gives us a merely superficial truth. As Hegel puts it: “A judgment is one-sided on account of its form and to that extent false.” [EL §31/W8 98]¹³. As the example of the murderer shows, the exclusive nature of a judgment indicates that another form of difference is necessary if we want to reach the object in its complexity. Judgment works well enough in certain everyday scenarios and empirical investigations, but it does not suffice for deeper thought, especially not for speculative philosophy. If Kant did not believe thought to be capable of grasping the thing in itself, then, according to Hegel, this is because Kant remained with judgment as the central model for thought. The job of thought is therefore not merely to judge (though also that), but to transcend the one-sidedness of the judgment so as to attain a more complex view of its object. To this end, thought must make the negative side of the determination explicit, thus exposing its limited purview and, as Hegel puts it, dissolving it.

¹¹ "Die Unterscheidungsmerkmale der Tiere z. B. sind von den Klauen und Zähnen genommen; denn in der Tat unterscheidet nicht nur das Erkennen dadurch ein Tier von dem anderen, sondern das Tier scheidet sich dadurch selbst ab; durch diese Waffen erhält es sich für sich und gesondert von dem Allgemeinen."

¹² Cf. PG §766/W3 557

¹³ "[D]as Urteil ist durch seine Form einseitig und insofern falsch."
Contradiction as the truth of difference

The dissolution of the one-sidedness of a judgment is what Hegel calls reason (Vernunft):

“The understanding determines, and holds the determination fixed. Reason is negative and dialectical, since it dissolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing...” [SL 10/W5 16]14

Whereas judgment was afflicted with negation, reason in turn is negative in relation to this judgment. Reason establishes what we could call a ‘second-order’ negation which negates the implicit negation of the judgment. This second-order negation is what Hegel calls contradiction.

If this sounds abstract, consider a debate, in which one of the participants expresses a one-sided view on a matter. He judges hastily. Then imagine an opposing view being uttered on the same subject, creating a disagreement. The opposing view, only by being expressed, reveals the first judgment as negative. By creating a contradiction, the opponent has made it apparent that the subject matter of the debate is more complex than initially anticipated. Now it has become necessary to render a more sophisticated judgment on the matter.

This is the nature of dialectics (from ‘dia’ = across/between and ‘legein’ = speech; to ‘speak between’) as Hegel understands it. We make progress in the understanding of a subject matter, by first determining it in a simple fashion and then showing how this simplicity is contradicted.

To make reason the faculty of contradiction is again quite close to Kant, for whom reason was the faculty that discovered the antinomies, the fundamentally contradictory aspects of the thought of the unconditioned. According to Hegel, it was Kant’s accomplishment to have discovered that thought leads itself to posit contradictions, but Kant was mistaken in his conclusions. Kant, believing that things could not contradictory in themselves, took the antinomies as an indication that reason should be subject to a critique. Because reason, when left unchecked, winds up in contradictions, its exercise should not extend to the unconditioned.

Hegel, however, believes that thought should not stop at contradiction. Kant, he says, shows too much “tenderness for worldly things” [EL §48/W8 126]15. In fact, for Hegel, contradiction is a necessary moment in thought, because it is where the one-sidedness of a judgment is overcome. Here it is again important to note that just as negation and judgment were not merely in our heads, but also real, the same holds for contradiction and reason. Hegel criticises those thinkers who see contradiction as a merely negative result. The ancient Zeno of Elea, for example, showed that movement was contradictory and concluded that this meant that there was no such thing: movement is contradictory, therefore it does not exist. It is this conclusion that Hegel rejects. “This kind of dialectic [i.e. dialectic in the style of Zeno]

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14 “Der Verstand bestimmt und hält die Bestimmungen fest; die Vernunft ist negativ und dialektisch...”
15 “Zärtlichkeit für die weltlichen Dinge”
… merely stops at the negative side of the result and abstracts from what is at the same time actually on hand, namely a determinate result…” [EL §89/W8 194][16]. Zeno, in Hegel’s view, proved merely that movement is contradictory, but not that it therefore does not exist.

Similarly, whereas Kant took the discovery of the antinomies as a negative result, as a clue that thought must be stopped or prevented from extending to the unconditioned, Hegel understands the antinomies as a positive discovery. The antinomies have shown us that reality is not ‘either-or’[17](Entweder/Oder) [EL §65/W8 155]. Reason reveals that things are themselves contradictory and this contradiction is their real nature. Contradiction is precisely where we must not stop, but where we must push on. Not only are both the theses and the antitheses of Kant’s antinomies true [see PN §247] – albeit one-sidedly – but it is not merely time, space, matter and causality that are contradictory, it is everything in general:

“The main thing to be noted is that the antinomy occurs not only in the four specific objects taken from cosmology but instead in all objects of all genera, in all representations, concepts, and ideas. To know [wissen] this and to gain knowledge of objects thus characterized belongs to the essence of a philosophical consideration.” [EL §48/W8 127-128][18].

But why should this be the case? Why should contradiction be real? And what is the exact meaning of contradiction for Hegel? To clarify this, we have to take a look at the dialectic of difference from Hegel’s Science of Logic, in which Hegel argues that contradiction is implied by the categories of identity and difference. As he puts it:

“Difference as such is already implicitly contradiction; for it is the unity of beings which are, only in so far as they are not one – and it is the separation of beings which are, only in so far as they are separated in the same reference connecting them.” [SL 374/W6 65][19].

Hegel argues that if we think the categories of identity and difference through, if we fully try to understand what it means for two things to be identical or different, then we are by the very nature of these thoughts led to believe also in contradiction. How so?

_Hegel’s dialectic of identity and difference_

This question is answered by the dialectic of identity and difference, which belongs to a part of the Logic Hegel calls the determinations of reflection. Here it is important to note that Hegel does not treat identity and difference as they are treated in formal logic. Identity, for example, does not mean the abstract logical equivalence of one subject to another (A=A),

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[16] “Diese Dialektik bleibt so bloß bei der negativen Seite des Resultates stehen und abstrahiert von dem, was zugleich wirklich vorhanden ist, ein bestimmtes Resultat…”


[18] “Die Hauptsache, die zu bemerken ist, ist, daß nicht nur in den vier besonderen, aus der Kosmologie genommenen Gegenständen die Antinomie sich befindet, sondern vielmehr in allen Gegenständen aller Gattungen, in allen Vorstellungen, Begriffen und Ideen. Dies zu wissen und die Gegenstände in dieser Eigenschaft zu erkennen, gehört zum Wesentlichen der philosophischen Betrachtung…”

[19] “Der Unterschied überhaupt is schon der Widerspruch an sich; denn er ist die Einheit von solchen, die nur sind als in derselben Beziehung getrennte.”
but the real identity of a thing, e.g. the persistence of a thing’s identity through time or the real identity between one thing and another. Now, when considered as real, rather than merely logical principles, Hegel argues that identity, difference, etc. are internally connected. This takes the form of a multitiered argument.

First of all, Hegel argues that the thoughts of identity and difference are fundamentally connected. We cannot talk about identity in absence of difference, nor about difference outside of identity. These thoughts imply one another. We can see this in some basic examples.

The thought of identity implies difference, because to say that two things are identical, means that we already understand them as two things. We can only say that this chair is identical to the chair, if there are two chairs, which would imply that a distinction has been made (if only in time or location). Identity thus always presupposes difference.

On the other hand, difference leads to the thought of identity, because to say that two things are different implies that we are in principle able to compare them, which that they are also in some sense identical (in the very fact of both being things for example). Difference, as Hegel puts it, is always introduced by the phrase ‘in that’ (darin) [SL 361/W6 46].

So identity implies difference and difference leads back into identity; they are reciprocal. Yet if this is the case, then that means that there is never a pure identity or difference. There is only ever an identity-in-difference and a difference-in-identity.

This brings us to the third step of this dialectic (the first being identity, the second being difference). If things are identical-in-difference and different-in-identity, then they are what Hegel calls diverse. Diversity (Verschiedenheit)\(^\text{20}\) is a combination of the previous two stages. When two things are diverse, we say that they are alike in one respect and unlike in another.

However, although diversity combines the thoughts of identity and difference, it nevertheless cannot express the way things differ in themselves, but only how they differ for us. When we say that two things are alike, we compare them. But this comparison has to have a basis; there has to be an intrinsic feature of the object that allows us to say that they are like or unlike. To give an example, if we say that Peter resembles Paul, then we have to compare Peter and Paul based on them having similar faces, for instance. Furthermore, similarity is always relative; Peter and Paul resemble each other based on a comparison with a context that exceeds them – e.g. Peter only resembles Paul in relation to background provided by the whole genus of people, or in relation to a family of which they are both a member. Similarity between two things always presupposes their dissimilarity from everything else.

It follows that when we consider a thing resembling itself, remaining similar to what it was before, this presupposes that it has intrinsic features that are contrasted with an entire background of things. Eo ipso for unlikeness. This is why Hegel says “Each of these moments [likeness & unlikeness], in its determinateness, is therefore the whole.” [SL 368/W6

\(^{20}\) It is in the dialectic of diversity where Hegel’s criticism of Leibniz’ principle of the identity of the indiscernibles appears. This principle, as Hegel reads it, entails that there are no two things that are completely alike. (It thus corresponds to what Hegel understands as a philosophy of diversity). But though this may be true, Hegel thinks it of little interest, because (un)likeness is for him never the way in which things are truly differentiated.
In order for something to be alike something else, it needs to be set apart from the whole of which it is a part.

This contrast with the whole is what Hegel calls opposition (**Gegensatz**). Regarding opposition, he writes: “Opposition is the unity of identity and diversity; its moments are diverse in one identity, and so they are opposites.” [SL 367/W6 55][22] This ‘one identity’ the quote refers to is the whole referred to above. Opposition expresses that the determination of a thing is essentially related to that which it is not, i.e. this whole which consists of the totality of which it is not. Hegel illustrates this with the scientific concept of polarity: the positive factor of a magnet (the thing) is only positive by virtue of its opposition to the negative pole (the whole). If the negative pole drops away, then the positive pole lose its positivity. Now it then follows that the difference of a thing is only a difference in relation to that which it is not. This inner connection of a thing with its outside is the ultimate form of difference: contradiction.

Contradiction means that a thing does not have self-subsistence, but instead has an ‘identity’ that only means something in relation to a whole. This whole is what Hegel will also call its ground or condition (**Grund**). To give a concrete example, Hegel writes that a human being exists as a contradiction. This is the case because a human being – and indeed all finite things – is internally related to that which it is not. A human being cannot exist but as a part of a larger sphere, e.g. a community that provides it with nourishment so that it is able to sustain itself. And they are furthermore internally determined by this larger sphere. Contradiction, in other words, means that human beings are essentially perishable, inclined to become what they are not.

The category of contradiction in Hegel’s dialectic concludes the dialectic of difference by leading into that of condition (**Grund**). Hegel calls this transition from the dialectic of difference to the dialectic of the condition ‘zum Grunde gehen,’ which means to perish, or, to stick closer to the etymology, to founder. This represents the dissolution of a one-sided determination and a move towards the condition of a determination, the whole from which the determination, as we discussed above, is an abstraction.

An example will make this transition clearer. Once again consider the example of the rose. Contradiction, as a logical principle, is inherent in the perishing of the rose, i.e. contradiction is expressed by the fact that the rose wilts. When the rose wilts, its determinations (its redness, odour, etc.) all disappear. The rose is referred back to its ground or condition, which in this case is literally the ground, i.e. the soil from which the rose draws its nutrients. When the rose perishes, it returns back into the soil of which it was a part.

The dialectic of difference thus has as a conclusion that all the forms of difference – identity, difference, diversity and opposition – have contradiction as their root; they conceal and presuppose contradiction, which is the true form of difference. This is the logical expression of a world in which everything is constantly on the way to turning into something else.

Now here it should be noted here that the meaning that Hegel gives to contradiction differs from the way that contradiction is traditionally interpreted. As we mentioned before, contradiction appears as a real principle, rather than a formally logical principle. In formal logic, to say that something is contradictory, means that it partakes of two contradictory

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21 “Jedes dieser Momente ist also in seiner Bestimmtheit das Ganze.”
22 “[Gegensatz] ist die Einheit der Identität und der Verschiedenheit; seine Momente sind in einer Identität verschiedene; so sind sie entgegengesetzt.”
predicates (A and -A, for example) at the same time. When Hegel talks about contradiction, he does not mean this – things are obviously not one thing and at the same time another. A plant is a plant and not at the same time a non-plant, as he puts it [LL 4]23. In fact, a better way to give expression to the logical meaning of contradiction would be that A=–A. Contradiction does not mean that a thing is also its other, but it does mean that it essentially tends towards its other, which is to say that it contains a tendency to change.

