Raising Labour Standards under Pressure:
Analysis of the 2013 Rana Plaza Building Collapse International
Advocacy Campaign

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Laurie Ann Ingibjorg Calverley
(Canada)

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Members of the Examining Committee:

Dr. Freek Schiphorst
Dr. Lee Pegler

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Disclaimer:

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Inquiries:

Postal address:
Institute of Social Studies
P.O. Box 29776
2502 LT The Hague
The Netherlands

Location:
Kortenaerkaide 12
2518 AX The Hague
The Netherlands

Telephone: +31 70 426 0460
Fax: +31 70 426 0799
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<td>APPG</td>
<td>All Party Parliamentary Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Canadian</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Corrective Action Plan</td>
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<td>CCC</td>
<td>Clean Clothes Campaign</td>
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<td>CNN</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FFC</td>
<td>Fair Factories Clearinghouse</td>
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<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of Seven</td>
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<td>German Development Agency</td>
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<td>GSP</td>
<td>Generalized Scheme of Preferences</td>
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<td>HTC</td>
<td>Human Thread Campaign</td>
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<td>IFA</td>
<td>International framework agreement</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
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<td>NTPA</td>
<td>National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety and Structural Integrity</td>
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<td>NYT</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PVH</td>
<td>Phillips-Van Heusen Corporation</td>
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<td>RMG</td>
<td>Ready-Made Garment</td>
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<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Sustainable Clothing Action Plan</td>
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<td>SJF</td>
<td>Social Justice Fund</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprise</td>
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<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Congress</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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<td>Waste &amp; Resources Action Programme</td>
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ABSTRACT

Whether it be an Industrial or Natural disaster – it’s an event that receives public attention, mobilizes interest groups, influences agenda setting and creates policy change. As was the case for the April 24, 2013, Rana Plaza garment factory collapse in Savar, Bangladesh, when intense pressure was placed on brands/retailers and the national government by policy communities to enact policy change. Neither the government nor brands could deny the visible example of policy failure or refuse to engage in the agenda setting that occurred in the labour policy domain. The combined pressure of the event and from interest groups, resulted in expedited labour law and structural reform, a shift in the dominate topic of International agendas, and most notably, the first internationally formed, union led, five -year legally binding agreement regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a particular country.

This paper will take you through the dynamic aftermath of the Rana Plaza Collapse using Birkland’s theoretical lens on ‘focusing events’. A detailed account of interest group mobilization, post event politics, agenda setting and policy change is then followed by an analysis of the effects of consumer and labour power on private market labour governance. In 2014, Donaghey, Reinecke, Niforou and Lawson (hereafter referred to as Donaghey) developed a conceptual framework on the governance regimes achieved by the intersection of consumption relations and employment/industrial relations. It has yet to be tested, and given that, the theoretical framework is applied and examined through the Rana Plaza case study as a means of testing the framework’s viability to the overall study of global labour governance.

Methodology: This analysis is conducted through a case study. Media reports, campaign documents, newsletters, formal letters, brochures, conference material and monitoring reports were obtained from research strings on the internet and direct searches on respective actors’ web pages. This material was collected and analyzed for documentary review. Academic literature, using the same case study, was also reviewed as secondary data.

Keywords: Rana Plaza, Focusing event, Interest Group mobilization, Consumption relations, Employment relations, Industrial Relations, Global Supply Chain, Corporate Social Responsibility, Global Labour Governance.

Word Count: 17, 094 words
**RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES**

The social problems associated with globalization and CSR are many. Highlighted by governance gaps and the policy communities that seek to address them, social problems are characterized by: precarious employment in the formal and informal labour sectors; ambiguous multi supplier relations; lack of transparency in commodity chains; competition between international organizations for legitimacy and influence in the labour domain; a shrinking role of national governments; restricted financial and political power of national government over multi-national enterprises/trans-national companies; an absence of corporate accountability/enforcement measures; growth in consumer demand/investor pressure; corruption of audits/inspections; cultural limitations of CSR (due to its western origins); conflicts of interest (dual role of government representative and entrepreneur). The complexities of these social problems have brought to light an increased difficulty in creating policy that holds corporations responsible for their conduct in a global economy.

Global unions, non-government organizations (NGO), civil society organizations (CSO) and consumers are important actors leveraging bargaining power and contributing to the formation of labour standards in global supply chains. This is a significant shift from the traditional tripartite model (local government, workers and employers) (Donaghey et al 2014:230) to a multi-party model – not yet labelled but inclusive of consumer influence and multi-disciplinary actors who are jostling for jurisdiction and claiming to have a resolve to labour concerns. Analyzing events like the Rana Plaza collapse help to close the gap in understanding how industrial disasters, labour power and consumer power bring about change in developing countries and how they drive social protection of workers in global supply chains.

Essentially, the analysis of industrial disasters is a study in reflection. One where parties can assess whether or not the change achieved was positive and desirable. CSR is marked as a Western and European concept and is criticized for its imposing nature on developing countries. CSR policy setting is also relatively non-participatory and builds on the latest mainstream approach (i.e. auditing, consumer labelling). Despite its widespread implications along the global supply chain, how actors mobilize for these policy changes is not deeply analyzed. “Policy literature often mentions the agenda setting influence of focusing events, but few policy studies systematically examine the dynamics of these events” (Birkland 1998:53). Donaghey also explains that “with the decline in collective bargaining, with the increased mobility of capital, and conditions of tighter competition, the relationship between labor, consumers, and multinationals inevitably will become more important” (Donaghey et al. 2014:247). This analysis is therefore critical to the understanding of policy development and is integral to the breadth of policy literature.

The studies of post-event dynamics are also a means of empowerment. Serving to empower nationally ‘disadvantaged interest groups’ (Birkland 1998:54) to intercept, divert and align themselves for the purpose of creating meaningful and culturally relevant policy change on their own terms. Equally important is the opportunity it creates for reflection. ‘Advantaged interest groups’ can reflect on the dominate agenda, what was overlooked, what actors were included or excluded, was mobilization of the agenda bottom up or top down, was sustainable change achieved. It is only through the analysis of past events, that actors can prepare contingencies for the inevitable duplication of interest group mobilization and agenda-setting in future events. The relevance of the Rana Plaza collapse as a research study in policy development is widespread, as these post-event actions could occur in any country where production takes place as part of a global supply chain regardless of industry - be it food, toys, electronics, toys.
INTRODUCTION

After Bangladesh became an independent state in 1971, “it adopted export-oriented industrialization by focusing on the textile and clothing industry, particularly the ready-made garment (RMG) sector” (‘Bangladesh Textile Industry’ 2016). From the 1980’s till now the RMG sector has grown exponentially, to a $19 billion-a-year industry, accounting for over 80% of the nation’s export earnings and employing around 4 million workers, an estimated 55-60% of whom are women” (ILO 2016). Overall, “the global apparel market is valued at 3 trillion dollars, 3,000 billion, and accounts for 2 percent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product” (‘Global Fashion Industry Statistics – International Apparel’ 2016). In 2014, 57.8 million people worldwide were employed in the manufacturing of textiles and apparel, of which 24.8 million were specifically employed in the manufacturing of apparel. Bangladesh, second to China, is the largest RMG exporter in the world and is Europe’s largest trade partner (EU 2015b) for apparel receiving 60% of its clothing production (Watts 2013).

With rapid growth, labour can suffer the most. During industrialization of the West, the garment industry employed mostly woman, children and migrant labour. There were cases of excessive work hours with no rest, poor pay, mandatory overtime, health and safety hazards including but not limited to locked windows and doors during work hours, poor building construction, lack of union representation and other circumstances that would deem employment ‘precarious work’. The Pemberton Mill textile factory collapse and fire of 1860; the Grover Shoe Factory collapse and fire of 1905; the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire of 1911; the Binghamton Clothing Company factory fire of 1913 are amongst the most notable industrial disasters in the apparel industry that set the stage for policy change in the West. Incidents like these gave rise to corporate social responsibility (CSR), a concept that has been around since the mid-1800 during the second phase of the Industrial Revolution (Van Tulder and Van der Zwart 2006:133). Arguably, the Industrial revolution for labour then, is what globalization is for labour now in the garment industry. The Rana Plaza garment factory collapse of 2013, coupled with the Dhaka Tazreen Fashion Fire of 2012\(^1\) (five months earlier), are modern day industrial disasters bringing labour conditions in the garment industry’s global supply chain to the forefront of policy change.

Inspired by the Rana Plaza collapse, this paper seeks to understand how an industrial disaster (focusing event), consumer power and labour power affect global labour governance. To make sense of the issues of global CSR within the labour policy domain, this paper uses Birkland’s theory on ‘focusing events’ and Donaghey’s theory on labour and consumer power. Additional questions applied to the main research question to achieve this analysis are: who are the actors outside the traditional tripartite model? How the actors are coming together to create pressure? What changes are they actualizing? Are those outcomes complementary or revealing competing interests?

Birkland concentrated on four elements of interest group mobilization and post event politics: change in the dominant issues on the agenda; change in the dominant issues in a policy domain; evidence of event-driven group mobilization; evidence of group attempts to expand or contain issues in the wake of these events. I will do the same and thus, Chapter two is an extensive narrative and detailed account of actor, their roles, alliances, agenda setting and policy outcomes.

\(^1\)Amongst other accidents, as “the RMG industry in Bangladesh has had at least 1800 deaths as a result of fires and building collapses since 2005” (Rubya 2014: 691).
Given the public unveiling of labour conditions that occur by way of focusing events, a level of transparency along the chain is achieved that might not otherwise be available—especially to the consumer at the other end of the supply chain. Although consumers and labour are often seen in the light of a productions-oriented paradigm (whereby the consumer is seen as market pressure on companies and labour in terms of production quantity and quality), they are also being seen in a new light (Donaghey et al 2014:230). That being the consumption relations paradigm, which sees the consumer as an advocate of labour applying market pressure on governments and companies for labour standards regulation (Donaghey et al 2014:230). These paradigms differ in perspective, one is focused on production demand, while the other on labour governance. Donaghey’s framework represents the connectivity between consumer relations and employment relations that has surfaced and acknowledges that both labour and consumers are drivers of global labour governance Donaghey et al 2014:230).

According to Donaghey, the degree to which consumer power and labour power intersect has a direct impact on the type of agreements and standards (means of governance) produced. International framework agreements, society led standards (i.e. civil society led, transnational-led or industry-led) multi-stakeholder standards and unilateral standards (i.e. corporate codes of conduct) are all forms of CSR/mechanisms of voluntary private governance (Donaghey et al. 2014:235). Donaghey’s takes these forms of CSR and associates them with one of four separate regimes of labor governance: governance gaps, collective bargaining, standards markets, and complementary regimes” (Donaghey et al. 2014:229). Using the insights availed through Birkland’s theory on post-focusing event mobilization and change in the policy domain, I will analyze Donaghey’s conceptual framework. Thus in Chapter three, I will identify the means of CSR achieved in the Rana Plaza aftermath, discuss the intersection of labour power and consumer power, and apply these findings to Donaghey’s four regimes.
FOCUSING EVENT:
RANA PLAZA BUILDING COLLAPSE

Benetton, Bonmarche, the Children’s Place, El Corte Ingles, Loblaw’s Joe Fresh, Monsoon Accessorize, Mango, Matalan, Primark, Walmart, Zara (indiEX)(‘2013 Savar building collapse’ 2015) – brands known to the modern day consumer. Yet, not so well known to consumers is where these brands manufacture their clothing and the labour conditions behind it. On April 24, 2013, the invisibility and separation of labour from the consumer was somehow lessened. On this pivotal day, consumers came to know the Rana Plaza, in light of a deadly and catastrophic industrial accident, its relationship to the well-known brands, and the aftermath of international attention which unveiled labour injustices in the garment industry’s global supply chains.

On April 24, 2013, the Rana Plaza, an eight story “commercial building housing garment factories in Savar, Bangladesh, an industrial suburb (Yardley 2013) outside the capital city of Dhaka, “collapsed leaving 1,127 dead and approximately 2,500 injured” (Rubya 2014:685). The workers killed and injured “were making clothes for sale in Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, Ireland, Canada and the United States” (‘Dhaka building collapse: Factories and Buyers’, 2013).

