Evaluation of Embeddedness of Humanitarian Mine Action Programs Funded by the Netherlands, for the Period 1996-2004

Project Report – Master Graduation

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Foreword and Acknowledgements

This project report is the result of my internship at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the evaluation research I participated in. My special interest lies in the following subjects: poverty reduction, sustainable development, the environment, and developing countries. I was very happy to have the opportunity of the internship at the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Directorate-General for International Co-operation (*Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie*; IOB). I was allowed to participate in the evaluation that is being undertaken now on the funding by the Netherlands of humanitarian mine action (HMA) programs.

Readers that are not familiar with HMA might read chapter 2 first where international developments and the Dutch policy are discussed. The actually research can be found in chapter 5 (description of the funded programs) and chapter 6 (evaluation of embeddedness in the Dutch policy).

I would like to thank Ko Colijn, my supervisor at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, Yvonne Kleistra, my supervisor at the ministry and the one who gave me the opportunity of the internship, and my colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that helped me and supported me.

The Hague, September 28, 2006.

"I can't remember anything
Can't tell if this is true or dream
Deep down inside I feel to scream
This terrible silence stops me

Now that the war is through with me
I'm waking up, I cannot see
That there's not much left of me
Nothing is real but pain now

Hold my breath as I wish for death
Oh please, God, wake me

Back in the womb it's much too real
In pumps life that I must feel
But can't look forward to reveal
Look to the time when I'll live

Fed through the tube that sticks in me
Just like a wartime novelty
Tied to machines that make me be
Cut this life off from me

(Metallica 1988)

Hold my breath as I wish for death
Oh please, God, wake me
Now the world is gone, I'm just one
Oh God, help me
Hold my breath as I wish for death
Oh please, God, help me

Darkness imprisoning me
All that I see
Absolute horror
I cannot live
I cannot die
Trapped in myself
Body my holding cell

Landmine has taken my sight
Taken my speech
Taken my hearing
Taken my arms
Taken my legs
Taken my soul
Left me with life in hell"

Executive Summary

In post-conflict situations, landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) have a devastating effect on the population, blocking sustainable development. Poorly trained soldiers and rebellion started to use landmines in internal conflicts for offensive purposes, or for terrorizing of civilians, in densely populated areas. The cost of the placement of a landmine is very low, the cost of the removal are very high. The annual number of casualties in the whole world is between 15.000 and 20.000 civilians. Even a suspicion of the presence of landmines can already have a devastating effect on communities and their social-economic well being.

Partial through strong lobbying by many NGOs, the 1997 Ottawa Treaty on banning landmines was established relatively quick. This treaty is nowadays ratified by 151 countries, including the Netherlands. The humanitarian mine action (HMA) sector was developed to undertake mine risk education/awareness, de-mining (clearance of landmines and ERW, survey and marking), victim assistance and social rehabilitation, stigmatization of the use of landmines, and stockpile destruction. The UNMAS set up the International Mine Action Standards guidelines.

As a donor country for development cooperation, the Netherlands is also funding HMA. The central aim of the Dutch HMA policy is the clearance of landmines and ERW, in order to limit casualties and advance socio-economic development. Cost-effectiveness, use of local labour, quick transfer to national capacity are seem as important. Emphasize is lied on de-mining, The Netherlands started financially supporting HMA in 1992, and was the eighth largest contributor for the period 1996-2004. The Netherlands was (co-)funding programs in 20 countries, and some programs that are not specific for a country.

This research describes the evaluation of the HMA programs that are funded by the Netherlands for the period 1996-2004, specifically on their embeddedness into a broader development strategy. Embeddedness is defined as the extent in which other humanitarian objectives and programs are attached, combined or integrated with HMA programs. Embeddedness has attracted increasingly attention, because landmines and ERW have a direct threat to individuals and communities, but also indirectly by being a barrier for short-term emergency interventions and long-term development efforts. Nevertheless the Netherlands does not directly mention embeddedness of HMA in neither its HMA policy paper nor in its 2003 macro policy paper on development cooperation.

Seven countries are selected for research, Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Eritrea, Laos, and Mozambique, on the basis of the extent and duration of funding, and interesting landmines and ERW features. The funded programs in those countries are mainly in line with the Dutch policy priorities.

Embeddedness in a broader framework for sustainable development of the funded programs was an issue in different extents. The available information gives clues that embeddedness became more important during the years, for both donors, as recipient countries and NGOs.

Exact information on socio-economic outcome and impact of the programs is not available, so the valuing on the criteria was very qualitative and reliant on the reports of NGOs and UN organizations. A strict judgment on the value of the embeddedness is therefore not possible. Embeddedness was quite clear in most countries on paper, but not always in practice. Most embeddedness of HMA is on relief, recovery, rehabilitation and development. The impact of HMA is often safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed development opportunities.

It is recommended to get better insight into the socio-economic impact of HMA activities. A good strategy and/or method should be sought in cooperation with other donors, relevant UN organizations, and NGOs.

Word count: 29.879

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1 Introduction

Landmines are often used in conflicts, for defending armies or rebellions against enemy forces. In the post-conflict situation, landmines have a devastating effect on the population, blocking sustainable development. Humanitarian mine action (HMA) is an important aspect of the development cooperation. Therefore the title of this project is "*Evaluation of Embeddedness of Humanitarian Mine Action Programs Funded by the Netherlands, for the Period 1996-2004*".

This project report is written for the master project as an important part of the graduation for the master International Public Management and Policy at the department of Public Administration of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. This project report is the presentation of my findings of the evaluation study, in particular on embeddedness of HMA in a broader development strategy. The research was undertaken as part of an internship at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

This report has the following outline: the second chapter deals with the background of the landmine problem and the Dutch HMA policy. Chapter three analyses the problem of this research. The fourth chapter shows the research design of the evaluation. In chapter five seven countries are discussed and the HMA programs funded by the Netherlands are given. The embeddedness of HMA is discussed in chapter six, which findings are compared to existing research in chapter seven. The report ends with conclusions and recommendations in chapter eight.

2 Background of the Landmine Problem and HMA Policies

This chapter describes all the background information that is needed to understand the landmine problem and the Dutch HMA policies. First the way landmines are used is described; secondly the size of the landmine problem is sketched, followed by the anti-landmine process towards the Ottawa Treaty. Fourthly the concept of HMA is explained, and the chapter is ended by an overview of the Dutch policy.

2.1 The Use of Landmines

Landmines were traditionally used for defensive purposes by state armies by well-trained personnel. From the Vietnam War, poorly trained soldiers started to use the low-cost landmines in internal conflicts for offensive purposes, and in densely populated areas. Landmines are not widely used by professional state armies nowadays (Lawson 1997, p.18; Rutherford 2000, p.81-83).

Landmines have three military roles (TK 24 292 1995-2001, p. nr.1 p.6-7):
1. *Hindrance*: in armed conflicts to build a barrier or to strengthen an existing barrier, in order to stop or slow down enemy forces. Infrastructures such as roads and bridges are too valuable to destroy, because they can be of use in the future. For this purpose ATMs were used, in combination with APMs to prevent enemy forces from easy clearance. Nowadays anti-handling devices are often used in stead of APMs to protect the ATMs;
2. *Protection*: to prevent enemy intruders and protect own forces and installations at military camps;
3. *Strategic/Geopolitical*: landmine fields are laid at borders of countries for protection. This is especially in countries with long, difficult to protect borders as Sweden and Finland (in the past against the Soviet treat. Remarkable detail is that Finland is the only EU country that did not sign the Ottawa Treaty yet).

Landmines are indiscriminate on soldiers or civilians. They are also specifically used as a weapon of terror against civilians in internal conflicts, both by rebellions and armies. Aim is to chase away civilians and to prevent refugees to return, to make access to water and agricultural area impossible, and to destabilize social life and disrupt socio-economic life (Rutherford 2000, p.82; TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.1 p. 8-9).

2.2 The Size of the Problem

Estimates say there are between 30 and 300 million landmines present world wide. At least 84 countries are affected with landmines and and/or explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly developing countries. An estimated area of 200.000 km² (about 5 times the size of the Netherlands) contains landmines and ERW worldwide, and can not be used for any other purpose. Even a suspicion of the presence of landmines can already has a devastating effect on communities and their social-economic well being. The negative effect of landmines on the population differs per country or region. Social economic problems are distorted traditional patterns of living and the hindrance of economic development, i.e. isolation of land, roads, markets etc, medical care for the growing number of disabled and their rehabilitation. In post-conflict era, peace-building is difficult and refugees refuse to return to their home ground (Danida 2001b, p.5; ICBL 2005b, p.4-5, 27; MvBZ 2004e).

In an article of Lawson in 1997 (p.18-19, 22) the following facts about the size are presented:
- About every twenty minutes there is a new landmine victim;
- The deadly casualty rate of landmines is higher than nuclear and chemical weapons combined;
- Twenty new landmines are placed in comparison with every landmine cleared;
- The clearance rate in 1997 gave a duration of 1.100 years to clear all landmines worldwide (with an assumed 110 million placed landmines);
- In Angola 1 out of 334 of the population is an amputee, were in the U.S. it is 1 out of 22.000;

- For about every 5000 landmines cleared, one de-miner is killed and two are injured;
- The production costs for an APM are about US$3, clearance of an APM costs up to US$800;
- Over 70% of the casualties are civilians, of which about 25% are children;
- Many minefields were never mapped;
- Under certain weather conditions and soil type, landmines can move kilometres.

2.3 Anti-Landmine Process

2.3.1 Pre-ICBL

During the Cold War most NGOs did not have access to landmine-infected areas, were unaware of the humanitarian and development problems caused by landmines, or could not assess the problem properly. Many governments were unaware too. In the 1970s the ICRC started with arguing that the use of landmines was not legitimate in relation with international humanitarian law, by stating that "landmines cause superfluous injury unnecessary suffering (damaging effects disproportionate to the military purpose) and that they are of an indiscriminate nature (no distinction between civilians and combatants)" (Rutherford 2000, p.80-81). The landmine issue came on the political agenda which resulted in the Landmines Protocol (Protocol II) of the CCW[1] of 1980, later amended at the CCW Review Conference in May 1996 in Geneva. Both the original Protocol II and the Amended Protocol II were not far reaching enough to have a considerable probability of solving the humanitarian problem (Rutherford 2000, p.80-81, 86; TK 25 925 (R 1614) 1998-2005, p. nr.3 p.20).

2.3.2 The Role of NGOs Grows

Until 1994 the use of landmines was considered legal by all states. Belgium was the first state to have legislation banning the use of APMs. An undeniable very important role in setting the agenda for the recognition of the landmine problem as a humanitarian problem instead of a political or defensive issue and a ban was played by the coalition of NGOs called International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL, founded in 1991). The ICBL[2] is a network nowadays of over 1,100 local, national, regional and international NGOs with a human rights, mine clearance, humanitarian, children's, veterans', medical, development, arms control, religious, environmental, or women's background. The coordinator of the ICBL, Jody Williams, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. Several scholars suggest that the agenda was set through norm diffusion facilitated by the NGOs (Danida 2001b, p.22; Rutherford 2000, p.74-76).

Two roles were played by the NGOs (Rutherford 2000, p.76, 80, 92-93):

1. *Cognitive agenda setting*: The NGOs used intense media and public attention to get the issue on the international political agenda. This was done by showing stories and impressive statistics of victims of explosions caused by landmines. An example of a statistic was the claim that landmines caused more victims than biological, chemical and nuclear weapons together;
2. *Norm agenda setting*: The NGOs helped with the way the issue was uttered and codified by international law by changing how the legality of landmines and the effects of the use were alleged by governments. The use of landmines was labelled illegal under existing international law. This was primarily based on the proportionality principle of the 1977 Protocol II of the Geneva Convention:
   - The military value of use of landmines was becoming more and more contested, and the humanitarian costs were considered to outweigh military benefits;
   - The time-delay feature. As the American senator Patrick Leahy stated that the use of landmines is "mass destruction in slow motion".

The NGOs were playing a winning game, despite the disappointing Amended Protocol II of the CCW in 1996. The UK was together with the U.S. an important opponent of a total ban of APMs. With the

[1] Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

[2] The ICBL was found in 1992. The original members are the Handicap International (HI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Mine Advisory Group (MAG), Medico International (MI), Physicians for Human Rights (MHR), and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF).

help of deceased Princess of Wales Diana, the British NGO successfully influenced the policy of the UK, leaving the U.S. on its own. Also in other countries NGOs were successfully mobilizing the public, helped by political figures such as Nelson Mandela. The U.S. went to Ottawa with several requests, still thinking that they could get a consensus that would be satisfactory for them. The US argued the strategically need at battle fields, e.g. at the Korean peninsula. The U.S. completely failed to get its requests granted (Rutherford 2000, p.97-105).

2.3.3 The Ottawa Treaty

After the reviewing conferences on the 1980 CCW in 1995 (Vienna) and 1996 (Geneva), it turned out that only 40 countries were in favour of a total ban on landmines. The Canadians, under the lead of minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, hosted a meeting in Ottawa in October 1996 for the interested and more progressive governments who were in favour[3]. This meeting was very successful, 50 countries, several IGOs and NGOs participated, and 24 countries sent an observer. The Ottawa Treaty was signed on September 18, 1997, in Oslo, and came into force on March 1, 1999. A minimal of 40 countries ratifying countries were needed, nowadays 151 countries already ratified (Brinkert 2003, p.782; Danida 2001b, p.22; ICBL 2006a; Rutherford 1999, p.37; Rutherford 2000, p.76-77, 107; TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.13; TK 26 137 (R 1620) 1998-2000, nr.3 p.3).

The Ottawa Treaty turned out to be insufficient with regard to ERW. Many victims were injured or killed by ERW (AXO and UXO), not only by landmines. Therefore the Protocol V of the CCW was created to cover ERW and cluster bombs in international law (TK 28 600 V 2002-2003, nr.63 p.2; TK 29 200 V 2004-2005, nr.61 p.1-3).

2.3.4 The Multilateral Treaty Making Process

The resulting Ottawa Treaty is far more successful than other conventions dealing with arms such as the CCW. Traditionally conventions are negotiated with a strong diplomatic consensus with much influence of the major state powers and just a small indirect influence of NGOs. The positive opinions about the Ottawa Convention can be summarized by stating that "[t]he Ottawa Convention was born out of a desire to make multilateralism work" (Petritsch 2004). The 1899 First International Peace Conference in The Hague was very similar to the Ottawa process, and both were very different in comparison with other treaty making processes. Thus it can not be said that the Ottawa Process was a completely new matter. The Hague Conventions were seen as internationally binding also for non-signatories (Rutherford 1999, p.36-37).

Table 2-1: "Standard" vs "alternative" multilateralism in the weapon banning treaty making

Issue	"Standard"	"Alternative"
Invitation	International organization	International political leader
Negotiation procedure	Consensus	Majority voting ⇒ less chance for one member to weaken the treaty
Verification measures	Yes ⇒ for security reasons, e.g. in case of nuclear weapons	No/minimal ⇒ if no direct national security threat. Verification difficult to carry out. More attractive to sign.
Purpose	State self interest, security	Peaceful international society
Negotiation duration	Fast-track	Long, slow, even decades
Support major powers	Yes	No
Participation	Limited to states	Support of NGOs and public opinion
Rules	Complicated, inconsistent, subject to interpretation and flexibility	Clear, simple and consistent
Examples	CCW, CWC	Hague Conventions, Ottawa Treaty

Source: (Rutherford 1999, p.37-41)

[3] Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Germany, Mexico, **the Netherlands**, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland were included in the initial 'core-group'.

Table 2-1 shows a comparison of two ways of multilateral treaty making with regard to the ban of weapons, where "standard" is such as the CCW and many other weapon banning treaties, and "alternative" as the Hague Conventions and Ottawa Treaty. A Ottawa/Hague model for treaties on banning any kind of weapons is only possible is states have no real direct need for the weapon for national security reasons or if weapons do not have a widespread legitimate use (Rutherford 1999, p.47-49). It was argued that the support of (international) NGOs for the Ottawa Treaty gave the "international civil society" legitimacy and enforced the "democratization of international law" (Andersson 2000, p.92).

2.3.5 The Non-Signing Countries

The U.S., Russia and China, and many Northern African, Middle Eastern and Asian countries have not signed and ratified the treaty yet (see Appendix 3). For many countries there are obvious reasons:

- *China* is still placing landmines to protect its borders. China claims that it needs landmines for self defence. China is a member of the CCW Amended Protocol II (ICBL 2005a: China);
- *Finland* is the only EU country that did not sign, however Finland does effectively support the ban of APM. Finland has large minefield at the long border with Russia, as a self defence system. To replace the landmines with another effective system takes a lot of time and money and the defence budget is recently decreased (ICBL 2005a: Finland);
- *Russian* forces are still using APMs in primarily Chechnya, but also Dagestan, Tajikistan and on the border with Georgia. Russia still sees APMs as useful and does not see good alternative, although it is investing in research on alternatives. The stockpile of APMs is considerable, and Russia does not think that it can reduce the stockpile within the time given in the treaty (4 years). Russia did ratify the CCW Amended Protocol II in 2005 (ICBL 2005a: Russia);
- The *U.S.* has tactical and geopolitical reasons, which they unsuccessfully tried to negotiate into the Ottawa Process (Rutherford 1999, p.40):
  - The U.S. has strategic minefields on the Korean peninsula at the Demilitarized Zone;
  - The U.S. wanted a postponement of the date that the treaty enters in force;
  - The U.S. wanted a change in definition of the APM, more intensive verification measures, and a withdrawal clause from the treaty in cases of national emergency.

  The U.S. too has the opinion that APMs are needed for defensive purposed and that there in no good alternative. Research is done on alternatives. APMs without self-destructing or self-deactivating system can be used until 2010 in Korea, or with presidential authorization only. The U.S. is a member of the CCW Amended Protocol II (ICBL 2005a: USA).

2.4 HMA

2.4.1 The Funding

The largest contributors for the period 1996-2004 were the U.S., European Commission, Japan, Norway, Canada and the Netherlands (see Table 2-1).

Table 2-2: Funding of top 10 donors for 1996-2004

Ranking	Donor party	Total funding 1996-2004	Funding 1996-2004 per capita*
1.	United States	$ 571,1 million	$ 1,91
2.	European Union (EC)	$ 249,3 million	$ 0,55
3.	Norway	$ 203,5 million	$ 44,14
4.	Japan	$ 148,0 million	$ 1,16
5.	UK	$ 130,5 million	$ 2,15
6.	Germany	$ 121,3 million	$ 1,47
7.	Canada	$ 119,3 million	$ 3,60
8.	The Netherlands	$115,2 million	$ 6,99
9.	Sweden	$ 101,7 million	$ 11,28
10.	Denmark	$ 90,6 million	$ 16,62
Total	**(only top 10)**	**$ 1.850,5 million**	

* Number of inhabitants for 2006, actual numbers per annum will probably be slightly higher
Sources: (CIA 2006; ICBL 2005b, p.61-66)

For the period 1996-2004, the U.S. was by far the largest contributor, the Netherlands was the 8th largest. If the numbers are looked at per capita, Norway, Denmark and Sweden were the largest contributors.



Figure 2-1: Top 10 HMA donors for 1996-2004 (ICBL 2005b, p.61-66)

Figure 2-1 shows that the contributions were growing since 1996, from a total of US$ 90,6 million in 1996 to a total of US$ 346,0 million in 2004 for the top 10 donors[4]. Most money in 2004 was contributed to Afghanistan, Iraq, Cambodia, Angola, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Sudan. Internationally, a totalled amount of US$ 376 million was funded for HMA in 2005, a decrease of almost 6% compared to 2004 (US$ 399 million, slightly more than the contribution op the top 10 donors), but second highest ever (ICBL 2005b, p.5, 60; ICBL 2006a, p.6; MvBZ 2004e).

2.4.2 The Sector

All activities concerning de-mining and related subjects are called mine action. There was critic in the mid-1990s on de-mining and mine awareness practices in the field. Emphasize was mainly on technique and not on the affected population. This led to the *Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes from a Development-Oriented Point of View* (Bad Honnef Guidelines) after an international NGO conference in 1997. After 1997 the sector increasingly professionalized and standardized (Harpviken 2003, p.777-778).

The HMA sector has its origin in Afghanistan, were de-mining was done for the first time not (only) by national army forces. The United Nations was the leading actor, and as consequence of the demand for standardization after success and failures, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was founded in 1997, after the founding of the Ottawa Treaty. Changes and shifts in HMA procedures, practices and norms, and the streamlining of HMA in a broader context of sustainable development and capacity building, made that in 2000 the first edition of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) was published by the UNMAS. Other actors are national organizations, IGOs and NGOs, such as the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining (GICHD). The latter is supporting UN with

[4] donors are defined here as state parties and the EU, not NGOs and other private organizations

the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Many countries affected by landmines, have a national HMA authority, let by the government, to handle with HMA issues. In most cases a national HMA centre (MAC; in an early phase run by the UN) acts as a national operator (Brinkert 2003; Danida 2001b, p.6-7, 64; GICHD 2004, p.21-27, 64, 118).

HMA is aimed on reducing the social, economic and environmental impact of landmines and ERW. HMA consists of five groups of activities (GICHD 2004, p.1; TK 27 162 2000, nr.8 p.5):
1. *Mine risk education or mine awareness* of the local population;
2. *Humanitarian de-mining*. The UNMAS sees a minimal of 99,6% accuracy as a norm for de-mining. According to many actors, this is the most important issue, for some even the only issue;
3. *Victim assistance and social rehabilitation*;
4. Advocacy to *stigmatize the use of landmines* and support a total ban on anti-personnel landmines;
5. *Stockpile destruction*.

Related are data management, training of mine clearing workers, and technological research on better detection and clearance techniques (TK 27 162 2000, nr. 8:1).

Humanitarian de-mining refers to the following activities (GICHD 2004, p.64):
1. The research on nature and size of the mine field (survey);
2. Designing of a common action plan;
3. Clearance of landmines and ERW;
4. Marking mine fields;
5. Ex post inspections;
6. Involvement of the local community in de-mining activities;
7. The transfer of de-mined land.

The IMAS function as a framework for the development of national HMA standards (GICHD 2004, p.2). The most important guidelines are (MvBZ 2004e):
1. The promotion of awareness of the presence of landmines and ERW and lowering the risks during the interaction between population/users and the area concerned;
2. The research into the location and size of minefields and their marking and clearance;
3. The assistance to casualties and their rehabilitation and reintegration;
4. The stigmatization of the use of landmines, and the support for a total ban on landmines;
5. Local capacity-building through education and training, leading to the transfer of mine clearance tasks to a national agency (institution building);
6. Quality control of the above-mentioned activities.

2.4.3 Socio-economic Aspects

In the Danida (2001b, p.125-128) evaluation on HMA the narrowness of the term “humanitarian” mine action was questioned. The term humanitarian has a short-term meaning. Many other aspects were relevant for HMA, particularly human rights and freedoms, which was a basis for development assistance/cooperation (long-term) leading to poverty reduction, economic growth and welfare. Other socio-economic impacts were (Danida 2001b, p.117-122; UNDP/GICHD 2001, p.23):
- less accidents and casualties;
- feeling of security, strong sense of relief, and reduction of stress;
- improved mobility and trade access, and access to social services such as health and education;
- employment in mine action for local population;
- reuse of land area;
- peace-building and confidence-building;
- for the environment: both positive such as no killed animals and negative such as disposal through burning or detonation in open;
- spreading of sexually transmitted diseases by de-miners.

2.5 The Policy of the Netherlands

2.5.1 The Funds

As a donor country for development cooperation, the Netherlands is also funding HMA. The Netherlands started financially supporting HMA in 1992. Despite a first reserved attitude, the use of landmines by the Dutch army was banned in 1996 after a major political change in the defensive policy. A small reserve capacity was kept for research and experiments, and education of de-mining personnel. Production was forbidden by law since 1996. As stated above, the Netherlands is one of the larger contributors since 1996. The total governmental budget for Development Cooperation in the Netherlands for 2005 was €4.2 billion (0,83% of GDP and 3% of governmental expenditure), where HMA counted for less than 1% of the Dutch Development Cooperation budget. The Netherlands signed (1997) and ratified (1999) the Ottawa Treaty. The ratification process was experienced as slow, although the Netherlands had a leading role in the realization of the Ottawa Treaty (Commissie Draagvlak en Effectiviteit Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 2006, p.8; ICBL 2005b, p.5, 60-61; TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.1, p.4:1).

Table 2-3: Funding of HMA by the Netherlands

Year	Amount
2006	€12.6 million (planned)
2005	$19.3 million
2004	$10.2 million
2003	$11.0 million
2002	$15.8 million
2001	$12.5 million
2000	$18.5 million
1999	$9.6 million
1998	$22.0 million
1997	$9.6 million
1996	$11.2 million
1992-1995	+/- €6.3 million
Total 1996-2004	**$120.4 million***

* The total number differs slightly from Table 2-2, due to data from different sources
Sources: (ICBL 2006a, p.61; TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.1 p.17; TK 30 300 V 2006, nr.117, p.3; UNMAS 2006: The Netherlands)

2.5.2 Policy priorities

The central aim of the Dutch HMA policy is the clearance of landmines and ERW, in order to limit casualties and advance socio-economic development. Cost-effectiveness (e.g. by priority-setting) and the use of local labour are the main issues. A quick transfer of the de-mining operation to national capacity is seen as important. Programs to be funded have to meet the IMAS guidelines. Dutch priorities with regard to subsidies are (MvBZ 2004e; TK 27 162 2000, nr.8 p.4-6):

- Emphasize on *de-mining*;
- Countries that have a *bilateral aid relation* with the Netherlands or where the de-mining activities *support human rights, peace building, and good governance*;
- *Continuance* of already subsidized programs is prefered above new activities, for optimum use of previous investments;
- *Capacity strengthening and training* for quickly transferring of de-mining activities to national governments. The use of local civilians for employment is strongly encouraged, because it increases employment and the speed of transferring, and makes the funding more sustainable. Use of expert of the Dutch Ministry of Defence is possible, for establishing or providing assistance at training facilities;
- *Manual de-mining by local labour* is preferred above mechanical de-mining, although support of manual de-mining by mechanical de-mining is favoured if necessary.

It should be noted that embeddedness of HMA into a broader framework for sustainable development was not mentioned as top-priority in the Dutch HMA policy. Coherence with existing plans for the socioeconomic rehabilitation of the post-conflict community (with regard to healthcare, the return of refugees and displaced persons, education, etc.) was nevertheless strongly asked for (MvBZ 2004e).

2.5.3 Minimal requirements of recipient country

The Netherlands in principal only funds programs in countries that signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty and is being observed (except for Afghanistan that signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty in 2002). Exceptions on this rule are possible when there are good plausible reasons, e.g. of country is lacking a recognised central government authority. International organizations that are funded are a.o. GICHD, HALO Trust, ICRC, UNDP, and UNMAS (ICBL 2004: The Netherlands; MvBZ 2004e).

2.5.4 Funding Channels

The Netherlands only funds NGOs (not commercial), and those who are not involved with illegal trade of anti-personnel landmines and/or arms. Other expectations are (MvBZ 2004e):
- Subscription to the UNMAS guidelines;
- Demonstration of knowledge of HMA. Allowing certain activities to be performed by other, qualified organizations is an alternative;
- Participation in mechanisms for international standardization, coordination and cooperation, as well as in local coordination arrangements.
- If research is funded, information should be made available to the coordinating agencies.