It is worth making explicit here how this discussion of difference as contradiction relates to the earlier discussion of negation. Negation does not appear here, in the dialect of difference, because it appears earlier in Hegel’s Logic in the dialect of determinate being (Dasein). The structure of the Logic is such that the doctrine of Essence makes explicit what was implicit in this earlier part of the doctrine of Being. The forms of difference that Hegel discusses here are all relational differences, whereas negation is an immediate difference. Only two things are identical, whereas a thing, as Hegel understands it, can in itself be negative. Negation is a difference not yet transparent, we understand something as negative, but not yet against what. The category of contradiction makes this explicit, it connects the negation to that which it negates. Negation just says ‘not-X,’ whereas contradiction is relational: X is not not-X. For Hegel, to know a thing means to understand what this thing contradicts. Negation merely says that something differs, but not how something differs. Therefore, if negation was an abstraction from the whole, contradiction is that which clarifies this abstraction by reconnecting it to the whole from which it was disconnected.

Now this discussion of contradiction is important, because it shows us what philosophy – i.e. dialectics – should be doing for Hegel, it should find contradictions which demonstrate the true nature of a thing. Now one might argue that there is no learning involved in contradiction. After all, continuing Hegel’s example, when the rose perishes, what have we learnt? The rose is gone, it is no more. Nevertheless, however, we have learnt something determinate. In fact, we have here seen that the rose was not a self-subsistent reality, but in fact belonged to a larger ecosystem. The rose has become what Hegel calls a moment (Moment) of a larger whole, of which the perishing of the rose is not merely a disappearance but a positive determination. The lifecycle of the rose ends, but is taken up in the larger cycle of the soil. This movement, by which the dissolution of a determination appears as the truth of a determination on a higher level is what Hegel calls Auflhebung, (perhaps best translated as ‘sublation’) a German word which invokes both disappearance and elevation.

We have seen earlier that understanding was the faculty of determining. The understanding carves out an identity for an object. However, this identity, as we have seen, is illusory and in fact conceals the complexity, the difference and the movement of the thing. Now the task of philosophy is to regain this movement, by showing how this identity is related to a larger whole. This explains the ‘cadence’ of Hegel’s dialectics, the movement of which always involves, at first, an abstract determination, then a demonstration of how this determination relates to what it is not, a positing of their contradiction and then once more a new abstraction. This, again, is a movement of tracing.

So when properly understood, every determination is not a stable identity, but a transition. Because the true nature of things is to be contradictory, thought should show the way in which things contradict each other. To use an etymological connection Hegel also

23 This is why there is little point to the oft-repeated criticism of Hegel’s flouting of the law of noncontradiction, a criticism that almost always ignores this technical meaning of contradiction.
uses: Philosophy is that which shows how a Bestimmung, in the sense of a determination, reaches its Bestimmung, or its destination, which is to say the point at which it turns into another determination. Hegel’s philosophical system does nothing but trace this movement and find through this tracing the true and necessary connection between things.

Negation and contradiction against Parmenides & Plato

Hegel thus presents himself as a critic of philosophies of identity. With the principles of negation and contradiction, Hegel aligns himself with a Heraclitean tradition of philosophy that believes in the reality of difference, change and movement. In fact, Hegel’s development as a philosopher in his own right started with a criticism of Schelling’s Identitätsphilosophie, which Hegel considered to be a modern form of Parmenideanism (after the ancient Parmenides). This Parmenideanism can be summarised in one of Parmenides’ extant sayings: “Being is and non-Being is not” [LHP Vol 1, C]. Schelling’s philosophy, for Hegel, holds to this proposition. Schelling believes in pure Being, pure identity; his Absolute is self-identical, corresponding to the principle of identity A=A. However, experience gives us finite existents that are distinct from one another. Schelling’s system of philosophy was much criticised in his time for not being able to give an account of how this pure identity comes to be separated into these distinct existents. Hegel aligned himself with this criticism in the introduction to the Phenomenology, calling Schelling’s Absolute “the night in which “the night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black” [PG §16/W3 22]24. Or, in other words, if A=A holds, then there is no such thing as qualitative distinction.

Hegel opposes the Parmenidean principle with a thesis from Heraclitus: “Being and non-being are the same; everything is and yet is not.” [LHP Vol 1, D.] Pace Schelling, non-Being and negation have to be real, in order to uphold both the unity of Being and the existence of discrete forms. The unity of Being has to split itself up through negation in order to account for the qualitative differences characteristic of concrete experience.

Hegel’s introduction of negation into philosophy is close to Plato’s conception of difference. Like Hegel, Plato rejected Parmenides’ pure Being, replacing it with a plurality of determinations – the Ideas. For Hegel, Plato’s philosophy corresponds to a conception of difference in terms of negation. In The Sophist, Plato pointed out that a discourse on falsehood presupposes that non-Being cannot be entirely opposed to Being. This is Bertrand Russell’s problem: how can there be a meaningful proposition about something that does not exist? Much like Russell’s introduction of ‘subsistence’ as a means of accounting for this fact, Plato concluded that the polar opposition (enantion) that Parmenides established between Being and non-Being or difference cannot hold. Non-being, as Plato puts it, “in some sense.” [Soph. 240e]. Hegel understands the concept of the to heteron or alterity that Plato introduces as a correlate of what he himself calls negation. (Hence Hegel’s reference to Plato on SL 91). But though Plato introduces this moment of negation into philosophy, his dialectic nevertheless differs from Hegel. Plato introduces negation, but not also contradiction; the Ideas are self-identical – auto kath’auto – they are stable forms. Hegel’s

24 “...[D]ie Nacht, worin, wie man zu sagen pflegt, alle Kühe schwarz sind.”
principle of contradiction constitutes a response to all the classical problems of Plato's philosophy – which ideas are there? how are the Ideas related? how do Ideas relate to the sensible world? Hegel's philosophy responds to these problems by, as Hyppolite puts it, "push[ing] (pousser) this alterity up to contradiction." [L&E 113]. The determinations of Being must be shown to be internally related to each other, rather than independent stable forms. We must show how one idea passes over into another. Plato's dialogues always stop when they reach a contradictions. Hegel's dialectics, however, takes these contradictions as the moment of passage between one determination to another. To give an example, Plato encounters contradictions in trying to separate the thoughts of the One and the Many and considers this a dialectical failure; Hegel's dialectic will show how the One contradicts itself into becoming the thought of the Many. Plato, for Hegel, did not realise that contradiction was the truth of dialectical method. As Hyppolite puts it: "[B]etween Platonic dialectic and Hegelian dialectic, there is the same difference as between a symphony heard and the creation of the symphony." [L&E 113]. Plato finds differences between the Ideas, but Hegel creates difference, by considering determinations in their dialectical coherence.

Hegel's conception of difference as negation and contradiction thus appear as criticisms of philosophy of identity, be it the pure Being of Parmenides or Schelling, or Plato's self-identical Ideas. They constitute the ways in which Being breaks itself up and the way in which this breaking-up can be thought. They are both ontological and methodological25 principles.

With regard to Hegel's method, it is worth saying a few things about the way in which negation and contradiction inform Hegel's system of philosophy.

**Negation and contradiction in Hegel's system**

Hegel's conception of negation and contradiction inform the whole of his philosophy. The moments of negation and contradiction – which correspond to acts of understanding and reason – reiterate themselves continually throughout Hegel's philosophical system. This system consists of three major parts: logic, nature and spirit. The *Science of Logic* deals with Hegel's logic, whereas the philosophies of nature and spirit are treated in Hegel's lectures and in the overview provided by Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*.

This system, as Hegel describes it, forms a circle:

"By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, the science presents itself as a circle that winds around itself, where the mediation winds the end back to the beginning which is the simple ground; the circle is thus a circle of circles, for each single member ensouled by the method is reflected into itself so that, in returning to the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member." [SL 751/W7 571]26.

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25 I use the term ‘method’ loosely; Hegel’s dialectics is conceived of as an immanent development, which is to say that it is designed to ensure that no single component is, in itself, independent of the whole. It is only a method in so far as it requires a certain discipline to hold fast to the dialectical train of thought.

26 "Vermöge der aufgezeigten Natur der Methode stellt sich die Wissenschaft als ein in sich geschlungener Kreis dar, in dessen Anfang, den einfachen Grund, die Vermittlung das Ende zurückschlingt; dabei ist dieser Kreis ein Kreis von Kreisen; denn jedes einzelne Glied, als Beseeltes der
We can understand why it is a circle by referring to the earlier treatment of contradiction and Aufhebung. At each stage of Hegel's system, he begins with the consideration of a simple thought, shows how it is internally connected to its opposite and from this contradiction it appears a new thought, ‘the beginning of a new member.’ [as above].

The beginning of the Logic provides the simplest example. The Logic begins with the consideration of the thought Being (Sein), which Hegel understands as “abstract immediacy” [abstrakte Unmittelbarkeit] [SL 57/NI 81]. Being is abstract immediacy, because it is the most general thing one can think – everything is, Being is applicable to everything. It is a rational minimum. Now Hegel points out that when one tries to think such a thought, without any further determinations, this thought is essentially indistinguishable from Nothing (Nichts). To think ‘is’ as a mere copula, is to think nothing. As a Zusatz puts it figuratively: “Pure light equals pure darkness.” [EL §36a / W8 §36z]27, the thought of Being pur sang contradicts itself: It becomes what it is not, namely its opposite: Nothing. Now this transition takes place in the reverse direction as well: to think Nothing, is to think it as something that is and hence to think Being.

Being and Nothing thus appear as abstractions for Hegel, that can only be thought in their connection: “[N]owhere on heaven or on earth is there anything which does not contain both being and nothing in itself.” [SL 61/W5 86]28 Their meaning lies in their unity, which Hegel names Becoming (Werden). However, Being does not merely disappear in this pure Becoming, in fact we have reached a determinate result: Being is determined as that which disappears into Nothing. This means that a positive result is reached, we have attained a new thought, which Hegel calls Dasein (often translated as ‘determinate being’.)

Here we have come full circle. Being contradicted itself, becoming Nothing, but this contradiction (here indicated as Becoming) sublates itself, appearing on a higher level as Dasein. Dasein, in turn, will involve a similar circular movement.

If this entire discussion sounds abstract, it is intended to be so. The point of the dialectic of Being and Nothing is to dismiss pure Being (represented by Parmenides) and pure Nothing (represented by Buddhism) as abstractions, abstractions which only make sense when conjoined. Dasein is a more concrete determination (indeed it is determination as such) than either Being or Nothing. The Logic continues by demonstrating the way in which this thought, however, also remains abstract, reiterating the same dialectical circle.

The point of the Logic is thus to demonstrate how the meaning of ontological categories can only appear in their coherence. None of them make sense when isolated from the others. The aforementioned Concept is nothing but the full system of these logical categories. The Logic consists of three major parts: Being, Essence and Concept, which themselves involve this circular motion.

Now the Logic is itself, of course, abstract. It begins with an act of abstraction, in which we clear our mind from all contingency, figurative representations, presuppositions etc. and begin with the pure thought of Being. This is the general circular motion of the Logic, involving an Ouroboros-style movement by which it comes to make this abstraction explicit

Methode, ist die Reflexion-in-sich, die, indem sie in den Anfang zurückkehrt, zugleich der Anfang eines neuen Gliedes ist.”,

27 “Das reine Licht ist die reine Finsternis.”

28 “…[D]aß es nirgend im Himmel und auf Erden etwas gebe, was nicht beides, Sein und Nichts, in sich enthielte.”
within itself. The Logic becomes self-transparent, understanding itself as an abstraction. This means that at the end of the Logic, the logical categories reveal themselves as determinations that are abstracted from the concrete realm of Nature. The Logic leads into Nature.

The philosophy of Nature ends with a similar reflexive circle, which terminates in Spirit, which leads back into the beginning of the system, the Logic. Hegel's full systematic philosophy thus consist of interlocking circles, in which each determination receives its meaning from the greater whole in which it is a part and everything is understood by its position within this systematic whole. Hegel's system of philosophy is a continuous movement of one determination turning into the next, which circles back upon itself. Negation and contradiction are its logical principles, which recur constantly throughout its development, as determination and the resolution of a determination.

FINITE AND INFINITE REPRESENTATION

*Difference without identity*

The aim of Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* is, as he puts it, to grant difference its own concept [D&R 41/59]. To grant difference its own concept means first of all that difference not be defined in relation to identity and not be understood as a conceptual difference. (Deleuze distinguishes between a concept of difference and a conceptual difference [D&R 27/48].) Deleuze’s project is summed up succinctly in the Introduction:

“We propose to think difference in itself independently of the forms of representation which reduce it to the Same, and the relation of different to different independently of those forms which make them pass through the negative.” [D&R xix/1-2]29

This proposal for an original concept of difference has a polemical twist. It is intended as a response to all forms of philosophy that Deleuze calls *representation*. For philosophies of representation, which make up the largest part of the philosophical tradition, we can only say X is different from Y on the basis of a prior understanding of the identity of X and Y. By contrast, Deleuze will argue that there are non-conceptual differences that exist outside of such identities, which he calls *pure* or *internal* differences. It is the fact that there are such differences, differences which cannot be conceptualised, made identical, put into language, translated into resemblances – in brief, *represented*, that Deleuze believes the philosophical tradition has forgotten or – because of the more chaotic worldview it implies – recognised, but did its best to conceal.

