IN THE FACE OF UPHEAVAL
AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE IN JORDAN AND
LEBANON DURING THE ARAB SPRING

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List of Acronyms and Terminology

GID: General Intelligence Directorate
PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization
Shaykh: Tribal Chief or Leader
Za'im: Notable (in Lebanon)
Zu'uma: Plural of Za'im
Mushir: Marshal (head of Mt. Lebanon government)
Fedayeen: Palestinian Paramilitary units
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Abstract

The countries of the Middle East and North Africa have experiencing the impact of the Arab Spring in a multitude of ways. The Regimes in Jordan and Lebanon, despite having witnessed anti-regime popular mobilizations and coping with turmoil of neighbouring countries, are apparently still maintaining control of the two countries. Adding to the complexity is the fact that both Jordan and Lebanon suffer from the same, dire socio-economic and political problems that are found in the countries that did experience an uprising such as Syria and Yemen. This Research paper seeks to analyse and explain the continuation of the relative resilience of the Jordanian and Lebanese regimes.

The main argument presented here is that there is a link between a Regime’s behaviour and its composition. Understanding this link is crucial to understand a Regime’s ability to withstand challenges. Through a Neo-Gramscian theoretical framework, this paper’s main finding is the Regimes that are found in Jordan and Lebanon emerged from political and socio-economic circumstances which continue to strengthen them politically and ideologically.

Relevance to Development Studies

The relevance of this research to Development Studies is that having a better understanding of a regime’s composition, we would be able to understand its actions towards the various issues including Development. Thus, Development scholars can gain better insights if they are able to connect a Regime’s approach to Development, locally and internationally, to its make-up. To that end, a Regime needs to be analyzed as “form” where various interests interact to secure their interests. By studying this chain, we will have a better sense of a Regime’s policies towards Development and related issues.

Keywords

Authoritarian Resilience, Arab Spring, Jordan, Lebanon, Regime, Hybrid Regime, Neo-Gramscian Theory, Historic Bloc, Manufacture of Consent, Forms
Chapter 1

Introduction:

The Authoritarian Regimes that governed the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) were subjects to countless academic studies and research for decades. Following the phenomenon now called “The Third Wave of Democratization”, there was a tendency to treat the region as a specific case shaped by its own particularities which in turn perpetuate authoritarian rule and hinder any prospect for democratization since it is the only region that remained immune to the worldwide spread of democracy at the end of the 20th century. This changed with the outbreak and spread of the Arab Spring in 2011 and it prompted many scholars and commentators to provide explanations and treat it as a new Democratization phenomenon (Abushouk 2016: 59.) As the Arab Spring unfolded, it became evident that the protest movements yielded different results and ventured onto different paths (Volpi 2013: 984.) One path that has been overshadowed by regional events is the apparent stability in Jordan and Lebanon where protests took place that did not produce drastic political change in these two countries (Byun et al 2015: 31-32.) Despite the ongoing upheaval taking place in the region and the dire domestic problems (political and socio-economic), the regimes in these two countries remain (on the surface at least) unaffected by the anti-Authoritarian sentiments and activity domestically and in the neighbouring countries.

This research paper investigates the ability of the regimes in Jordan and Lebanon to withstand the pressures brought about by the Arab Spring. It does so through the usage of a Neo-Gramscian Theoretical framework, with emphasis on two Neo-Gramscian concepts. The first is the “Historic Bloc” which refers to a coalition of the different yet most dominant social forces that is able to acquire a leadership role in a country (if analysed on a domestic level.) the other is “the Manufacture of Consent” which is the ability of a Historic Bloc to legitimize its position of leadership through a variety of methods. Based on the application of the Neo-Gramscian Framework and the aforementioned concepts, the main argument presented here is that the capacity of the
Regimes in Lebanon and Jordan to resist popular demands for reform and political change is due to these Regime’s composition. Specifically, these Regimes are composed of diverse social forces with different interests and world views that complex power sharing and conflict resolution mechanisms are needed to maintain and exercise power. Thus, these regimes need to be viewed and approached as “Hybrid Regimes” and this type of Regime Composition is vital in shaping how the two regimes reacted to the Arab Spring in a manner that avoided instability and simultaneously undermine their opponents.

1.1 Research Problem and Question:

Jordan and Lebanon have witnessed protest movements that were inspired by the popular mobilizations in the other Arab countries and called for concrete political reform and further democratization of the political system(s). Yet the Regimes in these two countries were able to resist large, popular protest movements without either granting serious concessions or resorting to major coercive capabilities to quell these movements. This is even more perplexing if one takes into account that these two countries suffer from the same chronic, political and socio-economic problems as the other Arab countries that experienced popular upheaval and they are exposed to the events taking place in the neighbouring countries. In Lebanon, for instance, the country suffers from budget deficits which by 2013 estimated to be 8 billion US Dollars (10% of the national GDP) and the public debt at the same period amounted to be 63 billion US Dollars (150% of the national GDP) (Neaime 2015: 129.) According to a World Bank report, the level of economic growth in Lebanon in 2013 was 2.5% while unemployment was between 12% and 13% with educated youth (younger than 25 years of age) being the most affected by it (Mottaghi 2014.) In addition, Lebanon shares with other Arab countries that experienced revolt similar problems such as the increasing gap between the rich and the poor and a negative perception of the Lebanese political system and this has prompted labour and civil society groups to carry out protests that attacked the system and its sectarian nature (Fakhoury 2014: 511.) All of this reflects a general sense of frustration and lack of faith in the political system that is common in Lebanese society (Fakhoury 2014: 511-512.)
The conditions that Lebanon faces are also found in Jordan where the level of unemployment reached 14% in 2013 with the Jordanian youth with university education suffering from this problem the most (20.6% of the unemployed fall into this category in 2013) (Mottaghi 2014.) Further compounding these problems was the tendency of the Regime to decrease energy and food subsidies as well as cut spending on social services in return of receiving economic assistance from both the IMF and the World Bank since the late 1980s (El-Said et al 2014: 102-103.) Even traditional measures of social protection (such as familial assistance) were also affected in this context (El-Said et al 2014: 104.) Furthermore, Jordan relies heavily on Foreign aid from different sources, such as the US which reached 13.38 Billion US Dollars in 2013 (Beck et al 2015: 89.) Other providers of aid include the EU, the UNDP, the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development and the Gulf States (Beck et al 2015: 90.) This reliance on external economic assistance dates back to the 1920s and it takes on different forms from military assistance to financial aid (Beck et al 2015: 89.) Thus, conditions in Jordan are as conducive as those found in Libya, Tunisia and other countries that experienced an uprising. Nevertheless, the Hashemite Monarchy is able thus far to maintain control in the face of popular resentment to its authority (Beck et al 2015: 88.)

These two countries, in addition to the local pressures, are also confronted with the events unfolding in neighbouring countries also have an impact on domestic political dynamics. Lebanese political elites had differing reactions towards the uprisings in different countries due to disagreements amongst themselves, the starkest of which has been over the uprising in neighbouring Syria (Fakhoury 2014: 515-516.) The split amongst the Lebanese political elite regarding Syria, especially between Sunni groups on one hand and Hezbollah and its allies on the other, has had a significant impact on Lebanese society as different social groups take stances vis a vis the Syrian conflict which transforms into a source of conflict between different segments of the Lebanese polity (Fakhoury 2014: 517.) The Syrian conflict also casts a long shadow on Jordanian politics and the regime has attempted to insulate itself from the regional turmoil by strengthening its ties with the US, the EU and the Gulf states (Beck et al 2015: 94.) After all, it is Jordan’s strategic position in Middle East that enabled the Regime to draw international assistance to maintain the
status quo (Beck et al 2015: 89) and this in turn have shaped its domestic policies (Yom 2014: 240-241.) Yet with all the domestic and regional pressures they faced so far, the regimes in Lebanon and Jordan were able to quell the domestic uprisings and simultaneously remain resilient and unaffected. This is the problem I am facing and intend to tackle in this research, which led me to formulate the following research question: “Why have the Regimes in Jordan and Lebanon been able to withstand popular revolts during the Arab Spring?”

One of the main arguments presented here is that there is a link between a Regime’s behaviour and its composition. To that end, one must study the social forces that make up a Regime and the process through which they came together. Understanding the connection between a Regime’s composition and it behaviour is crucial to understand its ability to withstand challenges. These considerations have informed my choice for the Theoretical framework and the Methodology used in tackling the research problem.

1.2 Methodology:

The Methodology that is used to analyse this paper’s research problem consists primarily of a detailed description of the Politics and Histories of Lebanon and Jordan and the Regimes that govern them, which would be followed by an analysis of the two Regimes through the application of the Theoretical Framework. Neo-Gramscian theory is the Theoretical framework that is used to analyse the relative resilience of both regimes. From Neo-Gramscian theory, two central concepts are utilized in the analysis: “The Historic Bloc” and “The Manufacture of Consent”. Another element that is important to this paper’s methodology is examining previous definitions of “Hybrid Regimes” and proposing a new understanding of the concept that reflects the multi-faceted nature of the composition of these two Regimes and its influence on their approaches.

Following this methodology was instrumental in gaining new insight and formulating new explanations regarding the resilience of the Jordanian and Lebanese regimes post-2011. It also enabled me to shed more light on the academic literature and debates regarding the region’s Authoritarian Regimes and how it can be enriched intellectually to study region in a new light.
1.3 Structure:

The structure of the paper is as follows: the first chapter delves into the research problem and the context in which it emerged, the analysis and explanations provided by previous scholars from different schools of thought and explanation of the methodology and theoretical framework. In the second chapter a historical overview of the two countries and their respective regimes will be provided from the Mandate era of the 1920s until the present day. The Third Chapter will cover scholarly contributions from different schools of thought and will explore the concept of “Hybrid Regimes”, a term developed by many regime scholars (most notably Steven Levitsy and Lucan A. Way). Chapter Four further elaborates on the Neo-Gramscian Theoretical framework with the emphasis on the “The Historic Bloc” and “The Manufacture of Consent.” Chapter Five examines the two regimes and their responses to the Arab Spring through a Neo-Gramscian lens. The Final chapter addresses the implications of the subject on these two countries, the politics of the MENA region and scholarship on the region and Authoritarian Resilience as a whole.

1.4 Limitations:

It should be noted that there have been many approaches to this same topic developed by scholars from other schools of thought. Some have focused on the subjective dimensions of the topic (such as identity) and others have emphasized the social and cultural particularities of the MENA region in explaining its political dynamics. These various Academic and Intellectual tendencies continue to influence discussion on the MENA region’s politics and provide explanations for the causes of the Arab Spring and its different outcomes. Despite their contributions, this paper will

There have been many analyses that explore how the International System affects MENA politics where many scholars examine the impact of Global dynamics on the Arab Spring. Neo-Gramscian theory also addresses International (or “Transnational”) dynamics in its analysis and many Neo-Gramscian scholars have theoretically maintained a link between the local and the Transnational. Thus, the Transnational is recognized by the Neo-Gramscians to have
a crucial role in shaping the political and socio-economic characteristics of any country in different fashions and the two cannot be separated to conduct a wholesome analysis. However, this level will not be analysed given the purpose and scope of this research. In addition there are other Neo-Gramscian concepts that are important in conducting research, such as “Passive Revolution” and “Organic Intellectual”. However, only the “Historic Blocs” and “Manufacture of Consent” are used here.