The Rana Plaza was built six years previous to the collapse and three additional floors were added illegally after its initial construction. Occupying the ground and first floors were a BRAC bank and shops (WHO n.d.(c)). The remaining floors housed “five garment factories supplying well-known brands” (‘Dhaka building collapse: Factories and Buyers’, 2013) and nursery facilities for the workers. “The garment makers in the building were Phantom Apparels, Phantom Tac, Ether Tex, New Wave Style and New Wave Bottoms. Altogether, they produced several million shirts, trousers and other garments a year” (‘Bangladesh’ 2013c). New Wave Bottom Limited was on the third floor (Rana Plaza 2015b); Phantom on the fourth (Rana Plaza 2015b); Ether Tex on the sixth (Rana Plaza 2016); New Style Limited on the eighth (Rana Plaza 2015b).

Cracks in the building were found the day prior to the collapse. The “Rana Plaza was shut down briefly after workers spotted cracks in its walls and pillars a day before the collapse” (‘Bangladesh’ 2013b). “The building was briefly evacuated” (‘Bangladesh’ 2013e) and “Industrial police had asked the garment factory owners at Rana Plaza to keep the factories closed and only continue further operations after consulting with expert structural engineers” (Gomes 2013). Local media reported on the cracks in the building and evacuation. “The building owner Sohel Rana allegedly told media on the same day that the cracks were “nothing serious” (Gomes 2013). In light of potential structural issues, many businesses within the building did not open the next day (‘2013 Savar building collapse’ 2015), “but the garment factory workers were called back to work, many of them forcibly, hours before the building fell” (‘Bangladesh’ 2013b) the garment workers of these five factories were also instructed to attend work or be without a month’s pay (‘2013 Savar building collapse’ 2015) (‘Bangladesh’ 2013b).
EVENT DRIVEN INTEREST GROUP MOBILIZATION & POST EVENT POLITICS

The Rana Plaza building collapse caught international attention. “Unlike natural disasters, which can be portrayed as acts of God, industrial accidents or disasters are dramatic events for which blame can be assigned to large corporate interests, possibly resulting in anti-industry mobilization” (Birkland 1998:67). Initial reactions included riots, protests, petitions, boycotts, investigations, arrests, extensive media attention and interest group mobilization. “Mass protest and pressure through the media are but two other ways in which interest groups influence the course of policy making” (Birkland 1998:60). Actors sought blame while others declined responsibility. Culpability was placed on the building owner, inspectors, government, companies and consumers. The discourse was restitution, changes to work conditions, institutional reform and legislative reform to address the structural power imbalances between government, corporations and unions. International and national social movements combined with their use of news broadcasts and social media meant no actor in the global supply chain was left unaware or unaffected by blame. Moreover, all actors within the global supply chain were encouraged to evaluate their role in labour violations. In keeping with Birkland’s theory, this focusing event created change in the dominant issues of the agenda; change in the dominant issues in the policy domain; showed evidence of event-driven group mobilization and evidence of group attempts to expand or contain issues in the wake of these events (Birkland 1998:54).

INITIAL REACTIONS TO POLICY FAILURE & ISSUE EXPANSION

“The public and policy makers learn of focusing events virtually simultaneously, which diminishes advantages that policy elites have in framing the nature and substance of public problems before broader public participation is possible” (Birkland 1998:57).

Civil Action & Labour Groups

Consumers, activists, unions and Rana Plaza victims gathered in protest of social problems facing labour at the production end of the global supply chain. In an effort to bring low wages, poor safety standards, unjust labour conditions and lack of union protection to the forefront of policy agendas many civil actions took place in the first few weeks of the aftermath. On April 26, 2013, thousands of protestors rioted in the streets enraged by the deaths in the Rana Plaza collapse and in demand for the execution of building owners (RTNews 2013). “The demonstrators – some armed with bamboo sticks – blockaded roads, smashed vehicles, burned tires and attacked factories at Gazipur, just outside the Bangladeshi capital Dhaka…the rioting also spread to several districts in the capital” (RTNews 2013). National “trade unions [also] called for a strike on Sunday [April 28] to demand better working conditions” (RTNews 2013). On May 1, 2013 Internationals workers day, a mass protest took place in central Dhaka, Bangladesh for safer work conditions and the death penalty for the Rana Plaza factory owner. By May 16 “thousands of garment workers took to the streets in Ashulia, the industrial belt near Dhaka, demanding wage increases and other benefits. Some vehicles were attacked during the protest” (Bangladesh 2013e). A protest in demand of higher wages followed the next week (Pitta 2015: n.p.) and “on June 5, 2013, police in Bangladesh opened fire on hundreds of former workers and relatives of the victims of the collapse who were protesting to demand back pay and the compensation promised by the government and garment association” (Pitta 2015: n.p.). In concert with the Bangladeshi actions, UK

2 The Protests temporarily ceased when the Government and BGMEA promised outstanding salaries plus three months (Pitta 2015: n.p.).
protestors and labour activists (Bristol Anarchist Federation, Stop G8 Network, War on Want, Workers Liberty) conducted numerous protests and rallies outside stores like Primark, Benetton and Mango throughout the months of April and May. The US also experienced protesting efforts, but on a smaller scale and with a particular focus on Walmart. Leafleting, petitions, strikes and protests continued over several months. But in September of 2013, labour action surfaced in the media with renewed vigour when a three day strike (regarding low wages and poor working conditions) in Bangladesh, closed over 100 factories and involved police intervention (Pitta 2015: n.p).

**Government of Bangladesh**
The government’s attempts to contain issues only created further upset. “Finance Minister Abul Maal Abdul Muhith remarked, after the death toll had surpassed 530, that the disaster wasn’t “really serious”” (Gomes 2013). Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina declined international emergency aid stating that Bangladesh had sufficient resources when they did not and was dismissive toward the collapse, saying to CNN that “accidents happen” (Gomes 2013). “While all concerned citizens, as well as industry and its critics, would rather avoid accidents, some of these mishaps may be “normal accidents” (Perrow 1984)” (Birkland 1998:67), but this was not a normal accident given the cracks in the building that caused an evacuation of the building the day previous.

Illegally constructed buildings/floors were not uncommon and often glossed over “to take advantage of the export boom” (Taplin 2014:77). Even so the government’s appointed a committee that would report on the reasons for the building collapse (‘Bangladesh’ 2013b). The report revealed that the building was not constructed for commercial use and two to three of the eight floors were added illegally (Bangladesh 2013b). The report served to point out that proper permits were not obtained and where to direct liability. It’s also likely that it was also done in the hopes of channeling civil society’s attention to the collapse as an isolated incident, rather the failure of the broader structural and institutional factors and retail strategy of ‘fast fashion’(Taplin 2014:72).

The people of Bangladesh wanted criminal charges – especially against the owner. When charges were laid against those involved with the illegally constructed floors but not the owner, the government was accused of stalling because of political ties with the owner. “Roughly 10 percent of seats in Parliament are taken by factory owners [which] confirm[s] the deep political linkages in this industry between owner and politicians who are often, it seems, the same persons (Davidson, 2013, p. 18)” (Taplin 2014:77). The Prime Minister denied knowing the owner, but changed her statement when news media determined that this was untrue (Mustafa et al. 2013). There were fears “Ms. Hasina, leader of the governing Awami League, could face political fallout from the accident [as] Rana Plaza [was] owned by a political figure affiliated with the Awami League” (Manik et al. 2013:3). The owner was arrested, but that did not put an end to interest group mobilization or dim issue expansion. According to Birkland, focusing events naturally disadvantage the policy monopoly; “the suddenness of an event means that politically disadvantaged groups gain a strategic advantage from the event itself, which illustrates the very problem they seek to address, while the members of the policy monopoly are placed in the position of managing negative publicity and defending the status quo in a highly charged, politically embarrassing environment” (Birkland 1998:57).

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3 The sourcing journal reported in November 2013 that “activists have been leafleting in front of Walmart board members’ homes and offices around the country over the past year seeking to be heard” (“The fight for Bangladeshi labour rights hits New York City’ 2013) due to Walmarts’ association with the 2012 Tazreen fire and 2013 Rana Plaza collapse.
EVENT DRIVEN MOBILIZATION & AGENDA-SETTING

“Focusing events can lead interest groups, government leaders, policy entrepreneurs, the news media, or members of the public to identify new problems, or to pay greater attention to existing but dormant problems, potentially leading to a search for solutions in the wake of apparent policy failure (Birkland 1998:55).

Focusing events create a greater balance of political power between interest groups and the policy monopoly, and they create spaces for advocacy coalitions within the policy community to exploit the event for the purpose of changing the institutional agenda (Birkland 1998:71). But then again, if no coalition exists or if coalitions are in competition with one another over the agenda, the capacity to create change is minimized and may not happen at all (Birkland 1998:72). Arising from the aftermath unexpectedly was a single united front; an unprecedented advocacy coalition with a clear agenda. With consumer support and political backing from International organizations and governments, the advocacy coalition ignited a policy community that embarked in considerable policy change in the labour domain.

Policy Failure of Audit Systems
Immediately after the collapse, a previous scheduled meeting of interest groups to be held in Eschborn, Germany went ahead as planned (Reinecke et al. 2015: 730) with the Rana Plaza collapse on the agenda. The German Development Agency wanted a “Global Social compliance program in line with the industry-driven social auditing regime” (Reinecke et al. 2015: 732) and they hoped to build off of the pre-existing agreement between PVH-Tchibo linked to the Tazreen Fire of 2012. Labour groups, NGO’s and CSO’s were already frustrated with the failure of corporate social auditing schemes (Clean clothes 2013 b) (Reinecke et al. 2015: 730) so a common approach was not reached. Rather an advocacy coalition emerged presenting a position, also with an eye to building off the existing PVH-Tchibo, for “a binding agreement, financial responsibility of brands, a role of unions and independent and transparent inspections” (Reinecke et al. 2015: 730). This binding agreement would be known as the “Accord on Fire and Building Safety in the Bangladesh Ready-Made Garment Industry’ (Accord) and a deadline of May 15, 2013 was set for brands/retailer to sign. Given the lack of preparedness by Industry to present a similar unified front and agenda, the Accord became the first viable agenda in the policy domain and stop gap measure on the possible rapid exit by consumers, brands and international trade from Bangladesh RMG exports.

Unprecedented Advocacy Coalition
Most civil society actions were invariably linked to a global campaign to have brands/retailers provide victim compensation and sign the Accord. The campaign was brought together by IndustriALL Global Union, UNI Global Union, Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF), United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS), Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), War on Want, People and Planet, SumOfUs.org, Change.org, Credo Action, Avaaz, Causes, and was endorsed by many others (CCC 2013a). This was a group of trade unions, non-government organizations (NGOs), labour rights organizations and civil society organizations (CSOs) spurred by a common agenda and relationships that had developed during previous industrial disasters in Bangladesh. “When such groups coalesce to form alliances based on mutual interests and values, they are known as advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993)” (Birkland 1998:57).

Being in the wake of the 2012 Tazreen garment factory fire (five months previous), they were prepared to mobilize, vocalize their reform agendas and strategically manage diversion and deflection tactics used by government and industry. The campaign jeopardized brand reputation to achieve its desired agenda.
Using a positive and negative reinforcement strategy; companies who signed the Accord were given praise and for those who had not signed they were targeted. Through news media/social media, the coalition created an environment where the only relief from reputational damage was signing the Accord. To start, labour groups rumbled through the rubble of what was the Rana Plaza for papers, invoices, tags that would link brands to the Plaza (Bangladesh 2013d). The Bangladesh Garments and Industrial Workers Federation (BGIWF) and Bangladesh Center for Worker Solidarity (BCWS) and the International Labor Rights Forum used these findings to call out big name brands for victim compensation, industry wage increases and signatures for the Accord (Stillman 2013). This was critical evidence used when companies like Zara (Inditex), and Benetton denied their association with the Plaza. Some companies maintained their position that they had not sourced from garment factories within the Plaza; while others including Benetton retracted once pressed with evidence from the scene (Bangladesh 2013d). This anti-industry mobilization was furthered by other actors in the coalition. For example, the CCC “educated consumers about the brands sourcing from the Rana Plaza and mobilized them to put pressure on brands to sign the Accord” (Reinecke et al. 2015: 732). Birkland says even when there is a complex reason for an industrial accident, interest groups will often lead anti-industry mobilization (Birkland 1998:67); in an effort “to curb the power of industry … [they] tell the causal story of a disaster as being the result of human negligence rather than unforeseeable complexity (Stone 1989)… [and] argue that the event is evidence that a policy, its implementation, or both have to some degree failed.” (Birkland 1998:67).

