The Participation Conditionality of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan: A Panacea for the Tanzanian Democracy?

A research into the consequences of the Tanzanian PRSP I and NSGRP participation processes for the democracy in Tanzania.

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Preface

This thesis is the end result of a year long study into the PRSP I and NSGRP processes and their consequences for the Tanzanian democracy. This study took place in the Netherlands but also partly in Tanzania. Especially the five months spent in Tanzania I have experienced as a chance of a life-time. Looking back at these five months I can say that it was a very studious time in which I got the opportunity to speak with a wide range of people. This has helped me to form a better notion of developmental issues, especially in the context of Tanzania.

This research would not have been possible without the help of many people, and I want to take this opportunity to thank these people. Firstly, I am grateful to Mr. Gert Jan Tempelman for offering me an internship at the Netherlands Embassy in Tanzania and for his enthusiastic coaching. Second, I want to thank the staff of the Netherlands Embassy in Dar es Salaam who made me experience the internship as a pleasant and valuable time.

Besides the Netherlands Embassy, there are many other people who made a success of my research in Tanzania. I would like to thank all my respondents who spend some of their scarce time to speak with me personally or on the phone or those who sat down and answered my questions by email. Especially considering the circa 5000 missions that visit Tanzania yearly, their willingness to do another interview with another *mzungu* (white person) is admirable.

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Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ALAT	Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania
AIV	Advisory Council on International Affairs
ARD	Associates in Rural Development
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCM	New Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi)
CDO	Community Development Officer
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CUF	Civic United Front
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DED	District Executive Director
DPG	Development Partners Group
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
ESRF	Economic and Social Research Foundation
FBO	Faith Based Organisation
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
IEO	Independent Evaluation Office
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme
MKUKUTA	Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umasikini Tanzania
MP	Member of Parliament
NESP	National Economic Survival Programme
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPF	NGO Policy Forum
NPES	National Poverty Eradication Strategy
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PFP	Policy Framework Paper
PMS	Poverty Monitoring System
PO	President's Office
PPA	Participatory Poverty Assessment
PPW	Poverty Policy Week
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
PSF	Private Sector Foundation
REPOA	Research on Poverty Alleviation
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
TAA	Tanganyika African Association
TAS	Tanzania Assistance Strategy
TANU	Tanganyika Afrikan National Union
TCDD	Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development
TUCTA	Trade Union Congress of Tanzania
UDSM	University of Dar es Salaam

| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| VPO | Vice President's Office |

Map of Tanzania

(ARD, 2003:v)

1. Introduction

1.1. Actuation of the study

Just like many things in a society, the ideas in the sector of development aid are subject to trends. Every now and then the ideas about how developing countries can become developed countries change and with this as well the type of development aid. A general trend that is visible over the last decennia is the shift from the classical and more practical type of development aid like building schools, educating teachers and building wells to a more differentiated type of development aid in which it is recognised that the effect of the classical type of development aid on the development of a country can be disappointing if there does not exist a true commitment to development in that same country. Commitment to development is believed to be most likely in a country where the political leadership can be hold to account. The population must be able to extort commitment to development from the political leaders. A democracy is regarded as a desirable form of government in which this is possible. Therefore development aid is more and more applied to promote democratic practices in developing countries alongside carrying on the classical type of development aid.

The shifts in the way of thinking how developing countries can develop are to a great extent influenced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the two main International Financial Institutions (IFI). The IFIs have played an ever increasing role in developing countries since their foundation in the 1940s. They were and still are the driving force behind many economic reforms in developing countries and are two major lending institutions.

In the last decennia the lending policies have been rather generous and have created major problems in developing countries. Many of these countries are faced with a heavy debt burden that forms a serious obstacle to the development of these countries. The IFIs have acknowledged this and launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in 1996. The aim of the HIPC is to ensure that no country faces a debt burden it cannot manage. In 1999, the Initiative was enhanced to strengthen the links between debt relief, poverty reduction and social policies. It has in mind the objective to ensure the proper use of debt relief as the resources freed, due to debt relief it should be used for poverty reduction. (IMF, 2004a). To devote strength to this objective every country that wants to apply for the HIPC Initiative has to prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in which the country describes how the freed resources from debt relief will be used to fight poverty. Besides, PRSPs form the new operational basis for the lending policies of the IFIs (Booth, 2003:132 and IMF, 2004b).

During the last six years, PRSPs have become increasingly important. Not only do PRSPs provide the operational basis for the lending policies and debt relief of the IMF and World Bank but also many international donors have reorganised their bilateral aid with reference to the national policies set out in PRSPs (Booth, 2003:132). The reason that the PRSP initiative has obtained such a dominant position is not necessarily the result of its success or potential in regard to poverty eradication. The praise of PRSP is also related to the way PRSPs should be drafted. By preparing a PRSP, the country has to meet the following requirements outlined by the IFIs. A PRSP should be:

1. country driven: promoting national ownership of strategies through broad-based participation of civil society;
2. result-oriented and focused on outcomes that will benefit the poor;
3. comprehensive in recognising the multidimensional nature of poverty;
4. partnership-oriented: involving coordinated participation of development partners (government, domestic stakeholders, and external donors); and
5. based on a long-term perspective for poverty reduction (IMF, 2004b).

A lot is expected especially from the first and fourth requirements. Participation of a wide range of stakeholders in the PRSP process should make the government more responsive so that the content of PRSP reflects the ideas of the whole society. This should enhance the country his ownership of PRSP. There is also the expectation that the government will be hold accountable for its actions by the stakeholders that have been consulted. In this way democratisation will occur. The rationale that lies behind this expectation will be described in more detail in the next paragraph.

Tanzania has also made its way into the race for debt relief and has already written two PRSPs, one in 2000 and the second in 2005. The existence of already two PRSPs makes it possible to study if the PRSP initiative indeed promotes democratisation. A convenient place in Tanzania to fulfil an internship was the Royal Netherlands Embassy as the Netherlands are one of the major donors in Tanzania and were most likely to be interested in this study. However, the Netherlands Embassy in Tanzania was not so much interested in the question if the PRSP initiative promotes democratisation but more in the consultation process that was just recently organised to draft the second PRSP. No study had yet been completed on this consultation process. As it was necessary to outline the second PRSP consultation process in order to study the effects of the first and second PRSP in Tanzania, the internship was a perfect opportunity to do this and also offered the opportunity to gather some insight opinions of Tanzanian respondents on the democratisation potential.

1.2. Participation and ownership as main principles of PRSP

With the introduction of the PRSP initiative, participation actually became a development goal in its own right. The IFIs want PRSPs to have a broad social basis, what explains that 'ownership' and 'participation' are the key principles of PRSP. 'Ownership' stands for the national responsibility for PRSP. This means that it is not only the government but also the citizens of the developing countries who are responsible for the contents of PRSP. 'Participation' refers to the political and social forces that want to share in this responsibility (Spanger & Wolff, 2003:19).

The World Bank (2004:237) defines 'participation' as the process by which '…stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, policymaking, resource allocations, and/or program implementation. During PRSP processes, the IFIs expect the following groups to participate:

- government, including ministries, parliament and sub-national governments;
- civil society, including Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), Community Based Organisations (CBO), trade unions, research institutions and academics;
- bilateral and multilateral donors;
- private sector; and
- general public, particularly the poor (World Bank, 2004:6).

This means that the IFIs envisage participation in PRSPs to be a deep and inclusive process and this should bring about a feeling of national ownership of a PRSP. Deep because participants should be able to influence and control agenda setting, policy making, budgeting and implementation. Inclusive because participation should be broad-based with a wide range of participating actors.

The IFIs are not specific about the kind of participation that is required for PRSP. It only proposes some participation mechanisms which could be applied like information sharing, participatory research (e.g. perceptions of the poor), informal and structured consultations, formation of committees and working groups, integration with political processes and donor involvement (World Bank, 2004:238). Despite the freedom to choose whatever participation mechanism, the World Bank warns for too much open-ended participatory processes. Without making clear that one wants to obtain concrete recommendations and advises out of the

participation processes, it is likely that the participation will result in generalities and obscure recommendations. Therefore countries should take care that their participatory processes are more outcome oriented. This means that participation should provide the drafters of PRSP with advices and recommendations, which can be easily converted into concrete inputs into the PRSP (World Bank, 2004:237).

Particularly a lot is expected of the participation of civil society actors. The assumptions of the IFIs are that participation of civil society in PRSP processes will increase ownership of the development strategy. By stimulating reasoned debate, shared understanding and a partial consensus on some of the fundamental strategic choices, feelings of ownership must increase among the population. Secondly, participation by civil society will bring pressure to bear on public officials for expanding participation possibilities in policy making, better institutional performance and government accountability. Civil society thus is turned into a watchdog of government, of course alongside the media and parliament. Thirdly, participation of civil society is supposed to increase the effectiveness of poverty reduction policies because civil society will help to identifying the causes of predicaments and some of the remedies. Fourthly, in the long run, the forgoing three factors will interact in a virtuous circle, deepening and strengthening both the development process and democracy (Dewachter et al., 2003:5).

1.3. Problem analysis

Tanzania is regarded as a HIPC and was therefore invited to prepare a PRSP in order to be considered for debt relief. In 2000, Tanzania completed its first PRSP (PRSP I). The government of Tanzania organised a consultation process and invited some key actors to participate. The government itself was very positive about the quality of this consultation process. Participants were far more critical about the process and complained about the rushed timetable and the vagueness about PRSP. Besides, civil society was disappointed about the fact that participation was limited to consultation. Also independent studies had some doubts about the consultation process. For instance they question the participation capabilities of civil society and condemn the negligible role of the parliament in the process.

In January 2005, the second PRSP of Tanzania was finished, which is now called the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). In the run-up to the consultation process of NSGRP the government of Tanzania promised to work up to the complaints. One of the purposes of this study is to make an assessment to what extent the government of Tanzania has lived up to its promise.

The IFIs have big expectations of participation during PRSP processes. By involving participants of all levels of society in the PRSP process, the IFIs hope to establish a form of country ownership of the PRSP documents. Besides, the IFIs are hopeful that the government will be held more accountable for the strategies outlined in PRSP. Consequently these strategies are supposed to become more effective. Finally, the IFIs hope that participation in the PRSP process will result in further democratisation due to a government that will become more accountable and transparent in its acts.

These expectations seem to be quite reasonable. In Western Europe of the 19th century, mass social movements representing the interests of the citizens also extorted more accountability of their governments and this did deepen and strengthen the democracy. The African practice is, however, very different from Europe of the 19th century. For instance mass social movements are almost non-existing in Africa. It is questionable if imposed participation can bring about the same as in Western countries. Therefore this expectation will be examined in the light of Tanzania. In order to be able to assess the expectations it is necessary to examine more closely theories on participation, civil society and democracy.

1.4. Formulation of the problem

This study has the objective to obtain insight in the participation and decision making during the PRSP I and NSGRP processes and the consequences of the consultation processes of PRSP I and NSGRP for the democracy in Tanzania. This leads to the following central question:

How can the participation and decision making processes of PRSP I and NSGRP in Tanzania be described and to what extent have the PRSP I and NSGRP processes contributed to further democratisation in Tanzania?

In order to give an answer to this question, it is necessary to answer the following questions:
1. What conditions have to be fulfilled so that participation can contribute to democratisation?
2. How can the democracy in Tanzania be described?
3. How can the participation during the PRSP I process be characterised and how were decision made on the content of PRSP I?
4. How can the participation during the NSGRP process be described and how was this in comparison with PRSP I?
5. To what extent can it be postulated that the democracy in Tanzania has been deepened and strengthened due to the participation of different actors in the PRSP I and NSGRP processes?

1.5. Scientific and social relevance

Scientific relevance

So far not a lot of research has been done into the feasibility that participation will lead to further democratisation in developing countries. Participation is generally praised for its positive effects on a democracy. It is believed that the positive experiences with participation in Western countries are also likely to occur in developing countries. Participation is, however, a new phenomenon in most developing countries that has just recently been introduced. It is therefore uncertain if participation will have positive effects on the, usually tender, democracies of developing countries. This study can contribute to new insights in the consequences of participation for the democracy in developing countries, in particular in Tanzania.

Social relevance

The social relevance of this study is threefold. First, this study is set up in this way to make clear to the Netherlands Embassy in Tanzania to what extent the consultation process of NSGRP has been changed and improved in comparison with the process of PRSP I. The outcome will be used to advise the government of Tanzania on how they can improve these kinds of consultation processes in the future. Second, this study will shed new light on the obstacles of introducing the principle of participation in developing countries. After all this study can contribute to new insights concerning the potential of participation in developing countries.

1.6. Design and methodology

Here an outline will be given of the design and methodology of this study. It deals with the questions how the central question and the five other research questions have been studied and what choices were made in this study and why these choices were made.

Qualitative study
The study has mainly a qualitative character. This is linked up with the type of information this study aimed to gather. This study aimed to collect profound information about motives, opinions and wishes of all involved actors in Tanzania in regard to the PRSP processes. It is very difficult to translate the variety of motives, opinions and wishes in statistical material. In annex 5 a few figures are included but if there would have been more time and more people who could have conducted interviews, a more representative part of the involved actors could have been interviewed and it would have been possible to present more profound statistical figures and tables.

Descriptive, explanatory and prescriptive type of research
This study falls under the descriptive, explanatory and prescriptive type of research. It is descriptive because it is meant to provide a detailed picture of the PRSP I and NSGRP processes in Tanzania. The study is also explanatory because it will test the expectation that participation will lead to democratisation (Neuman, 2000:22,23). Lastly this study can be seen as prescriptive because it has resulted in a recommendation.

Design of study
The study is divided in a theoretical and empirical part in order to gain better insights in the extent to which participation has improved the democracy in Tanzania. The theoretical part is necessary to assess if this expectation finds a hearing in the existing theories. Although it is often said and written that participation will benefit a democracy, there is a lack of theories that support this hypothesis. Therefore conditions have been sought for in theories on participation, the civil society concept and democracy theories that support the expectation that participation leads to democratisation.
The empirical part of this study focuses on Tanzania. A close look has been taken into the question if the conditions have been fulfilled in Tanzania in order to assess the impact of PRSP participation on the democracy in Tanzania. This object of study can be seen as a complex and isolated case. The assessment is bound to the Tanzanian context and it is therefore not possible to generalise to other countries. The change as a result of PRSP processes is, to a large extent, depended on the political system of the country. It is therefore necessary to conduct new case studies if one wants to know if the theory also holds to other countries. Consequently this study can be characterised as a case study, particularly a plural case study because two comparable cases, PRSP I and NSGRP, are being compared[1].

Selection of the cases
PRSP has been made an object for this study because it offers a good opportunity to study the effects of participation on a democracy. Since the 1990s, participation has been presented as a panacea for the often tender democracies of developing countries. With the introduction of PRSP as an obligation to receive debt relief, developing countries were forced to introduce participation. The question is if this can be justified?
The reason that Tanzania was selected for this study is the result of a lucky coincidence. The Netherlands Embassy in Tanzania welcomed me to do an internship within the Embassy and because Tanzania completed its first PRSP already in 2000 and completed the second PRSP, the NSGRP five years later in 2005, I seized this opportunity with both hands. Namely, the existence of already two PRSPs makes it interesting to compare the two consultation processes. Besides, it gives the opportunity to study the expectation that participation will improve the quality of a democracy as already five years have passed by since the

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[1] In a plural case study a theory is tested in every case. Yin calls this multiple experiments (Hakvoort, 1996:120).

consultation process of PRSP I. As PRSP I and NSGRP are chosen as objects for this study, this study is roughly restricted from October 1999, when a committee in Tanzania was formed to steer the process of preparing PRSP I, until May 2005, when the interviews in the scope of NSGRP were finished.

Method of data gathering
The gathering of data in this study can be described as triangulation because more than one method of data collecting has been used. First content analysis has been carried out to collect information about the history of Tanzania, the present situation of Tanzania and the PRSP I process. To these end scientific publications, scientific researches, government reports, web pages, journals and reports of the IMF and World Bank have been studied. Thereafter the research continued in Tanzania. Here documents, that were not available in the Netherlands, were studied in order to form a picture of the NSGRP process. Simultaneously interviews were conducted to get more insight perspectives on the NSGRP process but also to get some critical perspectives on the present situation of Tanzania and to ask respondents if they noticed any positive effects of the participation processes on the democracy in Tanzania. In addition, an inquiry with 6 statements (annex 4) was put to 17 respondents. The other 36 respondents were not knowledgeable enough to respond to (one of) the statements or refused to respond to the inquiry as they did not acknowledge the value of it.

Interviews
A wide variety of respondents were interviewed, representing the central government, local government, parliament, civil society, donors, media, trade unions, research institutions, academics and drafting team. These respondents have been selected intentional on grounds of relevance and availability. The intention was to conduct the interviews with previously structured questionnaires in which the formulation of the questions and the sequence of the questions were fixed (Hakvoort, 1996:134-137). After the first interview this already proved to be impossible and forced me to be flexible in handling the questionnaire. The questionnaire was too long and it was taking too much time of the respondent to go through all of the questions. Besides, e.g. when respondents were asked to compare the PRSP I and NSGRP participation process they answered most of the questions listed under this topic. It also happened on some occasions that respondents had forgotten about the details, especially respondents at the local level, and just remembered that they attended a 'workshop on poverty issues somewhere during the long rainy season of 2004'. This limited the number of questions that could be asked substantially.

Interviews at the local level were conducted in the towns of Maswa (between Mwanza and Shinyanga) and Monduli (close to Arusha). Time constraints forced me to limit it to two towns. The decision to go to these two towns was taken because of practical reasons. As the visits to the towns took place in April, at the height of the rainy season, Maswa and Monduli were chosen because they are still relatively good accessible during the rainy season in comparison with other towns. Besides, the development organisation SNV was able and willing to assist me in organising trips to these two towns.

First three days were spent in Maswa because of its remoteness and thereafter two days were spent in Monduli which is much better accessible than Maswa. The interviews in Maswa and Monduli were a thing by themselves. In both towns the assistance of a local translator was necessary as about 80 percent of the respondents could only speak Kiswahili. This fact hindered me to conduct the interviews in the way I wanted to and it took one or two interviews before the translators were familiar with the terms and the way I wanted to do the interviews. In Maswa I was confronted with some unpleasant surprises like for example that the translator had invited all the respondents I wanted to interview at once. This is not

particularly convenient if one does not speak the language. Another unpleasant surprise was that all respondents in Maswa, except one, asked me at the end of the interview to pay them sitting allowance to cover the costs they had made in terms of time and travelling (500 metres!) to be interviewed. This was very annoying but a good lesson for the interviews in the second town, Monduli. In Monduli I made clear from the beginning that I wanted to go to the respondents myself so that there would not be any reason to pay sitting allowance and I did not have to interview more than one respondent at once. Therefore my stay in Monduli was much more relaxing for me. Despite the troubles, I got the information I wanted to collect in Maswa and Monduli and I did not get the feeling that the information I got from the interviews were too much biased because of the inevitable help of the translators, the presence of a community development officer in Maswa or fear of respondents to be critical.

Concluding remarks
It is important to keep in mind that the research is limited beforehand because of the limited number of interviews that could be conducted. This has of course consequences for this research but is inevitable in almost all researches. Nevertheless did the interviews conducted provide a satisfactory amount and quality of information. On the base of this information the PRSP I and NSGRP processes could be compared. The results of this comparison have been analysed and some conclusions could be drawn from this.

1.7. Reading guide
The thesis is build up as follows. In chapter 2 a theoretical framework will be presented in which insights will be gained from the literature on participation, civil society and democratic forms. These insights will be used to develop conditions that can be used to measure the impact of participation on a democracy. Thereupon in chapter 3, the history of Tanzania and present-day Tanzania is described. In chapter 4, the PRSP I process will be described. The same framework is applied to describe the NSGRP process in chapter 5. Next in chapter 6, the conditions that are developed in chapter 2 are used to assess if the participation processes of PRSP I and NSGRP have positively contributed to the democracy in Tanzania. Chapter 7 will present some conclusions and a recommendation will be made. This thesis will round off with some reflections on the research done for this thesis.

2. Theoretical framework

The expectation of the IFIs is that civil society participation in PRSP processes will make it very likely that the democracy of a HIPC will be deepened and strengthened. This expectation is consistent with the supposition of Elsinga. Elsinga is of opinion that increasing participation possibilities for citizens can be considered as an indicator that a society is democratising (Elsinga, 1985:22).

It is a straightforward expectation of the IFIs but also questionable because of its simplicity. If civil society participation is the key to better democracies in developing countries, why was this invented only five years ago? To assess the prospect that civil society participation in PRSP will improve the quality of the democracy in Tanzania, this chapter will take a closer look at theories on political participation, civil society and democracy and also the role of legislatures in a democracy deserves some attention. In paragraphs 2.1 to 2.3 successively the definition of political participation, forms of political participation and factors affecting political participation will come up for discussion. Next, in paragraph 2.4, the civil society concept will be discussed. Thereafter in paragraph 2.5, the stages in the political process are presented which is necessary in order to rank the five democratic arrangements discussed in paragraph 2.6. Paragraph 2.7 will shortly elaborate on the role of the legislature in today's democracies. Finally in paragraph 2.8, the insights gained in the previous paragraphs are used to formulate some conditions that are decisive whether participation will have positive effects on the democracy in a country.

2.1. Defining political participation

Participation is a widely used concept and it is an often-heard word in daily language. There is, however, much diversity of opinion as to what participation exactly means and what the functions are of participation.

In this study the concept 'political participation' will be used because this is less inclusive and indeterminate than the concept 'participation'. However, there is still no general acceptable definition of the concept 'political participation'. The definition used depends on one's view on the kind and function of political participation. Before a few definitions will be brought up, it is important to make a distinction between the two views on political participation: the instrumental and developmental views.

The instrumental view on political participation is most popular nowadays. Here political participation of citizens is regarded as a means, a means to look after interests or to protect oneself against the sinister interests of tyrannical statesmen. Political participation will enable citizens to influence the decision making process with articulated interests and opinions (Irwin & Andeweg. 1981:194). The basic principle is that an individual knows the best his own interests and must therefore be able to look after his interests. Governments who refuse their citizens the right of political participation are considered as not legitimate (Parry, 1972:19,20). Next to the empowerment of citizens, political participation will result in better decisions because by participation of citizens and interests groups, new points of view will be suggested. The decisions taken thereafter will probably be of a better quality because they result in better solutions for problems (Cook & Morgan., 1971:12). Closely related to this reason is that political participation will make governments' decisions more acceptable (Pennock, 1979:442).

In contrast to the instrumental view on political participation, political participation in the developmental view is seen more as an objective in its own right. In this view political participation is considered as joining or being involved in decision making and is defended on the basis of its intrinsic value and the necessity for the mental well-being of human beings. Political participation has a more educative function because it will teach the citizens their

self-interest and has to lead to increased knowledge and awakening of the citizens. This means that one can teach citizens citizenship. Political participation will also contribute to the development of confidence in the possibility of influencing political decisions and decision-makers. Besides, political participation can diminish the alienation and the gap between citizens and the government (Irwin et al., 1981:193,194).

Most definitions of political participation emphasise the instrumental functions of political participation. Here a few of the most widely used conceptualisations will be mentioned. Political participation can be defined as:

- 'those legal activities by private citizens which are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take' (Verba et al. (1975) in: Van Deth, 2001:5);
- 'the whole of activities of citizens that aim at influencing the authoritative distribution of values in a society' (Thomassen (1979) in: Irwin, 1981:194); and
- 'action by citizens that is aimed at influencing decisions which are, in most cases, ultimately taken by public representatives and officials' (Parry et al. 1992: 16).

Although emphasising distinct aspects differently, these quotations show that a common understanding of political participation among instrumental theorists exists. First, political participation refers to people in their role as citizens and not as politicians or civil servants. Second, political participation is understood as an activity, which is meant as action. This means that watching television or claiming to be curious about politics is not a form of political participation. Third, the activities of citizens should be voluntary. Finally, political participation concerns government and politics but is neither restricted to specific phases (such as decision making, or the input side of the political system), nor to specific levels or areas (such as elections or contacts with officials) (Van Deth, 2001:5).

Political participation can thus be explained in a short and comprehensive definition: 'Political participation are those citizens' activities aimed at influencing political decisions' (Van Deth, 2001:4). Although this definition will find a wide agreement, it will raise opposition from the developmental theorists because this definition does not include the developmental view on political participation. Despite this well-founded criticism, the above definition will be used in this paper because the instrumental view underlies more the idea of participation in PRSP than the developmental view. Participation in PRSP is meant to increase the effectiveness of poverty reduction strategies, make governments aware of the value of participation and make citizens more powerful. The developmental view is only of some importance for PRSP in regard to the educative function for citizens.

2.2. Forms of political participation

The modes of participating in politics are various. This will differ according to the opportunities, degree of institutionalised participation, the interests and political resources of the participant, and the attitudes towards participation in society (Parry, 1972: 5,6). Verba & Nie (1972:46,47) have made a distinction between four modes of political participation:

1. Voting in elections;
2. Campaign activities, the political activities of citizens on occasion of elections with the exception of voting;
3. Citizens initiated contacts with politicians; and
4. Cooperative activities in which citizens take part in group activities to influence the government.

As the IFIs hope to introduce the fourth mode of political participation with PRSP, this mode will be discussed below.

There are numerous cooperative activities to influence political decisions with different measures of effectiveness. The effectiveness depends particularly on what participation

possibilities the government offers and how it gives shape to political participation. This means that most participation possibilities are initiated by the government. However, citizens can often extort participation possibilities by joining their forces in interest groups and bring collectively pressure to bear on governments.

Pröpper & Steenbeek (1999:50-55) have developed a ladder of participation, which is meant to show that there are different styles of governance in interactive policy making. Interactive policy making is a form of deliberative democracy and will be discussed in the subparagraph 2.6.4.

Pröpper & Steenbeek argue that there are no good or bad styles of governance, only badly chosen styles of governance, because styles of governance suit specific situations and need to be chosen on the ground of that. They have designed the following ladder of governance styles, starting with the style of governance that has the most far-reaching form of participation:

1. Facilitating style: participants have the initiator role and will make the decisions single-handed, the government only has a role in supporting the participants.
2. Cooperative style: participants share the initiator role with the government, together they will make decisions.
3. Delegating style: the government delegates certain authorities to participants to make decisions within prerequisite constraints.
4. Participatory style: participants have the role of advisor. They can bring up their own definition of the problem and solution but the government will make the final decision. This style fits the representative democracy the best because participants do not have decision making power, the elected representatives will make the decisions.
5. Consulting style: participants have the opportunity to give their opinion on a certain policy within a defined problem.
6. Open authoritarian governing style: the government does not involve participants in the policy making process, the government only wants to convince the participants.
7. Closed authoritarian governing style: the government does not inform the participants about its activities.

The first four styles of governance belong to interactive policy making because in these styles the participants are involved in policy making from the beginning, there is openness with respect to the contents, the government creates space for new ideas and plans and there is space to deviate from the opinions, intentions and actions of the government. The last three styles of governance do not fit these conditions and are therefore styles of non-interactive policy making.