In chapter 1 of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze gives a historical overview of this subordination of identity. It is here that he presents Hegel as the culmination of this philosophy of representation, appearing not as a philosopher of difference, but as what Deleuze calls *infinite representation*. In order to understand this, it is worth taking into account the contrast Deleuze creates between Aristotle and Hegel.

29 “Nous voulons penser la différence en elle-même, et le rapport du différent avec le différent, indépendamment des formes de la représentation qui les ramènent au Même et les font passer par le négatif.”
Finite representation

It was Aristotle who first conceived of difference as a difference in identity\(^\text{30}\). There is a passage in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* that Deleuze remarks upon in which Aristotle speaks of a greatest and most perfect (*megiste* and *teleios*) difference. This difference is specific difference (M.Iota 58\(^\text{30-31}\)). This *specific difference* is the differentiating factor which makes up the essence of a thing. In the genus *animal*, for example, the specific difference is the predicate *rational*, which distinguishes human animals from all the other, non-rational animals. The essence of the individual man is, as the classical definition puts it, his rationality.

What defines the thing, what makes it *be* what it is, is thus for Aristotle the particular class it belongs to. This class, in turn, derives its identity from the larger, more universal class that stands above it. (So the human is a type of animal, whereas an animal is a type of living thing, where a living thing is a type of substance, etc.) Aristotle provides us with a system of classes, of categories (Κατηγορίαι) which allows us to specify the identity of a thing by finding the class to which it belongs. We define the individual Socrates by finding his distinguishing feature (rationality). All other essential properties of the individual then follow from the specific hierarchical chain in which the individual is localised. We thus have a binary logic in Aristotle, where there are a few universal categories at the top and a plurality of particular categories at the bottom and all categories form a system of species and genera, a tree or pyramid of binary divisions.

However, Aristotle’s conception becomes difficult to maintain as soon as we ascend to the top or descend to the bottom of the hierarchy of classes. At the top of the system, Aristotle has difficulties specifying the *unity* of the highest categories, because the logic of division by specific differences no longer applies there. A highest genus, which would be a predicate applicable to everything (a predicate such as Being or Unity), would by the very logic of this structure be incapable of itself being differentiated. The reason is that it would have to be differentiated by differences that themselves are or have *unity*. It would have to distinguish itself from itself; a white space would need to be divided by white lines. Thus we find at the top of Aristotle’s system, not a single *genus*, but ten of them: substance, quality, quantity, relation, where, when, position, state, action and passion. But, because there is no highest category to link these ultimate categories, the difference between these biggest concepts cannot *itself* be a conceptual difference, it is, quite literally, non-specific. It marks a point at which the Aristotelian logic halts and it can go no further.

A similar problem occurs at the bottom of the pyramid, there are differences that are too small to be part of the essence, but nevertheless are crucial in individuating a being. These are the *accidents*, the properties that are too small to be part of the essence, or all those properties that make up the individual whatever he is. These, also, cannot be incorporated

\(^{30}\) We might be inclined to associate representation with Plato, who after all introduced the Ideas in philosophy. With Plato, however, difference was at least *other* to the Idea, it was not incorporated in the Idea. So whereas for Aristotle, difference is a difference-*in*-identity, Plato still considers difference and identity opposed and distinct.
into thought, because to include them within an essence would make the essence self-contradictory. To include within the essence of the human to be young, for example, would mean that as soon as the human ages, he would longer be human. To remove accidents from the essence would thus threaten the identity of the concept, making essences changeable.

This form of representation that Aristotle defines, which involves these stoppages and limits representation to a certain sphere in which it can more or less reliably operate, is what Deleuze calls finite or organic representation and it haunts a large part of the philosophical tradition. It is called organic, because we call organic that in which the part is determined by the whole and this is the case in Aristotle’s system: each difference and each class that is defined by this difference, receives its meaning from its place within the whole taxonomic system of species and genera. Secondly, this form of representation is finite, because it restricts itself to a taxonomy of different beings and bids thought to refrain from ever straying beyond this taxonomy. Thought, for Aristotle, cannot and should think the difference between the highest genera or the difference in accidents. Finite representation, in brief, is that representation which bids representation to stop somewhere – anankstenai31, as Aristotle calls it. We can determine the essences of things as specific differences, but we have to stop at the top when we reach the difference between the highest genera, or at the bottom when we reach accidental differences. In this respect, Kant is also a philosopher of finite representation, because he tells thought to restrict itself to empirically-informed judgments and stop as soon as reason encounters problems in the form of the antinomies. (Hence Deleuze’s assertion that Kant was not free from Aristotle’s influence [Deleuze, 1978].)

This development is what Deleuze considers a dreadful development in the philosophy of difference, because identity now becomes separated from the realm of difference. Difference, as the etymology of the word accident implies, now literally becomes a matter of bad luck, it becomes accidental, because it is always something that thought cannot fully grasp.

So we can define finite representation as that form of philosophy that is only able to represent things, because it bids thought to stop once at the differences that thought cannot digest. If Aristotle says specific difference is the greatest and most perfect difference, that is is because it is only through specific difference that he is able to create a system consisting of clear-cut, calm identities, separated by obvious differences. Difference is banished and the identity of the system is preserved. However, this makes Aristotle’s philosophy less than fundamental. It can only a partial view of the world, because it at the one time recognises that there are differences that it cannot incorporate, but at the other time bids thought to stop at them. Referencing Nietzsche’s concept of the Dionysian, Deleuze writes that Aristotle has forgotten the wider purview of difference and all those differences that are not so easily turned into a predicate:

“Specific difference refers only to an entirely relative maximum, a point of accommodation for the Greek eye - in particular for the Greek eye which sees the mean, and has lost the sense of Dionysian transports and metamorphoses.”32 [D&R 32/48].

31 Found in Deleuze’s lectures on Leibniz [2007, web source].
32 “La différence spécifique ne désigne qu’un maximum tout relatif, un point d’accommodation pour l’œil grec, et encore pour l’œil grec du juste milieu qui a perdu le sens des transports dionysiaques et des métamorphoses.”
Infinite representation

Hegel’s philosophy, according to Deleuze, constitutes a philosophy of representation that breaks through the limits of the Aristotelian worldview. We have already encountered Hegel’s criticism of finite representation earlier in this piece, though it was not directed at Aristotle, but at Kant – another representative of finite representation. In Deleuze’s reading, Hegel’s criticism of the finitude of judgment, as well as his revaluation of contradiction, constitute an attempt to save representation by taking down the walls established by Aristotle.

As a philosopher of infinite representation, Hegel is opposed to Leibniz. We saw earlier that Aristotle’s philosophy included two borders, one at the top of the system, another at the bottom. Now where Leibniz will try to remedy Aristotle’s system by incorporating the smallest differences into representation – i.e. the accidents – Hegel will start from generic differences, the differences between the most universal categories.

Hegel’s Logic can be seen as an attempt to resolve the problem of the relation between the highest genera. Understanding difference not as specific difference, but as contradiction, the division of Being is veritably thinkable in Hegel’s philosophy. The thought of Being, with which the Logic starts, has an inner negativity, and therefore needs no external difference to break it up. The relation of Being to all the other universals – Quality, Quantity, Cause, Effect, etc. – is perfectly determinate for Hegel, their relations being demonstrated through the internal dialectic characteristic of all abstract thought. Hegel starts from the most universal, lets this universal contradict itself and thereby reincorporates generic differences into philosophy. Hegel thus replaces Aristotle’s hierarchical model with the circular model of the Logic.

Hegel’s understanding of difference as negation/contradiction, rather than specific difference, means that thought should not stop at the Aristotelian borders. Opposed to Aristotelian anankstenai is a word that appears throughout Hegel’s works: Unruhe – disquiet. Thought and being are fundamentally disquieted for Hegel, every determination is taken up in a movement and is therefore always on the way to sublating itself and becoming another. If Aristotle had, as Deleuze puts it, ‘lost the sight of Dionysian transports’ by transforming the world into the static hierarchy of essences, Hegel’s philosophy, on the other hand, constitutes an attempt to bring the Dionysian principle back into philosophy. It was not Nietzsche who first introduced the Dionysian into philosophy; Dionysus (or Bacchus), god of intoxication, metamorphosis – in brief, difference – appears at many times through Hegel’s philosophy. Against any static mode of philosophising, Hegel defines philosophical truth as: “the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose. [PG §47/W3 46]”

It is because of this endlessness, this Unruhe, that Deleuze names Hegel’s philosophy (together with Leibniz’s) infinite or orgiastic representation. It is infinite, because thought, rather than excluding any differences, appropriates all differences into representation. On the other hand, it is orgiastic, because the defaults of representation are

33 “[D]er bacchantische Taumel, an dem kein Glied nicht trunken ist; und weil jedes, indem es sich absondert, ebenso unmittelbar [sich] auflöst, ist er ebenso die durchsichtige und einfache Ruhe.”
not remedied by the introduction of something non-representational, but instead are increased by the multiplication or reproduction of representations. So when Hegel, for example, recognises the limits of representation in his criticism of the one-sidedness of judgment, he does not say: the form of the concept is wrong in the first place and difference is lost, but rather: the concept is only limited, because it is internally limited. The limit of representation is not the sub-representational, but always another representation. Hegel's criticism of Kant's usage of the word concept (Begriff) was always that Kant, for whom concepts are always predicates, did not conceive of concepts as big enough, the concept did not comprehend (begreifen) enough [cf. EL §9]. So this form of representation is orgiastic, when one determination perishes, another is born in its place: “[T]he very notion of limit changes completely"³⁴: it no longer refers to the limits of finite representation, but on the contrary to the womb in which finite determination never ceases to be born and to disappear, to be enveloped and deployed within orgiastic representation.”³⁵ [D&R 43/62].

Despite its taking into account the Aristotelian shortcomings, Deleuze nevertheless believes that infinite representation is wrong. He criticises Hegel’s philosophy of difference for not having truly understood the real nature of difference, still trying to ‘represent’ it. The movement of Hegel’s philosophical system, in Deleuze’s words, is a false movement [D&R 52/74]. This implies that Deleuze believes that there are true differences to be found that cannot be incorporated into Hegel’s philosophy.

In order to discover these differences, Deleuze argues that a modified form of empiricism will be necessary. In other words, thought, rather than with a consideration of universals, must begin with the differences given by sensuous difference. But in order to grasp this last point, we have to consider the criticism Hegel levelled at philosophical empiricism.

THE POSSIBILITY OF IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE

Hegel’s ontology of sense

To see how Hegel relates to empiricism, it is useful to follow Hyppolite’s definition of Hegel’s philosophy, which defines succinctly what is at stake. Hyppolite points out that Hegel’s philosophy is what he calls an ontology of sense³⁶ (Sinn in Hegel’s German, sens in Hyppolite’s French). He is referring to a remark Hegel makes in his Lectures on Aesthetics:

“Sense [Sinn] is this wonderful word which is used in two opposite meanings. On the one hand it means the organ of immediate apprehension, but on the other hand we mean by it the sense, the Significance, the thought, the universal underlying the thing.” [LA 128-129/W13 173].”

³⁵ “C’est la notion même de limite qui change complètement de signification: elle ne désigne plus les bornes de la représentation finie, mais au contraire la matrice où la détermination finie ne cesse pas de disparaitre et de naitre, de s'envelopper et de se déployer dans la représentation orgiique.”
³⁶ This is also a reference to Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of sense developed in Sense and Nonsense. (Merleau-Ponty was greatly inspired by Hegel.)
This quote has Hegel playing on the way that the German word *Sinn* has two different roles, one referring to sensible experience, another referring to the linguistic or the meaningful. We can see this in the English word ‘sense’ too: the adjective ‘sensible’ expresses both that something can be apprehended through the senses (‘the colour red is sensible’), or that it makes sense (‘that is a sensible thing to say’). If sense is a ‘wonderful word’ as Hegel puts it, this is because he believes that these two different meanings of the word (sensuous, linguistic) are intimately related. There is nothing in the realm of sensory experience that does not allow itself to be expressed in language. All that is sensible – all that can be felt – is also sensible, which is to say meaningful or reasonable. Sensory experience is never given per se. There is no such thing as a pure sensory *qualium* that resists itself to expression.

If Hegel gives us an ontology of sense, this means that for Hegel there is no such thing as the *ineffable*. “[T]he ineffable, feeling, sentiment are not what is most exquisite and true, but instead the most insignificant and untrue.” [§20]. We sometimes speak as if there is something in a sensory experience, an indescribable richness, that can never be carried over into words. But Hegel’s dialectic precludes this. As Hyppolite puts it: “Immediate singularity, which would be ineffable intuition, the’‘what we will never see twice,’ is … the worst of banalities.” [L&E 15]. If it is a ‘banality,’ this is because even if it exists (which at any rate can never be excluded), it has no bearing on thought. “Let us assume that singular things and souls exist in themselves. We would be able neither to conceive them nor to name them, since conception and language move within the universal.” [Ibid 8]. (‘Singular’ refers here to things that are not instances of a universal.) The ineffable, according to Hegel and Hyppolite, can be nothing but an empty postulate, something entirely heterogenous to thought.