1.5 Justification and Positionality:

The decisions in using Neo-Gramscian theory, in emphasizing the concepts of “The Historic Bloc” and “The Manufacture of Consent”, in concentrating on the local rather than the Transnational, and rethinking the concept of “Hybrid Regime” are all taken due to the nature of the research problem. The research problem is situated within the scope of the “Regime Question” which focuses on the nature and behaviour of authoritarian regimes. While other scholarly approaches have yielded important insights on the subject matter, they do not analytically capture the multiple socio-political dynamics that operate simultaneously which can be exploited by a Regime to maintain its power and authority. In addition, these contributions would overlook how the Authoritarian Regimes themselves are influenced by such socio-political dynamics and thus determine their natures and behaviour. In order to fully understand how this happens, one needs to move beyond concepts such as “State” and “Society” and the notion that they are separate. Neo-Gramscian theory encourages the researcher to move beyond these concepts and assumptions and establish links between them as a crucial part of analysis.

The emphasis in this research is understanding the relationship between the composition of a regime and its actions played a role in my decision to focus on the domestic level in both Jordan and Lebanon. One needs to look how the Jordanian and Lebanese regimes are able to resist the threat posed by the Arab Spring in comparison to their counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia to realize that the explanation is to be found in domestic politics of this paper’s case studies. This is why the bulk of the analysis will delve into the local contexts rather than the Transnational despite the recognition of Neo-Gramscians of the direct link between the local and the Transnational/International. Yet, it
is emphasized that this analysis will hold significance for analysing the politics of the MENA region and for scholarship on both the region and Authoritarian Resilience. Indeed, an argument can be made that Morocco and its Arab Spring experience warrant a similar analysis as the one found here regarding Jordan and Lebanon. However, choosing Jordan and Lebanon was more logical given their geographical proximity and historical experiences (the Sykes-Picot agreement, conflict with both Israel and the PLO etc.) In addition, the scope of this research paper hinders me from analysing three case studies to analyse. Finally, the nature of the research problem and the analysis presented here necessitates a new definition of a “Hybrid Regime” that can analytically encapsulate a regime’s multifaceted nature, as it is found in Jordan and Lebanon.
Chapter 2

Jordan and Lebanon until the Arab Spring:

Before addressing the research problem and using the Neo-Gramscian theoretical framework to tackle it, it is necessary to provide a historical and political contexts of Lebanon and Jordan and how they are related to the current political and economic problems that the two countries face. These contexts will be analysed from the very foundation of these two polities until the events of 2011 and afterwards.

2.1 Jordan and Lebanon until 2011:

The roots of Jordanian and Lebanese politics date back to the British and French Mandates (1920-1946) with The British controlling Palestine and Iraq and the French occupying Syria and Lebanon (Alon 2004: 72.) Part of the Mandate of Palestine was the Emirate of Transjordan which was established following an agreement between the future King Abdullah I of Jordan and Winston Churchill (then Colonial Secretary) and the Cairo Conference in 1922 (Alon 2004: 72-73.) Abdullah I’s relationship with the British shaped his interactions with the Transjordanian tribes since he was tasked to secure Transjordan and to do that he needed to foster good relations with the tribes (Alon 2006: 69.) Both Abdullah and the British came to the realization that engaging with tribes was indispensable to governing Transjordan and as a result the British cultivated good relations with the tribal leaders (or Shaykhs) to ensure their control of Transjordan (Alon 2006: 72.) At the time of Jordan’s independence, the tribes would have a strong presence in the Jordanian state structure and would enjoy a great deal of social services such as public education and healthcare (Alon 2007: 146.) After 1948, Abdullah I incorporated the West Bank into Jordan which, along with the concern over the implications of the inclusion of Palestinians into the Jordanian polity, created a sense of urgency to establish modern institutions (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 74-75.) Following Abdullah’s death, he was succeeded first by Talal and then Hussein in the spring of 1953 where the Monarchy encountered increasing opposition from nationalist groups and political parties (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 73-74.) They would be out-
lawed political by Hussein in 1957 (Hamarneh 2000: 83.) Afterwards, Hussein became the heart of both the Jordanian political system and politics and he put more effort and energy to further integrate the West Bank into the Jordan administratively, politically and ideologically (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 72-73.)

Before the arrival of the French in the region, an autonomous unit existed in Mount. Lebanon with the goal of protecting the Maronites under the leadership of a Marshal (Mushir in Arabic) (Longrigg 1958: 22-23.) At the start of the French mandate in 1920, a decision was declared by the French High Commissioner to create what was then called “Great Lebanon” which constituted Mount. Lebanon, the major urban centres (Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli and Tyre), the Biqa’ valley, and the areas that is now South and North Lebanon. Not surprisingly, this resulted in the inclusion of other religious communities, the most important of which were the Muslims (Sunni and Shi’ite), the Druze and Greek Orthodox Christians (Longrigg 1958: 123.) The politics in this period was characterized by the division over the French Mandate, with the Muslims and Greek Orthodox being antagonistic to French presence and the Maronites being supportive of France since it benefited the most from the Mandate. There were also disagreements between the different segments of the Lebanese polity over the nature of government and the social contract, with concerns over sectarian demands and representation looming large (Longrigg 1958: 200.) These disagreements, particularly between the Maronites and Sunni Muslims, were resolved when the major leaders of the two sects met and negotiated an agreement that would become known as the “National Pact.” This informal agreement stipulated that all of Lebanon’s sects would be represented in the government through determined positions for different sects in both the State bureaucracy and in the Parliament. Representation in government will be allocated by quota with the Maronites benefitting the most due to the 6:5 ratio (Haddad 2009: 403.) The adoption of this specific ratio into the Pact was based on the 1932 census (Seaver 2000: 254-255) which found that the Maronites were numerically the largest sect and thus would enjoy the greatest allocation of seats in Parliament (Haddad 2009: 402-403.)

The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 had a fundamental effect on Jordan and Lebanon. The military setbacks afflicted on the Arab armies in the war and Israel’s triumph in its wake served as catalysts for a much more proactive Pales-
tinian involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Seaver 2000: 259.) The most important outcome of this was the rise of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 76.) From 1969, PLO paramilitary units (known as the Fedayeen) began launching military strikes against Israel (Seaver 2000: 259.) In Jordan, the back and forth conflict between PLO and Israel was deemed by Hussein to be costly for Jordan (Seaver 2000: 261.) This, along with the concern that the PLO was quickly becoming a political and military force to be reckoned with, precipitated the clash between the Jordanian government and the PLO in September 1970 (Lucas 2008: 283.) The outcome was the entrenchment of the power of the Monarchy militarily and politically and since then, no one was able to pose a significant military threat to the Jordanian Regime and its hold on the country (Lucas 2008: 284-285.) As for the PLO, it was forced to change its base of operations to Lebanon which by that time it was stated that the Palestinian population increased to 350,000 (Seaver 2000: 261.) The Palestinian presence in Lebanon since 1948 was already a source of tension in the country’s politics due to the demographic fears of the Maronites where it was estimated that the size of Lebanese Muslims have increased by the 1970s which in turn threatened the dominance of the Maronites over Lebanese politics (Seaver 2000: 259.) As a result of this, the Muslim sects called for reforming the political system in a manner that would allow them to have a more substantial share of political power, a proposition that was vehemently rejected by the Maronites (Haddad 2009: 403.) The tensions of that period caused the Civil War which lasted for 15 years and came to an end in 1990 following the implementation of the Ta’if accord (Haddad 2009: 404.)

During the 1980s, Jordan suffered from poor economic performance which King Hussein and his closest circles predicted would undermine the Regime. The only way to prevent this possibility from happening was to open up the political arena. The benefit for the Jordanian Regime was that the Public would express its frustrations by the time the government would decrease social spending and would carry out harsh economic policies (Mufti 1999: 103-104.) In 1989, protests took place, first in Ma’an and then across Jordan where the members of 9 professional syndicates participated (Mufti 1999: 105.) These demonstrations prompted King Hussein to arrange free Parliamentary
elections, the first since 1967 (Robinson 1998: 391.) This was the opening salvo of the Jordanian political Liberalization, which was seen by regional observers and commentators to be the most significant in the MENA’s recent history (Ryan 2011: 369.) This process consisted of six parliamentary elections nationwide (1989, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2007, 2011), laws which allowed Political Parties to operate, ended the implementation of Martial Law and decreased the level of media censorship (Ryan 2011: 369-370.) Ideologically, this process would be represented by the “National Charter”, which was finalized in 1990 and received Hussein’s approval a year later (Robinson 1998: 393.) It was also intended to set the parameters of Jordanian politics by compelling the opposition parties to (whose members participated in writing the Charter) recognize the Monarchy’s political power and significance (Lucas 2008: 286.) The expectations placed on the process were soon squashed when Hussein displayed minimal tolerance to criticisms towards the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel of 1994 and this was the point that political liberalization came to a halt. There was hope that Political Liberalization would continue once Abdullah II became King in 1999. However, his reign has been characterized by continuation of economic liberalization while simultaneously restricting the political arena (Ryan 2011: 370.) Regime supporters justified this dichotomy by pointing out to the turbulent events that the MENA experienced, particularly the Second Palestinian Intifada and the US occupation of Iraq, and claim that opening up the political space in Jordan would destabilize the country (Ryan 2011: 370-371.) The economic policies pursued by the Regime at this time caused a great deal of discontent among Jordanians due to the decrease of public welfare provision, lack of employment and widespread corruption (Ryan 2011: 370.)

The Ta’if accord sought to create political balance among the country’s sects not only to end the Civil war, but to also ensure that the peace that followed would last (Haddad 2009: 404.) Yet the accord often generated discord among Lebanese political elites and a third party was needed to ensure that the Lebanese political system operated effectively which Syria assumed during its presence in the country (Fakhoury 2014: 509.) Lebanon, however, would again experience acute political divisions and upheaval at the turn of the 21st, starting with the killing of Rafik Al-Hariri in early 2005 (Haddad 2009: 406.) By that time, many Lebanese have to come to resent the Syrian presence in the country.
and its control over Lebanese politics (Fakhoury 2014: 509.) Hariri’s death triggered large-scale demonstrations in Beirut which eventually resulted in the withdrawal of Syrian troops (Fakhoury 2014: 509-510.) In addition, two broad coalitions emerged at that time: the March 14th coalition (which took its name from the date of anti-Syrian demonstrations) and the other is the March 8th coalition (its name was taken from the date of a major pro-Syria demonstration) (Haddad 2009: 406.) Lebanon’s ties to Syria proved to be the main point of contention between the two camps (Fakhoury 2014: 509-510.) Other issues over which the two sides disagreed on included Hezbollah’s military arsenal and Lebanon’s foreign policy orientation. The Sectarian aspect to this division can be seen as one between the Shia Hezbollah (which led the March 8th movement) and the Sunni Future Bloc which was the most important group in the March 14th coalition with the Christians divided between the two (Rowayheb 2011: 418.) The situation in Lebanon further deteriorated due to the killing of 12 reporters and political figures, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 that caused the deaths of 1000 Lebanese and major destruction of Lebanon’s infrastructure, and the clash between the Lebanese army and the Fateh Al-Islam group in the Naher Al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in 2006-2007 (Rowayheb 2011: 418-419.) The final phase of this tenuous period began with the Al-Seniora government’s decision to examine Hezbollah’s phone records and system and remove an airport security official who is close to Hezbollah from his position at Beirut international airport. In response, Hezbollah and Amal launched a military operation in the spring of 2008. In this episode, Beirut’s Sunni Muslim’s bore the brunt of the Hezbollah and Amal assault which came to an end a few days later due to Arab League mediation (Haddad 2009: 409) The ensuing negotiations in the Qatari capital Doha resulted in the Doha agreement that ended the fighting, enabled the resumption of Lebanese state institutions, and the appointment of Michele Suleiman (from the army) by consensus (Haddad 2009:409-410.)