Also the World Bank has made a classification of political participation according to four levels of intensities:

1. Information-sharing: involves very limited decision making powers of participants but potentially important knowledge transfer and generation
2. Consultation: participants are able to express their opinions but are not guaranteed that their perspectives will be incorporated into the final decision.
3. Joint decision making: participants have the right to negotiate the content of the decision.
4. Initiation and control by stakeholders: participants have a high degree of control over decision making (World Bank, 1996).

Although Pröpper & Steenbeek speak of styles of governance and World Bank of a classification of participation, they both speak of the same, namely, the different ways in which governments give shape to political participation. In case of a representative democracy Pröpper & Steenbeek express their preference for the participatory style in which participants do not have decision making power. Pröpper & Steenbeek are of opinion that decision making

responsibilities can best be left to the elected representatives if one does not want to violate the representative democracy. Some nuance on this point is necessary. Formally speaking parliaments or local councils always have the final decision making power in representative democracies, apart from the fact that this can sometimes only be regarded as rubber-stamping. In other words, they have a watchdog role in which they have to make sure that proposed policies and laws are legitimate and well-considered. This means that participants in e.g. the cooperative style can safely get a role in decision-making in a representative democracy as the parliament will take the final decision on the question if the proposed policy can be approved. Consequently, the fear that participants with decision making power will undermine the representative democracy cannot always be recognised. It is, however, true that one should be careful in giving participants a say in decision making in countries that cannot be described as true representative democracies, thus in which it cannot be taken for granted that elected representatives have final decision making power. One can object to this proposition by stating that in this worst scenario, in which final decision making power does not rest with the parliament, the final decision making power will rest with the non-elected and non-representative government. This may raise the question why participants should not be involved in decision making in this case. The reason is the fear that only a few, non-representative participants get involved in decision making who may take decisions that disproportionately hit certain parts in society. Besides, this may block the development to a true representative democracy in which the parliament gets the final decision making power or may even lead to a further marginalisation of the parliament. Therefore it is preferable to exclude participants from the phase of decision making in dubious representative democracies.

It is not totally clear what form of participation the IFIs have in mind for the participation processes of PRSP. They leave the countries working on a PRSP a certain extent of elbowroom to make their own choices. The World Bank only speaks in its PRSP Sourcebook of 'broad-based consultation' that should 'influence the strategy' (World Bank, 2004:5). This is, however, already inconsistent in regard to what Pröpper & Steenbeek understand by 'consultation'. In their view influence can not be taken for granted in case of consultation as participants can only express their opinion.

The Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF suggests that more clarity of the IFIs would have been desirable. The IEO argues that the form of participation needed depends on the objectives sought. It states that information sharing suffices if the IFIs have the objective of (1) improved diagnostics in regard to poverty reduction, (2) improved policy implementation from enhanced accountability and/or (3) empowering the disadvantaged groups by fostering a sense of inclusion. However, if they want to establish a richer policy debate in which a wide range of alternatives are considered, consultation is required. The even more far-reaching form of joint decision making is required if the IFIs want to enhance the ownership of the document or want to strengthen the voice and influence of the poor (IEO, 2004:28). As ownership of PRSPs by the population is an objective of the IFIs, the participants have to share in decision making power. This would be in terms of Pröpper & Steenbeek the cooperative style which will violate the democratic principle that elected representatives have the ultimate decision making power. However, as already became clear, this should not be the case in true representative democracies, then the parliament will have the final decision making power.

In the following chapters of this paper it will become clear how the Tanzanian government has used the elbowroom and has given shape to the requirement of PRSP participation.

2.3 Factors affecting political participation

Ndegwa (1996:110) states that political participation is only possible when the government offers this opportunity to its citizens. Therefore the most crucial condition whether participation can take place is the willingness of the government in a country. Although this is a first requirement, the willingness of the citizens to participate can neither be taken for granted and depends on several personal and institutional factors. A lot has been written on this topic by different authors. Dahl (Dahl, 1961 in Vis, 1988:63,64), for example, has summarized six attitude factors which stipulate if and to what extent people participate in politics. These factors have their origin in personal characteristics and institutional circumstances. According to Dahl, citizens' participation in politics depends on the extent to which:

1. citizens attach value to the reward of political participation;
2. citizens conceive the alternative possibilities as important, they will be motivated to participate if they prefer a certain alternative;
3. citizens think that their participation will have an effect;
4. citizens think that the result will be unsatisfactory without their participation;
5. citizens think that they have enough knowledge and skills to participate effectively; and
6. citizens have to overcome obstructions in order to be able to participate.

Verba & Nie also speak in terms of personal characteristics and institutional circumstances determining the extent to which people will participate. They argue that how and how much a citizen participates, will first depend on the institutional structures, like the existence of voluntary associations, affiliation with political parties and the size and complexity of the community. Second, Verba & Nie stress that if a citizen will participate relates to the factor of personal characteristics. They say that the social circumstances of a citizen play a crucial role. The social circumstances include where the citizen lives, what he does for a living, his education and his race. The more a citizen is well-situated in regard to these four social circumstances, the more it is likely that this citizen will participate. This means that the socio-economic status of people determines to a large extent who participates and that the "upper-status citizens" are most likely to participate in contrast to the 'lower-status citizens' (Verba & Nie, 1972:19-21).

Bringing it all together, one can say that being a member of a voluntary organisation, having interest in politics, having expectations of the effectiveness of participation, being highly educated and having a high income, makes it more likely that a person will participate (Vis, 1988:62).

By introducing the idea of PRSP as requirement for debt relief, developing countries were confronted with the obligation to set up participation processes. By making this an obligation the willingness of governments to offer participation opportunities to citizens is enforced by the IFIs. However, the above discussed twofold factors of institutional circumstances and personal characteristics have shown that setting up a participation process is not enough. The decision of potential participants to participate depends on many factors and may lead to a situation in which only the upper-class participate. Consequently one should take care that participants are invited from all layers of society to ensure that participants are representative of society.

The motivations of the participants to participate in the PRSP processes correspond more or less to the six factors of Dahl. The participants interviewed in the scope of this study attached value to political participation, think that they can contribute to the participation process with their ideas, hope that their participation will have an effect on PRSP and are of opinion that their participation is indispensable because of their alternatives and knowledge.

In the following paragraph will be turned to the civil society concept. This concept did not yet come up for discussion but because of its importance in the PRSP initiative it will need to be elaborated in a separate paragraph.

2.4. The civil society concept

The promise of political participation benefiting a democracy lies particularly in the participation of civil society. Therefore it is necessary to dedicate a separate paragraph to the civil society concept. Successively the definition, potential of civil society, representative character of civil society and the relation with the PRSP initiative will be discussed.

2.4.1. Definition

There is a lot of discussion around the question what the term 'civil society' exactly means. The term has its roots in the Western world of the 18th century. Transferring the concept across space and time causes, however, some problems. The Western idealized rather narrow vision of civil society often seems out of place in the African countries of today (Monga, 1996:145).

This paper will not go into this discussion and neither will attention be paid to the numerous ways in which civil society can be defined. In this paper a definition of Orvis will be used. He defines civil society as "…a public sphere of formal or informal, collective activity autonomous from but recognizing the legitimate existence of the state". The word 'autonomous' is very important and expresses that the state must not be able to control the formal and informal activities of civil society. Besides, the term collective is intended to include virtually any activity involving more than one individual family or business, whether formal or informal, engaged in political activity or not (Orvis, 2000:20,21). Azarya stresses, however, that taking part in the activities of organisations should have a voluntary character, which means that people can always withdraw themselves (Azarya, 1994:94). It is important to notice that the private sector cannot be regarded as civil society; it influences civil society but does not constitute civil society. Private sector actors only become part of civil society when they engage in some type of public collective activity like trade union activities (Orvis, 2001:21).

In the African context one is now confronted with the question what kinds of formal organisations or informal networks might exactly be included in the term civil society. Normally the following types are counted among civil society which are all together often indicated as Civil Society Organisations (CSO): national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), trade unions, media, professional associations and Faith Based Organisations (FBO) like e.g. churches (Eberlei, 2001:13 and Kossoff, 2000:2).

One should be careful not to regard Non-Governmental Organisations as a synonym for civil society. This is not correct, civil society comprises not only NGOs as the above enumeration shows. The confusion is, however, understandable because the definition of NGO seems to reflect civil society. NGO is defined as '...those organisations outside the realm of government and distinct from the business community' (Hudock, 1999:1). Examples of NGOs are human rights groups, women organisations, youth associations, environmental organisations etc. Institutions like churches or the media cannot be regarded as NGOs but can be counted among the concept of civil society.

A subject under discussion is whether organisations based on ethnic identity or religion should be included or excluded from the civil society concept. Azarya discusses this problem and ascertains that some writers are hesitant to include organisations that are too parochial and too inward-orientated and whose demands have little bearing on broader societal processes. Azarya questions this opinion. He argues that CBOs, trade unions etc. also defend

very particular interests of specific sectors in society, no less than ethnic or religious organisations. According to Azarya, there is no reason why the former should be included in civil society and the latter not as long as the membership of these organisations is voluntary. He is, however, hesitant to include religious fundamentalist movements in civil society because it is quite likely that these kinds of organisations see themselves as total alternatives to the state and would like to overthrow the state (Azarya, 1994:94,95). This paper will go along with Azarya his view and incorporate ethnic and religious organisations in civil society, especially because these organisations are so visible in African countries and it will therefore not do justice to the African reality to exclude these organisations.

2.4.2. The potential of civil society

Civil society stands in good repute and is mostly seen as inherently good. This belief can be traced back to the work of the theorist Locke. He warned for an uncontrollable state that is behaving irresponsible and is self-interested if it is not brought under reliable restriction. The danger lies in the availability of violence and coercive power to the state. According to Locke, it is the task of the 'civil government' to prevent this. The state is conceived as one sphere, which exists against another sphere composed of all other associations in society. These associations have the duty to keep the state in check by keeping it within its limits (Kaviraj, 2001:291-293).

Nowadays civil society is believed to create organisational arenas for people to engage themselves in activities they perceive as important. It thus provides a room for discussion of critical issues that are of concern to people, thereby linking them together and creating shared values (Lange et al., 2000:2). Besides, it is believed that governments need an active and vibrant civil society in order to perform well. Namely, consultation and participation of civil society in policy making enables the government to consider the various viewpoints and forms the basis for better public policy. Most important, civil society is likely to play a critical role in the democratisation process of developing countries. It is considered to do so in three ways. Firstly, CSOs empower their members. They enhance the basis for and hope to encourage more active citizenship of the poor, who are traditionally excluded from economic and political benefits. It gives them the chance to make their opinions heard, and to provide input into decision making. This will hopefully create a greater trust in the government by civil society and citizens and this enhances the legitimacy of the government (OECD, 2001:18). Secondly, civil society can balance the power of the state and shield the citizens against an arbitrary state. Thirdly, civil society can propagate participation methods in the governance system which can lead to the emergence of a political culture of increased transparency, accountability and citizen engagement in the public sphere (Kiondo, 1994:82).

It should, however, not be taken for granted that civil society will generate a better democracy. Firstly, one has to await if civil society participate in politics. The factors discussed in paragraph 2.3 will play an important role. Civil society will decide to participate if it is of opinion that its alternatives are important and will be taken into consideration by the government and civil society will decide to participate if it is of opinion that its participation is meaningful to society or when it thinks that it can contribute to the democratisation process. Secondly, if civil society is participating the positive effects of civil society participation cannot be taken for granted, this depends on the ability of CSOs to put aside the rivalry and collaborate with other CSOs. Collaboration is necessary to make strong demands towards the government (Bayart, 1986:117,118).

2.4.3. Representative character of civil society

A problem of African CSOs is their questionable representative character. This is questionable because a lot of African CSOs have a membership problem, that means that they

have no members at all or only a few. Reason for the low membership of African CSOs is particularly the bad standard of living in Africa by which people are only occupied with surviving (Danida, 2001:23). This explanation is consistent with the conclusion that Verba & Nie brought forward in paragraph 2.3. They argue that the socio-economic status of people determines to a large extent who participates. The higher the standard of living of people, the more likely that these people will participate. Besides, African CSOs need incentives to keep members' support, even if they are clearly acting for objectives which members hold with high intensity. Especially when the membership of the CSO is large enough, the potential members will easily choose to be free riders, unless the CSO provides them with individual material benefits. This is called the collective action problem (Kasfir, 1998:131).

The fact that CSOs in developing countries can have a problem of membership and will consequently have a questionable representative character, receives little attention in the existing literature. Crotty confirms this and regrets that questions like who do interest groups represent and what proportion of the population is represented in interest groups, are underrepresented in interest groups research (Crotty et al., 1994:2). Molenaers & Renard wrote an exceptional notice to this issue. They have expressed their doubts about how representative CSOs in developing countries are and argue that a lot of these CSOs are donor-bred and fed. Consequently the CSO leaders cannot be regarded as representatives of their members and are unaware of what lives amongst the people (Molenears & Renard, 2002:4,28). And even if CSOs have a respectable number of members their influence on the operation of the CSOs is often negligible. Berry has evidence that in case of the United States of America members' views are often not incorporated in the deliberations of their organisation (Berry, 1994:22,23). It is most likely that this is as well the case in developing countries where the donors of CSOs also have a lot of influence on the acts of CSOs.

2.4.4. Civil society and the PRSP initiative

As shown in IFIs' documents on PRSP, the IFIs have obviously adopted the expectations of the OECD and Kiondo, the expectation that civil society participation in PRSP processes will without any doubt benefit the democracy in developing countries. This supposes that civil society is strong enough to make its presence felt through e.g. collaboration with other CSOs and is overall willing to participate in the PRSP process. However, as already mentioned, this depends on factors like the expectation of civil society that their assets will exceed their costs. Besides, the IFIs seem to overlook the questionable representative character of African CSOs. This can, however, have serious consequences for the PRSP process and the content of PRSPs. PRSP is meant to take account of all interests and views in society but to guarantee this, it is necessary to pay attention to the representative character of the participating CSOs and be accurate in inviting representatives of all affected interests in society.

The consequence of the questionable representative character of CSOs is that one has to be careful by giving CSOs a participatory role in government affairs, like for example the PRSP process. One should take care that the principle of equality is guaranteed. Firstly, all CSOs should have the same chances to take part in the process and to bring forward their opinions. Secondly, all participants must have the right to voice their criticism and propose discussion topics that can be put on the agenda. Thirdly, everybody must have the right and possibility to voice their critic on the rules under which participation takes place (Benhabib (1994) in: Edwards, 2003:33).

2.5 Stages in the political process

Now that political participation and the civil society concept are discussed, attention should be paid to the stages in a policy process. The reason for this is to recognise in which stage(s) participation takes place in order to see how far-reaching the chosen form of participation is.

A policy process can be divided in different stages that succeed each other. In each of these stages political participation can take place but the extent and type of participation varies substantially per stage. This depends on the form of democracy in a country because each form of democracy centralises its responsiveness in one of the stages in the policy process. This will become clearer in the next paragraph.

The stages in the policy process are:

1. Agenda setting: the process of articulating and defining social problems by which the support of society is asked for and one tries to position the problem on the political agenda.
2. Policy preparation or policy moulding: public debates and negotiations about the manner by which the problems will be handled.
3. Policy stipulation: the political decisions will be made over the content of the policy.
4. Policy execution: the policy is executed.
5. Policy evaluation: judging the content and results of the policy.
6. Feedback and reconsideration: assimilate the results of the policy evaluation to be able to continue, adjust or terminate the policy (Rosenthal et al., 1996:85).

It is important to keep in mind that this stages model is an idealised version of reality. The daily practice mostly deviates from this idealised model. The stages are not of the same length of time and it is not rarely that policy processes are suddenly broken off without having succeeded all stages.

PRSP can be considered as a policy process in which all stages can be identified. Also here participation does not take place to the same extent in all stages. Participation is particularly meant to take place in the stages of agenda setting and policy preparation but also in the stages of policy evaluation and feedback and reconsideration.

In this stages model the mechanism of accountability the IFIs have in mind, becomes apparent. In the last stage of feedback and reconsideration, the participants will come up with criticism. It is the task of the government to respond to this criticism and promise to live up to the critics in a next PRSP process and beyond in other policy processes. By looking at the extent to which the government is responsive to criticism, the accountability of the government can be judged. The promise of participation improving the quality of a democracy in developing countries can therefore be derived from the stages model. Each policy process is a kind of learning process for the government and will make the government more and more accountable. Consequently this will improve the quality of the democracy.

In the next paragraph five democratic arrangements will be presented in which the role of political participation gets special attention with the help of the stages model.

2.6. Five forms of democracy
Most people will agree that participation makes a democracy and maintain that a democracy cannot exist without participation. However, the importance of participation and the form of participation depend substantially on the type of democracy. Each type has its own notion about the way in which participants should be involved. Edwards distinguishes five different democratic arrangements that each has its own mechanism for responsive governance. Edwards uses the first four stages in the policy making process – agenda setting, policy moulding, policy stipulation and policy execution - to make a distinction between the different democratic arrangements. He argues that each democratic arrangement can be categorised in one of the four stages of the policy making process. The reason for this is that each democratic arrangement centralises its responsiveness in one of the four stages. A democratic arrangement that centralises its responsiveness at the stage of policy stipulation assigns an important role to participation and uses a far-reaching form of participation, in contrast to democratic arrangements that limit their responsiveness to agenda setting or policy

moulding. It does, however, by no means mean that the governments' responsiveness in a certain democratic arrangement is only located at one stage. It means that the emphasis is at one stage of the policy process (Edwards, 2003:26-29).

Democracy is a style of governance that came into being in Athens in the 5th century BC. The word 'democracy' comes indeed from the Greek 'demokratia' that means 'rule (kratos) by the people (demos)'. This lies at the root of all types of democracy. All types of democracy represent in some way the idea of popular power, of a situation in which power, and perhaps authority too, rests with the people. Despite this fact, our present day forms of democracy are quite different from the direct democracy of the Greeks. Especially over the last two centuries, democratic thought has changed considerably due to changing societies and population growth by which a direct democracy became more and more unfeasible. New democracy theories came into being (Arblaster, 1994:9).

Below five democratic arrangements will be discussed. One should keep in mind that democratic systems mostly do not consist of one democratic arrangement. Edwards emphasizes that democratic systems are mostly a combination of different arrangements, in which one arrangement dominates (Edwards, 2003:29). The types discussed below are direct democracy, representative democracy, pluralist democracy, deliberative democracy and consumers' democracy.

2.6.1. Direct democracy

In Athens the most pure form of democracy was pursued, the direct democracy. In a direct democracy all adult citizens participate in shaping collective decisions. It presumes that all citizens take decisions on the base of the general interest and in a rational way (Vis, 1988:46). As the direct democracy emphasises decision making by the citizens, one can situate this democratic arrangement at the stage of policy stipulation, nevertheless citizen participation is also taking place in the other stages (Edwards, 2003:28,37).

This type of democracy is seen as the most perfect and ideal form of democracy but one can make a few annotations. Firstly, the democracy in Athens was not as 'direct' as most people think it was. A lot of decisions were delegated to a council of 500 citizens. A commission of 50 citizens led this council. Secondly, the democracy in Athens was not as democratic as is believed. Women, slaves, manual workers and foreigners were not allowed to vote on the collective decisions. Thereby only the wealthy men had the right to vote, this was approximately 10 percent of the total population. Thirdly, the citizens of Athens did not have rights of freedom. Every 'democratic' decision was carried out, cruel or not. Lastly, this type of democracy will be unworkable in our complex and sizeable modern societies. Citizens will not fit in a market square and they will have to spend the whole day reading documents, having discussions and making decisions (Woerdman, 1999:260-262, and Vis, 1988:42).

Despite the general agreement that direct democracy is unworkable in today's societies, some form of direct democracy will be feasible and can be established in the modern world. Referenda, in which all adult citizens have a vote on decisions, is possible, especially since the rise of modern technology (Arblaster, 1994:84,85).

2.6.2. Representative democracy

Nowadays the representative democracy is seen as a more feasible and desirable type of democracy than the direct democracy. Jean Jacques Rousseau is seen as the father of the representative democracy. A central role in his works plays the term 'general will', with which he means what all of us would will if we thought of ourselves not as private individuals but as citizens identifying ourselves with the good of the community (Arblaster, 1994:64). He maintained that the general will is indivisible and it is therefore not able to represent this will. Consequently, a general meeting of all citizens who make all decisions in the country is most

desirable, according to Rousseau. He admits, however, that in countries with a large population a direct democracy will not work. Therefore he proposed that the daily government affairs would be delegated to judges and magistrates, provided that they would be responsible to the general meeting and that the general meeting would keep the function of legislature (Thomassen, 1981:29).

In contrast to Rousseau's vision, today's representative democracies are more based on the identity model. In this model the practical necessity of representation is stressed. Representatives have to be elected and appointed because citizens do not have the time and therefore not the knowledge and information to make reasonable decisions. Therefore representatives of the people have to make decisions. These representatives are engaged with ruling the country and with the legislation on behalf of the citizens. The representatives have to do a good job in order to keep the sympathy of their voters. The representatives, often grouped in political parties, compete each other with party programmes in order to win the sympathy of the voters. Representative democracy is thus a more indirect form of governing (Vis, 1988:42).

The identity model rejects the assumption that the general will is indivisible because the model states that citizens have different opinions and interests. Nevertheless, the identity model tries to bring about some kind of identity between the voter and the representative. The representatives must make those decisions the citizens would have made. They have a bounded mandate; they represent the interests of their voters. Accountability is organised along this line, the elected representatives have to make sure that the government is taking account of the interest of their voters (Woerdman, 1999:262,263).

Advocates of the representative democracy stress three positive consequences of this type of democracy. Firstly, a representative democracy guarantees the stability of states. Secondly, the appointment of representatives furthers the division of labour in a country. Thirdly, minorities are protected and a tyranny of the majority is banished (Vis, 1988:96,97).

According to Edwards, representative democracy can be situated at the stage of policy stipulation because its main function is decision making. It differs, however, from the direct democracy because citizens do not make the decisions themselves but their elected representatives (Edwards, 2003:27). Here lies an objection to the representative democracy, namely the fact that participation is basically limited to voting in elections. The other three modes of participation discussed in paragraph 2.2 are not common practice in representative democracies. Especially the fourth mode of cooperative activities in which citizens take part in group activities to influence the government is rare. Generally speaking, governments in representative democracies are hesitant to this mode of participation because they consider it as a threat to the representative character of national policies. Besides, governments fear that participation can result in ill-considered and populist policy (Pröpper & Steenbeek, 2001:56,57). Participation is mostly limited to the stages of agenda setting and policy moulding in representative democracies. It is often streamlined by a system of corporatism. In a corporatist system regular meetings take place between representatives of the government and labour unions, employers' organisations and other powerful interest groups to seek agreement on socio-economic policies (Lijphart, 1999:16).

2.6.3. Pluralist democracy

While in a representative democracy there is still the believe that one can distinguish some form of a general will and that all interest groups can cooperate harmoniously, the pluralist democracy does not believe in this. In this type of democracy one rejects that there exists a general will or a general interest, one takes the view that there are separate interests and a diversity or plurality of society. Society is characterised by a multiplicity of rivalry between

interest groups and political thoughts. This type of democracy is more common in Anglo-Saxon countries.

James Madison is the father of pluralism. According to Madison, the division of property is the source of most political struggles. Namely, the people who have properties and those who do not represent different interests. Madison feared a democracy in which the people without properties would build up a majority who deprive the minority of their rights. To prevent this Madison used the teachings of Montesquieu, the separation of powers or *trias politica*.

According to Montesquieu, the separation of the executive power, the legislature and the judiciary was necessary for a balance of power just as the separation of socio-economic powers. The legislature needs to be divided in a House of Lords of the nobility and a House of Commons of the citizens. Consent of all three powers of king, nobility and citizens is needed to enforce new legislation. This social separation of power is meant to bring about a balance of power between the different classes and groups.

Madison was, however, of opinion that this separation of powers does still not prevent a tyranny of the majority. He developed an intricate solution of horizontal and vertical separation of power. A vertical separation can be achieved by dividing government authority over a central government and governments of federal states who have a sovereign authority over their intern affairs. The horizontal separation of power can be achieved by separate elections for the executive power and the legislature. This horizontal separation of power must hamper the moulding of a majority, while the vertical separation of power must prevent a concentration of powers (Vis, 1988:101-103).

The modern pluralist theory differs from the pluralist theory of Madison but the underlying principle is the same, the non-existence of a general will and the diversity in society. Pluralists conceive a democracy as a political system with specific rules of the game, in which social conflicts are fought out. The daily reality can be described as a combination of negotiations, competition and coalition-building. Political parties are entangled in a rivalry for political power. The candidates of the political parties struggle for the vote of the citizens by promising a wide variety of benefits. In order to widen their prospect for winning, political parties often create coalitions with other political parties and/or CSOs. Consequently a political majority emerges that will change from time to time (Vis, 1988:104,105). Dahl calls this type of democracy a 'polyarchy', the rule of multiple minorities. He admits that there exists inequality in power in a polyarchy but maintains that the equality of power promise of a democracy is an unattainable ideal. He is of opinion that we must be content with a polyarchy in which leaders are relatively responsive to citizens because individuals can switch their support from one set of leaders to another. By these means minorities can bring their influence to bear on policy decisions and on the whole political system (Pateman, 1970:8,9)

The pluralist theory thus regards free competition between political parties for public positions during election times and competitive negotiations between CSOs, as a main element of democracy. Explained like this, it almost sounds similar to representative democracy. The difference is, however, the obvious presence of a great diversity of CSOs in a pluralistic democracy, which all have the possibility to participate in the political system and compete with each other. They may even have an important role to play in holding the government accountable for its actions along with the elected representatives. In a representative democracy participation of CSOs is much more limited. Only a selected number of CSOs are invited to participate in the scope of corporatism in which the aim is to reach consensus (Edwards, 2003:32-36 and Lijphart, 1999:16).

The consequence is that citizens in a representative democracy have a more minimalist role as in a pluralist democracy. In a representative democracy citizens only have a role as a voter and being a member of a political party or trade union and in a pluralist democracy citizens also have a role as participant although this is often restricted to the stage of agenda setting in

order to guarantee that the influence of participants is not too far-reaching (Edwards, 2003:29-36).

2.6.4. Deliberative democracy
Deliberative democracy, sometimes also called discursive democracy, is used to refer to a system of political decision making based on representative democracy and consensus decision making. It is by no means an isolated form of democracy; it is more a supplement to the representative democracy or pluralist democracy. A country can not be described as a deliberative democracy but as a representative or pluralist democracy with deliberative characteristics.