Hegel’s thought is therefore primarily linguistic. Or we could say, because words always refer to more than one thing, that it has an essential affinity with the *universal*. To see why this should be the case, we have to look at the dialectic of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and its first few chapters especially.

*The dialectic of truth and certainty*

As mentioned earlier, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is Hegel’s epistemology. It is concerned with how we should understand the relationship between knower and known. The Phenomenology investigates this relationship through an immanent development, which is to say that it does not presuppose a method that would be external to its subject matter (for then this method would have to be legitimised by a second method, and that by a third, and so on...). Rather, the Phenomenology takes as its point of departure one certain conception of the relationship between knower and known and examines if this conception is internally consistent. This examination means that it compares what Hegel calls the certainty (*Gewissheit*) and the truth (*Wahrheit*) of this conception of consciousness. This is the distinction between what consciousness takes its object to be and what the object proves to be. If certainty does not correspond to truth, then this conception of consciousness is false

37 “*Sinn* nämlich ist dies wunderbare Wort, welches selber in zwei entgegengesetzten Bedeutungen gebraucht wird. Einmal bezeichnet es die Organe der unmittelbaren Auffassung, das andere Mal aber heißen wir *Sinn*: die Bedeutung, den Gedanken, das Allgemeine der Sache.”
and we must look for a truer conception, one that would solve the problems of the previous conception.

An examination of the first chapter of the *Phenomenology* will give us a clearer idea of how this works. Hegel begins the book with the consideration of a mode of consciousness called sense-certainty (*Sinnlichkeit*). Sense-certainty, as its name indicates, is a mode of consciousness that takes its object to be the impressions received by the senses. What is true for sense-certainty is the host of different sensible qualities that it sees and feels. Because the truth is merely *received* through the senses, this conception of consciousness does nothing in its apprehension of the truth. "Our approach to the object must be immediate or receptive; we must alter nothing in the object as it presents itself. In apprehending it, we must refrain from trying to *comprehend* it." [PG §90/W3 82]38 The previously mentioned distinction between knower and known is therefore *minimal* here. Sense-certainty does not conceptualise, actively contribute any cognitive content, reflect upon what it receives or make distinctions within its object. We could say that it feels without understanding. It thus corresponds quite closely to what Kant calls the *given*, which is the *matter* of sensible intuition *without* the formative influence of the categories. In Hegel’s words, sense-certainty is an *immediate* knowledge, there is nothing between – no intermediary – between knower and known. In this respect, as a mode of consciousness, its structure is similar to that of a demonstrative pronoun, such as ‘this,’ ‘here,’ or ‘now’; it contains a direct reference to its object.

The object of sense-certainty is thus the collection of impressions it receives through the senses. This is why Hegel notes that it is seemingly the ‘richest’ form of knowledge; it takes up everything in it and everything for it is true. Yet this richness, according to Hegel, is misleading. The dialectic of sense-certainty reveals that this mode of consciousness is in fact incapable of retaining a firm grasp of its object, which is to say that it fails to actually *think* it. This is what Hegel describes as the distinction between the *this* and its meaning (*Meinen*). As soon as sense-certainty is asked to specify the *meaning* of the this-here-now, it loses it. Hegel explains it with reference to the word *now*:

“To the question: 'What is Now?’, let us answer, e.g. 'Now is Night.' In order to test the truth of this sense-certainty a simple experiment will suffice. We write down this truth; a truth cannot lose anything by being written down, any more than it can lose anything through our preserving it. If now, this noon, we look again at the written truth we shall have to say that it has become stale.” [PG §95?W3 84]39

This point made with respect to time holds for location too:

“Here is, e.g., the tree. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite: 'No tree is here, but a house instead'." [PG §95/W3 85]40

38 "Wir haben uns ebenso unmittelbar oder aufnehmend zu verhalten, also nichts an ihm, wie es sich darbietet, zu verändern und von dem Auffassen das Begreifen abzuhalten.”

39 "Frage: *was ist das Jetzt?* antworten wir also zum Beispiel: das Jetzt ist die Nacht. Um die Wahrheit dieser sinnlichen Gewißheit zu prüfen, ist ein einfacher Versuch hinreichend. Wir schreiben diese Wahrheit auf; eine Wahrheit kann durch Aufschreiben nicht verlieren; ebensowenig dadurch, daß wir sie aufbewahren. Sehen wir jetzt, diesen Mittag, die aufgeschriebene Wahrheit wieder an, so werden wir sagen müssen, daß sie schal geworden ist.”

40 "Das Hier ist z. B. der Baum. Ich wende mich um, so ist diese Wahrheit verschwunden und hat sich in die entgegengesetzte verkehrt: Das Hier ist nicht ein Baum, sondern vielmehr ein Haus.”
This is the first instance of the distinction between certainty and truth. Sense-certainty is certain that its object is the night or the tree, but in truth it turns out to be day or the house. A contrast emerges between the stability of the this and the differences introduced by the variations in time and in space. The ‘this’ is an empty reference and because sense-certainty has no richer concepts at its disposal, it loses its referent. Rather than having the immediate sensory differences for its object, it is stuck with an abstract Being.

Sense-certainty might try to take its refuge in its certainty of itself by saying that though there is no permanence in the outside world, itself remains the same. But this offers no solution. The ‘I’ is just as vague as the ‘this’:

“But in this relationship sense-certainty experiences the same dialectic acting upon itself as in the previous one. I, this ‘I’, see the tree and assert that ‘Here’ is a tree; but another ‘I’ sees the house and maintains that ‘Here’ is not a tree but a house instead.” [PG §101/W3 86]

Sense-certainty therefore appears stuck with an irresoluble contrast between its intention and its object, between the emptiness of the ‘this’ or the ‘I’ and the richness of the sensory qualities that it is trying to capture (Meinen). This contrast means that sense-certainty unwittingly carries out what we could call a synthesis. Instead of intending merely this-here-now, it intends more than this quality, more than this moment, more than this location. It ties together, i.e. synthesises a certain range of qualities and a certain portion of time and space. But it is not itself capable of carrying out this synthesis. Sense-certainty, being defined as it is, can only oscillate between what takes its object to be and what it actually is, between the ‘this’ and the Meinen. A more complex form of consciousness is required to actually effect the synthesis, to take the moments of unity and difference together. But sense-certainty, by the very nature of its inner opposition, already points forward to the shape that this new form of consciousness should take; it shows us where to go from here. This transition is what Hegel calls determinate negation (bestimmte Negation) and it forms the recurring theme of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Each chapter encounters an insurmountable dichotomy between its intended and actual object and the next chapter begins with the resolution of this disjunct. After sense-certainty comes perception (Wahrnehmung), which takes the two moments that were separated in sense-certainty together. Its object, what Hegel calls the thing and its properties, takes both the ‘this’ and the multiple qualities together in one object.

The dialectic of sense-certainty gives us the first clue as to why Hegel’s philosophy is an ontology of sense. This dialectic is meant to show that an entirely receptive mode of

41 “Die sinnliche Gewißheit erfährt aber in diesem Verhältnisse dieselbe Dialektik an ihr als in dem vorigen. Ich, dieser, sehe den Baum und behaupte den Baum als das Hier; ein anderer Ich sieht aber das Haus und behauptet, das Hier sei nicht ein Baum, sondern vielmehr ein Haus.”

42 My choice of the word synthesis will become clear in the proceeding, once it becomes apparent that Hegel draws a parallel between the indeterminacy of the ‘this’ and Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception.

43 Because, by virtue of the finite standpoint that it adopts, the moment of resolution is always implicit in the Phenomenology of Spirit, it properly speaking does not contain contradiction. Contradiction creates a continuous dialectic, whereas the Phenomenology is discontinuous. “[T]he origination of the new object, that presents itself to consciousness without its understanding how this happens, which proceeds for us, as it were, behind the back of consciousness.” [PG §87/W3 80]. (“[D]ie Entstehung des neuen Gegenstandes, der dem Bewußtsein, ohne zu wissen, wie ihm geschieht, sich darbietet, ist es, was für uns gleichsam hinter seinem Rücken vorgeht.”

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consciousness is impossible. To even have a sensory quality as an object, we must have a certain conceptual repertoire to grasp it. Consciousness must be more complex than how we have currently defined it.

The second and third chapter of the Phenomenology give us these more complex forms of consciousness, but encounter difficulties similar to the one just described for sense-certainty. In the first chapter, it was revealed that consciousness intended a universal in the form of the ‘this.’ The second and third chapter deal with the nature of this universal. Describing them briefly: the second chapter establishes that this universal cannot be a thing, the third that it cannot be a force or a law. If it cannot be a thing, this is because Hegel establishes that this thing, considered as a universal, cannot be separated from its properties. Once we remove every property from a thing, there is nothing left in the thought a thing but an empty shell.

If it cannot be a force, this is because Hegel argues that one force can never be separated from another. And laws, too, are by their very nature abstract, so give us an insufficient conception of our object. The conclusion of the first part of the Phenomenology is therefore that the universal that sense-certainty intends must be considered to be a Concept (Begriff). The Concept is a universal that divides itself and in dividing itself, determines itself. It is what Hegel earlier called the unity of Substance and Subject. It is a unity that differentiates itself by determining itself and is at one with itself in this self-differentiation. He defines it as such:

“This simple infinity, or the absolute Concept, may be called the simple essence of life, the soul of the world, the universal blood, whose omnipresence is neither disturbed nor interrupted by any difference, but rather is itself every difference, as also their supersession; it pulsates within itself but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest. It is self-identical, for the differences are tautological; they are differences that are none.” [PG §162/W3 132]45.

So this is where the Phenomenology of Spirit discovers that the object of philosophy should be this system of determinations that the Science of Logic describes. It is, one could say, Hegel’s deduction of idealism.

This deduction of the Concept reveals to us why Hegel’s philosophy is an ontology of sense. Because sensory experience shows itself to be impossible without the presupposition of a linguistic structure in the form of the Concept, the empiricist point of view is turned upside down. For an empiricist, we always begin with immediate knowledge and derive our concepts from this immediate knowledge. In David Hume’s philosophy, for example, knowledge always begins with simple impressions, such as a single patch of red. Universality only arises as the result of the association of such simple impressions. Red becomes associated with hardness, sweetness etc. in order to become the complex idea of an apple. But Hegel’s argument against sense-certainty precisely precludes the possibility of the simple experience in the first place. To experience a patch of red – a this – is not possible.

44 Some translations render Begriff as ‘Notion,’ Concept is, in my view, more appropriate, because Hegel’s Concept is definitely connected to what Kant understands by a concept.
45 “Diese einfache Unendlichkeit oder der absolute Begriff ist das einfache Wesen des Lebens, die Seele der Welt, das allgemeine Blut zu nennen, welches allgegenwärtig durch keinen Unterschied getrübt noch unterbrochen wird, das vielmehr selbst alle Unterschiede ist, so wie ihr Aufgehobensein, also in sich pulsirt, ohne sich zu bewegen, in sich erzittert, ohne unruhig zu sein. Sie ist sich selb st gleich, denn die Unterschiede sind tautologisch; es sind Unterschiede, die keine sind.”
We cannot go from sensible to universal in the order of reasons, but must always go from universal to sensible. This implies that there is a truth and content to immediacy such that this immediacy is relevant to thought. Yet this is precisely what Hegel denies. We cannot think without already having concepts.

To recapitulate, Hegel’s argument in the first chapters on the Phenomenology of Spirit implies that philosophical empiricism is impossible. This is because as soon as consciousness attempts to grasp sensuous qualities, it finds that it needs to have a conceptual or linguistic understanding in order for such an empiricism to be possible in the first place. In other words, difference, the realm of sensible experience, the ineffable – all of these are the product of the universal for Hegel. Another way of putting the nature of Hegel’s ontology of sense is to say that for Hegel, nonsense is always the effect of sense. Sensible experience, which is an experience of the singular or particular, is always an effect of a linguistic structure. This standpoint is heterogenous to empiricism, because it entails that sensory experience is always secondary to the universal.

The dualism between the Phenomenology and the Logic

The Phenomenology thus legitimises the point of view of the Logic. Because consciousness is only made possible by concepts – by the Concept – a treatment of this Concept as the ground of the various forms of consciousness that the Phenomenology describes is necessary.

But although the first three chapters of the Phenomenology establish consciousness of this Concept, they do not establish self-consciousness. The dialectic of sense-certainty, perception and understanding shows that there is such a Concept, but not how this Concept can be concretely apprehended.

This is why there is a second half to the Phenomenology in which thought becomes practically reconciled with the Concept. This part of the dialectic deals with our concrete relation to the world through action. It describes how consciousness, at first through individual action (self-consciousness), but later through collective action and institutions (Spirit), comes to recognise the Concept as its own. This is a quasi-historical process, in the sense that it describes a process that more or less corresponds to our history (actual historical events such as the French Revolution and Terror are parts of the Phenomenology, for example). Yet it is not a summation of historical facts. Instead, the Phenomenology is a phenomeno-logos, it tries to draw out the reason (logos) from historical phenomena. It is only concerned with those historical moments that can be shown to be necessary as the resolution of the problems inherent in a mode of consciousness.