The advocacy coalition requested direct pressure on brands and the Bangladesh Government (LabourStart 2013). “With event-induced attentions to the problem, pro-change groups mobilize in a number of ways…based on the need to react to the event and the failed policies that allowed it to happen. Groups will urge their members to write letters to business and political leaders, join boycotts, and participate in other forms of mass protest” (Birkland 1998:57). Coalition actors (AVAAZ, Change.org, SumOfUs) used news media and online campaigns to solicit consumer action in the form of petitions (Reinecke et al. 2015: 732). This led to companies like “GAP, Walmart, Coles, Rivers, Loblaw, River island, Edinburg Wollen Mill” (Reinecke et al. 2015: 732), “Kmart, Target, Cotton On Group, Forever New, Specialty Fashion Group (Rivers, Katies), Woolworths (Big W), Pretty Girl Fashion (Rockmans) and Pacific Brands (Bonds, Berlei)” (Oxfam 2014b) to sign the Accord. To achieve solidarity amongst unions around the world, the campaign used Labour Start – a “news and campaigning website of the international trade union movement. It distribute[d] news both via its own website and also through a news syndication service …used by over 730 trade union websites around the world” (LabourStart 2016). UK Unions (GMB, USDAN UNITE), Handels (Sweden); GMB, USDAN UNITE are some examples of unions who used their bargaining relationship to gain support for the Accord (Reinecke et al. 2015: 732). The coalition also mobilized political leaders who wrote letters directly to brands and the Government of Bangladesh requesting funds for victim compensation and support for the Accord. Possibly the most influential support received was that of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Their political backing was essential to the mobilization of other political leaders and in raising matters to a level where changes in the institutional agenda could occur.

The Catholic Church & Event-related mobilization
On April 26, 2013 “Special prayers for the dead, injured and missing were offered at mosques, temples and pagodas across Bangladesh” (RTNews 2013). Pope Francis would also say a prayer during the Regina Caeli address on April 28, 2013, and made his first of many appeals to respect the dignity and

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4 See Operant conditioning and Behaviour modification (McLeod 2015)
5 Handels used existing relationship with H&M to speak with company headquarters. Unions published in Swedish newspapers to urge retailers to sign the accord (Reinecke et al. 2015:731).
safety of workers (Pope 2013e). On May 1, 2013⁶ the Pope would speak more candidly and openly on labour issues while also appealing to the many actors of Global supply chains. During a sermon at a privately held mass in the chapel of the Casa Santa Marta (‘Caritas’ 2013a), the Pope called the Bangladesh garment work “slave labour” (Pope 2013c). He drew attention to the failure of policy systems, saying people “are in this situation because of these economic, social and political policies ... that signify exploiting the individual” (Pope 2013c). On the same day, during the weekly public sermon in the St. Peter Square at the Vatican, Pope Francis appealed to government and political leaders to address unemployment and slave labour (Pope 2013a); (Pope 2013c); (Pope 2013b). His statements were reported by Vatican radio and quickly spread to global, national, local newspapers and televised news broadcasts around the world - but he didn’t stop there. The Pope fulsomely expressed his concerns for labour, globalization and the prevailing economic ideology (amongst other topics) in his 223 page Apostolic Letter/Evangelii Gaudium of November 24, 2013. His desired action from politicians and economic leaders was financial reform, ethical conduct, less inequality and balanced human order. His also detailed actions for consumers and reminded all Christians that they have a moral call and obligation to the poor (‘Evangelii Gaudium’ 2015). This effectively placed labour matters and conscious consumerism to the forefront of the agenda for religious actors.

Victim Support Services
Health service providers and academic researchers advanced matters of mental injury, rehabilitation, victim support, and compensation disbursement. Caritas⁷, a branch of the international Catholic humanitarian network, worked with Dhaka University psychologists, social and religious workers to provide social and psychological assistance in the aftermath (Caritas 2013). The project began May 2 with an anticipated duration of one month (Caritas 2013). Caritas and “five or six other NGOs [were] providing mental health counseling for Rana Plaza victims... with foreign funding” (Rana Plaza 2016). An appeal was made through media for funding sources and action by the Bangladesh government. A Caritas counsellor stated in the media that “We have worked only with 150 victims. But we know the number is two thousand and five hundred...I don’t think all of the NGO’s could reach more than 500” (Rana Plaza 2016). Caritas also supported vocational training; seed funds for the social and economic rehabilitation (Rana Plaza 2015b); partnered with Porticus Asia Ltd.⁸ on a project to provide support to 175 of the closest relatives of the unidentified deceased workers that included funding/social support for children education and nutrition (‘Third Monitoring Report, Center for Policy Dialogue’ 2014); coordinated the distribution of wages received from companies and global supply managers⁹; and conducted a mental health study with the Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib Medical University. The World Health Organization (WHO) and National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) also produced a research study on the severity of mental illness among survivors. Their partnership also involved financial, educational and technical support to the NIMH mental health teams during the immediate aftermath to provide on-site psychological support to victims, family and rescuers (WHO n.d.(b)). The duration of the project was six months, at which point the WHO ended its financial support of the project and the Institute decidedly closed the project. Despite the closure of projects by the WHO and Caritas, there was a need for mental health support systems, lifelong care and restitution, as substantiated by their research. Their actions ultimately led to a mental health agenda within the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) and the ILO.

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⁶ May 1 “marks the feast of St. Joseph the Worker” (Pope 2013a).
⁷ Caritas Bangladesh
⁸ Caritas Luxembourg
⁹ For example: C&A Li-Fung via Caritas paid monthly wages (‘Rendered Jobless - Left Penniless’ 2014).

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“Claims of policy failure are ... made by pro-change groups in an attempt to expand an issue to a broader audience. These event-triggered issue expansion efforts should be clearly evident in post-event policy making, as groups seek to move their preferred ideas from the systemic agenda (the collection of all possible policy ideas) to the institutional agenda (the list of possible policies up for active consideration) (Cobb and Elder 1983)” (Birkland 1998:55).

Policy communities are defined by pro-change oriented groups and status-quo oriented groups. These groups can also be coined ‘anti-industry’ and ‘pro-industry’, respectively. “The presence, absence, or relative cohesiveness of certain types of advocacy coalitions [pro-change groups] can influence the policy community’s reaction to events” (Birkland 1998:57). After the collapse a single advocacy coalition arose. Even though the OECD, G7, faith-based interest groups, EU and some of its country members, had a ‘responsible supply chain’ agenda it did not interfere with the advocacy coalition’s agenda. The responsible supply chain agenda was a broader concept and ill-defined in the early stages of the aftermath. Once the event driven agenda-setting created policy change; it became clearer (in the inter-event period or longer range period after the collapse) that the institutional agenda needed greater change along the supply chain (see Table 1, Table 3). Given that more coalitions (multi-stakeholder platforms) formed within EU countries and further initiatives and agreements were reached regarding responsible supply chains. These continued actions of agenda setting and changes in the policy domain kept pressure on status-quo oriented groups (i.e. brands, government) and counteracted issue containment.

**PRO-CHANGE ORIENTED GROUPS**

*The Advocacy Coalition & the Accord on Fire and Building Safety Agreement (Accord)*

The scope of the Accord agreement was Health & Safety in the Bangladesh RMG Industry. It was premised on six key components: (1) a five year legally binding agreement between brands and trade unions; (2) an independent inspection program supported by brands, workers and trade unions; (3) public disclosure of factory inspection reports and corrective action plans through the Fair Factories Clearing house (FFC); (4) a commitment by brands to ensure sufficient funds for remediation and maintenance of those sourcing relationships; (5) placement of democratically elected health and safety committees; (6) engagement of worker empowerment through training programs, complaint mechanisms and right to refuse unsafe work (Accord 2015a). Shortly after the deadline, the parties agreed on an implementation plan which “led to the incorporation of the Bangladesh Accord Foundation in the Netherlands in October 2013” (Accord 2015a). The signatories to the agreement were two global trade unions (IndustriALL and UNI Global), eight local Bangladeshi trade unions and several international brands and retailers. Witnesses included four International NGOs: the Clean Clothes Campaign and the Workers’ Rights Consortium, International Labour Rights Forum and Maquila Solidarity Network (Accord 2015a). As a neutral body, the ILO accepted the position of independent chair of the Accord steering committee. By the May 15 deadline, there were a small number of brand signatories. The campaigning continued due to its inevitable capacity to gain more signatures. By 2016, “over 200 apparel brands, retailers and importers from over 20 countries in Europe, North

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10 Bangladesh Textile and Garment Workers League, Bangladesh Independent Garment Workers Union Federation, Bangladesh Garments, Textile & Leather Workers Federation, Bangladesh Garment & Industrial Workers Federation, IndustriALL Bangladesh Council, Bangladesh Revolutionary Garment Workers Federation, National Garment Workers Federation, United Federation of Garment Workers.

11 On May 15, well before the midnight deadline, only 24 brand/retailers had informed of their agreement to sign (IndustriALL 2013).
America, Asia and Australia” (Accord 2015c) had signed the Accord. The Accord was groundbreaking, being the first legally binding worldwide CSR initiative.

**International Labour Organization (ILO) & The National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety and Structural Integrity (NTPA)**

After the commencement of the advocacy coalition campaign and prior to decisions being made on trade sanctions threatened by the EU and the US within the first week of the collapse, the ILO went to Bangladesh on what was called a high level delegation. From May 1-4, 2013 the ILO Deputy Director General for Field Operations and Partnerships, Mr. Gilbert Houngbo, met with the tripartite partners (government, workers’ and employers’ organizations) and stakeholders to identify prevention strategies against further industrial accidents (ILO 2016). The Government of Bangladesh, employers’ organizations and workers’ organizations agreed to develop an action plan with short and medium term steps including: creation and submission of labour law reform package (freedom of association, right to collective bargain, occupational health and safety) to parliament by June 2013; structural building fire and safety assessments of all active export-oriented RMG factories by end of 2013 (along with initiation of remediation process); skills and training programme for disabled workers of the Rana Plaza, Tazreen Fashions Ltd. and Smart Export Garments; redeployment12 of workers who lost work due to loss of work location; redeployment of rehabilitated workers; staggered recruitment of a minimum 1000 inspectors in the Department of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Establishments in 2013; implementation of the NTPA and visible expansion into other vulnerable sectors; engagement with the ILO-IFC Better Work programme13 (ILO 2013). These agreed to terms became amendments to an existing NTPA agreement14 and would proceed with a six month progress review. By request of the Government of Bangladesh, the ILO assisted in the implementation and coordination of these agreements (ILO 2013).


The EU responded positively to the tripartite partners NTPA amendment announcement made on the last day of the high level delegation. Acknowledging the Bangladesh’s actions toward the ILO-IFC Better Work Programme and labour law reform, the EU confirmed trade sanctions were no longer a consideration. The EU also encouraged companies to maintain their operations in Bangladesh and work collaboratively on health and safety matters. In a joint statement with the Bangladesh Foreign Minister on May 28, 2013, they announced their “resolve to approach a period of deep engagement for all actors involved in the global value chain – namely, global buyers, brands, governments and consumers - to work together in promoting a fair, ethical and responsible supply chain management across the industry” (EU2013d). By July 2013, the EU and Bangladesh developed a joint initiative known as the ‘Sustainability Compact’. This was co-launched with the ILO Director-General in the presence of “Representatives of Bangladeshi manufacturers, major European importers, trade unions and other key stakeholders” (EU 2013c). Although the sustainability compact predominately mirrored components of the NTPA amendments, it had a review period of one year (June 2014), reiterated support through existing initiatives15 and development assistance (capacity building and financial aid) from 2014-2020 upon ILO-IFC Better Work Programme eligibility (EU 2013c).

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12To be acted upon by the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers Export Association (BGMEA), Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers Export Association (BKMEA) (ILO 2013).
13“A partnership between the ILO and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) which helps firms improve practices based on core ILO labour standards and national labour law” (EU 2013c).
14A pre-existing three and a half year programme funded Canada, the Netherlands and UK, that was developed following the 2012 Tazreen factory fire. The programme involved capacity building on fire safety assessments; labour inspection reforms; occupational safety and health; rehabilitation and skills training, and Better Work Bangladesh programme (ILO 2016).
15Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programme and the Better Work and Standards (BEST) programme (EU 2013c).
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct (Global Forum)

On June 4, 2013, OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría issued a statement calling on employers to take responsibility, maintain operations in Bangladesh and join the Accord. He also requested that Bangladesh take policy action, participate with global actors to achieve collective action and attend the Global Forum set for June 24-27, 2013, in Paris France. The OECD was the first host on the topic of responsible business conduct in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza collapse. This forum was designed for an open dialogue of experiences and best practices to ensure “that tragedies like Rana Plaza do not happen again ... [and to] make a significant contribution towards eradicating poor business conduct” (OECD 2013a). The Bangladesh Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Dipu Moni, attended the forum. As did “leaders from government, labour, business, NGOs, and academia from advanced countries and emerging-market economies” (OECD 2013a).