2.3 Description of the Jordanian and Lebanese Political Systems:

Since Jordan’s independence from Britain, the King is the main pillar of the Political system and enjoys many prerogatives, including the appointment
of officials in all branches of government and in different capacities (from judges involved in tribal law to employees in the public sector) and dismissal of the parliament (Alon 2007: 153-154.) He also has the capacity to choose the Prime Minister (despite the fact he is treated as the main representative of a Jordanian government) as well as to shape the composition of the government (Yom 2015: 286.) Even the Defence Minister reports to the King himself rather to the Prime Minister (Yom 2015: 287.) As for the Parliament, its activities are confined to a specific yet limited role, which is to legitimize the policies of the Regime. These included the implementation of IMF recommended measures as well as “the Political Parties Law” and “the Press and Publications Law.” (Robinson 1998: 393.) It does not possess any law-making prerogatives, including formulating and implementing a national budget (Yom 2015: 287.) Furthermore, the King has the power to allow the Parliament to operate and to disassemble it as well as formulate and implement laws without Parliamentary engagement (Alon 2007: 154.) “The Political Parties Law” of 1992 allowed political parties across the spectrum to operate openly, yet the law prohibits them from having any funding from outside Jordan which specifically undermines any party that has ties to the Palestinian population in the West Bank such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Robinson 1998: 395.)

The Lebanese political system is structured according to the principals of the 1943 National Pact and the 1932 census. The 1932 census was the basis for the 5 to 6 ratio, which favoured the Maronite Christians and no census was taken since. The ratio was applied to the Lebanese Parliamentary system. As for the country’s most important political positions, the National Pact stipulated that the President would be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister would be a Muslim Sunni and the speaker of Parliament would go to a Muslim Shi’ite (Deets 2015: 337.) Until the Civil War, the position of President in Lebanon possessed great deal of prerogatives such as issuing decrees unilaterally, dismissing the parliament, and having the ability to both choose a Prime Minister and remove him from his position along with his government (Seaver 2000: 255.) After the Civil War and in accordance with the Ta’if accord, some powers of the Maronite President were reduced while others were transferred to the Prime Minister’s government (Haddad 2009: 404-405.) Another result of the Ta’if accord was that the position of the Speaker of Parliament became more
important and prominent due to the extension of his mandate to four years. This allows him to play a decisively important part in shaping the composition of the government, determining its orientation and priorities, and even choosing the President (Haddad 2009: 405.) The 5:6 ratio was abandoned both the Christians and Muslims enjoy equal shares of Parliamentary seats (Deets 2015: 339.) What these changes represent was the loss of political power of the Maronites and the strengthening of the Sunni and Shi’ite positions and any policy formulation and enactment would have to be the result of an agreement between the President, Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament, each as a leader of his own sect (Maronite, Sunni, Shi’ite) (Haddad 2009: 404-405.)

2.4 Jordan and Lebanon during the Arab Spring:

As early as the end of 2010, a protest movement broke out in Lebanon that called for ending the dominance of Sectarian politics in Lebanese society which is characterized by the privileges granted to the country’s sects via the political system (Meier 2015: 179.) Describing itself as an “Anti-Sectarian Movement” (ASM), they pointed out to the stagnation of Lebanese politics and the hostility to change generated by the country’s political leadership. In addition to the local causes, the ASM were encouraged to take action after witnessing the protest movements in Tunisia and Egypt and how they pressured both Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak to step down (Meier 2015: 178-179.) The ASM saw itself as part of a wider Arab Spring Phenomenon and even took one of its popular slogan, “The People wants the fall of the Regime”, and modified to address what they saw as Lebanon’s chief political problem: “The People wants the fall of the Confessional Regime” (Meier 2015: 178.) Although these demonstrations took place in the major Lebanese cities of Tripoli, Sidon and Beirut, they were unable to attract large numbers to participate and to encourage others to launch similar demonstrations (Fakhoury 2014: 514.) By the summer of 2011, the ASM ceased to operate and withered away all together (Meier 2015: 179.)

In early 2011, large demonstrations took place throughout Jordan (Beck et al 2015:85.) Taking advantage of the Arab Spring phenomenon, these demonstrations were organized by various groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, leftist political parties, the March 24 and Al-Hirak movements (Yom
The local factors that served as catalysts for the 2011 protests where the increase in the price of food, widespread corruption and the severe unemployment rate (Beck et al 2015:85.) While these demonstrations advocated for an incremental reformism to solve the country’s problems, the Al-Hirak movement in Dhiban were much more radical in their approach and demands, which focused primarily on the influence of the Royal Family and the “General Intelligence Directory” (GID). Despite King Abdullah’s dismissal of the Rifai cabinet and the establishment of a new in its place led by Ma’ruf Bakhit, the Al-Hirak movement spread across the country from Irbid in the North to Karak in the South (Yom 2014: 233.) By 2012, other demonstrations erupted that took a much more apparent anti-Regime character, mainly due to a decrease in government provision of fuel-subsidies as adherence to conditions attached to an IMF loan of 2 billion US dollars (Beck et al 2015: 86-87.) Yet the Jordanian regime responded to these demonstrations and their demands by merely introducing new electoral laws for the Jordanian parliament which is merely a window dressing that does not resolve the problematic features of the previous electoral laws (Beck et al 2015: 86-87.) In the case of the Al-Hirak movement, the regime used a variety of methods to deal with them such as accusing the Al-Hirak as a Palestinian plot thus arousing anti-Palestinian sentiment among these Tribal communities, creating a schism between the elders of these tribes and their youth, and using the GID to apprehend the members of the movement (Yom 2014: 235.) More importantly, the demonstrations organized by the opposition political parties and the March 24 group never attacked the institutional and ideological nature of the regime (Beck et al 2015: 86-87.)

In the summer of 2015, another protest movement broke out in Lebanon the cause of which was the inability of the Lebanese government to develop an effective Waste Management policy following the closing of the Naameh dumping site and the end of garbage collection services of the Sukleen Company. All of this resulted in the accumulation of large piles of trash on the streets of Beirut. This prompted several groups such as the environmentalist “Lebanese Eco Movement” (LEM), the AUB secular club, to mobilize and launch a protest movement that would adopt the name of “You Stink” which is also the name of the movement from which it emerged. Although the
movement was concerned mainly with the garbage issue, it shed light on other political problems that Lebanon was facing such as corruption and many of the groups that participated in the movement believe that changing the Lebanese political system is a crucial first step towards solving the country’s woes. While most of the “You Stink” demonstrations were non-violent, violence took place between when protestors and security services confronted each other on August 22nd, 23rd and 29th and many individuals who participated in the movement were apprehended by the security services which on several occasions were sent to military tribunals. The 8th of October was the last where the movement was able to mobilize large numbers of demonstrators and while they continue to operate, the “You Stink” movement no longer draws the same number of participants as it once done (Herzog 2016.)
Chapter 3

Literature Review

After the Jordanian and Lebanese contexts is provided and before delving into the Neo-Gramscian theoretical framework, it is necessary to provide an outline of previous theoretical contributions made by other schools of thought since they are integral to the ongoing debate on the perpetuation of Authoritarianism in the MENA region. This debate has been taking place for several decades and it recently intensified due to the Arab Spring. Simultaneously, the shortcomings of each contribution will be highlighted and elaborated for the purpose of demonstrating how all of these theories have not provided satisfactory analyses for the political developments of Jordan, Lebanon and the rest of the Region. The Chapter concludes by outlining scholarly debates on the concept of “Hybrid Regimes”, its limitations and how it can be improved.

3.1 The Orientalist Scholarship and Modernization Theory:

The genesis of the debate(s) on the absence of Democracy (at least until 2011) and the continuation of Authoritarian rule in the MENA region was the region’s insulation from the “Third Wave of Democratization” while it hit other parts of the world (Lob 2015: 489.) In addition, discussion on the prospects of establishing a democracy is also influenced by Modernization Theory (Schlumberger 2000:106.) According to Modernization theory, democracy can only be established once a country has been able to achieve a certain level of economic, scientific, social and governmental modernization since it will be difficult to govern these societies with either dictatorial or traditional means (Hinnebusch 2006: 374.) Despite lacking a clear definition of the level of modernization needed to establish democratic rule, they resort to culturalist arguments in their analysis of MENA politics to explain the absence of democracy there. They point to elements such as Islam and political antipathy among the peoples of the region as factors that make the MENA a hostile area to democracy, thus creating a view of the region as distinct and different from other parts of the world (Hinnebusch 2006: 375.) Examples of this sort of scholarship include Raphael Patai’s “The Arab Mind” and the theories of Bernard
Lewis, and they and their students share the perspective that Arabs in general lack of the capacity to develop beyond their current socio-political condition (in Lewis’s case this extends to other Muslim peoples) (Marefleet 2016: 6.) From this perspective, the local cultural context and its impact on domestic politics is static and resilient to any kind of change (Hinnebusch 2006: 375.) Later contributions to Modernization Theory by scholars such as Karl Deutsch and Samuel Huntington present the pre-2011 persistence of Authoritarianism as a symptom of a continuing transformation of the MENA from traditional to modern societies which are characterized by socio-economic disparities, conflicting and competing political ideologies, and the tendency of elites to adopt dictatorial measures in response (Hinnebusch 2006: 376.) It should be noted that the aforementioned view of culture and its influence on politics and society, in analysing continuity and change, argues that culture and its impact is present everywhere and it can only be undone with modern approaches to society, economics and politics. Thus, the concept of modernity is applicable anywhere in the world and it is up to scholars to examine different cultures to understand its particularities to discover what is needed to modernize traditional societies. This is notwithstanding the fact that the West is the main reference point for the ideal society and thus the goal of any Modernization process (Boztemur 2013: 83.)