This historical dialectic – and the Phenomenology in general – ends with the transition from Religion to Philosophy. In religion (which in the treatment of the Phenomenology includes art), the subject has attained consciousness of the Absolute, but this consciousness remains figurative, appearing in sensuous form in religion and art. The Absolute therefore remains distinct from this consciousness by virtue of the fact of appearing
as a sensuous object. In manifest religion, the Concept is felt, but not thought. This is why
the transition to Philosophy is necessary. It is only in philosophy that the Concept, to use
Hegel’s terminology, is in-and-for-itself: we are both conscious of it and understand it as our
own. This is the point at which Thought and Being, subject and object, come to correspond
and a beginning with the Logic can be made:

But does this transition make sense? This is what Hyppolite, throughout all his
commentaries on Hegel, always struggled with. He writes:

“No chapter of the Phenomenology is more obscure than the one with which the book ends, "Absolute
Knowledge." This obscurity no doubt has multiple causes: the difficulty of the subject matter, Hegel's
varied intentions, probably also a hasty composition which is sufficiently explained by the circumstances
of the book's publication.” [GHP 573/553]46 (The Phenomenology was completed whilst Napoleon
besieged Jena.)

All of Hyppolite’s books make reference to this transition, which is more generally the
transition between the Phenomenology and the Logic. Undoubtedly, this transition is
necessary, even if Hegel sometimes omits the Phenomenology from his philosophical
system (e.g. in the Phenomenology). Without the Phenomenology’s criticism of the dualism
between subject and object, the Logic cannot be said to anything more than a formal
exercise or external reflection. Furthermore, the Logic is supposed to act as the ground for
our concrete, sensuous experience of the world. But if the relation between this concrete
experience and the Logic are not thought, then

But the ending of the Phenomenology is obscure. It ends with religion becoming
philosophy, but Hegel nowhere explains why the community, at some point in time, comes to
contemplate the Concept in its abstract form.

This is not merely a defect in presentation. Even if Hegel had given a richer account
of the transition between the Phenomenology and the Logic, the fact remains that there is a
dichotomy between two radically different kinds of dialectic. The dialectic of the
Phenomenology is sensuous and historical, whereas the Logic is abstract and atemporal.
The very act of abstraction, by which we move from the one to the other, seems impossible if
the Logic is understood as an atemporal truth. Furthermore, it makes the relation of how we
as concrete individuals relate to this system impossible to gauge (hence Kierkegaard’s
criticism of Hegel, which Hyppolite’s is not so different from.) As Hyppolite puts it: “[D]o we
not fall back into the immobility of the Eleatics, or into Schelling’s absolute…?” [GHP
577/557]47

In Genesis & Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology, Hyppolite still tentatively proposes
a reading of the Logic in which the Logic, like the Phenomenology, is not ontology but
epistemology. “Logic is also a theory of knowledge because it is truly a ‘self-knowledge’,
which Schelling’s absolute identity was not.” [GHP 588/567]48 But though this reading would

46 “Aucun chapitre de la Phénoménologie n’est plus obscur que celui qui termine l’oeuvre et s’intitule « le
savoir absolu ». Cette obscurité tient sans doute à des causes multiples : la difficulté de la matière, les
intentions diverses de Hegel, mais probablement aussi à une rédaction hâtive que les circonstances de
la publication de l’oeuvre expliquent assez.”

47 “[N]e va-t-on pas retomber dans l’immobilisme des Éléates qu dans l’Absolu de Schelling…?”

48 “La logique est aussi une théorie de la connaissance parce qu’elle est vraiment une ‘connaissance de
soi’, ce que n’était pas l’identité absolue de Schelling…”
be supported by the symmetry between the Logic and the Phenomenology (e.g. between sense-certainty and the dialectic of Being and Nothing and so on), Hyppolite nevertheless abandons it. This is because as soon as the Logic becomes a theory of our knowledge, the distinction between subject and object once again rears its head, as well as the hypothesis of a thing in itself distinct from our understanding of things. This is why Logic & Existence ends on an aporetic note, where Hyppolite no longer proposes a solution to the problem of the dichotomy in Hegel’s system.

Deleuze, in his review of Logic & Existence, addresses this conclusion. But, like Hyppolite, he rejects the solution of finitising the Absolute: “[I]f Hyppolite suggests that it is necessary to reintroduce finitude itself into the Absolute, are we not going to risk a return of anthropologism in a new form?” [HR 193/22]49. Instead, Deleuze wonders if a different ontology is not possible, suggesting that the source of the difficulty lies in Hegel’s philosophy itself:

“The richness of Hyppolite’s book could then let us wonder this: can we not construct an ontology of difference which would not have to go up to contradiction, because contradiction would be less than difference and not more? Is not contradiction itself only the phenomenal and anthropological aspect of difference?” [HR 193/23]50.

We have thus seen why Hegel’s philosophy remains abstract. Its basic problem is that though it attempts to reconcile essence and appearance and sense and nonsense, it nevertheless ends up introducing a new dualism, which come to the fore in the transition from the empircal and historical Phenomenology to the abstract and atemporal Logic. The divide between the abstract philosophy of the Logic and the here-and-now is what led Deleuze to call Hegel’s philosophy infinite representation. Furthermore, we see that Deleuze, in his review of Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence, proposes a different path, an ontology of difference.

DIFFERENCE WITHOUT NEGATION

The philosopher that Deleuze turns to in the years following these words is Henri Bergson. The choice for Bergson is obvious: In Logic & Existence, Hyppolite had drawn a contrast between Hegel and Bergson, noting the alternative conception of difference that Bergson’s philosophy poses. For Bergson, difference is primarily conceived of as duration, rather than negation. This opposition that Hyppolite poses between Hegel and Bergson leads Deleuze to believe that Bergson is able to provide a concept of difference that will not result in the kind of difficulties that the Hegelian system ran into. Like Hegel, as we will see, Bergson’s concept

49 “[S]i M. Hyppolite suggère qu’il faut dans l’Absolu réintroduire la finitude elle-même, ne va-t-on risquer sous une nouvelle forme un retour de l’anthropologisme?”

50 “Après le livre si riche de M. Hyppolite, on pourrait se demander ceci: ne peut-on faire une ontologie de la différence qui n’aurait pas à aller jusqu’à la contradiction, parce que la contradiction serait moins que la différence et non plus? La contradiction n’est-elle pas seulement l’aspect phénoménal et anthropologique de la différence?”
of difference is not merely subjectivistic, but internal; it describes a difference that belongs to being itself. Nevertheless, it is not negative, i.e. it is an exclusive difference. Before we go into Deleuze’s interpretation of Bergson, a few generalities about Bergson’s philosophy are required.

**Bergson’s ontology of duration**

The concept of duration starts out as a thesis about introspection for Bergson. In *Time & Free Will*, Bergson points that our inner experience does not allow itself to be divided into discrete moments. We never know when one feeling begins and the next one ends. So the transition of anger into sadness, for example, is always gradual and imperceptible, like the transition of one colour into the next on a colour spectrum. The continuous experience of these gradual transitions of one emotion into another is what Bergson calls *duration*. This is an unbroken, *qualitative* experience of time, opposed to the mechanistic or scientific model of time, which divides time into regular intervals (t1, t2, t3…) and its content into discrete entities (i.e. atoms). Duration is a view of time in which a psychological quality does not simply vanish, but remains preserved in the quality that follows it – there is change, but a change that *endures*.

Yet although Bergson at first put duration forward as a way of describing inner experience, later in his philosophical development duration becomes true for things themselves. Bergson comes to argue that duration is not only found in inner experience, but in outer reality too, especially in the case of the forms of living organisms.

Bergson’s thesis on the reality of *memory* is an essential step towards this conclusion. In *Matter & Memory*, Bergson points out that memory, conceived of as the storage of perceptual images, cannot be an effect of the brain. Bergson criticises any form of thought that would localise memory within a particular object, like Descartes’ infamous example of the pineal gland. We cannot conceive of the brain as a kind of drawer (*tiroir*) or register (*registre*), as Bergson puts it [CE 7/14]. This is because the brain is itself one of the images along with the images that it supposedly stores. The brain cannot preserve an image through time, because it must itself be preserved through time\(^{51}\), hence *memory must be preserved in and of itself*. As Bergson puts it “[T]he past is preserved by itself, automatically.” [CE 7/18]\(^{52}\). This means that not only our experienced time, but real time must be considered as a continuous movement, rather than a succession of distinct moments. Descartes held that for things to subsist through time, it was necessary for God to recreate them at every instant\(^{53}\). But God’s intervention is unnecessary: if memory exists, moments cannot simply disappear once they have passed. The past is never gone, but remains implicit in the

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\(^{51}\) To make this clearer: Consider the brain at \(t=1\) and an image at \(t=1\). If the brain wants to store the image at \(t=1\) and carry it over to \(t=2\), then the brain itself must likewise be preserved over the interval between \(t=1\) and \(t=2\). We would need to posit another brain to explain this preservation and this ad infinitum.

\(^{52}\) “[L]e passé se conserve de lui-même, automatiquement.”

\(^{53}\) See the Third Meditation: “For it is clear, if one considers the nature of time, that the same power and action is required to conserve any thing, whatever it may be, in being during the individual moments in which it continues to exist, as would be needed to create the same thing from the start if it did not yet exist.” [Descartes, 2008, p. 35]
experience of every present moment, like the lingering sound of a musical note. This persistence of the past in the present means that we can never experience the same moment twice. Even if we were to be placed in an objectively identical situation as before, the nature of this situation would be differently coloured by the preservation of memory.

Bergson’s philosophy, like Hegel’s, is thus one that involves becoming. The preservation of the past in the present means that Being continually differentiates itself, each moment is completely new. This becoming has the character of duration. That is to say that it involves a continuous gradual variation in nuance, rather than a discrete change. Nevertheless, concrete experience involves semi-permanent objects. Bergson attributes this exteriority to the intellect, which solidifies the continuous becoming that perception gives us into semi-permanent forms, which allow for understanding and action.

In *Creative Evolution*, Bergson argues that this determination of the present by the past is how we should understand living forms. He proposes a new evolutionary framework in which the forms of living organisms are explained as being determined by an original impulse which endures within these various forms. Life is thus not a collection of different organisms, but a complex movement that is constantly differentiating itself and of which the particular forms of organisms are only static images, snapshots, as it were. This original impulse is what Bergson calls the *élan vital*, which he compares to duration:

“The evolution of the living being, like that of the embryo, implies a continual recording of duration, a persistence of the past in the present, and so an appearance, at least, of organic memory.” [CE 23/30]54.

This ‘organic memory’ is displayed by the fact that divergent evolutionary lines display identical complex mechanisms — for example, the movements of carnivorous plants, which mirror those of animals. Arguing that both mechanisms and finalism (the dominant types of evolutionary thought in Bergson’s time) are unable to account for these complex variations, Bergson takes this complementarity as a clue to formulate the hypothesis that organic life contain the same kind of preservation of the past in the present as psychological life. Every offshoot of the *élan vital* thus still contains an echo of the *élan vital* in which all different forms were united.

This primordial unity divides itself in its interaction with matter. Bergson’s point out that life is principally a problem-solving activity55. Life is that which solves the problem of how to preserve itself through time. In this, it has to deal with matter, which lays obstacles in its path. The divergent lines of evolution constitute different solutions to the problems introduced by matter. Life, for instance, has to incorporate a certain amount of matter in order to preserve itself. Organisms have to eat. The difference forms of organisms are different responses to this problem. Plants, for example, solve this problem by having developed systems that allow them to absorb inorganic matter: minerals, water, sunlight. Because these forms of matter are relatively well-distributed throughout the world, plants are sedentary. They stay relatively still, incorporating all their energy into absorption and photosynthesis. Animals, on the other hand, feed on organic matter. But because organic matter is stored in organisms, which are not so homogeneously divided, the animal has to move in order to find

54 “L’évolution de l’être vivant, comme celle de l’embryon, implique un enregistrement continu de la durée, une persistance du passé dans le présent, et par conséquent une apparence au moins de mémoire organique.”

55 See: CE [128/130, for example, or the chapter on instinct/intelligence.
it. This is why the animal has a nervous system connected to muscle fibers. As Bergson writes: “the same impetus that has led the animal to give itself nerves and nerve centers must have ended, in the plant, in the chlorophyllian junction.” [L&E 126-127].

The various forms of life thus constitute different solutions to the problem of matter. The peculiar nature of matter, the distribution of various forms of matter etc. are what cause the initial complex impulse of the \textit{élan vital} to divide itself into various forms. The discrete shape of the organism is a certain way of ‘organising’ matter (quite literally). Matter is that which forces the \textit{élan vital} to divide, forming individuals. Hence the definition of matter that Bergson provides: “[M]atter has a tendency to constitute isolable systems, that can be treated geometrically. In fact, we shall define matter by just this tendency.” [CE 13/19]^{56}

Bergson illustrates this divergence through a comparison with achieving maturity:

“This each of us, glancing back over his history, will find that his child-personality, though indivisible, united in itself diverse persons, which could remain blended just because they were in their nascent state: this indecision, so charged with promise, is one of the greatest charms of childhood. But these interwoven personalities become incompatible in course of growth, and, as each of us can live but one life, a choice must perforce be made. We choose in reality without ceasing; without ceasing, also, we abandon many things. The route we pursue in time is strewn with the remains of all that we began to be, of all that we might have become.” [CE 111/120]^{57}.