2.5.5 Other important aspects

Other important aspects of the Dutch policy on landmines and ERW throughout the years are:
- The Netherlands is stimulating other countries to sign and ratify the Ottawa Treaty and the protocol of the CCW (TK 29 200 V 2004-2005, nr.2 p.49);
- Stockpile was reduced to 5,000 landmines (and is still lowering), to be kept for education and research (TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.15 p.3; TK 26 137 (R 1620) 1998-2000, nr.3 p.5; TK 29 200 V 2004-2005, nr.2 p.49);
- The Netherlands was not in favour of the principal of “the polluter pays” concerning ERW, which was a common opinion with other countries. Protocol V of the CCW on ERW was ratified on 25 July 2005 (TK 27 400 V 2001-2002, nr.53 p.6; nr.58 p.3; TK 29 848 (R 1775 2004-2005, nr.3 p.5);
- The Netherlands does not have its own mine clearing NGO. Financing the setting up of a new HMA NGO is more costly than financing an existing mine clearing NGO. Dutch NGOs are never funded by the MFA, to avoid unfairness, nepotism etc. The Ministry of Defence has 80 staff members that can be used for de-mining and mine education (TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.25 p.6);
- In 1999 large funds were reserved for a research project on improving mine clearance techniques. This was done by the TNO research institute. The objective was to create a prototype, but the project failed in an early stage. The acquired knowledge is shared with other research institutes from abroad in such as the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the EC, and with the International Test and Evaluation for Humanitarian De-mining (ITEP) organization of several NATO countries with projects on equipment, systems and methods (TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.18; nr.20 p.10; nr.24 p.1-3);
- From 2004, funding of HMA activities was placed in a Stability Fund (previously called Peace Fund), in order to get fast and flexible stability-advancing activities on peace, safety and development. ATMs also still play an important role (TK 30 075 2005-2006, nr.1 p.17);
- A total of 822 horizontal effect weapons were bought as an alternative for APMs. Those weapons have advantages concerning defensive purpose, but does not have the humanitarian disadvantages (TK 26 137 (R 1620) 1998-2000, nr.3 p.2, 5);
- Only ATMs which are detectable, have a self-neutralization and self-deactivating mechanism are allowed to be purchased by the Dutch army (TK 25 925 (R 1614) 1998-2005, nr.6 p.2).

3 Problem Analysis

In this chapter the problem of this research is analyzed in further detail. The problem is defined at first, followed by the aim of the project and the research question.

3.1 Problem Definition

As stated in the previous chapter, the Netherlands was funding HMA programs on a coherent policy basis from at least since 1996 under certain criteria. The question is how those funds are used and what the outcomes and impacts are.

3.2 Aim of the Project

The general objective of the whole project is to evaluate the funding by the Netherlands of HMA programs. This will be based on collected data and also on existing research and literature. My part of the project at the MFA will be the elaboration of a sub theme within the whole project.

The academic relevance of my project is to get skills on dealing with research in an international environment, and communicating with professionals in the field of international public management and policy. The research will add a better insight in the relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the funding of HMA in the sub theme.

The practical relevance of my part of the project lies in the information based on the findings of the research on the specific sub theme. The findings are in the first place important for the policy makers to be accountable to the higher servants, public and parliament. Secondly it might be supportive for them, either for assessing current funding and policies and designing future funding and policies on HMA, especially on the specific aspect of the sub theme.

3.3 Research Question

3.3.1 Main Question of the Ministry's Research

The overall research question of the whole evaluation research undertaken by the IOB department of the MFA is about as follows:

Does the Dutch policy on HMA match specific goals on relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact?

This research questions is very broad. Therefore, it will be specified on a specific sub theme for thesis master project (partial system evaluation (OECD 1999, p.10)). Possible case studies on sub themes are:

1. *Embeddedness of HMA in the broader development policy*: Is the HMA part of a broader development strategy for a certain area? This raises questions like:
   - How was embeddedness defined? Was it necessary to embed HMA in a broader development strategy? Did it have a positive influence on the effectiveness of HMA?
   - Were the HMA programs embedded in framework for sustainable development?
   - To which extend was it embedded?
   - In which way was it embedded?
   - Under which circumstances and conditions?

2. *Land use after clearance of the landmines*: The work of de-mining organizations is primarily for clearing land area, and thereby preventing casualties and making the land usable again for the population. Before the de-mining program starts, a certain priority function was decided for use

after clearance, e.g. settlement or agriculture. In practice, the actual land use after clearance is sometimes completely different. In many cases this does not have to be a problem (e.g. farming in stead of agriculture by the population), but in other cases bribery or nepotism can cause misuse. Questions to be asked are:
- Was it necessary to stipulate land use priorities before the clearance is undertaken?
- What were the priorities on land use before clearance?
- Is the land use after the clearance the same as it was decided before?
- If the use is different, is this a problem?

3. *The choice of which HMA programs to fund*: The main question is: What was the best place and program to fund, and why? To determine this, selection criteria and directives are available. In practice they are often difficult to apply and/or contradicting. Questions are:
   - What criteria and directives were used?
   - Which procedures were used?
   - Were those procedures consistent and transparent?

4. *HMA as a way of peace-building and peace-keeping*: Most of the worlds' HMA takes place in post-conflict settings, with a high degree of instability. HMA might have a positive effect on the stability. This gives the following questions:
   - How stable was the country just after the conflict?
   - What was the extent of HMA taken place?
   - Was the peace stable?
   - Can the increase in stability be explained by the HMA activities?

5. *The Dutch HMA policy compared to that of other important donors:* Every country might have its own way and reasons for funding HMA. Important questions are:
   - What were the HMA policies in other donors?
   - How much did other donors fund?
   - What were the policy arguments in the other donors?
   - What were the similarities and differences?

3.3.2 Specific Research Question

The first sub theme attracts by far the most attention and is most interesting too for the MFA. This sub theme has the most tangent planes with sustainable development. Therefore this sub theme will be the case study of this research project.

To embed is referred as to as: "*To become an integral part of something or to enclose closely*" (The Peak Agents Network 2004), and "*place or be placed solidly*" (Dictionary MSN Encarta 2006). A synonym is "*to be attached to*" (Princeton University 2006).

Landmines and ERW have a direct threat to individuals and communities, but also indirectly by being a barrier for short-term emergency interventions and long-term development efforts. The complexity of humanitarian assistance is understood by policy makers. Important issues are flexibility, innovation, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, safety of both operators and affected population, and the needs of target groups and beneficiaries. Political interests of donors, receivers and international organizations might conflict. In the past often incorporation of basic needs for target groups failed and ineffective use of resources occurred (Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.855-856). The Bad Honnef Guidelines were a logical development (see §2.4.2).

HMA falls under humanitarian assistance, although it has some military influence e.g. the hierarchical structure, which in potential limits emphasize on broader humanitarian objectives (Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.860, 862). In the case of HMA, there can be either emphasize be placed on emergency relief, post-conflict reconstruction, development cooperation, or on a combination of two or three of those.

Embeddedness should not be confused with coherence ("*The need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is*

consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human-rights considerations") and only coordination ("*the systematic use of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include strategic planning, gathering data and managing information, mobilising resources and ensuring accountability, orchestrating a functional division of labour, negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities and providing leadership*"). Coherence focuses on policy level, coordination on operational issues. Embeddedness is supposed to go deeper and more far-reaching than coherence and sectoral coordination (ALNAP 2006, p.21, 34, 54).

Embeddedness is here defined as follows:

The extent in which other humanitarian objectives and programs are attached, combined or integrated with HMA programs.

For this master project, the research question will be formulated as follows:

How are the HMA programs embedded in a broader framework for sustainable development?

3.3.3 Sub Questions

The following possible sub questions are derived from the main research question partially based on the first sub theme:

1. Which HMA programs were funded by the Netherlands (descriptive)?
2. What was the funding compared to other donors (descriptive)?
3. What is the available data for evaluation of HMA programs that are (partially) funded by the Netherlands (descriptive)?
4. What was the role of the Netherlands as a donor (descriptive)?
5. Were the HMA programs embedded in a broader framework for sustainable development (descriptive)?
6. To which extend and in which way was it embedded (descriptive)?
7. What were the goals, circumstances and conditions, instruments and resources of the programs that were embedded (descriptive)?
8. How were those programs to be valued in terms of relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact, taken into the account the circumstances, instruments and resources (evaluative)?
9. What were the good and what are the bad practices (evaluative)?
10. Which recommendations can be made based on the conclusions of the research (explanative)?

4 Research Design

In this chapter the design of this research is discussed. This chapter starts with the theoretical framework and ends with the methods of inquiry.

4.1 Theoretical Framework

4.1.1 Conceptual Lens

The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD says about evaluation (OECD 2002, p.21-22):
"The systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision– making process of both recipients and donors.
Evaluation also refers to the process of determining the worth or significance of an activity, policy or program. An assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of a planned, on-going, or completed development intervention.".

Evaluation in policy analysis is based on descriptive, normative and meta-ethical theories. Evaluation produces information about the value or worth of policy outcomes. When policy outcomes contribute to goals and objectives, they contain value. Compared other policy-analytical methods, evaluation has a value focus, fact-value interdependence, present and past orientation and value duality (Dunn 2004, p.356-358).

The functions of evaluations are threefold (Dunn 2004, p.358):
1. Reliable and valid information about policy performance are provided;
2. Values underlying the selecting goals and objectives are clarified and criticized;
3. Encourage the application of other policy-analytic methods in earlier phases.

Types of objectives of policies

Objectives for policies can be distinct between (European Commission 1997, p.15-16):
- *Outputs* (goods and services funded and directly produced by the program);
- *Impacts* (socio-economic changes brought about by the program). A further distinction gives:
  - *Results* (initial impact of the policy);
  - *Outcomes* (longer-term impact of the policy).

Type of evaluations

According to Dunn (2004, p.359-363), there are three approaches to evaluation:
- *Pseudo-evaluation*: Worth or value of outcomes is not questioned;
- *Formal evaluation*: Outcomes are evaluated on formal policy-program objectives. This type of evaluation has a sub division:
  - *Development evaluation* (direct and formative): serve day-to-day needs of program staff;
  - *Retrospective process evaluation* (indirect and formative): evaluation after programs have been in place for some time;
  - *Experimental evaluation* (direct and summative): monitoring and evaluation of outcomes of direct controls over policy inputs and processes;
  - *Retrospective outcome evaluation* (indirect and summative): monitoring and evaluation of outcomes, but not with direct controls over policy inputs and processes;
- *Decision-theoretic evaluation*: Outcomes are explicitly valued by stakeholders;

This evaluation will be a formal, retrospective outcome evaluation.

Evaluation design

The following characteristics are seen as important for an evaluation (European Commission 1997, p.9-10):
1. *Analytical*: based on recognized research techniques;
2. *Systematic*: careful planning and consistent use of the chosen techniques;
3. *Reliable*: findings should be reproducible by a different evaluator with access to the same data and using the same methods of data analysis;
4. *Issue-oriented*: address important issues relating to the policy, including its relevance, efficiency and effectiveness;
5. *User-driven*: successful evaluations should be designed and implemented in ways that provide useful information to decision-makers, given the political circumstances, policy constraints and available resources.

Evaluation criteria

There are seven key evaluation criteria identified by the OECD-DAC for humanitarian policy evaluation (ALNAP 2006, p.10, 20-21; Dunn 2004, p.358; European Commission 1997, p.18; European Communities 2004, p.75-76; OECD 1999, p.22-23; OECD 2002):
1. *Relevance/Appropriateness*: Relevance can be defined as to what extent are the policy's objectives pertinent in relation to evolving needs and priorities at local (population), national (government) and international level (donors). Appropriateness can be defined as if desired outcomes (objectives) are actually worthy or valuable, in terms of increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness;
2. *Connectedness*: The need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account;
3. *Coherence*: The need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human-rights considerations (Note: this is explicitly defined in terms of humanitarian assistance);
4. *Coverage*: Are major population groups reached with the policy or program;
5. *Efficiency*: How economically are various inputs/resources converted into outputs and results;
6. *Effectiveness*: How far have the policy's *impacts* contributed to achieving its specific and general objectives, taking into account their relative importance;
7. *Impact (or utility)*: How do the policy's impacts compare with needs of the target population(s).

The OECD-DAC criteria in the 2006 ALNAP guide are distinct from all other OECD-DAC sources. The original criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability) are evolved to the seven abovementioned criteria. All criteria seem to be more or less useful for this research (ALNAP 2006, p.20-21). The OECD-DAC criteria are widely used by agencies similar to the IOB department of the MFA, such as DANIDA (Denmark), DFID (UK) and SIDA (Sweden).

Other criteria are possible, the following are given by Dunn (2004, p.358):
- *Adequacy*: To what extend does the achievement of a valued outcome resolve the problem?
- *Equity*: Are costs and benefits distributed equitably among different groups?
- *Responsiveness*: Do policy outcomes satisfy the needs, preferences or values of particular groups?

Other possible criteria are goal-attainment (to what extend have the policy's objectives been achieved?), economy, consistency, allocative/distributional effects, and acceptability (see also Figure 4-1) (European Communities 2004, p.39; Hansen 2005; OECD 1999, p.23).



Source: (European Communities 2004, p.39)

Figure 4-1: Evaluation issues that are most relevant at different stages of the evaluation cycle

When an evaluation can be undertaken

There are three relevant moments, Figure 4-1 shows which criteria are relevant for what moment (European Commission 1997, p.15-17, 72-73, 75; European Communities 2004, p.12-13, 74-75):

1. *Ex-ante evaluation*: before the policy is implemented, in order to get a good insight in the likely output, results and outcomes, and assess them in relation with the policy objectives;
2. *Mid-term evaluation*: when the policy is already implemented, in order to see where the policy has to be adjusted to get the desired or even better output, results and outcomes;
3. *Ex-post evaluation*: (some time) after the policy ended, in order to get a good insight of the output, results and outcomes of the policy. The primary interest is accountability, to investigate what has been achieved and at what cost (= effectiveness and efficiency). The Danish International Development Agency (Danida) distinguishes between end-evaluations (just after ending a program and for follow up) and ex-post evaluation (two or five years after termination of the program, in order to see lasting impacts) (Danida 2001a, p.3).

In this research an ex-post evaluation will be undertaken.

Two main approaches

The logical framework approach

The logical framework (logframe) approach says that are three types of objectives, corresponding to outputs, results and outcomes (European Commission 1997, p.16):

- *Operational objectives* ⇒ outputs;
- *Specific objectives* ⇒ results;
- *General objectives* ⇒ outcomes.

Figure 4-2 gives the intervention logic of a policy; Figure 4-3 combines the key evaluation issues with the types of objectives.



Source: (European Commission 1997, p.17)
Figure 4-2: The intervention logic of a policy



Source: (European Commission 1997, p.20)
Figure 4-3: Key evaluation issues

The *logframe approach* is often used in evaluation of humanitarian action (EHA) (ALNAP 2006, p.20; Danida 2001a, p.66). However the weakest points of this approach are the assumptions that the whole process is very rational, linear, causal links are clear, and there is only one (important) actor,

in this for example the Netherlands as a financial contributor of programs. In practice, the whole process is a lot more complicated and has many actors, so more flexible approach is necessary. To attribute an outcome with a great certainty to an input is in many cases almost impossible. The approach is not appropriate when looking at overall policy goals, social ideals and higher principles (OECD 1999, p.13).

Social-constructivist approach
Quite often evaluators are faced by problems arising from no clearly stated goals or objectives. Therefore objectives for the different actors and interventions should be retrospectively constructed. Necessary is a framework of understanding, beliefs and assumptions. Inbuilt conflicts or contradictions in policy objectives are faced. The construction of a narrative history is a powerful tool to understand situations and structures (OECD 1999, p.13-14, 17-18).

The social-constructivist approach implies that every policy has multi actors and therefore multi value and beliefs. Causal relations are not always clear and straight forward. Important questions are if assumptions or theories on the policy are right; what went wrong and why; are we doing the "good thing". Especially the last question can be very political controversial and subjective. The main disadvantage is that this approach is vaguer and less easy to apply.

The approach that is most appropriate is dependant on which data, contexts and tools there will be available.

4.1.2 Actor Analysis

There are many different actors involved in the whole life cycle of landmines:
1. *Weapon industry*: the actors in this industry have a financial interest in the existence of use of landmines and other explosives. Governments can be sensible for the employment they generate.
2. *Armies and rebels*: these actors are responsible for the creation of landmine or ERW fields. Often ex-rebels and ex-soldiers are later used as de-miners, as part of post-conflict rehabilitation;
3. *Local communities*: communities are directly affected by landmine fields. Local labour is useful for HMA activities, and thereby (temporarily) reduces unemployment;
4. *National governments of countries with landmines*: those countries are faced with landmine fields on their area (sometimes laid down by there own army), which has socio-economic consequences for their population. Some countries have their governmental de-mining organizations (e.g. CMAC in Cambodia). National capacity-building is an important issue of the Dutch policies;
5. *Inter-governmental Organizations* (IGOs): mainly the United Nations, under the organization of UNMAS or UNDP;
6. *Research and education centres*: important examples are the IMAS by UNMAS, GICHD (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining) and MAIC (Mine Action Information Center);
7. *(International) Non-governmental Organizations* ((I)NGOs): They have a broad spectrum of HMA activities, e.g. clearance, education and awareness. An important player is the ICBL;
8. *Private sector HMA organizations*: organizations with clearing landmines as a business activity. The Netherlands does not fund private companies for HMA activities;
9. *National governments of donors*: Important are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and/or Development Cooperation. For countries that signed and ratified or acceded the treaty, see Appendix 3. The Mine Action Support Group is an information-sharing forum of donors and the European Commission.

In Table 4-1 an oversight is given on relations and interaction between actors, both negative and positive aspects.

Table 4-1: Possible relations and interaction between actors (both negative and positive)

		towards								
		1.	**2.**	**3.**	**4.**	**5.**	**6.**	**7.**	**8.**	**9.**
from	**1.**	x	delivering landmines	-	lobbying	lobbying	lobbying	-	-	lobbying
	2.	purchasing landmines	x	power, interests	power, interests, corruption	-	-	hassling	hassling	-
	3.	-	resistance, fear, distrusting	x	calling for help, distrusting	giving input	giving input	cooperating, giving input	cooperating, giving input	(indirectly) cooperating, giving input
	4.	purchasing landmines, trying to ban	power, interests	helping, hassling, HMA	x	*cooperating, giving input, accounting*	cooperating, giving input	cooperating, giving input, funding, hassling	cooperating, giving input, funding, hassling	cooperating, accounting, giving input, hassling
	5.	trying to ban	persuading not to use landmines, informing	collecting data and facts, informing	*cooperating, information sharing, informing, educating*	x	cooperating on data and information	*cooperating, information sharing*	cooperating	*cooperating, information sharing*
	6.	trying to ban	collecting data and facts	collecting data and facts	collecting data and facts	cooperating on data and information	*x*	collecting data and facts	collecting data and facts	collecting data and facts
	7.	trying to ban	persuading not to use landmines, peace keeping	capacity-building, HMA, cooperating, supporting, informing, educating, accounting	capacity-building, HMA, cooperating, supporting, informing, educating, accounting	*cooperating*	cooperating, giving input	x	cooperating, distrusting, opposing	cooperating, accounting
	8.	-	-	HMA, cooperating	cooperating	cooperating	cooperating	cooperating, distrusting, opposing	x	cooperating
	9.	employment concerns, trying to ban	persuading not to use landmines	funding, supporting	funding, supporting,	*funding, supporting*	funding, supporting, giving input	funding, supporting	funding, supporting	x

The relation from 9 towards 7 gives the funding relation between the Netherlands and a HMA NGO. The relation from 7 towards 9 is for the information/evaluation of the de-mining. The funding also goes from 9 - 6 and 6 - 7. The information for the evaluation also goes via the relations 7 – 5 and 5 – 9. In case of a governmental HMA organization the relations are successively 9 – 4, 4 - 9 and 4 – 5/5 - 9. The abovementioned relations are relevant for this research project.

	De-mining NGO	Governmental de-mining organization
Policy/funding relation	9 - 7 9 - 5 and 5 - 7	9 - 4 9 - 5 and 5 - 4
Information/evaluation relation	7 - 9 7 - 5 and 5 - 9	4 - 9 4 - 5 and 5 - 9

Table 4-2: Relevant relations for this research project

4.1.3 Analytical Framework

Variables of research

For the analytical framework, the following variables are identified in Figure 4-4. Not all variables will be discusses during this research, dependent on factor such as available data and relevance.



Figure 4-4: Variables of the whole research

4.2 Methods of Inquiry

In this section, the methods to be used are described. This will be done for either the collection as the analysis of data.

4.2.1 Data Collection

Data collection takes place by accessing information from on HMA programs funded by the Netherlands. This data will come from policy documents and papers (such as acts, guidelines, directives, white papers, project proposals, reports etc.) from the Parliament and mainly the archives and accounting systems of the MFA.

4.2.2 Data Analysis

Recently the final report of a commission, lead by the former Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs Hans Dijkstal, was published. The most important conclusion was that it is important for organizations to be accountable when funded by development aid, but that it is often difficult to measure effectiveness, which is a hot issue in public administration now for some time. Difficulties are methodological problem and gathering of reliable and useful information. The report suggest that organizations should be accountable by showing organizational professionalism by good governance principles, quality of organization management, and transparent reporting (Commissie Draagvlak en Effectiviteit Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 2006, p.20, 28-29; Koelé & Velthuis 2006).

Descriptive

Some of the sub research questions have a descriptive nature. Therefore the data will be analyzed and presented in a descriptive way.

Evaluative

A useful statistical method for the evaluation is a Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA), also called multi-attribute utility analysis by Dunn (2004, p.365). This method can be used if enough relevant numerical data is available.

The following steps have to be take in the Multi-Criteria Analysis evaluation process (Dunn 2004, p.365-367):
1. *Stakeholder identification*;
2. *Specification of relevant decision issues*;
3. *Specification of policy outcomes*;
4. *Identification of attributes of outcomes*;
5. *Attribute ranking* in order of importance;
6. *Attribute scaling* of importance;
7. *Scale standardization*;
8. *Outcome measurement*;
9. *Utility calculation*: $U_i = \sum w_i u_{ij}$:
   U_i = the aggregate value of the i'th outcome;
   w_j = the standardized scale value or weighing factor of the j'th attribute;
   u_{ij} = the probability of occurrence of the i'th outcome on the j'th attribute.
10. *Evaluation and presentation*.

For conducting a MCA, at least necessary are (Horstmeier 2003, p.11-1):
1. *Criteria to test*;
2. *Balanced weighing factors*;
3. *Different programs to test*;
4. *Valuing in what extend every entity satisfies every criterion*.

Criteria consist of general criteria and detailed criteria (sub criteria). Criteria are measured with indicators derived from policy outcomes. The weighing factors (attribute ranking) have to be balanced with relative importance. Afterwards the factors have to be checked, to avoid too much subjectivity (Horstmeier 2003, p.11-1 - 11-10). Special attention has to be given to a sensitivity analysis of the weighing factors.

Explanative

Explanative sub research questions will also be descriptive, but they are supported by the evaluation research outcomes.

4.3 Summary of Choices

The used criteria are the OECD-DAC criteria: relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact. The evaluation will be an ex-post, formal, retrospective outcome evaluation. Both the logframe and social-constructivist approach have their advantages and disadvantages. The approach that is most appropriate is dependant on which data, contexts and tools there will be available. The actors that will be used are national governments of countries with landmines, IGOs, (I)NGOs, and national governments of donors. The research will be descriptive, evaluative, and explanative. If possible a MCA will be done.

4.4 Reflection on Research Design

In this paragraph this chapter will be reflected on the proposed research design and the actual research.

4.4.1 Theoretical Framework

Conceptual Lens

The evaluation turned out to be an ex-post, formal, retrospective outcome evaluation. The used approach is mainly social-constructivist: it was not possible to attributed inputs to outputs in terms of embeddedness, due to a lack of relevant numerical data. Narrative reports are used to make a judgment.

Actor analysis

From the following actors information has been used:
- *National governments of countries with landmines*: National governments for PRSPs, for other report: BHMAC, CMAC, and UXO Lao;
- *IGOs*: UNDP, UNICEF, UNMAC, UNOCHA, and WFP;
- *(I)NGOs*: HALO Trust, HI, MgM, and NPA;
- *National governments of donors*: The Netherlands.

These are the same actors as mentioned in Table 4-2.

Analytical framework

The following variables are more or less described in this research (in black):

1. *Areas affected by landmines*:
   a. Amount of landmines
   b. Amount of casualties;
   c. Amount of unusable hectares;
   d. Hindrance of the mine fields for the socio-economic life;

2. *Dutch HMA policy*:
   a. Objectives of the Dutch HMA policy;
   b. Instruments to reach the objectives of the policy;
   c. Starting points of the policy;
   d. Embeddedness of HMA in the broader development policy.

3. *Selection of HMA programs to support*:
   a. Determining the national need for HMA in affected country;
   b. Involved actors in the decision making on assigning subsidies;
   c. Criteria of assigning subsidies;
   d. Criteria for mid-term evaluation;
   e. Coordination with other countries.

4. *National organization of HMA practice in affected countries*:
   a. Formal organization of the HMA practice in the affected country;
   b. Existence of a national HMA plan and/or priority scheme;
   c. Coordination of national priorities and needs of interest organizations on execution level;

5. *Execution of HMA programs supported by the Netherlands*:
   a. Formulation of the objectives;
   b. Fulfillment in national and regional needs and priorities;
   c. Attention and criteria for national capacity building for transfer of HMA tasks;
   d. Obstacles for execution of the program;
   e. Monitoring of the progress of the program;
   f. Goal-attainment;
   g. Progress in solving the mine problem (effectiveness);
   h. Short term effects;
   i. Long term effects (sustainability).

The used criteria are the OECD-DAC criteria: relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact.

4.4.2 Methods of inquiry

Data collection and analysis

In the research design, it was assumed that there would be enough numerical information to undertake a quantitative data analysis for the evaluative part of this research. Unfortunately necessary data was lacking in the available information, and a MCA could not be done. Therefore the only option was to do a more qualitative, descriptive and explanative analysis, mainly based on work plans, policy memorandum and progress/final reports (see also §4.2.1).

5 Programs Funded by the Netherlands

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the sub questions 1-3 will be answered. This means that the programs, funds, countries, and involved organizations (NGOs and I(G)Os) of the financed HMA programs will be discussed.

1. Which HMA programs were funded by the Netherlands (descriptive)?
2. What was the funding compared to other donors (descriptive)?
3. What was the available data for evaluation of HMA programs that are (partially) funded by the Netherlands (descriptive)?

5.2 Funds

Table 2-3 gave a brief oversight on how much the Netherlands funded on HMA for 1992 onwards 2005, and a planned budget for 2006. In this paragraph more detailed information will be given.

Table 5-1 shows the financial support by the Netherlands according to the information on the UNMAS Mine Action Investments website. All the countries that were financed are shown, as was other funding (see also Appendix 4): multilateral funding of the ICBL for monitoring and compliance, ICRC for victim assistance and UNMAS VTF, funding to HALO Trust for training of Mine Detection Dogs (MDD), and the program "*Humanitair OntMijnen*" for research and development of mechanical de-mining (funds went mainly to the Dutch TNO research institute).

Table 5-1: Financial support on HMA by the Netherlands

Country-related	Total 1996-2004 (US$)	Ranking	Years of funding
Afghanistan	**16.437.779**	**2**	**9**
Albania	177.165	20	1
Angola	**19.916.200**	**1**	**9**
Azerbaijan	2.240.910	10	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	**6.528.745**	**6**	**7**
Cambodia	**13.901.174**	**3**	**9**
Congo	252.000	19	1
Eritrea	**9.797.512**	**4**	**5**
Ethiopia	1.000.000	14	1
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	4.331.779	8	4
Georgia	1.436.564	13	5
Guinea-Bissau	1.000.000	14	2
Iraq	4.565.924	7	5
Laos	**2.421.000**	**9**	**6**
Mozambique	**9.261.404**	**5**	**8**
Russian Federation	272.030	18	1
Sudan	400.050	17	1
Somalia	1.848.925	11	5
Sri Lanka	465.987	16	1
Yemen	1.578.000	12	5
Sub-total	98.527.638		
Other	21.901.208	n/a	n/a
Total	**120.428.846**		

See Appendix 4 for a complete overview.

It is clear that Afghanistan (13,7% of the total funds for 1996-2004), Angola (16,6%), Cambodia (11,6%), Eritrea (8,2%), and Mozambique (7,7%) were receiving the largest sums.

