The Relation Between Performance Pay and Job Satisfaction

André Folmer

320089
May 2017
Supervisor: Mr Delfgaauw
Second reader: Mr Kapoor

We set out to investigate the relationship between receiving performance pay and job satisfaction. Our model is based on the model used by Green and Heywood (2007), and looks to extend it to include gender and racial differences. Our main results show that PRP schemes are positively associated with some aspects of job satisfaction (Pay and job security), but are negatively associated with satisfaction with the work itself. Our gender results show the same relations, but when looking at the marginal effects we see that women react more strongly to receiving a bonus or PRP. Racial differences are hard to determine, due to a lack of observations.

1. Introduction

Most studies analysing the effects of performance related pay (PRP) and bonuses, focus on the effect of performance related incentives on employee productivity.[1] Another area of interest is the effect PRP schemes have on job satisfaction. Job satisfaction can be a tool for employers to tie employees to their companies. Mynatt et al. (1997) show that employee satisfaction positively influences turnover intentions, meaning that, given a higher job satisfaction, employees are less likely to switch to another job or company. Russ and McNeilly (1995) find similar results, showing that job satisfaction has a positive effect on organisational commitment. However, as Delfgaauw (2007) shows, organizational commitment depends on the areas of satisfaction. When employees are dissatisfied with job-related aspects, such as the level of responsibility, they are more likely to look for another position within the same company. When they are dissatisfied with company-related aspects, such as management policy, they are more likely to search for a job outside the current company. Thus, job satisfaction can be a useful tool to bind employees to the firm, but its effectivity depends on the aspects of job satisfaction.

Most studies concerning the relation between PRP schemes and job satisfaction, however, study the effect on overall job satisfaction, ignoring the different aspects of job satisfaction.[2]

Green and Heywood (2008) do study the effect of three types of performance related pay (PRP) on four levels of job satisfaction. Specifically, they study the effects of profit sharing and bonuses, and performance pay on overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with salary, hours worked and job security. Using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the years 1998-2004, they find, when controlling for employee fixed effects, that PRP has a positive impact on job satisfaction.

We build on this study in a few different ways. First, we extend the sample to include the waves until the year 2009, allowing us to investigate whether the same effects hold over a longer period and maybe observe the first impacts of the economic crisis which hit in 2007.

Second, we introduce gender differences. As to these differences, Heywood and Wei (1999) found that men receiving piece-rate-pay are less satisfied with their job than men receiving a fixed salary. For women receiving piece rates this effect isn't significant and thus it seems that this has no effect on their job satisfaction. It will be interesting to see whether this is also true for other forms of performance related pay and when distinguishing between the different sectors of job satisfaction. The final extension is to account for race differences. We like to see whether ethnical background has some effect on job satisfaction and explore the role of performance pay in that relation.

---

[1] See for instance Lazear (2000) and Imberman and Lovenheim (2015).
[2] See for instance McCausland et al (2005)

The extension to gender and race differences will show whether the effect is universal between groups or that some form of distinction is necessary. This will enable employers to more specifically tailor incentive schemes for different employees.

Our main results show that PRP schemes are positively associated with some aspects of job satisfaction (Pay and job security), but are negatively associated with satisfaction with the work itself. Our gender results show the same relations, but when looking at the marginal effects we see that women react more strongly to receiving a bonus or PRP. Due to a lack of non-white respondents, the relations for respondents not native to the UK remain unclear.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we will look at the previous literature and form our hypotheses, section 3 describes the empirical strategy, section 4 describes the data used, section 5 contains the estimation results and interpretation and section 6 concludes.

2. Theory

The literature on the effects of Performance related pay (PRP) is quite extensive. Most studies concern a specific company or sector and then investigate whether PRP has any effect on job satisfaction and some other factors. Fernie and Metcalf (1999) compared the performance of jockeys before and after the introduction of a PRP scheme and find that performance increased significantly. This increase raised the wages of jockeys and should, therefore, improve wage satisfaction also. It is important to note that this is a very specific case study and thus it isn't clear whether these results also hold in other environments. Also, this is an indirect effect, since Fernie and Metcalf (1999) do not directly measure the change in job satisfaction.

McCausland et al. (2005) directly study the impact of a PRP scheme on job satisfaction. Using four waves of the BHPS, they find that, on average, the job satisfaction decreases when a PRP scheme is present, where for (very) high wage employees the effect is positive. A possible explanation they provide is that for lower-wage employees a PRP scheme is deemed to be controlling, while high-wage employees consider it more of a bonus for provided work.

Green and Heywood (2008) follow the same line as McCausland et al and study the impact of PRP schemes on job satisfaction. They also use the BHPS for the years 1998-2004. When looking at overall job satisfaction they find that PRP schemes seem to have a positive effect on overall job satisfaction. They also investigate the impact of PRP schemes on different aspects of job satisfaction. When controlling for employee fixed effects, they find a positive effect on all aspect of job satisfaction.

Another important factor in the relationship between PRP schemes and job satisfaction is the effect such a scheme may have on the morale of employees. Akerlof and Yellen (1988) show that it is important that employees earn equal salaries or at least salaries which they consider to be fair. They

suggest that fairness is an important factor in keeping employees motivated. This suggests that, when introducing PRP schemes, it is important to make sure that wage differences aren't too large, as this will reduce worker satisfaction. This is in line with Marsden, French and Kubo (2001), who find that when bonuses are deemed unfair this may decrease employee motivation and satisfaction.

In line with Akerlof and Yellen (1988), Brown (2001) studies how employees compare wages. He suggests that employees use five reference wages: historic wages, market wages, wages within the organization, social comparisons (relative wages) and their absolute level. He finds that employees with lower wages than their reference payments are always less satisfied, while the reverse is also true. He also finds that the most important comparisons are made within the organization and within the market. This suggests that employers can influence work satisfaction by increasing the wages of employees.

Kennedy (1995) studies the effect of PRP schemes on morale. His assumption is that an employee's morale only depends on his relative wage. He finds that a PRP scheme may have a negative effect on the morale of the least skilled workers if it only depends on their own productivity, where it has a positive impact on the morale of high-skilled employees. In firms with a sufficient heterogeneous workforce however, overall employee morale is boosted and productivity rises.

Using these results, we are able to formulate our first hypothesis. We've seen that PRP schemes can lead to higher satisfaction, but that when workers deem the wages unfair after the scheme has been introduced, the satisfaction may decrease. Regarding this point, McCausland et al. (2005) and Green and Heywood (2008) seem to contradict each other. McCausland (2005) finds that PRP schemes decrease overall job satisfaction, where Green and Heywood (2008) find a positive effect. The main reason for this contradiction may be that Green and Heywood (2008) look at different aspects of job satisfaction where McCausland et al. (2005) only consider overall satisfaction. Therefore, we expect our results to be more in line with the results of Green and Heywood (2008). This gives us our first hypothesis:

H1: When controlling for employee fixed effects, we expect the relation between PRP schemes and job satisfaction to be positive.

Considering profit sharing, Brown and Sessions (2003) build on three models introduced by Klein (1987). First, the intrinsic model, which suggests that making employees co owners or shareholders of the firm will increase commitment and satisfaction. Second, the instrumental model, which links the degree of satisfaction to how much decision rights employees have, with more decision rights meaning higher satisfaction. Finally, the extrinsic model: this assumes that the benefits of profit

sharing are evaluated using the financial rewards. In case of the US, Brown and Sessions (2003) find evidence that supports the instrumental model. They also find a positive correlation between receiving PRP and satisfaction with working hours and work environment. Since these effects are correlations and not causal effects it's difficult to see whether the same effects will show up in other research.

With profit sharing, there is a risk of a free-rider problem arising. Kandel and Lazear (1992) study this effect. They consider peer pressure a useful instrument to reduce the free-rider problem. Their results suggest that this indeed may reduce the free-rider problem. However, when peer pressure becomes too prevailing, it can reduce worker satisfaction.

Using these results, we formulate a second hypothesis. Following the results of Brown and Sessions (2003), we expect that worker satisfaction rises with increased profit sharing. The results of Kandel and Lazear (1992) agree with this, up to a certain point. Overall, we think that profit sharing will have a positive effect on job satisfaction, giving the next hypothesis:

H2: We expect to see a positive relation between the presence of a profit sharing scheme and job satisfaction.

2.1 Gender effects

Becker (1985) studies the wage gap between male and female employees. The main argument to include gender differences is that most women divide their attention between family, housework and their job, resulting in preference for a less demanding job. In this case, that means choosing a job without a PRP scheme. Interestingly, both Geddes and Heywood (2003) and Goldin (1986) find an opposite effect. They both suggest that women are more likely to be paid per piece rather than receiving a fixed wage. Geddes and Heywood (2003) specify further and conclude that while women are more likely to be paid per piece, they are less likely to receive bonuses and commissions. Again, Becker (1985) finds an opposite effect, where women and men have equal opportunities to receive a form of profit sharing. One factor that may explain this difference is the different era's where the studies refer to. The study by Geddes and Heywood (2003) is almost twenty years more recent, so it may be a change in preferences which has taken place over that twenty years. Heywood and Wei (1999) suggest that women receiving piece rates are not more satisfied with their jobs, so theoretically it shouldn't matter.

Overall, we expect that women receiving piece rates are not more satisfied with their job than women who do not. In case of bonuses or profit sharing there may be an effect. This leads us to our third hypothesis:

H3: We expect at most a small positive relation between PRP schemes and female job satisfaction.

2.2 Racial differences

Bartel (1981) studies the effect of race on job satisfaction. Using three survey years, 1966, 1969 and 1971, she finds that the race dummy has a significant positive effect on job satisfaction. The explanation given states that discrimination is a factor in lowering the aspirations of black employees, hence they are satisfied more easily. This positive effect is larger than the negative effect associated with lower wages. This study doesn't concern the effect of PRP on job satisfaction, but it gives us insight in the fact that black people tend to be more easily satisfied with their job. Thus, we expect to see a similar effect in our study, showing that the average job satisfaction should be higher. However, the study doesn't give us insight in how job satisfaction changes when a PRP is introduced. Using these results, we can form our final hypothesis:

H4: We expect that the relation between PRP schemes and overall job satisfaction will be the same for 'white' and 'black' employees. However, we expect a negative relation between being black and satisfaction with pay.

3. Empirical framework

For our empirical framework, we build on the analysis done by Green & Heywood (2008). In the BHPS there are two questions of interest regarding bonuses or PRP:

E31. Does your pay include performance related pay?
E32. In the last 12 months have you received any bonuses such as a Christmas or quarterly bonus, profit-related pay or profit sharing bonus, or an occasional commission?

The answers to these questions enable us to construct four variables: The respondent received PRP; the respondent received any bonus, including profit sharing; the respondent received both; the respondent received neither. We use the last-mentioned possibility as the standard and include the other three as dummies.

Regarding job satisfaction, the questions are as follows:

E18. I'm going to read out a list of various aspects of jobs, and after each one I'd like you to tell me from this card which number best describes how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with that particular aspect of your own present job
1 The total pay, including any overtime or bonuses
2 Your job security

3 The actual work itself

4 The hours you work

E19. All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your present job overall using the same 1 - 7 scale?

This gives us specific job satisfaction on the four mentioned questions and an overall score, measured on a 1-7 scale (where 1=not satisfied, 4=neutral, 7=completely satisfied). This allows us to run five estimations, one for each item and one for the overall satisfaction.

We also include a wide variety of domestic variables including the area where respondents live (city or countryside), age, gender, working sector, income, education levels, race, marital status and health. This should enable us to make some claims about causal inference.

Looking at gender and race differences, we consider two options. The preferred analysis for ethnic differences would be to run a separate regression for each type. When we look at the data, however, we see that there are only 110 respondents that are not white for 35.734 white respondents. So, running a separate estimation for ethnic differences doesn't seem feasible, due to a lack of observations. The second option is to introduce interaction effects. This directly estimates the variation due to gender and/or race differences. The problem is that the underlying assumption is that all other factors influencing job satisfaction are the same between the different groups. As Bartel (1981) shows, for race differences this doesn't seem to be the case, since job satisfaction for black respondents seems to be higher, even when performance pay isn't considered. This implies that in case of race differences there seem to be other factors influencing job satisfaction, clouding our results were we to use interaction effects.

As mentioned earlier, we are forced to use an interaction effect, which still can be interesting to give an indication of the effect. However, since there are so few employees which are not white, the expectation is that we still can't draw any conclusions. The only thing we can see is indications of the effect.

For gender differences, it is feasible to run a separate estimation for women, since over 50% of respondents is female. As we have seen, women have different job preferences, since most of them divide attention between work and family caring. Also, there tends to be some form of discrimination when it comes to wages (Becker, 1985). Therefore, we decide to use a separate estimation for gender effects, where we split the sample into female and male.

For our first series of estimations, we use the following equations:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_{1i} + \beta_2 \cdot bonus_{it} + \beta_3 \cdot PRP_{it} + \beta_4 \cdot both_{it} + \beta_5 \cdot X_{it} + \beta_6 \cdot S_{it} + \tau + \varepsilon_{it} \qquad (1)$$

where Y is job satisfaction, which is overall for the first estimation and then the estimation is rerun for all specific aspects of job satisfaction. *Bonus* indicates whether the respondent received a bonus, PRP indicates performance related pay and both indicates whether both were received. X is a vector of demographic variables, S is a vector of firm and sector specific variables, τ are time fixed effects and ε is the error term.

As far as we know, there is no general way to estimate an ordered logit model with fixed effects. There are some ways to do it[3], but it's complexity is beyond the scope of this paper. The downside of not using ordered logit models with fixed effects, is that we cannot be sure whether the relations we found are robust, which would enable us to infer causal relationships. We do estimate a fixed effects model, but use GLS instead. This makes the analysis easier to interpret, with the downside that GLS doesn't account for the fact that we have a categorical dependent variable. These estimations serve as a robustness check for the results we obtain in the ordered logit estimations, since they can still give an indication whether the relations are still present when individual fixed effects are introduced. For our estimation regarding gender differences, we estimate the same equations, but then for women and men separately. For ethnic differences, we include interaction terms of race with *bonus*, *PRP* and *both*, and then rerun the estimations.

4. Data description

For this estimation we use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS is an extensive survey ranging from 1991 to 2009. It questions roughly 10000 individuals a wave, asking questions about employment, family, income, living preferences and a range of other domestic variables. The waves of use to us range from 1998-2009, because since 1998 questions where added concerning the receiving of bonuses or performance related pay.

The BHPS comes with different datasets for each wave. In order to transform them into one usable dataset, we appended all the individual datasets. This gives us a dataset with roughly 155.000 observations. A lot of these observations concern the same respondents who are interviewed in more than one wave. Some respondents have multiple entries in one wave. Examining a few of them we find that only for the variable 'reason for stopping previous job' the answer is sometimes

---

[3] For example, the Chamberlain estimator.

different. When that is the case, there is one entry which is valid, and the others are inapplicable. The solution we opted for is to drop this variable, since it isn't essential for our analysis.[4]

There are some observations that are of no use, because they concern people who don't work, or only work in voluntary jobs or have no registered income. There are self-employed workers, which observations we can't use because they wouldn't be incentivizing themselves with PRP. We only consider respondents who have stated their job satisfaction. We remove respondents which have invalid responses to variables we want to use (see table 2).

To capture whether respondents are now receiving PRP because they switched job, we created a new variable. This dummy variable equals 1 when respondents a) switched job in the past year and b) weren't receiving PRP las year, but are now. In other words: this variable captures the sorting effect of respondents into jobs with PRP. In other words, the created a variable shows whether respondents are receiving PRP because they switched from one job to another. The downside is that, because we need to know whether they received PRP in the wave before, we can no longer use the variables in wave 8, since wave 8 is the first in which questions about performance pay are asked. Using these criteria, we are left with 35.727 observations, for 8.562 individuals. This is still a considerable amount to base our analysis on, so we don't expect problems on that front. In our sample, 55% of the respondents are female.

Looking at table 1, we see that correlations between the different aspects of job satisfaction are quite high. This suggests that for our different estimations, we might find differences in outcomes, but they might be quite small.

TABLE 1: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF JOB SATISFACTION, 1998-2009

	Overall	Total pay	Job security	Work itself	Hours worked
Overall	1				
Total pay	.8380	1			
Job security	.8233	.7616	1		
Work itself	.9171	.7944	.7872	1	
Hours worked	.8622	.7884	.7642	.8373	1

Source: BHPS

Table 2 depicts the summary statistics for the most important variables. For job satisfaction, we see that the means are quite high, which suggests that most respondents are considerably satisfied with

---

[4] We wanted to use this variable to check whether the respondents have been promoted recently, since this might influence job satisfaction.

their job. Also, the means of specified aspects of job satisfaction are quite close together, confirming what we saw in table 1, that the correlations are high. Since the standard deviations are not too small, there should be enough variation to see some results in our estimations. Roughly 16% of respondents received a bonus, where only 8% received PRP or both a bonus and PRP. Respondents are somewhat equally divided between different sized firms, with the least working for (very) small firms. Income growth is quite high, with a relative low standard deviation, suggesting that the differences between correspondents are small.

TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation
Job satisfaction: Overall	5.35	1.25
Job satisfaction: Total pay	4.98	1.45
Job satisfaction: Job security	5.47	1.44
Job Satisfaction: Work itself	5.39	1.31
Job satisfaction: Hours worked	5.26	1.37
Receiving profit share / bonus	.16	
Receiving PRP	.08	
Receiving profit share/ bonus + PRP	.08	
Receiving neither profit share/bonus or PRP	.68	
Firm size		
1-24 employees	.20	
24-99 employees	.25	
100-499 employees	.27	
500+ employees	.26	
Trade union member	.37	
Sex	.55	
Race	.003	
Log income	9.69	.69
Age	40.31	11.33

Source: BHPS

FIGURE 1: OVERALL JOB SATISFACTION FOR ALL RESPONDENTS

FIGURE 2: OVERALL JOB SATISFACTION FOR FEMALE RESPONDENTS

FIGURE 3: OVERALL JOB SATISFACTION FOR NON-WHITE EMPLOYEES

FIGURE 4: OVERALL JOB SATISFACTION FOR MALE RESPONDENTS

Source: BHPS

Figures 1-4 sketch the distribution of respondents over the different levels of job satisfaction. The basic distribution doesn't differ very much between the different groups of respondents.[5] The distribution is rather skewed to the right, showing that most respondents are relatively satisfied with their job. This is also the reason why we need to use a logistic model for our estimation, since the respondents aren't normally distributed.

Table 3 lists the number of times respondents switch from receiving PRP to not receiving PRP and vice versa, and the same for job switching. We see that most respondents (69%) don't switch at all and that there are a fair few respondents that switch twice (29%), but almost no respondents that switch only once (2%). When we combine this with job switching, we see that 84% of respondents don't switch jobs at all and 16% switches once, but no one switches more than once. When we

---

[5] For figures on the distribution between the different aspects of job satisfaction, see figure A1-A4 in the appendix. The basic distribution is the same for the different aspects, that's why we don't show them here.

combine this with the information in table 4, we see that of the respondents switching jobs, roughly one third switches to a job with PRP. So, it seems that most PRP changes are made by the current employer which change their minds quite often and return to the previous situation, being it with or without PRP.

TABLE 3: JOB AND PRP SWITCHING OF RESPONDENTS

Job switch	Frequency	Percentage	PRP switch	Frequency	Percentage
0	29,976	83.90	0	24,553	68.72
1	5,751	16.10	1	925	2.59
			2	10,249	28.69
Total	35,727	100.00	Total	35,727	100.00

TABLE 4: SORTING OF RESPONDENTS INTO PRP JOBS

	Frequency	Percentage
0	33,915	94.93
1	1,812	5.07
Total	35,727	100.00

5. Results

TABLE 5: COVARIATE ESTIMATES OF ORDERED LOGIT MODEL: GENERAL

	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP	-0.00218	0.213***	0.0304	-0.145***	0.0755
	(0.0534)	(0.0527)	(0.0518)	(0.0528)	(0.0515)
PRP only	-0.00841	0.202***	0.142***	-0.0486	0.0646
	(0.0494)	(0.0488)	(0.0486)	(0.0488)	(0.0477)
Bonus only	0.000421	0.0965**	0.0528	-0.121***	0.0609
	(0.0397)	(0.0391)	(0.0385)	(0.0393)	(0.0384)
Female	0.351***	0.382***	0.357***	0.245***	0.0158
	(0.0495)	(0.0511)	(0.0478)	(0.0504)	(0.0475)
Race: not native to the UK	-0.108	-0.396**	0.223	-0.369*	-0.0576
	(0.207)	(0.199)	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.204)
Log Income	-0.0341	0.269***	0.00589	-0.0581**	-0.0228
	(0.0279)	(0.0277)	(0.0271)	(0.0278)	(0.0269)
Hours Worked	-0.0128***	-0.0137***	-0.00403**	-0.00328*	-0.0392***
	(0.00189)	(0.00189)	(0.00183)	(0.00188)	(0.00186)
Overtime Hours	-0.00251	0.00308	0.0135***	0.00939***	-0.0690***
	(0.00249)	(0.00247)	(0.00244)	(0.00250)	(0.00244)
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727
Number of pid	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

Table 5 shows the results of the general logit model, using all observations. We see that the overall relation between PRP and job satisfaction is insignificant. When we include the different aspects of job satisfaction, however, some coefficients become statistically significant. First, we see that the relationship between receiving PRP and satisfaction with pay is positive. The estimated relation between PRP and job security is statistically significant and positive. The interesting part here is the estimated relation between receiving PRP and satisfaction with the work itself, which is significantly negative if respondents receive a bonus or a bonus and PRP. These results are similar to those of Green and Heywood (2008). They found that when introducing individual fixed effects, the negative relation disappeared. When we look at Table 4, were we introduce individual fixed effects, we see that this is true for our sample in the sense that the significance of the relation reduces. However, the negative relation persists in our sample. One explanation could be that we use a GLS model here, while Green and Heywood (2008) use an ordered logit estimation. Other explanations may be the differences in sample: we use 5 more waves, and a different selection procedure.

Table 5 shows some other remarkable effects. These concern the impact of for instance gender effects. These results suggest that women are overall more satisfied than men. Another remarkable relation, is the negative relation between income and satisfaction with the work itself. It seems that respondents with a higher income are less satisfied with the work itself. While this is an interesting relation, it's beyond the scope of this paper to find explanations. It is, however, something to keep in mind for further research.

TABLE 6: GLS ESTIMATES: GENERAL WITH INDIVIDUAL AND TIME FIXED EFFECTS

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP	-0.00261	0.113***	0.0591*	-0.0527*	0.0171
	(0.0305)	(0.0344)	(0.0346)	(0.0315)	(0.0321)
PRP only	0.00201	0.114***	0.101***	-0.0126	0.0344
	(0.0276)	(0.0311)	(0.0313)	(0.0285)	(0.0291)
Bonus only	-0.0120	0.0185	0.0446*	-0.0555**	0.00675
	(0.0226)	(0.0255)	(0.0257)	(0.0234)	(0.0238)
Income	-0.0469***	0.0848***	-0.0157	-0.0612***	-0.0127
	(0.0165)	(0.0187)	(0.0188)	(0.0171)	(0.0174)
Hours Worked	-0.00542***	-0.00377***	-0.00170	-0.00120	-0.0180***
	(0.00116)	(0.00131)	(0.00131)	(0.00120)	(0.00122)
Overtime Hours	-0.00345**	0.000527	0.00525***	0.00100	-0.0339***
	(0.00143)	(0.00161)	(0.00162)	(0.00148)	(0.00150)
PRP received because	0.101***	0.171***	0.0401	0.0939***	0.108***
of new job	(0.0310)	(0.0349)	(0.0352)	(0.0320)	(0.0326)
Constant	-26.09	49.25*	69.70***	-36.05	-16.92
	(23.68)	(26.72)	(26.89)	(24.49)	(24.95)
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727
R-squared	0.017	0.013	0.061	0.012	0.036
Number of pid	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

Table 6 summarizes a GLS estimation including individual fixed effects. Including individual fixed effects gives us a more precise estimation of the effect, since with individual fixed effects we control for unobserved time-invariant variables. Those unobserved variables can have an effect on our independent variables, blurring the observed relation. We observe that the positive coefficients remain fairly robust. The exception is the relation between Bonus only and satisfaction with pay. As mentioned earlier, the negative relation seems to diminish.

Table 7 displays the marginal effects corresponding to the ordered logit estimations. What we see is that for every effect, the sign reverses between the categories 5 and 6. This can be explained when

we look back at the distribution of respondents, where we find that most respondents are in the categories 5, 6 and 7. The turning point between being normally satisfied and being very satisfied seems to lie between the categories 5 and 6. Looking at the relation between receiving both a bonus and PRP and satisfaction with pay, we see that the likelihood of being in the top category is 1.3 percentage points higher for people receiving both a bonus and PRP. Since only 8% of the sample is in the top category, this means that when respondents receive both a bonus and PRP, they are roughly 16% more likely to be in the top category. However, it is also a possibility that the reverse is true: respondents in the top category are more likely to receive both a bonus and PRP. This is quite substantial, and for other aspects of job satisfaction we see similar results. This also holds for the negative relations, particularly between receiving a bonus and satisfaction with the work itself.

TABLE 7: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF LOGIT ESTIMATIONS WITHOUT WORKER FIXED EFFECTS: GENERAL

General	Overall	Pay	Job Security	Work Itself	Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP = 1					
1	0.00002	-0.004***	-0.0006	0.002***	-0.0008
2	0.00005	-0.006***	-0.0006	0.003***	-0.0015
3	0.00009	-0.012***	-0.0011	0.006***	-0.004
4	0.00007	-0.004***	-0.0008	0.004***	-0.002
5	0.0001	-0.007***	-0.0015	0.007***	-0.003
6	-0.0002	0.021***	0.0008	-0.010***	0.005
7	-0.0002	0.013***	0.0038	-0.013***	0.007
PRP = 1					
1	0.0001	-0.004***	-0.003***	0.001	-0.0007
2	0.0002	-0.006***	-0.003***	0.001	-0.001
3	0.0003	-0.012***	-0.005***	0.002	-0.004
4	0.0003	-0.004***	-0.004***	0.0015	-0.002
5	0.0005	-0.006***	-0.007***	0.002	-0.003
6	-0.0008	0.020***	0.003***	-0.003	0.005
7	-0.0006	0.012***	0.018***	-0.004	0.006
Bonus = 1					
1	-0.00001	-0.002**	-0.001	0.002***	-0.0007
2	-0.00001	-0.003**	-0.001	0.003***	-0.0012
3	-0.00002	-0.006**	-0.002	0.005***	-0.003
4	-0.00001	-0.002**	-0.001	0.004***	-0.002
5	-0.00002	-0.003**	-0.003	0.006***	-0.003
6	0.00004	0.01**	0.001	-0.008***	0.004
7	0.00003	0.005**	0.007	-0.011***	0.005

Source: BHPS

TABLE 8: COVARIATE ESTIMATES OF ORDERED LOGIT MODEL: GENDER

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Female					
Bonus and PRP	-0.0450	0.259***	-0.0680	-0.162**	0.0461
	(0.0822)	(0.0821)	(0.0798)	(0.0814)	(0.0792)
PRP only	0.0509	0.205***	0.150**	-0.0461	-0.00105
	(0.0686)	(0.0684)	(0.0678)	(0.0678)	(0.0657)
Bonus only	-0.0285	0.0587	0.0715	-0.144**	0.0392
	(0.0604)	(0.0597)	(0.0586)	(0.0599)	(0.0582)
Male					
Bonus and PRP	0.0240	0.179***	0.100	-0.132*	0.0912
	(0.0712)	(0.0691)	(0.0687)	(0.0699)	(0.0687)
PRP only	-0.0607	0.226***	0.140**	-0.0417	0.143**
	(0.0715)	(0.0697)	(0.0700)	(0.0706)	(0.0696)
Bonus only	0.0184	0.115**	0.0370	-0.104**	0.0682
	(0.0535)	(0.0519)	(0.0515)	(0.0526)	(0.0517)
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

Table 6 shows the ordered logit estimates for female and male respondents separately. We see similar results in table 5, but the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients is reduced. This seems reasonable, as we are using less observations. If we compare the female results with those for men, we see some differences in significance, but no differences in sign. When we include fixed effects in table 8, we observe a couple of differences. First, the negative relation between PRP and satisfaction with the work itself disappears for male respondents. Second, for the effects which are significant for both men and women, we see that the effect for women is much larger now, both for the positive and negative effects. This suggests that women react more strongly to PRP schemes.

TABLE 9: GLS ESTIMATES: GENDER WITH INDIVIDUAL FIXED EFFECTS

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Female					
Bonus and PRP	-0.0401	0.143***	-0.00463	-0.0675	-0.0441
	(0.0467)	(0.0527)	(0.0521)	(0.0479)	(0.0493)
PRP only	0.0568	0.133***	0.126***	0.0225	0.0297
	(0.0386)	(0.0437)	(0.0431)	(0.0397)	(0.0408)
Bonus only	-0.0462	-0.0139	0.0452	-0.0986***	-0.0139

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.0344)	(0.0389)	(0.0384)	(0.0353)	(0.0363)
PRP received because of new job	0.0904**	0.179***	0.104**	0.0772*	0.0838*
	(0.0450)	(0.0508)	(0.0502)	(0.0462)	(0.0475)
Constant	-26.48	77.77**	25.52	-59.17*	-6.668
	(32.12)	(36.28)	(35.86)	(32.97)	(33.92)
Male					
Bonus and PRP	0.0197	0.0891**	0.100**	-0.0418	0.0602
	(0.0403)	(0.0453)	(0.0467)	(0.0421)	(0.0424)
PRP only	-0.0599	0.0912**	0.0733	-0.0567	0.0393
	(0.0394)	(0.0444)	(0.0457)	(0.0412)	(0.0415)
Bonus only	0.0132	0.0372	0.0423	-0.0209	0.0202
	(0.0301)	(0.0339)	(0.0349)	(0.0315)	(0.0316)
PRP received because of new job	0.124***	0.172***	-0.0136	0.120***	0.134***
	(0.0428)	(0.0481)	(0.0496)	(0.0447)	(0.0450)
Constant	-27.26	14.33	120.7***	-7.679	-28.89
	(35.05)	(39.47)	(40.66)	(36.64)	(36.87)
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

Female	Overall	Pay	Job Security	Work Itself	Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP = 1					
1	0.0005	-0.005**	0.001	0.002*	-0.0004
2	0.001	-0.007**	0.001	0.003*	-0.001
3	0.002	-0.014**	0.003	0.007*	-0.003
4	0.001	-0.004**	0.002	0.004*	-0.001
5	0.003	-0.01**	0.004	0.009*	-0.002
6	-0.004	0.023**	-0.001	-0.01*	0.003
7	-0.004	0.017**	-0.009	-0.015*	0.005
PRP = 1					
1	-0.0005	-0.004***	-0.002**	0.001	0.00001
2	-0.001	-0.006***	-0.002**	0.001	0.00002
3	-0.002	-0.012***	-0.005**	0.002	0.0001
4	-0.001	-0.003***	-0.003**	0.001	0.00003
5	-0.003	-0.007***	-0.008**	0.002	0.0001
6	0.004	0.019***	0.001**	-0.003	-0.0001
7	0.004	0.014***	0.02**	-0.004	-0.0001
Bonus = 1					
1	0.0003*	-0.001	-0.001	0.002***	-0.0004
2	0.0006*	-0.002	-0.001	0.003***	-0.0007
3	0.001*	-0.003	-0.003	0.006***	-0.002
4	0.0007*	-0.001	-0.002	0.004***	-0.001
5	0.0017*	-0.002	-0.004	0.008***	-0.002
6	-0.002*	0.005	0.0008	-0.008***	0.002
7	-0.002*	0.004	0.01	-0.014***	0.004

Source: BHPS

Tables 10 and 11 show the marginal effects of the ordered logit estimations for female and male respondents, respectively. If we compare the marginal effects which are significant for both female and male respondents, we see that the probability of being in the top category is always higher for women, while the probability of being in category 6 is always higher for men, or at least equal to the female probability. This suggests that when it comes to PRP schemes it seems that women are more likely to switch to/from the top category, while men react more moderately. However, it could also be that to begin with there are relatively more women in the top category. It could be that women are overall more satisfied. The magnitude of the relation for women seems to be larger than average. For example, when women receive both a bonus and PRP, the probability of being in the top category for satisfaction with the work itself, decreases with 2.1 percentage points. Considering that 16% of women are in the top category, this means that receiving both a bonus and PRP decreases the likelihood of being in the top category with 13%. For men, this is about 11.5%.

TABLE 11: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF LOGIT ESTIMATIONS WITHOUT WORKER FIXED EFFECTS: MALE

Male	Overall	Pay	Job Security	Work Itself	Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP = 1					
1	-0.0003	-0.004***	-0.002	0.002*	-0.001
2	-0.0005	-0.005***	-0.002	0.003*	-0.002
3	-0.001	-0.011***	-0.004	0.005*	-0.005
4	-0.0008	-0.004***	-0.003	0.005*	-0.004
5	-0.001	-0.004***	-0.004	0.006*	-0.003
6	0.002	0.0198***	0.004	-0.010*	0.008
7	0.001	0.009***	0.011	-0.010*	0.007
PRP = 1					
1	0.001	-0.005***	-0.003**	0.0006	-0.002
2	0.001	-0.007***	-0.003**	0.001	-0.003
3	0.003	-0.014***	-0.005**	0.002	-0.008
4	0.002	-0.005***	-0.004**	0.0015	-0.006
5	0.003	-0.006***	-0.006**	0.002	-0.005
6	-0.006	0.025***	0.006**	-0.003	0.012
7	-0.003	0.011***	0.016**	-0.003	0.011
Bonus = 1					
1	-0.0002	-0.002**	-0.0008	0.002**	-0.001
2	-0.0004	-0.0035**	-0.0008	0.002**	-0.001
3	-0.0008	-0.007**	-0.0015	0.004**	-0.004
4	-0.0006	-0.003**	-0.0012	0.004**	-0.003
5	-0.0008	-0.003**	-0.0015	0.005**	-0.002
6	0.002	0.0128**	0.0016	-0.008**	0.006
7	0.001	0.0055**	0.0041	-0.008**	0.005

Source: BHPS

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP	0.00321	0.123***	0.0171	-0.0509*	0.0356
	(0.0260)	(0.0298)	(0.0293)	(0.0271)	(0.0274)
PRP only	-0.000636	0.114***	0.0773***	-0.0284	0.0399
	(0.0240)	(0.0274)	(0.0271)	(0.0250)	(0.0253)
Bonus only	2.17e-06	0.0530**	0.0367*	-0.0519**	0.0302
	(0.0194)	(0.0221)	(0.0218)	(0.0202)	(0.0204)
Race*Bonus and PRP	0.492	1.286**	0.481	0.561	0.394
	(0.499)	(0.568)	(0.564)	(0.519)	(0.526)
Race*PRP only	0.543	0.0428	0.444	0.575	0.298
	(0.378)	(0.431)	(0.427)	(0.393)	(0.399)
Race*Bonus only	0.470*	-0.0950	0.132	0.245	0.429
	(0.270)	(0.307)	(0.305)	(0.280)	(0.284)
Constant	0.00321	0.123***	0.0171	-0.0509*	0.0356
	(0.0260)	(0.0298)	(0.0293)	(0.0271)	(0.0274)
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727
Number of pid	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

Race effects

There are too few observations in this category to say something useful, since only 110 employees in our dataset are not native to Great Britain. There is only one significant estimated relation, between receiving both a bonus and PRP and satisfaction with work. However, when we include worker fixed effects this relation disappears. In this case, the relation between receiving a bonus and satisfaction with the work itself becomes significantly negative. However, the lack of observations prevents us to draw any conclusions from this result.

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP	-0.0153	0.105***	0.0486	-0.0616*	0.00931
	(0.0305)	(0.0343)	(0.0346)	(0.0315)	(0.0320)
PRP only	-0.0161	0.106***	0.0852***	-0.0272	0.0228
	(0.0276)	(0.0311)	(0.0313)	(0.0285)	(0.0290)
Bonus only	-0.0298	0.0112	0.0296	-0.0692***	-0.00384
	(0.0227)	(0.0255)	(0.0257)	(0.0234)	(0.0238)
Race*Bonus and PRP	0.173	0.942	0.226	0.263	-0.0452
	(0.568)	(0.640)	(0.644)	(0.587)	(0.597)
Race*PRP only	0.184	-0.151	0.293	0.414	0.0153
	(0.427)	(0.481)	(0.484)	(0.441)	(0.449)
Race*Bonus only	0.629**	-0.181	0.454	0.464	0.439
	(0.302)	(0.340)	(0.342)	(0.312)	(0.317)
Constant	-3.075	63.34**	91.68***	-15.88	-3.795
	(23.61)	(26.60)	(26.78)	(24.40)	(24.83)
Observations	35,844	35,844	35,844	35,844	35,844
R-squared	0.011	0.012	0.058	0.008	0.034
Number of pid	8,582	8,582	8,582	8,582	8,582

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

6.   Discussion

We set out to study the effects of PRP schemes and bonuses (or profit sharing) on five dimensions of job satisfaction. To this end we formulated four hypotheses. Now we will see whether these hypotheses were in line with the data.

The first hypothesis stated that: "*When controlling for employee fixed effects, we expect the relation between PRP schemes and job satisfaction to be positive*". Our results suggest that this hypothesis is only partly true. While there are positive relations, for example between PRP and satisfaction with pay, other relations are negative (satisfaction with the work itself). This is in line with the results of Green & Heywood (2008). However, when we introduced worker fixed effects, these negative relations persisted, while Green & Heywood (2008) reported a disappearance of this relation. This leads us to believe that there might be a negative effect of PRP schemes on satisfaction with the work itself. The reason behind this relation might be that part of the intrinsic motivation of employees is externalized with a financial bonus. It might also be that the amount of the bonus is insufficient to ensure employees feel that their work is fully appreciated. It might also be the case that these differences arise because we used GLS for our fixed effects estimations rather than the

ordered logit model of Green & Heywood (2008). That It is an interesting point to investigate in further research.

Our second hypothesis stated: "*We expect to see a positive relation between the presence of a profit sharing scheme and job satisfaction*". Here, the same story holds as for hypothesis 1. Is seems to be partially correct, but the relation with satisfaction with the work itself remains negative.

When considering gender differences, we expected to see a small relation between job satisfaction and PRP schemes, if any. Our results show an insignificant the relation between overall job satisfaction and PRP schemes for women, but, looking at the different aspects of job satisfaction, we do see a significant relation. This relation is very similar to that for men, only a bit stronger for the higher categories. This is clearly not in accordance with our hypothesis. This may have different reasons, one of which is that our hypothesis was based on one study, done by Heywood & Wei (1999), who estimated a model based on one year (1988) and US residents. It could be that the relations are different because we included more years, or that women in the US react differently from women in the UK. An additional factor may be the difference in sample periods.

Our final hypothesis concerned racial differences, and stated: *"We expect that the relation between PRP schemes and overall job satisfaction will be the same for 'white' and 'black' employees. However, we expect a negative relation between being black and satisfaction with pay"*. As stated in section 5, this dataset yielded a sufficient number of observations to estimate a useful relation. There is a slight hint that the second part of the hypothesis is worth a further examination. For example, in the Annex, table A1 we see that the relation between not being native to the UK and satisfaction with pay is negative. As mentioned earlier, due to the lack of observations we cannot be sure whether this effect holds. Also, when we include fixed effects in table A2, this relation disappears, so clearly, more research is needed to provide an answer.

It should also be mentioned that no relations mentioned are causal effects necessarily. The estimates may move in the same or opposite direction, but this doesn't necessarily mean that one is causing the other. It could also be that there is a third external factor which influences both job satisfaction and whether or not a respondent receives performance pay, for example economic growth. In that case, receiving PRP an job satisfaction may be correlated, but receiving PRP has no effect on job satisfaction. The effect we observed was then caused by economic growth.

This lack of causal interpretation has several reasons. First, we couldn't use an ordered logit model with fixed effects, due to complexity of such models. Second, we can argue that the sample isn't a complete representation of the population, since such a small part of the sample turned out to be

not native to the UK. When using a proper ordered logit model with fixed effects, we would be able to see whether the relations we found hold. For racial differences, a different dataset is needed where a larger portion of the population is not-native to the respective country.

The lack of causality is a major downside of this paper. Whereas the literature gives some reason to believe the relations might be causal, we cannot say this with certainty. As mentioned earlier, another downside is the lack of respondents that aren't native to the UK. This means that our racial analysis is compromised. However, the BHPS does give us a nice set of respondents over the span of ten years and it seems that most respondents appear more than once. Another nice aspect is that it gives information on different aspects or levels of job satisfaction, enabling us to investigate those. Because the BHPS gave us a nice division between male and female respondents, we were able to investigate whether female respondents react differently to PRP schemes than male respondents.

There remain, however, possibilities for further research. It would be interesting to see whether the relations we found are causal effects, and then mainly the negative relations between satisfaction with the work itself and PRP schemes. It would be nice to learn what causes this relation, and other relations we found.

Another point for further research are the possible racial differences, since there is little literature on this subject. For this, another dataset is needed with more non-native respondents.

References

Akerlof, G. A., & Yellen, Y. L. (1988, May). Fairness and Unemployment. *The American Economic Review, 78*(2), 44-49.

Bartel, A. P. (1981, Spring). Race Differences in Job Satisfaction: A Reappraisal. *The Journal of Human Resources, 16*(2), 294-303.

Becker, G. S. (1985, January). Human Capital, Effortand the Sexual Division of Labor. *Journal of Labor Economics, 3*(1), S33-S58.

Brown, M. (2001, September). Unequal pay, Unequal Responses? Pay Referents and Their Implicationsfor Pay Level Satisfaction. *Journal of Management Studies, 38*(6), 879-896.

Brown, S., & Sessions, J. G. (2003, December). Attitudes, Expectations and Sharing. *Labour, 17*(4), 543-569.

Delfgaauw, J. (2007). The effect of job satisfaction on job search: Not just whether, but also where. *Labour Economics*(14), 299-317.

Drago, R. (1996, October). Workplace Tranformation and the Disposable Workplace: Employee Involvement in Australia. *Industrial Relations, 35*(4), 526-543.

Fernie, S., & Metcalf, D. (1999). It's Not What You Pay it's the Way that You Pay it and that's What Gets Results: Jockeys' Pay and Performance. *Labour, 13*(2), 385-411.

Geddes, L. A., & Heywood, J. S. (2003, July). Gender and Piece Rates, Commissions, and Bonuses. *Industrial Relations, 42*(3), 419-444.

Godard, J. (2001, July). High Performance and The Transformation of Work? The Implications Of Alternative Work Practices For The Experience and Outcomes of Work. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 54*(4), 776-805.

Goldin, C. (1985). *Monitoring Costs and Occupational Segregation by Sex: An Historical analysis.* Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Green, C., & Heywood, J. S. (2008). Does Performance Pay Increase Job Satisfaction? *Economica*, 710-728.

Grund, C., & Sliwka, D. (2006). *Performance Pay and Risk Aversion.* Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.

Heywood, J. S., & Wei, X. (2006). Performance pay and job satisfaction. *Journal of Industrial Relations, 48*(4), 523-540.

Imberman, S. A., & Lovenheim, M. F. (2015, May). Incentive Strength and Teacher Productivity: Evidence from a Group-Based Teacher Incentive Pay System. *Review of Economics and Statistics, 97*(2), 364-386.

Kandel, E., & Lazear, E. P. (1992, August). Peer Pressure and Partnerships. *Journal of Political Economy, 100*(4), 801-817.

Kennedy, P. W. (1995, September). Performance Pay, Productivity and Morale. *The Economic Record, 71*(214), 240-247.

Klein, K. J. (1987, May). Employee stock ownership and employee attitudes: A test of three models. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 72*(2), 319-332.

Lazear, E. P. (2000, May). The Power of Incentives. *The American Economic Review, 90*(2), 410-414.

Marsden, D., French, S., & Kubo, K. (2001). *Does Performance Pay De-Motivate and Does It Matter?* London School of Economics and Political Science. London: Centre for Economic Performance.

McCausland, W. D., Pouliakas, K., & Theodossiou, I. (2005). Some are punished and some are rewarded. *Internatinal Journal of Manpower, 26*(7/8), 636-659.

Mynatt, P. G., Omundson, J. S., Schroeder, R. G., & Stevens, M. B. (1997, December). The impact of Anglo and Hispanic Ethnicity, Gender, Position, Personality and Job Satisfaction on Turnover Intentions: A Path Analytic Investigation. *Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 8*(6), 657-683.

Russ, F. A., & McNeilly, K. M. (1995, September). Links among satisfaction, commitment, and turnover intentions: The moderating effect of experience, gender, and performance. *Journal of Business Research, 34*(1), 57-65.

Appendix A: Estimation Results

TABLE A1: COVARIATE ESTIMATES OF ORDERED LOGIT MODEL: GENERAL

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP	-0.00218	0.213***	0.0304	-0.145***	0.0755
	(0.0534)	(0.0527)	(0.0518)	(0.0528)	(0.0515)
PRP only	-0.00841	0.202***	0.142***	-0.0486	0.0646
	(0.0494)	(0.0488)	(0.0486)	(0.0488)	(0.0477)
Bonus only	0.000421	0.0965**	0.0528	-0.121***	0.0609
	(0.0397)	(0.0391)	(0.0385)	(0.0393)	(0.0384)
Female	0.351***	0.382***	0.357***	0.245***	0.0158
	(0.0495)	(0.0511)	(0.0478)	(0.0504)	(0.0475)
Job Size					
>500	-0.131	-0.394***	-0.00871	-0.355***	0.00902
	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.105)
100-499	-0.0572	-0.385***	0.00611	-0.274**	0.0301
	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.107)	(0.105)
25-99	0.00517	-0.421***	0.0666	-0.0863	0.0468
	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.107)	(0.104)
<24	0.0265	-0.366***	0.0140	-0.0485	0.0849
	(0.108)	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.105)
No Pension via Employer	-0.0240	-0.138**	-0.293***	0.104*	0.0494
	(0.0585)	(0.0577)	(0.0561)	(0.0582)	(0.0566)
Temporary Job	-0.263***	0.229***	-2.692***	0.102	0.0726
	(0.0698)	(0.0695)	(0.0678)	(0.0696)	(0.0680)
Health					
Poor	-0.267	-0.177	0.0222	-0.392**	0.222
	(0.166)	(0.156)	(0.158)	(0.165)	(0.160)
Fair	-0.175	-0.168	0.0957	-0.269*	0.231
	(0.161)	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.161)	(0.155)
Good	0.179	0.0888	0.324**	0.00600	0.493***
	(0.160)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.160)	(0.155)
Excellent	0.527***	0.279*	0.599***	0.342**	0.819***
	(0.162)	(0.153)	(0.154)	(0.161)	(0.156)
Manager	0.0848**	0.147***	0.130***	0.0638*	-0.165***
	(0.0335)	(0.0330)	(0.0326)	(0.0334)	(0.0322)
Public Sector	0.411***	0.0464	0.526***	0.322***	0.278***
	(0.0406)	(0.0404)	(0.0394)	(0.0406)	(0.0391)
Health insurance via	0.196***	0.239***	0.0232	0.258***	0.0680
Employer	(0.0737)	(0.0737)	(0.0712)	(0.0741)	(0.0709)
Married	0.126***	0.288***	0.132***	0.137***	-0.00230
	(0.0417)	(0.0421)	(0.0406)	(0.0419)	(0.0401)
Race: Not native to the UK	-0.108	-0.396**	0.223	-0.369*	-0.0576
	(0.207)	(0.199)	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.204)
Education					
Other qualification	-0.402	-0.273	0.213	-0.479	-0.167
	(0.328)	(0.337)	(0.326)	(0.335)	(0.325)
Apprentice	0.00928	-0.525**	0.197	0.419*	0.293

	(0.242)	(0.246)	(0.233)	(0.245)	(0.232)
CSE 25	0.0885	-0.134	0.145	0.198	-0.00824
	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.130)	(0.137)	(0.129)
Commerce	0.0409	-0.137	-0.210	-0.243	0.0583
	(0.200)	(0.206)	(0.191)	(0.202)	(0.194)
O levels	-0.143*	-0.152*	0.128	-0.0775	-0.106
	(0.0827)	(0.0838)	(0.0793)	(0.0834)	(0.0792)
A levels	-0.403***	-0.338***	-0.0741	-0.178**	-0.158*
	(0.0868)	(0.0879)	(0.0836)	(0.0877)	(0.0833)
Nurse	-0.311*	-0.561***	0.165	-0.156	-0.368**
	(0.172)	(0.175)	(0.169)	(0.174)	(0.165)
Other high qualification	-0.249***	-0.309***	0.0583	-0.0418	-0.167**
	(0.0763)	(0.0773)	(0.0734)	(0.0772)	(0.0731)
Teacher	-0.490***	-0.249	0.166	-0.138	-0.623***
	(0.150)	(0.154)	(0.145)	(0.153)	(0.144)
First Degree	-0.465***	-0.140	0.252***	-0.244***	-0.482***
	(0.0881)	(0.0900)	(0.0850)	(0.0894)	(0.0845)
High Degree	-0.613***	-0.245**	0.147	-0.213*	-0.637***
	(0.121)	(0.125)	(0.117)	(0.123)	(0.116)
Log Income	-0.0341	0.269***	0.00589	-0.0581**	-0.0228
	(0.0279)	(0.0277)	(0.0271)	(0.0278)	(0.0269)
Age	-0.0730***	-0.0894***	-0.172***	-0.0263**	-0.0595***
	(0.0113)	(0.0114)	(0.0110)	(0.0114)	(0.0109)
Age^2	0.00103***	0.00120***	0.00209***	0.000547***	0.000762***
	(0.000136)	(0.000137)	(0.000132)	(0.000137)	(0.000131)
Union Member	-0.149***	-0.0370	0.0220	-0.113***	-0.144***
	(0.0359)	(0.0358)	(0.0346)	(0.0359)	(0.0345)
Hours worked/week	-0.0128***	-0.0137***	-0.00403**	-0.00328*	-0.0392***
	(0.00189)	(0.00189)	(0.00183)	(0.00188)	(0.00186)
Hours overtime/week	-0.00251	0.00308	0.0135***	0.00939***	-0.0690***
	(0.00249)	(0.00247)	(0.00244)	(0.00250)	(0.00244)
Tenure	-0.0348***	-0.0199***	-0.0196***	-0.0309***	-0.0158***
	(0.00265)	(0.00263)	(0.00258)	(0.00265)	(0.00255)
Region					
Inner London	-0.109	0.0121	-0.293	-0.212	0.0438
	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.210)	(0.214)	(0.208)
Outer London	-0.317*	-0.0929	-0.469***	0.0190	0.00850
	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.174)	(0.177)	(0.170)
Southeast	-0.0307	0.0597	-0.140	-0.00391	-0.0345
	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.144)
Southwest	-0.200	0.327**	-0.310*	-0.0354	0.00911
	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.162)	(0.164)	(0.157)
East Anglia	0.117	0.345*	-0.264	0.0771	0.163
	(0.198)	(0.201)	(0.194)	(0.199)	(0.192)
East Midlands	-0.00105	0.478***	-0.307*	0.111	0.180
	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.162)	(0.165)	(0.158)
West Midlands Conurbation	-0.305	0.139	-0.118	-0.223	-0.0786
	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.199)	(0.202)	(0.194)
Rest of West Midlands	-0.141	0.336*	-0.194	0.00458	-0.161
	(0.179)	(0.180)	(0.177)	(0.179)	(0.171)
Greater Manchester	-0.368*	-0.217	-0.354*	-0.288	-0.112
	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.185)	(0.189)	(0.180)

Merseyside	-0.0293	0.150	-0.271	-0.0112	-0.0942
	(0.232)	(0.234)	(0.226)	(0.233)	(0.222)
Rest of the Northwest	-0.224	0.170	-0.343*	-0.287	-0.0549
	(0.189)	(0.191)	(0.185)	(0.190)	(0.181)
South Yorkshire	-0.350	0.457**	-0.762***	-0.379*	-0.203
	(0.215)	(0.216)	(0.207)	(0.214)	(0.204)
West Yorkshire	0.319	0.552***	-0.265	0.436**	0.315
	(0.203)	(0.205)	(0.198)	(0.204)	(0.195)
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside	-0.190	0.294	-0.0351	0.00738	-0.00804
	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.198)	(0.203)	(0.194)
Tyne	-0.217	0.281	-0.562***	-0.285	0.0451
	(0.224)	(0.225)	(0.217)	(0.226)	(0.213)
Rest of the North	0.0692	0.612***	-0.368**	0.0901	0.300
	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.186)	(0.191)	(0.182)
Wales	0.242*	0.408***	-0.0747	0.458***	0.273**
	(0.145)	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.139)
Scotland	-0.0472	0.249*	-0.0538	0.0308	0.135
	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.137)
North Ireland	0.313**	0.171	0.0870	0.246*	0.510***
	(0.149)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.143)
Year	-0.00587	0.0193***	-0.00722	-0.0102**	0.00923*
	(0.00493)	(0.00488)	(0.00479)	(0.00491)	(0.00475)
Observations	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727
Number of pid	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP	-0.00261	0.113***	0.0591*	-0.0527*	0.0171
	(0.0305)	(0.0344)	(0.0346)	(0.0315)	(0.0321)
PRP only	0.00201	0.114***	0.101***	-0.0126	0.0344
	(0.0276)	(0.0311)	(0.0313)	(0.0285)	(0.0291)
Bonus only	-0.0120	0.0185	0.0446*	-0.0555**	0.00675
	(0.0226)	(0.0255)	(0.0257)	(0.0234)	(0.0238)
Female	-	-	-	-	-
Job Size					
>500	-0.0203	-0.105	0.0144	-0.104*	0.0442
	(0.0579)	(0.0654)	(0.0658)	(0.0599)	(0.0610)
100-499	0.00884	-0.0863	0.0186	-0.0713	0.0859
	(0.0574)	(0.0647)	(0.0651)	(0.0593)	(0.0604)
25-99	-0.0168	-0.145**	0.00423	-0.0318	0.0959
	(0.0572)	(0.0646)	(0.0650)	(0.0592)	(0.0603)
<24	-0.0313	-0.148**	-0.0430	-0.0483	0.110*
	(0.0578)	(0.0653)	(0.0657)	(0.0598)	(0.0609)
No Pension via Employer	-0.0469	-0.107***	-0.225***	-0.0204	-0.00547
	(0.0345)	(0.0390)	(0.0392)	(0.0357)	(0.0364)
Temporary Job	-0.120***	0.0650	-1.646***	0.0561	0.0439
	(0.0390)	(0.0440)	(0.0443)	(0.0404)	(0.0411)
Health					
Poor	0.0170	-0.140	0.0945	-0.0953	0.171*
	(0.0850)	(0.0959)	(0.0965)	(0.0879)	(0.0895)
Fair	0.0752	-0.166*	0.110	0.0119	0.204**
	(0.0833)	(0.0940)	(0.0946)	(0.0861)	(0.0877)
Good	0.219***	-0.0634	0.213**	0.114	0.297***
	(0.0832)	(0.0939)	(0.0945)	(0.0861)	(0.0877)
Excellent	0.300***	-0.0265	0.268***	0.214**	0.388***
	(0.0842)	(0.0950)	(0.0956)	(0.0871)	(0.0887)
Manager	0.000110	0.0512**	0.0172	0.00558	-0.0804***
	(0.0194)	(0.0219)	(0.0220)	(0.0201)	(0.0205)
Public Sector	0.114***	0.00111	0.124***	0.0835***	0.108***
	(0.0278)	(0.0314)	(0.0316)	(0.0288)	(0.0293)
Health insurance via Employer	0.0321	0.0297	0.0435	0.0728	-0.0283
	(0.0455)	(0.0513)	(0.0516)	(0.0470)	(0.0479)
Married	-0.0339	0.151***	0.00822	-0.0369	-0.0286
	(0.0309)	(0.0349)	(0.0351)	(0.0320)	(0.0326)
Education					
Other qualification	-0.0870	0.0832	0.0131	-0.177	0.206
	(0.336)	(0.379)	(0.382)	(0.348)	(0.354)
Apprentice	0.0867	-0.0977	0.164	0.327	0.220
	(0.267)	(0.302)	(0.304)	(0.276)	(0.282)
CSE 25	0.223	-0.105	0.575***	0.0706	0.0624
	(0.141)	(0.159)	(0.160)	(0.146)	(0.149)
Commerce	0.370*	-0.0705	0.366	-0.0989	0.0807
	(0.219)	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.227)	(0.231)

O levels	0.140	-0.0241	0.285***	0.119	0.0106
	(0.0893)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.0923)	(0.0941)
A levels	-0.0168	-0.0455	0.0651	0.0741	-0.0487
	(0.0892)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.0923)	(0.0940)
Nurse	0.0769	-0.325*	0.202	0.0322	-0.0583
	(0.153)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.158)	(0.161)
Other high qualification	0.0524	-0.0679	0.212**	0.0851	-0.0264
	(0.0813)	(0.0917)	(0.0923)	(0.0841)	(0.0856)
Teacher	-0.101	-0.208	0.208	0.0686	-0.0880
	(0.276)	(0.312)	(0.314)	(0.286)	(0.291)
First Degree	-0.0795	-0.158	0.0567	0.0274	-0.180
	(0.115)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.119)	(0.122)
High Degree	0.0742	-0.162	-0.0159	0.343**	-0.128
	(0.159)	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.165)	(0.168)
Log Income	-0.0469***	0.0848***	-0.0157	-0.0612***	-0.0127
	(0.0165)	(0.0187)	(0.0188)	(0.0171)	(0.0174)
Age	-0.0136	0.0315*	-0.0219	-0.00818	-0.00192
	(0.0150)	(0.0169)	(0.0170)	(0.0155)	(0.0158)
Age^2	2.56e-05	0.000170	0.000674***	-7.17e-05	1.27e-05
	(0.000117)	(0.000133)	(0.000133)	(0.000122)	(0.000124)
Union Member	-0.102***	-0.0354	-0.0202	-0.0709***	-0.0445*
	(0.0230)	(0.0260)	(0.0261)	(0.0238)	(0.0242)
Hours worked/week	-0.00542***	-0.00377***	-0.00170	-0.00120	-0.0180***
	(0.00116)	(0.00131)	(0.00131)	(0.00120)	(0.00122)
Hours overtime/week	-0.00345**	0.000527	0.00525***	0.00100	-0.0339***
	(0.00143)	(0.00161)	(0.00162)	(0.00148)	(0.00150)
Tenure	-0.0205***	-0.0112***	-0.0188***	-0.0169***	-0.0105***
	(0.00163)	(0.00184)	(0.00185)	(0.00168)	(0.00172)
Region					
Inner London	-0.191	0.297	-0.0924	-0.340*	-0.453**
	(0.193)	(0.218)	(0.220)	(0.200)	(0.204)
Outer London	-0.132	0.0284	-0.158	-0.0174	-0.208
	(0.162)	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.168)	(0.171)
Southeast	0.0216	-0.0421	-0.0428	0.0414	-0.231*
	(0.121)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.126)	(0.128)
Southwest	-0.134	0.539***	0.0251	0.0410	-0.0277
	(0.152)	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.157)	(0.160)
East Anglia	-0.0218	-0.136	-0.402	-0.0734	0.108
	(0.225)	(0.254)	(0.255)	(0.232)	(0.237)
East Midlands	0.133	0.388**	-0.144	0.188	0.230
	(0.147)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.152)	(0.154)
West Midlands Conurbation	-0.257	0.189	0.0562	-0.0965	0.126
	(0.215)	(0.243)	(0.245)	(0.223)	(0.227)
Rest of West Midlands	-0.271	-0.0601	-0.365*	-0.0804	-0.144
	(0.187)	(0.211)	(0.212)	(0.193)	(0.197)
Greater Manchester	0.106	0.255	0.130	0.0839	0.150
	(0.207)	(0.234)	(0.235)	(0.214)	(0.218)
Merseyside	-0.251	0.308	0.111	-0.292	0.574**
	(0.271)	(0.306)	(0.308)	(0.281)	(0.286)
Rest of the Northwest	-0.105	-0.166	0.417	-0.222	-0.307
	(0.225)	(0.254)	(0.256)	(0.233)	(0.237)
South Yorkshire	-0.302	0.305	-0.483*	-0.0288	0.115

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.230)	(0.259)	(0.261)	(0.238)	(0.242)
West Yorkshire	0.114	0.729***	-0.548**	0.270	0.204
	(0.211)	(0.238)	(0.240)	(0.218)	(0.222)
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside	-0.146	0.391*	-0.201	0.0328	-0.0102
	(0.198)	(0.223)	(0.225)	(0.205)	(0.209)
Tyne	0.273	0.449	-0.461	0.188	0.0516
	(0.254)	(0.286)	(0.288)	(0.262)	(0.267)
Rest of the North	0.332	0.478**	-0.0384	0.472**	0.463**
	(0.207)	(0.234)	(0.235)	(0.214)	(0.218)
Wales	0.107	0.0265	0.0872	0.0813	0.0319
	(0.126)	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.131)	(0.133)
Scotland	0.0328	0.219*	0.101	0.147	0.231*
	(0.118)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.122)	(0.125)
North Ireland	-0.315	-0.163	-0.0840	-0.0921	0.117
	(0.284)	(0.321)	(0.323)	(0.294)	(0.299)
Year	0.0162	-0.0232*	-0.0322**	0.0212*	0.0114
	(0.0120)	(0.0136)	(0.0137)	(0.0125)	(0.0127)
PRP received because of new job	0.101***	0.171***	0.0401	0.0939***	0.108***
	(0.0310)	(0.0349)	(0.0352)	(0.0320)	(0.0326)
Constant	-26.09	49.25*	69.70***	-36.05	-16.92
	(23.68)	(26.72)	(26.89)	(24.49)	(24.95)
Observations	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727
R-squared	0.017	0.013	0.061	0.012	0.036
Number of pid	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP	-0.0450	0.259***	-0.0680	-0.162**	0.0461
	(0.0822)	(0.0821)	(0.0798)	(0.0814)	(0.0792)
PRP only	0.0509	0.205***	0.150**	-0.0461	-0.00105
	(0.0686)	(0.0684)	(0.0678)	(0.0678)	(0.0657)
Bonus only	-0.0285	0.0587	0.0715	-0.144**	0.0392
	(0.0604)	(0.0597)	(0.0586)	(0.0599)	(0.0582)
Job Size					
>500	-0.0798	-0.442***	0.0539	-0.373***	-0.0105
	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.129)	(0.135)	(0.132)
100-499	-0.0319	-0.387***	0.0360	-0.225*	0.0543
	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.129)	(0.134)	(0.131)
25-99	0.0313	-0.433***	0.0809	-0.0902	0.0430
	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.128)	(0.133)	(0.131)
<24	0.108	-0.392***	0.0844	-0.0223	0.0812
	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.128)	(0.134)	(0.131)
No Pension via Employer	-0.0510	-0.160**	-0.350***	0.0395	0.00717
	(0.0811)	(0.0810)	(0.0775)	(0.0807)	(0.0785)
Temporary Job	-0.192**	0.237***	-2.721***	0.203**	0.134
	(0.0859)	(0.0861)	(0.0837)	(0.0862)	(0.0835)
Health					
Poor	-0.388*	-0.228	-0.0119	-0.661***	0.101
	(0.208)	(0.195)	(0.198)	(0.208)	(0.202)
Fair	-0.294	-0.233	-0.000237	-0.597***	0.0979
	(0.201)	(0.188)	(0.191)	(0.202)	(0.195)
Good	-0.00303	-0.0175	0.206	-0.331*	0.313
	(0.200)	(0.187)	(0.190)	(0.201)	(0.194)
Excellent	0.334*	0.168	0.495***	-0.00558	0.661***
	(0.202)	(0.189)	(0.192)	(0.203)	(0.196)
Manager	0.0721	0.200***	0.152***	0.0501	-0.185***
	(0.0451)	(0.0449)	(0.0441)	(0.0451)	(0.0432)
Public Sector	0.458***	0.112**	0.420***	0.423***	0.253***
	(0.0548)	(0.0553)	(0.0532)	(0.0552)	(0.0526)
Health insurance via Employer	0.0380	0.155	-0.249*	0.250*	0.0452
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.129)	(0.134)	(0.127)
Married	0.181***	0.332***	0.214***	0.177***	-0.00370
	(0.0546)	(0.0563)	(0.0534)	(0.0554)	(0.0523)
Race: Not native to the UK	-0.195	-0.326	0.0526	-0.485*	-0.189
	(0.270)	(0.260)	(0.266)	(0.273)	(0.262)
Education					
Other qualification	-0.197	-0.229	0.352	-0.127	0.101
	(0.456)	(0.495)	(0.446)	(0.467)	(0.440)
Apprentice	-0.297	-1.107	0.189	-0.282	-1.527**
	(0.802)	(0.865)	(0.796)	(0.823)	(0.755)
CSE 25	-0.277	-0.628***	-0.0595	0.150	-0.152
	(0.205)	(0.214)	(0.196)	(0.208)	(0.195)
Commerce	-0.115	-0.349	-0.268	-0.285	-0.120

31

	(0.214)	(0.228)	(0.205)	(0.219)	(0.206)
O levels	-0.240**	-0.209*	0.170	-0.120	-0.0519
	(0.111)	(0.116)	(0.107)	(0.113)	(0.106)
A levels	-0.399***	-0.438***	0.0543	-0.105	-0.0465
	(0.118)	(0.123)	(0.114)	(0.121)	(0.113)
Nurse	-0.431**	-0.722***	0.160	-0.198	-0.393**
	(0.184)	(0.193)	(0.181)	(0.188)	(0.176)
Other high qualification	-0.392***	-0.496***	0.142	-0.0882	-0.205**
	(0.105)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.0996)
Teacher	-0.671***	-0.351*	0.0744	-0.261	-0.719***
	(0.179)	(0.192)	(0.174)	(0.186)	(0.171)
First Degree	-0.627***	-0.250**	0.205*	-0.304**	-0.548***
	(0.118)	(0.124)	(0.114)	(0.121)	(0.112)
High Degree	-0.917***	-0.434**	0.0957	-0.374**	-0.882***
	(0.163)	(0.174)	(0.159)	(0.168)	(0.156)
Log Income	-0.0750**	0.161***	0.00322	-0.104***	-0.0447
	(0.0345)	(0.0343)	(0.0336)	(0.0346)	(0.0331)
Age	-0.0597***	-0.0696***	-0.141***	-0.00980	-0.0663***
	(0.0154)	(0.0160)	(0.0150)	(0.0156)	(0.0148)
Age^2	0.000815***	0.00100***	0.00171***	0.000325*	0.000839***
	(0.000187)	(0.000194)	(0.000183)	(0.000190)	(0.000180)
Union Member	-0.156***	-0.0835*	0.0369	-0.153***	-0.137***
	(0.0476)	(0.0482)	(0.0461)	(0.0480)	(0.0457)
Hours worked/week	-0.0118***	-0.0156***	-0.00428*	-0.00265	-0.0409***
	(0.00244)	(0.00247)	(0.00237)	(0.00245)	(0.00241)
Hours overtime/week	-0.00976***	-0.0118***	0.0154***	0.00396	-0.0750***
	(0.00371)	(0.00367)	(0.00366)	(0.00371)	(0.00361)
Tenure	-0.0362***	-0.0269***	-0.0195***	-0.0343***	-0.0162***
	(0.00389)	(0.00392)	(0.00380)	(0.00393)	(0.00374)
Region					
Inner London	-0.566**	-0.0205	-0.429	-0.498*	0.0253
	(0.277)	(0.286)	(0.273)	(0.279)	(0.268)
Outer London	-0.542**	-0.105	-0.658***	-0.161	0.0288
	(0.234)	(0.237)	(0.229)	(0.235)	(0.224)
Southeast	-0.293	-0.144	-0.155	-0.131	-0.0389
	(0.201)	(0.200)	(0.198)	(0.199)	(0.191)
Southwest	-0.526**	0.222	-0.479**	-0.156	-0.0140
	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.216)	(0.221)	(0.210)
East Anglia	0.0408	0.435	-0.300	-0.0353	0.0909
	(0.264)	(0.272)	(0.257)	(0.266)	(0.253)
East Midlands	-0.184	0.539**	-0.427**	-0.180	0.243
	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.216)	(0.220)	(0.209)
West Midlands Conurbation	-0.129	0.395	-0.0301	-0.267	0.381
	(0.274)	(0.277)	(0.267)	(0.272)	(0.260)
Rest of West Midlands	-0.420*	0.256	-0.139	-0.197	-0.00812
	(0.238)	(0.243)	(0.234)	(0.239)	(0.227)
Greater Manchester	-0.621**	-0.251	-0.404	-0.530**	0.0637
	(0.254)	(0.260)	(0.249)	(0.255)	(0.242)
Merseyside	-0.380	0.108	-0.519*	-0.395	0.0239
	(0.312)	(0.322)	(0.304)	(0.316)	(0.297)
Rest of the Northwest	-0.416	0.157	-0.516**	-0.460*	-0.191
	(0.253)	(0.261)	(0.247)	(0.255)	(0.241)

South Yorkshire	-0.455	0.524*	-0.676**	-0.455	-0.260
	(0.285)	(0.292)	(0.273)	(0.285)	(0.268)
West Yorkshire	0.0344	0.543**	-0.406	0.167	0.344
	(0.268)	(0.275)	(0.260)	(0.269)	(0.255)
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside	-0.442	0.248	-0.00408	-0.181	0.200
	(0.272)	(0.279)	(0.267)	(0.274)	(0.260)
Tyne	-0.514*	0.376	-0.623**	-0.517*	0.146
	(0.303)	(0.310)	(0.294)	(0.306)	(0.286)
Rest of the North	-0.0704	0.492*	-0.319	0.0683	0.430*
	(0.254)	(0.259)	(0.247)	(0.256)	(0.240)
Wales	-0.0232	0.389**	-0.0401	0.187	0.287
	(0.194)	(0.192)	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.184)
Scotland	-0.254	0.207	-0.0820	-0.149	0.255
	(0.191)	(0.189)	(0.188)	(0.189)	(0.182)
North Ireland	0.0406	0.0981	0.0826	0.00857	0.550***
	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.194)	(0.196)	(0.188)
Year	-0.00886	0.0178***	-0.0261***	-0.00647	0.00255
	(0.00665)	(0.00668)	(0.00647)	(0.00666)	(0.00639)
Constant	0.216**	0.264***	0.168**	0.178**	0.223***
	(0.0856)	(0.0844)	(0.0836)	(0.0846)	(0.0819)
Observations	19,721	19,721	19,721	19,721	19,721
Number of pid	4,652	4,652	4,652	4,652	4,652

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP	-0.0401	0.143***	-0.00463	-0.0675	-0.0441
	(0.0467)	(0.0527)	(0.0521)	(0.0479)	(0.0493)
PRP only	0.0568	0.133***	0.126***	0.0225	0.0297
	(0.0386)	(0.0437)	(0.0431)	(0.0397)	(0.0408)
Bonus only	-0.0462	-0.0139	0.0452	-0.0986***	-0.0139
	(0.0344)	(0.0389)	(0.0384)	(0.0353)	(0.0363)
Job Size					
>500	0.0175	-0.100	0.0532	-0.0435	0.0723
	(0.0725)	(0.0819)	(0.0810)	(0.0744)	(0.0766)
100-499	0.0415	-0.0905	0.0791	-0.00975	0.105
	(0.0715)	(0.0808)	(0.0798)	(0.0734)	(0.0755)
25-99	-0.0105	-0.177**	0.0302	-0.0248	0.0788
	(0.0709)	(0.0801)	(0.0792)	(0.0728)	(0.0749)
<24	0.0132	-0.188**	0.00567	-0.000332	0.114
	(0.0717)	(0.0810)	(0.0801)	(0.0736)	(0.0758)
No Pension via Employer	-0.0147	-0.102*	-0.227***	-0.00983	0.00129
	(0.0474)	(0.0536)	(0.0530)	(0.0487)	(0.0501)
Temporary Job	-0.113**	0.0631	-1.654***	0.0895*	0.0699
	(0.0474)	(0.0536)	(0.0529)	(0.0487)	(0.0501)
Health					
Poor	-0.0675	-0.255**	0.0831	-0.281***	0.0943
	(0.106)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.109)	(0.112)
Fair	0.0177	-0.271**	0.0607	-0.188*	0.117
	(0.104)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.107)	(0.110)
Good	0.130	-0.195*	0.160	-0.0827	0.188*
	(0.104)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.106)	(0.110)
Excellent	0.212**	-0.160	0.223*	0.0228	0.286***
	(0.105)	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.108)	(0.111)
Manager	0.00820	0.0732**	0.0192	0.0101	-0.0776***
	(0.0260)	(0.0294)	(0.0290)	(0.0267)	(0.0275)
Public Sector	0.129***	0.0349	0.0972**	0.137***	0.0762**
	(0.0366)	(0.0413)	(0.0408)	(0.0375)	(0.0386)
Health insurance via Employer	-0.0671	-0.0385	-0.109	0.115	-0.141
	(0.0811)	(0.0916)	(0.0906)	(0.0832)	(0.0857)
Married	0.00755	0.173***	0.0316	-0.0258	-0.0438
	(0.0412)	(0.0465)	(0.0460)	(0.0423)	(0.0435)
Education					
Other qualification	-0.101	-0.0194	-0.521	-0.358	0.443
	(0.551)	(0.622)	(0.615)	(0.565)	(0.582)
Apprentice	-	-	-	-	-
CSE 25	-0.149	-0.674**	-0.0339	0.0808	-0.411
	(0.242)	(0.273)	(0.270)	(0.248)	(0.256)
Commerce	0.501*	0.135	0.658**	0.0945	0.142
	(0.258)	(0.292)	(0.288)	(0.265)	(0.273)
O levels	0.149	0.0642	0.415***	0.171	0.221*
	(0.119)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.122)	(0.125)

34

A levels	0.0418	-0.0681	0.311**	0.241**	0.128
	(0.120)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.123)	(0.126)
Nurse	0.0900	-0.386**	0.340*	0.122	0.103
	(0.173)	(0.196)	(0.193)	(0.178)	(0.183)
Other high qualification	0.0446	-0.153	0.351***	0.158	0.0926
	(0.110)	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.113)	(0.116)
Teacher	-0.234	-0.388	0.238	0.0837	-0.00696
	(0.345)	(0.390)	(0.385)	(0.354)	(0.365)
First Degree	-0.0302	-0.112	0.189	0.116	0.0289
	(0.148)	(0.167)	(0.165)	(0.152)	(0.157)
High Degree	-0.0442**	0.0532**	-0.00892	-0.0686***	-0.0136
	(0.0201)	(0.0227)	(0.0225)	(0.0206)	(0.0212)
Log Income	0.0114	-0.276	0.0653	0.474**	-0.00562
	(0.206)	(0.233)	(0.230)	(0.212)	(0.218)
Age	-0.0216	0.0578**	-0.0275	-0.00959	-0.0214
	(0.0203)	(0.0230)	(0.0227)	(0.0209)	(0.0215)
Age^2	3.21e-05	5.13e-05	0.000380**	-0.000219	0.000222
	(0.000160)	(0.000181)	(0.000179)	(0.000164)	(0.000169)
Union Member	-0.114***	-0.103***	-0.0108	-0.108***	-0.0462
	(0.0303)	(0.0343)	(0.0339)	(0.0311)	(0.0320)
Hours worked/week	-0.00393**	-0.00415**	0.000594	-0.000489	-0.0187***
	(0.00152)	(0.00172)	(0.00170)	(0.00156)	(0.00161)
Hours overtime/week	-0.00888***	-0.00841***	0.00210	-0.00220	-0.0366***
	(0.00207)	(0.00234)	(0.00232)	(0.00213)	(0.00219)
Tenure	-0.0218***	-0.0175***	-0.0182***	-0.0189***	-0.0112***
	(0.00242)	(0.00273)	(0.00270)	(0.00248)	(0.00255)
Region					
Inner London	-0.311	0.509*	-0.199	-0.310	-0.475*
	(0.256)	(0.290)	(0.286)	(0.263)	(0.271)
Outer London	-0.127	0.0941	-0.292	-0.0477	-0.0934
	(0.210)	(0.238)	(0.235)	(0.216)	(0.222)
Southeast	-0.0959	-0.266	-0.171	0.101	-0.245
	(0.162)	(0.183)	(0.181)	(0.166)	(0.171)
Southwest	-0.531***	0.369	-0.444*	-0.187	-0.164
	(0.203)	(0.230)	(0.227)	(0.209)	(0.215)
East Anglia	0.280	0.0259	-0.181	-0.0583	0.691*
	(0.337)	(0.381)	(0.376)	(0.346)	(0.356)
East Midlands	-0.0619	0.362*	-0.375*	0.00593	0.125
	(0.192)	(0.217)	(0.214)	(0.197)	(0.203)
West Midlands Conurbation	-0.130	0.543*	0.363	-0.178	0.692**
	(0.290)	(0.328)	(0.324)	(0.298)	(0.307)
Rest of West Midlands	-0.636**	-0.286	-0.329	-0.486*	-0.0974
	(0.260)	(0.293)	(0.290)	(0.266)	(0.274)
Greater Manchester	-0.0954	0.234	-0.164	-0.158	0.292
	(0.299)	(0.337)	(0.333)	(0.306)	(0.315)
Merseyside	-0.399	0.225	-0.289	-0.458	0.593*
	(0.329)	(0.372)	(0.368)	(0.338)	(0.348)
Rest of the Northwest	-0.0602	-0.0638	-0.107	-0.308	-0.420
	(0.307)	(0.347)	(0.343)	(0.316)	(0.325)
South Yorkshire	-0.0835	0.290	-0.547*	0.181	-0.149
	(0.290)	(0.327)	(0.324)	(0.297)	(0.306)
West Yorkshire	0.0534	0.540*	-0.581*	0.106	0.198

	(0.280)	(0.316)	(0.313)	(0.287)	(0.296)
Rest of Yorkshire &	-0.439*	0.0273	-0.226	-0.284	0.0215
Humberside	(0.257)	(0.290)	(0.287)	(0.263)	(0.271)
Tyne	-0.443	0.121	-0.738*	-1.081***	0.0547
	(0.390)	(0.440)	(0.435)	(0.400)	(0.411)
Rest of the North	0.0771	0.229	-0.264	0.0612	0.358
	(0.278)	(0.314)	(0.310)	(0.285)	(0.293)
Wales	-0.202	0.131	-0.0921	-0.0750	-0.0211
	(0.177)	(0.200)	(0.197)	(0.181)	(0.187)
Scotland	-0.0300	0.242	0.0795	0.00942	0.219
	(0.162)	(0.183)	(0.180)	(0.166)	(0.171)
North Ireland	-0.616	-0.170	0.0415	-0.262	0.241
	(0.376)	(0.425)	(0.420)	(0.386)	(0.397)
Year	0.0167	-0.0375**	-0.00982	0.0331**	0.00647
	(0.0163)	(0.0184)	(0.0182)	(0.0168)	(0.0172)
PRP because of new job	0.0904**	0.179***	0.104**	0.0772*	0.0838*
	(0.0450)	(0.0508)	(0.0502)	(0.0462)	(0.0475)
Constant	-26.48	77.77**	25.52	-59.17*	-6.668
	(32.12)	(36.28)	(35.86)	(32.97)	(33.92)
Observations	19,721	19,721	19,721	19,721	19,721
R-squared	0.019	0.018	0.074	0.016	0.038
Number of pid	4,652	4,652	4,652	4,652	4,652

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP	0.0240	0.179***	0.100	-0.132*	0.0912
	(0.0712)	(0.0691)	(0.0687)	(0.0699)	(0.0687)
PRP only	-0.0607	0.226***	0.140**	-0.0417	0.143**
	(0.0715)	(0.0697)	(0.0700)	(0.0706)	(0.0696)
Bonus only	0.0184	0.115**	0.0370	-0.104**	0.0682
	(0.0535)	(0.0519)	(0.0515)	(0.0526)	(0.0517)
Job Size					
>500	-0.205	-0.308*	-0.127	-0.370**	0.0397
	(0.181)	(0.176)	(0.171)	(0.178)	(0.173)
100-499	-0.0971	-0.330*	-0.0803	-0.347*	0.0179
	(0.180)	(0.175)	(0.170)	(0.177)	(0.172)
25-99	-0.0147	-0.366**	0.0130	-0.101	0.0761
	(0.181)	(0.175)	(0.171)	(0.178)	(0.173)
<24	-0.0861	-0.306*	-0.132	-0.109	0.103
	(0.182)	(0.177)	(0.172)	(0.179)	(0.174)
No Pension via Employer	0.0182	-0.0998	-0.250***	0.192**	0.108
	(0.0851)	(0.0825)	(0.0813)	(0.0845)	(0.0822)
Temporary Job	-0.385***	0.205*	-2.574***	-0.0989	-0.0592
	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.116)
Health					
Poor	-0.0178	-0.0779	0.155	0.0932	0.447*
	(0.272)	(0.264)	(0.263)	(0.269)	(0.261)
Fair	0.0840	-0.0428	0.320	0.302	0.479*
	(0.266)	(0.258)	(0.256)	(0.262)	(0.254)
Good	0.518*	0.265	0.577**	0.587**	0.800***
	(0.266)	(0.257)	(0.256)	(0.262)	(0.254)
Excellent	0.878***	0.452*	0.835***	0.931***	1.100***
	(0.268)	(0.259)	(0.258)	(0.264)	(0.255)
Manager	0.110**	0.0951*	0.103**	0.0915*	-0.131***
	(0.0505)	(0.0488)	(0.0488)	(0.0499)	(0.0487)
Public Sector	0.347***	-0.0291	0.632***	0.200***	0.318***
	(0.0615)	(0.0597)	(0.0594)	(0.0609)	(0.0593)
Health insurance via Employer	0.231**	0.249***	0.148*	0.235***	0.0518
	(0.0905)	(0.0885)	(0.0864)	(0.0900)	(0.0870)
Married	0.00990	0.165***	0.0226	0.0517	-0.0445
	(0.0655)	(0.0639)	(0.0630)	(0.0651)	(0.0630)
Race: Not native to the UK	0.0393	-0.388	0.472	-0.204	0.154
	(0.321)	(0.311)	(0.327)	(0.313)	(0.326)
Education					
Other qualification	-0.543	-0.247	0.0972	-0.833*	-0.462
	(0.473)	(0.462)	(0.476)	(0.481)	(0.481)
Apprentice	0.138	-0.281	0.219	0.475*	0.549**
	(0.269)	(0.261)	(0.256)	(0.269)	(0.259)
CSE 25	0.417**	0.261	0.301*	0.241	0.131
	(0.185)	(0.180)	(0.176)	(0.185)	(0.176)
Commerce	0.345	0.497	0.0539	0.00492	1.326**
	(0.585)	(0.583)	(0.582)	(0.589)	(0.580)

O levels	-0.0395	-0.0885	0.0884	-0.0336	-0.178
	(0.125)	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.124)	(0.119)
A levels	-0.433***	-0.213*	-0.212*	-0.288**	-0.280**
	(0.129)	(0.126)	(0.123)	(0.129)	(0.124)
Nurse	-0.469	0.228	-0.0483	0.320	-0.674
	(0.696)	(0.688)	(0.670)	(0.711)	(0.668)
Other high qualification	-0.0997	-0.0868	-0.00660	-0.0107	-0.117
	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.107)	(0.112)	(0.108)
Teacher	-0.126	-0.0163	0.416	0.186	-0.268
	(0.277)	(0.270)	(0.263)	(0.276)	(0.265)
First Degree	-0.264*	0.0513	0.365***	-0.174	-0.348***
	(0.135)	(0.132)	(0.129)	(0.135)	(0.130)
High Degree	-0.220	0.0367	0.239	0.00650	-0.311*
	(0.182)	(0.178)	(0.174)	(0.182)	(0.175)
Log Income	0.0685	0.544***	0.0518	0.0536	0.0558
	(0.0483)	(0.0485)	(0.0464)	(0.0476)	(0.0471)
Age	-0.0998***	-0.141***	-0.210***	-0.0563***	-0.0680***
	(0.0171)	(0.0166)	(0.0165)	(0.0169)	(0.0164)
Age^2	0.00141***	0.00175***	0.00254***	0.000926***	0.000865***
	(0.000203)	(0.000197)	(0.000196)	(0.000201)	(0.000194)
Union Member	-0.118**	0.0367	0.0153	-0.0472	-0.115**
	(0.0552)	(0.0535)	(0.0528)	(0.0546)	(0.0531)
Hours worked/week	-0.0110***	-0.00572*	-0.00202	-0.00149	-0.0331***
	(0.00308)	(0.00302)	(0.00294)	(0.00302)	(0.00301)
Hours overtime/week	0.00501	0.0159***	0.0141***	0.0142***	-0.0637***
	(0.00342)	(0.00335)	(0.00330)	(0.00341)	(0.00334)
Tenure	-0.0342***	-0.0149***	-0.0188***	-0.0286***	-0.0163***
	(0.00366)	(0.00356)	(0.00354)	(0.00363)	(0.00352)
Region					
Inner London	0.592*	0.0946	-0.125	0.212	0.161
	(0.340)	(0.327)	(0.330)	(0.335)	(0.327)
Outer London	-0.0207	-0.0980	-0.238	0.258	-0.0200
	(0.270)	(0.266)	(0.266)	(0.269)	(0.262)
Southeast	0.318	0.277	-0.126	0.171	-0.0275
	(0.227)	(0.224)	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.220)
Southwest	0.234	0.473*	-0.110	0.144	0.0478
	(0.246)	(0.242)	(0.243)	(0.246)	(0.236)
East Anglia	0.180	0.226	-0.194	0.209	0.270
	(0.300)	(0.298)	(0.295)	(0.300)	(0.294)
East Midlands	0.258	0.394	-0.150	0.487*	0.127
	(0.248)	(0.246)	(0.245)	(0.250)	(0.241)
West Midlands Conurbation	-0.488	-0.149	-0.212	-0.146	-0.622**
	(0.303)	(0.298)	(0.298)	(0.301)	(0.292)
Rest of West Midlands	0.230	0.453*	-0.280	0.281	-0.333
	(0.273)	(0.267)	(0.268)	(0.271)	(0.261)
Greater Manchester	-0.0314	-0.159	-0.324	0.0359	-0.321
	(0.284)	(0.278)	(0.277)	(0.283)	(0.271)
Merseyside	0.424	0.192	0.00834	0.459	-0.256
	(0.348)	(0.339)	(0.339)	(0.348)	(0.333)
Rest of the Northwest	0.0309	0.200	-0.154	-0.0599	0.127
	(0.285)	(0.281)	(0.279)	(0.286)	(0.275)
South Yorkshire	-0.231	0.389	-0.913***	-0.279	-0.106

	(0.327)	(0.321)	(0.317)	(0.326)	(0.313)
West Yorkshire	0.707**	0.541*	-0.0636	0.794**	0.326
	(0.313)	(0.308)	(0.303)	(0.312)	(0.301)
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside	0.148	0.327	-0.0904	0.279	-0.203
	(0.302)	(0.298)	(0.295)	(0.302)	(0.291)
Tyne	0.186	0.207	-0.563*	0.0535	-0.0758
	(0.333)	(0.326)	(0.320)	(0.336)	(0.320)
Rest of the North	0.267	0.741***	-0.398	0.154	0.156
	(0.289)	(0.284)	(0.281)	(0.289)	(0.279)
Wales	0.591***	0.454**	-0.119	0.814***	0.268
	(0.218)	(0.215)	(0.217)	(0.218)	(0.211)
Scotland	0.235	0.313	-0.0178	0.281	-0.00373
	(0.215)	(0.212)	(0.215)	(0.216)	(0.208)
North Ireland	0.692***	0.305	0.0867	0.587***	0.473**
	(0.227)	(0.223)	(0.225)	(0.227)	(0.219)
Year	-0.00163	0.0203***	0.0138*	-0.0144**	0.0178**
	(0.00740)	(0.00721)	(0.00714)	(0.00733)	(0.00714)
Constant					
Observations	16,006	16,006	16,006	16,006	16,006
Number of pid	3,910	3,910	3,910	3,910	3,910

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP	0.0197	0.0891**	0.100**	-0.0418	0.0602
	(0.0403)	(0.0453)	(0.0467)	(0.0421)	(0.0424)
PRP only	-0.0599	0.0912**	0.0733	-0.0567	0.0393
	(0.0394)	(0.0444)	(0.0457)	(0.0412)	(0.0415)
Bonus only	0.0132	0.0372	0.0423	-0.0209	0.0202
	(0.0301)	(0.0339)	(0.0349)	(0.0315)	(0.0316)
Job Size					
>500	-0.0714	-0.0739	-0.0701	-0.204**	0.0265
	(0.0976)	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.102)	(0.103)
100-499	-0.0392	-0.0443	-0.0935	-0.176*	0.0723
	(0.0971)	(0.109)	(0.113)	(0.102)	(0.102)
25-99	-0.0360	-0.0748	-0.0701	-0.0745	0.126
	(0.0974)	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.102)	(0.102)
<24	-0.110	-0.0705	-0.153	-0.152	0.100
	(0.0983)	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.103)	(0.103)
No Pension via Employer	-0.0780	-0.0999*	-0.227***	-0.0199	-0.0133
	(0.0504)	(0.0568)	(0.0585)	(0.0527)	(0.0530)
Temporary Job	-0.140**	0.0512	-1.610***	-0.0315	-0.0186
	(0.0692)	(0.0779)	(0.0803)	(0.0723)	(0.0728)
Health					
Poor	0.169	0.0564	0.147	0.249*	0.339**
	(0.142)	(0.160)	(0.165)	(0.148)	(0.149)
Fair	0.194	0.0181	0.219	0.374**	0.387***
	(0.140)	(0.157)	(0.162)	(0.146)	(0.147)
Good	0.382***	0.157	0.331**	0.475***	0.508***
	(0.140)	(0.157)	(0.162)	(0.146)	(0.147)
Excellent	0.463***	0.198	0.374**	0.566***	0.591***
	(0.141)	(0.159)	(0.164)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Manager	-0.00936	0.0232	0.0141	0.00431	-0.0790**
	(0.0293)	(0.0330)	(0.0340)	(0.0306)	(0.0308)
Public Sector	0.0913**	-0.0428	0.153***	0.00130	0.150***
	(0.0430)	(0.0485)	(0.0499)	(0.0450)	(0.0453)
Health insurance via Employer	0.0607	0.0607	0.103	0.0479	0.0227
	(0.0548)	(0.0617)	(0.0636)	(0.0573)	(0.0577)
Married	-0.0828*	0.110**	-0.0150	-0.0474	-0.0131
	(0.0469)	(0.0528)	(0.0544)	(0.0490)	(0.0493)
Education					
Other qualification	0.00265	0.365	0.296	-0.0755	0.0181
	(0.426)	(0.480)	(0.495)	(0.446)	(0.448)
Apprentice	0.136	0.00739	0.0746	0.265	0.0388
	(0.281)	(0.316)	(0.326)	(0.294)	(0.296)
CSE 25	0.411**	0.187	0.736***	0.0209	0.152
	(0.182)	(0.205)	(0.211)	(0.190)	(0.192)
Commerce	-0.132	-0.722	-0.313	-0.508	0.261
	(0.449)	(0.506)	(0.521)	(0.469)	(0.472)
O levels	0.159	-0.131	0.150	0.0689	-0.275*

	(0.137)	(0.154)	(0.159)	(0.143)	(0.144)
A levels	-0.0649	0.0192	-0.232	-0.136	-0.280**
	(0.135)	(0.152)	(0.156)	(0.141)	(0.142)
Nurse	-0.710	-0.244	-0.459	-0.553	-1.189**
	(0.551)	(0.621)	(0.640)	(0.577)	(0.580)
Other high qualification	0.0800	0.0591	0.0702	-0.00695	-0.196
	(0.122)	(0.137)	(0.141)	(0.127)	(0.128)
Teacher	0.154	-0.0196	0.312	0.126	-0.156
	(0.465)	(0.524)	(0.540)	(0.487)	(0.490)
First Degree	-0.158	-0.405*	-0.0116	-0.0933	-0.494**
	(0.194)	(0.219)	(0.225)	(0.203)	(0.204)
High Degree	0.168	-0.167	0.0440	0.165	-0.330
	(0.258)	(0.291)	(0.300)	(0.270)	(0.272)
Log Income	-0.0462	0.168***	-0.0247	-0.0380	0.000154
	(0.0295)	(0.0333)	(0.0343)	(0.0309)	(0.0311)
Age	-0.00174	-0.0104	-0.0137	-0.00709	0.0180
	(0.0223)	(0.0251)	(0.0259)	(0.0233)	(0.0235)
Age^2	-1.10e-05	0.000436**	0.000989***	0.000112	-0.000198
	(0.000175)	(0.000197)	(0.000203)	(0.000182)	(0.000184)
Union Member	-0.0825**	0.0621	-0.0323	-0.0204	-0.0261
	(0.0355)	(0.0400)	(0.0412)	(0.0371)	(0.0374)
Hours worked/week	-0.00705***	-0.00222	-0.00469**	-0.00170	-0.0170***
	(0.00180)	(0.00202)	(0.00208)	(0.00188)	(0.00189)
Hours overtime/week	0.00163	0.00836***	0.00834***	0.00382*	-0.0313***
	(0.00197)	(0.00222)	(0.00228)	(0.00206)	(0.00207)
Tenure	-0.0191***	-0.00608**	-0.0190***	-0.0151***	-0.0100***
	(0.00220)	(0.00248)	(0.00256)	(0.00230)	(0.00232)
Region					
Inner London	0.0236	0.0399	0.0913	-0.442	-0.395
	(0.299)	(0.336)	(0.347)	(0.312)	(0.314)
Outer London	-0.152	-0.0468	0.0490	-0.0421	-0.337
	(0.257)	(0.289)	(0.298)	(0.268)	(0.270)
Southeast	0.182	0.170	0.187	-0.0296	-0.213
	(0.188)	(0.212)	(0.218)	(0.196)	(0.198)
Southwest	0.358	0.789***	0.597**	0.255	0.156
	(0.232)	(0.261)	(0.269)	(0.242)	(0.244)
East Anglia	-0.155	-0.271	-0.473	-0.0520	-0.258
	(0.307)	(0.346)	(0.356)	(0.321)	(0.323)
East Midlands	0.392*	0.358	0.160	0.350	0.377
	(0.234)	(0.263)	(0.271)	(0.245)	(0.246)
West Midlands Conurbation	-0.430	-0.246	-0.271	0.00919	-0.594*
	(0.323)	(0.364)	(0.375)	(0.338)	(0.340)
Rest of West Midlands	0.112	0.193	-0.401	0.387	-0.220
	(0.272)	(0.306)	(0.315)	(0.284)	(0.286)
Greater Manchester	0.364	0.401	0.441	0.374	-0.0581
	(0.291)	(0.328)	(0.338)	(0.305)	(0.307)
Merseyside	-0.0540	0.850	0.656	-0.109	0.354
	(0.534)	(0.601)	(0.619)	(0.558)	(0.561)
Rest of the Northwest	-0.339	-0.221	1.063***	-0.180	-0.130
	(0.347)	(0.391)	(0.403)	(0.363)	(0.365)
South Yorkshire	-0.734*	0.764	-0.506	-0.411	0.549
	(0.413)	(0.465)	(0.479)	(0.432)	(0.434)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
West Yorkshire	0.0967	1.067***	-0.485	0.348	0.292
	(0.332)	(0.374)	(0.385)	(0.347)	(0.349)
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside	0.0573	1.006***	-0.233	0.192	0.118
	(0.343)	(0.386)	(0.397)	(0.358)	(0.360)
Tyne	0.862**	0.705*	-0.264	1.250***	-0.0503
	(0.342)	(0.385)	(0.397)	(0.358)	(0.360)
Rest of the North	0.496	0.643*	0.306	0.822**	0.646*
	(0.327)	(0.368)	(0.379)	(0.342)	(0.344)
Wales	0.473**	-0.0458	0.220	0.273	0.110
	(0.185)	(0.208)	(0.214)	(0.193)	(0.194)
Scotland	0.160	0.219	0.128	0.430**	0.237
	(0.176)	(0.198)	(0.204)	(0.184)	(0.185)
North Ireland	0.200	-0.138	-0.223	0.384	-0.0807
	(0.437)	(0.492)	(0.507)	(0.457)	(0.460)
Year	0.0164	-0.00585	-0.0581***	0.00652	0.0170
	(0.0178)	(0.0201)	(0.0207)	(0.0186)	(0.0188)
PRP received because of new job	0.124***	0.172***	-0.0136	0.120***	0.134***
	(0.0428)	(0.0481)	(0.0496)	(0.0447)	(0.0450)
Constant	-27.26	14.33	120.7***	-7.679	-28.89
	(35.05)	(39.47)	(40.66)	(36.64)	(36.87)
Observations	16,006	16,006	16,006	16,006	16,006
R-squared	0.023	0.018	0.053	0.014	0.039
Number of pid	3,910	3,910	3,910	3,910	3,910

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP	0.00321	0.123***	0.0171	-0.0509*	0.0356
	(0.0260)	(0.0298)	(0.0293)	(0.0271)	(0.0274)
PRP only	-0.000636	0.114***	0.0773***	-0.0284	0.0399
	(0.0240)	(0.0274)	(0.0271)	(0.0250)	(0.0253)
Bonus only	2.17e-06	0.0530**	0.0367*	-0.0519**	0.0302
	(0.0194)	(0.0221)	(0.0218)	(0.0202)	(0.0204)
Race*Bonus and PRP	0.492	1.286**	0.481	0.561	0.394
	(0.499)	(0.568)	(0.564)	(0.519)	(0.526)
Race*PRP	0.543	0.0428	0.444	0.575	0.298
	(0.378)	(0.431)	(0.427)	(0.393)	(0.399)
Race*Bonus	0.470*	-0.0950	0.132	0.245	0.429
	(0.270)	(0.307)	(0.305)	(0.280)	(0.284)
Female	0.139***	0.179***	0.171***	0.110***	-0.0126
	(0.0234)	(0.0279)	(0.0258)	(0.0250)	(0.0247)
Job Size					
>500	-0.0339	-0.161***	0.0179	-0.137***	0.0562
	(0.0510)	(0.0582)	(0.0576)	(0.0531)	(0.0537)
100-499	-0.00561	-0.159***	0.0177	-0.0999*	0.0698
	(0.0507)	(0.0578)	(0.0573)	(0.0528)	(0.0535)
25-99	0.0215	-0.178***	0.0570	-0.00893	0.0753
	(0.0507)	(0.0577)	(0.0572)	(0.0527)	(0.0534)
<24	0.0342	-0.155***	0.0267	0.0124	0.0969*
	(0.0510)	(0.0582)	(0.0576)	(0.0531)	(0.0538)
No Pension via Employer	-0.0223	-0.108***	-0.176***	0.0293	0.00806
	(0.0276)	(0.0317)	(0.0310)	(0.0288)	(0.0291)
Temporary Job	-0.136***	0.0866**	-1.732***	0.0348	0.0172
	(0.0330)	(0.0377)	(0.0371)	(0.0344)	(0.0347)
Health					
Poor	-0.0772	-0.131	0.0233	-0.190**	0.139*
	(0.0781)	(0.0888)	(0.0883)	(0.0811)	(0.0823)
Fair	0.00123	-0.125	0.0655	-0.0707	0.163**
	(0.0758)	(0.0862)	(0.0856)	(0.0787)	(0.0798)
Good	0.196***	0.0243	0.207**	0.0791	0.299***
	(0.0754)	(0.0859)	(0.0852)	(0.0784)	(0.0795)
Excellent	0.328***	0.106	0.308***	0.223***	0.449***
	(0.0761)	(0.0866)	(0.0859)	(0.0791)	(0.0801)
Manager	0.0474***	0.0798***	0.0643***	0.0535***	-0.0718***
	(0.0161)	(0.0185)	(0.0181)	(0.0168)	(0.0170)
Public Sector	0.182***	0.0165	0.269***	0.151***	0.140***
	(0.0194)	(0.0224)	(0.0216)	(0.0203)	(0.0204)
Health insurance via Employer	0.0953***	0.131***	0.0185	0.124***	0.0331
	(0.0357)	(0.0411)	(0.0400)	(0.0373)	(0.0376)
Married	0.0670***	0.174***	0.0700***	0.0699***	0.00261
	(0.0200)	(0.0233)	(0.0222)	(0.0211)	(0.0211)
Race: Not native to the UK	-0.222*	-0.236*	0.0827	-0.294**	-0.132
	(0.122)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.126)	(0.128)

Education
Other qualification	-0.279*	-0.114	0.0141	-0.294*	-0.164
	(0.156)	(0.184)	(0.173)	(0.166)	(0.165)
Apprentice	-0.0133	-0.311**	0.122	0.191	0.169
	(0.115)	(0.136)	(0.128)	(0.123)	(0.122)
CSE 25	0.0152	-0.0407	0.126*	0.0680	0.0185
	(0.0640)	(0.0753)	(0.0709)	(0.0679)	(0.0675)
Commerce	0.0672	-0.0770	-0.101	-0.0873	0.0191
	(0.0944)	(0.112)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.0996)
O levels	-0.0531	-0.0743	0.0902**	-0.0316	-0.0301
	(0.0390)	(0.0459)	(0.0431)	(0.0414)	(0.0411)
A levels	-0.147***	-0.153***	-0.00836	-0.0684	-0.0495
	(0.0410)	(0.0483)	(0.0455)	(0.0435)	(0.0433)
Nurse	-0.0894	-0.257***	0.138	-0.0666	-0.125
	(0.0822)	(0.0965)	(0.0912)	(0.0871)	(0.0867)
Other high qualification	-0.0858**	-0.137***	0.0716*	-0.00527	-0.0546
	(0.0360)	(0.0424)	(0.0399)	(0.0382)	(0.0380)
Teacher	-0.189***	-0.107	0.0908	-0.0536	-0.303***
	(0.0708)	(0.0843)	(0.0779)	(0.0756)	(0.0747)
First Degree	-0.176***	-0.0704	0.143***	-0.102**	-0.233***
	(0.0416)	(0.0492)	(0.0460)	(0.0443)	(0.0439)
High Degree	-0.223***	-0.132*	0.101	-0.0586	-0.302***
	(0.0574)	(0.0679)	(0.0634)	(0.0611)	(0.0605)
Log Income	-0.00930	0.158***	-0.0115	-0.0137	0.000395
	(0.0132)	(0.0151)	(0.0148)	(0.0138)	(0.0139)
Age	-0.0260***	-0.0411***	-0.0808***	-0.00623	-0.0266***
	(0.00534)	(0.00624)	(0.00593)	(0.00564)	(0.00563)
Age^2	0.000361***	0.000529***	0.000982***	0.000168**	0.000325***
	(6.41e-05)	(7.50e-05)	(7.13e-05)	(6.78e-05)	(6.76e-05)
Union Member	-0.0719***	-0.0318	-0.00998	-0.0545***	-0.0735***
	(0.0171)	(0.0197)	(0.0191)	(0.0179)	(0.0180)
Hours worked/week	-0.00560***	-0.00735***	-0.00321***	-0.00149	-0.0184***
	(0.000898)	(0.00103)	(0.00101)	(0.000940)	(0.000946)
Hours overtime/week	-0.000843	0.00185	0.00793***	0.00407***	-0.0387***
	(0.00120)	(0.00137)	(0.00135)	(0.00125)	(0.00126)
Tenure	-0.0160***	-0.0101***	-0.0129***	-0.0148***	-0.00773***
	(0.00128)	(0.00147)	(0.00143)	(0.00134)	(0.00134)

Region
Inner London	-0.0102	0.0794	-0.128	-0.0783	0.0316
	(0.103)	(0.120)	(0.115)	(0.108)	(0.109)
Outer London	-0.140	-0.0163	-0.250***	0.00999	0.0138
	(0.0854)	(0.0989)	(0.0956)	(0.0897)	(0.0901)
Southeast	-0.0285	0.0507	-0.0378	0.0160	-0.0195
	(0.0729)	(0.0837)	(0.0820)	(0.0762)	(0.0769)
Southwest	-0.0782	0.215**	-0.0975	0.0162	0.0420
	(0.0793)	(0.0915)	(0.0889)	(0.0831)	(0.0836)
East Anglia	0.0407	0.202*	-0.154	0.0703	0.0991
	(0.0956)	(0.111)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.101)
East Midlands	0.0118	0.303***	-0.110	0.0783	0.120
	(0.0797)	(0.0920)	(0.0894)	(0.0835)	(0.0840)
West Midlands Conurbation	-0.158	0.0885	-0.0372	-0.0634	-0.0535

	(0.0972)	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.102)	(0.102)
Rest of West Midlands	-0.0881	0.197**	-0.0980	-0.000502	-0.100
	(0.0865)	(0.100)	(0.0967)	(0.0908)	(0.0912)
Greater Manchester	-0.193**	-0.0577	-0.126	-0.148	-0.0244
	(0.0910)	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.0958)	(0.0959)
Merseyside	0.00537	0.106	-0.0837	0.0630	0.0127
	(0.111)	(0.129)	(0.123)	(0.117)	(0.117)
Rest of the Northwest	-0.0590	0.127	-0.124	-0.0995	-0.0127
	(0.0913)	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.0962)	(0.0963)
South Yorkshire	-0.138	0.313***	-0.371***	-0.105	-0.0290
	(0.103)	(0.120)	(0.114)	(0.108)	(0.108)
West Yorkshire	0.0858	0.286**	-0.101	0.188*	0.145
	(0.0970)	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.102)	(0.102)
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside	-0.138	0.146	0.00489	-0.000439	-0.0406
	(0.0970)	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.102)	(0.102)
Tyne	-0.149	0.166	-0.243**	-0.114	0.0151
	(0.107)	(0.125)	(0.119)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Rest of the North	0.0264	0.344***	-0.150	0.0927	0.168*
	(0.0916)	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.0965)	(0.0966)
Wales	0.0865	0.219***	-0.0316	0.219***	0.128*
	(0.0703)	(0.0805)	(0.0791)	(0.0733)	(0.0741)
Scotland	-0.0203	0.153*	0.000575	0.0460	0.0987
	(0.0693)	(0.0793)	(0.0781)	(0.0723)	(0.0731)
North Ireland	0.134*	0.0890	0.0495	0.130*	0.235***
	(0.0721)	(0.0828)	(0.0810)	(0.0753)	(0.0760)
Year	0.000617	0.0159***	0.00248	-0.00141	0.0101***
	(0.00237)	(0.00272)	(0.00267)	(0.00248)	(0.00250)
Constant	4.472	-27.70***	1.769	8.078	-14.25***
	(4.727)	(5.425)	(5.317)	(4.937)	(4.981)
Observations	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727
Number of pid	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS

TABLE A8: GLS ESTIMATES WITH INDIVIDUAL FIXED EFFECTS: RACE

VARIABLES	(1) Overall	(2) Pay	(3) Job Security	(4) Work Itself	(5) Hours Worked
Bonus and PRP	-0.00215	0.111***	0.0594*	-0.0524*	0.0176
	(0.0305)	(0.0344)	(0.0346)	(0.0315)	(0.0321)
PRP only	0.00156	0.115***	0.0996***	-0.0135	0.0342
	(0.0276)	(0.0312)	(0.0314)	(0.0286)	(0.0291)
Bonus only	-0.0141	0.0196	0.0425*	-0.0566**	0.00487
	(0.0227)	(0.0256)	(0.0257)	(0.0234)	(0.0239)
Race*Bonus and PRP	0.130	0.879	0.357	0.117	0.0234
	(0.551)	(0.622)	(0.626)	(0.570)	(0.581)
Race*PRP	0.170	-0.199	0.444	0.292	0.101
	(0.406)	(0.458)	(0.461)	(0.420)	(0.428)
Race*Bonus	0.564**	-0.258	0.559*	0.300	0.503*
	(0.272)	(0.307)	(0.309)	(0.281)	(0.286)
Female (omitted)	-	-	-	-	-
Job Size					
>500	-0.0203	-0.104	0.0145	-0.104*	0.0441
	(0.0579)	(0.0654)	(0.0658)	(0.0599)	(0.0610)
100-499	0.00847	-0.0863	0.0183	-0.0715	0.0856
	(0.0573)	(0.0647)	(0.0651)	(0.0593)	(0.0604)
25-99	-0.0172	-0.144**	0.00370	-0.0321	0.0956
	(0.0572)	(0.0646)	(0.0650)	(0.0592)	(0.0603)
<24	-0.0317	-0.148**	-0.0435	-0.0486	0.110*
	(0.0578)	(0.0653)	(0.0657)	(0.0598)	(0.0609)
No Pension via Employer	-0.0463	-0.108***	-0.224***	-0.0200	-0.00491
	(0.0345)	(0.0390)	(0.0392)	(0.0357)	(0.0364)
Temporary Job	-0.120***	0.0650	-1.646***	0.0561	0.0438
	(0.0390)	(0.0440)	(0.0443)	(0.0404)	(0.0411)
Health					
Poor	0.0176	-0.140	0.0952	-0.0949	0.172*
	(0.0850)	(0.0959)	(0.0965)	(0.0879)	(0.0895)
Fair	0.0753	-0.166*	0.110	0.0120	0.204**
	(0.0833)	(0.0940)	(0.0946)	(0.0861)	(0.0877)
Good	0.219***	-0.0637	0.213**	0.114	0.297***
	(0.0832)	(0.0939)	(0.0945)	(0.0861)	(0.0877)
Excellent	0.300***	-0.0266	0.268***	0.214**	0.387***
	(0.0842)	(0.0950)	(0.0956)	(0.0871)	(0.0887)
Manager	0.000522	0.0512**	0.0177	0.00588	-0.0801***
	(0.0194)	(0.0219)	(0.0220)	(0.0201)	(0.0205)
Public Sector	0.114***	0.00102	0.124***	0.0836***	0.108***
	(0.0278)	(0.0314)	(0.0316)	(0.0288)	(0.0293)
Health insurance via Employer	0.0326	0.0294	0.0442	0.0732	-0.0278
	(0.0455)	(0.0513)	(0.0516)	(0.0470)	(0.0479)
Married	-0.0339	0.152***	0.00837	-0.0369	-0.0287
	(0.0309)	(0.0349)	(0.0351)	(0.0320)	(0.0326)
Education					

Other qualification	-0.0875	0.0837	0.0129	-0.177	0.206
	(0.336)	(0.379)	(0.382)	(0.348)	(0.354)
Apprentice	0.0861	-0.0976	0.164	0.327	0.220
	(0.267)	(0.302)	(0.304)	(0.276)	(0.282)
CSE 25	0.223	-0.105	0.575***	0.0706	0.0625
	(0.141)	(0.159)	(0.160)	(0.146)	(0.149)
Commerce	0.370*	-0.0702	0.366	-0.0991	0.0805
	(0.219)	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.227)	(0.231)
O levels	0.140	-0.0254	0.284***	0.118	0.0105
	(0.0893)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.0923)	(0.0941)
A levels	-0.0171	-0.0452	0.0643	0.0736	-0.0489
	(0.0892)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.0923)	(0.0940)
Nurse	0.0771	-0.325*	0.202	0.0324	-0.0582
	(0.153)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.158)	(0.161)
Other high qualification	0.0523	-0.0676	0.212**	0.0850	-0.0265
	(0.0813)	(0.0917)	(0.0923)	(0.0841)	(0.0856)
Teacher	-0.101	-0.208	0.207	0.0684	-0.0882
	(0.276)	(0.312)	(0.314)	(0.286)	(0.291)
First Degree	-0.0800	-0.158	0.0563	0.0272	-0.180
	(0.115)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.119)	(0.122)
High Degree	0.0736	-0.162	-0.0166	0.343**	-0.128
	(0.159)	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.165)	(0.168)
Log Income	-0.0474***	0.0850***	-0.0162	-0.0615***	-0.0131
	(0.0165)	(0.0187)	(0.0188)	(0.0171)	(0.0174)
Age	-0.0134	0.0313*	-0.0217	-0.00809	-0.00177
	(0.0150)	(0.0169)	(0.0170)	(0.0155)	(0.0158)
Age^2	2.34e-05	0.000171	0.000672***	-7.28e-05	1.08e-05
	(0.000117)	(0.000133)	(0.000133)	(0.000122)	(0.000124)
Union Member	-0.102***	-0.0358	-0.0201	-0.0708***	-0.0444*
	(0.0230)	(0.0260)	(0.0261)	(0.0238)	(0.0242)
Hours worked/week	-0.00540***	-0.00380***	-0.00169	-0.00120	-0.0180***
	(0.00116)	(0.00131)	(0.00131)	(0.00120)	(0.00122)
Hours overtime/week	-0.00345**	0.000551	0.00522***	0.000986	-0.0339***
	(0.00143)	(0.00161)	(0.00162)	(0.00148)	(0.00150)
Tenure	-0.0204***	-0.0112***	-0.0188***	-0.0169***	-0.0105***
Region	(0.00163)	(0.00184)	(0.00185)	(0.00168)	(0.00172)
Inner London	-0.192	0.300	-0.0929	-0.341*	-0.454**
	(0.193)	(0.218)	(0.220)	(0.200)	(0.204)
Outer London	-0.132	0.0308	-0.157	-0.0173	-0.208
	(0.162)	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.168)	(0.171)
Southeast	0.0219	-0.0400	-0.0419	0.0417	-0.231*
	(0.121)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.126)	(0.128)
Southwest	-0.134	0.541***	0.0262	0.0414	-0.0274
	(0.152)	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.157)	(0.160)
East Anglia	-0.0221	-0.134	-0.402	-0.0735	0.107
	(0.225)	(0.254)	(0.255)	(0.232)	(0.237)
East Midlands	0.131	0.392**	-0.145	0.188	0.228
	(0.147)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.152)	(0.154)
West Midlands Conurbation	-0.244	0.184	0.0695	-0.0895	0.138
	(0.215)	(0.243)	(0.245)	(0.223)	(0.227)
Rest of West Midlands	-0.265	-0.0609	-0.359*	-0.0773	-0.139
	(0.187)	(0.211)	(0.212)	(0.193)	(0.197)

Greater Manchester	0.109	0.275	0.138	0.0866	0.151
	(0.208)	(0.234)	(0.236)	(0.215)	(0.219)
Merseyside	-0.250	0.316	0.114	-0.291	0.574**
	(0.271)	(0.306)	(0.308)	(0.281)	(0.286)
Rest of the Northwest	-0.104	-0.157	0.420	-0.221	-0.307
	(0.225)	(0.254)	(0.256)	(0.233)	(0.237)
South Yorkshire	-0.320	0.316	-0.500*	-0.0382	0.0991
	(0.230)	(0.259)	(0.261)	(0.238)	(0.242)
West Yorkshire	0.120	0.730***	-0.542**	0.274	0.208
	(0.211)	(0.238)	(0.240)	(0.218)	(0.223)
Rest of Yorkshire & Humberside	-0.148	0.395*	-0.202	0.0321	-0.0118
	(0.198)	(0.224)	(0.225)	(0.205)	(0.209)
Tyne	0.273	0.452	-0.461	0.188	0.0511
	(0.254)	(0.286)	(0.288)	(0.262)	(0.267)
Rest of the North	0.331	0.481**	-0.0385	0.472**	0.462**
	(0.207)	(0.234)	(0.235)	(0.214)	(0.218)
Wales	0.107	0.0299	0.0875	0.0812	0.0312
	(0.126)	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.131)	(0.133)
Scotland	0.0324	0.221*	0.101	0.147	0.230*
	(0.118)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.122)	(0.125)
North Ireland	-0.314	-0.163	-0.0838	-0.0920	0.117
	(0.284)	(0.321)	(0.323)	(0.294)	(0.299)
Year	0.0164	-0.0231*	-0.0321**	0.0213*	0.0115
	(0.0120)	(0.0136)	(0.0137)	(0.0125)	(0.0127)
PRP because of new job	0.101***	0.171***	0.0403	0.0940***	0.108***
	(0.0310)	(0.0349)	(0.0352)	(0.0320)	(0.0326)
Constant	-26.32	49.15*	69.46***	-36.16	-17.12
	(23.67)	(26.72)	(26.89)	(24.49)	(24.95)
Observations	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727	35,727
R-squared	0.017	0.013	0.061	0.012	0.036
Number of pid	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562	8,562

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Source: BHPS