This process of maturity holds for life in general: the \textit{élan vital} initially contains a plenitude of possible forms, which through the course of time becomes solidified in the choice for certain solutions. This means that there is initially more in life than in its diverse products, more in the \textit{élan vital} than we see in the various products of life.

\textit{Bergson’s critique of negation}

Though Bergson, like Hegel, offers a philosophy of Becoming and an account of how Being differentiates itself in various organisms, their approach is radically different. As Hyppolite notes: “It is certainly difficult to imagine philosophical temperaments as different as theirs.” [L&E 161].

This is especially notable in one of the later parts of \textit{Creative Evolution}, where Bergson criticises the concept of negation. As we saw, Hegel accorded an essential ontological status to negation. For Hegel, things were really \textit{not} another thing; things

\footnote{56 \textit{“[M]atìere a une tendance à constituer des systèmes isolables, qui se puissent traiter géométriquement.”}}

\footnote{57 \textit{“Chacun de nous, en jetant un coup d’oeil rétrospectif sur son histoire, constatera que sa personnalité d’enfant, quoique indivisible, réunissait en elle des personnes diverses qui pouvaient rester fondees ensemble parce qu’elles étaient à l’état naissant: cette indécision pleine de promesses est même un des plus grands charmes de l’enfance. Mais les personnalités qui s’entrepénètrent deviennent incompatibles en grandissant, et, comme chacun de nous ne vit qu’une seule vie, force lui est de faire un choix. Nous choisissons en réalité sans cesse, et sans cesse aussi nous abandonnons beaucoup de choses. La route que nous parcourons dans le temps est jonchée des débris de tout ce que nous commencions d’être, de tout ce que nous aurions pu devenir.”}}
excluded each other. But Bergson argues that negation is never really given. He notes that from the point of view of our perceptual experience, we never encounter a ‘not’: He offers a thought experiment:

“I am going to close my eyes, stop my ears, extinguish one by one the sensations that come to me from the outer world. Now it is done; all my perceptions vanish, the material universe sinks into silence and the night. I subsist, however, and cannot help myself subsisting. I am still there, with the organic sensations which come to me from the surface and from the interior of my body, with the recollections which my past perceptions have left behind them nay, with the impression, most positive and full, of the void I have just made about me. How can I suppress all this? How eliminate myself?” [CE 302/298]58

Bergson’s last question in this citation is rhetorical. We cannot suppress the positivity of experience. We always experience something, be it an outer world, or, if we close our eyes, ourselves still. Our senses always have a positive object. In fact, according to Bergson, negation only appears when the faculty of memory intervenes. We use the suffix ‘not’ when we invoke a contrast between the past and the present. When we say ‘this is not what I was looking for,’ we have compared the object we currently see with the object that we remember seeing and found them not to correspond59. Negation thus only exists as a result of the intervention of memory, but never in the continuity of the real. “A being eneundowed with memory or prevision would not use the words “void” or “nought”; he would express only what is and what is perceived; now, what is, and what is perceived, is the presence of one thing or of another, never the absence of anything.” [CE 306/300]60.

There is thus an asymmetry between affirmation and negation for Bergson, such that we truly express the nature of an object only in a positive statement (this is X), whereas a negative statement (this is not X) merely refers us to the indeterminate whole of all that the object is not. As he puts it: “[N]egation is but half of an intellectual act...” [CE 312/305]61. Bergson says that when I say “this table is not-white”, I am not saying anything about the table. I am only admonishing those who say “this table is white”, telling them to adjust their statement.

Bergson thus concludes that negation is not real. Or, to be more precise, he argues that negation is an anthropological category; relative to our thought and social life, but not valid, as it is for Hegel, for the things themselves.

This involves an entirely different view of qualitative distinction than the one seen previously in Hegel’s philosophy. Bergson rejects the thesis that ‘omnis determinatio est negatio’. The nature of the rose, for Bergson, is not such that it negates anything else – there

58 “Je vais fermer les yeux, boucher mes oreilles, éteindre une à une les sensations qui m'arrivent du monde extérieur : voilà qui est fait, toutes mes perceptions s'évanouissent, l'univers matériel s'abîme pour moi dans le silence et dans la nuit. Je subsiste cependant, et ne puis m'empêcher de subsister. Je suis encore là, avec les sensations organiques qui m'arrivent de la périphérie et de l'intérieur de mon corps, avec les souvenirs que me laissent mes perceptions passées, avec l'impression même, bien positive et bien pleine, du vide que je viens de faire autour de moi. Comment supprimer tout cela ? comment s'éliminer soi-même ?”

59 More specifically, Bergson argues that negation always involves a degree of disappointment. We say ‘not’ when our experience does not live up to our memory, e.g. ‘This is not what I was expecting’ or ‘This is not true.

60 “[C]e qui est et ce qu'on perçoit, c'est la présence d'une chose ou d'une autre, jamais l'absence de quoi que ce soit.”

61 “[L]a négation n'est jamais que la moitié d'un acte intellectuel.”
is no exclusion present. This is why Hyppolite notes, disapprovingly, that Bergson “often sounds like Schelling” [L&E 95]. Hegel, as we saw, used the concept of negation to define qualitative distinction. For one quality to be different than another, means that this quality is not that other quality. This exclusive nature of difference means that contradiction is necessary as a means of relating between qualities. For Hegel, as Hyppolite puts it, “distinction and negation imply one another.” [L&E 306].

However, Hyppolite, despite this criticism, thinks that Bergson is wrong to say so. In fact, he believes that Bergson is also committed to a belief in negation as an ontological reality. He claims this in relation to Bergson’s view on matter:

“But does Bergson put this faculty of dissociating and distinguishing [i.e. memory] only in our minds? Are there not for him living bodies which individuate themselves more or less in the continuity of the real, directions in the evolution of life which, mixed from the beginning, accentuate then their divergences, quite while remaining complementary, for example, the torpor of the plant, the instinct of insects, the intelligence of vertebrates? Is not matter, finally, such as Bergson defines it, characterized by a tendency incompletely realized in the exteriority of the parts, in the fragmentation that our mind pushes to its extreme? But if Bergson grants that dissociation and distinction are also in the things, in being, in the duration, and perhaps in the absolute principle, he has to introduce negation into the universe and into the Absolute itself, because negation and distinction imply one another, as Hegel tried to show.” [L&E 306].

Let us unpack this quote. We have seen earlier that Bergson believed in an organic memory – the form of the organism echoes the élan vital of which it is only a particular shape. Yet at the same time Bergson holds that negation is introduced ‘merely’ by memory. Is Bergson not being hypocritical here? That depends entirely on what the distinction between these organisms means. According to Hyppolite, the opposition between organisms, their discrete forms, their ‘disassociation and distinction’ imply that negation is real.

But is this the only reading possible?

Deleuze’s rebuttal

Deleuze’s essay on Bergson’s Conception of Difference, despite not mentioning Hyppolite by name, deals with this point exactly. Its topic, as the title indicates, is the new concept of difference that Bergson introduces in his philosophy of duration. The main thesis of this essay is that Bergson’s philosophy provides us with a difference that is internal (cf. Hegel’s aforementioned inner difference) – which is to say not merely subjective – but nevertheless positive. Deleuze finds this in the concept of duration, which we discussed earlier as a qualitative difference in nuance, rather than in predicate. Yet at the same time the concern of this essay is to shield Bergson from Hyppolite’s interpretation. According to Deleuze, negation is not a concern for Bergson, because negation is always anterior to difference. Difference, as Deleuze puts it, is not between two things, but is itself one of those things.

Deleuze pays especial attention to Bergson’s conception of the virtual. ‘Virtual’ is what Bergson uses to express the persistence of a past instance in a present one. The élan vital is virtually present in the current organism (e.g. the movements of animals that are virtually contained in the movements of carnivorous plants). But Deleuze emphasises the
difference between this conception of memory and the one suggested by Hyppolite: "Bergson tries to show that the negation of one real term by the other is only the positive actualization of a virtuality that contains both terms at once." [BCD 41/59]62.

The crucial point is the way in which memory functions in Bergson’s view. The preservation of the past in the present means that in this or that particular form, the entirety of the élán vital is preserved, albeit virtually. This, however, is something entirely different from the way in which the organism – or difference in general – is conceived of in Hegel’s philosophy. Bergson’s conception of memory, in which there is an essential preservation, implies a determination does not negate, which is to say excludes, all others. In fact, it includes them. The distinction between organisms is not a difference in kind, it is instead that they ‘partake’ or ‘participate’ in a deeper unity of which they are both various expressions.

We have already seen that Bergson divides Being into opposing tendencies, the most significant of which are life – the complex impulse of the élán vital which becomes dispersed in the variety of living organisms – and matter, which divides the élan vital into different organic systems. But Deleuze suggests that Bergson is misunderstood if we take this to mean that difference and matter, or nuance and negation, are accorded equal status. The originality of Bergson lies for Deleuze in the fact that difference is not between life and mechanism, élan vital and matter, but instead belongs entirely on the side of the élan vital. Matter does not do anything, properly speaking, it is only a principle of resistance. As Deleuze puts it: “Differentiation certainly comes from the resistance life encounters from matter, but it comes first and foremost from the explosive internal force which life carries within itself.” [BCD 40/55]63. Negation is thus never a real difference for Bergson, but a psychological side-effect, a superficial phenomenon, always secondary to the primary impetus of the élan vital or duration.

This drastically changes the meaning of organic memory. We might be tempted to see a correspondence between the relation between the limited form of an organism with respect to the élan vital and what Hegel calls the one-sidedness of a determination or negation. But the logic involved is entirely different. Hegel’s logic of negation implies that the form of an animal excludes the universal form of life as a more universal determination. Bergson’s philosophy, on the other hand, despite the exteriority introduced by matter, forms a logic of inclusion. (This logic of inclusion, in Deleuze’s book on Nietzsche, will be called affirmation.) The élan vital is not negated by the discrete form of the organism, but is included therein. All the different forms of organisms display the characteristics of all the others; there is universal participation – or, as Deleuze will call later it, affirmation. This creates an entirely different ‘economy’ of Being, in which there is no longer a dynamic of exclusion, in which each property has its own ontological space. (Deleuze will joke that dialectics is “an art of disputing properties and changing proprietors” (un art de discuter sur les propriétés et de changer de propriétaires) [N&P 160/184]) It follows that though Hyppolite is correct in saying that memory is not merely psychological for Bergson, it is nevertheless

62 “[Il] essaie de montrer que la négation d’un terme réel par l’autre n’est que la réalisation positive d’une virtualité qui contenait à fois les deux termes.”

63 “Sans doute la différenciation vient de la résistance rencontrée par la vie de la part de la matière, mais elle vient d’abord et surtout de la force explosive interne que la vie porte en elle.”
the case that this memory only preserves durational differences, and it is only psychological memory that introduces negation.\textsuperscript{64}

\textit{Dialectics vs. empiricism}

Deleuze is not so much concerned with evolution or biology here, but with philosophical method. Bergson’s Conception of Difference deals with the way in which we find true or natural differences. Deleuze mentions Plato’s comparison of philosophy to the art of the butcher, i.e. “dividing things by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver….” [Plato Phae. 265e]. The job of philosophy is thus not to divide things arbitrarily, but to find natural differences, which are those differences that are not merely subjective, but belong to being itself.

For Bergson, however, these distinctions are never negative distinctions; nothing ever excludes anything else. Negation is always only an anthropological category. Differences are instead always what Bergson calls a difference in tendency. We can see this in Creative Evolution’s assessment of the difference between various organic species. Here, Bergson remarks that we must not look for the properties that the members of one species have in common, for here we all too often find countless exceptions. Rather: “[T]he group must not be defined by the possession of certain characters, but by its tendency to emphasize them.” [CE 118/120]\textsuperscript{65}. An organism is thus not so much defined by its property, but by what it works towards. Plants are not per se all torporous (for there are plants that move), but do express a tendency towards torpor, which becomes more or less accentuated in various plants.

Deleuze generalises Bergson’s approach to evolution into a philosophical method. If the job of thought is to find differences in kind or natural articulations, then it is not to so much to find the properties of a thing, but to find the tendency to which the thing must be related. If difference is wholly on the side of tendency, then the proper philosophical method for finding differences is no longer to find contradictions. Instead, philosophy is concerned with carving sensory experience up into its constituent parts. This is what Bergson calls intuition. Deleuze illustrates this, following Bergson, through a comparison with the procedure of infinitesimal calculus. “When we have benefitted in experience from a little light which shows us a line of articulation, all that remains is to extend it beyond experience – just as mathematicians reconstitute, with the infinitely small elements that they perceive of the real curve, ‘the curve itself stretching out in the darkness behind them.’” [B 27/18]\textsuperscript{66}. This is what

\textsuperscript{64} Though I cannot go into detail regarding Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, I would suggest that this thesis on memory informs his rather mysterious interpretation of the eternal return as a selective principle.