The gain of introducing some form of deliberative democracy in a representative democracy is, according to deliberative democracy theorists, the introduction of a more far-reaching form of citizen participation. They regard the voting of representatives as not sufficient for a democracy and they also oppose the selectivity of participating interest groups in a system of corporatism. In a pluralist democracy the gains of deliberative democracy will be the introduction of reasoning and consensus as this can be far to seek in a pluralist democracy. Besides, deliberative practices can overcome the problem of not represented minorities in pluralist democracies (Bohman, 1996:96,97,188).

Deliberative democracy theorists argue that political decision making is legitimate insofar as the policies are produced in a process of public deliberation. Public deliberation is an approach to decision making in which citizens and their representatives go beyond mere self-interest, but consider relevant facts from multiple points of view and reflect on the common interest. Public deliberations normally take place in the shape of a dialogue in which citizens exchange interests and reasons. Citizens are forced to justify their interests and opinions by appealing to common interests or by arguing in terms of reasons that all participants in the dialogue can accept. This will result in collective decisions that can in some sense be justified by public reasoning, reasons that are generally convincing to everyone participating in the process of deliberation. According to Habermas, the beliefs, decisions and actions that can be supported publicly by good reasons, can be characterised as rational (Bohman, 1996:1,4,5,7,27).

The political theorist Habermas is seen as an important advocate of public deliberation in democracies. He maintains that an institutional arena of public discourse and participation by citizens is essential to counterbalance the dual pressures of state and market. The citizens must be able to deliberate about their common interests. In this respect Habermas expresses his primary concern of the changing rationale for politics. He argues that the discursive and interactive politics are increasingly replaced by technical and administrative politics without public deliberation (London, 1995).

Deliberative democracy presupposes some degree of plurality among the participants, who have diverse interests and ideals and are from different races, classes, ages and areas (Bregman, 2000:2). This kind of pluralism can, however, also be a threat to the deliberative democracy. The participants will not have one opinion; opinions will differ according to the race, class, age and area of the participants. One can therefore question the assumption of consensus decision making. Pluralism of participants and their differences of opinion can lead to conflict or endless discussions. It can undermine the general will, a unitary common good and a singular public reason (Bohman, 1996:69,238).

Not only pluralism of participants can undermine a deliberative democracy but also social inequalities, which may produce a vicious circle in which certain participants are excluded from effective participation, and social complexity, which makes it necessary that deliberation takes place in large and powerful institutions (Bohman, 1996:238). Therefore Habermas argues that open access, voluntary participation outside institutional roles, the generation of

public judgment through assemblies of citizens who engage in political deliberation, the freedom to express opinions, the freedom to discuss matters of the state and to criticize the way state power is organised, are also essential requirements for a good working deliberative democracy (London, 1995). Rawls mentions as well a number of other conditions: adequate information, political equality in which "the force of the argument" takes precedence over power and authority, the absence of strategic manipulation of information, perspective, processes, or outcomes in general and a broad public orientation towards reaching right answers rather than serving narrow self-interest (London, 1995).

Since the 1990s, interactive policy making has become very popular in a lot of Western countries. This style of policy making puts the theory of deliberative democracy into practice. In interactive policy making the government draws citizens, civil society, private sector and different layers of government into policy making in an as early as possible stage. In an open interaction the government hopes to come to preparation, decisions, execution and/or evaluation of policy together with the participants. All participants get the opportunity to voice their opinion about a certain policy issue and can make suggestions, so that the government and elected representatives can make allowance for the opinions and desires of citizens. This does not mean that the representatives must accept participants' opinions doubtless. On the contrary, they must safeguard that they express the general interest and reach a weighed judgment. In sum it is hoped that the active involvement of stakeholders in public affaires will strengthen the democracy. Besides it is hoped that interactive policy making will improve the content of policy, improve the collaboration, strengthen the social basis, improve the internal organisation, improve the image of the government and educate the public (Pröpper & Steenbeek, 1999:15,21,34,35.64).

An outstanding issue with regard to the deliberative democracy theory are the problems deriving from the introduction of deliberation in a representative democracy. According to Selee it is often feared that deliberative democracy will supplant the representative democracy. He maintains, however, that deliberative democracy is no alternative but a supplement to representative democracy. Deliberative approaches can do a great deal to deepen democracy and strengthen the relationship between citizens and the state, but representative democracy should be seen as the ultimate guarantor of political equality, especially in societies emerging from authoritarian rule (Selee, 2003). This is easily said but Held worries that there has been little systematic attention to the problems deriving from introducing deliberative elements in a representative democracy. He wonders how the role of elected representatives and citizens should be reconceived if citizens gain new direct powers of deliberation and decision making. He also questions how institutions and mechanisms can ensure independent deliberative procedures. And he asks what the balance should be between the extension of consultative procedures and decision making mechanisms (Held, 1996:328).

Although there are no direct answers to these outstanding questions, a reassurance can be that ideally speaking, and of course normatively, participation in a deliberative democracy should be situated in the stage of policy moulding and not at the stage of policy stipulation. Citizens and interest groups should be able to bring forward their opinions and the government will examine these opinions but it should be the government who makes the decisions and who should guarantee that all interests are taken into account. The ultimate guarantee for this practice should be the parliament that has to supervise this process (Edwards, 2003:27-34).

2.6.5. Consumers democracy

In the USA and Europe more and more a consumers democracy is emerging as a supplement to the existing democratic arrangement. The reason for this lies in the fact that citizens do not participate anymore solely within the classical framework of democracy like the political parties and trade unions. Citizens decide themselves when, where and how they voice their

opinion. They organise themselves more and more in changing interest groups to voice their interests and demands. Especially at the stage of policy execution the citizens are more independent and confront the government with their demands. Therefore governments regard citizens more as customers nowadays and by doing so a consumers democracy has come more and more into being (Edwards, 2003:39 and Schalken, 1999:3,4).

2.7. Legislature
The last issue that needs to come up for discussion in this chapter is the legislature. As showed the above discussed forms of democracy, the legislature (in this paper the words 'legislature', 'parliament' and 'elected representatives' are interchangeably used) play an indispensable role in today's democracies. The legislature is a multimember representative body that considers public issues and has to give assent to proposed policies on behalf of a society (Hague & Harrop, 2001:218). From this it follows that the legislature has three important functions. Firstly, the legislature has to represent the wider society to the government. In practice this means that most legislatures in today's world operate through political parties in which the electorate vote for a party list. A second important function of the legislature is to debate public issues. Thirdly, the legislative function of parliaments is important. Legislatures have solely the right to make laws. In practice not many laws are initiated by parliaments or even transformed by the parliament but only adopted by the parliament (Hague & Harrop, 2001:223,224). In practice parliaments have more a role of supervisors. They supervise, on behalf of the society, the policy and law making process and they have to assure that the taken decisions and proposed laws are in the general interest of the whole society.
The above presented picture of the legislature exists not in all countries who claim to be democracies. For example many African countries typify themselves as democracies but are in practice one-party and/ or authoritative states. Consequently, in these countries parliaments play a minimal role and/or there exits an overwhelming majority of the dominant party in the parliament. This leads to parliamentary procedures that are nothing more than rubber-stamping but enables these kinds of countries to keep up appearances that they are representative democracies (Hague & Harrop, 2001:233).

2.8. Conclusion
The above presented theoretical framework is meant to shed light on the central question how and to what extent participation, especially of civil society, during PRSP can improve the quality of the democracy in Tanzania. According to the IFIs, the democracy will be deepened and strengthened due to participation. This is mainly expected to happen by civil society exerting pressure on governments for better accountability, transparency and expansion of participation possibilities or even institutionalisation of participation.
This expectation is very optimistic. The theoretical framework makes clear that one can raise some serious doubts about this expectation and also on its underlying assumptions. It shows that the form of participation has to be compatible with the type of democracy and that participation of civil society is not by definition of good quality. These two conditions for democratisation are discussed below.

First condition: Compatibility of the form of participation and the type of democracy
In order to improve the democracy by participation, the pursued form of participation is important and should be compatible with the form of democracy. In case of a representative democracy a far-reaching form of participation, like e.g. the cooperative style that the objective of ownership actually requires, will undermine this type of democracy, at least if one should believe Pröpper & Steenbeek. They argue that decision making power should be

reserved to the elected representatives of the parliament. Therefore they recommend, if one wants to respect the role of the parliament, the participatory style in which participation is excluded from the stage of decision making. More or less far-reaching forms of participation they regard as undesirable as those respectively do not respect the role of the parliament or are not fully exploiting the participation possibilities. In other words, Pröpper & Steenbeek particularly want participation to take place in the stages of agenda setting and policy preparation but absolutely not in the stage of policy stipulation.

However, as already came up for discussion in this chapter, this opinion needs some nuance. In practice should a parliament always have the final decision making power in representative democracies and act as a supervisor that makes sure that policy makers have drafted a well-considered policy with serious attention to the inputs of all participants. Consequently, the fear to make participants share in decision making power cannot be fully justified. However, one should be careful to give participants a say in decision making in dubious democracies in which it is uncertain if there exists a powerful and self-reliant parliament that takes its role as supervisor serious or that gets the chance to act as supervisor and takes the final decisions. If one does so, one runs the risk that policies and laws are not well-considered and hit certain parts in society disproportionately or the development of a better representative democracy may be blocked. Therefore in countries with dubious democracies participants should not be given too much decision making power and can indeed the participatory style be recommended.

Second condition: The quality of participation

Participation is not definitely of good quality. However, the quality of participation should be satisfactory if one aims for democratisation. In order to characterise participation of good quality, four sub-conditions need to be fulfilled. The law should encourage participation in government affairs, participants should be representative of society, participating CSOs should be strong in terms of capacity and objective and participating CSOs should put aside rivalries and collaborate. These four sub-conditions will be discussed below.

Existence of an enabling participation environment by law

Participation must be of good quality and an important condition for this is that the existence and functioning of civil society must be safeguarded by law. Without a good legal system, the emergence of a vibrant civil society is unlikely let alone the democratisation promise. The basis for a good legal system lies in the existence of a judiciary that is independent of the other branches of government and accessible by everybody, including civil society. This ensures that the government can be accused for abuses and that honest legal proceedings can take place. Besides, the government has to develop a good legal framework permitting freedom of access to information, freedom of opinion, freedom to engage in political activity and freedom of organisation, including a law defining NGOs and their right to organise and publish. These freedoms should of course be coupled with formal electoral and accountability rules that includes parliamentary oversight (Lewis, 1998:152,153 and World Bank, 2004:278,279).

The IFIs assume that developing countries have a good legal system and are consequently prepared for civil society participation. The African reality is, however, often different. The constitutional states in Africa are almost without exceptions still in their infancy and try to squelch criticism.

Representative participants

A well-balanced and representative group of participants is also important for the quality of participation. All interests that exist in a society must be represented, or at least no specific

interests must be thwarted. In addition the representative character of participants is important. A close look at civil society is especially necessary. All CSOs claim to be representative of a specific group in society. It is, however, not enough to assume that CSOs are representative if they say so. One should look at the amount of members and the background of the members to make a judgement about how representative a CSO is. This can be a good method but, like mentioned in paragraph 2.4, this is especially problematic in regard to the African situation. African CSOs often have a negligible amount of members. It is striking that the IFIs do not mention this problem and do not make a distinction between CSOs who are representative of society and those who are not. As already described in paragraph 2.4, this problem is partly superable by making sure that the principle of equality is guaranteed. This means that all CSOs must have the same chance of taking part, same influence on e.g. agenda setting and everybody must be able to voice their critical opinions.

Strong civil society organisations
An important factor for the good quality of participation is the character of civil society and its capabilities. CSOs that are participating should be strong and have an objective in mind. The IFIs assume strong CSOs that are willing to take part in the PRSP process and have the objective and knowledge to challenge the government in improving democratic practices. The opposite is, however, often the case in Africa. African CSOs can in general be characterised as weak because of a lack or uncertainty of resources and badly educated staff. Next to this, a lot of African CSOs are only occupied with basically economic and service delivery activities that prevent the emergence of a democratic ideal among CSOs. It is therefore unrealistic to think that all CSOs, especially their leaders, see good in participation in a PRSP process and have the objective to challenge the government in improving their democratic practices (Bayart, 1986:117,118; Lewis, 1998:151,152 and Ndegwa, 1996:111).

Collaboration of civil society organisations
Another factor that is crucial for the quality of participation is the necessity of collaboration between CSOs and to a certain extent mutual agreement. Collaboration is necessary to make strong demands towards the government. African CSOs can, however, often be described as segmented by cultural, religious and linguistic rifts. Consequently this prevents them to collaborate (Bayart, 1986:117,118). Also here it is striking that the IFIs do not take notion of this African reality and seem to suppose that all CSOs stand up for the poor and agree with each other who the poor are, why they are poor and how this can be solved.

It will be clear by now that participation of among others civil society has the potential to challenge the state, but will by no means automatically benefit a democracy. This will depend on the form of participation, the extent to which participation suit the type of democracy in a country, the parliament must (be able to) fulfil its role as supervisor and the quality of participation must be satisfactory. The most likely form of democratisation that can emerge will be the introduction or improvement of some element of political accountability. This is, however, not guaranteed, let alone further institutionalisation of participation. The IFIs have given a very rosy picture of the PRSP initiative. It seems as if they have not really thought over the idea.
After having elaborated the five types of democracy in this chapter, there is every indication that the IFIs aim to stimulate the pluralist democracy and introduce some form of deliberative democracy in developing countries with the PRSP initiative. PRSP can particularly be described as a form of interactive policy making because civil society representing different races, classes, areas and interests are invited to take part in public debates on the content of PRSP. After the debates, the government considers all opinions and suggestions and drafts a

PRSP. Participation is thus limited to the stages of agenda setting and policy preparation. It is the government that decides on the content of PRSP in the stage of policy stipulation and it is supposed that the government seriously considers the inputs of the participants. The parliament has to supervise this process. However, in practice this may not be taken as a matter of course.

If PRSP is an attempt to introduce deliberative democracy in developing countries, this means that the IFIs assume developing countries to be a democracy because the deliberative democracy is implicitly assumed to be a supplement to a representative or pluralist democracy. One can, however, certainly question if this is the fact in all developing countries. Many developing countries are only recently introducing democracy in their country and can therefore not yet be described as perfect democracies with powerful and self-reliant parliaments. Exactly the existence of a strong parliament is very important for the success of a deliberative democracy. In Western democracies strong parliaments are without many exceptions the case. The IFIs seem to assume that this is also the case in developing countries. As this is not particularly true, the positive effects of introducing a deliberative democracy in such countries can certainly be questioned. An important part of deliberative democracy is that the inputs of the participants will carefully be considered by the government and the elected representatives will oversee this process to ensure that indeed the inputs of participants are considered. In other words, the parliament has an important role of supervisor on behalf of the participants. Without a parliament that has strong overseeing powers the government is overlawed in its work. There will be no effective supervision that ensures that participants' inputs are taken into consideration.

Additionally, the kind and scope of deliberative democracy that the IFIs have in mind for developing countries is unreasonable. They require developing countries to prepare a PRSP with the help of a national dialogue in which participants of all levels in society should be involved. The developed countries can be accused of hypocrisy because they themselves have not much experience with deliberative democracy at the national level; they mostly introduce it at the local level because they maintain that this is the most feasible manner to practice deliberative democracy (AIV, 2003:44).

The theoretical framework has obviously shown that some serious questions can be raised about the PRSP initiative, its expectations and underlying assumptions. In the following chapters we will shift the attention to the case of Tanzania and study how the PRSP initiative and its expectations have worked out in the Tanzanian practice.

3. From colonial rule to Tanzania today

In order to grasp the effect of participation in Tanzania it is necessary to have a picture of the history of Tanzania and Tanzania today. In the first two paragraphs an overview will be given of colonial Tanzania and Tanzania under the rule of president Nyerere. In paragraph 3.3, the transition to a multiparty system in Tanzania will be discussed. In paragraph 3.4, the current governance structure in Tanzania will be explained. Paragraphs 3.5 and 3.6 will outline the economic situation of Tanzania after independence and the current debt and poverty problems. In paragraph 3.7, a historic overview will be given on the changing role of participation in Tanzania and the Tanzanian civil society will be described. Lastly, in paragraph 3.8, a conclusion will be drawn.

3.1. Tanganyika on its way to independence

Before Tanzania was colonised, kingdoms, chiefdoms and social orders laid down the law. In the course of the 19th century the trade relations between mainland Tanzania and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba increased. During this time the Arabs and Europeans (who had already close trade relations with the Zanzibar archipelago since the 16th century) began to invade the mainland.

In 1884 and 1885, Germany claimed the territory that compromises today's Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. They entered into a treaty with the local leaders and assured them that they could look to Germany for assistance. In 1986, Germany concluded an agreement with Great Britain and with this German East Africa became a German protectorate. The Germans attempted to govern Tanzania by dividing it in 22 administrative districts. Nevertheless, the influence of the Germans in the inland of Tanzania remained limited due to a lack of manpower and money. Besides, the Germans were regularly confronted with the Arabs and rebellious tribes in the inland (Infoplease, 27-05-2004).

In 1919, the German rule came to an end and the League of Nations[2] granted Great Britain the mandate to govern the former German colony. Only the Tanzanian part came under the rule of Great Britain, the area that comprises nowadays Rwanda and Burundi was granted to Belgium. According to the mandate provision, the colony had to be governed with an eye on the material and moral interests of its inhabitants. Great Britain named its colony 'Tanganyika' and introduced the indirect rule by which the population of Tanganyika itself became responsible for the daily affairs at the local level. Great Britain introduced a legislature, although this consisted only of British and Indian members. According to the British line of reasoning, the Africans still needed to learn how to govern themselves before they would be able to govern themselves at a higher level and the British tried to stimulate this learning process by improving the education (Kussendrager, 1996:7-9).

In 1946, the United Nations changed the mandate of Great Britain and Tangayika became a trust territory of the British with the purpose of gradually developing the country in the direction of self governance and independence. This was a response to the growing national and political awareness of the population in Tanganyika and the growing demand for independence.

The Tangayika African Association (TAA) has played a mayor role in attaining independence. The TAA was founded in 1927, initially meant as a private welfare organisation for public servants and for labourers in urban areas, however, in the 1940s the TAA established many offices throughout the country and changed the organisation into an anti-colonial organisation.

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[2] The League of Nations is the precursor of the United Nations.

In 1953 the TAA chose Julius Kambarage Nyerere as their leader. Nyerere was a teacher who had studied in Scotland. He transformed the TAA in an effective political organisation and in 1954 the TAA was renamed in the Tanganyika Afrikan National Union (TANU). Important issues on their agenda were national self-determination, freedom, creating trade unions and eradicating racism and tribalism (Kussendrager, 1996: 10-12).

The British responded to the demand of self-determination by calling multiracial elections for the legislature. The TANU entered into combat with the United Tanganyika Party that was established by the British to counterbalance the TANU. The TANU won the elections in 1958 and 1959 with an enormous victory. Consequently, Tanganyika got its first cabinet with five ministers from the TANU in 1959. In 1960, the British abolished the rule that a certain percentage of the seats in the parliament and the cabinet were reserved for the Arabs, British and Indians. As a result, the TANU won 70 out of 71 seats during the parliamentary elections of 1960. Nyerere became the minister-president and formed his own cabinet. In 1961, the British agreed that Nyerere's cabinet would get complete authority over all domestic affairs. Defence and foreign affairs remained the responsibility of Great Britain until Tanganyika became independent on the 9th of December 1961. In 1964, the name Tanganyika was changed into Tanzania. From then on Tanzania, Zanzibar and Pemba formed the United Republic of Tanzania. The Zanzibar archipelago remained, however, to a large extent autonomous and has its own president and its own cabinet (McCulla, 1999:57-59).

3.2. Nyerere's term of office

Short after Nyerere came to power he declared Tanzania a one-party state. Nyerere wanted to unite the Tanzanians and strengthen the unity of the country with its more than 120 distinctive population groups. He was anxious that a system with more political parties would split Tanzania along ethnic lines. He considered the TANU as a tool to unify Tanzania. In order to spread the organisation of the party and broaden the support among the population, the TANU was organised down to the households, grouped into ten-house cells, each with its own chairman. The members of these cells selected the delegation of the higher cells on district, regional and national level and thus indirectly the National Meeting of the TANU in Dar es Salaam. The National Meeting of the TANU was the most important political organ in Tanzania until democratisation in the 1990s. It assigned the party candidates, selected the executive committee and determined the long-term government policy. In 1977, the TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) (party of the original inhabitants of Zanzibar) merged to form the new revolutionary party of Tanzania, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) (Kussendrager, 1996:21).

Nyerere was worried about the enduring dependence of Tanzania on foreign countries, the growing social inequalities and the growing class contrasts. He considered this a threat to his dream, an egalitarian and democratic Tanzania. In response to his worries he began developing his vision of a uniquely African socialism. His vision was set out in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and described how socialism would create a self-reliant nation of peasants (Kussendrager, 1996:22).

The cornerstone of the declaration was the ujamaa (familyhood) village that had to make Tanzania more self-reliant. An ujamaa village was an agricultural collective run along traditional African lines with its characteristics of safety and mutual obligations. Each individual was obliged to work on the commonly held land and basic goods and tools were to be held commonly. The establishment of 7000 ujamaa villages resulted in enormous migration within the nation: 85 percent of Tanzania's rural population was resettled between 1973 and 1978. Besides the ujamaa policy, education formed an essential part of the Arusha Declaration. Nyerere considered an educated population as a condition for a self-reliant Tanzania. Other aspects of the Arusha Declaration included the nationalisation of the

economy and tax increases aimed at redistributing wealth. It is clear that Nyerere envisaged a society in which the Tanzanian government played a dominant role (Kussendrager, 1996:22,23 and McCulla, 1999:95,96).

Nyerere's program improved rural access to clean water, health care and education. It was also successful in nation building, unifying the country and bridging ethnic and religious divisions. However, the program failed to produce sufficient food to feed the country's population and the low state-mandated crop prices deepened rural poverty. In the mid-1980s the economic situation was hopeless and Nyerere realised that his program had failed and that reform was necessary. In 1985, he decided to resign as he realised that he was identified too much with the declaration and its policy. He was of the opinion that he was no longer reliable to carry out the necessary reforms (Encarta Africana, 07-06-2004).

3.3. The transition to a multiparty system

After the resignation of Nyerere, Ali Hassan Mwinyi was appointed as the new president of the one-party government. He began an economic recovery program involving cuts in government spending, encouragement of foreign investment and decontrol of prices such as the agricultural prices. He succeeded in altering the socialistic course of Tanzania (McCulla, 1999:68).

During Mwinyi's term of office the political system was reformed as a result of growing social pressure. Criticism of the one-party state began to rise because social organisations with diverging interests (workers, farmers, civil servants) could not participate in a meaningful way and because of increasing suffering caused by the economic reforms. Consequently and due to donor pressure, the constitution was amended and political parties became legal in 1992, which transformed Tanzania into a multiparty democracy (McCulla, 1999:68,69).

Despite this transition limited institutional changes took place and the governing regime did not really change. Unlike in many countries where political change is extorted by a massive popular movement, this was not the case in Tanzania. There is more talk of top-down democratisation by the CCM who tried to manage the external and internal pressures for change. The step to a multiparty system has consequently not lead to an ideal type as the move to this system has served to strengthen instead of weaken the CCM's political power (ARD, 2003:2,3). The CCM has succeeded in portraying itself as indispensable to preserve national unity and consequently the wider public identified opposition parties with dissension. The CCM has benefited heavily from the new electoral system, the simple plurality, in which the winning candidate is the one who receives most of the votes in a constituency. A majority is not necessary, a plurality of votes suffices. The CCM benefits because of the bonus in seats it offers. The first national multiparty elections in 1995 illustrate this. The CCM, under the leadership of Benjamin Mkapa, won 62 percent of the votes on the mainland. In the Zanzibar Archipelago the CCM won with a dubious 50,2 percent of the votes. Mkapa became the new president of the United Republic and the CCM ended up with 215 of the 265 seats in the parliament (Kussendrager, 1996:28-30). This means that the CCM possessed 85 percent of the seats in the parliament despite the fact that only 62 percent of the mainland voters voted for a CCM candidate (Gould & Ojanen, 2003:95). This makes the advance of the simple plurality for the CCM clear. The transformation to the multiparty system has consequently actually given a new lease of life to the legitimacy of the CCM as it can now state that it is democratically elected (ARD, 2003:2,3).

The new president Mkapa continued to pursue economic reforms. He has worked with the World Bank and IMF to implement economic reforms and secured financial aid and debt relief. He succeeded in improving the economy between 1995 and 2000. Foreign investment

increased nine-fold, average incomes grew at 1 percent per annum, and inflation decreased from 30 percent to 6 percent (Bohnet, 2000:14).

In 1999 Mkapa announced the 'Tanzanian Development Vision 2025' which was meant to replace the 1967 Arusha Declaration. Vision 2025 argues that national unity, social coherence, peace and stability in Tanzania are largely due to the basic values of the Arusha Declaration and should therefore be maintained in Vision 2025. On the other hand, Vision 2025 criticises the regulatory and economic policies pursued under the Arusha Declaration. Vision 2025 underlines the necessity for redefining the role of the government, thus giving civil society and economic activities in the private sector room to develop. Herewith, Vision 2025 contains a clear commitment to the rule of law and to a participatory market-oriented social and economic order (Bohnet, 2000:14).

In October 2000, Tanzania held its second multi-party general elections. The economic reforms bared its fruits and Mkapa won the presidential election with 71 percent of the votes. In the parliamentary elections, CCM won 202 of the 232 elected seats (90 percent) (TheFreeDictionary.com: 07-06-2004).

The elections of 2000 passed off in a much more orderly fashion than the elections of 1995, which can be characterised by organisational chaos and opposition parties accused the CCM of electoral fraud. However, there has been little progress in the development of the multiparty democracy in Tanzania since the first multiparty elections. The opposition parties won a substantial minority of seats in parliament in 1995 but lost a lot of their seats again in the elections of 2000. The cause can be found in CCM either co-opting leading figures of the opposition parties or provoking divisions between them. Besides, personality clashes between the leaders of the opposition parties did prevent them from forming a coalition that would enable them to constitute an adequate counterweight to the CCM. There are 13 registered parties but only 6 were active in the 2000-election campaign and all performed poorly. This lack of activity stems partly from the fact that parties receive funding based on the number of seats they already have in parliament, so that those without seats lack financial resources (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003:13,17).

3.4. Governance structure

All state authority in Tanzania is exercised and controlled by the government of the United Republic of Tanzania. The central government has three organs, namely, the executive, the judiciary and the legislature. Together they have powers over the conduct of public affairs. Next to this, local government authorities assist the central government to execute policies at the local level (United Republic of Tanzania, 17-06-2004).

3.4.1. Executive

The executive comprises the president of Tanzania, the president of Zanzibar, the vice-president, the prime minister; and the cabinet ministers. The president of Tanzania is the head of state, the head of government and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The vice-president is the principal assistant to the president in respect to all matters in Tanzania. The prime minister is appointed by the president and has authority over the control, supervision and execution of the day-to-day functions and affairs of the government. Besides this, the prime minister, collectively with the cabinet ministers, is responsible for the execution of the policies of the government. Lastly, the prime minister performs any matter or matters that the president directs to him.