Table 5-2 shows the funding per HMA category. Integrated Mine Action (33,6%) and Mine Clearance (32,9%) represent the main share of the funds.

Table 5-2: Funding by the Netherlands per HMA category in US$

Category	Total 1996-2003* (US$)
Advocacy & Prevention	1.090.440
Coordination	10.347.198
Information	2.297.000
Integrated Mine Action	37.508.235
Mine Awareness	6.183.972
Mine Clearance	36.691.612
Research & Development	10.000.000
Victim Assistance	7.391.862
Total:	**111.512.319**

* Data for the year 2004 is not available
See Appendix 4 for a complete overview.

Some findings are in line with the Dutch priorities (see §2.5.2 and 2.5.3 for details about the priorities):

- Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Eritrea, and Mozambique are said to be the most contaminated countries in the world. It is reasonable that the need in this countries was higher than in others, and high cost-effectiveness will be easier achievable;
- Mine clearance was the most important priority, and a major share of the funds were used for that (categories Integrated Mine Action and Mine Clearance in Table 5-2);
- Capacity building was emphasized (categories Integrated Mine Action and Coordination in Table 5-2).

Some findings that are not in line with the Dutch priorities are:

- Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq, Laos and Somalia did not sign or ratify the Ottawa Treaty yet, nor did Azerbaijan, Iraq and Somalia ratify the original or amended Protocol II of the CCW (ICBL 2006b). For Iraq (since 2002) and Somalia a strong central government was lacking. The humanitarian situation in Laos and human rights considerations made that Laos is nevertheless funded. Also Laos suffered from ERW and not landmines, what the Ottawa Treaty is about. For Azerbaijan and Georgia reasons for funding despite not having signed the Ottawa Treaty or the CCW Protocol II are unknown (MvBZ 2001b; MvBZ 2005);
- With Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kosovo, Laos, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen, the Netherlands had no bilateral aid relation (according to the new policy starting from 2003). So this does not mean embeddedness of the donor‘s policy. Reasons for funding were probably that HMA activities support human rights, peace building, and/or good governance (MvBZ 2006h, p.47; TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, nr.1, p.32).

It is interesting to see if the funding pattern of recipient countries by the Netherlands is similar to that of other donors. Figure 5-2 shows that Dutch HMA funds to a specific recipient country differed strongly per year Angola was the largest receiver of HMA funds until 1999, but faced a huge decline. The funds for Eritrea changed largely every year, and no country received a stable amount of money during a couple of years. For the total funds for all donors together (Figure 5-2), there was a bit more stability. Afghanistan receives a growing amount of money almost every year. Other recipient countries are showing some fluctuation every year. For more data, see also Appendix 6.



Figure 5-1: Funds per recipient country for the Netherlands



Figure 5-2: Funds per recipient country for all donors together

5.3 Countries

Countries where the Netherlands (co-)funded HMA programs are Afghanistan Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kosovo (Serbia/FRY), Laos, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen. Every country has its history concerning (civil) wars, rebels, and landmines and explosives. There are too many countries to analyze for this specific research project, therefore a selection is made. The countries that will be used in this research are chosen by the following criteria (see also Table 5-1):

1. The *extent* of Dutch funding in a specific country;
2. The *duration* of the funding;
3. *Interesting landmine and/or ERW related features* of a specific country.

The most appropriate countries regarding 1. and 2. are Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique. In combination with 3., Bosnia and Herzegovina (in Europe, detailed mapping during the war, and direct start of HMA after the war by entity armies), Eritrea (high amount of money in a few years, and a sudden withdrawal of foreign organization, forced by the government), and Laos (mainly, and a lot of, ERW) will also be chosen.



Figure 5-3: Selected countries for further analysis

The countries will be presented in the following subparagraphs. For every country the mine-related history, some basic key information, the key points from the HMA plans, and the programs funded by the Netherlands are given.

5.3.1 Afghanistan

Basic information

The population of Afghanistan is growing rapidly, not only because of returning internally displaced persons (IDPs). This will give pressure on the scarcely available fertile soil; therefore de-mining of agricultural area gives some relief. The economic growth is quite high. Appendix 5 shows some key basic indicators about Afghanistan.

Mine/ERW-related history

Afghanistan is one of the heaviest contaminated countries in the world, with both landmines and ERW. Afghanistan has been involved in several armed conflicts since 1978. In those conflicts all sides have been using APMs. Most notorious were the Soviet forces and the Afghan government (of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) from 1979-1992. Later in the 1990s in the fighting

between the Taliban and a loose coalition of opposition forces, landmines were also used, although the Taliban saw the use of landmines as un-Islamic. In 2001 Afghanistan was attacked by the U.S.-led coalition. Unexploded U.S. cluster bomblets (UXOs), ammunition scattered from storage depots hit by air strikes (AXO), and newly laid landmines and booby-traps by Northern Alliance, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda fighters, posed a new threat to the population. The coalition forces documented their cluster bomb air raids (ICBL 1999, p.18: Afghanistan; ICBL 2002: Afghanistan; ICBL 2005a: Afghanistan; Strand 2004).

The size of the landmine problem

Landmines were planted everywhere and on various types or area, urban and rural, and form a major obstacle to repatriation, relief, rehabilitation, and development activities. In eight years of intensive mine clearance in the 1990s, 146 km^2 (about the 2/3 of the municipality of Amsterdam) of mined area was cleared, but at least 713 km^2 (about halve of the province of Utrecht) remained to be cleared. Estimations say that landmines and UXO cause about 100 victims per month (both counting for about 50%), where 150-300 was common in 2000. Casualties have been reported in 33 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan (ICBL 1999: Afghanistan; ICBL 2002: Afghanistan; ICBL 2003: Afghanistan; Strand 2004, p.19).

HMA programs

The core issue for Afghanistan was peace-building and reintegration (Strand 2004, p.4-7, 9):

- The basic idea of the Afghan Mine Action for Peace (MAFP) Programme was to incorporate ex-fighters for training and employment as community-based de-miners (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)). They did not receive a full payment, but it gave them a chance for reintegration into their home community with dignity. The Area Mine Action Centre (AMAC) and Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META) were involved in a pilot. Important were local support, and after the demining is done the ex-fighters need job security;
- The Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) was a community-based process, and focused on communal conflicts. Local councils, local authorities and other influential persons were involved, in order to build local capacity and develop own strategies in dealing with conflicts in their areas and mobilizing people for peace-building. The local community had to recognize the value and have to become self-supporting;
- Landmines and weapons were seen as a major threat on lasting peace.

Afghanistan had to reduce its stockpile before March 1 2007, due to the ratification of the Ottawa Convention. There was no national HMA authority yet, UNMAS's MAPA and UNMACA are still responsible for issues involving HMA (ICBL 2005a: Afghanistan).

Funded programs

The Netherlands was a medium contributor for the period 1996-2004 to HMA in Afghanistan, counting for 5,5% of the total funds (see Table 5-3). The total ODA (official development aid) provided by Netherlands for the period 2000-2004 is US$ 338,08 million, in the same period the funds for HMA was US$ 10,34 million, thus counting for about 3%. The Netherlands was funding humanitarian aid, poverty alleviation, and reconstruction and development projects, were HMA was an important supporting issue. All donors together provided Afghanistan with US$ 5,5 billion for the period 2001-2004 (official development assistance and official aid), of which US$ 163,5 million for HMA, also about 3% (MvBZ 2006a; OECD 2006).

Table 5-3: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Afghanistan

Country	Total 1996-2004 (US$)	Share	Ranking
Canada	35.575.906	12,0%	3
Denmark	8.915.157	3,0%	9
European Union	21.701.514	7,3%	5
Finland	8.695.000	2,9%	10
Germany	29.940.111	10,1%	4
Japan	68.433.202	23,1%	2
Netherlands	**16.437.779**	**5,5%**	**6**
Norway	12.582.435	4,2%	7
United Kingdom	11.300.939	3,8%	8
United States	69.809.000	23,6%	1
Total (all countries)	**296.204.870**		

See Appendix 6 for details.

Programs funded by the Netherlands were focused on mine and ERW clearance (manual and mechanical), mine clearance training, mine awareness, mine identification, mine survey, mine marking, evaluation, monitoring, and logistics (see Appendix 7 for details). The programs had taken place in nearly all provinces. Funds were channelled mainly via (UN)OCHA/UNMAS (UNMAS took over the responsibilities concerning HMA of OCHA in 2003), but also to ICRC and HALO Trust. HMA had been carried out by the MACA (OCHA/UNMAC), ICRC, and HALO Trust.

The UN produced annual appeals for the coordination of aid and assistance for Afghanistan. The Netherlands was in favour of multilateral funding above bilateral funding (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.7-8), and the fact that the UN founded and were still responsible for MACA and MAPA, made the channelling of funds via UNOCHA/UNMAS a logical choice. The Netherlands was often funding several humanitarian programs from the appeals together. The reason to fund programs in Afghanistan was the fact that the country hugely suffered for decades from various armed conflicts, which caused a harrowing humanitarian situated. The communication and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ 1999a).

5.3.2 Angola

Basic information

The population of Angola is growing rapidly, despite the high number of IDPs, and the economic growth is quite high. The economic growth is varying, from 3 to 19% annually. Appendix 5 shows some key basic indicators about Angola.

Mine-related history

Angola officially gained independence from Portugal in 1975. The civil war started already in 1974, official ending in 2002 (despite the earlier 1994 Lusaka Protocols), with some cease-fire periods in between. It has been one of the real battle field directly related with the Cold War between the communists and western world. Three groups along racial and ideological lines were involved in the civil war: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA; links with communists), the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA; anti-communist and supported by Zaire/Mobutu and the U.S. playing a minor role), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA; supported by apartheid South Africa and the U.S.). Before the independence, the FNLA, UNITA and MPLA fought against the Portuguese in a colonial war. Cuban, South-Africa and U.S. intervened in the conflict in different periods (Meredith 2006, p.312-319; MvBZ 2006b).

The size of the landmine problem

Angola had a total of 4,28 million IDPs in 2002, what is more than one quarter of the total population. Many of them live in the DR Congo and Zambia, and suffered under bad and inhuman conditions. It was difficult for humanitarian agencies to reach the IDPs, and they were not top

priority for the authorities. Of all mine accidents, in 75% of the cases IDPs were involved when entering unfamiliar areas (HRW 2003, p.1-2; ICBL 1999: Angola; ICBL 2002: Angola).

HMA programs

In 2001 the Inter-Sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) was setup by the government for the regulation and coordination of HMA, as a successor of the National Institute for Removal of Explosive Devices (INAROEE), which was reformed and reorganized into the National Demining Institute (IND) for implementation of HMA. The CNIDAH set three strategic priorities (ICBL 2005a: Angola):

1. To consolidate CNIDAH as national authority and strengthening coordination with provincial authorities and decentralizing HMA;
2. To develop capabilities of relevant institutions;
3. To support sustainable expansion of operational capacity.

Funded programs

The Netherlands was the second large contributor to HMA programs in Angola (see Table 5-4), only the U.S. funded more. The Netherlands provided US$ 100,44 million of ODA for the period 2000-2004, where US$ 5,84 million was spent on HMA, about 6%. Emergency and humanitarian aid, human rights and good governance were the other financed issues, where HMA was an important factor. The official development assistance and official aid for Angola of all donors together was about US$ 2,35 billion for the period 2001-2004, with US$ 40,9 million or less than 2% for HMA. An explanation for the relatively very large contribution to HMA by the Netherlands could be the long civil war with the use of many landmines which brought a huge humanitarian problem, and the HMA-activities that made the provision of humanitarian aid easier. The communication and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ 1999b; MvBZ 2001a; MvBZ 2006b; OECD 2006).

Table 5-4: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Angola

Countries	Total 1996-2004 (US$)	Share	Ranking
Canada	2.474.931	1,9%	10
Denmark	3.484.868	2,7%	9
European Union	13.085.118	10,2%	5
Finland	6.615.728	5,2%	7
Germany	17.114.792	13,3%	3
Italy	8.179.591	6,4%	6
Japan	4.604.855	3,6%	8
Netherlands	**19.916.200**	**15,9%**	**2**
Norway	16.704.386	13,0%	4
United States	25.313.038	19,7%	1
Total (all countries)	**128.356.578**		

See Appendix 6 for details.

The programs focused on mine clearance in order to make the return of IDPs and the recovery of rural infrastructure possible, mine clearance training, mine survey, victim assistance and social rehabilitation (see Appendix 7 for details). Nearly all provinces are somehow affected by the programs. The funds are provided mainly to Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and Menschen gegen Minen (MgM), who were also the executers of most programs. Especially NPA turned out to be a reliable partner, with a very good record. Others are Handicap International (HI), UNICEF, and the UN World Food Programme (WFP). The Angolan government was seen as too weak for properly undertaking HMA activities, therefore only INGOs were funded (MvBZ 2001a).

5.3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Key basic information

The institutional framework of the country itself was still under development. The HDI and GDP per capita were much higher and the growth of the population much lower than in the other selected countries. Appendix 5 shows some key basic indicators about Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mine-related history

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) collapse after the end of the Cold War, into the countries Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Macedonia, and recently Montenegro. This collapse was not without rumours, euphemistically speaking, especially in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country declared independence in March 1992, followed by a war, officially lasting until December 1995. The facts about the war were nearly 3 million IDPs, over 250.000 people died or missing, and 170.000 wounded (with a population of 3,9 million in 2005!). The country became contaminated with landmines and UXO, and has a destroyed social infrastructure. Three armies were involved, the Bosnian Government Army (ARBiH), the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO), and the Bosnian Serb army (VRS). Landmine skills were widely available, due to the universally attended military service in the former army of the SFRY, who heavily relied on landmines (ICBL 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina).

There was a Bosnia and Herzegovina government for the whole country, there were two (ethnic) entities formed, the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina (FBiH; Bosnians and Croats), and the Republika Srpska (RS). The Brčko District (BD) is jointly controlled. A NATO army, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) arrived in 1996, who was responsible for training and supervising the demining teams for each entity army. Over 4% of the country and over 1.400 settlements were affected by landmines (ICBL 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina; IMF 2004a, p.251).

Figure 5-4: Map with landmine contamination in Bosnia and Herzegovina



Source (The World Bank Group)

The size of the landmine problem

Landmines and UXO still claim casualties (43 in 2004), both fatal and non-fatal, and numbers are slowly declining. Some of the victims were de-miners (ICBL 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina; ICBL 2005a: Bosnia and Herzegovina).

HMA programs

The responsibility for HMA went from the UN to the three governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina on July 1, 1998. Since then three MACs were operating, two entity MACs (FEDMAC, RSMAC), and the coordinating BHMAC, but were not un-problematically merged in one MAC later. In 2002 the Demining Commission was established for state-level responsibility and coordination, as an international representative and oversight for the BHMAC. The long-term national capacity-building Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP) was initiated in 2004, funded by Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. The new Mine Action Strategy for 2005-2009 (and the 2004 PRSP) emphasizes the link with overall national development, although this interferes with obligations from the Ottawa Treaty, e.g. the deadline of March 1, 2009 for destructing all APMs. Surveys were planned to reduce suspected hazardous areas. More than 40 organizations were involved with HMA activities (ICBL 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina; ICBL 2005a: Bosnia and Herzegovina; IMF 2004a, p.251; Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.865).

Funded programs

The Netherlands was a medium contributor to the Bosnian HMA programs with 4,6% of the total for 1996-2004 (see Table 5-5). The Dutch ODA budget information was only available for 2003-2004, when it was about € 33 million, and in which period HMA counted for US$ 499.500, so less than 2%. Other funds went to macro-economic support, support for the return of IDPs, and peace implementation. Especially the latter two subjects benefited from HMA. For the period 2001-2004 the amount of official development assistance and official aid for all donors in Bosnia and Herzegovina was US$ 2,14 billion, with US$ 37,6 million for HMA which is also less than 2% (MvBZ 2006c; OECD 2006).

Table 5-5: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Country	Total 1996-2004 (US$)	Share	Ranking
Canada	12.925.180	9,1%	4
European Union	29.137.218	20,5%	2
Finland	3.166.242	2,2%	9
Germany	10.268.620	7,2%	5
Italy	6.873.614	4,8%	7
Japan	7.694.665	5,4%	6
Netherlands	**6.528.745**	**4,6%**	**8**
Norway	19.696.074	13,9%	3
Slovenia	2.748.866	1,9%	10
United States	35.673.000	25,1%	1
Total (all countries)	**141.996.122**		

See Appendix 6 for details.

The focus of the programs was on mine/UXO clearance, mine clearance training, mine awareness, mine information, mine survey and marking, and institution building. Funds were mostly contributed to BHMAC activities, via UN's DHA and UNDP. There was also a contribution to NPA (see Appendix 7 for details). The Netherlands Ministry of Defence provided in-kind support at least from October 2002 to June 2004.

The UN produced annual appeals for the coordination of aid and assistance for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Netherlands was in favour of multilateral above bilateral funding, and the fact that the UN founded the MACs, made the channelling of funds via UNDP a logic choice. The Netherlands was often funding several humanitarian programs from the appeals together. The reason to fund programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the fact that the country hugely suffered of the war of 1991-1995, which caused a harrowing humanitarian situated with many IDPs and

refugees. The communication and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ 1999e).

5.3.4 Cambodia

Basic information

Cambodia has a low growth of population, compared to Angola, Eritrea, and Laos. Appendix 5 shows some key basic indicators about Cambodia.

Mine-related history

Cambodia gained independence from France in 1954. In 1970 a coup d'état was committed, followed by a civil war. In 1975 Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge came into power, with a horrible reign causing the death of many people. In 1978, Vietnam attacked Cambodia and put a communist government in place. A coalition of Khmer Rouge, the National United Front for an Independent. Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and others resisted in a guerrilla war. In 1991 the 'Paris Peace Accords' were signed. In 1997 there was another coup d'état. Landmines were laid by all factions. Cambodia also suffered from bombings during the Vietnam War (CMAC 2004, p.1; ICBL 1999: Cambodia; MvBZ 2006d).

The size of the landmine problem

About 4.446 km^2 (slightly smaller than the province of North-Brabant) was suspected to be contaminated with landmines or UXO, counting for 2,5% of the country. The provinces of Battambang, Banteay Manchey, Otdar Meanchey and Preah Vihear, and the municipality of Pailin, were among the most heavily contaminated areas, counting for 61% of the 4.446 km^2. It was estimated that Cambodia had 4-6 million pieces of landmines and over 1 million pieces of UXO. Landmines and UXO still claim many victims. The rate dropped from 12 casualties per day in 1996 to two to three per day since 2000. Casualties were related to daily livelihood activities such as farming, herding, clearing new land, fishing, collecting food and wood (54%), or travelling (26%). Mine clearance activities also claimed victims (CMAC 2004, p.1; ICBL 2005a: Cambodia; Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.122).

Figure 5-5: Potential UXO Contamination in Cambodia



Source (JMAS 2005)

HMA programs

In 1992 the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was established by the Royal Government of Cambodia as a successor of the HMA activities of the United Nations Transitional Authority of Cambodia (UNTAC). A joint program of CMAC, UNDP, and UNDHA was launched in 1993. The coordination and regulation of HMA was transferred from CMAC to Cambodian Mine Action Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) in 2000. The CMAA was also responsible for integration of HMA into development plans and strategies. The CMAA was however not appreciated by the donors, due to its weakness and ineffectiveness. In 2004 Mine Action Planning Units (MAPU; under auspices of the Provincial MACs) were created in order to prioritize HMA at local level and integrate HMA with development priorities. MAPUs were funded by UNDP and UNOPS. The Cambodian HMA standards were finished by CMAA in 2004 (CMAC 1996a, p.1; ICBL 2005a: Cambodia).

Funded programs

With the Dutch contribution to HMA in Cambodia it was the third largest contributor, after Japan and the U.S. (see Table 5-6). The total ODA provided by the Netherlands to Cambodia was US$ 40,71 million for the period 2000-2004, when HMA was US$ 2,50 million or about 6%. Cambodia was on the Dutch funding list for democratization, good governance, and human rights, where the removal of landmines plays an important role. For all donors world wide, the total provided sum was US$ 1,89 billion for the period 2001-2004 and HMA counted for US$ 65,8 million or about 3%. Reasons for this relatively high contribution for HMA by the Netherlands can be the very severe threat that landmines cause for the development of Cambodia and the IDPs. The communication and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ 1996; MvBZ 2004c; OECD 2006).

Table 5-6: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Cambodia

Country	Total 1996-2004 (US$)	Share	Ranking
Australia	8.571.000	5,6%	7
Canada	9.945.627	6,5%	5
European Union	9.457.000	6,2%	6
Finland	12.092.428	7,9%	4
Germany	7.559.287	4,9%	8
Japan	51.926.840	33,8%	1
Netherlands	**13.901.174**	**9,1%**	**3**
Norway	5.988.793	3,9%	9
United Kingdom	5.409.076	3,5%	10
United States	18.241.500	11,9%	2
Total (all countries)	**153.550.561**		

See Appendix 6 for details.

The main focus of the programs was mine and ERW clearance, besides mine awareness (see Appendix 7 for details). Funds were provided to CMAC, first via UNDP and later via NPA, due to problems at CMAC and problems with the supervision of the UNDP. NPA and HALO Trust also undertook activities themselves. Activities took place in a.o. Kampong Cham (3), Kratié (11), Svay Reang (23), Prey Veng (19), Banteay Meanchey (1), Battambang (2), Kampot (7) and Kampong Thom (6) by CMAC, Oddar Meanchey (13), Banteay Meanchey (1) and Siem Reap (21) provinces by HALO Trust, and the Banteay Meanchey (1) province by NPA (see Figure 5-6). The Netherlands Ministry of Defence provided in-kind support from November 1993 until at least the beginning of 1998.



Source: (Wikipedia 2006a)
Figure 5-6: Map with the provinces of Cambodia

5.3.5 Eritrea

Basic information

The economic growth is the lowest of all countries discussed in this chapter. The HDI is among the lowest of the world. The growth of the population is quite high. The economic growth is low, 3% or less. Appendix 5 shows some key basic indicators about Eritrea.

Mine-related history

Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after thirty years of war, led by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), in which landmines were used by both sides. There was a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000, where both sides used landmines again, at least Eritrea confessed (ICBL 1999: Eritrea; ICBL 2000: Eritrea).

The size of the landmine problem

There were many IDPs that used to live in the area that is now the TCZ[5], which was contaminated with landmines. The number of casualties was between 30 and 90 per year (ICBL 2004: Eritrea; ICBL 2005a: Eritrea).

HMA programs

In 2000 the UNMEE Mine Action Coordination Centre was established, which supported the Eritrean Mine Action Plan (EMAP). The EMAP was one-sided, and without discussion with donors and UNMEE, replaced by the Eritrean government with the Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA) in 2002. The international HMA activities in Eritrea were two times taken to a halt by the Eritrean government and restructured, in July 2002 and in April 2005. After the first time the UN continued operating in 2004, but the second time Eritrea indicated that the help of the UN was not needed anymore. Equipment was confiscated, and almost all foreign technical advisors were forced by the EDA to leave the country. An evaluation of the HMA in Eritrea was undertaken. Problems were encountered with mandates, and peace-keeping in combination with the development of HMA capacity seemed

[5] UN Temporary Security Zone, 25 km wide and 1000 km long, between Eritrea and Ethiopia

not always appreciated by the Eritrean government (GICHD 2005, p.vi, 69-73; ICBL 2003: Eritrea; ICBL 2004: Eritrea).

Funded programs

The Netherlands has been the large contributor to HMA in Eritrea in the period 1996-2004, counting for over two-fifth of the total funds (see Table 5-7). The other large contributor was U.S., this contribution was halve of that of the Netherlands. Eritrea received US$ 61,08 million from the Netherlands in the period 2000-2004, where HMA counted for US$ 9,75 million, which counted for about 16%. The Netherlands supported humanitarian aid and peace-building via unilateral channels and NGOs. Both subjects took advantages of HMA. Official development assistance and official aid for all donors provided to Eritrea was US$ 1,09 billion in the period 2001-2004, HMA for the same period was US$ 17,0 million or only about 1,6%. The Netherlands sent troops to Eritrea in 2000 under the UNMEE peace-keeping mission. UNMEE set up the MACC. The Netherlands had a wish for a more flanking policy to help the refugees and IDPs of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The presence of landmines was seen as a major threat for their save return, therefore HMA was seen as an important factor. The communication and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ 2000c; MvBZ 2006e; OECD 2006).

Table 5-7: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Eritrea

Country	Total 1996-2004 (US$)	Share	Ranking
Canada	1.607.692	6,8%	4
Denmark	2.199.000	9,3%	3
European Union	1.551.228	6,5%	5
Germany	1.112.826	4,7%	7
Italy	114.610	0,5%	10
Japan	563.385	2,4%	8
Netherlands	**9.747.512**	**41,2%**	**1**
Norway	333.333	1,4%	9
Switzerland	1.175.500	5,0%	6
United States	5.182.000	21,9%	2
Total (all countries)	**23.686.086**		

See Appendix 6 for details.

Mine clearance, mine awareness, capacity building and evaluation were the undertaken activities of the programs that were funded (see Appendix 7 for details). Funds were provided to HALO Trust, UNDP, and UNMAS/GICHD for the evaluation. The HALO Trust was the largest NGO working on HMA in Eritrea. The activities took place in the TSZ and adjacent areas in Eritrea. The communication and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for advice, control and support (ICBL 2004: Eritrea; MvBZ 2000a).

5.3.6 Laos

Basic information

Laos has a one-party rule as one of the last five communist countries in the world. The UXO contamination and rapid growth of the population and economy give pressure on the available land, blocking development and causing poverty. In Appendix 5 there are some key basic indicators on Laos (IMF/World Bank 2001, p.31).

Mine-related history

Laos gained independence in 1954. A coup d'état was committed by the army in 1959. The communists (Pathet Lao) started a guerrilla. Laos also suffered from the Vietnam or Indo-Chino War from 1964 until 1973, with heavy bombings by the U.S. on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The communist party (renamed in Lao People's Revolutionary Party) came into power in 1975 and founded the Lao People's Democratic Republic (MvBZ 2006f).

The Americans dropped a large amount of bombs. Two million tons of bombs were dropt in 580.344 bombing missions, which are more bombs than has been dropped on Germany, Italy and Japan together in WW II. This was the equivalent of a full B52 (31,5 tons), every 8 minutes for 9 years. It was estimated by experts that an average of 30% of the bombs failed, and became UXO. Bombs were dropt on infrastructure such as roads, rivers and paths, and as economic repercussion on valuable areas for farming or settlement. A part of the bombs were not directly meant for Laos, but were dropped on Laos as remainder after bombing in Vietnam, before returning to airbases in Thailand. The U.S. still keep the details of some bombs secret. (Lovering 2000; UXO Lao 2003a: sheet 3 & 4)

The size of the UXO problem

Landmines only count for 4% of the problem. In the most heavily bombed provinces three tons of bombs per capita were thrown. The most used bomb was the anti-personnel cluster bomb, which detonates sending high-velocity fragments. The UXO casualty numbers were as follows: over 200 victims per year, some figures claim that 45% of the victims are children (mistaking the bombies[6] for toys), other figures claim that 61% of the victims are men, 23% is boys, 12% is women, and 3% is girls. Of the accidents 52% is deadly. An area of 87.213 km^2 (12.427 km^2 high risk, 74.786 km^2 moderate risk) was contaminated by UXO, what is about 38% of the country and more than two times the Netherlands (Government of Lao PDR 1995; HI 1997; Lovering 2000).

Figure 5-7: UXO contamination in Laos



Source: (Sisavath 2006)

HMA programs

In 2001 all HMA activities were nationalized. The primary responsibility for mine and UXO clearance laid with the national Lao Uxo program (UXO Lao). Until 2004 UXO Lao was also responsible for the coordination of all mine/UXO action, but that was transferred to the newly established National Regulatory Authority (NRA). There have been some troubles with the NRA in the beginning. The goal was to bring mine/UXO action in line with the National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy (NGPES). In the National Strategic Plan of 2003-2013 objectives and priorities were set for the coming years (ICBL 2005a: Laos).