In the Secretary-General’s opening remarks, he acknowledged the “change in dominant agenda” (OECD 2013a). “That responsible business conduct is no longer an afterthought...[but] a key priority on the global economic agenda” (OECD 2013a). In his remarks he gave an extensive list of OECD successes and initiatives in the labour domain, then disclosed its mobilization with the ILO to work jointly “on a multi-stakeholder process ...to strengthen due diligence in textiles” (OECD 2013a). It appears that the opening statement was a pretext to legitimatize the international organizations’ footing in business and labour matters. With an underlying message was that in spite of, and without loss of, institutional power held by the OECD, they were collaborating with the ILO on the matter of responsible business conduct rather than having overlapping and competing efforts. Although, there was no immediate change from the OECD in the policy domain, they were indicating that the OECD and ILO were collaborating as a single policy community. This message was significant as any party hoping to counter-mobilize the ILO’s efforts through the OECD was now on notice that it would not happen.

The Advocacy Coalition, NTPA & the Memorandum of ‘Understanding for a Practical Arrangement on Payments to the Victims of the Rana Plaza Accident and their Families and Dependents for their Losses (The Arrangement)

The advocacy coalition’s campaign also sought victim compensation. This agenda item materialized in the policy domain through the NTPA amendments (The Arrangement 2013) and in the development of the Rana Plaza Coordination Committee established in September 13, 2013 (The Arrangement n.d.(f)). The committee was a multi-stakeholder body of national and international partners comprised of the Bangladesh Ministry of Labour and Employment; Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers’ Association (BGMEA); Bangladesh Employers Federation (BEF); IndustriALL Bangladesh Council (IBC); National Coordination Committee for Workers’ Education (NCCWE); Bangladesh Institute of Labour Studies (BILS); IndustriALL Global Union; CCC; and, brands (Bonmarché, El Corte Ingles, Loblaw, Primark) (The Arrangement 2013). The parties had an agreement in principle to develop a claims process consistent with ILO Convention No. 121, which was later captured in a memorandum of understanding known as ‘The Arrangement’ and signed on November 20, 2013. The committee’s mandate was to provide income loss payments, physical care, mental health care and supplementary payments to eligible beneficiaries. To do this, they established a claims process and the Rana Plaza Donor’s Trust Fund. The ILO became the neutral, independent chair of the committee, technical advisor and sole trustee of the Trust Fund (The Arrangement 2013). On June 8, 2015 a substantial anonymous donation was made to the Trust fund and the target reached (The Arrangement n.d.(c)). The donations recognized in reaching its target were: public and private donations, the Prime Ministers Relief and Welfare Fund and Primark’s payments in the initial aftermath (The Arrangement n.d. (a)).
STATUS—QUO ORIENTED GROUPS

Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Trade Sanctions
“In the U.S. context, linking labor standards with trade has always been on the agenda, although to different degrees (Arthur 2001, 286)... Labor standard clauses had been included in unilateral or bilateral trade regulations, either in terms of product bans on imports made by forced or child labor, or under the GSP that gave tariff concessions to certain products and countries” (Hassel 2008: 237). Although Bangladesh remained on Europe’s GSP, this would not be the case for the US. On June 25, 2013, “President Obama removed Bangladesh from the GSP due to labor and safety issues” (Quelch 2016: 337). This meant Bangladesh would not be placed on the list of 122 developing countries given the trade privilege of “duty-free access for up to 5,000 products in the U.S. market” (Caritas 2015b). The US had previously requested improvements to factory safety and worker’s rights (including freedom to associate and right to collective bargaining) after the Tazreen Fire in 2012 (NYT 2013a). Given the Rana Plaza collapse five months later and lack of substantial improvements on those requirements a 60-day notice of sanctions was issued to Bangladesh (NYT 2013a). On August 11, 2015, the US announced that sanctions would continue and Bangladesh would not be reinstated (Caritas 2015b). Although this was done to send a message for change—it was a punishment. For that reason, it could be seen as a status-quo measure.

North American Brands & the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (Alliance)
In reaction to the Accord, many brands publicly informed that they would not sign including, JC Penny, Sears, Gap, Walmart, Japan’s Uniqlo and Theory fashion brands (Rana Plaza 2013). According to Birkland, status-quo groups (often the more powerful groups) “may argue that an event is not as important as claimed by opposing groups, that existing policy is able to deal with any problems” (Birkland 1998:57). Gap said “they would not sign the pact because they believe that their own inspection plans will get faster results” (Rana Plaza 2013) and Walmart had “rejected reforms that would have retailers pay more for apparel to help Bangladesh factories improve safety standards” (Pitta 2015: n.p.) stating that it “will independently make safety inspections at all of its suppliers’ factories” (Rana Plaza 2013). “Status quo-oriented groups (such as business ...) seek to prevent the promotion of issues that they find detrimental to their interests” (Birkland 1998:56). Even though there were companies who did not sign the Accord; the eventual success of the Accord campaign made it necessary for those on the sidelines to accept the agenda-setting.

“On 10 July 2013, a group of 17 major North American retailers16, including Walmart, Gap, Target and Macy’s, announced a plan to improve factory safety in Bangladesh, drawing immediate criticism from labour groups who complained that it was less stringent than the Accord reached among European companies...[and] lack[ed] legally binding commitments to pay for those improvements” (Pitta 2015: n.p.). The Alliance website states they were “organized in 2013 through the Bipartisan Policy Center with discussions convened and chaired by former U.S. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) and former U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME)” (Alliance 2016a). However, Walmart who is known for its anti-union animus, reportedly “helped led efforts to create the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, a parallel initiative to the ILO backed Accord, causing a heavily debated divide between proponents of the Accord and of the Alliance” (Donaldson 2013). Unlike the Accord initiated by global unions, the Alliance was initiated by North American brands. This was an act of acceptance toward the dominant agenda, but on their own terms. Rather than acquiescing to a union pressured tripartite

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16 “Alliance’s members represent the majority of North American imports of RMG from Bangladesh” (Alliance 2016f).
agreement with a collaborative approach; the Alliance formed a management rights based agreement with a collaborative approach.

Although the formation of the Alliance was relatively speedy, they did not reach a common agreement on standards (fire, structural, electrical safety), inspection process and worker training curriculum until December 2013. It appears that this may have been done strategically since the Alliance was merely following the benchmarks set by the Accord rather than leading changes in the policy domain. “If events threaten or reduce the power of advantaged groups to control the agenda, these groups must carefully plan how they will respond” (Birkland 1998:57). Birkland states: industry representatives may adopt “a defensive strategy in hopes that the event would be quietly addressed and quickly forgotten” (Birkland 1998:71). The time lag was sufficient to wait out any potential fleeting success of the Accord that would render the formation of the Alliance moot and sustain the status-quo. Alternatively, the lag would provide time to absorb public criticisms and strategize further on what should be contained in their agreement rather than engaging in repeated criticism at every step of engagement.

Despite the critics and attempts to poach Alliance members\(^\text{17}\) - the Alliance would form a “legally binding, five-year commitment to improve safety in Bangladeshi RMG factories” (Alliance 2016a) comprised of the “U.S. and Bangladeshi governments, policymakers, NGOs, members of civil society, and organized labor” (Alliance 2016a). It had an industry led Board of Directors\(^\text{18}\) and a Board of Advisors manned by 10 people, four of which were prominent Bangladeshi union leaders (Alliance 2016b). By 2016, there were 28 membership companies and several supporting associations (Alliance 2016f). Similar to the Accord, the Alliance focused on “standards & inspections, training, remediation, worker empowerment, sustainability” (Alliance 2016b); used the NTC review panel\(^\text{19}\); the Fair Factories Clearinghouse (FFC) database; and membership dues were used toward a Worker Compensation Fund providing income replacement in the case of factory closure and remediation (Alliance 2016b).

Complimentary to the programme, the Alliance had an integrity Program “to ensure ethical practices and compliance with applicable laws in the implementation of [their] work in Bangladesh and internationally” (Alliance 2016b) which included an independent whistleblower hotline. Although the Alliance did not have an agenda focused on unionization it did have a commitment to worker empowerment. To achieve this they had a telephone helpline and promoted democratically elected worker representatives (Alliance 2016b). The Alliance also made a point to mention on its website that as of 2016 “twenty Alliance factories had established trade unions” (Alliance 2016b). The essence of what the Accord sought to achieve was there, but the fine details differed. “The compensation fund [was] $50 Million (10% of dues)...administered by BRAC...pays 50% of workers’ wages—with the other 50% supplied by factory ownership—for up to two full months” (Alliance 2016b). The alliance also had a fixed sum of “$100 million in affordable access to capital to help factories implement safety upgrades” (Alliance 2016b). In response to pressures for compensation and lack of contributions to the Rana Plaza Donors Trust Fund, the Alliance organized the first Fire and Safety Expo in Dhaka with proceeds donated to the fund (Alliance 2016b). “Several individual member companies [had also] made substantial contributions to the Bangladesh Humanitarian Fund, administered through BRAC USA to be directed to three specific programs, one of which included the ILO Rana Plaza Donors Trust Fund” (Alliance 2016b).

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\(^{17}\) For example: Oxfam “encourag[ed] the public to sign a petition asking ‘The Just Group’ and ‘Best&Less’ to join the Accord” (Oxfam 2014b). Even though they had joined the Alliance, efforts to have them sign the Accord persisted.

\(^{18}\) “Comprised of eight people: board chair and affiliates of Gap, Target, Walmart, Global Responsible Sourcing, Square Textiles Limited; BRAC UK” (Alliance 2016d).

\(^{19}\) The ‘3+5+1’ group of three Bangladesh Secretaries (Labour, Commerce and Foreign Affairs); five Ambassadors (US, EU, Netherlands, Canada and a 5th EU member state -- filled on rotation) and the ILO (ILO 2016).
**Group of Seven (‘G7’) Declarations**

At G7 Summit\(^2\) held on June 7 and 8, 2015, in Schloss Elmau Germany, leaders discussed responsible supply chains as a dominant agenda item. It was two years after the collapse but the G7 acknowledged the global milestones regarding “international cooperation and sustainable development issues [and recognized the G7’s] prominent share in the globalization process” (G7 2015b). This “was groundbreaking in that G7 leaders for the first time discussed such issues” (HTC 2016b). The resulting Summit declaration affirmed that the G7 would seek collaboration from the G20 and other countries “to strive for better application of internationally recognized labour, social and environmental standards, principles and commitments (in particular UN, OECD, ILO and applicable environmental agreements) in global supply chains” (G7 2015b). They pledged to provide financial assistance to: the Rana Plaza Donor Trust Fund shortfall, existing ILO projects (which they called a Vision Zero Fund) and the attainment of SME due diligence in responsible supply chain management. The G7 also pledged to address: supply chain transparency, complaint mechanisms, multi-stakeholder initiatives, coordination of bilateral development cooperation and local remedial actions (particularly through OECD national contact points) (G7 2015b). The declaration encouraged the “OECD to promote peer reviews and peer learning on the functioning and performance of NCPs” (G7 2015b). It also made a request from industry and international community for ideas in the formulation of “substantive National Action Plans... [and]... initiatives to promote the establishment of appropriate impartial tools to help consumers and public procurers in [their] countries compare information on the validity and credibility of social and environmental product labels” (G7 2015b). Lastly, they encouraged “enterprises active or headquartered in [G7] countries to implement due diligence procedures regarding their supply chains, e.g. voluntary due diligence plans or guides” (G7 2015b). In response to the declaration, ILO Director-General released a statement endorsing the G7’s commitments and “welcomed specific efforts to promote fair production in small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), including through a general discussion on ‘decent work in global supply chains’...scheduled to take place during the International Labour Conference” (ILO 2015).