From a scholarly point of view, the MENA region, its inhabitants and their perceived aversion to democracy have become the focus of research and analysis (Sadiki 2015: 710.) In other words, the traditional orientalist and culturalist scholarship of MENA politics places a lot of emphasis on local historical, cultural and social specificities to explain political dynamics in the region. However, they adopt an ahistorical view in the sense that these specificities do not evolve or change as well as devoid of context of any kind (historical, political, economic etc). They also see these cultural characteristics as immune to historical forces that can bring about any type of change. Last but not least, these cultural factors are decisive in conditioning the beliefs and behaviour of individuals and groups native to the region and in this respect, their agency is relegated to insignificance in the Orientalist/Culturalist analysis.
3.2 Contributions from the Critical School:

The Orientalist arguments regarding the persistence of Authoritarian rule have been refuted and one of the criticisms charged against it is that it focuses too much on local characteristics at the expense of the region’s relationship with Global dynamics and developments (Salamy 2009: 250-251.) This is where scholars from the Critical School enter the debate and put forth the claim that the MENA politics, including Authoritarian Resilience, is best understood in the context of Globalization. They argue that Globalization is exerting pressure on countries (including those of the MENA) to adhere to the needs of Global Neoliberal capitalism instead of their local populations which insulates the state from popular voices and thus serves as an obstacle to the establishment of democracy. Not only does this indicate that international business entities and International Organizations (especially the IMF and the World Bank) are more influential, but Globalization also transforms the state into a source of socio-economic disparity and the disappearance of socio-economic protection when protecting the people from Globalization’s impact is needed (Hinnebusch 2006: 390.) Furthermore, the rise of neoliberalism enabled the MENA’s authoritarian regimes to channel and steer the direction of wealth and resources that they obtained through participation in Global capitalism to consolidate their rule and authority before 2011 (Salamy 2009: 252-253.)

In analysing the Arab Spring, Marxist scholar Gilbert Ashcar claims that uprisings broke out due to the tension between the introduction and implementation of Neoliberal economic policies on the one hand, and the economic structure and practices of the region’s authoritarian regimes on the other. This tension exacerbated socio-economic conditions in Arab countries because they are characterized as “crony capitalist rent seeking…” in their economic approaches which hindered any prospect for economic growth and increased the level of unemployment. These factors, combined with the erosion of social services and indiscriminate privatization, created tension in Arab societies since the 1980s and the Regime have resorted to different tactics in quelling popular challenges from coercion through security services, benefitting certain seg-
ments of the population as a way of sowing divisions in society, and attracting those who benefitted the most from the Neoliberalization of the economy (Hinnebusch 2015: 209.) Other scholars and schools of thought that emphasize the role of the Global Capitalist economy and the MENA’s interaction with it include dependency theory, David Harvey and the Critical Geography school, Andre Bank and Martin Valbjorn (Bogaert 2013: 215-216.) From their perspectives, political dynamics in the MENA are strongly linked to Global Capitalist dynamics and the former cannot be analysed without taking into account the latter (Bogaert 2013: 214-215.) This is why many of these scholars and researchers link the Arab Spring to other popular protest movements such as the Occupy Movement and the “Indignados” (Bogaert 2013: 215.)

The significance of this form of analysis is that it dismisses the notion that the MENA is peculiar in its politics and history as an explanatory factor and it can be analysed in the same manner as other regions. Yet, while they do not overlook the MENA’s specificities, they primarily attribute its political and economic condition to the nature of Global Capitalism and the involvement of the region in this context. In this sense, Global Capitalism (as a structure) occupies an important place in Marxist and Critical scholarship in explaining any political, economic and social phenomenon in any part of the world.

3.3 Henry and Springborg:

The progression of events during the course of the Arab Spring demonstrated that the ability of a regime to withstand popular challenges compelled scholars and researchers to take into account the actual nature of a regime itself (Hinnebusch 2015: 213.) Indeed, many scholars and schools of thought have argued that it is important to focus on “actors”, their views and behaviour since they play an important in determining whether a political system can become more democratic, more authoritarian or unchanged. The implication here is that because of the importance of “actors”, a political process can take any direction and they are not necessarily pre-determined (Schlumberger 2000:106.) An example of this is Robert Dahl’s two indicators of defining a regime, which are “Level of Mass Inclusion” and “Elite Contestation” (Hinnebusch 2015: 207.)
One of the most influential scholarly contributions to the discussion on Regime type in the MENA has been “Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East” by Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg. Henry and Springborg (2001: 20) developed 4 categories of Regime types based on the MENA countries’ interaction with Globalization and the latter’s impact on the former: “Democracies” (Lebanon falls into this category), what they call “Bully Praetorian Republics” (examples of this include Egypt and pre-2011 Tunisia), “Bunker states” (Syria and Algeria for example) and finally “The Globalizing Monarchies” (Jordan is treated as an example of that.) The central claim that Henry and Springborg (2001: 226) make is that the Arab Monarchical regimes of the region were able to not only remain resilient in the face of Globalization but also benefit from it because these Regimes have given space for their societies, particularly the private sector, to operate freely without any hindrance and thus adjust to the changes brought about by Economic Globalization.

The argument made by both Henry and Springborg are insightful because the categories of regime types that they have developed correspond to what has taken in the region over the past few decades and it provides a useful explanation for why the Arab republics were affected the most by the Arab Spring (Hinnebusch 2015: 209.) There are, however, several flaws in their handling of both Jordan and Lebanon and it is related their theoretical framework and how the authors, through it, analysed the MENA’s Authoritarian Regimes. The first flaw is their inclusion of Jordan into “The Modernizing Monarchies” category given that Jordan has experienced economic stagnation in recent years (Mottaghi 2014), its historical dependence on Foreign aid since the mandate era (Beck et al 2015: 89) and the high levels of poverty and unemployment generated by its implementation of World Bank and IMF recommended policies (El-Said et al 2014: 103-104.) While there were periods where it did experience economic growth (such as in the period from 1992-1995 and from 2000-2004), it was in each case short-lived and it could not translate into long term economic prosperity through investment in manufacturing and commerce as other countries in the region has done such as Morocco (El-Said et al 2014: 104.) In addition, Jordan has no natural resources it can use to obtain rents and investment from overseas compared to the Gulf countries. Even Henry and Springborg (2001: 190-191) acknowledge that the Jordanian economy was ex-
periencing difficulties in achieving economic growth which compelled the regime to develop new economic approaches to resolve socio-economic problems and prevent its opponents from using Jordan’s poor economic performance as instruments to undermine the status quo. In addition, Henry and Springborg (2001: 191) document that the regime at that time it had increased repression and established a climate of censorship. The other flaw in their work is their poor analysis of Lebanese politics and the factors behind Lebanese economic policies. Rather than providing a detailed account of Lebanon’s political economy after 1990, Henry and Springborg (2001: 219-220) focused on Rafiq Al-Hariri’s attempts to emulate the Gulf States’ economic model in Lebanon and how it failed to revitalize the Lebanese economy. There is no mentioning of other political and social forces that played a role in re-shaping Lebanese economy and its impact on the country’s politics. While it is understandable why Henry and Springborg (2001: 194) have included Lebanon in the “Fragmented Democracies” category, they never quite address the distinctive features of Lebanese “Democracy” and how this concept is at tension with the realities of Lebanon’s politics, particularly sectarianism.

What these two shortcomings reveal is that the theoretical framework that Henry and Springborg use is Weberian. Throughout their book, the authors adopt a sharp distinction between the “State” and “Society” as concepts and how the former influences the latter. This dichotomy is Weberian because it views each concept as distinct in its essence and function, the result of which is both need to be analysed on its own terms. Of the two, the “State” is given emphasis by Henry and Springborg since they develop the 4 Regime types based on the “State’s” approach to Globalization, state-society relations and the former’s impact on the latter. This is why, for example, there is no distinction made between the “State” and the “Regime”. They do not take into account how a “Regime” can be composed of a variety of actors found in either the state, society or a combination of both. This indicates that the Murky nature of a regime calls for an analysis that transcends the Weberian dichotomy of “State” and “Society”. This is due to their treatment of the “State” as the primary unit of analysis while neglecting other social forces that are influential. This explains why, for example, Henry and Springborg (2001: 191) treat the Jordanian case as the “State” dealing with “Society” or the “opposition”. An-
other example of this is Henry and Springborg’s (2001: 191, 217) treatment of
King Abdullah II as a head of state while they discuss Rafiq Al-Hariri’s role in
Lebanon during the 1990s as his capacity of a “Prime Minister” of a government.

It can be said that Henry and Springborg’s analysed and described the
region’s authoritarian regimes as “Hybrid Regimes”. This can be seen in Hen-
ry and Springborg’s (2001: 15) argument of how European colonialism and the
MENA’s exposure to the global, capitalist economy throughout the 20th century
influenced the modern political history of the region, including regime for-
mation. In particular, Henry and Springborg (2001: 15-16) claim that region’s
politics of the last century was shaped by the attitudes and approaches of the
political elites towards the global economy out of maintaining their power and
authority which in turn affected their countries’ economies and societies. For
Henry and Springborg (2001: 17-18), the result was the rise of new socio-
economic groups (most notably the middle Classes) and the subsequent strug-
gle with the old elites who tend to be mostly from the landowning class based
in the cities. Henry and Springborg (2001: 17-18) highlight that this struggle
took on different manifestations and produced different outcomes due to the
differences among the region’s countries. Henry and Springborg (2001: 17-19)
differentiate between the regimes in Egypt, Syria and Iraq as ones established
by members of the new middle classes operating in the armed forces while
their Tunisian counterpart is characterized by the authors as a strong alliance(s)
between the new, emerging middle classes and the traditional elites which also
enjoyed popular support. These examples illustrate that the authors’ attempted
to conceive regime categories that are “Hybrid” by nature and this hybridity is
casted by both the impact of European colonialism and the MENA countries
interaction with globalization.

The concept of “Hybrid Regime” deserves to be examined more criti-
cally for two reasons. First, it is used as an analytical tool to examine regimes
that have specific characteristics that are neither typically democratic nor dicta-
torial (Ekman 2009: 12.) Second, it has a great yet unrealized potential to ana-
lyse the nature of regimes despite being used by many regime scholars in the
recent past. The following section will expand on these points.
3.4 “Hybrid Regimes”: Definition(s) and Limitations:

In general, a “Hybrid Regime” is used by scholars to describe regimes that are situated in the middle of the democracy/dictatorship spectrum and possess characteristics of both (Morlino 2009: 276.) Although using the “Hybrid Regime” concept and its research have only become common in the 1990s and the 2000s, it is influenced by scholarship on both political transitions and democratic systems of different countries (Diamond 2002: 24.) Examples of this include the work by both Phillip Schmitter and Guillermo O’Donnell on the unclear possibility of a political transition from authoritarianism, as well as the work by scholars such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Juan Linz who studied regimes which they described as “Semi-democratic” (Diamond 2002: 24-25.) One of the most influential treatments of “Hybrid Regimes” was by Lucan A. Way and Steven Levitsky. Levitsky and Way (2010: 20) argue that since the collapse of the Communist bloc in 1989/1990, the world witnessed the proliferation of Hybrid Regimes which they named as “Competitive Authoritarian,” which they describe as a regime that allows for elections to be held yet would use its power to suppress and undermine its opponents electorally and by other means. These regimes, according to Levitsky and Way (2010: 19-20), were previously either military dictatorships or regimes governed by one political party and were subsequently forced to adopt elections as a response to the pressures of the post-Cold War international order that linked democratization with elections. Thus, Levitsky and Way highlighted (2010:19-20) that such regimes adopted elections to appear legitimate internationally and acquire foreign aid yet they were able to use this situation to secure their grip on political power and circumvent the electoral process to their advantage. The significance of their work is that they determined which Regime is a “Competitive Authoritarian” Regime by examining 4 “arenas” where a Regime’s Opponents are allowed to participate and express their views without hindrance and repression (Diamond 2002: 29.) These are “The Judicial Arena”, “The Electoral Arena”, “The Media Arena” and “The Legislative Arena” (Morlino 2009: 290.)