The cabinet ministers are appointed by the president from among members of the parliament. Each minister is charged with a sector portfolio. There are 19 ministries in total (United Republic of Tanzania, 17-06-2004).

Distinctive of the Tanzanian executive is that it is very dominant in the governance system. On paper there is a separation of powers between the executive, judiciary and legislature but in practice the legislature and judiciary are subordinate to the executive. The judiciary and legislature are both weak and lack resources and this is maintained by the executive. As actually only CCM members comprise the executive, it can be stated that this situation is maintained by the CCM (ARD, 2003:19). The following two subparagraphs will dwell more on the imbalance between the executive-legislature and the executive-judiciary.

3.4.2. Parliament

The parliament consists of two parts, i.e. the president of Tanzania and the national assembly. The president exercises authority vested in him by the constitution to assent the law, which is a necessary procedure to complete the enactment process. This means that the legislative power is not solely vested in the national assembly as it should be according to the *trias politica*.

The national assembly is the principal organ of Tanzania and has the authority on behalf of the people to oversee and advise the government of Tanzania and all its organs in the discharge of their respective responsibilities (United Republic of Tanzania, 17-06-2004).

The national assembly consists of four categories of members of parliament (MPs), namely:

- members elected directly by the people of Tanzania to represent constituencies;
- five members elected by the Zanzibar House of Representatives from among its members[3];
- 49 seats are for women and are appointed by the political parties in proportion to their representation in the assembly;
- the attorney general; and
- ten members nominated by the president (United Republic of Tanzania, 17-06-2004).

This enumeration already makes clear that the separation of executive and legislature is incomplete as the president has the power to appoint ten MPs and besides this the president and the members of the cabinet are also MPs. This severely hampers the parliament to fulfil its role as watchdog. An MP of the Civic United Front (CUF) (the main opposition party) stated that the power and strength of the parliament is further undermined by the limited personnel and organisational capacity (training, staff, offices and working tools). This restricts the parliament from effectively overseeing the executive and having a real impact on policy making. Another insuperable obstacle is the overwhelming dominance of the CCM in the parliament with 202 seats out of 232 and the limited independence of CCM and opposition MPs from their parties. MPs hold their seat on behalf of their party and are effectively discouraged to take a stand against the party ideas because this will automatically mean that MPs lose their seat. It goes without saying that this ensures that the parliament will remain supportive of and responsive to the overall priorities of the CCM. As the priorities of the CCM are reflected in the proposed policies of the executive, these policies do not find much resistance in the parliament (ARD, 2003:19,32,33). Two non-governmental (donor and research institution) respondents argued that this practice has become more common with the transition to the multiparty system. This has enforced the party discipline and undermined the strength of the parliament. Before 1995, MPs were much stronger as they could freely criticise the government without being suspected of supporting the opposition.

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[3] The Zanzibar House of Representatives is elected by the Zanzibar voters and has the authority to make laws especially for the Zanzibar archipelago (United Republic of Tanzania, 17-06-2004).

3.4.3. Judiciary
The judiciary in Tanzania consists of the court of appeal, high court, regional magistrate courts, district magistrate courts and primary courts. The court of appeal and the high court are quite distinctive from the lower courts in respect to their reputation. They are regarded as competent and relatively free from corruption and therefore enjoy respect and credibility from the public. In contrast, the lower courts (regional and district magistrate courts and primary courts) enjoy little public credibility and are perceived as massively corrupt. This is, however, not surprising with the low salaries of magistrates[4], lack of resources to do their work and heavy workload. This has demoralised the lower courts and made them very prone to corruption.

The executive dominance over the judiciary is very apparent from the fact that the lower courts are systematically deprived of essential resources to operate independently but also the higher courts can not escape from the dominance of the executive. In recent years, the court of appeal and high court tried to assert their independence from the executive by some rulings against the executive. The executive succeeded, however, in effectively overturning any of the court's findings that the executive conceived as harmful to itself (ARD, 2003:19,24,34).

3.4.4. Local governance structure
Tanzania is divided in 21 mainland regions and 5 Zanzibar regions. Regional commissioners, appointed by the central government administer the regions. They have the duty to supervise the discharge of all duties and functions of the government in the region assigned to them. The regions are subdivided in 120 districts on the mainland and 10 on the Zanzibar archipelago. These districts are headed by appointed district commissioners and exist for the purpose of consolidating and giving more power to the people to participate in the planning and implementation of development programs within their respective districts but also generally throughout the country.

Local authority legislation has created two types of districts, namely, urban authorities and rural authorities. Both have an elected body and administrative staff. Urban authorities, commonly known as urban councils, are responsible for the administration and development of urban areas ranging from townships, municipalities and cities. The urban council is comprised of the town council, the municipal council and the city council. Each of these councils consists of elected councillors and MPs who represent the constituencies within the town, municipality or city (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 17-06-2004). Rural authorities, commonly known as district councils, are responsible for the administration and development of rural areas like wards, villages and sub villages (hamlets). The district council is composed of members elected from each ward in the area of the council, MPs representing constituencies within the area of the district council, three members appointed by the minister responsible for the local government and one elected (by the district council) chairman of village councils representing the constituent village councils on a rotational basis.

The only democratic element at the local government level are the village and ward council elections every five years in which all adults over the age of 18 in the respective village or ward have a vote (Mniwasa et al., 2001).

In short, local government authorities have the following functions:
- to perform the functions of local government within their area;
- to ensure the enforcement of law and public safety of the people; and
- to consolidate democracy within their area and apply it to accelerate the development of the people (United Republic of Tanzania, 1998:Art No.146).

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[4] Magistrates get a salary that is eight times less as the salary of the judges of the high court and court of appeal and they do not receive benefits like housing and a car that are enjoyed by the judges (ARD, 2003:34).

Some radical changes in this structure are, however, expected to be implemented through the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) that was launched in 1999. The power at the regional level will be reduced and power at district level will increase. The district level will take over the powers of policy implementation and oversight from the regional level. This will increase the autonomy of district level directorates from the central government and make them politically accountable to the district council and administratively accountable to the regional level directorates (Gould et al., 2003:105). This transformation of the relations between the central and local governments is a complicated process. Therefore the implementation of the LGRP is a time-consuming process and it is still under implementation. A serious obstacle is the capacity constraints of local authorities in terms of qualified personnel. Consequently there is great hesitation to grant increased financial autonomy to the local authorities. This reticence, however, reinforces the capacity constraints. Therefore the transfer of power to the local level needs to be preceded by capacity building of personnel at the local level and this will take time (ARD, 2003:37-40).

3.5. The economic situation of Tanzania
Until the mid-1970s the Tanzanian economy could be characterized by reasonable growth rates, stable macroeconomic environment and a sustainable resource balance. However, this picture changed dramatically in the latter half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Growth rates and gross domestic savings declined, whilst inflation and the public sector debt rose (Moshi, 2000:33).
During the 1970s the government had an extensive role in the economy and used a wide range of economic instruments. In general, government actions were directed to discourage the development of the private sector (Moshi, 2000:33,34). However, in the beginning of the 1980s it became clear that the socialistic governance structure had not been successful for the economy in Tanzania: there was stunted economic growth and the infrastructure (roads and communication) was in a bad condition. The international donor community advised the government to reach an agreement with the IMF. However, due to fundamental differences between the government and the IMF on the causes of and remedies to the economic situation, no agreement was reached. Nyerere decided to launch his own economic programmes without the interference of the IMF. In 1981, the government initiated the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP), which was a program to increase exports again. Between 1982 and 1985 the government committed itself to its own Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which was meant to lead to a rehabilitation and restructuring of the economy. These two programs did not lead to a significant recovery of the economy because more was needed. Nyerere admitted that new reforms of the economy had to be carried out by a new president and Nyerere decided to resign from office in 1985 (Mbelle, 1996:10).
The new president Mwinyi undertook a major review of the country's development strategy and started building a liberalized economy based on the market and private sector. Under pressure from the donors to come to terms with the IMF and the failure of the own alternative programmes NESP and SAP, Mwinyi concluded an agreement with the IMF and adopted the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1986. The ERP policy package included systematic removal of regulatory controls, structures and operational guidelines in the administration and pricing system in the economy. The ERP was meant to attract foreign assistance, increase output of food and export crops, rehabilitate the psychical infrastructure and promote private initiative (Mbelle, 1996:11).
In 1989, the ERP was replaced by the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) which included banking reforms and reforms of the parastatal sector and the civil service. However, fiscal benchmarks were not met and the implementation of structural reforms was insufficient.

Therefore the agreement with the IMF was abandoned in 1992. Due to this event and a corruption scandal most bilateral donors withdrew their aid to Tanzania (Danielson & Dijkstra, 2003:42). With these developments the high growth rates established by the ERP reforms in the end of the 80s were rapidly undone. In the first half of the 90s, the economic growth trend slowed down which manifested itself in a very low collection in government revenue and decline in the quality of social services like health and education (United Republic of Tanzania, 2002).

In 1995, Mkapa was elected as the new president of Tanzania. He intensified and sustained the economic reforms of Mwinyi and made overtures to the IMF. In 1996, the Government committed itself to a shadow program monitored by the IMF and a new three-year ESAF, underpinned by a Policy Framework Paper (PFP). This has resulted in a significant progress in restoring macro economic stability. The period after 1995, except 1997, has seen a sustained increase in the annual growth rate of the economy from 3.3 percent in 1997 to 5.8 percent in 2004 (United Republic of Tanzania, 20-06-2004 and Jubilee, 05-07-2005).

3.6. The debt and poverty problems of Tanzania

In 2004, Tanzania was ranked at 162 out of 177 countries on the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index (United Nations Development Program, 2004). Unlike the significant economic progress, the economic reforms of the last two decades did not lead to a decline of poverty in Tanzania and did not lift Tanzania in the UNDP Human Development Index. Despite the fact that there is a significant decline in the proportion of people living below the poverty line, the absolute number of people living in poverty increased during the 1990s owing to the population growth between 1980 and 2000. According to a Household Budget Survey in 2000/1, more than 35 percent of the Tanzanians are living below the basic needs poverty line (Evans & Ngalwea., 2003:273,274).

Poverty is broadly conceived as the "inability to attain a minimum standard of living". This does not only mean a lack of sufficient food and income but it also includes the inaccessibility to health, clean water, sanitation facilities, education, unsustainable environment and a lack of infrastructure (Mawenya, 1996:35).

In Tanzania poverty is largely a rural phenomenon and is concentrated in subsistence agriculture particularly in those parts of the country where there is a lack of rainfall, where the land is infertile and where the infrastructure is inadequate. Although poverty is far more widespread in rural areas, poverty also exists and is increasing in urban areas. Here poverty hits particularly women, children and the elderly (United Republic of Tanzania, 2000:6,7).

Notwithstanding the high poverty rate in Tanzania, the government has not been apathetic regarding poverty. Already from 1964 onwards poverty reduction has held a central place in Tanzania's development strategies and policies. Nyerere was of opinion that poverty is a enemy of economic growth and he carried out development strategies focused on their elimination. Impressive gains were made in the areas of basic health, education and social infrastructure (Evans & Ngalwea, 2003:271).

By the mid-1980s the social gains began to erode because of the worsened economic conditions in the country. A decade of preoccupation with macroeconomic stabilization followed. Since the mid-1990s, however, the government has resumed its focus on poverty reduction and has completed many important reforms and some are still in process of being carried out. Nevertheless, it will take considerable time to notice the positive effects of these reforms on poverty (Evans & Ngalwea, 2003:271,274).

An important obstacle to poverty reduction is the large debt of Tanzania. In 2004, the total debt stock stood at $8.8 billion, which is 78 percent of the Gross National Income. During 2004 the government spent 7.2 percent of the government revenues on debt servicing (Jubilee, 05-07-2005). This is already a much better record than in 1998 when the government

allocated over one-third of her revenues to external debt servicing (Moshi, 2000:41). Nevertheless 7.2 percent is still a high percentage and it speaks for itself that this is dwarfing the resources available for poverty reduction. This fact also makes clear that the HIPC Initiative with its debt relief is very much welcomed by the Tanzanian government.

3.7. Participation in Tanzania prior to the PRSP initiative
Before the participation of different actors during the PRSP I and NSGRP processes will be outlined and examined, this paragraph will have a look at the state of affairs concerning participation in Tanzania before the PRSP initiative was launched and the characteristics of the Tanzanian civil society.

3.7.1. Participation until the 1970s
During the colonial period various associations were founded as a response to the colonial impact and resistance to the colonial rule. For example, urban migrants formed ethnic associations to provide social services like burial assistance. By 1954 there were 51 such organisations in Dar es Salaam with a total membership of 6500 (Meena, 1997:34). Despite that one should not underrate the social functions of these ethnic associations, the occupational associations like the African Commercial Association (traders) and the African Association (clerks, teachers and civil servants), who were operating nationwide, were far more important. The African Association was formed in 1929 and in 1953 Nyerere became president of this association and turned the association into a political party. The name was changed to Tanganyika African Nationalist Union (TANU) and fought successfully for independence and won an overwhelming majority of votes by the first elections in 1960 (Lange et al., 2000:4).

TANUs success during the elections in 1960 and the elections that followed was due to their collaboration with existing associations However, whilst the existence of these organisations had enabled TANU to come to power, they were undermined by the TANU once independence had been achieved. Women organisations, youth and labour associations, and cooperatives were discouraged. Unions based on ethnic identity and religious associations were banned under the pretext that these kinds of organisations could upset the nation building project (Lange et al., 2000:5). This policy succeeded in bringing these organisations and associations under the governments' thumb and frustrated the establishment of a pro-active civil society. The civil society was not able to establish a mechanism to check and monitor the exercise and abuse of state power. The government had succeeded in weakening civil society and was able to exercise its power with minimal limits and control from the existing organisations and associations (Meena, 1997:34,35).

In the single-party decades, associations like cooperative associations and labour associations were set up under the party wing. These associations had a monopoly when organising people. Participation of the population through these associations remained, however, very low. A lot could have been expected from the Ujamaa initiative with the ideal that the people would get an opportunity to voice their concerns through their ten-house-cells and from there up to the National Meeting of the TANU. Reality was that it went the other way around, with instructions coming from the party headquarters that were implemented at the local level (Lange et al., 2000:5).

3.7.2. Changing mindset
During the mid-1970s things started to change due to the economic decline. The government showed that it was unable to provide a minimum level of social services. Consequently more people became self-employed and organised themselves in welfare organisations. The government tolerated these organisations because it realised that it was incapable of

delivering basic services. Also the fact that national integration had consolidated since independence led to this tolerance of the government. In the 1980s the government went even further by opening up of the education system for non-state secondary schools and calling upon churches and welfare organisations to play a greater role in the provision of education and health care services. During that same period, donors started to channel their aid through international NGOs and local CSOs as a way of enabling them to fill the gap that the state was leaving (Lange et al., 2000:5,6).

After the first democratic elections in 1995, the Tanzanian government admitted, under the pressure of donors, that the policy making process needed to be opened up in which the different groups in society would get a voice. A policy dialogue needed to be established if the Tanzanian government wanted to convince the donors that it was serious about democratisation (Wangwe, 1997:17,18). In 1999, the government announced Vision 2025, which states that the ideal nation's development should be people-centred, including the empowerment and effective democratic and popular participation of all social groups (men and women, boys and girls, the young and old and the disabled persons). It pursues a vision of Tanzania in 2025 which is characterised by good governance (governance that results in the betterment of human life), thereby ensuring a culture of accountability, good performance and effectively curbing corruption. In order to attain these ends, Vision 2025 argues that the people of Tanzania need to be empowered with the capacity to make their leaders and public servants accountable. A strategy needs to be developed that should entail empowerment of local governments and communities and promoting broad-based grassroots participation in the mobilization of resources, knowledge and experience. Vision 2025 also states that local people need to play a greater role because they know their problems best and are better able to judge what they need, what is possible to achieve and how it can effectively be achieved. Capacity building of the people of Tanzania will be necessary in order to get valuable inputs from the people. Therefore the government aims to restructure and transform the education system to create a well-educated population (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999a: 3,4,19,24,28).

Vision 2025 not only stresses the need for the active involvement of all Tanzanians in the development of Tanzania. Nowadays virtually every government policy and guideline in Tanzania speaks about the need to include the Tanzanians in planning and policy making. Reference is especially made to civil society who has the potential to contribute to a better understanding in society of the national state of affairs. However, this tendency to give a bigger role to civil society in policy making also made a specified policy on civil society necessary. The next subparagraph will discuss the National policy on NGOs, which arose out of this need.

3.7.3. National Policy on Non-Governmental Organisations

The making of the National Policy on NGOs goes back to 1996 when the government decided that there was need for such a policy. A steering committee with representatives from civil society was established and a consultative process followed before the new policy was approved in 2001. The consultation process was tightly managed by the government and left not much space for initiatives of civil society. The policy was rushed through parliament and civil society representatives could in the nick of time prevent that the provision that all NGOs needed to reregister on an annual basis was included in the National Policy on NGOs (ARD, 2003:7,29).

The National Policy on NGOs states that civil society is considered as a strong instrument for the effective participation and involvement of people in decision making and social, political and economic development activities. The overall objective of the policy is to create an enabling environment for civil society to operate effectively and efficiently in the social

transformation of the country. The policy promises that the government will develop partnership with civil society in all sectors. The policy outlines that at the national, regional and district levels appropriate frameworks and mechanisms will be established to facilitate communication and consultation between the government and civil society. In addition, the policy aims to improve the exchange of information and reporting between the government and civil society (Vice President's Office, 2001:3-17).

Despite these positive words, the policy can actually be regarded as an attempt to control the operation of civil society. The policy created a NGO board and a NGO national council with far-reaching powers. For instance, the board has the power to investigate all matters regarding the performance of civil society and can fine NGOs that contravene the law. Besides, the policy forces NGOs to harmonize their activities with national development plans, which takes away much of their autonomy (ARD, 2003:7,28,29). A respondent who is working for a CSO that organises capacity training for CSOs argued that the National Policy of NGOs is a severe attempt of the government to silence the voice of critical CSOs. All CSOs need to be registered. Also at the district level CSOs need to register themselves despite the fact that these CSOs often lack the money to travel to Dar es Salaam and register their CSO. Besides, he argued that all CSOs have to apply for a certificate of compliance. It is, however, unclear how a judgement is made on the compliance of a CSO. This indistinctiveness gives the government the power to refuse certificates of compliance to critical CSOs.

3.7.4. Civil society in Tanzania

There are many CSOs in Tanzania and its number is still rising. The number of registered CSOs in Tanzania rose from around 200 in 1993 to more than 2000 in 2000. The reason for this is the political liberalisation, which enabled people to organise themselves more (Kossoff, 2000:3). Despite the impressive number of CSOs, a majority of them can be regarded as weak. They are struggling with limited capacity in terms of educated personnel and financial resources. CSOs are also often incapable of articulating a coherent political voice, particularly because they have proliferated in large numbers, which has made them politically weaker. According to a respondent who is working for a CSO in Dar es Salaam, many CSOs are not born out of an honest attempt to serve their grassroots. They exist for the benefit of their founders. Especially local CSOs can be portrayed as elitist, self-serving, inefficient, unaccountable and corrupt (ARD, 2003:7,19,26). Nevertheless, in comparison with five years ago, civil society has developed and is more capable of coherent collective action. Collaboration between the government and civil society also appears to be more frequent. At the same time, however, the National Policy on NGOs has put new limits on civil society development (ARD, 2003:44).

A problem of CSOs in Tanzania is that they are not necessarily representative. They are not always neutral and do not definitely represent the interests of their constituency. A CSO can be regarded as proper when it has a substantial amount of members, an elected leadership, a certain level of infrastructure and concrete objectives and accountability and reporting systems. This is, however, often not the case in Tanzania. Tanzanian CSOs often seem to have no members at all. For instance 8 out of the 9 CSOs interviewed in Dar es Salaam and Mwanza had no members. Respondents of CSOs in Maswa and Monduli gave the impression that they have some sort of unofficial membership. The 5 umbrella organisations interviewed all have member-CSOs. The leadership of Tanzanian CSOs is often in hands of some upper-class citizens who have studied in a Western country. These people are not fully aware of the problems and challenges of their grassroots and can therefore not always be regarded as legitimate spokesman of their grassroots. Besides, it is often questionable to whom CSOs are accountable. One can distinguish upward and downward accountability. The situation in Tanzania seems to be that when a CSO gets external funding the upward accountability often

tends to be relatively high towards the donors. Downward accountability towards the constituency seems, however, often missing (Benjaminsen & Ebenezeri, 2004:34,35,44). The reason is because donors do a lot of monitoring nowadays to reduce the risk that resources are abused. As a respondent working for a CSO put it, this is an improvement but this facilitates the power of donors on CSOs at the expense of the grassroots population the CSOs claim to represent. Because of the membership problem, questionable leadership and the dominance of upward accountability CSOs in Tanzania should not necessarily be looked upon as legitimate spokesmen for the interest of their grassroots.

3.7.5. Growing role of participation in Tanzanian policy making
For the first time in 1996, the Tanzanian government started with organised participatory policy making. In 1997, the National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) was completed after a consultative process with national government officials, local government officials at the district level, representatives of CSOs and religious leaders. The complaint was, however, that the emphasis of participation was on hearing the views of line ministries and that the participation of CSOs was minimal. The consultation was top-down and only a handful of CSOs were invited, which has resulted in consultation with a corporatist style. Government officials indicated, however, that CSOs had, at this point in time, serious constraints that prevented them from participating effectively (United Republic of Tanzania, 1997:42,43 and OED & IEO, 2004:18,21).

In 1997/98, the government also committed itself to a Public Expenditure Review (PER) process. The PER is an integral part of the Public Finance Management reform that attempts to increase transparency in government's spending programs. These spending programs need to run efficiently and should be focused on poverty reduction priorities. PER takes a backward look at public expenditure and performance and identifies options about future directions. Consequently, PER has become the main avenue for policy debate and strategy formulation in Tanzania. At the top is a PER working group, which is responsible for guiding all aspects of the PER process. There are several sector-working groups focusing on areas such as education, gender and health. The PER groups include government officials and development partners and over the years civil society, research and academic institutions and the private sector were also invited to take seats in the working groups (ARD, 2003:39,40 and OED & IEO, 2004:19,64).

3.8. Conclusion
This chapter has made clear that the former president of Tanzania, Nyerere, has played an important and decisive role in Tanzania. Under his rule economic socialism was introduced that turned out to be disastrous for the economy and saddled Tanzania with an enormous debt burden and did not decrease the number of people living in poverty. This situation forced him to hand over his power to a successor who started with economic reforms and in 1995 the first democratic elections took place, followed by elections in 2000. With this Tanzania wants to show that it is making effort of introducing a form of representative democracy. However, some serious doubts exist about the sincerity of this attempt, as the currently existing democracy in Tanzania is not particularly effective. The overview of the executive, parliament, judiciary and local governance structure shows that there are still some serious flaws. There is no separation of the executive and legislature. At the national level the president is the head of state and therefore responsible for governments' actions to the national assembly but the president is also a member of this same national assembly and nominates ten members of the national assembly! The president also has the authority to assent the law while this authority has to be vested in the national assembly. Even more indistinctiveness exists on the issue of accountability at the regional and district level. The

regional and district commissioners are appointed by the central government but it is unclear to whom they are responsible for their actions and what kind of role the district councils have in this respect. Although there are local government elections for the village and ward councils every five years, their powers seem to be minimal. The root of this situation seems to be the predominance of the CCM. This is an insurmountable obstacle to further democratisation.

In paragraph 2.4 it became clear that civil society can alter the government. It is, however, questionable if the Tanzanian civil society is able to counterforce the predominance of the CCM. Tanzanian civil society can be characterised as weak and stunted. This is the result of systematic exclusion and neglection of civil society under Nyerere his rule. The governance system made people wait for initiatives from above instead of taking action themselves. Three decades of one-party rule created a politically ignorant population. Only since the 1990s have increasing efforts been made to involve civil society in government affairs and there has been a steep rise of CSOs since the 1990s. Nevertheless, participation in government affairs was almost non-existent by the time the PRSP initiative was launched. The first wary move was already made with the NPES and PER but this did not alter the fact that the PRSP initiative has proved to be a huge challenge.

4. Tanzania's PRSP I

In this chapter the PRSP I process will be discussed in order to make a comparison between PRSP I and NSGRP and its implications for the democracy in Tanzania later in this paper. In paragraph 4.1 an outline of the PRSP I process will be given. In paragraph 4.2 assessments will be made about the participation of the Tanzanian government, parliament, civil society, private sector, international donors and the actors at the regional and district level during the PRSP I process. In paragraph 4.3 attention will shift to the drafting process of PRSP I and in paragraph 4.4 the influence of the actors on the content of PRSP I will be discussed. In paragraph 4.5 an assessment will be made on the question if PRSP I is nationally owned. Lastly, in paragraph 4.6 a brief conclusion about the PRSP I consultation process will be drawn.

4.1. The PRSP I process

Tanzania has a heavy debt burden and was therefore invited to qualify for the HIPC Initiative. Not earlier as 1999 Tanzania was on-track for three consecutive years with IMF and World Bank programmes like macroeconomic stability and structural reforms. By that time Tanzania could finally qualify itself for the HIPC Initiative (Leyaro, 2001).

In October 1999, a committee of twelve ministers and the governor of the Bank of Tanzania were formed to supervise the preparation of the PRSP I. This committee was supported by a technical committee comprising officials from the Vice President's Office (VPO), Prime Minister's Office, Planning Commission, the Bank of Tanzania, and Ministries of Finance, Education, Health, Works, Community Development, Local Government, Agriculture, Water, Energy and Minerals, and Labour and Youth Development. The committee was coordinated by the Ministry of Finance. This technical committee set up a small team of Tanzanian professionals who got the task to draft the interim and final PRSP I. This team consisted of senior officials from the Ministry of Finance, the VPO, State House[5], the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) and two autonomous research institutions (ESRF and REPOA) (Danida, 2001:15-22).

Interim PRSP

In April 2000, Tanzania's Interim PRSP (I-PRSP) was endorsed by the executive boards of the IMF and World Bank. Consequently, Tanzania was admitted to the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. The I-PRSP was more or less based on the NPES of 1997, which was already prepared in a participatory way. Therefore, the Tanzanian government was of opinion that consultations for I-PRSP were unnecessary and no new consultations were held. However, as made clear in paragraph 3.7.5, some complaints were raised about the quality of the NPES consultation process. Despite the fact that one can criticize that no consultations were organised, it must be recognized that the I-PRSP was only interim and that the government faced a dilemma between the wish to produce the paper as fast as possible or a time-consuming process of participation (Danida, 2001:19). The drawback of this decision was that very few participants were prepared when the PRSP consultations started (Evans & Ngalwea, 2003:275).

Consultations were scheduled for the full PRSP I and the I-PRSP outlined the organisation of this consultation process (Leyaro, 2001).