Funded programs

The Netherlands was one of the medium contributors with a share of 5,8% of the total funds provided in the period 1996-2004 (see

[6] *Bombies* is the word that the Lao use for the unexploded fragments of the cluster bombs

Table 5-8). Programs focused on UXO clearance, UXO awareness, and training and capacity building (see Appendix 7 for details). The funds were channelled through the UNDP towards UXO Lao, which was the only real option of funding HMA in Laos.

Table 5-8: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Laos

Country	Total 1996-2004 (US$)	Share	Ranking
Australia	2.528.000	6,0%	6
Belgium	2.566.074	6,1%	5
Canada	1.418.565	3,4%	9
European Union	6.316.000	15,0%	3
Finland	1.607.250	3,8%	8
Germany	7.008.124	16,7%	2
Japan	958.730	2,3%	10
Netherlands	**2.421.000**	**5,8%**	**7**
Norway	2.731.770	6,5%	4
United States	12.321.000	29,3%	1
Total (all countries)	**42.048.879**		

See Appendix 6 for details.

For Laos the Netherlands provided US$ 9,96 million of ODA in the period 2000-2004, and US$ 1,85 million of HMA funds, which is about 19%. Funds were also used for sustainable forest management and human rights programs. The total official development assistance and official aid for Laos for the period 2001-2004 was US$ 1,09 billion, and total HMA funds were US$ 10,77 million for the same period, which is about only about 1%. The Dutch funding of HMA is not high compared to other donors, but the total ODA for Laos is low compared to other donors. The communication and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ 2004b; MvBZ 2006f; OECD 2006).

Activities took mainly place in the provinces of Luang Prabang (8), Xieng Khouang (18), Houaphan (5), Khammouane (6), Savannakhet (12), Sekong (17), Attapeu (1), and Champassak (4) (see also Figure 5-8).



Source: (Wikipedia 2006c)

Figure 5-8: Map with the provinces of the Laos where HMA programs were undertaken

5.3.7 Mozambique

Basic information

Mozambique has a low growth of population in relation with the HDI, if compared to Angola, Eritrea, and Laos. The HDI is the lowest of the selected countries, and among the lowest of the world. The economic growth is high, 7-10%. Appendix 5 shows some key basic indicators about Mozambique.

Mine-related history

A guerrilla war was started in 1964 by Frelimo, who used ATMs. The Portuguese decided in 1974 to hand over power exclusively to Frelimo. Before the independence in 1975, a white exodus removed Mozambique of its existing civil machinery. Frelimo had a Marxist-Leninist ideology causing wide-spread resistance, which was fuelled by Renamo. Renamo was backed first by Rhodesia and later by South Africa, and used landmines on airstrips, for route denial and ambushes. Rhodesia and South African forces laid landmines in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as did Tanzanian, Malawian, and Zimbabwean forces on moments. The Frelimo government defensively used landmines along the borders with Rhodesia and South Africa. Mozambique has been an important place for the South African ANC for a long time. A rapprochement to South Africa was made by Mozambique in 1984. Despite the halted support to ANC by Mozambique, South Africa kept on secretly supporting Renamo. More than 1 million of people died and 5 million became IDPs in the civil war (where the total population was estimated to be 19,6 million in 2005) which ended in 1992 (ICBL 1999: Mozambique; Meredith 2006, p.311-312, 426-428, 609-610).

The size of the landmine problem

It was estimated that landmines claimed 50-60 victims per month in 1995. Rates dropped enormous to 30 casualties for 2004. People enter unfamiliar area because of the need for enlarging farming land and resettlement (ICBL 1999; ICBL 2005a).

HMA programs

In 1999 the Mozambican MFA set up the National Demining Institute (IND), to replace the low trusted National Mine Clearance Commission (CND). NGOs and commercial companies were the executers of the HMA. The target for a mine impact-free country was changed from 2012 to 2009. After a lobby by the IND and UNDP, HMA became a cross cutting issue in the final version of the 2005 PRSP. Technical survey clearance of high and medium impact areas, and civic education and support for victim assistance programs became the priorities for the IND in 2005 (ICBL 2005a: Mozambique; IND 2001).

Funded programs

The Netherlands was the third largest contributor with 11,7% for the period 1996-2004, just after the U.S. and Norway (Table 5-9). The Netherlands funded US$ 302,18 million of ODA for the period 2000-2004, and US$ 5,48 million of HMA, counting for about 2%. Other funds were used for programs on education, health, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, and poverty alleviation. Especially poverty alleviation can take advantages of HMA. The total official development assistance and official aid for Mozambique for the period 2001-2004 was US$ 5,40 billion, where HMA counted for US$ 25,36 million or less than 1%. Mozambique was one of the 36 partner countries of the Netherlands, therefore Mozambique receives a large amount of funding (MvBZ 2006g; OECD 2006).

Mine clearance (manual, mechanical, and MDD) and capacity building were the core businesses of the funded programs (see Appendix 7 for details). The funds are mainly received by the HALO Trust and NPA, who were also the executors, and one mine survey program of Handicap International (HI). The HALO Trust was seen as an NGO with much experience in Mozambique, and their presence in the Nampula province was beneficial for other humanitarian programs funded by the Netherlands. NPA was seen as very well organized and professional. The communication and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ 1997b; MvBZ 2000b).

Table 5-9: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Mozambique

Country	Total 1996-2004 (US$)	Share	Ranking
Australia	3.492.000	4,3%	10
Canada	8.257.114	10,2%	4
Denmark	4.053.475	5,0%	9
Finland	6.852.300	8,4%	6
Germany	6.944.968	8,6%	5
Japan	4.149.153	5,1%	8
Netherlands	**9.456.394**	**11,7%**	**3**
Norway	10.718.670	13,2%	2
Switzerland	4.749.000	5,9%	7
United States	12.101.999	14,9%	1
Total (all countries)	**81.110.582**		

See Appendix 6 for details.

Affected provinces by HMA are Zambezia (11), Niassa (8), Nampula (7) and Cabo Delgado (1) by HALO Trust, and Tete (10), Manica (4) and Sofala (9) by NPA (see Figure 5-9). In the southern provinces no HMA activities were undertaken by the programs financed by the Netherlands.



Source: (Wikipedia 2006b)

Figure 5-9: Map with the provinces of Mozambique with HMA programs

5.4 Funding Channels

According to the Dutch Policy Framework for HMA, the following organizations are seen as reliable partners: the various UN Mine Action Centres, the HALO Trust, Handicap International (HI), the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA). Organizations that were funded were all non-commercial, and not involved with illegal trade of anti-personnel landmines and/or arms, as was strictly demanded in the policy framework. The other expectation from the framework were more or less met by the organization, and never violated (see also §2.5.4) (MvBZ 2004e).

5.4.1 Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)

In this sub paragraph only the NGOs that were in at least involved in two or more funded programs are discussed, in alphabetic order. Only Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) was not on the list of the Dutch HMA policy framework.

HALO Trust

The HALO Trust (Hazardous Area Life-support Organisation Trust) was an American/British NGO, specialized in the removal of the remnants of war. The HALO Trust undertakes HMA in the following countries and areas: Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chechnya, Croatia, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kosovo, Laos, Lebanon,

Nagorno Karabakh, Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland), Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Vietnam. The activities that were provided are mine clearance (manual, mechanical and MDD), mine survey, mine awareness and mine risk education, local capacity building, casualty evacuation, and medical training. Donors are governments, Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, UK, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, U.S., other donors include the European Commission, Fondation Pro Victimis, The Association to Aid Refugees (Japan), Tokyo Broadcasting Services, The Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, United Nations, and numerous private donators (HALO Trust 2006).

Handicap International

Handicap International (HI) is a French NGO with sections in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Luxemburg, Switzerland, UK, and U.S. HI is specialized in prevention, rehabilitation, and (re)integration of the disabled, and does useful work in the field of HMA in developing countries: provision of support to landmine survivors through orthopaedic and rehabilitation programs; implementation of mine risk education and humanitarian demining programs; participation in landmine impact surveys; and advocacy and research. This is done in a.o. Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, DR Congo, and Mozambique. Donors are for a large share public, from IGOs, Australia, Belgium, EU, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, U.S., and the rest private (a.o. the Dutch NGO *Stichting Vluchteling*) (HI 2005; HI 2006a; HI 2006b).

Menschen gegen Minen

Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) is a German NGO, founded in January 1996. Mine clearance (manual, mechanical, and MDD) is the only activity, which takes place in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia. Donors are public, E.U., WFP, Germany, The Netherlands and U.S., and private (MgM 2006).

Mine Advisory Group

The Mine Advisory Group (MAG) is a British NGO, and has the following HMA activities: mine risk education, mine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal, mine & explosive detection dogs, peace building, and community liaison. Activities are undertaken in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Cyprus, DR Congo, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam, and in the past in Azerbaijan, Kosovo and Somaliland. The donor are a.o. Australia, U.S. (MAG 2006a, p.2-11; MAG 2006b).

Norwegian People's Aid

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA; *Norsk Folkehjelp*) is a Norwegian NGO, known for its rights-based approach. The NPA has also activities besides HMA activities. NPA has activities with regard to partnership policy, landmines, land and resource rights, indigenous people, democratic rights, violence against women, and HIV/AIDS. The HMA activities are mine survey, mine clearance, and mine risk education. Affected countries are Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Mozambique, Northern Iraq and Sudan. Public sources count for about 90% of the funds, 45% by Norway (via NORAD), the rest by UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, EU, and the governments of Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and U.S. (Bottomley 2005, p.3, 7; NPA 2006).

5.4.2 International Organizations

International Committee of Red Cross

The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) is an international umbrella organization with national based sections. The HMA activities were HMA in general, mine clearance, mine risk education, and landmine stockpile destruction. The focus is on preventive HMA operations since 2005, not primarily on awareness anymore. The countries that are affected by ICRC activities are nearly all mine and/or UXO contaminated countries in the world. Activities are mine clearance (indirectly) and mine risk education through National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 25 countries around the world. Donors are many national governments, E.U., WHO, WFP, UN, (I)NGOs,

a few Swiss cantons and municipalities, individual donations, and in-kind contributions (ICRC 2004, p.378-385; ICRC 2006a; ICRC 2006b).

United Nations

Several departments and missions of the UN are involved in HMA. Most important are:
- *UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs* (DHA; reorganized into OCHA in 1998);
- *United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance* (OCHA);
- *United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP), taking care of several Trust Funds, for the channelling of funds;
- *United Nations Mine Action Service* (UNMAS), the main responsible for HMA in the UN organization and the coordinator of HMA world wide (see also §2.4.2). Afghanistan, Burundi, Cyprus, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kosovo (Serbia), Lebanon and Sudan are directly supported by UNMAS (UNMAS 2005, p.19);
- *United Nations Office for Project Services* (UNOPS), for landmine awareness;
- *World Food Programme* (WFP). Aid programs are obstructed by the presence of landmines.

The UN makes annual portfolios on HMA programs worldwide, and annual appeals for certain countries (e.g. Afghanistan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) for a broad range of humanitarian programs. The influence that donors can put on the programs of their interest is not strong, compared to programs at NGOs.

5.5 Available Information

The archives and accounting systems contain dossiers and files about the funded programs. The dossiers contain at least the following documents:
- A work plan, appeal or proposal from the NGOs, UN, and MACs, with information about objectives, targets, planned activities, duration, budget etc.;
- A policy memorandum (*beoordelingsmemorandum*), made by the responsible civil servant at the MFA;
- Progress reports and final reports with achievements and indicators.

5.6 Conclusions

The funded programs were mainly in line with the Dutch HMA policy priorities. Mine/ERW clearance and institution/capacity building have been massively undertaken, and many programs were funded for a couple of years. Mine clearance was often done manually, although also mechanical devices and MDD were used in several programs. The Netherlands funded HMA programs in 20 countries during the period 1996-2004. Some findings that are not in line with the Dutch priorities are:
- Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq, Laos and Somalia did not signed the Ottawa Treaty yet, nor did Azerbaijan, Iraq and Somalia ratified (the original or amended Protocol II of) the CCW;
- With Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kosovo, Laos, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen, the Netherlands had no bilateral aid relation.

The funded programs in the selected countries (Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Eritrea, Laos, and Mozambique) contained mine and ERW clearance (manual, mechanical, and MDD), mine and ERW clearance training, mine and ERW awareness, mine information, mine identification, mine survey, mine marking, institution and capacity building, victim assistance and social rehabilitation, evaluation, monitoring, and logistics. Funds were provided to DHA, HALO Trust, HI, ICRC, MgM, NPA, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNMAS, and WFP. HMA activities have been carried out by BHMAC, CMAC, HALO Trust, HI, ICRC, MACA, MgM, NPA, UNICEF, UNMAS/GICHD, UXO Lao, UNOPS, and WFP. The Netherlands Ministry of Defence provided in-kind support in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Eritrea (sub question 1).

Table 5-10 gives the Dutch funding for the period 1996-2004 per recipient country, the share of this funding for all the HMA funds in the recipient country and the ranking, and the share of the Dutch HMA funding compared to the total Dutch ODA funding in the recipient country. There was a (though

not very strong) relation of being a partner country and HMA being a small share of the ODA, except for Eritrea. Eritrea was a partner country, but HMA is an important share of the ODA (16%), which means that there are less funds for activities besides HMA compared to the other countries (2-3% is HMA there). For Angola and Cambodia too there was relatively much money spent on other activities, although they were not a partner country.

Table 5-10: Qualitative comparison of the recipient countries

Recipient country	Dutch funding 1996-2004 (US$)	Official partner aid relation ('36')	Share NL of total HMA donor funds 1996-2004	Ranking of total HMA funds 1996-2004	Share HMA of total Dutch ODA 2000-2004
Afghanistan*	16.437.779	yes	5,5%	6	3%
Angola	19.916.200	no	15,9%	2	6%
Bosnia and Herzegovina*	6.528.745	yes	4,6%	8	2%
Cambodia	13.901.174	no	9,1%	3	6%
Eritrea*	9.747.512	yes	41,2%	1	16%
Laos	2.421.000	no	5,8%	7	19%
Mozambique*	9.456.394	yes	11,7%	3	2%
Total	**78.408.804**				

* partner country

In Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Laos the Netherlands was a medium contributor, in Angola (huge humanitarian problems and solving problems with delivering of humanitarian aid), Cambodia and Mozambique (partner country of the Netherlands) the Netherlands was among the largest and in Eritrea (flanking policy to help the refugees and IDPs) the Netherlands was the largest of all. The Netherlands spent a relatively large share of its ODA to HMA in Eritrea and Laos (relatively low funding besides HMA). Other large contributors (where the Netherlands was among the largest) were the U.S. for Angola, Japan and the U.S. for Cambodia, U.S. for Eritrea, and U.S. and Norway for Mozambique. Overall, the U.S. was the largest contributor of HMA, but this country was also involved in many of the mine/ERW-related conflicts in the selected countries. The Dutch funding was not stable at all over there years, but this is also the case for other donors (sub question 2).

The accounting system of the MFA gives information about which programs were funded, what the HMA activities of the program were, and what the payments were. For every funded program, a work plan/appeal/proposal, memorandum of judgment, and a progress and/or final report exists (sub question 3).

6 Embeddedness of HMA

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the embeddedness of HMA into a broader framework for sustainable development. The definition of embeddedness is given in §3.3.2. The basis of the information comes for a major share from the programs, because this was the only source with enough information and easy access. Also the PRSPs of countries, if existent, are discussed. The difficulty with the PRSPs was that they are quite recent, so their information is not always about (at least a part of) the period 1996-2004.

It was not possible to make two clear separated groups, one of programs without embeddedness, and another with clear embeddedness. It would have been interesting to compare those two groups and test the hypothesis that programs with embeddedness do perform better. Every program had more of less a degree of embeddedness, and it was difficult to assess the exact social benefits of embeddedness. Therefore it is chosen to assess how embeddedness works in practice. The criteria are applied to the programs, but with emphasize on the embeddedness of the programs.

This chapter will provide the answers on the sub questions 4-9.

4. What was the role of the Netherlands as a donor (descriptive)?
5. Were the HMA programs embedded in a broader framework for sustainable development (descriptive)?
6. To which extend and in which way was it embedded (descriptive)?
7. What were the goals, circumstances and conditions, instruments and resources of the programs that are embedded (descriptive)?
8. How are those programs to be valued in terms of relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact, taken into the account the circumstances, instruments and resources (evaluative)?
9. What were the good and what are the bad practices (evaluative)?

For every country, if relevant, in §6.3-6.9 are applied:

- Development policies of the recipient country are assessed on HMA issues, mostly this is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Eritrea, Laos and Mozambique have made an (I)PRSP-like document until now. It should be noted that most documents are quite recent, so newly proposed strategies did not always affect the period 1996-2004;
- The funded programs with emphasize on broader development. Not all programs of §0 could be discussed due to lacking information;
- Achievements of the funded programs;
- How are those programs to be valued, with regard to the criteria relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact. This is done by the use of the ALNAP (2006) guide for evaluating HMA using the OECD-DAC criteria and the OECD-DAC (2002) "Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management".

6.2 Embeddedness in Donors' HMA policies

The Netherlands is of course discussed in this paragraph. Denmark, the European Union and Sweden see HMA as very important too (see Table 2-2), and those countries have widely available information on their HMA policy.

6.2.1 The Netherlands

As already stated in §2.5.2, embeddedness of HMA into a broader framework for sustainable development was not seen as top-priority, but coherence with existing plans for the socioeconomic rehabilitation of the post-conflict community was requested.

In 2003, the new macro policy on development cooperation was formulated under the name "Aan elkaar verplicht, Ontwikkelingssamenwerking op weg naar 2015", by the Minister of Development Cooperation Agnes van Ardenne-van der Hoeven. HMA was not mentioned in this policy report. Indirectly HMA can be brought in relation with several issues of the policy (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.9-10, 24-25):

- *Integrated foreign policy*. The *Stability Fund* was found recently, which objective is fast and flexible support of activities on the intersection of peace, security and development. Examples are support to peace processes and dialogues (conflict prevention), reintegration of combatants, destruction of small arms, and sending of Dutch experts;
- *Coherence* in development policies;
- *Poverty alleviation* and *sustainable development*. The economic and social aspect are definitely incorporated in HMA, the environmental aspect is quite neutral;
- The *PRSPs* and the *Millennium Development Goals* (MDG) are seen as important guidelines.

6.2.2 Denmark

The Danish policy paper on HMA formulated in 2001 was far more detailed than the official Dutch HMA policy. The paper had not a specific emphasize on embeddedness though. Nevertheless attention was given in some other subjects (Danida 2001b, p.19-22):

- Concerning *general objectives*, HMA activities will be where the most acute need is for humanitarian assistance, and geographically where there are possibilities for synergy with other Danish activities. For new activities in-depth socio-economic analyses have to be done, in order to identify priority areas with highest cost-effectiveness and greatest benefit to the local population;
- Great importance is put on *partnership* with the recipient countries, and planning of HMA with national priorities;
- *Cooperation* with *local actors* with long-term involvement: where economic, environmental and development plans exist in a certain area, and where established developmental priorities for cleared land in cooperation with the recipient country exist. Both are seen as necessary;
- *Bilateral sector programs* can be used in countries where landmines pose a serious barrier to development;
- When landmines cause serious *environmental problems* the Environment, Peace and Stability (MIfresta) budget can be used for HMA;
- Under the subjects *cooperation, quality and effectiveness* there is nothing found related to embeddedness.

The relevance of HMA for the local population is without any doubt, but as the policy paper says: "The problem here is that immediately measurable results, e.g. the number of mines or the extent of the area cleared, are not in themselves an indication of the usefulness of the activities for the local population." (Danida 2001b, p.14).

6.2.3 European Union

Also the EU HMA policy paper is more detailed than the Dutch one. The paper states that a broad range of humanitarian, economic, developmental, technical, legal, social and political instruments is required. A broad strategy takes into account the local populations in the context, the most pressing and immediate needs in full coherence with a long term approach. There are specific priorities on embeddedness (European Commission 2004, p.18, 22, 23):

- In moderately to lightly affected countries/territories *socioeconomic development* needs to be fully integrated into national development programs;

- *Long term sustainability* and *coherence with wider assistance program* are requested, i.e. HMA should form part of long term, sustainable solutions to the local landmine problems, coherence with national HMA frameworks, and integration into wider long term geographic and horizontal socio-economic development and rehabilitation programs.

6.2.4 Sweden

Sida concluded in the 2002 policy paper on HMA that in the 1990s HMA was developing into a new responsibility for the donor community. A small number of specialists implemented the programs, isolated from other forms of development cooperation. Sida defined the mine issue as a rehabilitation and development problem after a conflict. Embeddedness was an important issue in the policy paper. Priorities concerning embeddedness were (Sida 2002, p.1-6):

- Integration of the HMA programs in all other development cooperation activities in the partner country;
- Integration of the HMA programs in existing national structures and development plans as far as possible;
- The coordination function has to be secured for the integration of HMA programs with other activities. This is both about coordination between parties within the HMA sector and coordination between HMA and other sectors within development cooperation;
- Focus lies on integrating HMA with other development cooperation programs. HMA is seen as a method to eliminate a serious obstacle to development.

6.2.5 Millennium Development Goals

The development cooperation policy of many donors is directly linked to the Millenium Development Goals (MDG) (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.3). HMA itself is not part of a MDG. But HMA can directly and indirectly be linked to several MDGs:

MDG 1. *Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger*: The contamination of landmines and UXO blocks access to agricultural areas, which lowers the possibilities to raise crops. Also access to nearby markets can be blocked, thus no food can be bought, or commodities can not be sold to raise income and escape poverty;

MDG 2. *Achieve universal primary education*: Access to school buildings can be blocked by landmines and UXO, which hampers education;

MDG 6. *Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases*: HMA personnel can spread the HIV virus, this needs special attention;

MDG 7. *Ensure environmental sustainability*: The HMA procedures have to be designed as environmental friendly as possible. Development programs, followed after de-mining has taken place, need to contain the principles of sustainable development. Access to drink water can improve after removal of landmines and UXO from water wells and pumps;

6.3 Afghanistan

The Netherlands had an intensive aid relation with Afghanistan. Afghanistan is one of the 36 partner countries for development cooperation. The priorities of the Netherlands in humanitarian and development aid were put on the repatriation of refugees and IDPs (in conjunction with Denmark and the UK), channelling funds through multilateral channels, and humanitarian aid through the UN and ICRC (Danida 2005, p.1-2; TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32).

6.3.1 Development policy

The only important document on development is the 2006 Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS), which is published after the period 1996-2004 and is therefore not relevant for this research.

6.3.2 The HMA Programs

HALO Trust

The WW165531 program for 2000/2001 by HALO Trust aimed at clearing residential and agricultural areas. Farming is essential for the local population and the sustainable return of refugees and IDPs. The post-9/11 events had a very negative effect on the HMA activities. Land that was cleared was put to productive use (HALO Trust 2000b; HALO Trust 2002c, p.4-5).

UNOCHA

The AF006301 program for 1997 and WW135107 program for 1998 were part of broader program of UNOCHA. The HMA was undertaken to improve the delivery of humanitarian aid and the process of urban and rural rehabilitation and development. This was done to be supportive to other international agencies, NGOs, and local communities working on the repatriation of displaced persons, provision of food security poverty eradication, and poppy eradication. Immediate socio-economic benefits for the local population were seen as important. The mine clearance activities were undertaken in agricultural fields, roads, residential and commercial areas, irrigation canals and grazing areas. There were many troubles is in 1998 with humanitarian aid programs, due to a.o. restrictions posed by the Taliban authorities and an earthquake. Though the HMA achievements were mainly above target (UNOCHA 1998, p.1, 11, 13; UNOCHA 1999, p.5-8, 13).

The WW152709 program for 1999 was the successor of the previous programs. Mine awareness was linked here with the return of refugees (UNHCR), the health sector (WHO, ICRC and medical NGOs), the education sector (variety of NGOs) and other activities ran by the UN and other organizations. This program was funded in combination with six other humanitarian programs for Afghanistan (MvBZ 1999a).

The WW165511 (for 2000) and WW185802/WW185518 (for 2001/2002) programs were again successors, and again part of multiple programs for Afghanistan co-financed by the Netherlands. The overall objectives of this combination of programs were relief of human suffering, improvement of the human rights situation, provision of elementary social facilities, empowerment for the creation of fundamental resources, and support for the return of refugees. The latter program was hindered by the post-9/11 events, which caused a.o. stolen and destroyed equipment. Socio-economic pressure occurred on all sources of land and infrastructure. More funds were used for emergency clearing (MAPA 2003; MvBZ 2002, p.8-9).

The 6411 (2003) and 9768 (2004) programs were successor under the control of UNMAS, again from a portfolio. The programs were undertaken after a 2002 initiated new strategy in order to accelerate the mine and UXO clearance. The 2003 Progress Report argued that HMA facilitates agriculture, household food security, farming and grazing, post-conflict reconstruction effort, and access to education and healthcare. The use of demobilized soldiers as de-miners was beneficiary to the peace-building process. HMA was associated with almost every ministry in Afghanistan, and effective inter-ministerial consultation and cooperation was necessary (Kenny 2004, p.4; MAPA 2004, p.8, 18-19; MvBZ 2003a).

The Study of the Socio-economic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan (SIMAA) estimated the net socio-economic benefits of the 1999 MAPA mine clearance about US$ 40 million at a cost of about 28 million. A Danida/DFID assessment in 2002 of MACA and MAPA stated that “MACA is well integrated to UN agencies working in HMA, in particular UNHCR. Links to other agencies and development NGOs are less well developed, though this must change as Afghanistan moves from emergency to the development phase. There is currently minimal integration of strategic planning.” (Baric (Consultants) Ltd 2003, p.2; World Bank/UNDP 2001, p.58-62).

The programs in Afghanistan were to a large extent embedded in a broader UN program for humanitarian assistance, in order to improve aid delivery, rehabilitation, repatriation, and development. The situation in Afghanistan deteriorated due to restriction by the Taliban authorities, an earthquake, and the US-led invasion.

6.3.3 Achievements

In programs co-funded by the Netherlands during the period 1996-2004, a huge amount of square meters (according to the data over 690 km^2 or about 100.000 football fields), landmines and UXO were cleared (over four million pieces), and area surveyed (723 km^2) and marked (68 km^2 or about 10.000 football fields). Mine awareness and education reached over 9 million persons. As far as could have been reconstructed, the achievements were often exceeded the prior set targets (see Appendix 8). The OCHA programs were for about 4-16% co-financed by the Netherlands. There were no indicators on achievements concerning embeddedness.

6.3.4 Value

Relevance/appropriateness: The HALO Trust tried to get its operations in line with the needs of the local population. The operations funded via UNOCHA had a focus on the immediate socio-economic benefits for the local population. Large areas were cleared and can now safely be used by the population. The operations were also well in line with the Dutch donor policy. Emphasize was placed on mine clearance and institution building, and a clear embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development framework stimulated by UN agencies. Ownership, accountability, and cost-effectiveness were not especially emphasized. Overcoming the landmine and UXO problem was seen as an enormous undertaking and was a part of the National Security Policy.

Connectedness: Both relief and recovery were relevant here. The clearance of residential, commercial and agricultural areas, and (social) infrastructure made that in the future landmines can no longer cause a threat to the population, and delivery of humanitarian assistance. It removed a barrier for sustainable (post-conflict) development, and returning IDPs and refugees. The existing UN presence and structures stimulated the connectedness. Capacity was not specifically build on the local level, and there was still a high dependency on donors and UN agencies.

Coherence: The humanitarian considerations of HMA were without any doubt, as were the human rights considerations (e.g. safe repatriation of refugees/IDPs, removing the serious threat of getting disabled, peace-building). This counts for every country and will not be repeated in the next paragraphs. The invasion of the US-led coalition negatively influenced coherence, but might have a positive effect in the long-term. The integrated appeals of UN agencies make that coherence were more easily carried out. Links to other agencies and development NGOs were said to be less well developed.