The category of “Competitive Authoritarian” Regimes, as explained by both Levitsky and Way, is only one form of “Hybrid Regimes” (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 52.) Furthermore, there is the overlooked distinction between an
actual “Hybrid Regime” and a regime that is transforming from dictatorship into a democratic form of government or something entirely different (Morlino 2009: 274.) This was acknowledged by scholars and they have been treating “Hybrid Regimes” as “Authoritarian Regimes” which marked a divergence from the “Transition” Paradigm”, which stipulated that any country that is experiencing a process of Democratization will become a democracy. Instead, most countries that underwent a democratization process have only adopted the Façade of a democracy while setting aside democratic principles (Ekman 2009: 8.) The main implication here is that a concrete and distinct definition of a “Hybrid Regime” is still lacking and there is room to elaborate and/or add new elements to the concept. Another implication is that most analyses on “Hybrid Regimes” focus on their actions and policies towards other social and political forces rather examining the inner dynamics of these Regimes. They also treat these regimes as unitary actors that are distinct from other agents. In other words, they rarely study a regime as an entity composed of different social forces with different views and interests. This is another example of the influence of Weberian theory where these scholars, like Henry and Springborg, treat the “State” and “Society” as two separate realms and they never move beyond this duality. While scholars such as Levitsky and Way do differentiate between the “State” and “Regime”, they only approach the actions of “Hybrid Regimes” and the rationale behind these actions without explaining their purpose other than securing their own power and authority. Instead of analysing the internal dynamics of a “Hybrid Regime”, the scholars who used this concept in their analysis focused on these regime’s ability to undermine their political opponents and co-opt state institutions and actors to achieve their goals.

The significance here is that any attempt to analyse “Hybrid Regimes” are undermined if one overlooks their internal dynamics given that this type of Regime requires more thorough analysis to understand its characteristics which in turn influence its behaviour. This is more paramount given that a “Hybrid Regimes” category lies beyond other, traditional regime categories such as “Parliamentary Democracy” or “Military Dictatorship.” While it is important to avoid describing a “Hybrid Regime” as a unique political systems limited to a country (or group of countries) and contingent on that country’s circumstances and particularities, it is equally important to recognize that a “Hybrid
Regime” has to be analytically approached as a concept that has its own variables that are (analytically) unique to it. To achieve this, it is important to look at the actors that constitute a regime and understand their interests and how they interact with each other because such factors have an enormous effect on a regime and its behaviour. Doing this will be beneficial in developing a more concrete and specific definition of “Hybrid Regime” which can also be used to analyse cases that were proven to be difficult to categorize and/or analyse. All of this should invite us to conduct a more thorough analysis on Regime types that are difficult to characterize and examine by using a theoretical account that is capable of examining all the relevant actors in any context. It needs to examine both the material resources and the belief systems at hand to understand the motivations and behaviour of social forces. All of these issues are tackled with by Neo-Gramscian theory, which will be outline in the following Chapter.
Chapter 4

The Neo-Gramscian Theoretical Framework

In this Chapter, the Neo-Gramscian theoretical framework and its basic tenets are explained. From there the concepts of “Historic Bloc” and “Manufacture of Consent” will be examined in greater detail. Based on the information presented here and the findings in the next Chapter, we are able to develop a new and rigorous definition of a “Hybrid Regime.”

4.1 Overview:

“Neo-Gramscian” theory began to take shape in the 1970s following the re-examination of the works of Italian scholar and activist Antonio Gramsci. According to Overbeek (2000), the development of Neo-Gramscian theory by scholars such as Robert Cox and Kees Van der Pijl an attempt by the veterans of 1960s radicalism to understand the continuing dominance of the capitalist ruling elites in Western politics and society and, more fundamentally, the apparent acceptance of the status quo on part of the masses. Overbeek (2000) claims that Neo-Gramscian theory is related to Marxism since both argue that any analysis must take into account “The Social Relations of Production”, which is how the main mode of production and/or economic interactions shape the world in which individuals live in. However, Overbeek (2000) also states that the two theories diverge with regards to the manner in which the belief system of the ruling classes are formulated and the factors behind it, which in turn is related to the question of using economic or class power for political ends. Neo-Gramscians, as Overbeek highlights (2000), contributed to this debate by developing concepts that would highlight the argument that, in the advanced Capitalist countries of Europe and North America, the ruling classes’ hold onto power and authority is due to their ability to win over the acquiescence of the public and afterwards disperse their influence onto the rest
of society through “the myriad of institutions and relationship in civil society”. For Overbeek (2000), this form of domination constitutes “Hegemony”, and it can only occur with the prominent social forces coalescing to rule and secure it legitimacy through belief systems and ethics.

From a Neo-Gramscian perspective, any type of a “Social Relations of Production” will possess not only objective and institutional characteristics, but also subjective characteristics as well. The objective characteristics refer to the physical capabilities of production, the manner in which wealth is delivered in society at large and the nature of both political and social power in a social context. With regards to the Subjective characteristics, they stem from a set of norms and values aimed at reigning at a mode of production and it expresses notions of motivation and punishment that govern human behaviour in a Mode of Production. Also a Subjective Characteristic is the world view(s) that is adopted by social forces which is informed by the Mode of Production which they operate in (1987: 13.) The institutional characteristics aim at regulating the behaviour and interactions of the individuals and groups in a Mode of Production in order to preserve it (1987: 13-14.) It is important to mention that within every Mode of Production, there is a power structure and those who control it determine the nature of production, its output and the manner through which its spoils are distributed (1987: 8-9.) Another crucial factor to take into account was highlighted by Jeffery Harrod, who pointed out to the possibility of different modes of Production operating at the same time (1987: 5.) This can manifest itself in society where the positions of different groups can change depending on the mode of production in which they participate (1987: 20.) This is why Harrod argues that classifications such as “peasants” and “proletariat” need to be analysed thoroughly in accordance to their relations to the Mode of Production. What this means is that are a variety of “peasants” and “proletariat” depending on the Mode of Production that these classifications operate under (1987: 5.)

Based on the aforementioned explanation of the main tenets of Neo-Gramscian theory, the rest of the Chapter will delve into the concepts of “The Historic Bloc” and “The Manufacture of Consent” not only because they are two of the most important Neo-Gramscian concepts, but they also provide insight into how some social forces are able to benefit from a Mode of Produc-
tion and translate that into political, economic and ideological dominance onto the rest of society.

4.2 The Concept of “The Historic Bloc”:

Overbeek (2000) states that there have been many definitions of the “Historic Bloc”, such as the one by Robert Cox who defined it as: “a configuration of social forces upon which state power rests”. The best manner in understanding the “Historic Bloc” concept is that it is a coalition of different social forces that united to achieve their goals and promote their own interests. Once they have done so, they then mobilize resources and articulate their worldviews as universally accepted. It should be noted that the “Historic Bloc” is not confined to the state and its members can use either economic resources and/or social positions to promote their views and interests. This detail is examined by Jeffery Harrod when he discusses the concept of “power” and its different manifestations. Harrod distinguishes between four manifestations of power: the first is what he termed “power in production” which refers to the power relations found in production operations and the relationships between the groups who control and benefit from it on the one hand and those who operationalize the production operation but lack the rights and privileges of the former. The second is “social power” which Harrod uses to discuss the translation of the benefits from the production operations (found in “power in production”) to the social realm and how it enables certain social forces to become prominent in society. The Third is “political power” and it is used to describe power that emanate from parties and associations, their capacity to manage the provision of wealth and commanding state institutions. Finally there is “World Power” or the capacity to expand a group’s influence across the globe. Harrod emphasizes that these manifestations are related segments of a bigger whole which is the Mode of Production despite the possibility of examining each manifestation on its own (1987: 8.)
Based on the aforementioned discussion on the 4 types of power, Overbeek (2000) claims that Historic Blocs emerge according to their ability to obtain the benefits of the mode of production and use that to both establish and entrench their positions in the social order. Overbeek (2000) also emphasizes that the composition of the Historic Bloc can be heterogeneous as each member can have different origins and thus different interests and perspectives. Overbeek (2000) then recalls the “Fragmentation of capital”, which alludes to Marx’s argument that capital can be divided and take different forms and put into different uses. The result, as Overbeek (2000) stipulates, is different social forces emerging (in the literature as “class fractions”) with different beliefs and practices that inform their approach to politics, society and economic dynamics in manner that is distinct from each other. Overbeek (2000) uses as examples of such a process financial firms and their task in dealing with money capital, industry which specializes in productive capital and Merchant Houses that tackle Commodity Capital. According to Overbeek (2000), what brings these different groups together is that they share a common point of origin and their trajectories diverged (“fragmentation of capital”) and this process allows them to build coalitions to benefit themselves in the social order.

4.3 The Concept of the “Manufacture of Consent”:

Once these social forces unite to preserve their interests, Overbeek (2000) emphasizes that the next step for them is to present these interests as “the General Interest” to the rest of society. In other words, in order for the Historic Bloc to dominate society it needs to acquire the approval of the population and their acceptance of a Historic Bloc’s domination. Once this happens, groups occupying the lower strata of the social structure will adopt the ideational dimensions of the Mode of Production and its generated social organization (Murray et al 2013: 734.)

Maintaining the Historic Bloc’s ideational prominence are Intellectuals who not only cater to the ruling social forces, but also resort to different ideational instruments to preserve the social order in favour of the Historic Bloc and examples of these instruments are philosophy, rationality, language and “common sense” (Murray et al 2013: 734-735.) Through these instruments, the most important Intellectuals of any social order forge a broad world-view
through which all social groups (both the ruling and the ruled) perceive reality
and the sharing of this world-view amongst themselves bounds them together
to ideationally accept the status-quo (Murray et al 2013: 735.) Described in
Neo-Gramscian theory as “Organic Intellectuals”, Overbeek (2000) argues that
these thinkers take the principals, norms and values of the Historic Bloc and
portray them in universalistic terms as the means of influencing the lower strata
social groups to accept and support the social structure.

4.4 Significance:

The significance of the “Historic Bloc” and the “Manufacture of Consent”, as analytical concepts, is that they analytically address and resolve the
tensions between “structure” and “agency”. Overbeek (2000) defines “structure” as the practical and operational manner through which resources and
wealth are acquired, while “agency” refers to the social groups that emerge as a
result of the collection of resources. Overbeek (2000) highlights that “Agency”
also addresses issues of how the social groups involved in the production pro-
cess conflict with each other to determine the orientation of the process of ac-
quiring capital and resources, the characteristics and purposes of both the
“state” and the “world order”. Thus, “Structure” and “Agency” in a Neo-
Gramscian framework complement rather than exclude each other.