In the fall of 2015, a two day meeting took place in Berlin to discuss the Vision Zero Fund (ILO 2015). The G7 declaration informed that the fund would provide financial support to existing ILO programmes with a goal of “preventing and reducing workplace-related deaths and serious injuries by strengthening public frameworks and establishing sustainable business practices” (G7 2015b). At the meeting, in cooperation with the ILO, it was decided that the fund would “support social dialogue, the application of ILO standards on occupational safety and health (OSH) and fundamental principles and rights at work in global supply chains” (ILO 2015) starting in 2016.

In the end, the G7 had a rather slow start to agenda setting, lacked substance in its commitments, failed to mobilize, supported a status-quo approach to corporate social responsibly through codes of conduct and released its 2016 agenda (held in Ise-Shima, Japan) without mention of ‘responsible global supply chains’ or the 2015 commitments. Outside the realm of financial support, the G7 failed to follow through. It’s possible that the G7 was a divided group of pro-change (i.e. Germany, UK) and status-quo actors (i.e. US). And that divide negatively affected the declarations from proceeding into substantive change.

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\(^2\)The G7 countries (Canada, US, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Japan) represent “more than 64% of the net global wealth ($263 trillion)...46% of the global GDP evaluated at market exchange rates and 32% of the global purchasing power parity GDP” (G7 2016).
“Baumgartner and Jones (1993) find the greater attention to a problem usually leads to more negative assessments of current policy, thereby creating pressure on the dominant policy community or policy monopoly to open up policy making and accept change, regardless of efforts by dominant members of the policy community to contain conflict and to deflect attention from the problem” (Birkland 1998:55).

ILO Support & Coordination
To ensure that policy change was embedded throughout the system, a series of projects were enacted with ILO support and coordination (Table 2). As a neutral body, the ILO coordinated multi-party interests and was closely involved in the implementation and movement initiatives addressing: labour law reform, health and safety reform, legal compliance, victim reintegration, rehabilitation, education/training, functioning unionization, dispute resolution mechanisms and employment injury insurance. Staggered start times, deadlines and review periods were carefully coordinated. The ILO also held integral positions: independent chair of the Accord steering committee; lead designer and coordinator of the Rana Plaza Coordination Committee compensation scheme; sole trustee of the Rana Plaza Donors Trust Fund. Even though the ILO is a neutral party, it would make statements of support for the Accord. This leveraged the multi-stakeholder and tripartite agendas and legitimatized the ILO’s presence as the international organization on labour matters.

EU’s Sustainability Compact Review
In January 2014, the International Trade Union Confederation, IndustriALL, UNIGlobal, conducted a review of Bangladesh’s progress on the sustainability compact (IndustriALL 2016). Unsatisfied with the governments’ self-affirming reviews of factory safety and practical application of workers’ rights and freedom to association, IndustriALL released a report on their findings and appealed to the EU (IndustriALL 2016). After the EU’s own review, they issued a public statement (July 8, 2014) “urging the government of Bangladesh to complete the labour law refor, training and recruitment of inspectors and to create the conditions for meaningful freedom of association” (EU 2014f). The EU stated “working conditions must improve in practice and workers must be free to organise and exercise their right to collective bargaining without fear of anti-union discrimination, harassment, intimidation or harm... cause for concern are recent refusals to register trade unions, attempts to limit their freedom of expression and the lack of measures taken to address intimidation and violence against workers. The situation needs to be redressed so as to ensure sustainable improvements in labour conditions in Bangladesh” (EU 2014f). Human Rights Watch also followed with a call to “the Bangladesh government, factory owners and Western retailers to ensure respect for workers’ rights and end the unlawful targeting of labor leaders by factory owners and supervisors” (‘Human Rights Watch’ 2015a).

Sustaining the Campaign for Victim compensation
Political representatives increased pressure on brands for victim compensation. TUC general secretary, Frances O’Grady “called on the government to pressure UK companies sourcing from Bangladesh to pay up” (Butler 2014b). “Government ministers from seven European countries (including the UK, France, Germany and Italy) joined together to ramp up pressure on clothing brands to pay compensation to victims of the Rana Plaza factory collapse. A statement agreed at a forum on responsible business conduct organised by the OECD, said ministers regretted that some companies whose clothes had been produced in the building ...had not paid into an ILO backed compensation fund” (Butler 2014a). Government ministers also took action on their own initiative. UK minister Alan Duncan stated “we have to raise the pressure over a year after the event to make sure a complete compensation package is
assembled...retailers [cannot] claim that they weren't aware of where their clothes were produced because production had been sub-contracted by their suppliers” (Butler 2014b). He had a list of British companies who had not paid into the compensation fund and issued personalized letters in appeal (Butler 2014b). Along with Alan Duncan, Lilianne Ploumen a Dutch minister “urged the government of Bangladesh and the local factory owners association to increase their contributions to the fund and ensure their ‘public accountability’” (Butler 2014b). UK consumer affairs minister Jenny Willott, also spoke up stating “retailers must have a policy on sourcing ethical products, because ignoring consumers' concerns about forced labour and dangerous working conditions could risk putting them out of business” (Butler 2014a). In due course consumer labelling was raised at the international level (i.e. 2015 G7 Summit and 2016 EU member initiatives).

In 2015, UNIGlobal, IndustriALL and CCC “started a countdown campaign on March 24 to remind consumers, government and foreign brands about [the fund] and to urge them to pay compensation before the second anniversary of the collapse” (Rana Plaza 2015b). The Rana Plaza Coordination Committee also issued “letters to the international brands, the government and the garments industry owners association BGMEA” (Rana Plaza 2015b) to address the $8.5 Million shortfall. After considerable campaigning from the advocacy group, affiliate groups, politicians and consumers the Trust Fund reached its target on June 8, 2015. Given the G7’s summit declaration to assist with the shortfall, it’s possible that the final donation came from government rather than industry. Reaching the target was a difficult feat, faced with a considerable concession on the part of the coordination committee to change the target from $40 to $30 million (The Arrangement n.d.(e)). Although the committee, ILO, and, advocacy coalition, asserted that the changed was due to actual claim costs being less than estimated costs (The Arrangement n.d.(e)), it can’t be ignored that claims from that point forward would not be accepted, they proceeded with a skeleton staff (The Arrangement n.d.(e)) and throughout the campaign they had struggled to obtain donations from industry. Moreover, rendering the initiative a success was critical to future mobilization efforts. Success of the initiative would mean the advocacy coalition was a game changer and powerful force in the policy domain.

**Pressure on Brands in North America**

More recently a wave of lawsuits against brands in the global supply chains have been filed in Canadian and American courts by consumers and interest groups. The Rana Plaza incident was no exception. “A class action lawsuit against Loblaws and Joe Fresh ..was launched by Bangladeshi garment workers in response to the well-known 2013 Rana Plaza collapse”. Legal action, was used as an intimidation tactic and attempt to balance the power between pro-change and status-quo groups (in this case those who had not signed the Accord). This court application will lay the foundation on how and if, legal action is used as a future tactic of pro-change interest groups regarding MNC conduct abroad. For the court system, this raises precedent setting application of the law, with respect to ‘jurisdiction’, ‘duty of care’, ‘reasonableness’ (in reduction of harm and knowledge of harm), ‘true employer’ or ‘ultimate employer’, ‘damages’ (Burkett et al. 2015). Given the Canadian courts propensity to mediate, it’s possible that this legal application or others, could lead to settlements and leverage pro-change agendas without proceeding to hearing.

**G7 – 2016 Summit**

CSO’s and NGO’s joined forces in a letter writing campaign calling on the Chair and G7 Governments to address responsible global supply chains (2015 commitments) in the G7 2016 Summit agenda for Ise-Shima, Japan. The standard campaign letter voiced that “corporations based in G-7 countries claim that the brands are not responsible for the conditions in factories in Bangladesh that are locally owned and operated, [and] we disagree and believe that responsible supply chain practices are good for consumers
and good for business in addition to being good for the workers” (HTC 2016f). The letter raised the importance of 2015 declarations in the 2016 agenda; that G7 countries need to “require, by law, that companies implement human rights due diligence in accordance with the highest international human rights and environmental standards... and create, as a matter of urgency, a mechanism for meaningful engagement with all relevant stakeholders including civil society including the affected people, NGOs, international trade unions and labour rights groups, before, during, and after G7 Summits” (HTC 2016b). Amongst many others, the HTC and InterAction21 were part of that action. InterAction also issued a policy paper through their “U.S. G7/G20 Advocacy Alliance, a group of 45 non-governmental organizations” (InterAction 2016a) with recommendations for National Action Plans, G7 Action Plan and a coordinated intervention on ‘decent work in global supply chains’ at the ILO Labour Conference in June 2016 (‘G7 Policy Paper’ 2016). Unfortunately for these groups, their actions did not produce the desired result. When the 2016 Summit declaration was issued it addressed the topic of ‘responsible supply chains’ but lacked substance. It simply mentioned that progress reports were submitted and a brief statement that they will “continue to strive for better application of internationally recognized labour, social and environmental standards in global supply chains” (Civil Society response 2016). In disappointment, a final letter22 reiterated the call to action and gave notice that they “will continue to call for examination of the responsible supply chains issue at the next G7 Summit, in Italy” (Civil Society response 2016).

**EU Governments & Responsible Supply Chains**

A cross-party appointed delegation of UK party members formed an All Party Parliamentary Group (‘APPG’) for Bangladesh as a conduit for Bangladesh to the UK parliament (Bangladesh 2013a). They conducted a fact finding mission to Bangladesh on September 10-18, 2013 (Mahmood 2013) and interviewed stakeholders to produce recommendations for brands, governments and industry. Amongst the details of the report regarding the worker conditions, brand role/responsibility, infrastructure, building control, governmental support (minimum wage review, CSR auditing, industrial relations development, etc.) (Bangladesh 2013a), the APPG took time to reflect on the policy monopoly. Expressing “concern at the apparent lack of urgency and consensus on both sides of the political spectrum [in Bangladesh government] to tackle the profound issues facing the RMG industry which endanger the long term prosperity of Bangladesh” (Bangladesh 2013a).

Bangladesh implemented changes in the policy domain, but was heavily criticized for its slow incremental movement. Dutch Minister Lilianne Ploumen, in the Progressive Alliance speech of May 2015, said “the Labour Law that was passed is not being fully implemented. Registration of new unions is being frustrated. Members of existing unions are under constant and often violent attack. Responsibility for a living wage lies mainly with our own brands...But almost all of the other major problems we’re now facing are the responsibility of the Bangladeshi government. (‘Speech’ 2015). The pressure imposed by international actors and the focusing event itself, left little to no room for Bangladesh to decline change in the policy domain. On the other hand, brands still had that. With that in mind, if another large scale industrial disaster were to occur during the inter event period 23, Bangladesh could direct blame on what was ‘imposed’ by international governments and not sufficiently pursued up the supply chain. Perhaps having recognized this vulnerability, international actors attended to the pursuit of change in buyer driven countries.

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21InterAction is the largest alliance of U.S. private voluntary organizations and partners...[with] more than 180 member organizations...[from] faith-based and secular, large and small” (InterAction 2016b).
23 As there have already been a long list of smaller scale accidents in the inter-event period (PST 2016b).
By 2016 “many EU countries developed collaborative efforts to improve the impact of the fashion industry e.g. SCAP in the UK, the Dutch Action Plan in the Netherlands and the Textile Alliance in Germany” (Made-by 2015b) (See Table 3). The overarching focus of these groups was social and environmental impact, but still inclusive of human rights, gender, health & safety, living wage and consumer actions/empowerment. Modelled after the advocacy coalition for the Accord, these groups were comprised of CSOs, NGOs, industry, brands, government and trade unions. Although participation of brands was voluntary; targets were set for number of brands to join. There was also looming threat of legislation if they did not join24. Germany, Netherlands with Pakistan (as host) also worked collaboratively on an Asian Living Wage Conference. And, the EU as a collective, advanced the first high-level conference on responsible chain management in the garment sector on April 25, 2016, “seeking engagement on labour, human rights and environmental concerns in the supply chain in all garment-producing countries” (EU 2016g). “The Conference ... mark[ed] an important milestone towards a possible EU garment initiative. Discussions ... on concrete proposals and possible options for stakeholders and at EU level to tackle key challenges in enhancing responsibility and transparency in the sector, particularly in those areas where there are identified gaps” (EU 2016g). By June, agenda-setting working groups and the multi-stakeholder platform were progressing as ‘The EU Garment Initiative’ (Made-by 2015a).