Coverage: Afghanistan was the second largest receiver of Dutch HMA funds, and for worldwide funds the largest receiver for the period 1996-2004. This was legitimate when taking into account the magnitude of the problem. HMA was undertaken in nearly all provinces, due to the fact that mine and UXO contamination exist throughout the country. There was not much information on the exact local impact. There was no evidence suggesting that some groups were left out or neglected of HMA or development programs. Both refugees and IDPs were positively affected by the program.

Efficiency: Only the economic efficiency of the HMA can be assessed here. The cost of clearance per m^2 was calculated by MACA to be about US$ 0,60 which is very low compared to other countries. This number was brought down during several years and became stable. This was due to a strong organization of HMA. The efficiency on embeddedness is very difficult to assess, firstly due to lack of information. The net socio-economic benefits of the 1999 MAPA mine clearance were estimated to be about US$ 40 million at a cost of about 28 million. A good survey made that priority-setting and mine clearance with a great socio-economic impact went considerably smooth (Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.863).

Effectiveness: Often the direct HMA achievements were exceeding the targets, due to good survey information and strong organization. The achievement of other and indirect (socio-economic) objectives were more difficult to measure. The post-9/11 events had a negative influence on the effectiveness of the program in 2001 and 2002. Coordination was the core-business of MACA (and the UN), both intra and cross sectional, in order to increase effectiveness.

Impact: HMA and development programs stimulated the safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs. They stimulated renewed development opportunities in order to get an increase the socio-economic situation of the population and level of human rights, and a decrease of dependency on aid. The post-9/11 events had a (temporal?) negative impact. A study estimated that socio-economic benefits outweighed costs.

6.4 Angola

Angola was not one of the partner 36 countries for development cooperation. First local organizations were funded, but those organizations were weak and the government was unreliable. Therefore international NGOs were funded later. Emphasize was laid on clearance, and the humanitarian relevance was taking into account (MvBZ 1999b, p.2; TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32). No documents on a development policy by the government of Angola could be found.

6.4.1 The HMA Programs

MgM

The AO006803 program emphasized the safe return of IDPs, and stimulation of resettlement and cultivation of arable land by clearance of roads, bridges, water wells etc. It also stated the enablement for implementation of administrative structures by the government and NGOs. It was reported that the MgM mine clearance activities were not always followed by infrastructural projects in order to make the road accessibility sustainable. The WW152705 program was the successor and was also aiming at enabling private transport and trade. Despite a from time to time less stable environment caused by the temporal up rise of the civil war, the mine clearance activities had a very positive effect, a.o. the safe return of about 50.000 IDPs. Via MgM, in cooperation with Johanniter International, also basic medical equipment was provided. Expertise of (supporting) staff of de-miners is educated to local young people (MgM 1997, p.7-9; MgM 1998, p.4; MgM 1999a, p.2; MgM 1999b; MvBZ 1997a; MvBZ 1999b).

NPA

The AO005904 program and the 1997/1998 AO006802 program for the establishment of a MDD-capacity were undertaken to clear mines on request of development NGOs. Refugee repatriation and emergency relief work was obstructed by the presence of landmines. NPA cleared roads and bridges to facilitate reconstruction work. Agricultural area, schools, hospitals, water wells and the surroundings of population concentrations were cleared for development, in order to achieve independence from external aid delivery and to establish a strengthen the local infrastructure. The AO006801 mine survey program provided useful information for supporting the clearance. The WW135102 program for 1998 was a survey in order to support priority setting of most necessary, efficient en effective clearance in social and economic terms. Continued was with the WW152703 and WW152704 programs, both for 1999. Agricultural areas and grazing land, resettlement for IDPs, a landing strip, water sources, and secondary roads were cleared. WW165518 program for 2000 delivered socio-economic benefits to about 21.000 people, especially women, by providing them access to agricultural land, grazing area and schools, drinking water supply, and suitable accommodation. Mine clearance priorities were set in participation with local authorities and humanitarian organizations. The WW185801 program for 2001 mentions that NPA cooperates with about 20 partner organizations, clearing bridges, roads, airports, agricultural, grazing land, paths and secondary roads, residential homes and urban communal areas. Demining was undertaken for providing access for the humanitarian support of WFP to a camp of 17.600 IDPs. Almost 32.000 local residents and IDPs were able to resume agricultural activities, coal production, reconstruction of infrastructure and business, in order to become self-sufficient, which is often still difficult. For the 4423 program for 2003, NPA stated that demining will facilitate the development of the local and regional economy, popular movement and political engagement, which causes stability. Also HIV/AIDS and gender awareness was seen as important (MvBZ 1998a; MvBZ 1999b, p.1; NPA 1996; NPA 1997a, p.4; NPA 1998a, p.4; NPA 1998b, p.8; NPA 1999a, p.8; NPA 2000c, p.4, 8-10; NPA 2000e, p.4, 6; NPA 2001b, p.4, 8, 13-14; NPA 2002b, p.6-9; NPA 2002c).

UNICEF

The AO005903 mine awareness program incorporated the training of teachers for primary education, thereby also contributing to the overall education system of Angola (UNICEF 1998, p.12).

WFP

The AO005906 program was in cooperation with CMAO and INAROEE, executed by HALO Trust and NPA. The program is quite similar to the NPA's AO005904 program: rehabilitation of roads and bridges, return and resettlement of IDPs, access to basic services, humanitarian assistance, and provision of food aid are the objectives. Good results were reported: at least 15.000 IDPs returned and started agricultural production, due to MgM activities. WFP was working together with Swedrelief (bridge construction and road rehabilitation), NPA, and Santa Barbara Foundation (bridges and spot tasks). The succeeding program WW165516 in 2000 was undertaken by MgM. A social impact study concluded that cleared roads are suffering from the strain of vehicles and an extended wet season, making it difficult for the local population to reach the market, deforestation caused problems with coffee crops, and medical support collapsed after the de-miners left. Due to the politico-military situation, it made no sense to de-mine in order to let IDPs return, so other priorities were set (MgM 2000, p.2.0-3.2, 4.2; NPA 1999b, p.4; WFP 1998, p.3; WFP 2000; WFP n/a).

6.4.2 Achievements

A considerable area was cleared by the programs that were funded by the Netherlands, mainly bilateral. Area was cleared (8,0 km^2, or over 1.100 football fields) of landmines and UXO (over 150.000 pieces), surveyed (1.000 km), verified (2,4 km^2, or about 350 football fields), and at least 333.000 persons were positively affected by the programs (see Appendix 8). A few data shows that target were accomplished for only about 70-80%.

6.4.3 Value

Relevance/appropriateness: The programs heavily emphasized on the safe return of IDPs, emergency relief work, and development of the local population, especially women, and administration. Mine clearance priorities were set in participation with local authorities and humanitarian organizations. Large areas and roads were cleared and can now safely be used by the population. The operations were partly in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize was placed on mine clearance, but not on institution building. Cost-effectiveness was achieved by priority setting of most necessary, efficient and effective clearance in social and economic terms.

Connectedness: Both relief and recovery were relevant. The clearance of agricultural area, roads, bridges and social infrastructure, and rehabilitation of roads and bridges had a very positive effect on the return and resettlement of IDPs, access to basic services, humanitarian assistance, and provision of food aid. No long-term national capacity was built. Close cooperation existed between WFP and NPA/MgM, and MgM and NPA with other development NGOs.

Coherence: There was a very close cooperation between WFP and NPA and MgM, and WFP, MgM and NPA with other development NGOs.

Coverage: Angola was the largest receiver of Dutch HMA funds for the period 1996-2004, and one of the greater receivers worldwide. HMA was undertaken in nearly all provinces, due to the fact that mine contamination exists throughout the country. There was evidence of a positive impact on local level. There was an emphasize on HIV/AIDS and gender awareness. Both refugees and IDPs were positively affected by the program.

Efficiency: The cost of clearance per m^2 was calculated by MgM to be about US$ 1,55. Mine clearance activities were not always followed by infrastructural projects in order to make the road accessibility sustainable, so multiplier effects were not always reached. A survey was undertaken by NPA in order to make socio-economic priority-setting possible.

Effectiveness: A few data show that target were accomplished for only about 70-80%. Coordination went though WFP, both intra and cross sectional, in order to increase effectiveness. A social impact study concluded that cleared roads are suffering from the strain of vehicles and an extended wet season, making it difficult for the local population to reach the market, deforestation caused problems with coffee crops, and that medical support collapsed after the de-miners left. The instability that occurred from time to time, had a negative effect on the effectiveness of the programs, and disturbs the development of the population.

Impact: HMA and development programs stimulated the safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed development opportunities in order to get an increase the socio-economic situation of the population and level of human rights. The unstable politico-military situation had a negative impact. A social impact study concluded some severe negative impacts.

6.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the 36 partner countries of the Netherlands in development cooperation since 2003 (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32).

6.5.1 Development policy

The Bosnia and Herzegovina PRSP was published in 2004, thus it does not cover much of the period 1996-2004. The three goals were: create conditions for sustainable and balanced economic development; reduce poverty; and accelerate EU integrations. HMA is not an important issues in the paper, despite the fact that 4,2% of the country's area is still inaccessible due to the landmines. The landmine and UXO threat was linked with IDPs, health sector (injuries), agricultural sector, and the forestry sector (rehabilitation) (IMF 2004a, p.10, 158, 174, 193, 196, 251-253).

The following problems for the current operations were identified (IMF 2004a, p.251-252, quoted):
1. Gap between real needs of BiH and limited resources;
2. Weak cooperation with other sectors in vertical and horizontal line;
3. Weak response of authorities at all levels of administration;
4. Financial problems.

HMA is a factor in the development policy, but does not have high priority. HMA fits in the first two goals of the PRSP.

6.5.2 The HMA Programs

DHA/UNDP

The BA007101 (1997), the WW135106 (1998), the WW152707 (1999-2002), the WW185811 (2001-2003), and the 9685 (2004) programs were undertaken to let refugees and IDPs return and for reconstruction. DHA provided coordination support with humanitarian programs, within a broader UN program (known as post Dayton programs) for social-economic development on the long term, emergency aid, and peace building and reconciliation. The Netherlands also funded some of the other programs. It was underscored that HMA could be an important factor in rehabilitation and redevelopment of the population. Activities were a.o. the clearance of houses for returning refugees and IDPs, and land for agriculture reconstruction and development activities. The 2004 Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP) of UNDP focused particularly on the restoration of socio-economic activities, and embeddedness of HMA in the PRSP (ICRC/UNHCR 1997, p.5-6; MvBZ 1998b; MvBZ 1999c; MvBZ 2001c; MvBZ 2004a; UN 1996, p.41-42; UNDP 2001; UNDP 2004, p.4-5).

6.5.3 Achievements

In Bosnia and Herzegovina a huge area was cleared, due to significant contributions of the Netherlands during at least the period 1996-2004. The cost-effectiveness of mine clearance differed

between US$1,33 and US$ 1,93 depending on the type of HMA organization (see Appendix 8). Massive surveys (573 km^2 or over 1% of Bosnia and Herzegovina) were undertaken in order to reduce suspected area, and area (21,6 km^2 or over 3.000 football fields) was cleared of landmines and UXO (over 62.000 pieces).

6.5.4 Value

Relevance/appropriateness: The entities used to have their own MAC. The operations were also well in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize was placed on mine clearance and institution building, and a clear embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development framework stimulated by UN agencies. The cost-effectiveness of mine clearance differed between US$ 1,33 and US$ 1,93 depending on the type of HMA organization. HMA was one of the issues in the PRSP, in combination with IDPs, injuries from landmines and UXO, agriculture, and forest rehabilitation.

Connectedness: Both relief and recovery were relevant here. The clearance of residential, commercial and agricultural areas, and (social) infrastructure made that in the future landmines can no longer cause a threat to the population, and delivery of humanitarian assistance, and removed a barrier for sustainable (post-conflict) development, and returning IDPs and refugees. The existing UN presence and structures stimulat the connectedness. Capacity was not specifically build on the local level, and there is still a high dependency on donors and UN agencies. The IMAP focused particularly on the restoration of socio-economic activities, and embeddedness of HMA in the PRSP.

Coherence: The entities used to have their own MACs, and the entity armies were used for mine clearance. Cooperation was the responsibility of the BHMAC. The humanitarian considerations of HMA were without any doubt, as are the human rights considerations (e.g. safe repatriation of refugees/IDPs, removing the serious threat of getting disabled, peace-building). The PRSP identified weak cooperation with other sectors in vertical and horizontal line, and weak response of authorities at all levels of administration. The integrated appeals of UN agencies made that coherence should be more easily carried out.

Coverage: HMA was undertaken in both entities. There was no information on the exact local impact. There was no evidence suggesting that some (ethnic) groups were left out or neglected of HMA or development programs. Both refugees and IDPs were positively affected by the program.

Efficiency: The cost-effectiveness of mine clearance differed depending on the type of HMA organization. Massive surveys were undertaken in order to reduce suspected area, which greatly increased efficiency. Due to lacking information, few can be said about the efficiency of embeddedness.

Effectiveness: There was a gap between real needs of BiH and limited resources. Massive surveys were undertaken in order to reduce suspected area. The achievements of other and indirect (socio-economic) objectives were more difficult to measure. Intra sectional coordination was the core-business of BHMAC, UN coordinates cross sectional coordination.

Impact: HMA and development programs stimulated the safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed development opportunities in order to get an increase the socio-economic situation of the population and level of human rights, and a decrease of dependency on aid.

6.6 Cambodia

Cambodia was not among the 36 partner countries for development cooperation (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32).

6.6.1 Development policy

Cambodia published an IPRSP in 2000, a PRSP in 2002, and a PRSP Progress Report. In the IPRSP the presence of landmines was identified as one of the factors for poverty, disability and insecurity.

Mine clearance was seen as top priority of the national policy in improving security. Important HMA activities were the clearance of agricultural areas, awareness, mine disposal training, and increased victim assistance (Royal Government of Cambodia 2000, p.9, 11, 33, 35).

After the 1998 elections, the new Prime Minister Hun Sen launched "The Triangle Strategy" for the sustainable development of Cambodia (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.ii; quoted):
- The building of peace, stability and security;
- Cambodia's full integration into regional and international relations; and
- The promotion of economic and social development through the implementation of various reform programmes within the environment created by these policies.

The priority poverty reduction actions in the PRSP were (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.iv; quoted):
- maintaining macroeconomic stability;
- improving rural livelihoods;
- expanding job opportunities;
- improving capabilities;
- strengthening institutions and improving governance;
- reducing vulnerability and strengthening social inclusion;
- promoting gender equity;
- priority focus on population.

In the PRSP the landmine and UXO contamination was seen as one of the factors for vulnerability of people, which can cause poverty: discussed were that the people living in contaminated areas are vulnerable, the obstruction of landmines and vulnerability of people living in rural areas, the disabled due to mine/UXO-related accidents, and the return of IDPs to contaminated areas. The HMA activities to be undertaken were mine and UXO clearance, awareness education and victim assistance. The estimated costs were about US$ 30 million annually, in order to clear about 30 million m^2 (over 4.000 football fields) annually (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.26, 29, 31, 41, 122).

Priorities in HMA, in order to reduce poverty, were (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.123, quoted):
1. reducing the number of casualties which have negative economic consequences on affected families;
2. providing access for the worst-affected communities to essential services and infrastructure such as water resources, schools, hospitals and roads;
3. distributing safe land for settlement and agricultural purposes, contributing to the economic reintegration of landless populations in rural areas;
4. marking contaminated areas and educating and raising awareness on the dangers of land mines and UXO's among the populations of suspected areas;
5. ensuring that the prioritisation and distribution of cleared land are monitored in a participatory, equitable and pro-poor manner at the provincial level;
6. providing assistance to the reintegration and rehabilitation of victims of land mines and UXO's and their affected communities.

The Five Year Mine Action Strategic Plan of 2003-2007 is supported, which contained the following objectives, with regard to poverty reduction (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.123-124):
- Reducing poverty by providing safe access to productive resources and social services, clearing landmines and UXOs, and educating awareness by the population on the risks of landmines and UXOs;
- The CMAA will help to achieve national development goals to contribute to sustainable economic growth by reducing the negative impact of landmines/UXO;
- The CMAA will institute a specific unit essentially dedicated to the poverty reduction, on national and provincial level;
- The adoption of new standards and technical regulations will improve HMA's efficiency and effectiveness. Those standard are to be finalized in 2002 and to be applied as of 2003;
- With the help of the national database on HMA, the prioritization of suspected mined areas with the highest risks will be done;
- In order to decrease the number of UXO casualties, mine risk education will be developed;

- The ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Vocational Training & Youth Rehabilitation is made responsible to carry out specific interventions for victims and affected communities and to continue to build on the work in victim assistance, in co-operation with all relevant NGOs.

The relation of "The Triangle Strategy" with HMA is the building of peace, stability and security and the promotion of economic and social development through the implementation of various reform programs within the environment created by these policies. In the PRSP the following priority poverty reduction actions are related to HMA: improving rural livelihoods; reducing vulnerability and strengthening social inclusion; strengthening institutions and improving governance; and priority focus on population. HMA and the landmine and UXO threat did not play an important role in the PRSP.

6.6.2 The HMA Programs

CMAC/UNDP

Repatriation of IDPs, national reconstruction and development, maximizing the socio-economic impact of demining, and a constant dialogue with NGOs were important issues. CMAC had four demining priorities: land for resettlement of IDPs or settled land with casualty rates; land for agriculture, land for humanitarian community development; and land for reconstruction and infrastructural development. The KH006801 (1996) program, the KH009201 (1997/1998) program, the WW135108 (1998/1999) program and the WW152711 (1999) program were undertaken with these priorities. Nevertheless the embeddedness of CMAC's activities in development was questioned by donors. Besides that, in 1999 there were accuses of corruption and nepotism, which were not fully proved, and financial administrative and managerial weaknesses. Also the supervising of UNDP was lacking. A reorganization of CMAC and the responsible UNDP team followed (see also §5.3.4). Despite these development the funding via UNDP was stopped (CMAC 1996b, p.5, 7-8; MvBZ 1999d; MvBZ 1999e).

HALO Trust

In the WW165532 program for 2001, HALO Trust supported 19 development NGOs and IGOs by clearing specific areas (e.g. for housing and agriculture), roads (e.g. for rehabilitation and health care), schools, hospitals etc., and by building roads and bridges. Development priorities were embedded in the demining priorities, and are in cooperation with the newly established Land Use Planning Units (LUPUs). The population greatly benefited, agricultural production, transport communications and water availability improved, and a health care and hygiene development project of the NGO CARE could be undertaken (HALO Trust 2000a, p.6-7, 9; HALO Trust 2002b, p.2, 6; MvBZ 2003b).

NPA/CMAC

For the WW165534 (2001/2002) program, the WW192401 (2002/2004) program, and the 6476 (2003/2005) program, NPA hired a CMAC de-miners platoon. In cooperation with CMAC, relevant provincial authorities and development NGOs, sustainable development of new communities was set as top priority. NPA also had its own community development activities. In the CMAC Strategic Plan for the period of 2003-2007 the most important objective was the development objective to stimulat reconstruction, re-integration and development activities, by a.o. providing access for the worst-affected communities to essential services and infrastructure and safe land for settlement and agriculture. NPA phased out its own development activities since 2003, and put emphasize on mine clearance for the local population and other development organizations (CMAC 2002, p.8; MvBZ 2004d; NPA 2000a, p.6-9, 11; NPA 2001a, p.5, Annex 12: p. 2-3; NPA 2002a, p.5).

6.6.3 Achievements

In Cambodia a huge area has been cleared during the period 1996-2004 and before, where the Netherlands was one of the more important contributors. Most of the work undertaken was on

clearance (69 km^2 or almost 10.000 football fields) of mines and UXO (almost 92.000), and awareness/education (over 22.000 participants) (see Appendix 8).

6.6.4 Value

Relevance/appropriateness: The embeddedness of CMAC's activities in development was questioned. There were accuses of malpractices, financial administrative and managerial weaknesses, and a lack in supervising by the UNDP. Later funding via NPA strongly improved the situation and a stronger emphasize on development issues occurred. The presence of landmines became one of the most important issues in the PRSP and national policy. The proposed operations in the PRSP are in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize on mine clearance and institution building, and a better embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development framework is.

Connectedness: Repatriation of IDPs, reintegration and reconstruction were relevant for the long term sustainable development. The population greatly benefited from development projects possible due to HMA. The PRSP focused on clearance of agricultural areas, awareness, mine disposal training, and increased victim assistance.

Coherence: The embeddedness of CMAC's activities in development was questioned by donors. Later programs emphasized the need for better embeddedness of development priorities in demining priorities. Mine clearance was seen as top priority of the national policy in improving security in the PRSP. The CMAA will institute a specific unit essentially dedicated to the poverty reduction. The ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Vocational Training & Youth Rehabilitation was made responsible to carry out specific interventions for victims and affected communities and to continue to build on the work in victim assistance, in co-operation with all relevant NGOs.

Coverage: HMA was undertaken throughout the country. There was not much information on the exact local impact. There was no evidence suggesting that some (ethnic) groups were left out or neglected of HMA or development programs. IDPs and landmine victims were positively affected by the programs.

Efficiency: The PRSP aimed at the adoption of new standards and technical regulations in order to improve HMA efficiency. Due to lacking information, few can be said about the efficiency of embeddedness. The PRSP aimed at about US$ 1 per m^2 cleared area.

Effectiveness: The PRSP aimed at the adoption of new standards and technical regulations in order to improve HMA effectiveness. Financial administrative and managerial weaknesses could have undermined effectiveness. The achievements of other and indirect (socio-economic) objectives were more difficult to measure.

Impact: HMA and development programs helped declining poverty, improve the situation of the disabled, stimulated the safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed development opportunities in order to get an increase the socio-economic situation of the population and level of human rights, and a decrease of dependency on aid.

6.7 Eritrea

Eritrea was one of the 36 partner countries, and was already a partner country before the 2003 policy change. Eritrea received € 16,3 million for all humanitarian programs, were HMA consisted for the mayor share (about € 10 million, see §5.3.5) (MvBZ 2006h, p.48; TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32).

6.7.1 Development policy

The 2004 IPRSP of Eritrea said little about the threat of landmines. The border war with Ethiopia with the use of landmines was seen as one of the many determinants of poverty. Many of sections fertile land were contaminated and with the drought of 2002/2003 this became very clear. No

policy on HMA or whatsoever was mentioned in the IPRSP (Government of the State of Eritrea 2004, p.11, 19).

6.7.2 The HMA Programs

HALO Trust

For the WW165535 program (2001/2002) the HALO Trust was a partner of the Eritrean Humanitarian Demining Programme (EHDP). The objective was to let refugees and IDPs return to their homes. The need for a broader humanitarian policy was understood by the Netherlands MFA, UN organizations and NGOs. Communication and coordination was often failing at the time of 2000, due to the political and strategic agenda of the Eritrean government (HALO Trust 2002a, p.2; MvBZ 2000a; MvBZ 2000c).

6.7.3 Achievements

A considerable area was cleared (5,6 km^2 and over 8.000 pieces of explosives) in Eritrea by the WW165535 program financed by the Netherlands (see Appendix 8). Unfortunately there was no information available on other programs that were heavily funded by the Netherlands.

6.7.4 Value

The information on Eritrea was scarce, therefore it is impossible and inappropriate to give a full judgment.

Relevance/appropriateness: The objective was to let refugees and IDPs return to their homes. Mine clearance was undertaken, which is in line with the Dutch donor policy. A clear embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development framework was stimulated by UN organizations and NGOs.

Connectedness: A clear embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development framework was stimulated by UN organizations and NGOs.

Coherence: The need for a broader humanitarian policy was understood. Communication and coordination was often failing at the time of 2000.

Coverage: There is no information on coverage.

Efficiency: There is no information on efficiency.

Effectiveness: Communication and coordination was often failing at the time of 2000, which might have reduced effectiveness.

Impact: There is no information on impact.

6.8 Laos

Laos was not among the 36 bilateral partner countries of the Dutch development cooperation policy (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32).

6.8.1 Development policy

In the IPRSP UXO contamination was seen as one of the important causes of poverty: UXO caused great human suffering for the victims and their families; agricultural production was blocked there by UXO contamination, preventing a sustainable living for the population of villages, which was an important cause of poverty and food shortages. UXO community education awareness was seen as successful in improving child protection. UXO decontamination was one of the major national

priorities for alleviating poverty, and was one of the criteria for risk assessment of rural areas. Infrastructure was also affected by the presence of UXO, causing substantial extra cost and time for essential services to contaminated communities. The need for co-ordination with development plans and the optimal use of resources was stressed. The UXO Decontamination Programme was seen as an important program (IMF/World Bank 2001, p.13, 16, 25, 28, 30-31, 47), which had the following long-term need for UXO clearance and awareness (IMF/World Bank 2001, p.46-47, quoted):

1. Emergency response units, similar to the current roving teams as an "on call" service for reported or discovered UXO;
2. Humanitarian clearance for life saving, high risk areas where accidents are likely to, or have occurred;
3. Development clearance for community development where no other sources of funding are available;
4. Commercial, private clearance, in support of gem/mineral mines, commercial factories, tourism, and electricity supplies; and
5. Risk reduction education, to raise awareness of risks associated with UXO.

The UXO Decontamination program was one of the three most important poverty-related subjects in the PRSP/NGPES, with the National Drugs Control program and the National Action Plan for HIV/AIDS/STD. The UXO problem was seen as a cause of poverty, as a source of vulnerability and as a threat. UXO awareness is incorporated with standard teaching schedules. Related with UXO decontamination were road construction in affected areas and gender issues. Coordination and capacity-building were seen as important (IMF 2004b, p.7, 9-10, 29-30, 37, 52, 78, 115, 122, 125, 131, 146).

As main challenge was seen the incorporation of UXO decontamination into development programming, in order to (IMF 2004b, p.125, quoted):

- Ensure that the planning of operations relates closely to national priorities such as poverty reduction, phasing out shifting cultivation and opium elimination.
- Increase the pace of clearance, thereby opening land for agricultural production.
- Mobilise resources required for humanitarian UXO action programming.

The goal of the PRSP/NGPES was to leave the group of Least Developed Countries by 2020 through sustained equitable economic growth and social development. The country's social, cultural, economic and political identity must be protected. This is and will be done by the following ways (IMF 2004b, p.1):

- Moving consistently towards a market-oriented economy;
- Building-up the needed infrastructure throughout the country;
- Improving the well-being of the people through greater food security, extension of social services and environment conservation, while enhancing the spiritual and cultural life of the Lao multi-ethnic population.

The UXO problem was an important component of the Lao development policy. The UXO Decontamination Programme will sharply improve the well-being of the people.

6.8.2 The HMA Programs

UNDP/UXO Lao

The LA001302 (1997/1998) program, the WW165509 (2000/2001) program, the WW185806 (2001) program, the WW192406 (2002) program and the 9686 (2004) program were financed via the UNDP/UNICEF/LAO PDR Trust Fund to UXO Lao, who contracts demining capacity from a.o. the NGOs Gerbera, HI, MAG, NPA, and WVI. UXO Lao emphasized community-oriented projects clearing housing and agricultural area, clearance of land needed for sustainable development projects (e.g. construction of roads, schools, temples hospitals, airports, irrigation works, clean water, communication, national forest protection and conservation), assistance with provincial and district health services, and food security or income-generation assistance (e.g. markets, reduce slash-and-burn farming by giving alternatives, tree plantations, tourism, industrial and handicraft development). UXO Lao supported the overall development goals of Laos and the broader socio-economic development requirements of villages, districts and provinces, in a bottom up planning

process. The National UXO Steering Committee (NSC) was the policy-making body for UXO Lao and consists of members from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Security, UNDP, UNICEF, and representatives of 9 provinces. Donors and Implementing Partners can attend biannually. NGOs such as CARE, ACF and OXFAM, and Red Cross and WFP provide sustainable development programs. UXO Lao was recognized by the government as strategic support program, and the government identified four sectors for poverty alleviation, agriculture and forestry, education, road infrastructure, and health. Especially disabled are recognized as relatively benefiting very little. UXO clearance in Laos was one of the initiatives mentioned in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Lao PDR for the period 2002-2006. In the National Strategic Plan 2003 – 2013 three priorities were set, high, medium and low. Despite already existing cooperation with development NGOs, the degree of cooperation was less than desired by donors (MvBZ 2004f; UNDP 1995, p.4; UXO Lao 1996, p.4; UXO Lao 1999, p.15-17; UXO Lao 2000, p.4, 14, 16-17, 19, 23; UXO Lao 2001, p.11, 20-28; UXO Lao 2002a, p.6, 19; UXO Lao 2002b, p.8, 11, 14-15; UXO Lao 2003b, p.8; UXO Lao 2003c, p.7-12, 19; UXO Lao 2003d, p.17).

6.8.3 Achievements

Laos had massive programs on UXO clearance (almost 39 km^2 and at least 256.000 pieces of explosives) and awareness (838 students and over 540.000 attendants). The Netherlands was a smaller contributor. UXO Lao was able to reach a price of US$ 0,34 per m^2 and US$ 11,94 per beneficiary, which is very low (see Appendix 8).

6.8.4 Value

Relevance/appropriateness: UXO Lao emphasized community-oriented projects and a bottom up planning process. UXO Lao supported the overall development goals of Laos and the broader socio-economic development. Especially disabled were recognized as benefiting very little. The operations were in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize is placed on UXO clearance and institution building, and a clear embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development. The degree of cooperation was lower than desired by donors. The National UXO Steering Committee was constructed for accountability. In the PRSP UXO contamination was identified as one of the aspects causing poverty and UXO decontamination was seen as one of the major national priorities.

Connectedness: Both relief and sustainable development were relevant here. The clearance of housing and agricultural area, clearance of land needed for sustainable development projects, assistance with provincial and district health services, and food security or income-generation assistance made that in the future landmines can no longer cause a threat to the population, and delivery of humanitarian assistance, and removed a barrier for sustainable development. Capacity was built on the local, provincial and national level. There was still a high dependency on donors despite the already long period of programs and financial assistance.

Coherence: UXO Lao emphasized community-oriented projects and supports the overall development goals of Laos and the broader socio-economic development. In order to stimulate coherence, the National UXO Steering Committee was set up as the policy-making body for UXO Lao. UXO Lao was recognized by the government as strategic support program. UXO clearance in Laos was one of the initiatives of the UN for the period 2002-2006, thus the clearance programs were not independent from other programs. The degree of cooperation was lower than requested by donors.

Coverage: Especially disabled were recognized as relatively benefiting very little and are in focus. UXO Lao tried to reach all groups in society and let them participate by a bottom-up planning process. The PRSP saw UXO community education awareness as successful in improving child protection. There was not much numerical information on the exact local impact.

Efficiency: The cost of clearance was very low compared to other countries. The efficiency on embeddedness was more difficult to assess, a clue was given by the fact that the degree of cooperation was lower than requested by donors. The PRSP saw as one of the main issues the increase the pace of clearance.

Effectiveness: Often the direct HMA achievements were exceeding the targets. Information on the achievement on other and indirect (socio-economic) objectives was not widely available. Also here the low level coordination can be an indication of lack of effectiveness.

Impact: HMA and development programs increased the socio-economic situation of the population and level of human rights, and a decrease of dependency on aid. Lives were saved due to clearance and awareness activities.

6.9 Mozambique

Mozambique was a partner country in the list of 36 (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32).

6.9.1 Development policy

The central objective in the PRSP of 2001 was substantial reduction of absolute poverty. As fundamental areas were seen: education; health; agriculture and rural development; basic infrastructure; good governance; macro-economic and financial management (Republic of Mozambique 2001, p.1, 3).

For Mozambique, HMA is just sparsely mentioned in the PRPS documents. The Review of the 2003 Economic and Social Plan mentions the completed demining undertaken by the defence sector (IMF 2004c, p.107). In the Economic and Social Plan Evaluation 2004 the outcome of a summit for HMA was an important issue (IMF 2005b, p.84).

In the PRSP there was no link with HMA at all.

6.9.2 The HMA Programs

HALO Trust

The MZ014501 program for 1998-1999 was undertaken in Nampula (in cooperation with World Vision International), where the Netherlands already funded projects on sustainable development in sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, and market development. The clearance activities will strengthen those programs, and are part of the Preliminary Prioritised Provincial Work Plan (PPPWP) framework, containing 10 key sites including bridges, village centres, roads, power lines and water pipelines. Spin-off was increased mobility of the population, improved provision of services and aid. Not all projects were completely finished during the time of the program, and were finished in the WW165502 program for 2000. This program also supports the District Demining Initiative. A socio-economic land use study on the period 1994-1999 shows that in the Nampula province areas were cleared, boosting agriculture, rehabilitation, transportation, and trade, but the handover of some areas to local communities was not always done well. The study concludes that HMA can boost development (HALO Trust 1997, p.8; HALO Trust 1998, p.4; HALO Trust 1999a, p.2; HALO Trust 1999b, p.3; HALO Trust 1999c, p.104-113, 124; MvBZ 1997b).

HI

The 1996-1998 MZ003315 was about mine survey and mine clearance (although HI had other paramedic and social programs in Mozambique). The aim was to clear for villages and rural population to boost the daily economic and social activities (HI 1996, p.1, 7).

NPA

In the MZ003314 program for 1996-1997, NPA worked together with two NGOs providing food, and with other HMA organizations. The WW135105 program for 1998-1999, the WW165508 program for 2000, WW185813 program for 2001, WW192405 program for 2002, and the 5809 program for 2003-2004, took into account sustainable improvement of the socio-economic, political and democratic living conditions by clearing surroundings of rural communities, water supplies and path and road

clearance, provision of primary health awareness (HIV/AIDS awareness and basic courses on construction of improved traditional latrines) and educational programs, access to education, skills training and commercial opportunities. Some activities were only facilitated to stimulate ownership and sustainability. Women were seen as an important vulnerable group. NPA was also beware of environmental impacts of the activities, and tried to keep them as low as possible. NPA was reviewed for the period 1993-1998 (WW152103). Concluded was that the impact of the community services was difficult to measure and not necessary per se. The 2003 NORAD review of the NPA activities emphasized that communities should not become too dependent on the community services provided. That also counts in overall, the presence of de-miners gives a temporal boost to the local economy. NPA itself should not get involved in long term development actions. It was believed that phasing out demining should be accompanied with a development program (Agenda Utredning & Utvikling 1999, p.65-66; NPA 1997b; NPA 1997c, p.1; NPA 1999c, p.13; NPA 2000b; NPA 2000d, p.12, 15; NPA 2001c, p.14-15; NPA 2004, p.10-12; Scanteam 2003, p.16, 18, 20).

UNDP

The UNDP Trust Fund funded the setup of the mine clearance policy and strategy by CND. Part of the strategy was the determination of the impact of landmines on socio-economic development. The ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, Education, Agriculture, Health, Social Welfare, and Police were involved. CND turned out to be a weak partner (UNDP 1997, p.8; UNDP 1999, p.6).

6.9.3 Achievements

During the period 1996-2004 an area of 14 km^2 and over 220.000 pieces of explosives were cleared in Mozambique. The programs were over 10% co-financed by the Netherlands. There were no indicators on achievements concerning embeddedness. The cost per m^2 was estimated to be US$ 1,89 at an NPA program, which was a higher than other countries (except clearance by NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (see Appendix 8).

6.9.4 Value

Relevance/appropriateness: The HALO Trust programs took into account sustainable improvement of the socio-economic, political and democratic living conditions. Some activities of NPA were facilitated to stimulate ownership and sustainability. The impact of the community services provided by NPA to the local population was difficult to measure and not necessary per se. The population should not become too dependent on the community services (lack of ownership). Large areas were cleared and can now safely be used by the population. The operations were also well in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize was placed on mine clearance and institution building. Some programs were undertaken in Nampula, where the Netherlands already funded projects on sustainable development. The PRSP hardly mentioned the subject landmines.

Connectedness: The clearance of the PPPWP framework sites, clearance surroundings of rural communities, water supplies and path and road clearance, provision of primary health awareness and educational programs, access to education, skills training and commercial opportunities made that in the future landmines can no longer cause a threat to the population, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and removed a barrier for sustainable (post-conflict) development. The link with other humanitarian programs funded by the Netherlands and the HMA program of HALO Trust in Nampula improved the connectedness.

Coherence: In Nampula programs were undertaken in cooperation with WVI, and where the Netherlands already funded development projects on sustainable development in sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, and market development. NPA worked together with two NGOs providing food, and with other HMA organizations. The PPPWP framework was launched to improve coherence. The UNDP Trust Fund funded the setup of the mine clearance policy and strategy by CND. Part of the strategy is the determination of the impact of landmines on socio-economic development. CND turned out to be a weak partner.

Coverage: Women were seen as an important vulnerable group. Primary health awareness was provided, e.g. HIV/AIDS awareness. There was not much information on the exact local impact. There was no evidence suggesting that some groups were left out or neglected of HMA or development programs.

Efficiency: The estimated cost at a NPA program was quite high. The efficiency on embeddedness was again very difficult to assess, due to lack of information. The PPPWP framework, containing 10 key sites, helped improving efficiency.

Effectiveness: The handover of some areas to local communities was not always done well. The UNDP Trust Fund funded the setup of the mine clearance policy and strategy by CND, but the CND turned out to be a weak partner. Spin-off of the PPPWP framework was increased mobility of the population, improved provision of services and aid. Sometimes the HMA achievements did not achieve the objectives that were set beforehand. On the socio-economic achievements there was little information.

Impact: Spin-off was increased mobility of the population, improved provision of services and aid. NPA tried to keep environmental impacts of their activities as low as possible. The impact of NPA's community services was difficult to measure and not necessary per se. The presence of de-miners gave a temporal boost to the local economy, but made communities to dependent on them.

6.10 Overview of Achievements of the HMA programs

Table 6-1 gives an overview of the achievements of the programs. The extent in which the Netherlands funded the programs differ, some information is incomplete or non-existing and local differences in circumstances are not known. Thus straight conclusions can not always be drawn. The complete data can be found in Appendix 8.

Table 6-1: Overview of the achievements of the HMA programs in the recipient countries for 1996-2004

Recipient country	Dutch funding	Share	Cleared area	Landmines & UXO	Surveyed area	Verified area	Marked area	Awareness/ education	Efficiency
	million US$		*km²*	*pieces*		*km²*	*km²*	*attendants*	*US$/m²*
Afghanistan	16,4	5,5%	690	4.000.000	723 km²	-	68	9.000.000	0,60
Angola	19,9	15,9%	8	150.000	1.000 km	2,4	-	330.000	n/a
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6,5	4,6%	21,6	3.000	573 km²	-	-	-	1,33-1,93
Cambodia	13,9	9,1%	69	92.000	-	-	-	92.000	n/a
Eritrea	9,7	41,2%	5,6	8.000	-	-	-	-	n/a
Laos	2,4	5,8%	39	256.000	-	-	-	540.000	0,34
Mozambique	9,5	11,7%	14	220.000	-	-	-	-	1,89

6.11 Conclusions

Some of the information were the conclusions are based on, comes from chapter 5.

The Netherlands as a donor country

The Netherlands did not see embeddedness of HMA in a broader framework for sustainable development as top-priority in the HMA policy. HMA was even not mentioned in the 2003 macro policy paper on development cooperation at all. Only indirectly it can be brought in relation with

several issues from the macro policy: integrated foreign policy on the field of peace, security and development (Stability Fund); coherence in development policies; poverty alleviation and sustainable development; and the PRSPs and the MDG as guidelines. To compare with other similar donors: Denmark's policy and the MDGs can only be very indirectly linked with HMA within a broader framework. Embeddedness was more clearly incorporated in the HMA policy of the European Union and Sweden. In the Danish policy it was stated that the usefulness of HMA for local population was difficult to measure (sub question 4).

Recipient countries

For many of the programs that the Netherlands funded in the selected countries, embeddedness in a broader framework for sustainable development was an issue in different extents. Socio-economic data of outcomes were hard to find, therefore the criteria are assessed in a qualitative way.

Afghanistan

The Netherlands had an intensive aid relation with Afghanistan. Most programs in Afghanistan were to a large extent embedded in a broader UN program for humanitarian assistance, in order to improve aid delivery, rehabilitation, repatriation, and development. The situation in Afghanistan deteriorated due to restriction by the Taliban authorities, an earthquake, and the US-led invasion. The goal was to clear residential, commercial and agricultural areas, roads, irrigation canals, and grazing areas. Mine/ERW clearance, mine clearance training, mine identification, survey and marking, and mine awareness and education were undertaken. Afghanistan was a large receiver in the world of humanitarian funds, and the largest concerning HMA in the period 1996-2004 (sub questions 4-7).

Angola

The Netherlands had no bilateral aid relation with Angola. Clearance programs facilitated emergency relief work, access to basic services, humanitarian assistance, safe return of refugees and IDPs, resettlement and cultivation of arable land, development, private transport and trade. Basic medical equipment and education were provided too. First local organizations were funded, but those organizations were weak and the government was unreliable. Therefore international NGOs were funded later. Emphasize was laid on clearance, and the humanitarian relevance was taking into account. The politico-military situation was not always prosperous during the period 1996-2004. The programs focused on mine/ERW clearance (manual, mechanical, MDD, EOD), priority setting, mine clearance training, mine survey, victim assistance and social rehabilitation. Angola was a larger receiver of HMA funds (sub questions 4-7).

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Netherlands had an intensive aid relation with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The HMA programs were part of a broader UN program. HMA was seen as an important factor in rehabilitation and redevelopment of the population. HMA was a factor in the development policy, but did not have high priority. Activities were clearance of houses for returning refugees and IDPs, and land for agriculture reconstruction and development activities. Mine/UXO clearance, mine clearance training, mine awareness, mine information, mine survey and marking, and institution building was undertaken. Bosnia and Herzegovina was a large receiver of HMA and other ODA (sub questions 4-7).

Cambodia

Cambodia was not among the 36 partner countries. HMA and the landmine and UXO threat did not play an important role in the PRSP. Repatriation of IDPs, national reconstruction and development, maximizing the socio-economic impact of demining, and a constant dialogue with NGOs were important issues. The embeddedness of CMAC's activities in development was questioned by donors. HALO Trust programs had development priorities embedded in the demining priorities. Sustainable development of new communities was set as top priority with the NPA/CMAC programs. The main focus of the programs was mine and ERW clearance (manual and mechanical). Cambodia received a large amount of HMA and humanitarian funds (sub questions 4-7).

Eritrea

Eritrea was one of the 36 partner countries, and the Netherlands has been by far the large contributor on HMA in Eritrea. There was nothing on HMA in development policy. There was a need for a broader humanitarian policy. Communication and coordination was often failing at the time of 2000. Mine clearance, mine awareness, capacity building and evaluation were the undertaken activities (sub questions 4-7).

Laos

Laos was not among the 36 bilateral partner countries. Dutch ODA funds were also used for sustainable forest management and human rights programs. The UXO problem was an important component of the Lao development policy. UXO Lao emphasized community-oriented projects clearing housing and agricultural area, clearance of land needed for sustainable development projects, assistance with provincial and district health services, and food security or income-generation assistance. UXO Lao was recognized by the government as strategic support program. Programs focused on UXO and mine clearance, UXO survey, UXO awareness, and training and capacity building. Laos received a small amount of HMA funds compared to other donors (sub questions 4-7).

Mozambique

Mozambique was one of the partner countries. The Netherlands funded much on ODA, other funds were used for programs on education, health, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, and poverty alleviation. There was nothing on HMA in the development policy. HMA activities took place in the Nampula province, where they had positive effects on other programs funded by the Netherlands. Most important in the HMA programs were mine clearance (manual, mechanical), mine survey and capacity building (sub questions 4-7).

Overall

The available information gives a clue that embeddedness became more important during the years, for both donors as recipient countries and NGOs. Exact information on socio-economic outcome and impact of the programs was usually not available, thus the valuing on the criteria was very qualitative and reliant on the smart reports of NGOs and UN organizations. Countries with a partnership with the Netherlands had some humanitarian programs funded that benefit from the HMA activities.

Criteria

In most countries the HMA programs were more or less in line with Dutch HMA policy. Embeddedness was quite clear in most countries on paper, but not always in practice. UN programs showed a higher degree of embeddedness. Most embeddedness of HMA was on relief, recovery, repatriation, rehabilitation and sustainable development. IDPs and refugees benefited most from HMA. As far as could be assessed, no groups were left out of the HMA program and some vulnerable groups received extra attention. Efficiency and effectiveness were not always satisfactory. The impact of HMA was safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed development opportunities, but the exact socio-economic numbers are often unknown (sub question 8).

Good and bad practices

Due to lack on good qualitative information it is difficult to give a fair judgement on good and bad practices. The relevance of HMA for the local population is without any doubt, since the removal of the threat of landmines and UXOs (sub question 9).

7 Discussion of Findings on Embeddedness

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter the findings of the previous chapter will be compared with research by Denmark, Sweden, UNDP, and with two articles published in the magazine "Third World Quarterly" from a special thematic number about HMA. Other donors are more or less looking on the embeddedness of their HMA programs into the broader development framework. For Denmark and Sweden an evaluation of HMA activities has taken place. The term coordination (with other sectors) is often used, although embeddedness is more than just coordination (see also § 3.3.2).

7.2 Denmark

The Danish view from the 2005 Danida[7] evaluation is that the HMA sector's interaction (dialogue, co-ordination and collaboration) with other sectors stayed on a poor level, and HMA was an isolated sector. A couple of reasons were given (Danida 2003, p.62-63):

- Insufficient understanding of aid policies, structures and practices among many HMA staff;
- HMA is seen as highly specialized "add-on" by the rest, and is considered to be slow;
- HMA is not appreciated despite the high importance of HMA assessments. The sector did not try hard enough to be understood by the aid community.

The lack of coordination and collaboration between the HMA sector and the aid community caused a loss of resources and possible impact. Joint strategic planning should take place, e.g. in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and other development planning strategies. National governing structures were providing overall policy guidance to HMA in some countries, but did not have enough influence or did not shown enough interest to integrate HMA to get synergic effects. Organizations with a broader mandate on HMA, humanitarian aid and development assistance (such as UNDP, UNICEF, DanChurchAid and the World Bank) can stimulate strategic planning, but in practice it was minimal. Even within Danida HMA was not strongly connected at all to other development program (Danida 2003, p.63-64).

The Danida policy described in §6.2.2 did not have a specific emphasize on embeddedness. Synergy and bilateral sector programs were emphasized, but this was not what was done in practice.

7.3 Sweden

The Sida[8] evaluation of 2001 concluded that within the HMA sector, as in other fields of humanitarian aid, a common understanding of the most important goals and the best way in which to achieve objectives became more important. HMA is highly specialized and often includes large numbers of actors, while it is part of an integrated overall humanitarian effort. A larger coordination effort should improve HMA and humanitarian assistance (Sida 2001, p.41).

Existing coordination between HMA and other humanitarian sectors was nonetheless not seen as satisfactory. Several reasons are given (Sida 2001, p.54):

- The predominance of military expertise, personnel and organizational culture within the HMA sector is seen as a problem;
- The type of imposed coordination within HMA may be a hindrance to coordination with non-HMA actors;
- Focus on coordination within the HMA sector is stronger, since non-HMA actors can not sanction actors within the HMA-sector;
- Coordination is far stronger with policy and strategic planning, compared to day-to-day operations in the field;

[7] Danida is the Danish International Development Agency at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
[8] Sida is the Swedish International Development Agency at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

– UNMACs cause a difficult starting-point for the transfer of responsibility to national institutions.

The policy paper in §6.2.4 was made later than evaluation where abovementioned information comes from. In the policy paper there was a clear wish for more embeddedness.

7.4 Third World Quarterly

In §3.3.2 the article of Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. (2003) was already used to explain the term embeddedness. The UN-led MACs had a rigid approach towards coordination. This article concluded too that embeddedness gained increasingly interest, among policy makers and governmental officials. The predominance of military expertise, personnel and organizational culture was seen as a threat for embeddedness in a broader institutional context/cross-sectoral coordination with non-HMA actors. Coordination inside the HMA sector was seen as smoother than cross-sectoral coordination. Flexibility and innovation had to be encouraged and facilitated. The sector must be aware that competition inside the sector can have negative side-effects in coordination. It can bring increasing hierarchy and authority. Another threat can be the pressure of donors or politicians on decisions, instead of decisions based on adequate information (Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.855, 868-869).

Impact-assessment practices (Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), economic analysis, and community study) were seen as necessary in the article of Harpviken, Millard, Kjellman et al. (2003) for HMA to get a better notion on broader impact issues. Although becoming more accepted, impact is still see as an event and not as integral part of HMA (Harpviken, Millard, Kjellman et al. 2003, p.889).

7.5 UNDP /GICHD study

The 2001 Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action by the UNDP/GICHD also signalized improvements during the years in the pursuit for more and better embeddedness in HMA programs. Focus was not only on numbers of cleared square meters or explosive devices, but on HMA output such as types of land cleared, reductions in accident rates, return of IDPs and refugees, and the number of development projects assisted, in order to get positive socio-economic outcomes. It was found that actors from the non-HMA development actors have to guide HMA actors to ensure embeddedness of HMA in broader development objectives, but also HMA actors have to be pro-active to have HMA activities incorporated into the planning of development actors. When a country turns from conflict to normal development, national authorities have to incorporate socio and economic goals into their development strategy and plan. In practice many problems arise in the transition between post-conflict to normal development. It is better to work together with other willing development actors, than operating independently (UNDP/GICHD 2001, p.3-10).

7.6 Comparison

As in the Netherlands, embeddedness became more important in Denmark and Sweden. Also the article of Kjellberg et al. and the UNDP/GICHD study saw the increasing interest of embeddedness of HMA in a broader development framework. The evaluations of Denmark and Sweden emphasized on that embeddedness/coordination between sectors failed, and possible solutions, and why. In this research on the Netherlands it was found that embeddedness was quite clear in most recipient countries on paper, but not always in practice. One reason was that socio-economic data of achievements was hard to find. Therefore it was difficult to give reasons for the lack of embeddedness. All sources saw problems and threats for a smooth cross-sectoral co-ordination. Both the Sida evaluation as Kjellberg et al. pointed out the distinct military background of HMA and the strong role of the MACs, which made embeddedness with other development sectors difficult.

8 Conclusions and Recommendations

8.1 Conclusions Based on the Research

In this paragraph the main conclusions of this research will be drawn. The conclusions answer the main research question:

How are the HMA programs embedded in a broader framework for sustainable development?

The most important findings are:
- Embeddedness was not seen as top-priority in the Dutch HMA policy, but coherence with existing plans for the socioeconomic rehabilitation of the post-conflict community was requested;
- HMA and its embedding were not mentioned in the 2003 Dutch macro policy paper on development cooperation. Only indirectly it can be brought in relation with several issues;
- Embeddedness became more important during the years, for both donors, as recipient countries and NGOs. This was also found in other research;
- Embeddedness was quite clear in most countries on paper, but not always in practice;
- Most embeddedness of HMA was on relief, recovery, repatriation, rehabilitation and sustainable development;
- The impact of HMA was often safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed development opportunities. The exact socio-economic numbers are often unknown, which was also found in Danish research;
- Therefore it was not possible to give a genuine judgment on the value of the embeddedness;
- Other research concluded that embeddedness has failed to some extent.

8.2 Recommendations for Future Policy

From the conclusions, recommendations for future HMA policy are drawn. This answers the last sub question 10:

10. Which recommendations can be made based on the conclusions of the research (explanative)?

The conclusions show that there is uncertainty on the utility of embeddedness. Therefore no well-grounded recommendations can be made. The only recommendation therefore is:

It is necessary to get better insight into the socio-economic impact of HMA activities. A good strategy and/or method should be sought in cooperation with other donors, relevant UN organizations, and NGOs.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Abbreviations and Acronyms

APM	Anti-personnel mine
ATM	Anti-tank mine (synonym of ATM)
AVM	Anti-vehicle mine (synonym for ATM)
AXO	Abandoned Explosive Ordnance
BHMAC	Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CCW	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
CMAA	Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority
CMAC	Cambodian Mine Action Centre
CMAO	Central Mine Action Office
CND	Commissão Nacional de Desminagem, International De-mining Commission of Mozambique
CNIDAH	Inter-Sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance
CPAU	Cooperation for Peace and Unity
CWC	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
Danida	Danish International Development Agency, part of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
DDI/ST	Dienst Documentaire Informatievoorziening/Semi-statisch archief, Documentary Information Systems Department/Semi-current Records Division
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DGIS	Directoraat-Generaal Internationale Samenwerking, Directorate-General for International Cooperation
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (changed into OCHA)
DMV	Directie Mensenrechten en Vredesopbouw, Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department
EC	European Commission
EDA	Eritrean Demining Agency
EHDP	Eritrean Humanitarian Demining Programme
EMAP	Eritrean Mine Action Programme
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War. ERW is UXO plus AXO.
EU	European Union
FEDMAC	Federation Mine Action Center (BiH)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HALO Trust	Hazardous Area Life-support Organisation Trust
HDI	Human Development Index
HI	Handicap International
HMA	Humanitarian Mine Action
HOM	Humanitair Ontmijnen, humanitarian de-mining
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGO	Inter Governmental Organization
IMAP	Integrated Mine Action Programme
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
INAROEE	Instituto Nacional de Remocao de Obstaculor e Engenhos Explosivos, Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Obstacles and Explosive Ordnance

IND	Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, International De-mining Institute of Mozambique
IOB	Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Directorate-General for International Co-operation of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ITF	International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims
KZA	Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika (Committee for Southern Africa)
LM	Landmine Monitor
LUMU	Land Use Management Unit
LUPU	Land Use Planning Unit
MAC	Mine Action Capacity
MACA	Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan
MACC	Mine Action Coordination Centre
MAFP	Mine Action for Peace
MAG	Mine Advisory Group
MAPA	Mine Action Program for Afghanistan
MASG	Mine Action Support Group
MDD	Mine Detection Dog
META	Mine Evaluation and Training Agency (Kabul)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MgM	Menschen gegen Minen
MMT	Mine Marking Team
MvBZ	Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Coorperation
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NRA	National Regulatory Authority
OCHA (UNOCHA)	United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Ottawa Treaty	The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
RSMAC	Republika Srpska Mine Action Center (BiH)
SAA	Small Arms Ammunitions
SIDA	Swedish Development Agency
St Vl.	Stichting Vluchtelingenwerk
TK	Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Dutch lower house parliament
TMF	Thematische Medefinanciering, thematic co-financing
TNO	Nederlandse Organisatie voor toegepast-natuurwetenschappelijk onderzoek, Dutch organization for applied natural science research
TSZ	Temporary Security Zone
UN	United Nations
UNDHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAC	United Nations Mine Action Centre (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
UNMACA	United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
UXO Lao	Lao National UXO Programme
VTF	Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (United Nations)
WFP	World Food Programme

Appendix 2: Definitions

Term	Abbr	Definition	Source
Abandoned explosive ordnance	*AXO*	Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under control of the party that left it behind or dumped it. Abandoned explosive ordnance may or may not have been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use.	(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2)
Anti-handling device		A device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.	(Ottawa Convention 1997: Article 2)
Anti-personnel mine	*APM*	A mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.	(Ottawa Convention 1997: Article 2)
Blinding Laser Weapons		Laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices.	(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 1995: Article 1)
Existing explosive remnants of war		Means unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance that existed prior to the entry into force of this Protocol for the High Contracting Party on whose territory it exists	(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2)
Explosive ordnance		Conventional munitions containing explosives, with the exception of mines, booby traps and other devices as defined in Amended Protocol II of the CCW	(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2)
Explosive remnants of war	*ERW*	Unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance.	(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2)
Mine		A munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or	(Ottawa Convention 1997: Article 2)

		contact of a person or a vehicle.	
Remotely-delivered mine		A mine not directly emplaced but delivered by artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. Mines delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 metres are not considered to be "remotely delivered".	(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 1996: Article 2)
Self-deactivating		Automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example, a battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition.	(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 1996: Article 2)
Self-destruction mechanism		An incorporated or externally attached automatically-functioning mechanism which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated or to which it is attached.	(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 1996: Article 2)
Self-neutralization mechanism		An incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which renders inoperable the munition into which it is incorporated.	(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 1996: Article 2)
Unexploded ordnance	*UXO*	Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for use and used in an armed conflict. It may have been fired, dropped, launched or projected and should have exploded but failed to do so.	(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2)
Mine survey:			
General mine action assessment (IMAS 8.10; previously called Level One: General Survey)		Aims are: assess the scale and impact of the landmine problem on the country and individual communities; investigate all reported and/or suspected areas of mine or UXO contamination, quantities and types of explosive hazards; and collect general information such as the security situation, terrain, soil characteristics, climate, routes, infrastructure and local support facilities, to assist the planning of future mine action projects.	(GICHD 2006, p.48)
Technical survey (IMAS 8.20; previously called Level Two: Technical Survey)		The primary aim of a technical survey is to collect sufficient information to enable the clearance requirement to be more accurately defined, including the areas to be cleared, the depth of clearance, local soil conditions and the vegetation characteristics.	(GICHD 2006, p.51)
Post-clearance documentation		All post-clearance inspections should be completed and any corrective action carried out. Permanent survey markers should be put down and	(GICHD 2006, p.54)

(IMAS 8.30; previously called Level Three: Completion Survey)	accurately recorded for future reference. And all necessary information such as monitoring and inspection reports should be collated and made available for the formal handover.	
Land use - Transport	Actual land use after clearance is for transport infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, railways or airstrips.	(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11)
Land use - Communal Infrastructure	Actual land use after clearance is for communal infrastructure, such as schools, health centres, churches or wells.	(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11)
Land use - Agriculture	Actual land use after clearance is for agriculture, including crops such as cassava, maize, rice and fruit. Excluded are smaller scale gardens inside any housing plots.	(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11)
Land use - Settlement	Actual land use after clearance is for housing plots, including smaller scale gardens inside the plots.	(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11)
Land use - Other	Actual land use after clearance is for does not fall into any other definition.	(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11)

Appendix 3: States Parties of the Ottawa Treaty



Source: (ICBL 2006a)

Appendix 4: Overview of the Financial Support on HMA by the Netherlands

Table 0-1: Amount of the financial support by the Netherlands

Country-related	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total	%	R*[5]	Y*[6]
Afghanistan	750.000	2.500.000	1.500.000	1.350.000	3.434.180	2.000.000	2.090.000	1.468.561	1.345.038	**16.437.779**	13,7	2	9
Albania					177.165					**177.165**	0,1	20	1
Angola	4.670.500	4.008.815	4.101.000	1.800.000	1.095.508	1.143.170	500.000	1.096.631	2.000.076	**19.916.200**	16,6	1	9
Azerbaijan*[1]					572.422		518.181	650.000	500.307	**2.240.910**	1,9	10	4
BiH	250.000	500.000	2.100.000	1.179.245	1.000.000	1.000.000			499.500	**6.528.745**	5,5	6	7
Cambodia	2.553.000	2.450.000	2.502.000	300.000	776.786	565.654	2.912.810	675.489	1.165.435	**13.901.174**	11,6	3	9
Congo									252.000	**252.000**	0,2	19	1
Eritrea					4.200.000	500.000	3.500.000	1.547.512	50.000	**9.797.512**	8,2	4	5
Ethiopia						1.000.000				**1.000.000**	0,8	14	1
FRY*[2]				2.892.948	364.998	376.761		697.072		**4.331.779**	3,6	8	4
Georgia				190.101	446.905		376.015	300.000	123.543	**1.436.564**	1,2	13	5
Guinea-Bissau						500.000	500.000			**1.000.000**	0,8	14	2
Iraq	276.088				692.249	997.587		975.000	1.625.000	**4.565.924**	3,8	7	5
Laos		100.000	470.000		500.000	500.000	500.000		351.000	**2.421.000**	2,0	9	6
Mozambique	2.433.928		1.343.000	194.990	1.275.628	1.199.544	1.230.862	973.568	804.874	**9.261.404**	7,7	5	8
Russian Federation	272.030									**272.030**	0,2	18	1
Sudan									400.050	**400.050**	0,3	17	1
Somalia				100.000		159.776	535.000	457.445	596.704	**1.848.925**	1,5	11	5
Sri Lanka								465.987		**465.987**	0,4	16	1
Yemen					80.000	500.000	500.000	300.000	198.000	**1.578.000**	1,3	12	5
Other	**1996**	**1997**	**1998**	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**Total**			
HALO Trust							570.000	324.592	200.000	**1.094.592**	0,9		
ICBL						120.000	120.000		120.000	**360.000**	0,3		
ICRC				1.600.000	2.153.846	454.000	454.000	454.000	n/a. TMF*[4]	**5.115.846**	4,3		
HOM*[3]			10.000.000							**10.000.000**	8,4		
UNMAS VTF					1.730.770	1.500.000	1.500.000	600.000	n/a. TMF*[4]	**5.330.770**	4,5		
Total	11.205.546	9.558.815	22.016.000	9.607.284	18.500.457	12.516.492	15.806.868	10.985.857	10.231.527	**120.428.846**	100		
%	9,3	7,9	18,3	8,0	15,4	10,4	13,1	9,1	8,5	**100**			

*[1] In *Azerbaijan* the program was undertaken in the Nagorno-Karabkh region

*[2] In the *FRY* (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) the program was undertaken in the Kosovo province, in nowadays Serbia

*[3] HOM = *Humanitair OntMijnen* (humanitarian de-mining). This fund was largely spent on research of the TNO research institute on mechanical mine clearance

*[4] TMF = *Thematische Mede-Financiering* (thematic co-financing)

*[5] R = ranking of countries

*[6] Y = number of years that programs were funded in the specific country

Sums in US$

Source: (UNMAS 2006: The Netherlands)

Table 0-2: Funding by the Netherlands per HMA category

Category	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	Total	%
Advocacy & Prevention:									*1.090.440*	1,0
Campaign Support	110.000				100.000	120.000		120.000	**450.000**	0,4
Conference Support		50.000			295.275				**345.275**	0,3
General / Unspecified					177.165		120.000		**297.165**	0,3
Coordination									*10.347.198*	9,3
General / Unspecified			1.050.000					300.000	**1.350.000**	1,2
Mine Action Centre Core Support	246.428		1.050.000		1.730.770	1.500.000	1.500.000	1.470.000	**7.497.198**	6,7
Multilateral / Regional Core Support						1.500.000			**1.500.000**	1,3
Information									*2.297.000*	2,1
Surveys		1.297.000				1.000.000			**2.297.000**	2,1
Integrated Mine Action	5.053.000	5.550.000	5.978.000	4.229.245	9.314.749	5.883.241	1.500.000		**37.508.235**	33,6
Mine Awareness									*6.183.972*	5,5
General / Unspecified	647.500		175.000		677.203		4.518.181		**6.017.884**	5,4
Training	166.088								**166.088**	0,1
Mine Clearance									*36.691.612*	32,9
De-mining	2.873.000	1.510.598	2.177.000	4.050.069	3.528.951	1.801.735	5.913.825		**21.855.178**	19,6
Dogs		1.201.217					570.000	324.592	**2.095.809**	1,9
Equipment					364.998				**364.998**	0,3
General / Unspecified	1.150.000						1.230.862	9.307.265	**11.688.127**	10,5
Training	687.500								**687.500**	0,6
Research & Development									*10.000.000*	9,0
Equipment Development			10.000.000						**10.000.000**	9,0
Victim Assistance									*7.391.862*	6,6
General / Unspecified			1.761.000	1.600.000	2.153.846	711.516	454.000	454.000	**7.134.362**	6,4
Prosthetics / Orthotics					257.500				**257.500**	0,2
Total:	**10.933.516**	**9.608.815**	**22.191.000**	**9.879.314**	**18.600.457**	**12.516.492**	**15.806.868**	**11.975.857**	**111.512.319**	100

PS: This table is without data for the year 2004. Total numbers differ slightly from the previous table.
Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: The Netherlands)

Appendix 5: Basic Key Indicators for the Analyzed Countries

Table 0-3: Some key basic indicators about Afghanistan

Subject		Value	Year
Continent		Asia	
Official name		Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	
Capital		Kabul	
Type of government		Islamic republic	
Population	inhabitants	31,1 million	2006
Growth of population		2,67%	2006
Area	km^2	647.500 (15,6x NL)	
Density	inhabitants/km^2	48,0	2006
Development	HDI	n/a	
Life expectancy at birth	years	43,34	2006
Income	GDP (PPP) per capita	$800	2004
Economy	Real GDP growth/year	8,0-28,6%	2002-2005

Sources: (CIA 2006: Afghanistan; EIU 2006a: Afghanistan)

Table 0-4: Some key basic indicators about Angola

Subject		Value	Year
Continent		Africa	
Official name		Republic of Angola	
Capital		Luanda	
Type of government		Unitary republic	
Population	inhabitants	12,1 million	2006
Growth of population		2,45%	2006
Area	km^2	1.246.700 (30,0x NL)	
Density	inhabitants/km^2	9,7	2006
Development	HDI	0,445 (160^{th}/177)	2003
Life expectancy at birth	years	38,62	2006
Income	GDP (PPP) per capita	$3.200	2005
Economy	Real GDP growth/year	3,2-19,1%	2001-2005

Sources: (CIA 2006: Angola; EIU 2006a: Angola; UNDP 2005, p.222)

Table 0-5: Some key basic indicators about Bosnia and Herzegovina

Subject		Value	Year
Continent		Europe	
Official name		Bosnia and Herzegovina	
Capital		Sarajevo	
Type of government		Emerging federal democratic republic	
Population	inhabitants	4,5 million	2006
Growth of population		1,35%	2006
Area	km^2	51.129 (1,2x NL)	
Density	inhabitants/km^2	88,0	2006
Development	HDI	0,786 (68^{th}/177)	2003
Life expectancy at birth	years	78	2006
Income	GDP (PPP) per capita	$6.800	2005
Economy	Real GDP growth/year	4,0-5,7%	2001-2005

Sources: (CIA 2006: Bosnia and Herzegovina; EIU 2006a: Bosnia and Herzegovina; UNDP 2005, p.220)

Table 0-6: Some key basic indicators about Cambodia

Subject		Value	Year
Continent		Asia	
Official name		Cambodia	
Capital		Phnom Penh	
Type of government		Constitutional monarchy	
Population	inhabitants	13,9 million	2006
Growth of population		1,35%	2006
Area	km^2	176.520 (4,3x NL)	
Density	inhabitants/km^2	78,6	2006
Development	HDI	0,571 (130^{th}/177)	2003
Life expectancy at birth	years	59,29	2006
Income	GDP (PPP) per capita	$2.200	2005
Economy	Real GDP growth/year	5,2-7,7%	2001-2005

Sources: (CIA 2006: Cambodia; EIU 2006b: Cambodia; UNDP 2005, p.221)

Table 0-7: Some key basic indicators about Eritrea

Subject		Value	Year
Continent		Africa	
Official name		Eritrea	
Capital		Asmara	
Type of government		Unitary state	
Population	inhabitants	4,8 million	2006
Growth of population		2,47%	2006
Area	km^2	121.320 (2,9x NL)	
Density	inhabitants/km^2	39,5	2006
Development	HDI	0,444 (161^{st}/177)	2003
Life expectancy at birth	years	59,03	2006
Income	GDP (PPP) per capita	$1.000	2005
Economy	Real GDP growth/year	0,7-3,0%	2002-2005

Sources: (CIA 2006: Eritrea; EIU 2006a: Eritrea; UNDP 2005, p.222)

Table 0-8: Some key basic indicators about Laos

Subject		Value	Year
Continent		Asia	
Official name		Lao People's Democratic Republic	
Capital		Vientiane	
Type of government		One-party rule	
Population	inhabitants	6,4 million	2006
Growth of population		2,39%	2006
Area	km^2	230.800 (5,6x NL)	
Density	inhabitants/km^2	27,6	2006
Development	HDI	0,545 (133^{rd}/177)	2003
Life expectancy at birth	years	55,49	2006
Income	GDP (PPP) per capita	$1.900	2005
Economy	Real GDP growth/year	5,0-10,6%	2001-2005

Sources: (CIA 2006: Laos; EIU 2006b: Laos; UNDP 2005, p.221)

Table 0-9: Some key basic indicators about Mozambique

Subject		Value	Year
Continent		Africa	
Official name		Republic of Mozambique	
Capital		Maputo	
Type of government		Unitary republic	
Population	inhabitants	19,7 million	2006
Growth of population		1,38%	2006
Area	km^2	784.090 (18,9x NL)	
Density	inhabitants/km^2	25,1	2006
Development	HDI	0,379 (168^{th}/177)	2003
Life expectancy at birth	years	39,82	2006
Income	GDP (PPP) per capita	$1.300	2005
Economy	Real GDP growth/year	7,2-13,0%	2001-2005

Sources: (CIA 2006: Mozambique; EIU 2006b: Mozambique; UNDP 2005, p.222)

Appendix 6: HMA Funding by the Different Donors

The tables in this appendix show the funds that different countries provided in the years 1996-2004 for HMA per recipient country. This data comes from the UNMAS Mine Action Investments website, which is an important database, which is annually updated by many HMA donors, including the Netherlands.

Table 0-10: Donors that funded HMA programs in Afghanistan

Country	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total	Share
Australia			700.000		300.000					**1.000.000**	0,3%
Austria					200.000	200.000	1.238.324	104.453	622.837	**2.365.614**	0,8%
Belgium		250.000								**250.000**	0,1%
Canada	24.386	1.492.426	337.150	984.599	94.262	3.811.910	5.939.500	7.296.780	7.822.356	**35.575.906**	12,0%
Denmark				350.000		2.460.000			3.290.913	**8.915.157**	3,0%
European Union	14.000.000		1.748.000	564.000		5.389.514				**21.701.514**	7,3%
Finland	435.000	367.000	500.000	541.000	488.000	458.000	1.000.000	1.108.333	1.222.500	**8.695.000**	2,9%
France		135.250								**135.250**	0,0%
Germany		2.639.464	2.999.999	2.715.000	2.107.000	1.641.708	6.444.530	3.509.661	3.825.470	**29.940.111**	10,1%
Italy			855.818	545.786	778.792	2.280.000	1.003.500		114.610	**6.206.963**	2,1%
Japan		1.000.000	210.000	1.500.740	1.031.460	799.477	24.169.044	10.501.849	13.220.632	**68.433.202**	23,1%
Korea, Republic of										**75.000**	0,0%
Lithuania										**100.000**	0,0%
Netherlands	**750.000**	**2.500.000**	**1.500.000**	**1.350.000**	**3.434.180**	**2.000.000**	**2.090.000**	**1.468.561**	**1.345.038**	**16.437.779**	**5,5%**
Norway	706.212	1.375.000	4.258.500	1.362.500	705.654	1.264.700				**12.582.435**	4,2%
Sweden				2.100.000						**2.100.000**	0,7%
Switzerland							101.000	75.000	174.500	**581.000**	0,2%
United Kingdom	1.640.000	3.200.000	1.744.000							**11.300.939**	3,8%
United States			2.200.000	4.615.000	3.000.000	2.800.000			42.794.000	**69.809.000**	23,6%
Total	**17.555.598**	**12.959.140**	**17.053.467**	**16.628.625**	**12.139.348**	**23.105.309**	**41.985.898**	**24.064.637**	**74.432.856**	**296.204.870**	

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Afghanistan)

Table 0-11: Donors that funded HMA programs in Angola

Countries	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total	Share
Australia			750.000		62.000					**812.000**	0,6%
Austria							158.180	147.583		**305.763**	0,2%
Belgium		1.370.000	140.000							**1.510.000**	1,2%
Canada	13.201	654.314	168.575	208.630	168.325	129.164	401.592	342.549	152.597	**2.474.931**	1,9%
Denmark				1.250.000					993.262	**3.484.868**	2,7%
European Union	7.240.000		1.607.000	4.060.000	178.118					**13.085.118**	10,2%
Finland	98.000	367.000	500.000	541.000		422.000	833.200	1.108.333	1.222.500	**6.615.728**	5,2%
France	600.370	1.237.123					239.400			**2.076.893**	1,6%
Germany		1.531.122	2.531.391	1.105.000	326.000	518.111	1.628.969	2.784.300	4.188.806	**17.114.792**	13,3%
Ireland				266.099						**266.099**	0,2%
Italy				3.550.873			2.805.200	869.120	954.398	**8.179.591**	6,4%
Japan	1.400.000	400.000		82.412		130.000		1.351.354	1.241.089	**4.604.855**	3,6%
Netherlands	**4.670.500**	**4.008.815**	**4.101.000**	**1.800.000**	**1.095.508**	**1.143.170**	**500.000**	**1.096.631**	2.000.076	**19.916.200**	**15,9%**
New Zealand		852.200	362.800	159.150						**1.374.150**	1,1%
Norway	2.150.077	3.067.977	1.396.262	2.714.500	1.750.939	2.259.999				**16.704.386**	13,0%
Switzerland							400.000	320.000	658.000	**2.016.000**	1,6%
United Kingdom										**2.002.666**	1,6%
United States			2.417.038	3.033.000	3.096.000	3.844.000			6.100.000	**25.313.038**	19,7%
Total	**16.172.148**	**13.488.551**	**13.974.066**	**18.770.664**	**6.676.890**	**8.446.444**	**6.966.541**	**8.019.870**	**17.510.728**	**128.356.578**	

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Angola)

Table 0-12: Donors that funded HMA programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Country	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total	Share
Austria				518.171	474.743	130.658	115.544	481.654	459.240	**2.180.010**	1,5%
Belgium		710.000								**710.000**	0,5%
Canada	11.184	1.184.986	1.665.521	2.421.358	1.158.076	1.168.059	979.146	1.330.618	1.983.947	**12.925.180**	9,1%
Denmark			400.000	400.000						**800.000**	0,6%
European Union	12.290.000		2.583.000	5.640.000	3.330.806	5.293.412				**29.137.218**	20,5%
Finland	457.000		196.000	541.000	327.000	540.000	709.000	188.417	207.825	**3.166.242**	2,2%
France		274.916	274.916							**549.832**	0,4%
Germany		450.371	724.136	577.500	911.500	748.825	1.692.937	1.386.528	1.736.823	**10.268.620**	7,2%
Ireland				229.618						**229.618**	0,2%
Italy		3.445.187				420.000	1.829.587	496.640	682.200	**6.873.614**	4,8%
Japan	1.300.030		1.195.644	1.095.750	3.100.000	832.061	171.180			**7.694.665**	5,4%
Korea, Republic of					60.000					**60.000**	0,0%
Netherlands	**250.000**	**500.000**	**2.100.000**	**1.179.245**	**1.000.000**	**1.000.000**			**499.500**	**6.528.745**	**4,6%**
Norway	4.882.250	2.936.030	3.734.463	2.629.375	3.015.716	1.663.241				**19.696.074**	13,9%
Slovenia			1.300.000	298.042	102.087	225.346	171.168	222.296	156.299	**2.748.866**	1,9%
Switzerland				1.120.000	398.000	345.000	267.070	120.000	135.000	**2.706.070**	1,9%
United Kingdom	24.000									**48.368**	0,0%
United States			9.400.000	7.739.000	5.500.000	5.661.000			3.500.000	**35.673.000**	25,1%
Total	**19.214.464**	**9.501.490**	**23.573.680**	**24.389.059**	**19.377.928**	**18.027.602**	**5.935.632**	**4.226.153**	**9.360.834**	**141.996.122**	

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Table 0-13: Donors that funded HMA programs in Cambodia

Country	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total	Share
Australia			2.900.000	3.648.000	2.023.000					**8.571.000**	5,6%
Austria				546.166	133.300	71.283				**750.749**	0,5%
Belgium		850.000	2.025.000	1.159.210	284.000	337.931				**4.656.141**	3,0%
Canada	537.766	529.553	664.492	535.708	1.599.761	1.409.164	690.208	1.188.485	2.790.490	**9.945.627**	6,5%
European Union	3.666.000		4.889.000	902.000						**9.457.000**	6,2%
Finland	218.000	2.298.000	757.000	751.200	3.150.600	1.328.000	1.109.900	1.232.778	1.246.950	**12.092.428**	7,9%
France	796.592				754.426	323.669	1.104.603			**2.979.290**	1,9%
Germany		443.616	321.839	1.275.000	1.535.000	1.383.695	1.018.489	697.248	884.400	**7.559.287**	4,9%
Ireland				128.963						**128.963**	0,1%
Italy				485.143						**485.143**	0,3%
Japan	2.778.510		1.726.921	7.446.881	5.893.396	3.030.932	9.494.634	3.242.891	18.312.675	**51.926.840**	33,8%
Korea, Republic of		50.000	25.000	25.000	80.000	70.000				**250.000**	0,2%
Netherlands	**2.553.000**	**2.450.000**	**2.502.000**	**300.000**	**776.786**	**565.654**	**2.912.810**	**675.489**	**1.165.435**	**13.901.174**	**9,1%**
New Zealand	75.000	376.550	275.500	283.500		120.000	40.000	37.000		**1.207.550**	0,8%
Norway	1.216.602	1.607.732	1.632.625	562.500	861.557	107.777				**5.988.793**	3,9%
United Kingdom	1.693.920	1.103.497	2.611.659							**5.409.076**	3,5%
United States			2.900.000	3.000.000	3.119.500	4.591.000			4.631.000	**18.241.500**	11,9%
Total	**13.535.390**	**9.708.948**	**23.231.036**	**21.049.271**	**20.211.326**	**13.339.105**	**16.370.644**	**7.073.891**	**29.030.950**	**153.550.561**	

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Cambodia)

Table 0-14: Donors that funded HMA programs in Eritrea

Country	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total	Share
Canada						1.072.063	68.175	150.000	317.454	**1.607.692**	6,8%
Denmark						2.199.000				**2.199.000**	9,3%
European Union						1.551.228				**1.551.228**	6,5%
Finland						99.000				**99.000**	0,4%
Germany						727.851	99.989		284.986	**1.112.826**	4,7%
Italy									114.610	**114.610**	0,5%
Japan							563.385			**563.385**	2,4%
Netherlands					**4.200.000**	**500.000**	**3.500.000**	**1.547.512**		**9.747.512**	**41,2%**
Norway						333.333				**333.333**	1,4%
Switzerland						75.000	488.000	287.500	325.000	**1.175.500**	5,0%
United States			2.025.000		500.000	1.205.000			1.452.000	**5.182.000**	21,9%
Total	**0**	**0**	**2.025.000**	**0**	**4.700.000**	**7.762.475**	**4.719.549**	**1.985.012**	**2.494.050**	**23.686.086**	

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Eritrea)

Table 0-15: Donors that funded HMA programs in Lao PDR

Country	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total	Share
Australia			630.000	1.008.000	890.000					**2.528.000**	6,0%
Belgium		425.000	810.000	417.500	417.500	496.074				**2.566.074**	6,1%
Canada	10.719	10.555	306.807	100.950	100.995	228.621	173.650	171.593	314.675	**1.418.565**	3,4%
Denmark		360.000								**360.000**	0,9%
European Union	3.271.000		3.045.000							**6.316.000**	15,0%
Finland		283.000			325.000		300.000	332.500	366.750	**1.607.250**	3,8%
Germany		991.294	1.183.908	1.085.000	884.000	827.967	745.212	705.734	585.009	**7.008.124**	16,7%
Italy							150.225			**150.225**	0,4%
Japan		250.000	33.582	200.000	75.148		200.000	200.000		**958.730**	2,3%
Korea, Republic of					50.000	50.000				**100.000**	0,2%
Netherlands		**100.000**	**470.000**		**500.000**	**500.000**	**500.000**		**351.000**	**2.421.000**	**5,8%**
New Zealand		239.250	232.250	224.100						**695.600**	1,7%
Norway		187.500	312.500	687.500	877.605	666.665				**2.731.770**	6,5%
United Kingdom	237.291	101.250	528.000							**866.541**	2,1%
United States			4.630.000	3.300.000	1.486.000	993.000			1.912.000	**12.321.000**	29,3%
Total	**3.519.010**	**2.947.849**	**12.182.047**	**7.023.050**	**5.606.248**	**3.762.327**	**2.069.087**	**1.409.827**	**3.529.434**	**42.048.879**	

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Laos)

Table 0-16: Donors that funded HMA programs in Mozambique

Country	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total	Share
Australia			140.000	2.652.000	700.000					**3.492.000**	4,3%
Austria					373.300		270.389	400.000		**1.043.689**	1,3%
Canada	18.335	25.277	438.296	1.728.937	2.212.417	1.066.661	1.317.342	873.600	576.249	**8.257.114**	10,2%
Denmark				2.000.000	2.000.000				53.475	**4.053.475**	5,0%
European Union	2.871.000			81.000						**2.952.000**	3,6%
Finland	98.000	1.000.000	2.802.000	1.351.000	195.000	1.070.000	336.300			**6.852.300**	8,4%
France		41.234	2.611.522				687.240			**3.339.996**	4,1%
Germany		416.051	1.628.063	525.000	986.000	1.277.287	912.007	1.004.560	196.000	**6.944.968**	8,6%
Italy							903.150			**903.150**	1,1%
Japan			1.000.000	264.000	600.000	932.402		690.273	662.478	**4.149.153**	5,1%
Korea, Republic of					50.000					**50.000**	0,1%
Netherlands	**2.433.928**		**1.343.000**	**194.990**	**1.275.628**	**1.199.544**	**1.230.862**	**973.568**	**804.874**	**9.456.394**	**11,7%**
New Zealand		254.250	195.750	162.500		54.000				**666.500**	0,8%
Norway	2.546.000	1.974.125	1.966.375	937.500	1.628.004	1.666.666				**10.718.670**	13,2%
Slovenia					20.174					**20.174**	0,0%
Switzerland				82.000	1.124.000	950.000	1.160.000	705.000	728.000	**4.749.000**	5,9%
United Kingdom		780.000	580.000							**1.360.000**	1,7%
United States			2.600.000	3.000.000	3.839.999	2.480.000			182.000	**12.101.999**	14,9%
Total	**7.967.263**	**4.490.937**	**15.305.006**	**12.978.927**	**15.004.522**	**10.696.560**	**6.817.290**	**4.647.001**	**3.203.076**	**81.110.582**	

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Mozambique)

Appendix 7: Programs Funded by the Netherlands

The tables in this appendix shows activities funded by the Netherlands. The numbers of the tables in this and previous appendix may differ, due to the difference in Euro (guilder) and US$ rate, and difficulties finding certain information from archives and databases.

Table 0-17: Funded programs in Afghanistan

MFA program number	HMA activities*	Start	End	Supervising organization	Executive organization	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total 1996-2004
AF005601	Mine clearance, management support, and co-ordination of OCHA activities	01/01/1997	31/12/1998	DHA	OCHA		1.247.896								**1.247.896**
AF006301	Mine awareness, mine clearance training, mine identification, mine survey, mine clearance (manual and mechanical), and support for management, monitoring and logistics of the Mine Action Plan.	01/01/1997	31/12/1998	OCHA	OCHA		1.361.341								**1.361.341**
WW131501	Mine clearance	01/01/1997	31/12/1998	ICRC	ICRC		453.780								**453.780**
WW135107	Mine awareness, mine clearance training, minefield survey and marking, and mine clearance	01/01/1998	31/12/1999	OCHA	OCHA			907.560							**907.560**
WW152709	Mine and ERW clearance, mine survey, evaluation and training, mine awareness	01/01/1999	31/12/2000	OCHA	OCHA				1.361.341						**1.361.341**
WW165511	Mine clearance, mine identification and marking, mine awareness, and mine clearance training	01/01/2000	30/06/2001	OCHA	OCHA					3.176.462					**3.176.462**
WW165531	Mine clearance	01/10/2000	31/12/2001	HALO Trust	HALO Trust					434.784	129.685	125.611			**690.080**
WW185802	Mine clearance	01/01/2001	31/12/2001	OCHA	OCHA						1.123.028				**1.123.028**
WW185818	Mine and ERW clearance	01/01/2001	31/12/2002	OCHA	OCHA						1.132.567	1.135.912			**2.268.479**
6411	Mine and ERW clearance	01/01/2003	31/12/2003	UNMAS	UNMAS								600.000		**600.000**
9768	Mine and ERW clearance, mine survey and marking, and mine awareness	01/01/2004	31/12/2005	UNMAS	UNMAS									499.500	**499.500**
Total						**0**	**3.063.017**	**907.560**	**1361.341**	**3.611.246**	**2385.280**	**1.261.523**	**600.000**	**499.500**	**13.689.467**

* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)

Table 0-18: Funded programs in Angola

MFA program number	HMA activities*	Start	End	Supervising organization	Executive organization	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total 1996-2004
AO005903	Mine awareness	01/06 /1996	31/12 /1998	UNICEF	UNICEF	587.645									**587.645**
AO005904	Mine clearance, to make humanitarian aid programs possible	01/10 /1996	30/09 /1998	KZA	NPA	1.211.593	340.335	1.007.392	84.071						**2.643.392**
AO005906	Mine clearance, to make the return of IDPs and the recovery of rural infrastructure possible	01/08 /1996	31/10 /1999	WFP	WFP	1.043.920									**1.043.920**
AO006801	Mine survey, priority setting for mine clearance	01/01 /1997	31/12 /1997	NPA	NPA		928.199		119.556						**1.047.755**
AO006802	Mine clearance training, and mine clearance with MDDs	01/07 /1997	30/06 /1998	NPA	NPA		537.485	329.882	213.008						**1.080.375**
AO006803	Mine clearance, to make the return of IDPs and the recovery of rural infrastructure possible	01/10 /1997	30/06 /1998	MgM	MgM		1.224.768	71.725	51.873						**1.348.365**
WW135102	Mine survey	01/01 /1998	31/12 /1998	NPA	NPA			720.403	188.250						**908.652**
WW152703	Mechanical mine clearance, to make the return of IDPs possible	01/01 /1999	31/12 /1999	NPA	NPA				278.418			40.893			**319.311**
WW152704	ERW clearance	01/01 /1999	31/12 /1999	NPA	NPA				175.658			45.223			**220.881**
WW152705	Mine clearance, to make the return of IDPs and the recovery of rural infrastructure possible	01/01 /1999	31/12 /1999	MgM	MgM				869.636			41.811			**911.447**
WW165516	Mine clearance to support humanitarian programs of WFP programs	01/01 /2000	31/12 /2001	WFP	MgM					595.085					**595.085**
WW165517	Victim assistance and social rehabilitation	01/01 /2000	30/09 /2001	St Vl.	HI NL					229.023		44.198			**273.220**
WW165518	EOD and mechanical mine clearance	01/01 /2000	31/12 /2000	NPA	NPA					368.350		52.306			**420.656**
WW185801	De-mining of infrastructure (bridges, roads) in order to make the population more mobile, facilitating humanitarian programs, clear agricultural area in order to increase ability to live, rebuild social infrastructure	01/01 /2001	31/12 /2001	NPA	NPA						608.792				**608.792**

WW185810	De-mining	01/01/2001	31/12/2001	HALO Trust	HALO Trust						428.541	95.657			**524.198**
WW192402	De-mining	01/01/2002	31/12/2002	NPA	NPA							408.000			**408.000**
WW207102	De-mining	01-jan-03	31-dec-04	NPA	NPA								372.000		**372.000**
4423	De-mining	01/01/2003	31/12/2004	NPA	NPA								400.000	49.674	**449.674**
6466	De-mining	01/01/2001	31/12/2004	NPA	NPA								129.426		**129.426**
6478	De-mining	01/01/2002	31/12/2004	NPA	NPA								100.000		**100.000**
Total						**2.845.154**	**3.030.787**	**2.129.402**	**1.980.470**	**1.192.458**	**1.037.333**	**728.008**	**1.001.426**	**49.674**	**13.994.712**

* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)

Table 0-19: Funded programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

MFA program number	HMA activities*	Start	End	Supervising organization	Executive organization	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total 1996-2004
BA002801	Set up a school for mine clearance training for demobilized soldiers, mine clearance	01/05/1996	30/04/1997	NPA	NPA	181.512			17.205						**198.717**
BA007101	Mine awareness, mine information and minefield marking, mine/UXO clearance. training	01/01/1997	31/12/1997	DHA	DHA	453.780									**453.780**
WW135106	Mine survey and marking, mine awareness, mine clearance, training	01/01/1998	31/12/1998	UNDP	UNMAC			952.938							**952.938**
WW152707	De-mining, institution building of national MAC	01/01/1999	31/12/2002	UNDP	UNDP				1.118.825						**1.118.825**
WW185811	De-mining	01/06/2001	31/05/2003	UNDP	UNDP						688.787	389.937			**1.078.724**
9685	Mine awareness, mine information and minefield marking, mine/UXO clearance. training	01/01/2004	31/12/2004	UNDP	UNDP									499.500	**499.500**
Total						**635.292**	**0**	**952.938**	**1.136.030**	**0**	**688.787**	**389.937**	**0**	**499.500**	**4.302.484**

* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)

Table 0-20: Funded programs in Cambodia

MFA program number	HMA activities*	Start	End	Supervising organization	Executive organization	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total 1996-2004
KH006801	De-mining	01/07 /1996	31/12 /1996	UNDP	CMAC	2.317.361									**2.317.361**
KH009201	De-mining	01/10 /1997	31/03 /1998	UNDP	CMAC		2.217.103								**2.217.103**
WW135108	De-mining	01/10 /1998	30/06 /1999	UNDP	CMAC			1.089.164	1.181.406						**2.270.570**
WW152711	De-mining	01/07 /1999	31/12 /1999	UNDP	CMAC				292.688						**292.688**
WW165532	De-mining for safety of civilians, facilitating the return of IDPs and recovery of agriculture	01/12 /2000	31/12 /2001	HALO Trust	HALO Trust					300.667	16.648	59.007			**376.322**
WW165534	Mine clearance aimed at IDPs and landless, agriculture, rehabilitation and social infrastructure	01/03 /2001	30/04 /2002	NPA	CMAC					424.937	579.106	47.281			**1.051.324**
WW192401	De-mining, ERW clearance, and mine awareness	01/05 /2002	30/04 /2004	NPA	NPA							681.607			**681.607**
WW207101	Mechanical mine clearance, mine risk education	01/01 /2003	31/12 /2004	NPA	NPA								372.000		**372.000**
6476	De-mining	01/05 /2003	31/12 /2005	NPA	NPA								969.093	189.435	**1.158.528**
Total						**2.317.361**	**2.217.103**	**1.089.164**	**1.474.094**	**725.604**	**595.754**	**787.895**	**1.341.093**	**189.435**	**10.737.503**

* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)

Table 0-21: Funded programs in Eritrea

MFA program number	HMA activities*	Start	End	Supervising organization	Executive organization	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total 1996-2004
WW165535	Mine clearance	01/12/2000	31/12/2001	HALO Trust	HALO Trust					2.918.678	1.536.679	216.203			**4.671.559**
WW185819	Mine action centre core support, mine awareness	01/01/2001	31/12/2002	UNDP	UNOPS						559.754				**559.754**
WW192404	Mine awareness	01/01/2002	31/12/2002	HALO Trust	HALO Trust							3.570.000			**3.570.000**
6323	Mine clearance	01/01/2003	31/12/2005	HALO Trust	HALO Trust								1.547.512		**1.547.512**
10093	Evaluation of HMA	01/01/2004	31/12/2004	UNMAS	GICHD									50.000	**50.000**
Total						**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2.918.678**	**2.096.433**	**3.786.203**	**1.547.512**	**50.000**	**10.398.825**

* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)

Table 0-22: Funded programs in Laos

MFA program number	HMA*[1] activities	Start	End	Supervising organization	Executive organization	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total 1996-2004
LA001301*[2]	UXO awareness, training and capacity building for mine and UXO clearance and UXO survey	01/01 /1996	31/12 /1996	UNDP	UNDP	265.129									**265.129**
LA001302	UXO awareness, training and capacity building for mine and UXO clearance and UXO survey	01/01 /1997	31/03 /1998	UNDP	UNDP		88.487								**88.487**
WW135109*[2]	UXO awareness, training and capacity building, mine clearance	01/04 /1998	31/03 /2000	UNDP	UNDP			426.553							**426.553**
WW165509	UXO awareness, training and capacity building, mine clearance	01/04 /2000	31/03 /2001	UNDP	UNDP					555.881					**555.881**
WW185806	UXO clearance	01/04 /2001	31/12 /2001	UNDP	UNDP						540.161				**540.161**
WW192406	UXO clearance	01/01 /2002	31/12 /2002	UNDP	UNDP							514.060			**514.060**
9686	UXO awareness, training and capacity building, mine clearance	01/01 /2004	31/12 /2004	UNDP	UNDP									390.000	**390.000**
Total						**265.129**	**88.487**	**426.553**	**0**	**555.881**	**540.161**	**514.060**	**0**	**390.000**	**2.780.271**

*[1] see §2.4; *[2] information is derived from other sources and could not be fully verified; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)

Table 0-23: Funded programs in Mozambique

MFA program number	HMA activities*1	Start	End	Supervising organization	Executive organization	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total 1996-2004
MZ003314	De-mining, creating de-mining capacity	01/01 /1996	31/12 /1997	NPA	NPA	757.813	730.534								**1.488.347**
MZ003315	De-mining, creating de-mining capacity	01/09 /1996	31/08 /1999	HI FR	HI FR	234.164			194.218						**428.382**
MZ006306	Capacity building, development of a national mine action plan	01/01 /1996	31/12 /1997	UNDP	UNDP	246.428?									**246.428**
MZ014501	De-mining, creating de-mining capacity	01/01 /1998	31/12 /1999	HALO Trust	HALO Trust			249.179	83.794		7.245				**340.218**
WW135105	De-mining, creating de-mining capacity	01/01 /1998	31/12 /1999	NPA	NPA					459.887	82.967				**542.854**
WW152103	Review of de-mining activities	01/02 /1999	30/04 /1999	DGIS	Agenda *2				12.388						**12.388**
WW152706	Manual and mechanical mine clearance	01/01 /1999	31/12 /1999	HALO Trust	HALO Trust				147.235						**147.235**
WW152718	Manual and mechanical mine clearance	01/01 /1999	31/12 /1999	HALO Trust	HALO Trust					19.613					**19.613**
WW165502	Manual, MDD and mechanical mine clearance	01/01 /2000	31/01 /2001	HALO Trust	HALO Trust					373.017	226.983				**600.000**
WW165508	Mine clearance	01/01 /2000	31/12 /2000	NPA	NPA					474.524		35.726			**510.250**
WW165513	Mine survey	01/05 /2000	30/04 /2001	HI FR	HI FR					147.313		35.795			**183.108**
WW185807	De-mining	01/02 /2001	31/01 /2002	HALO Trust	HALO Trust						607.869	137.719			**745.588**
WW185813	De-mining	01/01 /2001	31/12 /2001	NPA	NPA						459.856		25.651		**485.507**
WW192404	De-mining	01/01 /2002	31/12 /2002	HALO Trust	HALO Trust							614.170			**614.170**
WW192405	De-mining	01/01 /2002	31/12 /2002	NPA	NPA							408.000	88.933		**496.933**
5809	De-mining	01/01 /2003	31/12 /2004	NPA	NPA								240.000	26.529	**266.529**
6323	De-mining	01/01 /2003	31/12 /2005	HALO Trust	HALO Trust								673.568		**673.568**
6607	De-mining	01/09 /2003	31/12 /2008	HALO Trust	HALO Trust									454.387	**454.387**
6608	De-mining	01/09 /2003	31/12 /2008	NPA	NPA									270.000	**270.000**
Total						**1.238.405**	**730.534**	**249.179**	**437.635**	**1.474.354**	**1.384.920**	**1.231.410**	**1.028.152**	**750.916**	**8.525.505**

*1 see §2.4; *2 Agenda Utredning & Utvikling AS; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)

Appendix 8: Achievements of the HMA Programs

Table 0-24: Achievements in Afghanistan

General information		Activity		[unit]	Target	Achievement	%
AF006301	DHA/OCHA	Clearance		m^2	28.000.000	33.620.930	120%
01/01/1997	31/12/1997		landmines			33.752	
			UXO			192.639	
Netherlands:	€ 1.361.341			cost/m^2		US$0,60	
Total:	$ 20.166.000	Survey		m^2	20.000.000	130.200.000	651%
		Survey/clearing	battlefield	m^2	20.000.000	49.230.514	246%
		Marking		m^2	2.500.000		
		Awareness		people	600.000	986.000	164%
WW135107	OCHA	Clearance	minefield	m^2	42.000.000	n/a	
01/01/1998	31/12/1999		battle field	m^2	48.500.000	n/a	
		Survey	minefield	m^2	41.000.000	n/a	
Netherlands:	$ 1.087.000		battle field	m^2	51.500.000	n/a	
Total:	$ 25.644.282	Awareness		persons	1.075.000	n/a	
WW152709	OCHA	Clearance	mine	m^2	34.700.000	34.200.000	99%
01/01/1999	31/12/2002		landmines			27.951	
			UXO	m^2	54.500.000	75.700.000	139%
Netherlands:	€ 1.361.341		UXO			265.344	
Total:	$ 24.000.000	Survey	mine	m^2	33.000.000	37.100.000	112%
			landmines			467	
			UXO	m^2	54.000.000	77.900.000	144%
			UXO			1.046	
		Awareness		people	1.000.0000	1.500.000	150%
WW165511	OCHA	Clearance	mine	m^2	27.200.000	24.000.000	88%
01/01/2000	30/06/2001		landmines			13.975	
			UXO	m^2	73.500.000	80.300.000	109%
Netherlands:	€ 3.176.462			UXO		298.370	
Total:	$ 22.782.013	Survey	mine	m^2	22.300.000	32.100.000	144%
			landmines			202	
			UXO	m^2	67.500.000	90.200.000	134%
				UXO		521	
		Awareness		people	1.270.000	1.080.000	85%
WW165531	HALO Trust	Manual clearance		m^2		729.761	
01/10/2000	31/12/2001	Landmines				431	
		UXO				270	
Netherlands:	$ 634.180	Mechanical clearance		m^2		301.397	
		Landmines				149	
		UXO				115	
		Survey		m^2		> 463.435	
		Landmines				8	
		UXO				19	
WW185802/	OCHA	Clearance	mine	m^2	49.000.000	64.900.000	132%
WW185818			UXO	m^2	104.500.000	169.200.000	162%
01/01/2001	31/12/2002	Survey	mine	m^2	61.800.000	33.400.000	54%
			UXO	m^2	100.600.000	167.300.000	166%
Netherlands:	€ 2.268.479	Awareness		people	1.860.000	3.087.231	166%
Total:		Total Mine/UXO*1				272.869	
		APM*2				36.793	
		ATM*2				2.769	
		UXO*2				882.323	
6411	UMNAS	Clearance	mine	m^2		33.900.000	

01/01/2003	31/12/2003		UXO	m^2	69.200.000
			APM		18.979
Netherlands:	€ 600.000		ATM		5.318
			UXO		1.727.461
		Survey	mine	m^2	38.300.000
			UXO	m^2	66.400.000
			APM		522
			ATM		31
			UXO		510
		EOD	APM		829
			ATM		2.913
			UXO		565.510
		Awareness			2.595.690
9768	UNMAS	Clearance	high priority	m^2	21.400.000
01/01/2004			reconstruction needs	m^2	9.200.000
Netherlands:	€ 499.500		former battlefield	m^2	73.900.000
		Marking	high priority	m^2	22.500.000
			reconstruction needs	m^2	11.300.000
			former battlefield	m^2	34.000.000
			grazing	m^2	120.000.000
		Education	school teachers		25.000
			other teachers		5.000

*1 2001
*2 2002

Table 0-25: Achievements in Angola

General information		Activity		[unit]	Target	Achievement	%
AO005904	KZA/NPA	Clearance	manual	m^2		478.384	
01/10/1996	31/12/1998		APM			619	
			ATM			207	
Netherlands:	€ 2.643.392		UXO			1.303	
AO005906	WFP	Clearance	manual	m^2		306.299	
01/08/1996	31/10/1999*[1]		mines			588	
			UXO			21	
Netherlands:	€ 1.043.920		mechanical	m^2		136.000	
Total:	$ 3.000.000		mines			3	
		EOD	UXO			40.000	
		Survey		m		1.000.000	
AO006803	MgM	Clearance	road	m		66.050	
01/10/1997	30/06/1998			m^2		432.989	
			APM			30	
Netherlands:	€ 1.348.365		ATM			20	
			UXO			198	
				$cost/m^2$		$1,55	
				cost/explosive		$19.630	
WW152703	NPA	Clearance	mechanical	m^2	3.750.000	2.918.173	78%
01/01/1999	31/12/1999		APM			254	
			ATM			24	
Netherlands:	€ 319.311		UXO			70.544	
		Verified		m^2		611.224	
WW152717	MgM	Clearance	manual	m^2		4.190	
01/01/1999	31/12/1999		MaD *[2]	m^2		5.027	
			MaM *[2]	m^2		1.627	
Netherlands:	€ 911.447		mechanical	m^2		559.200	
Total:	$ 1.680.000		road	m		61.700	
			mines			38	
			UXO			832	
WW165516	WFP/MgM	Clearance	road	m		42.300	
01/01/2000	31/12/2001		area	m^2		211.400	
			mines			691	
			UXO			449	
WW165518	NPA	Clearance	mechanical	m^2	500.000	335.163	67%
01/01/2000	31/12/2000		EOD	m^2		125.205	
			APM			29	
Netherlands:	€ 420.656		ATM			1	
			UXO			69.817	
		Verification	mechanical	m^2		596	
			EOD	m^2		525.674	
4423	NPA	Clearance	area	m^2		1.899.615	
01/01/2003	31/12/2004		road	m		n/a	
			APM			586	
Netherlands:	€400.000		ATM			219	
			UXO			6.393	
		Verification		m^2		1.087.260	
		Affected	people			301.787	
6466	NPA	Clearance	area	m^2		558.661	
01/01/2001	31/12/2004		road	m		1.049.400	
			APM			149	
Netherlands:	€ 129.426		ATM			9	
			UXO			745	
		Verification		m^2		188.325	
		Affected	people			31.941	

*[1] Achievements for 22/06/1998 – 31/12/1998

*[2] MaD = Mechanically assisted Dog Demining; MaM = Mechanically assisted Manual Demining

Table 0-26: Achievements in Bosnia and Herzegovina

General information		Activity		[unit]	Target	Achievement	%
BA007101	DHA	Clearance		m^2		4.500.000	
01/01/1997	31/12/1997		houses			3.144	
			mines			28.245	
Netherlands:	€ 453.780		UXO			19.572	
		Personnel				1.460	
WW135106	UNDP/UNMAC	Clearance		m^2		6.446.380	
01/01/1998	31/12/1998		houses			701	
			APM			3.815	
Netherlands:	€ 952.938		ATM			229	
			UXO			2.722	
WW152707	UNDP	Clearance*[1]		m^2	14.500.000	6.001.392	41%
01/01/1999	31/12/2002		houses/facilities			300	
			APM			1.532	
Netherlands:	€ 1.118.825		ATM			251	
			UXO			1.575	
		Survey*[1]		m^2		55.594.000	
		Efficiency	NGO	Cost/m^2		$ 1,93	
			commercial	Cost/m^2		$ 1,33	
			governmental	Cost/m^2		$ 1,56	
WW185811	UNDP	Clearance*[2]		m^2	7.250.000	2.000.395	27%
01/06/2001	31/05/2003		houses/facilities			152	
			APM			700	
Netherlands:	€ 1.078.724		ATM			93	
Total:	$ 6.407.985		UXO			869	
		Survey*[2]		m^2	52.160.000	44.861.800	86%
9685	UNDP	Clearance		m^2		2.612.000	
01/01/2004	31/12/2004		mines			3.226	
		Survey		m^2		472.340.000	
Netherlands:	€ 499.500						
Total:	$ 4.722.188						

*[1] Achievements for 2002
*[2] Achievements for 01/01/2002 – 30/06/2002

Table 0-27: Achievements in Cambodia

General information		Activity		[unit]	Target	Achievement	%
KH006801	UNDP/CMAC	Clearance		m^2		56.300.000	
01/07/1996	31/12/1996		mines			4.205	
			UXO			16.810	
Netherlands:	€ 2.317.361						
KH009201	UNDP/CMAC	Clearance		m^2		7.371.849	
01/10/1997	31/03/1998		APM			7.204	
			ATM			121	
Netherlands:	€ 2.217.103		UXO			17.532	
			fragments			13.381.189	
		De-miners	working days			116.014	
WW135108	UNDP/CMAC	Clearance *1		m^2		2.027.245	
01/10/1998	30/06/1999		APM			3.559	
			ATM			4	
Netherlands:	€ 2.270.570		UXO			6.932	
			fragments			6.714.002	
		De-miners	working days			124.352	
WW165532	HALO Trust	Clearance *2		m^2		105.700	
01/12/2000	31/12/2001		APM			153	
			ATM			0	
Netherlands:	€ 376.322		UXO			159	
WW165534	NPA/CMAC	Clearance	*platoon*	m^2	1.140.000	1.720.437	151%
01/03/2001	30/04/2002		APM			719	
			ATM			68	
Netherlands:	€ 1.051.324		UXO			550	
			MMT	m^2		42.626	
		EOD	APM			1.178	
			ATM			63	
			UXO			5.369	
			total		6.200	6.610	107%
		Marking	*MMT*	m	32.000	52.875	165%
WW192401	NPA	Clearance*4	*platoon*	m^2	1.272.000	1.033.361	81%
01/05/2002	30/04/2004		APM			2.932	
			ATM			89	
Netherlands:	€ 681.607		UXO			11.287	
Total:	$ 4.108.271*3		*MMT*	m^2	36.000	10.230	28%
			mechanical	m^2	96.000	72.932	76%
			MDD	m^2	384.000	409.587	107%
		EOD*4	explosives		7.200	10.018	139%
		Awareness*4	presentations		80	193	241%
			participants			19.595	
WW207101	NPA	Clearance	mechanical	m^2		90.884	
01/01/2003	31/12/2004	EOD	UXO			2.847	
		Risk education	participants			2.460	
Netherlands:	€ 372.000						

*1 Achievements for 01/01/1998 – 31/03/1999
*2 Achievements for 01/01/2001 – 31/12/2001
*3 For the period 01/01/2002 – 01/07/2002
*4 Achievements for 01/11/2002 – 31/10/2003

Table 0-28: Achievements in Eritrea

General information		Activity		[unit]	Target	Achievement	%
WW165535	HALO Trust	Clearance		m^2		1.026.892	
01/12/2000	31/12/2001		mines			1.638	
			UXO			109	
Netherlands:	€ 4.671.559		stray ammo			0	
		EOD		m^2		4.554.505	
			mines			32	
			UXO			363	
			stray ammo			6.329	
		Personnel				465	

Table 0-29: Achievements of some HMA programs in Laos

General information		Activity		[unit]	Target	Achievement	%
LA001302	UNDP	Clearance*1		m^2	600.000	1.588.100	265%
01/01/1997	31/03/1998		UXO		10.500	7.515	72%
		Roving*1	villages visited		450	678	151%
Netherlands:	€ 88.487		UXO		27.000	35.583	132%
		Awareness*1	courses		24	n/a	
			students		374	327	87%
WW165509	UNDP	Clearance		m^2	10.050.000	7.430.000	74%
01/04/2000	31/03/2001		bombies		5.500	n/a	
			UXO		14.500	14.016	97%
Netherlands:	€ 555.881	Roving	villages visited		857	2.046	239%
Total:	$ 3.096.057		bombies		45.000	n/a	
			UXO		42.000	66.522	158%
		Awareness	villages		759	813	107%
			people		190.000	256.582	135%
		Training	de-miners		158	127	80%
			medics		17	21	124%
			surveyors and additional provincial support staff		20	20	100%
			other			84	
			courses			18	
		Efficiency	cost per m^2			$ 0,34	
			cost per beneficiary			$ 11,96	
WW185806	UNDP	Clearance*2		m^2	9.500.000	8.730.000	92%
01/04/2001	31/12/2001		UXO		80.000	82.724	103%
		Roving*2	villages		927	2.107	227%
Netherlands:	€ 540.161	Awareness*2	villages		847	766	90%
Total:	$ 6.080.660		people		324.631	181.963	56%
		Training*2	courses			21	
			graduates			241	
WW192406	UNDP	Clearance		m^2	8.090.000	8.425.230	104%
01/01/2002	31/12/2002		UXO		80.000	15.920	20%
		Roving	villages		1.392	1.454	104%
Netherlands:	€ 514.161	Awareness	villages		753	683	91%
Total:	$ 7.940.000		people		100.000	160.053	160%
9686	UNDP	Clearance		m^2	11.316.000	12.550.000	111%
01/01/2004	31/12/2004		UXO			50.203	
		Survey		m^2	1.073	n/a	
Netherlands:	€ 390.000	Roving	villages		1.108	1.570	142%
Total:	$ 4.255.000		UXO			50.203	
		Awareness	villages		542	495	91%
			people			125.341	

*1 Achievements for 1997 only; *2 Achievements for 2001 wholly

Table 0-30: Achievements in Mozambique

General information		Activity		[unit]	Target	Achievement	%
MZ003314	NPA	Clearance		m^2		3.552.733	
01/01/1996	31/12/1997		roads	m		157.000	
			APM			7.883	
Netherlands:	€ 1.488.347		ATM			10	
Total:	$ 12.591.940		UXO			540	
MZ003315	HI FR	Clearance		m^2		156.000	
01/09/1996	31/08/1999		APM			121	
			UXO			435	
Netherlands:	€ 428.382						
Total:	$ 2.123.717						
MZ014501	HALO Trust	Clearance		m^2		133.539	
01/01/1998	31/12/1999		APM			1.066	
			UXO			487	
Netherlands:	€ 340.218	Survey		m^2		1.021.368	
WW135105	NPA	Clearance		m^2	4.400.000	2.964.334	67%
01/01/1998	31/12/1999		roads	m		151.000	
			APM			4.157	
Netherlands:	€ 542.854		ATM			0	
			UXO			1.517	
			SAA			157.326	
WW165508	NPA	Clearance		m^2	2.200.000	2.624.231	119%
01/01/2000	31/12/2000		APM			3.506	
			ATM			1	
Netherlands:	€ 510.250		UXO			458	
Total:	$ 4.149.857		SAA			20.740	
			metal debris			447.336	
		Efficiency	cost/m^2			$1,89	
WW165514	HALO Trust	Clearance		m^2		106.120	
01/01/2000	31/01/2001		APM			198	
			ATM			0	
Netherlands:	€ 600.000		UXO			138	
			SAA			36	
			EOD			101	
WW185813	NPA	Clearance*[1]		m^2	2.800.000	1.321.342	47%
01/01/2001	31/12/2001		APM			1.712	
			ATM			0	
Netherlands:	€ 485.507		UXO			85	
			SAA			1.052	
			fragments			113.127	
WW192405	NPA	Clearance		m^2	2.200.000	1.989.935	90%
01/01/2002	31/12/2002		APM			468	
			ATM			4	
Netherlands:	€ 496.933		UXO			191	
Total:	$ 3.489.418		SAA			21.911	
			fragments			418.971	
		Staff			570	n/a	
5809	NPA	Clearance*[2]		m^2	2.450.000	1.200.641	49%
01/01/2003	31/12/2004		APM			94	
			ATM			0	
Netherlands:	€ 266.529		UXO			187	
			SAA			20.183	
			fragments			113.430	

*[1] Achievements for 10/01/2001 – 26/10/2001
*[2] Achievements for 01/01/2003 – 31/12/2003