This relationship between “structure” and “agency” can pave the way
to rich and fruitful analysis which have the potential to yield insightful explana-
tions to complex political issues and dynamics. Neo-Gramscian theory also
reconcile two opposite concepts, which are Objective characteristics with Sub-
jective Characteristics. Neither concept is dispensable analytically because the
combination of both shape the dominant “Institutions” of the mode of pro-
duction. Cox (1987) explains that this is a specific treatment of the concept of
“Institutions” and its importance is that by understanding the main operating
Institutions, we can better understand the mode of production since the for-
mer reflects the latter. An example of this understanding of “Institutions” is
the Neo-Gramscian treatment of the “State”. From Gramsci’s perspective, the
“State” is best understood as a manifestation of both the material and ideation-
al characteristics of a Historic Bloc, as well as its capacity to convince the
masses to accept its authority (Bieler et al 2004: 91-92.) Accordingly, the pur-
pose of Institutions is to maintain the hegemony of a Historic Bloc (Bieler et al 2004: 88) and, as articulated by Cox (1987), to legitimize the structure(s) and practices it has promoted. It should be noted that an “Institution”, the objective and subjective characteristics of any mode of production can take different directions in terms of causality (Bieler et al 2004: 88.) Cox (1987) added that the three always influence each other in different ways yet an “Institution” is always an expression of a mode’s ideational and material qualities. In short, looking at Institutional Forms tells us how Hegemony is created and implemented in any society.

After outlining the main tenets of Neo-Gramscian theory, the following Chapter contains analysis on Jordanian and Lebanese politics from a Neo-Gramscian theoretical lenses. By doing this, we will be able to understand how the dominant social forces in both countries and how there are able to produce and maintain their Hegemony on their respective societies. It is in this understanding of the Jordanian and Lebanese contexts that we might better understand the two regimes and their ability to remain resilient in the face of the Arab Spring.
Chapter 5

A Neo-Gramscian perspective on the Jordanian and Lebanese Regimes

This Chapter examines Authoritarian resilience in Jordan and Lebanon through a Neo-Gramscian lens. The benefit from using Neo-Gramscian theory here is that a Regime, like other institutions, is an Institutional Form which is informed by both material and ideational factors. Thus, we can better understand the Historic Blocs that successfully maintain their Hegemony through the Manufacture of Consent. To have a more holistic analysis of authoritarian resilience in the two countries, it is fruitful to analyse two features of public life that are heavily present in each country. The first is the Tribe in Jordan and the other is the Sect in Lebanon. By doing so, we can understand how Hegemony is maintained by the Historic Blocs in the two countries materially and ideationally. From there, it will be possible to more accurately identify the Historic Blocs and their ability to Manufacture Consent in both Jordan and Lebanon.

5.1 Dissecting The Tribe and The Sect:

Traditionally, most commentaries on Jordan point out to the strong ties between the Hashemite Monarchy and the Transjordanian Tribes. Because of this relationship, the tribes are considered to play a prominent role in the country’s key political and judicial apparatuses (Al-Odat et al 2010: 70.) An example of this is that individuals belonging to the tribes have a better access to public sector employment than Palestinian Jordanians (Beck et al 2015: 92.) Since the 1950s, this phenomenon is often explained by scholars in culturalist terms that connected support for the Monarchy to tribal values and traditions and treated this connection as organic and normal in the Jordanian context (Yom 2014: 236-237.) A similar attitude is found in scholarly treatment of sects and sectarianism in Lebanon, and the latter is recognized as the cornerstone of
the country’s politics (Hazran 2013: 164.) Despite the recognition that the sectarian nature of the political system played a crucial role in igniting the Lebanese Civil War and the population’s dissatisfaction with it, many believe that accommodating various sects and other groups as much as possible (even if their interests collide) is necessary to ensure the viability of the Lebanese polity (Nassar 1995: 263-264.) It is common since the 1990s to believe that Lebanon’s sectarian pluralism is a source of tension and suspicion amongst the country’s sects even if it experiences socio-economic change (Nassar 1995: 263.) Yet, both accounts suffer from analytical shortcomings when compared to crucial facts found in each case. In regards to the relationship between the Hashemites and the Bedouin tribes, it overlooks the fact that the tribes were severely harmed by the Regime’s neoliberal economic and administrative policies given their dependence on Public Sector employment and public welfare provision. Thus, it poses the question of how the Monarchy could enact policies that have a negative impact on the tribes if the latter’s support is important in maintaining the status-quo (Yom 2014: 238.) Even in the demonstrations that took place in 2011 and 2012 against the Regime, the participants belonged to the Transjordanian Tribes and marched alongside old political forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood and formed new ones, prominent of which was Al-Hirak (Beck et al 2015: 87.) In the Lebanese context, tensions were at an all-time high between 2005 and 2008 between the March 14th and March 8th coalitions that could have led the country into another civil war (Rowayheb 2011: 418-419.) However, neither side wished to enter in a military confrontation because each believed that further increase in violence will endanger their places in the Lebanese political system and could not gain anything by military means (Rowayheb 2011: 430.) The significance of this is that sectarian dynamics do not entirely determine the behaviour of Lebanon’s political forces and that there are other factors that they take into account. The relationship between the political system in Lebanon and its predominant political forces needs to be critically examined in an unorthodox manner to understand the motivations of the country’s key political players. To that end, a re-understanding of the sect as a unit of analysis is necessary to understand how the regime in Lebanon maintains its Hegemony over Lebanese society. A similar approach is also needed in analysing the Tribe in Jordan given that it is
treated simplistically by analysts. The relationship between the Tribes and the Monarchy are multifaceted and understanding this relationship requires a different approach to have a better insight into how the Jordanian Regime operates. In other words, both the Sect and the Tribe require a different form of analysis to detect Hegemony in both Jordan and Lebanon.

The importance of the Tribe and Tribal culture in Jordan dates back to the Mandate era. By the 1930s, the Tribes had come to rely on the services provided by both the local Government and the British as a means of sustaining themselves socio-economically (Alon 2006: 71.) At the same time, the relationship between the Tribes and the nascent Jordanian government gradually became tighter as the former needed governmental welfare services for their wellbeing and the latter (along with the British) recognized the effectiveness of the tribes in maintaining control of Transjordan (Alon 2006: 72.) Thus, it was in the interest of both Abdullah and the British to promote Tribal practices and this relationship significantly, rather than fully, transformed the nature and conduct of the Transjordanian tribes (Alon 2005: 224.) Furthermore, the reciprocal dependency between the Hashemites and the tribes became a key characteristic of Jordanian politics even after independence from British rule until the 1990s (Yom 2014: 240-241.) The result of this is that the Tribe, in present day Jordan, became a vehicle through which the regime distribute benefits and privileges to its members (Alon 2007: 155.) For instance, the Regime directed Foreign aid streams to subsidize basic goods and to give endowments for Jordanians belonging to the Tribes living in areas beyond the capital (Yom 2014: 241.) The Tribe also became a vehicle for anyone who seeks advancement in Jordanian society and tribal members who acquire prominent ranks in the army, an academic and/or state institution, will be enabled to become leaders in the tribe itself. This happens when the member in question can be easily reached and uses his rank to provide other members of the tribe various forms of assistance from providing employment opportunities to decreasing taxation levels (Alon 2007: 155.) The ideational dimension of this relationship is that the Monarchy used Tribal values and culture as a basis for a narrow form of Jordanian nationalism (Yom 2014: 241.) This was possible due to the accessibility of education to the members of the Tribes from the 1970s onwards and the educational system was the prime conduit used by the Monarchy to pro-
mote this Tribal-rooted nationalism (Alon 2007: 156.) The Tribes also played an important role in constructing this type of nationalism by linking it to Tribal identity, history and culture (Alon 2007: 157.) What is remarkable is that this linkage of Tribal identity with the Jordanian national identity influences other groups in Jordan who have no relation of any kind to the Transjordanian tribes, such as Jordanians of Chechen and Circassian background who established the “Circassian-Chechen Tribal Council” as a means of articulating their views and positions in Jordanian society (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 71.)

The modern function of the Tribe (both materially and ideationally) can also be observed in the Sect and its influence on Lebanese politics and society. The roots of the Lebanese political system date back to the 19th century, particularly in the Sectarian arrangement in the government of Mount Lebanon (established by the European powers) and in the Ottoman Millet system (Deets 2015: 337.) The Millet system provided non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire independence in handling crucial issues such as “Marriage, divorce, inheritance…” (Nassar 1995: 247.) Many aspects of the Millet system are found today in Lebanon and examples of this include the Sect’s legal jurisdiction of matters related to “Personal Status” and involvement in the Educational and Cultural realms. The economic modernization of Lebanon in the 1960s created a socio-economic dimension to the country’s sectarian divisions and changed the relationship between the sect and individual (Deets 2015: 337.) Migrants from the countryside to Lebanon’s major cities sought assistance from individuals and organizations who belonged to the same Sect as he/she did and the leaders of a sect would use their resources and influence to establish schools and charities to help these migrants. The result of this is that Sectarian forms of identification and solidarity became more profound among all the members of the sect irrespective of class (Deets 2015: 337-338.) Since then, acquiring a leadership role in any sect is conditioned by an individual’s or group’s ability to provide benefits and social services to the members of the sect (Deets 2015: 339-340.) An illustrative case of this sort is the spectacular rise of the Hariri family to a prominent position among the Lebanese Sunni Muslims (Deets 2015: 340.) The main implication of this is that Sects in Lebanon are not uniform actors and that within each Sect there are a multitude of actors that compete with each other to achieve leadership status in the Sect.
Examples of this are the feud between the Arslan and Junblatt families within the Druze Sect and the competition between Hezbollah and Amal among the Shi‘ite Muslims (Deets 2015: 339-340.) This is also true for the Maronite Christians, which witnessed rivalry between the Franjieh and Jumayyil political dynasties over both leadership of the sect and access to material capabilities (Chorev 2013: 308.) Today, it is common to find most of the country’s major political forces possess ties to other countries, bureaucratic means, a military capabilities, a belief system and the means to provide social services (Stel 2014: 59.) Furthermore, the manner in which the Political system through its institutions (such as the Parliament) distributes power to different sects strengthens the belief that the single central form of political representation is sectarian which in turn marginalizes non-sectarian forms of political representation (Deets 2015: 339.)

Based on the re-examination of the Tribe in Jordan and the Sect in Lebanon, the case can be made that the Tribe and the Sect, rather than being unitary actors and/or reflections of primordial identities, are in fact Institutional Forms in the Neo-Gramsician sense. The Tribe is where the member can receive benefits and seize on opportunities for material betterment. In addition, if a member does land in a prestigious position and uses it to help fellow members of the Tribe, he can easily become a new Shaykh (Alon 2007: 155.) This dynamic is very relevant in Jordanian society not only materially but ideationally as well where it has been utilized by the Jordanian Regime to forge contemporary Jordanian political culture. A similar process took place in Lebanon where the Sect set the parameters where individuals operated and socio-political groups emerged. What made this possible was the material reinforcement (through the economy and the political system) and ideational legitimacy. However, various groups within the Sect that attempted to obtain a leadership role competed with each other to that end. In this sense, all of Lebanon’s political forces that operate today succeeded in becoming a Historic Bloc, or part of it, in their respective sects in one way or another. The Ideational dimension to this is that Sectarian identity and Sectarian perspectives are normalized, if not encouraged. Thus, we are able to detect the material and ideational factors that feed into the functions of the Sect and the Tribe as Institutional Forms. In addition, the creation of these forms tells us more about the Historic Blocs in these
countries and their capacities to Manufacture Consent. It should be noted that in these two countries, and in other contexts, there are multiple Historic Blocs operating simultaneously due to numerous modes of production which produces different social relations’ of production, the subjectivities that emerge from them and different Institutional Forms (Hurt et al 2009: 305-306.) In other words, there is always a Historic Bloc dominating a Form and with multiple forms there is bound to be “interaction” between the different Historic Blocs. Given that this paper deals with the Arab Spring and the Regimes’ responses to it, the scope will only encompass the national level that protest movements operated in and attempted to undo the Hegemony of the Historic Bloc of that level. Nevertheless, some interactions will be addressed to provide a more wholesome picture.