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[5] The State House is the private office of the Tanzanian President. Its staff has the duty to advise the president on his day-to-day executive functions and coordinates all decisions and policies of the cabinet (United Republic of Tanzania, 04-08-2005).

First consultation round

In order to reach the HIPC completion point, Tanzania had to proceed with the structural reforms and complete a full PRSP, which had to be prepared in a participatory way. Therefore the VPO, who was in charge of coordinating the consultation process, organised seven zonal workshops in May 2000, which were mainly aimed at collecting the views from the grassroots stakeholders from all over the country. The seven zones included: Lake Zone (Mwanza, Mara and Kagera), Western Zone (Kigoma, Shinyanga and Tabora), Northern Zone (Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Tanga), Central Zone (Dodoma and Singida), Southern Highlands Zone (Mbeya, Ruvuma, Rukwa and Iringa), Southern Zone (Mtwara and Lindi) and Eastern Zone (Dar es Salaam, Morogoro and Coast). Four villagers (sampled randomly from two villages), one district councillor, one town councillor, and one District Executive Director (DED) represented each district. For every zonal workshop, five CSOs represented civil society (with one person each). In total, 804 participants attended the workshops, comprising 426 villagers, 215 councillors, 110 DEDs and 53 persons from CSOs. Of the participants, 180 (22 percent) were women (Leyaro, 2001).

On the 22nd of May 2000 the government gave a briefing at the Tanzanian Consultative Group meeting[6] on the progress towards the preparation of PRSP I, including the outcome of the zonal workshops. The concerns raised during this meeting, the feedback of the zonal workshops and background papers such as the 'Tanzanian Development Vision 2025' were used by the drafting team to write the first draft of PRSP I. Also the specific studies of the five technical working groups on several aspects of the PRSP like e.g. education, rural development and employment also provided useful background information to the drafters.

Second consultation round

On the 30th of June 2000, a consultative meeting with the donor community in Tanzania was organised to seek comments on the PRSP process and the first draft of PRSP I. One day later, on the 1st of July, MPs were briefed on the concerns and priorities identified at the zonal workshops and they got the opportunity to indicate their concerns and priorities (Danida, 2001:17,25 and Leyaro, 2001).

A national workshop followed with 25 participants. Among the participants were permanent secretaries, regional commissioners, representatives of the donor community, multilateral institutions, private sector, civil society, media[7], and an informal sector representative. The aim of this workshop was to seek further reactions on the targets, priorities and actions as outlined in the first draft of PRSP I (United Republic of Tanzania, 2000: 39).

On the 3rd and 4th of August 2000, a workshop for regional administrative secretaries was organised to discuss the first draft of PRSP I and on the 31st of August the revised, final draft of PRSP I was presented to the cabinet for review and approval. Thereafter the parliament endorsed the document. In total the whole PRSP I process took not more than six months (Leyaro, 2001).

In November 2000, the executive boards of the World Bank and IMF endorsed the full PRSP I with only some comments that Tanzania had to meet in the first PRSP Progress Report. In November 2001 the first PRSP Progress Report was submitted to the executive boards who endorsed the report by which the completion point was reached and this cleared the road for debt relief (Danielson & Dijkstra, 2003:44,45).

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[6] The Consultative Group meetings are chaired and called by the World Bank and usually dominated by government and donor presentations of prepared positions on aid and development (Holtom, 2002:36).
[7] See ARD (2003) for an analysis of the media in Tanzania.

4.2. The actors participating in the PRSP I process
Opinions about the quality of the PRSP I process differ substantially. The government of Tanzania was self-congratulatory and overall satisfied with the process although it admitted that there were some points of concern which needed improvement. The participants had mixed views, but were generally more critical.

The overall picture of the Tanzanian PRSP I process is that it was exceptionally compressed by which the breadth and depth of participation has been insufficient. Furthermore, the complaints varied from a lot of vagueness around the PRSP process, a minimalist role of the parliament, shortcomings of civil society itself and the limited awareness of the existence of PRSP at the regional, district and village level.

4.2.1. Participation of the Tanzanian government
It is said that the PRSP is a government document but in fact only a limited number of national government officials were involved in preparing PRSP I and also in-depth knowledge of the contents of PRSP I among national government staff was limited. The VPO was in charge of organising the consultation process for PRSP I and was therefore highly knowledgeable of PRSP. Also the Ministry of Finance was heavily involved, especially during the drafting of PRSP I. Initially the perception of the sectorial ministries was that PRSP was of little relevance to them and did not pay a lot of attention to it. Besides, the ministries were reluctant to cede power to an increasingly powerful Ministry of Finance. However, some ministries (like e.g. education, health and agriculture) started to realise that they had to engage more with the PRSP and were also forced so by the establishment of the technical committee and because some senior staff of these ministries were requested to attend the technical working groups. However, detailed knowledge and understanding of PRSP I was still limited to the Ministry of Finance staff and the senior staff of the involved ministries. Next to them the 12 ministers, who were members of the steering committee of PRSP I, were familiar with PRSP I, its content and purpose (Danida, 2001:20-22 and Holtom, 2002:21).

4.2.2. Participation of the parliament
A special meeting was organised to present the draft of PRSP I to the parliament in July 2000. It is said that the subsequent discussion made PRSP I more responsive to the regional dimensions and differences of poverty. Despite this meeting and endorsement of the document by the parliament, the general opinion is that the involvement of parliament was modest, especially compared to the active involvement of civil society (Danida, 2001:20,21).

There were, however, some doubts about the competence of MPs to make informed judgements on the PRSP. Most MPs lack the capacity for policy engagement, have difficulties to read budgets, lack understanding of government documents or draft legislation and are unfamiliar with the details of national policy debates. In fact, most MPs had never heard of the PRSP short after PRSP I was completed (Gould & Ojanen, 2003:93,94,108).

In the context of little awareness of the PRSP in the parliament, some concerns about the possibility that the government starts to see civil society as main instrument of accountability, bypassing the parliament and elected assemblies at the local level, were raised in the aftermath of PRSP I (Danida, 2001:21).

4.2.3. Participation of the civil society
In Tanzania there was uncertainty about who had to be included in the term 'civil society'. In the absence of a clear definition, the government decided to identify the NGOs as representatives of civil society (Danida, 2003:25). In the context of Tanzania this interpretation is relatively narrow. FBOs were excluded from the consultation process, despite

the fact that FBOs are very important in Tanzania with over 50 percent of the Tanzanians who are Christians. By these means, churches and related organisations are actually one of the best representatives of the Tanzanian society and do have well-established structures at the local level throughout Tanzania. Therefore, one would expect a role of these organisations in the PRSP process (Kossoff, 2000:3,7).

The government attempted to involve civil society in the planning of the consultations. The Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD) was willing to assist in the planning but the rushed timetable and differences between TCDD and the government over who should participate in the zonal workshops, resulted in the withdrawal of TCDD. The Tanzanian government only wanted to commit itself to a short-lived consultation process and it decided that participation was only by invitation. The VPO decided who of civil society would be invited for the zonal workshop. The TCDD could not agree with this and decided to pull out. Striking is that the selection criteria for civil society representatives have not been made public but some say that only government-friendly CSOs were invited. For instance, women organisations were not invited to participate, most likely because of their confrontational way of working (Evans & Ngalwea, 2003:275 and McGee et al., 2002:66).

Tanzanian Social and Economic Trust, TCDD and Oxfam Tanzania have been key civil society players and organised a civil society meeting in January 2000, at which civil society discussed whether or not they should participate in the PRSP process. Some expressed the view that they should remain outside the process. The whole PRSP initiative was considered to be imposed upon Tanzania by the World Bank and the IMF and some CSOs felt being used to legitimise the PRSP process. The majority felt, however, that the PRSP process was an unique possibility for engaging in a dialogue with the government on policy issues and they developed a strategy how they would participate in the PRSP process. There were 28 CSOs present at this meeting and most of them were Tanzanian-based (McGee et al., 2002:65 and Gould & Ojanen, 2003:52).

Civil society could participate on two occasions in the PRSP I consultation process, namely, the zonal workshops and at a national workshop. For both workshops participants had to be invited. CSOs were not prepared for participation in the zonal workshops and therefore their effective contributions can be questioned. On the contrary, CSOs were much better prepared for the later organised national workshop in Dar es Salaam in June 2000. The first draft of PRSP I was presented during this national workshop. The present CSOs were invited to comment at that workshop on all topics of the PRSP. Effective contributions were made, although there are some differences of opinion because some participants complained that their critical inputs were neglected. Besides these two participation possibilities, some CSOs got the opportunity to take seat in the five technical working groups and asserted their influence through this channel (Danida, 2001:25).

The government was overall vague over the PRSP process and its objectives. Consequently, CSOs have complained about poor information provision and ignorance of civil society about what had been done and what would be the next step in the PRSP process. Besides, it was difficult for CSOs to access key documents and there was a lack of clear mechanisms for forwarding comments to the drafting team. Some CSOs felt that they were being asked to endorse the PRSP draft rather than engage with it (Evans & Ngalwea, 2003:277).

Shortcomings are not only on the side of the government. The limited organisational capacity, poor familiarity with national policy issues and macroeconomic analysis and weakness in coordination among key CSOs, reflective of a history of one-party dominance of the policy agenda, were important shortcomings of the civil society. Few CSOs were able to engage effectively in the PRSP workshops (Evans & Ngalwea, 2003:277). This was also acknowledged by some CSOs who, after dissatisfaction with the PRSP process, decided to establish a parallel process of analysing poverty, drafting sector strategies and presenting

them to the drafting team of PRSP I. They produced a well-structured document after transparent consultations with sector-specialists but also generalists. The document presented a detailed analysis of the nature of poverty in Tanzania and clear policy prescriptions. It is, however, unclear if this document has been used by the drafting team to write PRSP I (McGee et al., 2002:66).

4.2.4. Participation of the private sector
The involvement of the private sector was modest and besides the zonal workshops in which some private sector actors were involved there were no specific efforts made to involve the private sector more. Some representatives of the private sector were invited for the consultative meeting with the donors in June 2000 but the participation of e.g. trade unions was non-existent (Holtom, 2002:18,19). This can be attributed to the limited time available for consultation but as well to the perception of the Tanzanian government at that time that poverty reduction is not an agenda of the private sector. Consequently, the private sector was not regarded as an important player in poverty reduction as is apparent in the PRSP I, which is very much focused on the traditional social poverty reduction sectors such as education and health. PRSP I only recognised that a more enabling environment for the private sector had to be created in order to support the private sectors contribution to Tanzania's development. This aim was particularly expressed in regard to the commitments in PRSP I to maintain macro-economic stability and to reduce the bureaucratic restrictions on rural trade (Danida, 2001,7 and Olomi et al., 2005:42,43).

4.2.5. Participation of the international donors
At the time the PRSP I was developed some of the development partners in Tanzania were organised in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). DAC was established in order to discuss national development priorities, exchange information and coordinate dialogue with the government (DPG, 2003:1). Unlike this official relation, the donor input during the PRSP I consultation process was not streamlined via the DAC. A special consultative meeting with all donors in Tanzania was held in June 2000 but several donors provided comments and support throughout the whole process. Despite the rather chaotic participation of the donors, it appeared that the government attached a lot of value to the input from the development partners and took a lot of their comments as a prescription. This led to a PRSP I that is often characterised as donor driven (Danida, 2001:20). The 'technical assistance' of the World Bank also contributed to this reputation. At several occasions during the consultation and drafting process this technical assistance took the shape of binding advices like e.g. the early draft of PRSP I that was rejected by the World Bank because it did not adequately address cross-cutting issues like gender and environment. Also the decision to abolish user fees for primary education was heavily lobbied by the World Bank (Holtom, 2002:17,18).

4.2.6. Participation of the actors at the regional and district level
The seven zonal workshops, which were organised throughout the country, were the only possibility for the actors at the regional and district level to participate, provided that they were invited to participate. The zonal workshops had the aim to inform local government authorities and civil society at the regional and district level on PRSP I and to get some input from them. Participants were asked to discuss the definition, causes and characteristics of poverty as well as indicators and priority areas for poverty reduction and actions required. The zonal workshops were organised with district commissioners, regional administrative secretaries and some other government officials. These people selected the participants. Democratically elected district and town councillors, DEDs, five representatives of civil society and four villagers (sampled randomly from two villages) were invited to participate in

the zonal workshops. The opinion about these one-day workshops is that they were too short and precluded adequate preparation or meaningful interaction.

The government tried to involve the regional level more by inviting the regional commissioners to participate in the national workshop and another workshop was organised for regional administrative secretaries. The purpose of these workshops was to inform the participants from the regional level on the PRSP and to seek further reactions to the targets, priorities and actions as were outlined in the first draft of PRSP I.

Despite this attempt to involve the regional and district level in the consultation process there was still very little awareness of the PRSP at these levels after PRSP I was completed. (Danida, 2001:20-24 and Leyaro, 2001).

4.3. Drafting of the PRSP I

The technical committee formed a drafting team who was assigned with drafting the interim, first and final draft of PRSP I. The drafting team comprised a small team of Tanzanian professionals of the Ministry of Finance, the Vice President's Office, State House, the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) and two autonomous research institutions (ESRF and REPOA[8]) (Danida, 2001:22). The team split up in several working groups who drafted sections of the PRSP. ESRF and REPOA were given chapter coordinating and writing responsibilities by the technical committee. Individuals of the UDSM provided technical assistance to the working groups of the drafting team (Evans & Ngalwea, 2003:277).

One can raise questions about placing much influence in the hands of a small group of technocrats but the individuals involved had a deep knowledge of the reform processes during recent years, and their contribution ensured that the document was a national product[9] (Danida, 2001:22). Also one may question the degree of country ownership when the PSRP is written by a group of non-representative technocrats. However, while the document has not been written by elected representatives of the Tanzanian population or entirely by the government, the involvement of ESRF and REPOA and individuals of the UDSM means at least that the document is largely written by Tanzanians and not by the IFIs or other development partners (Eberlei, 2001:32 and Evans & Ngalwea, 2003:277).

CSOs openly expressed their disappointment that no representative of the civil society was included in the drafting team. But this decision was well-considered by the Tanzanian government. The government was of opinion that it is responsible for policy making and accountable to the public through elected institutions. Therefore the involvement of non-elected, non-representative CSOs in the policy making process of PRSP had to be limited to consultation, according to the government. A lot of CSOs see themselves as representatives of particular interests, however, mostly they are not the elected representatives of their grassroots and their organisations have no or only a small number of members. They may represent sectional interests, whose concerns need to be balanced against those of other groups, that may not be so well-represented by other CSOs. Another point of concern is if CSOs would participate in the actual drafting of the PRSP, they would have to share in the collective responsibility for the outcome, in the same way as members of the government. This would make CSOs an element of the government, rather than an independent critical outsider. Therefore the government decided to limit civil society's involvement to consultation (Danida, 2001:23,25).

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[8] ESRF and REPOA can be regarded as monopolist in the Tanzanian consultancy field and are heavily donor funded (Holtom, 2002:12).

[9] It is anyway a virtually universal aspect that the responsibility for drafting policy documents is often placed in the hands of a small team capable of effective drafting (Danida, 2001:22).

4.4. Influence by the actors on the content of PRSP I

Officials of the government claimed that PRSP I showed very little changes in policy content in respect to previous policies like NPES and Vision 2025. This suggested that consultation process did not achieve a shift in the content. This corresponds to the complaints of civil society, that stated that the main outcomes of the process were decided in advance and that participation was restricted to 'safe' areas of policy and not permitted in the area of economics. Civil society was only allowed to put the priority sectors in the PRSP on the agenda, namely, primary education, rural roads, water and sanitation, judiciary, health and agriculture. Civil society also complained that there was no feedback to their input in the process, which suggests that their inputs were not taken seriously (McGee et al, 2002:67). At this point it is necessary to refer back to the responsibility of the government to decide on the appropriate balance and contents of national policies, and to be accountable for its performances to the electorate. The civil society is not an elected representative of the Tanzanian society and must therefore have a limited role in determining the PRSP content (Danida, 2001:29). Nevertheless, this does not justify that the government did not give feedback to the participants.

However, according to a study of the World Bank (2002:32,33), the civil society has had some influence. The World Bank asserts that as a result of civil society involvement higher priority was attached to community driven development projects and employment schemes were created for the poor. Also it is argued that the abolition of user fees for primary education was owing to civil society participation. However, it is said that this decision by the government was triggered by the World Bank who heavily lobbied for abolition. Besides, influence of participants on macroeconomic issues like liberalization, stabilization and privatisation, was basically non-existent, these topics were not even on the discussion table.

4.5. National ownership of PRSP I

The IFIs were very enthusiastic about the degree of national ownership. They stated that the PRSP I process was "strongly owned domestically". Critical observers, however, did not fully agree with this. They said that the political commitment to write a PRSP existed only at the very top of the political hierarchy who held close ties with the World Bank staff in Tanzania. This certainly raises questions about the degree of national ownership and has resulted in characterising PRSP I as donor-driven. The unawareness of the content and even the existence of PRSP I among government officials and MPs is striking for the degree of national ownership that existed. Also the seven one-day zonal workshops were not enough to build ownership at the local level. At the district level there were very few people who were aware of the existence of PRSP I (Spanger & Wolff, 2003:48,49).

4.6. Conclusion

When analysing the history of the PRSP I consultation process in Tanzania, it becomes clear that it was conducted rather hastily and was top down driven. The main reason for this was that the PRSP I needed to be developed within a tight time frame to meet the HIPC completion point. Participation of participants left much to be desired and the opportunities for meaningful participation were limited. Ministries and MPs could have been much more involved, participation should have been open to all interested CSOs, FBOs should not have been excluded, private sector should have been much more encouraged to participate and the consultations at the regional, district and village level could have been more comprehensive. Next to this, the government should not have been so vague about the process and objectives of PRSP. Participants had a lot of difficulties to attain information and a copy of the first draft of PRSP I. Consequently participants were not well-informed about the purpose of PRSP and not well-prepared for the consultations.

5. Tanzania's NSGRP

In this chapter the NSGRP consultation process will be discussed. In paragraph 5.1 the organisation of the NSGRP process will be discussed. In paragraph 5.2 assessments will be made about the participation of the Tanzanian government, parliament, civil society, private sector, international donors and the actors at the district and village level during the NSGRP process. In paragraph 5.3 attentions will be paid to the drafting of the NSGRP. Paragraph 5.4 will go into the issue of influence by the participants on the content of the NSGRP and paragraph 5.5 will shortly discuss the issue of national ownership. In paragraph 5.6 a conclusion will be drawn from the NSGRP consultation process.

5.1 The NSGRP process

Between 2001 and 2003 three PRSP progress reports were written and in May 2003 the government announced its commitment to review PRSP I. The government started to map out the PRS review process together with donors and some key CSOs, who are permanently involved in the PER review but not definitely representative of Tanzanian society[10]. Also internal consultations with the ministries took place. Decisions were made on the timeframe, the stakeholders at the sub-national level were identified and a PRSP review guide was written. Like during the consultation process for PRSP I, the VPO became the focal point for assembling and processing the views expressed during the consultations. Just like PRSP this happened under the supervision of a ministerial and technical committee (United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b:9-11).

In the Poverty Policy Week (PPW) in 2003, since 2003 an annual public event in which discussions take place on poverty issues, the government informed all those present about the upcoming consultation process and presented the PRSP review guide. Comments expressed during this week were used by the VPO to revise the review guide (United Republic of Tanzania: 2004b:11).

First consultation round

In January 2004, a non-government stakeholder meeting took place in Dar es Salaam. This was not a public event, participants had to be invited. During this meeting the VPO presented a consultation guideline in order to encourage CSOs to conduct consultations within their constituencies. However, CSOs were not bound to follow this guideline and got the opportunity to present their own consultation methods during the meeting. These proposals formed the basis for resource allocation to some CSOs by the VPO and UNDP. The resources needed ranged from financial, logistical, persons and equipment (United Republic of Tanzania: 2004a and 2004b:20).

In February 2004, the VPO started with organising the consultations at the district and village level. The Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania (ALAT)[11] was assigned to be in charge of organising these consultations. ALAT appointed two facilitators per region who had to facilitate the consultations in the districts. The facilitators were community development officers and they had to attend a two day training workshop in Dar es Salaam. Thereafter regional preparatory meetings were held to select districts that represented the regional situation and to make arrangements on the logistics of these district consultations (Association of Local Authorities, 2004:1-3). A respondent working for ALAT in Dar es Salaam showed on a sheet of paper that the consultations took place in 42 districts (2 districts in each of the 21

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[10] According to a respondent, it are mainly the big CSOs that are largely funded by donors who have a seat in the PER working groups.

[11] ALAT represents urban and district councils in the country and its main functions is to make proposals on policy and legislative matters which are of interests to the urban and district councils (Association of Local Authorities, 2004:1).

mainland regions) between the 8th and 24th of March 2004. The district level consultations took place through workshops in which representatives from the district council secretariat, FBOs, the aged, children, youth, women, persons with disabilities, persons living with HIV/AIDS, widows, orphans, CBOs, NGOs, private sector, trade unions and informal sector were invited. In addition to the district level consultation, consultations were also organised in 168 villages in the end of March and beginning of April 2004. These village level consultations took place in the village council. Consolidated views from the district and village level consultations were forwarded by the facilitators to the regional headquarters and compiled to form regional reports, which were submitted to ALAT in Dar es Salaam (United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b:12).

An attempt was made to consult the general public by distributing 500.000 questionnaires countrywide. It is said that this was partly by post, however, it is not made clear to who exactly. The questionnaire was also distributed to all members of parliament and many questionnaires found their way to the districts as the VPO distributed them to the facilitators of the district and village level consultations. Besides, the questionnaire could also be answered on the Internet in order to reach the Tanzanians living abroad. The questionnaire had three main questions:

1. What are the most significant changes observed in the last three years in the course of the country's poverty reduction efforts?
2. What are the bottlenecks preventing Tanzanians from attaining a better life and enjoyment of their rights?
3. What important factors must be incorporated in the ongoing PRS review if poverty is to be reduced further and quality of people's lives improved?

The VPO received 22,122 responses (4.5 percent of all distributed questionnaires) and the National Bureau of Statistics analysed the responses. They tabled the amount of responses gender-wise, age-wise and district-wise and listed the top 25 issues that were raised like e.g. corruption and health (United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b:8,20-27).

Besides the outcomes of the questionnaire, the first consultation round resulted in many reports of CSOs (the exact amount is not revealed) and 21 regional reports. The VPO forwarded these reports to the drafting team. The drafting team was responsible for writing the PRSP II and its members were coming from the VPO, UNDP, UDSM and civil society. In August 2004, the first draft of PRSP II was published, made available via the Internet and was sparsely distributed by email (United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b:20).

Second consultation round
In August and September 2004, the second round of consultations took place. These consultations were much more under control of VPO. First internal government consultations took place mainly with ministries who were able to identify key areas of inter-sector linkages. This was very important because it was decided that the strategy would shift from a priority sector approach, as was the case with PRSP I, to an outcome-oriented approach. This approach counts on all the sectors towards specific outcomes as identified. These outcomes are classified in three clusters. The first cluster is 'growth and reduction of income poverty'. The second cluster is 'improvement of quality of life and social well-being'. The third cluster is 'governance and accountability'. The outcome-approach is hoped to encourage inter-sector collaboration and inter-sector linkages and synergies in devising a more efficient way of achieving the outcomes. This means that the priority sectors, which were identified in PRSP I, are no more regarded as such. Due to a lack of resources, even for solely the priority sectors, the government decided to change this strategy and pleaded for inter-sector collaboration (United Republic of Tanzania, 2005:20,38).

According to a member of the drafting team, the first draft was already written with the outcome-oriented approach in mind but the drafting team took the decisions on the outcomes. Therefore, to secure more input from participants and to elaborate the outcomes, the second round of consultations consisted of stakeholders clustered in specific sector groups in order to get detailed feedback. The sector groups were public administration, macro framework and policies, social services, productive sector, infrastructure sector, members of parliament, civil society, FBOs, development partners, research and higher education, private sector, trade unions and media. The first five sector groups consisted, however, solely of representatives from the relevant ministries, thus providing for much government input. A convenor was identified per sector group. During the national technical meeting on the 29th and 30th of September 2004, the convenors of the sector groups presented their suggestions and recommendations on the first draft. The VPO received around 50 submissions, not only from the identified convenors but also from other stakeholders who organised consultations themselves. These submissions were forwarded to the drafting team, who used it to revise the first draft. In October 2004 the second draft was finished (United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b:36-39).

In this stage it was decided to unfold the name of the PRSP to 'National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty' (NSGRP) or 'Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umasikini Tanzania' in Kiswahili (MKUKUTA). The reason for this was to depart from the hangover of PRSP I as well as to reflect growth and national ownership of the strategy (United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b:40).

Third consultation round
The second draft of NSGRP was presented at the third round of consultations during the PPW in November 2004. The PPW 2004 was organised at two levels, namely the national and regional level. At the national level a wide public was participating and stakeholders presented comments on the second draft of NSGRP. At the regional level workshops were organised in 13 regions, involving stakeholders at grassroots level. The recommendations of this third round of consultations were used to draft the final document, which was published on the 15th of January 2005 (United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b:42-46). The parliament was informed about the final draft of the NSGRP in April 2005. According to a respondent working for the VPO, it was not necessary that the parliament had to endorse the document as the parliament already endorsed PRSP I.

5.2. The actors participating in the NSGRP process
The opinion of the respondents about the quality of the NSGRP consultation process is unanimous. All of them state that the consultation process for NSGRP was much more comprehensive and meaningful than the consultation process for PRSP I. It was an honest attempt by the government and there was true commitment to involve all relevant actors. This has breathe new life into the conviction of Tanzania as an African 'success story'. Despite the enthusiasm about the consultation process, a closer look at the participation of the different actors reveals some shortcomings.

5.2.1. Participation of the Tanzanian government
The President's Office (PO) is the official creator of the NSGRP but the PO has delegated the coordination of poverty reduction initiatives to the VPO. Consequently involvement of central government in the consultation process for NSGRP was mainly limited to the VPO (United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). However, according to a member of the drafting team, there were even within the VPO only a few people who carried the process and some of these people raised critical voices about the value of the numerous consultations.

Some other ministries were involved in the second round of the consultation process when sector groups were established to discuss the first draft of the NSGRP. According to the same respondent, this involvement was mainly seen as an obligation and most ministries have started recognising that they have to pay a little bit of attention to the NSGRP since they had to submit their budget proposals on the basis of NSGRP. The indifference of ministries to these kind of documents can be partly explained by the fact that it is not rarely that the policies in these kinds of documents are not carried out.

5.2.2. Participation of the parliament

The parliament has been more involved in the NSGRP consultation process than in the PRSP I consultation process. According to a respondent working for the VPO, some debates have been organised in the parliament in Dodoma However, it remained unclear during the interview what exactly had been discussed during these debates. One important improvement in comparison with the PRSP I consultation process is, according to a MP of a opposition party the fact that some of the parliamentary committees have been more heavily involved and the respondent said that through these committees the parliament has had some influence. Also the Bunge Foundation for Democracy, of which all MPs are member, has been consulted on a few occasions (United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b:37,38).