\textsuperscript{65} “[L]e groupe ne se définira plus par la possession de certains caractères, mais par sa tendance à les accentuer.”

\textsuperscript{66} “[Q]uand on a profité dans l'expérience d'une petite lueur qui nous signale une ligne d'articulation, il reste à la prolonger jusqu'en dehors de l'expé- rience - tout comme les mathématiciens reconstituent, avec les éléments infiniment petits qu'ils aperçoivent de la courbe réelle, ‘la forme de la courbe même qui s'étend dans l'obscurité derrière eux.’”
Deleuze argues thought consist in: to reduce things to the tendencies that they express. Learning consists in nothing else.

As Deleuze points out, this constitutes a kind of philosophical empiricism. In *Difference and Repetition*, he will name this particular type of empiricism ‘transcendental’ empiricism, a term which expresses its two major characteristics. It is empiricism, on the one hand, because it begins from sensory experience, with the composites provided in perception. The *élan vital*, after all, is not something outside of experience, but something that is implicit in the concrete experience of life. (“What is essential here is that this ground is experienced, and we know how much Bergson insisted on the empirical character of the *élan vital.*” [BCD 36/49]67.) On the other hand, it is transcendental, because it does not remain with empirical diversity, but instead, through this empiricism, tries to gain a grasp of the conditions that make this empirical diversity possible.

*Sinnlichkeit and the ‘What is?’*

But here a Hegelian rebuttal becomes possible. After all, we saw earlier in the dialectic of *Sinnlichkeit* that Hegel rejected any form of immediate knowledge, i.e. any knowledge that had empirical beginnings. The dialectic of *Sinnlichkeit* was meant to show that such a mode of thought always ends up in a mediated knowledge, a knowledge of the conceptual and, with this initial step, the whole further dialectic of the *Phenomenology* would carry us to the Logic.

But here we must note the presuppositions of this dialectic. Sense-certainty, as Deleuze points out, already comes equipped with a certain preconception, in that it desires to intend its object in a very particular way. This intention, as Hegel describes it, takes the form of a question: the first thing sense-certainty wants to do is answer the question: what is it? (‘what is Here?’ ‘what is Now?’). But the form of this question – and the mode in which the entire Phenomenology begins – is itself already a presupposition. This means that the Phenomenology does not start entirely critically, because it already presupposes that consciousness, thought and knowing are principally concerned with answering ‘What is?’ And this question already contains a bias, it is geared towards creating a unity in the different sensory perceptions that it receives. This presupposition is only confirmed by what Hegel writes about sense-certainty in the *Encyclopedia Logic*:

“Aroused by [sensory] stimulus, thinking essentially reacts by elevating itself above the natural, sensory, and formally reasoning consciousness and into its own unmixed element. In this way, it at first takes up a self-distancing, negative relationship towards that point of departure. It thus finds satisfaction, for the time being, within itself, i.e. in the idea of the universal essence of these appearances, an idea that may be more or less abstract (such as the absolute, God).” [EL 40/W8 55]68.

67 “Que le fondement soit le fondement mais n’en soit pas moins constaté, tel est l’essentiel, et l’on sait combien Bergson insiste sur le caractère empirique de l’*élan vital.*”

68 “Dadurch als einen Reiz erregt, benimmt sich das Denken wesentlich so, daß es über das natürliche, sinnliche und räsonierende Bewußtsein sich erhebt in das unvermischte Element seiner selbst und sich so zunächst ein sich entferendes, negatives Verhältnis zu jenem Anfange gibt. Es findet so in sich, in der Idee des allgemeinen Wesens dieser Erscheinungen, zunächst seine Befriedigung; diese Idee (das Absolute, Gott) kann mehr oder weniger abstrakt sein.”
As the quote above indicates, negation is already presupposed from the beginning. And although the Phenomenology of Spirit is meant to be a critical exercise, it seems that consciousness is from the beginning already understood as being geared establishing a unity within these various sensory experiences, it begins, as Hegel puts it, with an ‘idea of the universal essence’ within these differences. When we look closer at the argument on sense-certainty, we note that sense-certainty only lost its object, i.e. the sensory qualities, at the moment when it tried to intend (Meinen) them. But this act of meinen is precisely a unifying act\textsuperscript{69}, as evinced by the questions that it introduces into the account on sense-certainty: ‘what is Now?’ and ‘what is Here?’ But these questions, by their very nature, are already predisposed towards producing a certain answer. When we ask ‘what is. . . ?’, we always already want to identify something. In a way, all the other consequences of Hegelian philosophy follow from this initial act, from this initial question or problem. This explains why Deleuze, in a presentation in front of the French Society of Philosophy, remarks:

“They when we examine the history of philosophy as a whole, we will have a tough time discovering any philosopher whose research was guided by the question ‘What is this?’ [Qu’est ce que c’est?] Aristotle? Definitely not Aristotle. Maybe Hegel, maybe there is only Hegel who did so, precisely because his dialectic, that of the empty and abstract essence, is inseparable from the movement of contradiction. The question ‘What is this?’ prematurely judges the Idea\textsuperscript{70} as simplicity of the essence; from then on, it is inevitable that the simple essence includes the inessential, and includes it in essence, and thus contradicts itself.” [MD 95/133]\textsuperscript{71}

This is the point to emphasise: because Hegel begins in the Phenomenology of Spirit, by introducing the act of Meinen, which acts as a unifying principle and introduces a structural tension within the book that drives the dialectic movement forwards, sensible or empirical difference is from the very beginning excluded. From the very beginning, Hegel has adopted a negative standpoint towards which Deleuze considers the most important component of thought. This is why Hegel’s dialectic, according to Deleuze, far from trying to reconceive difference, instead is from the get-go concerned with representing this difference or subjugating it to identity. Hegel’s assertion at the beginning of sense-certainty that it goes from being the richest form of knowledge to being the poorest form of knowledge is therefore given an ironic twist; sense-certainty was indeed the richest form of knowledge, but it is lost by the form of the question. In fact, it appears that the concept of negation is already present here from the get go. The subject is already that which already has, as Hegel puts it, a ‘self-distancing, negative relationship towards that point of departure.” [EL 40/W8 55]\textsuperscript{72}.

\textsuperscript{69} In this respect, there is a correspondence between the Meinen and Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. Hegel himself draws out this correspondence in EL §20.

\textsuperscript{70} Idea here is more or less equivalent to what we earlier called the Concept, although Idee has a technical meaning in Hegel’s philosophy.

\textsuperscript{71} “Si l’on considère l’ensemble de l’histoire de la philosophie, on cherche en vain quel philosophe a pu procéder par la question ‘qu’est-ce que?’”. Aristote, surtout pas Aristote. Peut-être Hegel, peut-être n’y a-t-il Hegel, précisément parce que sa dialectique, étant celle de l’essence vide et abstraite, ne se sépare pas du mouvement de la contradiction. La question Qu’est-ce que? préjuge de l’Idee comme simplicité de l’essence; il est force, dès lors, que l’essence simple comprenne l’inessential, et le comprendre en essence, donc se contredire.”

\textsuperscript{72} “ein sich entfernen, negatives Verhältnis zu jenem Anfange gibt.”
So, looking back, we have seen that sense-certainty, in its criticism of empiricism, in fact already presupposes a negative relationship towards empiricism by containing within itself a question that was antithetical towards a philosophy of difference in the first place. This is why Deleuze writes:

“Hegel wanted to ridicule73 pluralism [what we above called transcendental empiricism], identifying it with a naive consciousness which would be happy to say "this, that, here, now" - like a child stuttering out its most humble needs. The pluralist idea that a thing has many senses, the idea that there are many things and one thing can be seen as "this and then that" is philosophy's greatest achievement, the conquest of the true concept, its maturity and not its renunciation or infancy.” [N&P 4/4]4.

'This and then that' is the key phrase here, because it corresponds precisely to the 'inclusionist' (rather than negative) logic that Bergson had formulated in his conception of difference.

This logic creates an entirely different philosophical method. Hegel's method was always to start from an abstract simplicity (a Kantian-style judgment), which, through opposition and contradiction, attempted to include difference. But Deleuze suggests that such a mode of doing philosophy can never become anything more than abstract. This is why Deleuze remarks that Hegel's philosophy is still too close to Kant's model of judgment [D&R 33/50] (and Hegel's affinity with Aristotle has often been noted). As he puts it in Bergson's words:

"To Bergson, it seems that in this type of dialectical method, one begins with concepts that, like baggy clothes, are much too big. The One in general, the multiple in general, nonbeing in general.... In such case the real is recomposed with abstracts; but of what use is a dialectic that believes itself to be reunited with the real when it compensates for the inadequacy of a concept that is too broad or too general, by invoking the opposite concept, which is no less broad and general? The concrete will never be attained by combining the inadequacy of one concept with the inadequacy of its opposite." [B 44/38]75.

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73 Hegel does indeed ridicule sense-certainty, which Deleuze here calls pluralism. However, he does not compare it with infancy. He writes: "In this respect we can tell those who assert the truth and certainty of the reality of sense-objects that they should go back to the most elementary school of wisdom, viz. the ancient Eleusinian Mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus, and that they have still to learn the secret meaning of the eating of bread and the drinking of wine." ("In dieser Rücksicht kann denjenigen, welche jene Wahrheit und Gewißheit der Realität der sinnlichen Gegenstände behaupten, gesagt werden, daß sie in die unterste Schule der Weisheit, nämlich in die alten Eleusinischen Mysterien der Ceres und des Bacchus zurückzuweisen sind und das Geheimnis des Essens des Breites und des Trinkens des Weines erst zu lernen haben...") [PG §109/W3 91]. Put simply: Hegel believes that sense-objects have only a symbolical meaning, they mean something only as far as they represent ideas. Outside of this, they are nothing. Deleuze, for his part, when connecting pluralism to infancy, is suggesting a connection between pluralism and psychoanalysis that need not concern us here.

74 "Hegel vouloit ridiculiser le pluralisme, en l'identifiant à une conscience naïve qui se contenterait de dire 'ceci, cela, ici, maintenant' – comme un enfant bégayant ses plus humbles besoins. Dans l'idée pluraliste qu'une chose à plusieurs sens, dans l'idée qu'il y a plusieurs choses, et 'ceci et puis cela' pour une même chose, nous voyons la plus haute conquête de la philosophie, la conquête du vrai concept, sa maturité, et non pas son renouement ni son enfance."

75 "[Bergson] a l'impression que, dans une telle méthode dialectique, on part de concepts beaucoup trop larges, comme de vêtements qui flottent (1). L'Un en général, le multiple en général, l'être en général, le non-être en général... on recompose le réel avec des abstraits; mais que vaut une dialectique qui croit rejoindre le réel quand elle compense l'insuffisance d'un concept trop large ou trop général en faisant appel au concept opposé, non moins large et général ? On ne rejoindra jamais le concret en combinant l'insuffisance d'un concept avec l'insuffisance de son opposé..."
The movement should instead be the other way around. We must start with the complex (the mixture of sensuous experience) in order to move towards the simple. This is what Deleuze’s reversal of the relation between difference and identity consists in. From Deleuze’s point of view, the starting point of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, i.e. a situation in which we find ourselves confronted with a wealth of different sensible qualities, should not lead us to recede into abstraction. Rather, we must take this complexity and learn, through trial and error, to make distinctions. Following Bergson’s logic, to draw distinctions between these various qualities does not require the intervention of a subject to introduce negation within this field. Instead, these qualities are already different within *themselves*, possessing an internal, durational difference that is not the inner difference of negation.

(This creates an entirely different relation to Kant. The problem of the relation between concepts and intuitions, which was such a formative influence on Hegel’s generation, is posed by Deleuze too but resolved in the different direction. Whereas Hegel resolved it by making concepts – the Concept – the primary term, Deleuze, following Bergson, pushes this dualism in the direction of intuition. It is through intuition, not concepts, that we come to distinguish between the various objects in our perceptual experience.)

So Deleuze believes that Hegel’s dialectical movement makes an initial mistake in the way it departs from certainty. As he puts it in *Difference and Repetition*:

> “The imprint of the Hegelian dialectic on the beginnings of Phenomenology has often been noted: the here and the now are posited as empty identities, as abstract universalities which claim to draw difference along with them, when in fact difference does not by any means follow and remains attached in the depths of its own space…” [D&R 51-52/73]\(^\text{76}\).

Deleuze thus envisages another way of proceeding, this time from the empirical rather than through the dialectical. But here another Hegelian counter-argument becomes possible. We have argued that the unifying principle implied by the beginning of the Phenomenology was unwarranted. But there is another ground for this connection between identity and difference. Earlier, we have looked at the dialectic of identity and difference, which for Hegel appeared to be essentially connected, which led into the dialectic of diversity, opposition and contradiction. But this dialectic, even when considered outside of its place in the systematic whole of Hegel’s philosophy, would imply that the sensuous determinations encountered in *Sinnlichkeit* do in fact need to be related to a unifying principle, because their oppositional and contradictory nature implies that they only have a meaning within such a larger unity. Bergson’s philosophy also contains the risk of being interpreted in this way. Do the differences inherent in duration not amount to differences in likeness and unlikeness, or in what Hegel calls diversity?