5.2 The Historic blocs in Jordan and Lebanon:

The significance of the Tribe and Tribalism persists in Jordan due to the efforts of the Monarchy (Alon 2007: 155.) It began with Abdullah I, who resorted to adopt Tribal practices to establish alliances with the Transjordanian Tribes as part of his efforts to establish a power base in Jordan (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 68-69.) This resulted in him emerging as a unifying factor for the different Tribes that could rally behind (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 69.) Another result is that Abdullah I’s approach was adopted by his successors, Hussein and Abdullah II. Both Monarchs would travel across the country to attend tribal assemblies and meet leaders of the Tribe, societal notables and individuals from various socio-economic backgrounds (Alon 2007: 155-156.) These assemblies could be used by individuals to address problems and to seek help from the King. Another example is the involvement of the Regime in Tribal law to resolve disputes and govern everyday life in Jordan despite the creation of a National Legal system that applies to all Jordanians. Even with the elimination of its institutions in 1976, Tribal Law continues to be implemented until this day and with the backing of the Regime (Alon 2007: 155.) Most significantly, Abdullah I’s reign saw the formation of the Historic Bloc that would rule Jordan until the present, with the alliance between the Hashemites, the Tribes and Palestinian elites that emerged before 1967 serving as the core of this Historic Bloc (Beck et al 2015: 89.) Specifically, an important component of the Jordanian Historic Bloc is a collection of the leading families of Jordan’s Tribes,
with the Hashemites acting as a chief mediator amongst them and as first among equals (Alon 2007: 154.) The transformations that the Tribes experienced during the Mandate era gave rise to Tribal leaders (or Shaykhs) who acquired their leadership positions in their respective tribes by presenting themselves as intermediaries between their tribes and the government rather than through being perceived as honourable and virtuous (Alon 2005: 231.) Not only did these Shaykhs acquire significant amounts of wealth and become part of the state apparatus by the 1940s, they were also able to make their role as intermediaries hereditary and limited to their immediate families (Alon 2005: 233.) These families continue to play an integral role in the Historic Bloc and in the country’s politics to this very day as delegates of their respective tribes and examples of these families include the Jazis, the Majalis, the Adwan and the Fayizs (Alon 2007: 154-155.) Another component of this Historic Bloc is the notable Palestinian families of the West Bank, who were integrated by Abdullah I’s to control the West Bank and incorporate it into Jordan as part of his expansionist plans (Al-Oudat 2010: 74-75.)

From the late 1940s onwards, more social forces were incorporated into the Historic Bloc as responses to changing domestic and International circumstances, as well as to challenges to Hashemite rule and their allies. For example, following the events of Black September in 1970, the Jordanian Minister Wasfi Al-Tal established the “Jordanian National Union” which was a large organization that sought at encompassing all of Jordan’s social forces for the purpose of garnering popular support for the Regime with the Monarchy at its heart. It was able to incorporate many actors such as Women’s groups and left wing factions that opposed the Regime in the 1950s but endorsed it in the 1970s (Lucas 2008: 285-286.) When the political Liberalization process began to take shape in the early 1990s, the Regime brought in both Islamist and Leftist opposition parties to determine the nature and demarcate the boundaries of this process (Mufti 1999: 112-113.) However, the opposition do not possess significant political influence compared to other, more important components of the Historic Bloc. One important component is what is known as “the Palace”, an institution dedicated to serving the King and the Royal Family which evolved into an administrative apparatus that include key posts such as the “Director of the King’s Office” and the “Chief of the Royal Hashemite Court” (Yom 2015:
Another vital institution is the “General Intelligence Directory” (GID), seen by many Jordanians as a social force to be reckoned with, which protects the Monarchy through a variety of means including arbitrary incarceration, subvert activist groups from within and incentivize Members of Parliament to decry anyone who challenges the status quo (Yom 2015: 287-288.) The GID and the Palace are extremely influential in formulating policy that they together overshadow the Prime Minister, his government and the Parliament and all three are only tasked to implement and legitimize such policies (Yom 2015: 286-287.) In addition, many Palestinian-Jordanians became part of the Historic Bloc due their involvement in the private sector of the Jordanian Economy which benefited greatly from the Regime’s neoliberal economic approach of Abdullah II (Beck et al 2015: 93.) There is now a social force that is made of men of business, of both Palestinian-Jordanians and Jordanians of Tribal background, that became very wealthy due to neoliberal policies and there effect on the Private sector of Amman (Yom 2014: 241.) Not surprisingly, they are supportive of the Regime and can easily meet with officials as a means of garnering favours (Yom 2014: 242.)

If the Historic Bloc in Jordan is characterized by evolution through the incorporation of different social forces, in Lebanon there were two Historic Blocs that governed the country in two different time periods despite the continuities and similarities between the two. The first HistoricBloc lasted from independence until the break out of the Civil War in 1975 and it took shape due to the arrangements outlined by the “National Pact” of 1943 with the Muslim Sunnis and Christian Maronites benefitting the most from it institutionally and Politically (Deets 2015: 337.) In addition, Lebanese politics is often shaped by powerful leaders (or zu’ama plural for za’im, which means leader in Arabic) who achieved this status due mainly to their ability to meet the needs of individuals and social groups, having societal and familial esteem and distinction, becoming politically powerful in one region of the country and either being wealthy or able to obtain economic resources (1975: 12.) This last quality has proven to the most important in moulding Lebanese politics and most of the prominent zu’ama to emerge in the first half of the 20th century gained wealth and social distinction through banking and trade and were able to confine their economic, social and political pre-eminence to their immediate
families (1975: 14.) The most important source of wealth, however, was land as this enabled many zu‘ama to develop political capital thanks to their constituencies that worked on the land and protected it (1975: 16.) This propelled many notable families into politics and after Independence they were also able to use their wealth into other, more productive sectors of the Lebanese economy such as finance and trade (1975: 16-17.) Many illustrative examples of these families include the Maronite Mu‘awwads and Franjyyahs, the Sunni Salams and Karamis, the Shi‘ite Haydars and Khalils and the Druze Junblats (1975: 17.) Even two of the chief architects of the National Pact, first President Bishara Al-Khuri and first Prime Minister Riad Al-Sulh (Seaver 2000: 254), also belong to notable landowning families (1975: 13,17.) The key beneficiaries of the political order of the pre-1975 period, the Notables of the Sunnis and Maronites, were challenged by the social forces that mobilized the impoverished living in Lebanon’s cities, the Shi‘ite (who suffered from acute socio-economic marginalization) and the Druze. The most prominent of these social forces were the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) under the leadership of Kamal Junblatt and Musa Sadr, whose efforts to enhance the position of the Lebanese Shi‘ite led to the creation of the Amal party and compelled the Lebanese Parliament to set up the Supreme Islamic Shi‘ite Council (Deets 2015: 338.) The events of the Civil War forced individuals to become even more imbedded in their respective sects and a need developed for to provide security and public services for the members of the sects. In addition, different factions within each sect competed with each other to dominate their respective sects (Deets 2015: 339) Both of these factors either enhanced the position of pre-existing social forces, such as Junblat’s PSP which created the “Civil Administration of the Mountains” as a means of creating a controlling apparatus of the Druze territory, or paved the way for new ones to emerge, the most illustrious case being Hezbollah which came into existence partly to rally the Lebanese Shi‘ite according to its vision in time of Civil War (Deets 2015: 338-339.) The most significant political forces to play a crucial role in Lebanese politics following the Civil War are the Hariri family among the Sunnis, Hezbollah and Amal parties among the Shi‘ites (Chorev 2013: 316-317.) It was Hezbollah and Amal, for instance, that led the March 8th coalition while the March 14th was directed
by the Future Movement under the leadership of the Hariri family and was considered the pre-eminent Sunni political force (Rowayheb 2011:419-420.)

Nevertheless, there are political continuities between the two eras. Notable families of the country’s sects, such as the Jummayils and the Sulhs, re-emerged as important political actors from the 1990s onwards (Chorev 2013: 317.) Even Amal and Hezbollah, as part of their attempt to consolidate their political influence within the Shi’ite Sect, forged alliances with the Shi’ite Notable families such as the Al-As’ads and the Beyduns despite the fact that the two parties have become the pre-eminent Lebanese Shi’ite actors (Chorev 2013: 317-318.) What these examples illustrate is that the Lebanese political structure continues to favour the Notable families of all sects as the principles of Sectarian political system that existed before the Civil War was adopted again as part of the Taif settlement (Chorev 2013: 317.) Because of this, major institutions where politicians are elected into (such as the Parliament) serve as forums where they act as representatives of their sects and use this status to negotiate amongst themselves and make agreements with each other (Deets 2015: 339.) In addition, this process has been monopolized by politicians who are affiliated with Lebanon’s major political forces and it has excluded other social forces (Fakhoury 2014: 513.) This is acknowledged by Lebanese anti-Regime activists when, for instance, differentiate Lebanon from other Arab countries and state that “Lebanon has not one but several authoritarian leaders to fight, within each community (Meier 2015: 179.) A similar process can take place in the civil society realm, where organizations affiliated with actors that are a component of the Historic Bloc can cooperate with other social forces that are not part of it. The result of this is that the social forces that operate outside the Historic Bloc can be co-opted by it to serve its interests or fulfil particular purposes (Harding 2015: 1146.) An example of this is the “National Network for the Right to Access to Information” (NNRAI) which incorporated many actors, not only NGOs but also government and parliamentary bodies (Harding 2015: 1145.) Another actor that is involved in the NNRAI is the Safadi Foundation, an organization that was established by the Lebanese Minister of Finance Muhamad Safadi and it participates in many development initiatives (Harding 2015: 1136, 1145.)
5.3: Manufacturing of Consent in Jordan and Lebanon:

So far, we have discussed the material characteristics of Hegemony in the two countries in the form of the Historic Blocs found there. Its ideational manifestations are best seen through the prism of the “Manufacturing of Consent” concept. In Jordan from the reign of Abdullah I, the Regime acknowledged that establishing a loyal population was difficult yet necessary given that it had to create a national community from a handful of Tribal groups and the country’s sensitive geo-political location (1984: 27-28.) When large numbers of Palestinian refugees arrived in 1948 and 1967, the Regime was prompted to create a distinct Jordanian identity while simultaneously incorporating the Palestinians into the Jordanian national context without hampering their origins (Al-Oudat 2010: 74-75.) This entailed making the Palestinians, both the refugees and the West Bank population, more Jordanian and this process lasted until 1967 (Al-Oudat 2010: 75.)