The final draft of the NSGRP was presented to the parliament in April 2005. According to a respondent of the VPO, the government is of opinion that the parliament did not have to endorse the NSGRP as the PRSP I was already endorsed in 2000 and it was now more a matter of keeping the parliament informed about the changes and share some of the ideas. This is a disputable argumentation as the NSGRP has changed substantially from PRSP I and should therefore go through parliament again.

MPs are likely to have heard of the NSGRP while at the time PRSP I was completed most MPs were not aware of the existence of this document. Nevertheless, most of the MPs are still not well-informed about the meaning and content of the NSGRP. One MP respondent justified this by saying that these kinds of documents are too difficult to read for non-experts. Three other respondents agreed with this and stressed that more efforts are needed in order to increase the capacity of MPs to be involved in issues like PRSP.

5.2.3. Participation of the civil society

During the PRSP I consultation process, participation of some CSOs was lacking. Only a selective group of participants were invited to participate and e.g. women organisations and FBOs were more or less excluded. With the NSGRP consultation process the government really showed its willingness to have an open debate with all relevant participants from the civil society on the content of the new PRSP, according to a respondent working for a CSO. They encouraged all CBO, CSOs, FBO and NGO to participate. This has led to a good representation of all people in the society ranging from organisations that are dealing with the issues of women, youth, disabled, elderly, HIV/AIDS, children, widows, orphans, environment, pastoralists etc. But also Muslim and Christian organisations were given the opportunity to participate this time (United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b:16,38,39). Figure 1 in annex 5 shows, however, that government, donor and civil society respondents hold different views on the statement that all stakeholders were adequately consulted. It shows that government respondents totally agree with this statement while civil society respondents are generally speaking more critical towards this statement. One CSO respondent said that especially CSOs that operate in Karatu town, one of the few towns in Tanzania where the opposition party CUF has a strong hold, were kept in the dark about the participation possibilities. This made some CSOs based in Karatu decide to organise a consultation workshop themselves and they submitted a report to the drafting team.

A considerable number of CBOs, CSOs, FBOs and NGOs have taken up the opportunity to participate with a lot of dedication and enthusiasm. They have organised workshops themselves, either with or without funding from VPO/ UNDP, or they have informed their member organisations on the upcoming district level consultations. There are some theme-based umbrella organisations like e.g. Help Age International who organised workshops based on their constituent specific theme. There are also larger umbrella organisations like the Hakikazi Catalyst, NGO Policy Forum (NPF) and World Conference on Religions and Peace who have organised workshops to collect the views of their member organisations on poverty issues. Most of them produced a report and submitted this to the VPO (United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b:16-18,38,39). According to a VPO respondent and three members of the drafting team, the drafting team highly valued the commitment and professionalism of these umbrella organisations as it was impossible for the drafting team to deal with hundreds of organisations and moreover there is still the problem that a lot of organisations miss the capacity to participate meaningfully and need the guidance and support of a more professional organisation, said a respondent who works for an umbrella organisation. However, all those theme-based organisations and umbrella organisations who organised workshops and the simultaneously organised district consultations by ALAT has lead to an uncoordinated scene in which it was unclear who was doing what, according to a respondent who works for the umbrella organisation Hakikazi Catalyst. This organisation organised a workshop in the Southern Highland region of Tanzania but also ALAT organised workshops here in the scope of the district level consultations. This caused a lot of confusion among participants.

As the timeframe was very tight during the PRSP I consultation process, the participants had difficulties to prepare themselves for participation. The timeframe for the NSGRP was twice as long compared to the PRSP I process. Therefore civil society had more time to prepare itself and CSOs were able to consult their grassroots (United Republic of Tanzania, 2004b). Six civil society respondents state, however, that the timeframe was still too tight, especially the time to review the second draft of NSGRP was too short and only possible during the PPW in November 2004. Besides, four of those six respondents say that they would have liked to get more time to reach the remote, rural areas and consult the grassroots there. Two respondents added that their CSO had a problem of inadequate financial resources. Organisations who wanted to organise a workshop and consult their grassroots had to submit a proposal to the VPO but only a few organisations got the financial resources they needed in order to organise a workshop.

During the consultation process of PRSP I access to information and documents on PRSP by civil society was really difficult but according to one employee of the Netherlands embassy in Tanzania and two CSO respondents, the VPO did its best to make information more available this time. However, the same respondent of the Netherlands Embassy complained that necessary information and documents were sometimes provided only 24 hours in advance, which makes a good preparation impossible. But at least the information was provided. The VPO made good use of modern technology like email and Internet. The drawback of this is, admitted by a respondent of the VPO, that the organisations that work outside the main cities have a problem to obtain these documents and information as this modern way of communication is not yet common practice in rural areas. This explains that a lot of organisations outside Dar es Salaam are not yet aware of the existence of the final draft. Therefore more hardcopies of the NSGRP should have been provided.

5.2.4. Participation of the private sector
Compared to the PRSP I consultation process, the private sector has been much more involved in the NSGRP consultation process. During the first round of consultations their involvement was still lacking. The private sector was only involved during the district and

village level consultations and some informal consultations between private sector representatives and relevant government authorities took place. As one of the clusters in the NSGRP was 'growth and reduction of income poverty', the VPO realised that specific effort had to be made to involve the private sector. The problem was that the VPO did not know how to incorporate the private sector and also whom to deal with. The Private Sector Foundation (PSF) offered a way out.

In cooperation with the PSF, a private sector consultation process was organised in May and June 2004. First some interviews took place with members of the PSF and thereafter a workshop was organised. In total 35 representatives of PSF member organisations attended this workshop. This can definitely be regarded as a sincere attempt but unfortunately most representatives who attended the workshop were from Dar es Salaam based large enterprises, employers' organisations, chamber of agriculture and livestock, International Labour Organisation and United Nations Industrial Development Organisation. The only exceptions were eight representatives of the Dar es Salaam based Informal Workers Association (VIBINDO) and a representative from the Imani Youth Development. Therefore one can question if the concerns of the micro-level, small enterprises and rural agricultural sectors have been sufficiently represented (Olomi, Gerwen & Poel, 2005).

An improvement with the consultation process of PRSP I was not only the attempt to include the private sector but also trade unions were involved this time through the Trade Unions Confederation of Tanzania (TUCTA). A respondent working for the TUCTA said that the TUCTA organised consultations itself with their members in Arusha and Dar es Salaam. This resulted in a report. They were as well appointed as the convenor of the trade unions sector group during the second round of consultations.

5.2.5. Participation of the international donors

There are many development partners in Tanzania and the most significant ones have organised themselves into the Development Partners Group (DPG). Before 2003 some of the development partners were organised in the DAC but this was more an informal grouping with no terms of reference as was already explained in paragraph 4.2.5. The DPG has terms of reference and all bilateral and multilateral development partners that provide development assistance to Tanzania can become a member of the DPG. The intention is to give one coherent and consistent voice towards the government. There are several working groups, e.g. gender macro group, health group and private sector development group (DPG, 2003:1,2).

A respondent who is working for the Netherlands embassy told that the DPG was involved in the NSGRP process on two occasions. The DPG was asked to give its view on how the PRS review had to look like in terms of objective, principles, focus, timeframe and key stakeholders. After the completion of the first draft, discussions within all the working groups of the DPG took place on the content of the first draft. All opinions and views of the different working groups were compiled into one report and this report was presented to the VPO.

Compared to the consultation process of PRSP I, the donors have been minimally involved in the NSGRP consultation process. The DPG does not regret this as there was a lot of criticism on the heavy donor involvement in the PRSP I process, which led to characterise PRSP I as donor driven. This is also the reason why the DPG decided not to produce a report before the first draft was published, they wanted to avoid that the government would copy the recommendations in the report indiscriminately. (Olomi, Gerwen & Poel, 2005:54). A member of the drafting team stated that this strategy has succeeded and also the involvement of the World Bank was much less compared to its involvement in PRSP I. However, it seems as if the UNDP has taken over this role as will come apparent in paragraph 5.3.

5.2.6. Participation of the actors at the district and village level

The VPO committed itself to a more comprehensive consultation process at the local level than was the case for PRSP I. District and village level consultations were organised to get input from the local level during the first round of consultations. With this Tanzania has been much better covered than with the seven zonal workshops for PRSP I although one can still raise questions if the 42 districts adequately represent all 120 districts in mainland Tanzania. In order to get a better insight in the district level consultation, two district towns where a NSGRP workshop was organised, were visited, namely Maswa and Monduli. This can not possibly present an objective picture of the consultations in all 42 districts but it reveals some of the problems that are likely to have appeared as well in other district workshops.

A wide range of participants were invited to participate in the 42 district level workshops. Two members of the finance committee, 6 heads of the departments, 7 ward functionaries and councillors (who are democratically elected) and 15 representatives of different groups, including private sector, trade unions, informal sector, FBOs, and CSOs or CBOs working on the aged, children, youth, women, persons with disabilities, persons living with HIV/AIDS, widows and orphans were supposed to attend. They were invited by the facilitators and the DEDs and/or community development officers who assisted the facilitators with organising the workshops in their respective district. It seems, however, that they had a lot of elbow-room who to invite for the workshops as show the participants lists of Maswa and Monduli. In Maswa there was a good civil society representation but no single representative of the wards attended the workshop, which made only non-elected local government officials participate. In Monduli there was a good ward representation but a lacking civil society representation. This makes the drawback of invitations become clear as certain potential participants can intentionally be excluded from participation in the workshop. A respondent in Monduli who is the director of a newly established umbrella CSO organisation said that he was not invited for the NSGRP workshop organised in Monduli. He said that he asked one day before the workshop if it was possible to participate without an invitation but he was told that this was impossible. The respondent had no clue why he was not invited but after a glimpse at the participants list he realised that the reason was probably because his umbrella organisation is not affiliated to the CCM, all CSOs that were invited to participate in the Monduli workshop operate under the wing of the CCM.

Also village level consultations took place in 168 villages in the end of March and beginning of April 2004. Village assembly members, ward councillors, representatives of CBOs and the facilitator were attending the workshops at the village level. As none of these villages have been visited for this research nothing can be said about the participants or quality of the workshops.

The quality of the district and village consultations can be questioned. The fact that some participants in Maswa received the invitation letter only the evening before the workshop put constraints on the input of participants; they had no time to prepare themselves. Besides, the shortness of the workshops in the districts (one or two days) also stood in the way of attaining meaningful input. Furthermore all respondents in Maswa and Monduli, except two, said that they were unaware of the existence of PRSP I and lacked knowledge on the issue of poverty reduction before they attended the NSGRP workshop. It goes without saying that the participants at the village level were also most likely to be unaware of PRSP I. This placed huge challenges on the shoulders of the facilitators to get meaningful input from the participants. The facilitators were often inexperienced. For instance, the facilitator in Maswa announced the workshop in an invitation letter in which he described the content of the workshop as 'the removal of poverty'. This made most participants very curious about the workshop and they wondered what kind of solution the government had for removing poverty

in Maswa! Already early during the workshop they learnt that this was an unfortunate choice of words in the invitation letter.

It is striking that most respondents in Maswa and Monduli, including local government officials, had difficulties to recall the workshop organised in their town for the NSGRP and they were unaware of the fact that the final draft of the NSGRP was completed. Only one respondent was aware of this and had read the final draft. After some reminders all respondents, except one, could recall the workshops and 8 respondents immediately expressed great disappointment that no action had yet been taken to reduce poverty in their districts. This shows that the workshops created some high expectations among participants that can impossible be met on short term.

A remarkable issue that came up during the interviews was the issue of sitting allowance. All participants of the workshop in Maswa had received 10.000tsh (€8) and five respondents literally said that the workshop was satisfactory as they got the allowance. The respondents in Monduli were far less outspoken and there was much more secretiveness about the question if and how much sitting allowance was paid. No definite answer was given here.

5.3. Drafting of the NSGRP

The writing and decisions on what to include in the NSGRP were made by a drafting team, which was formed by the VPO. Three members of the drafting team told that the drafting team had between 20 and 30 members, although the precise amount varied from week to week, as some people were only involved in the writing of one chapter. A small core group of around 5 people wrote the first draft with the assistance of a few other people who were able to give some specific input. For writing the second draft there were much more people involved, especially convenors of the crosscutting sector-groups. During the third phase of completing the final draft the VPO took it over.

The drafting team consisted of people from the government, research institutions, the UDSM, UNDP and civil society (United Republic of Tanzania, 2003:14). This was a team of professionals but by no means democratically elected or representative of society. At least it can be argued that it was a wider group of drafters compared to PRSP I. It is, however, impossible to prove this as there was, just as with PRSP I, no transparency on who was in the drafting team and why they were asked to do that job. The names of the members in the drafting team were never publicly announced by the VPO and there was no list of members. The VPO took pride in the fact that civil society had a role in the drafting process but in fact the amount of civil society members in the drafting team was limited to one person who was there on behalf of the NPF. This person said that she pulled out of the drafting team after the first draft of NSGRP was completed because she did not want to be used by the government and donors as evidence that the civil society was involved in the drafting process.

The timeframe for writing the document was very limited, according to a member of the drafting team. In first instance the drafting team got four weeks to write the first draft. The first time that the drafting team met was only four weeks before the deadline of completing the first draft. The deadline was coming even closer when after the first meeting the actual drafting had not started yet and there was still uncertainty about the outline and major subjects. The clusters and outcome-based approach were still unclear to the drafters. The drafting team was giving a postponement and in fact the deadline kept changing. After the extensions the drafting team were given five weeks of actual writing the first draft and that was too short according to the respondent. The fact that most of the drafters were not able to spend all of their time on the writing, as most of them had their work, also hampered the drafting process. As the drafters were given a salary of the UNDP for being a member of the drafting team, it would have been reasonable to appoint only people who were able to spend 100 percent of their time on this job. Besides, the respondent expressed its frustration that

there was a lot of confusion as the allocations of tasks within the drafting team were not clearly set out and there was no clarity about who was going to lead the writing process. The people in charge differed from time to time and others supplanted people without any disclosure about why this was happening.

Another obstacle for doing their work well was that the drafters were confronted with piles of reports of all the workshops and organisations. They could not possibly go through all these reports within the short timeframe, according to three members of the drafting team. An attempt was made to compile the reports into tables. The VPO gave a consultant of the UDSM this assignment. This consultant called in the help of 20 students. One drafter stated that the intention was good but not sufficient, as the tables were not as useful as they were meant to be and only covered reports of ministries. The drafters ended up reading as many reports as possible. They formed their opinion on the basis of the reports they had read. This resulted in a situation that every member of the drafting team had a different view on what was important. To dismiss themselves from this situation a lot of importance was given to the reports of the NPF. Three drafters stated that the reports of the NPF were regarded as objective and comprehensive and therefore a lot of issues in the report of NPF have been taken out and incorporated in the NSGRP. Also the fact that reports of the workshops organised by the government and reports of other CSOs were of bad quality made the reports of the NPF stand out. An important reason for this according to a member of the drafting team was that there was no clear elaborated structure that classified the participants in different areas of subjects. If this had been the case then the reports from the workshops would have been qualitatively better and more useful to the drafting team. Only the crosscutting consultations in the second round were a good attempt and resulted in comparatively useful reports.

These facts raise questions about the sense of the numerous consultations when one does not has the capacity to handle all the reports of the consultations. Also the feedback of the questionnaire that was distributed country-wide was not useful at all, according to two drafters. However, even within the VPO critical voices were raised about the value of the numerous consultations and questionnaire. There was some awareness within VPO that its staff lacked the capacity in terms of knowledge and manpower to handle the whole drafting process. Therefore the UNDP was quite heavily involved in the drafting process. One member of the drafting team even stated that the UNDP took over the whole process but this was toned down by two other members of the team.

The rush of writing the first draft and the numerous reports caused a disillusionment among the drafters and partly explains why the first draft has not changed that much. Although the timeframe for completing the second and final draft was not as short as for the first draft, there was a certain reluctance to revise the first draft thoroughly among the drafters, according to one member of the drafting team.

5.4. Influence by the actors on the content of NSGRP

Figure 2 in annex 5 shows that respondents of the government, donors and civil society are all satisfied with the amount of influence the participants had, although civil society respondents remain the most critical. However, those respondents who have seen and read the final document state that it is a very representative document and everybody will find something that he or she wanted to be in it. The only complaint of three CSO respondents is that they would have liked to have more clarity why some advises and views were incorporated in the NSGRP and others not. However, as the last paragraph showed, the writing of the NSGRP passed off rather chaotic and there were no clear guidelines for the drafting team about what to incorporate in the document and what not.

It seems that especially the umbrella organisation NPF had a lot of influence and it is mainly because of their urgent request that the third cluster 'governance and accountability' has been included in the NSGRP, according to a member of the drafting team. None of the participants had much influence on the first cluster 'growth and reduction of income poverty' including organisations working on macro-economic policy. According to the same member of the drafting team, some economists in the drafting team have been writing this part and it is basically the same old framework that is put into the NSGRP. Besides, a director of a CSO in Mwanza in the Western part of Tanzania wonders if actually the concerns of all regions in Tanzania have been incorporated in the document as the existing security problems in Western Tanzania, due to the presence of many refugees from Burundi, Congo and Rwanda have not been incorporated in the document. As this is a big problem in the Western part of Tanzania and affects many people, this raises doubts how well the district and village level consultations have been conducted and to what extent the reports from this part of Tanzania have been taken into account while writing the NSGRP. On the other hand, one should keep in mind that it is impossible to incorporate all the concerns raised during the consultations. The NSGRP is already very inclusive and serious doubts can be raised about the feasibility but that is a different study.

5.5. National Ownership of NSGRP

There is a much better feeling of ownership of the document than at the time of the PRSP I. PRSP I was characterised as donor driven but this can not be said about the NSGRP. The donors united in the DPG have limited their input to two official occasions. It will go too far to state that the NSGRP is 100 percent national owned but it can be stated that much more people have participated during the NSGRP process and much more issues were raised. There was a wide communication campaign launched via the radio, TV and newspapers during the first round of consultations to make people aware of what was going on, to make civil society know that it was welcome to participate and to stimulate the public to fill in the questionnaire. The PPW 2003 and 2004 were announced with banners in the streets of Dar es Salaam in order to encourage as many people as possible to attend the PPW (United Republic of Tanzania: 2004b). In addition, a few umbrella organisations have contributed to spread the news of the upcoming PRS review. The question is, however, to what extent people outside the urban areas were exposed to this media coverage and know about the NSGRP. The visits to Maswa and Monduli showed that this is not the case, most of the respondents were not aware of the existence of the PRSP I before they attended the workshop and most of the respondents did not know that the final draft of the NSGRP was already completed. It goes without saying that the 'normal man in street' is not aware of the NSGRP. This is not a secret and a respondent of VPO admits that it is a huge challenge to make the NSGRP known in the 126 districts and 12.000 villages.

5.6. Conclusion

The opinions did not differ substantially when respondents were asked if the consultation process for NSGRP was better compared to PRSP I. They all agreed that the consultations were more comprehensive and significant. The timeframe was double as long, there were not so many obstacles for civil society to participate, a serious effort was made to include the private sector in the consultations and the consultations organised at the district and village level were a more thorough attempt to collect the views on poverty from these levels. The Tanzanian government can be praised for its openness to include everybody who wanted to be involved. This has led to an admirable participation. However, this does not mean that there are no comments and objections. The main observation is that the government wanted to do too good. It wanted to give as many actors as possible the opportunity to participate. This has

led to many consultations and innumerable reports. In addition to these reports, regional reports of the district and village level consultations were submitted. The drafting team was unable to cope with all these reports because of its number but also because of the lack of coordination of the team. There was no clear elaborated structure, which outlined who was doing what. This could have been foreseen and the VPO should have thought over beforehand how they wanted to cope with the drafting of the NSGRP. Besides, the value of the district and village level consultations can be questioned as ALAT was not given a lot of time to organise these consultations. It is as well the question if really everybody could participate who wanted. The refusal of a CSO respondent that is no member of the CCM to participate in the Monduli workshop raises the suspicion that some potential participants were excluded from participation. Lastly, the lacking involvement of MPs is again very disappointing and the refusal of the government to allow the parliament to endorse the documents is more than disappointing. The parliament could have been given a much bigger role as supervisor of the consultation process.

6. The difference that the PRSP I and NSGRP processes have made for the democracy in Tanzania

In chapters 4 and 5, the consultation processes of PRSP I and NSGRP were described and it appeared that the consultation process of NSGRP has improved substantially compared to the consultation process of PRSP I. In this chapter the impact of these two consultation processes on the democracy in Tanzania will be studied.

6.1. The impact of the PRSP I consultation process on the NSGRP consultation process

The consultation process of PRSP I did have a considerable influence on the NSGRP consultations. The dissatisfaction of participants and independent observers with some aspects of the PRSP I process exerted pressure and encouraged the government to establish a more satisfactory NSGRP process.

The unsatisfactory PRSP I consultation process led civil society to establish a parallel process of analysing poverty, drafting sector strategies and presenting them to the technical committee of PRSP I. This has resulted in a well-structured document with clear policy descriptions. Besides, civil society openly admitted in this document that its participation during the PRSP I process was unsatisfactory. This was a positive sign and has encouraged them to analyse and come to terms with complex issues such as macro economic policy, debt sustainability and poverty reduction, which was beyond them before the PRSP I process started (Danida, 2001:7).

This pro-active attitude of civil society created potential for the NSGRP consultation process to be more participatory. Civil society showed that they want to be fully-fledged partners. It challenged the government of Tanzania to organise a more inclusive consultation process. Also the criticism on the PRSP I consultation process by independent studies encouraged the Tanzanian government to organise a better consultation process for the NSGRP.

This exerted pressure on the Tanzanian government had significant positive effects. The NSGRP consultations were in many respects an improvement compared to PRSP I. The government allowed a much longer consultation process, which was twice as long as the PRSP I process. The government made a big effort to collect the views on poverty from all parts of Tanzania. They did so by distributing questionnaires and assigned ALAT to organise workshops in 42 district towns. Furthermore there was also an honest commitment to get together a more divers group of participants. During the NSGRP consultations the civil society was much better represented, FBOs were able to participate and special efforts were made to involve the private sector. The government also encouraged civil society to collect the views of their grassroots by publishing a consultation guideline.

An important difference with the PRSP I process is the prominent role of some civil society umbrella organisations. Umbrella organisations such as Hakikazi Catalyst, NPF and Tanzania Gender Networking Group have been big players in the NSGRP consultations and the government has attributed a lot of value to their reports and other inputs. Especially the biggest umbrella organisation, the NPF, had a lot of influence.

It seems as well that participants had more influence on the NSGRP compared to their influence on the PRSP I. Influence of participants on PRSP I was very much limited and the claim that the decision of the government to abolish user fees for primary education was triggered by the requests of participants, it was in fact heavily lobbied by the World Bank. Participants' influence on the NSGRP seemed to have been bigger because the NPF put the issue of accountability on the agenda and this has resulted in inclusion of the 'governance and accountability' cluster in the NSGRP. It is said to be the result of heavy lobbying by the NPF. However, the influence on economic issues in the 'growth and reduction of income poverty' cluster was minimal just like at the time of PRSP I.

6.2. Impact of the PRSP I and NSGRP consultations on policy processes in Tanzania

The consultation processes for PRSP I and NSGRP have had consequences for other policy making processes in Tanzania. Although it is too early to see any effects of the NSGRP process, the effects of the PRSP I process are more visible.

The most apparent improvement is that the consultation processes have encouraged a more regular dialogue on policy issues between government and non-governmental actors. The consultations for PRSP I raised the expectations enormously among non-governmental actors, especially the civil society. It created the hope that policy making would not be the same anymore in Tanzania. This growing social pressure encouraged the government to consult civil society on a more regular basis. This statement of a director of a CSO is underlined by figure 3 in annex 6. Civil society respondents were most critical but in average the civil society agrees with the statement.

A first step towards more participatory policy making was already taken with the PER initiative in 1997. In the PER reviews different actors cooperate and do detailed work on improving the control and targeting of public expenditures in the social sectors like e.g. health and education. Now it has become the centrepiece of the government's budget review and management process. In first instance only central government officials from various ministries, local government officials and donors were cooperating. However, the first consultation experiences with PRSP I made the government decide to invite research and academic institutions, CSOs and private sector actors also to take seats in the PER working groups (Danida, 2001:37).

Another direct result of the PRSP I consultations is said to be the decision to include politicians (including opposition spokesmen), the private sector and CSOs in the Consultative Group meeting in September 2001. From then on these new partners were invited for all Consultative Group meetings. This was a crucial step towards building a more coherent and coordinated framework for discussion between the government and non-governmental actors (Danida, 2001:21 and Evans & Ngalwea, 2003:278).

The implementation and monitoring of poverty is also more and more counting on the participation of non-governmental actors. Especially in regard to poverty monitoring is the change most visible. A Poverty Monitoring System (PMS) has been set up. This arose out of the need to measure the activities outlined in PRSP I if they are indeed improving the welfare of the people and to use the resulting information to improve these activities. The PMS pulls together information from three main sources: routine data which is collected by the local, regional and national government, investigations that are carried out by the National Bureau of Statistics and special studies carried out by a range of formal and independent researchers. The PMS is managed by the steering committee. There are four technical working groups who develop and implement plans for poverty monitoring related work and a wide range of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders participate in these working groups (Mwasha, 2001).

Another important move towards a more open dialogue on policy issues is a new annual event, the Poverty Policy Week (PPW). In September 2002 this 4-day public event took place for the first time in Dar es Salaam. The purpose is that participants learn about the results of the PMS and get the opportunity to share their views on poverty reduction. Participation during the first PPW was still restricted to invited participants, which ranged from representatives from national and regional government, civil society, donors, academic and research institutions and the media. After the criticism on the decision that only invited guests were welcome at PPW 2002, the government decided to open up participation in the PPW of 2003 to everybody who wanted to attend. This resulted in approximately 600 participants. The PPW 2004 was again a step forward because this time workshops did not only take place in Dar es Salaam but also 13 regional two-day workshops were organised (United Republic of

Tanzania, 01-07-2005).The organisation of the 13 regional two-day workshops is important as all new opportunities for non-governmental actors to participate in policy processes are restricted to actors based in Dar es Salaam. There is no talk of more participation possibilities at the local level in Tanzania but PPW 2004 may have been the start of a change.

6.3. Institutionalisation of participation

To become 'transformative', and not just an occasional affair, the PRSP consultation processes and related policy making initiatives need to become institutionalised in the political system (Piron & Evans, 2004:24). Despite the fact that more and more possibilities are created to involve non-governmental actors in policy making in Tanzania, it is one step too far to speak of an institutionalisation of participation. The PRSP I consultations can definitely be seen as a breaking point because for the first time there was a common platform for discussion, which brought together government, donors and civil society. This did increase expectations among civil society that there would be more participation possibilities from then on and by doing so social pressure for a more participatory approach to policy making grew. It seems as if the government little by little gives in to this pressure as shows the enumeration of new participation possibilities in the last paragraph. In addition, the civil society itself has developed a degree of self-criticism and tries to be better prepared now, and is occupying the spaces that the PRSP has opened to demand the institutionalisation of participatory policy processes.