SUMMARY
Contemplating the Rana Plaza Collapse as a focusing event through the lens of Birkland’s theory, it is my opinion that six critical findings in the area of labour governance have surfaced: (1) global unions, local unions, CSOs and NGOs mobilized in an unprecedented manner creating a unified advocacy coalition that did not previously exist in the policy community; (2) the pro-change policy community utilized a high-pressure non-exit strategy from the Bangladesh RMG industry; (3) civil society (i.e. consumers, catholic church, etc.) played a critical role in power relations and agenda setting; (4) many actors had compromised, altered or retracted their initial positions due to the rising pressure from the majority and political backing from International organizations; (5) post event politics in the immediate aftermath and the resulting changes in the policy domain had a snowball effect on the international agenda-setting for ‘responsible global supply chains’ in the inter-event period; (6) the pluralist (union recognition/collaboration) perspective of Industrial relations theory predominated mobilization and post-event politics.

The advocacy coalition spearheaded change for worker protection in the global supply chain by means of a high pressure campaign. Most notably, they altered how mobilization efforts will unfold in the future. They created a global tension between pluralist (predominately European) and unitarist (predominately American) perspectives within Industrial Relations theory, they positioned trade unions as a legitimate body for worker representation at the global level, they attained global bargaining power and expanded the breadth and depth of who participates in those negotiations. The advocacy coalition was a well-formed cohesive force that drove change in the policy domain and gained support of like-minded politicians and international organizations. “Defying the popular conception that long lists of coalition partners make for powerful alliances... [successful coalitions are trading]... “breadth” for “depth””(Tattersall 2010: 143). Hassel in her study on the evolution of the global labour governance regime found that “the lack of coordination and the existence of collective action problems related to

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24 Ploumen stated in her speech of April 2016: “The Dutch Agreement on Sustainable Garments and Textiles aims to include at least 35 brands that together form 30 per cent of the Dutch market for clothes. That should increase to 80 per cent by 2020....By June, I expect to have the 35 companies needed to set the agreement in motion. But if we don’t, then my only option will be to introduce legislation that requires all brands to carry out due diligence” (‘Speech’ 2016).
various decentralized activities have not prevented the convergence on a coherent set of norms” (Hassel 2008:247). It appears that this notion still holds true, however policy communities are coordinating and collaborating in a better way to set those norms.

The leaders and organizations feeling that Bangladesh was not acting fast enough and didn’t have the coercive power to push for more ethical and responsible conduct, decided to push the policy domain on their own. “National governments are not necessarily veto players in the emergence of the new [Global labour governance] regime. The lack of governmental commitment in implementing labor standards in some countries does not rule out a convergence of globally set norms on labor standards. The distributional struggle between poor and rich countries and their relative competitive interests can be superseded by a new constellation of actors in which an alliance of high-standard firms, international institutions, and CSOs can set and reinforce minimum standards of economic activities” (Hassel 2008:247). Birkland states that to sustain “discussions between events, there must be a coherent, organized and ongoing policy community that deals with these issues even without a fresh disaster on the agenda” (Birkland 1998:62). It appears from the latest efforts by the EU, UK, Germany and the Netherlands, that they are doing just that.

Prior to their acquiescence, Bangladesh and many brands sought to contain the events the agenda. Eventually the momentum of the pro-change communities and rapid change in the labour policy domain, caused status-quo oriented groups to recognize their need to accept the agenda-setting and formulate an actioned response (i.e. Alliance as a response to the Accord; G7 response after the actions of other IO’s; US funding and technical support to ILO after trade sanctions). As policy change unfolds it will be a matter of debate as to whether or not: “Forces may be at work, weakening high-standard firms’ interest in pushing for a global labor regime or undermining the enforceability of the regime” (Hassel 2008:247); the commitments achieved are sustainable; genuine reform was achieved and if the approaches were culturally applicable or perceived to be imposed.

Sustainable change in the policy domain means going beyond stop-gap and reflexive measures (Birkland 1998:67). Through the Rana Plaza aftermath, the world witnessed interest group mobilization and agenda setting of all actors within the global supply chain. This led to policy change in the areas of minimum wage, capacity for union representation, dispute resolution systems, building and worker safety, auditing, transparency, CSR accountability and responsible global supply chains. The results of mobilization were reflected in the agenda setting of international organizations, academic research, the church and government and change in the policy domain. Agreements included: the Accord, Alliance, EU sustainability compact, NTPA were reached; safety and labour law reform, American state laws, trade sanctions. While program initiatives included: Promoting Social Dialogue & Harmonious Industrial Relations, Reintegration/Rehabilitation Programmes, Employment Injury Insurance Scheme, Vision Zero Fund, Donor Trust Fund, Caritas/Porticus Asia Ltd. a project to provide support to 175 of the closest relatives of the unidentified deceased workers.

Birkland says “Where public interest in an issue is low, expansion of the issue is largely left to professionals inside and outside government who seek to induce other actors to change policy. In other domains, where public interest is relatively high or easily mobilized, a focusing event can trigger extensive interest group mobilization...” (Birkland 1998:67). In the case of the Rana Plaza collapse, civil society (i.e. consumers, catholic church, etc.) and labour unions were quintessential actors in agenda setting and in the achievement of policy change. To examine how and to what extent, consumers and labour power drove change in the labour policy domain, I will apply Donaghey’s theoretical framework in the next Chapter.
Donaghey acknowledges the role of consumption relations and employment relations\textsuperscript{25} as drivers in global labor governance and suggests consumers have taken on a more prominent role since globalization, particularly, in the regulation of labour conditions within the global supply chains\textsuperscript{26}. On the premise that consumption relations are causing a noticeable shift from the traditional tripartite model, to a model with many more actors (consumers, social movements, civil society organizations (CSO), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), transnational corporations, multinational corporations, government, and international organizations), Donaghey developed an analytical framework theorizing the interaction of consumer power and labour power as a first step in understanding consumer impact on labour governance. Donaghey suggests that the degree of consumer and labour power have a direct impact on the means of governance and governance regime achieved (Figure 1).

![Figure 1. Regimes of Global Labor Governance](image)

The analytical framework (Figure 1) shows that high levels of labour and consumer power result in a combination of collective bargaining and standards markets, known as complementary regimes (top right quadrant); high consumer power and low labour power achieve results in the standards markets regime (top left); and for vice versa when there is high labour power results are achieved in the collective bargaining regime (bottom right); lastly, when there is low power all around, then the effect is

\textsuperscript{25}Also known as Industrial Relations.

\textsuperscript{26}“This article adopts the generic “supply chain” terminology” (Donaghey et al 2014:231).
a governance gap (bottom left). Consumer and labour power are on a different axis, but the
intersections represent the symbiotic relationship between labour and the consumer (Donaghey et al
2014: 244). This is not to presume that labour and consumer have the same agenda or desired
outcomes for labour governance, but rather it marks the tension between union representation and
participative democracy.

Donaghey conceptualises labour and consumers as drivers of labour governance within a production-
oriented view of employment relations interfaced with consumption relations. This is how he identified
four types of private labour governance regimes. They are: standards markets, collective bargaining,
complementary regimes (presence of both) and governance gaps (absence of both). While standards
markets fit within the consumption oriented view on regimes in labour governance; collective
bargaining fits within the production oriented paradigm.

These regimes are characterized by their methods/means. Even though there are four quadrants, there
are only two basic regimes: standards markets and collective bargaining. The ‘standards markets’
regime uses voluntary standards (CSR initiatives) as a means of voluntary private governance (private
market based governance). Methods include: multi-stakeholder standards (i.e. civil society-led
standards, transnational-led standards, industry-led standards) and unilateral standards (i.e. corporate
codes of conduct) (see Figure 2). The methods used in the ‘collective bargaining’ regime are locally
bargained agreements and International framework agreements (IFA’s) which he says are also described
as global union collective agreements (Donaghey et al 2014:232). Donaghey argues that “greater labour
power drives labour based collective agreement regimes and greater consumer power drives market-

To explain labour and consumer power, Donaghey draws upon Wright and Hirschman respectively.
“Wright’s (2000) use of structural and associational power to conceptualize the power of labor”
(Donaghey et al. 2014:238) and “Hirschman’s (1970) “Exit, voice and loyalty” framework to
conceptualize the power of consumers in terms of their ability to pressurize ‘lead firms’” (Donaghey et al
2014: 238) through purchasing power (exit) and reputation power (voice power) on firms. Donaghey
explains “highly visible, global brands are more vulnerable to consumer campaigns via reputational risk
or political pressure than those escaping the scrutiny of consumers (Lange & Washburn, 2012)”
(Donaghey et al 2014:241).

Labour is defined as local or global trade unions, while the consumer is defined by its actions including
actions through other organizations. It can include: “customers who have joined with media and
advocacy groups to protest against abusive working conditions” (Donaghey et al 2014: 230); consumer
activism; action facilitated by “changing strategy of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith
groups, student organizations, and human rights activists, whose arenas for political struggle have
shifted from the state to private sector” (Donaghey et al 2014: 233); “pressure of public opinion and
consumer choice to move MNCs voluntarily to assume a political role in global society (Matten & Crane,
2005; Scherer & Palazzo , 2011); public pressure exerted through direct campaigning by social
movements and advocacy NGOs or through more indirect exposure of firms to global institutional
pressure which encourages adoption of CSR frameworks” (Donaghey et al 2014: 234).

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27 Generally includes collective bargaining and state regulation, however this framework works only with the labour power in collective
bargaining (Donaghey et al 2014: 232).
POWER RELATIONS: RANA PLAZA COLLAPSE
Consumers were a significant actor in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza Collapse. Through a top down approach by global unions, CSOs, NGOs and religious leaders, consumers found their place to exercise power. An example of this was the religiously affiliated consumer campaign known as the Human thread campaign (HTC) which formed in response to Pope Francis’ called for consumer action. The HTC mobilized consumers through parishes, primary, secondary, college and university institutions of the Catholic faith; the Catholic theology based on Catholic social teaching and through its affiliations and alliances28. Consumer formed part of activist groups, student groups and faith based groups (as in the example above) to leverage action.

The strategies utilized to empower the consumer came with a clear and succinct directive that boycotting/exit power should not be deployed. Consumers utilized their voice power more than their exit power, given that the strategies implemented in this top down campaign focused on reputational damage. The HTC deterred the use of exit power stating: “we know that we can’t boycott such clothing because virtually all our clothing is made in places like Rana Plaza. Except for a few places where specialty clothing is made, almost all of the new clothes we buy come from sweatshops of one kind or another. Furthermore, we have been told by the workers that leaving such places is not the answer to the problems they face. They tell us that what they have provides them with more money than they previously had” (HTC n.d.(a)). War on Want, in their protest of April 27, 2013 said to UK media “The campaign group does not want a boycott but added there should be a full inquiry into the incident and companies involved should sign the [Accord] to end the ‘appalling unsafe factory conditions’ in the country” (Protesters 2013a). Even the EU joined the non-exit strategy, shifting from their position of trade sanctions (consumer exit) working collaboratively in order to maintain production operations in Bangladesh. This is not to say that exit power, or the threat of exit power, was not used by other actors.

In fact, the EU’s move to a move toward collaborative approach did not deter the US government from using an exit strategy (trade sanctions), which was dissimilar to the mass consumer action and mobilization deployed by the advocacy campaign. According to Hirschman “exit has been accorded an extraordinarily privileged position in American tradition..[explaining] why raise your voice in contradiction and get yourself into trouble as long as you can always remove yourself entirely from any given environment should it become too unpleasant?” (Hirschman 1970: 106). Some states even “passed laws that products purchased by state agencies (including for example, uniforms) be sourced either from American factories or from importers that certified that products were made overseas in factories complying with US standards” (Quelch 2016: 337). This could have the effect of an imposed consumer exit. Essentially, it straddled both purchasing power (exit) and power over company reputation (voice power).

Predominately, consumer power was in the form of petitions, leafleting, marching and protesting. Oxfam Australia issued a media release encouraging the public to sign a petition targeting employers who had not signed the accord a year after the Rana collapse (Oxfam 2014b); IndustriALL, UNI Global, CCC, online campaigns (AVAAZ, SumOfUS, Change.org, UK trade union congress) amongst others sought out petition support from consumer to encourage brands to sign the Accord and donate to the Rana Plaza Donors Trust Fund (CCC 2013a). One news report stated “over a million of them signed a petition calling on Benetton in just a few days” (Rana Plaza 2015b) and Australia’s Oxfam Corporate Accountability and Fair Trade advisor Daisy Gardener acknowledged the mobilization of “thousands of

28 Clean Clothes Campaign, United Students Against Sweatshops, Worker Rights Consortium, Better Work, Sustainable Apparel Coalition, Alta Gracia, Fair Hiring, Oxfam, All American Clothing, Goods of Conscience and the Catholic Climate Covenant (HTC 2014).
Australian consumers [who] joined the call, making their concerns known on companies’ own Facebook pages – and most companies listened” (Oxfam 2014b). The magnitude of consumer power raised the Accord and ethical business conduct as a dominant agenda item. Brands and policy makers could not ignore its effect agenda setting.