What is necessary is a conception of difference that is entirely unrelated to identity.

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\(^{76}\) “On a souvent remarqué ce qui se passe au début de la Phénomé­nologie, le coup, de pouce de la dialectique hégélienne: l’ici et le maintenant sont posés comme des identités vides, des universalités abstraites qui prétendent entraîner la différence avec elles, mais justement la différence ne suit pas du tout, et repte accrochée dans la profondeur de son espace propre.”
What would this mean – difference without identity? We have seen earlier that Hegel argued that difference and identity are always conjoined; difference is always a difference ‘in that’. However, we can wonder if this conclusion, intuitively acceptable though it may be, is necessary, or if another conception of difference is not necessary, which would not involve such a relation to identity.

**Difference and Repetition** is concerned with arguing that this relation does not hold. Or, at any rate, that although difference and identity are always related, it is nevertheless difference that is the primary term in this relation. Deleuze is not claiming to be entirely original in formulating a conception of pure difference.. He finds some historical precedent for such a conception: in Duns Scotus’ concept of *haecclitas*, in Spinoza’s concept of *affectus*, or in Nietzsche’s conception of force. But none of these philosophers made difference the explicit topic of their philosophy and at any rate their doctrines, even if they do contain an inkling of an ontology of pure difference, nevertheless remain ambiguous. This is why Deleuze’s readings always involve a certain measure of violence in order to make these philosophers work towards to his philosophical project.

This is why *Difference and Repetition* contains a systematic account of a difference without identity, in which Deleuze draws these philosophers together and attempts to establish pure difference as a coherent and necessary thought. Deleuze believes that such a conception of difference need not be taken up into the dialectical movement that Hegel outlines. “Difference is not diversity.” [D&R 222/286]77, as Deleuze puts it.. He is thus concerned with showing that the thought of a pure difference, a difference outside of identity, is not as incoherent or unthinkable as it seems at first glance to be.

One of the models he uses to argue for this point, drawn from the work of Salomon Maimon, a lesser-known post-Kantian, is the differential (or infinitesimal) calculus. In mathematics, differential calculus is the study of change, its field consists of mathematical techniques for calculating, not the absolute values of a mathematical function, but the rates of change of these values. In a graph that measures distance over time, for example, differential calculus can be used to express (the change in) velocity by specifying the angle of this graph. This angle, at every point of the graph, expresses the ‘speed’ at which the y-value changes in relation to the x-value.

What is counter-intuitive about this method is that it shows the possibility – indeed the necessity – of employing the infinitely small in the process of calculation. The advantage of differential calculus, as opposed to estimates of the rate of change of a graph, is that it allows for absolute precision. The mathematical act of differentiation involves a limit function in which a division takes place by ‘h’ or ‘dx’, which are mathematical symbols that express a number infinitely close to zero. This procedure is rather as if we are measuring the speed of an object over an infinitely small distance. And although mathematics may forbid division through zero, this division through a number that, for all intents and purposes, is virtually equal to zero is necessary in order to find the differential graph. The peculiar nature of this limit function is that the variable ‘h’ at first needs to be introduced to carry out the

77 “La différence n’est pas le divers.”
differentiation, but then later is dropped from the function to arrive at the determinate result. It is a variable that appears negligible, but is in fact a crucial aspect of the calculus. In a very peculiar way, differentiation uses an infinitely small difference. Bishop Berkeley famously pointed out the paradoxical nature of these infinitely small differences:

“They are neither finite Quantities, nor Quantities infinitely small, nor yet nothing. May we not call them the Ghosts of departed Quantities?” [1992, p. 199].

There is a long history of the interpretation of this procedure, involving whether or not differential calculus presupposes the existence of infinitely small particles like Leibniz’ monads. Deleuze sidesteps this discussion; for him, the infinitely small exists, but not as a particle – which at any rate would possess a form of identity – but as a difference, as a pure rate of change.

Of course, even if we accept these pure differences, the fact remains that identities exist, if only as an illusion. But if we compare identity to the absolute values of the graph, it becomes apparent that the model of the differential calculus also makes it possible to think the way these differences give rise to identity. As Deleuze points out, dx and dy are both virtually equal to zero. But despite this fact, when put into a relation to one another, they nevertheless possess a determinate value: “In relation to x, dx is completely undetermined, as dy is to y, but they are perfectly determinable in relation to one another.” [D&R 172]. These infinitely small differences, to be sure, only exists in principle; in actuality, they are always part of an ensemble. Nevertheless, they show that it is possible to think pure difference, pure change.

_Dialectics vs. difference_

Deleuze thus conceives of a pure difference in the form of the infinitely small differences of the differential calculus. This is what he believes will give him what we earlier called a ‘concept of difference.’ Such a concept of difference, if it is to be appropriate, is revolutionary only by virtue of the fact that it would include within itself all forms of difference. As we saw earlier with Aristotle, his metaphysical system excluded generic and accidental differences. If Hegel did not provide a concept of difference, it is because Hegel expanded only Aristotle’s system of categories into the region of the universal. ‘Small’ differences, which include accidents and are exemplified by the example of infinitesimal differences, are excluded from the dialectical system.

This is reflected in Hegel’s rather uneasy relation to those differences associated with contingency, individuation and the realm of nature in general. In his own time, Hegel was challenged by Wilhelm Traugott Krug to deduce the existence of Krug’s quill from his philosophy of nature. This is often taken as a joke, but it is not an entirely non-serious argument against Hegel’s philosophy. The accidental, contingent, the singular – all of these are foreign to the universal nature of the dialectical movement. Hegel himself recognises this, writing in the Philosophy of Nature:
“This impotence on the part of nature sets limits to philosophy; and it is the height of pointlessness to demand of the Notion that it should explain, and as it is said, construe or deduce these contingent products of nature, although the more isolated and trifling they are the easier the task appears to be.” [PN §250/W9 35]83

Hegel’s philosophy thus appears to have the same bottom limit as Aristotle’s: it offers no account of accidents, which are entirely opposed to thought. Though Hegel accepts this, it nevertheless appears that there is a domain of Being that he excludes. (This is why Deleuze opposes Hegel’s brand of infinite representation to that of Leibniz, who expanded representation into the domain of the infinitely small – though he will find different reasons to disagree with Leibniz’ version of infinite representation.)

Because Hegel’s system excluded all these differences, by starting from the question “What is?”, Deleuze considers his philosophy abstract. Though Hegel tried to introduce movement and difference into philosophy, real movement and difference are from the get-go excluded. “[P]hilosophy does not free itself from the element of representation when it embarks upon the conquest of the infinite. Its intoxication 79 is a false appearance.” [S&AP 197/300]80. Hegel’s system of philosophy thus appears as an illusion, or an alienation, which does not at all match the actual world of differences in which we reside.

This is why Deleuze will argue that Hegel’s philosophy does not actually move:

“It is said that there were thinkers who explained that movement was impossible, but that this did not prevent movement from occurring. With Hegel it is the other way round: he creates movement, even the movement of the infinite, but because he creates it with words and representations it is a false movement, and nothing follows.” [D&R 52/74]81

From this point of view, the transitions between Being and Nothing that we discussed earlier are not really transitions at all. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze will write:

“The being of Hegelian logic is merely ‘thought’ being, pure and empty, which affirms itself by passing into its own opposite. But this being was never different from its opposite, it never had to pass into what it already was.” [N&P 183/210]83

78 “Jene Ohnmacht der Natur setzt der Philosophie Grenzen, und das Ungehörgste ist, von dem Begriffe zu verlangen, er solle dergleichen Zufälligkeiten begreifen - und, wie es genannt worden, konstruieren, deduzieren; sogar scheint man die Aufgabe um so leichter zu machen, je geringfügiger und vereinzelter das Gebilde sei”

79 Cf. the earlier discussion of Hegel’s Dionysianism.

80 “[L]a philosophie ne quitte pas l’élément de la représentation quand elle part à la conquête de l’infini. Son ivresse est feinte.”

81 “Il arrivaît à des penseurs, dit-on, d’expliquer que le mouvement était impossible, et cela n’empêchait pas le mouvement de se faire. Avec Hegel, c’est le contraire: il fait le mouvement, et même le mouvement de l’infini, mais comme il le fait avec des mots et des représentations, c’est un faux mouvement, et rien ne suit.”

82 Cf. Kierkegaard: “From this it follows quite simply that Hegel’s matchless and matchlessly applauded invention – having movement brought into logic (apart from the absence one notes in every other passage of any attempt on his part to make one believe that it is there) does nothing but confuse logic.” [2009, pp. 91-92].

83 “L’être de la logique hégélienne est l’être seulement pensé, pur et vide, qui s’affirme en passant dans son propre contraire. Mais jamais cet être ne fut différent de ce contraire, jamais il n’eut à passer dans ce qu’il était déjà.”
The Logic is thus a mystification, it is the constant rearrangement of boxes that were empty to begin with, layers and layers of thought that has nothing to do with reality. Though Hegel wanted to ‘quicken the dead bones of logic through spirit’, he has brought nothing to life. The system of the Logic, despite its intentions, remains abstract and self-contained.

CONCLUSION: DELEUZE’S PHILOSOPHICAL PROJECT

The way to get out of abstraction thus requires an entirely different way of proceeding, which starts from difference, rather than identity. Deleuze’s aim will be to construct a metaphysics on the foundation of pure difference, the difference we encountered earlier in the form of Bergson’s duration and the differential. Rather than expanding on Aristotelianism, Deleuze abandons the tradition of representation, making difference the primary term – which is not at all to say that identities do not exist. The task of Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism is to explain how all phenomena, including identities, can be explained from a foundation in difference. It is to show how difference is capable of grounding identity, whereas identity was not capable of grounding difference.

All of Deleuze’s books tell the story of this single metaphysical system. This includes Deleuze’s historical commentaries. Even in books that are ostensibly about Spinoza or Nietzsche, Deleuze is really concerned with showing how these philosophers can be shown to draw near to some aspect of the philosophy of difference. (Though this is not to say that Deleuze’s interpretations does not offer any orthodox insights into these philosophers’ works...) The story that in Deleuze’s text on Bergson is told in terms of tendencies, is retold in Nietzsche and Philosophy in terms of forces and in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza in terms of bodies. Underneath all these various versions lies the same essential story. Difference and Repetition is only the most condensed and systematic version of this story.

But throughout all these various accounts of Deleuze’s philosophical system, what remains constant is a continued attempt to distinguish this philosophy from that of Hegel. The distinction that we have here made between Deleuze and Hegel’s treatment of difference, is also evident from Deleuze’s treatments of limit, infinity, subjectivity, properties, etc, which he constantly takes care to distinguish from their Hegelian counterparts. Nearly every book that Deleuze writes contains some sort of criticism of Hegel, be it in the form of reading Nietzsche’s philosophy as a doctrine of “anti-Hegelianism” [N&P 8], construing Hume’s philosophy in light of Russell & Moore’s anti-Hegelian thesis that ‘relations are external to terms’ [E&S 101/109] or reading Spinoza’s philosophy as a theory of expression, against Hyppolite’s treatment of expression in Logic & Existence. Furthermore, Deleuze’s book on language is called The Logic of Sense, which poses an open challenge to Hegel’s ontology of sense.

Since it would be impossible to delve into all of these aspects without this piece becoming more superficial, we have focused on the concept of difference here, insofar as it offers the most condensed version of this story.

Yet what is it that makes Hegel such an important target here? Of all Deleuze’s philosophical opponents, Hegel is treated least gently, save for a few kind remarks in What is
Philosophy? Even Plato and Kant, who Deleuze also opposes, are nonetheless often treated with admiration and respect.

Perhaps the reason for this lies in Deleuze's method. As is perhaps apparent from this thesis, Deleuze's style of doing metaphysics is quite different from that of nearly every other philosopher. He does not simply write down his theses one by one, but instead illustrates his metaphysical systems through a constant conversation (or polemic) with the history of philosophy. In this regard, Hegel is Deleuze's favorite conversational partner. Hegel indicated the path that a philosophy of difference would have to take, without himself ever taking it. The best way to illustrate a philosophy of difference is thus through a constant opposition to Hegel's philosophy. And perhaps Malabou and Zizek have a point: Hegel is indeed an essential inspiration for Deleuze's own philosophy, though I hope to have shown that there are nevertheless crucial and irreconcilable differences. Deleuze's antipathy seems at times to be more of a rhetorical device than anything, intended to draw out the specificity of his own philosophy.

When asked about his relation to Hegel in an interview, Deleuze did not seem to take it too seriously: "Well, somebody has to play the role of traitor." [Deleuze, 2004d, p. 144].

USED WORKS:

Deleuze’s works (alphabetically by title, matched with translation):


Hegel’s works, original works:


Hegel’s works, translations:


Hyppolite’s works:


Other used works:


