Ideas, Interest, Institutions, and Organizations in Development Aid Policy of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

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Disclaimer:

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## Contents

*List of Tables* ....................................................................................................................... v

*List of Appendices* .................................................................................................................. vi

*List of Acronyms* ..................................................................................................................... vii

*Acknowledgment* ................................................................................................................... viii

*Abstract* .................................................................................................................................. ix

**Chapter 1 Introduction** ....................................................................................................... 1

  Background ......................................................................................................................... 1

  Research Problem and Question ............................................................................................ 2

  Analytical Framework ........................................................................................................... 3

  Political System of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands ............................................. 4

    The Netherlands’ Political System ....................................................................................... 4

    The UK’s Political System .................................................................................................. 5

  Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 6

    Collecting Primary Information ......................................................................................... 6

    Collecting Secondary Information ..................................................................................... 6

    Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 7

**Chapter 2 Analytical Framework: Ideas, Interest, Institutions, and Organizations** ............... 9

  Ideas ..................................................................................................................................... 9

  Interest ................................................................................................................................. 11

  Institutions ........................................................................................................................ 13

  Organizations .................................................................................................................... 14

**Chapter 3 Ideas, Interests, Institutions and Organizations in Development Aid from the Late 1990s to 2015 in the Netherlands** ................................................................. 16


    Ideas ................................................................................................................................. 16

    Interests .......................................................................................................................... 18

    Institutions ..................................................................................................................... 19

    Organizations ............................................................................................................... 20

  3.2. Coalition Governments 2002-2010 ........................................................................... 20
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende II (CDA, VVD, D66; May 2003-June 2006)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkenende IV (CDA, PvdA and Christen Unie; February 2007-February 2010)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 The Coalition Government from 2012-2015</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4 Ideas, Interests, Institutions, and Organizations in Development Aid from the Late 1990s to 2015 in the United Kingdom</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 UK’s Development Aid Under the New Labour</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2. The UK under the Conservative-Liberal</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5 Conclusions</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Tables

Table 1.1 Type of Ideas 8
List of Appendices

Appendix 1 DAC Member Profile: The United Kingdom 53
Appendix 2 DAC Member Profile: The Netherlands 54
**List of Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3D</td>
<td>Defense, Diplomacy, and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Appeal</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department of International Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGGF</td>
<td>Dutch Good Growth Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLPP</td>
<td>High Level Prosperity Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOB</td>
<td>Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUM</td>
<td>Netherlands Senior Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOM</td>
<td>Private Sector Investment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Partij van de Arbeid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAp</td>
<td>Sector-Wide Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRR</td>
<td>Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (Scientific Council for Government Policy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgment

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Abstract

Current development policy, in general, is noticeably giving more space for the involvement of private sectors as compared to the previous ones. Similar is the case for the Netherlands and the UK starting from 2010. Both countries, despite of having their differences, have adopted a similar development aid policy under the Conservative-led government coalition which was different from their previous government coalitions. In light with that, this paper tries to elucidate and compare the role of ideas, interest, institutions and organizations in shaping development aid policy from the late 1990s to 2015 by using Lancaster’s and Campbell’s analytical framework.

Keywords

Programmatic ideas, Paradigmatic Ideas, Frames, Public Sentiments, Economic Interest, Political Institutions, Conservative, New Labour, Government Coalition

Relevance to Development Studies

Development aid policy has been changing significantly in recent few years. Such changes have imminent effect on the international society especially the beneficiaries. Therefore, to understand the changes and the content of aid policy itself, we need to look and clarify the forces within the donors which ultimately shape their aid policy.
Chapter 1 Introduction

Background

Generally speaking, the development assistance policy reflects the domestic interest or policy of the donor countries. In this regard, in recent years, the development aid policies in the UK and the Netherlands have progressed towards giving importance to economic growth in the developing countries to reduce poverty. Such policies echo the ideas of what development cooperation is for the donor countries. Therefore, these ideas are not constant and with the changing of ideas, it also changes the policies and practices. Hence, there can be political parties with different ideas and interest struggling to get a dominant position in policy making process. In particular, there are some similarities in the UK and the Netherlands regarding the changes in development cooperation policy. Politicians in these donor countries are concerned with how they could benefit from development cooperation programs thereby implying the development cooperation being increasingly driven by their self-interest. However, the two countries have had a different historical record as donors with different type of target society in general which also very much affects the discourse and practices of development cooperation. Thus, it is important to know why certain ideas are dominant in certain countries. From there on, we can see the power of domestic forces and their interaction.

The Netherlands and the UK have had similar development cooperation policy and practices after the Conservative-led coalitions took power in the government. In the Netherlands, they became focused on the notion where the donors would “benefit substantially from giving aid by increasing export to development countries” (The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014:12). This entailed the return of assistance provided by the Netherlands such that every euro spent on development aid in trade reform was required to directly affect the Netherlands income from export. The Netherlands approach was based on the recommendation paper from Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) titled "Less Pretention More Ambition" (Lieshout et al. 2010). The actual practices of the policy recommendations were to promote the role of entrepreneurship activities in recipient countries. It meant that the development cooperation policy prioritised the establishment of an enabling environment for investment signalling the importance of cohesion between economic growth through trade and aid. This in return changed their priorities from social development to economic growth with an emphasis on Dutch's
domestic interest. The shift was also marked by the change in labeling the Ministerial position from the Minister of Development Cooperation to Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. With this, the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation was held “responsible not only for the coherence of development policy but also for the coherence of foreign trade policy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013:21). Three years later, on 2013, the Netherlands released a policy document "A World to Gain" which marked the inclusion of trade as an essential element of foreign aid policy after previous ones were dominated by development cooperation agenda (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013).

In the UK, the Conservative-Liberal coalition under Prime Minister David Cameron announced to increase the amount of development assistance from 2013 (Cameron and Clegg 2010:22). PM Cameron also clearly stated that economic growth was going to be the main agenda of reducing poverty (Ford 2013). Hence, "The re-centering of economic growth in international development assistance in DfID marked the comeback of a conservative concept of how development assistance is for donor countries" (Mawdsley 2015:1). Development cooperation funds from 2013 exceeded the targeted development assistance and placed UK as the sixth highest donor (Lunn and Booth 2016:8). Similarly, the Secretary of State for International Development – Justine Greening, emphasized in her speech that the Department of International Development (DfID) will push the UK private sector to invest in Africa. The interest here was purely towards funding business sector in developing and LDCs with no mention on combating inequality (Tran 2013; Tran et al. 2014). In the similar line, the UK government stressed the role of DfID as the driver of economic growth in developing countries (Greening 2014). This gave a strong emphasis on the role of private sectors in development cooperation.

Research Problem and Question

The comparison of the development policy of the Netherlands and the UK would help us explain that the changes so observed in this sector are comparable over time. Looking closely at the ruling parties, there is an increasing tendency of conservatism in both the countries since Conservative parties are more likely to prioritize their foreign aid sent to richer countries compared to the poorer ones (Tingley 2010:42, 47). The intention is to have their aid contribute to an increasing trade relation. Hence, even a small number of aids so given reflect the priorities, ideologies and political forces of donor countries (Chong and Gradstein 2008:1). Also, though the recipients’ political economy condition is considered as a part of aid selectivity, the government of donor countries
themselves is finally the one to choose who and why those development programs are sent to the selected recipients (Bundock et al. 2015:545). Similarly, the selection of beneficiary countries evidently gets affected by the change in policy. With high involvement of the private sectors which has commercial interest while providing development assistance, it becomes important to select the recipients from middle-income countries because the likelihood of having the investment back to the donor countries is bigger (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2014:12). Hence, in relation to the dynamics of the UK’s and the Netherlands’ development cooperation policy, their similarities and differences, I propose a research question as follows, to what extent can the choices in development assistance policies in The Netherlands and the United Kingdom between the end of the 1990s and 2015 be understood in terms of the (changes in) interests, ideas, institutions and organisations in the two countries?

Analytical Framework

“Development cooperation policy could not be explained solely on the basis of political, economic interest of donor countries but also ideas that underlie the development cooperation policy” (Lumsdaine 1993:29) and “it is important to note that development cooperation provisions are embedded in national ideologies, social and political administrative of the country” (de Haan 2009:37).

Ideas are understood as worldviews and principled beliefs (Lancaster 2007:19). The dynamics of ideas might change over time. Ideas determine the public policies debate in the domestic arena, which is then reflected in the international development cooperation policy. Likewise, ideology influences social spending including development assistance (Therien and Noel 2000:152). However, ideas behind development assistance policy cannot be separated from political parties especially the ruling ones. Dominant ideas and norms in domestic politics and international level affect the politics of foreign aid. “In the domestic politics, the perception on how the usage of foreign aid might need public support which also depends on how ideas framed by policy makers based on ideas as public sentiments” (Campbell 1998:385).

Interest is undeniably an important causal factor (Keohane 2000:125). Meanwhile, interest itself is not given. "Instead, interests develop from states’ identities, with materialism playing second fiddle to meaning. In such a world, norms are endowed with causal properties and are viewed as collective expectations about the proper behavior for a given identity" (Katzenstein 1996:54 and Blyth 2003:5). Similarly, institutions in general are understood as both rules of the game and an organization (North 1990). "Institutions principal role is to
help the community to coordinate expectations and interactions; institutions support the underlying ideas” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:184). "Political Institutions shape the rules of the political game – they decide who sets the agenda, who has access to decision makers, who decides policies and who can veto decisions" (Lancaster 2007:19). In this regard, political institutions have the power to set the relevant rules. Since different political institutions might have a different interest, it will have an effect on the policy outcome. Furthermore, “The management of aid determines the voices for development” (Lancaster 2007:22). The way it is managed; under a Ministry or even an independent body contributes to “the voice within government in favor of the development use of aid” (Ibid.).

**Political System of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands**

This section aims to sketch the political system of the UK and the Netherlands. It is imperative to take into account every relevant political institution involved in the political system to understand their development cooperation policy.

**The Netherlands’ Political System**

“A unitary state, a monarchy, bicameralism: these have been fundamental characteristics of the Dutch political system since 1815” (Andeweg and Irwin 2005:11). From the multi-party representation in the government, “the Netherlands is very much a consensus democracy… with the fifth most consensus-oriented polity on the executives–parties dimension, and it takes ninth place on the federal–unitary dimension” (Andeweg 2005:492). With a divided society, the government composition of the Netherlands is always in the form of a coalition party where the PM usually comes from the majority party in the coalition. "In the Netherlands, political parties in the government coalition tend to predicament both the ministers to political parties and political parties to one another" (Andeweg and Irwin 2005:114).

The Dutch foreign policy making process, in general, involves the PM, the parliament, civil society organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassies. Similarly, the Dutch parliament consists of two chambers; the Eerste Kamer and the Tweede Kamer. Both are composed of politicians and bureaucrats from political parties. The Tweede Kamer is stronger than the Eerste Kamer regarding its capability to amend the laws, but it holds no veto power (Andeweg 2005:492). The Senate is currently fractured into twelve political parties with three popular parties such as VVD 13 seats; CDA 12 seats; and PvdA 8 seats (Eerste Kamer der Staten Generaal 2016).
Development cooperation is habitually administered by CDA or PvdA. In that sense, there is an existing tendency to have Social Democrat in the social-related policy. Development cooperation policy section is placed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This ministry consists of four Directorates-General (DGs) together with the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation Lilianne Ploumen. The implementation of foreign policy including development cooperation is under the responsibility of the DGs supported by embassies and departments (Donor Tracker 2017).

The UK's Political System

The Westminster type of democracy is different from the political system of the Netherlands. The parliamentary system of the UK consists of two chambers where the Upper House is called the House of Lords, and the lower one is called the House of Commons. Together with the Queen, they form a legislative body of the UK government. Here, "executive power is concentrated in the hands of single-party cabinets that dominate parliament, and these majority governments themselves are normally manufactured by the disproportional Single Member Plurality (SMP) system of election" (Mitchell 2005:157). The UK is habitually governed by a single majority party, unlike the latest general election result in 2010 which called for the formation of a coalition. It is because, ".. no single party gained the majority position in the House of Commons… The Conservative Party at the time, led by David Cameron, won the most with 306… The Labor Party, which was led by Gordon Brown, came second with 258 seats” (The House of Parliament 2016).

"The notable characteristic of the UK political system is political parties continue to be dominant within Britain's since they remain the only currently available method of aggregating public support and offering a comprehensive program of government… While interest and pressure groups advocate specific policies and actions, they do not provide a viable alternative to parties as they do not present a comprehensive manifesto or possess the organizational structures necessary for government" (Dommett 2012:8). The House of Commons consists of publicly elected political parties' members. On the contrary, the House of Lords consists of appointed members who are not necessarily from political parties. Since the members of House of Lords are not from political parties, the House of Commons remain stronger than the House of Lords. Also, "The UK's parliamentary rejected any institutional arrangements alongside the linkages between the government and the parliament – which may be used by political actors to further their aims" (Kaiser 2008:21).
One of the similarities with the Netherlands is that the Prime Minister has no stronger say in the government. Furthermore, the political parties here can replace the PM without consultation with the constituents and the Queen.

**Methodology**

**Collecting Primary Information**

Primary information I use consisted of policy documents, namely: coalition agreements, speeches, evaluation reports, and white papers related to international development policy of the UK and the Netherlands. The coalition agreements were important sources because they contained political commitments of governments in development aid. Similarly, speeches were crucial since they were the convergences of public attitudes and political views of policy makers while the White papers served as the guidelines of development aid. They contain extensive ideas and the reflection of government’s promises’ after the coalition agreements. The White Paper on Poverty from 1997 in the New Labour contained a set of new ideas in development aid which for the UK was inspired by the United States' Marshall Plan. The rest of the documents of the UK so selected conveyed the same elements with a different majority government. For the part of the Netherlands, I experienced language barrier in collecting relevant. However, the documents selected for the Netherlands were also based on similar criteria.

Besides the valuable information attained from the documents mentioned above, the other reason for me relying solely on these documents was because I could not get any interviewees. The DfID rejected my request since their documents were readily available on their website so it was unnecessary to have any interview sessions with them. Similarly, the IOB of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands also rejected my request for interview because a broad policy review on the presumed policy shift I describe in the research paper was yet to be published (C. Lobbrecht, personal communication 29 July 2016).

**Collecting Secondary Information**

The secondary information used in the research consists of journal articles, newspapers, and yearbooks on development aid. Journal articles so chosen were the ones related to political parties and their attitudes against foreign aid. These articles helped me elucidate the political views of political institutions, government composition, Ministers and Secretary of States’ in development aid.
Newspapers also remained one of my sources to find the general public supports of the UK and the Netherlands'. The newspapers were chosen by their data availability and not necessarily by their political views.

**Analysis**

The research paper is of qualitative nature with Lancaster’s analytical framework as a starting point. The documents were analyzed using an interpretive approach to understand the four elements of the Lancaster's analytical framework. Such interpretive approach to policy analysis "... focuses on revealing the meanings, values, and beliefs expressed in a given policy, and on the processes by which these meanings are communicated to and ‘read’ by various audiences" (Goodwin 2011:169). Though Lancaster's framework provided four elements in analyzing development aid, it did not give a whole picture of the concept of ideas since it did not clearly explain the main or basic principles that a country had in their development aid policies. To help me with this issue, I decided to use Campbell's framework on ideas. The Campbell concept of ideas had more to say than Lancaster’s in a sense that it practically distinguished several kinds of ideas operating in the countries.

This paper is a reflection of my curiosity on the changes of the discourse of the Netherlands' and the UKs' development cooperation. In this regard, I have made a longitudinal comparison as an attempt to seek a pattern amongst the donors. Despite of knowing that the UK and the Netherlands are not the only countries that have changed their aid policies, I have chosen these two countries because of their different histories as donors in terms of their political commitment to meet the GNI percentage standard of DAC and their coalition government. Additionally, there is a significantly increasing contribution towards development cooperation in general in the case of the UK. Both the UK and the Netherlands case study are two interesting cases on illustrating how the work of ideas, interest, institutions, and organizations work leads to changes in development aid policy. They are similar regarding political system. Both countries have a different degree of monarch’s involvement in their decision-making process. The parliaments are bicameral with variations of political parties. The UK has a single majority party which is the other way around in the Netherlands i.e. minority government. Both the UK and the Netherlands started to emphasize the economic growth recipe for combating poverty after the Conservatives-led coalition took power in the government: Conservative-Liberal Democrat in the UK and Conservative Liberal – Social Democrat (2010-2012); Conservative – Labour (2012-now) in the Netherlands respectively. However, development aid could not be easily explained by a neat analytical framework since it also involves a political process which I could not cover in this paper.
Chapter 2 Analytical Framework: Ideas, Interest, Institutions, and Organizations

With Lancaster’s work, I aim to “provide a basis for analysing the politics of aid” (2007:218). Her analytical framework elaborates domestic political forces in donor countries which is significant in understanding development aid policy in each government composition. This does not mean that I neglect the international influence which is also very important. However, I agree with Lancaster that they are “far from enough” (2007:ix). International influence exists but the whole process is in domestic level. In this regard, Lancaster’s framework offers a comprehensive understanding of “widely shared ideas and norms shaping aid giving, the political institutions in which aid decisions are made, the interests behind the policy, and the organizations of governments to manage their aid” (Ibid.). However, Lancaster’s concept of ideas faces limitation as it could not describe what kind of ideas operates in the government and at the society level. To fill this gap, Campbell’s work on four types of ideas helps in elucidating ideas underlying policy and programs; how it is used to justify in front of domestic society; and in understanding public tendency or attitude against the development aid policy itself. The detailed elaboration is as follows.

Ideas

Ideas, in general, have many roles. Likewise, ideas can be interpreted in many ways and understandings. Ideas can be used as an instrument, be it as guidance or a legitimation tool by the policy makers (Goldstein and Keohane 1993) to cope or to deal with past situations or experiences (Blyth 2002). In this sense, ideas enable the coping strategy i.e. to adapt and adjust to the previous policies and practices. Ideas are also an integral part of "intensive social learning process throughout the time" (Hall 1993:277). Powerfully, "ideas are important factors in the causation of any political outcomes including policy… that changes in ideas also change policy outcome and the ability of actors to interpret the environment in which they find themselves may play a crucial role in shaping the process of policy change" (Hay 2002:166).

Having sketched the concept of ideas in general, I will be situating the concept of ideas and their role in policy changes in the UK and the Netherlands. The changes in policy are obviously the result of the changes of ideas since the policymakers adapt to the previous experiences with the policies. The reflexive policymakers have studied that some of their former ideas had to adjust to the
current or future situations. The ideas help policymakers to materialize their experience in policy documents and actions. The changes of ideas are not necessarily exogenous, but more importantly, it is endogenous since policy makers can reflect on their past experiences. Accordingly, we also need to turn to the domestic environment of the donor country. Quoting a large part of Campbell (1998:385) on the role of ideas, we can get a practical explanation on what type of ideas underlie policies:

Table 1 Types of Ideas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognitive Level</th>
<th>Concepts and theories in policy debates</th>
<th>Underlying assumptions in policy making process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Program         | Ideas as elite policy prescriptions that help policymakers to chart a clear and accurate policy action | Paradigm  
                                                                                     Ideas constrain the cognitive range of the useful source of information available to policy makers. |
| Frames          | Ideas as symbols and concepts that help policymakers to legitimize policy solutions to the public. | Public Sentiments  
                                                                                     Ideas as public assumptions that constrain the normative range of legitimate solutions available to policy makers. |

Campbell divides the concept of ideas based on their level of operationalization and their role. On a cognitive level, he classifies the concept into Paradigms and Programs. On the normative level, he categorizes ideas as Frames and Public Sentiments. They are related in the sense that a policy released by a government will reflect the whole four ideas. Paradigmatic ideas vary across nations and consist of assumptions (2002). Therefore, the policy makers possibly take them for granted. They constrain the policy options and choices. Subsequently, policy makers compose their policy based on their assumption which is probably narrow. If there is a change in paradigmatic ideas, it is due to the policy makers who are stuck without clear-cut options. In that point, the policy makers turn to different paradigm to solve their problem. Paradigmatic ideas also face changes if there is an occurrence of extreme changes in the government composition. However, the change in programmatic ideas is more feasible to be materialized since they are flexible. Likewise, the programmatic ideas are more likely to change if paradigmatic ideas are facing changes. Programmatic ideas can stay in the government even if the government coalition or dominant political institutions are modified. Practically, programmatic ideas are crafted carefully to suit the interest of policy makers.
On the normative level, public sentiments and frames consist of "collectively shared expectations" (Katzenstein in Campbell 2002:23). Since they are a set of commonly shared expectations, policymakers are expected to compose a set of policies which are aligned with society's expectations. These types of ideas could be used as a tool to legitimize a certain policy taken by the government. Also, public sentiments contain social opinion about certain issues hence to have a coherent frame with the public sentiments is important to legitimize the policy program.

One of the examples of paradigmatic ideas is the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MDGs became the guidelines in composing development aid policies of both UK and the Netherlands. By becoming the source of inspiration of the relevant White Papers, speeches and coalition agreements, they unavoidably became paradigmatic ideas. The example of programmatic ideas is the sector-wide approach (SWAp) which set out the actions needed to implement donor's aid policies and hence was more practical than MDGs. It consists of several plans for development policy, for e.g. what sectors need to be elaborated and how to improve the situations in beneficiaries. On the normative level, frames can be found in newspapers and policy documents since they contain justification explained by the policymakers. We can find the public sentiments in the national newspapers as they send signals of general public attitudes against development policy of their country.

**Interest**

Lancaster clusters interest into three categories and embeds them to particular groups. The first is commercial interest which is often found in "those supporting the commercial purposes of aid such as agriculture, manufacture, services producers" (Lancaster 2007:21). Similarly, the second is humanitarian interest which is attached to the "NGOs and public interest groups that support aid for relief, development and related purposes in which related to the organizations' activities they commence" (Lancaster 2007:21). Finally, the last one is the self-enlightened interest which is embedded with "groups with an affinity for particular foreign countries, ethnicity or religious orientations that support aid directed to those groups and countries" (Lancaster 2007:21). All of these three types of interest are embedded in specific agents with different capabilities and degree to influence the development cooperation policy of donor. However, political parties and interest groups might have similarities and differences in projecting their interest.

Defining interest is both subjective and contextual tasks. "...interests are the weapons of choice in political science for explaining outcomes, the concept
of interest is far from unproblematic" (Blyth 2002:27). Consequently, we need to take into account the context together with motivations, desires, and preferences within which the interest rests before we associate it to a particular group or even specify the type of interest in the analysis. "Interest is accountable for giving an explanation of why certain groups and individuals behave this way and not another" (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997:50). "Any interest-based explanation will draw its elucidation based on policy makers' preferences that are why comparative explanation across countries with different domestic features tend to behave in the same or similar way if they are similarly positioned in the international system" (Sprinz and Vahtoranta 1994:78).

"The causal mechanism of interest and policies is as important as the interest itself" (Goldstein 1993:xi). Interest-based explanation contains an elaboration of motivations, desires, and preferences of policy-makers and not to mention the society's interest. This can be done by doing empirical observation or implementation of policy. By doing so, we will know what kind of elements as mentioned earlier underlie the interest in policy. To embed interest in certain agents is crucial since different agents have different motivations, desires, and preferences. A specific policy might serve a specific interest of agents. Thus to understand the intentions behind government coalition, a specific interest gives a decent explanation (Goldstein 1993:19) be it material or geopolitical. The same or similar interest between agents can be a source of explanation on why they decide to form a coalition or to agree on certain policies and adjustments. On a normative level, policy actions reflect how interest is articulated. Interest-based explanations also see those different constellations of interest that might give rise to a different political outcome.

“A policy shift involves rational calculations of several options and preferences. The most attainable interest is restrained by situations under which the policy is taken” (Jacobsen 1995:289). Therefore, to explain the concept of interest we need to take into account the ability of agents on having information and data regarding the policy. Rational actors are blessed with an ability to choose one policy based on their interest and the constraining environment. On the other hand, rational actors also have the possibility of not owning sufficient information. Constraining environment determines policy options and of course preferences. Policy options also have a full spectrum consisting of intertwined motivations and desires. Each political party may have a different perception of what interest is and their preference may vary over policy options. Conservative party may perceive that interest should be the primary aim of having a foreign policy in general and development cooperation in particular. On the contrary, left-wing or social democratic parties are more committed to keep development aid policy (Brech and Potrafke 2014:62).
**Institutions**

In a broad view, institutions have been interpreted in many ways as described below,

"Political institutions have been described and analyzed in terms of perspectives as varied as that of a formal, legal style concentrating on constitutions, laws, and rules, of a purely descriptive style, focusing on the origins and developments of specific institutions, of a great man tradition portraying political institutions as arenas for charismatic leaders, and of realpolitik style emphasizing political institutions as arenas for rival, external groups with different resources and interests" (March and Olsen 1989:159).

Despite the differences in understanding political institutions as mentioned above, there are distinctively two major groups. "The first one is referring to institutions as organizations and the second description refers to institutions as the rules of the game" (North 1990:3). "Political institutions shape actors' strategies, and the latter produce collective outcomes. Institutions provide information, opportunities, incentives, and constraints for both citizens and leaders choosing certain strategies, and it is only through the intermediation of actors' strategic decisions that collective outcomes can be explained" (Colomer 2001:7). In that sense, institutions are perceived as a structure which is constitutive towards the agency. Hence, institutions are "the kinds of structures that matter most in the social realm: they make up the stuff of social life based on agents' preferences" (Hodgson 2006:2). Therefore, institutions could be the resources that are maximized by political agents. Likewise, institutions have three distinctive features (Peters 2012). The first is, institutions are made up of a structure. Structure in institutions has regularities. Therefore, it is predictable. The interaction inside the structure is a patterned one. The second characteristic is, the stability of institutions lasts over time. Although some of the institutions are alterable, some of them are very steady. Consequently, there is a certain degree of stability in institutions over time. The last one is, institutions commonly affect people's behavior. Institutions, therefore, constraint individuals in a sense that it drives people to conform the shared norms, rules and regulations.

Having sketched the general concept of institutions, now in order to specify the concept of political institutions, I turn to Lancaster's concept of institutions. In her book, Lancaster points out the elements of political institutions in the development cooperation policy of donor countries. Those elements are "electoral rules; parliamentary versus presidential system (Moreover the role of a legislative body; local government and semi-public entities such as advisory
committees and state-supported NGOs" (2007:19). Lancaster's definitions of institutions are interesting regarding their embeddedness with outside government institutions such as NGOs. In this regard, the political institutions she refers to is interwoven with the concept of a political system. As described by Almond (1956:393), the difference between political institutions and political system is as follows:

"political institutions or persons performing political roles are viewed regarding what it is that they do, why they do it, and how what they do is related to and affect what others do. The term system satisfies the need for an inclusive concept which covers all of the patterned actions relevant to the making of political decisions. Most political scientists use the term political process for these purposes. The difficulty with the term process is that it means any patterning of action through time. In contrast to process, the concept of system implies a totality of relevant units, interdependence between the interactions of units, and a certain stability in the interaction of these units (perhaps best described as a changing equilibrium)"

In light of Almond's description, the political institutions of Lancaster in her description are more inclined to the definition of political system rather than political institutions (2007:19-21). However, a political system is much broader than political institutions since political institutions are part of a political system. Consequently, in this section, I would like to establish that the term I am using as political institutions will be referring to relevant “institutions or persons performing political roles” (Ibid.).

**Organizations**

".. the way governments organize themselves to manage their aid - whether aid programs and policy-making are fragmented or unified and where they are located in the bureaucratic hierarchy - determines the voice and influence of the interest within government on aid's purposes. Further, organizational arrangements - which institutionalize aid's purposes - are hard to change once in place..." (Lancaster 2007:7). An independent or separated body for development aid may be a reflection of the political commitment of a government, but it does not mean that under a specific ministry, a political commitment of aid giving is weak. Some changes in organizational arrangements can also be "a price of coalition building and maintenance" (Lancaster 2007:219). The changing of
Ministerial post to Secretary of State might be the example of both i.e. the reflection of the political commitment of the coalition and the price of the coalition itself. This can be seen in the case of the Netherlands while in the UK, DfID has so far worked more with other departments especially the ones related to trade issues.

Organizations of development aid can also show the governments’ priority of development (Lancaster 2007:220). Some changes can be made possible if the ruling government does not possess the same concern with the previous or the future ones. There can be seen three arrangements in this regard. The first possibility is that, the government changes the name of the responsible body or the programs depending on the priority of the ruling government. This happened in the Netherlands in the latest government coalition. The second is the changed amount of partners; or changes of partners, for instance, a shift from lesser NGOs’ to more private sectors’ involvement. The shift of partners in aid delivery shows a shift of interest in recipient countries. Hence, the third is the changes in aid recipients’. From aforementioned organizational changes, both the UK and the Netherlands experienced them all.

Lastly, the four forces are to be used in a close examination of the following: ideas are operationalised by reading white papers, letters to parliament, speeches, newspapers and relevant reports. Paradigmatic ideas are usually the ones policy makers refer to when they mention a program in documents. Similarly, public sentiments as well as frames are to be noticed in any justification of programs. Likewise, Interests are operationalised by examining the selection of policy sectors, beneficiaries and preconditions expected by donors. Also, political institutions can be operationalised by looking at the political parties to which the Minister and Secretary of State belong. And, the organization of aid can be operationalised by noticing any changes in management of aid deliveries, the establishment of new department, and a change in the name for relevant ministry.
Chapter 3 Ideas, Interests, Institutions and Organizations in Development Aid from the Late 1990s to 2015 in the Netherlands

After describing the four forces, this and the next chapters will be dealing with the development of ideas, interest, institutions, and organizations from the late 1990s to 2015 in the Netherlands and the UK. Both countries started with coalitions built by center-left parties at the end of the 1990s, and from 2010 onwards, were governed by the Conservative-led coalitions.


Ideas

Paradigmatic Ideas

Introduced by Minister Herfkens (Minister of Development Cooperation), the existence of Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) could not be divorced from the paradigmatic view adopted by the Minister. Despite of coming from a Social Democrat political background, her policies reflected a different vibe. She was quite inspired by the international discourse on how to fight poverty in developing countries. She adopted the paradigmatic ideas on aid effectiveness which was in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Before 2005, the issue of the quality of aid was dominant which pushed the donor countries to evaluate their aid policies. Hence, the focus was more towards the result of development aid such as in "reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and accelerating achievement of the MDGs" (OECD 2005). Development aid was required to be effective otherwise; it would not have benefited either of the parties involved in addressing development issues. In this regard, both the recipients and donors were responsible for the quality of aid. Therefore, to make sure the aid was delivered effectively, only few sectors were chosen especially the ones that the Netherlands had expertise on. “This required policies to be in coherence with the international and national level policies to ensure harmonious policies directed towards achieving poverty eradication effectively” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2006:15). Minister Herfkens's decision to implement SWAp strengthened the dominant paradigmatic idea of aid effectiveness in foreign policy issues. Therefore, by applying the SWAp, she contributed to the acceptance of the ideas on aid effectiveness.
Programmatic Ideas

The dynamics of changes in development aid policy started since the end of the 1990s as observed in several policies under Minister Herfkens (Hout 2007:50-51). The most obvious programmatic ideas in the late 1990s until 2008 in the Netherlands was the Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) characterized by its specific programs on development aid as the following:

"The aim of this new approach was to enable the recipient government to determine policy itself for a particular sector (education or health, for example)... Aid would then no longer be provided in the form of project aid but, whenever possible as program aid, preferably as budget support. Moreover, the rules and procedures of the recipient country would have to be observed as much as possible (alignment). In this way, it was attempted to increase the recipient government's ownership. The policy's ultimate aim was to contribute to more effective poverty reduction" (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2006:9).

The SWAp in the Netherlands as a set of programmatic ideas was more focused on the nonproductive sectors such as social sectors, and not the economic ones. However, these social sectors in SWAp were expected to be indirectly influencing the economic sectors. In other words, though the interventions so carried out were significant, the results in regard to poverty eradication were not. Therefore, the government was required to reconsider the SWAp (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2006). Moreover, SWAp also largely relied on the political will of the recipient countries. Hence, it entailed a risk of development aid in the form of budget support being allocated to a different policy programs depending on the strategic priorities of the beneficiary countries.

Frames

To implement the ideas encapsulated in programmatic policies, it is important for the policymakers to be able to set an appropriate frame. Without coherent frames on the national level, it would be difficult for the policymakers to legitimize their policies and to get their justification accepted by the society. The Netherlands, therefore, chose the idea of eradicating poverty in the developing countries as a part of the bigger frame: a humanitarian intervention to validate the implementation of SWAp. The usage of poverty reduction as a frame also
strengthened the previous frames related to humanitarian response efforts carried out in the developing countries. "In some sector-wide working groups and consultations with the government, the Netherlands played an active role in promoting more focus on poverty in policy" (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2006:150). The humanitarian frame adopted by the Netherlands i.e. its involvement in reducing poverty in the beneficiaries’ countries also needed to be supported by their own domestic public. By publicly reporting the implementation of SWAp, it would make the policymakers appear to be carrying out a set of positive and appropriate actions that is consistent with national public sentiments in the Netherlands: fighting against poverty in developing countries.

Any statements from the donor countries should be made publicly accessible to guarantee transparency as it is the ultimate aim of ideas as frames. It also applies to the evaluation report or the newsletter as mentioned earlier. Frames matter because they serve the public expectations in donor country on what and how the government conducts the development aid abroad. For the Netherlands who has a definite tendency to fight poverty in general, the humanitarian intervention in poverty eradication as a frame would be readily accepted and supported. Accordingly, the health and education sectors in development program received a significant support from the public (Spitz et.al. 2013:6).

Public Sentiments
Minister Herfkens’ decided to introduce the Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) in the bilateral policy program together with technical cooperation and co-financing arrangement. This change drastically transformed the bilateral policy (Hoebink 2006 and Hout 2007). Because she was more supportive of the private sector with a clear sound in economic interest, sufficient support was required not only from the private sector but also from the society in general. The practical reason for introducing the SWAp was originally a response to inefficient implementation of bilateral policy in recipient countries. Hence, based on her personal empirical observation, she believed that a policy should manifest a balance between the reflection of the previous policies, her personal encounter and the appropriate thing to do as a policymaker. In that sense, the public sentiments worked as a filter for Minister Herfkens’s to choose the correct policies. By linking public sentiments with poverty reduction as a frame, Minister Herfkens was able to address public opinion that Dutch’s development aid should be able to reduce poverty. More importantly, it also reflected the Dutch’s humanitarian values adopted by their society.

Interests
During this first period, there were visibly three types of interest in the policy documents and speeches related to the Netherlands’ development cooperation: self-enlightened, commercial and political interests. On the discourse level, the
commercial interest in the SWAp was not as visible as the self-enlightened interest since it focused on the social sectors, especially the education sector. On the contrary, the presence of good governance criteria in the policies was quite contradictory with Minister Pronk in the 1970s which was very much driven by the humanitarian values (van der Veen 2011:189). In her terms, Minister Herfkens expected the recipient countries to perform good governance, for instance, a supportive macroeconomic policy. Such demand, however, was quite contradictory from humanitarian values or even with the agenda of combating poverty in the developing countries.

Even though the commercial interests were not very noticeable, SWAp did give an avenue to political interest. For example, the beneficiaries’ countries so selected did not meet the good governance criteria such as the former colonies of the Netherlands: Indonesia and Suriname (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2006:43-45). The political decision of taking Indonesia into recipients’ list was to some extent to maintain the political interest of the Netherlands in Indonesia.

**Institutions**

Political agents are more likely to accept policies which follow their cognitive representation or political views (Campbell 2002:32). Minister Herfkens who came from PvdA was by default expected to value socialist principles. Moreover, during her administration (1998-2002), the Netherlands was under the coalition of PvdA, D66 and VVD with PM Wim Kok. Minister Herfkens’ policies were expected to reflect both normative values adopted by the Social Democrat and the Labor Party. However, the development cooperation policy was largely influenced by personal experience of Minister Herfkens as she once worked as the World Bank Executive Director. The increasing selectivity and the discourse of good governance were very much inspired by the notion of good governance in the World Bank Report. Moreover, party identity did not play a significant role in Minister Herfkens’ policy choices. International paradigmatic ideas influenced her more than the political institution she belonged to as indicated below,

“The introduction of the sector-wide approach was a strong incentive to increase activities and spending in the social sectors, especially education This trend was reinforced by the influence of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the internationally agreed input goals for certain sectors and themes, and the policy priorities contained in the policy paper Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2006:74).
In the period when Minister Herfkens took her position, the coalition government of Social Democrat and the right-wing party in a way allowed the change to happen. Coalition government required the recipients to meet certain preconditions. Beneficiaries were expected to have supportive socio-economic and macroeconomic foundations (Hout 2007:51). Not only because it would be else needlessly spending money on development aid but also because in general, the right-wing parties had no interest in development aid. Therefore the conditions for development aid were made stricter.

Organizations
During the Second Purple Coalition, there was a change in delivering SWAp in the recipient countries. The embassies were given more space in implementing SWAp. This arrangement, however, created tensions between The Hague and the embassies abroad. “The embassies found it difficult to fully comprehend with SWAp since they were insufficiently equipped to carry out these tasks, and the Ministry was also not properly organized to do so” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2006:37).

Among all of the four elements, the paradigmatic idea was the one playing prominent role than the other forces. Aid effectiveness practically guided Minister Herfkens in her policy and the organizational arrangement of the Dutch development aid. Though the commercial, self-enlightened and political interest were there, the main force was the idea of Minister Herfkens to apply the SWAp during her leadership in development cooperation section. Political institution gave an avenue for her idea in the coalition composition even though Minister Herfkens came from PvdA and relied more on her personal experience on international issues.

3.2. Coalition Governments 2002-2010

This section is composed of eight years of different coalition governments. Since they were entirely different in composition, I decided to split this section into two subsections: Balkenende I and Balkenende IV. Because of the short term nature of Balkenende I and III, it would not be incorporated.

Balkenende II (CDA, VVD, D66; May 2003-June 2006)

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1 Balkenende refers to PM Jan Peter Balkenende.
Ideas

Paradigmatic Ideas

During Balkenende II, the Netherlands' intervention in the conflict was basically under the idea of responsibility to keep international order in a stable condition and to attain international solidarity. This could be explained by how committed the Netherlands were on the security issue as reflected in several actions guided by the idea mentioned above and its participation on numerous initiatives such as “...in monitoring a peace agreement in Sudan, the involvement in "Friends of UNMEE" and stepping up training, demobilization, reform and African activities aimed at peace in the region” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2003). Netherlands also developed an initiative to set up a structure for the long-term conflict resolution in the area.

Programmatic Ideas

Minister for Development Cooperation van Ardenne put the security issues as her central theme. This step was taken to address the increasing number of conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. Accordingly, a particular program called 3D (Defense, Diplomacy, and Development) was introduced to address this security issue. The 3D approach aimed to combine development and security issues. Both complemented each other in a sense that security was imperative for the development of a country and development would eventually contribute to security. The Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region were the focus of the Netherlands with two primary programs aimed at reducing the number of conflicts in general, namely “strengthening the conflict Unit of the African Union, public contribution and project expenses, capacity building and strengthening controls on small arms trade, support capacity peacekeeping South Africa, intensification, training, demobilization, reintegration, peacekeeping, security consultancy sector" (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2003).

Frames

"Our globalizing world needs more solidarity and cooperation than ever before. Without these vital ingredients, we cannot secure a safe and peaceful world. The Netherlands plays an important and visible role in the sphere of international cooperation" (van Ardenne 2003:11). This frame sent a message that the world needed the Netherlands to contribute more to the international peace and security thereby inclining the Netherlands' policy program towards the importance of a safe and peaceful world. However, using safe and peaceful international community as a frame was not in coherence with small arms trade in the program. Additionally, 3D program might have been a useful approach in setting security as the precondition of development, however, while assessing the final result i.e. development and poverty reduction; the frame, the programs...
and the objectives of development aid did not appear to be compatible. Hence, though creating a safe and peaceful region might have resulted in stability, the fact that impending military intervention would contribute to development was insufficient to justify the program.

Public Sentiments

Public support in the Netherlands was positive given the frame so built was to enhance the Netherlands' support in developing countries, which in this case was the countries of the African continent. In regard to Africa, the public were of the opinion that it was ".. a lost continent where hunger, war, disease and poverty rule" (IOB 2008:15). With such view, it did injustice to the existing huge diversity amongst the African countries. Furthermore, it overlooked “…positive trends which are considerably improving the opportunities for development” (IOB 2008:15). In this regard, the Netherlands had been playing a significant role in rebuilding the image of the African countries as a continent with potential. However, generally speaking, public sentiments synonymous to public's opinion, it was normal for them to hear that their government was helping the developing world. Hence, the public understood that the government was using their tax money to for poverty alleviation program in the African countries. Conversely, in the same report of IOB, we could see that the urgency of the Netherlands involved in the peace and security process in the regions of Africa was to twist the role of the Netherlands in the development itself which was in the interest of this country.

Interest

"Many factors are involved in peace and democratization processes. The complexity and scale of the financial investment required suggest that it would be better to pursue peace and stability through multilateral channels" (IOB 2008:115). From this recommendation, it is quite clear that getting involved in some parts of Africa meant two things. Firstly, using the 3D program as an instrument to secure a seat at the peace negotiation table even though in the IOB report, the Netherlands were considered neutral (IOB 2008:117). Secondly, despite of taking a neutral position, the persisting political economy motivations in the response of the Netherlands' as mentioned above (financial investment) involved intervention in the agricultural sector entailing the need for the Netherlands' government to put more focus on agriculture in the rural areas of Africa (IOB 2008:123).

Institutions

The newly formed coalition was required to maintain its commitment to keep the development aid 0.8% during a slowed down economy. It was essential to
have a deeper political economy intervention in some parts of African continent, followed by some budget cuts in domestic affairs for instance "abolition of most job subsidy program and abolition of disability insurance for the self-employed" (Korthouwer 2010:194). Here, one could see that the Netherlands had a firm political commitment for development aid even though inside the country, VVD was adamant to budget cuts. In this regard, the center party i.e. CDA, took care of the development aid and the conservative took care of the domestic affairs. “Six seats of D66, the third coalition party, were needed for parliamentary majority” (Korthouwer 2010:196).

Organizations

With such composition, the ministerial position was restored again. Minister van Ardenne increased the participation of private sector in her policy and also increased the funding for the Netherlands Senior Experts (PUM) and Private Sector Investment Programme (PSOM). She phased out recipient countries if they were considered as relatively rich countries (Hout 2007:60). This case was interesting because good governance discourse was still around the corner. Good governance would have required a favourable domestic political economy of the recipients. In that sense country's economy should have been categorized as the middle-income country to make good governance a possible thing to do.

The development aid policy under Balkenende II was pretty much influenced by the country's interest in peace and security in the Horn of Africa, Great Lakes region and in the Middle East especially in Afghanistan. The 3D approach was composed to address the increasing conflicts in the region. Apart from the four elements, during the Balkenende II, the Netherlands used its development policy as a way to strengthen its position as the president of the EU. Hence, it was a good timing for the Netherlands to compose a set of development aid policies which also reflected its shared values to be presented to the international public. In other words, the interest of the Netherlands could be framed effectively when leading the EU. The combination made it possible to form a frame to justify the Netherlands' actions in the Africa and the Middle East. The government composition proved to be supportive since they were composed of parties concerned with international development when the commitment of aid was still 0.8% of GNI with security issues as the priority.

Balkenende IV (CDA, PvdA and Christen Unie; February 2007-February 2010)

Ideas
Paradigmatic

MDGs were mentioned as the paradigmatic ideas in this period. "The Dutch government has worked since the beginning of the MDGs - the government as a whole was committed to bringing about a powerful common strategy to reduce the backlog in achieving the MDGs and will focus more attention on social and economic development for the poorest section of the world's population" (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2007:6). However, it appeared that security was more dominant as the paradigmatic idea. As far as the development intervention in the pursuit of MDGs applied in the form of 3Ds was concerned, it was unclear on how one would achieve MDGs by military intervention in Afghanistan. In this term, security idea could only find itself in the form of socioeconomic security rather than military security since government’s justifications were not sufficient to maintain the program in Afghanistan.

Programmatic

In this period, even though the SWAp was not mentioned as often as in the previous era, there were four focus areas of development aid policy: security and development, growth and distribution, gender and sexual and reproductive health and rights, and sustainability, climate, and energy. In this four policy programs, the economic aspect of development aid was endorsed by the private sector as they were given a chance to be the motor of development in the growth and distribution program. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands were of the view that the private sector “...creates jobs and contributes to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals” (2007:27). However, government prioritized the 3D security program as seen in the case of Afghanistan and some parts of African continent.

In this fourth term, the 3D program had more Defense than Development, especially in Afghanistan. The 3D referred to the military intervention rather than an active defense to protect civilians in Afghanistan. This type of high-level security program needed sufficient and long-term public supports which however failed. Applying 3D program to achieve MDGs was far from feasible. Afghanistan government had a limited capacity to protect their civilians. In other words, there was less than sufficient base for development aid from socioeconomic perspective. It might have been feasible if the Netherlands' government focused more on the humanitarian intervention rather than military operation. Hence below is the quotation below from Robbert Gabielse who was the Director of Conflict Prevention, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

"In Defense, the emphasis is on stability through assisting the Afghan government in developing its security institutions. Diplomacy is aimed at improving the local, regional
and national level of government and preventing conflicts. Development is directed at improving the socioeconomic perspective for the local population" (Gabriëlse 2007:68).

Frames
In the fourth term, the Netherlands took a conscious participation in achieving MDGs.

“Poverty reduction is a matter of common concern to us all. New partners and new coalitions are now tackling global poverty… The government wants to take the lead with a coherent foreign policy. Development cooperation as a catalyst for development must become more political, with a greater focus on human rights, particularly those of women, and a more integrated approach to resolving conflict. Greater effort is needed in international negotiations on trade and the environment to ensure that developing countries and poor people enjoy their share of global economic development” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2007:7).

While the Minister called for solidarity in the second term, Minister Koenders in the fourth term wanted the Netherlands to be more engaged than that. The government presented itself as a committed actor in development. In this term, women’s right was placed as one of the elements of achieving MDGs since the second term had no discussion on women’s rights. This frame brought a holistic approach in implementing the development policies. However, since the Netherlands had put the security issue under the spotlight, women’s issues were not broadly discussed in the frame.

Public Sentiments
As mentioned in the preceding subsection, the programmatic ideas did not receive sufficient support from the Dutch society. Therefore, the report below presented the indirect image of the Netherlands’ intervention in the conflict areas related to security programs.

“Given that society receives many reports from the field of deployment via journalists and the internet, it is vital that the discrepancy between image and reality is not too great, or else the legitimacy of the mission will be undermined. At the very least, the government will, therefore, have to make it clear from the outset that it may take a long time to achieve the final political
objective, that there will undoubtedly be setbacks and that significant results may sometimes take several years to materialize. "In addition, the government should clarify that the Netherlands and the countries with which it is working in crisis management operations are only willing to commit themselves for an extended period if there is a reasonable prospect of improvement, and that other contingents will only enjoy the fruits of ‘our’ labour after we are gone" (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in AIV 2009:51 emphasis added).

The report by AIV above failed to acknowledge rejection from society. It instead stated that "For the record, however, the AIV currently notes that the lack of such support in the case of Afghanistan has thus far not caused any major political problems" (AIV 2009:52). Having said that, if the society would have agreed to the policy programs in Afghanistan, the coalition would not have fallen. "Dutch government…failed to convince its population of the necessity of the mission in Uruzgan… a political choice, rather than inescapable necessity… This would have sobered down the political and sometimes heated debate about the prolongation of the mission" (De Graaf 2010:4-5). Thus, the incoherence of public sentiments and supports against the Netherlands' intervention in the Afghanistan showed the importance of public support in legitimising a development policy program; and an understanding that the Netherlands' society was more supportive of security issues related to humanitarian aid rather than military intervention.

Interest

The Netherlands had a geopolitical interest in Afghanistan despite of their statements that "eradicating the roots of terrorism is most definitely a vital interest for the Netherlands" (Knapen et. al 2011:47). The materialization of geopolitical interest had more of their vital interest aside from altruistic motivation. I assume the Dutch government must have done a set of interest calculations which resulted in prioritization of security issues in Afghanistan. However, explaining security as the precondition of development in the Netherlands' intervention in Afghanistan also explained how engaged the Netherlands were in a group interest such as in this case i.e. the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Institutions

"... the Dutch Second Chamber of Parliament consented to the Uruzgan mission with a vast majority of 126 votes on 2 February 2006" (Knapen 2011:39). "Labour Party leader Wouter Bos confirmed the key role of the notion of a
special and better Dutch way of operating during the final debate on deployment to Uruzgan when his party secured a parliamentary majority for the mission” (Zaalberg 2013:883). Despite insufficient public support for the 3D program, CDA started the program under van Ardenne’s administration which was another political commitment of CDA in development policy. However, PvdA’s support withdrawal contributed to weak government, leaving the coalition with only 47 seats from 150 in the parliament (Guardian 2010). In this term, we could see how volatile the government coalition can be in security issues.

Organizations

Even though 3D program abroad was conducted by the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Minister of Development Cooperation, it also involved the Ministries in charge of domestic affairs judging from how the society disapproved the program. "To be really ‘comprehensive,’ other Ministries such as Security and Justice, Interior and Kingdom Relations, Finance, and Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation needed to be more involved" (Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ 2011:52). However, the Development quotient balanced the Defense among the three ministries. There were two types of organizational arrangements in 3D: Defense was under the government’s authority and Development in the civil societies. “Dutch NGOs and the Dutch private sector also began activities in Uruzgan province… (with) the Dutch Consortium for Uruzgan (DCU) as an umbrella organization for initially three and later five Dutch NGOs" (Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ 2011:33). This fragmentation of organization showed both government and civil society’s concern over the implementation of the 3Ds and made it clear that geopolitical interest was the primary driver in the Dutch intervention in Afghanistan.

3.3 The Coalition Government from 2012-2015

The booming voices for Conservative-Liberal in the Netherlands portrayed the social tendency to move towards the right part of the spectrum. “The euro-crisis, demographic shifts, need for ecological innovation, cost-of-care explosion, housing market bubble" (Cuperus 2012) were the reasons to turn to the right. This situation inside drove the coalition government to take into account that public support might fall if the government failed to produce satisfying policy outcomes. PVV even withdrew the support in 2012 leaving VVD to form another majority coalition with PvdA until 2015.

Ideas
Paradigmatic Ideas
From 2012, the idea of economic growth became far more robust than previous years. The MDGs were no longer sufficient to eradicate poverty. “Without economic growth there will not be enough wealth to distribute” (Lieshout et al 2010:164). “Economic growth generated by a healthy private sector is, after all, a driving force of poverty reduction” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2012:10-15). “Economic growth by no means always leads to jobs, access to clean drinking water and equal rights for women” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2013:15). Economic growth as an idea successfully dominated amongst the policy makers in the Netherlands after the Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) delivered its policy recommendation to government. Economic growth was seen as the most essential idea in designing development aid policy.

Programmatic Ideas
Ever since the idea of economic growth rested in the policy makers’ cognitive level, the program designed by government was based on the notion of economic growth. The program was the Dutch Good Growth Fund (DGGF) which supported,

"…Dutch SMEs and entrepreneurs in emerging markets and developing countries, by offering a source of financing for development-relevant local investments and exports… for activities that create new local jobs, increase the production capacity of local industry, and contribute to the transfer of knowledge to the developing country concerned" (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2017).

It showed trade as an integral part of development cooperation: it was the only feasible program in development aid policy.

Frames
The change in the paradigmatic and programmatic ideas is connected to the frames policymakers use to justify the change of development cooperation policy. By using development aid as the frame to justify the new policy, it would serve Dutch (economic) interests, while the Netherlands retains its role as a donor country. In this way, the Netherlands could be more visible in contributing to the betterment of international society. Also, "Netherlands can make a difference with its knowledge and expertise… The government would like Dutch development cooperation to have a recognizable face in the world" (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2012:15).
Public Sentiments

“Dutch discussion about development cooperation focuses primarily on the aid budget” (Spitz 2013:27) with details such as,

“... the ability to save it, the allocation of resources (“to where the money goes?”), The effectiveness of the spending ("What do I get for my money?") And the relevance of this expenditure ("Does this kind of international cooperation make sense?")” (Pollet et. al. 2012:18).

The Dutch society needed to know the value of money spent for international development. The inquiry was linked to the aid effectiveness and the result that could be seen by taxpayers. Therefore, trade and aid element in the frame was coherent with the value for money. The taxpayers indirectly could get their money back for the betterment of their life from trade arrangement. Policy makers, hence, successfully absorbed public sentiments in the Netherlands which was reflected in the frame.

Interest

There were two signals on the increasing domestic interest in the development assistance in this period. The growing domestic interest meant a further reduction of recipient countries and the rising skepticism in development aid program. The decrease in the beneficiary countries was justified to increase the economic benefit of development cooperation. For instance, water and food as one of the spare heads of the Netherlands' development aid policy; it was an instrument to pursue the interest of the Netherlands' in these areas. As mentioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, "The world is increasingly interconnected; the globalizing challenges that the world faces today (climate change, decreasing biodiversity, food security, etc.) cannot be solved without the cooperation of developing countries as well" (2012:11). By paying attention to such aspects, the Netherlands was originally doing well for its betterment. The Netherlands was also aware that with increasing connectivity of one country to another, it could also enhance their dependency on the events happening on the other side of the world. Hence, since the developing countries served as prospective future markets for Netherlands' companies, the Netherlands invested in the development aid to ensure the success of the Netherlands’ companies abroad. Hence, water and food were not just public goods essential for the Netherlands; these were also the sectors where the country had their expertise on. Consequently, the emphasis in the water and food program as Dutch's priority would have ultimately benefitted the Netherlands' (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2012).
Institutions

In the Rutte II, the government placed development cooperation back in the ministerial post. The change was made possible by PvdA in the cabinet. Such change clearly reflected the mix parties in the government coalition. With the increasing right-wing inclination of society in general, the ideas spread in public sentiment quadrant made it easier to shape a set of policy programs which were inclined to the interest based policies. The previous experience with development practices such as the issues of corruption in the recipient countries governments; it became the primary consideration in evaluating the Netherlands' development cooperation policy.

Organizations

In the latest organizational changes in the Netherlands, there were two shifts; the most recognizable one was “the change of the Ministerial position: from Minister of Development Cooperation to Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation” (Hout 2017, personal communication, 19 March 2017). Such combination was directed towards providing “an opportunity to modernize”. Furthermore, while there was a concern for the poor, the government also equally prioritized their trade interest (Ploumen 2013). The second was the aid delivery. To implement DGGF, government involved the private sector. Consequently, DGGF supported by a consortium of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and Triple Jump, made the organization of development aid closer to trade and investment practices. The aim of changed organizational conduct was also unclear. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that this scheme would benefit women and developing countries (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2017). On the contrary, PwC, Triple Jump, and Atradius Dutch State Business collectively only funded "primarily for Dutch's small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and for larger companies which can demonstrate that the export transaction will benefit Dutch SMEs" (Atradius Dutch State Business 2017 emphasis added). The organization risked the development cooperation into being merely a business, abandoning the fundamental aim of development policy.

Concluding Remarks

In the Netherlands, international paradigmatic ideas such as aid effectiveness and MDGs obviously showed how high the Netherlands' engagement was in the international forum. Economic growth appeared as the paradigmatic idea in development aid policy only after the conservative-led came to power. This was
proven by the changes of the Ministerial position and aid delivery which seemed to be as a result of changes in both programmatic and paradigmatic ideas.

Different from the UK as discussed in the next chapter, the Netherlands have had volatile political institutions. The minority government made it easier for a party to weaken the government. However, development aid policy was always embedded in different coalition with different characteristic depending on the party's origin of Minister of Development Cooperation. In the Netherlands, this position was always occupied by the same political party associated with the PM. In this way, the Netherlands' development aid policy was dependent on the Minister of Development Cooperation and international trends. Organizations of aid in the Netherlands were always under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which entailed that development cooperation would always be a part of Dutch's foreign policy.
Chapter 4 Ideas, Interests, Institutions, and Organizations in Development Aid from the Late 1990s to 2015 in the United Kingdom

This chapter focuses on the four domestic forces in the UK from 1998 to 2015. The first section explores the years of New Labour where development aid policy deepens the ideas and practices of economic growth, giving a leeway for Conservative to take the driver seat with their own interpretation, which I will explore in the second section.

4.1 UK’s Development Aid Under the New Labour

Ideas

Paradigmatic Ideas

Having the institutions set in 1997, the DfID has continued using poverty reduction as the main theme of its development cooperation policy. In the UK, economic growth and the discourse of poverty reduction were always mentioned in the white papers. Compared to the Conservative government in the second section, New Labour treated poverty reduction as the paradigmatic idea and economic growth as the subordinate. The institutionalization of development cooperation in the form of DfID was an empirical proof on how paradigmatic ideas about poverty reduction travelled in the bureaucratic processes. They guided the policymakers from the Labour Party to compose a coherent policy program in delivering aid to previously colonized countries and take its form in an organization.

Poverty reduction stayed as the UK’s paradigmatic idea until the MDGs took over in the 2000s. The change was evident since the existence of MDGs served as primary guidelines in development aid in their 2009 White Paper (DfID 2009:13) while in the previous term i.e. 1997 White Paper, there was no discussion of MDGs. The UK was involved in achieving the MDGs target and took several steps such as, “(UK) presidencies of the G8 and the European Union to press for the Gleneagles commitments on aid, trade, and debt… and the UK worked closely with the UN Secretary-General to deliver the Call to Action campaign in 2008, championing the EU Agenda for Action and renewed commitment by the G8 to the MDGs” (DfID 2009:13). By using the MDGs, it was easier for the UK to legitimize their development aid to the recipients because
the MDGs were global commitments. It also gave them an avenue as a donor country to intervene in the beneficiaries’ domestic programs.

**Programmatic Ideas**

The adoption of both poverty reduction and MDGs as paradigmatic ideas resulted in the adoption of the sector-wide program. UK’s sector-wide approach consisted of twelve sectors ranging from humanitarian intervention to the economic recipes. The UK’s sector-wide program had a broader scope from the SWAp applied by the Netherlands. The UK considered that "a wide range of interventions through development assistance programs will often be needed to support economic growth which makes significant progress towards the elimination of poverty" (DfID 1997:23). A wide range of assistance was designed to eradicate poverty by any means possible, especially focusing on the productive sector. This program believed economic development was the recipe to reduce poverty in developing countries. The White Paper 1997 was visibly clear in putting poverty reduction and economic growth as the main goal and the cure to poverty even though SWAp was only mentioned twice in the document which neglected the complexities of processes.

"SWAps were designed to enhance policy coordination and implementation within a particular sector" (FAO 2017). It implied that every intervened sector should be able to contribute to poverty reduction. "It facilitated the alignment of funding and technical support around national priorities and improved the government's role in program design as well as in implementation and development partner coordination" (Ahsan et al. 2016:612). The comprehensive intervention required a certain degree of political commitment and acceptability between donor and recipients. Beneficiaries also needed to increase their capacity in every chosen sector to be able to achieve expected results. However, there was a possibility that sector-wide program would enhance the dependency. The sector-wide program worked intensely in every sector thus for poor countries who needed the program but had not implemented good governance were less likely and capable to apply the program. In other words, "even though the UK was eager to hand the ownership of the sector-wide so the program would be under beneficiaries' control, without beneficiaries' capabilities, regardless the program, development aid would not work" (Porteous 2005:292).

**Frames**

During the leadership of the New Labour, the pride as a donor gained a certain level of trust from the British people.

"We also want British people to know that their taxes are being used (effectively) to tackle global poverty, deal with issues that will affect us all such as climate change, and help some of the most vulnerable
people on the planet. We want them to be proud of our development program, just as they are proud of the BBC and the National Health Service. Our ultimate objective is that Britain meeting its international obligations to provide development aid is seen as central to Britain's sense of identity and part of who we want to be as a nation in the 21st century" (DfID 2009:135 emphasis added).

UK governments’ attempt to explain that the tax money paid by their citizen was used to combat poverty abroad was to convince their citizens that the UK was contributing to development in other parts of the world as well. This refers to the issue of effectiveness. The government framed the sector-wide program as an effective program to deal with tax money and British pride of donor country to combat poverty.

Public Sentiments
During the rule of the New Labour in this period of time, "the UK public has enthusiastically supported major campaigns to address global poverty such as Live Aid and Make Poverty History in recent decades, gives substantial amounts to development charities and has responded generously to one-off appeals for disaster relief such as for the 2004 Asian tsunami" (Glennie et. al. 2012:3). Hence, the support of the UK citizens were for the campaigns about combating poverty abroad which were in coherence with the frame used by the policymakers.

"Helping to lead the world in a commitment to poverty elimination and sustainable development is an international role in which all the people of Britain could take pride" (DfID 1997:20). Such notion, in turn, gives certain pride for being the citizen of donor country with a sound contribution to the poverty reduction in developing countries. More importantly, such pride facilitates the justification of using public money. Consequently, this made it possible for the UK beneficiaries to be able to implement the sector-wide approach. Similarly, though there is a moral value attached to it for being able to do good things for people abroad, it also has tendency of putting oneself as a superior entity compared to the recipients.

Interest
There was a considerable need in the UK to promote their economic interest, especially in the Africa continent through the discourse of poverty reduction (Barder 2005). “Commercial interest had very much to do with economic development and increasing number of aid in the Africa since 1995 until 2003/4” (Killick 2005:666). The African continent was projected to be UK’s main trading partner. After the Cold War, the UK "included a desire to spread British culture
and values… a number of important economic, political and strategic interests. British economic concerns largely revolved around trade and investment in pivotal African states - notably South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya" (Cumming 2004:111). Furthermore, the donor-recipient relations could be very tricky. Evidently, “The UK was more than powerful to set the rules of the game” (Cumming 2004:109). In other words, the patron-client relations did not change significantly under the New Labour. Consequently, the aid policy had a less positive impact on beneficiaries.

In the early years of the New Labour’s, they embraced the notion that “eradicating poverty and conflict in the poor countries of the continent will prevent the disaffection and instability that drive people to migrate to Europe or turn towards terrorism” (Gallagher 2009:3). However, the commercial and humanitarian interests could not be entangled from the development practices delivered by the UK under the New Labour as they originally conveyed economic growth as the cure for poverty,

"CDC Group plc (a company wholly-owned by DFID) invests in poor developing countries and aims to attract private capital by showing that such investments are worthwhile… CDC has mobilized about £360 million of private investment since 2003, and its portfolio has grown by 60% to £1.6 billion… CDC was the first institutional investor in Celtel which now has telephone operations in fourteen countries, covering 30% of Africa's population. It has transformed access to telephones for more than 5 million customers" (DfID 2006:47).

The inclusion of private sector to invest in the developing countries as mentioned in the document above reflected the commercial interest of the UK through the CDC and DfID. "The increasing number of investment from the UK private business increased from £0.5 billion in 2005 to £3.0 billion in 2014" (Office for National Statistics 2016). CDC as a company owned by DfID was involved in creating an enabling investment environment in the developing countries. In that sense, CDC prepared the economic sector of recipients to prevent market failures in developing countries for the UK business.

Institutions
The change witnessed in institutions was the increasing power of Secretary of State in International Development Act 2002. The Act endorsed Secretary of State’s legal power to decide on the conduct of development aid (DfID 2002). In this way, it would depend on the political party the Secretary of State belonged to. This, in the UK's case, was most likely to be the same party governing the country.
Judging from how the sector-wide approach was presented in the white paper, from the manifesto 1997, the New Labour tried to distance itself from the Conservative. Consequently, the aid policy was outward looking, "Britain cannot be strong at home if it is weak abroad" (Blair 1997). Hence, the development aid policy aspired to have more roles in international issues. The UK under the New Labor was quite different from the party’s predecessor. “The New Labor, to distinguish from the Old Labor was the closeness of the New Labor to the private sector” (Falconer and McLaughlin in Osborne 2000:122). Inherently, aid policy under the New Labour was not fundamentally different with the Conservative. Given the reformatory virtue of the sector-wide approach, the New Labour did not take significant steps to distance itself from the Conservative. More importantly, they were getting closer to the right wing.

Overall, a particular political commitment in development cooperation spending in the UK was low (see appendix 1). In the Netherlands, whether the Minister and/or government coalition had PvdA or not in their composition, the GNI percentage remained relatively stable (see appendix 2). Also, 2005 was not quite a winning year for the Labour Party. They won the general election with lesser seat difference from 2001. Though there was an increase in the number of the conservative seats in the parliament as compared to the 2001 election i.e. from 166 seats to 198; the number of seats gained by the Labor decreased from 412 to 356 (UK Political Info 2001 and 2005). This phenomenon meant that the margin of success between the two parties was getting thinner. Also, it signaled an increasing support towards the Conservatives. In that sense, the Labour needed to adjust their development aid policies more into the constituents' expectation which meant adapting the Conservatives' type of development aid i.e. more economic benefit for the donor. The poverty reduction idea was stretched from the late 1990s until now which means the UK has a certain pattern of using the same discourse even though the usage is slightly different.

Organizations
Organizational-wise, Labour government, changed the set-up of development aid significantly.

"The Labour government gave a new name and status to the former Overseas Development Administration (ODA), which was a wing of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The DFID is now autonomous of the FCO… Unlike her predecessor, the Minister of State for Overseas Development, the Secretary of State (Clare Short) has a seat in the cabinet and assisted by a Parliamentary Under Secretary of State" (Burnell 1998:789).
Working independently, the new organizational arrangement gave DfID space to deliver the development aid. DfID's independence enabled it to directly work with international organizations rather than through bilateral scheme because bilateral scheme did not work working with international organizations such as IMF and World Bank (DfID 1999:3). Judging from how DfID organized development aid including the cooperation with international organizations, there were less significant differences with the Conservative. It could be because DfID was a newly built organization. However, since the early work of DfID involved IMF and World Bank, “DfID’s organization was merely a continuation of the previous organizational arrangement especially with over 90 percent of economic reform program agreed by the two institutions” (DfID 1999:14).

In this second timeline of the UK development aid, DfID tried to enhance its partnerships with international organizations and business sectors. Moreover, cross-departmental works also increased but only in trade-related issues reflecting the UK's concern on their commercial interest in development aid. Compared to the former organizational arrangements, DfID in these five years focused more on the improvement of research to stimulate the economic sector of beneficiaries. The activities included, establishing a new research center to support economic growth in developing countries. "The International Growth Centre will provide high-quality, practical, analytical and policy support to developing countries on PSD, drawing on a network of growth experts" (DfID 2009:6).

Lastly, UK under the administration of the New Labour did not experience changes in ideas except in paradigmatic level. MDGs took over poverty reduction’s position as a paradigmatic idea while sector-wide approach was still being used. It meant that the change in the paradigmatic idea did not result in a change in the policy program. Similarly, the publics’ altruism was reflected by the effectiveness of using public's money. The UK's government was able to capture the willingness of their public to provide aid for which the government used spending money effectively for poverty reduction as a justification. However, interests ranged from spreading British's values to trade and another economic gain such as investment. Over time, the Secretary of State enjoyed increasing significant power in formulating and deciding the development aid policy of the UK. At the same time, DfID ever since their establishment had increased the coordination with other relevant organizations such as the World Bank and private companies.

4. 2. The UK under the Conservative-Liberal
The UK from 2010-2015 after the shift of government from the Labour to the coalition of Conservative and Liberal Democrat issued a more aggressive development aid policy focused on the involvement of private sector compared to the previous years.

Ideas

Compared to the previous years, ideas during the conservative-led government was less about the UK's responsibility as a developed country alleviating poverty abroad.

Paradigmatic Ideas

Economic growth was always the UK's recipe to abolish poverty in developing countries. Despite the existence of poverty reduction in paradigmatic ideas, economic growth was founded as the hallmark of UK development aid from 2010. Nonetheless, economic growth replaced the idea of poverty reduction. Economic growth was seen as "the most important means of raising people's incomes and reducing poverty in the developing world – it creates jobs and opportunities for poor people to support their families and build more stable futures" (DFID 2015). Economic growth was perceived as the panacea of poverty reduction in developing countries, especially in African countries. The idea of economic growth in the Conservative administration, to contrast it with the previous government, was "subordinated to the central analytic of poverty reduction" (OECD-DAC in Mawdsley 2015:343). To experience development which would lead to poverty reduction, the beneficiaries were expected to commit themselves to the idea of economic growth as the only solution available. However, economic growth overlooked inequalities existing in developing countries. While the previous idea of battling poverty involved a more holistic approach: poverty would not have perished by putting solely economic growth as the only recipe.

Programmatic Ideas

Conservatives, instead of taking an effort to distance itself from New Labour's approach, accepted New Labour's commitment to development aid (Cameron 2010). The difference was seen in the way the New Labour's programmatic ideas were treated. Without creating a new White Paper, programs offered by Conservatives were more inward looking ones. High-Level Partnership Program (HLPP) was programmed to help business sector from the UK to invest in Africa continents. The program concentrated on creating jobs because of the absence of jobs leading to unemployment and poverty. As a development solution, a scheme to build an attractive market for investors was fundamentally needed. HLPP is a particular program endorsed by DFID with specific features such as "... aim to strengthen economic cooperation between the UK and Angola,
Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania based on shared priorities in specific sectors. The FCO, UKTI, and DFID will work together and with African governments and business to identify opportunities to increase trade and investment and create mutual growth and jobs” (DFID 2013). HLPP concentrated on specific sector which supported economic growth with business environment and extractives as its common characteristic (DFID 2013). From these two elements of HLPP, we could see how prosperity was perceived by the UK since achieving those two elements were considered the preconditions. In that sense, prosperity assumed by DFID was seen only from an economic point of view. The situation was different from New Labour's approach to the sector-wide approach which consisted of broader program to contribute in poverty reduction because New Labour believed that wide sectors contributed to poverty reduction. Hence, economic intervention on broad reforms was considered as a panacea.

Frames
UK’s public support towards development cooperation was originally low (Niblett 2011). This situation was coupled with "growing skepticism about the effectiveness of UK aid programs (and, indeed, of aid in general) with calls to refocus the development debate on the quality of results" (Glennie et al 2012:2). As a solution to the decreasing support for development aid, market-driven aid effectiveness (by privatisation of part of aid) was chosen as the most suitable frame. It was believed that “Private spending has become a much greater contributor to development than official aid” (The House of Parliament 2012). However, there was no straight line to link the benefit of development aid to either beneficiaries or national economy while the money went to the corporations.

Public Sentiments
The public perception did not change until Conservative took power which meant the public was keener to use the aid for national interest rather than for altruism values (Lightfoot et al. 2015). There was a tendency to prioritize poverty issues inside the UK even though helping poor people abroad was also considered important. "The UK public attitude's level of concern about poverty in developing countries is sensitive to short-term communications efforts (for example antipoverty campaigns such as Make Poverty History) but with no evident long-term shifts in public attitudes" (Henson and Lindstrom 2013:74).

Interest
Commercial interest was the most visible one in the UK development aid practices under the Conservative Party. Since Conservative took the leadership in DFID on 2010, development cooperation policy became even more inclined towards fulfilling the UK’s general and economic interest in particular. To this
entanglement, development cooperation was not merely a part of foreign policy. It was the UK’s main instrument of foreign policy under the Conservative. There was a significant number of money spent to big companies involved in UK’s development aid. Evidently so, according to DfID’s spending data “in 2014 Adam Smith Institution was the department’s third largest private contractor (having spent at least £88.4m through the company that year), behind Crown Agents (£191.6m) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (£122.2m)” (DfID in Provost 2016:8). This continuity (with deepening commercial interest) regardless of the government’s composition was always a part of the UK’s development aid character. "The coalition government has accepted the increased level of importance assigned to international development by the Labour administration" (Dunne et al. 2011:29).

More practices of DfID supporting the business sectors were the opposite of the coalition agreement since the aid was to be kept "...untied from commercial interests" while maintaining “...DfID as an independent department focused on poverty reduction" (Cameron and Clegg 2010:22). In practice, in its findings, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) mentioned that, “DfID’s vision for the role of the private sector in development has been consistent over time: a strong private sector drives economic growth. It wants ‘private sector thinking to become as much part of DfID’s DNA as [its] work with charities and governments’ (ICAI 2014:9). In that sense, the creation of the International Development Act 2015 was influenced heavily by economic interest of the UK. The Act was designed to secure both the latest White Papers since DfID White Papers made private sector involvement a priority in their policy programs.

**Institutions**

In the UK, development cooperation-related posts were habitually under the administration of either Conservative or Labour even though in this year they had Liberal-Democrat in the coalition. Interestingly, the Conservative type of programmatic ideas was not easily distinguishable from New Labour. “The fact that the new coalition government accepted the increased level of importance assigned to international development by the former Labour government means a brief outline of international development policy under New Labour is necessary” (Heppel and Lightfood 2012:131). Such acceptance explained that PM Cameron was trying to make a distinction between Conservative before 1997 and his administration. In other words, Conservative under PM Cameron was moving from right to the center. Regarding this point, a bold segregation of right and left political parties and their attitude against foreign aid had lost its relevancy. Conservative would not plainly cut development aid fund anymore and the other way around for New Labour. However, Conservative government's decision to stick to New Labour's policy would have had effect on the voters. Voters who seem to seek a balance between how poverty issues addressed at
home and yet, still care about such issues abroad would give a shot for Conservative way of doing development aid.

A significant difference was how the establishment of International Development Act 2015 affected the increasing power of the Secretary of State. International Development Act 2015 was mainly created to embed the political commitment of the Secretary of State to the UK’s law.

“It places a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that the 0.7% target is met by the UK in the year 2015 and each subsequent calendar year, accountability over meeting the 0.7% target is to Parliament, rather than the courts, and the Secretary of State must make arrangements for the independent evaluation of the extent to which UK ODA represents value for money. The Secretary of State must include in each annual report a statement as to how he or she has complied with this duty” (DfID 2015).

However, this Act endorsed the dependency of development aid to the Secretary of State. Supported by International Development Act 2015, Secretary of State would be able to push the 0.7% of GNI annually to fund development projects without a clear explanation on the appropriate target as long as UK’s money could be returned. It also meant that the Secretary of State could continue to spend public money to the DfID’s partner companies. Consequently, there was a chance that Secretary of State might overlook the essence of development itself.

Organizations
DfID from 2010 was involved with different relevant ministries. It showed that DfID was the primary instrument of the UK foreign policy for developing countries under the Conservative. After implementing more researches on aid management and delivery, Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) found that the DfID needed to put the private sector at the heart of organizing their aid (ICAI 2014). The report suggested DfID should work with a better communication with multinational companies since it was important to adopt a private sector way of thinking within DfID as an organization. However, ICAI recommendations were problematic. If ICAI supported a deepening cooperation between DfID and their private sector partners, UK’s aid policy would have been dominated solely by the private sector intervention. Thus, the claim of organizing UK aid by placing the spotlight on private sector and creating benefits such as jobs and thereby reducing poverty, would simplify the development process. It would be fair if DfID gave more space for local participation which could be done through local offices.
Another significant feature in DFID was the establishment of a new department inside DFID - the Private Sector Department (PSD). With its establishment, it was stated that "Over one-third of the 1.8 billion DFID spending target for economic development in 2015/16 will be managed by PSD… (PSD) manages DFID's shareholding in the CDC Group – the UK's development finance institution – and the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG)" (DFID 2014:3). The new organizational arrangement reflected how UK government took investment practices seriously. In a way, it changed the process of aid delivery. PSD drove the organization of aid to more like a business environment which DFID had to be more careful of so as to not get captured in doing business more than development.

Lastly, a significant change happened in the paradigmatic idea in the UK after a shift in the government. Economic growth replaced poverty reduction as the paradigmatic idea of the UK development aid policy. This change affected the programs. The UK under the administration of Conservative was keen to use the programs which favored the private sector. Large companies led development programs and practices. However, the ideas that traveled in the society’s level were supportive ones. Public encouraged giving aid because it benefitted the national economy. Thus, the frame followed. Effectiveness of aid was understood as market-driven aid effectiveness. The public’s money so spent had to be returned for public’s economic profit. Therefore, we could see more private companies involved in the development sector. The money spent would not have been effective without private companies’ intervention. Consequently, commercial interest was the only visible one in the UK's policy under the Conservative. Similarly, the International Development Act 2015 enhanced the Secretary’s power to stick with spending 0.7% of UK's government on developing market for big companies. Moreover, the DFID created PSD inside it which would manage DFID’s money. The new organization of DFID appeared to be more identical to investment rather than development practices.

**Concluding Remarks**

UK’s development aid has been dominated by poverty reduction as the paradigmatic ideas under New Labour administration with economic growth as one of its element. However, it changed under the Conservative government. Economic growth replaced the position of New Labour’s poverty reduction. We can see a subtle paradigmatic shift in development aid. This suggests that governing UK for thirteen years, New Labour had not successfully altered the previous Conservative’s paradigm in development aid policy. Supportive public sentiments related to development aid were never really part of their concern as seen
under both New Labour administration and Conservatives. Thus, framing and justifying development aid would have been a challenging task.

There was a similarity between New Labour and Conservative in their early administration. Both tried to distant themselves from one another even though they were using the same ideas. Moreover, the bold gap between the two as left-right political parties became less clear since New Labour’s policy was acceptable for the Conservatives. To gain national interest, Conservative had to use a strategic frame which had been offered by New Labour. For New Labour, PM Blair’s effort to distance New Labour from Old Labour was in a way, a subtle move to the center. On contrary to the Conservatives, their move in using the same ideas with New Labour was plain because there was the possible frame in the interdependent world with deeper commercial interest and private sector involvement. At last, the UK development aid has shown us a trend toward a stronger domestic interest in their development aid. The establishment of DfID which organization-wise, was expected to stand as an independent organization was not successfully achieved. Instead, the growing private sector partners were unavoidable with the establishment of PSD inside DfID. This was different from DfID’s expectation as an independent organization. Hence, the trend of development showed by HLPP was to encourage profounder private sector involvement while putting national interest first.
Chapter 5 Conclusions

In the past few years, development cooperation policies in the UK and the Netherlands have changed significantly. Despite their differences, the UK and the Netherlands adopted a similar development aid policy when both Conservative-led coalitions took power. Thus, to understand the evolution of their policies, it was crucial to look closely at the domestic level where the whole processes were conducted. Lancaster's analytical framework helped to elucidate the complex interaction in domestic level. The four forces helped to understand the widely shared ideas, the interest of donors, the political institutions of the government and how the government managed their development aid. However, Campbell's four types of ideas helped to distinguish paradigmatic ideas inspiring the donor countries, their policy program; the frame used by policymakers; and lastly the public sentiments in regard to the development aid.

The Netherlands was more flexible in terms of changes rather than the UK. In the late 1990s, the Netherlands had the idea of aid effectiveness under Purple Coalition; followed by security in the Balkenende II; MDGs in the Balkenende IV; and lastly economic growth under VVD and PvdA coalition respectively. The changes were possible when globally acknowledged ideas were established such as MDGs or when collective interests were to be exercised which was shown in security issue. However, paradigm shift was not instantly followed by program changes. For instance SWAp continued from the late 1990s until Balkenende II when the Netherlands were shifting ideas from aid effectiveness to security. This meant that as long as the ongoing program was considered relevant and public support was enough, the change was less likely to occur. A comprehensive change in the four forces was found only under the conservative-led government. Here, the change was possible because the ideas of economic growth and the implementation of DGGF were widely supported. Similarly, the economic growth was also coherent with growing economic interest of the Netherlands in the developing countries. The changes in ideas, interest and institutions thus pushed for the changes in organization. This was exactly found in the change of Minister for Development Cooperation to Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation.

Meanwhile in the UK, the change was quite subtle. The idea of economic growth during the administration of the New Labour was constantly the sub-idea of poverty reduction. The position of economic growth as part of poverty reduction meant the UK’s paradigmatic idea was, on the contrary to the Netherlands, more stable. The rise of the Conservative in the government made it easier to focus on purely the economic dimension in aid policy. However, the government treated public’s altruism to justify aid effectiveness. It showed that
even though public sentiment towards development aid policy was positive, the frame could be twisted to meet the interest of the government. It also showed that the UK's public attitude from the late 1990s to 2015 never entirely differed from the governments. The change was feasible because the New Labour’s ideas and interest were close with the Conservatives’ in society and at the state level. Therefore, it was quite easy for political institutions and aid organizations to align with the changing government composition.

As addition, there were also events when the frames were on the opposite of paradigmatic ideas: in the late 1990s, UK had poverty reduction as the paradigmatic idea and aid effectiveness as the frame. It was the opposite in case of the Netherlands. However, SWAp and altruism both could be found in the program and public sentiments in the two. These meant that the frame and paradigms can exchange place while at the same time, programs and public sentiments could stay the same. The swapped position could be because of the transcendental nature of ideas. Ideas traveled in public as well as in the state level. However, both changed their paradigmatic ideas when MDGs took place. The similarity lays in the latest government coalitions where conservative parties were in charge. Economic growth as the paradigmatic idea guided policymakers to compose programs. However, it would not have been possible if the public support was zero as discussed earlier in the case of the Netherlands on Balkenende IV where the public did not support programs and frames. This public attitude also meant that the conservative-led coalitions had more impact on the ideas, interest, institutions and organizations rather than another type of coalitions.

Interests of both countries were diverse and the political institutions undoubtedly affected development aid differently. In the UK, the International Development Acts gave power to the Secretary of State. However, even though the Netherlands had no such scheme, the power of the Minister of Development Cooperation (or in the last label Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation) was enough to shape their development aid policy. In light with that, political parties in both countries, except the Conservative had a relative power over development aid policy. It was also observed that the organizations of aid affected the content of aid policy. The deeper involvement of private sector led to privatization of development aid and such developments existed in both countries under the Conservative-led coalitions.
References


Greening, J. (Last updated 2014) 'Beyond Aid - Development Priorities from 2015' (a webpage of Department of International Development). Accessed August/6 2016


Appendix 1

Appendix 2

Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1999-2015, Netherlands