Consumers do not have representational capacity to bargain worker rights/standards, but in this case consumers were able to leverage bargaining power in the form of purchasing contracts – indirectly effecting worker rights/standards. The “Worker rights consortium (founded by US led student activism group, united students against sweatshops, engaged students in US and CA and Affiliate colleges) mobilized students as consumers of university licensed apparel in the US and Canada to include the Accord into University Licensed agreements” (Reinecke et al. 2015: 732). The HTC in collaboration with Catholic Climate Covenant also worked “with student groups at Catholic educational centers to get their schools committed to school uniforms and clothing that are produced sustainably” (HCT 2014). The mere fact that circumstances arose were consumer negotiations took place, demonstrates the considerable consumer power at play. Consumer power undoubtedly leveraged bargaining power for labour actors. However, in many ways labour actors facilitated and directed consumer power in the pursuit of the Accord agenda. This makes it difficult to say whether consumer power was present despite of, not because of, the Accord campaign.

IndustriALL and UNI Global sought leverage for their agenda (fire and building safety, compensation fund and the freedom to associate) through associate power. “High associative power depends on the coexistence of three factors: the relationships between supplier-firm union and lead-firm unions, the degree of unity among unions and the ability of unions across a supply chain to coordinate solidaristic actions” (Donaghey et al 2014: 238). The Accord was signed by the two global unions and eight local unions including: Bangladesh Textile and Garment Workers League, Bangladesh Independent Garment Workers Union Federation, Bangladesh Garments, Textile & Leather Workers Federation, Bangladesh Garment & Industrial Workers Federation, IndustriALL Bangladesh Council, Bangladesh Revolutionary Garment Workers Federation, United Federation of Garment Workers (Accord 2015a). Solidarity from union locals around the globe was sought as a means of increasing their associative power. They encouraged direct solicitation of garment brands/retailers through their existing bargaining relationships, petition collections, consumer campaigning and letter writing to the Bangladesh Prime Minister and Minister for Labour and Employment (Labour Start 2013). “UK Unions (GMB, USDAN UNITE), Handels (Sweden); GMB, USDAN UNITE and Handels used existing bargaining relationships to pressure brands; Handels used existing relationship with H&M to speak with company headquarters. Unions published in Swedish newspapers to urge retailers to sign the accord” (Reinecke et al. 2015:731). To sustain labour union momentum a workshop was held on February 12 and 13, 2015 in Brussels with “more than 40 trade union representatives from the European garment and retail companies that signed the Accord gathered in Brussels” (UNIGlobal 2015). This opportunity was used to “explore the pressure that European worker representatives in European Works Councils, local works councils and trade union structures [could] exert on their own European employer towards fulfilling their commitments towards workers at the factories of their suppliers and subcontractors in the global South, as laid down in the Accord” (UNI Global 2015).

29 “For instance, student-led campaigns at five prestigious US campuses led Fruit of the Loom in November 2013 to sign the Accord despite already having been a member of the industry-led Alliance, as the company could not afford to lose consumers in its important collegiate market” (Reinecke et al. 2015: 732).

30 Organized by European Worker Participation Competence Centre, European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), IndustriALL Europe, IndustriALL Global Union, UNI Global Union and UNI Europa (UNI Global 2015).
Although structural power was low in Bangladesh, the presence of structural power from international organizations filled the gap. High structural power of workers is “when workers are not easily substitutable, when they have effects on other parts of the economic system, and when knowledge of the structure of a supply chain enables workers to upset the flow of the chain to claim better wages and employment condition” (Reinecke et al. 2015: 722). Structural power was built up in the aftermath. Agreements and demands for workers protection (i.e. labour law reform, re-deployment, rehabilitation etc.) formed the NTPA agreement during the ILO high level delegation. Where workers were easily replaceable before the Rana incident; this was no longer the case when support of International Organizations used a non-exit strategy and capacity building initiatives. PSAC Social Justice Fund, Bangladesh Center for worker solidarity and Canadian unions (PSAC, USW, CUPE and OSSTF) mobilized on a capacity building project in 2013 to strengthen worker voices with a particular focus on women, who represented a larger majority of the workforce (PSAC SJF 2016). This agenda-setting was also replicated by the ILO in collaboration with local and global unions. The EU, Netherlands, Germany, UK (and others) also had an effect on structural power by pressuring brands to maintain operations, sign the Accord and engage in the coalitions/multi-stakeholder platforms on responsible global supply chains.

PRIVATE MARKET GOVERNANCE: RANA PLAZA COLLAPSE

Several means of private labour governance were achieved in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza Collapse. In keeping with Donaghey’s characterization on the means of governance, the Accord would be an International framework agreement achieved through high labour power. State regulations were also implemented as the Bangladesh developed labour protection through legal frameworks on safety, dispute resolution systems, labour law reform (minimum wage and union recognition). With the labour law reform providing improved access to union representation and union recognition, new local bargaining relationships were formed. Given the above mentioned, labour power was a driver of labour governance in the collective bargaining regime (Figure 1).

In the regime of standards markets, all four means of governance were present (society-led standards, transnational institution-led, industry-led, and uni-lateral standards/corporate code of conduct). Society-led standards were school purchasing agreements; the project ‘for the 175 of the closest relatives of the un-identified deceased workers’; formation of the Rana Plaza Coordination Committee; Rana Plaza Donors Fund. Transnational institution-led were the NTPA amendments; ILO Better Work programme; ILO Promoting Social Dialogue and Harmonious Industrial Relations in the Bangladesh RMG Industry initiative; ILO US Department of Labor, Norway and Denmark capacity building in the areas of freedom of association and collective bargaining; EU’s Sustainability Compact'; US trade sanctions in the GSP; OECD Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct; G7 ‘responsible supply chains’ declaration, G7 Vision Zero Fund. Since the Alliance was made in response to industry change it could be regarded as an industry-led standard, but it could be seen as a code of conduct as labelled by its critics. Lastly, many employers responded to the Rana Plaza collapse with changes to their corporate codes of conduct (Human Rights Watch 2014).

With the presence of high labour and consumer power, a complementary regime (combination of standard markets and collective bargaining) was achieved. Donaghey explains that this regime is accomplished when “both consumer power and labor power are sufficiently strong to create a symbiotic labor standards regime. The interactions between consumers and producers can be complementary in creating stronger workers’ rights when (1) private regulation mechanisms are strong enough to enforce standards and (2) democratic unions are sufficiently strong to conduct collective bargaining (Compa,
2004, 2008)” (Donaghey et al. 2014:244). Even in the event that labour incorporates consumers into their campaigning, the result of a complementary regime can occur.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Donaghey’s conceptual framework is static—a snapshot in time from which to conduct analysis. For the sake of an example let’s say in a particular moment in time, labour power is high and consumer power is low. Labour just completed negotiations and achieved an agreement, but consumer power is not visible and thereby qualifies as low. In a few months’ time, visible strategies of consumer’s mobilization occur with eventual results leading to society-led standards. This now deems consumer power as high. However, labour is now low because their associate power is no longer in use along the global supply chain (collective bargaining completed) and low structural power remains that same at the national level (producer end of the chain). This example reveals that an analysis at different points in time can have different outcomes (regimes); making it difficult to know how long after an event (or no event) to apply the framework. Arguably this means the framework is effective because consumer power and labour power can act independently of one another. However, it may prove more difficult to find value in the analysis when applying the framework in these more typical circumstances of labour governance.

Another typical circumstance is raised by Hassel (2008). That “voluntary, market-driven, and private regulation can be dismissed as public relations exercises that aim at deflecting attention from discussions on enforcement mechanisms and legislation” (Hassel 2008:234). This raises the possibility that regulation can be implemented irrespective of consumer and labour power. Meaning a company could be vulnerable to consumer power campaigning, but proactively employs social standards (Hassel 2008:235) without an immediate threat to reputational harm (voice), consumer loyalty or threat of exit. According to the framework when low power exists for both actors the ‘governance gap’ regime applies (bottom right) (Figure 1). Therein lies a contradiction. If unilateral standards form the ‘standards market’ regime (top left quadrant) (Figure 1), it must be derived from high consumer power. I would suggest, as does Hassel, that this is not always the case.

Consequently, the framework may not be a well suited tool of analysis in more common efforts (non-focusing events) to achieve global governance in global supply chains, as power is fluid and ever changing hands – these are the ebbs and flows of power relations in social movements and labour campaigning. Conversely, this static framework can be useful in the study and analysis of focusing events like the Rana Plaza collapse. The snapshot of time is easily captured (date of focusing event and aftermath) and would not be subject to much scrutiny as the period of time is relatively definitive.

Donaghey’s conceptual framework is an analytical tool post agreement/standards. Which means it serves as an analysis after the fact. The Rana Plaza case study may have made the examination of Donaghey’s theory easier. Even still, I didn’t find the theory easy to use. For example, I had to be subjective in my determinations on the means of governance. The Alliance was criticized for being a unilateral standard (multi-party code of conduct), but I placed it in the category of industry-led standards. Rather inconsequential because the same regime would have been achieved, nevertheless important when conducting an analysis. Another is the Accord. I considered the Accord to be an international framework agreement but one could argue that it was a civil society led standard or a means of governance not captured by the framework. According to Pigott: “in some ways, the Bangladesh Accord resembles an International Framework Agreement (IFA)...However, certain features of the Bangladesh Accord appear to go much further than IFAs or similar agreements. These features may set the stage for significant changes in how global companies and global unions interact” (Pigott 2013). He explained that some of the ways that the Accord differs from other IFA’s are its legally
binding structure; its use of a binding arbitration system; a permanent bilateral steering committee with a neutral chair; and that it is specific to a particular country and sector. “In light of this, the success of the Bangladesh Accord may spur UNIGlobal, IndustriALL, and other actors in the global union movement to shift their focus away from IFAs and towards agreements like the Accord that are less comprehensive in scope, but that establish far more detailed standards and processes in respect of a specific workplace issue and/or geographic location” (Pigott 2013). This is significant as my selection on the means of governance changes the regime achieved (standards market or collective bargaining) or I could have rendered the framework unusable due to this unprecedented means of governance.

After establishing the means of governance, the regimes became evident. I then worked backwards to determine if the power level matched with the axis descriptors of high and low against what I believed to have occurred. Evaluating the level of power had its challenges. Firstly, the conceptualization fails to adequately address how consumer power (even if low consumer power) would contribute to the collective bargaining regime. On the basis that Donaghey is conceptualizing labour power through the production oriented view of employment relations (which does not contemplate consumption relations) I believe his use of the terminology ‘low’ power meant ‘no’ power. This begs the question as to why he used a ‘low-high’ scale as the measurement tool rather than a ‘yes-no’ measurement. Since my belief of his intent is still an assumption, the framework needs further clarification.

My second challenge was around the ability to adequately rate labour power in the framework. For example: when associate power is high and structural is low (50/50 split) does that mean labour power is high or low? Again, raising questions on his choice in measurement tool (‘high-low’ over ‘yes-no’). High-low can be a gradient scale and typically the point of intersection has some meaning. In this framework it does not. The same can be said for rating consumer power. If both voice power and exit power are used together naturally consumer power is high; but if only one of the two is used, what is the rating? The drawback of the framework is in its inability to address these gray areas.