During the reign of King Hussein, the Regime promoted through print and education a limited version of Jordanian nationalism that denied the Palestinians a place in the Jordanian polity and emphasized the country’s tribal heritage for being the essence of the Jordanian National identity (Yom 2014: 240-241.) This was reversed with the writing and adoption of the “National Charter” which attempted to reconcile the Palestinian and Jordanian identities even if it did not provide a clear explanation as to how it will achieve this (Lucas 2008: 288-289.) More fundamentally, the Charter emphasized the Monarchy’s centrality in Jordanian politics and compelled the opposition groups that participated in writing it to acknowledge the undisputed role of the Hashemite Monarchy’s role in Jordan (Lucas 2008: 288.) The opposition groups believed that they could benefit from the arrangement articulated by the Charter by enabling them to openly participate in politics (Mufti 1999: 115.) It was also an attempt to formulate a new kind of Jordanian nationalism that would overcome pre-existing divisions in Jordanian society yet it would also have loyalty to the Monarchy at its core, which in turn is treated as a source of unity for all Jordanians (Lucas 2008: 290.) Many of the ideas expressed in the Charter were re-iterated in “Jordan First”, a national political programme launched by
Abdullah II at the outset of his reign and it was claimed then that the bond between ordinary Jordanians and the state was fragile which needed to reinvigorated via the programme (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 85-86.) However, its real purpose was to insulate the country from regional events (the American occupation of Iraq, for example) as a means of pre-empting anti-regime groups from capitalizing on such events to challenge the status-quo (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 86.) The programme emphasized the necessity of improving Jordan’s economy and argued that all attention and effort must be directed at the serving at what it describes as “Jordan’s national interests” (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 83-84.) One major implication of the programme is that the Jordanian population needs to be ready to face the impact of accelerated socio-economic growth and enhancement in the performance of state institutions, all under the guidance of the Monarchy (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 81-82.) Another consequence is that disagreeing with it would be a sign disloyalty to Jordan itself and the only manner of demonstrating patriotism for Jordan is through supporting the Monarchy (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 85.) In this context, the media is encouraged to cover only Jordanian domestic issues and the opposition must dedicate its efforts to look after the wellbeing pf Jordan and its people rather than attending other agendas (Al-Oudat et al 2010: 82.) Despite these efforts, the political culture that is predominant in Jordan today and helpful to the Regime is a Jordanian nationalism rooted in tribal culture and history (Alon 2007: 157.) Although this has created divisions among Jordanians, this specific form of nationalism plays a key role in legitimizing the Regime and the political reality that is shaped (Alon 2007: 157-158.)

The process of Manufacturing Consent that took place in Lebanon between 1943 and 1975 originated in the principals of the National Pact. One of the important goals of the pact was to end the disagreement between Sunni and Maronite leaders over the political and cultural orientation of Lebanon. It served as a compromise between the two groups, with the Sunni leaders abandoning their hopes of deepening Lebanon’s ties to the Arab world while their Maronite counterparts would end Lebanon’s attachment to France (Haddad 2009: 403.) As a result, the political system generated by the National Pact was seen as exemplary in how it enabled different religious sects to enjoy rights and liberties with regards to expression and religious practice in comparison to oth-
er Middle Eastern countries and it even became an ideal example of inter-religious harmony. This form of Legitimacy that the Lebanese political system enjoyed then would dissipate in the build-up to and outbreak of the Civil War (Nassar 1995: 249.) The political reality generated by the Ta’if agreement emphasized that a delicate symmetry needs to be maintained between all the country’s Sects, which in reality reflected the political importance and capabilities of the different political groups by the end of the war. It also stipulated that all the sects’ interests and their places in Lebanon would be safeguarded. This new arrangement was legitimized was that it was the only way to bring about stability (Haddad 2009: 404.) As the years went on and ordinary Lebanese became more disgruntled with the Ta’if order and with the Historic Bloc that dominated it, the notion that seeking a more democratic alternative would ultimately result in chaos is often used to discourage anyone from proposing new approaches that are both progressive and efficient in meeting popular needs. There is also a socio-economic element in this argument where is that desiring to end the dominance of za’im or a group over a sect will inevitably undermine the economic wellbeing of other sect members and also cause friction within to determine who will be in charge of providing welfare services (Fakhoury 2014: 519.)

5.4 Towards a New Understanding of “Hybrid Regime”:

The significance of the preceding discussion on the Historic Blocs and the Manufacturing of consent is that it helps us understand more the character of the Jordanian and Lebanese Regimes. It also reveals that there are several Historic Blocs interacting with each other which shapes and sustains Authoritarian Resilience in Lebanon and in Jordan. For instance, the Jordanian Regime continues to rely on tribal practices and structures for political appointment and distribution of resources despite national initiatives such as “Jordan First” (Al-Oudat 2010: 89-90.) In fact, power is shared between the different Shaykhly families with the Hashemites being the mediator to maintain an equilibrium between them and all governments and key state appointments reflect proportional representation of the country’s tribes and regions (Alon 2007: 154.) In Lebanon, the sectarian nature of the political system informs how power is
shared among the country’s political forces who act as sectarian representatives (Haddad 2009: 404-405.) It also has an impact on the nature of state institutions since many individuals who operate there are affiliates of Lebanon’s dominant political groups (Deets 2015: 339.) All of this indicates that there are elements of “Hybridity” involved here yet that previous definitions of “Hybrid Regimes” failed to highlight. It also highlights that a Regime is another Institutional Form where one can identify the material and ideational characteristics that shape it. Thus, these characteristics must be taken into account in defining these regimes to have a better sense on how they respond to challenges and changing circumstances.

We should take the aforementioned discussion as an opportunity to give a new definition of a “Hybrid Regime”. Therefore, the new definition I propose here is: “A Regime that is composed of diverse social forces with vastly different interests, belief systems and goals which necessitates the creation of complex conflict resolution mechanisms and power sharing arrangements amongst these social forces as a means of maintaining Regime Cohesion.” The following section will chronicle how this understanding of “Hybrid Regime” can help explain the Authoritarian resilience in Jordan and Lebanon from 2011 and onwards.

### 5.5 Authoritarian Resilience as Hegemony:

The protest movements in Lebanon and Jordan have faced significant obstacles to both draw popular support and to spread their messages as means of pressuring the Lebanese and Jordanian Regimes. Although Regime crackdown and the fear from the effects of the Syrian conflict were important in stunning the momentum generated by the anti-regime demonstrations, local factors also played a role in the Regime’s favour. The Hirak, for example, deliberately avoided escalation with the Regime due to the fear that the latter will be pressed to implement extreme measures (such as laws of emergency) that would further hinder the movement’s ability to mobilize. In other words, they did not wish to jeopardize the opportunities provided to them by the Jordanian public space (Yom 2014: 247.) Other social forces that are part of the Historic Bloc, despite their own discontent with the Regime and its policies, believed that the current order is preferable to any alternative given that dramatic
change would entail ending systems of rewards and benefits designed by the Regime. These systems, including distributing and drawing resources through the tribal structure, are too precious for the dominant social forces to give up (Beck et al 2015: 93.) Furthermore, many Jordanians have come to favour a “gradual” approach that would involve a political process of granting the Parliament more political and law-making powers, limiting the political clout of the GID, revising the electoral law and system and allow the Monarchy to have a ceremonial role, all of which (Yom 2015: 299-300.) The fact that such an approach has appeal is a sign of that the Regime’s Hegemony is still maintained because the Monarchy is still perceived be a factor of national unity and the approach’s appeal is mostly due to the desire to avoid “uncertainty” rather than a strive for a radical alternative (Yom 2015: 299.)

Lebanon’s two Arab Spring protest movements, ASM and “You Stink”, have encountered similar challenges as their Jordanian counterparts. The ASM have faced and resisted attempts to be co-opted by Lebanon’s major political groups and figures such as Amal and Sa’ad Al-Hariri. It later attempted to launch other demonstrations in February and May 2012 yet they were only able to draw small number to participate. Further undermining the movement was internal division between two camps: the first wanted to join forces with the dominant political groups as a means of achieving their goals while the second camp advocated a more radical position which refused to compromise with any of the dominant political forces that could grant them “legitimacy.” The decline of the ASM reveals how there is little room to operate in Lebanon for anyone seeking to promote issues that are not endorsed by the Regime (Meier 2015: 184.) As for the “You Stink” movement, aside from attacks from the Regime, it struggled to draw more Lebanese to join the protests despite already attracting huge numbers already. Members of the movement argue that they have failed to draw support from the country side (where support for the main political parties that constitute the regime is strong) and they believe that most Lebanese are more concerned with maintaining stability (which is driven not only by the regional events but also by the experience of the Civil War) and that they are too engrossed in everyday, socio-economic challenges to participate in a political or social movement. However, these members attribute these obstacles to the ability of the Regime, via the political
parties, to impose itself on Lebanese public life and in the process sway Lebanese citizens to its advantage through the sectarian political culture (Herzog 2016.) All of these factors explain why the Lebanese citizenry are unwilling to forgo the status quo: the political and socio-economic systems engineered by the members of the Regime are seen as the only viable options to sustain one’s livelihood and security (Fakhoury 2014: 514.) The contradictions of the system, along with its sectarian characteristics, serve to prevent any large scale attempts at political change (Fakhoury 2014: 507.)

Hegemony in the two countries are possible due to the Hybrid nature of the Jordanian and Lebanese regimes. More importantly, it de-incentivizes important social forces from creating new political orders and successfully hinder less important ones from attempting to bring about any kind of change that is not in the interest of the Historic Bloc. Through the process of Manufacture of Consent, the Lebanese and Jordanian populations have come to believe that there is no better alternative to the status quo.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

This research paper has demonstrated how a Regime’s actions is directly linked to its composition. Through Neo-Gramscian theory, we have discovered how the Hybridity of the Jordanian and Lebanese regimes was a crucial factor in their resistance to the Arab Spring. So far, the Hegemony they have imposed on Jordan and Lebanon seems to be maintained. Only time will tell if it will last longer given the fluidity of regional events since 2011.

The implications of this research’s findings are tremendous. For the scholarship on “Hybrid Regimes”, it helps move the concept and the debate surrounding it away from “Democratization” issues and orient it on the characteristics of a regime’s hybridity and its impact on a Hybrid Regime’s behaviour. It is also significant for “Authoritarian Resilience” both in the MENA and beyond. While this Paper focused on Jordan and Lebanon, a Neo-Gramscian analysis of the resilience of any Authoritarian Regime can provide us with important insights not offered other Theories. This point should be considered when examining the MENA dictatorships given that the region is experiencing rapid change and its Regimes continue to resist popular mobilizations. A Neo-Gramscian analysis of this dynamic can be helpful in developing useful recommendations on how to respond to current MENA events. The
most crucial finding of this analysis is that a “Regime” is not a unitary actor. Rather, it is a product of political and socio-economic circumstances and these circumstances feed into it. A Regime can also influence these circumstances and in both instances it is a sphere where different social forces interact to achieve their goals. This should be the starting point of any fruitful analysis of Authoritarian Regimes and their role in either perpetuating continuity or resulting in change.
References


Maps:

Map 1
Mount Lebanon and Surrounding Areas
Map 2
Mandate Era Middle East in 1920
Map 3
Jordan between 1948 and 1967
Map 4
The Levant, Iraq and Turkey today