On the other side, there are signs that nothing has changed. The new possibilities to participate did not change that the government still remains touchy for criticism from the civil society (McGee et al., 2002:68) and the launching of the National Policy on NGOs in 2001 is a clear attempt to erect obstacles for the effective operation and participation of civil society. This means that there is still a lot in the way to institutionalisation of participation, notwithstanding the fact that the new participation possibilities are very encouraging and offer numerous points of departure for consolidation and expansion of participation.

6.4. Conditions for democratisation in Tanzania

Despite that institutionalisation of participation did not yet take place in the Tanzanian policy making practice, this does not necessarily mean that the PRSP initiative has not made a difference for the democracy in Tanzania. The question if PRSP has influenced the democracy in Tanzania will be discussed in this paragraph. The conditions presented in paragraph 2.7 will be used to study the effects of PRSP on the democracy in Tanzania.

6.4.1. First condition: Compatibility of the form of participation and the type of democracy

The decision on the form of participation exercised during the PRSP process should not only be taken on the base of desirability but also the question if the chosen form is appropriate in the existing democracy of the country should be taken into consideration. This deals with the question how far the power of the participants should go. In democratic theories it is regarded as undesirable to give non-elected participants far-reaching influence on policy making because they do not possess the democratic legitimacy to determine political decisions. It should be assured that the parliament has the final decision making power. Only when this is the case, one can expect positive influence of participation on the democracy in a country.

As discussed in paragraph 2.2, an improved feeling of ownership will require that participants have a share in decision making. In terms of the ladder of governance styles of Pröpper and Steenbeek, this means that the cooperative style, in which the government and participants take decisions together, is the most desirable. This will mean that participants are involved in the stage of policy stipulation in the policy process. However, this will seriously undermine the democracy in Tanzania. Tanzania aims to be a representative democracy since the

introduction of multiparty elections in 1995, the first democratic elections. In chapter 3 it already appeared that in many respects doubts can be raised about the sincerity of this attempt and the quality of the representative democracy that came into being. Paragraph 6.5 will come back to this subject more extensively. Despite the doubts that can be raised, it is important that the democracy in Tanzania is not even more undermined. Therefore the role of the parliament should not be violated. This means that the ultimate decision making power should rest with the parliament and the form of participation that is chosen, should be one in which the participants have no say in decision making. This is particularly important in Tanzania where there is yet no speaking of a well-developed representative democracy. However, in true representative democracies the opinion that participants should have no say in decision making does not have to be taken so strict. Namely, in the end it should always be the parliament as supervisor that makes sure that the decisions are righteous.

The Tanzanian government has limited the role of participants to the participatory style during the PRSP I and NSGRP processes. Participants' role was that of advisor, they were able to give their own view on poverty problems and could suggest their own solutions but they had no say in the decision making. Their involvement was restricted to the stage of policy preparation, participants had no role in the stage of policy stipulation. So far it can be concluded that the Tanzanian government has not violated the existing democracy. However, this is not totally true. A non-elected drafting team was assigned to draft PRSP I and NSGRP. This should not be problematic provided that the final document will be discussed and endorsed by elected representatives, the parliament. PRSP I was discussed and endorsed by the parliament and although the voting was not much more as a formality, the parliament got at least the chance to endorse the document. This is in contrast to the NSGRP. The parliament has been informed on the final draft of the NSGRP and its changes compared to PRSP I but the government was of opinion that endorsement by the parliament was not necessary as the document differed only slightly from PRSP I. Notwithstanding the fact that this is not particularly true as the NSGRP has a significant different framework, this is a serious sign that the government takes the principles of a representative democracy with a grain of salt.

6.4.2. Second condition: The quality of participation
Not only the chosen form of participation is decisive for the democratisation objective but also participation should be of good quality. Only when the quality of participation is satisfactory, participation can be meaningful and valuable. There is talk of good quality participation when the law is encouraging participation in government affairs, when a representative group of participants for the whole society is involved, when the participating CSOs have good capacity and are strongly minded and when CSOs unite themselves to strengthen their voice.

Existence of an enabling participation environment by law
Participation can only be of good quality and meaningful if the law enables and encourages participation. In Tanzania this is not particular the case, on the contrary, the newly adopted National Policy of NGOs is an attempt by the government to control NGOs and prejudices the principle of freedom of organisation. This hampers the development of vibrant CSOs and with that the prospect of valuable participation. In this way the government has not particularly created an enabling environment for participation. Only new obstacles are erected that discourage potential participants to participate. Also the fact that the executive tries to rule over the judiciary and the systematic depriving of essential resources of the lower courts, limits the enabling circumstances for participation. The underpayment and lack of resources of the lower courts has made them prone to corruption. This made the courts not very accessible for CSOs to institute legal proceedings.

Representative participants

Good quality participation requires as well that a well-balanced, representative group of participants is participating. This means that all layers of society in terms of interests must be represented. However, one should be careful with taking for granted the statements of CSOs who they claim to represent. The reason is that these claims of CSOs can be seriously questioned.

A lot of CSOs in Tanzania have a negligible number of members and the leadership of Tanzanian CSOs is often in hands of some upper-class citizens who studied in a Western country. These people are not fully aware of the problems and challenges of their grassroots and can therefore not always be regarded as legitimate spokesman of their grassroots. Therefore when assessing the participation of participants, one should take a critical look at the representative character of the participants.

Although it is difficult to assess how representative participants during the NSGRP process were, it can be stated that there was a more divers group of participants participating in the NSGRP process than during the PRSP I process. For example, women organisations and FBOs were allowed to participate in the NSGRP process in contrast to the PRSP I process. Nevertheless, there was no elaborated system that secured that all interests were represented in the consultation processes. At the district and village level consultations there was no control on the representative character of the participants. The facilitators got a list of required categories of participants but it was up to them and some district government officials to choose the participants. In Maswa this resulted in a workshop in which no single elected ward councillor (as was a requirement) was invited to participate; only local government officials participated. It is quite likely that this is not an isolated case and happened in other district consultations as well. In Monduli it seems as if only CCM members were invited to participate as an important CSO umbrella organisation was excluded from participation, most likely because it was not affiliated to the CCM.

Strong civil society organisations

The participating CSOs should be strong in terms of personnel capacities, financial resources and have a clear objective in mind. Only when this is the case these CSOs can contribute meaningfully as participants. The opposite is, however, often the case with CSOs in Tanzania. A majority of the CSOs have limited capacity as they are run by inexperienced and unqualified personnel and lack financial resources. This is slowly changing and CSOs are slowly but surely shaking off the characteristics of being weak and lacking capacity (ARD, 2003:26,27). Also the only recently established umbrella organisations are rapidly growing strong in terms of capacity, knowledge and the amount of member-CSOs.

Nevertheless, it can be questioned if imposed participation, like the PRSP initiative is in principle, will work in Tanzania. It seems as if the offered sitting allowance has to persuade potential participants to participate. According to an employee of the Netherlands embassy, sitting allowance has been introduced in the mid-1990s by the Tanzanian World Bank branch and a few other major donors in Tanzania. This was done to encourage people to participate. The 35 years of single-party rule, in which organisations based on ethnic or religious identity were banned and numerous new associations were set up under the party wing of the CCM, had created a passive civil society that needed some incentives to be encouraged to participate. Since then sitting allowance has become common practice in Tanzania and is paid to all participants of workshops without regard to the ministry, CSO or company they work for or their salary. It is meant to cover the transport, accommodation and food costs made by the participants to attend the workshop but the amount of money paid is often out of proportion to the real costs the participants make. This of course encourages misuse of the

sitting allowance and has led to a situation in which participants choose the workshop to attend on the base of the amount of allowance they will receive.

Sitting allowances were also paid for the consultation workshops organised for the NSGRP. Two respondents speculated independent from each other that the relatively high amount of allowances paid for participation in NSGRP workshops has lead to such a massive participation during the NSGRP process and it was not rare that a representative of a CSO working on environmental issues attended a workshop dealing with the issue of HIV/AIDS. Although no respondents in the major cities of Dar es Salaam, Arusha and Mwanza admitted that the sitting allowances played a role in their decision to attend a certain workshop, the hesitation to admit this seems to be less at the local level as five respondents in Maswa said literally that they attended the NSGRP workshop because of the sitting allowance they received for attendance.

Collaboration of civil society organisations

CSOs need to collaborate to share their knowledge and capacities in order to make their presence felt. In regard to this condition, Tanzania is performing much better during the NSGRP process than during the PRSP I process. The rise of umbrella organisations, of which more and more CSOs are becoming member, is a good sign. Especially the NGO Policy Forum has turned into a powerful umbrella organisation which has participated effectively in the NSGRP process. The NPF came into being in 2001 and currently brings together about 70 national and international NGOs. After the disappointing PRSP I process some CSOs decided that they had to set up a policy forum in order to seek a more strategic role in discussions with the government about future policy decisions. The major focus of the NPF is to make policies more transparent and democratic, and accountable to the people. It especially focuses in the PRSP, the PER and LGRP. In three years time the NPF has grown into a respected partner by the Tanzanian government, which is consulted on a regular basis.

6.5. PRSP as an attempt to introduce deliberative democracy

It was already concluded in paragraph 2.7 that the PRSP initiative is an attempt to introduce interactive policy making in developing countries. The same applies for Tanzania. By putting the drafting of a PRSP as requirement for debt relief, the IFIs try to establish a sort of deliberative democracy in these countries as a supplement to the existing democracy. Problematic in this respect is that the existing democracy must be close to an ideal type in order to make interactive policy making work. Ideally speaking should the final decisions be made by the elected representatives after the consideration of the inputs of the participants. The stage of policy stipulation must be solely reserved to these elected representatives. The IFIs implicitly seem to assume that developing countries like Tanzania are close to this ideal type of democracy. This is an unfounded supposition; developing countries mostly do not have the ideal type of democracy as the developed countries have.

The state of the democracy in Tanzania has already been spelled out in chapter 3 and it has become clear that it is far from an ideal type. Despite the fact that Tanzania can formally be described as democracy, in practice it can be characterised as a 'show' multiparty system in which the outcome of elections are no surprise, it is sure beforehand that the CCM will win.

The elections of the legislature are pursuit with the simple plurality in which MPs compete with each other to receive most of the votes in their constituency. However, the CCM has succeeded to portray itself as a binding agent in the Tanzanian society and consequently has won an overwhelming majority of seats in the parliament and dominates the parliament. This dominance is further extended by the right of the president to appoint 10 MPs by himself and because of the fact that the president and the members of the cabinet are members of the parliament themselves. In fact, the CCM dominates the whole governance system as the

powerful executive is dominated by CCM members too. Despite the separation of powers on paper, the parliament and judiciary are in practice subordinate to the executive. The judiciary is practically subordinate to the executive as the lower courts find themselves in a situation in which they are not able to do their work the way they should do it. They are systematically deprived from resources and salary. The higher courts have found themselves already a few times washed away by the executive that effectively overturned findings of the higher court the executive conceived as harmful to itself. The parliament is in practice subordinate to the executive because of the whipping system. This system ensures that CCM MPs (90 percent in parliament) will not vote against the proposals of the executive and turned MPs into a kind of party mouthpieces. Also the fact that the president has to assent the law prejudices the principle of separation of power.

This reality of a pseudo democracy puts limits on the expected positive outcomes of interactive policy making in Tanzania. In order to make interactive policy making successful, the government needs to be accountable so that inputs from participants have a fair chance. A strong parliament is essential in order to hold the government to account and make it responsive. Without a powerful and self-reliant parliament there is no effective supervision of the acts of the government and this brings along with it the danger that the government will take decisions in the stage of policy stipulation without any regard to the inputs of the participants in the stages of agenda setting and policy preparation (Bekkers & Edwards, 2005:14).

It seems as if interactive policy making stands or falls with a powerful and self-reliant parliament and exactly this is missing in Tanzania. The danger of introducing interactive policy making in this not yet well-developed democracy and giving participants even a greater role than the parliament, is that the deliberative democracy slowly but surely supplants the representative democracy. This is the fear of Selee (see subparagraph 2.6.4) and seems to occur in Tanzania. The parliament is systematically marginalized while non-elected CSO participants are more and more regarded as alternative, legitimate spokesmen of society as their growing role in the PER working groups, PMS and PPW shows. The IFIs have been overhasty by introducing interactive policy making in Tanzania. Attention must first be paid to the strengthening of the parliament in the Tanzanian governance system.

6.6. Small signals of democratisation

The last two paragraphs may raise the question if absolutely no effects of PRSP processes on the democracy in Tanzania are perceptible. This is not true; some small but promising improvements are perceptible. Of course it is yet too early to draw far reaching conclusions from these small changes but it would not do justice to the Tanzanian reality if these changes will not be mentioned in this paper.

Apparent is that democracy issues are increasingly under discussion in Tanzania. The special cluster on governance and accountability in the NSGRP speaks volumes as this was not yet included in PRSP I. This can be attributed to the participation of civil society. The NPF effectively lobbied for the inclusion of this cluster. This is a concrete proof that participation actually led to influence. Another proof of effective participation is that since PRSP I has been completed, efforts within the government to fight corruption have increased. It is said that this can be attributed to the urgent request of civil society to strengthen accountability and transparency in government structures (Kajege, 2001). The fact that participation of civil society did bring some change in policies shows that the government is getting more responsive towards participants. During PRSP I donors had a lot of influence on the content of PRSP I, in comparison their influence on the NSGRP was minimal. This can be evaluated as the first step towards more domestic accountability instead of external accountability towards the donors. This can certainly be evaluated as democratisation.

Important for the democratisation process in Tanzania is that PRSP I and NSGRP put new life into the issues of accountability and transparency. Many CSO respondents praise the government for the transparency of the NSGRP process in comparison with the PRSP I process. They were given the information and documents they asked for and this was not the case four years ago. They state that this new willingness of the government to share information is not only limited to the NSGRP process but also information about other policy issues is more widely available. In general are civil society and donors starting to be optimistic about the statement that transparency has increased in governments' acts after the PRSP I and NSGRP process. Figure 4 in annex 5 shows that civil society and donors are both close to agreeing with this statement.

Accountability is still a dim area and for the time being there exists only the potential that the government can be hold more to account. This more reserved attitude of respondents corresponds to the results presented in figure 5 in annex 5. In general civil society and donor respondents positioned themselves close to neutral when they were asked to position themselves on the statement if the government has been held more to account since the PRSP I and NSGRP processes. The potential of accountability is most apparent in the annex of 38 pages in the NSGRP in which the strategies to reduce poverty are outlined. For each strategy it is made clear which key actors will implement it. With outlining the responsible actors, the government has offered a good opportunity for non-governmental actors to hold the responsible actors to account for what they achieve or do not achieve. This single fact that the government specifies who is responsible for which strategy can already be regarded as democratisation. The problem is, however, the absence of a powerful and self-reliant parliament that will hold the government to account in regard to its promises in the NSGRP. There may be the potential that the civil society can take over this role of the parliament, although the National Policy on NGOs may prove to be an insuperable obstacle, but this is of course the world upside down. In this way the civil society will be taking over the role of the parliament and will undermine the representative democracy in Tanzania even more.

6.7. Conclusion
Three CSO respondents stated during the interviews that further democratisation will require that civil society get a vote in decision making. They conceived their influence on the final NSGRP as unsatisfactory. This opinion, however, does not correspond with reality. It seems that participants had more influence on the NSGRP than on the PRSP I. Influence of participants on PRSP I was very much limited. Participants' influence on the NSGRP appears for the incorporation of cluster three 'governance and accountability' in the NSGRP. This was decided on the urgent request of the NPF. With the inclusion of this cluster the NPF has succeeded to put the issue of accountability on the agenda.

The statement of the three CSO respondents to be included in decision making is in any case undesirable as this paper has made clear. It can contribute to the erosion of the representative democracy when informal decision making processes dominated by a hotchpotch of participants take the place of formal decision making processes in which elected representatives are involved. In fact, a hotchpotch of participants was the case during PSRP I and NSGRP. Participants who claimed to represented different interests participated but there was no system that secured that all interests were equally represented during the consultation processes. The same was the case at the district level consultations. Recommendations were made about the ideal composition of participants but it was up to the facilitators whom to invite and this has resulted in the case of Monduli that only CSOs affiliated with the local CCM branch have been invited and in Maswa it has led to an exclusion of elected ward councillors.

Despite the wish of some CSO respondents to be included in the decision making, decision making power did not rest with the participants during the NSGRP neither did it rest with the parliament. The drafters took the decisions what to include in the document and the parliament was only briefed on its content. According to the government, it was unnecessary that the parliament endorsed the NSGRP. This indicates the disdain of the government for the role of the parliament. In fact it undoes any other positive effect of PRSP processes on the democracy in Tanzania. Despite that the quality of participation has been much better during the NSGRP process compared to the PRSP I process in terms of a more representative group that was able to participate, CSOs that are growing slowly more strong and a significantly better cooperating civil society, the ignorance regarding the parliament undoes all the other improvements. Provided that the parliament had got the role of supervisor of the participation process and had got the opportunity to discuss and endorse the NSGRP, this and the better quality of participation would have had together positive effects on the democracy in Tanzania.

Interactive policy making has not much chance to be a success in a country where the parliament is being marginalized and where accountability and transparency are still in their infancy. However, as the last paragraph made clear, respondents have noticed some steps forward in regard to transparency and accountability and they are hopeful of more improvements.

An important gain of the PRSP I and NSGRP processes is that they have provided a basis for new forms of and much more productive interaction between the government and civil society in the future. Non-governmental actors, although mainly those who are based in Dar es Salaam, have clearly expressed themselves in the PRSP I and NSGRP processes and showed that they were better informed and prepared for the NSGRP process. This can be evaluated as a contribution to political empowerment and, as such, also to democratisation in Tanzania. Social mobilisation is established and the policy making process is gradually opening up in Tanzania and therefore it can be asserted that the PRSP initiative has directly and indirectly allowed some democratic effects to unfold. The drawback of this opening up is the expectations that it raises. Participants take part in the deliberations and expect that the policies discussed during the deliberations are indeed executed. The problem is, however, that the government has not enough financial resources to carry out all the policies. This leads to disappointment and frustration among participants.

Tanzania is placed for some huge challenges if the participatory approach will be applied on a more regular basis. This can have far-reaching implications for the issue of accountability. The government will have to become more accountable if the participatory approach is supposed to become sustainable. The question in this respect is who has to hold the government to account, the parliament or civil society? So far this paper has made clear that a right balance has to be struck between government accountability, the role of the parliament and the involvement of non-governmental actors.

7. Conclusions and recommendation

The objective of this study was to give an answer on the following central question:

How can the participation and decision making processes of PRSP I and NSGRP in Tanzania be described and to what extent has participation in the PRSP I and NSGRP processes contributed to further democratisation in Tanzania?

The first part of the question 'how the participation and decision making processes of PRSP I and NSGRP in Tanzania can be described' has been discussed in detail in chapters 4 and 5. The consequences of these processes for the democracy in Tanzania have been discussed in chapter 6. In this last chapter an attempt will be made to present a conclusion in regard to the central question (paragraph 7.1). Paragraph 7.2 will discuss a recommendation and in paragraph 7.3 some closing remarks will be made.

7.1. Conclusions
Some important conclusions can be drawn from this study. In separate topics these conclusions will be discussed below.

More comprehensive NSGRP process
The PRSP I consultation process was in the view of most participants and critical observers unsatisfactory. The biggest problem is believed to be the tight timeframe. If this would not have been so tight, more time would have been available to consult a wider variety of participants, participants could have prepared themselves and participants could have been better informed about the purpose of PRSP. This was not the case and the complaints about the process mainly concerned these issues.

Chapter 5 showed that the unsatisfactory experiences and complaints about PRSP I had influence on how the NSGRP process was organised. The NSGRP process was much more comprehensive particularly in terms of time, amount and variety of participants and coverage of Tanzania. Also the influence of participants on the content of the NSGRP has been bigger than their influence on PRSP I. The NPF effectively put the issues of governance and accountability on the agenda and a separate cluster dealing with these issues is incorporated in the NSGRP. The NSGRP process gives, however, the impression that the Tanzanian government has overshoot with its will to do well. It seems as if the government wanted to satisfy everybody (donors, CSOs, FBOs, private sector) and over-estimated its capacity to handle such a comprehensive consultation process, especially in regard to the drafting process as the drafters could not go through all the consultation reports. The consequence of this is that the drafters only consulted a limited number of reports and this has possibly made the final content of the NSGRP not as representative of society as it could have been. In addition it is important to mention that there was no check on the extent to which all supposed participants at the district and village level were indeed invited to participate. It seems as if the invitations were rather selective and consequently the representative character of participants at the local level is questionable.

The danger of the more comprehensive consultation process lies particularly in the expectations that the NSGRP consultation process has created. Participants, especially those who participated in the workshops at the district and village level, now expect that the government is taking effective action against poverty in Tanzania. It is for sure that the Tanzanian government cannot live up to all these expectations as there are not enough financial resources to execute all policies outlined in the NSGRP.

Despite the well-founded criticism on the NSGRP process it would not do justice to the honest and thorough attempt of the Tanzanian government to establish a more satisfactory NSGRP consultation process. This has led to a NSGRP process that has been a step forward in comparison with the PRSP I process.

A step forward to institutionalisation of participation
Chapter 6 showed that the participation possibilities in policy making have increased since the PRSP I and NSGRP processes. Breaking steps forward are the opening up of PER working groups to civil society, research institutions, academics and private sector participants. Also the inclusion of non-governmental actors in the PMS and in the Consultative Group meetings is important. Lastly the PPW forms the basis for a regular dialogue with non-governmental actors on poverty policy issues.

This opening up of policy making by the government can be regarded as democratisation. However, it should not be fully emphasised that this opening up of policy making is solely triggered by the PRSP I and NSGRP processes as there is no proof that this is the case. Most likely another factor did play a (important) role in this process. It is only very notable that this opening up has taken place since the participation experiences with PRSP I.

Tanzania, a pseudo democracy
Tanzania aimed to introduce a representative democracy with the first multiparty elections in 1995. However, the 35 years of a single party system had enabled the CCM to portray itself as a binding agent in Tanzania with its 120 different tribes. Consequently, the opposition parties did not have the ghost of a chance to challenge the CCM in the 1995 elections. The CCM won 85 percent of the seats in the parliament. The next elections in 2000 were even more successful for the CCM and it won almost 90 percent of the seats.

This overwhelming majority of the CCM in the parliament does not necessarily have to undermine the representative democracy. As long as MPs can properly fulfil their role as watchdog, there should not be any negative consequences for the democracy. There are, however, two obstacles in the Tanzanian reality. Firstly, the president has the power vested in him to assent the law. This does harm to the separation of power between the executive and legislature as it should ideally be the parliament who assents the law. Secondly, the whipping system makes trouble. This system ensures that CCM MPs will not vote against the proposals of their CCM party associates who occupy all positions in the Tanzanian executive. This will, namely, mean that they will be expelled from their party and lose their seat in the parliament. As the priorities of the CCM are reflected in the proposed policies of the executive, these policies do not find much resistance in the parliament and this has enabled the CCM to execute most of its ideas. It goes without saying that this is seriously undermining the representative democracy in Tanzania and it is even said that the introduction of multiparty elections has made life easier for the executive. The reason is that before 1995 MPs had much more freedom to freely criticise the government without being suspected of supporting the opposition.

Not only the parliament is in daily practice subordinate to the executive but also the judiciary is disproportionate weak in comparison with the executive. The lower courts lack the resources to fulfil their role and the higher courts have been overruled on some occasions by the executive as the executive nullified some of their findings that would prove to bring a loss upon the power of the executive.

In conclusion, two important principle of a democracy are violated in Tanzania. There is a coinciding of party and state and there is in practice no separation of power between the executive, judiciary and legislature. This can only lead to characterise Tanzania as a pseudo

democracy, on paper it may be regarded as a representative democracy but in practice there are many hooks and eyes.

Deliberative democracy in Tanzania: A huge challenge

PRSP is an attempt by the IFIs to introduce a form of deliberative policy making in developing countries. Non-governmental actors are given a voice in policy making. Governmental and non-governmental actors are supposed to interactively debate about policy issues and that has to result in policies that are supported by participants. The government seriously has to weigh the ideas and suggestions of the non-governmental actors against another and makes decisions on the final content of the policy. In the end this policy should be discussed and endorsed by the parliament to make sure that the government has been responsive to the inputs of the participants.

This brief summary of interactive policy making makes clear that the existence of a well-organised, powerful and self-reliant parliament that can fulfil its watchdog role is decisive for the success or failure of interactive policy making in a country. If a parliament lacks power there exists the risk that the government does not take account of the inputs of the non-governmental actors and this may result in a policy that does not reflect the opinions and ideas that exist in a society.

As the above section shows, Tanzania lacks a powerful and self-reliant parliament. The whipping system prevents the parliament to fulfil its watchdog role. This hinders the functioning of interactive policy making in Tanzania and makes it very difficult to make a success out of the introduction of deliberative democracy in Tanzania.

The difficulties appear from the following. The PRSP I and NSGRP consultations took place and some inputs of participants were incorporated in the documents. However, there was no supervision of the parliament on this process. PRSP I was endorsed by the parliament but it is said that this happened after a short and lacking debate. In contrast, the NSGRP has not been endorsed by the parliament at all. This means that there has not been a check on the NSGRP in respect to the question if the government has seriously weight the inputs of the different participants. Many non-governmental actors were consulted on numerous occasions during the NSGRP process and this resulted in piles of reports. Too many reports to go through by the drafters as appeared. It was a matter of luck if the drafters came across the report of a certain workshop or of a certain CSO. In this situation a thorough discussion on the content of the NSGRP by the parliament should have been necessary to secure that all relevant and important problems and interests had been taken into account. This has not been the case and it has resulted in complaints of some respondents that they would have liked to hear why their inputs have not been incorporated in the NSGRP.

Representative democracy further undermined by NSGRP process

By introducing the PRSP initiative the IFIs hoped that this would have positive consequences for the democracies in developing countries. In order to assess if this has happened in the Tanzanian case two conditions and four sub-conditions were developed in paragraph 2.7 that (partly) need to be fulfilled if one wants to speak of positive consequences for the democracy in Tanzania.