The third challenge was determining how consumers realistically participated in that achievement, or didn’t participate for that matter, in the achievement of private market based labour governance. The model suggests that if private market-based labour governance occurred, then consumer power was involved (or drove change in the policy domain) when that may not have been the case. Donaghey conceptualizes that consumer power can embody NGO and CSO activities; but the reality is consumers are typically used as leverage by these groups rather than the other way around. In applying the Rana Plaza case to the framework I found it difficult to separate the actions of the advocacy coalition. It was a combination of NGO’s, CSO’s and labour unions who leveraged consumer power for their campaign. Leveraging the public is also a long standing tactical approach of unions. In this framework, labour power achieved by leveraging the consumer is irrelevant. It simply does not meet the frameworks definition of labour power in its application of the production oriented paradigm and theories on structural and associative power. According to Fransen, “our understanding of civil society includes trade union organizations” (Fransen et al. 2015: 205). Hassel also states that “the emergence of a new global labor governance regime is based on a number of building blocks that emerged from different actors whose actions reinforced one another” (Hassel 2008: 243) which includes global unions, CSO actions and using the vulnerable position of business (Hassel 2008: 244). The framework has applicability to the study of consumption and employee relations, but I am not convinced that consumer power and labour power should be on different axis points and that they are not more intertwined in the consumption relations view of private market based labour governance then the model suggests.
CSR is primarily based on voluntarism “regulated by social norms, its violations being sanctioned predominantly by public opinion” (Calliess 2009: 277). The framework works off that notion and uses Hirschman’s (1970) “Exit, voice and loyalty” framework to do that. “On the other hand a systems theory-informed approach to law and social norms also shows how transnational regulatory mechanisms can be “legalised” through the establishment of an institutional and procedural setting that allows for the autopoietic generation of legal communications” (Calliess 2009: 277). Unions and consumers are moving toward legal means of enforcement. Examples from the Rana aftermath being the civil action claim in Canada and the Accord with its binding contract and arbitration system. I agree that labour power would be high when achieving enforcement mechanisms in IFA’s (collective bargaining regime) (Figure 1). But, I don’t agree with the weighting of high consumer and low labour power in the escalation of legal norms in the standards markets regime (Figure 1). It doesn’t appear to be contemplated by the framework, which could affect the longevity of the framework since enforcement is a key social problem that parties are actively addressing.

Donaghey says “our argument is designed to initiate a substantive debate on the validity of the traditional tripartite view of labor regulation in the context of global production regimes. As the consumer emerges as a relevant actor in labor governance, scholars need to rethink the interdependence between consumption and employment relations and how this link could produce real labor governance” (Donaghey et al. 2014:247). It is widely known that consumers are having a greater impact on labour governance; however, the model could be improved by further clarification in its usefulness in understanding the movement from the traditional tripartite approach. Not to say I disagree with the notion, only to say that the conceptualized framework doesn’t create substantive a debate. In the Rana Plaza case study consumer power was high, but again reflects more of a shift in the relationships and mobilization of labour unions and NGOs, CSOs and civil society at large. I believe this framework wrongfully directs ownership of NGO and CSO power onto the consumer. Another important part of the consumption and employment relations is the analysis of when consumer and labour are not in sync with their agendas. Unfortunately the framework does not benefit those discussions and inaptly names the quadrant of both powers, ‘complimentary’.

Donaghey’s model proposes a relatively static approach to power relations when power is fluid and ever changing hands. The Rana Plaza case was a focusing event making it easier to apply to the framework with its more defined range of time. But still it’s important to note that Birkland sees focusing events as catapulting policy change, rather than actor power alone. Not to mean that consumer and labour actors cannot generate power on their own, but rather a focusing event naturally drives agenda setting and actors can use the event to mobilize and achieve their desired means of labour governance. Overall, I enjoyed using the framework and see its potential in the study of labour governance. Through further testing and clarifications on the framework, its future viability and applicability will be determined.
CONCLUSION

First and foremost, labour unions are seeking worker protection. Second, they are seeking to raise their monopoly power (Freeman and Medoff 1984:191) so they may be a force to be contended with, at local and global levels. Some of the challenges effecting growth and viability of trade unionism are labour outsourcing, subcontracting, lack of transparency in global supply chains, cultural sensitivities and legal frameworks effecting access to union representation. At least in part, until the aftermath of Rana Plaza Collapse wherein global bargaining success was attained. The first union led 5 year agreement effecting worker safety (Accord) was signed by over 200 employer brands and witnessed by NGOs and CSOs. This combination of parties represents the new collaborations that are forming in the attainment of global bargaining relationships and labour standards. Due to its success, at least in its implementation, the landscape of global labour governance regime has forever changed.

Consumers, like labour, are seeking transparency and empowerment. They want to know where their products are coming from and if there was any harm done in its production. This fight for empowerment to make ethical choices, to be a “moral consumer”, has led to changes in how businesses operate, marketing approaches and private labour governance approaches. Consumers have been drivers of CSR initiatives like certifications, auditing systems and amended codes of conduct. These systems have been praised, but also received much criticism: Certification systems for ethically ‘traded’ coffee and chocolate etc. have been criticized for their expensive bureaucratic processes that pad the pockets of retailers rather than farmers; auditing has been criticized for false reporting and corruption; and, codes of conduct slated as ineffective and superficial. Means of private market based labour governance are looked down upon for their voluntary nature, relative ineffectiveness and lack of enforcement mechanisms. For all these reasons consumers, labour, governments, businesses, must analyze what we are promoting when applying mainstream approaches to CSR.

Moral or ethical consumerism and business practices (CSR) – are Western and European concepts. Even though purchasing practices are often hypocritical and contradicting the positions they take in the fight for labour standards; the consumers’ intention and desired outcome is to meet their needs as a consumer, while also meeting the needs of labour producing the products. Even still consumers need to reflect on their bargaining position. It’s critical to acknowledge that there is a cultural lens that drives judgement, actions, standards, and preferred means of governance on variety of matters including child labour, women in labour, pay structures, hierarchies/casts, the act of collective bargaining, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, managerial determinism and business models. We must evaluate our moral agendas and how that is being imposed on others. The reality - consumers have this power (as proven in Donaghey’s framework) regardless of their personal reflection. Nonetheless, this should not negate mindfulness on how that power is used.

Birkland’s theory on focusing events can help in the practice of mindfulness. By asking if the actions achieved were collaborative or competing with national labour power in Bangladesh? Are international organizations, international unions, and consumers playing a role: coach, bully, ruler, a hero, victim, and villain\(^{31}\)? Was the agenda imposed or advocated from the bottom up? Did actors acquiesce to the masses? With international criticism that Bangladesh was not acting fast enough, not enforcing labour law, not eradicating the mistreatment of unions – we must contemplate if the direction of pressure onto government is the appropriate response. Could alternative initiatives been implemented and directed

\(^{31}\) See (Harper 2004).
at other parties, like consumers or brands? Or, is the problem mass consumerism and pure capitalism? This analysis of focusing events and consumer power is important in uncovering tactics, approaches, and alliances used by other actors. Through this theoretically informed understanding of the Rana Plaza case, a level of preparedness for future focusing events can be achieved. Particularly for national policy makers, organizations and civil society to join or intercept international agenda-setting and policy change which seeks conformity or simply so they may attend to alternative and culturally favoured courses of action.
## APPENDIX I

**TABLE 1: Dominant Topic on the Agenda in the Policy Domain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTORS</th>
<th>EVENT-RELATED CHANGE (DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF RECENT EVENT)</th>
<th>INTER-EVENT PERIOD (REGULATORY OR PROGRAMMATIC ISSUES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy Coalition (Accord)</td>
<td>Fire and Building Safety, Occupational Health &amp; Safety, Role of Unions, Victim Compensation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>Fire and Building Safety, Occupational Health &amp; Safety, Role of Unions, Victim Compensation, Legislative reform, Structural reform, Capacity building, Reintegration, Rehabilitation/Redeployment</td>
<td>Employment Insurance Scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Fire and Building Safety, Occupational Health &amp; Safety, Role of Unions, Victim Compensation, Legislative reform, Structural reform, Capacity building</td>
<td>Responsible global supply chains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Responsible global supply chains, Legislative reform, Structural reform</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties to the Alliance</td>
<td>Fire and Building Safety, Occupational Health &amp; Safety, Victim Compensation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Responsible global supply chains</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>Responsible global supply chains, Role of Unions, ‘ethical trade’ labelling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith based interest groups</td>
<td>Responsible global supply chains, Victim Support Services, Wage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom, Netherlands</td>
<td>Accord, Victim compensation</td>
<td>Responsible global supply chains, living wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Fire and Building Safety, Occupational Health &amp; Safety, Auditing procedure.</td>
<td>Responsible global supply chains, living wage ‘ethical trade’ labelling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 2: Initiatives supported by ILO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties Involved*</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA, IFC</td>
<td>Factory Inspection &amp; Departmental reform</td>
<td>Training on incident response &amp; building inspection. Remediation process, detailed engineering assessment guidelines, remediation costs and funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA, EU, Netherlands, Canada &amp; 5th EU member state (rotation) Accord, Alliance</td>
<td>Factory Inspections (NTPA, EU Compact) 5 year legally binding agreements (Accord/ Alliance)</td>
<td>Factory inspection, suspension, closure, remediation of RMG Factories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Sweden</td>
<td>Promoting Social Dialogue &amp; Harmonious Industrial Relations</td>
<td>Workplace dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms of mediation, conciliation and arbitration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Aid, BRAC</td>
<td>Reintegration/Rehabilitation Programme</td>
<td>Medical assistance, counselling and livelihood training (i.e. small business mentoring).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ, Action Ad</td>
<td>Victim Needs Assessment</td>
<td>Victim compensation through Rana Plaza Coordination Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>Vision Zero Fund</td>
<td>Social dialogue, application of ILO standards on OH&amp;S and fundamental principles and rights at work in GSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rana Plaza Coordination Committee</td>
<td>Donor Trust Fund</td>
<td>Victim Compensation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Government of Bangladesh had involvement in all projects.
### APPENDIX III

**TABLE 3: Policy communities & Change in Policy Domain - Timeline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2013</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Apr</strong></td>
<td>Rana Plaza Collapse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German Development Agency &amp; Advocacy Coalition Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU &amp; USA threaten trade sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accord campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May</strong></td>
<td>ILO High Level Delegation to Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NTPA amendments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accord deadline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>News of a counter mobilization called the Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jun</strong></td>
<td>EU announces no trade sanctions &amp; makes appeal to keep business in Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accord implementation agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OECD appeals to brands to keep business in Bangladesh &amp; invites Gov’t of Bangladesh to attend the Global Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OECD Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US Trade sanctions announcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jul</strong></td>
<td>EU Sustainability compact announcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance officially formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sept</strong></td>
<td>Rana Plaza Coordinating committee &amp; letter of intent created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nov</strong></td>
<td>Letter of intent forms the ‘Arrangement’ &amp; signed by the Rana Plaza Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dec</strong></td>
<td>Alliance reaches agreement on process and standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>n.d.</strong></td>
<td>Sustainable Clothing Action Plan (SCAP) led by UK WRAP (Waste &amp; Resources Action Programme)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2014</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>May</strong></td>
<td>Inception of German Textile Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oct</strong></td>
<td>Launch of Textile Alliance /Partnership for Sustainable Textiles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2015</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jun</strong></td>
<td>G7 Declarations on Responsible Supply Chains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fall</strong></td>
<td>G7 &amp; ILO meeting on Vision Zero Fund</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2016</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mar</strong></td>
<td>Dutch Action Plan/Dutch Agreement on Sustainable Garments &amp;Textiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Apr</strong></td>
<td>EU High-level Conference on Responsible Management of the Supply Chain in the Garment Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May</strong></td>
<td>Asian Living Wage Conference (Netherlands, Germany, Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jun</strong></td>
<td>Task groups &amp; agenda building on EU Garment Initiative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX IV

FIGURE 1. Regimes of Global Labor Governance
(Donaghey et al. 2014: 240).
**Figure 2: Examples of Private Labour Governance (Donaghey et al. 2014:235).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Framework agreement</td>
<td>Global union federations; multinational corporations</td>
<td>National/local employment relations institutions</td>
<td>Danone, Accor Hotels, Telefonica, Volkswagen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal-led, multi-stakeholder standard</td>
<td>Societal groups, NGOs, religious organizations, unions, and multi-industry</td>
<td>Mostly third party certification of specific production facilities; some communicated through a recognizable consumer label</td>
<td>Social Accountability 0000 (SA 0000), Fairtrade Labelling, Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), Fair Labor Association, Global Reporting Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational institution-led, multi-stakeholder standard</td>
<td>Intergovernmental institutions, NGOs, multi-industry</td>
<td>Voluntary self-obligation to ethical principles, or nonfinancial reporting practices</td>
<td>UN Global Compact, ILO’s Core Labor Standards, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ISO 26000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate code of conduct</td>
<td>Lead company</td>
<td>First- or second-party self-monitoring of MNCs at the firm and supplier levels</td>
<td>Levi Strauss, Nike, Reebok, Starbucks’ C.A.F.E. Practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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