In paragraph 6.4, it appeared that the two conditions have been partly fulfilled in Tanzania and this may lead to the conclusion that the democracy has benefited from the PRSP I and NSGRP consultations. This is, however, not rightly. It is true that most of the conditions are (partly) fulfilled. Namely, the chosen form of participation was compatible with the representative democracy in Tanzania. Participants had no say in decision making so that the principle of the representative democracy has been guaranteed. Besides, the quality of participation was sufficient in terms of CSOs that are growing slowly stronger and are better

prepared for participation. Their capacity increased through better knowledge and more resources. Also the establishment of some umbrella organisations since PRSP I can be regarded as a success and their influence on the NSGRP has been astonishing big. In addition, the sub-condition of a good mixture of representative participants has been improved in the NSGRP process in comparison to the process of PRSP I. A wider range of participants have participated although these participants were mainly based in Dar es Salaam. Potential participants in rural areas only had the opportunity to participate in the district and village consultations. The representative character of participants remained, however, problematic and no appreciable proof of change has been found. CSOs still claim to be representatives of certain groups in society but they do not have registered members. Also the fact that MPs have been consulted on a disproportionate few occasions in comparison with CSOs, private sector and research institution actors shows that some doubts can be raised about the representative character of all participants. Lastly, the legal system in Tanzania can not be regarded as a system that is supportive to participation of non-governmental actors in government affairs; on the contrary, it has created new obstacles as shows the National Policy on NGOs of 2001. Therefore this sub-condition has obviously not been fulfilled.

So far this summary does not have to lead to the hard conclusion that the democracy has not improved from the PRSP I and NSGRP processes, in contrary, one could draw the conclusion that it has benefited the democracy. In addition, respondents indicate that some significant progress is visible in transparency and they have good hopes that increased accountability can be witnessed in the near future. However, the most important requirement that has to be fulfilled has not been met in the Tanzanian practice. The final decision making on the NSGRP, the endorsement, has not been done by the parliament. The parliament was fully overruled by the executive by denial of the executive that the parliament had to endorse the final version of the NSGRP.

The central questions in this research was to what extent the consultation processes of PRSP I and NSGRP have contributed to further democratisation in Tanzania. This question should be answered in the negative. In fact the contrary is the case, in practice is the representative democracy further undermined by the NSGRP process as the government has refused the endorsement of the NSGRP by the parliament. It may only be suggested that the pluralist democracy in Tanzania has been strengthened as the role of non-governmental actors has increased. However, in this way the strengthening of the pluralist democracy is at the cost of the representative democracy as the growing role of non-governmental actors seems to bypass the role of the Tanzanian parliament.

Revision of the first condition
It has become clear that countries that claim to be representative democracies will not definite take the principles of this kind of democracy so serious. This means that parliaments do not necessarily have to possess the power they are supposed to possess and they may not be able to fulfil the duties they are supposed to fulfil in representative democracies. Parliaments may not be able to fulfil their role as supervisor effectively and it can not be assumed that a parliament has the final decision making power. Despite the fact that in chapter 2 it was already explicitly mentioned that not all participants in representative democracies can fulfil their role as supervisor equally effective, the possibility that some parliaments do not have the final decision making power was not mentioned and with this not considered as very likely. The reasoning applied unconsciously was that a country that claims to be a representative democracy will at least give the parliament the right to make the final decisions. Therefore this issue has not been incorporated in a condition. With the same naivety of the IFIs the same mistake has been made as the IFIs did, it was simply presumed that the parliament in Tanzania has final decision making power. It was only acknowledged that the parliament may

not be able to fulfil its duty as supervisor as effectively as expected in a representative democracy. That this is not the case in Tanzania became clear during this study. It raised the issue that this can be the case in many other countries. Therefore it is necessary to revise the conditions mentioned in paragraph 2.7. This concerns particularly the first condition, namely, 'compatibility of the form of participation and the type of democracy'. This condition should be rephrased in 'existence of a powerful and self-reliant parliament'. The governance system of a country must have a powerful and self-reliant parliament that takes the final decisions in regard to proposed policies and laws and that can effectively fulfil its role as supervisor. If this is the case, participants can safely get involved in decision making as the parliament will always have the final say. However, if this is not the case, one should be hesitant to give participants decision making power as there will be no parliament that will guarantee that the decisions are righteous. Also the danger that the development of the representative democracy will be hampered can become true or even worse, it can lead to a situation in which the parliament is being marginalized even further.

7.2. Recommendation
It has become clear that the major obstacles to further democratisation in Tanzania include the reluctance of the CCM to loose its grip on power, weak performance and capacities of the opposition parties, a poorly developed legal system and the young independent civil society that has to grow into its role. This study showed that especially the weakness of the parliament severely limits the chances of further democratisation in Tanzania. Therefore this problem needs to be tackled first.

It is unlikely that the decisive steps in changing the reality of the weak parliament will be taken by the executive itself or by the CCM. Just like in Europe of the 19th century, change has to be prompted by social pressure. Here lies an important role for the civil society and its grassroots in Tanzania. The civil society has to strongly advocate for systemic change by requesting a more meaningful role of the parliament and efforts to improve the capacity of the parliament. This will prove to be a gradual process as civil society, but also the political parties, confront unwillingness of the government and organisational obstacles like the National Policy on NGOs. Besides, efforts need to take place in order to increase the capacity of civil society to fulfil this role as advocate for a more important role of parliament in Tanzania. Not so much can be expected from the parliament in the beginning of this process. MPs can urge for changes within the National Policy on NGOs so that it is no longer hampering civil society. However, it is questionable if enough MPs will stand up and question this national policy so that changes are indeed taking place. The whipping system forms a real treat to this potential.

Of course it is questionable if the Tanzanian civil society is the best partner on the way to democratisation as civil society can not claim that it represents the population on a comprehensive basis. Also the fact that if one gives such far-reaching tasks to the civil society this actually prejudices the representative democracy and this may raise doubts about this strategy. However, it is currently the most plausible mechanism for organised social pressure for reform, civil society is the most likely to express the interests of the Tanzanian population. In the long run the ultimate goal would be a close cooperation between parliaments and civil society vis-à-vis the government, a kind of network in which MPs are able to translate civil society concerns into parliamentary work.

7.3. Closing remarks
The expectations of the PRSP initiative ran high. However, now 6 years after the idea was launched, it has become clear that these expectations were too optimistic and that PRSP is not a panacea for the Tanzanian democracy. In Tanzania only two democratic developments can

be identified that can be traced back to the introduction of the PRSP initiative. Firstly, policy making processes seem to open up slowly in Tanzania as show the PER, PMS, PPW and Consultative Group meetings. Secondly, respondents stated that the transparency of governments' acts increased since the PRSP I and NSGRP process. Besides, respondents expressed hope that the government will become more accountable. However, the causality with the PRSP I and NSGRP processes is difficult to proof and there exists only the supposition that these two processes have played a role.

For sure is the fact that democratisation does not occur on command. Questions can be raised about the success of imposed participation. It must be embedded in the culture and when this is not the case e.g. sitting allowance has to encourage potential participants as shows the Tanzanian reality. Democratisation is a slow process, patience is necessary.

Reflections

This section will reflect on some of the remarkable experiences encountered whilst conducting the research for this study.

In numerous respects Tanzania is different from the Netherlands or any other Western country. While travelling through Tanzania these differences are mainly visible by the primitive houses the people live in, the bad roads etc. The differences are often less experienced and are mostly limited to the border formalities that are bureaucratic and can take hours. Living in such a country for five months and doing research makes one really experience the differences. These differences make the research a challenge but also an unforgettable experience.

Remarkable differences I came across during the research in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Arusha, Maswa and Monduli were diverse and some of them I will explain here.

Remarkable is the heavy burden interviews form for government officials, CSOs and donors. About 5000 missions pay a visit to Tanzania each year and numerous studies are focusing on Tanzania. Numerous interviews take place every year in Tanzania and I experienced a certain interview fatigue among my respondents. However, it seemed as if being a *mzungu* (white person) and doing an internship with one of the big donors in Tanzania has opened doors for me. After having insisted that an interview with a certain respondent was very important for the research of the embassy, all my respondents agreed to make an appointment for an interview. However, some Tanzanians interpret appointment times rather broadly and it was not seldom that I had to wait up to an hour before the respondent finally turned up, and on three occasions the waiting did not pay, the respondent did not turn up and a new appointment had to be made. Notable in this respect is that interviews can easily be made in the evening, Saturdays and even Sundays.

The drawback of 'being an intern of the Netherlands Embassy' was the supposition of some respondents that I was carrying around a bag full of dollars. Every time when I asked my last question, namely, if the respondents had something to add I was holding my breath. Often the respondent started summing up the good work that his or her organisation was doing and the lack of financial resources the organisation was suffering from.

The differences that exist between the urban and rural areas in Tanzania became apparent and tangible during my stay in Maswa and Monduli. The interviews in Maswa and Monduli were an experience in themselves. For instance the formalities in these towns meant that before I could start interviewing I had to fulfil some official procedures that took up to 1,5 hours. Ideally the DED, the Regional Administrative Secretary and the District commissioner should be paid a duty call to thank them for their hospitality, to explain why you are there, who you want to interview and how the community will profit from it. Especially in Maswa town the formalities were striking. After the first day of interviewing in Maswa I wrote the following passage in my notebook:

'Formalities and hierarchy seem to dominate in Maswa. I had to pay visits of courtesy to the DED and district commissioner. Fortunately the Regional Administrative Secretary was out of town so that I could skip this ceremony. Many "your-welcome's", handshaking's, signatures in "important looking books" and 1,5 hour later I could finally start interviewing. However, not only formalities seem to exist with the government officials in Maswa but also in the streets people are busy to shake hands and inform about the families health. Also I could not escape from this. I gave up counting quite soon but I estimate that I have shaken at least 200 different hands today!'

In Maswa I was confronted for the first time with sitting allowances. I had already heard a lot about this issue but was very surprised when my respondents asked me how much sitting allowance they would get for being interviewed. I wrote the following in my notebook:

'At the end of the interview all three respondents asked me how much and when I was going to pay them sitting allowance. The translator translated this and all three looked at me anxiously with a look in his face like "tell us, that's the only thing we have been wondering about during the interview". I was speechless and got myself out of this situation by saying that I was not sure yet how much and that I had to discuss this with my boss. One minute later I already regretted the answer I had given. I realised I just made a promise that is encouraging this culture of holding out your hand.'

During the interviews in Maswa and Monduli the drawback of the participation approach on policy making became apparent. Not only in the scope of PRSP I and NSGRP have consultations been held in the rural areas. There are other occasions in which the people were asked to participate like NPES and Vision 2025. Logically this creates hope among the people that the government is really making an effort to reduce poverty. In Maswa and Monduli most of the respondents asked me why nothing had happened yet in their town to reduce poverty since the workshops in March/April 2004. In addition, they asked me why I paid another visit to their town. They wanted no more talking or workshops; they wanted concrete improvement of their lives. This made me aware that all those workshops are dangerous. They create a lot of expectations which can not be fulfilled in the short term and inevitably lead to disappointment in the government and even anger towards them. The following passage I wrote in my notebook after two days of interviewing in Monduli:

'Also in Monduli respondents have asked me over and over again why the government had not started yet with the strategy proposals discussed in the workshop in March 2004. They had not noticed any action yet. And what was my research adding to it? Again this brought me in a difficult position and I had to come up with an plausible explanation that was accepted with scepticism and mistrust.'

Despite all difficulties and new situations I was facing, I have to stress that doing research in Tanzania has been an unforgettable and studious experience. Not everything went smoothly and there were some moments that I asked myself why I had been so keen on doing a research in Tanzania. The answer was simple, precisely for the reason that I wanted to do research in which unexpected things happen.

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Annexes

Annex 1: Persons interviewed

CSOs

Name of person	Position	Name of organisation
Mr. Petro P. Ahham	Director & President	Multi-Environmental Society Karatu
Mr. Donald Kasongi	Area Programme Manager	Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development Mwanza
Mr. Jimmy Luhende	Head of Media & Learning Materials Programme	Kivulini Mwanza (Women's Rights)
Mr. Habib Miradji	Administrator	Grassroots Media Trust
Mr. Alli S. Mosse	Co-ordinator	World Conference on Religion and Peace
Mr. James Njelwa	Branch Manager	Lawyers' Environmental Action Team Mwanza
Mr. Humphrey Polepole	Director	Tanzania Youth Coalition
Mr. Henry Wimile & Mr. Kagauri Rutachwamagyo	Secretary General & Co-ordinator	Information Centre on Disability/ SHIVYAWATA

CSO umbrella organisations

Name of person	Position	Name of organisation
Mr. Abdul Jetha	Country Programme Director	HelpAge International
Mr. Emmanuel Kalonga	Director	Hakikazi Catalyst Arusha
Mr. Zabdiel Kimambo	Co-ordinator of PRS working group	NGO Policy Forum & CARE
Mr. Michael Kimaryo	Director	Mwanza Civil Society Policy Forum
Mrs. Mary Rusimbi	Executive Director	Tanzania Gender Networking Programme

Donors

Name of person	Position	Name of organisation
Mr. Philip Courtnadge	Economist	UNDP
Mr. Axel Maisonneuve (by phone)	Chairman of Development Partners Group Poverty Monitoring sub-group	European Commission
Mr. Emmanuel Maliti	Programme Officer Economic	Netherlands Embassy Dar es Salaam
Mrs. Zaina Maimu	Programme Officer Institutional Development & Gender	Netherlands Embassy Dar es Salaam
Mrs. Tamahi Yamauchi	Poverty Monitoring Advisor	Japanese International Co-operation Agency

Drafters

Name of person	Position	Name of organisation
Mrs. Maggie Bangser	Director & Member of the Drafting Team	Women's Dignity Project
Mrs. Masuma Mamdani	Long Term Project Co-ordinator & Member of the drafting team	Research on Poverty Alleviation
Mr. Longinus Rutasitara	Economist & Member of the Drafting Team	University Dar es Salaam

Government

Name of person	Position	Name of organisation
Mr. Celestine T. Kimaro	Research & Development Officer	Association of Local Authorities of Tanzania
Dr. Servacius Likwelile	Head of Poverty Eradication Division	Vice President's Office
Mr. Mwangombe	Senior Human Resource and Administrative Officer	Local Government Mwanza
Mr. Said L. Tofiki	District Community Development Officer & facilitator Mwanza district	Local Government Mwanza
Mr. Ibrahim Ugulumu	PRSP Consultant Analyst	Vice President's Office

Journalists

Name of person	Position	Name of organisation
Mr. Bernard Mapalala	Editor	Daily Times Newspaper
Mr. Jack Meena (by email)	Lecturer with Institute of Journalism and Mass Communication	University Dar es Salaam

Parliament

Name of person	Position	Name of organisation
Mr. Wilfred Lwakatare	MP Bukoba Urban	MP for Civil United Front
Mr. Hamad Rashid Mohammed	MP Pemba & Shadow Minister Finance, Planning and Privatisation	MP for Civil United Front
Mr. Daniel N. Nsanzugwanko	Director	Bunge Foundation for Democracy

Trade unions

Name of person	Position	Name of organisation
Mr. John Gonza	Research Director	Trade Unions Confederation of Tanzania

Research organisations

Name of person	Position	Name of organisation
Mr. Theo M. Macha	Program Officer	Pact Tanzania
Mr. Donald E. Mmari & Mr. Lucas Katera	Consultancy Coördinator & Researcher	Research on Poverty Alleviation

Maswa

Name of person	Position	Name of organisation
Mr. Shehe Kiloba Alimas	Chairman	Baraza Kuu Maswa (Muslim)
Mr. Nathayo H. Grawu	District Pastor	KKKT Maswa (Lutheran church)
Mr. D. Lugora	District Administrative Secretary	Maswa District
Mr. Max Lyoba	Owner	Max Investments Maswa
Mr. Jowika Kasunga	District Commissioner	Maswa District
H.R. Magoge	Treasurer	TCCIA Maswa
Mr. Madeleke Masanja	District Chairman	Yadec Maswa (Youth organisation)
Mrs. Joyce Mbutta	District Executive Director	Maswa District
Mr. M.M. Mungiya	Committee Member	Wazee Maswa (Elderly)
Mr. Shadrack Ndohe	Elected Representative	Walemavu Maswa (Disabled)

Monduli

Name of person	Position	Name of organisation
Mr. Donald Goa	Community Development Officer	Monduli District
Mr. S.M. Kissangas	Chairman	Tanzania Local Government Workers Group Monduli
Mr. Mlay	Community Development Officer	Monduli District
Mr. Rehema P. Msabila	Ward Executive Officer	Monduli District
Mrs. Blandina Nkini	Community Development Officer Arusha & Facilitator Monduli	Arusha Region
Dr. A.N. Rwegasira	District Agriculture & Livestock Officer	Monduli District
Mrs. Magdalena H. Shoo	District Councillor	Monduli District
Mr. Essou Sigalla	District Planning Officer	Monduli District
Mr. Emmanuel Youze	Chairperson	Monduli NGO Network

Annex 2: List of the 42 districts where district level consultations took place

Arusha Region:	- Arumeru
	- Monduli
Dar es Salaam:	- Kinondoni
	- Temeke
Dodoma Region:	- Dodoma
	- Mpwapwa
Iringa Region:	- Iringa
	- Makete
Kagera Region:	- Karagwe
	- Muleba
Kigoma Region:	- Kasulu
	- Kigoma
Kilimanjaro Region:	- Mwanga
	- Rombo
Lindi Region:	- Lindi
	- Nachingwea
Manyara Region	- Simanjiro
	- Hanang
Mara Region:	- Musoma
	- Serengeti
Mbeya Region:	- Mbeya
	- Mbozi
Morogoro Region:	- Morogoro
	- Ulanga
Mtwara Region:	- Mtwara
	- Tandahimba
Mwanza Region	- Missungwi
	- Sengerema
Pwani Region:	- Bagamoyo
	- Rufiji
Rukwa Region:	- Nkasi
	- Sumbawanga
Ruvuma Region	- Mbinga
	- Tunduru
Shinyanga Region:	- Maswa
	- Shinyanga
Singida Region:	- Iramba
	- Manyoni
Tabora Region:	- Tabora
	- Uyuyu
Tanga Region:	- Handeni
	- Muheza

Annex 3: Questionnaire

This questionnaire was used during the interviews with the respondents. The first questions listed, were put to all respondents. Thereafter the specific questions for donors, civil society, government, facilitator and participants at the local level are listed.

General:
- Introduction research
- Introduction respondent

PRSP I:
- Did you participate in the process leading up to PRSP I?
- What is your opinion about the consultation process of PRSP I?

Consultation process NSGRP:
- Are you satisfied with the way the consultation process was organised?
- Were you involved in organising the participation process of NSGRP?
- If yes, why were you involved and what was your role in organising it?
- Was everybody you expected to be participation, actually participating?
- If no, what participants did you miss and do you know why they were not participating?

Participation of the respondent in NSGRP process:
- How were you informed about the possibility of participating in the NSGRP process (e.g. invited, media)?
- Where and when did you participate?
- Did you have enough time to prepare yourself for your participation?
- Were you well-informed about PRSP?
- Did you have access to all the necessary information and documents?
- Was it clear what was expected from you during the participation?
- Did you got the opportunity to get insight in the early drafts of NSGRP?
- What form(s) of participation have been applied for NSGRP (info sharing, consultation, joint decision making, initiation and control by the stakeholders)?
- Were you satisfied with your opportunities to participate?
- Did you feel freely to voice your opinion and give advises?
- Can you give your opinion about the consultation process of NSGRP?

Influence:
- Could you influence the agenda of the meetings/ discussions? In what way and were they effective? Please give an example.
- Did the government use your opinions and advises to draft NSGRP?
- Do you think you had influence? Explain.
- Did you have influence on specific issues (macro-economic, health etc.)? Please give an example.
- Did all the participants have the same extent of influence?
- If no, who had more influence? What is your opinion about this?
- Would more influence of you and other donors have had a positive effect on the content of NSGRP?

Ownership of NSGRP:
- Is the aim of broad-based ownership by the population reached in regard to NSGRP?

- More than with PRSP I? Explain.

Role of the parliament in the NSGRP process:
- How would you describe the role of the parliament in the NSGRP process?
- Did it differ from their role during PRSP I?
- Can you assess the quality of their contribution?
- Can you suggest any improvements?

Consultation process of NSGRP compared to PRSP I:
- Can you summarise the main differences in the consultation processes of PRSP I and NSGRP and are you of opinion that it has improved?
- Has the government responded in the NSGRP process to the complaints about PRSP I?
- Did you conceive the timetable as less compressed than the timetable of PRSP I?
- Was the purpose of the participation and PRSP in general more clearly this time?
- Were the participants themselves more prepared this time?
- Did you have more or less influence in the process of NSGRP in comparison with PRSP I? Please give an example.
- Was the population, especially the poor, better represented in the process than in the process of PRSP I?
- Is the NSGRP now more known among the population than it was at the time of PRSP I?
- Does NSGRP reflect the views of the poor?

Tanzania in general:
- Can Tanzania be regarded as a democracy? To what extent is it, and to what extent is it not?
- What is your opinion about the role of the parliament in Tanzanian politics? Are MPs functioning as a watchdog or is the CCM dominance a real big problem? How do you see the future for the parliament in Tanzania?
- In the last ten years international donors and institutions are stimulating the involvement of CSOs in politics. It is regarded as a panacea for the democracy in developing countries. It is believed that CSOs will hold the governments more accountable. What is your opinion about this?
- Is the legal framework in Tanzania adequate in the way that it is not obstructing the possibilities to participate but rather facilitating it?
- Is civil society in Tanzania able to participate in complex policy issues when taking into account their staff, educational background and commitment? Is there a difference between CSOs based in Dar or inland?
- Too what extent are CSOs representative of their constituency?

Specific questions for donors
Donor and its relation with the government:
- Do you participate in government affairs other than PRSP at this moment? Explain.
- If yes, in what kind of government affairs and what is your role in this?
- How can you characterise your relation with the government (e.g. independent)?

Collaboration with other donors:
- Did you collaborate or have contact with other donors about the NSGRP process?
- Why did you decide to collaborate or have contact with other donors?
- How was the collaboration organised?
- How often did you have contact or met each other?

- How can you describe these contacts (easy going, laborious)?
- Where did you talk about with each other?
- Did you develop a strategy together?
- What were the advantages of your collaboration?
- Were you more powerful towards the government because of your collaboration?
- Would you collaborate a next time again? Why?
- Has your collaboration with other organisations made a difference (e.g. for your influence or knowledge)?

Specific questions for civil society
The organisation:
- What is the objective of your organisation?
- What means does your organisation have to attain their objectives (number of staff, financial means and certainty around these means)?
- What is the educational background of the staff?
- How would you assess your own participation capabilities for the participation process of PRSP?

Organisations grassroots support:
- Who does your organisation represent?
- Does your organisation have members? How many? Please explain.
- What are the requirements for being a member?
- Do you communicate with your members/ grassroots support? Explain.
- How do you communicate with your members/ grassroots support?
- How did you try to collect the views of your grassroots in regard to NSGRP?
- Do your members have a voice in the way you stand up for them?
- If yes, how is this organised?
- Do you give account to your members? Explain.
- Do you see a role for your organisation in holding the government more accountable (e.g. responsible for its acts)?

Specific questions for the government
The PRSP initiative and its participation process:
- Do you agree with the need for PRSP?
- Is the required participation process broadly based within the government?

Organisation of the participation process of NSGRP:
- Did the IFIs support you during the participation process for NSGRP? How?
- Did you experience this as positive or negative? Explain.
- Are you satisfied with the way you organised the consultation process?
- What lessons were learnt from PRSP I, and how did you incorporate them?
- What were the goals of the consultation process (collect opinions, concrete advises)?

Decisions made on participants:
- Did the participants have to be invited in order to participate?
- If yes, what criteria did you use for selecting the participants?
- Did all the participants respond to their invitation?
- If no, who not and do you know the reason for this?
- How representative were the participants for their members?
- Were participants representative of population at large?

- Did you attempt to involve the poor in the participation process? How?

Role of the parliament in the NSGRP process:
- What role did the parliament have?
- Did it differ from their role during PRSP I?
- If yes, why did you decide to change their role?
- Were they involved in decision making of the priority setting?
- Were they allowed to propose changes in the drafts of PRSP?
- Did the parliament have to approve the final draft?
- Can you assess the quality of their contribution?

Specific questions for facilitator:
Your role as facilitator:
- Was organising the district workshop a challenge for you or did you organise workshops before?
- Why did you decide to take the role as facilitator?
- Did you attend the 2-day training workshop in Dar and was the training useful?
- How did you handle the organisation of the district level consultations?
- Did you had to organise it all by yourself or were more people involved?
- Did you have enough time to organise the workshop?
- Were you well-informed about PRSP and did you have access to all the necessary information and documents?
- Can you describe how the workshop was organised? How many days?
- Did you have enough resources?
- Did you also speak to the participants individually?
- Did you decide solely on the topics discussed during the workshop or did the participants also have some influence?
- Are you satisfied with the way it was organised?
- Do you think that the consultations in March and April 2004 were sufficient? Or would another round have had additional value?

Participants in the district level consultations:
- Were the participants satisfied with their opportunities to participate?
- Were most of the participants well-prepared and aware of PRSP I?
- Did the participants have to be invited?
- If yes, what kind of criteria did you use?
- How well do these participants represent their constituency?

Specific questions for participants at the local level
The workshop:
- Did you have influence on how the workshops were organised or the topics discussed in the workshop?
- Was a balanced and representative group of people consulted (from private sector to civil society)?
- Were local associations, representing marginalized groups such as the informal sector, peasants, youth etc., able to participate?
- Was the facilitator doing a good job? Could he or she have done it better? Explain.

Influence:
- Have you read the final draft?

- Do you know if the government has incorporated some of your opinions in the document?

Ownership of NSGRP:
- Is the NSGRP now more known among the people in Maswa/Monduli than PRSP I?
- Did you notice any media coverage of the NSGRP in e.g. newspapers, tv, radio?

Annex 4: Inquiry

Six propositions were put to civil society, donor and government respondents. The other 36 respondents were not knowledgeable enough to respond to (one of) the statements or refused to respond to the inquiry as they did not acknowledge the value of it. Especially at the local level respondents were not able to respond to these propositions (all 19 respondents in Maswa and Monduli could not fill in the inquiry).

Respondents were asked to indicate if they (1) completely disagreed, (2) disagreed, (3) were neutral, (4) agreed or (5) completely agreed with the propositions. The propositions are:

1. Stakeholders were adequately consulted in the consultation process leading to NSGRP.
2. The NSGRP document was modified to accommodate some of participants' views.
3. Participation possibilities for civil society in government affairs have increased since the consultation processes of PRSP I.
4. The consultation processes for PRSP I and NSGRP have increased the transparency of governments' acts.
5. The government is held accountable more often due to participation during the consultation processes of PRSP I and NSGRP.

Annex 5: Results of inquiry

Figure 1: All stakeholders were adequately consulted in the consultation process leading to NSGRP

Figure 2: The NSGRP document was modified to accomodate some of participants' views

Figure 3: Participation possibilities for government affairs have increased since the consultation processes of PRSP I and NSGRP


Figure 4: The consultation processes for PRSP I and NSGRP have increased the transparency of governments' acts

Figure 5: The government is held accountable more often due to participation during the consultation processes of PRSP I and NSGRP